THE ORIGINS OF THE HUSSERL-HEIDEGGER PHILOSOPHICAL DISPUTE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY PHENOMENOLOGY

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Abstract: This paper investigates the different ‘scientific’ methods of enquiry that were proposed by Brentano, Dilthey, and Husserl in late nineteenth-century philosophy as background to understanding the philosophical dispute that later emerged between Husserl and Heidegger regarding the definition of phenomenology in the twentieth century. It argues that once Heidegger accepts both Dilthey’s approach and hermeneutic method of enquiry into human experiences, he is unable to follow Husserl in his development of Brentano’s idea of a descriptive science of consciousness and its objectivities into an eidetic science of pure intentional consciousness.

I.

Introduction

Martin Heidegger is generally regarded as one of the most important figures of the new phenomenological movement in philosophy that Edmund Husserl inaugurated in Germany at the turn of the twentieth century and which spread rapidly throughout Germany, France, Europe, and further field in the first half of that century. Yet despite this reputation, Heidegger, as is well known, disagreed fundamentally with Husserl regarding not only the subject matter of phenomenology but also its method of analysis. For Husserl, phenomenology is an eidetic science of consciousness and its objectivities. For Heidegger, phenomenology offers the possibility of raising anew the question of the meaning of being through a hermeneutic-existential analysis of ‘the facticity of Dasein’ (in Heidegger’s sense of those terms). To what extent, then, Heidegger adheres to Husserl’s idea of phenomenology is a matter

1. Since there appeared many different versions of phenomenology that not only deviated significantly from Husserl’s original idea but also came into conflict with each other, the question ‘what is phenomenology?’ emerged by the mid-half of the twentieth century. See Pierre Thévenaz, ‘Qu’est-ce que la phénoménologie?’, Revue de théologie et de philosophie, 9:1 (1952), 9–30.
of much dispute. Indeed, this issue became so contentious between Husserl and Heidegger that when Husserl enlisted Heidegger’s help to write the entry on phenomenology for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* in the late 1920s, they could not agree over the drafts so that Husserl published his version without Heidegger’s contribution. This dispute in phenomenology was not resolved between Husserl and Heidegger during their respective lifetimes, nor is it resolved among commentators and critics of the Husserl-Heidegger philosophical relationship today.

In order to shed light on this intractable dispute, in this paper I would like to step back and draw attention to some of the main features of the different ‘scientific’ methods of Franz Brentano in descriptive psychology and Wilhelm Dilthey in historical hermeneutics that were profoundly influential on Husserl’s and Heidegger’s later proposed divergent methods for phenomenology. The nature of the philosophical disagreement between Husserl and Heidegger, however, is intricate and complex. In the first section of this paper, therefore, I will sketch the parameters of this disagreement and the controversial place that Heidegger’s philosophy occupies in relation to Husserl’s idea of phenomenology and Brentano’s science of descriptive psychology. Section two examines Husserl’s critique of Brentano’s method of inner perception in descriptive psychology and its replacement with eidetic intuition, which Husserl considers to be a more appropriate and rigorous scientific method of enquiry in descriptive phenomenology. Heidegger, however, rejects both Husserl’s eidetic analysis and

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2. In the 1960s, Herbert Spiegelberg was probably the first to raise the question, ‘[H]ow far is Heidegger’s thinking rightfully to be included in the history of the Phenomenological Movement?’ (*The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, 3rd revised ed. [Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994], p. 339). This issue remains unresolved, for, ‘to what extent Heidegger should be seen as a follower of Husserl and thus a phenomenologist in something like the same sense is still hotly debated’ (Søren Overgaard, ‘Heidegger’s Early Critique of Husserl’, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 11:2 [2003], 157–75 [p. 157]).


Brentano’s method of inner perception in his conception of phenomenology, siding instead with Dilthey’s emphasis on hermeneutics as the more appropriate method in phenomenology. In the final section of the paper, therefore, I will draw attention to Heidegger’s attempt in the 1920s to deploy Dilthey’s hermeneutic science as a reforming measure within the kind of descriptive-eidetic science that Husserl practiced in phenomenology. This is the source both of Heidegger’s conception of phenomenology and of the dispute that later arose between Husserl and Heidegger regarding what phenomenology is. The aim of this paper, then, is not to judge whether Husserl and Heidegger are correct or incorrect in their understandings and assessments of each other’s work, but to explain why such different conceptions of phenomenology did emerge, and had to emerge, between Husserl and Heidegger.

II. Heidegger’s Disputed Place within Husserl’s Idea of Phenomenology

With the publication of his *Logical Investigations* (1900–01), Husserl launched what he considered to be a new way of thinking in philosophy which he called ‘phenomenology’. Many of Husserl’s students subsequently affiliated their philosophies with his (earlier or later) development of phenomenology, and many other thinkers who read his work likewise paid tribute to the direct influence of his idea of phenomenology on their thinking. Yet despite this fact, none of Husserl’s so-called followers actually committed themselves to Husserl’s definitive view and conception of phenomenology as a rigorous eidetic science of pure intentional consciousness and its objectivities that he eventually elaborated and defended in *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*

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5. This is a revised and elaborated version of a paper entitled ‘Different Scientific Methods in 20th Century Phenomenology’, which I first presented at a conference on ‘The Idea, History, and Institutional Foundations of Science’ at Maynooth University, December 9, 2017. I would like to thank my colleagues Dr Amos Edelheit for his reading and comments on the original draft and Prof. Philipp Rosemann for his reading, careful editing, and comments on the paper that have helped me greatly clarify some important points.


7. Spiegelberg was the first to compose a major study of some of the main thinkers associated with this movement in his *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction* (n. 2 above).
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(1913). Today, nonetheless, commentators and critics still accredit Husserl as the founder of this new phenomenological movement in philosophy.9

Heidegger, without doubt, is the most well-known philosopher of the twentieth century for the expression of an alternative view of phenomenology to Husserl’s, in Being and Time (1927).10 In this unfinished essay, dedicated to Husserl ‘in friendship and admiration,’ Heidegger maintains that the main task and priority in phenomenology is not to study consciousness and its objectivities, but ‘to raise anew the question of the meaning of being (die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein).’11 “This question,’ Heidegger remarks, ‘has been forgotten today.’12 Furthermore, Heidegger argues that if we are to address this question, we need to take another forgotten topic in philosophy into consideration, namely, ‘Dasein.’ This (in)famous term is notoriously difficult to explain, usually being left untranslated as a technical term in Heidegger’s philosophy. By ‘Dasein,’ however,


10. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962, 2000); German: Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927). Further references will be to Being and Time, with pagination of the original German text following the English page reference, separated by a slash.

11. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 18/1.

12. Ibid., p. 21/2. At the time of his writing of Being and Time, Heidegger believes and stresses the point that, although this question had been forgotten by his contemporaries in general and by Husserl in particular, it was ‘a thematic question of actual investigation (als thematische Frage wirklicher Untersuchung)’ among the ancient Greek philosophers (ibid.). Later, Heidegger would argue that this question had been forgotten in the entire tradition of western metaphysics, from Parmenides onwards. There is, nonetheless, a difference in the way in which it is forgotten in traditional metaphysics and in Husserl’s phenomenology. In metaphysics, it is necessarily forgotten and it cannot be raised. In phenomenology, it is necessarily forgotten by Husserl because of the latter’s theoretical commitments to problems in modern philosophy, but it requires to be thought—at least, so Heidegger argues. See Cyril McDonnell, Heidegger’s Way Through Phenomenology to the Question of the Meaning of Being: A Study of Heidegger’s Philosophical Path of Thinking from 1909 to 1927 (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2015), esp. chap. 1: ‘The Forgotten Question of the Meaning of Being in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research’ (pp. 8–71).
Heidegger means: ‘the there (das Da)’ of being (Sein) in which I find myself implicated or ‘thrown’ (geworfen) as that-which-is (als Seiendes) in being and as a being who has at least some implicit understanding of what it means to be (Seinsverständnis) a being in being.\(^{13}\) Heidegger stresses that ‘[t]his average and vague understanding of being is a fact’.\(^{14}\) Yet this ‘facticity (Faktizität) of Dasein,’ Heidegger continues, is not comparable to facts (Tatsachen) about that-which-is that exists outside of Dasein’s own understanding of being, such as, for instance, that the sky exists, or is blue, or that two and two are four.\(^{15}\) The facticity of Dasein, rather, is constitutive of Dasein itself. Thus it follows that ‘facticity [in Dasein] is not the factuality of the factum brutum of something lying-in-stock, but a characteristic of Dasein’s being—one which has been taken up into existence, even if proximally it has been thrust aside.’\(^{16}\) According to Heidegger, therefore, constitutive of Dasein is some immediate and implicit understanding of the being of beings in one’s own ‘being-in-the-world’ (In-der-Welt-Sein), even if we pay little to no heed to this ‘fact’ most of the time. Nevertheless, this does not mean that this ‘fact’ has no ontic or ontological significance for understanding Dasein or in philosophy. On the contrary, it is precisely because ‘this being’, Dasein, as a particular being, ‘is concerned in its being about that being’ that ‘it is thus ontically distinguished from other beings and just does not occur among other beings.’\(^{17}\) Thus, even if it is the case that we seldom pay heed to either Dasein or the question of the meaning of being, ‘the [meaning and understanding of its] being is that which is at stake for every such being.’\(^{18}\) In Heidegger’s formulation and depiction of Dasein, Dasein is a kind of being that expresses concern for its

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13. We have to interpret this technical term of Heidegger’s philosophy in this rather complicated sense, for this is not what the word normally means in German (but this does explain why Heidegger often took to hyphenating this term as ‘Da-Sein’). In everyday German ‘Dasein’ simply means existence. Thus, for example, Brentano’s lectures on the existence of God, delivered at Würzburg and Vienna universities (1868–1891), were entitled and posthumously published in 1980 as *Vom Dasein Gottes.*


15. See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 23/4: ‘Whenever one cognizes anything or makes an assertion, whenever one comports oneself towards that-which-is (Seiende), even towards oneself, some use is made of “being” (Sein); and this expression (Ausdruck) is held to be intelligible “without further ado”, just as everyone understands “The sky is blue”, “I am merry”, and the like.’


