MURAL - Maynooth University Research Archive Library



    Less is more? Research Joint Ventures and Entry Deterrence


    O'Sullivan, Paul (2013) Less is more? Research Joint Ventures and Entry Deterrence. Working Paper. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)

    [img]
    Preview
    Download (716kB) | Preview


    Share your research

    Twitter Facebook LinkedIn GooglePlus Email more...



    Add this article to your Mendeley library


    Abstract

    This paper analyses the incentives of incumbent firms to form a first-mover RJV when faced with possible entry. If entry is accommodated, firms’ relative profits under R&D competition and RJV formation depend on R&D spillovers and firms’ R&D efficiency. RJV formation may make entry unprofitable if spillovers are sufficiently low. If entry is deterred, RJV formation may be more profitable. Similarly, whether accommodation or deterrence is more profitable under RJV formation depends on spillovers and the firms’ efficiency. How welfare is affected by RJV formation depends on whether output is exported or domestically consumed. There may be a role for active government policy to affect market outcomes.

    Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
    Keywords: Research Joint Ventures; Entry Deterrence;
    Academic Unit: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
    Item ID: 4585
    Depositing User: Ms Sandra Doherty
    Date Deposited: 15 Nov 2013 15:56
    URI:

      Repository Staff Only(login required)

      View Item Item control page

      Downloads

      Downloads per month over past year