



An Examination of a Thirteenth-Century Treatise on
the Mind/ Body Dichotomy: Jean de La Rochelle
on the Soul and its Powers

by

Denise Ryan, M.A.

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Presented to:

The Department of Philosophy
National University of Ireland, Maynooth

29th October, 2010

Head of Department of Philosophy: Dr Michael Dunne

Supervisor: Dr Michael Dunne

Co-Supervisor: Dr Cyril McDonnell

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements		iv
Preface		v
Note on Translation		vii
Introduction		1
CHAPTER I:	Background to the <i>Summa</i> of Jean de La Rochelle	12
Section One:	Jean's Early Education, Career and Writings	12
Section Two:	Encounter between Theological Anthropology and Philosophical Anthropology	18
Section Three:	The Translation of the Works of Aristotle and Avicenna in Thirteenth-Century Europe	19
Section Four:	Sources	22
Section Five:	Introduction to the Critical Edition of the <i>Summa</i>	26
Section Six:	Outline of the First <i>Consideratio</i> of the <i>Summa</i>	27
	1.6.1 Prologue	28
	1.6.2 Whether the Soul exists	28
	1.6.3 What is the Soul?	29
	1.6.4 Origin of the Soul	31
	1.6.5 Soul with Regard to Being	33
	1.6.6 Soul with Regard to the Image	35
	1.6.7 On the Soul in Relation to the Body	38
	1.6.8 On the Immortality of the Soul	42
	1.6.9 On the Passibility of the Soul	44
	1.6.10 On the Place of the Soul	45
	1.6.11 Movement of the Separated Soul	46
Section Seven:	Outline of the Second <i>Consideratio</i> of the <i>Summa</i>	48
	1.7.1 Powers of the Soul according to the Pseudo-Augustine	48
	1.7.2 Powers of the Soul according to John Damascene	50
	1.7.3 Powers of the Soul according to Avicenna	52
Section Eight:	Influences of the <i>Summa</i>	53
	1.8.1 Conclusion	56
CHAPTER II:	Exposition and Analysis of Arguments Relating to Specific Doctrines	58
Section One:	Arguments for the Existence of the Soul	58
Section Two:	Causality with Regard to the Soul	64
	2.2.1 The Material Cause of the Soul	65
	2.2.1.1 That the Soul is not made from a Divine Substance	65
	2.2.1.2 That the Soul is not made from Matter	66
	2.2.1.3 That the Soul is not made from a Soul	69
	2.2.2 The Formal Cause of the Soul	71
	2.2.3 The Efficient Cause of the Soul	78
	2.2.4 The Final Cause of the Soul	79
Section Three:	The Being of the Soul	81
	2.3.1 Soul as a Substance	81
	2.3.2 Simplicity of the Soul	85
	2.3.3 Incorporeality of the Soul	87
	2.3.4 Soul as One in Three Powers	90
Section Four:	The Soul in Relation to the Body	96
Section Five:	The Immortality of the Soul	103
Section Six:	Conclusion	112

CHAPTER III:	The Significance of Jean’s Account of the Pseudo-Augustine’s <i>De Spiritu et anima</i>	114
Section One:	Whether the Soul is its Powers	115
Section Two:	Distinction of the Powers of the Soul by their Actions and their Objects	120
Section Three:	The Division of the Powers according to the Pseudo-Augustine	125
CHAPTER IV:	Human Psychology According to John Damascene	135
Section One:	The External Senses	139
Section Two:	The Cognitive Powers	142
Section Three:	Human Free Will	155
Section Four:	John Blund. <i>Tractatus de Anima</i> . Chapter XXVI.i: Concerning Free Will	167
CHAPTER V	Avicenna’s Influence on the Thought of Jean de la Rochelle	175
Section One:	Jean’s Interest in Avicenna’s Psychology	176
Section Two:	The Vegetative Soul	179
Section Three:	The Sensitive Soul	186
	5.3.1 The External Senses	187
Section Four:	Internal Senses	195
	5.4.1 The Common Sense	196
	5.4.2 The Imaginative Power	198
	5.4.3 Imagination	199
	5.4.4 The Estimative Power	200
	5.4.5 Memory	207
Section Five:	The Driving Forces of the Senses	211
Section Six:	The Intellective Soul	219
	5.6.1 Doctrine of the Four Intellects	224
	5.6.2 The Active Intellect	227
Conclusion		233
Bibliography		239
Appendix (I)	Latin Text with English Translation of Selected Passages from the <i>Summa de anima</i> of Jean de La Rochelle	248
Appendix (II)	Outline of Chapters of the <i>Summa de Anima</i>	283

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to begin by thanking the National University of Ireland, Maynooth, for granting me a four year John & Pat Hume Scholarship which enabled me to pursue my doctoral studies in Philosophy. I would also like to take this opportunity both to remember and to thank Professor Thomas Kelly for all his encouragement in the early years of my studies at Maynooth. I am privileged also to have known Professor John Cleary and Professor James McEvoy and thank each of them for their generosity of spirit and enthusiasm for philosophy.

My thanks also go to the following who have helped me in my studies: to Anne Gleeson, Administrative Officer, in the Department of Philosophy, for her help and advice over the years; to all in the Postgraduate group for their encouragement, both past and present members; to Dr Gordon Campbell (Ancient Classics, NUIM) for his advice on Latin translation. Special thanks goes to Haydn Gurmin for his continuous support and friendship. I would like to thank, in particular, Dr Cyril McDonnell, my co-supervisor, not only for his practical advice on particular aspects of thesis writing but also for his advice on planning, researching and bringing a thesis to completion. Finally, I am indebted to my supervisor, Dr Michael Dunne, whose lectures in my undergraduate studies led to my interest in Medieval Philosophy. I am indebted to him for his confidence in me and for his guidance throughout the process of writing and researching my topic. On a personal note, I would like to say ‘thank you’ to my family for their love and support; to Andrew, my husband, and to my children, Tracy, Ciara, David and Alan Ryan for everything they have done for me and for helping me to keep a sense of proportion throughout.

P R E F A C E

Because Jean de la Rochelle has remained in the background to some of the more well-known authors of the later thirteenth century, such as, for instance, Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure, the aim of this study is to highlight the contribution made by him and his contemporaries to philosophical thought in the light of the new Greek and Arabic translations. This was a very specific moment in the history of medieval philosophy when Avicenna, rather than Aristotle, was the preferred philosopher of many writers of the early thirteenth century. That he is the philosopher for Jean will become clear throughout our study. His aim would seem to have been to transmit all the views on the soul that were known at this time. His range of sources certainly testifies to the breadth of his knowledge as he appeals to a wide range of authorities: Augustine, (also the Pseudo-Augustine's work *De Spiritu et Anima*), Philip the Chancellor and John Damascene, on the theological side; and, on the philosophical side, he appeals to Avicenna and Aristotle (the latter to a limited degree). It is only by looking back to this very specific moment in time that we can begin to realise the impact that follows in its wake. Jean's *Summa* is testament to the moment when the new Arabic sources facilitated access to the classical texts and to its own medical tradition which far outweighed that of Western Europe.

The accusation could be made against Jean that he misunderstood a theory or that he deliberately digressed from the original text of a specific author, but equally it could be stated that it is often the misunderstandings and digressions that can be of great benefit to a philosophical discussion. This could certainly be the case with regard to the doctrine of 'Avicennised Augustinianism', which would not be what

Avicenna intended by the doctrine, yet it does reveal, as Hasse states, the sagacity of the scholastic writers.¹ Hasse also highlights the difficult task of the theologians who confronted and mastered the task of assimilating the philosophical works into their *Summae* and commentaries on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. It is remarkable that a theologian, such as Jean, managed to integrate, considering the constraints of his office, the new sources and, in doing so, to create a certain freedom for his successors. Confronted with the medical tradition, Jean was one of the first to appreciate the value of the new learning and the need to formulate an account of the complex philosophical-theological enigma of the soul.

The expansion of thought which occurred in this period owes much to the activity of translating. Jean, in turn, must also be recognised for his work of assimilation and transmission of new ideas to his successors, for his personal engagement with and interpretation of three of the most significant writers on the soul at this time (Augustine, John Damascene, and Avicenna). He certainly deserves his place in the formation of the philosophical anthropology of the thirteenth century; and it is hoped that this study will also contribute towards gaining a better understanding of the philosophical background to the mind of the greatest thinker of this period, Thomas Aquinas.

¹ Dag Nikolaus Hasse, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West* (London – Turin: The Warburg Institute – Nino Aragno Editore, 2000).

NOTE ON TRANSLATION

My translation of Jean de La Rochelle's *Summa De Anima* is a work in progress. To be found in Appendix (I) to this study is a draft translation of some central passages from this author's text. Appendix (II) provides an outline of the chapter headings of the table of the contents of the *Summa de Anima*. It is hoped to produce a publishable, complete translation of this treatise in English, making it available to a wider audience. The work of translating has been helped by a French translation of the text.¹ At times, I have relied upon the French text where the meaning in the Latin was either obscure or difficult to follow. English translations of the works of John Damascene and of the Pseudo-Augustine's *De Spiritu et anima* are also available. They provided a sense of the author's original thought, if not the correct translation of a word. My aim is to translate, in a literal sense, as far as this is possible, to enable the reader to follow the English translation and the original Latin passages as they are presented by Jean de La Rochelle.

¹ *Somme de L'âme*, Introduction, traduction et notes par Jean-Marie Vernier (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2001).

INTRODUCTION

With the arrival of the Greek and Arabic writings into the Latin West in the thirteenth century, in particular works by Avicenna and Aristotle on the soul, a new challenge presented itself to the existing understanding of the ‘soul’ of the writers and scholars of that century. This study focuses on the work of Jean de la Rochelle, one of the most influential writers in thirteenth-century psychology, and author of two works on the soul, the *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*¹ (written about 1233–5) and the *Summa de anima* (written about 1235–6) the second of which is the subject of our study.² Psychology of the soul at this time ‘relates to the outline of a doctrine on man, of medical, biological origins complementary to the traditional theological anthropology of Augustinian school’.³ However, it is not about the soul alone; it also studies life in its various manifestations, appetite, the powers of the soul and the relationship between man’s body and soul.

The *Summa de anima* of Jean de La Rochelle represents a very specific moment in the history of medieval philosophy. The very breadth of his sources is testimony to that century’s engagement not only with the works of Aristotle and Avicenna but also with the patristic authorities of Augustine and John Damascene. It was not only moral psychological works which were coming on stream at this time but medieval students were also introduced to the works of ‘natural philosophy’. As

¹ Jean de La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, Texte Critique Avec Introduction, Notes, et Tables. Publié par Michaud-Quantin (Paris: Vrin, 1964).

² Jean de La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, Texte Critique Avec Introduction, Notes et Tables, ed. by Jacques Guy Bougerol (Paris: Vrin, 1995).

³ Romana Martorelli Vico, ‘*Virtutes et Potentiae*: The Medical-Biological Tradition in the Formation of the Philosophical Anthropology of the Thirteenth Century’, *Analecta Husserliana*, 74 (2002), 307–318 (p. 317).

one commentator succinctly puts it, summing up this newly emerging ‘scientific outlook’ of the century on man:

On this subject, in particular, a series of texts extending from Aristotle’s psychological and biological thought (*De anima* and *De animalibus*) to the medical texts of Hippocrates, Galen, and Avicenna, translated from Greek and Arabic between the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries, represent the re-emerging ‘scientific’ outlook of that century, which enriched with new topics the great issues connected with man, supplementing the religious and theological tradition based on Saint Augustine’s theology and on Peter Lombard’s *Sententiae*.⁴

This encounter provoked huge interest in the study of human nature, and so, as Romana Martorelli Vico also notes, ‘a new anthropological reflection took shape’.⁵

Understandably, therefore, as a theologian interested in the study of human nature, Jean would have wanted to engage in the debate regarding the powers of the soul in light of the vegetative, sensitive and rational faculties from the peripatetic point of view. It offered a new way of understanding both the physical and the spiritual natures of man, and a new way of classifying the powers of the soul and those of the body. In his treatise, Jean engages with the new physiological accounts of man and discusses the vegetative and sensitive powers, examining in detail the powers of the soul according to the Pseudo-Augustine, John Damascene and Avicenna in the second *Consideratio* of the treatise.

Jean does not say ‘anything specific about the purpose of his book’.⁶ It can be assumed, therefore, that he wanted to give an exposition of all the accounts of the soul which were known at this time. The text was, without doubt, very valuable to

⁴ Vico, p. 308.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Hasse, p. 49.

his contemporaries since Jean can be credited with providing very precise accounts of the new knowledge. He saw the new wave of Greek and Arabic thinking as challenging his Christian beliefs, but he realised the importance of assimilating and making use of what was to become an indispensable contribution to medieval philosophy.

Early medieval psychology, ultimately, goes back to Plato and Aristotle, but how did the soul become the central focus in the medieval understanding of man? How did the Greek understanding of man influence the traditional biblical understanding of man? The concept of man in the Bible is one of unity as the living body is considered to be a manifestation of the soul. We only need to remember the second Person of the Trinity, the ‘Word made flesh’, to appreciate that the scriptural understanding of man includes both the physical and the spiritual as a unity. In contrast to this Judeo-Christian viewpoint, the Greek concept of man, as portrayed in Plato’s *Phaedo*, is one in which soul and body are regarded as having two distinct natures. As Bernard McGinn states, ‘The unity of man in Platonic thought (to choose the most influential classical system) is the unity of the soul as the intelligible principle of order behind the appearances of the body’.⁷ Yet, despite this difference, both traditions emphasise that man must take responsibility for himself, and so, as McGinn also notes, the Greek sense of responsibility ‘is conditioned by an intellectualism that equates the right with the rational, while the Biblical sense of responsibility is seen in terms of unquestioning obedience to the will of God.’⁸ What stands out, however, and what perhaps brings us nearer to understanding why the study of the nature of the soul becomes the central preoccupation in the thirteenth

⁷ Bernard McGinn, *Three Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology* (Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 1977), p. 3.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

century, is that the emphasis now lay on the inner man, the higher part of man, the part that would endure. The emphasis was not on the resurrection of the body, but on the immortality of the individual soul. Thus the question of immortality, that is to say, the question whether the human soul continues to exist after the death of the body, or not, generates their philosophical anthropology. Another significant effect of the interaction between the Christian thinkers and Platonic philosophy is, of course, the use and deployment of the concept of image (*eikon*) which was central to Augustine's explanation of man's relation to God.

Augustine, then, in many respects, is 'the most important influence on how medieval philosophy developed in the Latin West'.⁹ Jean de La Rochelle, it would be fair to say, appeals to his Augustinian heritage first and foremost. Indeed, it is arguably the case that Jean, amongst others at this time, could be said to have helped bring about a revival of Augustine's teachings on the soul in light of the reception of the *De anima* of Aristotle and that of Avicenna. Augustine's theory of the soul is largely Platonic in origin; man is viewed by him as a 'soul using a body', as is his definition of the human soul, quoted by Jean in his *Summa*, as 'a rational substance designed to rule the body'. In his later writings, nonetheless, Augustine tries to explain the union of soul and body in man such that a human being is a rational substance composed of body and soul, thus, as he argues in his *De Trinitate*, 'If we should define a human being such that a human being is a rational substance

⁹ John Marenbon, *Medieval Philosophy: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction* (London & New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 29.

consisting of soul and body, there is no doubt that a human being has a soul which is not the body and has a body which is not the soul.’¹⁰

Jean also follows Augustine’s views on the question of the origin of the soul; the immortality of the soul; its incorporeality; its presence in the body and movement according to place; the soul as the image of God. All of these doctrines held great weight down through the centuries, and just as much as the new philosophical wave of thinking was enthusiastically welcomed, so, too, theology enjoyed something of a renewal in the twelfth century. Augustine’s theory that the soul is subject to change and that God alone is immutable is clearly present in Jean’s treatment of man’s ability to err, which Jean explains, further, by making a distinction between the ‘essential’ and the ‘accidental’ nature of the soul; on the one hand, Jean argues, it is essential to the soul to be rational, but, on the other hand, it is accidental to the soul to be just. Augustine’s influence on Jean can be seen also with regard to his reflections on the nature of the body as something that is extended in space, in comparison to the soul whose nature is unextended.

It was Augustine’s search for meaning and his famous method of ‘interiority’ that led to his conviction that the intelligible world was of far more importance than either the physical or sensible world. This conviction stemmed from his encounter with the writings of Plotinus (c. 205–70), Porphyry (c. 232–303), Marius Victorinus (*fl.* 360’s) and also, most notably, St Paul. Much discussion has been given to Augustine’s conversion in 386 AD to Christianity and to the question whether his conversion to Platonism was generated by his conversion to Christianity, or vice

¹⁰ Roland Teske, ‘Augustine’s Theory of Soul’, in *Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, ed. by Eleonore Stump & Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) pp. 116–123 (p. 116). (*De Trin.* 15.7.11).

versa, but it would appear to be the case that he was converted to both Christianity and Platonism around the same time. From this time onwards, however, the two most important themes in philosophy for Augustine were the immaterial realities of God and the human soul.¹¹ The Neoplatonism of Plotinus offered Augustine a belief in a non-material world. This leads him to his philosophical proof for the incorporeality of the soul. Augustine, nevertheless, eventually separated himself from both Plato and Plotinus in that he tried to solve the body/soul dichotomy. He never solved the problem, however, of how an immaterial substance unites with the substance of the body to produce a third substance, the unity of body and soul. Augustine did not hold a 'faculty psychology; there are no distinct operative powers in the Augustinian soul'.¹² For Augustine, rather, the whole soul is memory, the whole soul is understanding, the whole soul is will. Thus, although the union of the body and soul is not without difficulty, he takes up an interesting position with regard to the union. Referring to 'the doctrine of the two natures united in the person of the Word made flesh', Augustine argues that there can be no *a priori* objections to a doctrine which posits the unity of body and soul on philosophical grounds. This was a Neoplatonic argument known as a 'union without confusion' explanation, but eventually Augustine declared it to be incomprehensible.

Jean's first *Consideratio* of the *Summa*, therefore, is testament to the esteem and following which Augustine gained, in particular with regard to his Trinitarian psychology. There were, nevertheless, other routes through which theories of the soul reached the medieval scholars. Some, mentioned by name in Jean's *Summa*,

¹¹ Teske, p. 118.

¹² 'This [Augustine's] is a trinitarian psychology in which the diversity of functions of remembering, knowing and willing does not entail any real difference within the nature of the soul.' Vernon J. Bourke, Ed., *The Essential Augustine*, 2nd edn (Indiana: Hackett, 1974), p. 68.

could be referred to as belonging to what is called the ‘Eclectic Tradition’,¹³ while others can be sourced in the ‘Greek Patristic Tradition’. The former refers to texts from the early fourth to the late sixth century, which contain both pagan and Christian material and as pointed out ‘it is an over simplification to treat the philosophical basis of twelfth-century anthropology as if it were purely Neoplatonic’.¹⁴ A list of the most important authors of this period would include Porphyry (c. 232–305); Calcidius, who wrote a long commentary on Plato’s *Timaeus*, and dates from the fourth century; Boethius (c. 480–524), regarded as second only to Augustine in his influence on twelfth century authors and also, as we will see, on Jean in his employment of Boethius’ formula to support his position against those who held that the soul was composed of matter, albeit a spiritual matter. Another important source which was to prove influential to twelfth century authors was Cassiodorus (c. 477–570) whose *Book on the Soul* is also mentioned by name in Jean’s *Summa* in his discussion on the immortality of the soul.

With regard to the second major tradition mentioned above, that of the Patristic tradition, one author stands out as paving the way for what was to come in the writings of the Arabic medical texts of Avicenna. The treatise by Nemesius, Bishop of Emesa (c. 400), entitled *The Nature of Man* ‘whose fourth book is an extensive summary of ancient medical knowledge’¹⁵ heralded the beginnings of the combined theological, philosophical and physiological understanding of man. Jean appeals to Augustine as his main theological source; to Avicenna as his philosophical source while John Damascene’s work entitled *The Orthodox Faith* was employed by him for his understanding of Greek theology. These works will be considered at

¹³ McGinn, p. 10.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 16.

greater length in the second part of our study, in particular, in the discussion of the classifications of the powers of the soul. While Augustine and Avicenna both convey anthropological positions that are inspired by Neoplatonism certain tensions will emerge as Jean endeavours to bring about a synthesis of both authors. While Jean remains faithful to his Augustinian heritage he also adopts many aspects of Avicenna's anthropology, often reconciling both traditions by taking the middle ground between the traditions.

The study contains five chapters. Chapter one introduces the person of Jean de La Rochelle (1190/ 1200–1245) who was teaching and writing at a time when the Latin West became acquainted with the philosophy of the soul of Aristotle and Avicenna. These works were to change and challenge the theologian's whole approach to the established psychology of the soul. Jean is writing within the *topos* of the 'philosophical anthropology' of the thirteenth century which sees both the physical and spiritual nature of man as part of that century's *philosophia naturalis* 'which was still of the competence of the theology masters'.¹⁶ Jean de La Rochelle can be placed at the very beginnings of this new wave of interest in Greek–Arabic sources before 'there took place an ideal handing over of medical, naturalistic themes from the theologians to the new scientific intellectual of the mediaeval universities, the "Scholastic Physician".'¹⁷ Born at the end of the twelfth century, he was regent master at the University of Paris from the year 1238 at the latest. He was the only Franciscan among the university masters other than his master and colleague Alexander of Hales (1185–1245). This chapter also gives an account of how the

¹⁶ Vico, p. 309.

¹⁷ Ibid.

editor J.G. Bougerol was introduced to the works of Jean de La Rochelle and how he set about the work of transcribing and editing the *Summa*.

In chapter 1, I will also give an overview of the contents of the *Summa* concentrating on the sources that were well known to Jean at this time. The *Summa* (written about 1235–36) is divided into two main parts, called a ‘*Consideratio*’, each of these in turn is divided into a number of chapters; 58 for the first; 60 for the second. Jean proceeds along the lines of the university ‘disputed question’, although it is not strictly arranged in that style. It is a work of its time with a *Prologue* based on the writings of scripture and again the transition between the two parts calling on Divine intervention. The first part of the work, on the substance of the soul, ‘is a fully-fledged theological treatise on the soul’,¹⁸ but, as our study will show, Jean incorporates much philosophical speculation to his psychology of the soul. The second part, on the powers of the soul, is above all a treatise on the most abstract of all philosophical topics, the human soul, what makes us humans what we are.

Chapter 2 examines philosophical doctrines relating to the soul; the existence of the soul, the essence of the soul, the unity of the soul, the origin of the soul, the soul’s relation to the body, the immortality of the soul. Taking, for example, the question of the existence of the soul, it will be shown that Jean was one of the few writers on the soul who employed Avicenna’s thought experiment of the ‘Flying Man’ to prove the existence of the soul and, as Hasse notes, Jean is one of only two authors who come closest to Avicenna’s original intention in the theory. The ‘Flying Man’, according to Hasse, ‘is an example of a theory of considerable philosophical

¹⁸ Hasse, p. 49.

interest whose reception depends very much upon the understanding of nuances in the meaning of key terms'.¹⁹ Of philosophical interest also is Jean's formulation of the distinction between 'being' and 'essence', where he employs the concepts of '*quod est*' and '*quo est*' (a formula which he borrows from Boethius 480–524) to explain how the 'being' of the soul is distinct from the 'essence' of the soul.

Chapter 3 highlights the significance of the Psuedo-Augustine writings on the powers of the soul in Jean's psychology of the soul. Although there is a question mark over the authorship of this work, it was one of the most influential works of the early thirteenth century. It originated in the twelfth century Cistercian milieu and it played an even more important role than the work of Isaac of Stella.²⁰

Chapter 4 presents a philosophical commentary on the powers of the soul according to John Damascene who was the author of the 'first great *Summa* of theology to appear in either the East or the West', entitled *The Fount of Knowledge* and was written in Greek in 743.²¹ A complex account of human behaviour emerges from this study as 'Damascene believes that to understand human actions we have to see that they involve an exercise of the will'.²² This chapter will focus on the doctrine of the will in Damascene in light of Jean's exposition of the powers of the soul in Damascene and, in particular, the appetitive powers.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 79.

²⁰ Janet Coleman, *Ancient and Medieval Memories: Studies in the Reconstruction of the Past* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 220.

²¹ Saint John of Damascus, *Writings*, trans. by Frederic H. Chase (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1958), p. v.

²² Michael Frede, 'John of Damascus on Human Action, the Will, and Human Freedom', in *Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources* ed. by Katerina Ierodiakonou (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), pp. 63-95 (p. 63).

Chapter 5 will discuss the powers of the soul according to Avicenna and, in particular, the latter's doctrine of the external and internal senses. Our study will examine one major philosophical issue that confronted Jean de La Rochelle and his contemporaries at the time, namely, that of the passive and active intellect in both Aristotle and Avicenna. In spite of the fact that Jean de La Rochelle retains Aristotle's teaching on the active and passive intellect, he also accepts Avicenna's separate agent intellect. The powers of the soul according to Avicenna contain much philosophical material and it seems that Jean had first-hand knowledge of the latter's *De Anima*. Jean, for instance, quotes passages from Avicenna never referred to before in the West. He repeats, almost verbatim, the long discussion of the estimative power, one of the five internal senses, which was not only one of the most interesting of Avicenna's doctrines but also one of the most controversial.

This study will highlight the thought of one author who belongs to the first group of theologians who were influenced by the Arab philosopher, Avicenna. Jean's *Summa* gives a clear picture of the moment immediately prior to the huge growth of interest in the psychological works of Aristotle and the commentaries on them, in particular, that of Averroes. Jean was not seeking to explain the unity of body and soul as a result of the new thinking. This, as we have seen, was already present in Augustine as he attempted to determine the relation between body and soul. Jean, however, is writing at a time which witnessed the very beginnings of a philosophy which undertook an extensive examination of the powers of the soul. We turn now to an examination of the background to the *Summa* of Jean de La Rochelle.

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND TO THE *SUMMA* OF JEAN DE LA ROCHELLE

This first chapter of our study begins with a sketch of the background to Jean de La Rochelle's writing on the soul, in light of the new Greek-Arab sources and the impact they had on Jean's *Summa de anima* in the first *Consideratio*. Jean's sources will then be examined, after which a general overview of the contents of the *Summa de anima* will be presented. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the influence of Jean's *Summa de anima* on some of the better-known writers of the thirteenth century.

SECTION ONE

JEAN'S EARLY EDUCATION, CAREER AND WRITINGS

Jean de La Rochelle [*Joannes De Rupella*] of the Franciscan Order, author of the *Summa de Anima* was born at the end of the twelfth century in La Rochelle and belonged to the Franciscan province of the Aquitaine.¹ Though little is known about the early life of Jean, it may be surmised that he probably entered the Franciscan Order at an early age because his writings are considerable and given that he died in 1245, perhaps before he had reached the age of fifty. Jean was a student of William of Auxerre (c. 1140–1231) who no doubt influenced him in his writing. William, it is stated, was 'a master of theology at Paris who developed the first great synthesis of

¹ Bougerol, 'Introduction', in Jean de La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, p. 9.

Christian theology and the philosophy of Aristotle'.² Jean was also a student of Alexander of Hales (1185–1245) and we learn that, as a secular master of theology Alexander had held a 'public chair' in theology at the University of Paris but when he joined the Franciscan Order in 1236 he brought this chair with him though 'not without opposition on the part of the secular masters'.³ Alexander and Jean taught from that chair and while legally one master could not hold more than one chair nothing prevented two masters from sharing the same chair. Bougerol states that the university assigned bachelors of theology to both masters and that Jean's name is included in a document borrowed by the record keeper of the University of Paris (*Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*) which lists the names of the masters of theology who took part in a public disputation alongside the Bishop of Paris (William of Auvergne 1180/90–1249). This document confirms that Jean was a 'regent master' at Paris since he was able to 'determine', that is to say, to publicly give his conclusions at the time of disputed questions.⁴ It is also recorded in a chronicle that Jean collaborated with Alexander of Hales in a petition to depose the general of the Order, Brother Elias.⁵ In addition, Alexander, together with 'Jean de la Rochelle, Eudes Rigaud, and Robert de la Bassée, under the leadership of Godefroid de Brie'⁶ wrote an *Exposition of the Rule of the Friars Minor* in the years 1241–1242. While the date of Jean's birth cannot be determined it is recorded that

² Jack Zupko, 'William of Auxerre', in *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, ed. by Jorge J. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), p. 688.

³ Edward A. Synan, Review of Jean de La Rochelle's *Summa de anima* in *Speculum*; 1997 Vol. 72, No. 4, 1188–9.

⁴ Bougerol, *Summa*, Introduction, p. 11. 'Un autre document emprunté par le *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* à Thomas de Cantimpré, nous apprend que l'évêque de Paris (Guillaume d'Auvergne) "détermina" dans une disputation publique et avec lui, Hugues de l'ordre des Prêcheurs et plus tard Cardinal de L'Eglise romaine, frère Guerric et frère Gaudefrid, du même Ordre, frère Jean de La Rochelle, de L'Ordre des frères mineurs et beaucoup d'autres maîtres en théologie déterminèrent dans leur propres écoles sur la pluralité des bénéfices.'

⁵ Bougerol, *Summa*, *ibid*, p. 11, n. 6. *Chronica fratris Jordani*, ed. by H. Boehmer (Paris, 1908), n. 61: 'Habitio ergo consilio fratres decreuerunt communiter ordini prouidere. Quibus in consilio precipui frater Alexander de Ales et frater Johannes de Rupella, magistri Parisienses, tunc temporis, affuerunt.'

⁶ J. Guy Bougerol, *Introduction to the works of Bonaventure* (New Jersey: St Anthony Guild Press, 1963), p. 14.

his death occurred just a few months before his friend and master, Alexander. It states that he died on the 3rd February 1245 and Alexander died on August 21st of the same year. This is known from a letter sent by Robert Grosseteste to the minister of the English Brothers, William of Nottingham. Grosseteste was expressing his fear that the loss of both masters would ‘put the Franciscan claim to their chair in jeopardy’.⁷ The letter requested that Adam Marsh would remain in Paris and it specified the names and dates of the deaths of Jean de La Rochelle and that of Alexander of Hales.

In the history of medieval philosophy the thirteenth century ‘marks the privileged moment when the Greek–Arabic philosophical tradition became thoroughly known and used in the Latin West’.⁸ Jean can be placed at the very beginnings of the new ‘anthropological’ outlook and was one of the first theologians to describe the physical and spiritual nature of man ‘within the theological perspective of the *natura lapsa*’,⁹ that is, within the view of man as forever struggling against the corruption brought about by original sin. Jean devotes two works to the soul and its powers, the *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae* written between 1233–1235¹⁰ and his *Summa de anima* follows in the years 1235–1236, the latter work being the topic of my thesis. In the first *Consideratio* of the *Summa de anima* Jean presents his own views on the subject of the soul. This is described as a more personal work than the *Tractatus de divisione potentiarum animae*, and represents the fruits of his labours and the results of his engagement

⁷ Bougerol, p. 11.

⁸ Vico, p. 308.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Francis Shaw, ‘Medieval Medico-Philosophical Treatises in the Irish Language’ in John Ryan, ed. *Féil-scríbhinn Eóin Mhic Néill Essays and Studies presented to Professor Eóin Mhic Néill* (Dublin: Four Courts, 1995), pp. 144–157.

with the new medical and philosophical sources that were coming on stream at this particular time. While it may be necessary to refer to the *Tractatus* regarding Jean's sources on the powers of the soul our study will be confined to translating and commenting on his later work, the *Summa de anima*.

Both the *Summa de anima* and the *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae* (henceforth referred to respectively, in abbreviation, as the *Summa* and the *Tractatus*) belong to moral psychology of the thirteenth century but Jean was first and foremost a theologian. He was, nonetheless, inspired by a 'very highly developed philosophical spirit' and, we are told that he, in one of his sermons, was critical of 'the hostility of those who were at that time making every effort to stifle theological studies', he equated philosophical studies with 'cultivated minds'.¹¹ The titles of his works, both his theological and philosophical works, are listed in the introduction to Bougerol's critical edition,¹² and in the French translation of the *Summa*.¹³ Jean, therefore, was an influential theologian, as well as an influential philosopher and was one of the first authors in the West to face the challenge of reconciling the new Greek-Arab sources with his own Christian beliefs. Jean's moral psychology, when viewed in the context of the history of medieval moral psychology, mark him out as one of the first authors who undertook the task of presenting a systematic account of all the doctrines circulating on the theme of the

¹¹ Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York & London: Sheed & Ward, 1955), p. 329. Somewhat dated but very reliable source for medieval scholars.

¹² Bougerol, *Summa*, pp. 12–13.

¹³ Vernier, *Somme de Lâme*, Introduction, p. 9. 'Son oeuvre est abondante. Elle comporte plusieurs summae: la *Summa de vitiis*, la *Summa de anima* (vers 1235–1236), la *Summa de articulis fidei*, la *Summa de praeceptis* et la *Summa de sacramentis*; le *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae* (sans doute après 1233); un *Introitus generalis in sacram doctrinam*; des Postilles sur le livre de Daniel, Isaïe, Jérémie, Ezéchiel, et les douze petits prophètes; des Commentaires sur les Evangiles de saint Matthieu, saint Marc et saint Luc, et une *Summa sur les Epîtres de saint Paul*; enfin de nombreux Sermons. J.G. Bougerol ajoute: "La Glose sur les Sentences contenue dans le manuscrit Vat. lat. 691 pourrait, à mon avis, constituer le Commentaire de Jean de La Rochelle".'

soul. Commenting on the philosophical anthropology of the thirteenth century, Romana Martorelli Vico, for instance, makes the point, highlighting Jean's *Tractatus* in particular, that:

This new anthropological horizon is initially documented right in the works of some theologians of that century, among them the Franciscan John of Rochelle, master in theology at Paris in the first half of the 1200s. He is the author of the *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, written between 1233 and 1239, where the different doctrinal traditions on the theme of the soul and of its faculties or forces are described for the first time in a systematic way, testifying to the growing interest in the new Greek-Arab sources. This work can be rightly considered the initial stage of the new cultural foundation that started to link the study of the soul to natural philosophy, distinguishing it formally from moral philosophy.¹⁴

The theme of the powers of the soul is taken up again in the second part of the *Summa* where Jean discusses the faculties of the soul according to Pseudo-Augustine, John Damascene, and Avicenna. As the *Summa* postdates the *Tractatus*¹⁵ it would seem that Jean had reshaped his theory in the light of his earlier formulation of the powers of the soul and wanted to expand the Peripatetic psychology into a theological treatise on the soul. Hasse remarks that the two medical sources are omitted from the *Summa*: that of the *Isagoge* of Johannitius and the *Canon* of Avicenna.¹⁶ It is interesting to note that, apart from the medical writings of Galen and Hippocrates, the medical tradition really came into its own in the middle of the twelfth century. The main reason for this was due to the work of translation, which provided the medieval authors not only with the philosophical writings from the

¹⁴ Vico, p. 311.

¹⁵ Hasse, p. 47, n. 201. 'That the *Summa* postdates the *Tractatus* was first demonstrated by Lottin, "A propos de Jean de La Rochelle", pp. 185–92. The date of the *Summa* is Bougerol's approximation; the *terminus ante quem* is the date of book two of the *Summa fratris Alexandri* (which borrows from the *Summa*) written before 1245.' A further Bibliographical reference in Hasse, p. 330: 'A propos de Jean de la Rochelle', in O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, VI, Gembloux, 1960, pp. 181–223 (first published in two articles as: 'Les Traités sur l'âme et sur les vertus de Jean de la Rochelle', *Revue néo-scholastique de philosophie*, 31, 1930, pp. 5–32; and: 'Alexandre de Halès et la "Summa de vitiis" de Jean de la Rochelle', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 1, 1929, pp. 240–43).

¹⁶ Hasse, p. 49.

Arab world but also with the medical works of the classical Greek originals together with the Arabic Aristotelianism of Avicenna's mammoth work the *Canon*. While Jean refers briefly to the latter, he integrates much of the new medical tradition into the *Summa* without attributing it to its source. He introduces the theories of the four elements, the humours and the three spirits (*naturalis, spiritualis, animalis*) into the first *Consideratio* on the soul, the latter explaining the main vital functions of a living organism. In the *Summa* he, also, 'enlarges the already comprehensive Avicennian section of the *Tractatus* quite considerably by adding new quotations, often silently, in particular on the vegetative faculties and on the senses'.¹⁷ Hasse states, however, that this does not seem to have received much attention. He provides a useful list of the quotations that had been overlooked, unfortunately, in Bougerol's critical edition.¹⁸ He also raises the issue as to why Jean seems to rely more on Avicenna rather than Aristotle: was it that he preferred Avicenna because he offered more in his highly developed Peripatetic philosophy? Or was it because Avicenna's philosophical psychology seemed more compatible with his Augustinian background? The answers to these questions will emerge, as our study progresses. In addition, we will see that Jean is included among those who satisfy the criterion for the application of the phrase 'Avicennised Augustianism' a modern term which is applied to Jean and which will be the subject for discussion in the chapter on the cognitive powers of the soul.¹⁹

¹⁷ Hasse, p. 49.

¹⁸ Hasse, p. 49 n. 217.

¹⁹ See Chapter Five on the cognitive powers in Avicenna.

SECTION TWO
ENCOUNTER BETWEEN THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND
PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Christian philosophy up to the twelfth century was a mixture of Platonism and Christianity as evidenced in the works of Plotinus,²⁰ Dionysius the Areopagite, and above all in Augustine, even if, as Brown states, ‘the influence of Platonism on the Latin Middle Ages, however, was certainly much more vast than the influence of the texts of Plato himself’.²¹ Earlier writers, such as John Scottus Eriugena, Peter Lombard, Aelred of Rievaulx were already questioning the nature of man but they mostly found their answers, according to Hasse, in Augustinian and Cassidorian material. St Augustine (354–430) was certainly the ‘authority’ for the majority of Christian thinkers in the Latin West. Augustine’s main interest was in his journey to God and the search for wisdom and truth. We know from his writings that he gained a love of philosophy after he read the *Hortensius* of Cicero (106–42 BCE). It is not until he was in his forties, however, that he describes the great impact Neoplatonism had on his life and how it gave an answer to the problem of evil as well as showing him how to conceive of a spiritual substance. It also convinced him that the ultimate truth must be something immaterial. Thus it is that through his reading of Plotinus’s *Enneads*, or, at least, parts of it in translation, his reading of Plato’s *Timaeus* and the *Meno* and his own thinking that Augustine ‘had found what he believed was a true presentation of reality’.²² It is through Augustine that Neoplatonism passed down through the generations of writers within the Christian tradition, in particular his

²⁰ The writings of Plotinus were not directly known at this time. Augustine, for example, read some of the *Enneads* in Marius Victorinus’s translation, the latter being a distinguished *rhêtor* in Rome in the mid-fourth century.

²¹ Brown, Stephen, ‘Translation and Transmission of Greek Philosophy’ in *The Pimlico History of Western Philosophy*, ed. by Richard H. Popkin (UK: Pimlico, 1999), pp. 230–244 (p. 230).

²² David Knowles, *The Evolution of Medieval Thought* (London: Longman, 1962), p. 35.

theory of the soul, which is characterised by the definition of man as a soul that makes use of a body (*anima utens corpore*).²³ Augustine dominates most of the Middle Ages until the rise of Aristotelianism in the twelfth century. It is at this time that Augustinianism enjoys something of a revival by those who, like Jean de La Rochelle, want to incorporate his teaching into the Greek-Arab writings of Aristotle and Avicenna, in particular the theory of illumination of the intellect.

Thus began the ‘age of the *summae*, magisterial and comprehensive synthesis ranging over a wide domain of theology and philosophy’.²⁴ With the rise of the universities and also the flourishing of the Dominican and Franciscan Orders it is easy to see how theology held sway over philosophy. So why did the introduction of Greek and Arabic authors present a great challenge to the theologians writing in this century?

SECTION THREE

TRANSLATION OF THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE AND AVICENNA IN THIRTEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE

The logical works of Aristotle presented little or no problems for the Latin scholars: but the natural philosophy of Aristotle did present the greater challenge to Christian writers. In fact, what is called the ‘old logic’ of Aristotle, that is to say, the *Categories*, *On Interpretation* and Porphyry’s *Introduction to the Organon* were available in the early twelfth century and by the middle of this century the ‘new logic’ arrived, the *Analytica priora*, the *Analytica posteriora*, the *Topica* and *de*

²³ On this point, Augustine follows Plotinus (*Enneads*, 1, 1, 3) who held that man was a “soul that uses a body”. Taken literally this would mean that we are essentially our souls but Augustine sees this as a forcible expression of the transcendent superiority of the soul over the body. Plotinus, *Enneads*, trans. by Stephen MacKenna (London: Penguin, 1991).

²⁴ Arthur Hyman and James, J. Walsh, eds, *Philosophy in the Middle Ages, The Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Traditions*, 2nd edn (Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett, 1973), p. 451.

Sophisticis Elenchis completing the corpus on logic which was very well received in the new universities. Logic was to become the ‘necessary preparation for all higher studies in the nascent universities’²⁵ and from a cursory reading of Jean’s *Summa* we can see his appreciation of Aristotelian propositions and syllogisms. His use of the style of the disputed question can be seen in the chapters which proceed according to what must at first be asserted, *dicendum est*, which is often followed by an appeal to an authority, then a *contra* and then the replies to objections. Knowles states regarding the new logic, ‘it was in fact, decisive in making dialectical logic, for more than fifty years, the be-all and end-all of the course in the liberal arts’.²⁶

Aristotle’s major philosophical works, however, gradually came on stream in the late twelfth century when Gerard of Cremona (died, 1187) translated the *Physics*, *On Generation*, *On the Heavens* and the first three books of *On the Meteors* from Arabic to Latin, making them available to the Latin thinkers of the early thirteenth century. Brown remarks that anonymous twelfth century translations of the *Physics*, *On the soul*, and of books 1 through to 4 of the *Metaphysics* translated from the Greek were also known at this time.²⁷ Aristotle’s *On the soul* was also translated from the Greek by James of Venice c.1150 but did not make an impact at that time; However, it was soon to become ‘one of the focal points of controversy in the thirteenth century, but this was due principally to the appearance of the Arabic commentaries on the book, and to the doctrines of the Arabs on the human soul’.²⁸ Jean and his contemporaries, as we have alluded to above, are presented not only with the philosophical tradition based on Aristotle’s biological works but also with

²⁵ Knowles, p. 190.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Brown, ‘Translation and Transmission of Greek Philosophy’, p. 231.

²⁸ Knowles, p. 192.

the medical tradition derived from Hippocrates' and Galen's texts. These texts were known indirectly through the works of Avicenna but they also reached the medieval scholars through translations made from the Greek and Arabic by Constantine the African. The impact of the translations will be discussed below in relation to the powers of the soul according to Avicenna. We can begin to appreciate the impact that the medical and biological sources had on thirteenth century authors from the words of William of Thierry, when he describes his acquisition of the new texts as work drawn from 'philosophers and natural scientists (*physici*) and partly from ecclesiastical writers'.²⁹ The key word here is the *physici*,³⁰ relating to the work of the physician and the biologist and, according to Hasse, this challenge was the most important event in the course of the early medieval history of psychology.

Jean has 'first hand knowledge' of Avicenna's *De anima*, citing passages never before referred to in the West.³¹ He presents Avicenna's doctrine of the internal senses, *ad verbum*, with regard to the estimative power and the memorative power and it is clear that the authority of Avicenna eclipses that of the Pseudo-Augustine and John Damascene, whose sections on the powers of the soul are, as we will see, much shorter. As a physician, Avicenna could forge agreement between philosophy and medicine and, as Romana Martorelli Vico remarks, 'only a synthesis of the two models was really descriptive of all the complexity, physical and psychic, of human nature. Only in this way, as a matter of fact, could philosophical

²⁹ Hasse, pp. 10–11.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 49 – 50. Hasse explains further that Jean had first hand knowledge of Avicenna's *De anima* which was translated from Arabic into Latin. See below p. 22 for details of the translators.

anthropology present a suitable and opportune completion of theological anthropology'.³²

Dominic Gundissalinus and Ibn Daud (Avendauth), two of the most prolific translators to emerge from the school of translation set up by the Archbishop of Toledo, Raymond (1126–52) translated Avicenna's *De anima* in Toledo. The preface to this translation tells us that the work was ordered and paid for by John, Archbishop of Toledo, to whom it is dedicated. This fixes the date of the translation between 1152, the death of Archbishop Raymond, and 1166, the death of his successor Archbishop John of Toledo. As we shall see this is the text which Jean uses, although it seems he had two versions of the translations at different times, this is explained in the next section.

SECTION FOUR

SOURCES

In his account of Jean's sources, Bougerol states that Avicenna is the philosopher for Jean although the important qualification is made that it is an Avicenna inspired by Aristotle.³³ Given that Aristotle was available to the Arab world from the ninth century onwards, it is held by many commentators that Avicenna's *De anima* is a commentary or paraphrase of Aristotle's *Peri Psychés (De anima)*. This is not the case, however. Avicenna's *De anima* is a comprehensive compendium of the theory of the soul. It is arranged, for the most part, according to the Peripatetic tradition and it presents Avicenna's own philosophy. The translation of the text by Gundissalinus and Avendauth is extant in fifty manuscripts but the work of editing the text was

³² Vico, p. 317.

³³ Bougerol, p. 31. 'Parmi elles, il faut citer en premier le *De anima* d'Avicenne par lequel Aristote pénètre largement dans les développements de la *Summa*.'

complicated by the fact that it is extant ‘in two recensions, called A and B by modern scholars’.³⁴ The editor, Simone Van Riet, sheds new light with regard to the reception of the two versions;³⁵ Dominicus Gundissalinus (c. 1170) and John Blund (c. 1200) quote version A while Albert the Great (1242–43) quotes version B. The quotations in Jean’s *Tractatus* (1233–35) are in the wording of version A, while those of the newly added passages in the *Summa* (1235–36) follow version B. It seems that version B is a re-working of version A.

For Jean, Aristotle is an important philosopher but he is not the philosopher. Vernier states that it appears that Jean had only a limited knowledge of Aristotle, yet Jean refers to Aristotle by name in a number of places in the *Summa* and he quotes Aristotle’s definition of the soul, giving it a prominent place in his definitions of the soul. If Bougerol is correct in his dating of Jean’s *Summa* (written between the years 1235–1236) we could place the reception of Aristotle’s *De anima* in the early to mid-thirteenth century, given that Jean’s earlier work the *Tractatus* (written about 1233–1235) uses the same quote in a list of definitions on the soul.³⁶ It would probably be more correct to say that he had a good knowledge of Aristotle’s *De anima* and, as we will see, Aristotle’s presence is pervasive in the second treatise, in particular on the theme of the intellect.

The Pseudo-Augustine’s *De spiritu et anima* is another major source for Jean. He wrongly attributes this work to the genuine Augustine (who of course is also a

³⁴ Hasse, p. 8.

³⁵ Avicenna, *Avicenna Latinus, Liber De Anima seu Sextus De Naturalibus*, Édition critique de la traduction latine médiévale par S. Van Riet (Louvain & Leiden: E. Peeters & E. J. Brill, 1972).

³⁶ Jean de La Rochelle. *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, p. 64. Ad expositionem sexte diffinitionis que talis est: Aristoteles in libro *De anima* ‘Anima est actus primus corporis phisici organici potentia vitam habentis’, notandum quod diffinitio communis est anime vegetabili, sensibili et rationali, in quantum est anima, scilicet copori unibilis.

considerable influence on Jean) but when Jean quotes the manuscript in the *Summa* he reverses the order in the title, calling it *De anima et spiritu*. Albert the Great attributed it to Augustine but, according to Gilson, Thomas Aquinas did not make the same mistake.³⁷ This should not devalue the Pseudo Augustinian manuscript which played a very important role in the history of philosophy. It was compiled c. 1170 and was at one stage attributed to Alcher of Clairvaux. Recent studies claim that this work is a string of excerpts from various authors, e.g., Augustine, Cassiodorus, Isidore of Seville, Alcuin, Anselm, Bernard, Hugh of St Victor and Isaac of Stella. It was most influential in the years of the 1230's and early 1240's as it was connected with the beginnings of Franciscan theology and it provided 'a centre for the continuation of a Neo-Platonic and Augustinian current in the teeth of a developing Aristotelianism'.³⁸

Augustine is 'the' theological authority and is cited repeatedly throughout the treatise (forty eight times according to Bougerol). For the most part the quotations are from *De civitate Dei*; *De quaestionibus* 83; *De Genesi ad litteram*; *De quantitate animae*; *De Trinitate*; The *Summa de Bono* of Philip the Chancellor (1160/85–1236) is another main source for the first treatise. Philip was a contemporary of Jean's and in the foreword to the French translation of the *Summa* Bataillon states that it is without doubt through Jean's *Summa* that Philip's influence continued to be exercised.³⁹ This may be referring to the fact that Philip the Chancellor was an important source for both Jean and his master and colleague, Alexander de Hales. Jean quotes from Philip's *Summa de Bono*, in particular in his

³⁷ Gilson, p. 169.

³⁸ Coleman, p. 227.

³⁹ 'On sait que son influence directe ne durera guère et c'est sans doute en partie par l'intermédiaire du traité de Jean de La Rochelle qu'elle a continué à s'exercer.' Vernier, *Somme de Lâme*, Avant-propos de Louis-J. Bataillon, p. 8.

discussion on the Trinity and also on the question of intermediaries between body and soul. Philip's work is also quoted in the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*.⁴⁰ This suggests that Jean held him in high esteem. Hilaire of Poitiers in the *De Trinitate* and *De Synodis* is also appealed to at the theological level, particularly as an authority on the soul as an image and likeness to God.

Also from the Greek tradition, John Damascene (c.675–c.750) is an important authority. Bougerol states that he is present in forty-five quotations from twenty-four chapters of *De fide orthodoxa*. In the second *Consideratio* of his *Summa* Jean discusses Damascene's account of how we come to have intellectual knowledge and how the mind comes to a conclusion based on a relation of ideas. Other Greek sources cited are: Calcidius on Plato's *Timaeus*, Didymus, Gregory Nazianzus, the *Liber de causis* by Proclus, Nemesius of Emesa, and Dionysius the Areopagite.

The *De potentiis animae et obiectis* is cited at least twelve times in the *Summa*. The anonymous author is a theologian, 'as is apparent from the changes and additions he makes to his source' and like many other theologians he omits the discussion on the vegetative powers.⁴¹ It is one of the earliest examples of a '*divisio potentiae animalis*', a forerunner to Jean's *Summa*. The text has been edited by D.A.Callus.⁴² It is thought to have been written by an English theologian 'without the influence of the Latin translations of Averroes, which entered circles at the

⁴⁰ Bougerol, p. 38. 'Pour montrer que l'âme est une en trois puissances, la *Summa* recourt à la même source que Jean de La Rochelle, c'est-à-dire à la *Summa de bono* de Philippe le Chancelier.'

⁴¹ Hasse, p. 35.

⁴² D.A. Callus, 'The Powers of the Soul, An early unpublished text', *Extrait de Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale*, Tome XIX, January-June 1952, pp. 131–170.

University of Paris c. 1230'.⁴³ Jean employs this source in his discussion with regard to distinguishing the powers of the soul and with regard to the intellect.

SECTION FIVE

INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITICAL EDITION OF THE *SUMMA*

In the introduction to the critical edition of the *Summa* J. G. Bougerol relates how he became interested in the work of this master of theology whose dates are recorded as between c.1190/1200–1245. These consisted of a series of registers containing notices, lists of manuscripts and transcriptions of the most well known works of Jean. He provides what little biographical details we have of Jean. Bougerol states that work on Jean dates back at least to 1856, when Canon M. Cholet, working alongside another diocesan priest, Th. Grasilier, listed the manuscripts of Jean de La Rochelle and from one of them, MS Arras, Bibliothèque de La Ville 537 transcribed the present work. This project was carried forward by Henry Luguët in two studies based on Jean's *Summa de anima*, both dated 1875, one of which is a thesis that Luguët submitted to the Sorbonne.⁴⁴ In 1882 Teofilo Domenichelli published an edition of the *Summa* under the direction of P. Marcellino da Civezza. Domenichelli lists whatever manuscripts Luguët had consulted. Bougerol used Canon Cholet's transcription of the *Summa de anima* as a basis for his updated version and provided a list of fifty manuscripts in which the text of the *Summa* appears and has included a stemma in the introduction to his edition.⁴⁵ The late Pierre Michaud-Quantin edited Jean's other work on the soul, the *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum*

⁴³ Coleman, p. 382.

⁴⁴ Reference in Bougerol, p. 27. Henry Luguët, *Essai d'analyse et de critique sur le texte inédit du Traité de l'âme de Jean de La Rochelle*, Paris, A. Durand et Pedone Lauriel, 1875. 'La même année, il publia en latin le texte d'une thèse en Sorbonne sur la psychologie de Jean de La Rocelle': *Fratri ac Magistri Johannis a Rupella ex eo libro hactenus inedito cui Summa de anima titulus inscribitur psychologicam doctrinam exprompsit Henricus Luguët*, Paris, 1875, 76pp.

⁴⁵ Bougerol, p. 26.

animae, which is a less finished version of the work we have here before us. Jean's works have attracted the attention of scholars for a long time and while there are entries on his writings in many of the anthologies of medieval philosophy these are very brief accounts of his work. In 2001, however, the French translation of the *Summa*, referred to above, was produced under the aegis of the *Bibliothèque Des Textes Philosophiques*, translated by Jean-Marie Vernier. The introduction to the French text contains a comprehensive outline of the *Summa* which, no doubt, has contributed to a renewal of interest in Jean and his works, as will the present work.

SECTION SIX

OUTLINE OF THE FIRST *CONSIDERATIO* OF THE *SUMMA*

The *Summa* is divided into two main parts, each called a *Consideratio* which are further divided, in turn, into chapters; fifty eight chapters are included in the first, sixty in the second. The first *Consideratio* is a theological treatise in which Jean tries to bring together the 'seemingly boundless tradition of psychological doctrines' flourishing at this time.⁴⁶ In the second *Consideratio*, Jean presents the faculties of the soul as found in Pseudo-Augustine, John Damascene and Avicenna. Bougerol states that there is a problem with the titles and the numbers of the chapters because of the many differences between the manuscripts.⁴⁷

The following is an outline of the chapters that are contained in the *Summa*.

Beginning with the *Prologue* I will follow the structure of the first *Consideratio* in

⁴⁶ Hasse, p. 48.

⁴⁷ Bougerol states there are many differences between the manuscripts and the only conclusion he could reach is that Jean did not write headings for his chapters since he found that the best manuscripts had no titles or badly matched titles. He therefore adopted the headings from one of the manuscripts, the Uppsala manuscript, and the numbering from the Cholet transcription. He also provides numbers, in brackets, which correspond to Domenichelli's edition of 1882 (Domenichelli, Teofilo, *La Summa de anima di Frate Giovanni della Rochelle*, Prato, 1882).

order to show that, while this first division is described as a theological treatise it is evident that Jean incorporates the new philosophical and medical learning into his account of the soul. Some of the philosophical doctrines that emerge will be elaborated upon in the second chapter, while certain themes, for example, the Trinity, and topics relating to the place and movement of the soul, including those relating to the separation of the soul from the body after death, will be discussed only as part of this initial overview. Inasmuch as they are, in their own right, of philosophical and theological interest and deserving of broader analysis, they are themes that go beyond the scope of our study.

1.6.1 *Prologue*

The treatise on the soul begins with a prologue which is Jean's interpretation of the *Canticle of Canticles* (1.7). In it he addresses the rational soul announcing the three things which must be considered, namely, its substance, power and activity.⁴⁸ The first *Consideratio* examines: (I) the existence of the soul; (II) the *quiddity* or the definition of the soul; (III) the origin of the soul; (IV) the 'being' of the soul; (V) the soul as an image of God (VI); the soul in relation to the body; (VII) the immortality of the soul; (VIII) the suffering (or passibility) of the soul; (IX) the location of the soul; and (X) the movement of the separated soul.

1.6.2 (I) *Whether the Soul Exists*

The first section questions the existence of the soul and for this Jean employs Avicenna's famous 'Flying Man' thought experiment to establish its existence. It is a

⁴⁸ *Summa, Prologus*. Tibi ergo, anima, de te ipsa consideranda sunt tria: substantia uidelicet tua, uirtus et operatio, in quibus consistit tua admirabilis pulchritudo.

thought-experiment in which man finds himself floating in the air or the void in such a way that he is not conscious of his physical body but yet he is aware of the existence of his own essence. The question as to what Avicenna intended to demonstrate by his thought-experiment will be discussed in a later chapter with regard to the reception of Avicenna and his influence on our author. Jean employs a further two arguments from the Pseudo Augustine's *De spiritu et anima* in order to establish the self-awareness of the soul. It is significant that Jean places the thought-experiment in the opening question of his *De anima* on the existence of the soul.⁴⁹ In fact, he opens the study with a quotation from Avicenna. However, in contrast to the Flying Man thought-experiment he does not attribute the content of the passage to Avicenna.

1.6.3 (II) *What is the Soul?*

Seven definitions of the rational soul follow: in the first, the soul is defined as spirit by Alfred of Sareshel; 'the soul is an incorporeal substance, intellectual, receptive, through an ultimate relationship, of the illuminations which are from God'.⁵⁰ It is defined as soul in a twofold way: it is compared and united to the body as 'the mover of a mobile and the sailor of a ship'.⁵¹ Quoting Remigius⁵² Jean states that 'the soul is an incorporeal substance which rules the body' (in fact this quote should be attributed to Nemesius).⁵³ Aristotle's definition of the soul follows and is taken from

⁴⁹ 'The significance of the Flying Man for Western psychology lies in the fact that three early writers quote the thought-experiment at prominent places in the opening questions of their books: Gundissalinus, Anonymous (Vat. Lat. 175) and Jean de La Rochelle.' Hasse, p. 91.

⁵⁰ *Summa*, C. 2, 15-16. 'Anima est substantia incorporea, intellectualis, illuminacionum que sunt a primo ultima relacione perceptiua'. Alfredus Anglicus, *De motu cordis*, 1 (ed., 1923, 2 7).

⁵¹ *Summa*, C. 2, 17-18. 'Ut anima, diffinitur dupliciter quia dupliciter comparatur et unitur corpori, ut motor mobili et nauta nau'.
⁵² *Summa*, C. 2, 19. 'Anima est substantia incorporea, regens corpus'.

⁵³ Bougerol, p. 53. Cf. Nemesius, *De Natura hominis*, c.2. (ed., 23-50); cf. I.Brady, *Remigius-Nemesius*, in FS 8 (1948) 275-284.

his *De anima*. It is defined as follows; ‘the soul is the first act of a natural organised body, having life in potency’.⁵⁴ The next four definitions refer to both spirit and soul: the first is taken from Augustine (actually the Pseudo-Augustine) where it is stated that the soul bears within itself all things generally, ‘the soul is the likeness of all things’⁵⁵ and the second ‘the soul is a certain substance partaking of reason, fitted to ruling the body’.⁵⁶ Jean’s next definition relies on Scripture; the soul is the ‘Divine breath of life’, in so far as it refers to the breath of life the definition from Genesis 2. 7 is also quoted by Jean as he states: *God made man from the mire of the earth and infused the breath of life into his countenance*. In so far as the soul has a likeness to the divine, Jean quotes from Genesis 1. 26: *Let us make man to our image and likeness*. The seventh and final definition is from Seneca’s *Epistles*: ‘the soul is an intellectual spirit determined in itself and in the body towards happiness’.⁵⁷ Although Jean separates the theological from the philosophical his intention would seem to be to give a precise account of all the sources which were then at his disposal.

Definitions on the soul abounded at this time; sometimes the soul was defined as soul alone, sometimes as spirit and sometimes as soul and spirit.⁵⁸ The influence of the Cistercian text, the Pseudo-Augustine’s *Treatise on the Spirit and the Soul* is clear. The distinction between spirit and soul ‘was important to that wing of twelfth-century psychology which identified the term *spiritus* with the highest dimension of

⁵⁴ *Summa*, C. 2, 20-22. Et secundum hoc diffinitur ab Aristotele, in libro *De anima*: ‘Anima est actus primus corporis phisici, organici, potencia uitam habentis.’ Aristotle, *De Anima*, 11 (412a 19-22, 27-28, 412b 5-6).

⁵⁵ *Summa*, C. 2, 24-25. ‘Anima est omnium similitudo.’

⁵⁶ *Summa*, C. 2, 26-27. Ps. Augustine, *De spiritu et anima*, c. 1 (PL 40,783). ‘Anima est substancia quedam rationis particeps, regendo corpori accommodata.’

⁵⁷ *Summa*, C. 2, 35-36. Seneca, *Epistles* 92, 1-2. ‘Anima est spiritus intellectualis in se et in corpore ad beatitudinem ordinatus.’

⁵⁸ *Summa*, C. 2, 12-13. Diffinitur autem anima rationalis aliquando ut spiritus, aliquando ut anima, aliquando ut spiritus et anima.

the soul'.⁵⁹ It is the soul which animates or enlivens the body, while 'spirit is the soul considered in its spiritual nature, or derives its name from the fact that it may be regarded as the body's breath'.⁶⁰ From the medical tradition, however, we will see that a physical theory of *spiritus* was more suited to explaining the physiological systems involved in the functions of the living organism. This will become clearer when we examine the powers of the soul according to the Pseudo-Augustine in which Jean discusses the natural, the vital and the animal spirits according to the *De spiritu et anima*. Jean's inclusion of Aristotle's *actus* sees him going towards the 'idea of a mover that presides over a series of specific operations of an animated human body', as '*actus* is the substance of a thing relative to its operations'.⁶¹ The second *Consideratio* will illustrate this with regard to the vegetative, the sensitive and the intellectual powers of the soul.

1.6.4 (III) *The Origin of the Soul*

A discussion on the essence of the soul follows with a reference to its becoming and to its being. The origin of the soul is considered from the point of view of causality and the moment of creation. Jean discusses the soul under the aspect of Aristotle's four causes. Regarding, (1) the material cause, Jean argues that the soul is immaterial, yet it cannot be made from a divine substance since it is subject to 'falsehood';⁶² the divine substance is simple in that it is a whole, but souls are substantially different; and, following Augustine, Jean states that the soul is not made from spiritual matter either. Since the operation of the soul is through abstraction

⁵⁹ McGinn, p. 73.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 190.

⁶¹ Vico, p. 312.

⁶² *Summa*, C. 14, 4-5. Anima falsitatem habet: ergo non est ueritas, nec de ueritate: ueritas autem divina substancia est.

from matter, the substance of the soul must be immaterial. Further proof for its immateriality can be seen in the ability of the intellect to receive the ‘species’ of things, a term used in the thirteenth century to explain how the soul knows objects in the world with the senses and with the soul’s intellect.

The soul’s intellect is immaterial; for if it was material like a sense, it would not receive any sort of species whatsoever of a sensitive thing beyond itself, but only that species which has a likeness with an organ, such as sight to colour, hearing to sound and not the opposite. Similarly the intellect would not receive every intelligible species, but some yes and some no. That is why, since it is certain that it receives every species whatsoever, it will be immaterial.⁶³

Regarding (2) the formal cause, in order to avoid either ascribing corporeal or spiritual matter to the soul, Jean uses a formula, taken from the ‘forgotten formulae of Boethius’. The formulae, based on the terms *quo est* and *quod est* describe the composition of the soul and are employed by Jean to distinguish the being of the soul from the essence of the soul. The formal cause of the soul, therefore, distinguishes between an incorporeal essence which has its being through participation, such as the soul and an angel, and a being who is uncreated and the First cause of all that exists;

This is shown as follows: because everything that is below the First is a being through participation. Therefore, in every creature ‘that which exists’, namely being itself, is different from ‘that through which it exists’, namely, its essence; because since it is a being through participation, it is not its essence. This is shown as follows: for just as the good that is God is good through essence, since by his very nature he is good and to be and to be good are the same for him; therefore in him the good and goodness are entirely without distinction.⁶⁴

⁶³ *Summa*, C. 16, 43-49. Intellectus anime est immaterialis; si enim esset materialis sicut sensus, non reciperet quamlibet speciem rei sensibilis supra se, sed illam speciem tantum que habet similitudinem cum organo sicut uisus colorem, auditus sonum et non e conuerso. Similiter intellectus non reciperet quamlibet speciem intelligibilem, sed aliquam sic, et aliquam non. Quare cum certum sit quod recipit quamlibet, erit immaterialis.

⁶⁴ *Summa*, C. 17, 30-36. Quod manifestatur sic: quia omne illud quod est citra Primum est ens per participacionem. Est ergo in qualibet creatura ens differens quod est, scilicet ipsum ens, ab eo quo est, scilicet sua essencia; quia cum sit ens per participacionem, non est sua essencia. Quod manifestatur sic: sicut enim bonum quod est Deus, est bonum per essenciam, quia est se ipso bonum, nec est ei aliud esse et bonum esse: ideo in eo indifferens omnino bonum et bonitas.

In relation to (3) the efficient cause, Jean remarks that God alone is the efficient cause of the rational soul since no created being can create, or make something from nothing; one of the arguments put forward is the fact of man's free will and how we understand that we are not born to be subject to another created being.

Likewise, every power of a thing which has been made is subject to its efficient cause; however the power of the rational soul, in accordance with free will is not subject to any creature since it cannot be forced by anything.⁶⁵

In relation to his discussion on (4) the final cause, Jean quotes from the Pseudo-Augustine who considers man from both the spiritual and the physical side and he states that man can find happiness in God who is the principal end of the soul and in a secondary way man participates in the highest good as the rational soul is made to know, love, possess and enjoy the highest good. With regard to the moment of creation of the soul, Jean states it is known to the Creator alone but in general he states that as soon as the body is made and formed in the womb the soul is created and infused and a human being has life in the womb.

But we say that the body alone is produced through the union of marriage; and that the Creator alone knows the creation of the soul, and by his judgment the body comes together in the womb, and is made and formed; and as soon as the body is formed, the soul is created and infused, and a human being has life in the womb.⁶⁶

1.6.5 (IV) *The Soul with Regard to Being*

⁶⁵ *Summa*, C. 18, 69-74. Item, omnis potencia rei effecte subiecta est sue cause efficienti; potencia autem rationalis anime, secundum libertatem arbitrii, nulli creature est subiecta cum a nulla cogi possit.

⁶⁶ *Summa*, C. 20, 26-30. Sed dicimus corpus tantum per coniugii copulam seminari; creacionem uero anime solum creatorem nosse, eiusque iudicio corpus coagulari in uulva, et compingi atque formari; ac formato iam corpore, animam creari et infundi, ut uiuat in utero homo.

Having discussed the origin of the soul Jean wants to show that the soul is a substance, that it is incorporeal, that it is simple and that it is one in three powers. The soul is a '*hoc aliquid*', it is a substance following Aristotle's account of substance and while its essence remains unchanged it is capable of receiving opposites, as in the case of moving from ignorance to knowledge.⁶⁷ One argument for the soul's incorporeality is that anything whose qualities are not perceived by a corporeal sense is itself incorporeal.⁶⁸ Further the soul does not have spatial dimension which is clear with reference to the imaginative, the memorative and the intellectual powers. The species or likenesses of things, whether imagined or understood enter the soul in a simple mode, not a dimensional mode.