17. Ibid., p. 32/12, trans. mod.: ‘Das Dasein ist ein Seiendes, das nicht nur unter anderem Seienden vorkommt. Es ist vielmehr dadurch ontisch ausgezeichnet, daß es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht.’

own being (Sein) in what it does about the place. This is part of the ‘essence’ of Dasein's understanding of itself (Seinsverständnis). This is how Heidegger defines this entity and this term in his philosophy: ‘We have chosen to designate this entity as “Dasein”, a term which is purely an expression of its being (als reiner Seinsausdruck).’ 19 It now follows for Heidegger that

19. Ibid., p. 33/12.

Unlike Husserl’s interest, then, Heidegger’s interest in phenomenology does not fall on the intentionality of consciousness and its objectivities. It focuses instead on the understanding of being (Seinsverständnis) that is implicitly present in the facticity of Dasein. This means that Heidegger’s focus does not rest on the being of things that are outside of Dasein. Not that Heidegger denies the existence of things outside of one’s own understanding of being. Rather, in the starting point of his ‘path of thinking’, he does and is required to distinguish about the question of the meaning of being between the being of things that are and the understanding of the being of things that are in order for his thinking on the question of the meaning of being to unfold. As he writes in Being and Time,

Beings are quite independently of the experience by which they are disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is ascertained. But being ‘is’ only in the understanding of those entities to whose being something like an understanding of being belongs. Hence being can be something unconceptualized, but it never completely fails to be understood. 21

In his articulation and construction of the question of the meaning of being, then, Heidegger recognises a pivotal distinction between two concepts of being: the being of beings and the understanding of the being of beings. It is with the latter that Heidegger is solely concerned. And in this latter issue, Dasein, as Heidegger understands that term, must occupy a privileged role both in addressing and in retrieving (wiederholen) the question of the meaning of being precisely
because this being is both a being and the only being who can put the question about the meaning of being directly to being itself, as it were, that is to say, from within that being's (Dasein's) own implicit understanding of the meaning of being. This, in Heidegger's estimation, gives Dasein both ontic and ontological priority in the addressing of the question of the meaning of being, which he wishes to do in phenomenology. This ontic-ontological priority of Dasein in the formulation of the question of the meaning of being is of fundamental importance to Heidegger's definition of phenomenology as 'fundamental ontology' in Being and Time. This priority also indicates that Heidegger has departed from any traditional, pre-critical starting point in metaphysics. That things are, the being of things, outside of whatever understanding of the being of things that are in Dasein, is to be set aside from the start. Doing traditional metaphysics is not the aim, nor the goal, nor an option for the enquiry in Being and Time. Heidegger's approach to ontology in Being and Time, like Husserl's, rather, is post-Kantian.

With these stipulations and strictures in place, Heidegger can now proceed to argue that the question of the meaning of being must be methodologically broached through a hermeneutic-existential analysis of the implicit understanding of being that is found in the facticity of Dasein. This, Heidegger believes, ensures that his approach to the question of the meaning of being will be concrete work in phenomenology and insures it against becoming a 'free-floating thesis' or abstract approach. It also means that this question can become a very particular question for each and every one of us (qua Dasein), for, as Kierkegaard succinctly puts it, 'I always reason from existence, not towards existence'. Unlike Kierkegaard, however, this, for Heidegger, includes the question of the meaning of the being of anything that is, however universal such a concept may extend or be extended, including understanding the being of one's own individual existence. Just as for Kierkegaard and Kant before him, how-

22. See Heidegger, Being and Time, esp. §1, §3, and §4. According to one commentator, Heidegger regarded it as his task to analyse 'Dasein' ontologically, 'a phenomenon [. . .] not contemplated and not analysed by the Greeks or ever since in later philosophical tradition' (Werner Brock, 'An Account of “Being and Time”', in 'Introduction' to Martin Heidegger, Existence and Being, trans. by W. Brock [London: Vision, 1949], pp. 25–131 [p. 27]).
25. Ibid., p. 61/36.
27. See Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 63/39, 'The question of the meaning of being is the most universal and the emptiest; but at the same time in it lies the possibility of its very own precise particularisation for any individual Dasein'; trans. mod: ‘Die Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins ist die universalste und leerste; in ihr liegt aber zugleich die Möglichkeit ihrer eigenen schärfsten Vereinzelung auf das jeweilige Dasein.’
however, there is for Heidegger no issue of proving (or not proving) the existence (or non-existence) of something, only deeper engagement with the issue itself (*die Sache selbst*), that is, the *question* of the meaning of being that is implicitly present in Dasein. This engagement with the question of the meaning of being cannot step outside of Dasein. It can only step back into it simply because the facticity of the experience of the ‘there of being’ (Dasein), a facticity in which I find myself implicated as that which is in being, is a particular experience behind which none of us can go (*unhintergehbar*): ‘As existent, it [Dasein] never comes back behind its thrownness in such a way that it might first release this “that-it-is-and-has-to-be” from its *being-its-self (aus seinem Selbstsein)* and lead it into the there (*das Da*)’.28 Thus it is from this unavoidable (*unhintergehbar*) existential-phenomenological starting point that a methodological reappraisal of the origin of (the concept of) what being means will be re-enacted by Heidegger in his project of fundamental ontology.29 When Heidegger, therefore, insists that ‘*only as phenomenology is ontology possible*’,30 this sentence cannot be rewritten and inverted to mean ‘*only as [pre-critical] ontology is [Husserlian] phenomenology possible*’—as Husserl and others had thought—without gross distortion of Heidegger’s meaning and approach to ontology in phenomenology. It means, rather, that it is only through adopting a post-Kantian existential-phenomenological approach towards the question of the meaning of being that the question of the meaning of being itself becomes visible at all.

28. Ibid., p. 330/284. ‘Existierend kommt es nie hinter seine Geworfenheit zurück, so daß es dieses “daß es ist und zu sein hat” je eigens erst aus seinen Selbstsein entlassen und in das Da führen könnte.’

29. This entails, as Heidegger explains in *Being and Time*, a ‘destruction’ of all metaphysical reflection on beings as beings in the history of substantialist metaphysics, whatever guise such has taken and however it has been interpreted from Aristotle to Husserl. Otto Pöggeler traces the link between ‘destruction’ and ‘construction’ as a new way of looking at the history of philosophy to the concept of the ‘moment’ (*Augenblick*), which Heidegger explains in the following terms to the students in his winter lectures of 1929–1930: ‘what we characterise here as the “moment” is what Kierkegaard actually conceptualised for the first time in philosophy—a conception that for the first time since antiquity initiates the possibility of a completely new epoch of philosophy’ (quoted by Otto Pöggeler, ‘Destruction and Moment’, trans. by Daniel Magurshak, in *Reading Heidegger from the Start*, ed. by Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren [New York: State University of New York Press, 1994], pp. 137–56 [p. 138]). In his 1920 summer semester lecture course at Freiburg University, however, Heidegger had already subjected Dilthey’s historical hermeneutics to such a Kierkegaardian ‘destructive reading’ and ‘possibility’. See Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression. Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation*, trans. by Tracy Colony (London and New York: Continuum, 2010), esp. the last two sections of this course, §18 (‘The destruction of Diltheyan philosophy’) and §19 (‘Natorp and Dilthey—the task of philosophy’).

