Digging Underneath the Reconciliation Paradigm in Northern Ireland: Survival, Temporal Resistance, Rebellious Mourning

Presented by

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Abstract

This dissertation argues that the political and spatial control over time and temporality is a deeply under-studied aspect of transitional societies. Specifically, I examine the temporal assumptions and temporal demands of the "reconciliation paradigm" in Northern Ireland. In transitional societies supposedly emerging from war and interethnic conflict, dominant manifestations of political power seek to bracket, periodicise, or temporally discontinue the violent past from an allegedly reconciling present and the promise of a liberal democratic future. Justice-seeking victims, survivors, and bereaved of political violence, in these contexts, are widely presented as anachronisms, people out-of-step with the direction an allegedly reconciling society is going.

In contrast to the impulses of the mainstream Transitional Justice, Trauma Studies, and Peace Studies, throughout this dissertation I argue that violent pasts are always in a state of "diabolical continuity" with an unjust present. I consider the reconciliation paradigm to be largely a mechanism of insulating the postconflict order from meaningful criticism and depoliticising survivors' demands for justice. In this study, I examine the temporal and spatial practices of victims, survivors, and bereaved people in Northern Ireland, arguing that they are engaging in forms of "temporal resistance" that seek to prolong the past in the face of ubiquitous social and political pressure to "move on from" or "close the books on" Northern Ireland's troubled past. But where this study departs from other excellent work critical of temporal power-formations in postconflict space is in its emphasis on geographical place as the crucial engine of temporal resistance. Specifically, I argue that temporal resistance is inseparable from the chronotopic, threshold places where the past can be re-emplotted in the present, places that still seethe and meddle with the lived realities and everyday mobilities of Northern Irish inhabitants.

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List of Abbreviations

1 PARA	1st Battalion, Parachute Regiment, British Army
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AMDPM	Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BDS	Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions
BRG	Bogside Residents' Group
BSI	Bloody Sunday Inquiry
BSJC	Bloody Sunday Justice Campaign
CAIN	Conflict Archive on the Internet
CIRG	Community-Industry Response Group
CRC	Community Relations Council
CONADEP	La Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DMP	Dublin Metropolitan Police
DSM	Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
DSM-III	Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
ESR	Ethical and Shared Remembering
EU	European Union
FC	Football Club
HET	Historical Enquiries Team
HIU	Historical Investigations Unit
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HRBA	Human Rights-Based Approach
ICIR	Independent Commission for Information Retrieval
ICRIR	Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery
IHN	Irish Housing Network
INLA	Irish National Liberation Army
IRA	Irish Republic Army
IRS	Indian Residential Schools
IRSP	Irish Republic Socialist Party
LGBQTI+	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Queer, Transgender, Intersex and Other Non-Heterosexual Genders and Non-Binary Sexualities
MLA	Member of the Legislative Assembly
MMIWG	Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls
MP	Member of Parliament
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NICRA	Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
NIMMIWG	National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls
NIO	Northern Ireland Office
OED	Oxford English Dictionary
OHA	Oral History Archive
OTR	On-the-Runs
PAR	Participatory-Action Research

PBP	People Before Profit
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republic Army
PSNI	Police Service of Northern Ireland
PPS	Public Prosecution Service
RBSI	Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry
RCGP	Report of the Consultative Group on the Past
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RIC	Royal Irish Constabulary
RMP	Royal Military Police
RNU	Republic Network for Unity
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary
SDLP	Social Democratic and Labour Party
SEFF	Southeast Fermanagh Foundation
SEUPB	Special European Union Programmes Body
SF	Sinn Féin
SHA	Stormont House Agreement
TD	Teachta Dála (Member of the lower house of the Parliament of the Republic of Ireland
TJ	Transitional Justice
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
TRCC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada
UDA	Ulster Defence Association
UDR	Ulster Defence Regiment
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States of America
USC	Ulster Special Constabulary
UUP	Ulster Unionist Party
WWI	World War I

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"'You don't understand what time is,' he said. 'You say the past is gone, the future is real, there is no change, no hope… But it is not real, you know, it is not stable, not solid, nothing is. Things change, change, you cannot have anything. And least of all, can you have the present, unless you accept with it the past… and the future.'"

-Ursula K. Le Guin, *The Dispossessed* (1973)

"He who seeks to confront his own buried past must conduct himself like a man digging."

Walter Benjamin, "Excavation and Memory" (1932/2005)

"Between my finger and my thumb
The squat pen rests
I'll dig with it."