Likewise, all that is received is present in that which receives it, according to the nature of the receiver, not according to the nature of that received; therefore, since the soul is receptive of all likenesses and species, they will be in the soul according to its nature; therefore since the species of things are in the soul, whether as imagined or understood, they are in a simple mode and not a spatial mode, since they do not fill the soul up; therefore the nature of the soul is simple and without quantity.⁶⁹

Jean distinguishes between the absolute simplicity of God and the simplicity of spiritual substances, such as the soul and an angel. He employs the concept of *quod est* and *quo est* (which, as stated above, Jean also employs to describe the formal cause of the soul) to distinguish the simplicity of God from the simplicity of the human soul.

But properly and absolutely something is simple in which there is not a composition of matter and form nor the difference between 'that which

⁶⁷ *Summa*, C. 22, 12-14. Sed anima secundum se recipit opposita intransmutata secundum essenciam, ut sciencie et ignorancie, ergo est substancia.

⁶⁸ *Summa*, C. 23, 4-6. Item, omne illud cuius qualitates non percipiuntur sensu corporeo est incorporeum

⁶⁹ *Summa*, C.24, 7-11. Item, omne quod recipitur est in recipiente secundum naturam recipientis, non secundum naturam recepti; cum ergo anima sit receptiua omnium similitudinum et specierum, erunt in anima secundum naturam ipsius; cum ergo sint in anima species rerum siue imaginatiue siue intellectiue, modo simplicitatis et non dimensionis, quia non replent eam; ergo natura anime simplex est et sine quantitate.

exists' and 'that through which it exists', as in the case of God: for God and divinity do not differ in the same way as man and humanity differ; since when I say 'a man' I indicate 'that he exists' and when I say 'humanity' I refer to 'that through which he exists'. However, when I say body, I am referring to matter; when I say soul, I am referring to form.⁷⁰

Following Avicenna the soul is one in three powers; they are the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational powers. Jean explains that just as a triangle is in a square so the vegetative is in the sensitive, the sensitive in the rational with the soul encompassing all three. The soul is one from the point of view of substance, but it is different with regard to powers of the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational soul.

Let us say therefore, following Augustine, in his book *On the soul and spirit*: 'the substance of the soul is one and the same', the vegetative, the sensitive, the rational; but 'according to the different powers it is assigned different names'.⁷¹

1.6.6 (V) *On the Soul with Regard to the Image*

Jean raises many questions with regard to the soul as the image of God. He devotes nine chapters to the topic, although two of the issues raised in his opening chapter are omitted altogether. He begins by asking what is the image in the divine persons essentially? The image to which the human soul is made is the essence of God as present in the Three Persons of the Trinity.

And this is what Augustine said in the *Sermon on the Image*: There is a likeness of the Trinity in the soul which is as an image of its creator, perfectly formed in the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit; and although it is of one nature, it has however, three dignities, intellect, will and memory; and just as there is God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit, there are not

⁷⁰ *Summa*, C. 25, 11-16. Proprie uero et absolute simplex est in quo non est compositio materie et forme, nec differentia eius quod est et quo est, ut Deus: non enim differt Deus et deitas, sicut homo et humanitas; quia cum dico hominem significo quod est, cum dico humanitatem dico quo est. Cum autem dico corpus, dico materiam; cum uero dico animam, dico formam.

⁷¹ *Summa*, C. 26, 89-92. Dicamus ergo, secundum Augustinum, in libro *De anima et spiritu*: 'Una et eadem est anime substantia' uegetabilis, sensitua, rationalis; sed 'secundum diversas potencias diversa sortitur uocabula.'

however three gods, so also the soul is intellect, will and memory, but there are not three souls.⁷²

The image of God in man is seen in man's knowledge of first truth and in his love of the highest good; the soul remembers, understands and loves according to its own way and in an analogous way it is an image of God.⁷³ The relationship between the three Persons is that the Son of God is an image of the Father in his characteristics and it is said of the Holy Spirit that he proceeds from the Father through spiration and also from the Son through spiration.

So also the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son through one and the same spiration, and on account of this the Holy Spirit will not be an image of the Son, as the Son is the image of the Father.⁷⁴

The human soul alone carries within itself the likenesses of all things, spiritual and corporeal and for this reason it is capable of unity with God. Also in union with God the human soul has the power over its own body, which is analogous to the power of God to govern the world.⁷⁵ Man also has the power to produce another person, as the first two Persons of the Trinity produced a third but an angel does not share this

⁷² *Summa*, C. 28, 18-23. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus, in *Sermone de ymagine*: Est similitudo Trinitatis in anima que est ad ymaginem sui conditoris perfecte in Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto condita; et licet illa unius nature sit, habet tamen tres dignitates, intellectum, uoluntatem et memoriam; et sicut Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus Spiritus sanctus, non tamen tres dii, ita anima est intellectus, uoluntas et memoria, non tamen tres anime.

⁷³ *Summa*, C. 30, 19-26. Ad ultimum dicendum quod quamuis non sit conueniencia in aliqua forma substanciali uel accidentali, est tamen conueniencia in ordine, quia rationalis creatura ordinatur ad Deum secundum immediacionem in cognicione prime ueritatis et amore summe bonitatis. Est eciam conueniencia proporcionaliter in effectu, ut sicut Deus memoratur, intelligit, diligit que tribus personis approprianatur, sic anima secundum suum modum.

⁷⁴ *Summa*, C.29, 30-32. Ut sicut a Patre spiritus sanctus per spiracionem, ita et a Filio per spiracionem unam et eandem, et propter hoc non erit Spiritus sanctus ymago Filii, sicut Filius ymago Patris.

⁷⁵ *Summa*, C. 30, 79-85. Secundum quod accipitur essentialiter: sicut Deus habet uirtutem ad regimen, et continenciam, et mocionem sui mundi, sic anima ad regimen sui corporis, quasi sui mundi; unde Augustinus, in *Sermone de ymagine*: sicut Deus semper et ubique totus est omnia uiuificans, mouens et gubernans, sic anima ubique in suo corpore tota ubique uiget, illud mouens, uiuificans et gubernans; et hec est ymago Trinitatis omnipotentis Dei, quam habet anima in se.

power with the Trinity.⁷⁶ What is meant by the quotation from Scripture, *Let us make man to the image; Faciamus hominem ad ymaginem nostram*; man is made according to the image, the preposition *ad* has the sense of completion or an efficient cause, that man is made as the nearest thing to perfection as is possible.⁷⁷ The human soul is an image of the Trinity because of its most elevated part, the mind, and as an analogy of the Trinity it has three powers, memory, understanding and will.

Inasmuch as man is called an image, according to the purpose of its nature, namely an expression of conformity, not of totality, in the same way that the soul and man are an expression of conformity, according to their most pure and highest part of man, which is formed immediately by the first truth, which is called mind or *intelligencia* or superior reason, are said to be made in the image of the Trinity according to a threefold account of its power, namely memory, intellect, will, through which it is said to be immediately turned towards God; according to memory towards perfect eternity, according to intellect, towards first truth, according to the will, towards the highest good: eternity is attributed to the Father, truth to the Son and goodness to the Holy Spirit.⁷⁸

The section on image concludes with a long discussion on the soul as a representative of the Trinity. The unity that exists between memory, understanding and will in the human soul is analogous to the relationship between the persons of the Trinity in that both relationships are substantially inseparable. Jean, quoting from Augustine,⁷⁹ states:

⁷⁶ *Summa*, C.30, 86-89. Preterea, est in ymitacione diuine uirtutis secundum quod accipitur personaliter, ut sicut est uirtus in personis qua possunt producere ex se personam, et uirtus in personis qua possunt produci, sic in humana natura: in hiis autem deficit angelus.

⁷⁷ *Summa*, C. 31, 15-19. – Vel per ymaginem potest accipi forma exemplaris, id est hominis; et tunc ymago supponit creatam ymaginem et hec dictio *ad* nota est termini siue complementi, id est cause efficientis, et est sensus: *Faciamus hominem ad ymaginem*, id est ad talem perfectionem que sit nostra ymago et similitudo.

⁷⁸ *Summa*, C.33, 51-60. Secundum autem quod ymago dicitur, secundum intencionem qualitatis, expressio uidelicet conformitatis, non totalitatis, sic anima et homo secundum partem suam purissimam et summam, que immediate a prima ueritate formatur, que dicitur mens uel intelligencia uel superior ratio, dicitur ad ymaginem Trinitatis secundum triplicem rationem potencie, scilicet memorie, intelligencie, uoluntatis, quibus immediate conuertitur ad Deum, secundum memoriam in summam eternitatem, secundum intelligenciam in primam ueritatem, secundum uoluntatem in summam bonitatem; eternitas Patri, ueritas Filio, bonitas Spiritui sancto.

⁷⁹ Augustine, *De Trinitate*, IX, c. 5, n. 8 (PL 42, 965).

Therefore in a wonderful way these three are inseparable from each other; and yet each singly is a substance or an essence, although they are said to be together in a relative sense.⁸⁰

1.6.7 (VI) *On the Soul in Relation to the Body*

The question of the unity of soul and body goes back ultimately to Plato. Augustine, however, rejects the strong dualistic account of soul in Plato, and as we have seen above, stresses the unity of body and soul, particularly in his portrayal of the Trinity as an analogy of the human mind. The soul is united to the body essentially, in this way the rational soul is different from an angel. The instrumental *quo* differentiates, as before, between the nature of the human soul and its ability to be united to the body and how it does not belong to the essence of an angel to have a body.⁸¹ The soul is united to the body through its essence, as its form and its perfection. In this way it is united without an intermediary but in another way the powers of the soul are the intermediary between the substance of the soul and the activity of the soul. The soul is compared to the work of a craftsman who produces his works through an instrument. In the same way the soul acts through the medium of the vegetative and the sensitive powers, as, for example, in seeing and hearing:

Since the activity of the soul is by means of an organ, inasmuch as the soul acts through the animated body, namely in seeing and hearing and other acts of this kind; the union of the soul itself to the body, as to its organ, occurs through its potency and its power, for example, by means of the vegetative and sensitive power.⁸²

⁸⁰ *Summa*, C. 35, 92 – 94. ‘Miro itaque modo tria ista sunt inseparabilia a se ipsis; et tamen singulum eorum quodque est substantia uel essentia, licet ad inuicem relatiue dicantur.’

⁸¹ *Summa*, C. 37, 1-4. Primo ergo queritur an anima corpori uniat per medium, an sine medio; et cum unibilitas non sit accidentalis anime sed essentialis et sit illud quo essentialiter differt anima rationalis ab angelo, sicut dictum est prius.

⁸² *Summa*, C. 37, 60-62. Quia ergo operatio anime fit organo, secundum quod anima per corpus animatum operatur, uidendo scilicet et audiendo et huiusmodi; unio ipsius anime ad corpus ut organum erit mediante potencia et ui eius; uerbi gracia, ut mediante uirtute uegetatiua et sensitua.

In his discussion of the unity of the body, which is a composite, and the soul, which is a simple nature, Jean states that the body is composed of the four elements in collaboration with the fifth essence and is therefore the most perfect among all bodies constituted from the elements. It is because the body is so organised that it is impossible for it to be simple and of one nature.

The body, therefore, not only the human or the animal but also the vegetative, is from elements, together with the fifth essence, for the purpose of establishing a harmony between them.⁸³

Two intermediaries pertain to the soul and two to the body.⁸⁴ On the part of the soul, as we have seen above, are the sensitive nature and the vegetative nature.

On the side of the body it is the fifth essence, called spirit. On the part of the body two intermediaries must be posited: one pertaining to the celestial nature, which is the fifth essence, which is called spirit: the naturalists call it the vehicle of the powers of the soul; and it is a delicate body, spiritual, and is diffused into the cavities of the limbs from the nature of the fifth essence; consequently its movement comes from its sources, as the movement from irradiation and illumination comes from luminous bodies: the principal and essential limbs are called the heart, the brain and the liver. Inasmuch as they are distinguished the threefold differences in spirit, are, natural in the liver, vital in the heart and animal spirit in the brain.⁸⁵

The union of body and soul is explained further in terms of 'light'. Three forms of light, the light in carbon, the light in flame and the light in air are applied to the powers of the soul. The vegetative power is considered according to the mode of the

⁸³ *Summa*, C. 38, 65-68. Corpus ergo, non solum humanum uel animale, sed etiam cuiuscumque uegetabilis, erit ex quattuor elementis et quinta essencia concurrente, ad unam armoniam conciliandam in eis.

⁸⁴ The second intermediary on the part of the body is referred to in Chapter II, Section Four.

⁸⁵ *Summa*, C. 39, 53-61. Ex parte uero corporis ponenda sunt duo media: unum pertinens ad naturam celestem, que est quinta essencia, quod dicitur spiritus: dicitur a phisicis uehiculum uirium anime; et est corpus subtile, spirituale, diffusum in concauitatibus membrorum a natura quinte essencie; unde motus ipsius a fontibus est, sicut motus irradiacionis et illuminacionis a corporibus luminosis: fontes autem dicuntur principalia et radicalia membra, cor scilicet, cerebrum et epar. Secundum quod distinguitur triplex differencia spiritus, naturalis in epate, uitalis in corde, animalis in cerebro.

light in carbon, the sensitive to the light in flame and because both are dependent on bodies they perish with the body.

Inasmuch as it is possible to think according to such a mode, one must understand a triple difference of the corporeal light, which is in the soul; just as there is a triple difference in corporeal light that is capable of unity, as the light in charcoal, the light in a flame, the light in air, in relation to the incorruptible celestial nature; in the same way there is a triple difference in the soul, which is understood as an incorporeal light that is capable of unity, also the vegetative soul in plants is considered according to the light in charcoal because it is united to the dense and terrestrial bodies of plants not suited to local movement, nor is it radiant through knowledge, in such a way that a light of cognition shines; on the other hand, the sensitive soul is considered as the light present in a flame which is united to bodies that are more fine and more suited to movement and it is radiant since the light of cognition pours out from it; and these two according to nature are dependent on the body and therefore die with the body.⁸⁶

The rational power is thought of as the light of the celestial nature, incorruptible, radiating in the air and in this way the soul is present in the human body, leading the intellect to the comprehension of truth.⁸⁷ This light is called the empyrean light (*lux celi empirei*) disposes the human body to receive the noblest life, that is, the rational life.

The explanation for the unity of body and soul in terms of the fifth element points to an explanation that is later used by Thomas Aquinas where he denies that the four elements alone are responsible for cognition. For Jean and Thomas Aquinas

⁸⁶ *Summa*, C. 40, 122-135. Secundum talem modum secundum quod possibile est cogitare, est accipere triplicem differentiam lucis incorporee, que est in anima: ut sicut triplex est differentia lucis corporee unibilis, ut lux in carbone, lux in flamma, lux in aere, a natura celesti incorruptibili; sic est triplex differentia anime, que intelligitur ut lux incorporea unibilis, et cogitetur uegetabilis anima in plantarum inaptis ad motum localem, nec est radiosa per cognitionem, ut ex ea lumen cognitionis fulgeat; anima uero sensibilis cogitetur ut lux in flamma que unitur corporibus subtilioribus et aptioribus ad motum, et est radiosa quia lumen cognitionis effundit de se; et hec due secundum naturam sunt dependentes a corporibus, et ideo deficiunt cum eis. Anima uero rationalis cogitetur ut lux nature celestis, incorruptibilis, radians in aere, sic et ipsa anima in humano corpore.

⁸⁷ *Summa*, C. 40, 142-144. Sic ergo sane intelligatur exemplum positum, in quantum scilicet dirigit intellectum ad comprehensionem veri.

the account of sensation must go beyond the four elements, that of earth, air, fire and water. The unity of body and soul is influenced by the heavenly bodies which are composed of *quintessence* or fifth essence. Aristotle posited the theory that ether was the cause of the circular movements of the celestial bodies and in his psychology he held the doctrine of the *pneuma* ‘and it is usual to assume that *pneuma* means only something like a peculiar kind of body (analogous to ether) in which the soul permanently resides or which is its organ’.⁸⁸ Avicenna’s theory of emanation is also behind the explanation as will become apparent in our discussion on the active intellect in Avicenna. While Aquinas seems to hold to a quasi-materialist explanation of sensation he also wants to maintain that there is something above and beyond the material explanation of sensation. Avicenna’s explanation of the sublunar world relies on his theory of emanation where ‘he knits intelligences and spheres together through a series of emanations.’⁸⁹ The last in the series of Avicenna’s incorporeal intelligences is the active intellect which along with the aid of the movement of the heavens ‘there emanates [...], something containing the imprint of the forms of the lower world’.⁹⁰ The question is asked as to why the heavenly bodies were believed to have souls in the first place. One possible answer is stated as follows:

One rationale for supposing that the heavenly bodies are living rather than just bodily but not living is the assumption that reality is hierarchical: to be alive is supposed to be better than not to be alive, and the heavenly bodies are assumed to be beings of a higher kind than we are. [...] If there is life already in sublunary nature, there must be life in the heavens as well, which is a higher sphere of being than nature.⁹¹

⁸⁸ A.H. Armstrong, ed. *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 40 n. 9.

⁸⁹ Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes, on Intellect* (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 74.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

⁹¹ Miira Tuominen, *The Ancient Commentators on Plato and Aristotle* (UK: Acumen, 2009), p. 151.

This hierarchy is also present in Jean's identification of different types of light to explain the reciprocal nature of body and soul. The rational soul receives the most noble light, that of the empyrean light. The reference to light highlights the reciprocity of matter and form and but also the separability of both. A contemporary of Jean's at Oxford, Robert Grosseteste (c. 1168–1253) developed an original theory with regard to light. His thesis was that the 'first form of corporeity is to be identified with light'.⁹² This conclusion is supported by the fact that light has 'excellences which place it beyond all corporeal and material things and liken its nature to that of the separate forms of intelligences, in view of all *sapientes*'.⁹³ Jean and Grosseteste share a common source, that of Avicenna and his theory of vision. In fact, in the thirteenth century 'there is hardly any Western reader who does not give an Aristotelian or Grossetestian bent to Avicenna's concept of acquired light (*lumen*)'.⁹⁴ This will be referred to in our discussion of the five senses and how Avicenna's theory of vision impacted on the authors on the soul in the early thirteenth century.

1.6.8 (VII) *On the Immortality of the Soul*

Jean begins his discussion on the immortality of the soul by stating that if there is divine justice bad deeds will be punished and good deeds rewarded, but not in this life:

The immortality of the soul is shown in relation to the justice of God by way of two arguments, the first of which is: if there is divine justice, God will repay the good as much as the bad according to merit; that is, to the good there will be rewards, to the bad, punishments. But it will not happen in this life: if there is divine justice, the good and bad will be repaid after this life.

⁹² James McEvoy, 'Medieval Cosmology and Modern Science' in *Philosophy and Totality*, ed. by James McEvoy (Belfast: Mayne, Boyd & Son, 1977), pp. 91–110 (p. 92).

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ Hasse, p. 115.

Therefore the souls of the good as much as the bad remain after this life since there is divine justice.⁹⁵

He puts forward many arguments for the immortality of the soul; that man shares immortality with an angel and mortality with the beast.

Likewise, Gregory, in the fourth book of the *Dialoges* states: ‘Man is created as an intermediary, so that he is inferior to an angel, superior to an animal; thus he possesses something which necessarily agrees with that which is superior and something which agrees with the inferior, namely immortality of the spirit with an angel, mortality of the body with an animal’.⁹⁶

Further if in material being prime matter is incorruptible, similarly in formal being ultimate form is incorruptible, that is, the rational soul, which is the noblest perfection.⁹⁷ Since the being of the soul does not depend on the being of the body the soul is, therefore, separable from the body.

Likewise, the immortality of the soul in comparison to the body is shown in many ways, as follows. Every substance, whose activity does not depend on the body, is itself not dependent on the body; but the activity of the rational soul itself inasmuch as it is of this kind, does not depend on the body, namely understanding. Therefore it is a substance that does not depend on the body; it is therefore separable from the body and lives without the body.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ *Summa*, C. 44, 1-6. Ostenditur ergo immortalitas anime per comparacionem ad Dei iusticiam duabus rationibus, quarum prima est: si divina iusticia est, retribuet tam bonis quam malis secundum merita; bonis scilicet premia, malis penas. Sed hoc non fit in hac uita: si ergo divina iusticia est, bonis et malis fiet retribucio post hanc uitam. Manent ergo anime tam bonorum quam malorum post hanc uitam cum divina iusticia sit.

⁹⁶ *Summa*, C. 44, 35-39. Gregorius, *Dialogorum*, IV, c. 3 (PL 77, 321 B). Item, Gregorius, in quarto libro *Dialogorum*: ‘Homo sicut in medio creatus est, ut esset inferior angelo, superior iumento; ita habet aliquid quod necesse est conuenire cum summo, aliquid cum infimo, scilicet immortalitatem spiritus cum angelo, mortalitatem uero corporis cum iumento’.

⁹⁷ *Summa*, C. 44, 44-46. Si igitur in esse materie incorruptibilis est materia prima, scilicet yle; similiter in esse forme incorruptibilis erit forma ultima, scilicet anima racionalis que est perfectio dignissima.

⁹⁸ *Summa*, C. 44, 145-150. Item, ostenditur immortalitas anime per comparacionem ad corpus multipliciter, sic. Omnis substancia cuius operacio non dependet a corpore, nec ipsa dependet ex corpore; sed ipsa operacio anime intellectiue in quantum huiusmodi non dependet ex corpore, scilicet intelligere. Ergo nec substancia dependet ex corpore: igitur est separabilis a corpore et uiuens sine corpore.

The rational soul is moved naturally by desire for happiness and beatitude as for an end, desiring immortality it seeks and strives naturally for it.⁹⁹ The more the intellectual power is immersed into the body the more passive and slow it is but when distanced from the body it understands more clearly.¹⁰⁰

1.6.9 (VIII) *On the Passibility of the Soul*

The passibility of the soul is described in two ways. Firstly, the question of the passibility of the soul is considered before the Fall and, in this mode, the soul is not at fault; but, in the second mode, it refers to after the Fall and, therefore, the soul is said to suffer.¹⁰¹ The question is asked as to whether the soul suffers as a result of being in the body and if it does not have ‘dimensional quantity’ how can there be contact between the body and soul.¹⁰² The soul does, however, suffer in many ways along with the body, for example, the master suffers in punishment of his slave, a mother in the punishment of her son.

It should be said in reply to the objections: to the first that suffering is twofold, that is, of subjection and of compassion. The suffering of subjection is, by nature, weaker, in the way that weaker bodies suffer from stronger bodies, as wood from fire; the suffering of compassion is of a stronger nature, in the way that a master suffers in the punishment of his slave, and a mother in the punishment of her son; in this way the soul suffers in the suffering of the body in the feeling of compassion.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ *Summa*, C. 44, 130-131. Sed anima rationalis naturaliter mouetur per appetitum ad felicitatem et beatitudinem.

¹⁰⁰ *Summa*, C. 44, 150-153. Item, omnis uirtus cuius operatio impeditur a corpore, eius esse non dependet a corpore; sed uirtus intellectiua est huiusmodi, quia quanto plus corpori se immerserit, tanto intelliget obtusius et tardius; quanto autem se elongauerit, tanto clarius et facilius.

¹⁰¹ *Summa*, C. 46, 67-69. Causa ergo passibilitatis miserie que pena est, est ex culpa. Primo modo passibilitas antecedit culpam; secundo est post culpam.

¹⁰² *Summa*, C. 48, 4-6. Item, omnis actio naturalis est per contactum, sed non est contactus nisi eorum que habent quantitatem dimensionum.

¹⁰³ *Summa*, C. 48, 16 -21. Dicendum ergo ad obiecta: ad primum quod passio est duplex, subiectionis scilicet et compassionis. Passio subiectionis est nature infirmioris, quemadmodum paciuntur corpora infirmiora a forcioribus corporibus, ut ligna ab igne; passio compassionis est nature forcioris, quemadmodum dominus patitur in pena serui, et mater in pena filii; sic anima patitur in passione corporis compaciendo.

The above at least points to one way in which the body and soul interact with each other. The problem for the medieval thinkers of the thirteenth century was not only to explain how body and soul can interact but it also raises the problem as to how can the soul be understood as self-subsisting as Plato and Augustine argued and as the form or principle of a body as defined by Aristotle. This will be among the topics for discussion in the following chapter where we will see that Jean sees no contradiction in holding that the soul can be conceived in both ways.

1.6.10 (IX) *On the Place of the Soul*

To say that the soul is determined to a place is appropriate by the fact that it is a substance which is limited and finite since it must be distinguished from God who is unlimited and infinite and, therefore, everywhere.

Note therefore that being in a place through limitation is suited to the soul by reason of substance which is limited and finite. Hence, being in one place and not in another is fitting in relation to the difference from the divine substance which is unlimited and infinite, and for this reason it is everywhere. This mode of being is suited to the separated soul. For being in a place through a presence is suited to it on account of its activity. Also John Damascene states, in relation to an angel, that it is present where it acts. On the other hand, being in a place because it is circumscribed is fitting by accident, that is, through union with the body. There ought to be a place through limitation, by reason of substance; by reason of its activity; by reason of being circumscribed, but it is by accident, because of the body.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴ *Summa*, C. 51, 48-58. Nota ergo quod esse in loco per diffinitionem conuenit anime ratione substantie que est terminata et finita. Vnde ei conuenit ita esse alicubi quod non alibi, ad differentiam diuine substantie que interminata est et infinita et ideo ubique est. Et hic modus essendi in loco conuenit anime separate. Esse uero per presenciam in loco ei conuenit propter operacionem. Vnde et Ioannes Damascenus de angelo dicit quod ibi est ubi operatur. Esse uero in loco per circumscriptionem ei conuenit per accidens, scilicet per eam unionem que est ad corpus. Debetur ergo ei esse in loco per diffinitionem ratione substantie; esse uero per presenciam eidem ratione operacionis; esse uero per circumscriptionem, sed per accidens, ratione corporis.

Also, following the Pseudo-Augustine, Jean states that it cannot be said that it occupies a space such that a greater part of it occupies a greater place. On the contrary, the soul in total is every part of the body.

Hence Augustine in the book *On the soul and the spirit* states that in respect to the incorporeal nature of he who is everywhere supremely unchanging, namely through his presence, the soul itself is said to be corporeal or localised, since it is in one place, and therefore not in another; but it is in a place through limitation, not however that it is situated in the space of a place, so that a greater part occupies a greater part, that it is in a place through circumscription, on the contrary, it is whole in every part and completely present in each part.¹⁰⁵

Jean posits a number of states of being for the soul after its separation from the body, for example, following Augustine, he states that the soul will be where it was always, acting in the body and in that way it will be punished or rewarded.¹⁰⁶ He also follows Augustine where he states that just as it can be said that God was in some place before the World began and would be in if the World ceased to be, in the same way if the soul had being before the constitution of the body it will have it after the dissolution of the body.¹⁰⁷

1.6.11 (X) *Movement of the Separated Soul*

It is asked if the soul is moved from place to place, if it is moved suddenly or if it is moved in succession. The soul is not moved to a place but it is moved by time according to the Pseudo-Augustine. The soul is understood as passing through in

¹⁰⁵ *Summa*, C. 51, 78-84. Vnde Augustinus in libro *De anima et spiritu*, dicit quod respectu incorporee nature que summe incommutabilis est et ubique est, scilicet per presenciam, ipsa anima dicitur corporea siue localis, quia alicubi est, ita quod non alibi; hoc est esse per diffinicionem, non tamen loci spacio ita sistitur, ut maiore sui parte maiorem locum occupet, quod est esse in loco per circumscriptionem, immo in omnibus partibus corporis est tota et in singulis tota.

¹⁰⁶ *Summa*, C. 55, 11-12. Augustinus, in libro *De anima et spiritu*: 'Ibi est anima, post corporis separacionem, ubi erat agens in corpore'.

¹⁰⁷ *Summa*, C. 55, 26-28. Ita intelligendum est de anima, secundum Augustinum: si haberet esse ante constitutionem corporis, sicut habet post resolutionem.

time, as a succession is found according to a before and an after or according to a past and future, since it knows that which it did not know previously and desires that which it did not desire previously.

Hence Augustine, in the book, *On the soul and the spirit*: placed between God and the body, it moves through time, either remembering what has been forgotten, or learning what one does not know, or by willing what has been denied.¹⁰⁸

Jean's source is clearly the Pseudo-Augustine's *De spiritu et anima* where it is said that the soul does not move through space since it is not 'extended over the space of places'.¹⁰⁹

The movement of the soul is the last topic of the series of questions on the soul. The first *Consideratio* is, as was stated earlier, a fully fledged theological treatise yet some points regarding its structure and content deserve mention. The order of the topics follow a certain logical order; the soul as part of the body; the soul as it leaves the body; the soul after separation from the body. Jean places Avicenna's thought-experiment in the opening chapter thereby giving prominent place to the Arabic philosopher in his discussion on the existence of the soul. With regard to the personal nature of the first *Consideratio* it can be said that Jean incorporates the new material in order to clarify his theological beliefs. At the theological level, Augustine is the authority, but Jean shows himself to be very much open to the challenge of integrating Avicenna's works into his Augustinian account of the psychology of the soul. It is true to say that he held philosophy in high regard. The overview shows that Jean was aware of philosophical questions that are with us to this day; that of the

¹⁰⁸ *Summa*, C. 56, 44-47. Vnde Augustinus, in libro *De anima et spiritu*: anima inter Deum et corpus posita, per tempus mouetur, uel reminiscendo quod oblita fuerat, uel discendo quod ignorabat, uel uolendo quod nolebat.

¹⁰⁹ McGinn, p. 206.

mind/body problem, the immateriality of the soul, the immortality of the soul. He realised the great divide that still existed between body and soul and it is Jean's engagement with philosophy, above all with Avicenna, which helped to narrow the gap between philosophy and theology.

SECTION SEVEN

OUTLINE OF THE SECOND *CONSIDERATIO* OF THE *SUMMA*

The second main topic of my thesis is a discussion of the powers of the soul according to the Pseudo-Augustine, John Damascene, and Avicenna, the authorities on the psychology of the soul at this time. The translation of appropriate passages will be withheld for inclusion in their respective chapters.

1.7.1 *Powers of the Soul According to Pseudo-Augustine*

Recent scholarship dates the Pseudo-Augustine's work in Cistercian circles around 1170; *The Fount of Knowledge*, Damascene's major work, written in Greek in 743 was translated into Latin in the middle of the twelfth century; Avicenna's *De anima* was also translated into Latin in the twelfth century, sometime between 1152 and 1166; the reception of the texts will be examined in more detail later. The following may serve as a brief introduction to the second *Consideratio*.

Although the Pseudo-Augustine's *De spiritu et anima* was written in a predominantly theological framework it was, nevertheless, the most influential Augustinian discussion of the psychology of soul in the early thirteenth century. It is a compilation by different authors (originally it was ascribed to Alcher of Clairvaux)

and, as it was stated above, Jean also wrongly attributes the work to the genuine Augustine. Augustine's psychology was not, as we have already mentioned, a faculty psychology, so how was his name associated with the text of *De spiritu et anima*? The treatise although 'ascribed to, among others, Bernard, Hugh of St Victor, Isaac of Stella, and William of Thierry, at different times, its connection with the name of Augustine was the one that stuck'.¹¹⁰ The error was also made possible by the amount of genuine Augustinian material contained in it and also because there were those who were anxious to incorporate Augustine into the new Greek and Arabic sources but wished to do so while remaining 'in harmony with the best aspects of tradition'.¹¹¹

The first question asks whether the soul is its powers or potencies. Jean gives several positions for and against the statement that the soul is identical with its powers. Some argue, according to Jean, that the being of the soul and its activities are not the same and that, therefore, its essence and its powers are not the same. Others, he states, and he includes Augustine among them, are those who say that the soul is the same as its powers but differ only according to reason (*secundum rationem*). The assertion or non assertion of the identity was of interest to philosopher and theologian and according to McGinn it was because of the ascription to Augustine that the *De spiritu et anima* played 'an important role in the evolution of one of the major themes of thirteenth century Augustinianism'.¹¹² The anonymous author or authors of the *De spiritu et anima* defended the Augustinian view, as we will see, in Jean's treatment of the question. Jean's presentation of the powers of the soul according to the Pseudo-Augustine is considerably shorter than that of John

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p.68.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p.69.

¹¹² Ibid.

Damascene or Avicenna, but the particular passages in the *Summa* introduce the ‘new’ medical theories of the four elements and the four humours and their respective organs (liver, heart and brain). The author (or more correctly, the compiler) of the *De spiritu et anima* distinguishes between the rational, the concupiscible and the irascible powers. In addition there are five cognitive powers, they are sensation, imagination, reason, intellect and understanding. The importance of the text lies in the fact that it was connected with the commencement of Franciscan theology and for our purposes it has much to tell us about the early studies on the soul.¹¹³

1.7.2 Powers of the Soul According to Damascene

John of Damascus (c. 650/ 660–750) a monk in the monastery of Mar-Saba,¹¹⁴ near Jerusalem ‘was the son of a local Christian notable who served in the financial administration of the Caliphate of Damascus’.¹¹⁵ Little is known of the life of Damascene, but his psychology was known to the medieval scholars through his work entitled *De fide orthodoxa*.¹¹⁶ Jean quotes extensively from this work, and here I give a brief summary of the cognitive powers as outlined by Jean.

¹¹³ ‘In the late 1230’s and early 1240’s the influence of *The Spirit and the Soul* is connected with the beginnings of Franciscan theology, the current which was to provide the center for Augustinianism in the thirteenth century.’ McGinn, p. 71.

¹¹⁴ ‘The tradition that his monastery was the famous Great Laura, the monastery of St Sabas (or Mar Saba), founded in 478 by St Sabas on the steep slopes of the Wadi Kidron in the Judaeen desert, is a late tradition: there is no mention of this monastery in the account of John in the tenth-century *Synaxarion of Constantinople*; its earliest mention seems to be in the probably tenth-century Greek *vita*, composed by John, patriarch of Jerusalem. There is little doubt, however, that it was in the environs of Jerusalem that he became a monk, for one of the rare personal references in his works mentions his closeness to the patriarch (presumably John V, 706-35: *Trisag.* 26. 13-14).’ Andrew Louth, *St John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 6.

¹¹⁵ Coleman, p. 389.

¹¹⁶ See Chapter IV below (pp. 136-137) for details of the translation of *De fide Orthodox* (On the Orthodox Faith).

The first division is that of the exterior irrational powers of knowing, these are the five external senses, an explanation of the functions of each is given. The interior irrational powers are the imaginative, the excogitative (also called opinion) and the memorial powers. The imaginative is the source and origin of the external sensibles; opinion pertains to the sensitive power of judgement and is the power to conceptualise, to make judgements as regards carrying out an action or avoiding it. The power of memory stores the representations left by the senses; it also stores the types of objects on which an opinion is formed and things which it understands.

The rational powers of knowing, known as intellect or mind, follow a triple path, the way of experience, the way of conceptualising and the way of teaching; the first way passes through the senses, to the 'imaginacio', from which one forms an opinion, the mind then judging the opinion decides whether it is true or false. The second is conceptualising something that is permanently known by the soul and it refers to syllogistic reasoning, such as; the whole is greater than its parts; every continuum is a whole; therefore every continuum is greater than its parts. This way is called prudence and is an example of how Damascene's connects the virtues with the powers of the soul. The third way is the way of teaching and it refers to the transfer of insight to another. Jean then provides an exposition of the irrational appetite and the emotions that follow from it, pleasure, sadness, fear, and anger. This is followed by a discussion on the rational movement of the soul with regard to the will and reason, and he finishes with a long discussion on the question of free will. He poses two questions, the first is whether we do have free will (or not) and the second concerns the things over which we do have power.

1.7.3 *The Powers of the Soul According to Avicenna*

The treatment of the powers of the soul according to Avicenna occupies thirty-eight chapters. It follows the psychology of Avicenna for the most part but it brings in some elements from outside sources, such as in Chapter 100 where Jean discusses which cognitive faculties are at work when we are dreaming.

Briefly Jean posits three powers of the soul, the *vis vegetabilis*, the *vis sensibilis* and the *vis rationalis*. The *vis vegetabilis* is further divided into the generative, nutritive and augmentative powers; the *vis sensibilis* into the apprehensive power and the motive power. The apprehensive power is further divided into an animal mode and a natural mode, the animal mode being the cognitive power subject to reason, as in the power of sight and hearing; and the natural mode is the imagination which is not subject to reason. The motive power is likewise subdivided into a natural mode and an animal mode, the former is called the *virtus vitalis* or the *pulsativa*; the latter is the appetitive power, that is, the irascible and concupiscible powers. The third power, specific to man, is the rational soul which acts only as guided by reason.

Jean follows Avicenna's *De anima* very closely in his treatment of the external and the internal senses. The five internal senses are *fantasia* (also called the common sense by Avicenna); imagination; imaginative (also called sensitive imagination and cogitative imagination); estimative; memory; Avicenna assigns a place for each within the ventricles of the brain. The estimative power is innovative in Avicenna's account of the internal senses and, as we will see, Jean provides a comprehensive account of the estimative power and also of Avicenna's theory of

abstraction. He is one of a few authors who successively integrates an Augustinian psychology of the soul with Avicenna's theory of the agent intellect.

SECTION EIGHT INFLUENCES OF THE *SUMMA*

Jean's *Summa* is one of the principal sources of the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*, also called the *Summa Halesiana*, after Alexander of Hales (1180/1186–1245). Alexander is considered a very notable figure in the history of medieval philosophy and according to Gilson one of the first masters to teach a commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, the standard theological text of the period.¹¹⁷ It is from the studies of Victorin Doucet, published almost sixty years ago, that we now know that it was Jean who produced the first and third books of the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*.¹¹⁸ In fact, Bougerol's edition of the *Summa* is a twentieth century contribution to a process which began in the thirteenth century when it was remarked by Roger Bacon that it was not Alexander who produced it but others (*quam ipse non fecit, sed alii*).¹¹⁹ Although Alexander of Hales (d.1245) was the initiator of the work scholars today recognise the important contribution of Jean and others to the *Summa Halesiana*.¹²⁰ The fact that it was compiled by members of the same doctrinal school gives it 'a distinct signification' and Gilson continues it 'remarkably illustrates what may be

¹¹⁷ Gilson, p. 327.

¹¹⁸ Hasse, p. 51, n. 227. Doucet, *Prolegomena* (1948). (Victorin Doucet, *Alexandri Hales O.M. Summa theologica*, t. 4, *Prolegomena*, Quaracchi, 1948).

¹¹⁹ Roger Bacon, *Opera hactenus inedita*, p. 326. Quoted in Hasse, p. 51, n. 226

¹²⁰ Bougerol, pp. 38-39.

called “the spirit of the thirteenth-century Franciscan school of theology at the University of Paris”¹²¹.

In his introduction to Jean’s *Summa de anima* Bougerol highlights a number of passages in the *Summa Fratris Alexandri* corresponding to chapters in Jean’s *Summa*. The following is taken from Bougerol’s account; from a cursory reading of the content and chapter headings in the *Summa Fratris Alexandri* it seems that the list is not exhaustive. For example, Bougerol does not refer to Alexander de Hales’s employment of the terms *quod est* and *quo est* in the latter’s discussion on the simplicity of the soul. The following examples are borrowed from Bougerol to illustrate the important contribution made by Jean to the work of his master and colleague, Alexander who, ‘may truly be seen as the founder of the Franciscan School, for he gave that school both its body of teachings and its characteristic spirit’.¹²² The *Summa Fratris Alexandri* is referred to as the ‘*Summa*’ by Bougerol, the numbers refer to the ‘questions’ in Alexander’s *Summa*. The chapter numbers refer to Jean’s text.

From Book I of Alexander’s *Summa* on the study of the image, question n. 413 is reproduced from Chapter 28 of Jean. It is reproduced to the letter, including the citations from Sermon 52 of the Pseudo-Augustine. In Book II-I of the *Summa* concerning the existence of the soul certain arguments from Chapter 1 of Jean’s *Summa* appear. Also, among the definitions of the soul, the first, second and the fourth are from Jean. The treatment of the final cause of the soul in question 330 of Alexander’s *Summa* is to be found in Chapter 19 of Jean’s text. Likewise, the

¹²¹ Gilson, p. 327.

¹²² J. Guy Bourgerol, *Introduction to the works of Bonaventure*, trans. by José Vinck (New Jersey: St Anthony Guild Press), p. 15.

simplicity of the soul in question in 331 is found in Chapter 24 of Jean. The question of the place of the soul in Alexander's *Summa*, 334 and 335 are copied ad verbum from Jean's chapters, 51 and 53. Jean's chapters on image and the Trinity are also the source of much of the content of questions 336-342 of Alexander's work. There are parallels also between both works in the treatment of the powers of the soul. It is interesting to note that Jean's *Tractatus*, which was his first treatise on the powers of the soul, does not appear to be a source for Alexander's *Summa*. Jean's contribution to Alexander's *Theological Summa* deserves to be highlighted if we consider that the latter is described as a 'remarkable, indeed a unique, witness to the intellectual state of the first half of the thirteenth century'.¹²³

Jean's *Summa* is also one of the principal sources of Vincent Beauvais's *Speculum Naturale* where his *Summa* is also quoted extensively in Beauvais's work. The latter is described by Hasse as 'the most influential encyclopaedist of the Middle Ages'¹²⁴ and from Vernier we learn that he was a Dominican of the thirteenth century, lector of the Cistercian abbey of Royaumont¹²⁵ and an acquaintance of Saint Louis the King.¹²⁶ Vernier states that after the study of God as creator of all beings, of the Trinity, of angels and devils it presents an immense glossary of the Genesis story of Creation.¹²⁷ It is in Book XIII that Vincent includes a section on the soul

¹²³ Bourgerol, *The Works of Bonaventure*, p. 15.

¹²⁴ Hasse, p. 74.

¹²⁵ Vernier. *Somme de L'âme*, p. 22 n. 2. Vincent écrit lui-même que sur l'ordre du roi, il exerçait cet office à Royaumont (cf. *Epistola consolatoria, De eruditione filiorum regaliū, Tractatus de morali principis institutione*, voir Quéatif et Echard, *Scriptores O.P.*, t. 1, p. 239).

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 22 n. 3. Cf. *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, Letouzé et Ané, Paris, 1950, t. XV, 2nd partie, col. 3027-3028, art. Vincent de Beauvais par H. Peltier.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-27. Vernier provides a comprehensive survey of the sections from Jean's *Summa* and gives a detailed list of the paragraphs that are incorporated into Beauvais' work.

which according to Hasse depends heavily on Albert the Great's *De Homine* and Jean's *Summa*.¹²⁸

It is held also that Thomas Aquinas followed Jean's structure of the *Summa* in his work entitled *Disputed Questions on the Soul* which is highlighted by Bazan in the preface to his edition of this work.¹²⁹ He states that without doubt it was Jean's *Summa* which influenced Thomas Aquinas in his structuring of his questions on the soul. Bazan points to chapter thirty six of the *Summa* in which Jean discusses how he will proceed to discuss the relationship between the body and soul which corresponds to that used by Thomas Aquinas. There is further evidence which connects the two authors, for example the distinction between being and essence is already present in chapter 17 of the *Summa*, this distinction was employed by Thomas Aquinas in his work entitled the *De Ente et Essentia* and it points to the fact that Jean's work was well known to him and influenced him in his writing on the soul. It is more than likely the case that certain other doctrines which Jean exposes may help to find possible sources of theories that at times can be difficult to pinpoint.

1.8.1 Conclusion

The tradition that we are examining here stems from what has come to be known since the twentieth century as 'philosophical anthropology' a term that could be said to have had its origin in the medieval reflection on the subject of Man. One author writing on the philosophical and theological traditions of the thirteenth century states:

¹²⁸ Hasse, p. 51.

¹²⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Disputed questions on the soul*, ed. B. Carlos Bazan, *Opera Omnia*, t. XXIV, 1, (Rome-Paris, Commissio Leonina-Ed. Du Cerf. 1966), p. 102*.

It is well known that the term ‘philosophical anthropology’ has its cultural matrix in twentieth-century currents of thought. The use of such a definition in a different and definite chronological context, such as that of the thirteenth century, therefore derives the idea from contemporary philosophical studies, such as phenomenological thought, but it perfectly suits the hypothesis of research here developed, related to the outline of a doctrine of man, of medical, biological origins complementary to the traditional theological anthropology of Augustinian school.¹³⁰

This was a very specific moment in time when the philosophical works of Aristotle and Avicenna overwhelmed the intellectual scene, presenting a great challenge to the theologian writing in the early years of the thirteenth century. Jean’s *Summa* is testament to the great efforts of the scholastic writers who were writing at the very beginning of a new genre of writing on that ‘philosophical-theological enigma, the soul, which makes us humans what we are,’¹³¹ not only as it is presented in the works of Aristotle and Avicenna but also taking into account the efforts to integrate them with Augustine’s Neoplatonism on the philosophical level and with Christian dogma and principles on the theological level. It is testament to Jean that his works were known widely but more importantly, Jean knew the potential value of this new knowledge and the need to understand it and not only to provide an exposition of the many doctrines but to show that it is his own search for truth that is uppermost in his mind and this is what gives the *Summa* its distinctive shape.

¹³⁰ Vico, p. 317.

¹³¹ Edward A., Synan, : *Speculum*: 1997 Vol. 72, No. 4, pp.1188-1189 (1889).

CHAPTER II

EXPOSITION AND ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS RELATING TO SPECIFIC DOCTRINES ON THE SOUL

For the purposes of our inquiry into and analysis of themes relating to Jean's doctrines on the soul, references in this exposition of Jean's arguments regarding his specific doctrines on the soul will be made to the Greek, Arabic and Christian influences on our author where they apply to passages in Jean's text or are most relevant to their evaluation. While it may be difficult to trace conclusively the origin of some of Jean's arguments, it will be useful to refer to the views of those who, directly or indirectly, influenced his position on such topics as, for instance, the existence of the soul; the incorporeality of the soul; the soul in relation to the body and the question of the immortality of the soul.

SECTION ONE

ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL

The first topic for discussion is the existence of the soul. In order to prove the existence of the soul Jean quotes Avicenna's famous thought-experiment in support of his argument. It appears in many of Avicenna's psychological writings but we can see that Jean quotes the passage almost *verbatim* from Avicenna's *De anima*.¹ The *De anima* is part six of a work entitled *aš-Šifā*, it is Avicenna's most comprehensive work on the soul, and also known by another Latin name, the *Liber sextus de naturalibus*. The translation of the *De anima* was carried out in the middle of the twelfth century by Avendauth (also known as Abraham Ibn Daud) in collaboration

¹ Van Riet, pp. 36 49-37 68 (Book 1, c. 1).

with Dominicus Gundissalinus, archdeacon of the district of Cuéllar in the diocese of Segovia between 1162 and 1181.² It is around this time too, the middle of the twelfth century, that James of Venice translated Aristotle's treatise on the soul, the *Peri psychēs* from the Greek. This is known as the *translatio vetus* and is to be distinguished from the revision produced by William of Moerbeke between 1260 and 1269. The following is Avicenna's argument as we have it in Jean's treatise:

For this purpose the argument of Avicenna is as follows: given that a man was created immediately and, his vision has been veiled, he would not see exterior objects, and that he was made in such a way that the breadth of the air which he himself could feel would not touch him, and the limbs were separated in such a way that they do not meet nor touch each other; it is clear that man made in this way, thinking about himself, would not hesitate to affirm that he exists: however he would not affirm the outer parts of his organs nor the hidden parts of his interior organs, such as the brain or other inner organs; indeed if it were possible for him to imagine a hand, or another limb, he would not imagine that limb as his own, nor as necessary to his essence. Since therefore everything that is affirmed is different from that which is not affirmed, and that which is conceded is different from that which is not conceded, the essence however, which he affirms, is his own, because it is his very self: however this essence is apart from his body, since he does not affirm his body. Once awakened therefore from a state of this kind he has a way to realise and know that the being of the soul is different from the being of the body.³

It is employed here by Jean specifically to prove the existence of the soul, but it has been pointed out that both Jean and a number of his contemporaries misinterpreted the text to varying degrees. Jean, however, is one of three authors who placed the

² Hasse, p. 5. 'The preface to this translation tells us that the work was ordered and paid for by John, Archbishop of Toledo, to whom it is dedicated [...]. This fixes the date of the translation between 1152, the death of Archbishop Raimundus, and 1166, the death of his successor Archbishop John of Toledo'.

³ *Summa*, C. 1, 27–41. Ad hoc est ratio Avicenne talis: posito quod subito esset homo creatus perfectus et, uelato uisu suo, non uideret exteriora, et taliter creatus esset quod non tangeret eum spissitudo aeris quam ipse sentire posset, et membra sic essent disiuncta ut non concurrerent sibi, neque contingerent; constans est, quod sic conditus homo, cogitans de se, non dubitaret affirmare se esse; non tamen affirmaret exteriora suorum membrorum, uel occulta suorum interiorum, sicut cerebrum uel alia; immo si possibile esset ei ymaginari manum, uel aliud membrum, non ymaginaretur illud membrum sui, nec necessarium sue essencie. Cum ergo omne quod affirmatur aliud est ab eo quod non affirmatur, et concessum aliud est ab eo quod non conceditur, essencia autem quam affirmat est propria illi, eo quod illa est ipsemet; tamen est preter corpus eius, quod non affirmat. Expergefactus igitur ab huiusmodi statu, habet uiam euigilandi et cognoscendi quod esse anime aliud est quam esse corporis.

thought-experiment at a prominent place in the opening question of his work.⁴ In fact, it is employed by Jean in his first question, *an sit anima*. Regarding the purpose of the Flying Man, it is said that the primary objective is to point to the independence of the soul from the body. However, from a recent study of the Latin reception of the Flying Man it is clear that it was interpreted in different ways. Jean, as we see, employs the thought-experiment to prove the existence of the soul and, according to Hasse he is also one of only a few authors to come close to Avicenna's original intention in the latter's *Liber de anima*. The very first line of Jean's treatise states that it is necessary to show that the soul exists in such a way that no doubt arises as to its existence and this is followed almost immediately by Avicenna's doctrine. Although Avicenna's main purpose was to point to the incorporeal nature of the soul it will be shown that Jean follows him closely with regard to the following: that the soul is the form and perfection of the body; that it is a substance; that as a substance it can exist independently from the body. For Jean, the Flying Man thought-experiment establishes that there is a core entity that is inherent in the human being and that whatever we understand it to be, it is other than body. In other words, it points to the existence of an essence apart altogether from the physical body. Jean develops this thesis further in his use of quotes from the Pseudo-Augustine's *De spiritu et anima* (which he quotes immediately after that of Avicenna). This, as we have already seen, played a major role in medieval moral psychology. It is employed by Jean as a major source in the second *Consideratio* on the powers of the soul, that of John Damascene and Avicenna also being the authorities with regard to the psychology of the soul. The following is taken from the Pseudo-Augustinian text

⁴ Hasse, p. 90.

which Jean presents to further his argument for the self-awareness that is implied in Avicenna's thought-experiment:

Likewise, <Pseudo > Augustine in the book *On the soul and spirit*: <states> 'The mind or soul knows nothing except that which is present to itself; nothing whatsoever is more present to either the mind or the soul than itself. Therefore it knows nothing as much as it knows itself: for it understands that it lives, that it remembers, desires, understands, knows, judges; and it most certainly knows all of these things about itself.' Therefore, it is impossible that it does not know that it exists.

Likewise 'when the mind or soul asks what is the mind or soul, it certainly knows that it is asking itself; and it knows that it itself is the mind or soul which is questioning itself; nor does it ask something else about itself, but itself. Since therefore it knows that it is itself questioning, it certainly knows that it exists'.⁵

Jean's placement of this text alongside that of Avicenna is significant in light of a later reference to the Flying Man, highlighted by Sorabji, which only became available to Latin readers in the sixteenth century and which provides a more advanced account of Avicenna's reasoning as to why the Flying Man must grasp his essence. The reference is to Avicenna's work entitled the *Almahad* which was translated by Alpago, (who died in 1522), which Sorabji states became available to Latin readers a hundred years before Descartes in the Venice edition of 1546 (repr. Farnborough 1969). Avicenna gives a further explanation in another work, the *Reply to Bahmanyâr* and *al Kirmânî*⁶ which has since been translated into French.

Avicenna gives his reason why the Flying Man must grasp his essence only in this recently translated text (*Reply to Bahmanyâr*, paras. 58-59, Michot). It is that nothing grasps a thing without grasping its *own* essence as grasping.

⁵ *Summa*, C. 1, 42-51. Item, Augustinus, in libro *De anima et spiritu*: 'Nichil tam novit vel anima quam id quod sibi presto est; nec menti nec anime quicquam magis presto est quam ipsa sibi. Ergo nichil tam novit quam se: cognoscit enim uiuere se, meminisse se, uelle, cognoscere, scire, iudicare; et hec omnia certissime novit de se'. Impossibile est igitur quod ignoret se esse.

Item 'cum querit mens uel anima quid sit mens uel anima, profecto novit quod seipsam querit; et novit quod ipsa sit mens que se ipsam querit uel anima; nec aliud querit de se, sed ipsam. Cum ergo querentem se novit, se utique novit esse.'

⁶ Richard Sorabji, *Self, Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life and Death* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), p. 222.

Augustine argues, admittedly differently (*On the Trinity* 10.10.16), that nothing knows a thing without knowing *that thing's essence*.⁷

Jean had the foresight to make this connection with the Pseudo-Augustine's text and although he may not have been aware of the many ambiguities and misunderstandings associated with the Arabic-Latin translation he does, nevertheless, give us some insight into how Avicenna's influence was beginning to take hold in those early years of the thirteenth century.

Another argument taken directly from Avicenna's *De anima* by Jean introduces the distinction between the three principles of soul: the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational soul.

Since we see certain bodies which are neither nourished, nor increased nor generated, nor moved by voluntary movement, such as stones: and we see other bodies which are nourished, both increased and generating like ourselves, such as plants; and we see others which sense and are moved voluntarily; it remains that the principle of their actions is in their essence, besides corporeality. Because if the principle of their actions were corporeal, then it would be found in all bodies. Therefore since that from which those actions emanate is called soul by everyone: therefore it is soul. Besides, we see actions in which plants, animals and human beings only share such as nourishing and begetting; and actions in which only animals share, or many of them, and human beings share in and which plants do not, such as sensing, imagining and being moved voluntarily; and there are actions which are proper to human beings such as reasoning, understanding, discerning between both truth and falsity and good and evil, discovering the arts, and both deliberating and choosing freely. Therefore there is a principle of nutrition and generation in plants, indeed a principle we call the vegetative soul; in animals a principle of sensing, and in man the principle of reasoning, and of understanding etc., which is called the rational soul. Therefore there is the vegetative soul, the sensitive and the rational.⁸

⁷ Sorabji, p. 222, n. 18. "French trans. Jean (=Yahya) Michot in *Le Muséon*, 2000".

⁸ *Summa*, C. 1, 5-26. Cum videamus quedam corpora que non nutriuntur, nec augmentantur, nec generant, nec mouentur motu uoluntario, ut lapides; et uideamus alia corpora que nutriuntur, et augmentantur, et generant sibi similia, ut plantas; et uideamus alia que sentiunt et mouentur uoluntarie; relinquitur ut in essencia eorum sit principium harum actionum, preter corporeitatem. Quia si principium harum esset corporeitas, inueniretur tunc in omnibus corporibus. Cum ergo illud, a quo emanant iste actiones, ab omnibus dicatur anima: anima igitur est. Preterea, nos uidemus actiones in quibus conueniunt uegetabilia et animalia et homines tantum, sicut nutrire et generare; et actiones in quibus conueniunt animalia tantum, aut plura ex eis, et homines in quibus non conueniunt uegetabilia,

The soul, for Avicenna, comprises three species; the vegetative soul, the animal soul and the human soul. Plants, although they are truly living bodies, do not have sensation as do animals and humans but they have the three faculties of nourishment, growth and reproduction. Besides the faculties ascribed to plants, animals have, in addition, the power of sensing, perception and movement. In addition to the vegetative and sensitive faculties, human beings, have the intellectual powers of reasoning, understanding and discernment and the faculty of free will. The question as to whether this implied that there were three souls in man or whether they could be understood as faculties of one soul was the cause of much debate in the early part of the thirteenth century and it is treated below under the topic of the simplicity of the soul. The soul is described here as a principle and as ‘that from which those actions emanate’ *a quo emanant iste actiones, ab omnibus dicatur anima: anima igitur est*. Principle, in this sense, is something that is over and above the body, the material body, so to speak. This introduces Jean’s use of *quo*, as highlighted by Spruit,⁹ to explain the instrumental cause of something and which, as we will see later, Jean also employs in various ways to make distinctions, particularly that between being and existence in his discussion on the simplicity of the soul.

Avicenna shares much with Aristotle with regard to the soul and its three faculties. The basic structure of both theories are the same but we will see how they differ with regard to how each accounts for the division of the powers of the soul:

ut sentire, ymaginari et moueri uoluntarie; et actiones que sunt proprie hominum, sicut racionari, intelligere, discernere inter uerum et falsum et bonum et malum, adinuenire artes, et consiliari et libere eligere. Erit ergo in uegetabilibus principium nutrimenti et generacionis, quod quidem principium dicimus animam uegetabilem; in animalibus principium senciendi, ymaginandi et mouendi secundum appetitum, quod dicitur anima sensibilis; in hominibus uero principium racionandi et intelligendi etc., quod dicitur anima racionalis. Ergo anima uegetabilis est et sensibilis et racionalis.

⁹ Leen, Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*; Volume 1. *Classical Roots and Medieval Discussions* (Brill Studies in Intellectual History 48, 1994), p. 126.

A division of the faculties according to Aristotle would have looked different from Avicenna's, after all; to quote Aristotle's most straightforward account: 'potentias autem dicimus vegetativum, appetitivum, appetitivum, sensitivum, motivum secundum locum, intellectivum.'¹⁰

The question is asked as to why Jean does not include an Aristotelian division of the powers of the soul in either of his two philosophical treatises. Is it simply that Avicenna is the preferred philosopher for Jean? Avicenna clearly went beyond Aristotle and already we see that, in contrast to Avicenna, Aristotle 'had not conceived the notion of the self as a pure spiritual being to which its body is as much a part of the outside world as other physical things'.¹¹

SECTION TWO CAUSALITY WITH REGARD TO THE SOUL

The next topic for discussion clearly shows that Jean is indebted to Aristotle, whether directly or indirectly (via Avicenna) we cannot know, for the doctrine of the four causes is obviously well known to him. He employs the Aristotelian doctrine to explain the immaterial nature of the soul, its origin and its final cause. Jean also borrows a formula from Boethius (c. 480–524) as we have referred to above, to explain the formal cause of the soul. It was Philip the Chancellor (c.1165/85–1236) who was responsible for the re-introduction of the Boethian formula which he employed to distinguish between the simplicity of God and the hylomorphic nature of the soul, that is, that because the soul is composed of an active and a passive intellect Philip held that it, therefore, had matter and form. Rather than attribute a

¹⁰ Hasse, p. 51.

¹¹ David Ross, *Aristotle*; with a new introduction by John L. Ackrill, 6th edn (London & New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 138.

composite nature to the soul Jean employed the formula to distinguish between the ‘being’ of the soul and its ‘essence’.

The distinction between ‘being’ and ‘essence’, therefore, arose in the elaboration of the theory of universal hylomorphism, defended by the Franciscans, which maintained that there is a composition of matter and form in all beings other than the First cause.¹² Jean situates the distinction within the context of a discussion of the formal cause of the human soul in its difference from other souls, in particular from angels. It raises the question as to whether Jean’s formulation of the distinction anticipates that of St Thomas Aquinas’s (1224–1274) in his early writings on *De Ente et Essentia*.

2.2.1 THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF THE SOUL

Jean begins by addressing the question of the material origin of the human soul. That is to say, he raises the question, what is that out of which the soul is made? Before directly answering this question, he first endeavours to tell us what the soul is not made out of. It is not made out of divine substance, for instance.

2.2.1.1 *That the Soul is Not Made from a Divine Substance*

Jean quotes Augustine in support of the argument that the soul is not made from a divine substance because we know that it can be mistaken in many ways, it can be

¹² Universal hylomorphism refers to the doctrine that states that everything below the first cause is a composition of matter and form. This marks everything off from God as in God there is no such composition. Jean de La Rochelle explains the composition of everything below the first cause in terms of *quod est* and *quo est*. This is discussed in Section 2.2.2. below on the formal cause of the soul.

deceived, and it can be changed for better or for worse.¹³ Augustine states that divinity does not possess falsehood, but a soul does have falsehood, therefore, it is not truth, nor is made from truth (*ergo non est veritas, nec de veritate*). Jean continues,

Likewise from something that is substantially simple, since it does not have parts, it cannot exist as substantially different. The divine substance, however, is simple; souls, however, are substantially different: therefore, souls are not made from the divine substance.¹⁴

Jean is following Augustine here in that he holds that the soul is mutable in comparison to God's unchangeable nature. Under the influence of the Platonists, Augustine, in his early writings, believed that the human soul is part of the divine but later came to realise that the soul 'is not what God is, it is a creature made by God, not made out of God, but out of nothing.'¹⁵

2.2.1.2 *That the Soul is Not Made from Matter*

As a theologian, the fact that the soul is not made from matter is not in question. The question, rather, is whether the soul arises from a spiritual matter, or not; but what, Jean asks, is meant by spiritual matter? Jean uses a number of arguments throughout the *Summa* to show that the soul is free from any sort of matter whatsoever. The soul is incorporeal because its operation is through abstraction from matter, and since the activity follows from the nature of the power and substance, both the power and the

¹³ *Summa*, C. 14, 1-4. Quod autem non sit de diuina substancia, ostendit Augustinus, *Super Genesim*: quia si esset de Dei substancia, nec a se, nec ab alio decipi posset, nec ad faciendum, nec ad paciendum compelli, nec in melius, nec in deterius mutari.

¹⁴ *Summa*, C. 14, 8-11. Item, ex simplici secundum substanciam, cum non habeat partes, non potest esse differens secundum substanciam. Diuina autem substancia simplex est; differentes autem secundum substanciam anime sunt: non ergo de diuina substancia sunt anime.

¹⁵ Teske, 'Augustine's Theory of Soul', p. 118.

substance of the soul itself will be immaterial.¹⁶ Jean does not develop the theory of abstraction here, but later, when he discusses the powers of the soul, he puts forward a number of arguments, taken from Avicenna, to prove that the intellective power is incorporeal. The question as to whether Jean maintains the doctrine known as Avicennised Augustinianism,¹⁷ based as it is, on the authorities whose names are understood by it, will be addressed in the chapter on the powers of the soul according to Avicenna. It will examine Jean's attempt to reconcile Avicenna and Augustine in the area of intellective cognition. In brief, an exponent of the doctrine is a medieval thinker who '(1) teaches that God is the active intellect, and (2) affirms that this can be proved by establishing the concordance of Augustine with Aristotle as interpreted by Avicenna.'¹⁸

The dualistic nature of Avicenna's 'flying man' thought-experiment appears to be similar to Descartes' *Cogito*, but the similarity turns out to be superficial because both the context and the purpose of the 'flying man' thought-experiment are very different to those of the *cogito*, as Wisnovsky notes.¹⁹ Avicenna does not arrive at his thought-experiment of 'the flying man' at the termination of the process of methodic doubt; rather, Avicenna's argument is a claim about essence, or more exactly stated, about the fact that nothing grasps a thing without grasping its own

¹⁶ *Summa*, C. 15, 13-16. Preterea intellectus ipsius anime est immaterialis, quia eius operacio est per abstractionem a materia: ergo et uirtus et substancia ipsius anime erit immaterialis: operacio enim consequitur naturam uirtutis et substancie.

¹⁷ The term is first introduced in Gilson, "Pourquoi saint Thomas", p.102, n. 3. Gilson studied the phenomenon in three articles between 1926 and 1933: "Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin" (1926/27), pp. 5-127; *Les Sources gréco-arabes de l'Augustinisme avicennisant* (1929), pp. 5-149; "Roger Marston: un cas d'Augustinisme avicennisant" (1933), pp. 37-42. The most important article of the three is the first (although the term 'augustinisme avicennisant' does not appear in the title) because it discusses the traces of the doctrine in many thinkers of the 13th century. Gilson's article on Duns Scotus from 1928 does not concern Avicennised Augustinianism proper. Hasse, p. 205, n. 704.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 205.

¹⁹ Robert Wisnovsky, 'Avicenna and the Avicennian Tradition', in *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, ed. by Peter Adamson and Richard Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005; repr. 2006), p. 103.

essence as grasping. Sorabji maintains that there are certain links between Augustine and Avicenna which point to the fact that self-awareness involves turning into the interior part of ourselves. The ‘flying man’ thought-experiment is one of many ‘coincidences’ between Avicenna and Augustine which come close to Augustine’s argument for the immateriality of the soul. Sorabji argues that there must be a common Greek source for some of their ideas, given that Avicenna could not have known Augustine’s works which were written in Latin. The common source, he thinks, may be Porphyry’s *Sentences* 40. Sorabji attributes this finding to Courcelle²⁰ who, he states, ‘has compared with Augustine’s phrase “present to itself” Porphyry’s *Sentences* 40 where Porphyry says that you are by nature present to a self that is present to you [...] although you can absent yourself, rather as Augustine thinks that the soul ignores its presence to itself when it searches for itself through images’.²¹

There is a connection to be made with Descartes’s *cogito* which was written in the context of his search for first principles. Descartes’s doctrine of innate ideas has much in common with Augustine with regard to knowing the self as non-bodily. According to Descartes, we receive the ‘ideas’ of things through our capacity to think, imagine, feel, or experience, but our ‘ideas’ with regard to God, the self and self-evident truths, these are already present in the baby in the womb. The fact that Avicenna’s objective in the ‘Flying Man’ is to point to the independence of the soul (and that the other theses pertaining to the existence of the soul, the self-awareness of the soul and the substantiality of the soul, are only implied)²² does not devalue what is a powerful argument for the existence of the soul and its incorporeality.

²⁰ P. Courcelle, *Connais-toi toi-même*, Paris, 1974, vol. 1; quoted in Sorabji, p. 226, n. 27.

²¹ Ibid, p. 226.

²² Hasse, p. 51.

2.2.1.3 *That the Soul Is Not Made from a Soul*

Jean argues that if all souls were from one soul, the soul would be both communal and divisible, and, therefore, not simple.²³ The background to Jean's position may be that of Plato's *Timaeus*²⁴ and the question of the universal soul. In the *Timaeus* Plato states that the World is a living entity and that it has, in common with us, a body and soul, it is, as it were, a living organism, as if the soul were one. The notion that souls are multiplied in seeds, or in matter must be also rejected (*cum anima rationalis non dependeat a materia, nullo modo potest poni multiplicabilis in materia*) as the soul is not generated, nor procreated through the generation of the body, a theme which I will return to briefly in discussing the efficient cause of the soul.

Jean's main theological source is Augustine who clearly rejects the theory that the soul is one because, if, as he remarks, a soul is happy in one person and unhappy in another, how can a soul be said to be from a soul? Jean's goal is to prove the immateriality of the soul and here he introduces the concept of 'the intelligible species' to further his argument. He states that if the soul's intellect is material like a sense, it would not receive any sort of species that goes beyond the sense, it would receive only that species which has a likeness with a particular organ, such as sight to colour, hearing to sound and not the opposite.²⁵ Notions like quantity, contrariety and

²³ *Summa*, C. 16, 1-4. Quod non sit anima de anima uidetur. Si enim essent omnes anime de una anima, esset anima partibilis et diuisibilis et non simplex; cum ergo sit simplex et immaterialis, non erit possibile animam de anima esse.