Heidegger’s main philosophical disagreement with Husserl in phenomenology, therefore, amounts to this. The understanding of being (Seinsverständnis) which is implicit in my very awareness of the there of being, and in which I find myself implicated as that-which-is in being, can and must become the issue itself at stake (die Sache selbst) and in dispute (das Streitige) in Husserl’s own call in phenomenology to go ‘back to the things themselves’ (zurück zu den Sachen selbst).31

Husserl, of course, thought otherwise. Throughout his career, Husserl followed his mentor Franz Brentano (the descriptive psychologist) in insisting that philosophy is a strict science, or it is nothing at all.32 Furthermore, Husserl agreed with Brentano that philosophy is a science that concentrates on the intentionality of consciousness, that is, on the way in which our human consciousness is always a consciousness of something. Brentano had discovered this tenet in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874).33 Following Locke, Hume,
J. S. Mill, and others, Brentano argued that the way to gain knowledge of our consciousness and its objectivities in all its diverse mental and moral activities is from within ‘inner perception’, that is to say, from consciousness reflecting upon itself.34 Here, we need to appeal to nothing other than the testimony and evidence of a true experiential judgement; for, ‘inner perception tells me that I am now having such-and-such sound or colour sensations, or that I am now thinking or willing this or that.’35 Husserl, in his 1931 ‘Author’s Preface to the English Edition’ of Ideas I (1913), explicitly recalls and reminds his reader that ‘his [Brentano’s] conversion (Umwertung) of the scholastic concept of intentionality into a descriptive root-concept of psychology constitutes a great discovery, apart from which phenomenology could not have come into being at all’.36 ‘The name (der Titel) of the problem that encompasses the whole of phenomenology,’ Husserl declares, ‘is intentionality. The name precisely expresses the fundamental property of consciousness.’37 In Ideas I, therefore, Husserl aligns reflection in phenomenology to this Brentanian-Lockean approach to the study of human consciousness; for, as he writes,

Reflection is a name for acts (ein Titel für Akte) in which the stream of mental processes (Erlebnisstrom), with all its manifold occurrences (mental process-moments, intentionalia), becomes evidentially apprehensible and analysable (evident faßbar und analysierbar). It is, as we can also say, the name of the method of consciousness leading to the cognition of any consciousness whatever (Sie ist, so können wir es auch ausdrücken, der Titel der Bewußtseinsmethode für die Erkenntnis von Bewußtsein überhaupt).38

Husserl, then, was in no doubt about both the cogency and the originality of Brentano’s discovery of the intentionality of consciousness and its significance

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38. Ibid., p. 177/147.
for his own idea of phenomenology. Where Husserl disagreed with Brentano was in the role of ‘eidetic’ analysis in phenomenology. In Husserl’s estimation, the inner perception of factual experiences—for example, that I am seeing a colour (i.e., particular sense judgements)—cannot justify the validity, universality, and necessity that are characteristic of the truth of an a priori judgement that we can and do make about those experiences, such as ‘colour implies extension’. These judgements must have a basis in experience upon which the evidence of such inner perceptions rests. In such a priori judgements as ‘colour implies extension’, Husserl notes, we are inspecting colour itself and making a judgement about colour as a universal object of experience, and not just about particular sense judgements of colours. Thus ‘intuiting essences’, Husserl writes in his famous 1910–11 Logos essay ‘Philosophy as Rigorous Science’, ‘conceals no more difficulties or “mystical” secrets than does perception. When we bring “colour” to full intuitive clarity, to givenness for ourselves, then the datum is an “essence” […]. As far as intuition—i.e., having an intuitive consciousness—extends, so far extends the possibility of a corresponding “ideation” (as I called it in Logische Untersuchungen), or “seeing essence” (Wesensschau).’

It is of the essence of colour to be extended. This is what is grasped about colour itself in the judgement that colour implies extension. We cannot know colours without colours being extended. For Husserl, then, all eidetic laws are eidetic-ontological laws. They express the ‘inability-to-be-otherwise’ for the experienced or judged object, and not the factual, empirical, psychological ‘incapacity-to-represent-things-otherwise.’ We can, of course, see green leaves become brown leaves, imagine particular colours, or not experience at all Hume’s missing shade of blue, but if a colour exists, it is extended. We cannot think away extension from the being of colour itself. It thus follows that Husserl’s account of the ‘intuition of an essence’ is bound up with his sustained reflections on ‘dependent and non-dependent contents’ of judgement. As Theodore de Boer sums it up, ‘when a certain content is subjected to variation in fantasy, we discover that there are limits to the variation. To go beyond such a limit is to rob the object of one of its essential characteristics. This invariable limit is therefore part of the essence. The aspects that can be altered in fantasy are non-essential or contingent.’ That Husserl, then, can regard colour as a universal object given

39. Also see Edmund Husserl, Phenomenological Psychology: Lectures, Summer Semester 1925, trans. by John Scanlon (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977), section (d): ‘Brentano as pioneer for research in internal experience—discovery of intentionality as the fundamental character of the psychic’ (pp. 22–27).
in its ‘living bodily reality (in seiner leibhaften Wirklichkeit), to (eidetic) perception, ‘so to speak (sozusagen); should be enough to alert commentators to the fact that in this analogy Husserl has in mind the givenness of an object for perception—and not the full presence of the living body of a fellow human being.\(^{43}\)

The process of eidetic analysis, then, requires variation of factual experiences, but for the purpose of reaching the invariant intelligibility of the thing itself—the thing itself being the essence itself. When we attempt to ‘think away’ or ‘annihilate’ those contents ‘in thought’ that either can or cannot be ‘eliminated’, what we are doing is ‘trying to discover the independence or non-independence of something’.\(^{44}\) ‘Eidetic ideation’, ‘eidetic variation’, ‘eidetic abstraction’, and ‘eidetic reduction’, therefore, all mean the same; they are all part of the same process. This form of ‘seeing’ is ‘not an odd form of imagination’, as de Boer remarks, ‘but a procedure that is rigorously scientific, according to Husserl’\(^{45}\).

Heidegger, therefore, is correct to note in *Being and Time* that there is nothing constructivistic or aprioristic about Husserl’s doctrine of ‘seeing essences’. Rather,

> to disclose the *a priori* is not to make an ‘*a-prioristic*’ construction. Edmund Husserl has not only enabled us to understand once more the meaning of any genuine philosophical empiricism; he has also given us the necessary tools. ‘*A-priorism*’ is the method of every scientific philosophy which understands itself. There is nothing constructivistic about it.\(^{46}\)

For Husserl, then, essences do not exist ontologically *a priori*; they are ‘only *a priori* relative to empirical method in the narrow sense of sensory perception’.\(^{47}\) Furthermore, their existence, counter nominalism and conceptualism, is defended by Husserl solely on the basis of descriptive-psychological analysis of the actual acts of our consciousness intending those general objects that correspond to the general meaning of the concepts deployed in *a priori* judgements. None of this is a return to the concept of ‘essence’ as understood in Plato, Aristotle, or Aquinas. It is, rather, a return to a method of meditation on invariant notes in ‘ideal objects’ of human experience itself and a move towards a new universal eidetic science of intentional consciousness and its objectivities.\(^{48}\) If we wish to

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45. Ibid., p. 344.
48. If one wishes to call this position ‘realism’ or ‘Platonism’, as it was at the time, then so be it. See Husserl’s response to this interpretation in *Ideas*, §22: ‘The Reproach of Platonic Realism. Essence and Concepts’, pp. 40–42/40–42 (p. 41/40): ‘I did not
compare Husserl’s ‘essences’ to previous philosophical doctrines, then they are more akin to material categories of the human understanding (in Kant’s sense) as Husserl later refers to them. Since these material objects, however, are given directly to our experience, that is, to eidetic intuition, Husserl does not need any elaborate Kantian theory of transcendental deduction to justify them. In the seeing of an essence, such as the seeing of colour as necessarily extended, there is direct insight into the intelligible structural unity of colour itself that makes possible any actual or possible human experiences of particular colours in existence. The perception of the essence of colour as extended, therefore, adds further knowledge to our understanding of the intelligibility of the very being of objects (colours), beyond what can be achieved at either a sensuous or categorical level of judgement. In this regard, for Husserl, an essence is trans-categorical and thus functions more like scholastic *transcendentalia*.