²⁴ *Timaeus*, 41e

²⁵ *Summa*, C.16, 43-49. Intellectus anime est immaterialis; si enim esset materialis sicut sensus, non reciperet quamlibet speciem rei sensibilis supra se, sed illam speciem tantum que habet similitudinem cum organo sicut uisus colorem, auditus sonum et non e conuerso. Similiter intellectus non reciperet quamlibet speciem intelligibilem, sed aliquam sic, et aliquam non. Quare cum certum sit quod recipit quamlibet, erit immaterialis.

opposition apply to matter but when we talk about form we go beyond matter: form, he states, is transcendent.²⁶

This is of importance from the point of view of later accounts of ‘intelligible species’, as for example in Thomas Aquinas, and may be seen as an anticipation of the theory. It was present in Augustine as *ideae*, *rationes*, *formae*, or *species* which ‘were what the mind objectively confronted, not subjective mental features,’²⁷ but it was not pursued in his account of cognition. Although the senses had a role to play in Augustine’s epistemology his theory of illumination explained how things entered the mind in order to be known, his definition of ‘soul as a likeness of all things’ supports his theory of the mind. It is likely that Jean was influenced by his teacher William of Auxerre (c. 1140–1231) in the latter’s early synthesis of Christian philosophy and the philosophy of Aristotle. While William retained Augustine’s doctrine of divine illumination he also accepted the Aristotelian notion of abstraction of forms by the intellect. He held that the ‘material intellect’, Aristotle’s potential intellect, had to receive its *species* from *species* of corporeal things. Jean’s reference to the ‘intelligible species’ emphasises the fact that we cannot describe the intellect in terms of matter and form in the way that we can describe things that are capable of generation and corruption. His explanation is that the soul is ‘perfectible according to knowledge and virtue’ and that it is not ‘constituted by means of form’ a point he will develop in the next chapter on the formal cause of the soul.

²⁶ *Summa*, C. 16, 63-70. Dicendum est enim quod materia non habet determinari nisi secundum id quod est eius nocio: uerbi gracia, quantitas habet determinare materia, et est eius nocio; similiter et motus contrarietatis. Quandoque ergo per quantitatem determinatur materia, et non per contrarietatem, ut in celestibus. Nunquam autem per substancialem formam determinatur cum qua ueniat in composicionem. Forma igitur non determinat materiam quoniam ipsa est transcendens, sed quantitas non inuenitur nisi in materia.

²⁷ Joseph Owens, ‘Faith, Ideas, Illumination and Experience’, in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. by Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 442.

The doctrine of ‘intelligible species’ reaches a high point in Thomas Aquinas who returns to a theme that goes back to Aristotle, that of phantasms; phantasms are the objects towards which the intellect must constantly turn ‘not only in order to acquire intelligible species, but also somehow to inspect those species in phantasms’.²⁸ Imagination is what produces the phantasms on the level of the senses, but on the level of cognition the agent intellect produces the intelligible species.

2.2.2 THE FORMAL CAUSE OF THE SOUL

When referring to the formal cause of the soul Jean employs the concepts of ‘*quod est*’ and ‘*quo est*’. These, as we have referred to them above, have been called the ‘forgotten formulae of Boethius’, which, as Crowley notes, were re-introduced by Philip the Chancellor (d.1236).²⁹ Philip’s work, entitled the *Summa de Bono*, is frequently the theological reference point for Jean in the *Summa*. The *quod est*, as interpreted by Jean, refers to the ‘being’ of the soul, the *quo est* refers to the essence of the soul.

Therefore, in every creature ‘that which exists’ namely, being itself, is different from ‘that through which it exists’, namely its essence; because since it is a being through participation, it is not its essence.³⁰

The distinction between *quod est* and *quo est* has been variously interpreted by philosophers throughout the Middle Ages. Boethius (c.480–c.525) introduced the distinction in his treatise *De Trinitate* where he argues that the Divine Substance is form without matter and is its own substance. Jean quotes from the *De Trinitate* (the

²⁸ Robert Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 289.

²⁹ Theodore Crowley, *Roger Bacon: The Problem of the Soul in Philosophical Commentaries* (Louvain & Dublin: Duffy & Co. Ltd., 1950), p. 81.

³⁰ *Summa*, C. 17, 31-34. Est ergo in qualibet creatura ens differens quod est, scilicet ipsum ens, ab eo quo est, scilicet sua essentia; quia cum sit ens per participacionem, non est sua essentia.

first of Boethius's five treatises known as the *Opuscula Sacra* which survived into the Middle Ages) in support of the view that created being is of a composite nature whereas divine being is of a simple nature.³¹ In the third treatise Boethius deals with being and goodness. He poses the following problem: if everything is good in that 'it is', and if everything receives its goodness from God, is everything, therefore, identical with God? Boethius's solution is contained in the distinction between *id quod est et esse*: 'Being and the thing that is are different. For simple being awaits manifestation, but the thing that is "is" and exists as soon as it has received the form which gives it being.'³²

Jean states that the constitutive principles *quod est* and *quo est* are to be found in everything below the First cause since everything below the First is a being through participation. Therefore, the 'being' or the 'subject' (*quod est*) of an essence is different from its 'nature', the latter being that through which it is an essence (*quo est*). If we say that God is good through his essence, since by our understanding he is good, 'to be' and 'to be good' are the same for him. With regard to anything below the First cause, however, a creature is good because it is ordered toward the highest good. With regard to the soul it is a created 'being' (*quod est*) created by God out of nothing, the nature of the soul (*quo est*) is understood as an 'essence' received from God. In addition to their composition of matter and form which 'is a receptive and

³¹ *Summa*, C 17, 5-6. Hoc videtur per Boecium, in libro *De Trinitate*; 'In omni eo quod est citra Primum, est hoc et hoc.'

³² Boethius, *De Trinitate*, ed. Steward-Rand, *Loeb classics*, vol. 74, ch. 2, p. 41: 'Diversum est esse et id quod est; ipsum enim esse nondum est, at vero quod est accepta essendi forma est atque consistit.' This distinction would appear to be echoed in Heidegger's meditation on the 'ontological difference' and the latter's famous attempt to raise anew the question of 'the meaning of Being (*Sinn von Sein*)' in its difference from 'that-which-is (*das Seiende*)'.

passive potential in a creature',³³ human beings, therefore, have this second composition, that of 'being and essence'.

Jean asks whether there are specific differences between the soul and an angel even if it can be said that they share the same formal cause of their being. In so far as it can be a part of an angel's composition, 'that through which' an angel exists is 'intellectuality' and 'that which it is' is an intellectual substance; in the case of human being 'that through which' it is a human being is rationality and 'that which it is' is a rational substance. Jean accounts for a number of differences according to species and according to essence, e.g., the angelic intellect is not directed towards sensation whereas the human intellect begins at this level and it is so directed. An angel has being as a person, a soul has being as a form and as a perfection. An angel is like God in its intellect and according to act because from the beginning of its condition it has the forms imprinted on it for the purpose of knowing the nature of things. In contrast Jean holds that the human soul is like a clean writing tablet which contains possibilities for the forms. Jean wants to present an argument for the formal cause of the soul in a manner which is acceptable to Christians but in admitting composition of *quod est* and *quo est* Jean seems to deny the simplicity of the soul.

According to Burrell it was philosophers in the Arabic tradition who were the first to distinguish 'what constitutes the individual, namely its existing, from what makes it the kind of thing it is',³⁴ but as we have seen these speculations were already familiar to medieval thinkers, 'especially from the ninth century when they

³³ *Summa*, C.17, 60-61. Secundum primum modum, est in creatura potencia receptiua et passiuua; iuxta secundum modum, potencia actiua.

³⁴ David B. Burrell, 'Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish thinkers', in *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas*, ed. by Norman Kretzmann & Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 60-84 (pp. 64-65).

first aroused interest.³⁵ According to Parviz Morewedge, however, it is a matter of contention regarding whether Aristotle made a distinction between essence and existence, or not.³⁶ He acknowledges the monumental work of A.N. Goichon³⁷ and N. Resher³⁸ who refer to a passage in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*:

But if you are to prove what it is and that it is, how will you prove them by the same argument? For both the definition and the demonstration make one thing clear; but what a man is and that a man is are different.³⁹

Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274) in *De Ente et Essentia* is especially indebted to Avicenna's remarks made on essence and existence, for, Thomas too argues that in God alone there is no distinction between essence and existence, 'no becoming, no potency, because he is pure existence without contingency or finiteness.'⁴⁰ He rejects the form–matter composition in non-bodily substances and, instead, ascribes the essence–existence composition to them. Thomas restrictedhylomorphic composition to corporeal bodies while Bonaventure (1217-1274) held the opposite view, that angels must be hylomorphically composed, 'otherwise they would be pure act and God alone is pure act'.⁴¹ Bonaventure appealed to the doctrine of seminal reasons in order to explain how forms are imparted to matter in two modes; in one mode the primary cause is God but in a secondary manner we see that parents produce new life through their activity. There is something in matter, a seed, like an acorn which becomes an oak tree: the agent gives to the essence, already present in matter, a new

³⁵ David Luscombe, *Medieval Thought* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 21.

³⁶ Parviz Morewedge, *The 'Metaphysica' of Avicenna (Ibn Sinā)* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 182.

³⁷ A.-M. Goichon, *La distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sinā (Avicenna)* (Paris: 1937), p. 132, cited in Morewedge, p.183, n. 56.

³⁸ Nicholas Resher, *Studies in Arabic Philosophy* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1967), p. 73; cited in Morewedge, p.185, n. 62.

³⁹ Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* Book II Chapter 7, 92 b 8. *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. by Jonathan Barnes Volume One (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984).

⁴⁰ Luscombe, *Medieval Thought*, p. 101.

⁴¹ Frederick Copleson, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 2 (New York: Image Books, 1962), p. 49.

form of existence, transforming an essence really existing in matter from a potential to an actual form. While the souls of animals and plants arise entirely from seminal reasons, the human soul enters the body after it has gone through a process which is explained in terms of the celestial bodies and the four elements. Thus the human body is a composite of many forms. Thomas, however, argued against this position in the debate on the plurality of forms which provoked lively discussion in the thirteenth century. For Thomas, form is ultimate, there is only one form of the living human being, its soul, and as Gilson remarks there is no form of the form.⁴²

Arguing for his position regarding angels Thomas appealed to the distinction between potency and act as something which runs through the whole of creation and as such he can claim that angels display potentiality in their performance of acts of will and intellect.

Now whatever acquires something from another has a potentiality for what it acquires, a potentiality that what is acquired actualizes; so the very whatness or form which an intelligence is has the potentiality for the existence it acquires from God and the acquired existence actualizes it.⁴³

Therefore, there is composition in an angel, namely, composition of form and existence. In substances composed of matter and form, however, there is a double composition of act and potentiality, the first is a composition of matter and form, the second a composition of the latter with existence. This second composition is called by Thomas the *quod est* and *esse* or the *quod est* and the *quo est*. In a chapter of the *De Ente et Essentia* entitled ‘The Compositeness of Intelligences’, Thomas makes

⁴² Gilson, p. 376.

⁴³ ‘Omne autem quod recipit aliquid ab alio, est in potentia respectu illius; et hoc quod receptum est in eo, est actus eius. Oportet ergo quod ipsa quiditas vel forma quae est intelligentia, sit in potentia respectu esse quod a Deo recipit; et illud esse receptum per modum actus.’ ‘De Ente et essentia’ (Caput V) in *Opuscula Et Textus: Historiam Ecclesiae Eiusque Vitam Atque Doctrinam Et Mystica* (Aschendorff: Monasterii, 1926), p. 44.

use of the formula *quo est et quod est* as he states, ‘so some people say such things are composed of that which and that by which, or from that which exists and existence as Boethius says’.⁴⁴ The editors of the Leonine edition of the *De Ente et Essentia* point to a variant reading of the line in question and to its authenticity.⁴⁵ According to Etienne Gilson, there is great confusion regarding the use of Boethius’s terminology in its Thomistic meaning.⁴⁶ He maintains, ‘the very precision of his [Boethius’s] formulas was to make it more difficult for his successors to go beyond the level of substance up the level of existence, but they helped those who succeeded in doing to formulate their own thought in strictly accurate terms.’⁴⁷ In fact, this formula is used by Thomas in thirty-six cases throughout his many works.⁴⁸

In some instances, Thomas acknowledges two sources and two formulations, they are: *id quod est et esse*, attributed to Boethius; and that of *quod est et quo est*, the source of which is attributed to ‘*quidam*’ or in another case to ‘*alii*’ (the Latin translated respectively as ‘certain persons’ and ‘others’). Considering the dates of two of the works in which Thomas employs the formulae indicates he maintained the distinction throughout most of his works, one example, which I have already referred to, is the *De Ente et Essentia*, written between 1252–1256; the second work, the

⁴⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *De Ente et Essentia*, in *Aquinas Selected Philosophical Writings*, ed. by Timothy M^cDermott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 105. Latin Text: Et propter hoc a quibusdam dicuntur huiusmodi substantie componi ex quo est et quod est, vel ex quod est et esse, ut Boethius dicit. See <http://www.corpusthomicum.org/it/index.age> > *De Ente et Essentia*, cap. 3 (Case 33. Place 39)

⁴⁵ Sancti Thomae de Aquino, *Opera Omnia, De Ente et Essentia*, Tomus XL111. Editori di San Tommaso, Roma, 1976. p. 351 ch. 4. line. 165: ‘[componi ex quo est et quod est, vel ex *quod* est et esse ut Boethius dicit] Au lieu de *quod*, les anciens – sauf b g - ont *quo*: cette leçon de l’archétype ne peut se recommander ni de Boèce, qui écrit: “diversum est esse et quod est” (PL 64, 1311 B); ni de saint Thomas, dont l’autographe du *Contra Gentiles* 11, 54, lieu parralèle de celui-ci, porte exactement: “quibusdam dicitur ex quod est et esse, vel ex quod est et quod est”.’ (ms. Vat. lat. 9850, fol. 42 vb).

⁴⁶ Gilson, p. 421.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁴⁸ A search in the *Index Thomisticus* revealed this result: <<http://www.corpusthomicum.org/it/index.age>>.

Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima was written in the year 1269.⁴⁹ If we examine some quotes from Jean's *Summa*, however, we see clearly that he had already made this distinction with regard to immaterial substances. As we have seen in his discussion of the formal cause of the soul Jean writes: 'that which exists' and 'that through which it exists' is different in created being,⁵⁰ again, 'therefore it is clear that "that which exists" and "that through which it exists" namely the essence differ in the soul',⁵¹ and further, 'therefore one should say that spiritual beings and the rational soul have a composition made from the essential parts, which are the parts "that which exists" and "that through which it exists"'.⁵² Thus Jean's *Summa*, written between 1235–1236 may have been the source for Thomas's position in *De Ente et Essentia*. Further evidence which connects the two authors can be found in the preface to Thomas's *Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima*. The editor, B.C. Bazan, states that, without doubt, it was Jean's *Summa* which influenced Thomas's structure of the disputed questions on the soul. He points to Chapter Thirty Six of the *Summa* where Jean explains the structure of his work in terms which anticipates the structure of Thomas's questions.⁵³ Jean's work was, therefore, well known to Thomas and it is testament to the quality of his work that it influenced Thomas in his writing on the soul, the question is to what extent; this will become clearer as our study progresses.

⁴⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima*, p. 51: 'Et hinc est quod Boethius dicit in libro ebdomadibus, quod in aliis que sunt post Deum differt esse et quod est, vel, sicut quidam dicunt, quod est et quo est, nam ipsum esse est quo aliquid est, sicut cursus est quo aliquis currit.'

⁵⁰ *Summa*, C.17, 44-45. Et ideo erit differens in ente creato quod est et quo est.

⁵¹ Ibid, 54-55. Patet ergo quod differt in anima quo est, scilicet essentia et quod est.

⁵² Ibid, 67-69. Dicendum est ergo quod spiritualia et anima rationalis compositionem habent ex partibus essentialibus que partes sunt quod est et quo est, quia sunt a Deo et de nichilo.

⁵³ B.C. Bazan, 'Preface', in Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputante De anima*, ed by Bazan, p. 102: 'Saint Thomas a structuré soigneusement la série de questions disputes sur l'âme unie au corps: sept questions consacrées à l'essence de l'âme; sept questions consacrées à l'âme unie au corps; sept consacrées à l'âme séparée du corps. Cette structure lui a été suggéré, sans doute, par la Summa de Summa de anima de Jean de La Rochelle. En effet, dans le chapitre 36 (XXXIV) de la première partie de cette somme, Jean de La Rochelle explique la structure de son oeuvre dans des termes qui rappellent la structure des questions de saint Thomas: "Dicto de anima secundum esse absolutum [...] secunda de modo essendi in corpore; tercia de esse post separacionem a corpore" [Bougerol, p.114].'

2.2.3 THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF THE SOUL

For Jean, as a theologian, God alone is the efficient cause of the soul; no creature can be its efficient cause (*cum ergo anima rationalis sit de nichilo, nulla potentia creata potest educere eam in esse*). While Jean does not refer directly to Avicenna, Gilson states that no one could have read Avicenna and ignored his notions of a moving cause and of an efficient cause. Avicenna was one of the first philosophers to recognize that the notion of creation required more than Aristotle's 'moving cause'. Aristotle's universe consisted of substances, material substances defined in terms of matter and form and eternal substances which required no explanation as their whole nature is being *qua* being. In his *Metaphysics* Avicenna introduced two notions of productive causality: first, that of Aristotle's moving cause, which connects the moving power with causal power, but in order to introduce existence to the created world Avicenna introduced a second notion, that of a creating cause. God was the Prime Mover, as Aristotle held, but for Avicenna the prime mover 'is only the first principle in the series of causes and is not the cause of the perfection of every entity.'⁵⁴ Quoting from Aristotle, Jean states, 'the intellect alone originates in a divine way from an exterior principle'.⁵⁵ This chapter deals with the distinction between spontaneous life and life that is created *ex nihilo*. Jean refers to the doctrine known as traducianism (*ex traduce per generacionem*) which holds that souls are propagated along with bodies. This would bring the immateriality of the soul into question, but Jean argues that no created power can create, or bring forth something from nothing and he states that every power is subject to its efficient cause; however,

⁵⁴ Morewedge, p. 209.

⁵⁵ *Summa*, C. 18, 22-25. Item, dicit Aristoteles, in libro *De animalibus*, quod solus intellectus diuinitus ab extrinseco prouenit: ergo solum anima rationalis est ab extrinseco; anima ergo sensibilis et uegetabilis seminatur. Compare: Aristoteles Latinus: Translator: Guillelmus de Morbecka, *De generatione animalium*, liber 2, cap.: 3 (Bekker: 736b): Relinquitur autem intellectum solum deforis aduenire et diuinum esse solum: nichil enim ipsius operationi communicat corporalis operatio.

the power of the rational soul, in accordance with free will, is not subject to any creature since it cannot be forced by anything. Therefore, no creature is its efficient cause and he concludes that, therefore, God alone is its efficient cause and creator.

The influence of Avicenna's theory of emanation is apparent in Jean's positing of the power of an intelligence, or of an angelic substance as the source of the sensitive soul.⁵⁶ Avicenna's theory of emanation comprises a 'translunar region comprising nine primary spheres that contain the planets, the sun and the moon'⁵⁷ where each sphere is accompanied by an incorporeal intelligence, at the summit of which is the First Cause and at the lowest point in the chain of incorporeal intelligences is the active intellect. It is the active intellect which figures large in Jean's theory of cognition in the second part of the *Summa*. Although the agent intellect for Avicenna is separate and one for all men this does not put Jean's theory into doubt since, as Gilson notes, he still holds the view that we each possess an active intellect and that God and the angels can be considered as so many separate agent intellects.⁵⁸

2.2.4 THE FINAL CAUSE OF THE SOUL

The final cause of the rational soul is beatitude or love of God.⁵⁹ In this life as human beings we can participate in the goodness of God by knowing, loving and possessing the highest good. All of these come together in a fourth way, which is enjoyment in loving God. In this life too, knowing, loving and possessing are related to the three

⁵⁶ *Summa*, C. 18, 30-34. Exitus anime sensibilis non a uirtute celi corporei, sed a uirtute celi mouente celum, que est uirtus intelligencie siue substantia angelica; que intelligencia, cum sit incorporea, bene potest esse principium substantie incorporee.

⁵⁷ Davidson, p. 74.

⁵⁸ Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, p. 331

⁵⁹ *Summa*, C. 19, 12-15. Facta est rationalis creatura primo modo ut intelligeret summam bonitatem, et intelligendo amaret, amando possideret, possidendo frueretur.

theological virtues: understanding to faith, loving to charity and possessing to hope. It is said that in a second way the soul is made for the goodness of God, that is, that we are made to serve God by acts of praising, serving and enjoying the highest good (*facta est ut laudaret, serviret et frueretur ipsa summa bonitate*). These issues originated in Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, the basic book for the study of theology at this time, but it is interesting to note that this work was not used at the University of Paris until the time of Alexander of Hales (between 1223 and 1227) who was a master and colleague of our author. The purpose of the rational soul is also posited as the healing of a fallen angel (*dico quod reparacio est quantum ad angelos bonos et hoc secundum quid, non simpliciter*) this is very similar to what we find in the *Sentences*.⁶⁰ Jean states that this is a purpose by accident (*per accidens*) which may mean that it is just one purpose among many, but to understand what it means to say that an angel or a soul are created on account of goodness we should return to the text of the *Sentences* where it is stated that the rational soul and an angel share in the beatitude of God through intelligence.

And in this manner He [God] distinguished it, so that part would remain in its purity and not be united with a body, namely the Angels, part would be joined to a body, namely souls. And so the rational creature is distinguished into the incorporeal and the corporeal; and indeed the incorporeal [is called] an 'Angel', but the corporeal is called a 'man', subsisting out of a rational soul and the flesh.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Peter Lombard, *The Four Books of Sentences*, Book II, d. 1, Part 1, c. V. De homine quoque in scriptura interdum reperitur, quod factus sit propter reparationem angelicae ruinae. <<http://www.franciscan-archive.org/lombardus/opera/1s2-01.html>> [accessed 16/10/2009].

⁶¹ Ibid, Book II, d. 1, Part II, c. 1V. Eamque hoc modo distinxit, ut pars in sui puritate permaneret nec corpori uniretur, scilicet Angeli, pars corpori iungeretur, scilicet animae. Distincta est itaque rationalis creatura in incorpoream et corpoream; et incorporea quidem Angelus, corporea vero homo vocatur, ex anima rationali et carne subsistens.

This is also brought out in Jean's text where he states that beatitude in the rational creature must refer to both the body and the soul whereas that of an angel is in one nature alone.⁶²

SECTION THREE THE BEING OF THE SOUL

The next topic for discussion is the being of the soul which, Jean states, must be examined with regard to two modes; that of absolute being and that of being in relation to the body. First absolute being refers to that which can exist by itself, it has *esse absolutum*. Applying the Aristotelian language of substance and accident to the being of the soul Jean holds that the soul is a substance, a *hoc aliquid*.

2.3.1 *Soul as a Substance*

Jean's first argument for stating that the soul is a substance is:

The first reason is: everything that moves and governs a substance is a substance; for a mover of this kind does not depend on that which it moves, and in this way the soul does not have dependent existence; therefore it is not an accident, therefore it is a substance, which must be conceded. Besides, no accident at all is more noble than a substance; but everything that moves a substance is more noble and more powerful and more actual than a moved substance; therefore etc., Further, everything that moves a substance is more noble and more actual than a moved substance; therefore etc.⁶³

⁶² *Summa*, C. 19, 44-50. Cum ergo finis rationalis anime sit beatitudo, tota anima rationalis erit beatificabilis; sed non est beatitudo nisi in Deo, ergo tota anima beatificabitur in Deo: ergo et quantum ad sensum et quantum ad intellectum; sed quantum ad sensum non potest beatificari in Deo secundum naturam diuinam, sed solum quantum ad intellectum; finis ergo ipsius anime rationalis erit beatificatio in utraque natura.

⁶³ *Summa*, C. 22, 2-8. Primo ratio est: omne quod mouet substanciam et regit, est substancia; mouens enim in quantum huiusmodi non dependet ab eo quod mouet, et sic anima non habet esse dependens: ergo non est accidens, ergo substancia, quod concedendum est. Preterea, nullum accidens omnino est nobilius substancia; sed omne mouens substanciam nobilius est et uirtuosius et actualius substancia mota; ergo etc.

A substance is distinguished from an accident in that it is the substance that sustains it and as a substance it can exist independently, whereas an accident needs a substance for its existence. Aristotle states, primary substances are neither ‘said of’ a subject nor ‘in’ a subject, whereas other things are either said of them as subjects or in them as subjects.⁶⁴ The question arises as to whether Aristotle held that the soul is a substance. One position is that while according to Aristotle the soul (*psychê*) is not a substance, God is a substance, a view which clearly contrasts with Avicenna for whom the soul is a substance whereas the Necessary Existent is not.⁶⁵ The question at the centre of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* is whether the three aspects of reality, that is, form, matter and the composite are really substances. In the introduction to his translation of Aristotle’s *De anima*, Hugh Lawson Tancred writes with regard to the candidates for substance:

For something to be substance in the fullest sense, it must be the possible subject of a definition and thus of fundamental knowledge, and it must thus constitute the *logos* of a particular thing. It is further required that it should be connected with a thing’s persisting through change and indeed be the cause of its so doing. Finally it must represent the fulfillment or realization of the particular thing. None of these requirements is wholly clear in itself, but it does seem that Aristotle’s mind is made up that these, vague as they are, will be the features of that which he will be most ready to recognize as deserving to be called substance, and on these grounds it is clear enough that the most successful candidates will be essence and closely related notion of form.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Aristoteles Latinus: Translator: Guillelmus de Morbeka: *Categoriae* [vel Praedicamenta] cap.: 5 (Bekker: 2a11). Substantia autem est que propriissime et primo et maxime dicitur, que neque de subiecto aliquo dicitur neque in subiecto aliquo est, veluti quidam homo et quidam equus. Secunde autem substantie dicuntur species, in quibus speciebus que dicuntur prime substantie existunt, eadem que et genera specierum harum, puta aliquis homo in specie quidem existit homine, genus autem speciei est animal; secunde igitur hee dicuntur substantie, puta homo et animal.

⁶⁵ Morewedge, p. 195. ‘From the extensional point of view (i.e. on what kinds of substances there are), ibn Sīnā and Aristotle hold different views. Regardless of how we interpret Aristotle’s remarks on *nous* (the active intelligence) we can claim that according to Aristotle the soul (*psychê*) is not a substance while God (*theós*) is a substance. For ibn Sīnā, on the other hand, a soul (*nafs*) is a substance, whereas the Necessary Existent [...] is definitely not a substance.’

⁶⁶ Aristotle, *De Anima (On the Soul)*, Translated, with an introduction and notes, by Hugh Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin Books, 1986), p. 63.

Additionally, Ross states, when viewed abstractly substance can be described in terms of the essence but when viewed concretely we can look to its efficient or final cause, as he states, ‘the reason why this flesh and these bones make a man is that they are informed by the form of form, the human soul.’⁶⁷

Aristotle’s understanding of substance is that which is composed of matter and form but as we have seen Jean rejects hylomorphism of the soul and instead employs the distinction between stating ‘that a thing is’ and ‘that through which a thing is’. This distinction underpins Jean’s position on the soul and while it was referred to by Aristotle and others it is Avicenna who thus ‘transforms a logical distinction between essence and existence into an ontological distinction of great import’.⁶⁸ Avicenna also accepted the substance and accident division according to Aristotle. He posits a hierarchy of substances; immaterial substances are the highest, next is form, next is that which is composed of matter and form and finally matter itself.⁶⁹

In his discussion on the soul’s relationship to the body Jean states clearly that the soul is united to the body as its form and perfection. Avicenna refers to the soul as an ‘*entelechy*’ as in Aristotle’s definition of the soul and as Rahman states in Avicenna an ‘*entelechy*’ is a term ‘which describes the soul’s relationship with the body, just as if we describe a man as a builder the building will be included in the definition, but this does not describe the nature of the man taken in himself as man,

⁶⁷ Ross, David, *Aristotle* (London & New York, 1995), p.178.

⁶⁸ Soheil, M. Afnan, *Avicenna – His Life and Works* (Connecticut: Greenword Publishers, 1980), p.117.

⁶⁹ Afnan, p.110. “Substance could be in different states. Where it is part of a body it could be its form, or it could be its matter; and if it is entirely apart and separate, it could have a relation of authority over the body through movement and it is then called ‘the soul’; and it could be entirely free of matter in every way and it is then called ‘an intellect.’”

i.e. whether he is a substance or not.⁷⁰ Avicenna uses the concept of *entelechy* but he uses it in a wider sense than form and it is in this sense that Jean states that the soul is the perfection of the body. This guarantees that it is a separable substance and provides the basis for his argument for the immortality of the soul. It is important, however, to state that Avicenna stressed that the soul is not an ordinary form, just as Jean states that it is a complete thing in itself, an *unum quid*, as he states. It is, in Aristotelian terms, an *entelechy* and a substance in itself. Avicenna was also arguing against a tradition, that in the conception of the soul as a substance some held that the soul was a physical or corporeal thing:

Accordingly, Ibn Sīnā follows Aristotle in emphasizing that some entelechies are mere forms, while others are substances: The soul that simply animates an organic body is its form. Here soul is to body as seaworthiness is to ship. But the rational soul, the human mind or consciousness, does more and is more. It is a substance and in principle separable from the body.⁷¹

A second argument for the substance of the soul refers to its potential to receive an opposite. Everything that receives an opposite as such, while remaining unchanged as regards its essence, is a substance. This can be applied in a simple case of an apple, which although it changes its outward appearance, in its essence it remains the same. On a higher level, but following the same principle, the soul receives opposites, as for example, when it moves from ignorance to knowledge, yet in essence, it is the same substance. Although the soul is a substance, Jean states, it is

⁷⁰ Rahman, F, *Avicenna's Psychology: An English Translation of Kitāb Al-Najāt* Book II, Chapter VI with Historico-Philosophical Notes and Textual Improvements on The Cairo Edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 9. 'Now, Avicenna continues, to say that the soul is 'form' is to say that the soul is an entelechy, for it is the soul which perfects the several species of living beings, i.e. makes a particular living being a member of a particular species.'

⁷¹ Goodman, L.E. *Avicenna*, (London & New York: Routledge, 1992) p. 155.

not a substance like matter, nor is it substantial form only, it is a complete thing in itself, fixed in its nature.⁷²

2.3.2 *Simplicity of the Soul*

In his discussion on the simplicity of the soul Jean describes a hierarchy of substances very similar to the Avicennian distinctions above; there exists improper, common and proper substances; when something is composed of matter and form it is an improper substance; a common substance refers to spiritual or immaterial substance; a proper substance refers to God.

But it should be noted that substance is called simple in three ways: improperly, commonly and properly. For instance, improperly, it is called simple in a certain respect and in comparison, just as the elements with respect to the elements of the body are called simple, but which are composed of matter and form. Commonly something is called simple which by comparison and according to itself, in a certain way is called simple, such as spiritual substances which in comparison to the elements are called simple, and also in a certain way: but they do not have a composition which is of matter and form; however they have the composition of ‘that which is’ and ‘that through which it is’. But properly and absolutely something is simple in which there is not a composition of matter and form nor the difference between ‘that which exists’ and ‘that through which it exists’, as in the case of God: for God and divinity do not differ, in the same way as man and humanity differ; since when I say man I indicate ‘that he exists’ and when I say humanity I state ‘that through which he exists’. However when I say body, I am referring to matter; when I say soul, I am referring to form.⁷³

⁷² *Summa*, C. 22, 8-16. Item, omne quod recipit secundum se opposita, manens secundum essenciam intransmutatum, est substantia; nec est instancia in quantitate et superficie, quae non transmutata recipit contrarios colores, quia non recipit colores secundum se, immo secundum uirtutem subsistentem corporee substantie. Sed anima secundum se recipit opposita intransmutata secundum essenciam, ut sciencie et ignorancie, ergo est substantia. Eisdem rationibus ostenditur quod anima non est substantia ut materia, nec est ut substantialis forma tantum, sed ut unum quid, fixum in sua natura.

⁷³ *Summa*, C. 25, 3-16. Sed notandum quod substantia simplex dicitur tripliciter: improprie, communiter et proprie. Improprie quidem, secundum quid et in comparacione, simplex dicitur, sicut elementa respectu elementorum corporum dicuntur simplicia, que tamen composita sunt ex materia et forma. Communiter dicitur simplex quod in comparacione et secundum se, quodam modo simplex dicitur, ut spirituales substantie que comparacione elementorum simplicia dicuntur, et eciam in se quodam modo: non enim habent compositionem que est ex materia et forma; habent tamen compositionem eius quod est et quo est. Proprie uero et absolute simplex est in quo non est compositio materie et forme, nec differencia eius quod est et quo est, ut Deus: non enim differt Deus

Jean makes further use of the distinction between something existing and that by which it exists, being is analysed into essence and existence to distinguish all of creation from the Creator. In this instance, however, he refers to a universal term, 'humanity' which belongs to the definition of man but it has nothing to do with existence. Universals, for Aristotle, are things which are said of primary substances, they are distinguished from particulars in that they are to be found in many places at once, whereas particulars can only be in one place at any one time. Aristotle agreed with Plato in admitting the reality of universals but he argued against Plato treating them as other worldly and independent of the particulars to which they referred. Aristotle refers to universals as characteristics common to many different individual objects or persons and for him these are as real as the individual objects or persons themselves. He was not, however, interested in the 'existential' sense of being, substance is what exists and can be explained as what something is and in the final analysis its being it is reduced to its essence.

For Avicenna, '(A)ll true being is true according to its essential reality'⁷⁴, in the case of man he possesses a 'unique reality' something that the senses cannot perceive but that is 'pure intelligible'.⁷⁵ Universals, according to Avicenna, have a 'triple existence'. They are before things, *ante res*; they are in things, *in rebus*; and they are after things, *post res*, at one and the same time'.⁷⁶ The first of these refers to the ideas in the understanding of God as God must have an idea of what a man or animal is; the second refers to the 'sensible existence' as it is attached to matter; the

et deitas, sicut homo et humanitas; quia cum dico hominem significo quod est, cum dico humanitatem dico quo est. Cum autem dico corpus, dico materiam; cum uero dico animam, dico formam.

⁷⁴ Afnan, p. 120.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Afnan, p. 267.

third refers to when the mind abstracts the universal from the particular sense experience and forms a ‘conceptual notion’ of the universal. Clearly Jean accepts Avicenna’s account of universals as real substances. According to Afnan, however, Avicenna also tended towards nominalism in his logic (the latter being the theory that universals are just names attached to classes) and therefore he contends that it is more correct to call him a ‘conceptualist’.⁷⁷ If we, however, consider universals in a causal sense when Jean refers to ‘humanity’ as ‘that through which’ man has existence, we can, with Avicenna, see that although universals exist only as concepts this does not ‘prevent them from being real common natures of things’.⁷⁸ In this understanding of universality Marenbon explains that what Avicenna means is that although a general term can be used in the particular or universal sense that when it comes to considering ‘common natures’ they are neither universal nor individual. Avicenna has, as Marenbon states, ‘explained a certain veridical way in which things can be regarded’.⁷⁹

The definition of, for instance, ‘horseness, is not the same as and does not include universality in it, although the concept of horse can indeed be predicated of many. If we ask about this common nature, horseness, we should deny that it is either one or many, and that it either exists only in the mind or as a concrete thing’.⁸⁰

2.3.3 *The Incorporeality of the Soul*

The argument for saying that the soul is incorporeal states that while the body is subject to all the senses the same cannot apply to the soul. The qualities of the soul cannot be perceived by a corporeal sense, therefore the soul is incorporeal.

⁷⁷ Afnan, p. 269.

⁷⁸ Marenbon, p. 107.

⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 108.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

Consequently it should be shown regarding the soul that it is incorporeal. In this respect we proceed as follows: each body is subject to all the bodily senses or to some of them; but the soul is not subject to all or to some of the senses: therefore the soul is not a body. Likewise anything whose qualities are not perceived by a corporeal sense is incorporeal; such is the soul; therefore the soul is incorporeal.⁸¹

Anticipating Descartes '*res extensa*' Jean states that everything corporeal has spatial extension but the powers of the soul, such as the imaginative, the memorative and the intellectual powers are not present in the soul spatially but in a simple mode. If they were present in the soul spatially the soul would be infinite spatially. From a philosophical point of view extensionality is important as it raises issues such as space and the movement of bodies, but here Jean is referring to extensionality to further his argument for saying that the soul is of a simple and indivisible nature.

Again everything corporeal has spatial extension; the rational soul does not have spatial extension: therefore it is incorporeal. The proof of the minor premise is clear with reference to the imaginative, the memorative and the intellective power; from which it is clear that the likenesses received in the soul are not there spatially, but in a simple mode. For if they were present spatially, because it is possible to imagine infinite things, the soul would be infinite spatially. Likewise, nothing corporeal can comprehend that which is incorporeal and spiritual; the rational soul can comprehend the incorporeal and spiritual: therefore it is not corporeal.⁸²

Jean addresses the simplicity of the soul relying on Augustine's explanation of quantity: quantity can be explained in two ways; one is when we refer to the actual size of something or someone, as in the example given by Jean, that of Hercules. The

⁸¹ *Summa*, C. 23, 1-6. Consequenter ostendendum est de anima quod sit incorporea. Ad quod proceditur sic: omne corpus subiacet omnibus sensibus corporalibus aut quibusdam; anima uero nec subiacet omnibus, nec quibusdam: ergo anima non est corpus. Item, omne illud cuius qualitates non percipiuntur sensu corporeo est incorporeum; talis est anima: ergo est anima incorporea.

⁸² *Summa*, C. 23, 6-15. Item, omne corporeum habet extensionem dimensionum: anima rationalis non habet dimensionem extensionem; ergo est incorporea. Probatio minoris patet ex comparatione uirtutis imaginatiue et memoratiue et intellectiue; unde manifestum est quod similitudines recepte in anima non sunt ibi dimensionum, sed modo simplici. Si enim essent dimensionum, cum infinita possint ymaginari, anima esset infinite dimensionum. Item, nullum corporeum comprehensuum est incorporei et spiritualis; anima racionalis comprehensua est incorporei et spiritualis; ergo non est corporea.

latter is not only renowned for his physical attributes but there is the second sense in which he is renowned, that is, for his inherent powers which are not visible.

Quantity is spoken of in two ways, in respect of powers and dimensions; consequently when one questions what size is Hercules, it is possible to ask about either the spatial quantity, namely, how tall is he or the inherent quantity, namely, how many powers? Therefore I say that the soul has inherent quantity, but not dimensional or material; and similarly there is inherent extension in the body since the activities of the body derive from powers.⁸³

The soul has inherent powers that are not quantifiable as they would be in something corporeal. As powers of the soul they are distinguished by their activity and their act, unlike parts in the body that are distinguished one from another, each assigned a distinct position in the physical body. Following the doctrine advanced in the *Book of Causes*, ‘that all that is received is present in that which receives it, according to the nature of the receiver, not according to the nature of that received’⁸⁴ all likenesses and images will be in the soul in a simple mode, not in a spatial mode. If the soul had size or quantity, it would be larger in a larger body and lesser in a lesser body as Jean states:

Likewise, if the soul was a quantity, therefore it would be larger in a larger body and lesser in a lesser body; and by increasing the body it would be increased and by diminishing it would be diminished, and consequently therefore, also its substance and all of its powers; therefore those whose bodies are larger would be more wise and old men would be more intelligent, and those small in body more foolish and uncultured, which, it is evident, is false.⁸⁵

⁸³ *Summa*, C. 24, 30-35. Quantum dicitur duobus modis, uirtualiter et dimensiue; unde cum queritur quantus sit Hercules, potest queri uel quantitas dimensiua, scilicet quot pedum, aut quantitas uirtualis, scilicet quante uirtutis. Dico ergo quod anima habet quantitatem uirtualem, sed non dimensiuiam siue materialem; et similiter uirtualem extensionem in corpore, quia uirtutibus insunt operationes in corpore.

⁸⁴ *Summa*, C. 24, 6-7. Item, omne quod recipitur est in recipiente secundum naturam recipientis, non secundum naturam recepti. See also Bougerol p. 82 reference to *Book of Causes*, IX (ed. Pattin, 99 46-49).

⁸⁵ *Summa*, C. 24, 15-20. Item, si anima esset quanta, ergo esset maior in maiori corpore et minor in minori; et augmentato corpore augmentaretur et diminuto diminueretur, per consequens ergo, et

The notion that ‘all that is received is present in that which receives it, according to the nature of the receiver, not according to the nature of that received’ had its source in the *Liber de causis*, as stated above. This treatise, dating from around 1180, is a translation of an Arabic text, probably dating back to the ninth century. It is itself a transcription of Proclus’s *Elementatio theologica* from the fifth century and wrongly attributed to Aristotle. Its actual author was Alfarabi but for most of the thirteenth century it was thought to have been the work of Aristotle. Thomas Aquinas was the first to recognise that it was based on a work of Proclus’s.⁸⁶ What we must appreciate is that Jean and his contemporaries had no notion of the history of Greek philosophy as it is available to the modern scholar. It is all the more remarkable that they knew the value of information which came their way from compilations and commentaries, but seldom from original texts.

2.3.4 *The Soul as One in Three Powers*

The soul for Jean is one in three powers: the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational, however, they are not three separate substances. He states:

Consequently it should be shown concerning the soul that it is one in three potencies: vegetative, sensitive and rational. With regard to this we must proceed as follows: in the same way that the perfectible is constituted in relation to the perfectible, so perfection is in relation to perfection; but the perfectible in man does not differ from the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational, since a man, according to his essence is vegetative, sensitive, rational. Therefore there is one perfection in relation to substance.⁸⁷

substantia et omnis uirtus ipsius; essent ergo sapienciores maiores corpore et ingeniosiores senes, et parui corpore insipenciores et rudiores; quod, patet, est falsum.

⁸⁶ ‘His [William of Moerbeke] translation of Proclus’s *Elementatio theologica* brought to St Thomas the realisation that *Liber de Causis* was not the work of Aristotle, as it was previously supposed to be, but was based on the work of Proclus.’ Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, Volume 2, Medieval Philosophy (London:New York: Continuum, 2003), p. 207.

⁸⁷ *Summa*, C. 26, 1-6. Consequenter ostendendum est de anima quod sit una in tribus potenciis: uegetabili, sensibili, rationali. Ad quod procedendum est sic: sicut se habet perfectibile ad

This can be understood in light of the argument whereby Jean employs the argument from geometrical shapes (also used by Bonaventure and others in the debate on the plurality of forms).⁸⁸ The source of the argument from geometrical figures had its origin in Aristotle's *De anima* as he states:

The cases of figure and soul are exactly parallel; for the particulars subsumed under the common name in both cases, figures and living beings, constitute a series, each successive term of which potentially contains its predecessor, e.g. the square the triangle, the sensory power, the self-nutritive.⁸⁹

Here Jean employs the argument to show how a complex form, the pentagon, contains the less complex, the square.

Likewise, the proportion of the vegetative to the sensitive is the same as the sensitive to the rational, just as the proportion of a triangle is to a square, and a square to a pentagon; since just as a triangle is in a square, so the vegetative is in the sensitive and the sensitive in the rational. But although the triangle is in the square, so they do not differ according to substance, indeed they are the same in substance; therefore in the same way, the vegetative, since it is in the sensitive and both of these are present in the rational, they do not differ according to substance.⁹⁰

perfectibile, sic perfectio ad perfectionem; sed non differt in homine perfectibile a uegetabili, sensibili et rationali, quia unus homo secundum rem est uegetabilis, sensibilis, rationalis; ergo una est perfectio secundum substanciam.

⁸⁸ 'But, in fact, so ardent a disciple of St Augustine as the Seraphic Doctor does not hesitate to find arguments in support of his thesis in Aristotle and in Averroes.' Crowley, p. 135; also in a footnote (p. 135, n. 55) he refers to Bonaventure: In II *Sent.*, d. XXXI, a.1, q.1; *Op. Omn.*, II, p. 740.

⁸⁹ Aristotle, *De anima*, Book II c. 3 414b 1 28-32 in Jonathan Barnes, ed., *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Revised Oxford Translation, Vol. One (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984). See also Aristoteles Latinus: Translator: Iacobus Veneticus: *De anima*, liber: 2, cap.: 3 (Bekker: 414b). Similiter autem se habent ei que de figuris est, et que sunt secundum animam. Semper enim in eo quod est consequenter, est potentia quod prius est, et in figuris et in animatis, ut in tetragono quidem trigonum est, in sensitivo autem uegetativum.

⁹⁰ *Summa*, C. 26, 6-13. Item, similis est proportio uegetatiue ad sensitium, et sensitiui ad rationale, sicut est trianguli ad quadrangulum et quadranguli ad pentangulum; quia sicut triangulus in quadrangulo, sic uegetatiuum in sensitio et sensitium in rationali. Sed cum triangulus est in quadrangulo, sic non differt secundum substanciam, immo sunt idem in substancia; ergo similiter uegetatiuum, cum est in sensitio, et utrumque in rationali, non differunt secundum substanciam.

If they were separate substances the actions of one would not be impeded by the actions of the other which contradicts our experience if we think how our physical selves are affected by how we think or imagine.

The vegetative and sensitive powers are described as the ‘material qualities’ for the purposes of the soul and, as such, will play an important role in Jean’s discussion of the unity of body and soul through intermediaries.

And although there are three substances, however, there are not three souls in man, since soul is the name of perfection. For this reason the vegetative substance is not a soul except in plants, of which it is the perfection, and the sensitive substance is a soul only in brute animals; but in man they are like the material qualities for the purpose of rationality, and rationality is the full actuality; and because of that reason alone is the soul in man, with the others existing as material dispositions for the purposes of the soul.⁹¹

If the powers are one in substance how does Jean explain the connection between a corruptible and an incorruptible substance given that the vegetative and sensitive souls are material dispositions for the rational soul? Jean supports his position in saying that the soul is a single substance in three powers when he states that the sensitive soul is not corrupted in man ‘neither according to essence or according to potency, but according to act only, when the soul is separated from the body’.⁹² Jean states that a distinction must be made between the vegetative and sensitive souls in animals and those in man. In the case of animals they are not separable but because these powers belong to man as rational animal they are separable according as each

⁹¹ *Summa*, C. 26, 38-44. Et quamuis sint tres substancie, non tamen tres anime in homine, quia anima nomen est perfectionis. Ideo substancia uegetabilis non est anima, nisi in plantis quarum est perfectio, sensibilis uero nisi in brutis; in homine autem sunt quasi materiales ad racionalem, et racionalis est complecio; et ideo ipsa sola est anima in homine, aliis existentibus ut dispositionibus materialibus ad ipsam.

⁹² *Summa*, C. 26. 65-67. Responderi potest quoniam sensibilis non corrumpitur in homine nec secundum essenciam, nec secundum potenciam, sed secundum actum tantum, cum separatur anima a corpore.

is a power of the soul but they are not separable according to act. Powers are accorded different names but in substance they are one and the same. Jean concludes:

I respond as before, that the sensitive power in man is different from that in brute animals; since in animals, although it is substantial incorporeal form, it is not separable from the body, neither according to power, nor according to act; however, in man since it is a power present in the rational soul, it is separable according to power, not according to act. Let us say following Augustine,⁹³ in his book *On the Soul and Spirit*: ‘the substance of the soul is one and the same’ the vegetative, the sensitive, the rational; but ‘according to the different powers it is assigned different names’.⁹⁴

The question arises as to how to explain the powers of the soul of man that are separable and therefore capable of surviving our earthly existence but not according to act? This has implications for the immortality of the soul since the rational soul is separable but how then can it be said that man will be reunited to his body in the resurrection? In what way are the ‘acts’ of the soul understood if, as it is stated, they are not separable from the body? Does the soul reach a stage of full actuality and, as form of the body it no longer requires the ‘material’ attachments? For Jean the vegetative and sensitive souls that were necessary as long as the body endures in this life will be needed on the day of resurrection. Referring to a distinction between that of a two-fold vegetative power and a two-fold sensitive power in man, Jean argues that of necessity, the vegetative and sensitive souls must be reunited with the body. This will be discussed further with regard to the arguments for the immortality of the soul which relies on the distinction between the nature of the form in brute animals and human beings.

⁹³ Pseudo-Augustine, *On the Spirit and Soul*, c. 15 (PL 40, 791).

⁹⁴ *Summa*, C. 26, 85-92. Respondeo ut supra, quia potencia sensibilis in homine aliter est quam in brutis; quia in brutis cum sit forma substantialis incorporea non est separabilis a corpore, nec secundum potenciam, nec secundum actum; in homine uero cum sit potencia in substancia anime rationalis, separabilis est secundum potenciam, non secundum actum. Dicamus ergo, secundum Augustinum in libro *De anima et spiritu*: ‘Una et eadem est anime substancia’, uegetabilis, sensitua, rationalis; sed ‘secundum diversas potencias diuersa sortitur uocabula’.

A further problem arises in relation to the doctrine that the soul was one in substance but also one in three powers. If, as in the case of the embryo, the vegetative soul is present before the infusion of the rational soul would this not lead to the problem of difference in time, therefore a difference in substance? Jean distinguishes between the vegetative soul which prepares the body for the infusion of the rational soul and a separate form which is created with the rational soul and endures as long as the rational soul remains, or, as long as a person has life. The first disappears once the body receives the rational soul and from there it would seem that the vegetative soul (and the same holds for the sensitive soul) is one with the rational soul. The text from Jean reads as follows:

In the second place they object: what exists before and what exists afterwards is not the same substance; but the vegetative soul comes first in time, which is clear in the seed and the embryo, because it is first brought to life since it is nourished and grows before the rational soul is infused: therefore as before. And it can be said that there is a vegetative soul that orders and a vegetative soul that completes; one is a form present in the becoming, the other is present in being: however the first is handed on and sown with the body, the second, however, is infused with the rational soul. Therefore the first passes away, once its becoming is completed, that is, the formed and organized body; the second, however, remains in the power of the rational soul; and similarly one must make a similar distinction with regard to the sensitive soul.⁹⁵

Jean's solution may be said to anticipate Thomas Aquinas who held that the vegetative and the nutritive souls do not co-exist but that the one replaces the other

⁹⁵ *Summa*, C. 26, 73-82. Secundo obiciunt: non est eadem substantia prius ens tempore, et succedens tempore; sed uegetabilis est prior tempore, quod patet in semine et embrione, quod prius uegetatur quia nutritur et crescit, antequam anima racionalis infundatur; ergo primum. Et dici posset quod est uegetatiua disponens et uegetatiua perficiens; una est forma in fieri, alia est in esse: prima autem traducitur et seminatur cum corpore, secunda uero infunditur cum rationali anima. Prima ergo transit completo fieri, id est corpore formato et organizato; secunda autem manet in esse potencia racionalis anime; et similiter distinguendum est de sensibili.

and this is replaced by the rational soul.⁹⁶ This did not, however, convince one of the most representative figures of this time, that of Roger Bacon, who taught in the Faculty of Arts at Paris from the period 1241 to 1245. He was, in contrast to Jean, a strong supporter of universal hylomorphism, which, as we have seen, is the doctrine which held that everything that exists is either matter or form or a composite of both, including the soul. One argument which Bacon relies on is taken from Boethius⁹⁷ in the *De Trinitate*; that no pure form is subject to accidents but, he states, the separated intelligences are subject to accidents as, for example, to knowledge, virtue and even local movement. They cannot therefore be pure forms. Jean, however, has already made the distinction in terms of the essential and accidental nature of an angel and the soul.

Likewise, the essence by which a creature is, is only said in respect of that which is essential to a creature. However, ‘that which is’ refers to the essential and accidental, as is clear in an angel and in the soul; because it is said about it that it is a soul, and that it is rational, and this is essential to it; and that it is just, that this is accidental.⁹⁸

The soul is the form and perfection of the body but it is subject to error and to a badness of will (*malicia voluntatis*). The question as to whether the good are rewarded and the evil punished will be an issue for discussion on the immortality of the soul but we turn next to a discussion on the unity of body and soul.

⁹⁶ ‘Et sic primo inducatur anima vegetabilis; deinde ea abjecta, inducatur anima sensibilis et vegetabilis simul: qua abjecta, inducatur non per virtutem praedictam, sed a creante, anima quae simul est rationalis, sensibilis et vegetabilis. Et sic dicendum est secundum hanc opinionem quod embrio antequam habeat animam rationalem, vivit et habet animam, qua abjecta inducitur anima rationalis’ (*De Pot.*, q. iii, a, ix, ad 9) quoted in Crowley, p. 126.

⁹⁷ Crowley, p. 84, n. 11. “Contra: Boethius in *de Trinitate*, nulla forma pura est accidentibus subjecta; set intelligentia est accidentibus subjecta, scilicet scientie sive virtuti et mutationi secundum locum, licet non motui, ergo non est forma pura.....Quod concedendum est” (O.H.I. XII, pp. 136-137). Cf. O.H.I., X, p. 282. (O.H.I., X, refers to one of Bacon’s Philosophical Commentaries: *Questiones altere supra libros prime physicorum*. pp. 1-336).

⁹⁸ *Summa*, C. 17, 49-54. Item, essencia que creatura est non dicitur nisi respectu eius quod est essenciale creature. Quod est uero respicit essenciale et accidentale, ut patet in angelo et anima; quod dicitur de eo quod est anima, et quod racionalis est, et hoc est essenciale ei; et quod est iusta, quod est accidentale.

SECTION FOUR
THE SOUL IN RELATION TO THE BODY

Jean gives a number of reasons for saying that there are no intermediaries between the soul and the body. That the soul is united to the body is not accidental but essential to it. Unlike an angel it is united through necessity; therefore through its essence and therefore without an intermediary. If the soul is united to matter as its form and perfection, it is joined without an intermediary. It is stated that just as form, through itself, is joined to matter, so the soul, through itself, is joined to the body. Further it is stated:

Therefore at first it is asked whether the soul is united to the body through an intermediary or without an intermediary; and since the capacity to be united is not accidental to the soul but essential to it and it is that through which the rational soul differs from an angel, as was stated previously. The soul is united to the body through its ability to be united: therefore it is united through its essence; therefore without an intermediary. Likewise, since an intermediary by nature ought to have a share in the extremes and the extremes are an incorporeal substance, that is, the rational soul and a corporeal substance, that is, the body; therefore if an intermediary were proposed it would be in part a corporeal substance and in part incorporeal, which is not possible; it remains therefore that it is without an intermediary.⁹⁹

On the other hand it is stated there is a great distance between the body and the soul. The body is a composite while the rational soul is simple in that the soul is not a composition made from the essential parts of matter and form. The body arises from

⁹⁹ *Summa*, C, 37. 1-12. Primo ergo queritur an anima corpori uniatur per medium, an sine medio; et cum unibilitas non sit accidentalis anime sed essentialis et sit illud quo essentialiter differt anima rationalis ab angelo, sicut dictum est prius. Unitur anima corpori per suam unibilitatem: ergo unitur per suam essenciam; ergo sine medio. Item, cum anima uniatur corpori ut forma et perfectio ejus, forma autem unitur per se materie, ergo anima unitur per se corpori; ergo sine medio. Item, cum medium natura debeat habere conuenienciam cum extremis, extrema autem sunt substancia incorporea scilicet anima rationalis, et corporea scilicet corpus; ergo si poneretur medium, esset partim substancia corporea et partim incorporea, quod non est possibile; relinquatur ergo quod sine medio.

contrary elements, the soul is beyond contrariety in its substance. The body is weak, the soul is knowledgeable, the former is dependent, the latter absolute and fixed in its nature. The body is corruptible while the soul is incorruptible and immortal.¹⁰⁰ Jean puts forward the theory that things that are united are united through similarity but soul and body exhibit such a distance between them there must be an intermediary which shares something of both natures. The Pseudo-Augustine allows for certain similarities between body and soul as it is stated:

There are certain similarities between the body and soul, that is, supremacy of the body and humility of spirit, in which, without confusing their natures, they can be easily joined as belonging to a person. For similar things delight in similar things.¹⁰¹

Jean responds in two ways. In the first way he states that because the soul is the form of the body and is its perfection (*unitur enim ut forma sive materie sive ut perfectio suo perfectibili*)¹⁰² it is therefore said that the union takes place without an intermediary. Using the example of how wood is predisposed to accept the form of fieriness, which is immediate, in the same way the body accepts the form of the soul. In a second way, however, he states the soul is united through intermediaries. The comparison is made between the works of a skilled craftsman who produces his works by means of an instrument (*est comparacio anime sicut artificis operantis per instrumentum*).¹⁰³ In the case of the soul there must be something that is instrumental in bringing about the unity between the essence of the soul and its powers of

¹⁰⁰ *Summa*, C. 37, 18-24. Cum substantia corporis sit substantia composita, substantia autem anime rationalis simplex; cum illa contraria uel ex contrariis, ista omnino preter contrarietatem in sui substantia; cum illa obtusa, ista cognoscitiua, cum illa dependens, ista absoluta et in se fixa, illa corruptibilis, ista incorruptibilis et immortalis; infinita distancia erit nature corporis et nature anime rationalis, sicut perpetui et temporali; non erit ergo possibilis unio sine medio.

¹⁰¹ *Summa*, C. 37, 31-34. Item, Augustinus, in libro *De anima et spiritu*: 'Sunt corporis et anime quedam similia, scilicet supremum corporis et spiritus infimum, in quibus sine naturali confusione, personali tamen cum unione facile coniugi possunt. Similia enim gaudent similibus'.

¹⁰² *Summa*, C. 37, 45.

¹⁰³ *Summa*, C. 37, 56.

actualising. Jean states that the intermediary that brings about the unity is the power of the soul itself which is the intermediary between the essence of the soul and its activity. An intermediary exists between the essence of the soul and the activity of the power in, for example, the power of seeing and hearing.

However, according to the second mode, the soul is united through an intermediary, and this intermediary is its potency or its power; for inasmuch as the soul is united to the body as its organ, through which it acts, the relation between the soul and the body is similar to that of a skilled craftsman working by means of an instrument, since in this way the soul is constituted for the body. In this way, three things must be considered, the substance of the soul, its power and its activity; the potency or power is the intermediate between the essence and the activity. The activity of the soul therefore occurs through an organ, inasmuch as the soul acts through the enlivened body through seeing and hearing and acts of this kind; the union of the soul itself to the body as its organ occurs through the intermediary of its potency or power, for example, by means of the vegetative power and sensitive power.¹⁰⁴

How can the body, a corporeal substance, be joined to the soul, an incorporeal substance? Jean discusses the composition of bodies generally to distinguish between the composition found in various bodies, beginning with the composition of minerals; next, the composition of the vegetative nature, which is a mixture of the elements and in addition it requires what in Latin is translated as a '*complexio*';¹⁰⁵ next are brute animals whose bodies are composed of organs and limbs. The human body, however, is the most composite of all bodies in order for it to be an organ for the human soul.

¹⁰⁴ *Summa*, C.37, 53-64. Secundum uero secundum modum unitur anima per medium, et medium istud est potencia siue uis eius; secundum enim quod anima unitur corpori ut suo organo per quod operatur, est comparacio anime sicut artificis operantis per instrumentum, quia secundum hunc modum se habet anima ad corpus. In uia autem ista, est tria accipere substanciam anime et uirtutem ejus et operacionem; potencia uero medium est siue uirtus inter essenciam et operacionem. Quia ergo operacio anime fit organo, secundum quod anima per corpus animatum operatur, uidendo scilicet et audiendo et huiusmodi; unio ipsius anime ad corpus ut organum erit mediante potencia et ui eius; uerbi gracia, ut mediante uirtute uegetatiua et sensitua.

¹⁰⁵ Vico, p. 318, n 15. 'The Latin word '*complexio*' translates the complex idea of physiology and pathology that Galen defines in the prologue to the work *De complexionibus*. He states that each living being has his own peculiar combination of hot, cold, wet and dry qualities that is suitable to the nature of each and that establishes a right balance that can be identified with the state of health. Consequently, each deviation from or breaking of it causes pathological situations'.

The most perfect kind of perfection or form ought to be more perfect than what is capable of perfection; but among all bodies constituted from the elements, and also the elements themselves, the human body is the most perfect; and the rational soul is the most perfect perfection among all natural forms: therefore the human body alone is capable of unity to the rational soul. But that the human body is the most perfect is proved as follows. Everything that is the material of something is imperfect in relation to it, such as stones in relation to a house. Therefore with material elements in relation to bodies composed of elements, they are more imperfect than bodies composed of elements. Likewise, among bodies composed of elements, as mineral bodies; and certain in which not only a mixture is required but also a combination, as in the vegetative; from this it is correctly said concerning a tree or an herb that it is of such and such a combination, that in no way would it be said of any other body of mineral, as gold or silver; and there are certain bodies in which not only a mixture and a combination is required, indeed also a composition of organs or limbs, as the bodies of animals which have multiple composition, as in functional limbs. Therefore, since the mixture of the elements is material with respect to the combination and the combination with respect to the composition, and all these with respect to the human body are more imperfect, the mineral bodies are more imperfect than the vegetative, the vegetative more than the bodies of animals and all of those more than the human body.¹⁰⁶

All of these powers arise from the four elements and their qualities (hot and dry, hot and moist, cold and moist, and cold and dry). Anything, however, composed of the four elements is that of a nature that has contrariety. Accordingly, there is another nature, free from all contrariety, which establishes a harmony among the soul's activities, whether of the vegetative, the sensitive or the rational souls. This is the celestial nature or, as it is also known, the fifth essence or quintessence. It is

¹⁰⁶ *Summa*, C. 38, 12-33. Perfectissime perfectionis siue forme debet esse perfectius perfectibile; sed inter omnia corpora constituta ex elementis, et eciam ipsis elementis, perfectius est corpus humanum; anima uero rationalis perfectissima perfectio est inter omnes naturales formas: ergo solum corpus humanum erit unibile anime rationali. Quod autem corpus humanum sit perfectissimum, probatur sic. Omne quod est materiale respectu alterius, est imperfectum respectu illius, sicut lapides in respectu ad domum. Ergo cum elementa materialia respectu corporum elementatorum, imperfectiora sunt corporibus elementatis. Item, inter corpora elementata quedam corpora sunt in quorum generatione exigitur tantummodo mixtio elementorum, ut corpora mineralia; quedam uero in quibus non solum requiritur mixtio, sed eciam complexio ut uegetabilia; unde recte dicitur de arbore uel de erba quod est talis complexionis uel talis, quod nullo modo diceretur de alio corpore minerali ut auro uel argento; quedam uero sunt in quibus non tantum requiritur mixtio et complexio, immo eciam compositio organorum siue membrorum, ut corpora animalium que compositionem habent multiplicem, ut in officialibus membris. Cum ergo mixtio elementorum materialis sit respectu complexionis, et complexio respectu compositiois, et hec omnia respectu corporis humani imperfectiora sunt, mineralia corpora uegetabilibus, uegetabilia autem corporibus animalium, et hec omnia corpore humano.

explained further in terms of the doctrine of light. Jean makes a three-fold distinction in order to explain how the human body receives the most noble light, which is the rational soul. He states that there is a triple difference in the nature of the celestial light; for there is a light of the heavenly sky; above that there is the aqueous or crystalline sky; above that again there is the light of the empyrean sky.

For there is a light of the heavenly sky and above that there is the light of the aqueous or crystalline sky and again above both there is the light of the empyrean sky, and there is an order in them according to the nobility of the essence of the light; therefore since it is agreed that the influence of the light of the heavenly sky orders the vegetative bodies towards the reception of the vegetative life, and the influence of the more noble light, which is the light of the aqueous sky, orders the bodies of sensitive things to the reception of the sensitive light which, perhaps on account of a power which is there from the reception of the impressions of the images which is necessary in the sensitive apprehension, it is called the aqueous or crystalline light; and the influence of the most noble light, which is the light of the empyrean sky, also it especially approaches to the nature of the spirit, hence also the region of angels is the empyrean sky, and it disposes the human body to receive the most noble life, which is the rational life.¹⁰⁷

It is stated that the empyrean light approaches to what is called spirit which is described as a vehicle of the powers of the soul. Spirit in this sense relates to the corporeal in that the natural spirit relates to the liver, vital spirit to the heart and animal spirit to the brain. This is the tripartite scheme which refers to the functions of the living being. This will become apparent in the second *Consideratio* as we refer to the physiological systems which explain the vital functions present in man. This is to be distinguished from the biblical account of *spiritus* which is the breath of life and refers to the soul of man.

¹⁰⁷ *Summa*, C. 40, 150-162. Est enim lux celi siderei et supra ipsum esse lux celi aquei siue cristallini, et iterum supra utrumque est lux celi empirei, et est ordo in eis secundum nobilitatem essencie lucis; cum ergo constet quod influencia lucis celi siderei disponat corpora uegetabilia ad susceptionem uite uegetabilis, et influencia lucis nobilioris que est lux celi aquei disponat corpora sensibilia ad susceptionem uite sensibilis que, forte propter uirtutem que est ex receptione impressionum ymaginum que necessaria est in apprehensione sensitua, dicta est lux aquea uel cristallina; influencia uero lucis nobilissima que est lux celi empirei, que eciam maxime accidit ad naturam spiritus, unde et regio angelorum celum est empireum, et disponet corpus humanum ad susceptionem uite nobilissime, que est uita racionalis.

The nature of the spirit is therefore simple, non contrary, corporeal, passive, dependent. Simple since it is not a composite from the elements; corporeal in relation to the different natures, the vegetative, the sensitive, the rational; passive with regard to the difference between the sensitive and the rational; dependent with regard to the rational soul.¹⁰⁸

The second intermediary on the part of the body is the elemental nature which is founded in the humours and especially in uniformity and moderation, which is in the blood. This is simple, contrary, corporeal, passive and dependent. Thus, between the extremes, that is, the rational soul on the one hand, and the body composed of the elements on the other, there are four intermediaries; two on the part of the soul and two on the part of the body. On the part of the soul there are the vegetative and the sensitive natures; on the part of the body there are the celestial and the elemental natures as we have briefly examined. In his discussion on the many modes of union Jean states that the mode of union of the vegetative and the sensitive souls to the body cannot be the same as the union of rational soul to the body. Similarly the mode of union, which comes from the celestial sky, must be distinguished according to that in which it is received. He distinguishes various relationships involved in the account of matter and form as he states:

To that which investigates the account of form, since it seems that no form is separable from matter, a distinction must be made among the forms, since there is a form which totally relies and rests on its matter and does not rule nor sustain it but is sustained by it; and a form of this kind is properly a corporeal form just as it is in all inanimate bodies; but the other is the form which relies more on its matter and it is sustained and ruled by the form itself. However the activity of this form only exists in and through its matter, the form of this mode is the vegetative soul; as regards plants the body of a plant is sustained and ruled and conserved; in this way also the animal body in brutes is ruled and moved by the sensitive soul. Therefore the vegetative and the sensitive soul is of the kind of form which relies more on its matter. Nevertheless since their activity is only present in a body and through a body,

¹⁰⁸ *Summa*, C. 39, 64-69. Est ergo natura spiritus simplex, non contraria, corporea, obtusa, dependens. Simplex quia non composita ex elementis; non contraria, quia nature celestis, non elementaris; corporea ad differenciam naturarum uegetabilis, sensibilis, racionalis; obtusa ad differenciam sensibilis et racionalis; dependens ad differenciam racionalis.

it is shown that their essence depends on the body: without it, it would be useless and empty to posit them separated from the body, since they have no activity separate from the body. There is yet another form on which its matter relies and is sustained and ruled by it, and its principle activity is not in matter, nor through it, and such is the rational soul, which according to the intellectual activity is abstracted from matter; nor is this activity exercised through any organ of the body. Hence, from this it is most certain that its essence is not dependent on the body, and for that reason, although it is the form, it is however separable from the body.¹⁰⁹

The form on which matter relies is superior to matter itself and while the body cannot exist as a separate substance, since it only has the power to receive forms, the soul is a form that is capable of a separate existence. The soul can be seen, as it is in Avicenna, as an authority over the body, the powers of the soul being dependent to varying degrees on the body. Avicenna describes the soul as the ‘entelechy’ of the body. This is not saying anything about the soul itself but ‘it is merely a term which describes the soul’s relationship with the body’.¹¹⁰ The concept of ‘entelechy’ is wider than form for Avicenna and explains how some souls are ‘not forms subsisting in matter but are separable from it’.¹¹¹ The rational soul, as the principle of intellectual activity is capable of independent existence as we will now see when we turn to the question of the immortality of the soul.

¹⁰⁹ *Summa*. C. 40, 64-84. Ad illud quod queritur de ratione forme, quia uidetur quod nulla forma sit separabilis a materia, distinguendum est in formis, quia est forma que totaliter innititur et incumbit materie sue et non regit nec sustinet eam, sed sustinetur ab ea; et huiusmodi forma est proprie forma corporalis sicut est in omnibus inanimatis corporibus; alia uero est forma cui potius innititur sua materia, et sustinetur et regitur ab ipsa forma. Verumtamen non est operatio huius forme nisi in sua materia et per eam, cuiusmodi forma est anima uegetabilis; in plantis sustinetur et regitur et conseruatur corpus plante; sic etiam ab anima sensibili regitur et mouetur corpus animale in brutis. Anima ergo uegetabilis et sensibilis est talis forma cui potius innititur sua materia. Verumtamen quia eorum operatio non est nisi in corpore et per corpus, manifestum est quod earum essencia dependet a corpore: sine eo cassum et uanum esset ponere eas separatas a corpore, cum nullam operationem habeant separatam a corpore. Est iterum forma alia cui innititur sua materia et sustinetur et regitur ab ipsa, et eius principalis operatio non est in materia, nec per ipsam, et talis est anima racionalis, que secundum operationem intellectiuam abstracta est a materia; nec illam operationem exercet per aliquod organum corporis. Unde ex hoc certissimum est quod eius essencia non est dependens a corpore, et ideo quamuis sit forma, tamen separabilis est a corpore.

¹¹⁰ Rahman, p. 9.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

SECTION FIVE
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

Jean's first argument states that if there is divine justice the good are rewarded and the bad are punished. However, this will not happen in this life, therefore, it will happen in the next life; similarly divine justice will be meted out in the next life; through his goodness and wisdom God attends to those who love him but not in this life; therefore, in the next life. However, it is the soul of man that is incorruptible and as Jean states, quoting from Gregory:

Likewise, Gregory, in the fourth book of *Dialogues*: states 'As man is made as an intermediary, so that he is inferior to an angel, superior to an animal; thus he possesses something which necessarily agrees with the highest, something with the lowest, namely the immortality of spirit with an angel, and the mortality of the body with an animal.'¹¹²

If prime matter, *hyle*, is incorruptible it follows that the ultimate form is also incorruptible, that is, the rational soul. If the corruption of bodies does not affect prime matter, even more forcibly, the corruption of the body will not affect that which is above it, namely the rational soul. Jean sets out to prove that the rational soul is not subject to corruption, death, or destruction. He puts forward a number of examples to explain the various modes of destruction, however, his main argument with regard to matter and form is that the rational soul is immaterial and, therefore, it is not a composite of matter and form. Even if some hold that it is from matter and form, he states that its form is not destructible since it does not have an opposite. Nothing is opposite to it, nor is it destructible through the destruction of integral parts since it is simple and indivisible, as we have already seen.

¹¹² *Summa*, C. 44, 35-39. Item, Gregorius, in quarto libro *Dialogorum*: 'Homo sicut in medio creatus est, ut esset inferior angelo, superior iumento; ita habet aliquid quod necesse est conuenire cum summo, aliquid cum infimo, scilicet immortalitatem spiritus cum angelo, mortalitatem uero corporis cum iumento.' Gregorius, *Dialogorum*, IV, c. 3 (PL 77, 321 B).

Compared to our bodies which weaken as we get older the intellective power gains in strength and understanding; the more it understands the stronger it becomes. It does not have a limit placed upon it as regards, activity, time or power. In contrast the sensitive soul can be damaged, for instance the sense of sight can be damaged by a powerfully bright object and the sense of hearing can be damaged by a powerfully sounding object but the intellect cannot be damaged in the same way by its object, the principal object of which is the truth, which is incorruptible.¹¹³

The rational soul is moved naturally by the desire to reach its goal, which, as we have already seen is beatitude and which can only be attained after this life. As human beings we are subject to death but the natural inclination for the rational soul is to find perpetual rest and incorruption and since no movement in nature is in vain it is natural for the rational soul to be moved by the desire for happiness and beatitude.

Likewise, every substance striving naturally and resting only where death or corruption do not reach, is incorruptible and immortal, since the natural dispositions towards a goal precede the natural inclination toward the end; therefore since everything that is desired naturally is desired by a natural movement, and immortality and perpetual rest and incorruption is desired naturally by the rational soul, therefore it seeks and strives naturally for it and it rests also; therefore it is incorruptible and immortal itself.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ *Summa*, C. 44, 116-124. Item, omnis potencia nata cognoscere incorruptibilia est incorruptibilis; proporcionabilia enim sunt cognoscituum et cognoscibile, quod scilicet naturaliter est cognoscibile, quia ex condicione obiectorum cognoscitur condicio potencie, et ex condicione potencie cognoscitur condicio substancie. Cum ergo obiectum precipuum uirtutis intellectiue sit ueritas, que quidem incorruptibilis est, uirtus autem intellectiua est incorruptibilis; ergo et ipsa substancia.

¹¹⁴ *Summa*, C. 44, 138-145. Item, omnis substancia naturaliter tendens et ibi solum naturaliter quiescens quo non attingit mors uel corruptio, est incorruptibilis et immortalis, quia naturalem inclinationem ad finem naturales dispositiones ad finem antecedunt; cum ergo omne quod appetitur naturaliter, naturali motu appetatur, immortalitas autem et quies perpetua et incorruptio a rationali anima naturaliter appetatur, ergo naturaliter petit et tendit in illam et eciam quiescit; ergo ipsa est incorruptibilis et immortalis.

Further arguments reiterate the independence of the intellectual soul from the body, that the more it distances itself from the body the more it understands. It is impeded by the body when it is occupied by the love of temporal things but that does not mean it is dependent on the body. It can, in intellectual vision, know incorporeal things such as prudence and justice and the like where knowledge of such things occurs without a body but it is in separation from the body that it grows in understanding.

Jean addresses a number of errors with regard to immortality; why is the intellectual power not damaged in the same way that a corporeal sense is damaged? If the sensitive soul of animals is immaterial and simple, in that an animal can abstract and reach cognition can it not also be immortal? The latter is replied to with reference to the nature of form in brute animals. The activity of the form in brute animals exists only in and through its matter; a form of this kind weakens with the weakening of the matter. The vegetative soul and sensitive soul of a brute animal are material and therefore die with the body.

Loss or perishing do not follow the vegetative or the animal soul for the reason that it is a soul, but in the way that it is totally ordered for the body. Hence, since in the case of brute animals and plants that are ordered for the body, it is necessary that they die with the body. But in man they are not ordered totally to the body, on the contrary, they are ordered to reason which is immortal and therefore do not die with the body.¹¹⁵

He argues for the second time that there is a two fold vegetative power and a two fold sensitive power in man. For Jean writing first and foremost as a theologian it was necessary that the vegetative soul and the sensitive soul would be united to the

¹¹⁵ *Summa*, C. 45, 35-40. Deficere uel interire non consequitur animam uegetabilem uel sensibilem eo quod anima est, sed eo quod totaliter ordinatur ad corpus. Vnde cum in brutis et in plantis totaliter ordinantur ad corpus, necesse est eas interire cum corpore. In homine uero non totaliter ordinantur ad corpus, immo ad rationem que immortalis est et ideo non intereunt cum corpore.

body in the resurrection; they are necessary for man to have immortal being; because the souls of animals are not intellectual they do not survive their earthly existence. Jean, quoting from the Pseudo-Augustine states that the soul drags the vegetative, the sensitive, the irascible and the concupiscible powers with it into death.¹¹⁶

The question is posed, how is man made in the image of God if he is imprisoned by an end, by death?

It must be noted that God is Alpha and Omega, not having a beginning nor an end; a creature, however, in so far as he is a creature has a beginning. Therefore, the imitation of the creature in relation to the Creator is not possible since he does not have a beginning. If therefore a creature must be the image of the Creator, this will only be possible if he does not have an end. And since an image is an expressed likeness and an expressed likeness is considered more in the persistence of an essence than in the activity of a power; therefore a creature exists, which is an image of the Creator, in the imitation of a persistence without end.¹¹⁷

Referring to Avicenna's distinction between necessary and possible being to highlight the cause of permanency it is stated that everything that 'is' is either necessary or possible, but one thing alone is necessary because it has in itself the cause of its own necessity.¹¹⁸ In fact Avicenna divides 'being' into three classes: contingent, necessary and impossible. In the first case, that of contingent being, something may or may not exist; in the second whatever is necessary has existence and is applied to God alone; in the third what is impossible cannot exist but yet it has

¹¹⁶ *Summa*, C. 45, 64-66. Unde Augustinus in libro *De anima et spiritu*, dicit quod anima in morte secum trahit uegetatiuam et sensituiam, irascibilem et concupiscibilem.

¹¹⁷ *Summa*, C. 45, 98-105. Notandum ergo quod cum Deus sit Alpha et Omega, non habens principium nec finem; creatura uero, in quantum creatura est, habens principium. Non est igitur possibilis ymitacio creature respectu Creatoris in hoc quod est non habere principium. Si ergo creatura debeat esse ymago Creatoris, non erit hoc possibile nisi in hoc quod est non habere finem. Et cum ymago sit expressa similitudo, similitudo autem expressa magis attenditur in duracione essencie quam in operacione potencie; erit ergo creatura, que est ymago Creatoris in ymitacione duracionis sine fine.

¹¹⁸ *Summa*, C. 45, 79-83. Cum omne quod est sit necessarium aut possibile, solum autem illud est necessarium quod habet in se causam sue necessitatis. Sed solus Deus est talis: ergo solus Deus habet in se esse necessarium. Ergo omnia alia habent esse possibile ad non esse.

being. Morewedge explains that Avicenna assumed that the modalities of contingency, necessity, and impossibility could be legitimately be applied to being.¹¹⁹ However, if God alone has necessary being and if all other beings fit into the other two categories, how can it be argued that contingent beings have immortality? To this Jean replies:

To the last argument, it must be said that to have in itself the cause of its own necessity is spoken about in two ways: either it has the cause of its own permanency in being from another, and in this way the soul has in itself the cause of its own necessity, that is from God; or from itself and in this God alone has the cause of his own necessity.¹²⁰

The distinction between necessary, contingent and impossible existence ultimately derives from Aristotle. The latter devotes a chapter on ‘the necessary’ in his philosophical dictionary in *Metaphysics V*, where he discusses five different types of necessity. Avicenna employed the various distinctions to respond to two unsolved problems in relation to God; that of ‘the conceptual reality entailed by God’s being both a final and efficient cause; the second problem he tried to solve was ‘how to distinguish between God and other eternal things’.¹²¹ Avicenna’s latter distinction was influential in post-classical Islamic teaching and had obvious appeal to medieval scholars with regard to the existence of the soul.¹²²

¹¹⁹ Morewedge, p. 204

¹²⁰ *Summa*, C. 45, 128-131. Ad ultimum, dicendum quod habere in se causam necessitatis sue dicitur dupliciter: uel habere causam sue permanencie in esse ex alio, et sic anima habet in se causam sue necessitatis, scilicet ex Deo; uel ex se et sic solus Deus.

¹²¹ Robert Wisnovsky, ‘Avicenna and the Avicennian Tradition’ in Peter Adamson & Richard C. Taylor, *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 92-136 (p. 120-121).

¹²² ‘He [Avicenna] does not offer a criterion by means of which we can determine a decidable procedure for deducing whether or not a particular thing has existence. He does, however, make a helpful indication in that direction by avowing that although one may know a being and its essence (*māhiyya*), one cannot deduce that it does exist unless one knows the subject-matter of which the essence is predicated. Thus, knowing a being is possible without any empirical investigation of the actual world; however, such a knowledge is not factual (i.e. it is analytic in that it does not inform us about the world).’ Morewedge, p. 169.

Jean's employs the distinction to explain the difference between 'that which, in itself, necessarily exists' and 'that which, through another (i.e., through its cause), necessarily exists'.¹²³ The Necessary Existent is viewed 'as a theological principle in the sense of being a philosophical explication of the religious notion of God'.¹²⁴ The soul, Jean states above, is said to have in itself the cause of its own necessity, which is from God. This is similar to Avicenna's identification of the 'necessary existence in itself' as the uncaused and his identification of the 'necessary existence through another' with the caused. However, this is just one of the many features of Avicenna's 'Necessary Existent'; the following highlights Avicenna's statement that there is no distinction between the essence and existence of the Necessary Existent.

The Necessary Existent can have no essence (*māhiyya*) other than mere existence (*anniyya*) for the following reason. The realization of an entity whose essence is other than existence is due to a cause other than itself; since the Necessary Existent has no cause, Its essence is no other than Its existence. The Necessary Existent obviously is not an accident (*'arad*) because an accident subsists in something, whereas the Necessary Existent does not subsist in anything. But It is not a substance (*jauhar*), for a substance must have an essence which determines whether or not the substance in question exists. The Necessary Existent, on the other hand, exists necessarily.¹²⁵

With regard to the immortality of the soul how does Jean explain cases of mental illness, such as dementia? In the case of mental illness the intellective power is wounded or impeded, but once the power is restored to health, it reverts to its 'proper activities' as if it had not endured such injuries. As Rahman sees it, Avicenna's theory that the intellective soul does not weaken as the body deteriorates but instead gets stronger, 'by a strenuous exercise of its functions',¹²⁶ can be defended. Intellectual activity is suspended during illness but this is 'not because the intellect is

¹²³ Wisnovsky, *Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy* p. 115.

¹²⁴ Morewedge, p. 229.

¹²⁵ Morewedge, p. 225.

¹²⁶ Rahman, p. 102.

dependent on the body but because the soul, during illness, is preoccupied with the body and is diverted from the intellectual activity'.¹²⁷ With regard to the intellectual power's dependency on sense and imagination, which are the instruments of the body, Jean states that the intellectual power must be distinguished in two ways; the inferior, which works through the senses and images and the superior which is illuminated to attain to first truths. The inferior and superior reason referred to by Jean had its origin in Augustine's distinction between things that the soul can look upwards towards higher things, as in divine truths, or it can look downwards towards bodily things and events. For Augustine there is no possibility of error with regard to the highest level of reason: one knows that two plus two equals four. If not, this is due to ignorance, just as doing wrong is due to a lack of moral training.¹²⁸

Augustine places the human soul on a level between God and bodies, where it is able to look upward (*ratio superior*) to consult the divine truths, or downward (*ratio inferior*) to consider bodily things and events. The disposition, or habit, which enables the human mind to judge in accord with the divine truths is *wisdom*, while the habit that perfects the lower reason is *knowledge*. Both are useful, but knowledge depends on wisdom and not the reverse.¹²⁹

This was later developed in the writings of Algazel, Avicenna and Gundissalinus as the doctrine of the two faces of the soul. With Jean we see that the 'higher reason is independent of bodily conditions and does not require the co-operation of the senses and of the imagination in order to exercise its functions'.¹³⁰ The senses and the imagination, as instruments of the body, are required to reach the intellect but, once

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ 'Yet Augustine admits that erroneous judgments are made by men. Error consists in taking one thing for another, by virtue of willing to do so; error becomes a volitional fault. "Bodies themselves are in no way present within the mind but only their images; and so, when we assent to the latter in place of the former, we err; thus error consists in assenting to one item in place of another" (*The Trinity*, IX, 11, 16).' *The Essential Augustine*, p. 21.

¹²⁹ Ibid., pp. 20-21.

¹³⁰ Crowley, p. 188.

reached, the imagination or the sense are no longer required in the process of knowing first truths. The superior face of the soul is sometimes illuminated by God or by intermediary luminaries, such as the angels.¹³¹ He also states that it can happen that the insane can make predictions and see the sublime although they may not be able to reason from sensible realities.

With regard to the lower reason, it requires sensation and imagination, this is not in regard to the superior reason. Hence it is that in phrenetics and the insane that, although the intellective power is impeded with regard to the comprehension of sensitive things, which ought to be able to connect with the sensitive forms in the imagination, but due to the non performance and disorder of the imaginative power, the intellective power cannot be illuminated. However, the superior reason, is sometimes illuminated by irradiation, which comes to it from the first light, or by intermediate luminaries, that is, the angels. Hence it is that phrenetics can prophesy and can sometimes see many sublime realities.¹³²

Avicenna gives prophecy a very prominent place in his philosophy and while Jean does not elaborate on the theory he combines a passage from Avicenna with that of the Pseudo-Augustine and its explanation of five types of dreams that can be experienced during sleep. Visions are possible ‘if there is a connection between the divine realm, the soul and the imaginative faculty’.¹³³ Jean refers to the illumination received from the good spirits as a way of gaining knowledge of the hidden but he also refers to the bad spirits whose main aim is to deceive souls, quoting the Pseudo-Augustine Jean states:

¹³¹ Rega Wood, “Imagination and Experience in the Sensory Soul and Beyond: Richard Rufus, Roger Bacon & Their Contemporaries” in Henrik Lagerlund, ed. *Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment* (Netherlands: Springer, 2007) pp. 27-57 (p. 45).

¹³² *Summa*, C. 45, 161-170. Quantum ergo ad inferiorem, indiget sensu et ymagine, non quantum ad superiorem. Hinc est eiam in freneticis et alienatis quod, quamuis impediatur uirtus intellectiua quantum ad comprehensionem inferiorem, que uniri debet formis sensibilibus in ymagine, propter infectionem uirtutis ymaginatie et confusionem, uirtus intellectiua non potest illuminari. Tamen secundum faciem superiorem illuminatur aliquando ab irradiacione, que est illi a luce prima, uel ab luminaribus mediis, scilicet angelis. Unde et frenetici prophetant et multa de sublimibus et interdum uident, quamuis prohibiti sint racionari de sensibus istis.

¹³³ Hasse, p. 155.

Sometimes a bad spirit, sometimes a good spirit, influences a human spirit, and it is not easy to discern by which spirit it is influenced, except that a good spirit teaches, an evil spirit deceives.¹³⁴

Jean allows for the fact that knowledge can be attained through the senses and the imagination and as such a certain role is granted to the senses and the power of the mind to create images. His account of the unity of body and soul and his belief in the soul as one in substance but also as a combination of vegetative, sensitive and rational powers shows that he did not hold to a dualist account of the human being as Descartes did in the sixteenth century.

One argument which Jean puts forward for the immortality of the soul, and one which we have already referred to, concerns the relationship between the body and soul; since the soul does not depend on the body for its existence it is therefore not destroyed with the body. A second argument is also taken from Avicenna, one which Jean relies on here, is that only composites are destructible and since, as has been proved, the soul is simple, it is therefore incorruptible. It is interesting that when he examines the passibility of the soul (the question as to whether the soul suffers in the body) Jean states that there exists a certain *colligatio* between the soul and the body. The meaning of the word is that of ‘a binding together’ but the binding that is involved is distinct from what is involved when a body acts on a body or when a spirit acts on a spirit; the former is through contact and the latter is through

¹³⁴ *Summa*, C. 100, 81-84. Nam sicut dicit Augustinus: ‘Humanum spiritum aliquando bonus, aliquando malus assumit spiritus, nec facile discerni potest a quo spiritu assumatur quantum nisi quia bonus instruit, malus fallit.’

inclination; the action of a body on spirit, however, is through a *colligatio* as in the case of the body and the soul.¹³⁵

SECTION SIX

CONCLUSION

Jean's *Summa* is imbued with the new Greek and Arabic sources which came on the scene at this very specific moment in the history of philosophy, that of the early thirteenth century. Like many of his contemporaries he embraced the challenge of reconciling the philosophies of Aristotle and Avicenna (who had engaged in his own synthesis of Aristotle) to his Christian beliefs. Jean can be looked upon as belonging to the early phase of the reception of both Aristotle and Avicenna and it seems that Averroes was unknown at this time.¹³⁶ It is clear that Jean had first-hand knowledge of Avicenna's *De Anima*, in fact, as we have seen, he may have had two manuscripts to hand. His incorporation of Avicenna with regard to the issue of the existence of the soul, the soul as a substance, the immortality of the soul, all emphasising the importance of what today we might call 'personal identity', appealed, no doubt to Jean as much as it does to us today as we reflect on whether there is a part of us which remains after our earthly bodies die, as they inevitably will.

There is no doubt that Jean was also aware that though Avicenna did hold to the doctrine of individual immortality he did not believe in the physical resurrection of the body. As we have seen, however, Avicenna's Flying man thought-experiment was a unique demonstration of how each of us are conscious, reflective, autonomous

¹³⁵ *Summa*, C. 49, 136-138. Dico ergo quod anima colligatur corpori quod perficit duobus modis: uno modo ut agens in corpus uel per corpus, et alio modo ut recipiens in corpore et per corpus. Primum uirtutis est et perfectionis, scilicet agere; secundum imperfectionis et infirmitatis, scilicet recipere.

¹³⁶ Vernier, *Somme de L'âme*, p. 8.

human beings. Jean also found in Avicenna a solution to the problem of how he could define the soul as a substantial form and at the same time hold to the definition that the soul is the form of the body. For Plato, the body was, in many respects, a hindrance to the soul. He was not interested in arguing for the unity of the human composite but he was the preferred philosopher for the Christian believers. The union of the soul and body was a natural union, but yet Augustine's definition of the 'soul using the body' still pointed to a view of the body which placed it on a lower level to the soul. The new Greek and Arab texts were therefore, a major challenge to the schoolmen of the early thirteenth century. They tried to integrate the new psychology into their theological treatises on the soul while remaining faithful to their Christian beliefs. Augustine may not have provided a satisfactory account with regard to the soul and its relation to the body, nevertheless, we will see that Jean, remained constantly faithful both to Augustine with regard to his theory of illumination and to the theory of the superior and inferior powers of the mind. Jean was one of the first authors to attempt to reconcile Avicenna and Augustine in the area of medieval moral psychology. As we move into this area, the reasons as to why Avicenna really was the philosophical authority for Jean will become clearer.

CHAPTER III

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JEAN'S ACCOUNT OF THE PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE'S *DE SPIRITU ET ANIMA*

The second treatise or *Consideratio* by Jean contains a discussion on the powers of the soul. He examines the powers of the soul following three authors, namely: the Pseudo-Augustine (chapters 62–67) Damascene (chapters 68–81) and Avicenna (chapters 81–119). Jean wrongly attributes the Pseudo-Augustinian's *De Spiritu et anima* to the genuine Augustine and, in fact, throughout the treatise he reverses the order in the title. Although this work is by an anonymous author it played a significant role in the history of medieval thought and especially in the years from the early 1230's to the early 1240's, encompassing the years in which Jean wrote his two philosophical works on the soul. It would seem that Jean was following his master, Alexander of Hales, who accepted the *De Spiritu et anima* to be by Augustine, but it was Philip the Chancellor (1165/ 85–1236) who recognized that it was not by the 'genuine' Augustine,¹ and as later pointed out by Gilson, Thomas Aquinas did not make the same mistake.²

While the *De spiritu et anima* lacks originality, it did appeal to the medieval scholars. Its appeal lay in the fact that it gathered together, 'even in a totally unsystematic way, so much traditional wisdom on the soul, it served as an admirable textbook or *vade mecum*'.³ Anyone could find in it, therefore, definitions of the soul, classification of the powers of the soul, the definition of *spiritus*, the study of mind

¹ Coleman, p. 390, n. 3.

² Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, p. 169.

³ McGinn, p. 67.

and its functions, and so forth. That is, as long as one chose to neglect the sometimes conflicting views in the text. This chapter examines the significance of Jean's account of the Pseudo-Augustine's reflections for his understanding of the powers of the soul.

SECTION ONE

WHETHER THE SOUL IS ITS POWERS

Jean asks whether the soul is identified with its powers and, secondly, if so, how are its powers distinguished one from the other. He addresses the question by examining the very meaning of the word 'soul'. According to its activity, the soul is called by various names:

It is called 'soul' when it enlivens; sensation when it feels; spirit when it contemplates; mind when it knows; reason when it distinguishes; memory when it recalls; will when it desires. These, however, do not differ in substance as they do in names, since all of these [aspects] are one soul, in fact the properties are diverse, but the essence one. From this it follows that the soul is its powers and potentialities and the opposite.⁴

By discussing its many functions, we can come to understand in what way the powers of the soul are distinguished one from the other. Among the powers of the soul are the powers to nourish, to sense, to rationalise, to understand, to discern, to remember and to will. Though the functions of the soul are many, the soul is one and simple. How is the soul 'one', if its functions are many? According to the Pseudo-Augustine, the powers of the soul are no more or no less than the soul itself. As it is stated:

⁴ *Summa*, C. 60, 6–9. Dicitur namque anima dum uegetat; sensus dum sentit; animus dum sapit; mens dum intelligit; ratio dum discernit; memoria dum recordatur; dum uult uoluntas. Ista tamen non differunt in substancia quemadmodum in nominibus, quoniam ista omnia una sunt anima, proprietates quidem diuerse, sed essencia una. Ex quo relinquitur quod anima est sue uires et potencie et econverso.

But we assign different names to one and the same substance according to its diverse powers. The soul has these powers even before it unites to the body. They are natural to it and are nothing other than the soul itself. The whole substance of the soul is perfect and complete when it has these three faculties: rationality, the positive appetite, and the negative appetite.⁵

Anything that the soul has, then, it has it naturally. Jean, following the author of the *De spiritu et anima*, holds that the soul is the same as its powers but he remarks that qualities, such as prudence, temperance and justice are not natural powers but, in fact, are acquired accidents. Quoting from the Pseudo-Augustine Jean notes,

The soul has certain things naturally and it is itself all these things; for the potencies and the powers of the soul are the same thing as the soul; it has accidents which are not the same as it; it is its powers and it is not its virtues; for it is not its own prudence, its temperance, its justice and fortitude.⁶

In the first *Consideratio* Jean also has stated, in his discussion on what is essential and what is accidental to the soul, that rationality is essential but whether the soul is just or unjust is accidental to it. Jean also established there that the soul is not made from a divine substance and is, therefore, subject to error and to wrong doing.

Jean puts forward a number of arguments, which appear to be his own as there is no attribution mentioned by him, or by the editor of the *Summa*. Arguing for his position he states:

Likewise, just as prime matter has the power to receive all natural forms, so the soul has the power to receive all species. Therefore, since prime matter is itself a power to receive the forms, it follows more forcibly that the soul itself, which is more simple and is an image of God, is a power to receive all

⁵ McGinn, p. 200.

⁶ *Summa*, C. 60, 10–13. Habet anima naturalia et ipsa omnia illa est; potencia namque eius atque uires idem sunt quod ipsa; habet accidentia et illa non est; sue uires est et sue uirtutes non est; non enim est sua prudentia, sua temperancia, sua iusticia et fortitudo.

species. Therefore, the power to receive intelligible and sensitive species is the soul itself. Therefore, it is its powers.⁷

Jean is clearly following Augustine and, as we have seen, the genuine Augustine did identify the soul with its powers throughout the whole of his career.

In the twelfth century the contrary position which asserted a distinction between the soul and its powers was to be found in ‘William of Champeaux, Peter Abelard, and others’.⁸ This heralded the beginnings of an opposition to the Aristotelian psychology of the soul coming from those who wanted to defend the Augustinian identification of the powers of the soul with the soul itself. Opposition arose from the belief that a distinction between the essence of the soul and its powers would be counter to their belief in the soul as analogous to God. Jean and his contemporaries can be placed at the very early stages of the debate which lasted well into the thirteenth century with Thomas Aquinas advocating a contrary position to Jean and to those who invoked the authority of Augustine. For Aquinas, ‘these capacities, as he conceives them, are positioned midway between the soul’s essence and its operations. Only this mid-way status can explain why we sometimes make use of these capacities and sometimes leave them unactualised’.⁹ In other words, a human being is not always actualising the capacities of the soul. The argument ‘rests on a rather subtle distinction. Since the soul’s essence is always actualized, for as

⁷ *Summa*, C. 60, 18-24. Item, sicut materia prima habet potenciam ad susceptionem omnium formarum naturalium, sic anima habet potenciam ad susceptionem omnium specierum. Cum ergo materia prima sit ipsa potencia ad susceptionem formarum, igitur et multo forcius ipsa anima, que simplicior est et ymago Dei est, erit potencia ad susceptionem specierum omnium. Ergo potencia susceptiua specierum intelligibilium et sensibilium est ipsa anima. Ergo est sue potencie.

⁸ McGinn, p. 69.

⁹ Pasnau, p. 156. Cf., Aquinas, *Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis* II sc 4 referred to by Pasnau.

long as the substance exists, the soul's various powers will be part of its essence only if those powers are always actualized'.¹⁰

Jean seems to be advocating a middle ground between those who followed Augustine and those who, like Thomas Aquinas, followed Aristotle in holding that the powers of the soul inhere in the soul as accidents. The powers of the soul differ according to their activity and in their relation to different acts but only conceptually as each belongs to the soul which is a single essence. In the passage below Jean refers to the power of heat in fire which, as a power, 'naturally follows the thing. For *being* is prior to *being able*, that is, being able to act or be acted on'.¹¹ He states that the power to receive the likeness of colour is accidental to the eye. How then is the soul identified with its powers?

As he states:

Others say that the soul is entirely identical to its powers, but differs with regard to reason, Augustine, himself, expressed this above. They say that there exists a power which is an accident in the thing of which it is the power and there is a power which follows essence as a property of it; and there is a power which is an essence, entering into a certain relation to act; for example: the power to receive the likeness of colour is accidental to the eye, for it weakens in old age; the power of heat in a fire follows essence, but it is inseparable and natural; the power of receiving the form in matter is the substance itself of matter. By how much more then is the power of the soul the soul itself. But it takes on a relation from one act to another act, in the different relations to the different acts there is a difference in the powers of the soul according to reason.¹²

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Robert Pasnau, ed. *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, Volume Three, Mind and Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 13 n. 12 '*Summa Fratris Alexandri* (vol. 2, p. 204b, n. 155, contra 1): "Power follows essence"'.
¹² *Summa*, C. 60, 54-66. Alii dicunt quod omnino idem est anima quod sue potencie, sed solum differre ratione, unde ipse Augustinus in superioribus hoc expressit. Dicunt ergo quod est potencia que est accidens in re cuius est potencia, et est potencia que consequitur essenciam sicut proprietas eius; et est potencia que est ipsa essencia adiciens quandam relacionem ad actum; verbi gracia: potencia recipiendi similitudines colorum est accidens pupille, deficit enim in ea per senium; potencia calefaciendi in igne est consequens essenciam, sed inseparabilis est et naturalis; potencia recipiendi formam in materia est ipsa substancia materie. Quanto ergo magis potencia ipsius anime est ipsa anima. Sed adiecit relacionem ad alium actum et ad alium, penes quam differentem relacionem ad actus differentes est differentia potenciarum anime secundum rationem.

It was philosophers in the late thirteenth century, Henry of Ghent (c.1217–1293), John Duns Scotus (1265–1308) and William of Ockham (1285–1347) who, following Jean, rejected the distinction between the soul and its powers. Ockham’s rejection and his argument for the identity of the soul’s powers and its essence rests on his famous principle of parsimony. In some respects Aquinas maintains a contradictory position; in one, the rational soul is the form of the body but in another ‘the soul’s intellective capacity, is neither the form nor the actuality of any body’.¹³ Is intellect therefore a capacity of the soul for Aquinas? The latter maintains that the powers of the soul are distinguished from its essence by arguing that ‘the *principle* of intellective cognition, whatever that may be, is the form of the human body’.¹⁴ This allows him to associate the intellect with the soul but without specifying the nature of that ‘relationship’.

Jean also holds a distinction with regard to the intellective power of the soul but on his account the ‘instrumental’ *quo* distinguishes between a real and a conceptual understanding of the soul’s identity with its activities. The being of the soul is distinguished from its activities; this is understood as ‘that by which it is’, and ‘that by which it acts’, or as the distinction between the essence of the soul and its powers respectively. This allows for a distinction between actions and objects but Jean can maintain his position with regard to the powers of the soul being identified with the soul itself.

The being of the soul and its activity are not the same: therefore ‘that by which it is’ and ‘that by which it acts’ are not the same. But, ‘that by which it is’ is its essence and ‘that by which it acts’ is its potency. Therefore its essence is not the same as its potency. – Likewise in God, since his being does not differ from his activity, I call this the activity that by which he acts,

¹³ Pasnau, p. 159.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 164.

his essence and potency are the same and not different. Therefore since being and acting are not the same in the soul, the essence and its potency are not the same.¹⁵

SECTION TWO
DISTINCTION OF THE POWERS OF THE SOUL BY THEIR
ACTIONS AND THEIR OBJECTS

Jean draws upon an anonymous treatise as his source for a discussion on the question of the manner in which the powers are distinguished. It is one of two anonymous treatises on the soul, dating from 1225 and 1230 respectively, the *De anima et de potentiis eius*, edited by René Gauthier, and the *De potentiis animae et obiectis*, edited by Daniel Callus, the second of which is the source for our author. Both treatises are important for different reasons. The first is ‘one of the few witnesses to the psychological doctrine of masters of arts before 1240 (the only other example being John Blund)’,¹⁶ and the second treatise is one of the earliest examples of a ‘*divisio potentiae animalis (or animae)*’ from which Jean quotes both in his earlier work, the *Tractatus divisione potentis animae* and in his *Summa*. It seems that Jean was ‘heavily indebted’ to this work. According to Hasse, the second treatise, *De Potentiis animae et obiectis* draws heavily on the first. Jean quotes from the latter at least fifteen times in the *Summa* but, unfortunately, he fails to acknowledge the source. At times he refers to this source as the anonymous *alii*. It is extant in three manuscripts but its anonymity remains to this day. As the editor of the treatise states:

¹⁵ *Summa*, C. 60, 31-37. Non est idem esse anime et suum operari: ergo non est idem quo est et quo operatur. Sed quo est, sua est essentia, et quo operatur est sua potentia. Ergo non est idem sua essentia et sua potentia. Item, in Deo, quia non differt esse ab operatione, operatione dico qua operatur, idem est et non differens essentia et potentia; ergo cum in anima non sit idem esse et operari, non erit idem in anima essentia et sua potentia.

¹⁶ Hasse, p. 34.

Yet whoever its author was, he assuredly wrote in the first decades of the thirteenth century and moved in the same intellectual circles as William of Auvergne. He must have been a theologian, not a Master in Arts, and could on occasion express his views forcibly and with a certain independence. His knowledge of Aristotle and of the ‘new learning’ was surprisingly wide in such an early stage of speculation.¹⁷

According to Callus quotations from the text are more numerous in the *Summa* than in Jean’s earlier *Tractatus* and it is stated that he had a copy of the text before him due to the ‘extreme literalness’ of some passages in question. There is clear evidence of Jean’s employment of the text, however, unlike the author of the *De Potentiis animae et obiectis* Jean does not miss out on the vegetative powers of the soul. In fact Jean’s treatment of the vegetative soul is very extensive, in particular as he follows Avicenna. A major difference between the anonymous author and Jean lies in the fact that this treatise asserts that the active or agent intellect, ‘was not to be considered a substance *separata a substantia anime* but rather as an immanent faculty of the soul.¹⁸ We will see how Avicenna’s *De anima* impacted on Jean’s interpretation of the powers of the soul and in particular, how he accepts Avicenna’s theory of the separate intellect.

With regard to the view that the powers of the soul can be distinguished according to actions Jean states this would lead to an almost infinite number of powers.

Actions of the soul sometimes differ in rapidity and slowness, as opinion [differs] from certitude through lack of understanding. If therefore a difference of powers follows a difference of actions opinion and certitude would not come from the same power. [...] Similarly, if an action of the soul is sometimes more perfect, sometimes less perfect, as happens with every action, such as seeing, understanding, etc.; if the decrease of action pertains

¹⁷ D. A. Callus, ‘The Powers of the Soul’, p. 140.

¹⁸ Janet Coleman, p. 381.

to another power other than perfection, then it would be necessary that the number of powers be as great as the order of decrease and growth which are almost infinite.¹⁹

A similar argument is applied to privation and possession, and to resting and moving.

It would lead to a need for powers for both contrary and contradictory positions and therefore the positing of separate essences for each. As he states:

Likewise, actions of the soul differ in privation and possession as doubt differs from knowing; in the way that doubt is a privation of comprehension on one of two contradictories; but knowing is a particular understanding of one of the contraries. And in this way resting and moving differ, as well as blindness and sight. But if these differences of actions produce differences of powers, then privation and possession are not meant to occur with regard to the same essence, which is false.²⁰

Jean maintains that if the distinction follows from the 'object, either as that from which or that towards which the power is moved, just as color moves sight' that similarly a distinct power would be required for each of contrary colours or tastes, such as sweet and sour. Considering the distinction in relation to the different organs of the body Jean states that there is one power which does not use an organ, that is, the intellective power. If the powers are distinguished according to their organs, however, this would mean that the intellective power could not be distinguished from powers which have no distinct organs assigned to them. Distinct powers exist in many organs, for example, the tongue is the organ of taste but also of speech.

¹⁹ *Summa*, C. 61, 9-18. Actiones anime aliquando differunt uelocitate et tarditate, sicut est in comprehensione subtilis et hebetis; subtilis enim uelocius comprehendit, hebes tardius. Ab alio ergo inesset comprehensio in subtili et in hebetate, si quecumque differentia actionum differentiam faceret potenciarum. Item, si actio aliqua anime aliquando est perfectior, aliquando est diminucior, sicut accidit circa omnem actionem, ut uidere, audire, etc.; si diminucio actionis pertineret ad aliam uim quam perfectio, tunc oporteret quod numerus uirium tantus esset quantus est numerus ordinum diminucionis et augmenti qui pene infiniti sunt.

²⁰ *Summa*, C. 61, 19-25. Item, differunt actiones anime in priuacione et habitu, sicut differt dubitacio a sciencia; eo quod dubitacio est priuacio comprehensionis alterius contradictoriarum; sciencia uero est certa comprehensio unius contrariorum. Et sic differunt quiescere et moueri, cecitas et uisio. Sed si hec differentia actionum faceret differentiam uirium, tunc priuacio et habitus non essent nata fieri circa idem, quod falsum est.

There is a power that does not use an organ, such as the intellectual power; therefore if the difference of powers follows from a diversity of organs, since the intellectual power does not have an organ, it does not differ from the other powers. Likewise, there is one organ for many powers, such as the tongue is the organ of taste and of the power to speak or explain. Likewise, there are many organs for one power, such as the organs of the powers of touch that are the limbs, not the bones, nails, hair and the like: therefore there is not a distinction between powers through a distinction of organs.²¹

Jean's conclusion is that the powers are distinguished through themselves.

They are known through acts and objects and sometimes through organs (*cognicio tamen distinctionis virium est secundum differentiam actionum et obiectorum, et aliquando secundum differentiam organum*).²² In support of this he relies on Aristotle's statement that acts are prior to powers and objects precede the acts.²³ The editor refers the reader to the *De Potentiis animae et obiectis* as Jean's source for this particular paragraph. Jean refers to Aristotle as the 'Philosopher' whereas the anonymous author quotes Aristotle by name.

Powers are distinguished in themselves, not through actions as through causes, or through objects or organs: however, the cognition of the distinction of powers is according to the different actions and objects, and sometimes through a difference of organs, and the Philosopher states that actions are prior to powers in the account of cognition and objects are prior to acts. It should be said, therefore, that some powers differ by organ or object or act; however, all differ by act and object, thus it does happen to a power or powers that they differ in the organ.²⁴

²¹ *Summa*, C. 61. 46-53. Aliqua uirtus est que non utitur organo, sicut uirtus intellectiua: ergo si differentia uirium sit secundum diuersitatem organorum, cum uirtus intellectiua non habeat organum, non differt ab aliis uiribus. Item, plurium uirtutum unum est organum, sicut lingua est organum uirtutis gustatiue et uirtutis locutiue uel interpretatiue. Item, unius uirtutis plura sunt organa sicut uirtutis tangibilis organa sunt omnia membra, preter ossa et ungues et pilos et huiusmodi: non est ergo distinctio uirium per distinctionem organorum.

²² *Summa*, C. 61. 55-57.

²³ Aristotle, *De anima*, II, 4, 415a18-20: 'acts and actions are prior to powers in account; but if so, still prior to these are their counterparts (*opposita*).' C/f. Robert Pasnau, *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, p. 14, n. 19. Compare: Aristoteles Latinus: Translator: Iacobus Veneticus: *De Anima*, liber: 2, cap.: 3 (Bekker: 415a). Priores enim potentiis actus et praxis secundum rationem sunt. Si autem sic his adhuc priora opposita sunt, oportet considerare de illis primum, si indigens erit determinare propter eandem causam, ut de alimento et sensibili et intelligibili.

²⁴ *Summa*, C. 61, 54-61. Respondeo. Distinguuntur uires seipsis, non per actiones sicut per causas, uel per obiecta, uel organa: cognicio tamen distinctionis uirium est secundum differentiam actionum et obiectorum, et aliquando secundum differentiam organorum, et hoc dicit Philosophus quod actus sunt

A distinction is also made with regard to the existence of a power which acts without an organ or without an object; this is the first power, that is, God. His power of knowing is in him but it does not require an organ or an object, nor does he know by a likeness to things but in ‘knowing’ itself.

And there is a power which acts, having an organ and an object, such as the powers of the soul acting through the body, as the visual power acting through the pupil of the eye, and has colour as its object in order to see. And there is a power operating without an organ, but not without an object, such as the intellective power, (this will be made known afterwards). Therefore the difference of objects, according to the mode, which is asserted, is always accompanied by a difference of powers. The origin of the distinction of the powers of the soul is made known. For the distinction comes from the powers themselves, but the knowledge of the actual distinction comes from the objects and the actions.²⁵

The above passage in Jean’s *Summa*, a part of the *Summa* which has its source in the *De Potentiis animae et obiectis*. The author of *De Potentiis animae* is concerned to ‘explain the many capacities of the individual human soul to respond to sense experience and come to the most abstract and universal knowledge through its own natural activities’.²⁶ Jean maintains that while body and soul exist as a composite, the soul is no more or no less than the powers of the soul. The rational soul, however, is

preiui potenciis, et obiecta actibus secundum rationem cognoscendi. Dicendum ergo quod aliquae uires differunt et organo et obiecto et actu; omnes uero differunt actu et obiecto, unde accidit uirtuti siue potenciis quod differant organo. C/f. *De Potentiis Animae et Obiectis*, p. 147, 15 – 148, 4. Questio autem est si recipiat diversitatem suam essentialem vel secundum esse vel secundum rationem, ab organo vel instrumento vel obiecto. Et sumatur obiectum communiter pro materia, cum ex parte essentie anime in se, cuius est illa diversitas potentiarum, non inueniatur diversitas. Et si dicatur quod ex seipsis diversificantur, non ex ipsis cognoscitur illa diversitas, prout dicit Aristoteles quod ‘actus preuii sunt potentiis secundum rationem, et obiecta actibus’. Quod autem non per organa vel instrumenta diversificentur, aut diversificate cognoscantur, patet per hoc quod non omnis potentia habet organa vel instrumenta sui proprii actus. Sed sunt obiecta generaliter omnis potentie humane, et diversa diversarum; ex quo sumitur diversitas potentiarum secundum obiecta, cognosci aut esse, et maxime cum potentie sint per suos actus ad obiecta.

²⁵ *Summa*, C. 61, 100-108. Et est potentia que est operans habens organum et obiectum, sicut potentie anime operantes per corpus, ut potentia uisua pupillam, et obiectum colorem ut uideat. Et est potentia operans sine organo, non tamen sine obiecto ut potentia intellectiua, sicut postea manifestabitur. Differentia ergo obiectorum, secundum illum modum qui dictus est, semper concomitatur differentiam uirium. Sic ergo manifestum est unde sit distinctio uirium in anima. Est enim distinctio ex seipsis, sed cognitio ipsius distinctionis est ex obiectis et actionibus.

²⁶ Coleman, p. 384.

separable from the body as it does not depend on the body in the same way as the vegetative and sensitive souls.

The agent intellect, as stated above, according to the author of *De Potentiis animae et obiectis* is not separate from the soul. It is distinguished from the possible or passive intellect, but both are immanent faculties of the soul.²⁷ The anonymous author also rejects the theory of illumination from a separable agent intellect but instead holds that ‘the agent intellect is itself an interior light along with the possible intellect’.²⁸ We will see how Jean uses Avicenna to prove that there exists an active intellect and he asks whether this active intellect is separate from the soul or whether it is part of it, a created intelligence, or an uncreated intelligence. His response is to accept all three propositions. This will be discussed in chapter five below. The next chapter in Jean is a discussion of the powers of the soul according to the Pseudo-Augustine. Although it is a lengthy text Jean limits his discussion to passages coming from the ‘new’ medical sources and those concerned with the cognitive powers of the soul.

SECTION THREE

THE DIVISION OF THE POWERS ACCORDING TO THE PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE.

As pointed out by Bougerol, Jean wrongly attributes the Pseudo-Augustinian work, *De anima et spiritu* to the ‘genuine’ Augustine. According to recent scholarship, as stated above, it is a work which was compiled c.1170 and is a string of excerpts

²⁷ *De Potentiis animae et obiectis*. p. 156, 17-20. ‘Sed quia natura intellectualis est superior rebus corporalibus et supra res incorporales que sunt in ipsa, ideo ad hec comprehendenda non est necessarium illuminatione substantie separate, sed sufficit intellectus agens, qui est lumen interius, cum intellectu possibili’.

²⁸ Coleman, p. 384.

taken from Augustine, Cassiodorus of Vivarium, Isidore of Seville, Alcuin, Anselm, Bernard, Hugh of St Victor and Isaac of Stella. Bougerol also points to the fact that Jean incorrectly reverses the title which should read as *On the Spirit and the Soul* and it is listed under the works of Augustine in the *Patrologia Latina*.²⁹ Augustine, however, did not assign separate powers to the soul in the same way as the medieval scholars and as one author states:

When Augustine describes the functions of man's soul in terms of memory, understanding, and will (*memoria, intelligentia, voluntas*), he is not at all thinking of different powers. Rather [...] the whole soul is memory, the whole soul is intelligence, and the whole soul is will. This is a trinitarian psychology in which the diversity of functions of remembering, knowing and willing does not entail any real difference within the nature of the soul.³⁰

Augustine's theory was not so much a theory of substance and accidents in the Aristotelian sense as much as a theory which held that the activities of the soul stemmed from the nature of the soul itself. It could be said that while there are three distinct faculties of the soul, this does not necessarily imply that they are unrelated.

It is from Boethius onwards that we have what is described as 'a wider anthropology of the soul and its powers'.³¹ Boethius had translated and commented upon Aristotle's logical works and was the main transmitter of ancient logic, 'as developed within the Neoplatonic curriculum, to the Latin West'.³² His theological treatises, the *Opuscula sacra* were an important influence on medieval thinking and we have already seen the Boethian influence on Jean where he distinguishes between the *quod est* and *quo est* to explain the distinction between the creator and created. The story of the writings that would influence the early medieval thinkers and

²⁹ Ibid, 220.

³⁰ *The Essential Augustine*, p. 68.

³¹ Coleman, p. 156.

³² Marenbon, p. 35.

ultimately the twelfth centuries authors on the soul is complicated. Plotinus, for example may have influenced Augustine Porphyry also may have been an even greater influence. We do not know for certain but we do know that many neo-Platonic texts survived into the twelfth century, Calcidius's *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, Martiannus Capella's *The Marriage of Mercury and Philology* and the *Commentary on the Dream of Scipio* by Macrobius. The *Categories* of Aristotle, for example, provided the notion of the composite individual to the medieval scholars, however, Boethius's interpretation of it 'shifted the meaning further into a Platonic mode'.³³ There is, in Boethius's writing, a 'tension between an Aristotelian logic and a Platonic ontology at odds,'³⁴ a tension which, as will be seen, increases in the thirteenth century when the works of Aristotle and Avicenna were made available to the medieval scholars. Boethius's interpretation of Aristotle's *Categories* influenced the early medieval scholars of the ninth and tenth centuries. As mentioned above, however, there were other texts, even more influential, which were known to some later authors writing on the psychology of the soul. According to Coleman the Platonising tendencies based on the Boethian tradition of the early authors were supplemented by 'renewed interest in Eriugena's translations of the the pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus the Confessor and Gregory of Nyssa'.³⁵ This resulted in greater emphasis being placed on the soul/body dichotomy. Although such a sharp distinction was not present in the writings of Aristotle, some late fifth and sixth century neo-Platonist philosophers interpreted the distinction between the rational and irrational soul in Aristotle as that of a separation between body and soul.

This strict dichotomy was not present in Aristotle's account (*De anima*, III, 4) where, as we have seen, he moves in a more ambiguous way, using the

³³ Coleman, p. 195

³⁴ Ibid., p. 194.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 198.

language of potentiality and actuality, from discussing imagination to a discussion of thought. He argues that thinking is akin to perceiving and that it is reasonable to suppose the intellect should not be mixed with the body. The faculty of sense perception is not independent of body where intellect is distinct.³⁶

The tension between Aristotelian logic and Platonic ontology re-surfaces again in the writings of the Greek neo-Platonists, John Philoponus, Stephanus of Alexandria and Simplicius. Their views would be transmitted through the works of the Arabic philosophers, in particular, we will see Avicenna's *De anima* influencing Jean and his contemporaries in the early part of the thirteenth century. The neo-Platonic emphasis on the separation of body and soul would now be viewed in light of the reception of the Greek-Arabic texts of Aristotle and Avicenna. In particular the 'new' medical theories in the writings of Avicenna and Constantine the African (these will be discussed below in chapter five) heralded the beginnings of the new physiological understanding of man which is clearly documented in the Pseudo-Augustine's treatment of the powers of the soul that are linked to the body through the arteries and the veins.

Jean's own writings and his use of his sources are testament to the growing interest in the physiological understanding of human nature and the body/soul dichotomy. Writing on this period in medieval thought:

These themes on the whole were part of that century's *philosophia naturalis* which was still of the competence of the theology masters. Later on, around the end of the thirteenth century, there took place an ideal handing over of medical, naturalistic themes from the theologians to the new scientific intellectual of the mediaeval universities, the "Scholastic Physician".³⁷

³⁶ Ibid., p. 198.

³⁷ Vico, p. 309

In the Pseudo-Augustine we meet the ‘new’ medical theories of the four elements and the four humours, the three spirits (*naturalis, spiritualis, animalis*) and their respective organs (liver, heart and brain). The origins of the physiological schemes will be discussed in relation to Avicenna. These are real ‘functional dynamisms and physiological systems causally related to specific body organs and endowed of a material *spiritus*.³⁸ With regard to the powers that are joined to the body, Jean observes,

The natural power acts on the blood in the liver and the other humors and which it transmits through the veins to all the limbs of the body, in such a way that they grow and are nourished. This power is divided into four parts, namely, the appetitive, the retentive, the expulsive and the distributive. The appetitive seeks those things necessary for the body; the retentive retains the expended food until the food is made useful by digestion; the expulsive expels the harmful and the excess; the distributive distributes the humors of the good foods to all the limbs and delivers to each in proportion.³⁹

Jean discusses the spiritual power which is the vital spirit and is the principle of life. It is sourced in the heart and it spreads through the body, through the arteries and the veins. The third power is the animal power which is located in the brain from where it invigorates the five senses. There are three ventricles of the brain, one is the anterior part which directs all the senses; the posterior part is that by which we have movement; the third is the intermediary between both of these, and is the rational power. In the first part of the brain the animal power is called the phantasy, that is, the imagination, since images and likenesses are impressed on it and contained therein. In the intermediary part it is called rationality or that which judges that

³⁸ Ibid, p. 314.

³⁹ *Summa*, C. 62, 5-12. Et uirtus naturalis operatur in epate sanguinem et alios humores quos per uenas ad omnia alia membra corporis transmittit, ut inde augeantur et nutriantur. Vis ista in quadrifariam diuiditur, scilicet in appetitiuam, retentiuam, expulsiuam, distributiua. Appetitiua que sunt necessaria corpori appetit; retentiua sumpta detinet donec ex illis utilis digestio fiat; expulsiua nociua et superflua expellit; distributiua bonorum alimentorum humores omnibus membris distribuit prout cuique expedit.

which is represented through the imagination. In the ultimate part of the brain we have that which belongs to memory. Through these three powers the soul is spread throughout the entire body, not by extension in space but through a living presence. These powers are as much of the soul as they are of the body, one cannot exist without the other.⁴⁰

The next chapter dealing with the cognitive powers of the soul is also taken from the *De Spiritu et anima* and as stated by Coleman the latter provides a physiological analysis of cognition. The powers of the soul itself are divided into the rational, the irascible and the concupiscible. These are further divided into sensation, imagination, reason, memory, intellect and understanding. The author links the various elements of which corporeal objects are made with the cognitive faculties. The origins of this tradition go back as far as Calcidius's translation and commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*. Jean refers to Calcidius in a chapter from the first treatise on the soul, referring to the question as to how the soul which is not distended throughout the body feels movement in every part of the body? Calcidius gives the example of a spider who residing in the centre of its web feels the movement made, no matter what size, in any part of the web; in the same way the soul, residing as the principal movement in the centre of the heart feels each movement produced in the body. Jean posits a definite link between cognitive powers of the soul and the body. He names three cognitive powers of the soul through which we gain knowledge of the corporeal and incorporeal objects.

One, he states, belongs to us in the way we sense bodies; that we do through the five corporeal senses; another, through understanding not bodies, but

⁴⁰ *Summa*, C. 62, 37-40. His tribus uiribus iam dictis, scilicet naturali, uitali, animali, anima per totum corpus diffunditur, non locali distensione, sed uitali intensione. Iste uires tam anime quam corporis dici possunt, quia ab anima in corpore fiunt, nec sine utroque fieri possunt.

things similar to bodies; another, in contemplating not bodies, not the likenesses of bodies; but those things which do not have images similar to themselves, such as God and the rational soul itself, and powers, such as prudence, justice, charity and whatever other essences we discern and define by our understanding. The first refers to the exterior cognitive power, which is called the sensitive exterior power; the second refers to the sensitive interior power, such as imagination; the third to the intellective power.⁴¹

This is further explained in terms of Augustine's three genera of vision.⁴² The first genera of vision is the lowest vision and refers to the seeing of bodies by means of the corporeal senses. The second type of light is spiritual, that is the soul views images or likenesses of bodily things. The third is the intellectual vision in which the soul sees intelligible truths without the help of any images. This refers back to the objects of the powers of the soul and here again we have the objects which are at different levels towards which we turn our gaze using our will. It is because of the rational power of the soul we know that there is something that is above the soul, something next to it, something in the soul and something below it. We are, therefore, capable of going towards something or fleeing it, of loving or hating it. This distinction has its source in the genuine Augustine and is employed by Jean in his argument for the existence of an active intellect that would accord with his Christian beliefs. This will be discussed in relation to the adherents of Avicennised Augustinianism, among whom Jean may be said to be counted.

⁴¹ Summa, C. 64, 1-10. Aliud, inquit, est nobis quo corpora sentimus; quod quinque corporeis sensibus facimus; aliud quo non corpora, sed corporibus similia cernimus; aliud quo nec corpora, nec corporum similitudines inspicimus; sed res illas que non habent ymagines sibi similes, sicut Deus et ipsa mens rationalis, et uirtutes, ut prudentia, iusticia, caritas et quecumque alie sunt quas intelligendo discernimus et diffinimus. Primum pertinet ad uirtutem cognitiuam exteriorem, que dicitur sensitua exterior; secundum ad uirtutem sensituiam interiorem, quemadmodum ymaginatio; tertium ad uirtutem intellectuiam.

⁴² *Literal Commentary on Genesis*, XII, 6.15-11.22, 30.58-31.59; trans. J.H. Taylor, S.J., *St Augustine: De Genesi ad Litteram*, Bk XII (St Louis University Dissertation, 1948), pp. 25-29, 33, 39-43, 137-139. Quoted in *The Essential Augustine*, p. 93.

The author of the *De Spiritu et Anima*, according to Coleman, develops his treatise to include a most interesting explanation of corporeal vision but this is missing in Jean. It is a theme which is also absent in his exposition of the powers of the soul according to Avicenna. The question as to why Jean chose not to include either in his treatise may be related to the scientific nature of the theories. He does take from the *De spiritu et anima* that in intellectual vision the soul is never deceived but in corporeal vision we are deceived in many ways. He cites the examples of those who gaze at the stars which seem to be stationary and are moving; how the rays of the sun can affect our eyes and we see double; or how an oar in water seems to be broken. The senses can be deceiving. In imaginary vision the soul is often deceived as in moments of worry or even when tranquil.

Jean states that there is in us a spiritual nature in which the likenesses of bodies are either formed or placed upon it, once they are formed. He states:

For it is certain that this spiritual nature is in us, in which the likenesses of bodies are either formed, or once formed, are infused; either that happens when we are in contact, through some sense of the body, with objects that are present and continually their likenesses are formed in the spirit; or when we think about things that are absent, things known or unknown.⁴³

He refers further to how we can often imagine that we are seeing bodies when in fact we are only seeing images. This can happen in cases of fever when we think we see things that are not there at all. Following the author of the *De Potentiis Animae et Potentiae* it is because of *vis morbi* that we are capable of contriving things in the mind, things that either do not exist or are not known to exist.

⁴³ *Summa*, C. 65, 11-15. Certum namque est hanc esse in nobis spiritualem naturam, qua corporum similitudines aut formantur aut formate ingeruntur; siue cum presencia aliquo corporis sensu tangimus, et continuo eorum similitudo in spiritu formatur; siue cum absentia iam nota, uel que non nouimus, cogitamus.

The cognitive powers are further divided according to five differences, sensation, imagination, reason, intellect and understanding.

Sensation is, as Augustine stated, that power of the soul which perceives the forms of corporeal bodies which are present; the imagination perceives such forms but as absent; but the sense perceives the forms in the material, but the imagination perceives them outside the material; and that same power which is formed outside is called a sense and when carried over into the deepest part [of the soul] is called imagination. And know that it acts in the same way in the genus of sensitive cognition. And reason is a power of the soul which perceives the different forms of corporeal things, proper and accidental, that is, belonging to all incorporeal things, but not found apart from a body, subsists only in reason; for it abstracts from bodies those things which are founded in bodies, not by action but by reflection; for the nature of a body, according to which a body is a body, is not itself a body, that is, it is singular. And the intellect is a power of the soul which perceives created invisible beings, such as angels, demons, souls and any created spirit. And the understanding is that power of the soul which discerns supreme being itself, the true and the immutable, God.⁴⁴

The explanation that reason perceives the different forms, incorporeally, but which are not found apart from bodies, is taken directly from the *De spiritu et anima*. Coleman's explanation may help to explain the various stages in the theory of knowledge as it is very similar to Jean's but she gives a different meaning to *intellectus* and *intelligentia*.

Whatever the senses perceive through sense knowledge the imagination represents through similitudes, the *cognitio* forms, the *ingenium* investigates, the *ratio* judges, the memory delivers up, the *intellectus* defines or separates, and the *intelligentia* comprehends. *Intelligentia* is the soul's power which

⁴⁴*Summa*, C. 66, 6-21. Est autem sensus, sicut dicit Augustinus, illa uis anime que rerum corporearum corporeas percipit formas presentes; ymaginatio uero est uis anime que rerum corporearum percipit formas, sed absentes; sensus namque formas in materia percipit, sed ymaginatio extra materiam; et eadem uis que exterius formata sensus dicitur, usque ad intimum transducta ymaginatio uocatur. Et intellige eadem in genere cognitionis sensitue. Racio uero est ea uis anime que rerum corporearum naturas, formas, diferencias et propria accidentia percipit, scilicet uniuersalia omnia incorporea, sed non extra corpus nisi ratione subsistencie; abstrahit enim a corporibus que fundantur in corporibus, non actione, sed consideratione; natura enim corporis, secundum quam corpus est corpus, nullum utique est corpus, scilicet singulare. Intellectus uero est uis anime que inuisibilia percipit creata, sicut angelos, demones, animas et omnem spiritum creatum. Intelligentia uero est uis anime que cernit ipsum summum, uerum et incommutabilem, Deum.

immediately perceives invisible things. One is led then to meditation or contemplation.⁴⁵

There are a number of common themes which will re-emerge in the course our study: how two substances can come together to form a third; how the dictum 'know yourself' must also include the material as well as the spiritual aspect of man's nature; the influence of the medical writings on our authors. These are some of the themes that will be developed in the next chapter on the powers of the soul according to John Damascene. His study of the psychology of the human soul includes a discussion of free will as a means to furthering our understanding of the human condition.

⁴⁵ Coleman, p. 222.

CHAPTER IV

HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY ACCORDING TO JOHN DAMASCENE

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the powers of the soul, according to the Pseudo-Augustine, are three-fold: rationality, irascibility and concupiscibility. These are further divided into the cognitive powers of sensation, imagination, reason, memory, intellect and understanding. The cognitive powers, according to Jean's next source, John Damascene, are mind, thought, opinion, imagination and sensation; will and choice belong to the appetitive powers. What is interesting is that imagination and sensation are common to both divisions; imagination being the power which is intermediate between body and soul according to the Pseudo-Augustine. Jean, as we will see, quotes extensively from Damascene's most important work, *On the Orthodox Faith*, which is Part Three of *The Fount of Knowledge* written in Greek in 743 (the first two parts of which are an introduction to logic entitled *Dialectica* and a study of heresies entitled *De haeresibus*). *On the Orthodox Faith* (also known as *The Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*) is the best known part of the work.¹ It is divided into four books, the second book of which discusses God's creation, both invisible and visible, with special attention being given to man and his faculties. Jean follows Damascene's text very closely with regard to the powers of the soul. The exposition on human freedom and the will are also taken from Damascene's chapters on free will, sometimes verbatim. Jean's account is testament to the fact that Damascene was an important source for both

¹ For details of Damascene's life and works see pp. v-xxxviii, St John of Damascus, *Writings*. See above Introduction p. 10.

early and later medieval scholars as *The Fount of Knowledge* was the first Greek theological *Summa*. This is the work of a Byzantine scholar, who had access to the major ancient texts and who, because of his Greek background and language, made it possible for him to read the original works of the ancients. The earliest translations of *The Fount of Knowledge* were made in the East, the first of which was that of the *Dialectica* and *On the Orthodox Faith* in the early part of the tenth century. In the introduction to the *Fount of Knowledge* we are told that the latter was a translation from the Greek into Old Slavonic by John, Exarch of Bulgaria in the time of the Tsar Simeon. The same divisions of the work were translated into Arabic in the second half of the tenth century, followed by a series of Russian translations undertaken throughout the following centuries, up to and including the twentieth. In the West another long series of Latin translations began in the twelfth century. A Latin translation of Chapters 1–8 of Book 3 of *The Orthodox Faith* was undertaken in Hungary by a monk named Cerbanus (c. 1134–1138), followed by a complete translation of the entire work by Burgundio of Pisa (c.1148–1150) at the request of Pope Eugenius III. Another Latin edition was made by Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln (1235–1253), a version of the *Dialectica*, produced about 1240. It seems that there are some seventeen references to Damascene's *De fide orthodoxa* in Grosseteste's *Hexaemeron*. He also produced another Latin version of the text, based on Burgundio's translation.² It would seem that Jean had Burgundio's version to hand as this is the version used by Bonaventure and, in fact, Bonaventure 'quotes him over two hundred times in his *Commentaries on the Sentences*'.³

² Michael Frede, 'John of Damascus on Human Action, the Will, and Human Freedom', in *Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources*, ed. by Katerina Ierodiakonou, pp. 63–95 (p. 68).

³ Bourgerol, *Introduction to the Works of Bonaventure*, p. 25.

The *De Fide Orthodoxa* left its mark on the development of Latin systematic theology. Damascene's ideas on human action and freedom in particular 'prepared the way for the development of the notion of will in Aquinas and other Latin thinkers'.⁴ This chapter will examine the powers of the soul according to Damascene and will critically assess his views on the nature of free will, deliberation and choice. I will also discuss those chapters in Damascene that deal with sensation, the rational and non-rational powers of the soul and free will as presented by Jean.⁵

Damascene draws on Nemesius for his account of human psychology, but one might ask what is the relevance of his precise analysis of the different types of fear and anger. One interpretation may be that Damascene, 'is here close to Pascal with his insistence on our grasping both the *misère* and the *grandeur* of humankind'.⁶ It is the search for self-knowledge or, as Louth states, 'the ambivalent nature of self-knowledge'. Without this self-knowledge, 'we shall only mis-understand ourselves, mistaking what is natural for what is wrong, or vice versa, or realizing only one aspect of human nature, and thus being dangerously elated, or equally dangerously downcast'.⁷ Damascene, it seems, had a penchant for lists; this is apparent in the passages selected by Jean. As we examine his discussion of human emotions and possible explanation for each, we can only conclude that it was his way of understanding the complexities of human nature; for Damascene 'they tame the potentially uncontrollable nature of reality'.⁸

⁴ Marenbon, 2007, p. 62.

⁵ In the course of doing so, I will refer to Frede's article, mentioned above, which will shed some important light on the topic of human action, the will, and human freedom.

⁶ Andrew Louth, *St John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 135.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

⁸ *Ibid.*

Damascene divides the powers of the soul into the cognitive powers and the life-giving powers (*has quidem cognitivas, illas vero zoticas*). The cognitive powers are mind, thought, opinion, imagination and sensation; those of the appetitive powers include will and choice. Damascene, following the Platonic tradition assumes that reality consists of two worlds, that of the intelligible and that of the sensible. Human beings straddle the two worlds since they are composed of mind and a body. However, the main divide for Damascene ‘is not that between the intelligible world and the sensible world, but the divide between God and his creation, and this creation contains both the intellects other than God and the visible world.’⁹ For most of the ancients and for Damascene all intellects have a will in virtue of which they are able to make right decisions and, even if at times we fail in our efforts to choose the right course of action we have, at least, intellect, whereby we can justify our actions. Before examining his theory of the will I will give a summary of the senses and the intellect as it is presented by Jean and following that I will address the issue of the will and the important role it plays in Damascene’s understanding of human action. I will then compare the views of a contemporary of Jean de La Rochelle, that of John Blund (c. 1175-1248), who addresses the issue of free will as he understood it as present in human beings, in angels and in God. Blund, according to Hasse, is probably the first master of arts who wrote a treatise on the soul and also one of the few early writers who is influenced by Avicenna rather than Aristotle.¹⁰

We begin with an account of the five senses in Damascene. A sense, according to Damascene is a faculty of the soul by which material things are perceived. Damascene’s account of the senses is heavily dependent on Nemesius’

⁹ Michael Frede, p. 74.