The main conclusion, however, that Husserl draws from his acknowledgement of the givenness of such ‘essences’ to our human experience, is that what is needed in philosophy—whether of a pre-Kantian or post-Kantian variety—is not a rejection of ‘British empiricism’ or a return to scholasticism, but a widening of the concept of experience to include both the experience of particulars and the experience of essences. This eidetic manner of thinking must become the method of analysis for Brentano’s own very idea of a descriptive *a priori* science of consciousness and its objectivities. If this method is to be followed, the factual ‘inner perception’ of our own experiences can be and must be dispensed with for the purposes of rendering descriptive psychology a universal science of the essential features of our human experiences. No amount of inner perceptions of our factual experiences, Husserl argues, can justify our *a priori* judgements without falling into the trap of psychologism. This, however, is in stark contrast to Brentano’s insistence that, for his new science of descriptive

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50. See ibid.
51. Brentano was particularly offended when charged with psychologism by Husserl, his former student, since the evidence of inner perception, Brentano believed, avoided all forms of psychologism; see Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, pp. 291–301 and pp. 306–07. This philosophical dispute between Brentano and Husserl is still ongoing among commentators. Cf. Robin D. Rollinger, ‘Brentano and Husserl’, in *The Cambridge Guide to Brentano*, ed. by Dale Jacquette (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 255–76. There are, however, different forms of psychologism, not all of which Brentano escapes; see de Boer, *The Development of Husserl’s Thought*, pp. 115–17.
psychology, ‘inner perception (innere Wahrnehmung) […] constitutes the primary (erste) and indispensable source (unentbehrliche Quelle) of psychology.\textsuperscript{52}

Brentano, therefore, could see in Husserl’s theory of the intuition of essences only a complete rejection of his idea of an empirical descriptive science of consciousness and its objectivities, and a return to some spurious form of seeing Platonic essences, which he had already dispelled from any ‘modern conception’ of psychology in \textit{Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint}.\textsuperscript{53} To understand Husserl’s ‘essences’ as ontologically self-subsisting Platonic entities, however, is to misunderstand Husserl’s theory.

Much to Husserl’s personal and philosophical disappointment, his transformation and advancement of his mentor’s descriptive science of intentional consciousness and its objectivities into a descriptive-eidetic science of intentional consciousness and its objectivities was not recognised ‘as the fruition of his [Brentano’s] own ideas.’\textsuperscript{54} Husserl, nonetheless, was adamant that inner perception is dispensable epistemologically, and the intuition of essences methodologically required in any new descriptive \textit{a priori} empirical science of consciousness; otherwise, this descriptive science cannot realize the universal science it promises to be. To relinquish either the eidetic character of its method or the intentionality of consciousness as its main topic is to abandon adherence to this phenomenological conception of philosophy as a science. Thus it is understandable why Husserl later came to the ‘distressing conclusion’ that Heidegger, through his focus on the meaning of being in phenomenology and his appeal to an existential-hermeneutic analysis of the facticity of Dasein as a method of addressing this topic, not only went against everything that his original idea and method of phenomenology stood for; rather, Husserl felt, Heidegger also may have been ‘involved in the formation of a philosophical system of the kind which I have always considered my life’s work to make forever impossible.’\textsuperscript{55} In this dispute, then, it is of importance to understand what phenomenology stood for, as Husserl defined it, and why it was necessary for Heidegger to find an alternative method to address the topic that he wished to pursue phenomenologically.

\textsuperscript{52.} Brentano, \textit{Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint}, p. 29.
III. Husserl’s Defence of Eidetic Intuition and Heidegger’s Rejection of that Method

In Section §75 (‘Phenomenology as a Descriptive Eidetic Doctrine of Pure Experiences’) in Ideas I, Husserl writes,

The study of the stream of experiences is, for its part, carried on in a variety of peculiarly structured reflective acts which themselves also belong to the stream of experiences and which, in corresponding reflections at a higher level, can be made the objects of phenomenological analyses. This is because their analysis is fundamental to a universal phenomenology and to the methodological insight quite indispensable to it (unentberliche methodologische Einsicht).\(^{56}\)

Initially, Husserl had launched this idea of phenomenology as a descriptive-eidetic science of ‘the stream of experiences’ focusing on logical acts of reasoning in that stream in his two-volume study Logical Investigations. The first volume, published in 1900, contains arguments against naturalism in the form of logical psychologism, that is, against the attempt to turn the normative discipline of logic into an empirical science of the way we actually do think. Empirical generalizations concerning the causal origins of our thoughts, be they of a psychological, factual, physiological, social, or historical nature, Husserl argues, can never in principle justify the normative validity of a correct judgement in logic. To do so would be to commit the genetic fallacy, confusing the validity of a judgement with the context of its origins, and so, to fall into some kind of naturalism in the form of logical psychologism. How we ought to think, in a logically consistent manner, is simply not reducible to reflections on how we actually think, which is often not logical at all nor correct. In this regard, Husserl agrees with Brentano’s definition of logic as the theory of the art of correct judgement;\(^{57}\) but Husserl thinks this definition is too narrow since any judgement is a knowing (Wissen), but not a science (Wissenschaft).\(^{58}\) A science, rather, forms an ordered coherence of ‘knowings’. Husserl thus expresses his appreciation of Schleiermacher’s definition of logic as the theory of the art of scientific knowledge.\(^{59}\) Putting these definitions together, we could say, with de Boer, that for Husserl, ‘logic is the theory of the art of correct scientific judgement’\(^{60}\).

The second volume of the Logical Investigations, published in 1901, was twice as long as the first and published in two parts containing six detailed de-

\(^{56}\) Husserl, Ideas I, §75, p. 177/147.
\(^{57}\) See Husserl, Logical Investigations, vol. 1, § 3: ‘Disputed questions. The path to be entered’.
\(^{58}\) See ibid., § 6: ‘The possibility and justification of logic as theory of science’.
\(^{59}\) See ibid., §12: ‘Relevant definitions of logic’.
\(^{60}\) De Boer, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, p. 91.
scriptive-psychological investigations into the invariant features of the experiences of a normatively valid logical consciousness as such. Thus Husserl, quite properly, names the first volume *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* because it removes the psychologistic obstacles to the proper clarification of the origin of the discipline of pure logic in the second volume. The ‘origin’ (*Ursprung*) which Husserl seeks in the second volume, then, is the origin that justifies the a priori knowledge-claims to which we must conform, if we are to think in a logically appropriate and normatively valid consistent manner. What Husserl seeks is an epistemological origin, in Kant’s sense, which clarifies the validity of what is under investigation; he does not seek an origin in the sense of the psychological or historical genesis (*Entstehung*) of an idea.\(^61\) In the second volume, Husserl brilliantly recovers this origin of pure logic via a descriptive-eidetic psychology of the experiences of a normatively valid logical consciousness as such. Therefore, as de Boer succinctly points out, Husserl ‘accepts the term “consciousness as such”—but then conceived of as “timeless normal consciousness”, so that it coincides with his realm of ideas.’\(^62\)

The appearance of the second volume of the *Logical Investigations* in 1901 nevertheless caused perplexity for some commentators and critics at the time because they thought that in this volume Husserl had fallen back into the psychologism which he had already refuted in the first.\(^63\) The first volume, for example, singularly impressed Dilthey, as it defeated outright the dominant naturalistic approaches in empirical psychology.\(^64\) Thus Heidegger remarks to his students in his 1925 summer semester lecture course at Marburg University, that ‘the first to immediately recognize the central significance of these investigations was Dilthey’ and that ‘Dilthey immediately embarked upon semester-long studies of the book within a circle of his closest students.’\(^65\) In his earlier 1920 summer semester lecture course at Freiburg University, Heidegger had al-

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61. See ibid., pp. 107–08.
62. Ibid., p. 278.
ready praised Dilthey’s ‘Studies in Laying the Ground for the Human Sciences’ (1905) because in this work Dilthey calls attention to Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (1900–01). One cannot esteem this highly enough because at that time (1905) one saw in the actually important and positive second volume of the *Investigations* in general ‘a falling back’ into the psychologism that was fought against in the first. Dilthey now attempted to bring his psychology into line with the phenomenological results of the *Logical Investigations*.66

What Heidegger does not emphasize to his students, however, is that Dilthey was singularly unimpressed and disappointed with the second volume when it appeared, precisely because it contained abstract (a-historical) descriptive-psychological analyses of ‘eternal’ *a priori* features of human logical consciousness as such, analyses that he found difficult to comprehend. Husserl had overcome naturalism in the form of logical psychologism, but overlooked in the second volume the significance of historical consciousness in the examination of the meaningfulness of our lived human experiences as a whole. In his 1894 essay ‘Ideas towards a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology’, Dilthey, as Heidegger knew, had proposed a different method of analysis to Husserl's abstract eidetic method, a hermeneutic method of understanding the coherences and structures in their human significance from the point of view of the totality of life.67 Dilthey’s method attempted to explain the parts by the whole, not the whole by its parts.68 And this method takes the experience of language, as opposed to the experience of abstract (a-historical) perception, as the model upon which to develop an appropriate method for the human sciences. Dilthey distinguished this ‘understanding psychology’ from any natural-scientific ‘explanatory psychology’ or ‘descriptive-eidetic psychology’; it requires a hermeneutic-scientific approach, for, as Heidegger informs his students in his 1920 summer semester lecture course ‘Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression,’

Dilthey sees the problem of inner perception not in whether it had evidence (*Evidenz*) or certainty (*Sicherheit*) or which scope belonged to it. (For Dilthey, who considered everything as a historian, inner perception does not have