¹⁰ Hasse, p. 18.

treatise, *On the Nature of Man*, who in turn relies on both Aristotle and Galen for the most part.¹¹ Nemesius was considered an authentic source for the transmission of Galen's medical texts before they were made known through the works of Avicenna. Thus we can understand why Jean would wish to include Damascene among his sources. Jean's aim at all times would seem to be to expose in as clear and precise a manner as possible the views of the various traditions, that of Galen coming from the medical tradition and sourced in Nemesius; that of Damascene, a Father of the Orthodox Church, a theologian and the author of the first great *Summa* in theology who, as we will see offered a moral theory based on Aristotle's moral psychology. Damascene's contribution to the history of ancient and medieval thought should be highlighted, 'because of the remarkable status John attained as an authority in Christianity, both Eastern and Western, an authority which also seems to give special weight to his account of human action and the will'.¹²

SECTION ONE THE EXTERNAL SENSES

First, Jean, follows Damascene. The latter, for instance, describes the sense of sight, followed by that of hearing, then smell, taste and touch. Here we are given details of the organs and nerves involved in each of the senses.

The first sense is sight; its organs are those which lead from the brain, the nerves and the eyes; sight perceives, following its first account, colour; and it distinguishes along with colour, the coloured body, its size, its shape, the place where it is and the distance between [where] it is and the middle, its number, its movement and rest, its roughness and smoothness, its evenness or

¹¹ 'The medical works of Galen and philosophical writings of Plato, Aristotle and the Neoplatonist Porphyry are all major influences on Nemesius, directly or indirectly; so too the controversial Christian Origen.' Nemesius, *On the Nature of Man*: Translated with an introduction and notes by R.W. Sharples and P.J. van de Eijk (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2008), p. 1.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 65.

unevenness, sharpness and bluntness and its consistency, that is whether it is of water or of earth, that is whether it is liquid or dry.

The second sense is hearing, sensitive to voices and sounds; it distinguishes between their sharpness and heaviness, their harshness and gentleness of tone and strength. Its organs are the nerves leading from the brain and the architecture of the ears.

The third sense is that of smell which occurs through the nostrils sending back vapours to the brain; it is terminated at the extremities of the anterior ventricles of the brain; it is both sensitive to and capable of receiving odours. The most general differences of odours is the difference between a good and a bad odour and that the intermediary between them is neither a good or a bad one.

The fourth sense is that of taste; it is capable of or sensitive to perceiving flavours. Its organs are the tongue and the palette in which the nerves which are led from the brain are extended, announcing the impression produced; those which are called the taste qualities of the flavours are; sweetness, tartness, pungency, astringency, bitterness, saltiness, greasiness, stickiness; the sense of taste distinguishes these.

The fifth sense is that of touch which is common to all animals. It comes from the nerves leading out from the brain to the entire body, and the other sense organs possess the sense of touch. Touch is subject to heat and cold, softness and hardness, stickiness and aridness, heaviness and lightness, for these are known only through the sense of touch; but common to both the sense of touch and sight are; roughness and smoothness, dryness and wetness, thickness and thinness, up and down, place and size, density and scarcity and roundness, if it is on a small scale and certain other shapes. Similarly the sense of touch senses the approach of a body with the memory and the understanding, as well as number, up to two or three, and since they are small objects they are known by touch. Sight, however, perceives these things more than touch.¹³

¹³ *Summ*, C. 68, 10-42. Primus sensus est uisus; organa uero eius sunt que ex cerebro sunt, nerui et oculi; sentit autem uisus, secundum primam rationem, colorem; dignoscit autem et cum colore coloratum corpus, et magnitudinem eius et formam, et locum ubi est et interuallum quod est in medio, et numerum, et motum et quietem, asperum et leue, equale et inequale, acutum et obtusum, et consistenciam, scilicet si aquosa est siue terrestris, hoc est humida uel sicca. Secundus sensus est auditus uocum et sonituum existens sensibilis; dinoscit autem eorum acumen et grauitatem, asperitatem et lenitatem, et magnitudinem; organa uero eius sunt nerui qui sunt ex cerebro, et aurium constructio. Tercius sensus est odoratus qui fit per nares, remittens uapores ad cerebrum; finitur autem ad fines anteriorum uentriculorum cerebri; et est sensitiuus et susceptiuus uaporum; uaporum autem generalissima est differencia bonus odor et malus odor; et quod est medium horum neque bene neque male olens. Quartus sensus est gustus; est autem saporum susceptiuus siue sensibilis; organa autem eius sunt lingua et palatum in quibus sunt nerui dilatati qui a cerebro feruntur, enunciantes eam que facta est susceptionem; que uero uocantur gustatiue qualitates saporum sunt hee: dulcedo, acedo, ponticitas, stipticitas, amaritudo, salsitas, unctuositas, uiscositas; horum enim est gustus dinoscitiuus. Quintus sensus est tactus qui et communis animalium; hic fit a cerebro missis neruis ad totum corpus, sed et alia organa sensuum habent sensum tactus; supponitur autem tactui calidum et frigidum, molle et durum, uiscosum et aridum, graue et lene: per solum enim tactum hec cognoscuntur; communia uero tactus et uisus sunt asperum et leue, siccum et humidum, grossum et subtile, sursum et deorsum, locus et magnitudo, densum et rarum, et rotundum, cum fuerit paruus, et alie quedam figure, similiter autem approprians corpus cum memoria et mente sentit, numerus autem usque ad duo vel tria, et hec cum parua sunt cognoscuntur tactu; hec autem magis uisus comprehendit quam tactus.

The sense of sight follows the standard point about vision in Aristotle. Each of the senses has its own object of sense, colour is the object of sight, sound is the object of hearing, and so on. Damascene, following Aristotle (albeit via Nemesius) distinguishes between the proper sensibles and the common sensibles, the latter being the objects which are common to more than one sense as movement and rest, shape, size, roughness and smoothness. The senses are given to us in pairs so that if one is damaged the other makes up for what is lost; the tongue is divided in certain animals, for example in serpents, but not in man; touch, however, is present in the entire body (except for the bones, the nerves, the nails, horns, hair and the like). Sight sees along straight lines, smell and hearing not only along straight lines but from all directions. Touch and taste do not perceive according to a straight line, nor from all directions but only when they approach the proper objects of the sense.

Though Damascene gives but brief descriptions of each of the senses, we can already see how the two traditions, the philosophical and the medical, were melding and were ‘meant to provide a physical and naturalistic description of man as a living organism’.¹⁴ Here in Damascene we meet Aristotle who, on the one hand, held that ‘two characteristic marks have above all others been recognised as distinguishing that which has soul in it from that which has not - movement and sensation’.¹⁵ On the other hand, we have the ‘anatomical description of Galen’s medicine, based on human and animal dissection’.¹⁶ It could be said that Damascene was the first major authority who had to face the challenges posed by the new medical and biological systems, even long before the works of Aristotle were circulating in the thirteenth

¹⁴ Vico, p. 310.

¹⁵ Aristoteles Latinus: Translator: Iacobus Veneticus: *De anima*, liber: 1, cap.: 2 (Bekker: 403b). Animatum igitur ab inanimato duobus maxime differre videtur; motu que et sentire.

¹⁶ Vico, p. 310.

century. While it is beyond the scope of our study to investigate Damascene's primary sources in a more detailed manner we can at least acknowledge that he is one of the most important intermediaries between the Eastern Greek fathers and the Western theologians of the Middle Ages.

SECTION TWO THE COGNITIVE POWERS

The cognitive powers, as we have seen, are both rational and irrational according to Damascene. The irrational powers, the senses, are, what we call the exterior powers of knowing; the interior powers of knowing are the imaginative, the excogitative, and the memorative power, all of which belong to the irrational part of the soul. Damascene, following Nemesius, provides information as to which part of the brain each of the faculties belong. We begin with the irrational interior powers. Damascene distinguishes between imagination and fantasy. Imagination is an irrational power of the soul but it arises from something imaginable, whereas fantasy is an empty passion which is not produced by an imaginable object, just as when one imagines a chimera. It is difficult to say if Damascene is merely referring to something like an over-active imagination when he refers to *fantasia*. This might be understood more clearly if we also refer to the words of Damascene in the *De fide et orthodoxa*.¹⁷ This passage is not included in Jean's presentation.

Moreover, that which comes within the province of the imagination and the senses is the imaginative and the sensible, just as the visible, — say, a stone or something of the sort — comes within the province of sight, which is the power of vision. An *imagination*, or fantasy, is an affection of the irrational part of the soul arising from some imaginable object. But an *imagining*, or phantasm, is an empty affection arising in the irrational parts of the soul from no imaginable object at all.

¹⁷ Saint John of Damascus, *Writings*, p. 242.

This distinction also appears in later authors on the soul, e.g., Albert the Great states that if *phantasia* is understood in a broad sense, ‘there will be only a slight difference between *phantasia*, imagination and estimation with regard to function, object and organ’.¹⁸ It seems that for Damascene the imagination sees things that have their basis in reality whereas there is nothing in reality which corresponds to the images produced in the fantasy. What is of more interest here is that according to Damascene there is a link between our sensitive and imaginative powers as he states:

that the source and origin of the exterior sensitive powers is the imaginative power. The organ of the imagination, as Damascene states, is the anterior ventricle of the brain, as Augustine states, the nerves have the origin which are the organs of the external senses; And following the order of acts, imagination is posterior to the exterior senses.¹⁹

The distinction between imagination and *fantasy* is not as clear, however, if we consider Aristotle’s understanding of *phantasia*, and if we also note that, like imagination, *phantasia* has a variety of meanings in classical thought. Aristotle held that *phantasia* is among the powers of soul, ‘in virtue of which we are enabled to judge and arrive at truth or falsity, even though it is not an actual judgement, in any of the forms of judgement, about truth or falsity, and is not *epistēmē* or *nous*’.²⁰ Aristotle states that *phantasia* is a movement which will not happen unless there is someone or something to be perceived and ‘must be like the perception which causes it’. In other words, beings without perception do not possess *phantasia*. *Phantasia* is a movement which follows from *aisthesis*. It ‘is simply involved in the process of

¹⁸ Albertus, *De homine*, 38.4, p. 334a: Dicendum quod si phantasia large accipiatur, tunc parva erit differentia inter phantasiam et imaginationem et aestimationem quantum ad actum et obiectum et organum. Quoted in Hasse: pp. 148-9.

¹⁹ *Summa*, C. 69, 4-7. [...], ex quo datur intelligi quod fons et origo uirium exteriorum sensibilium est uirtus ymaginatiua. Vnde organum ipsius, sicut dicit Damascenus, est anterior uenter cerebri a quo, sicut dicit Augustinus, originem habent nerui qui sunt organa sensuum exteriorum.

²⁰ Gerard Watson, *Phantasia in Classical Thought* (Galway: Galway University Press, 1988), p. 24.

supplying the materials on which the mind builds judgements'.²¹ It might be useful to quote a passage from Watson, which helps to explain the status of *phantasia* as a power in Aristotle which comes between perception and thinking.

It would appear from this that in a judgement where the term 'white' occurs, there is involved the (first) thought, *noema*, 'white' (see *De Anima* 430a26-8), which in turn would not exist without the *phantasma* of white. The *phantasma* of white would not in turn exist without the perception of white. For the perception to become the *phantasma* it is necessary for the phantasia to act, for this has been stated to be something between perception and thinking, that in virtue of which a *phantasma* occurs to us. The process is to be envisaged presumably as follows: when a colour, for instance, comes before the special sense of sight, the special sense reacts and causes the further movement of phantasia. If in a particular instance three senses will be affected, special, incidental and common, the three phantasiai or movements corresponding to each of the three initial sense movements will correspond also as regards veridical nature.²²

For Aristotle, and, as we have seen in Damascene, distinctions are made with regard to the senses and their objects; the objects of sight and hearing are colour and sound respectively; next are the common sensibles which are perceptible by more than one sense, e.g., movement, rest, shape and size. A third class referred to above are the objects that are perceived incidentally, that is, that we perceive a white object that happens to be a particular object or person. Thus, the objects of the first type are more likely to be true whereas 'that of the objects perceived incidentally leaves room for error, and that of objects perceptible by more than one sense, the objects of the 'common' sense, leaves most room of all'.²³

²¹ Ibid., p. 28.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid., p. 25.

After the imaginative Damascene posits the excogitative power which Jean tells us is also called ‘opinion’²⁴ in Damascene. It is the power of judging; a sensitive power from which one can form opinions regarding the process of synthesising (*composiciones*), inclinations to act or to avoid actions (*incessionones ad actus et occasionones vel actionones, et fuge actionum*). Its organ is the intermediate ventricle of the brain and the animal spirit in it. The exterior sense perceives the species present in the matter; imagination perceives the form deprived of the matter. Opinion or excogitation then makes a judgement.²⁵ In Damascene’s philosophical chapters (the chapters, commonly called the *Dialecta* in the West, which immediately follows the introduction to the *Fount of Knowledge*), he elaborates on the power of excogitation. In one respect it involves an extra thinking out of the ‘unanalysed knowledge of things’ as, for example, something appears to be simple through sensation but by excogitation it turns out to be ‘manifold and varied’. Man, for example, appears to be simple but by excogitation he is discovered to be two-fold, i.e. made up of body and soul. A second type is called ‘simple excogitation’ which is the combination of the sensitive and the imaginative powers which, when working from things that exist imagine things that do not exist and thus produce a ‘figment of thought’. This is going further than the imaginative power in that if it gives form to something it is said to produce idols.²⁶

²⁴ It was called the calculative faculty in Aristotle and later called the faculty of opinion. Cf. Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 221.

²⁵ *Summa*, C. 70, 6-12. Circa que nota quod sensus exterior comprehendit speciem presentem in materia et simplicem; ymaginacio uero comprehendit formam absente materia et simplicem. Excogitacio uero iudicat de ea, siue opinio; et si secundum racionem ueri, ut quoniam est hoc uel quoniam non est hoc, sic dicuntur excogitatiue uirtutes, iudicia et composiciones; si secundum racionem boni et mali, sic est excogitatiua uirtus principium incessionis ad actum uel fuge.

²⁶ Saint John of Damascus, *Writings*, p.101.

After the imagination and excogitation comes the memorative power.

Memory is related to imagination as Jean states:

The power of the memorative, as Damascene states, is the storehouse of memories and recollections. Memory is a left over fantasy from one of the senses following the act of sensing; fantasy is a sensible form; for memory is the accumulation of sensation and thought. For the soul apprehends sensible objects through the senses, that is, it senses and an opinion is formed; on the other hand it apprehends intellectual objects through the mind and intellectual understanding occurs. Therefore, when it retains the *typi*, that is the forms of things, of those things of which it has opinions and of those of which it has understood, intellectually, it is said to remember.²⁷

Damascene distinguishes between the memory of intelligible and sensible objects as

he states:

One must note that the apprehension of intellectual things only comes through learning or through a natural ability; but not through the senses. For sensible things are committed to memory in and through themselves; intelligible things we do remember, if indeed we have learned of them, but we have no memory of their substance.²⁸

It is stated that the memory of the sensibles are remembered in themselves.

This is perhaps a reference to Aristotle's position that we do not learn how to see colours or how to hear sounds and the same with the remaining senses. These capacities are in us naturally. Also with regard to sensible things being committed to memory, Aristotle states that it is impossible to think without a *phantasm*. For example, if we have to draw a triangle we are thinking of a definite size, but, he states we are not really concerned with the physical dimensions but more with the

²⁷ *Summa*, C. 71, 2-9. Est autem memoratium, sicut dicit Damascenus, memorie et rememoracionis promptuarium. Memoria autem est fantasia derelicta ab aliquo sensu secundum actum apparentem; fantasia autem dicit formam sensibilem; uel est memoria coarceruacio sensus et intelligencie. Anima enim sensibilia per sensus suscipit, scilicet sentit, et fit opinio; intelligibilia uero per intellectum et fit intelligencia. Cum igitur typos, id est formas, eorum que opinata est, et eorum que intellexerunt, custodit, memorari dicitur.

²⁸ *Summa*, C. 71, 9-14. Oportet autem scire, quoniam intelligibilium susceptio non fit nisi ex disciplina uel naturali ingenio; non enim ex sensu est. Nam sensibilia quidem secundum seipsa memorie commendantur; intelligibilium uero, siquidem didicimus, memoramur, substance uero earum memoriam non habemus.

properties of the triangle which remain the same regardless of the actual dimensions of its sides or angles. We do, however have a physical model before us, we have the thought of it and we remember it. This is a thing ‘of which we have a phantasia’²⁹ and which is capable of being remembered of itself, *per se*. As Watson further states, ‘the properties of triangles *involve* the presence of such a phantasia and are capable of being remembered accidentally, *per accidens*. Hence he states that memory, even of intelligibles, does not take place without *phantasmata*’.³⁰

Next we are told that recollection (*remoracio*) is the term used by Damascene to mean the recovery of memory that has been lost by forgetting. Forgetting is simply the loss of memory. The imaginative power apprehends material things through the senses, it hands it over (*tradit*) to the excogitative or the distinguishing power which transmits it to the memory. The organ of the power of memory is the posterior ventricle of the brain and the animal spirit which is present therein. We will meet the ventricles of the brain again in Avicenna. In brief, there are three chambers or *ventriculi*: one in the front, the back and the central one. Damascene’s source for his physiological account of man is Nemesius whose work *On the Nature of Man* elaborates on the workings of the human body.³¹ It was accepted for the layman to possess such medical knowledge and in fact it was not until late into the thirteenth century that the medical themes were handed over to the ‘scholastic physician’.

²⁹ Watson, p. 30.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ ‘The attraction of Galen’s work was obvious: it offered a teleological account of the structure and workings of the human body and its parts, showing in great detail its purposeful design and referring, in language very to the Christian accounts of the creation, to the craft and skill of ‘the Craftsman’ (*ho dêmiourgos*). Nemesius, *On the Nature of Man*, Translated with an introduction and notes by R.W. Sharples and P.J. van der Eijk (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press), p.13.

The preceding powers, memory, excogitative (or opinion) and the imaginative, belong to the irrational part of the soul. We now turn to the rational part of the soul which concerns the intellect or mind and we are told that the movement or the act of the rational power is determined by Damascene in a threefold way: through experience, through logical learning and through teaching (*secundum triplicem viam, scilicet viam inveniendi, viam addiscendi, et viam docendi*). First through sensation a passion is caused in the soul and this is the imagination which then forms opinions. The thinking faculty (*excogitative*) then judges the opinion as to whether it is true or false; it decides what is true. Hence this is called mind (*mens*) because of its estimating, its thinking and its judging and that which has been set down and determined as true is called the understanding (*intellectus*).³²

The second way³³ we come to have knowledge is a type of logical learning, the *via addiscendi*, which is described in terms of mental motions. The first movement is *intelligentia* and whatever it is concerned with it is called the intention (*intencio*). In other words, we have learned something intellectually, but we do not have the substance of the memory. When the intention remains in the soul and the soul is adapted to the thing thought, this is excogitation. When it continues in the same subject and examines itself it is called prudence (*fronesis* or in the modern

³² *Summa*, C. 72, 7-15. Via inveniendi est uia experimenti per sensus ad intelligibilia cognoscenda; secundum quam uiam ordinat Ioannes Damascenus uires irracionales ad racionales dicens quod per sensum anime constituitur passio, que uocatur ymaginacio; ex ymaginacione uero fit opinio; deinde mens diiudicans opinionem, siue uera siue falsa sit, iudicat ueritatem. Vnde et mens dicitur a meciendo, et cogitando et diiudicando; quod ergo diiudicatum est et determinatum uere intellectus dicitur. Hec ergo est uia inuencionis siue experimenti, incipiens a sensu.

³³ *Summa*, C. 72, 16-25. Alia uia est uia addiscendi, secundum quam determinat Damascenus motus mentales dicens: oportet cognoscere quoniam primus motus intelligencia dicitur; que autem circa aliquid est intelligencia, intencio uocatur; que autem permanens et figurans animam ad id quod intelligitur, excogitacio est; excogitacio uero in eodem manens et seipsam examinans fronesis uocatur. Qui motus possunt manifestari circa racionem fronesis sillogisticam et in uia discendi, ut uerbi gracia: omne totum est maius sua parte; omne continuum est quoddam totum; ergo omne continuum est maius sua parte.

sense it is *phronesis*). He gives the example; every whole is greater than its parts; every continuum is a whole; therefore every continuum is greater than its parts. For Damascene this kind of thinking which is based on logic and the mind's working towards a conclusion, based as it is on the relation of ideas, is the perfection of the interior movement of the mind.

Further still is the third way, the way of teaching, the *via docendi*,³⁴ the passing on of knowledge from one to another. Since it is a movement towards perfection, either by way of acquiring knowledge through experience or of logical learning it will not remain still until it is passes on that which it knows to another. Further still is the movement of the mind to the most perfect knowledge, namely prudence, which is the examined certitude of truth itself. Prudence is then extended and produces reasoning (*cogitationem*) which is a disposition called 'mental speech', the most complete movement of the soul occurring in the reasoning part of the soul.³⁵ Mental speech occurs at times when we go through an entire discourse with ourselves and even in sleep we dispute in words and according to Damascene we are totally rational in this. Projected speech acts through the voice and in syllables. It is projected by means of the tongue and the mouth and is described as the messenger of thought (*enusciativuus intelligencie*).

³⁴ *Summa*, C. 72, 52-57. Alia uia perfectissima que consequitur ad predictas est uia docendi. Cum enim perfectus est interior motus intellectus aut per uiam inuencionis, aut per uiam discipline, non restat nisi transfundere intellectum in alterum; et hec est uia docendi. Incipit ergo tunc motus mentis a perfectissimo, scilicet a fronesi, que est examinata ipsius ueritatis certitudo.

³⁵ *Summa*, C. 72, 58-62. Dicit ergo Damascenus quod fronesis dilatata facit cogitacionem, id est interius dispositum sermonem nominatam, quam determinantes dicimus motum ipsius anime plenissimum in excogitatione fientem, sine aliqua enunciacione, ex quo prolatum sermonem aiunt provenire per linguam enarratum.

For Damascene the thinking faculties involved in the movement of the mind towards the truth, which are obvious in the example of the syllogism are linked to what is called practical wisdom in Aristotle, or *fronesis*, this is the term used by Damascene. This is not a moral virtue in itself but it could be said to connect the intellectual and the moral virtues. Damascene's point may be that if we apply the same rigorous thinking to questions of morals we will arrive at a decision as to what is the right thing to do and by so doing we are developing the power to examine our conscience and practice the virtue of prudence. In a previous chapter of Book II of *De fide et Orthodoxa* Damascene states, 'Although the virtues are referred to the soul, yet, in so far as the soul utilizes the body, they are common to both'.³⁶ Damascene links the powers of the soul to prudence; the powers are also linked to the emotions as we will see in the discussion of the appetitive powers.

The irrational powers are further divided into two groups; those which are capable of obeying or being persuaded by reason and those which do not listen to reason and are not persuaded by it. Those that are not persuaded by reason but by nature, are called the pulsating power, (or the vital power), the generative or seminal power, the vegetative or the nutritive power, and the augmentative power. The generative power refers to the generation of off-spring and the conservation of the species, the remaining three protect the individual e.g., the pulsative power regulates the heat of the body and the nutritive restores energy to the body. The group of powers that can be persuaded by reason or are open to persuasion by reason is subdivided into the power that controls and a power which effects movement. The latter is the movement that is associated with the movement of bodies and it is

³⁶ Saint John of Damascus, *Writings*, p. 238.

obedient to reason. The power which controls movement is subdivided into the concupiscible and the irascible powers (desire and anger) from which emotions arise.

The emotions of pleasure, pity, fear and anger are held to be open to persuasion by Damascene. A good person will react to the emotions and behave in a certain way because of a 'good' character.

Some pleasures are of the soul, some of the body. Those of the soul are those which are of the soul itself; namely those which involve study and contemplation. Corporeal pleasures are those which happen with the cooperation of the soul and the body; therefore those involving food and sexual intercourse and the like are called corporeal pleasures; in fact no one would find pleasures that belong to the body alone.³⁷ Further, some pleasures are true, some are false. Those that are true are of the soul itself according to study and contemplation; those that are false are of the body and according to sensation.³⁸

Damascene ranks intellectual pleasures above those of the senses. Contrary to his statement, however, that 'no one would find pleasures that belong to the body alone' Plato, in his dialogue the *Philebus*, states that there are some 'affections' of the body alone which are quenched before they even reach the soul. However, this needs to be viewed in the context of Plato's discussion of pleasure and pain.³⁹ It seems that Damascene is following Plato in his reference to false pleasures which again is to be

³⁷ Cf., *De L'âme*, Vernier, p. 181 n. 4; 'Le plaisir a une dimension nécessairement psychique comme l'établit Platon dans le *Philèbe* en 33d, 35c sqq'.

³⁸ *Summa*, C. 75, 1-11. Leticiarum quedam sunt animales, quedam corporales. Animales quecumque sunt solius anime secundum seipsam; quecumque scilicet sunt circa disciplinas et contemplacionem. Corporales uero sunt quecumque cooperacione corporis et anime fiunt; et ideo corporales uocantur quecumque sunt circa cibos et coitus et talia; solius quippe corporis nequaquam inueniet quis leticias. Alio modo sic: leticiarum quedam sunt uere, quedam mendaces. Vere quecumque sunt solius mentis secundum doctrinam et contemplacionem; mendaces quecumque sunt cum corpore secundum sensu

³⁹ Dorothea Frede, 'Disintegration and Restoration: Pleasure and Pain in Plato's *Philebus*', in *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*, pp. 425-463 (p. 441). 'The general definition of pleasure as restoration of natural integration is soon modified in the *Philebus* by an important qualification that appears necessary when Socrates tries to introduce the further subdivision between pleasures of the soul and pleasure of the body. Strictly speaking, pleasures and pains are never a matter of the body alone, because only those disturbances in the body are pains and those restorations pleasures that are perceived by the soul (33c-d; 35b). This leads to the so-called pleasures of the body as perceptions. They are to be distinguished from the pleasures that the soul can experience all by itself'.

found in the *Philebus*. Plato's intention in the dialogue is to show that there are many different ways in which pleasures can be considered false, but as far as a moral philosophy is concerned he 'insists that all our painful emotions, such as rage, longing, lamentation, love, jealousy, and envy, are deprivations of some sort or other that contain a portion of pleasure'.⁴⁰

Whether Damascene shares this negative view of the emotions is not clear but what seems to be behind his exposition of the 'passions' is Plato and Aristotle's vision of the moral life in which the state of one's character is paramount. If we are to have a proper moral character we must ensure that the rational part of our souls has control over the irrational parts. The question must be raised as to what extent we are in control of our emotions? In another chapter of the *De fide Orthodoxa* (not mentioned by Jean) Damascene describes a 'passion' of the soul as follows; 'passion is a movement of the appetitive faculty which is felt as a result of a sensory impression of good or evil'.⁴¹ Passion is a 'movement in one thing caused by another' and it seems that Damascene wishes to say that it is not just our actions but that our passions or emotions must also be considered in moral philosophy. His statement that 'the pulsating movement of the heart is action, because it is natural; but its palpitating movement, because it is immoderate and not according to nature, is passion and not action'⁴² marks this distinction. Actions are also subject to the passions and he states that 'action is called passion when one is not moved according to nature, whether by himself or by another'.⁴³ This will be discussed below in the discussion of the freedom of the will.

⁴⁰ Dorothea Frede, 'Disintegration and Restoration: Pleasure and Pain in Plato's *Philebus*', p. 450.

⁴¹ St John of Damascus, *Writings*, p. 246.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 247.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

Following Damascene's account of pleasures, Jean states that some pleasures are of the soul alone which others are of the body. Those pleasures belonging to the soul alone are those concerning learning and contemplation while corporeal pleasures are those which are shared by the body and the soul. Of the latter there are three kinds: some are natural and at the same time necessary. Those that are necessary are those without which life would be impossible, such as nourishment, digesting, replenishing, necessary covering (*sine quibus vivere impossibile est, ut nutritive, digestive et repletive et indumenta necessaria*). Other pleasures are natural but not necessary, such as natural and lawful sexual union, since this ensures survival of the human race. Some pleasures are neither natural nor necessary such as drunkenness, lust, excess, (*ut ebrietas et luxuria et plenitudo utilitatem excedens*). For they neither contribute consistency to our lives, nor to the continuance of our race, but they actually do harm. The way to the good life is therefore to seek those pleasures which are both necessary and natural; those which are natural but not necessary must take second place and they can only then be sought in a suitable time, manner and judgement. All other pleasures must be rejected.

The next emotion or passion dealt with is grief. There are four kinds of grief; grief, as oppression or as weighing one down (*accidia*); distress that renders one speechless (*achos*); envy as grief over another's good fortune (*invidia*); mercy as sadness over another's misfortune (*miser cordia*). I have translated *tristicia* as 'grief' but in the English translation of *De fide orthodoxa* it is stated that there are four kinds of pain, the account of which correspond to those in Jean's *Summa*.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ St John of Damascus, *Writings*, p. 240.

Damascene also lists various types of fear, six in all: apprehension (*segnicies*), embarrassment (*erubescencia*), disgrace (*verecundia*), terror (*admiracio*), dread or consternation (*stupor*) and anxiety (*angonia*).

Apprehension or alarm is fear of something going to happen in the future; embarrassment or shame is fear of an expected reproach; disgrace is fear on account of a shameful act; terror is fear that arises from a very active imagination; dread or consternation is fear which comes from an unaccustomed imagining; anxiety is fear of failure, that is to say through mis-fortune. Modesty and shame are not altogether negative in that both are open to redemption and a mending of one's ways.⁴⁵

Anger is described in two ways; in the first way it is described as a boiling of blood around the heart as a result of the thickening of yellow bile (*cholê*); anger is also a desire for revenge. It is the bodyguard of reason and at the same time it is the avenger of desire; when a desire is frustrated it arouses anger.⁴⁶

In Damascene's distinction between the virtues of the mind and the affections of the body he highlights a very important fact, that is, that as far as the moral life is concerned we must give an account not only of our actions but also of our feelings. They are inseparable and as we will see they are also central to his account of freedom of the will, which is the next topic for discussion. Damascene's discussion

⁴⁵ *Summa*, C.77, 3-7. Segnicies est timor future operacionis; erubescencia est timor in expectatione conuicii; uerecundia est timor in turpi actu; admiracio est timor ex magna ymaginacione; stupor uero est timor ex inassueta ymaginacione; agoniam autem est timor per casum, scilicet per infortunium; timentes enim infortunate actionis agonizamur.

⁴⁶ *Summa*, C. 78, 1-7. Consequenter subdiuidit de ira quam diffinit secundum duos modos. Primo modo materialiter sic: ira est feruor eius qui circa cor est sanguinis ex euaporacione uel returbacione fellis fiens; secundo formaliter et hoc dupliciter; uno modo sic: ira est desiderium repugnacionis uel uindictæ; iniuriam enim passi, uel estimantes pati, irascimur et est quasi mixta passio ex concupiscencia et ira; alio modo sic: ira est id quod audax est mentis uindex lese concupiscencie.

of the emotions is significant if one considers that he was writing at a time in which the body was considered in a very negative light. His discussion of human nature expresses the orthodox wisdom of the day but above all it emphasises his desire to understand the human condition, in all its guises. Damascene clearly gives priority to the soul but he is also open to the view that as humans we also share in the life of irrational beings. This had obvious appeal to the medieval scholars who wanted to remain faithful to Augustine but at the same time wanted to follow in Damascene's footsteps. They developed their own synthesis of the medical and philosophical learning to their Christian beliefs. We turn now to Damascene's analysis of human free will and see how reason for Damascene is a corollary of human freedom.

SECTION THREE HUMAN FREE WILL

Damascene defines the rational movement of the soul according to will, reason and freedom of the will. The very notion, that we, human beings have a will can be traced back to the Stoics. Indeed, Damascene's analysis of human psychology is of Stoic origin although 'drawn immediately from Nemesios'.⁴⁷ The notion of will is also present in Christian authors from the second century onwards.⁴⁸ While Aristotle assumes that human beings 'will' things this is not to say that he believed there is a separate power of the soul which can be appealed to in matters of morals. To understand why Christian authors were interested in the concept of having a will we must look back to the various doctrines which challenged the Christian belief in God

⁴⁷ Louth, p. 135.

⁴⁸ Michael Frede, p. 64.

who created man in such a way that man could choose the right thing to do in a given situation. The Manichees, for example, believed that man was made in such a way that he could not but sin. It is in answer to this that Christian authors would take an interest in the topic of the will. They wanted to explain why God would create human beings who would sin and as a consequence of sin they would be punished.

Christians from the second century onwards had to explain this in the face of a variety of so-called ‘Gnostic’ doctrines, according to which the world, including human beings, was not created by God, but by an imperfect Demiurge who, with the powers subordinate to him, had created the world and ruled the world in such a way that human beings could not but sin, perhaps even systematically were made to sin.⁴⁹

Damascene uses the term *thelesis* to describe the will:

He distinguishes the will according to the following; ‘one should note that there is a natural power in the soul, appetitive of that which is in accordance with the nature of the soul and that it embraces all those things which are linked to its nature essentially; this is called the will’ (*thelesis*). Substantially, however, natural goods pertain to the nature [of the soul], such as being, existing, understanding. The will is also a rational appetite for something, and this is called *boulesis*. This is the same as if he had said: there is a natural will and there is a rational will.⁵⁰

The meaning of the Greek terms may help to clarify Damascene’s position as we begin to examine the concept of free will as they are presented by Jean but also with the aid of the aforementioned author, Frede, who highlights Damascene’s contribution to the debate on free will among scholastic theologians and philosophers.⁵¹ As he states, Damascene’s term for the will is *thelesis* which is to be

⁴⁹ Michael Frede, p. 72

⁵⁰ *Summa*, C. 79, 4-11. Voluntatem autem distinguit [Damascenus] secundum hunc modum dicens: ‘Oportet scire quoniam anime inserta est naturaliter uirtus appetitiua eius quod secundum naturam est, et omnium que substancialiter nature assunt contentiua uoluntas; et hec dicitur thelesis.’ Substantialiter autem nature assunt naturalia bona, sicut esse, uiuere, intelligere. Est iterum uoluntas appetitus rationalis ad aliquam rem, et hec dicitur bulisis. Idem est ergo ac si dixisset: est uoluntas naturalis, et est uoluntas rationalis.

⁵¹ Michael Frede, ‘John of Damascus on Human Action, the Will, and Human Freedom’ in *Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources*, ed. by Katerina Ierodiakonou, pp. 63-95.

distinguished from *boulesis*, the latter was used in ancient times (also the form, *boulesthai*, meaning to will or to want). Damascene, however, uses *thelesis* as a general term for the will and the term *boulesis* to explain ‘wishing’; it is distinguished from *thelesis* as follows. *Thelesis* is that part of the will which cannot but wish for existence and understanding and everything that goes to make up the nature of the soul. Willing is a ‘a natural and rational desire’⁵² whereas ‘wishing’ is concerned with the end. *Boulesis* or rational appetite is moved towards something that it may or not desire and as such it includes the ability to make choices. According to Frede, these are two distinct functions of the rational will. The ability to make choices is not equivalent to saying we have a will but, as we will see, it is ‘choice’ that is given a privileged position in Damascene’s account of wishing or willing something.

He subdivides the rational will into things which we can will and into those things which we cannot will; this is, the possible and the impossible; for example, the things we can will, the things which are in our power, as fornication, being sober, to go to sleep and the like; wishing for those things which are in our power, may sometimes be possible, as when we wish to be a king or a bishop, which is possible, but not, however, in our power; at other times it is impossible, as when we wish never to die.⁵³

The means to the end is what we determine, for example, the means to becoming healthy. Thus, we begin with a rational desire and we then decide if what we will is in our power to attain. Then follows deliberation which is described as an ‘inquisitive’ appetite. Deliberation seems to be the important stage as judgement is a matter of choosing one option over another. Once we have deliberated as to whether

⁵² Louth, p. 138.

⁵³ *Summa*, C. 79, 14-22. Voluntatem autem rationalem subdividit in uoluntatem eorum que sunt in nobis, et uoluntatem eorum que non sunt in nobis; et hec est possibilium et impossibilium; uerbi gracia, uoluntas eorum que sunt in nobis, est eorum que sunt in potestate nostra, ut fornicari, sobrium esse, dormire et huiusmodi. Voluntas uero eorum que non sunt in nobis, aliquando est possibilium, ut cum uolumus reges esse uel episcopi, quod possibile est, sed tamen non in potestate nostra; aliquando est impossibilium, ut cum uolumus nunquam mori.

we wish to pursue a course of action we use our judgement in choosing between the various options. The next criterion is that we must be inclined to, or even take delight in, the proposed action. It is only if we are disposed to doing something, that is, we like or even love it, which then involves choosing or selecting a particular course of action. If the proposed action is something we would like or even love to do we choose it from one or more options. This leads to an impulse to enjoy what is desired; its use brings the process to completion and the desire ceases.⁵⁴ In this process one is either making a good use or a bad use of our abilities to deliberate. Referring to the above Frede writes:

We should at least consider the possibility that John of Damascus presents things as if they formed a temporal sequence for reasons of exposition to point out at how many places things could go wrong and hence at how many places we had a chance to avoid wrong-doing.⁵⁵

Before turning to his discussion of free will we must first examine Damascene's views on reason and how it is connected to freedom of the will. It was said earlier that for Damascene the most 'radical' divide is between God and his creation and it follows that there is a radical divide between God's intellect and His will and created beings and their will. God's willing is 'tantamount to its being the case', on the other hand, human beings, must deliberate and make choices accordingly. Damascene states that the contemplative and active faculties belong to reason:

⁵⁴ *Summa*, C. 79, 30-40. Primus ergo motus uoluntatis, respectu eorum que in nobis sunt, est consilium. Consilium autem est appetitus inquisitiuus de hiis rebus que in nobis sunt. Consiliatur enim aliquis, si debet tractare rem uel non debet. Deinde iudicat quid melius et dicitur iudicium. Deinde disponit et amat quod ex consilio iudicatum est, et uocatur sententia. Si enim iudicet et non dispositus fuerit ad quod iudicatum est, hoc est non diligit non dicitur sententia. Deinde post dispositionem fit electio: eligere autem est de duobus praeiacentibus, hoc preoptare altero. Deinde facit impetum ad operationem, et dicitur impetus. Deinde utitur, et dicitur usus. Sic ergo determinat de uoluntate quam nichil aliud secundum substantiam ponit esse quam liberum arbitrium.

⁵⁵ Michael Frede, p. 88.

He determines that which concerns reason in distinguishing the existence of a rational power which has for its object the truth and it is a rational power which has for its object the good. It is also a power that contemplates all that exists; and this pertains to the knowledge of things; and it is the rational power that distinguishes acts and this pertains to the motivating powers. This is what Damascene calls the rational, on the one hand it is contemplative, and on the other, it is active. The contemplative is what excogitates with regard to how things are; the active, that is, the deliberative, is what determines the right reason to actions; and he calls the contemplative faculty the intellect; and that of the active, he calls it reason. He therefore determines that which concerns reason inasmuch as it is a movement.⁵⁶

Reason therefore has both a theoretical and a practical side to it. The background to this, according to Frede, is the Platonic view ‘that the intellect contemplates eternal truth, but that the rational soul not only contemplates the truth, but also concerns itself with ordering the visible world in such a way as to reflect eternal truth’.⁵⁷ As rational beings we can deliberate and make choices, sometimes the choices are good and right but we are also capable of making the wrong choices. We have, however, control over our actions; whether it is correct to call it free will or freedom in choice is a question which we will return to presently.

According to Damascene it is because we have free will that man freely desires, freely wills, freely inquires, freely explores, freely judges, freely disposes himself, freely chooses, freely moves to act and freely acts.⁵⁸ Jean states that Damascene asks two questions concerning free will; the first is whether there are

⁵⁶ *Summa*, C. 80, 1-10. De ratione uero determinat distinguens quod est uirtus rationalis cognitua ueri et est uirtus rationalis cognitua boni. Et est uirtus rationalis contemplatiua encium; et hoc pertinet ad cognituias; et est uirtus rationalis discretiua operabilium et hoc pertinet ad motuias. Et hoc est quod dicit Damascenus rationale, hoc est contemplatiuum, hoc autem actiuum. Contemplatiuum quidem est quod excogitat ut se habent encia; actiuum autem, hoc est consiliatiuum, quod determinat actibilis rectam rationem; et uocat contemplatiuum intellectum; actiuum uero rationem. Sic ergo determinat de ratione secundum quod est motiua.

⁵⁷ Michael Frede, pp. 74-75.

⁵⁸ *Summa*, C. 81, 4-8. Libero enim arbitrio appetit, et libero arbitrio uult, quantum ad motum uoluntatis. Libero enim arbitrio inquirat et scrutatur, et libero arbitrio iudicat quantum ad discrecionem rationis, libero arbitrio disponit; et libero arbitrio eligit, et libero arbitrio impetum facit, et libero arbitrio agit.

things which depend on us? The second asks, what are the things that depend on us and over what things do we have power or control? To the first question Damascene puts forward a number of possible causes or principles of human actions. There are those who say that God is the cause, or that things happen through necessity, or fate, or nature, or chance or spontaneity (*aut Deum aiunt causam esse, vel necessitatem, vel fortunam, vel naturam, vel eventum, vel casum*). He dismisses each in turn:

God cannot be said to be the principle of all human acts, since it is not permitted to ascribe to God unjust acts, which are often caused by men. Neither to necessity, since the acts of humans are not similar, as is the case with necessary things. Neither to fate, for those who put fate forward as the principle, state that it is not the principle of contingent things, but of necessary things, which must be completed within a certain period of time; according to this fate and necessity differ inasmuch as they are principles; for necessity concerns the whole of time, fate concerns determined time. Neither to nature, for the works of nature are generation, growth, plants and animals, the principle of movement being in themselves, not like artificial objects which are the works of human beings. Neither to chance, for chance is the principle of actions which are unusual and inconceivable. [...] Nor can spontaneity be posited as the principle of human actions, for they say that spontaneous acts are symptomatic of inanimate things or brute animals, they are deprived of nature or art.⁵⁹

It remains therefore that man himself is the principle of his own actions.⁶⁰ In contrast to irrational animals he is master of his actions and free in his will. Irrational animals are, on the contrary, led by nature, that is to say they move according to their natural appetite. As soon as an animal desires something they move to act. Man, however, as a rational animal when he desires something he has the power to curb his appetite or

⁵⁹ *Summa*, C. 81, 14-33. Non enim potest Deus dici principium omnium actuum humanorum, quia non est fas ascribere Deo actus iniustos, qui frequenter fiunt ab hominibus. Neque necessitas, quia actus humani non semper similiter se habent sicut necessaria. Neque fortuna, nam illi qui ponunt fortunam principium, dicunt eam non esse principium contingencium, sed necessariorum, que habent impleri per tempus aliquod; et secundum hoc differt fortuna et necessitas secundum quod sunt principia; nam necessitas respicit omne tempus, fortuna tempus aliquid determinatum. Neque natura; nature enim opera sunt generacio, augmentacio plante et animalis, quorum principium motus in ipsis est, non sicut artificialia que sunt opera humana. Neque euentus, nam euentus est principium actuum, qui sunt rari et inopinabiles. [...] Neque casus potest poni principium humanorum actuum, nam sicut dicunt, casus sunt inanimatorum et irrationabilium simptomata sine natura et arte.

⁶⁰ *Summa*, C. 81, 33-35. Relinquitur igitur ipsum agentem et facientem hominem esse principium proprie harum actionum, et arbitrium liberum.

to follow it. It follows therefore that irrational animals can neither be praised or blamed, man however must receive praise or blame for his actions.⁶¹

Being a rational human being implies, therefore, that we are in control of how we deal with a given situation. Animals, on the other hand, when they see an appetising object it is not so much that they have no choice but to go after the object but it is, according to Frede, that the animal simply has no choice: it follows nature. This has theological and moral implications for, as Frede states, if it moved by choice it would have control over what it is doing. This is brought out more clearly if we consider the view put forward by the Stoics, that ‘animals are created in such a way that they in general will display the desired kind of behaviour, because their response to a situation is fixed by the situation and the way they have been constructed’.⁶² Human beings, on the other hand, are meant to do what they do because they are acting of their own accord, as individuals. Because we human beings have been endowed with rationality our reactions are not ‘fixed by the situation’, but how we react and ultimately what actions we take are determined by rationality. Damascene emphasises the fact that, of course, we can be mistaken in our judgements and our choices; rationality, in other words, is subject to change. The term Damascene uses is *trepton* which Frede translates as *turnable*; just as a material substance is corruptible, so the rational soul is *turnable*; but that is not to say that we are not in control, even though the control we have is lessened. This is an important concept in Damascene but it is not mentioned by Jean in his exposition, however, it will be helpful to refer to it as we come to discuss the importance of choice and freedom of choice in actions.

⁶¹ *Summa*, C. 81, 49-50. Vnde irrationabilia quidem neque laudantur, neque uituperantur; homo autem laudatur et uituperatur.

⁶² Michael Frede, p. 78.

Damascene discusses voluntary and involuntary acts in reply to the second question which asks what things depend on us and what are the things over which we have control (*ad questionem secundum qua queritur que sunt ea que sunt in nobis quorum potestatem habemus*). The acts which depend on us are the acts which we are free to do or not to do; we do them voluntarily (*hoc est omnia que per nos voluntarie aguntur*) and we are said to be in control of them. Acts which depend on us are subject to praise or blame and may also be subject to the law (*illi actus quos sequitur laus vel vituperatio et in quibus est lex*). In principle it is all those things about which we deliberate. These are contingent actions which we may carry out but equally we may choose to do its opposite (*pariter autem contingens est quod et ipsum possumus et oppositum eius*); we may choose to move or not to move, to desire things or not to desire them; to act or not to act and many similar actions.

Jean asks whether Damascene means that we are in control of interior actions, such as thinking and choosing, just as much as we are in control of the exterior acts, such as walking or speaking. Very often we are prohibited from speaking or walking or some such actions but it is important to note that Damascene is saying that the choice always remains with us. Even at that he states that it can be that God's will intervenes and prevents us from acting in a certain way (*actus autem multociens prohibentur secundum quemdam modum providencie*). The fact that we have a choice is what is important and as Frede points out there are reasons as to why 'choice' has this privileged position in Damascene's account of free will.⁶³

⁶³ Michael Frede, p. 81. It is choice which distinguishes created intellectual beings, that is, rational beings, from God on the one hand, and animals on the other. If we also take into account John's doctrine of providence, it turns out that John is following a long tradition in Christian thought, already manifest in Origen, based in part on Stoicism, and in part on St Paul, according to which our action, as

Jean raises a number of questions with regard to actions that are committed out of ignorance and those committed also out of violence. He asks why some actions are subject to praise or blame while some are not? Are the insane or the inebriated to be blamed for wrong actions? Or what about those who are compelled to do something wrong against their wishes? Jean here relies on a distinction found in Damascene between acts that are accompanied by delight and those that are accompanied by distress; some acts are desired by the agent, while others are shunned. Of those which are desired some are always to be desired but others are only at certain times (*et eligibilium, hii semper eligibiles, hii vero secundum quoddam tempus*). The same applies to acts which are shunned by an agent.

Again, some acts are considered worthy of pity and forgiveness, others, however, are considered hateful and are to be punished. Voluntary acts are those which are carried out with delight and are desired by the agent, either at all times or at the particular time that they are carrying it out and therefore praise or blame accompanies them. The involuntary, however, are carried out with distress and they are not desired, neither are they carried out by the agent of his own accord, although it is he who suffers the pain and for that reason they are worthy of pity and forgiveness.⁶⁴

In the case of an involuntary act which is attributed to ignorance Damascene gives the example of a person who is drunk and who commits a murder; he does so unwittingly but not involuntarily as he himself brought about the cause of his ignorance. An act is said to be involuntary through violence when the efficient cause is extrinsic, that is, when there is no co-operation from the person who suffers the

opposed to what we ordinarily think, is not as free as our choice, since it, even in ideal circumstances, would not come to fruition without at least divine cooperation

⁶⁴ *Summa*, C. 81, 92–97. Et rursus hii quidem actus misericordiam consequuntur et indulgentia digni habentur, hii autem odio habentur et puniuntur. Voluntarii ergo actus sunt qui cum delectacione aguntur et eligibiles sunt agentibus uel semper, uel tunc cum aguntur, et ideo eos consequitur laus uel uituperacio. Inuoluntarii uero actus cum tristicia aguntur et non sunt eligibiles, nec per ipsum agentem perficiuntur quamuis uim paciatur, et ideo misericordia et indulgentia digni estimantur.

violence (*hoc est nichil cooperante illo qui patitur violenciam*). The voluntary act is opposed to both of these, occurring neither through violence nor through ignorance.⁶⁵ Can the acts of children and acts which we do suddenly without deliberation be regarded as voluntary? In principle we do deliberate if we have to choose between one or more options, however children act voluntarily although they do not deliberate on their actions. In the same way when we do things through anger we are doing them voluntarily, but not through choice. It is only when we have to make a choice that we must first deliberate.

The Greek term *autexousion* is rendered by Jean in Latin as *liberum arbitrium*. According to Frede it is a standard translation, meaning ‘freedom of the will’ or ‘freedom of choice’. This translation, however, seems to Frede to be misleading for our understanding of Damascene. In support of his thesis he states that Damascene also applies the term to God who is the very ‘paradigm of *autexousion*’ but even in the case of God there is no ‘choice’ as such as, by His nature he will not do but what is good. Nothing can be forced upon God and this is also the case for rational human beings as far as they have *autexousion*, ‘they have some kind of freedom in their activity, because their activity is not forced upon them and because they have some control over what they are doing’.⁶⁶ There must be some sense of freedom in our choices, otherwise it could be said that our thoughts are not free, if action is said to follow thought.

⁶⁵ *Summa*, C. 81, 100-113. Inuoluntarium simpliciter est quod per uiolenciam uel per ignoranciam fit; actus autem per ignoranciam determinatur cum non ipsi tribuimus causam ignorancie, sed quia ita contingit; sicut si ebrius aliquis homicidium faciat, ignorans quidem occidit, non tamen inuoluntarie; causam enim ignorancie ipse egit. Inuoluntarium autem per uiolenciam est cuius principium, hec est effectiua causa, deforis est, nichil committente secundum proprium impetum uim passo, hoc est nichil cooperante illo qui patitur uiolenciam. Si enim cooperaretur cause cogenti, non diceretur actus illius inuoluntarius. Inuoluntarium igitur simpliciter est duobus modis: hoc quidem secundum uiolenciam, hoc autem secundum ignoranciam. Voluntarium autem simpliciter utrique opponitur; est enim uoluntarium simpliciter quod neque per uiolenciam, neque per ignoranciam fit.

⁶⁶ Michael Frede, p. 82.

Choice, as we understand it, is choosing between two or more options; it may be a choice between good and evil or a choice that one makes in rejecting one situation in favour of another. Damascene is concerned to show that we, as rational beings, have been given the ability to do what we are meant to do in the way we have been created. We are, as Damascene believes, made in the image of God. We have the ability to remain in the good state in which we have been created even if the rationality we have been created with is imperfect. What is important is that we make the effort to use our rationality to make the right choices. God must have at least endowed man with the knowledge and understanding to enable him to do so but it is up to each to consider his or her own situation.

Returning to Damascene's statement that the will is in some respects an innate power:

One should know that there is in the soul a natural power, appetitive of that which is in accordance with the nature of the soul, and embracing all those things which pertain to its nature substantially; and this is called the will.⁶⁷

The will, therefore, is what gives one 'the ability to desire what is good for one to desire', the source of which is the ability to have the right rational desires. The more we rationally desire the good the more attracted we are towards it. Damascene believes that we can go badly wrong in our choices and if we continually make the wrong choices that can cloud our judgement and in a sense we have then lost our freedom. We act and choose freely according to our rationality and will and in this respect we are responsible for our actions. Damascene also takes our non-rational

⁶⁷ *Summa*, C. 79, 5-7. Oportet scire quoniam anime inserta est naturaliter uirtus appetitiua eius quod secundum naturam est, et omnium que substancialiter nature assunt contentiua uoluntas; et hec dicitur thelesis.

desires into account when making a choice. With regard to the body's need for food Frede comments that the rational desire for food 'will set in process deliberation which will end in the choice to eat'.⁶⁸ On this account, one's appetite has its origin in the intellect. This re-enforces what Damascene has already stated with regard to pleasures, that in fact no one would find pleasures belonging to the body alone (*solius quippe corporis nequaquam inveniet quis leticias*). As Frede states:

So one's eating would have its origin in reason, in a rational desire, but the non-rational appetite would serve a double function: it would provoke a rational desire to eat, if this was appropriate, and it would help to strengthen the affective attitude in favour of eating in the face of a possible aversion. In this way, I take it, non-rational desire is made to play a substantive role in rational activity and rational behaviour.⁶⁹

He also highlights a difference between Aristotle's theory on human action and Damascene. Damascene does not allow for 'action against one's choice',⁷⁰ but this is 'how Aristotle characterizes acratik behaviour, cases in which one acts on a non-rational desire against one's better knowledge'.⁷¹ Damascene does allow for a non-rational desire which prevails over rational desire but, for Damascene, because we have a will we make choices and we are responsible for our choices. The criterion for whether we have made the right choice is whether we are sufficiently satisfied or sufficiently dissatisfied with the choice we have made, this is when we have reached a point of *sententia*. It is a word which has various meanings. For example, in Thomas Aquinas it is taken to mean 'consent'. This is also found in the Stoical understanding of choice; it is simply a matter of assenting to a particular thought or

⁶⁸ Michael Frede, p. 91.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 93.

⁷¹ Ibid.

act.⁷² In Damascene, it refers to choosing one situation over another, but it implies a weakened sense of freedom. One is free to do what one is ‘meant’ to do but this presupposes that one believes that one cannot but act for and seek the ‘good’. Damascene’s theory, however, highlights the fact that in many situations we often make a decision or choose to act in a certain way because we want to act as we are meant to, but equally there are times when temptation overcomes and we do the very opposite.

Jean’s account of Damascene is very precise and he quotes him verbatim from the chapters of *De fide orthodoxa* dealing with free will and human actions. We are not told whether he agrees or disagrees with Damascene’s position, but it may be helpful to discuss an earlier treatise on the soul composed by one of Jean’s contemporaries, sometime before 1204 at Paris, some thirty years before Jean’s treatise on the soul was written. The work is entitled *Tractatus de anima* and its author, John Blund (ca. 1175-1248) would probably have known of Jean as both of them taught arts at Paris in the early years of the thirteenth century.

SECTION FOUR
JOHN BLUND. *TRACTATUS DE ANIMA*.
CHAPTER XXVI.I *CONCERNING FREE WILL*

Blund begins his enquiry by stating that, in fact, reason and free will are the same. The intellect begins the process by taking in ‘some things’. Reason acts upon these, judges them and chooses whatever seems best to it, this is described as freedom in the soul. If there is something in the soul which chooses between good and bad

⁷² Ibid, p. 87. ‘But this single assent involves both the acceptance of one’s attitude towards this proposition reflected in the way one thinks of the proposition.’

things it must be reason which judges and chooses. The freedom of the will is a power to preserve the integrity of the will; the preservation of the will comes from reason; therefore reason and free will are the same power of the soul.

To counter the above he states that as the will appears to be free because there is choosing in it, that is, that it chooses good and evil and since the choice of evil is not from reason (it is more due to absence of reason), therefore reason is not the same as free will. Blund states:

We state that reason and freewill are one and the same in essence, because both one and the other are the same power, but they are regarded as diverse because of their various relations to diverse things.⁷³

Damascene, as we have seen above, states that freedom of the will is connected with reason as the cognitive and the appetitive faculties come together in man. Thus as far as both Blund and Damascene are concerned it is one thing to be rational but another thing altogether to be able to choose. In fact, without reason, there cannot be free will, as both authors maintain. As Blund states, ‘free will has been joined to a rational creature to choose what is advantageous and what he ought to’.⁷⁴ For both the ability not to sin also comes from creation. This is something we have seen already in Damascene and it is stated by Blund:

Thus in a state such as this rational creature takes its being from the Creator, so that it has this freedom, namely that it can not sin and cannot be compelled to sin by any thing, but it is left to his will to do good or choose evil.⁷⁵

The ability not to sin refers back to what was said at the beginning of the chapter; that for Damascene and for the scholastic theologians who followed him it

⁷³ John Blund, *Treatise on the Soul*, Chapter XXVI.i Para. 385.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, Para. 400.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

was necessary to give reasons as to why God created man if, sooner or later, he was going to sin. What they had to show was that man was made in such a way that he could not sin, but this was not to say that human nature is not corruptible. In virtue of the fact that he is rational, however, man has a will. The statement that the freedom of the will cannot ‘be compelled to sin by any thing’ must be taken to mean that we have been given the abilities to remain in the state in which we were created but that, given we are human, it cannot be said that we will always make the right choices. In this connection Blund states that if human beings ‘could not sin in any way, then he would not obtain merit if because of a necessity of compulsion he did not sin, nor indeed would he lose merit’.⁷⁶ The question of gaining or losing merit introduces the topic of the immortality of the soul which Blund argues for in his treatise on the soul. Damascene, as we have already seen, believes that our rationality ‘does not have the perfection of the divine intellect’,⁷⁷ that as human beings we are limited and since we are created we are thus subject to corruption, as are the angels. It is only by divine grace that rational beings who have reached ‘a certain state of perfection of their rationality, [...], are made to be no longer liable to corruption, and thus become immortal and divine, able to enjoy a life of eternal bliss’.⁷⁸ The question of reward and punishment does not apply to irrational animals since the appetitive power in animals is not rational.

The will in Damascene, *thelesis*, is distinguished from the act of willing. This is also the case in Blund if we consider his remarks with regard to the will and its lack of reason which can lead one to choose evil. For Blund, when the will chooses evil it is in fact the will which is evil. Following Augustine in *The City of God*,

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Michael Frede, p. 76.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

Blund states ‘the choice of evil is from an evil will, and there is not any efficient cause of it but rather a deficient cause’.⁷⁹ This underpins what is the basic message in Damascene, that is, because of reason we know what is the right thing to do and we should make every effort to do so. Constantly choosing the wrong course of action, however, will eventually lead to someone being incapable of making the right choices or as Blund states ‘a lack of reason more diminishes freedom than increases it’.⁸⁰ The distinction between the will and volition or desiring is also brought out in Blund’s remark about free will that ‘through no necessity does it sin, but only by the will, namely insofar as it wishes what it should not and what is not advantageous’.⁸¹ Constantly sinning, he states, man becomes a servant to sin as sin can rule over him. In this way, however, power is handed over to sin, which is wrong, according to Blund. In other words it is the responsibility of the agent to overcome his weakness.

According to Blund, ‘there is no free will in brute animals since they lack that investigation of reason’.⁸² He does, however, ascribe to them the concupiscible and irascible powers, by which animals can discriminate between the useful and the harmful. He also refers to the estimative power in animals, one of the interior senses according to Avicenna. The estimative power was an important part of animal psychology in the Middle Ages and in some authors it is also seen as important in human psychology. This will be discussed in the next chapter on the powers of the soul according to Avicenna, but it is interesting to note that here we have one of the first references to the power of estimation, a theory which was to be one of the most

⁷⁹ Blund, Chapter XXVI.ii Para 404. ‘Indeed the choice of evil is from an evil will, and there is not any efficient cause of it but rather a deficient cause, as we know from Augustine in the twelfth book of the *City of God*.’

⁸⁰ Blund, Para. 402.

⁸¹ Ibid., Para. 392.

⁸² Ibid., Para. 411.

influential theories to reach the Latin West in the thirteenth century. Blund's understanding of *intentiones* in Avicenna's theory is, 'more accurate than modern interpretations.'⁸³

Damascene, as we have seen, also discusses the concupiscible and irascible powers which he applies to the both animals and human beings.⁸⁴ The concupiscible and irascible powers (also called desire and anger) are those powers which are obedient to reason. Human beings, however, differ from animals in that non rational desires in animals forces the animals to act on impulse, the animal is moved towards something or away from something. Rational beings, on the other hand, are determined by reason and by their will.

The ability to sin is not a part of free will as this would compromise God's goodness but that that is not to say that man does not in fact sin. Free will, according to Blund is the power to choose between good and evil, 'therefore he whose will is left to choose whichever of the two ways he wishes, is free'.⁸⁵ As we have seen in Damascene's account freedom of the will is explained with regard to a number of moves in the process of choosing the best course of action to take when one desires something. Choice in Damascene's account is not strictly a choice between two alternatives (as good and evil) but we reach a point where if something is to our liking we choose it and if it is not to our liking we do not choose it. In other words he wants to give an account as to why one chooses not to follow the chosen way,

⁸³ Hasse, p. 145.

⁸⁴ See above Chapter IV, Section Two, on The Cognitive Powers.

⁸⁵ Blund, Para. 386.

‘because it plays a crucial role in his account of how we are not bound to act on inordinate non-rational desires’.⁸⁶

Both Blund and Damascene agree that the ability not to sin is crucial to their doctrines of free will and if that is ‘badly preserved’ as Blund states, then one is disposed to sin. Both believe that freedom of the will is concerned with what God wishes us to want ‘when someone wishes what God does not wish him to want, then he wishes for what he should not’.⁸⁷ That is not to say, however, that there is any force or coercion involved. One is free to the extent that one does not always want what God wishes us to want. Both agree that ‘we cannot be forced to sin by anything’,⁸⁸ but because it is left up to us to decide we are often mistaken in our choices. Blund raises the question as to whether there is free will in God and in the angels. Damascene distinguishes between the sense of freedom that exists in God, in the angels and in human beings. Just as we say that God is goodness itself we can also say that God is the very paradigm of freedom. Nothing is forced upon him nor does he have need of rational control or rational desires. The ability to sin is inconceivable in the case of God, not, however, in the case of angels.

If someone were to object that a man is more powerful than God and angel because a man is able to sin, and God cannot sin, it should be said, as is clear from what has already been stated, that the ability to sin is not a power rather it is a lack of power.⁸⁹

According to Blund the freedom that angels possess is stronger than in man. Angels are also more perfect and truer ‘in the judgement of reason’ but because they have a will they are also subject to change and corruption. They can be moved

⁸⁶ Michael Frede, p. 85.

⁸⁷ Blund, Para. 392.

⁸⁸ Ibid., Para. 394.

⁸⁹ Ibid., Para. 405.

towards evil as in the case of the devil. For, as Blund states, freedom is sometimes impeded when one turns away from the good that was given to him and instead one chooses evil, ‘just as someone who is in the dark has the ability to see but he does not see because of the lack of light’.⁹⁰ While the ability to sin is inconceivable in the case of God, it is not, however, in the case of angels. In the case of angels Blund states, ‘with the will to choose evil there is an absence of grace there’, but where there is grace angels can not be moved towards evil.

As thinkers, Blund and Damascene agree with regard to the following: we have a will and it is free; free will is connected to reason; as rational beings we have an ability not to sin; it is lack of reason which leads one to choose evil; we are free as we do not always want to do what we are meant to do; the ability to sin is inconceivable in God, but not in the case of the angels who are subject to change and corruption. There is, nonetheless, one important difference between them, that of the criterion as to the goodness or badness of an action. For Blund it is a choice between good and evil, for Damascene the choice rests on whether one is sufficiently disposed to a chosen course of action. Damascene’s criterion must be examined in relation to the process which one must follow before deciding whether to follow or abandon a particular course of action. It demands that one think through one’s actions in a very careful and deliberative manner to arrive at a point where one is left with no other option but to proceed, or not. Blund’s theory rests on following a course of action which relies on the choice between good and evil, that is, that we are free to choose the good, but, on the other hand, we are also free to choose evil. This is the standard way we understand choice, yet, as Frede holds, this is not the way

⁹⁰ Ibid., Para. 410.

Damascene thought of choice. Whatever about the way our authors view freedom in choosing a course of action it is the ability to choose to do what we are meant to do that is central to both. This is the sense of freedom that we possess, but with this ability comes responsibility. Whether we live up to that responsibility, or not, is a matter of choice.

As Frede remarks, what guaranteed Damascene a place in Western thought was the fact that ‘Peter Lombard in the middle of the twelfth century made extensive use of the *Exposition* as an authority in his *Sentences*’.⁹¹ According to Frede, there are twenty-six references to Damascene in Peter Lombard. It is likely that Blund was amongst those who regarded Peter Lombard’s views on free will as authoritative and although Avicenna was the authority for Blund the latter did not include a discussion on free will. Damascene’s influence can also be seen in the writings of Thomas Aquinas on the topic of the will. In the *Summa Theologiae* (II.1, qq. 6-17), on voluntary will, Frede states that Damascene is quoted at least nineteen times and again on the questions on the intellect and will (1, qq. 79-83) he is quoted at least twelve times.⁹² In the introduction to the *De fide orthodoxa* Damascene states that he does not wish to add anything of his own to the *Summa* but that he intended his work to be a compendium of ‘the most eminent teachers’.⁹³ Scholars have debated the question as to whether he succeeded in this, or not; but he did succeed in writing the first great *Summa*, and it is testament to his influence on Western thought that Jean has included him alongside Avicenna, one of the great names in the Islamic philosophical tradition. It is to his discussion of the powers of the soul to which we now turn.

⁹¹ Michael Frede, p. 68.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 70.

⁹³ St John Damascus, *Writings*, p. xxv.

CHAPTER V

AVICENNA'S INFLUENCE ON THE THOUGHT OF JEAN DE LA ROCHELLE

Jean's primary philosophical source is Avicenna (980–1037) and in particular the latter's *De Anima*. The text of Avicenna which Jean uses is that which was translated by Ibn Daud (Avendauth) and Dominicus Gundissalinus sometime between 1152 and 1162. As stated above, there were two translations of the text identified as versions A and B. Version B is used by Jean in his *Summa*.¹ In an earlier chapter (chapter II), I referred to Jean's application of the 'Flying Man' argument to prove the existence of the soul but, as we shall see, Jean's exposition of a number of doctrines also have their sources in Avicenna, whom he acknowledges: the power of estimation which is one of five internal senses; his treatment of animal movement; the theory of the four intellects and the reconciliation of Avicenna's agent intellect with Augustine's theory of divine illumination. Jean devotes thirty eight chapters to Avicenna, but his reading of Avicenna is combined with the anonymous *De Potentiis animae* and the Pseudo-Augustine's *De Spiritu et anima*.

This chapter begins with an outline of Jean's general interest in Avicenna's psychology (section one) and then examines his treatment of the vegetative soul and explains how he integrates the physiology involved with his philosophical and theological understanding of the soul (section two). Following that, in section three I will discuss the five external senses in Jean and then turn in section four to the interior powers of the soul, namely, the common sense, the imagination, the

¹ See above Introduction, Section Four regarding the two versions of the translation.

imaginative, the estimative and memory and their driving forces (section five). Finally, I will discuss Jean's appropriation of Avicenna's doctrine of the agent intellect and show how Jean can be included among those who combined Augustinian and Avicennian theories on intellection to give a Christian understanding to the Avicennian theory of the separate agent intellect (section six).