68. This is not to suggest that commentators are in agreement about Dilthey’s precise method of enquiry, or that Dilthey had one method, or that he successfully overcame all of the problems he encountered in finding a proper method of enquiry for the *Geisteswissenschaften*. See Frederick C. Beiser, *The German Historicist Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), chap. 8: ‘Dilthey and the Foundations of the Human Sciences’ (pp. 332–64).
that absolute evidence that phenomenologists most of the time attribute to it.) [ . . . ] [Rather,] inner perception has an inner intellectuality, it is pervaded by an inner conceptuality [ . . . ]. *Dilthey did not make this inner intellectuality of inner perception into a problem.* The inner perception must for itself always bring everything to givenness in the whole of the acquired complex (*im Ganzen des erworbenen Zusammenhangs*); all mental meaningfulness (*Bedeutsamkeit*) can always only be interpreted from the complex (*immer nur aus dem Zusammenhang heraus gedeutet werden*), never in an isolated way. [ . . . ] *Dilthey did not carry out* (*sind nicht durchgeführt worden*) *these approaches* (*diese Ansätze*). However, provided that one really grasps the problem of lived experience (*das Erlebnisproblem*) primordially (*ursprünglich*) one must see in here an instruction (*Anweisung*) that is not yet exhausted.69

Thus, for Heidegger, *Dilthey’s attempt ‘to understand the complex of lived experience as a whole [ . . . ] requires primordial explication’* precisely because ‘only that can be understood which in life and from out of life *has uttered itself* (*sich geäußert hat*); life becomes accessible only in its objectifications (*nur in seinen Objektivierung*).’70 Heidegger continues:

In the subsequent understanding (*Im Nachverstehen*) of those [expressed objectified meanings], primordial life itself is attained (*wird das ursprüngliche Leben selbst gewonnen*). The complex of reconstruction in *Dilthey* [ . . . ] is determined through the connection (*Zusammenhang*) between lived experience (*Erlebnis*), expression (*Ausdruck*) and understanding (*Verstehen*). Lived experience leads to expression, the latter to understanding, and understanding back to lived experience; in this way it comes full circle.71

What Heidegger of course alludes to here is the hermeneutic circle into which one is required to immerse oneself for the purposes of understanding the texts or words of another, or even one’s own. In *Dilthey’s well-known triadic-hermeneutic unity of ‘experience-understanding-expression’* (*Erlebnis-Verstehen-Ausdruck*), all human lived experience contains some meaning in itself; the more one seeks to understand and articulate this meaning in words, the more such expression raises the initial meaning of the experience to a higher level, which, in turn, is completed in and through such expression. Expression in words does not cancel the original facticity of meaning or the particularity of the experience itself; it rather intensifies and completes its meaning. In this process we find meaning expressed ‘full circle’ and understand ourselves and our experiences from such objectifications.

It is, then, an integral part of human self-understanding that it unfolds never completely, but always partially in and through language, in each other’s

70. Ibid., p. 129/168.
71. Ibid., p. 129/168–69.
experiences, as well as in history. ‘Thus’, Dilthey notes, ‘lived experience arises which can be generally expressed as involving the interaction of different persons. […] I experience the death of a person; an intense grief wells up in me; it leads to an expression of it in words to others, or to a volition which somehow refers to this death. In the structural nexus of these processes the successive parts are connected through the unity of the object.’

In this example, Dilthey is not brooding over his own death (as Heidegger was later to do famously in Being and Time), but drawing attention to the peculiar nature of human experience itself and, in particular, to the way in which the meaning of such experiences is connected to our emotional world and in which it is expressed in our linguistic world too.

We articulate the meaningfulness of our experiences out of those experiences themselves. Thus, for Dilthey, ‘[t]he singular person in his individual existence is an historical being. He is determined by his place in the line of time, by his place in space, by his position in the confluence of cultural systems and communities.’

Plays, poems, novels, as well as state laws, social systems, art, music, economies, philosophies and religions, all, in Dilthey’s eyes, document and articulate something meaningful about the historically evolving nature of human self-understanding that is never always completed but always partially unfolding in and through history and life itself, and yet always belonging to a greater whole of understanding of the kind of being that we ourselves are.

This is why Dilthey saw his work (after Kant) in terms of a ‘critique of historical reason’. The upshot of this, however, is that Dilthey proposed, in his concept of a ‘descriptive and analytic psychology’, a method of analysis for the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) that was an alternative to the kind of ‘descriptive and analytic eidetic psychology’ that Husserl elaborated in the second volume of the Logical Investigations. From Dilthey’s perspective, Husserl’s endeavour to analyse and describe the experiences of a valid, atemporal, normative logical consciousness as such in the second volume could only yield insight into the life of an abstract (that is, ahistorical) possible logical consciousness, not into the significance or the meaning of experiences as lived in their actual facticity. The experiences of human consciousness as such, for Dilthey (and here Heidegger follows suit), are not reducible to the reflective consciousness of experience. Thus, in his 1894 Berlin Academy essay Dilthey’s descriptive method regard-

ing our experiences goes in the opposite direction to Brentano’s and Husserl’s descriptive method. Unlike Brentano and Husserl, Dilthey does not attempt to understand the whole of life experiences in terms of its discrete parts, that is to say, as abstractable and analysable mental events occurring, somehow, in consciousness and accessible via inner perceptions of consciousness reflecting upon itself. As Dilthey famously puts it in his 1894 essay, ‘[M]an does not apprehend what he is by brooding (Grübelei) over himself, nor by doing psychological experiments, but rather by history.’

In comparison to historical research, in Dilthey’s eyes, the descriptive method proposed by Brentano and Husserl is profoundly abstract, unnatural, solipsistic, and tantamount precisely to ‘brooding over oneself.’

Dilthey, then, sought to understand and to analyse the meaning of the parts (individual experiences) in terms of the whole (of life); that is, Dilthey sought a descriptive-hermeneutic-analytic understanding of the meaning of life that is historically embedded and uttered in particular life experiences and in the products of such life experiences (for example, in plays, poems, and cultural objects). In other words, Dilthey’s descriptive method seeks to understand individual life experiences from the entire context in which and through which such experiences are lived and expressed—and vice versa: it seeks to understand the whole of life that is partially expressed in such products. Dilthey’s hermeneutic method, therefore, eschews entirely the ‘absolute evidence’ of Brentano’s method of inner perception and Husserl’s method of descriptive-eidetic analysis. Although Brentano, Husserl, and Dilthey all called their work ‘descriptive psychology’, identity in terms is not identity in concepts. Dilthey develops an entirely different concept of descriptive psychology to Brentano’s and Husserl’s.

Heidegger chooses to follow Dilthey, not Husserl or Brentano.

It is, therefore, precisely because ‘the question about the actual facticity (die Frage nach der eigentlichen Faktizität) is forgotten (ist vergessen) if one conceives the areas of being from the perspective of [Husserlian] transcendental philosophy,’ that Heidegger, on the last day of lectures in his course on ‘Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression’, informs his students that he must make facticity into a problem within phenomenology. ‘Dilthey’, Heidegger notes, ‘did

78. In Being and Time, however, Heidegger explicitly maintains that his analysis of ‘being-towards-death’, from a methodological point of view, is a form of ‘brooding’ over one’s own death; but ‘of course’, Heidegger adds, ‘such brooding over death does not take away from it its character as a possibility’ (Being and Time, p. 305). In fact, Heidegger goes as far as to hold that this ‘inner brooding over one’s own death’ is an existential requirement for one’s own life; so, ‘this possibility must not be weakened; it must be understood as a possibility, it must be cultivated as a possibility, and we must put up with it as a possibility, in the way we comport ourselves towards it’ (ibid., p. 306).
not make this inner intellectuality of inner perception into a problem.\textsuperscript{80} Nor did Brentano, we can add. The facticity of our experiences, for Brentano, required no further analysis other than the fact they exist. ‘The only one’ who did or who, in Heidegger’s estimation, was ‘on the way to (auf dem Weg zu) such a philosophy, without seeing its way, is Jaspers (Psychology of Worldviews, 1919).\textsuperscript{81} Yet following this path, Heidegger continues, ‘is only possible on the basis of Diltheyan intuitions’.\textsuperscript{82} This, however, will become the task of [Heidegger’s own] phenomenology (die Aufgabe der Phänomenologie) and require that it ‘put itself into that [Diltheyean-hermeneutic] tendency towards actual primordial Dasein and […] throw always from anew the torch (die Brandfackel) into all subject matter-systematic philosophy.’\textsuperscript{83} This hermeneutic method of analysing our experiences will not follow the strictness of eidetic variation seeking eternal truths, as it will engage in the interpretative task of retrieving the significances of the temporal truths of lived experience in their very existence. Yet this ‘torch’ that will shed its light will have its own strictness. Indeed, ‘the rigour (Strenge) of [this] philosophy’, Heidegger stresses and forecasts, ‘is more primordial than every scientific rigour’.\textsuperscript{84} That is to say, Heidegger will need to follow closely the clues and cues he found in Dilthey’s hermeneutic-scientific method for developing this ‘possibility’ of phenomenology. This is why Heidegger argues, in the final section of this lecture-course, that he will take up Dilthey’s hermeneutic approach to human experience, and not Natorp’s (or Husserl’s), because ‘lived experience as a whole […] requires primordial explication’ as ‘only that can be understood which in life and from out of life has uttered itself’.\textsuperscript{85} If, then, we understand the meaning and significances of our life experiences as manifested in, through and from its articulation in language, what applies in the interpretive retrieve of the reading of a text is equally admissible to the interpretative retrieve of the meaning of an experience. Such cannot be transacted from outside of the reading of the particular text itself or the particular experience itself. Indeed, it is precisely because the whole meaning of life, as in that of the text, is mediated only through the particular experiences themselves and words themselves, that, ‘[F]or that reason alone,’ Dilthey remarks, Schleiermacher emphasised the point that in the interpretation of a text (or an experience), ‘one cannot speak of presuppositionlessness.’\textsuperscript{86} Soon, in his analysis, Heidegger will begin to apply

\textsuperscript{80.} Ibid., p. 124/161.
\textsuperscript{81.} Ibid., p. 133/174
\textsuperscript{82.} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{83.} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{84.} Ibid.: ‘Die Strenge der Philosophie ist ursprünglicher als alle wissenschaftliche Strenge.’
\textsuperscript{85.} Ibid., p. 129/168.
\textsuperscript{86.} Wilhelm Dilthey, ‘Schleiermacher’s Hermeneutical System in Relation to Earli-
er Protestant Hermeneutics (1860),’ trans. by Theodore Nordenhaug, in Dilthey, \textit{Hermeneutics and the Study of History}, ed. by Rudolf Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi,
this hermeneutic circle of understanding to the issue of the meaning of being itself as expressed in the history of thought and in our daily lives. It, too, is always rooted in particular experiences requiring interpretation and understanding. In other words, what Heidegger sees here is the destructive-constructive potential of a hermeneutic approach towards retrieving the significances of our understanding of what it means to be a being in being in *that* being who can say and understand and conceptualize such expressions as, ‘I am’, ‘the sky is blue’, and other ‘similar expressions’. This, in embryonic form, is the existentialistic-Diltheyian approach to fundamental ontology later realized in *Being and Time*.  

IV. Heidegger, Dilthey, and Phenomenology

Heidegger’s deployment of Dilthey’s hermeneutic approach as a reforming energy within the kind of thinking in phenomenology that was practised by Husserl is, perhaps, most tellingly captured in a letter that he writes to Georg Misch, Dilthey’s son-in-law, on June 30th, 1922. In this letter Heidegger is convinced that his own work in philosophy and phenomenology at Freiburg University, as Husserl’s assistant-lecturer, is advancing both ‘the positive tendencies of [Dilthey’s] “life philosophy”’ and moving towards ‘a principled meditation-on-meaning (*Besinnung*) within phenomenological research and its direction.’ Here, Heidegger is self-consciously aware of the fact that his own researches into the meaning of experiences in his lecture courses in phenomenology are going against the grain of the ‘meditation-on-meaning’ that was characteristic of Husserl’s elaboration of phenomenology at Freiburg. This, as we noted above, is because in his work and his lectures Husserl left out the very thing that interested Dilthey—the facticity of our life experiences—in favour of a science of eidetic analyses of eternal truths of our intentional consciousness and its objectivities. By contrast to such eidetically-reduced and perceptually-founded acts, Heidegger reassures Misch that his meditative reflections on experiences are being unfurled in deference to an appropriated Diltheyean-hermeneutic-phe-
nomenological philosophy of life. For, as Heidegger confesses and self-professes to Misch,

Here life is approached [by Heidegger] as the basic comprehensive object of philosophical research. The self-illuminating comporting of factic life to itself is, on the cognitive level, interpretive exposition (Auslegung); the principled scientific development of this exposition is phenomenological interpretation (Interpretation); the genuine logic of philosophy is accordingly a principled phenomenological hermeneutics.  

Heidegger’s emphasis in his letter to Misch that ‘the principled scientific development’ of investigations into the meaning of ‘factic life’ lies in the direction of a ‘principled phenomenological hermeneutics’ indicates at least two major changes in relation to Husserl’s conception of phenomenology.

Firstly, it indicates that Heidegger rejects the priority of the descriptive-eidetic-scientific method of doing phenomenology that Husserl had advocated in his Logical Investigations (1900–01), his 1910–11 Logos essay ‘Philosophy as a Rigorous Science’, and his defence of transcendental idealism in Ideas I (1913). Secondly, it indicates that Heidegger accepts and incorporates the descriptive-hermeneutic-scientific method of enquiry into his own way of promoting a phenomenology of factic life.

Heidegger’s self-assessment of his philosophical position within phenomenological research to Misch in 1922—with respect to his deviance from Husserl’s manner of thinking as well as his advancement of Dilthey’s manner of thinking—is exceedingly accurate because after he had delivered his summer semester lecture course in 1920 on ‘Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation’, Heidegger sets about to

90. Ibid., p. 104.
91. Ibid., my emphasis. According to Kisiel, Heidegger makes his first decisive breakthrough to the main topic of his philosophy in hermeneutic phenomenology—namely, to what Heidegger calls ‘factic life-experience’ (later to be called ‘Dasein’) in his ‘war-emergency semester’ (Kriegsnotsemester) lecture course on ‘The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews’ at Freiburg University, which begun shortly after the end of World War I in February 1919 (Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of ‘Being and Time’ [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993], p. 103). Dilthey traces this breakthrough to the emergence of ‘historical consciousness’ and the ‘self’ to the early Christian community. Heidegger, as Kisiel records, was thoroughly aware of this insight of Dilthey’s from his earliest days as a student of theology in Freiburg (ibid., pp. 16–17). See also Kisiel, ‘Kriegsnotsemester 1919: Heidegger’s Hermeneutic Breakthrough’, in The Question of Hermeneutics: Essays in Honor of Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed. by T. J. Stapleton (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), pp. 115–208.
examine and retrieve, throughout the 1920s, the way in which intuitions (Anschauungen) come to expression (zum Ausdruck kommen, ausdrücken) in the theoretical construction of philosophical concepts (Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung) with specific reference to crucial figures drawn from the history of philosophy—the focus being on passages from central texts that reflect their understanding of lived experiences, such as Plato’s Sophist, Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics 6, Aquinas’s Summa contra gentiles, Husserl’s Logical Investigations II, Husserl’s Ideas I, and J. B. Droysen’s ‘Basic Outline of Historical Science’ (1926). For Heidegger, these readings of texts are his way of doing phenomenology. This is clearly not Husserl’s way. It is, instead, an application of Dilthey’s linguistically founded hermeneutic triadic model of lived experience-understanding-expression (Erlebnis-Verstehen-Ausdruck) to issues and concepts in the history of philosophy.

Heidegger’s prevalent and persistent interest in using Aristotle’s texts as introductions to phenomenology throughout the 1920s—such as, for example, his 1921–22 winter semester course ‘Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Introduction to Phenomenological Research’—has led a prominent commentator to remark (in agreement with Heidegger’s later self-evaluation in ‘My Way into Phenomenology’ and elsewhere): ‘in some regards, one could rightfully claim that it was his reading of Aristotle that made it possible for him to redefine for himself the task of phenomenology, a philosophical direction and method first articulated by his teacher, Edmund Husserl.’

It could not, however, have been his reading of Aristotle that led Heidegger away from Husserl; it was, rather, his reading of Dilthey that showed Heidegger a positive method to doing phenomenology as an alternative to Husserl, a hermeneutic one that focuses on the significances of the facticity of life-experiences. This is the conception of post-Kantian philosophy or phenomenology that Heidegger wishes to advance in his own thinking.

There is, then, no doubt that Heidegger redefines for himself the phenomenological method that Husserl articulated, but that redefined method is clearly not Husserlian (nor is it Aristotelian). Leaving aside the fact that Husserl was never his teacher, Heidegger is not practicing either descriptive-eidetic psychology or transcendental-idealistic phenomenology in his reading of Aristotle’s text (or of any other text). He is practising some form of hermeneutics because, as Walter Brogan himself correctly points out, Heidegger’s attention is primarily directed towards textual understanding. Hence, ‘even though Heidegger’s phenomenological reading of key passages from Aristotle may force us to re-examine our basic understanding of Greek philosophy (and therefore of the Western tradition), nevertheless these interpretations remain thorough and careful renderings of Aristotle’s thought that derive their force from the texts themselves. They also teach us how to read texts in a philosophically penetrating way. In

a course on Book Θ1–3 of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* [at Freiburg University, in 1931, summer semester], Heidegger says of his kind of reading of Aristotle: “It is necessary to surpass Aristotle—not in a forward direction, in the sense of a progression, but rather backwards in the direction of a more original unveiling of what is comprehended by him.”95