SECTION ONE

JEAN'S INTEREST IN AVICENNA'S PSYCHOLOGY

As we have already seen in the first *Consideratio* on the soul that Jean follows Avicenna in distinguishing the powers of the soul into the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational powers.² Unlike some of his contemporaries, however, Jean discusses the vegetative soul at some length (the vegetative soul is often omitted by theologians of this period).³ Jean can be counted among those who were interested in the medical, the philosophical and scientific writings of this period. His exposition on the vegetative soul and the sensitive soul testify to his willingness to integrate the new learning which has been described as a philosophical anthropology of the thirteenth century. In his earlier work on the powers of the soul, the *Tractatus* (1233–1235) Jean is, 'simply confronting the traditional thought of Christian theology on the theme of the nature of man with the new Greek-Arab classifications'.⁴ In the *Summa* (1235–1236) he omits the medical section of the

² See Chapter 1.

³ See, Hasse, p. 38 n. 147. 'Callus has collected passages in Philip the Chancellor, Hugh of Saint-Cher and Alexander Neckam ('The Treatise of John Blund on the Soul'),' p. 482, n. 31, and 'The Function of the Philosopher', (pp. 157–8). Cf. also Grosseteste, *Ecclesia Sancta*, p. 170, line 33: '...omittentes vitam eius vegetativam'; Anonymous (Callus), *De potentiis animae et obiectis*, p. 147, line 13: '...dimittamus autem potentiam animae vegetabilis'; Thomas Aquinas, *Prima pars Summae theologiae*, 78.1: 'Ad considerationem autem theologi pertinet inquirere specialiter solum de potentiis intellectivis et appetitivis, in quibus virtutes inveniuntur'.

⁴ Vico, p. 311.

Tractatus, according to Iohannitus's *Isagoge* and Avicenna's *Canon*, but, instead, he presents a comprehensive Avicennian section on the powers of the soul in the later work. If we can assume, as Hasse does, that Jean aimed at giving a presentation of the soul's faculties and everything that was known about the faculties at this time, it can be said that the *Summa* is a result of his reflections and ponderings and therefore a clear indication that, for him, Avicenna was the philosopher *par excellence*. His work 'is an important step towards mastering the seemingly boundless tradition of psychological doctrines'⁵ and provides at least an entry into Avicenna's approach to psychology.

Jean keeps the philosophical, the medical and the theological traditions apart but he is one of the first scholastics to include a comprehensive Avicennian section in his *Summa*, particularly on the vegetative powers of the soul and on the internal senses. Blund, to whom we have referred to above, was the first master of arts, as far as one can say, to write a treatise on the soul, the date of which is fixed at 1200 (pre-dating Jean's works on the soul by at least thirty years) and while it seems that both authors knew Aristotle's *Peri psychēs* well both chose to model their theories on Avicenna.

Jean is obviously influenced by his immediate predecessors and by their reactions to the new medical sources. Since it was the scientific works that were translated before the philosophical works, by the end of the eleventh century certain medical texts, containing much philosophical material, were translated from Arabic into Latin. The impact of the translation of one of the most important sources,

⁵ Hasse, p. 48.

Constantine the African's *Theorica Pantegni*, can be seen in early psychological writings and also particularly in Jean's presentation of the four elements and the humours of the body. Constantine's *Pantegni* is 'an adaptation for Latin readers of Alī ibn al-‘Abbas al-Majūsī's *Complete Book of the Medical Arts*',⁶ a huge medical encyclopaedia. It contains quotations from the works of Hippocrates, though it may be the case that al-Majūsī was also indebted to Galen's *On the Elements according to Hippocrates*.⁷ The latter was 'one of sixteen works chosen to be part of the teaching curriculum in Hellenistic Alexandria'.⁸ It is interesting to note that Galen's work was translated from Greek into Latin by Burgundio of Pisa (died 1193), who, as was stated previously, translated John Damascene's *De Fide Orthodoxa*. It is important to mention another medical text with respect to Jean, that is, the *Ysagoge* by Johannitius which was one of Jean's medical sources in his earlier work, the *Tractatus*, but this was omitted from his *Summa*. Jean uses the medical terms *commixtio*, *compositio*, and *complexio* with regard to the generation and corruption of the animal body. The quotation in question appears in Jean's discussion on the external senses. His source is Avicenna's *De anima*, but it is clear that the *Ysagoge* of Johannitius and the *Pantegni* introduced Jean and his contemporaries to the new theories of the four elements and the humours at this earlier stage. The *Ysagoge* enumerates the elements along with their qualities; these are the four elements, fire, air, water, and earth; fire is hot and dry, air is hot and moist, water is cold and moist, earth is cold and dry. The *Pantegni* goes somewhat further in defining the elements as it describes an element as the simplest of the parts of a composite body.⁹

⁶ Danielle Jacquart e Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, *La Scuola Medica Salernitana* (Sismel: Edizioni Del Galluzzo, 2007), p. 64.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 77–78. 'Know that the philosopher means by element the thing which is the simplest of the parts of a composite body, and the smallest of them in extent. The simple thing is that whose

Temperament refers to the balancing of the qualities of hot, cold, moist and dry which were applied to the constitution of body and mind. Jean follows Avicenna in his explanations of how different mental complexions can retain information well, but may be weak in recollecting. This will become clear in the discussion on memory in Avicenna where he distinguishes between memory, recollecting and learning. The Latin word for temperament, *complexio*, refers to the mixture of the elements, although, ‘there is a difference in vocabulary between the *Ysagoge*, which uses *commixtio*, and the *Pantegni*, which offers for the first time in medical terminology, the word *complexio*’.¹⁰ *Commixtio* is related to the *mixis* in Aristotle: for example, it refers to the product of water and wine mixed together, each retaining their own particular qualities. *Complexio*, as stated above, refers to the mixture of elements and ‘since anybody destined to “construction and destruction is born of this mixture, the dominant elements assign their own specific qualities to the final product”’.¹¹ The Salernitan commentators removed any ambiguity by stating that ‘*complexio* is the effect of *commixtio*’.

SECTION TWO THE VEGETATIVE SOUL

In the first *Consideratio* Jean divided the powers of the soul into the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational powers. He now devotes three chapters to the vegetative soul, following Avicenna; the vegetative soul is distinguished according to

substance is one substance and whose parts are similar, not different. These things either are truly like this, such as fire, air, water and earth or they are like this among what appear to the senses, such as stones and metals and the like. For, although the latter are simple to the senses, to the intellect they are composed from fire, air, water and earth.’

¹⁰ Peter Dronke, *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 415.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

nutrition, growth and reproduction. Jean begins his account with a definition which he attributes to Avicenna:

The vegetative power is the principle of conservation of nature through generation and nutrition and its perfection is achieved through the augmentative power. The sensitive power is the principle of sensation and of local movement in the animal body. The rational power is the principle of intellectual speculation and freedom of actions.¹²

Avicenna states that the vegetative soul has three distinct faculties, the generative, augmentative and the nutritive power. He ‘emphasizes their being different faculties by pointing out that unripe fruits have the faculty of nutrition and growth, but lack that of reproduction’¹³, developing Aristotle’s theory somewhat further. Aristotle held that the lowest level of the soul is the vegetative but he seems to say that nutritive and reproductive faculties are one and the same.¹⁴ Both hold that the generative power is that which perpetuates the species but that the nutritive and the augmentative powers preserve the life of the individual.

The generative power is the principle of living, whether of plants, of irrational animals or of man, and of producing from itself what is the same nature as itself, as man from man and as plant from a plant. The augmentative power is the principle of growth of the living body, attributable to the perfection of quantity and consistency in accordance with nature. The nutritive or nourishing power is the principle of preservation of living things through restoring what was lost; for natural heat acting on the substance of the body relaxes it and the body loses it, once relaxed it empties and evacuates, and for this reason unless it is replenished and restored with food it would die.¹⁵

¹² *Summa*, C. 82, 6–10. Et est uis uegetabilis principium conseruacionis nature per generacionem et nutrimentum, et perfectionis eiusdem per augmentum. Vis uero sensibilis est principium sensus et motus localis in corpore animalis. Vis uero racionalis est principium intellectiue speculationis et libere electionis actionum.

¹³ Rahman, p. 71.

¹⁴ De Anima, II, 416a 19 in Barnes, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. ‘Nutrition and reproduction are due to one and the same psychic power.’ Compare: Aristoteles Latinus: Translator: Iacobus Veneticus: *De anima*, liber: 2, cap.:4 (Bekker: 416a). Quoniam autem hec potentia anime est uegetativa et generativa, et de alimento necessarium est determinare primum.

¹⁵ *Summa*, C. 82, 12–21. Generatiua autem est que est principium uiuendi, siue plante, siue bruto, siue homini, et producendi de se tale quale ipsum est, ut hominem ex homine et plantam ex planta. Augmentatiua uero est que est principium crementi corporis uiuentis et perfectionem debite quantitatis et consistencie secundum naturam. Nutritiua uero siue pascitiua est principium conseruacionis

The nutritive power maintains life whereas the augmentative brings about the actualisation of life, whether of a plant, an irrational animal or the human being. The former is therefore required throughout life, the latter, on the other hand, functions as long as it is required to bring about perfection or actualisation of a particular body.¹⁶

Following Avicenna, Jean states that the activity of the augmentative power with regard to nourishment is not the same as the nutritive. As he states:

The nutritive power has [the power] in itself to give to each nutriment according to its greatness or smallness, and unites it to itself uniformly. On the other hand the augmentative power takes from one part of the body and adds to another part and unites to it, so that one part is increased more than the other, with the nutritive power being subservient to it.¹⁷

In the discussion of the generative power Jean digresses and introduces a seminitive principle which has echoes of the doctrine of seminal reasons, originally derived from the Stoic tradition which was transmitted down through the ages by Augustine. The doctrine is concerned with how human beings can produce new life which can be understood in terms of matter and form; it states that the form of

uiuentis per reparacionem deperditi: calor enim naturalis agens in substanciam corporis resoluit illud et deperdit, resolutum uero exinanitur et euacuatur, et ideo nisi repletur nutrimento et reficeretur, deficeret.

¹⁶ *Summa*, C. 82, 22–30. Dicendum ergo quod generatiua est ad conseruacionem esse speciei et multiplicacionem eiusdem. Nutritiua uero et augmentatiua referuntur ad esse singularis, ut huius animalis et plante; sed nutritiua est ad conseruacionem, augmentatiua ad perfectionem, et ideo nutriuntur animalia semper, non autem semper augentur, quia semper indigent conseruatiuo et reparatiuo deperditi, sed non semper indigent perfectiui; non enim indigent postquam perfecta sunt, et ideo cessat operacio uirtutis augmentatiue animali perfecto secundum debitum modum sue quantitatis et consistencie. Compare the following in Avicenna's *De Anima*: Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus, I-II-III, Édition Critique de la Traduction Latine Médiévale par S. Van Riet (Louvain: Leiden: E. Peeters; E.J.Brill, 1972), Part II, c. 1: p. 108 78–86. Omnino autem uirtus nutritiua appetitur ad hoc ut per eam conseruetur substantia cuiuslibet singularis, et augmentatiua appetitur ut per eam perficiatur substantia singularis. Sed generatiua appetitur ut per eam remaneat species, quia appetere permanere est res quae uenit ex Deo in omne quod est; et in singulari quod non est aptum ad permanendum, sed est aptum ut species eius remaneat, excitatur uirtus ad reparandum aliquid uice eius: nutritiua ergo restaurat quod resoluitur de singulari, et generatiua restaurat quod resoluitur de specie.

¹⁷ *Summa*, C. 83, 45–49. Virtus enim nutritiua ex se habet ut det unicuique membro de nutrimento secundum eius magnitudinem uel paruitatem, et unit ei equaliter. Augmentatiua uero tollit ab una parte corporis et addit alii parti, et unit ei, ut illa pars augmentetur potius quam alia, ministrante sibi nutritiua.

‘human being’ must already be contained in the embryo. In other words something must be present in the matter, in the seed, which follows a certain order, it is not just a mass of limbs and organs, not just material extension. According to Augustine, it is the elements, created by God, which contain seminal reasons.¹⁸ Jean states that ‘the seminata is the principle of separation or derivation of the seed, which possesses the generative principle of everything in order to produce a likeness in a species’.¹⁹

Jean returns to the language of medicine comparing the ‘plasmative power’ to an artificer which forms the limbs from seed. First to be created is the heart, then the brain, the liver and the testicles; then the parts which serve these; then the arteries which serve the heart; air is then conducted through these to moderate the heart and the body; the veins serve the liver in administrating the humours; the nerves serving other similar and functional parts.²⁰ The heart was the centre of sensation in Aristotle and, according to Rahman, the heart is also the seat of the common sense for Aristotle and ‘therefore also of imagination and memory’.²¹ As we will see Avicenna located sensation in different ventricles of the brain. This will be discussed in connection with the internal senses of Avicenna.

¹⁸ Bourke, p. 103. Augustine, *Literal Commentary on Genesis IX, 17.32*; ‘The elements of this bodily world have their own precise force and quality, what each of them can or cannot do, what can be made from what, or cannot. From these elements, as the original principles of things, all things that are generated take their origin and development, each in its proper time; and they receive their terminations and decreases, each according to its kind.’

¹⁹ *Summa*, C. 82, 30-33. Sciendum autem quod generatiue uirtutis multiplicatur uis et operatio per seminatiam et plasmatiuam Est autem seminatiua principium decisionis siue deriuacionis seminis habentis rationem tocus ad simile in specie producendum.

²⁰ *Summa*, C. 82, 34-44. Dico autem rationem tocus, quia ibi, scilicet in semine, sunt omnia membra secundum rationem, quamuis non secundum molem; secundum uirtualem productionem, non secundum materialem extensionem. Plasmatiua uero est ut artificiale principium configuracionis et conformacionis parcium et tocus, id est corporis et membrorum. Hec enim est que, ut artifex, membra plasmata ex semine; primo radicalia ut cor, cerebrum, epar, testiculos; deinde hiis deseruientia, ut arterias que deseruiunt cordi; per illas enim ducitur aer ad contemperanciam cordis et corporis; et uenas que deseruiunt epati in ministrandis humoribus; et neruos qui deseruiunt cetera membra consimilia et officialia.

²¹ Rahman, p. 79.

The three chapters on the vegetative soul in Jean's *Summa* follow the text of Avicenna's *De anima* very closely. Jean was interested in mastering and combining the different traditions, the medical, the philosophical and, the theological; his precision in transmitting the text of Avicenna is remarkable. Jean follows Avicenna's account of how food is changed into the nature of that which it nourishes; it is not changed suddenly but is changed a little at first and through alteration in the substance which is responsible for nutrition, it assimilates the food by means of the digestive power. The latter is also the power which spreads the food evenly throughout the body. The nutritive power draws the food into the body, at first by altering it in the blood and the humours, from which the constitution of the body is formed. Each limb has a nutritive power proper to itself which alters the food into a likeness of itself and unites the food to itself; the function of the nutritive power is therefore to assimilate and to unite.²²

The first instrument of the nutritive power is natural heat; heat is capable of moving material bodies. There are, of course, echoes here of Aristotle where the latter states that heat is the principle of digestion and every living thing is in

²² *Summa*, C. 83, 3–13. Primo sciendum ergo quod nutrimentum non permutatur in naturam nutrimenti subito, sed primo permutatur aliquantulum a sua qualitate et aptatur per mutacionem in substantiam eius quod debet nutriri, in quo operatur uirtus digestiua deseruiens nutritiue; et hec est que dissoluit nutrimentum in animali ad hoc ut diffundatur equaliter. Deinde uirtus nutritiua deducit illud in animali, primo permutando in sanguinem et humores, ex quibus est constitutio corporis. Deinde omne membrum habet nutritiuam uirtutem propriam que permutat nutrimentum in similitudinem membri propriam et unit ei; uirtus igitur nutritiua assimilat et unit. Compare the following in Avicenna's *De Anima*, II, c. 1: pp. 103 10 – 104 21. Dicemus nunc quod nutrimentum non semper permutatur in naturam nutrimenti subito. Sed primo permutatur aliquantulum a sua qualitate et aptatur permutationi in substantiam nutriendi, in quo operatur una ex uirtutibus seruiens uirtuti nutritiuae, quae est digestiua. Et haec est quae dissoluit nutrimentum in animali et praeparat illud ad hoc ut diffundatur aequaliter. Deinde uirtus nutritiua deducit illud in animal sanguineum, primo permutandum in sanguinem et humores ex quibus est constitutio corporis, sicut iam ostendimus alias. Sed omne membrum habet uirtutem nutritiuam propriam, quae est in eo, quae permutat nutrimentum in similitudinem eius propriam et unit ei. Ergo uirtus nutritiua restaurat quod solutum est, et assimilat et unit.

possession of this quality.²³ Contrariety in qualities is also required in any change and it is stated that cold, moisture and dryness play their part in digestion. Avicenna replies to argue against those who say that fire accounts for nourishment and increase (*nota etiam quod fuerunt qui dixerunt quod ignis nutritur et augetur*). Fire was put forward because it grows as long as it gets or finds matter. However, this is stated to be incorrect for two reasons; it would mean that a body has no limit to its growth (*sed augetur semper et crescit sine fine*). In the case of the human body, it requires nourishment throughout its life but there is a limit which determines the size and growth of the body.²⁴ This also has its source in Aristotle where he explains that the reason some are of the opinion that fire is the cause of nutrition and growth is because, ‘it alone of the bodies or elements is observed to feed and increase itself’,²⁵ but against that, ‘limit and ratio are marks of soul but not of fire, and belong to the side of account rather than that of matter’.²⁶

Jean’s account of the four powers that support the nutritive power; the appetitive, the retentive, the digestive and the expulsive are taken from Avicenna’s work the *Canon*. This was the standard doctrine of nutrition and digestion and is of Galenic origin. Arabic authors were influenced by Hippocrates and Galen whose

²³ Aristoteles Latinus: Translator: Iacobus Veneticus: *De anima*, liber: 2, cap.: 4 (Bekker: 416b). Omne autem necessarium est alimentum posse coqui; operatur autem decoctionem calor; unde omne animatum habet calorem.

²⁴ *Summa*, C. 83, 39–43. Corpus ergo nutritibile est habens uirtutem terminatam conuertendi corpus aliquod in similitudinem sui et uniendi sibi pro reparacione eius quod resolutum est ex illo, et quia huiusmodi resolucio est corporis omni tempore uite singularis, ideo nutritiua operatur omni tempore uite singularis. (This contains one of the quotations in Jean’s *Summa* which was overlooked by Bougerol; see Hasse, p. 49, n. 217. Compare the following in Avicenna’s *De Anima*, II, c. 1: p. 105 25–29. Ergo uirtus nutritiua ex uiribus animae vegetabilis operatur omni tempore uitae singularis; quae dum permanserit exercens suas actiones, vegetabile et animal erunt uiva; cum autem destructa fuerit, vegetabile et animal non erunt uiva.

²⁵ Aristotle, *De anima*, Book II c. 4, 416a12.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Book II c. 4, 416a17–18.

works were translated by Hunain ibn Isaac, who lived from 809–873.²⁷ References to the *Canon* are very rare and ‘appear only after 1225’.²⁸ For the most part Jean’s quotations are taken from Avicenna’s *De anima*. In the *Tractatus*, however, Jean’s earlier work on the powers of the soul, we find more references to the *Canon*. Jean devotes a section entitled *On the division of the powers of the soul according to medical authors* in the *Tractatus*. He relies on two sources, Johannitius’s *Isagoge* and Avicenna’s *Canon*, and gives precise references to his sources. He omits the chapter on the medical sources in his *Summa* but he ‘enlarges the already comprehensive Avicennian section of the *Tractatus* quite considerably by adding new quotations, often silently, in particular on the vegetative faculties and on the senses’.²⁹ Jean, it seems, had first hand knowledge of Avicenna’s *De Anima*. I have referred earlier to the fact that the latter is extant in two versions, called A and B and it is interesting to note that the earlier *Tractatus* (written c. 1233–1235) is in the wording of version A while newly added passages in Jean’s *Summa* (written c. 1235–36) follow version B. According to Hasse Jean includes passages from Avicenna’s *De Anima* which had never being referred to before in the West, further emphasising Jean’s first-hand knowledge of Avicenna’s writing.

The emphasis on the role of the vegetative soul seems to have reached its peak with Jean. By the late thirteenth century, for example, Thomas Aquinas, ‘does not favour a psychology of faculties grounded on physiology’.³⁰ Although he uses Avicenna’s *De anima* he ‘hardly ever mentions Avicenna’s localisation of the

²⁷ Michael Dunne, *Magistri Petri De Ybernia: Expositio et Questiones in Aristotelis Librum de Longitudine et Brevitate Vitae* (Louvain-Paris: 1993), p. 60.

²⁸ Hasse, p. 41.

²⁹ Hasse, p. 49.

³⁰ Hasse, p. 71.

internal senses in the different ventricles of the brain'.³¹ Jean, on the other hand, gives a detailed account in his *Summa* as he tries to assimilate the new learning of the physical processes involved in the life of the vegetative and the sensitive faculties. The role of the vegetative soul is prominent in his account and for him as for Avicenna, the animal faculties 'are served in their entirety by the vegetative faculties'.³²

SECTION THREE THE SENSITIVE SOUL

Next Jean presents the sensitive soul which he states, following Avicenna, has two powers: the motive power and the cognitive or the apprehending power. Jean adds to this that some apprehending follows the natural mode and some the animal or perceptive mode. That which follows the natural mode proceeds from the imagination (*fantasia*): this is because it is not governed by reason, such as the case of the vegetative soul. The animal or perceptive power is subject to reason, that is to say, the external senses are subject to reason (*operacio vero per modum animalem dicitur que est virtutis subiectibilis et obtemperantis rationi, sicut est virtus visiva, auditiva etc.*). The imagination (*fantasia*) is not subject to reason as is clear in the case of dreams when it is at its most active; imagination, as fantasy, is to be distinguished from imagination in a general sense, that is, as one of the interior apprehending senses, which is subject to reason. Imagination, in the latter sense, is called the compositive imagination (*cogitativa* when it refers to humans and *imaginativa* when it refers to animals), and is one of the interior senses. Imagination in man may or may not be subject to reason, but animals possess a sensitive

³¹ Hasse, p. 71.

³² Afnan, p. 140.

imagination alone. A discussion of Avicenna's interior senses will follow the exterior senses; the former are: the common sense, imagination, compositive imagination, estimative and memory. The external senses are: sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch.

5.3.1 *The External Senses*

Jean discusses the five external senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch according to their number, their different organs, the difference in the intermediaries and the difference in their objects.³³

The number of the senses are understood in different ways. One way to understand the number of senses is by examining the **purpose** of the senses. Some of the senses are ordered in relation to the soul, some in relation the body. Sight and hearing are ordered in relation to the soul; smell, taste and touch are ordered in relation to the body. Sight and hearing are organised in relation to the apprehensive rational power which is the power which comes to knowledge through research and learning, either through oneself or through another. It possesses sight which serves it zealously especially in searching and in practice and in the knowledge of the written word; hearing also serves in instruction and in learning words. The three senses serving the body discern what is healthy and what is harmful for the body; some

³³ *Summa*, C. 88, 1–19. Numerus autem sensuum multipliciter accipitur. Primo, per ordinem sensuum ad finem potissimum in homine: nam quidam sunt ordinati ad animam, quidam ad corpus. Ad animam ordinati sunt uisus et auditus; cum enim uires sensibiles ordinentur ad racionales, et apprehensiuas; uisus et auditus ad apprehensionem rationalem; apprehensiuas autem rationalis peruenit in cognitionem inquisitione et disciplina, per scripta, per uerba, per se, uel per alium. Habet uisum qui deseruit maxime in inquisitione siue experientia et in scripto cognoscendo; habet etiam auditum qui deseruit discipline et uerbis. Ad corpus uero ordinati sunt olfactus, gustus, tactus; corpus enim saluatur nutrimento. Ad discernendum ergo salubre et nocium in nutrimento ordinantur isti tres sensus. Quidam iudicant in distancia: sic olfactus per odorem bonum uel malum. Quidam in propinquitate, et hoc dupliciter: aut enim iudicat de nutrimento secundum qualitates elementales que antecedunt naturam, ut per caliditatem, frigiditatem, humiditatem, siccitatem et cetera, et sic est sensus tactus; aut per qualitates consequentes complexionem, ut sapor et saporum differentie, et sic est gustus. Sic ergo patet numerus sensuum quinque secundum finem potissimum.

sense from a distance, such as that of smell; some come into contact with the elemental qualities, such as heat, cold, humidity and dryness; such is the the sense of touch; others discern through the qualities, such as a flavour, this is the sense of taste.

It is also possible to understand the number of the senses according to the nature of the **intermediaries**. Jean states that since sensation occurs through the composite body which is made up of the four elements, one comes to know the sensitive soul through the nature of the four elements.

Therefore through the nature of a fiery light which radiates upon the eyes, upon an illuminated colour, and through the intermediary of a penetrating route, sight reaches its object. Through the nature of air, hearing. Through the nature of the humour, the sense of smell and the sense of taste. But a humour has a twofold nature; that is, through condensation, as in a surge of liquid, such as water; and rarefaction, as in blasts of wind, such as vapours. The sense of smell therefore occurs through the medium of a rarefied humour, that is, vapour; taste occurs through a condensed humour, as in the case of saliva. Through the nature of earth, that is the soil of the earth, as is the nature of skin, the sense of touch arises.³⁴

The number of the senses is also understood according to the relationships between the senses and the elements. The traditional opinion is, as we have seen, that there are four elements but Jean includes a fifth element, also called *quintessence* in his account of the principles of sensitive objects. The latter is the first of the principles and is associated with the sense of sight. Historically the fifth element had its origins in Aristotle. He situated it above the moon's sphere and it is interesting that Jean equates its power with the natural light of the sun and of one of the celestial

³⁴ *Summa*, C. 89, 4–11. Per naturam ergo ignee lucis que radiat in oculis et in colore illuminato et mediante peruio lucido, peruenit uisus in suum obiectum. Per naturam uero aeris, auditus. Per naturam uero humoris, olfactus et gustus. Sed duplex est humor in natura: scilicet concretus, ut in unda labili, ut aqua; et rarefactus ut in aura flabili, ut uaporibus. Mediante ergo humore rarefacto, scilicet uapore, peruenit olfactus; mediante uero humore concreto, ut saliuu, peruenit gustus. Per naturam uero terre, hoc est soli terrei, ut est caro, peruenit tactus.

bodies. Jean's source for this would seem to be the text of the anonymous author of *The Powers of the Soul* as shown in the comparison below.³⁵ The following passage is quoted in Jean's *Summa* and also in the anonymous author:

For light is that which is in a luminous body, such as the sun or one of the celestial bodies; when it is dispersed into a transparent body, such as air, that is, it is light that is emitted; < light > in a body that is dark, as in the earth and anything exhibiting resistance, brings about brilliance; in something mixed, it is colour. For that reason it is defined as follows: colour is the extremity of the transparent in a limited body.³⁶

Distinctions are made between the light of the sun and the light from one of the celestial bodies which is emitted or radiates on to bodies; and light that brings about brilliance; also light that manifests colour. These distinctions are central to Avicenna's theory of vision as he distinguishes between natural light and light that is 'acquired', but neither Jean nor the anonymous author attribute the distinction to Avicenna. The first, natural light is the light of the sun and of fire, as Hasse states, if we look at it we cannot distinguish any colour.³⁷ On the other hand, light is acquired from the sun or fire, the keyword, as Hasse states, is 'to acquire'. These two kinds of light are called, respectively *lux* and *lumen*. Jean does not develop Avicenna's theory of vision. Neither does he give Avicenna's 'oft-quoted abbreviated definition of vision', although a version of it is present in the anonymous author, in which sight is considered to be spiritual. It is, however, 'wide of the mark to conclude that

³⁵ *Summa*, 91, 2–6. Quinque autem sunt principia in rebus sensibilibus, quattuor scilicet elementa et quinta essentia, et habent in se ordinem naturalem, prout unum alio nobilius est. Supremum autem est quinta essentia que, secundum suam uirtutem influentem, determinat sensibile uisus. Compare: Anonymous (Callus), *De Potentiis animae et obiectis*, p. 151 20-25. 'Manifestum autem est quod quinque sunt principia rerum sensibilium, scilicet, quattuor elementa et quinta essentia; et hec ordinem habent inter se naturalem prout unum est alio nobilius: et secundum quod unum est alio nobilius potens est secundum hoc imprimere dispositionem super minus nobile tamquam materiale, et sic derelinquitur effectus in composito. Supremum autem quinta essentia est que habet posse supra corpora materialia, et secundum uirtutem suam influentem determinatur sensibile uisus.'

³⁶ *Summa*, C. 91, 6–11. Nam lux que est in corpore luminoso, sicut est sol uel aliquod celestium corporum, derelinquit in corpore transparente, sicut est aer, effectum scilicet lumen; in corpore uero opaco, quemadmodum est terra et omne corpus prebens resistenciam, splendorem; in corpore uero mixto, colorem. Unde diffinitur sic: color est extremitas perspicui in corpore terminato.

³⁷ Hasse, p. 109.

Avicenna, under the influence of Neoplatonism and Stoic theories of *pneuma*, offers a “spiritualist” interpretation of vision’.³⁸ The *spiritus* theory in Avicenna, as we will see in the case of the organs of the senses, derives from the medical tradition.

Following *quintessence*, as the first of the principles in the relationship between sense and object, the second principle is fire, and according to its power the sensitive object of smell is produced. On account of the power of heat in the complexity of the body a fume-like evaporation is produced, this then is odour.

Then in the medium which carries, such as air, it has being from the vapour or from the released fume from the object that possesses the odour because of the power of heat, the principle of which is fire.³⁹

Avicenna gives the example of an apple and how through the evaporation of heat the apple is spoiled (through someone smelling the apple over time) because the vapour has been released from it.⁴⁰ The third principle is air which is associated with the sensitive object of hearing. With regard to sound Jean states there are two causes: the extrinsic cause is the violent movement of air in a shorter time than is normal for its nature; the intrinsic cause is the violent movement making a resisting sound causing

³⁸ Hasse, p. 123.

³⁹ *Summa*, C. 91, 15–17. In medio uero deferente, quemadmodum est aer, habet esse uaporis aut fumi resoluti ab odorabili uirtute caloris, cuius principium est ignis. Compare: Anonymous (Callus), *De Potentiis animae et obiectis*, p. 152 21-26. ‘Secundum uero corpus est ignis, qui habet uirtutem super inferiora corpora, scilicet, aerem, et ita de aliis; a uirtute caloris est fumalis evaporatio, que est odor, et habet in igne, scilicet, in radice, esse caloris; in corpore uero quod est commixtum, esse odoris; in corpore uero medio, quemadmodum est aer aut aqua, esse fumi aut uaporis; et hoc manifestum est ex corporum resolutione.’

⁴⁰ ‘Unless odor were diffused through something’s being discharged, heat (and whatever promotes heat due to friction, evaporation or the like) would not promote odors, nor would cold hide them. Therefore it is clear that odor reaches the sense of smell only on account of a vapor that evaporates from what has the odor, which is mixed with the air and diffused through it. Hence, when an apple has been smelled for some time, it spoils because of how much has been released from it.’ Cf., Anonymous (Arts Master c. 1225) ‘The Soul and its Powers’ in Robert Pasnau, ed. *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, Volume Three, Mind and Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 9–34 (p. 21, n. 58).

a tremor in the air or in water.⁴¹ Jean refers to Aristotle's distinction between two kinds of air; the exterior air in which sound exists, and connatural air, present in the chambers of the ears in which the change of sound occurs.⁴²

The fourth element is water according to which the sense of taste is determined. When moisture, which flows from water, mixes with the substance of what is to be tasted, it produces flavour. The moisture of saliva, however, is received into the sponge like flesh of the tongue and reaches as far as the organ of taste; this is the medium of taste.

The fifth and final principle is earth, according to which the sensitive object of touch is determined. Flesh is the medium of touch. In the compound of flesh there is a composition of the four elements, of which earth is the predominant. The sensitive objects of touch have their being in the tangible exterior objects but the sense of touch also exists in the flesh.

The nerves play their part in each of the senses. Jean states that the nerves descending from the anterior part of the brain together with the sensitive spirits are the organs of the senses. These are described as 'real functional dynamisms and physiological systems causally related to specific body organs and endowed of material *spiritus*'.⁴³ The nerves which form the pupils and the arrangement of the eyes are the organs of sight; the organs of hearing are the nerves branching out from

⁴¹ *Summa*, C. 91, 22–26. Extrinseca, motus uiolentus aeris qui facit eum moueri tempore breuiori quam additum sit sue nature. Intrinseca uero causa est parcium densarum aeris ad raras resistencia, que facit tremorem in aere uel in aqua; et hec est causa immediata soni.

⁴² *Summa*, C. 91, 31–34. Nisi uellemus distinguere, sicut distinguit Philosophus, duplicem aerem; aerem exteriorem, in quo habet sonus suum esse, et aerem connaturalem intra concauitatem auris, in quo habet fieri soni immutacio.

⁴³ Vico, p. 314.

the brain and at the end of which are formed the ‘bellows’ of the ears within the concavities of the ears; the organs of the sense of smell are the nerves which descend from the anterior part of the brain, where there are little pieces of flesh and end with the nostrils; the organ of taste is the tongue, it originates in the same part of the brain; in a serpent it is divided and it therefore has two tongues! The organ of touch is in every part of the body and also in the organs of the other senses. The nerves, which are the organs of touch, branch out into the entire body and are covered by flesh which is compared to the covering provided by a net or clothing.

Jean follows Avicenna in stating that an intermediary is necessary in the case of each of the senses. According to Avicenna the intermediary is indispensable. It is not possible to see an object if it is applied directly on the eyes, just like it is not possible to hear a sound if the ears are blocked.⁴⁴ In a chapter on the different intermediaries Jean states that the intermediaries are necessary since if one placed the object to be sensed on top of the sense it is not sensed, for example, colour upon the eye.⁴⁵ In fact, following Avicenna, Jean states that sensation is produced through the reception of the image or the likeness of the object, not through the receiving of the object itself according to its essence. If a sense received the essence of an object, contrary sensations would not be received. It would not be possible to see white or black or to touch warm or cold. For if the essence of white were received in the eye, unless it (that is, the eye) changes, it would not receive the contrary colour of blackness. From experience, we know that our eyes are not changed by seeing whiteness or blackness and that we can see white and black at the same time.

⁴⁴ Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus I-II-III*, p. 56*

⁴⁵ Pasnau, *Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, p. 19, n. 38. Cf. Aristotle, *De Anima* II, 7, 419a28-30: ‘When someone positions something that has a smell or sound on the sensory capacity itself, this will not bring about a single sensation.’ Cf. 421b17, 423b24-25.

However, it is the case that an image of the sensitive object is received and in the case of sight this is through the medium of the transparent; in hearing through the medium of air; in smell through the medium of vapour; in taste, through the medium of the salival humour; in touch, through the medium of flesh which covers the nerves.⁴⁶

With regard to the object of the senses Jean distinguishes between the sensitive objects that are perceived *per se* and those that are perceived *per accidens*. Those perceived *per accidens* is when the object of one sense is said to be perceived by another sense. To perceive *per accidens* is to perceive the sweetness of an apple because of its scarlet colour,⁴⁷ whereas properly speaking, the sweetness of the apple is only perceived by the sense of taste. The common sense, one of the interior senses, will be discussed in the next chapter but here Jean explains that it is through the common sense⁴⁸ that we perceive size, length, width, figure, depth, movement, rest, number, time and place. These are the common sensibles and their properties. The common sense is not separate, however, from particulars, according to essence. For we often speak of seeing size, length, shortness and even touch. We speak of seeing movement or rest, of seeing something above or below. We perceive according to a particular sense, sight in this case, but in addition to the external sense the common sense discerns between the different sensitive objects of the senses.

⁴⁶ *Summa*, C. 93, 14–30. Si autem queratur quare adhibita sunt media in sensibus, ut non perueniat sensus in cognitionem obiecti sine medio; dicendum quod hoc est quia sensibile appositum supra sensum non sentitur. Sensus enim fit per receptionem speciei uel similitudinis obiecti, non per receptionem ipsius obiecti secundum essenciam. Si enim reciperet sensus essenciam sui obiecti, nunquam esset sensus contrariorum. Ergo non esset uidere album uel nigrum, uel tangere calidum uel frigidum; quod patet. Nam si in oculo reciperetur essencia albedinis, iam non nisi alteratus, non esset receptius nigredinis. Sed constat quod non alteratus oculus recipit uidendo albedinem et nigredinem. Si ergo recipit secundum essenciam, sunt contraria secundum essenciam in eodem. Relinquitur ergo, aut quod non erit susceptius nisi tantum alterius contrariorum, aut quod non recipitur color ab oculo secundum essenciam, sed secundum speciem suam uel similitudinem, propter haec ergo quia non recipitur a sensu nisi specie obiecti; apposita enim sensibilis essencia supra sensum, ut coloratum supra oculum, non sentitur. Necessarium ergo fuit medium in quolibet sensu.

⁴⁷ Vernier, p. 205 n. 1.

⁴⁸ Vernier, *Ibid.*, n. 2.

Another distinction highlighted by Jean is that between primary and secondary sensitive objects. For example, hot, cold, moist and dry reach the sense of touch in the first place and therefore primarily. Soft and hard, thin and dense, heavy and light follow consequently and therefore in a secondary way. Avicenna therefore anticipated the primary and secondary qualities in later epistemology, particularly in the work of Locke. The passage we refer to is one highlighted by Hasse as being one among a number of passages overlooked by the editor of the *Summa* as having its source in Avicenna.⁴⁹ In fact Jean draws on Avicenna for much of this chapter on the objects of the senses. With regard to the intermediaries the sense of touch differs from the other senses in that it experiences delight and sadness without an intermediary since the flesh or skin is the organ of touch. Jean also refers to another difference between the sense of touch and the other senses. For the whole of the skin which surrounds the entire body is sentient through touch, and not just in one part; since this sense is by nature that which preserves the entire body from injuries; this is why the entire body as constituted is endowed with tactile sensation.⁵⁰ Sight experiences neither delight nor sadness on account of sight itself but the soul is pleased or saddened internally on account of what is seen. This happens in the case of hearing also, the pain or delight is associated with suffering of the soul. Both the

⁴⁹ *Summa*, C. 94, 28–32. Secundaria vero sunt que non primo sensum attingunt, sed consequenter. Verbi gracia, calidum, frigidum, humidum, siccum primo sensum tactus attingunt, et ideo principalia. Molle uero et durum, rarum et densum, grave et leve, ex consequenti, et ideo secundaria. Compare: Avicenna's *De Anima*, II, c. 3, pp. 133 25 – 134 28. Ea autem quae tanguntur, divulgatum est quod sunt calor et frigiditas, humiditas et siccitas, asperitas et lenitas, gravitas et leuitas; sed durities et mollities et viscositas et solubilitas et cetera huiusmodi, non sentiuntur nisi consequentes eas quas praediximus.

⁵⁰ *Summa*, C. 94, 60–65. Nota eciam aliam differenciam tactus ab aliis secundum organum. Nam tota cutis que circumdat totum corpus est sciens per tactum, et non una sola pars; quia enim sensus iste est natura conseruans totum corpus ab accidentibus que multum nocerent si consisterent in aliquo membrorum cui acciderent, oportuit idcirco ut totum corpus poneretur sciens per tactum. This passage, (in fact the entire passage - lines 60-70 of Jean's *Summa*) was overlooked as a quotation from Avicenna. See Hasse, p. 49, n. 217 which refers the reader to Avicenna's *De anima* II, 3, p. 140, lines 28-38.

sense of smell and taste, however, are delighted or saddened in a physical sense since they are influenced by qualities which are either suited or unsuited to their respective organs.

It is remarkable that Jean and his contemporaries made such enormous efforts to integrate the various traditions that were becoming available during the twelfth century into their own accounts of the psychology of the soul. The challenge of incorporating material from Avicenna's *De anima* is testament to Jean's determination to understand the physical and the psychical nature of mankind. To understand why Jean is an exponent of Avicenna we must appreciate that 'while a deep chasm is posited between sense and intellect in terms of their cognitive value, the Arabic philosophers offered a general theory of the nature of cognition that was applicable to both sensation and intellection'.⁵¹ It is Avicenna who gives the first systematic account of the internal senses to the Latin West and it is described as 'an attempt to expand and systematize Aristotle's account of the pre-intellectual capacities of the soul that could not simply be explained as functions of the five external senses of vision, hearing, smell, taste, and touch'.⁵²

SECTION FOUR INTERNAL SENSES

The term 'internal senses' is believed to be of Stoic origin.⁵³ Alfarabi, also posited a principal of sensitive power in a treatise entitled, '*Treatise on the opinion of the inhabitants of the ideal city* in which, 'the perceptions of the five senses come

⁵¹ Black, 'Psychology: Soul and Intellect', in *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, pp. 308–326 (311).

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 312.

⁵³ Rahman, pp. 77-78.

together, as if the five senses were warnings for it, as if the five senses were informers, each responsible for a “genre” of knowledge of one of the regions of a kingdom’.⁵⁴ Alfarabi situated the sensitive principal power in the heart while Avicenna situated it in the brain. The treatise of Alfarabi was unknown, however, in the West so it can be rightly said that it was Avicenna who introduced the peripathetic division to the Latin West. A full account of the internal senses is to be found in Avicenna and while there are various combinations of the faculties in his different works it is stated that Avicenna “means to contrast the two ways in which the internal senses may be viewed, the medical or physiological and the philosophical, without one’s necessarily excluding the other”.⁵⁵

Jean’s presentation of the internal senses is taken from Avicenna’s *De Anima*, maintaining the order of the senses as it appears there. Following Avicenna, Jean states that there are five internal senses, each is assigned a location within the ventricles of the brain; the belief that the internal senses were located in the brain was of Galenic origin.⁵⁶ The first internal sense is *fantasia*, also called the common sense (*sensus communis*); second is the imagination (*ymaginacio*); third the imaginative, also called the sensitive imagination and cogitative imagination (*ymaginativa* or *excogitativa*); fourth, the estimative (*estimativa*); fifth, memory (*memorativa*).

5.4.1 *The Common Sense*

⁵⁴ Alain de Libera, ‘Le sens commun au XIII^e siècle De Jean de La Rochelle à Albert le Grand’, *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 1991 Vol. 96 PT. 475 – 496 (p. 478).

⁵⁵ Harry Austryn Wolfson, ‘The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts’, in *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion*, Vol. One, ed. by Isadore Twersky and George H. Williams (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 250 – 314 (p. 279).

⁵⁶ Rahman, p. 79.

The *fantasia* or common sense is located in the front ventricle of the brain. It receives the forms which are imprinted on it by the five external senses. This power is the centre for all of the exterior senses and from which they lead out as if they are the branches of the central sense. It is called the common or central sense and the formal sense. Central inasmuch as it facilitates an exchange between it and the acts of the particular senses; I see what I hear, and I hear what I see; it also has the power to unite sensations of the various senses, for example, seeing black and white or, with regard to taste, distinguishing between sweet and savoury.⁵⁷ It is called the formal sense because of its close connection to the second internal sense, the *imaginacio* which, as we will see, retains the forms of the sensitive objects which the common sense first receives from the external senses. Jean quotes a passage from Avicenna, almost verbatim, in which the latter uses the example of a rain drop to explain the roles of the external senses, the imagination and the common sense.

Accordingly Avicenna proposes an experiment: when we wish to know the difference between the function of the exterior sense and that of the formal sense, that is to say the common sense, consider the relative position of a drop of rain which is falling, and you will see a straight line; consider also the relative position of anything in a straight line. Consider the relative position of this straight line whose summit is presented in a circle and you see a circle. It is impossible for you to see the line and the circle unless you look at them often. It is impossible even for an exterior sense to see the thing in two places, it is only possible that you see where it is. Since each is assigned to the common sense and it is removed before the form which was assigned to it is deleted the common sense grasps it in the place it is, the common sense grasps both ‘as if’ it was in that place and ‘as if’ it is also in that other place; in this way it sees circular or straight extension. It is impossible for this to occur without an exterior sense. But the common sense apprehends these two

⁵⁷ *Summa*, C. 97, 1–10. Sensus autem communis est uis ordinata in prima concauitate cerebri, recipiens per se ipsam omnes formas que imprimuntur quinque sensibus et redduntur ei. Hec autem uirtus est centrum omnium sensuum, et a qua deriuantur ut rami. Dicitur autem hic sensus formalis et communis. Communis secundum duos modos: uno modo in quantum communiter habet conuerti super actus sensuum particularium, prout dicitur: uideo quod audio, et audio quod uideo; et uideo quod odoro, etc. Alio modo secundum quod habet conferre sensibilia diuersorum sensuum, ut cum confertur album, nigrum, dulci uel saporato, quoniam est illud.

aspects, although one was destroyed. For this reason it is called the ‘sense which forms’ by Avicenna.⁵⁸

De Libera states that the common sense plays a role in the ‘transformation’ of sensation in perception. The common sense and imagination are two distinct faculties; anatomically the common sense, as we have already seen, is located in the front ventricle of the brain and the imagination is located at the extremity of the anterior ventricle. Yet, as Jean states (following Avicenna) the common sense and the imagination are also considered ‘as if’ they are one power. The first receives, the second retains. Avicenna’s argument is that it is one thing to receive, another to retain. He makes this distinction with regard to the powers of the soul. He demonstrates this by using the example of water that has the potential for receiving the images and the imprinted forms but it does not have the potential to retain them.⁵⁹

5.4.2 *The Imaginative Power*

Next is the **imaginative** power, which is located in the middle ventricle of the brain, which has the power to combine and separate the forms as one wishes. When this is under the control of the intellect it is called the cogitative power and when under the control of the sensitive soul it is called the imaginative power. Avicenna uses the

⁵⁸ Summa, 97, 16–30. Vnde ponit Auicenna experimentum: cum uolumus scire differentiam inter opus sensus exterioris, et opus sensus formalis, id est communis, attende disposicionem unius gutte cadentis de pluuiis, et videbis rectam lineam; et attende disposicionem alicuius recti, cuius summitas mouetur in circuitu, et videbitur circulus. Impossibile autem est ut apprehendas lineam aut circulum nisi illam rem sepe inspexeris. Impossibile eciam est ut sensus exterior uideat eam bis, nisi uidebit eam ubi est. Cum autem describitur in sensu communi, et remouetur antequam deleatur forma que descripta est in sensu communi, apprehendit eam sensus exterior illuc ubi est, apprehendit eciam eam sensus communis quasi esset illuc ubi fuit, et quasi esset illuc ubi est; et ita uidet extensionem circularem aut rectam. Hoc autem impossibile est fieri sine sensu exteriori. Sed sensus communis formalis apprehendit illa duo, quamuis destructa sit illa res. Hac ergo ratione dicitur sensus formans secundum Auicennam.

⁵⁹ C. 98, 13–18. Differentiam autem hanc probat quod ex una ui est recipere, et ex alia retinere; quod est uidere in aqua que habet potenciam recipiendi sculpturas et impressiones figurarum, non tamen habet potenciam retinendi. Differentis ergo uirtutis erit retinere sensibilia et recipere ea. Alia ergo uirtus est ymaginacio a sensu communi; et hec est sententia Auicenne.

term *ymaginativa* when referring to this power in animals and the term *cogitativa* when it refers to man. Jean gives a summary of how Avicenna distinguishes the senses as follow:

For the common sense surrenders to the formal power, as if to restore whatever the exterior senses hand over to it. The formal power, that is the imagination, preserves and retains. It has therefore, in itself, the power to multiply the sensitive forms. But the cogitative or imaginative power is turned towards the forms which are in the formal power or the imagination in order to combine or separate them, since they are subject to it; and according to this changes occur in the imaginations of things which are not subject to an external sense, as it happens in sleep but also in wakefulness.⁶⁰

It is the power that also explains how we produce images in dreams that are not subject to the external senses, it also happens in wakefulness, or daydreaming or using our imagination.

5.4.3 *Imagination*

It is important to stress the distinction between *imaginatio* and the *imaginative* faculties. The Arabic terms used by Avicenna are *ḥ ayāl* and *qūwa mutaḥ ayyiila*, which were translated into Latin as *imaginatio* and *imaginativa* respectively. The internal faculty of *imaginatio* does not imagine. It stores the sense data which it receives from the common sense while the *imaginative* faculty ‘is concerned with the combination and separation of the sense data and connotational attributes’.⁶¹ The imaginative power (cogitative in humans) is also called *taḥ ayyul*, ‘imagining’ by Avicenna as he ‘emphasizes the active function (combining and separating) of this

⁶⁰ *Summa*, C. 99, 11–19. Nam sensus communis reddit uirtuti formali quasi ad reponendum quidquid ei tradunt sensus exteriores. Virtus uero formalis, que est ymaginacio, reponit et retinet. Habet enim uirtutem multiplicandi in se formas sensibiles. Virtus uero cogitatiua sive ymaginatiua conuertitur ad formas que sunt in uirtute formali siue ymaginacione ad componendum eas et resoluendum, quoniam ei sunt subiecta; et secundum hoc accidunt fieri transformationes ymaginacionum eorum, que non ceciderunt in sensu exteriori, sicut accidit in sompnis et eciam in uigilia.

⁶¹ Hasse, p. 157.

faculty, which contrasts with the passive function (storing) of the faculty of imagination'.⁶² Imagining is therefore the action of the imaginative power and not of the imagination. The meaning of a 'connotational attribute' referred to above will become clearer as we discuss one of the most widely known theories of Avicenna, the estimative power. The passage quoted below clearly shows that estimation is connected with the internal sense of memory and reminiscence which conserves the 'intentions' of the estimative power.

5.4.4 *The Estimative Power*

The estimative power apprehends these 'intentions' which are present in the object as, for example when the sheep judges that it must flee from the wolf and cherish the lamb. This theory influenced a number of important thinkers in the thirteenth century and beyond but it is Jean's account which will be our starting point as he gives an almost verbatim account of Avicenna's theory. I quote the passage in full as it will be helpful in explaining the activities of the estimative power.

Consequently we must discuss the following two interior powers, namely the estimative power and the power concerned with memory. The estimative power is, as Avicenna states, a power located in the innermost ventricle of the brain, apprehending the intentions of sensitive objects, just as there is power in a lamb, through which it judges it must flee from the wolf, and that it must live with the sheep. And this power is transcendent since its apprehension does not concern the sensitive and material forms but the immaterial forms: namely, good and evil, the agreeable and the disagreeable, the beneficial and the harmful, which in themselves are not material, and do not rely on the exterior senses. They are however accidents of sensitive beings and for this reason they are called the intentions of the sensitive beings. The estimative power, which is the fourth power of the interior sensitive powers, has these as objects. Note therefore that the estimation of the beneficial and the harmful occurs in three ways: the first mode stems from a natural precaution, just as occurs in a child who, when raised to standing and thinks he is falling, at once he clings to something; and when someone's eye needs to be cleared of inflammation of the eyes, which he closes at once, before he knows it, it is

⁶² Ibid., p. 158.

gone away; and just like the sheep fears the wolf naturally, animals a lion, the birds a hawk, since they judge them harmful. The second mode is from experience, just as happens when an animal has grief or delight from something, whose form is inscribed in the formal power or imagination, and the beneficial or harmful intentions are inscribed in memory. As soon as that external thing appears it will be assessed as malicious or harmful. It is from this that dogs are terrified of sticks and stones, since they regard them as harmful, and they are tempted by bones, which they regard with delight. The third mode is a mode of likeness, through sharing a certain property, just as an object shares some form with an intention, an object of estimation, in some sensitive object, just as occurs with an apple, when it is the colour red that it is mature and sweet. For that reason also when we see a red apple we reckon it is sweet. Therefore estimation occurs in these ways.⁶³

The *estimative* faculty in Avicenna's account of the internal senses anticipates the modern concept of intentionality as initiated by the founder of phenomenology, Franz Brentano (1838–1917).⁶⁴ There is also the question of its

⁶³ *Summa*, C. 101. Consequenter dicendum est de duabus uirtutibus consequentibus sensitiuis interioribus, scilicet estimatiua et memoratiua. Est autem estimatiua, sicut dicit Auicenna, uis ordinata in summo concauitatis medie cerebri, apprehendens intenciones sensibilium, sicut est uis in oue, diiudicans quod a lupo est fugiendum, et quod cum agno cohabitandum. Est autem ista uirtus transcendens quia apprehensio sua non est formarum sensibilium et materialium, sed immaterialium: bonitas enim et malicia, conueniens et inconueniens, utile et nocium, in se sunt res non materiales, nec cadentes in sensu exteriori. Sunt tamen accidentia sensibilium rerum, et ideo dicuntur intenciones sensibilium. Horum autem est uirtus estimatiua que est quarta uirtus uirtutum sensibilium interiorum. Nota ergo quod estimacio utilium et nociuorum fit tribus modis: primus modus est ex cautela naturali, sicut accidit in puero qui, cum eleuatur ad standum et estimat cadere, statim alicui adheret; et cum oculus alicuius debet purgari a lippitudine, quem statim ille claudit, antequam cognoscat quid sibi accidat de illo; et sicut ouis timet lupum naturaliter, et leonem animalia, et aues accipitrem, quia estimant nociua. Secundus modus est per experienciam, sicut accidit cum animal habuit dolorem aut delicias ab aliqua re, cuius forma descripta est in uirtute formali siue ymaginacione, et intenciones utilitatis uel nocuenti descripte in memoria. Statim ut apparuerit extra res illa, erit in estimacione malicie uel nocuenti. Hinc est quod canes terrentur a fustibus et lapidibus, quia estimant nociua, et alliciuntur ossibus, quia estimant delectabiliter. Tercius modus est ad modum similitudinis per proprietatem quandam coniunctam, sicut cum res habet aliquam formam coniunctam cum intencione estimacionis in aliquo sensibilium, sicut accidit in pomo, cum est coloris coccinei, quod est maturum et dulce. Et ideo cum uidemus pomum coccineum estimamus dulce. Hiis ergo modis fit estimacio.

⁶⁴ Cf., Franz Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, trans. by Antos. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell & Linda L. McAlister (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973; Routledge, 1995), p. 88–89; *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, originally published in 1874. See, also, Herbert Spiegelberg's essay, 'Intention and Intentionality in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl', originally published in 1933/34 in German as 'Der Begriff der Intentionalität in der Scholastik, bei Brentano und bei Husserl', and revised without major changes in 1969, and translated into English in 1976 as 'Intention and Intentionality in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl' in *The Philosophy of Brentano*, ed. by Linda L. McAlister (London: Duckwork, 1976) pp. 108–27. For the significance of Avicenna's influence on Brentano's understanding, see Richard Sorabji, 'From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality', in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. Julia Annas (1991), *Supplementary Volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition*, ed. by H. Blumenthal and H. Robinson, pp. 227–259. While Brentano accepts part of the meaning of the scholastic doctrine of 'intentional in-existence of an object', he deviates from it also considerably. See, Hugh Lawson-

meaning in Arabic philosophy and its use in the medieval Latin translation. According to Black, the English term ‘intention’ came to be applied to the Arabic concept through the use of ‘*intentio*’ as the medieval word for *ma‘na*.⁶⁵ She states that although many philosophers in the Arabic world and also in the Latin West accepted Avicenna’s positing of the estimative faculty, al-Ghazâlî (1058–1111) and Averroes (Ibd Rushd, 1126–1198) found his arguments problematic. While it will be necessary to confine the discussion to what is presented by Jean in the *Summa* it is worth noting that Black extends the discussion to include many other contexts in Avicenna’s writings and she argues ‘that an adequate understanding of Avicenna’s reasons for positing the existence of an estimative faculty demands an integrated analysis of all these dimensions of Avicenna’s theory, and that such an integrated analysis can mitigate many of the objections of Avicenna’s critics, even if it raises new questions for the Avicennian perspective’.⁶⁶

Al Ghazâlî raises the objection that if the estimative power, which is located in a part of the brain, is able to grasp the immaterial intention, such as hostility, then the power by which intelligible forms are apprehended could also be said to be located in the brain, then, according to Ghazâlî, ‘all Avicenna’s rational demonstrations for the immateriality of the intellect are nullified.’⁶⁷ Black states that, in fact, Avicenna only argues that since intentions are different from sensible forms, and since only sensible forms are directly apprehended by the senses and the imagination than another power besides sense and imagination is needed to

Tancred, ‘Introduction’, in Aristotle, *De Anima (On the Soul)*, trans. by H. Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin, 1986), esp., pp. 101–3.

⁶⁵ Black, ‘Psychology: Soul and Intellect’ in *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, p. 312.

⁶⁶ Deborah Black, ‘Estimation (*Wahm*) in Avicenna: The Logical and Psychological Dimensions in *Dialogue*, *Canadian Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXX11, (No. 2 Spring 1993), 219–258 (p. 220).

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

apprehend intentions'.⁶⁸ Intentions are not essentially material, they can be material accidentally but as Black interprets it, estimation 'receives intentions which are not in their essences material'.⁶⁹

Avicenna gives the examples of a baby grasping at something when he is about to fall and of a person's reaction to inflammation of an eye but as Hasse⁷⁰ states, commenting on this passage, these reactions are what we describe as reflex reactions. It is difficult to equate these examples with the famous example of how the sheep fears the wolf. However, this may become clearer as we examine the terms used by Avicenna in his theory. Jean recounts a second mode in which estimation is combined with memory — this explains how, for example, a dog associates a stick with a bad experience but then it is delighted when he sees his master. The estimative faculty, with the aid of memory, sensation and the imaginative combine the forms and intentions 'from a given object into a perception of a concrete whole'.⁷¹ It makes sense to say that an animal will feel threatened if it has once been beaten or that it will at least be cautious of anything resembling a stick in the future. This is not a rational judgement as Hasse⁷² points out.

A third mode is the mode of likeness. When, for example, I see something sweet, although the sweetness itself remains a sensible quality, the intentions in such a case are 'not primarily in terms of their non-sensible character, but rather, as properties that are not conveyed to or perceived by the external senses'.⁷³

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 222.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Hasse, pp. 134–135.

⁷¹ Black, 'Estimation (*Wahm*) in Avicenna', p. 226.

⁷² Hasse, p. 135.

⁷³ Black, 'Estimation (*Wahm*) in Avicenna', p. 225.

Black provides a comprehensive account of the estimative faculty in Avicenna in many other contexts but we move to Hasse's discussion of the medieval writers who made use of the estimative faculty in their works on the soul. Hasse⁷⁴ states that the theory of the internal sense of estimation, and its objects, the 'intentions', is one of the most widely known theories of Avicenna, 'paralleled only by the distinction between essence and existence and the theory of the separate active intellect'.⁷⁵ He further explains that it is not correct to say that an 'intention' refers to certain knowledge which the internal sense possesses. The 'intention' is in the object perceived, imagined or believed. It conveys or indicates 'the significance or meaning of an image with which this indicator is connected'.⁷⁶ In the example of the wolf, the sheep perceives the outer appearance and also the 'intention' (in the wolf) as harmful and threatening, it then judges that it is harmful and flees. However, as Hasse⁷⁷ further explains, it is not the sheep's judgement, nor its fear, nor its pleasure or pain that are the 'intentions'. The intentions are in the object, as 'hostility' is in the wolf, Hasse describes it as a 'connotational attribute', the sheep is aware of more than the presence of the wolf. According to Hasse the fact that intentions exist in the sense-object distinguishes Avicenna's theory of 'intentionality' from many other theories on 'intentions' as the 'intention' is not in the perceiver but in the object. The 'intentions' are immaterial, they refer to what is good or bad, agreeable or disagreeable, the beneficial and the harmful; they exist accidentally in beings and are the objects of the estimative power.

Almost every writer after 1200 who wrote on the soul mentioned the main tenets of Avicenna's theory, the example of the sheep and the wolf is mentioned in

⁷⁴ Hasse, p. 127.

⁷⁵ Hasse, p. 127.

⁷⁶ Hasse, p. 131.

⁷⁷ Ibid.,

most of the authors writing before our author and it is there in later and better known authors such as Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. Hasse highlights the manner in which John Blund, writing around 1204, interprets the *intentiones* as ‘qualities and attributes of perceived objects’.⁷⁸ Blund raises a question as to how if the *intentiones* ‘pass through sense perception and through the imagination until they reach estimation which is located behind them in the brain, why are they imperceptible to the senses and the imagination? It is a valid question - how can it be that the sheep knows that it must take action in order to avoid being attacked by the wolf if the *wahm* experience means the sheep ‘directly perceives *intentiones* without any intermediate perception by other senses’.⁷⁹ Hasse provides us with a direct quote from Blund’s *Tractatus* in which he defends Avicenna.⁸⁰

But because this could appear difficult to understand for someone, one can say that a likeness of the *intentio* comes about in sense perception and in imagination, but that the soul does not perceive them with these faculties, since sense perception and imagination do not have a nature which is in accordance with the original carrier of the *intentio*. But the organ of estimation is similar in nature to that which is *per se* and originally the carrier of the *intentio*, and therefore the perception of the *intentio* happens through the estimative faculty.

Blund is using different terminology but he is conceding that the *intentiones* are only in the object and are not perceived by the senses but what is perceived are representations of them. Blund is trying to understand the new psychology which purports to provide an explanation for how we can know something which is neither discernible through sense data nor through a process of reasoning.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 145.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Hasse, p. 145. Cf., Blund, *Tractatus*, 19, p.70, line 2.

The appearance of Aristotle's works would complicate matters even further when the apparent incompatibilities between Avicenna's and Aristotle's views became an issue for debate in many of the well known thinkers of the thirteenth century. We can see how this manifested itself in the approaches which the Dominicans and the Franciscans took in trying to reconcile the new philosophies with their Christian beliefs. With regard to the faculty of estimation the question was asked as to whether the Avicennian theory could be traced to Aristotle. Albert the Great, according to Hasse, is the first to highlight the differences among the authorities. Albert maintained that many of the faculties in Avicenna could be traced back to *phantasia* in Aristotle's *De Anima*. This was Albert's attempt to harmonise Avicenna and Aristotle but this, according to Hasse, leads to a mis-representation of the theory of 'connotational attributes' since for Albert, attributes such as harmful, and pleasant are not perceived in the object, as Avicenna holds, but in 'perceived images'.⁸¹ The faculty of *phantasia*, according to Albert, is based on the theory of abstraction, as Hasse states, 'the theory of *phantasia* (in the broad sense) derives *intentiones* from sense data by combining and separating these data – a theory special to Albertus.'⁸² Thus, Hasse concludes that Albert is concerned only with the 'connotational' aspect of Avicenna's theory, not with the 'attribute' aspect.

Thomas Aquinas⁸³ relegates the estimative power to animal psychology. He explains how animals know certain things instinctively, the sheep avoids the wolf

⁸¹ Hasse, p. 149.

⁸² Hasse, p. 148

⁸³ Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Vol 11, 1a. 78, 4. trans. by Timothy Sutor. 'Sed necessarium est animali ut quaerat aliqua vel fugiat, non solum quia sunt convenientia vel non convenientia ad sentiendum, sed etiam propter aliquas alias commoditates et utilitates, sive nocumenta. Sicut ovis videns lupum venientem fugit, non propter indecentiam coloris vel figurae, sed quasi inimicum naturae. Et similiter avis colligit paleam, non quia delectat sensum, sed quia est utilis ad nidificandum. Necessarium est ergo animali quod percipiat hujusmodi intentiones quas non percipit sensus exterior.'

because something triggers a warning to it to flee. Aquinas, following Albert, does not accept that the sheep perceives the intentions in the wolf. However, he does assign a comparable power to humans, this is the power of cogitation, *vis cogitiva*. Also called the particular reason it compares 'individual intentions' in the way that the reasoning intellect compares 'universal intentions' (*Summa Theologiae* 1a, q.78, a.4, corpus). The cogitative power in man, therefore, comes under the influence of reason. Animals lack this power of conceptualization that enables human beings to see objects as belonging to this or that category, animals, unlike humans, cannot reason and cannot reflect on their fears and desires. The senses alone cannot directly know existence, nor can they perceive it. It is called particular reason because it can compare individual intentions, that is, it apprehends individual, concrete objects, in the way that the intellect conceives universal essences. There is therefore a special co-operation between intellect and an external sense.

5.4.5 *Memory*

The fifth and final internal sense, following the order given by Avicenna in the *De anima*, is memory and is located in the posterior ventricle of the brain. Jean calls it the *memorativa* but in the Latin translation of Avicenna's *De anima*, the power is called *memorialis*. As we have seen, it is the power which retains what the estimative power apprehends of the intentions of sensitive objects. Avicenna states that the relationship between the estimative power and the memorative power is the same as that between imagination and the common sense; for just as the imagination retains, and is the treasure house of the sensitive forms, which the common sense apprehends, so the memorative is the treasure house which conserves the intentions of the

Et hujus perceptionis oportet esse aliquod aliud principium, cum perceptio formarum sensibilium sit ex immutatione sensibilis, non autem perceptio intentionum praedictarum.'

estimative power.⁸⁴ Avicenna distinguishes between memory and reminiscence; memory is present in animals but recollection, the ability to search for something that has been forgotten is only found in man. To even know that something was present to oneself, but was later deleted, is none other than the rational power or if it belonged to any other power besides reason it may be the estimative, enhanced by reason.⁸⁵ Therefore the differences between memory and reminiscence is that memory retains the images or intentions of sensitive objects or their representations; reminiscence is the searching for forms deleted from memory due to forgetfulness; through searching for triggers, when for example, we forget someone we have seen, we recall both the time, the place and the activity and we are satisfied that through these we recall the details and circumstances.

There is also a difference between recollecting and learning. Avicenna states that according to some learning is nothing other than reminiscing and that recollecting or reminiscing and learning are the same. Avicenna distinguishes between them in stating that recollecting is a searching for something that one knew in the past and that learning is an extension of the soul in order to gain knowledge of the unknown, that which was not previously known.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ *Summa*, C. 102, 3–8. Comparacio autem uirtutis estimatiue ad uirtutem memoratiuam secundum Auicennam est qualis est comparacio uirtutis ymaginacionis ad sensum communem; sicut enim ymaginacio retinet, et est thesaurus formarum sensibilium quas apprehendit sensus communis, sic uirtus memoratiua est thesaurus conseruans intenciones sensibilium quas apprehendit uirtus estimatiua.

⁸⁵ *Summa*, C. 102, 11–17. Ad quod dicendum, secundum Auicennam, quod memoria est in aliis animalibus; sed recordacio que est reuocacio ingenii ad querendum quod oblitum est non inuenitur nisi in solo homine. Cognoscere enim sibi aliquid affuisse, quod postea deletum est, non est nisi uirtutis rationalis, uel si est alicuius uirtutis alterius preter rationem poterit esse rationem estimacionis, sed in quantum decoratur racionalitate. Compare: Avicenna's, *De anima*, IV, c. 3, p. 40 61–66 ad verbum.

⁸⁶ *Summa*, C. 102, 24–30. Nota eciam differenciam inter recordari et addiscere, quia quidam posuerunt quod addiscere nihil aliud fuerit quam reminisci et conueniunt in hoc quod utrobique est motus a cognitis ad incognita, ad hoc ut sciantur. Sed in hoc differencia est quod recordacio est inquisicio incognitorum ut cognoscantur de futuro, que quidem fuerunt cognita de preterito; addiscencia uero siue disciplina est extensio anime ad cognoscenda incognita, que tamen non fuerint cognita prius.