This way of reading a text, on Heidegger’s part, is of course a deliberate application of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic approach, for, as Schleiermacher adroitly puts it, ‘the goal of the hermeneutic procedure is to understand the author better than he understood himself’, which, in turn, as Dilthey elaborates, is ‘a statement which is the necessary conclusion of the doctrine of unconscious creation’.96 This kind of principled Schleiermachean-Diltheyean hermeneutic reading focuses on the necessity of making explicit today that which is implicit in a text, but which is not thought by the author himself, yet essential to that author’s understanding as expressed in the text. This is the ‘unthought’ (*das Ungedachte*), as he later calls it, to which Heidegger is methodologically committed in his reading of Aristotle’s text of the *Metaphysics* in his 1931 lecture course at Freiburg University (and to which he is committed in any and all of his ‘phenomenological readings’). From this Schleiermachean-Diltheyean hermeneutic point of view, a raid upon what is articulated will always invite and include, *in principle*, a raid upon what remains unarticulated. The aim of this hermeneutic process is not, as was unjustly said of Dilthey’s and Schleiermacher’s approach, to understand the intention of the author or to be in an ‘immediate or intuitive awareness of the states of minds of other persons’;97 it is, rather, to understand the author better than the author himself or herself could, but still from within the limits of possible human communal experience and the capabilities of interpretative retrieval from the meaning of the text of both author and com-

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95. Ibid., p. 5.
96. Wilhelm Dilthey, ‘The Development of Hermeneutics,’ in Dilthey, *Selected Writings*, trans. and ed. by H. P. Rickman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 247–63 (pp. 259–60). See also Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics and Criticisms*, trans. and ed. by Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): ‘The task is also expressed as follows, to understand the utterance at first just as well and then better than its author. For because we have no immediate knowledge of what is in him, we must seek to bring much to consciousness that can remain unconscious to him, except to the extent to which he himself reflectively becomes his own reader. On the objective side he has even here no other data than we do’ (p. 23).
mentator. This kind of reading Heidegger did not learn from Husserl or from Aristotle, but from Schleiermacher and Dilthey.

One major consequence of this kind of reading is that it will have a direct bearing on the content of Heidegger’s understanding of scientific philosophy and phenomenology. That is to say, whatever is left ‘unthought’ by these authors but addressed by Heidegger will make its appearance, however explicitly or implicitly, in Heidegger’s own work in phenomenology. This is why there are so many traces of concepts, ideas, and tenets of other thinkers in Heidegger’s elaboration of the question of the meaning of being and its relation to Dasein, even though Heidegger strictly adheres to none of these as he articulates them in *Being and Time* (and beyond). It is of importance to note, therefore, how this kind of reading to which Heidegger subscribes generally operates and the presuppositions it contains.

From a Diltheyan-Schleiermachean hermeneutic point of view, before you open a book, or read a line in a poem, or try to understand the significance of an historical event, or engage in reflection upon an experience that befell you, you assume, presume, or anticipate that something meaningful has been deposited in that text, in that historical event, or in that personal experience for you to understand. One of the major presuppositions of reading a text, or interpreting a historical event, or seeking to understand a personal experience is that that particular text, historical event, or personal experience has some meaning (*Sinn*) expressed in it, and that you will engage with that meaning as you read and reflect on that text, interpret that event, or gain some understanding of that experience. It thus follows that the more you read the text, interpret the event, or gain an understanding of the experience, the more your grasp of the original (unarticulated) meaning is completed and fulfilled. This is where the generation of meaning occurs and appears, from a hermeneutic-phenomenological point of view. It takes place both in the experiencing of the writing of a text and in the experiencing of the reading of another’s text. And this is what is emphasized in the hermeneutic tradition of philosophy as developed by Schleiermacher and advanced by Dilthey and others, including Heidegger.

98. Thus Schleiermacher does not commit the ‘intentional fallacy’, as is often asserted, but his ‘alleged psychologism’, as Thomas Seebohm notes, ‘has been the topic of a long dispute’ (Seebohm, *Hermeneutics: Method and Methodology* [Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004], p. 54).

99. Seeking that which is left unthought in an author’s text drives Heidegger’s way of doing philosophy further into Diltheyan historical hermeneutics. After he leaves Freiburg in 1923, Heidegger continues with these ‘phenomenological exercises’ at the University of Marburg from 1923 through 1928, introducing both beginners and more advanced students to ‘phenomenology’ by focusing on central passages and texts that came not only from Aristotle but also from Plato, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Bergson, Dilthey, and Husserl. See Kisiel, *Genesis*, pp. 462–66 and 470–74.

What is of crucial importance to note here is that in this process of interpreting the meaning of a text, an event, or an experience, it is assumed, presumed, or anticipated that what is retrieved and to be made sense of is what is said or expressed in the book, the historical event, the personal experience. On this hermeneutic model of reading, it follows that understanding the meaning that is deposited in a text, historical event, or past experience mimics the creative process of the generation of the original meaning itself. Hence, there really is a point of contact between my understanding of others and their understanding of themselves, as Dilthey insists. However, such mutually interdependent human self-understanding and other-understanding, according to Dilthey, always unfolds partially and incompletely, and necessarily in history and time and within the context of the totality of one’s own factic life-experiences—our ‘being-in-the-world’, as Heidegger would later call it. Thus Frederick Beiser remarks, ‘[U]nlike his neo-Kantian contemporaries, Dilthey appreciates fully that there is no ahistorical or asocial realm of meaning; an ahistorical and asocial being would never understand anyone, least of all itself.’

Nonetheless, for Dilthey such an understanding of both others and of oneself can be accomplished only hermeneutically; it is not accomplished, nor can it be, at the level of perception (for example, of ‘perceptually-founded acts’, as Husserl stresses in his idea of phenomenology, including his *Ideas II*), or by volition (that is, by wanting or not wanting to read what is or what is not in the text). It can be accomplished only by listening to and hearing what is deposited in the text itself, taking into consideration the unthought as well as the articulated thought. This hermeneutic model of reading a text, with all its socio-historical presuppositions in place, is what Heidegger commits himself to, in his phenomenological readings. This is what the ‘science’ of hermeneutics means. Here ‘science’ means, following Dilthey, re-enacting remembrance of the significances of the meaning of our life experiences as deposited in the text itself through acts of interpretative retrieval of the silent past. Here, man poetically dwells.

This way of reading a text with its supporting presuppositions is often referred to as ‘the romantic-hermeneutic model of meaning’. It has been subjected to much negative criticism by many commentators in the twentieth century following ‘the three masters of suspicion’ (Paul Ricoeur): Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche. One of the main arguments made against this model of meaning is that because of hidden social, linguistic, psychological, and ideological-cultural factors, over which the author has no control, there is no original meaning, pure intention, or objective meaning available to the author in the first place. It thus follows, a fortiori, that it is impossible for any interpreter (commentator, critic, or author herself) to retrieve any such pure objective meaning deposited in the text. This objection is phrased differently as the ‘myth of origin’, the ‘myth of the pure presence of meaning’, or the ‘intentional fallacy’. In response to this criticism, it is only fair to note that in this hermeneutic-textual model of under-

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standing it is not assumed that it is the author’s intention that one is retrieving in its purity precisely because there is always the ‘unthought’, the non-articulated as an essential part of the thought and articulated meaning.

At any rate, it is this model of reading a text, with its inherent presuppositions in place, which Heidegger endeavours to incorporate into his practice of doing phenomenology.¹⁰² In fact, Heidegger applies these very suppositions that are necessary for the reading of text to the interpretation of the significance of things that are deposited around him in his daily world, whether they be the table upon which he writes, or the hammer that breaks in his workshop, or the lectern that he uses in a lecture-theatre.¹⁰³ The ‘objective meaning’ of the experience of the table, hammer, or lectern is retrievable through repeatable acts of interpretation, according to this model of human understanding that is advocated by Dilthey for the humanities and philosophy in particular.

It is true, then, that Husserl, Dilthey, and the early Heidegger all considered their work in philosophy as ‘science’, but Husserl’s science of (conscious) experiences and Dilthey’s science of linguistically expressed (lived) experiences are radically different forms of ‘science’: one mathematical-eidetic in character, the other hermeneutic; one based on the experience of perception, the other on

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¹⁰². Curiously, Heidegger makes no mention at all of the significance of Dilthey’s hermeneutic-phenomenological stance on his early way into phenomenology in his autobiographical sketch, ‘Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie’, in Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), pp. 81–90. Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that since this essay was written in appreciation of the publishers of Husserl’s work, Max-Niemeyer-Verlag, Heidegger overlooks the philosophical lead into phenomenology that Dilthey’s manner of thinking had afforded to him. He does acknowledge, of course, elsewhere and in many places the crucial significance of Dilthey’s hermeneutic manner of thinking for his own thought in phenomenology.

¹⁰³. The experiencing of the lectern, for Heidegger and for his students, is what it is in the situation in which the ‘I’ finds itself thoroughly present. That is the lectern for the lecturer and the student alike, no more, no less. In his last lecture course at Freiburg in 1923, before he goes to Marburg University, Heidegger explains and gives these examples to his students: ‘What is there in the room there at home is the table (not ‘a’ table among many other tables in other rooms and houses) at which one sits in order to write, have a meal, sew, play. Everyone sees this right away, e.g., during a visit: it is a writing table, a dining table, a sewing table—such is the primary way in which it is being encountered in itself. This characteristic of ‘in order to do something’ is not merely imposed on the table by relating and assimilating it to something else which it is not. […] This side is not the east side, and this narrow side so many cm shorter than the other, but rather the one at which my wife sits in the evening when she wants to stay up and read, there at the table we had such and such a discussion that time, there that decision was made with a friend that time, there that work written that time, there that holiday celebrated that time. That is the table’ (Martin Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, trans. by John van Buren [Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999], p. 69).
the experience of language (as expressed meaning). In his 1919 war emergency summer semester lecture course Heidegger unequivocally sides with Dilthey’s stress on the hermeneutic nature of a philosophical science of life experiences (Erlebnisse) and against Husserl’s stress on the strictly perceptually-founded eidetic nature of such a science. It is precisely for this reason, as Kisiel remarks, that ‘for the next ten years, Heidegger vacillated between the two poles of whether philosophy is to be a primal science or no science at all’. For ‘philosophy’, we can here of course read ‘phenomenology’. So, the question for Heidegger was whether phenomenology as practised in line with Dilthey’s hermeneutic considerations in place is a science or not a science at all. This vacillation did not (and could not) arise for Husserl, for whom—following Brentano—philosophy/phenomenology is a science, or it is nothing at all.

V.
Conclusion

From both a historical and a philosophical point of view, it is clear that it is at least some version of Dilthey’s historical-hermeneutic manner of thinking that Heidegger wishes to advance in his elaboration of phenomenology. Despite (the young or old) Heidegger’s allusions to his adherence to Husserl’s manner of thinking, Heidegger was well aware of the fact that in his ‘workshops’ at Freiburg (1916–1919) Husserl was explicit in not allowing its participants to bring into the practice of ‘phenomenological seeing’ any untested and unvouchsafed theories or historical interpretations of ideas. Heidegger was equally well aware that at the time when he became Husserl’s assistant-lecturer (from 1919 to 1923), ‘Husserl watched me [Heidegger] in a generous fashion’, permitting him to work on historical texts with students as introductions to phenomenology, but ‘at bottom in disagreement’. From this time, Heidegger was working against the grain of Husserl’s meditation on meaning in phenomenology.

Even if the later Heidegger does not mention in his autobiographical sketch, ‘My Way into Phenomenology’, the critical influence which Schleiermacher and Dilthey (along with Jaspers and Kierkegaard) had on his understanding of phenomenology, from whom else could the early Heidegger obtain, learn, and internalize the idea of phenomenology as a hermeneutic discipline that requires one to concentrate on the actual experiences of the existing individual human being and on that being’s linguistic expression? It certainly was not from Husserl’s way of doing philosophy/phenomenology, nor from reading Husserl’s texts in phenomenology. We could say, rather, that once Heidegger accepts Dilthey’s pre-scientific interpretive retrieval of the significance of unique works of art

(exemplified in the language of a recorded play, poem, prayer, or philosophical
dialogue), his way of thinking in phenomenological research is placed outside
of the reaches of a method that is characteristic of both the natural and the
mathematical sciences, including Husserl’s rigorous eidetic method of enquiry,
and all philosophical naturalisms as well. In this regard it is hardly surprising
to hear Heidegger realize later, in his 1947 ‘Letter on Humanism’, that the only
manner in which he could think his way through phenomenology in order to
raise anew the question of the meaning of being was to give up the concern
for science and research that marked Husserl’s way of thinking.106 This is not a
criticism by Heidegger of Husserl’s way of thinking or his method, as some com-
mentators believe. It is, rather, a self-directed criticism against his own earlier
efforts in doing philosophy, that is to say, in his examination of the meaning of
our lived experiences in his early writings. Examples of these earlier efforts from
Being and Time are his pivotal analyses of the significance of the anticipatory
awareness of one’s own death in the present and of the idle talk (Gerede) about
the death of the other, as well as their significance for the meaning of the total-
ity of one’s actual lived experiences. Understanding what was thought and left
unthought regarding the significance of death, however, is premised on under-
standing philosophy not as science at all, but as an interpretative retrieval of the
meaning of our human experiences from the point of view of actual, concrete,
individual human existence and the totality of life, which includes the experi-
ence of the other, the world, and of God and his word as the absolute other. This
much Heidegger leaves unthought in his philosophy.

Heidegger’s approach to fundamental ontology in phenomenology, then, is
not a return to any form of traditional pre-Kantian metaphysics (as Husserl and
others thought). Neither is it, however, a return to the phenomenological ontol-
ogy that Husserl defended in the elaboration of his version of post-Kantian tran-
scendental idealism in Ideas I. In the mid-1920s Heidegger had focused on and
interpreted (correctly) Husserl’s transcendental reduction in Ideas I as a genuine
attempt to clarify the meaning of ‘being as thing’ (Sein als Ding) given to outer
(sense) perception and the meaning of ‘being as (conscious) experience’ (Sein
als Erlebnis) given to inner perception.107 Here, however, as Heidegger notes and
reiterates in Being and Time, he could find no clue towards addressing the ques-
tion of the meaning of the being of anything that I may understand in relation
to the awareness of the there of being in which I find myself implicated as that-

Glenn Gray, in Heidegger, Basic Writings: From ‘Being and Time’ (1927) to The Task
193–242 (p. 219).
107. Cf. Heidegger’s 1925 summer semester lecture course at Marburg, History of the
Concept of Time, esp. §11: ‘Immanent critique of phenomenological research: criti-
cial discussion of the four determinations of pure consciousness’ (pp. 102–07).
which-is in being. Without reference but in clear allusion to Husserl’s famous transcendental reduction of Ideas I, Heidegger argues in Being and Time,

Our everyday environmental experiencing (Das alltägliche umweltliche Erfahren), which remains directed both ontically and ontologically on inner-worldly entities (auf das innerweltliche Seiende gerichtet bleibt), is not the sort of thing which can yield up Dasein in an ontically primordial manner (vermag Dasein nicht ontisch ursprünglich vorzugeben) for ontological analysis (für die ontologische Analyse). In equal manner, the immanent perception of experiences fails to provide (Imgleichen mangelt [. . .] der immanenten Wahrnehmung von Erlebnissen) an ontologically sufficient leading-thread (ein ontologisch zureichender Leitfaden).108

Heidegger does not wish to reject Husserl’s transcendental approach in Ideas I, but to advance the enquiry that Husserl began in Ideas I into the question of the meaning of the being of any being (der Sinn von Sein des Seienden), and do this in relation to Dasein’s understanding of being. In this regard, Heidegger is not repudiating the validity of Husserl’s later view of phenomenology as transcendental-idealist ontology, but furthering such transcendental phenomenology in the direction of fundamental ontology. This will be Heidegger’s contribution to Husserl’s view and idea of (transcendental) phenomenology. Husserl, however, thought it was a rejection of everything which (his idea of) phenomenology stood for.

It was Heidegger’s dismissal of eidetic analysis in his hermeneutic-phenomenological approach to the meaning of factic life experiences that, understandably, led Husserl towards the end of his life to the conclusion that ‘the dream (der Traum)’ which he had of establishing, with a community of scholars, of philosophy ‘as science, as a serious, rigorous, indeed apodictically rigorous, science’ was ‘over (ist ausgeträumt)’ for his followers, and for Heidegger in particular, but not for Husserl himself.109 Heidegger, however, never shared this dream to begin with; or perhaps, more accurately stated, once Heidegger was converted to Dilthey’s stress on a hermeneutic approach to the historicity and facticity of our life experiences, shortly after the completion of his habilitation thesis in 1915, it was impossible for him to follow Husserl’s idea of phenomenology uncritically.110 This critical distance that Heidegger took in relation to Husserl’s way of doing phenomenology and towards finding a new way extends

109. Husserl, Crisis, p. 389/508. This dream to render philosophy a strict science was the ‘consciousness of a great mission’ that Husserl had inherited from Brentano (Husserl, ‘Reminiscences of Franz Brentano’, p. 48).
110. According to Heidegger himself, it was as early as 1915 that ‘my [Heidegger’s] aversion to history, which had been nurtured in me by my predilection for mathematics, was thoroughly destroyed’ (Heidegger, ‘Curriculum Vitae 1915’, in Becoming Heidegger, p. 8).
right from the time when Husserl had invented and graciously secured for Heidegger the post as his assistant-lecturer to introduce students to the basics of phenomenology at Freiburg University in 1919. It is nonetheless this origin of Heidegger’s conception of phenomenology that later leads to the irresolvable dispute between Husserl and Heidegger over what phenomenology is. What, then, is phenomenology? There is no pre-set answer to this question simply because the answer depends upon who it is that one is taking as defining what phenomenology is. Husserl? Heidegger? Or, someone else?

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