Jean presents Avicenna's physiological account of memory. Accordingly he refers to the different kinds of bodily constitutions in Avicenna's account which explain the various strengths and weaknesses involved in the powers of remembering, recollecting and learning. The question is asked as to why some people find it easier to learn new things than to recollect. Why do others find that they are the reverse of this? Avicenna states that the sort of person who have a dry constitution have good memories but they are weak in recollecting. A mental constitution that is dry is suitable for receiving and retaining the impressions but it is unwieldy with regard to movement.⁸⁷ As Coleman states, 'this must mean that the restless inquiry of recollection (*recordatio*) cannot be undertaken if one cannot creatively respond to images in the imagination, whose substance must be moist rather than dry.'⁸⁸ On the other hand, those of a warm cerebral constitution (as in air, that is hot and moist) recollect more easily. These are people who perceive more and produce movement and have 'a greater will to grasp or hold on to mental objects, being more in command of sensible motion and intentions'.⁸⁹

Those who possess a humid cerebral matter learn more easily as it is the most suited disposition for the taking up of the impressions but because it is humid they do not possess a strong memory. Memory necessarily requires that matter which is imprinted on it can only be deleted with difficulty, which is the nature of a dry constitution.

⁸⁷ *Summa*, C. 102, 35–40. Ad que intelligendum est, secundum Auicennam, quod illi qui sunt sicce complexionis, fortes sunt in memoriter retinendo, debiles in recordando. Siccitas autem memorie est conueniens dispositio ad susceptionem impressionum et retencionem; inhabilis autem est ad motum, et ideo sicca complexio conuenit memorie, non recordacioni.

⁸⁸ Coleman, p. 355.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

Although children have a cerebral matter that is humid they retain the impressions firmly. The reason for this is that they are not occupied with so many objects, as adults are. As Coleman states ‘memory with its dry matter requires that the soul is quick to take up forms and that its matter is diligent regarding these forms and that having them is not possessed of anything else.’⁹⁰ It is not the same for young people for although they possess a warm cerebral matter and are therefore agile in movement they also possess a dry cerebral matter but their powers of remembering are said to be weak. Old people, on account of the humour which prevails in them do not remember well.⁹¹

Avicenna justifies his ‘positing of each of these sense powers by a set of principles for differentiating psychological faculties’.⁹² The two most important have already been referred to above; the first is that the reception and retention of the sensitives must belong to different powers; the second refers to the sensitive objects; a diversity of objects requires a diversity of powers and from these two principles he derives the five interior senses. The common sense perceives the sensitive forms but it is not able to retain the forms that it perceives. As we have seen, this is the function of the imagination (*imaginatio*). Again the estimative power does not retain the intentions. It is the memory that retains them and is the treasure house of the intentions. The imaginative faculty combines and divides the forms which are retained in the imagination and it is what we normally understand by imagination. It

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 356.

⁹¹ *Summa*, C. 102, 60–65. Vnde est quod pueri, quamvis sint humidi, firmiter tamen retinent; anime enim eorum non occupantur circa multa, sicut anime maiorum, sed sunt fixe circa unum. Iuuenum uero, propter calorem suum, et propter motus suos agiles, debilis est memoria, quamvis sit complexio sicca. Senibus uero accidit, propter humorem qui preualet in eis, non memorari ea que uiderant.

⁹² Black, ‘Psychology: Soul and Intellect’, p. 313.

can also be subject to the rational powers and it is then called the cogitative power. As Black states it, ‘in Avicenna the cogitative faculty – that is, the entity formed by the cooperation between the intellect and imagination is responsible for a good deal of what we would ordinarily call “thinking,” including the analysis and synthesis of propositions and syllogistic reasoning’.⁹³

SECTION FIVE

THE DRIVING FORCES OF THE SENSES

According to Avicenna the powers of the soul are divided into the cognitive powers, (as we have seen they are the five external senses and five internal senses) and into the motive powers, the topic to which we will now turn. Jean defines the motive power in terms of a natural mode and an animal mode corresponding to Avicenna’s two kinds of motive power. According to Avicenna, ‘either it is motive in so far as it gives an impulse, or in so far as it is active’.⁹⁴ Avicenna’s statement introduces the faculty of appetite ‘in so far as it provides an impulse’ and ‘in so far as it is active’ this refers to the workings of the body as he states:

As for the motive faculty in its active capacity, it is a power which is distributed through the nerves and muscles, and its function is to contract the muscles and to pull the tendons and ligaments towards the starting-point of the movement, or to relax them or stretch them so that they move away from the starting-point.⁹⁵

In a similar vein Jean describes the motive faculty in the natural mode as the vital or pulsative power. This is one of three powers which we have already encountered in

⁹³ Ibid., p. 315.

⁹⁴ Rahman, p. 26.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

the Pseudo-Augustine and it corresponds to the vital activities of the body in Avicenna.

The motive sensitive power is of two modes; for one is motive in a natural mode, one is an animal mode; I describe the motive sensitive power according to the natural mode that which neither moves according to apprehension, nor is it subject to the command of reason, such is the vital or pulsative power. This power is situated in the heart as in its organ; it is a power for the purpose of inspiration and respiration, being the principle of a suitable blending of the heat of the heart and the body.⁹⁶

With regard to the animal mode Jean states that while the cognitive powers apprehend or judge what is good or evil there must be another power which moves the agent into action. He further states that according to Avicenna, there are two parts to the appetitive power; the concupiscible power and the irascible power.

The concupiscible power is that which commands movements in order to approach those things that are thought necessary or useful in pleasing the appetite. The irascible power is that which commands movements in order to reject that which is thought to be harmful or corrupting, by overwhelming the appetite.⁹⁷

Jean obviously agrees with Avicenna's definition of the concupiscible and irascible powers and recognises that they belong to movement as opposed to perception. There, however, is the point at which Jean parts company with Avicenna's theory. Avicenna includes the concupiscible and irascible powers in his theory of decision-making. It may be helpful to refer to the process involved which includes Avicenna's notion of the will. According to Hasse⁹⁸ the theory involves the following steps:

⁹⁶ *Summa*, C. 103, 2-8. Virtus autem motiua sensibilis est duobus modis: nam quedam est motiua modo naturali, quedam uero modo animali; et motiuam sensibilem modo naturali dico que nec mouet secundum apprehensionem, nec est subiecta imperio rationis, qualis est uirtus uitalis siue pulsatiua. Est autem hec uis in corde sicut in organo; et est uis per inspirationem et respiracionem, principium existens contemperancie caloris cordis et corporis.

⁹⁷ *Summa*, C. 105, 2-6. Vis autem concupiscibilis est uis imperans moueri ut appropinquetur ad ea que putantur necessaria aut utilia appetitui delectandi. Vis uero irascibilis est que imperat moueri ad repellendum id quod putatur nocium uel corrumpens appetitum uincendi.

⁹⁸ Hasse, p.139.

- (1) sense perception of the form (external senses, common sense)
- (2) perception of its connotational attribute (estimation)
- (3) judgement about the connotational attribute with regard to the form (estimation)
- (4) development of attraction or repulsion (will = irascible and concupiscible)
- (5) decision (faculty of decision)
- (6) movement performed with the help of nerves and muscles

Some of the above actions are accompanied by mental states such as fear, anger, joy, hunger and as we have seen hostility and friendliness are perceived by the power of estimation. Further in *De anima*, IV, 4, Hasse tells us that Avicenna states that some of these mental states ‘are accidents of the irascible and concupiscible faculties’.⁹⁹ It seems that Avicenna’s remarks are ‘a bit sketchy’ but the point is to show how these mental states trigger a positive or a negative reaction towards something.

Jean’s interest in the concupiscible and irascible powers is naturally grounded in moral philosophy. He confines his discussion to the positive and negative aspects of the appetitive power. The appetitive powers can help to explain the conflicts that arise because of these two powers.

In order to know the difference between the irascible and the concupiscible it is necessary to note that the good is spoken of in two ways: there is the pure and simple good, and there is also what Jean calls the expedient good. The good purely and simply is delight, while an expedient good is described as saddening and difficult. Nevertheless it is a good since it is useful. An example of a good that is a delight is food while an expedient good is medicine or an incision in order to save the body. Therefore, the concupiscible is the power which desires the good; the irascible is the power which desires the expedient but difficult good. Just as there are

⁹⁹ Ibid.

two aspects to existence, existence according to nature and the existence according to an order, there is also two aspects to the good. The first is the concupiscible power which aims at delectation; the second the irascible which aims at excellence or honour.

The concupiscible power finds rest in the possession of the good. On the other hand, the taking away of a desired good causes a disturbance in the irascible power and this is considered bad. When an evil is apprehended the irascible power, if it is strong, will hope for the desirable and will be both courageous and angry. Jean quotes from Damascene ‘anger is the spearman of reason and the avenger of desire’. If it is weakened the irascible power despairs and both fears and flees.

The question might be asked as to why there should be a distinct power for pursuing the good and another which resists anything that prevents one from pursuing the good? Aquinas, for example, would not agree that the will ‘is distinguished into a concupiscible and irascible component’.¹⁰⁰ For Aquinas, the will, contrary to sensitive appetites, has ‘a single unifying object’ whereas the appetitive power has two sides to it and therefore can be described as two separate powers.

Jean outlines the acts and movements which arise from the command of the concupiscible and the irascible powers. Since the concupiscible powers seek what is delightful to the senses, its acts are those of desiring, rejoicing, loving and acts of this kind. Their opposites are to be avoided. These include such acts as despising, sorrow, sadness, hatred, namely, acts that are contrary to loving and valuing. Jean

¹⁰⁰ Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature*, p. 240.

differentiates between different modes of pleasure and displeasure. He discusses how pleasure can be related to good or to evil; either it can refer to one's own pleasing or to the pleasing of another but he states no one would want to seek evil for himself. Therefore, evil or displeasure only arise in respect of another and it generates hatred. Jean presents a list of possible acts of the concupiscible power, the positive and the negative. He states, however, that these and all other acts of the concupiscible power are reducible to one criterion, that is, whether they generate a pleasing or a displeasing result and therefore, whether one must pursue the former and shun the latter.

Jean continues his discussion of the irascible power and the acts that follow from it. The acts of the irascible, since they refer to the arduous and the difficult have a two fold disposition, that is, a weak and a strong disposition. According to the strong disposition of the acts that arise from the command of the irascible power; some act for the good, some against evil. Acts that are directed towards the good are acts that demonstrate excellence and honour. These include acts of ambition and hope, pride, domination, contempt. Jean discusses how each of these acts can help one towards achieving excellence and honour. Acts that are aimed at overcoming evil are acts that call for courage and anger at whatever is the cause of the evil. The contrary position holds with regard to the weak disposition of the irascible power. Fleeing from what is good causes a lack of spirit, despair, humiliation and reverence. Jean raises an obvious question, since good attracts the appetite, how is it possible to flee from the good? In reply he states that it is not fleeing from the good inasmuch as it is good, but inasmuch as it is difficult.

Jean poses the question as to whether appetite and emotions refer to the same thing? He distinguishes between them as he states that appetite is a movement, a command, whether of the irascible or the concupiscible. On the other hand, emotions arise after the apprehension of the good or the bad. Following a four-fold division of desires of the soul Jean states:

Consequently feelings are multiplied according to four differences, and this is according to the saints and the philosophers, that is, joy or happiness, grief or sadness, desire or hope, dread or fear; the number of them is evident. Two come from an apprehension of the good, two come from the apprehension of the bad. From an apprehension of the good, comes joy or happiness, desire or hope. Joy or happiness concerns a present good, desire or hope concerns the future. From the two that come from an apprehension of the bad, grief or sadness concerns a present evil, dread or fear concerns the future.¹⁰¹

Although Jean does not mention the source of this doctrine it is to be found in Isaac of Stella and, more significantly, in the Pseudo-Augustine's *De spiritu et anima*, which, as we have seen, was one of Jean's sources on the powers of the soul. The four divisions are also to be found in William of St Thierry, but were originally derived from Stoic moral theory and were 'available to the medievals through a wide variety of sources'.¹⁰² The four powers, 'serve as the basis for the virtues and vices; when well ordered, they are the sources of the four cardinal virtues, which quoting St Augustine, are asserted to be nothing more than different modifications of the power of love'.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ *Summa*, C. 108. 7-14. Vnde affectiones multiplicantur secundum quattuor differencias, et hoc secundum sanctos et philosophos, scilicet gaudium seu leticia, dolor seu tristicia, cupiditas seu spes, metus seu timor; quarum patet numerus. Nam due sunt ex comprehensione boni, due ex comprehensione mali. Ex comprehensione boni, gaudium seu leticia, cupiditas seu spes. Sed gaudium siue leticia est de bono presenti, cupiditas uel spes de futuro. Due ex comprehensione mali, dolor seu tristicia de presenti malo, timor uel metus de futuro.

¹⁰² McGinn, p. 53. Sources cited are Chalcidius, *Commentarium*, chap. 194 (ed. Waszink, pp. 216-217); Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, 6 (ed. cit. II, p. 421); Nemesius, *Premnon physicon*, XVII, 1-6 (ed. cit., pp. 95-96); and Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae* I, met, 7 (ed. Rand, pp. 168-170).

¹⁰³ Ibid.

According to Jean differences in emotions originate from three causes. One is the disposition of the person, another is the disposition of the motive power and the third is the disposition of the complexion of the body. The first refers to how feelings can have a positive or negative effect on a person. The positive disposition of a person who is ill but believes he is getting better can have a beneficial effect on the person's health. The second aspect is that the more we exercise a power, according to its proper nature, the more it becomes a habit and it is re-enforced in us. The third aspect is the disposition of the humours, the blood and the spirits, all of which influence the feelings. Melancholia, as Jean states, is characterised by an excess of black bile in the body which was believed to affect the cognitive capacities. It is the imbalances between the elementary qualities which predisposes one to a good or bad physical state but they also affect the mental states associated with joy, anger, fear and sadness.

Before moving on to the cognitive and motive faculties of the sensitive soul mention must be made of another topic which seems to have intrigued the writers of the early thirteenth century. This is Avicenna's theory of the shellfish and nerves, two topics which feature in the latter's theory of touch. We have seen that Jean follows Avicenna in his account of the organs, the intermediaries and the objects of the senses in which the nerves figure in a very prominent way. He is also interested in a new kind of voluntary movement which is introduced by Avicenna as a critical response to Aristotle's theory that touch 'is the only faculty shared by all animals and not touch and movement as Avicenna says'.¹⁰⁴ Avicenna's main argument is that it is impossible that an animal should have the sense of touch but no voluntary

¹⁰⁴ Hasse, p. 94.

movement. There is, according to Avicenna a kind of voluntary movement which is to be distinguished from progressive movement, that is movement from place to place.

As Avicenna states, there are two kinds of animal movement: since there is local movement from place to place and the movement of contraction and extension of the animal's limbs. For it is impossible that an animal has the sense of touch, and does not have the power of movement of some kind in itself.¹⁰⁵

Avicenna's main point is that in the case of the shellfish, 'the shellfish contract and dilate in the interior of their shell' and does not move from its position. While Jean is interested in the new kind of movement he refers to it as 'animal movement' and not as 'voluntary movement' as Avicenna had called it. Despite the misunderstanding Hasse states that Avicenna's theory was successful, one reason is that it was in disagreement with Aristotle and secondly he maintains that it was of particular interest to writers concerned with the faculties of the soul. It is interesting to note that Jean does not refer to the disagreement with Aristotle. As Hasse states, Avicenna's views often differ from those of Aristotle; he highlights the fact that with regard to the sense of touch for example, 'Aristotle would oppose the view that there is no medium and that the organ of touch is affected directly by the object. Also, he would not locate the organ in the nervous flesh, but inside the body, close to the heart'.¹⁰⁶

The topic of the nerves was also of great importance since they also serve as an example to demonstrate the success of Avicenna's psychology. It was in the third century BC that Herophilus and Erasistratus made the great discovery by carrying

¹⁰⁵ *Summa*, C. 110, 11-15. Sicut enim dicit Avicenna, motus animalis duplex est: quia est motus localis de loco ad locum, et est motus contrahendi et extendendi membra animalis. Impossibile enim est ut animal habeat sensum tangendi, et non habeat in se uirtutem motus aliquo modo.

¹⁰⁶ Hasse, p. 101.

out dissections ‘which enabled them to distinguish between nerves, veins and arteries’.¹⁰⁷ It is not, however, until the eleventh century that the medical tradition begins to impact on philosophical and theological writings. The writings of Constantine the African were available in the eleventh century yet, at that time, few authors on the soul incorporated the newly available knowledge. With the arrival of Avicenna, however, the situation changed to a physiological understanding of the soul which can be seen in the case of the vegetative and sensitive soul and the very concrete example in the case of the nerves. The Arabic influences were at their peak in the early half of the thirteenth and this will be even more obvious as we approach the topic of the intellect in Avicenna and its impact on the scholastic writers at a very specific time in the history of philosophy.

SECTION SIX

THE INTELLECTIVE SOUL

While Jean holds to Aristotle’s active and passive intellect as proper to the individual human being our study will show that he faithfully followed Avicenna with regard to the intellectual soul; one with regard to the doctrine of the Four Intellects and secondly with regard to the Agent Intellect. Aristotle’s doctrine was interpreted by some Greek commentators as saying that both the active and passive intellects belonged to each individual soul. However, Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 200 AD) held that the active or agent intellect was separate and one for all minds. Following Alexander, Avicenna regarded the active intellect as a separate substance, however his doctrine of the agent intellect was placed within the context of his theory of

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 99.

emanation. Jean, as we shall see, tries to incorporate the distinction between the different levels of intellection into his Christian beliefs while accepting the active intellect of Avicenna.

Having considered the cognitive and motive faculties of the sensitive soul, Jean states, that the intellective soul also has two faculties; the theoretical and the practical.¹⁰⁸ Jean's main argument for stating that the intellective power is immaterial is taken from Avicenna's *De anima*, where it is stated that the intellect does not employ any organ in its activity. As it is stated by Jean:

Likewise, no power that is embodied, that is, no power that is determined or acts in a part of the body, knows itself through its organ, since it cannot reflect upon itself, since it is in the body. Therefore, the eye does not see itself; the imagination does not imagine itself; therefore, since the intellective power is capable of knowing itself; it therefore knows itself when it reflects upon itself. Therefore the intellective power is not embodied not does it act through an organ.¹⁰⁹

Another argument which is put forward for the immateriality of the intellective soul is that whatever is known is in the knower according to the nature of the knower and not according to the nature of the known object. Jean states that 'all that is received is in that which receives according to the nature of the recipient and

¹⁰⁸ *Summa*, C. 111, 1-3. Consequenter est dicere de uiribus racionalibus et humanis que primo diuiduntur per apprehensiuas et motiuas siue per intellectum secundum speculatiuum et practicum. Compare the following lines from Avicenna's *De anima*, Book I, c. 5: p. 90, 61-63. Quotation highlighted by Hasse as being attributable to Avicenna: 'Sed animae rationalis humanae vires diuiduntur in virtutem sciendi et virtutem agendi, et unaquaeque istarum virium vocatur intellectus aequivoce aut propter similitudinem.'

¹⁰⁹ *Summa*, C. 112, 19-24. Item, nulla uirtus incorporata, id est parti corporis determinata siue operans, per organum est cognitua sui, quia non potest reflecti supra se, cum sit incorporata. Vnde oculus non uidet se; nec ymaginacio ymaginatur se; cum ergo uirtus intellectiua sit cognitua sui; intelligit enim se cum reflectitur supra se. Ergo uirtus intellectiua non est incorporata, nec operans per organum. Compare the following lines from Avicenna's *De anima*, Book V, c. 2: p. 93, 60 – 94, 67. It is also highlighted by Hasse as being attributable to Avicenna: 'Dicemus igitur quod uirtus intellectiua, si intelligeret instrumento corporali, oporteret ut non intelligeret seipsam, nec intelligeret instrumentum suum, nec intelligeret se intelligere: inter ipsam etenim et essentiam suam non est instrumentum, nec inter ipsam et instrumentum eius est instrumentum, nec inter ipsam et id quod intelligit est instrumentum; sed intelligit seipsam, et ipsum instrumentum quod adscribitur ei, et intelligit se intelligere: ergo intelligit per seipsam, non per instrumentum.'

not according to that which is received'.¹¹⁰ The statement that sensation perceives 'neither its own organ, nor itself, nor its activity'¹¹¹ has its source in Aristotle.

According to Rahman:

Aristotle's reply to this question is that the faculty of sensation exists only potentially until some actual sensible object brings it into actuality. This is, however, difficult to understand, for according to Aristotle the sensible object becomes actual only in the act of sensation and before that it exists only potentially. The question is not really answered at all. If other bodies can become actual objects of sensation, why not the organs themselves? Avicenna's reply is that sensation must use a bodily organ, and there being no such organ between it and its organ, it cannot know its own organ.¹¹²

In fact this leads Rahman to say that Aristotle failed 'to formulate the idea of an individual central ego' for two reasons. The first is because of his 'general doctrine that the soul in itself, being form, is universal and is individualised only through matter', and secondly, because he attributed 'self consciousness to a sensual principle'.¹¹³ This contrasts with Avicenna's Flying Man experiment which, as we have seen, was employed by Avicenna to prove that self awareness is non-sensory.

Since the intellective power is immaterial its object is immaterial. The intellective power abstracts the form of the object from matter and from all its material conditions. This is the work of the theoretical intellect which grasps the intelligible forms and by combining Avicenna's theory of abstraction with the Pseudo-Augustine Jean differentiates between coming to know intelligible forms of the corporeal and spiritual spheres. For example, he states that the form by which God is known is a likeness or an image of a first truth impressed on the soul from

¹¹⁰ *Summa*, C. 112, 24-28. Item, quod comprehenditur uel cognoscitur est in cognoscente secundum naturam cognoscentis, et non secundum naturam rei cognite, ut patet in omnibus, et generaliter omne quod recipitur est in recipiente secundum naturam recipientis, et non secundum naturam recepti.

¹¹¹ Rahman, p. 103.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 104.

creation. In other words there are some forms which are abstracted by nature and the soul simply receives them. As he states, according to the Pseudo-Augustine ‘the soul knows that God is above it, that it can know itself and that it can know an angel which is near to it’ which helps Jean to explain how we know the forms of spiritual beings.¹¹⁴ Other forms are abstracted through contemplation through which we know corporeal things and those things which have their foundation in bodies.

However forms which are abstracted through contemplation are the forms through which we know corporeal things and those which have their foundation in bodies. For since the nature of the intellect is superior to corporeal things and it has power over the corporeal forms because of its extraordinary way of abstracting them; for at first it abstracts from the senses, then from the imagination and from all material conditions, such as shape, location and the like. And once all the material conditions are removed and the particular subsistences, it receives these abstracted and universal, generally and immaterially, as genera, as species, as differences between proper or accidental properties. However, this abstraction does not occur by action but by contemplation.¹¹⁵

Abstraction can occur through the imagination and through estimation, but as Jean explains following Avicenna, imagination does not strip the form of all the material conditions since forms that are in the imagination are imagined together with their quantity, quality and other qualities. Imagination abstracts the particular form. Estimation abstracts the intentions, which, as we have seen, are present in matter, such as the hostility which is present in the wolf when it is perceived by the

¹¹⁴ *Summa*, C.113, 24-25. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus, quod, ‘anima cognoscit Deum supra se, se in se, angelum iuxta se’.

¹¹⁵ *Summa*, C. 113, 33-41. Forme uero que sunt per considerationem abstracte sunt forme quibus cognoscuntur corporalia et ea que in corporibus fundantur. Cum enim natura intellectus superior sit rebus corporalibus, et potestatem habet super corporales formas miro modo abstrahendi eas; abstrahit enim eas primo a sensibus, postea ab ymaginacione et condicionibus materialibus omnibus, ut figure, situs et huiusmodi. Et sic expoliatis omnibus condicionibus materie et singularis subsistencie, accipit eas abstractas et uniuersales, communes et immateriales, ut genera, species, differencias per propria uel accidentia. Abstractio autem ista fit non actione sed consideratione.

lamb. It is only at intellectual level, when the form is stripped of all its material conditions that the ‘apprehension of the form is most true’.¹¹⁶

Jean refers to Avicenna’s statement that on account of matter ‘many dispositions accrue to material forms’,¹¹⁷ however they do not possess them because of their essence. This is best explained by Rahman¹¹⁸ when he refers to the ‘quiddity of man’, which is in itself an immaterial form, but when present in matter it is subject to material accidents, such as, Jean states, shape, place, quantity, quality and position. These are not essential to the quiddity of man, they do not belong to the essence of the form of man, if they did then all men would have the same qualities, quantities and similarly for other qualities.

In addition to abstraction the intellectual soul knows by means of the active and the possible intellects.

Therefore, it should be known that there is a passive and corruptible intellect which is called the material intellect by Aristotle; there is also an incorruptible and separable intellect. The passive intellect is the inferior power of the intellective part joined to the sensitive power which receives intelligible species in the phantasms.¹¹⁹

Jean adds to this that the intellective power is also distinguished according to higher or lower reason (*ratio superior et inferior*) or the superior and inferior intellect. This is a well known distinction from Augustine which enjoyed something of a renewal

¹¹⁶ *Summa*, C. 113, 93-94. Cum ergo sic apprehenditur, uerissima est ipsius forme apprehensio.

¹¹⁷ *Summa*, C. 113, 68-70. Notandum tamen est secundum Auicennam, quod formis materialibus propter materiam accidunt dispositiones multe quas non habent ex sua essentia, scilicet ex hoc quod sunt forme.

¹¹⁸ Rahman, p. 95.

¹¹⁹ *Summa*, C. 114, 2-5. Sciendum igitur quod est intellectus passius et corruptibilis qui dicitur ab Aristotele materialis; et est intellectus incorruptibilis et separabilis. Intellectus autem passius est uis inferior partis intellectiue coniuncte sensibili que recipit species intelligibiles in fantasmatis.

among the medieval scholars. It may be associated with the distinction made by Avicenna, (which was referred to above with regard to the immortality of the soul) as the doctrine of the two faces of the soul. The distinction appealed to Jean although he seemed to favour the Augustinian distinction between the inferior and superior reason of the soul.¹²⁰

5.6.1 *Doctrine of the Four Intellects*

Avicenna is indeed indebted to Aristotle for his distinction between the active and passive intellect. Avicenna, however, goes further as he divides the possible intellect into what is called the ‘doctrine of the four intellects’. Described as ‘four different categories of relating to the universal forms’¹²¹ the doctrine is also based in a theory of syllogistic intellection. Avicenna distinguishes between the various phases of the human intellect. This appealed to Jean as he incorporates the doctrine in full.

The first is the intellect having possibility only; and it is like a material power in relation to the likeness of prime matter which of itself does not have any form, but is the subject of all forms. The second is the intellect having a disposition; this is when the principles are already held in the intellect, that is, propositions which it comes to believe, not from somewhere else, but they are known by their very nature; such as every whole is greater than its parts, and if from an even quantity you take away an even quantity the remaining quantities are even. The third is the actualised intellect, which already has the knowledge of the conclusions which follow from principles, but there is no conversion in the act towards them through deliberation. The fourth is the intellect in practice, when it deliberates immediately the doing of an action.¹²²

¹²⁰ See Chapter II, Section 5: The immortality of the soul.

¹²¹ Hasse, p. 178.

¹²² *Summa*, C. 115, 10-19. Prima est intellectus habens possibilitatem tantum; et est sicut potencia materialis ad similitudinem materie prime que ex se non habet aliquam formam, sed est subiectum omnium formarum. Secunda est intellectus dispositionem habens; quod est cum iam habentur in intellectu principia, hoc est propositiones quas contingit credere non aliunde sed per se note; sicut omne totum est maius sua parte, et si ab equalibus equalia demas, que relinquuntur sunt equalia. Tercia est intellectus perfectus, cum iam habet intellectus conclusionum eorum que secuntur ad principia, sed non est conuersio actu ad illa per consideracionem. Quarta est intellectus in usu, cum iam considerat in actu.

Jean's discussion of the four intellects begins with a reference to an analogy made by Avicenna with regard to learning to write.¹²³ The first stage is a state of absolute potentiality when the child has no knowledge of the art of writing or of anything connected with the art. The second stage, 'marks the rudiments of the art of writing' when the child has learnt simple letters. The third stage is when the child has mastered the art of writing 'the whole art has been learnt in its completeness'.

The analogy helps to explain the four intellects with regard to the acquisition of knowledge, the first stage is the intellect beginning from a state of absolute potentiality. It is a 'mere potentiality for thinking and is the first stage given to us at the time of birth. The second is the intellect *in habitu*, that is, once the intellect has acquired some primary intelligibles it can proceed to secondary intelligibles. From the premisses of a syllogism such as, 'The whole is bigger than the part', one can make further deductions. The third is the intellect *in effectu*, when the intellect has gone through an act of syllogistic reasoning. Thus the intellect has passed through two stages of potentiality to a third stage which is the 'perfection of this potentiality'.¹²⁴ In the fourth stage (this stage is not referred to in the analogy) the intellect 'passes into absolute actuality', and while the second and third stages can know the various parts of the syllogism the fourth stage, *intellect accomodatus* is the actual thinking of 'the syllogistic order which corresponds to reality'.¹²⁵ This is absolute actuality which occurs when the intelligible forms are actually present in the soul and connects with the separately existing active intellect.

¹²³ The analogy is adapted by Jean but here I refer to the explanation by Rahman, p. 87.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Hasse, p. 183.

Avicenna's doctrine of the four intellects proved to be very successful but 'comparing the fate of this Avicennian doctrine with that of others, notably theories of the external and internal senses, one finds that it was transformed rather than accepted, even as a piece of Peripathetic teaching.'¹²⁶ Initially, the fact that it was a theory about syllogistic reasoning was not realised. However, due to the anonymous treatise *De anima et de potentiis eius*, 'Avicenna's idea fell on fertile ground for the first time'.¹²⁷ This treatise influenced both Jean and Albert the Great. Jean 'understood the connection between Arabic intellect theory and Western discussion of the axiomatic method'.¹²⁸ The following is quoted by Hasse from Jean's *Tractatus*, it appears also in Jean's *Summa*, with some slight differences between them.

Then follows the activity of the [already formed] possible intellect, with respect to, first, the quiddities, second, the first pieces of knowledge which are the principles of the sciences, third the conclusions. For example: first [the intellect] knows what is a whole, what is a part; then it knows the proposition (which is a principle known *per se*) that 'Every whole is bigger than its part', and likewise in other cases; third, it knows the conclusion which follows, namely that every continuous [thing] is bigger than its part, and likewise in other cases. Hence, it is in the way of induction that the form abstracted from particulars is collected, through which the possible intellect is formed; it is in the way of a syllogism that the already formed possible intellect proceeds.¹²⁹

Jean adapts the Avicennian doctrine slightly. As Hasse explains, 'in Jean's theory, the formation of the possible intellect through abstraction precedes the act of

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 200.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 191.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 195.

¹²⁹ Hasse, p. 196, n. 657. Jean de La Rochelle, *Tractatus*, 2.22, p. 94. 'Et tunc subsequitur operatio intellectus possibilis, prima circa quidditates, secunda circa comprehensiones primas, quae sunt principia scientiarum, tertia circa conclusiones. Verbi gratia: Primo cognoscit quid totum, quid pars; secundo propositionem, quae est principium per se notum: omne totum maius est sua parte, et sic in ceteris; tertio conclusionem, quae consequitur, scilicet quod omne totum continuum est maius sua parte, et sic in ceteris. Per viam ergo inductionis colligitur ipsa forma abstracta a singularibus, qua formatur intellectus possibilis; per viam vero syllogismi proficit operatio intellectus possibilis iam formata.'

sylogistic intellection'.¹³⁰ Avicenna, states Hasse, holds that the primary intelligibles are innate knowledge, while the conclusions are abstracted through contact with the agent intellect.

5.6.2 *The Active Intellect*

The active intellect is 'an external intelligence which is always in actuality and which makes the potential human intellect actual'.¹³¹ It does not belong to the individual intellectual soul as does the possible intellect. As we will see this was a major challenge to the Latin authors who were interested in maintaining the role played by the active intellect but some could not accept the fact that the active intellect remained outside the soul. Jean, on the other hand, found a way to take a mediating standpoint. For this he can be counted among those medieval thinkers who held the doctrine which was later to be called 'Avicennized Augustianism'¹³² which is described as 'one of the most significant medieval fusions of philosophical and theological doctrine'.¹³³

Following Avicenna, Jean proves the existence of the agent intellect:

With regard to the agent intellect's existence, it is proved as follows by Avicenna. The human soul is at first the intellect in potentiality and later the intellect in actuality. All that passes from potentiality into actuality, only passes through a cause which leads it from potentiality into actuality. This is the cause whereby our souls, in the case of intelligible objects, passes from potentiality into actuality. But the cause of the act of giving the intelligent form is none other than the intelligence in actuality; the agent intellect, therefore, exists.¹³⁴

¹³⁰ Hasse, p. 196.

¹³¹ Rahman, p. 88.

¹³² See above p. 67, n. 17 regarding the origin of the term Avicennized Augustianism.

¹³³ Hasse, p. 190.

¹³⁴ *Summa*, C. 115, 27-33. De intellectu autem agente quoniam sit, sic probatur ab Avicenna. Anima humana prius est intelligens in potencia et postea intellectus in effectum. Omne autem quod exit de potencia in effectum, non exit nisi per causam que educit illud de potencia in effectum. Est ergo hec

Jean asks whether the agent intellect is separate from the human soul, and if it is separate or a part of the human soul, whether it is a created intelligence, as is an angel, or whether it is an uncreated intelligence, which is God. Jean accepts all three positions, holding that there is no contradiction involved in the following; that God, the angels and an interior light within the soul are different agent intellects which are distinguished according to their respective objects of knowledge; that some are above the soul, some below the soul, some near the soul and some within the soul.

First he proves that the agent intellect is God; Jean relies on Augustine's theory of illumination and quotes directly from the *Soliloquia*:

Augustine states in *The Soliloquies*: 'That just as we observe three things about the sun, that is, that it is, that it glistens, that it illuminates; so there are three things in the most secret God that we ought to know, that he is something which exists, that he is something which knows and that he is something which makes everything else know'.¹³⁵

Jean makes reference to the Gospel of John 1,9, 'there was the true light which lighteth every man coming into the world'. This reference helped to identify Jean as belonging to a group of theologians who identified God with the active intellect.¹³⁶

Thomas Aquinas, in his early *Commentaries on the Sentences*, attributed the opinion

causa quare anime nostre in rebus intelligibilibus exeunt de potencia in effectum. Sed causa dandi formam intelligibilem non est nisi intelligencia in effectu; necessario igitur est agens intellectus.

¹³⁵ *Summa*, C. 116, 5-7. Nam dicit Augustinus, in libro *Soliloquiorum*: 'Sicut in isto sole tria animaduertimus, scilicet quod est, quod fulget, quod illuminat; sit in secretissimo Deo tria intelligere debemus: quod est, quod intelligit, quod cetera intelligere facit', quoted in Hasse, p. 210, n. 739 where he states that both Jean and the anonymous author of the *Liber de causis primis et secundis*, edited by de Vaux (dating from the turn of the thirteenth century) read *intelligit* instead of *intelligitur* in Augustine. Cf., Augustinus, *Soliloquiorum*, c. 8, n. 15 (Patrologia Latina: 32, 877). See above p. 90, n. 86 regarding the authorship of the *Liber de Causis*.

¹³⁶ Hasse, p. 203, n. 697. Adam of Buckfield, *Sententia de anima*, MS Oxford Bodl. Canon. Misc. 322, f. 54ra: 'Alii autem concedunt secundum modum concedentes aliam esse substantiam [...]. Et huius opinionis sunt multi theologi qui dicunt intellectum agentem in nobis esse intellectum primi, qui quidem intellectus est lux scilicet secundum quod dicitur "erat lux vera quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum" (John I. 9) et quod lux ista lux videtur intimior animae nostrae quam sit ipsa sibi.'

to ‘quidam catholici doctores’, and ‘signals agreement, never repeated in his later works’.¹³⁷

The agent intellect above the soul is God himself, as Jean states:

Therefore it should be said that in order to know those things which are above it, those which concern the divine essence and the Persons of the Trinity, which are understood in a divine way, the soul needs illumination from the ray of light itself of the first eternal truth upon the highest power itself, which is called mind or intelligence, of which Augustine states, it is formed by the first truth itself, with no intervention from nature.¹³⁸

In order to know those things that are near to the soul, such as essences, powers, orders and angelic acts, the soul needs the angelic revelation or instruction, according to this an angel may be an agent intellect inasmuch as it instructs the human intellect. The agent intellect at this level looks not to the highest form of the human intellect which refers to the eternal and the uncreated, but to the inferior form, inasmuch as Augustine distinguishes between intelligence, intellect and reason.

To know what is within the soul, the soul itself is the agent intellect. Jean states that by an innate light the soul knows that it exists, that it can reason, sense, that it knows or does not know something, that it is just or unjust. Following Augustine he states that it is a turning towards one’s inner self. Finally to understand the nature of corporeal beings the agent intellect as the supreme power of the human soul, suffices.

¹³⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super sententiis*, II.17.2.1.c, p. 423. Ref. in Hasse, p. 204, n. 701.

¹³⁸ *Summa*, C. 116, 41-46. Dicendum ergo quod ad intelligenda ea que sunt supra se, sicut sunt ea que de divina essentia et Trinitate personarum intelliguntur diuino modo, indiget anima irradiatione ab ipsa luce prime veritatis eterne super supremam uim ipsius que dicitur mens uel intelligencia, de qua dicit Augustinus quod nulla interposita natura formatur ab ipsa prima ueritate.

Jean, therefore, maintains the doctrine of the separate agent intellect. He is certainly an exponent of Avicennised Augustinianism. This can be proved if we return to Gilson's criterion for the application of the phrase: 'the term is appropriate if a medieval thinker (1) teaches that God is the active intellect, and (2) affirms that this can be proved by establishing the concordance of Augustine with Aristotle as interpreted by Avicenna'.¹³⁹ Jean establishes his position on the basis of Augustine and Avicenna. We have seen how he interprets Avicenna's agent intellect according to a distinction which is to be found in Augustine's *Soliloquia*, that is, Jean locates the agent intellect not only above the soul but also beside, within and below the soul. With regard to the act of the agent intellect Jean follows Avicenna as he states:

It should be noted, following Avicenna, that the function of the active intellect is to illuminate or to diffuse the light of the intelligence upon the sensitive forms which exist in the imagination or in estimation; and by illuminating to abstract them from all material circumstances, and to join the abstracted forms or set them in an order in the possible intellect, just as through the action of light the form of colour is somehow abstracted and joined to the pupil of the eye.¹⁴⁰

According to Hasse, the above, 'is a faithful interpretation, which surpasses much of what has been said on Avicenna's theory of abstraction in modern times'.¹⁴¹ In some respects the active intellect is the Augustinian theory of illumination; for example, Jean compares the sun to God, in the passage from Augustine's *Soliloquia*. In other respects the agent intellect plays an intermediary role in the abstraction of forms, which, according to Avicenna, exist in the imagination and estimation. For Jean the positing of many different agent intellects would not be difficult to explain. He

¹³⁹ Hasse, p. 205.

¹⁴⁰ *Summa*, C. 117, 1-7. Notandum ergo secundum Avicennam, quod operatio intellectus agentis est illuminare siue lumen intelligencie diffundere super formas sensibiles existentes in ymaginacione siue estimacione; et illuminando abstrahere ab omnibus circumstanciis materialibus, et abstractas copulare siue ordinare in intellectu possibili, quemadmodum per operacionem lucis species coloris abstrahitur quodam modo et pupille copulatur.

¹⁴¹ Hasse, p. 202.

wanted to explain his Christian belief in the forms that were completely separate from all the material and temporal conditions. There is just one agent intellect above the soul, which is God, but so many separate agent intellects which are needed to know what is beside, within and below the soul. Hasse poses an interesting question: how did Avicenna come to be identified with the doctrine of the separate active intellect? The scholastic thinkers of the early thirteenth century linked Avicenna's analogy of the sun with Augustine's, and, according to Hasse, 'it also implied Avicenna's conviction of the separateness of the active intellect'.¹⁴² However, 'the active interest in the agent intellect was originally posited to explain thought in man'¹⁴³ which, as we have seen, was also Jean's main interest, including that of imparting a Christian meaning to a theory which helped to explain how we can know forms of knowledge that cannot be known empirically. Jean transformed the theory of the active intellect and although Avicenna might have reacted negatively to Jean's identification of God with a separate active intellect, it is a testament to Jean's intellectual skill that he does not confine the active intellect to knowledge of the divine. Instead, his fusion of Avicenna and Augustine leads to, 'a refined epistemological position which discriminates between different kinds of intellection depending on the ontological status of their object'.¹⁴⁴

Jean is indeed indebted to Avicenna's psychology of the soul, and the Avicennian influence is particularly clear in Jean's presentation of the external and internal senses and his positing of the agent intellect as having both an external and an internal role in his understanding of the mind. Jean could be accused of being too free in his use of the doctrine of the agent intellect as, 'it would imply an

¹⁴² Hasse, p. 222.

¹⁴³ Davidson, p. 18.

¹⁴⁴ Hasse, p. 231.

intermediary between the soul and God in some aspects of illumination'.¹⁴⁵ Jean is certainly less indecisive regarding certain Avicennian doctrines, particularly in his reconciliation with the doctrine of illumination from St Augustine. He is, however, writing at the time before the views of Averroes had been assimilated, causing a major problem for Christian authors on the soul. Averroes agreed with Avicenna that the active intellect was separate and one for all men, but he held the same view with regard to the possible intellect. As with the agent intellect, the possible intellect was separated from matter in order to know universals. This was Averroes response to rescuing Aristotle from a Neoplatonic interpretation. His views, however, could not be reconciled with Christian teaching, particularly with regard to the immortality of the soul.

¹⁴⁵ Leonard J. Bowman, 'The Development of the Doctrine of the Agent Intellect in the Franciscan School of the Thirteenth Century', *The Modern Schoolman* (March 1973), 251–279 (p. 257).

CONCLUSION

Jean's *Summa* is an important witness to the encounter between three different sources of reflection; the theological, the medical and the philosophical, marked, for the most part, by Augustine, Avicenna and Aristotle respectively. This encounter was one of the most significant to have occurred in the history of medieval philosophy and Jean can be placed among a few authors who wrote on the soul at this very specific moment in time. The writings of both Aristotle and Avicenna offered an alternative approach to the way the soul had been understood under the influence of Neo-Platonism and Augustine. This *had to be* taken into consideration, it was unavoidable, but, Jean, like so many medieval thinkers, remained substantially faithful to the teaching of Augustine. He frequently cites Augustine in his treatise on the soul (albeit from the work which is wrongly attributed to Augustine but, nonetheless, a very influential source in the thirteenth century) and, as we have seen, he successively created, in his discussion of the agent intellect, a synthesis between Augustine and Avicenna. Aristotle's definition of the soul 'as the first actuality of a physical body having life potentially in it' is taken up by Avicenna and it is this account which we find in Jean. In the *Najat*, Avicenna describes the three parts of soul (the vegetable, the animal and the specific human parts) as *entelechy* respectively, of their natural functions. Jean, in his discussion of the three faculties, following Avicenna, states that 'soul is the name of perfection'.¹ The vegetative soul is the perfection in plants; the sensitive soul (or animal soul in Avicenna) is the perfection in brute animals; rationality is the perfection in man. Aristotle's definition of the soul (probably the first definition of soul) was obviously regarded by

¹ *Summa*, C. 26, 38-40. Et quamuis sint tres substancie, non tamen tres anime in homine, quia anima nomen est perfectionis.

Avicenna as a comprehensive definition of the soul and, as Rahman remarks, ‘when added to the differentiae, would yield the definition of the species, so to speak’.²

What impact did such philosophical sources have on Jean’s understanding of the soul? The first chapters of the *Summa*, relying on Jean’s original combination of Avicenna’s famous ‘Flying Man’ argument for the existence of the soul and the Augustinian account of ‘interiority’, establishes, argumentatively, that the soul has self awareness and is capable of reflecting upon itself. The editor of Jean’s *Summa* compares the latter’s interpretation of the Canticle of Canticles with the very topic of self-knowledge. It is a reminder to the reader of the Delphic oracle to ‘know thyself’, but following Augustine in the *Confessions* it is more true to say that Jean is referring not just to the self reflective nature of the soul but also to the fact that the mind can be ‘unconscious of itself’ and, *therefore*, as Augustine stressed, must ‘return from over absorption in self images which cause forgetfulness of self’.³ The first *consideratio* of the *Summa* is a theological study of the soul but as we have seen, Jean was one of the first Franciscan authors to have attempted to integrate the Greek and Arabic philosophical works to the work of a theologian. It is precisely because Jean gives philosophy such a high status that he should be given a prominent place in the history of medieval philosophy. This can be seen in his use of logic and of the Aristotelian categories of substance and accident; matter and form; causality with regard to the soul; possible and necessary existence in relation to the existence of God. In particular, Jean shows himself to be an original thinker when he applies the Avicennian distinction between ‘being’ and ‘essence’ to the soul. He maintains that, *a priori*, the human soul is an immaterial substance, if and only if it is

² Rahman, p. 72.

³ Mary T. Clark, ‘De Trinitate’, in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, ed. by Stump and Kretzmann (2001), pp. 99–102 (p. 98).

understood in terms of its being and its essence. The notion of essence, which plays a key role in Avicenna's philosophy, was not an important theme at this time and it was not until the thirteenth century, as one commentator points out, 'did this theme enter the philosophy and theology of the Western Christian world, in particular with the use made of it by St Thomas in his *De ente et essentia*'.⁴ This distinction, nevertheless, is already present in Jean's account of the formal cause of the soul. The notion of *quo*, as an instrumental cause, is picked up again by Jean in relation to the intelligible species, and it is stated that 'the characterization of the species as an instrumental *quo* is a remarkable trait of his thought',⁵ and perhaps it anticipated the species theory in St Thomas. Jean's interpretation of the intelligible species reads as follows:

And since it [the intellective power] is an immaterial substance its object is immaterial and this is the intelligible [species]. The intelligible [species] is the form abstracted from matter and from the conditions of matter. Of the images or forms abstracted from matter, some are abstracted through their own nature, as spiritual beings, some, however, through the action of the intellective power itself, that is through reflection, as the images or likenesses through which corporeal beings are known.⁶

It is stated, however, that the 'mediating role of abstracted species is not elaborated any further in his [Jean's] works'.⁷ Jean, as we have seen, follows Avicenna and Augustine to form his theory of abstraction. St Thomas, however, offered his own interpretation of the intelligible species. It is interesting to note that, for St Thomas, the intelligible species is characterised as '*quo intelligitur*', and thus it may be concluded that Jean was a possible source for St Thomas's epistemological account, either directly or indirectly.

⁴ Jean Jolivet, 'The Arabic Inheritance', in *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy*, ed. by Peter Dronke, pp. 113–148 (p. 130).

⁵ Spruit, p. 127.

⁶ *Summa*, C. 113, 1-8.

⁷ Spruit, p. 127.

The question of the unity of body and soul was a major issue for theologian and philosopher alike. How could an immaterial substance, such as the soul, be the form or perfection of a corporeal substance, such as the human body? Jean maintains that there is a *colligatio* between the soul and the body. He states that because the soul is the form or perfection of the body it is united directly with the body. However in order to explain the unity of a spiritual substance with a material substance Jean states that the powers of the soul are the intermediaries between the body and soul. Following Philip the Chancellor, he states that the union takes place by means of the vegetative and sensitive powers. More specifically, and following the Pseudo-Augustine, Jean states that it is the imaginative faculty which links the soul and the body. For Damascene it is the memory which links the senses to the intellect as memory is the power of retention of both sensitive and intellectual objects.

For Avicenna, the lowest level of abstraction is at the level of the senses, the highest is intellection, ‘and the two middle grades occupied by the faculties which were known in the Arabic tradition as “internal senses”’.⁸ Of the internal senses, the estimative faculty, appealed to the medieval authors of the early thirteenth century; however, it was *also* one of the most controversial for later medieval authors. It is a faculty which deserves our further study, as it helps to explain the ‘fight or flight’ concept. It also helps to explain how sensing is not only triggered by physical external causes but also how we can also perceive the real causes of things in an immaterial way. It also has implications for contemporary philosophy of mind ‘where it refers to the directedness of mental states towards objects’, a theory elaborated in the work of Franz Brentano (1838–1917) who introduced his own

⁸ Black, p. 312.

interpretation of intentionality which, he, in turn, inherited from the ancient and medieval commentators on Aristotle and Avicenna.⁹

It can be concluded, therefore, that, for Jean, Avicenna simply offered more in his account of the cognitive faculties of the soul. Jean's account of the powers of the soul according to Avicenna surpasses in length his account of the division of powers that he accorded to Augustine and John Damascene. This is why Jean provides a detailed account of the interior senses in Avicenna before moving his discussion to the nature of abstraction as a stripping of forms from their individuating accidents. His exposition of the various levels of intellect, known as the 'doctrine of the four intellects', is an important example of a doctrine that shows that Avicenna was simply preferred to Aristotle. Jean is also identified as one of a few authors who accepted the doctrine of the separate active intellect thereby achieving 'a refined epistemological position which discriminates between different kinds of intellection depending on the ontological status of their object'.¹⁰

Jean, in other words, had an open mind with regard to the new medical and philosophical sources but he, like his contemporaries, realised that they had to take sensations of the body into account, if they wanted to understand man in his physical and psychological nature. This was an enormous challenge to the theologian, given the often negative view of sensation and the body in the early years of the Christian Church. The very word 'soul' itself had a different meaning in the medical tradition to the philosophical or theological sense. Soul, in the medical sense, referred to the rational, living human being which points 'towards an evident mechanism while the

⁹ Ibid, p. 311.

¹⁰ Hasse, p. 231.

philosophical model, even if it is sometimes ambiguous, seems to manifest the intuition of the main characteristic of the rational processes, that is to say, their metaphysical dimension'.¹¹ It may mean that there will always be a difference between the physical and the psychical, but what Jean and his contemporaries achieved by their engagement with the Greek and Arabic authors was an understanding of man which went beyond seeking a reconciliation between the two models. They made great efforts to make sense of the relationships between the various sensations and powers of both body and soul. The impact of the first encounter between Augustine, Aristotle and Avicenna gave rise to heated arguments on the relationship between body and soul, with the Arabic texts as their basis. Following Avicenna, Jean argues for the immortality of the soul yet there are the obvious tensions between the Avicennian notion that the essence of the soul can be understood apart from its union with the body, and the Christian belief in the resurrection of the body. This must be understood, however, as coming from Avicenna's refusal to believe in the literal acceptance of passages in the Koran and that for him, the intellectual apprehension of God was the purest joy or happiness for man.

For our study I have focused on Jean's reflections on the nature of the human soul and its powers as documented in his *Summa de anima* (1235-1236). This is arguably his most significant contribution to Medieval thought in general and to philosophical psychology in particular. Over the last thirty years there has been a renewal of interest in the psychological doctrines of the Middle Ages. It is hoped that the study presented here will be a worthwhile contribution to said renewal.

¹¹ Vico, p. 316.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography is divided into two main sections. Section (A) gives details of primary texts consulted. Section (B) gives details of selected texts cited or that were consulted that I found most relevant to the topic of this study.

SECTION (A): PRIMARY TEXTS

Jean de La Rochelle, *Summa de anima* (Texte Critique Avec Introduction, Notes et Tables), ed. by Jacques Guy Bougerol (Paris: Vrin, 1995).

_____, *Tractatus De Divisione Multiplici Potentiarum Animae*, Published by Michaud – Quantin (Paris: Vrin, 1964)

Jean de La Rochelle, *De Lâme* (Introduction, traduction et notes) by Jean-Marie Vernier (Paris: Vrin, 2001)

Alexander de Hales, Ordinis Minorum, *Summa Theologiae*, Tomus I, Liber Primus (Quaracchi: Ex Typographia Colegii S. Bonaventure, 1924).

_____, Tomus II, Prima Pars, Secundi Libri (Quaracchi: Ex Typographia Colegii S. Bonaventure, 1928)

S. Van Riet, *Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus I-II-III*, Édition Critique de la Traduction Latine Médiévale (Louvain: Leiden: E. Peeters: E.J. Brill, 1972)

_____, *Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus IV-V*, Édition Critique de la Traduction Latine Médiévale (Louvain: Leiden: Éditions Orientalistes: E.J. Brill, 1968)

Biblia Sacra Vulgata, ed., Roger Gryson (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2007)

The Holy Bible: Douay-Rheims Version (UK: Baronius Press, 2005)

SECTION (B): SECONDARY READING

Afnan, Soheil, M., *Avicenna: His Life and Works* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1958)

Aristotle, *De Anima (On the Soul)* Translated with an introduction and notes by Hugh Lawson Tancred (London: Penguin Books, 1986)

Aristotle, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Volume One, ed. by Jonathan Barnes (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984)

Aristoteles Latinus Database: accessed via National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Count Kildare.

Augustine, *The Trinity*, in *The Works of Saint Augustine*, Part 1 – Books, Volume 5: Introduction, translation and notes by Edmund Hill, O.P. (New York: New City Press, 1991)

Adamson, Peter & Taylor Richard C., eds, *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)

Armstrong, A. H., ed., *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967)

Barnes, Jonathan, ed., *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, The Revised Oxford Translation, Volume 1 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984)

Black, Deborah, L., ‘Estimation (*Wahm*) in Avicenna: The Logical and Psychological Dimensions’, *Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review*, 32 (1993), 219–258

Blund, Iohannes, *Tractatus de anima*, ed. by D. A. Callus and R. W. Hunt (London: Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi II, 1970) (English translation by Michael Dunne forthcoming)

Bougerol, J. Guy, *Introduction to the works of Bonaventure*, trans. by José de Vinck (New Jersey: St Anthony Guild Press, 1964)

Bourke, Vernon, *The Essential Augustine* (USA: Hackett, 1974)

Brentano, Franz, *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, trans. by Ralph George (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975); *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*, (Freiburg, 1862),

_____, *The Psychology of Aristotle, In Particular his Doctrine of the Active Intellect*, trans. by Ralph George (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1977); *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom νοῦς ποιητικὸς* (Mainz, 1867), (*Habilitationsschrift*, 1866)

_____, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, trans. by Antos. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell & Linda L. McAllister (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973; Routledge, 1995); *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (Leipzig, 1874)

Bowman, Leonard, J., ‘The Development of the Doctrine of the Agent Intellect in the Franciscan School of the Thirteenth Century’, *The Modern Schoolman* (March 1973), 251–279

Brown, Stephen, ‘Translation and Transmission of Greek Philosophy’ in *The Pimlico History of Western Philosophy*, ed. by Richard H. Popkin (UK: Pimlico, 1999), pp. 230–244

Callus, D. A., ‘The Powers of the Soul. An Early Unpublished Text’, *Extrait de Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale*, Tome XIX, Janvier-Juin 1952, 131–170 (Inter-Library Loan; The Warburg Institute, London)

Coleman, Janet, *Ancient and Medieval Memories, Studies in the reconstruction of the past* (New York: Cambridge Press, 1992)

Copleston, Frederick, *A History of Philosophy*, Volume 2, Medieval Philosophy (London & New York: Continuum, 1950)

Crowley, Theodore, *The Problem of the Soul in his Philosophical Commentaries* (Louvain: Dublin: Editions de L'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1950)

Damascus, John, *The Fount of Knowledge*, trans. by Frederic H. Chase, Jr. (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1958)

Davidson, Herbert, A., *Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992)

De Libera, Alain, 'Les sens commun au XIII^e siècle, De Jean de La Rochelle à Albert le Grand', *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 96 (1991), 475–496.

Dronke, Peter, *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)

Dunne, Michael, ed., *Magistri Petri de Ybernia: Expositio et Quaestiones in Aristotelis Librum de Longitudine et Brevitate Vitae* (Louvain-Paris: Peeters, 1993)

Goodman, L.E., *Avicenna* (London & New York: Routledge, 1992)

Gilson, Etienne, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955)

_____, *Elements of Christian Philosophy* (New York: Doubleday, 1960)

Gracia, Jorge, J. E. & Noone, Timothy B., eds., *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (USA-UK-Australia: Blackwell, 2006)

Hasse, Dag Nikolaus, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West* (London – Turin: The Warburg Institute – Nino Aragno Editore, 2000)

- Hedwig, Klaus, 'Intention: Outlines for a History of a Phenomenological Concept', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 39 (1979), 326–40
- Houser, R. E., Translator, *The Cardinal Virtues* (extracts from Aquinas, Albert and Philip the Chancellor), (Canada: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2004)
- Hyman, Arthur, & Walsh, James J., eds, *Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (USA: Hackett Publishing Company, 1973)
- Ierodiakonou, Katerina, ed., *Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002)
- Irwin, Terence, *Classical Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)
- Jacquart, Danielle & Bagliani, Agostino, *La Scuola Medica Salernitana Gli autori e I testi* (Sismel: Edizioni Del Galluzzo, 2007)
- Janssens, Jules & De Smet, Daniel, eds, *Avicenna and his Heritage* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002)
- Kraut, Richard, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Plato* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)
- Kretzmann, Norman, & Stump, Eleonore, eds, *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)
- Kretzmann, Norman, Kenny, Anthony, Pinborg, Jan, eds, *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982)
- Lagerlund, Henrik, ed., *Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment* (Netherlands, Springer, 2007)
- Louth, Andrew, *St John Damascene* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)

- Luscombe, David, *Medieval Thought* (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 1993)
- Marenbon, John, *Medieval Philosophy* (London & New York: 2007)
- Marsh, Thomas A, *The Triune God: A Biblical, Historical & Theological Study* (Dublin: Columba Press, 1994)
- McAlister, Linda, ed., *The Philosophy of Brentano* (London: Duckworth, 1976)
- McGinn, Bernard, *Three Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology* (Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 1977)
- McGrade, A.S., *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)
- McEvoy, James, ed., 'Medieval Cosmology and Modern Science', in *Philosophy and Totality* ed. by James McEvoy (Belfast: Mayne, Boyd & Son, 1977)
- McEvoy, James, & Dunne, Michael, eds, *The Irish Contribution to European Scholastic Thought* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2009), pp. 91-110
- Morewedge, Parviz, *The Metaphysica of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā)* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973)
- Nemesius, *On the Nature of Man*, translated with an introduction and notes by R. W. Sharples & P. J. Van Der Eijk (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2008)
- O' Daly, Gerard, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind* (London: Duckworth, 2007)
- Pasnau, Robert, *Theories of Cognition in the later Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)

_____, ed., *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, Volume 3, Mind and Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)

_____, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, A Philosophical Study of Summa theologiae 1a 75-89* (Cambridge University Press, 2002)

Plotinus, *The Enneads*, trans. by Stephen MacKenna (London: Penguin, 1991)

Peter Lombard, *The Four Books of Sentences*, available on line from: <http://www.franciscan-archive.org/lombardus/opera/1s2-01.html>

Piltz, Anders, *The World of Medieval Learning* trans. by David Jones (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981)

Rahman, F, *Avicenna's Psychology: An English Translation of KITĀB AL NAJĀT, Book II, Chapter VI with Historico-Philosophical Notes and Textual Improvements of the Cairo Edition* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952)

Ross, David, *Aristotle* (London & New York: 1995)

Ryan, John, *Féil-Sgríbhinn Eóin Mhic Néill: Essays and Studies Presented to Professor Eoin MacNéill* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1995)

St John of Damascus, *Writings* (Vol. 37) *The Fount of Knowledge* trans. by Frederic H. Chase (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1958)

Sorabji, Richard, *Self, Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006)

_____, 'From Aristotle to Brentano: 'The Development of the Concept of Intentionality'', in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. by H. Blumenthal & H. Robinson, pp. 227–259

Spiegelberg, Herbert, 'Intention and Intentionality in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl' in *The Philosophy of Brentano*, ed. by Linda L. McAlister (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 108–27

Spruit, Leen, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge, Vol 1 Classical Roots and Medieval Discussions* (Leiden: New York: Köln: E. J. Brill, 1994)

Stump, Eleonore & Kretzmann, eds, *Cambridge Companion To Augustine* (Cambridge University Press, 2001)

Synan, Edward A., 'Review', *Summa de anima*, *Speculum*: 1997 Vol. 72, No. 4, 1189–1189

Thomas Aquinas, *Selected Philosophical Writings*, ed. by Timothy McDermott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993)

_____, *Summa Theologiae*, Volume 11 Man (Ia. 75-83) Latin text and trans. by Timothy Suttor (London & New York: Blackfriars, 1970)

_____, *Disputed Questions on the Soul*, ed. by B. Carlos Bazan, *Opera Omnia*, t. XXIV, 1, (Rome-Paris: Commissio Leonina-Ed. Du Cerf, 1966)

_____, *Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima* ed. B.-C. Bazán (Roma: Commissio Leonina, 1996)

_____, *De Ente et Essentia*, Tomus XLIII, *Opera Omnia* (Roma, Editori di San Tommaso, 1976)

_____, *Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas On CD-ROM*, by Roberto Busa

Torrell, Jean-Pierre, *Aquinas's Summa: Background, Structure, & Reception* trans. by Benedict M. Guevin (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005)

Tuominen, Miira, *The Ancient Commentators on Plato and Aristotle* (UK: Acumen, 2009)

Vico, Romana Martorelli, 'Virtutes et Potentiae: The Medical-Biological Tradition in the Formation of the Philosophical Anthropology of the Thirteenth Century', *Analecta Husserliana*, 74 (2002), 307–318

Watson, Gerard, *Phantasia in Classical Thought* (Galway: Galway University Press, 1988)

Weijers, Olga, *La 'disputatio' à la Faculté des arts de Paris (1200-1350 environ)* (Amsterdam: Brepols, 1995)

Wolfson, Harry Austryn, 'The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts', in *Studies in The History of Philosophy and Religion*, ed. by Isadore Twersky and George H. Williams (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 250–314

APPENDIX (I)

LATIN TEXT WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF SELECTED PASSAGES FROM THE
SUMMA DE ANIMA OF JEAN DE LA ROCHELLE

THE FIRST *CONSIDERATIO*

- I. Prologue
- II. That the Soul exists (Chapter 1)
- III. On The Formal Cause of the Soul (Chapter 17)
- IV. That the Soul is One in Three Powers (Chapter 26)
- V. On the Differences between the Intermediaries of Union (Chapter 39)

THE SECOND *CONSIDERATIO*

Pseudo-Augustine

- VI. Division of the Powers with regard to the Soul Itself (Chapter 26)
- VII. On the difference between Truth and Falsity (Chapter 29)

John Damascene

- VIII. On Imagination (Chapter 69)
- IX. IX. On Memory (Chapter 71)

Avicenna

- X. On Common Sense (Chapter 97)
- XI. On Imagination

(I) Prologus

*Si ignoras te, o pulcherrima mulierum, uade et abi post greges caprarum etc. Tibi, anima rationalis, proponitur uerbum istud, que es mulierum pulcherrima, quia omnium creaturarum speciosissima, tenens ymaginem et similitudinem summe pulchritudinis et decoris; hanc tuam si ignoras pulchritudinem, irrationabilibus gregibus compararis: unde uade et abi post greges caprarum. Tibi ergo, anima, de te ipsa consideranda sunt tria: substantia uidelicet tua, uirtus et operatio, in quibus consistit tua admirabilis pulchritudo. Da michi ergo, amantissime Ihesu, *sedium tuarum assistricem sapientiam et noli me reprobare; sed da michi sapientiam que mecum sit et mecum laboret, considerantem doceat et instruat, reuelans oculos meos, et considerabo mirabilia de anima mea.**

I. AN SIT ANIMA
CAPITULUM I
(II) QUOD ANIMA SIT

Imprimis ergo, adiuuante Ihesu Christo, ostendendum est ipsam

(I) Prologue

*If you ignore yourself, most beautiful of women, go and follow after the herds of she-goats etc. Rational soul, this very speech is addressed to you, you who are the most beautiful of women, since you are the most splendid of creatures, possessing an image and likeness of the highest beauty and elegance; if you ignore your beauty, you are compared to the irrational herds: whence go and follow after the herds of she-goats. For you, therefore, O soul, concerning yourself three things must be considered: namely your substance, power and activity, in which your admirable beauty exists. Give me, therefore, most loving Jesus, *the wisdom which attends upon your thrones and do not reject me; but give me the wisdom that will be with me and assist me, that it may teach and instruct the one contemplating, uncovering my eyes, and I will consider the wonders concerning my soul.**

I. WHETHER THE SOUL EXISTS
CHAPTER I
(II) THAT THE SOUL EXISTS

First, therefore, with the help of Jesus Christ, it must be shown that the soul

esse, ut nunquam contingat de ea dubitare an sit, hoc modo. Cum uideamus quedam corpora que non nutriuntur, nec augmentantur, nec generant, nec mouentur motu uoluntario, ut lapides; et uideamus alia corpora que nutriuntur, et augmentantur, et generant sibi similia, ut plantas; et uideamus alia que sentiunt et mouentur uoluntarie; relinquatur ut in essentia eorum sit principium harum actionum, preter corporeitatem. Quia si principium harum esset corporeitas, inueniretur tunc in omnibus corporibus. Cum ergo illud, a quo emanant iste actiones, ab omnibus dicatur anima: anima igitur est. Preterea, nos uidemus actiones in quibus conueniunt uegetabilia et animalia et homines tantum, sicut nutrire et generere; et actiones in quibus conueniunt animalia tantum, aut plura ex eis, et homines in quibus non conueniunt uegetabilia, ut sentire, ymaginari et moueri uoluntarie; et actiones que sunt proprie hominum, sicut ratiocinari, intelligere, discernere inter uerum et falsum et bonum et malum, adinuenire artes, et consiliari et libere eligere. Erit ergo in uegetabilibus principium nutrimenti

exists, so that it may never happen for it to doubt if, in this way, it exists. Since we see certain bodies which are neither nourished, nor increased nor generated, nor moved by voluntary movement, such as stones: and we see other bodies which are nourished, both increased and generating others like themselves, such as plants: and we see others which sense and are moved voluntarily: it remains that the principle of their actions is in their essence, besides corporeality. Because if the principle of their actions were corporeal, then it would be found in all bodies. Therefore, since that from which those actions emanate is called soul by everyone: therefore, the soul exists. Besides, we see actions in which plants, animals and human beings only share such as nourishing and begetting; and actions in which only animals share, or many of them, and human beings share in and which plants do not, such as sensing, imagining and being moved voluntarily; and there are actions which are proper to human beings such as reasoning, understanding, discerning between both truth and falsity and good and evil, discovering the arts, and both deliberating and choosing freely. Therefore, there is a principle of nutrition and generation in plants, indeed, a principle we call the vegetative soul; in animals a principle of sensing, of imagining and of being moved

et generacionis, quod quidem principium dicimus animam uegetabilem; in animalibus principium senciendi, ymaginandi et mouendi secundum appetitum, quod dicitur anima sensibilis; in hominibus vero principium racionandi et intelligendi etc., quod dicitur anima racionalis. Ergo anima uegetabilis est et sensibilis et racionalis.

Ad hoc est ratio Avicenne talis: posito quod subito esset homo creatus perfectus et, uelato uisu suo, non uideret exteriora, et taliter creatus esset quod non tangeret eum spissitudo aeris quam ipse sentire posset, et membra sic essent disiuncta ut non concurrerent sibi, neque contingerent; constans est, quod sic conditus homo, cogitans de se, non dubitaret affirmare se esse: non tamen affirmaret exteriora suorum membrorum, uel occulta suorum interiorum, sicut cerebrum uel alia; immo si possibile esset ei ymaginari manum, uel aliud membrum, non ymaginaretur illud membrum sui, nec necessarium sue essencie. Cum ergo omne quod affirmatur aliud est ab eo quod non affirmatur, et concessum aliud est ab eo quod non conceditur, essencia

according to desire, which is called the sensitive soul; and in man the principle of reasoning, and of understanding etc., which is called the rational soul. Therefore, there is the uegetative soul, the sensitive and the rational.

For this purpose the argument of Avicenna is as follows: given that a man was created immediately and, his vision has been veiled, he would not see exterior objects, and that he was made in such a way that the breadth of the air which he himself could feel would not touch him, and the limbs were separated in such a way that they do not meet nor touch each other; it is clear that man made in this way, thinking about himself, would not hesitate to affirm that he exists: he would not, however, affirm the outer parts of his organs nor the hidden parts of his interior organs; indeed if it were possible for him to imagine a hand, or another limb, he would not imagine that limb as his own, nor as necessary to his essence. Since, therefore, everything that is affirmed is different from that which is not affirmed, and that which is conceded is different from that which is not conceded, the essence, however, which he affirms, is his own, because it is his very self: however, this essence is apart from his body, since he does not affirm his body. Once

autem quam affirmat est propria illi, eo quod illa est ipsemet; tamen est preter corpus eius, quod non affirmat. Expergefactus igitur ab huiusmodi statu, habet uiam euigilandi et cognoscendi quod esse anime aliud est quam esse corporis.

Item, Augustinus, in libro *De anima et spiritu*: ‘Nichil tam novit mens uel anima quam id quod sibi presto est; nec menti nec anime quicquam magis presto est quam ipsa sibi. Ergo nichil tam novit quam se: cognoscit enim uiuere se, meminisse se, uelle, cognoscere, scire, iudicare; et hec omnia certissime novit de se’. Impossible est igitur quod ignoret se esse.

Item, ‘cum querit mens uel anima quid sit mens uel anima, profecto novit quod seipsam querit; et novit quod ipsa sit mens que se ipsam querit uel anima; nec aliud querit de se, sed seipsam. Cum ergo querentem se novit, se utique novit esse’.

III. DE ANIMA QUANTUM AD
FIERI
CAPITULUM 17
(III) *DE CAUSA FORMALI ANIME*

Consequenter querendum est de forma, que est pars rei per quam est actu. Queritur ergo an anima habeat

awakened, therefore, from a state of this kind he has a way to realise and know that the existence of the soul is different from the existence of the body.

Likewise, [Pseudo]Augustine in the book *On the Soul and Spirit*: [states] ‘The mind or soul knows nothing except that which is present to itself; nothing whatsoever is more present to either the mind or the soul than itself. Therefore, it knows nothing as much as it knows itself: for it understands that it lives, that it remembers, wishes, understands, knows, judges; and it most certainly knows all of these things about itself’. Therefore, it is impossible that it does not know that it exists.

Again, ‘when the mind or soul asks what is the mind or soul, it certainly knows that it is asking itself; and it knows that it is the mind or soul which is questioning itself; nor does it ask something else about itself, but itself. Since, therefore, it knows that it is itself questioning, it certainly knows that it exists’.

III ON THE SOUL WITH REGARD TO
BECOMING
CHAPTER 17
ON THE FORMAL CAUSE OF THE SOUL

Next we should investigate the form, which is the part of a being through which

formam, quia, cum forma sit aliquid unum componendum, si non habet formam, videtur quod habeat materiam; et si habeat formam et materiam, tunc est compositum quid. Hoc videtur per Boetium, in libro, *De Trinitate*: ‘In omni eo quod est citra Primum, est hoc et hoc’. Sed non materia et materia, forma et forma: ergo materia et forma. Ergo anima est composita ex partibus essentialibus, scilicet materia et forma. Item, beatus Dionysius: Post monadem sequitur dyas: ergo cum prima dualitas sit materie et forme, post monadem divinam erit in qualibet creatura dualitas materie et forme. Item, nichil est agens et recipiens ipsius materie. Cum igitur agere sit proprium forme, recipere ipsius materie, anime autem sit agere et recipere; anima igitur est composita ex materia et forma. Item, esse accidentis ponit esse substantie: ergo compositio accidentalis ponit compositionem substantialem. Cum igitur in anima sit compositio accidentalis, quae attenditur in compositione accidentis cum substantia, ut sunt in anima scientia et virtutes, tunc erit in anima ipsa compositio substantialis.

Contra. Augustinus, in libro

it is in act. Therefore, it is asked if the soul has a form, since form is a certain one of the components, if it does not have form, it seems that it has matter; and if it has form and matter then it is something that is a composite. This is apparent through what Boethius states in the book *On the Trinity*: ‘in everything that is below the First there is this and this’. But there is not matter and matter, form and form: therefore there is matter and form. Therefore the soul is composed of essential parts, namely matter and form. Likewise, blessed Dionysius: ‘After the monad comes the dyad’: therefore, since the first duality is that of matter and form, after the divine monad there will be a duality of matter and form in every creature whatsoever. Likewise, nothing produces or receives matter itself. Therefore, since acting is proper to form, receiving proper to matter itself, however, it is proper to the soul to act and to receive; therefore, the soul is composed of matter and form. Likewise, accidental being needs substantial being: therefore, accidental composition needs substantial composition. Therefore, since an accidental composition is present in the soul, which is considered in accidental composition with substance, just as knowledge and the virtues are in the soul, accordingly, there will be a substantial composition in the soul itself.

De quantitate anime: Simplex anime natura dici potest, quia ex aliis naturis non est: ergo non habet partes essenciales. Item, omnis substantia nobilior est quam sua potencia. Cum ergo nobilitas essendi sit maior penes simplicitatem quam penes compositionem, erit omnino substantia simplicior, uel ad minus eque simplex, sicut sua potencia; sed potencia anime intellectiva simplex est et immaterialis, sicut infra probatur, capitulo de viribus rationabilibus cognitiuis: ergo simplex est substantia anime.

Ad hoc dicendum quod partes entis essenciales dicuntur dupliciter: uno enim modo partes entis dicuntur quod est et quo est; et iste partes entis inueniuntur in omni eo quod est citra Primum, in omni scilicet creatura. Quod manifestatur sic: quia omne illud quod est citra Primum est ens per participacionem. Est ergo in qualibet creatura ens differens quod est, scilicet ipsum ens, ab eo quo est, scilicet sua essencia; quia cum sit ens per participacionem, non est sua essencia. Quod manifestatur sic: sicut enim bonum quod est Deus, est bonum per essenciam, quia est se ipso bonum, nec est ei aliud esse et

On the contrary. Augustine, in his book, *Concerning the quantity of the Soul:* The nature of the soul can be called simple, since it is not derived from other natures: therefore, it has not got essential parts. Likewise, every substance is more noble than its potency. Therefore, since the nobility of being is greater in respect of simplicity than in respect of composition, the substance will be entirely more simple, or at least as equally simple as its potential; but the potency of the intellective soul is simple and immaterial, as was proved above in the chapter on the cognitive rational powers. Therefore, the substance of the soul is simple.

In reply to this it must be said that the essential parts of being are spoken of in two ways: for in one way the parts of being are called ‘that which exists’ and ‘that through which it exists’; and these parts of being are to be found in everything which is below the First, that is in every creature. This is shown thus: because everything that is below the First is a being through participation. Therefore, in every creature ‘that which exists’ namely, being itself, is different from ‘that through which it exists’, namely its essence; since it is a being through participation, it is not its essence. This is shown as follows: for just as the good that is God is good through essence, since by his very nature he is

bonum esse: ideo in eo indifferens omnino bonum et bonitas. Creatura autem, cum sit bona, non est ex se ipsa bona, nec ipsa bonitas; immo ex hoc est bona quod ordinabilis ad summam bonitatem; et ideo non est bona per essenciam, sed per participacionem ipsius summe bonitatis, quam habet ex ordinacione ad ipsam, bona est. Ideo differt in creatura quod est bonum et quo est bonum, et hoc ipsum bonum et ipsa bonitas. Similiter ens quod est Deus, cum sit ens se ipso, est ens per essenciam. Ens uero creatum, cum sit ens ab alio quod est Deus, est ens per aliud, est ens per participacionem. Et ideo erit differens in ente creato quod est et quo est. Sicut enim ex hoc quod bonum creatum non est bonum nisi ex hoc quod ordinatum est ad summam bonum; et in hoc apparet quod differt in creatura bonum et bonitas; sic ens creatum, licet non sit ens nisi ab alio quod est Primum, et per illud a quo dependet, apparebit quod differt in eo quod est et quo est, scilicet ens et essencia. Item, essencia que creatura est non dicitur nisi respectu eius quod est essenciale creature. Quod est uero respicit essenciale et accidentale, ut patet in

good, and to be and to be good are the same for him; therefore in him the good and goodness are entirely without distinction. However, a creature, although it is good, it is not good from its own goodness, nor is it goodness itself; rather it is good because it can be ordered toward the highest good; and, therefore, it is not good through essence, but it is good through the participation in the highest good itself, which it possesses from its being ordered towards the good. Therefore, ‘that which is good’ and that ‘through which’ it is good are different in a creature, and this good itself and goodness itself also differ. Similarly, the being that is God, because he is a being in itself, he is a being through essence. However, a created being, since it is a being from another, which is God, is a being through another, it is a being through participation. Therefore, ‘that which exists’ and ‘that through which it exists’ is different in a created being. For just as from the fact that a created good is only good from the fact that it is ordered for the highest good; and it is evident in this that the good and goodness differ in a creature; in the same way since created being is not a being except by another which is the First, and through that upon which it depends, it will be apparent that ‘that which exists’ and ‘that through which it exists’ is different in him, namely being

angelo et anima; quod dicitur de eo quod est anima, et quod rationalis est, et hoc est essenciale ei; et quod est iusta, quod est accidentale. Patet ergo quod differt in anima quo est, scilicet essencia et quod est. Unde regulariter in omni eo quod est possibile respectu esse accidentalis, erit differens quod est et quo est. Tale autem est esse creatum. Preterea, omne ens creatum est ens a Deo de nichilo. In eo autem quod dicitur quod est creatura, intelligitur quod est ens de nichilo. In eo autem quod dicitur quo est, intelligitur essencia a Deo sive quam accipit a Deo. Secundum primum modum, est in creatura potencia receptiua et passsiua; iuxta secundum modum, potencia activa. Alio modo dicuntur partes essentielles materia et forma; et hee partes solum inueniuntur in illis solis que a Deo sunt de aliquo, non autem in hiis que a Deo sunt de nichilo. Corporalia ergo, que sunt de aliquo compositionem habent materie et forme; materia enim est de qua est aliquid uel fit aliquid; forma uero per quam est aliquid.

Dicendum est ergo quod spiritualia et anima rationalis compositionem habent ex partibus essentialibus que partes sunt quod

and essence. Likewise, the essence by which a creature is, is only said in respect of that which is essential to a creature. However 'that which is' refers to the essential and accidental, as is clear in an angel and in the soul; because it is said about it that it is a soul, and that it is rational, and this is essential to it; and that it is just, that this is accidental. Therefore, it is clear that 'that which exists' and 'that through which it exists', namely the essence, differ in the soul. Hence, regularly 'that which exists' and 'that through which it exists' will be different in everything that is possible with regard to accidental being. But this is created being. Besides, every created being is a being created by God from nothing. But insofar as a creature is called that 'that which exists', it is understood that it is a being made from nothing. But insofar as it is called 'that through which it exists' one understands the essence as from God or that it receives from God. According to the first mode, there is a receptive and passive potential in a creature, according to the second there is an active potential. In another way, the essential parts are called matter and form; and these parts are only found in those things alone which are from God out of something, but not in those which are from God out of nothing. Therefore, corporeal beings which are made out of something,

est et quo est, quia sunt a Deo et de nichilo; et non habent compositionem que est ex materia et forma proprie dictis, quia non sunt a Deo creata de aliquo. Sic ergo a Boecio intelligitur hoc et hoc, et a beato Dionysio dyas sequens monadem; et secundum hoc recipere et agere in anima differens est, scilicet recipere per naturam eius, quod dico quod est, agere per naturam eius quo est. Sic etiam intelligendum est quod compositio essentialis precedit accidentalem. Sed queritur, cum anima sit compositio eius quod est et quo est (quo est ut forme et quod est ut subiecti et quasi materie), utrum quo est angelus, et quo est anima rationalis sint idem secundum speciem; et cum uterque sit spiritus rationalis, nec differant nisi in hoc quod alter est spiritus unibilis corpori, alter uero non, sed separatus: unitum autem et separatum non uidetur inducere differentiam secundum speciem, sed alium modum essendi: erit anima et angelus idem secundum speciem. Sed contra. Quoniam angelus per hoc quod separatus est, habet esse persona; anima per hoc quod unibilis, habet esse forma et

have a composition of matter and form; for matter is that from which something exists or from which something becomes; form, however, is that through which something exists.

Therefore, one should say that spiritual beings and the rational soul have a composition made from the essential parts, which are the parts ‘that which exists’ and ‘that through which it exists’, since they are from God and made from nothing; and they do not have a composition which is from matter and form, properly speaking, since they are not created by God from something. Therefore, it is in this way that the one and the other is understood by Boethius, and the dyad following the monad by blessed Dionysius; and according to this to receive and to act is different in the soul, namely through its nature it receives, what I call ‘that which exists’, acting through its nature I call ‘that through which it exists’. Also it must also be understood that the essential composition precedes the accidental. But the question arises, since the soul is a composition of ‘that which exists’ and of ‘that through which it exists’ (‘that through which it exists’ as form and ‘that which exists’ as subject and as a kind of matter), whether that through which an angel exists and that through which the rational soul exists are the same according to species;

perfectio et non persona: ergo differens est esse hinc et inde secundum speciem. Item, anima rationalis habet differentes virtutes secundum speciem, scilicet uegetare, sentire, ab angelo cuius solum est intelligere; ergo et essenciam differentem secundum speciem; quod concedendum est. Et dicendum ad obiecta, quod cum dico spiritum unibilem, hoc quod dico unibilem facit differenciam secundum speciem, et non solum differenciam secundum modum essendi; nam unibile facit speciem hominis esse animam, non unibile uero in angelo facit angelum spiritum esse tantum.

Sed queritur utrum quo angelus est spiritus (hoc est creatura rationalis uel intellectualis), et quo anima est spiritus differenciam faciat secundum speciem; et cum angelus quo est rationalis faciat angelum deiformem in intellectu, secundum quod dicit beatus Dionysius et secundum actum, quia ab inicio sue condicionis habet formas impressas ad intelligendas rerum naturas; quo uero anima humana est rationalis non facit ipsam deiformem nisi potencia, ut in ipsa prima condicionem sit quasi tabula nuda in qua est possibilitas ad formas et non actus;

and since both are a rational spirit, differing only in that one is a spirit that can be united to the body, and the other is not, rather it is a separated spirit: but being united and separated does not seem to introduce a difference according to species, but according to another mode of being: a soul and an angel will be the same according to species. But against that. Whereas an angel, from the fact that it is separated, has being as a person; a soul, from the fact that it can be united, has being as a form and a perfection and not as a person: therefore there is a difference according to species between one and the other. Likewise, the rational soul has different powers according to species, namely, vivifying, sensing, which is different from an angel to whom only understanding belongs; therefore it has also a different essence according to species; which must be conceded. And in response to the objections, when I speak about a spirit that is capable of unity, that which I say is capable of unity causes a difference according to species, and not only a difference according to the mode of being; for being capable of unity makes the species of man to be a soul, and not being capable of unity in an angel makes an angel to be spirit alone.

But the question is asked whether that by which an angel is a spirit (that is, a

ergo differt rationale secundum speciem in anima et in angelo. Item, ratio et intellectus angelicus non indigent sensu, nec habent ordinacionem ad sensum; intellectus autem humanus essencialiter quantum ad materiam inferiorem qua percipit creaturas esse in ordine ad sensum; ergo differunt secundum speciem. Item, intellectus angelicus prima relacione suscipit illuminationem a Primo, sicut predictum est; humanus autem secunda relacione. Item, intellectus angelicus cum non sit ordinatus ad sensum non est collatius sensibilium et intelligibilium; intellectus uero humanus est collatius: cum ergo rationale dicat intellectum conferentem, intellectuale uero dicat intellectum absque collacione contemplantem ueritatem, erit differentia specifica intellectus humani rationale, et intellectus angelici intellectuale; ut quo angelus est sit intellectualitas, ut loquamur secundum quod possumus; et quod est ipse angelus, sit substantia intellectualis; quo anima humana est, sit racionalitas; et quod est sit substantia rationalis, quemadmodum dictum est; et inde est quod differentia specifica

rational or an intellectual creature), and that by which the soul is a spirit makes a difference according to species; and since that by which an angel is rational makes the angel Godlike in its intellect, according to what blessed Dionysius states; and according to act, since from the beginning of its condition it has the forms imprinted on it for the purpose of knowing the nature of things; but that by which the human soul is rational does not make it Godlike except in potency, in such a way that in the original condition it is like a clean writing tablet in which there is the possibility for the forms and not the act; therefore, the rational differs according to species in the soul and in the angel. Likewise, reason and the angelic intellect do not need sensation, neither are they ordered in respect of sensation; but the human intellect as regards the lower way in which it perceives creatures, is essentially ordered towards sensation; therefore, they differ according to species. Likewise, the angelic intellect, in its original orientation receives illumination from the First Being, as has already been said; but the human intellect receives it through an ulterior orientation. Likewise, since the angelic intellect is not directed towards sensation it does not compare the sensibles and the intelligibles; but the human intellect does: therefore, since by rational is meant the

hominis est rationale.

intellect in the act of comparing and by intellectual is meant the intellect contemplating the truth without comparing, there is a specific difference between the rational human intellect and the intellectual angelic intellect; so that that through which an angel exists is 'intellectuality' insofar as we can talk about it; and 'that which is', the angel itself, is an intellectual substance; and 'that by which' a human person is, is rationality; and 'that which exists' is a rational substance, in the way that was stated; and so it is that the specific difference of a human being is rationality.

IV DE ANIMA QUANTUM AD
ESSE

CHAPTER 26

(IV) *QUOD ANIMA SIT UNA IN TRIBUS
POTENTIIS*

Consequenter ostendendum est de anima quod sit una in tribus potentiis: uegetabili, sensibili, rationali. Ad quod procedendum est sic: sicut se habet perfectibile ad perfectibile, sic perfectio ad perfectionem; sed non differt in homine perfectibile a uegetabili, sensibili et rationali, quia unus homo secundum rem est uegetabilis, sensibilis, rationalis; ergo una est perfectio secundum substanciam.

IV ON THE SOUL WITH REGARD TO
BEING

CHAPTER 26

(IV) *THAT THE SOUL IS ONE IN THREE POWERS*

Consequently it should be shown concerning the soul that it is one in three powers: the vegetative, sensitive and the rational. With regard to this we should proceed as follows: in the same way that the perfectible is constituted in relation to the perfectible, so perfection is constituted in relation to perfection; but the perfectible in man does not differ from the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational, since a man, according to his essence is vegetative, sensitive, rational; therefore, there is one

Item, similis est proportio uegetatiui ad sensitium, et sensitui ad rationale, sicut est trianguli ad quadrangulum et quadranguli ad pentangulum; quia sicut triangulus in quadrangulo, sic uegetatiuum in sensitio et sensitium in rationali. Sed cum triangulus est in quadrangulo, sic non differt secundum substantiam, immo sunt idem in substantia; ergo similiter uegetatiuum, cum est in sensitio, et utrumque in rationali, non differunt secundum substantiam. Item, si essent multa secundum substantiam et secundum potenciam in uno genere, actus unius non impediretur per actum alterius; ut si aliud est subiectum in quo est potencia sensibilis, et aliud in quo est potencia rationalis, actus non erit dependens ab actu ut si esset differens secundum substantiam et subiectum uis sensibilis interior et exterior non impediretur actio interioris per occupationem exterioris, et e conuerso. Occupata ergo anima rationalis circa sensibilia non impediretur ad spiritualia; cum contrarium sit, quia occupata illa circa actum unius impeditur ab actu alterius, relinquitur ergo quod sint idem subiecto et substantia

perfection in relation to substance. Likewise, the proportion of the vegetative to the sensitive, is the same as the sensitive to the rational, just as the proportion of a triangle is to a square, and a square to a pentangle; since just as a triangle is in a square, so the vegetative is in the sensitive and the sensitive in the rational. But although the triangle is in the square, they do not differ according to substance, in fact they are the same in substance; therefore, in the same way, the vegetative, since it is in the sensitive, and both of these are present in the rational, they do not differ according to substance. Likewise, if they were many with regard to substance and in one genus according to power, the act of one would not be impeded by the act of the other; so if one is the subject in which the sensitive power is present, and another in which the rational power is present, the act of one will not be dependent on the act of the other so that, if the interior sensitive power and the sensitive exterior power were different according to substance and subject, the action of the interior power through the activity of the exterior would not be impeded and vice versa. Therefore, the rational soul, being occupied with regard to sensible objects would not be impeded from turning towards spiritual affairs; since the opposite is the case, because when it is occupied with the act

uegetabilis, sensibilis et racionalis, differentes potencia. Item, si essent differentes secundum substanciam et potenciam et operacionem, in nullo conuenirent et sic impossibilis esset unio in homine: non enim uniuntur que in aliquo non conueniunt. Item, si hoc esset, esset homo diuersarum specierum; differentiam enim speciei facit diuersitas substancialis perfectionis. Item, essent tres anime, quod dampnat Augustinus, in libro *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus*. Concedendum est ergo eandem substanciam in homine: animam uegetabilem, sensibilem et racionalem; secundum potenciam tamen differentem.

Fuerunt tamen qui dixerunt tres substancias incorporeas, sicut tres uitae, scilicet uitam uegetatiuam, sensitiuam et intellectiuam. Habet enim homo substanciam incorpoream, qua uiuit, crescit et nutritur; et hoc ex traduce in generatione, in qua conuenit cum plantis. Habet substanciam incorpoream, qua sentit, ex celo et stellis, secundum quam conuenit cum brutis. Habet etiam substanciam incorpoream, qua uiuit et intelligit, immediate a Deo per creacionem. Et quamuis sint tres

of one it is impeded by the act of the another, therefore, it follows that the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational are the same in subject and in substance but differing in power. – Likewise, if they were different according to substance, ability and operation they would not share in anything and in this way their union would be impossible in man: for things which cannot share in anything cannot be united. Likewise if this were the case, a man would belong to different species; because a difference of species causes a difference in substantial perfection. Likewise there would be three souls, which Augustine condemns in the book *On Ecclesiastic Dogmas*. Therefore, we must concede that there is one and the same substance in man: the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational soul; it is different, however, according to power.

There are those, however, who have said that there are three incorporeal substances, just as there are three ways of living, namely, the vegetative life, the sensitive and the intellectual. For man has an incorporeal substance through which he lives, grows and is nourished; and this is passed on in reproduction, something he shares in common with plants. He has an incorporeal substance, through which he senses, under the influence of the sky and the stars, inasmuch as he has it in common

substantie, non tamen tres anime in homine, quia anima nomen est perfectionis. Ideo substantia uegetabilis non est anima, nisi in plantis quarum est perfectio, sensibilis uero nisi in brutis; in homine autem sunt quasi materiales ad racionalem, et racionalis est completio; et ideo ipsa sola est anima in homine, aliis existentibus ut dispositionibus materialibus ad ipsam. De unione autem illarum adducunt exemplum in radiis ignis et solis qui quandoque uniuntur in aere, in quo non sunt nisi quasi unus, et hoc propter eorum simplicitatem; et sicut contingit quod radius ignis cum igne corruptibilis est, et radius solaris cum sole incorruptibilis est, sic due corrumpuntur cum corpore, scilicet uegetabilis et sensibilis; tertia remanet et separatur a corpore, ut radius ab aere. Dicunt etiam, secundum Aristotelem, quod prius tempore est in semine ipsa uegetatiua, qua nutritur et crescit; deinde cum creuerit, subsequitur per influenciam corporis celestis, sensitiua; ultimo uero infunditur per creacionem racionalis ut perfectio ultima. Nec sequitur: ante infusionem anime racionalis, qua est homo, est sensibile et animatum:

with brute animals. He has also an incorporeal substance through which he lives and understands, which comes immediately from God through creation. And although there are three substances, however, there are not three souls in man, since soul is the name of perfection. For this reason the vegetative substance is not a soul except in plants, of which it is the perfection, and the sensitive substance is a soul only in brute animals; but in man they are like the material qualities for the purpose of rationality, and rationality is the full actuality; and because of that reason alone is the soul in man, the others existing as material dispositions for the purposes of the soul. Concerning their union they give the example taken from the rays of fire and of the sun, which are sometimes united in the air, in which they only exist as if they were one, and this because of their simplicity; and just as it happens that the ray of a fire can be destroyed with the fire, so the ray of the sun is incorruptible with the sun, in this way two substances are corrupted with the body, namely, the vegetative and the sensitive; the third substance remains and is separated from the body, as a ray is separated from the air. They also say, following Aristotle, that at the beginning the vegetative soul itself is in the seed, by which it is nourished and grows; then when it has grown, the

ergo leo uel capra etc., quia est animal imperfectum; imperfectum dico, non sicut dicitur animal imperfectum simpliciter, quod non habet omnem sensum, sed imperfectum quod est materiale ad ultimum complementum. Non sunt etiam species differentes, quamuis sint differentes substantiales perfectiones; quia una est materia uel dispositio ad aliam, et ideo est simplex perfectio una, scilicet ultima, rationalis. Adducunt autem ad hoc rationes: primo quia non est eadem substantia corruptibilis et incorruptibilis; sed corruptibilis est sensitua; incorruptibilis, rationalis; ergo non sunt idem secundum substantiam. Item, separabilis et inseparabilis, mixta corpori et immixta, eadem non est substantia: ergo primum. Responderi potest quoniam sensibilis non corrumpitur in homine nec secundum essenciam, nec secundum potenciam, sed secundum actum tantum, cum separatur anima a corpore. Unde Augustinus, in libro *De anima et spiritu*, dicit quod anima trahit secum sensum et ymaginacionem in separacione. Item, misceri corpori secundum operacionem et uirtutem aliquam, non misceri secundum

sensitive soul, through the influence of the celestial body, comes next; and lastly, the rational soul is infused through creation as the final perfection. It does not follow: before the infusion of the rational soul, by which a man is, that a sensitive and a living thing exists: and so there is a lion or a she-goat etc., since it is an imperfect animal; I say imperfect, not in the way that an animal is called imperfect simply, because it does not have any sense, but imperfect inasmuch as it is potential in respect of ultimate completion. They are again not a different species, even though they are different substantial perfections; since one is the matter or a disposition in respect of other matter, and therefore it is one simple perfection, namely the final perfection, the rational. However they produce reasons for this: in the first place that a corruptible substance and an incorruptible substance are not the same; but the sensitive is the corruptible; the rational is the incorruptible; therefore, they are not the same according to substance. Likewise, the separable and the inseparable, mingled with the body and not mingled with the body are not the same substance: therefore as before. It can be replied that since the sensitive soul is not corrupted in man, neither according to essence or according to power, but according to act only, when the soul is

operacionem uirtutis alterius, et separari secundum habitum, et non separari secundum actum uel diuersas potencias, nichil prohibet esse unius substantie. Secundo obiciunt: non est eadem substantia prius ens tempore, et succedens tempore; sed uegetabilis est prior tempore, quod patet in semine et embrione, quod prius uegetatur quia nutritur et crescit, antequam anima rationalis infundatur; ergo primum. Et dici posset quod est uegetatiua disponens et uegetatiua perficiens; una est forma in fieri, alia est in esse: prima autem traducitur et seminatur cum corpore, secunda uero infunditur cum rationali anima. Prima ergo transit completo fieri, id est corpore formato et organizato; secunda autem manet in esse potencia rationalis anime; et similiter distinguendum est de sensibili. Tercio obiciunt: substantie separabilis non est potencia inseparabilis: ergo anime rationalis non est potencia uegetabilis uel sensibilis.

Respondeo ut supra, quia potencia sensibilis in homine aliter est quam in brutis; quia in brutis cum sit forma substancialis

separated from the body. Hence Augustine, in his book *On the soul and spirit*, states that the soul takes sensation and imagination with it after the separation. Likewise, mingling with a body according to the activity and some power, not mingling according to the activity of another power, and being separated according to a disposition, and not being separated according to an act or diverse powers will not stop anything being a single substance. In the second place they object: what exists before and what exists afterwards is not the same substance; but the vegetative soul comes first in time, which is clear in the seed and the embryo, because it is first brought to life since it is nourished and grows, before the rational soul is infused: therefore as before. And it can be said that there is a vegetative soul that orders and a vegetative that completes; one is a form present in the becoming, the other is present in being: however the first is handed on and sewn with the body, the second, however, is infused with the rational soul. Therefore, the first passes away, once its becoming is completed, that is, the formed and organised body; the second however remains in the being power of the rational soul; and similarly one must make a similar distinction with regard to the sensitive soul. Thirdly, they object: an inseparable power does not

incorporea non est separabilis a corpore, nec secundum potentiam, nec secundum actum; in homine uero cum sit potencia in substantia anime rationalis, separabilis est secundum potentiam, non secundum actum. Dicamus ergo, secundum Augustinum in libro *De anima et spiritu*: ‘Una et eadem est anime substantia’, uegetabilis, sensitua, rationalis; sed ‘secundum diuersas potencias diuersa sortitur uocabula’.

VI. DE ANIMA QUANTUM AD
CORPUS
CAPITULUM 39
(V) *DE DIFFERENCIA MEDIORUM
UNIENCIUM*

Consequenter querendum est de differencia mediorum uniencium. Nam constans est quod non erit ponere medium unius nature; si enim esset unius nature, non posset unire et confederare tam dispaes et distantes naturas sicut est corpus elementatum, habens mixtionem, complexionem et compositionem et

belong to a separable substance: therefore the vegetative or the sensitive powers do not belong to the rational soul.

I respond as before, that the sensitive power in man is different to that in brute animals; since in animals, although it is a substantial incorporeal form, it is not separable from the body, neither according to power, nor according to the act; however in man since it is a power present in the substance of the rational soul, it is separable according to power, not according to act. Let us say, therefore, following Augustine in his book *On the soul and spirit*: ‘the substance of the soul is one and the same’, the vegetative, the sensitive, the rational; but, ‘according to the different powers it is assigned different names’.

CHAPTER 39
(V) *ON THE DIFFERENCES OF THE
INTERMEDIARIES OF UNION*

The differences between the intermediaries of union should be examined. It is agreed that one cannot propose an intermediary of one nature. For if it is of one nature it would not be possible to unite and join such different and distant natures, such as a body composed of elements, having a mixture (*mixtio*) a combination (*complexio*) and something that is brought

ipsam substantiam rationalem.

Queritur ergo de differentia que est in medio. Notanda est ergo distancia anime rationalis et corporis: est ergo substantia rationalis, id est anima, natura simplex, non contraria, incorporea, cognoscitiva, non dependens. Corpus vero humanum est natura compositum, contrarium, hoc esse ex humoribus contrariis, corporeum, obtusum, dependens. Vt per compositionem opponatur simplicitati, per contrarietatem non contrarietati seu equalitati omnimode, per corporeitatem incorporeitati, per obtusionem cognitioni, per dependenciam qua dependet ab anima rationali, sicut a suo rectore et gubernatore, opponatur non dependencie, hoc est absolute libertati, que est in anima rationali secundum intellectum et libertatem arbitrii. Hee autem sunt quinque oppositiones sive distancie. Si ergo debeant hee nature distantes in confederacionem unionis uenire, necesse est intercurrere media quattuor, quatenus, quattuor mediis conuenientissima proporcione sibi inuicem coniunctis, quinto loco nature anime rationalis et corporis quinque distanciis seiuncte ualeant

together (*composicio*) and the rational substance itself.

Therefore, one seeks the difference which is in the intermediary. Therefore, the distance between the rational soul and the body must be indicated: the rational soul, that is, the soul, is, therefore, by nature, simple, non contrary, incorporeal, knowledgeable, independent. The human body, on the other hand, is, by nature, composite, contrary, that is, [it has] being from contrary humours, corporeal, powerless, dependent. Through composition it is opposed to simplicity, through contrariety to non contrariety or to equality of every kind, through corporeality to non corporeality, through powerlessness to cognition, through the dependence by which it depends on the rational soul, such as from its ruler and its governor, it is opposed to independence, that is, to absolute freedom, which is in the soul according to intellect and free will. These are, however, five oppositions or distances. Therefore, if these distant natures ought to reach an agreement of union it is necessary to bring together the four intermediaries, so that, once the four intermediaries are joined in the most suitable proportion they, in turn, are joined together in a fifth place, they have the power to unite the natures of the rational soul and the body, having joined the five

copulari. Quia ergo media debent habere equaliter convenienciam cum extremis, quattuor autem sunt media necessaria; ergo duo debent esse ex parte anime et duo ex parte corporis, ut autem melius appareat ratio, nominemus illa.

Ex parte anime sunt duo, natura sensibilis et uegetabilis, et est natura sensibilis simplex, non contraria, incorporea, cognoscitiva, dependens. Simplex enim est, aliter species et ymagines sensibiles facerent distanciam in ea et replerent istam. Est eciam incorporea, cum sit carens dimensione, quia si haberet dimensionem esset maior in maiori corpore et minus in minori; et maior esset sensus in maiori corpore. Incontraria est eciam, hoc est non habens contrarium sicut elementa, uel ex contrariis sicut elementa. Ipsa enim est susceptiva omnis contrarietatis corporalis ut secundum tactum, calidi, frigidi, humidi et sicci, etc.; secundum uisum, albi et nigri et sic de ceteris. Cum ergo sit receptiva contrarietatum ex natura, in se nullam habet contrarietatem. Dependens eciam est, non solum a natura rationali, que in homine est rector ipsius et gubernatrix, immo eciam a natura corporis cui unitur

distances. Therefore since the mediums ought to have an equal share with the extreme parts, and that there are four necessary intermediaries; therefore two ought to be [proposed] on the part of the soul and two on the part of the body, but for a better account, let us name them.

On the part of the soul there are two, the nature of the sensitive and the vegetative, and the nature of the sensitive is simple, non contrary, incorporeal, cognisant, dependent. And it is simple, otherwise the species and sensitive images would create a distance in it and would fill it up. It is also incorporeal, since it is lacking in dimension, since if it had dimension it would be greater in a greater body and lesser in a lesser one; and sensation would be greater in a greater body. It is also non contrary, that is, it does not have contrariety such as the elements, neither is it from contraries such as are the elements. For it is receptive of all the contrarieties of the body as follows, touch, heat, cold, wet, dry etc., according to sight, white and black and it is the same for the others. Therefore, since it is receptive of the contrariety from nature, in itself it has no contrariety. It is also dependent, not only on the rational soul, which in man is its ruler and governor, but also indeed, on the nature of the body to which it is united, as is [the nature of matter], through which

sicut materie et per quod operatur.

Natura uero uegetabilis est incorporea, simplex, non contraria, obtusa, dependens. Simplex est; hic enim simplicitatem dicimus que opponitur compositioni que est in elementatis; ratione contrarietatis qualitatum ex elementis, non contraria est, quia contrarietatem non dicimus ratione contrarietatis que est in elementis, sed ratione contrariarum qualitatum, ut ignis contrarius aque caliditatis et frigiditatis, aeri et terre ratione humiditatis et siccitatis. Incorporea etiam est, ut ostendatur differentia ipsius a natura celi et corporum celestium, que quamuis non habeant compositionem ex elementis nec subiaceant contrarietati, corpora tamen sunt. Obtusa uero est, ad differentiam anime ipsius sensitue nature que est cognoscitiua. Dependens uero est ad differentiam rationalis que est absoluta. Sic ergo manifesta sunt duo media ex parte anime rationalis: natura scilicet sensibilis et uegetabilis.

Ex parte uero corporis ponenda sunt duo media: unum pertinens ad naturam celestem, que est quinta essentia, quod dicitur spiritus: dicitur a phisicis uehiculum

it acts.

But the uegetative nature is incorporeal, simple, non contrary, powerless, dependent. It is simple; for here we describe simplicity as that which is opposed to the composition which is in things composed of elements; by reason of the contrariety of the qualities from the elements, it is non contrary, since we do not speak about contrariety by reason of the contrariety which is in the elements, but by reason of the contrary qualities, as fire is contrary to water on account of the heat and the cold, [it is contrary] to air and earth because of humidity and dryness. It is also incorporeal, as is shown by its difference from the nature of the sky and of the celestial bodies, which although they do not have composition from the elements, nor are they subject to contrariety, nevertheless they are bodies. And it is powerless, in relation to the difference from the sensitive nature of the soul itself which is cognisant. And it is dependent as regards the difference from the rational soul which is absolute. Therefore, the two intermediaries are shown in this way on the part of the rational soul: namely the sensitive nature and the uegetative nature.

And on the part of the body two intermediaries must be posited: one pertaining to the celestial nature, which is

uirium anime; et est corpus subtile, spirituale, diffusam in concauitatibus membrorum a natura quinte essencie; unde motus ipsius a fontibus est, sicut motus irradiacionis et illuminacionis a corporibus luminosis: fontes autem dicuntur principalia et radicalia membra, cor scilicet, cerebrum et epar. Secundum quod distinguitur triplex differencia spiritus, naturalis in epate, uitalis in corde, animalis in cerebro.

Aliud medium pertinet ad naturam elementalem que fundatur in humoribus, et maxime in equalitate et contemperancia que est in sanguine, quod melius inferius apparebit. Est ergo natura spiritus simplex, non contraria, corporea, obtusa, dependens. Simplex quia non composita ex elementis; non contraria, quia nature celestis, non elementaris; corporea ad differenciam naturarum uegetabilis, sensibilis, rationalis; obtusa ad differenciam sensibilis et rationalis; dependens ad differenciam rationalis. Natura uero elementalis est simplex, contraria, corporea, obtusa, dependens. Simplex ad differenciam nature elementate; contraria uero ad differenciam

the fifth essence, which is called spirit: the naturalists call it a vehicle of the powers of the soul; and it is exquisite, spiritual, diffused into the concavities by the nature of the fifth essence; therefore its movement comes from sources, in the way that the movement of irradiation and illumination comes from luminated bodies: the sources are called the principal and fundamental parts, namely, the heart, the brain and the liver. Inasmuch as a triple difference of spirit is distinguished, natural in the liver, vital in the heart, animal in the brain.

Another intermediary belongs to the nature of the elemental which is founded in the humours and especially in the level and mixing which is in the blood, which will be more apparent below. The nature of the spirit is therefore simple, non contrary, corporeal, passive, dependent. Simple, since it is not a composite from the elements; it is non contrary, since it is of the celestial nature, it is not composed of elements; it is corporeal in relation to the different natures of the uegetative, the sensitive, the rational; powerless in relation to the difference between the sensitive and the rational; dependent in relation to the difference from the rational soul. The nature of the elemental is simple, contrary, corporeal, powerless, dependent. Simple in relation to the difference from the elemental nature; but contrary in relation to

predictorum, etc., ut patet. In hiis ergo uides naturalem ordinem et proporcionem, ut primo natura rationalis quasi unum extremum, deinde ordinantur media, primum natura sensibilis, secundum natura uegetabilis, tertium natura spiritus celestis, quartum natura elementaris, ultimum uero natura elementati corporis, quod conuenientissima armonia, mediis dispositis, copuletur, cum natura anime rationalis. Hoc autem quod iam diximus probatur sic: racione sumpta ex natura mediacionis in ordine rerum: nam cum sit simplex nature, non contraria, ut anime rationalis, et natura composita, contraria, ut humani corporis, medium erit inter hec natura simplex contraria, uel composita non contraria. Sed hec ultima non potest esse, scilicet composita non contraria; quia compositionem hic dicimus que est in elementatis ex elementis, que omnino est ex contrariis.

Relinquitur ergo alterum, scilicet natura simplex contraria, que est natura elementaris; simplex, quia non est elementata, et contraria propter contrarias qualitates; ut ergo copuletur corpus humanum anime rationali; necessarium est medium

what was said before etc., it is clear. In these you see a natural order and proportion, as in the first place the rational nature is one extreme, then the intermediaries are ordered, first the sensitive nature, second the vegetative nature, third, the nature of the celestial spirit, fourth the elemental nature and the last, the nature of the body composed of elements, that of a harmony that is most suited, once the intermediaries are arranged, to unite with the nature of the rational soul. And that which we have already discussed is proved as follows: the account, taken from the nature of mediation in the order of things: for since simple nature exists, non contrary, as the rational soul, and a composite nature, contrary, as the human body, the intermediary between these is a simple, contrary nature or a composite, non contrary nature. But this last one cannot be, namely a composite, non contrary nature; since here we are calling 'composition' that which is present [in beings] composed of elements from elements, which are entirely made from contraries.

Therefore, another remains, namely the simple, contrary nature, which is the elemental nature; simple, since it is not composed of elements and contrary, because of contrary qualities; therefore, in

nature elementaris. Item, inter naturam non contrarium incorporeum, que est anime rationalis et naturam contrarium corpoream, que est humani corporis, medium est natura non contraria corporea uel incorporea contraria; sed hoc quartum non potest esse, scilicet incorporea contraria; nam cum omnis contrarietas fundetur super naturam corpoream et elementarem, si est natura incorporea, erit abstracta a contrarietate.

Relinquitur ergo tantum tertium, hoc est natura corporea non contraria, et hec est natura celestis. Vt ergo copuletur corpus humanum anime rationali necesse est ponere corpus aliud quod sit nature celestis. Item, inter naturam incorpoream cognoscitiuam anime rationalis et naturam obtusam humani corporis, medium est natura incorporea obtusa uel corporea cognoscitiua; sed hoc quartum non potest esse: si enim est cognoscitiua, de necessitate est incorporea, sicut probatum est supra.

Relinquitur ergo tertium, scilicet incorporea et obtusa, et hec est natura uegetatiua; in unione ergo corporis et anime rationalis ponetur tertium medium, scilicet natura

order that the human body be united to the rational soul, an intermediary of an elemental nature is necessary. Likewise, between the non contrary, incorporeal nature, which is the rational soul and the contrary, corporeal nature, which is the human body, the intermediary is by nature, a non contrary, corporeal, nature or an incorporeal contrary; but this fourth [possibility] cannot be, namely an incorporeal contrary; for since all contrariety is founded upon corporeal and elemental nature, if it is an incorporeal nature it is abstracted from contrariety.

Therefore, only the third possibility remains, that is, a non contrary corporeal nature, and this is the celestial nature. Therefore in order that the human body be united to the rational soul it is necessary to posit another body which is the celestial nature. Likewise, between the knowledgeable, incorporeal nature of the rational soul and the powerless nature of the human body, the intermediary is an incorporeal, powerless nature, or a corporeal, knowledgeable nature; but this fourth possibility cannot be: for if it is knowledgeable, out of necessity it is incorporeal, as was proved above.

Therefore, the third possibility remains, namely the incorporeal and powerless nature, and this is the vegetative nature; therefore, a third intermediary is

uegetatiua. Item, inter naturam cognoscitiuam non deponentem anime rationalis et obtusam dependentem humani corporis, medium est natura cognoscitiua dependens uel obtusa non dependens; sed hoc quartum non potest esse, quia si est obtusa, de necessitate est dependens; quia natura obtusa regitur a natura cognoscitiua; et eiam si est non dependens, de necessitate erit cognoscitiua, quia spiritualis et absoluta.

Relinquitur ergo tertium, scilicet natura cognoscitiua dependens. Sed hec est natura sensitua. Ponetur ergo de necessitate adhuc quartum medium ut copuletur natura corporali cum anima rationali. Quattuor ergo erunt media unienza, natura sensitua, uegetatiua, spiritus qui est natura celestis, et natura elementaris.

SECUNDA CONSIDERACIO
TRACTATUS SECUNDUS DE
VIRIBUS ANIME
II. DE DIVISIONE VIRIUM SECUNDUM
AUGUSTINUM
CHAPTER 63
(VI) *DE DIVISIONE ANIME QUANTUM
AD SEIPSAM*

Consequens est dicere de distinctione uirium quas habet anima

posited in the union of the body and the rational soul, namely the vegetative nature. Likewise, between the knowledgeable, non dependent nature of the rational soul and the powerless, dependent nature of the human body, the intermediary is a knowledgeable, dependent nature or a powerless, non dependent nature; but this fourth nature is not possible, since if it is powerless, out of necessity it is dependent; since a powerless nature is ruled by a knowledgeable nature; and equally if it is non dependent, out of necessity it is knowledgeable, since it is spiritual and independent.

Therefore, the third possibility remains, namely the knowledgeable, dependent nature. This is the sensitive nature. Therefore, out of necessity a fourth intermediary is posited in order to unite the corporeal nature with the rational soul. There are, therefore, four intermediaries of unity, the sensitive, the vegetative, the spirit, which is the celestial nature, and the elemental nature.

CHAPTER 63
*ON THE DIVISION OF THE POWERS OF THE
SOUL WITH REGARD TO ITSELF*

One should speak then about the distinction of the powers which the soul

quantum ad se, secundum Augustinum. Diuidit autem uires per racionalem, irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Per racionabilem est habilis illuminari ad cognoscendum aliquid supra se et iuxta se et in se et infra se; cognoscit quidem Deum supra se, se in se, angelum iuxta se, et quidquid celi ambitu continetur infra se. Per concupiscibilitatem et irascibilitatem, habilis est affici ad aliquid appetendum uel fugiendum, et amandum uel odiendum. Et ideo de racionabilitate anime omnis sensus oritur; de aliis autem omnis affectus. Nota ergo quod illam termembrem diuisionem reducit Augustinus ad bimembrem, sicut si diceretur : uirium anime quedam sunt cognitue, quedam affectiue; et cognitue ad uerum, affectiue ad bonum. Cognitiuas autem uirtutes generaliter subdiuidit duobus modis : uno modo per per tres diferencias, alio modo per quinque.

CAPITULUM 65
(VII) *DE DIFFERENCIA SECUNDUM*
UERITATEM ET FALSITATEM

In intellectuali uisione nunquam

possesses with regard to itself, following Augustine. He divides the powers into the rational, the irascible and the concupiscible. On account of the rational power it is predisposed to being illuminated to know that there is something that is above it, something near to it, something in it and something beneath it; indeed it knows that God is above it, it knows itself in itself, it knows that an angel is close to it, and that whatever is contained within the range of the sky is below God. On account of the concupiscible and the irascible [powers] it is predisposed to going towards something or fleeing it, it loves or hates it. And for that reason every sensation arises from the rationality of the soul; from the other powers then, all the emotions arise. Note therefore that Augustine reduced the three part division to a two part division, as he states: that certain powers of the soul are cognitive, certain affective; also the cognitive powers are for finding the truth, the affective for the good. But he subdivides the cognitive virtues generally into two ways: in one way through three differences, in the other way through five.

Chapter 65
On the diffence between truth and falsity

In intellectual vision the soul is never

fallitur anima. Aut enim intelligit anima quod uerum est, aut si uerum non est, non intelligit. In uisione autem corporali sepe fallitur anima, cum in ipsis corporibus fieri putat quod sit in corporeis sensibus: sicut nauigantibus uidentur moueri que stant in terra; et intuentibus celum sidera stare que mouentur; et diuariatis oculorum radiis, res una habere duas formas, ut unus homo habere duo capita, et in aqua remus fractus, et multa huiusmodi. In uisione autem spirituali siue ymaginaria aliquando fallitur et illuditur anima, aliquando non. Nam aliquando uidet uera, aliquando falsa, aliquando perturbata, aliquando tranquilla.

Certum namque est hanc esse in nobis spiritualem naturam, qua corporum similitudines aut formantur aut formate ingeruntur; siue cum presencia aliquo corporis sensu tangimus, et continuo eorum similitudo in spiritu formatur; siue cum ausencia iam nota, uel que non nouimus, cogitamus. Innumerabilia enim pro arbitrio et opinione nostra fingimus, que non sunt, uel esse nesciuntur. Innumerabiles quoque et alie forme rerum in animo nostro

deceived. For either the soul knows that something is true, if it is not true, it does not know. But in corporeal vision the soul is often deceived, since it thinks that what happens in the corporeal senses is what happens in actual bodies: just as to those who sail things seem to be moving which are stationary on land; and to those gazing at the sky the stars seem to be stationary whereas they are moving; and through the various rays of the eyes, one thing has two forms, as one man has two heads, and in water an oar seems broken, and many of these kinds. On the other hand, in spiritual vision or imaginary vision the soul is sometimes deceived and deluded, sometimes it is not. For sometimes it sees true things, sometimes false things, sometimes it is perturbed, sometimes it is tranquil.

For it is certain that this spiritual nature is in us, in which the likenesses of bodies are either formed, or they are infused already formed; either that happens when we are in contact, through some sense of the body, with objects that are present and immediately their likenesses are formed in the spirit; or when, in [their] absence, we think about things that are known or not known. For we imagine innumerable things in our judgement and opinion, things which do not exist or are not known

uersantur, uel cum aliquid facimus uel facturi sumus. Aliquando eciam, spiritu rapiente, tollitur anima in spiritu huiusmodi, uidendo siue bona, siue mala, siue intencione cogitacionis, siue aliqua ui morbi, ut frequencius per febrem accidere solet, siue commixtione cuiusdam alterius speciei siue boni siue mali. Ita per corporalium rerum ymagines in spiritu exprimuntur, tanquam corpora ipsis corporeis sensibus representantur. A dormientibus eciam multa uidentur, uel nichil, uel aliquid significancia; quorum omnium uisorum natura siue dormientibus, siue uigilantibus, eadem est; quoniam non ex alio genere sunt que uident, quam ex natura spiritus, hoc est spiritualis uirtutis, siue ymaginatie, in qua fiunt uel sunt.

III. DE DIVISIONE VIRIUM
ANIME SECUNDUM
DAMASCENUM
CAPITULUM 69
(VIII) *DE YMAGINACIONE*

De ymaginacione autem que est uirtus sensibilis interior, que secundum ordinem uirtutis principium est sensuum exteriorum, sicut dicit Damascenus : ymaginacio

to exist. The innumerable things and also other forms of things whirl around in the soul, either when we do something or are about to do something. Sometimes also, with a snatching by the spirit, the soul is lifted up into a spirit of some kind, [this is] either by seeing good, or evil, or from the intention of thought, or by some violence of disease, as usually happens more often through fever, or by a mixture of certain kinds of good or bad. Thus the images of corporeal things are themselves expressed in the spirit, just as bodies are represented by the corporeal senses themselves. Also many things are seen by those who sleep, either it is of no importance or it is something significant; and the nature of all visions, whether in those sleeping or in those awake are the same; since that which they see does not arise from a different genus other than the nature of spirit, that is, the spiritual or imaginative power, in which they occur or exist.

CHAPTER 69
ON IMAGINATION

And on the imagination which is an interior sensitive power, which, according to the order of a power, it is the principle of the exterior senses, as Damascene states: imagination is an irrational power of

est uirtus irrationalis anime, per sensus operans que dicitur sensus, supple : interior, ex quo datur intelligi quod fons et origo uirium exteriorum sensibilium est uirtus ymaginatio. Vnde organum ipsius, sicut dicit Damascenus, est anterior uenter cerebri a quo, sicut dicit Augustinus, originem habent nerui qui sunt organa sensuum exteriorum. Secundum autem ordinem actuum, posterior est ymaginatio sensibus exterioribus ; nam, sicut dicit Damascenus, per sensum constituitur passio que dicitur ymaginatio. Tamen ipse distinguit inter ymaginationem et fantasiam, quia ymaginatio est passio irrationalis anime, que ab ymaginabili aliquo fit ; fantasia uero est passio inanis que a nullo ymaginabili facta est, sicut cum aliquis ymaginatur chimeram.

Capitulum 71
(X) De memoria

Post ymaginationem et excogitativam uirutem, ordinat Damascenus memoratiuam. Est autem memoratiuum, sicut dicit Damascenus, memorie et rememoracionis promptuarium. Memoria autem est fantasia derelicta ab aliquo sensu secundum actum

the soul, operating through a sense which is called sensation, supply: interior, from which it is given to be understood that the source and origin of the exterior sensitive powers is the imaginative power. Consequently its organ, as Damascene states, is the foremost protuberance of the brain from which, as Augustine states, have as their origin the nerves which are the organs of the exterior senses. And following the order of acts the imagination is posterior to the sensitive exterior powers; for as Damascene states, through a sense a passion is constituted which is called imagination. However he himself distinguishes between imagination and fantasy, since imagination is a passion of the irrational soul, which is produced through what is imaginable; but fantasy is an empty passion which is not produced by the imaginable, such as when one imagines a chimera.

Chapter 71
On Memory

After the imagination and the excogitative power Damascene pronounces the [power of] memory. Memory is, as Damascene states, a storehouse of memories and recollections. And memory is the fantasy separated from some sense in accordance with a visible act; and he calls the fantasy a sensible form; or memory is a collection of

apparentem; fantasia autem dicit formam sensibilem; uel est memoria coarceruacio sensus et intelligencie. Anima enim sensibilia per sensus suscipit, scilicet sentit, et fit opinio; intelligibilia uero per intellectum et fit intelligencia. Cum igitur typos, id est formas, eorum que opinata est, et eorum que intellexerunt, custodit, memorari dicitur. Oportet autem scire, quoniam intelligibilium susceptio non fit nisi ex disciplina uel naturali ingenio; non enim ex sensu est. Nam sensibilia quidem secundum seipsa memorie commendantur; intelligibilium uero, siquidem didicimus, memoramur, substancie uero earum memoriam non habemus. Rememoracio uero dicitur memorie ab obliuione restitucio; obliuio autem est memorie ablacio. Igitur fantasticum quidem, id est ymaginatum, per sensus suscipiens materias, tradit excogitatio uel discretio; idem enim sunt, quod suscipiens et diiudicans transmittit memoratio. Organum autem memoratiui est posterior uentriculus cerebri et animalis spiritus qui est in ipso.

sensations and of thoughts. For, on the one hand, the soul apprehends sensitive things through the senses, that is, it senses, and opinion is formed; on the other hand, it receives intelligible things through the intellect, and understanding occurs. When it preserves the images, that is, the forms, those which are expressed as opinion and those which are understood, it is called memory. It must be known that the apprehension of intelligibles only occurs from learning or from a natural ability; for it does not come from sensation. For indeed sensitive things are commended to the memory according to themselves; on the other hand, we remember intelligibles, if indeed we have learnt them, but of their substance, we do not have a memory. Remembrance is said to be the restitution of memory from oblivion; and oblivion is the taking away of memories. Therefore the fantasy, that is, the imagination, apprehending material [forms] through the senses, hands over to the *excogitative* or discerning power; for they are the same, since it entrusts to the faculty of memory what it receives and judges. And the organ of the [power of] memory is the posterior ventricle of the brain and the animal spirit which is present in it.

IV. DE DIVISIONE VIRIUM
ANIME SECUNDUM AVIENNAM

CAPITULUM 97
(X) *DE SENSU COMMUNIS*

Sensus autem communis est uis ordinata in prima concavitate cerebri, recipiens per se ipsam omnes formas que imprimuntur quinque sensibus et redduntur ei. Hec autem uirtus est centrum omnium sensuum et a qua deriuantur ut rami. Dicitur autem hic sensus formalis et communis. Communis secundum duos modos: uno modo in quantum communiter habet conuerti super actus sensuum particularium, prout dicitur: uideo quod audio, et audio quod uideo; et uideo quod odor, etc. Alio modo secundum quod habet conferre sensibilia diuersorum sensuum, ut cum confertur album, nigrum, dulci uel saporato, quoniam est illud.

Secundum ergo hoc duos actus, quorum primus est absolutus, secundus comparatus, dicitur sensus communis. Sensus uero formalis dicitur ratione ymaginacionis sibi coniuncte que dicitur uirtus formalis, eo quod remouetur antequam deleatur forma que descripta est in

Chapter 97
On the common sense

The common sense is the power located in the first cavity of the brain, receiving, through itself, all the forms which are imprinted by the five senses and transmitted to it [from them]. This power is the centre of all the senses, and from which they are derived as its branches. It is called the formal sense and the common sense. Common according to two modes: in one mode inasmuch as it is able to turn towards the acts of the particular senses, according to which it is stated: I see what I hear, and I hear what I see; and I see what I smell etc. In the other mode according to which it can gather together the sensitive objects of the diverse senses, as when white is united to black, or sweet to savoury, since it is this [power].

Therefore, following these two acts, the first of which is independent, the second is relational, it is called the common sense. It is called the formal sense by reason of the imagination joined to it, which is called the formal power, in the way that it moves to preserve the form, which is received through the exterior sense before the form is destroyed and in

sensu communi, quia format, siue formam receptam per exteriorem sensum, re absente, continet. Vnde ponit Auicenna experimentum : cum uolumus scire differentiam inter opus sensus exterioris, et opus sensus formalis, id est communis, attende dispositionem unius gutte cadentis de pluuiis, et uidebis rectam lineam; et attende dispositionem alicuius recti, cuius summitas mouetur in circuitu, et uidebitur circulus. Impossibile autem est ut apprehendas lineam aut circulum nisi illam rem sepe inspexeris. Impossibile etiam est ut sensus exterior uideat eam bis, nisi uidebit eam ubi est. Cum autem describitur in sensu communi, et remouetur antequam deleatur forma que descripta est in sensu communi, apprehendit eam sensus exterior illuc ubi est, apprehendit etiam eam sensus communis quasi esset illuc ubi fuit, et quasi esset illuc ubi est; et ita uidet extensionem circularem aut rectam. Hoc autem impossibile est fieri sine sensu exteriori. Sed sensus communis formalis apprehendit illa duo, quamuis destructa sit illa res. Hac ergo ratione dicitur sensus formans secundum Auicennam. Allis uero placet, ut sensus communis

the absence of the object. Consequently Avicenna posits an experiment. When we wish to know the difference between the function of the exterior sense and that of the formal sense, that is to say the common sense, consider the relative position of a drop of rain which is falling, and you will see a straight line; consider also the relative position of anything in a straight line. Consider the relative position of this straight line whose summit is presented in a circle and you see a circle. It is impossible for you to see the line and the circle unless you look at them often. It is impossible even for an exterior sense to see the thing in two places, it is only possible that you see it where it is. Since each is assigned to the common sense and it is removed before the form which was assigned to it is deleted, the common sense grasps it in the place it is, the common sense grasps both 'as if' it was in that place and 'as if' it is also in that other place; in this way it sees circular or straight extension. It is impossible for this to occur without an exterior sense. But the common sense apprehends these two aspects, although one was destroyed. For this reason it is called the 'sense which forms' by Avicenna. And it is acceptable to others that it is called the formal common sense, by reason of its proper apprehension which is of the common sensibles which are size,

formalis dicatur, ratione sue proprie apprehensionis que est sensibilium communium que sunt magnitudo, motus, quies, numerus, etc.

Capitulum 98 (XXIII)
(XI) De ymaginacione

Secunda uirtus est ymaginacio. Est autem, sicut dicit Auicenna, uis ordinata in extremo concauitatis anterioris partis cerebri, retinens que recipit sensus communis a quinque sensibus, et remanet in ea post remocionem illorum sensibilium. Vult ergo dicere quod sensus communis est apprehendere formas omnium sensibilium. Virtutis uero que uocatur ymaginacio, retinere. Dicit ergo quod sensus communis et ymaginacio sunt quasi una uirtus, et quasi non diuersificantur in subiecto, sed in forma. Hec enim recipit, illa retinet. Quod autem recipit, non est hoc quod retinet. Virtus ergo que est ymaginacio que etiam uocatur formalis sensus, formam sensibilem retinet et non discernit illam nullo modo. Sensus etiam communis et sensus exteriores discernunt ea, dicentes hoc esse album uel nigrum, etc.

Differenciam autem hanc probat quod ex una ui est recipere, et

movement, rest, number, etc.

Chapter 98
On the imagination

The second power is the imagination. It is, states Avicenna, a power located in the furthest part of the front ventricle of the brain, retaining what the common sense receives from the five senses and it remains in it after the removal of those sensitive objects. He wants to say therefore that the [function] of the common sense is apprehending the forms of all the sensitive objects. On the other hand, the function of the power, which is called imagination, is to retain. He states therefore that the common sense and the imagination are as if they are one power, and, as if they are not distinguished in subject but in form. For one receives, the other retains. And that which receives is not that which retains. The power, therefore, which is the imagination is also called the formal sense, it retains the sensitive form and does not separate it in any other way. Again the common sense and the exterior senses discern those things, stating this is white or black etc.

He proves this difference, that receiving is in accordance with one power

ex alia retinere; quod est uidere in aqua que habet potenciam recipiendi sculpturas et impressiones figurarum, non tamen habet potenciam retinendi. Differentis ergo uirtutis erit retinere sensibilia et recipere ea. Alia ergo uirtus est ymaginacio a sensu communi; et hec est sententia Auicenne. Aliis uero uidetur quod ymaginacio sit conuersio ipsius uirtutis sensibilis interioris super ymaginem, tanquam rem; quorum utrumque est uerum, sed secundum diuersos modos accipiendi hoc nomen: ymaginacio

and retaining is in accordance with another; one can see that water has the potential for receiving images and imprinted forms, it does not, however, have the potential to retain. It belongs therefore to different powers to retain sensitive objects and to receive them. Imagination is therefore, a different power from the common sense: and this is the opinion of Avicenna. But to others it seems that imagination is the conversion of the interior sensitive power itself upon the image, as it were, the object; both of these positions are true, but according to different ways of accepting this name: imagination.

APPENDIX (II)
OUTLINE
OF CHAPTERS OF THE *SUMMA DE ANIMA*

Prologue
FIRST CONSIDERATION.
ON THE SOUL ACCORDING TO SUBSTANCE

I. Whether the Soul Exists

I. That the Soul Exists

II. What is the Soul

2. What is the Soul according to Definition

3. Explanation of the First Definition

4. A Doubt

5. Another Doubt

6. Explanation of the Second Definition

7. A Doubt arising from the Above

8. Explanation of the Third Definition

9. Explanation of the Fourth Definition

10. Explanation of the Fifth Definition

11. Explanation of the Sixth Definition

12. Explanation of the Seventh Definition

III. On the Soul with regard to Being

13. What is the Soul according to Essence

14. That the Soul is not from the Divine Substance

15. That the Soul is not made from Matter

16. That the Soul is not from a Soul

17. On the Formal Cause of the Soul

18. On the Efficient Cause of the Soul

19. On the Final Cause of the Soul

20. On the Origin of the Soul with regard to Duration

IV. On the Soul with regard to Being

21. On the Soul with regard to Being

22. That the Soul is a Substance

23. That the Soul is Incorporeal

24. That the Soul is Simple

25. That the Soul is Simple according to which it excludes essential parts

26. That the Soul is One in Three Powers

V. On the Soul with regard to Image

27. On the Soul with regard to Image

28. What is the Image in the Divine Persons Essentially

29. What is the Image in the Divine Persons Personally

30. What is the Account of Image in Man

31. What is Being in relation to Image

32. What is the Difference between Image and Similitude

33. In regard to what is Man said to be made in the Image

34. In What consists the Being of an Image

35. How is the Soul Representative of the Trinity

VI. On the Soul in relation to the Body

36. On the Soul in Relation to Being in the Body

37. If the Soul is united to the Body through a Intermediary or without an Intermediary

38. On Unity on the part of the Body

39. On the Different Intermediaries of Unity

40. On the Mode of Union

41. Why is the Soul united to the Body

42. On the mode in which the Soul is present in the Body

VII. On the Immortality of the Soul

43. On the Soul after the Separation of the Body

44. On the Immortality of the Soul

45. On the Removal of Error with regard to Immortality

VIII. On the Passibility of the Soul

46. On the Passibility of the Soul

47. On the Passibility of Punishment

48. How the soul, present in the body, suffers because of the body

49. How the soul suffers outside the Body

IX. On the Place of the Soul

50. On the Place of the Soul

51. Should a Spiritual Substance have a place?

52. Whether a Spiritual Substance should have a Corporeal Place

53. Whether a Spiritual Substance should have a Spiritual Place

54. Can two Spiritual Substances be in the same Place?

55. On the Place of the Soul separated from the Body

X. On the Movement of the Separated Soul

56. On the Movement of the Separated Soul

57. On the Sudden or Successive Movement of the Soul

58. Whether the Soul moves through an Intermediary Space

SECOND CONSIDERATION.
ON THE POWERS OF THE SOUL

I. On the Soul and its Powers

59. On the Soul and its Powers

60. Whether the Soul is its Powers

61. On the Differences and the Distinctions of the Powers of the Soul

II. On the Division of the Powers according to Augustine

62. Division of the Powers according to Augustine

63. Division of the Powers according to Itself

64. On the Powers of the Soul through three differences

65. On the Differences between Truth and Falsity

66. On the Cognitive Powers distinguished by Five differences

67. On the Affective Powers

III. ON the Division of the Powers of the Soul according to John Damascene

68. On the Division of the Powers according to John Damascene

69. On Imagination

70. On Opinion

71. On Memory

72. On Mind

73. On Mind which is described in two ways

74. Division of the Appetitive Irrational powers

75. On Joy

76. On Sadness

77. On Fear

78. On Anger

79. On the Rational Motive Power

80. On Reason

81. On Free Will

IV. On the Division of the Powers according to Avicenna

82. On the Vegetative Power as Independent

83. On the Vegetative Power as Relational

84. On the Function of the Generative Power

85. Division of the Sensitive Powers

86. On *Fantasia*

87. On the Cognitive Power according to the Animal Mode

88. On the Number of the Senses in the Order of Purposes

89. On the Number of the Senses according to the Nature of Intermediaries

90. On the Number of the Senses according to the Mode of Sensing

91. The Number of the Senses according to the Number of Principles

92. On the Different Organs of the Senses

93. On the Differences between the Intermediaries of the Senses

94. On the Objects of the Senses

95. On the Apprehending Interior Power

96. On the Division of the Sensitive Interior Power

97. On the Common Sense

98. On Imagination
99. On the Imaginative Power
100. On Sleep
101. On the Estimative Power
102. On the Memorative Power
103. On the Motive Sensitive Powers
104. On the Motive Power according to the Animal Mode
105. On the Distinction of the Motive Powers
106. On the Difference between the Irascible and the Concupiscible Power
107. On the Act and Movement of the Irascible and the Concupiscible Power
108. Whether the Affective Powers are identical with the Appetitive Powers
109. On Power and on Aptitude
110. On the Motive Exterior Power
111. On the Rational Powers
112. On the Organ of the Intellective Power
113. On the Object of the Intellective Power
114. On the Distinction of the Intellective Power from the
Apprehensive Power
115. On the Differences between the Possible and Agent Intellect
116. Whether the Agent Intellect is separate
117. On the Function of the Agent Intellect
118. On the Differences of the Intellective Apprehending Power
according to the Account of Order
119. On the Intellective Motive Power