-Seamus Heaney, "Digging" (1966)

CHAPTER 1:

"CLOSE THIS PAINFUL CHAPTER": THE RECONCILIATION PARADIGM AND NORTHERN IRELAND

I.   DESTABILISING TIME

In their introduction to a special issue of the journal *Memory Studies* focused on "unwieldy pasts," Hite and Jara (2020) argue that memory studies as a discipline is now entering "the spectral turn." They argue that spectres, often manifesting in the literature as "ghosts" or "hauntings," "create languages to imagine the afterlives of violence over the long term, beyond narratives of closure" (246). Increasingly, they claim, "memory-minded civil society calls for social justice surface across generations, culture, race, and nation," (246), and established constellations of political, cultural, and social power face a burgeoning challenge, global in its reach. This challenge, which they do not claim is new, but increasingly coherent and conversant across space and borders due to twentieth and twenty-first century media technologies, is fundamentally rooted in the "destabilization of the past-present relationship." "Time itself has been destabilized," (247) they argue, and "Collectivities all over the world seek both representation and recognition of the violent past, often held as intimately linked to the violence and injustices of the present" (246).

This dissertation positions itself firmly within this "spectral turn." From within it, I examine and criticise what I refer to as the "reconciliation paradigm" in dominant or mainstream inflections of the disciplines of transitional justice and peace studies. Specifically, I argue that survivor mobilisations seeking the destabilisation of time and temporality must be understood as a particular brand of the politics of refusal (Simpson 2014). This refusal is rooted in resistance to the severing of violent, colonial, and/or

authoritarian pasts from presents of transition and idealised futures of reconciled, liberal democracy. In the work that follows, I will focus primarily on one case study, that of Northern Ireland, or the six northeastern counties on the island of Ireland.

I began the research programme that would ultimately result in this dissertation with a straightforward question. I first articulated this question prior to joining the academy full-time, prior to beginning my Ph.D., when I was working at a Northern Irish non-governmental organisation (NGO) developing methodologies and pedagogical materials rooted in reimagining how divisive and contentious narratives of the past on the island of Ireland could be narrated, shared, and remembered ethically. When I began this work in 2013, it seemed like what I term reconciliatory memory, or the collective mediation of the memories of the past in order to become conducive to more peaceful, tolerant, and hospitable societies in the future (Brewer 2010; Rigney 2012), was the "only game in town," not only in Northern Ireland, but across the global landscape of transitional societies (Hayner 2000; Kritz 1995), or societies supposedly transitioning to democracy and away from civil war and/or the systematic abuses of former regimes (Linz and Stepan 1996). Yet when I began to actively seek out and work with victims, survivors, and bereaved of Troubles-violence in Northern Ireland, I encountered active hostility towards reconciliatory memory from both sides of the inter-communal divide in Northern Ireland. This dissertation began as a means of trying to uncover the nature of that refusal to reconcile and where (both geographically and metaphorically) these refusals were most intense.

What I have discovered, with the assistance and at times unfathomable bravery and determination of my research partners, is that resistance to reconciliatory memory may take many forms, but it is always *temporal* and always *place-based* resistance. By temporal resistance, I mean a persistent refusal to allow the violent past to be moved on from, to close the books on the past, to periodicise the past by presenting it as completed, bracketed, over, in

contrast to it persisting into the present. By place-based resistance, I mean a resistance that seethes and returns to particular places in the larger landscapes of human societies where the past remains temporally "uncodifiable," where the material and spectral presence of violence "transgresses the classificatory order" (Feldman 1991, 67-68), resulting in places that cannot be easily converted into linear, accelerationist temporalities of transition. Following Mikhail Bakhtin (1984), Keith Basso (1996), and Karen Till (2017; 2005), I name these places "chronotopes of the threshold," or often just "thresholds." Thresholds are those places that remain temporally set apart in the Northern Irish landscape, the places where the ghosts of the Troubles persistently haunt, and where the living perpetually return to (both corporeally and in narrative form) to commune with and care for the restless dead.

There is a robust and voluminous criticism of reconciliation as a colonial, and especially a settler colonial paradigm, across both academic and activist literature. I will refer throughout to a dominant ideal of reconciliation in transitional justice through Damien Short's (2008; 2005) concept of "the reconciliation paradigm." One of the major contributions of this dissertation is to situate Northern Ireland after the 1998 Good Friday/Belfast Agreement (hereafter, "The Agreement" or "The 1998 Agreement") squarely within the international promotion of the reconciliation paradigm. Additionally, I will illustrate the uniquely Irish and Northern Irish contours of how the paradigm operates in this space. Beyond that critical situating, this dissertation actively contributes to a small but growing literature (Bevernage 2012; Castillejo-Cuellar 2014; Hinton 2018; Mueller-Hirth 2017; Mueller-Hirth and Rios-Oyola 2018; Robinson 2020) identifying and illustrating what Short (2008, 160) refers to as reconciliation's "temporal dimension" in postconflict, postcolonial, and/or postauthoritarian societies; how transitional power weaponises reconciliation to demand a particular chrononormative orientation to the problem of past violence. This is an orientation that consistently assigns, in Bevernage's (2012, 1) words, "an

inferior ontological status to the past." In other words, the reconciliation paradigm insists the past be viewed as less real than both the present and the idealised future, belonging to a completed temporal space, one whose persistent and troublesome vestiges must be overcome in the service of a new society.

My final contribution is to illustrate how even in the excellent studies cited above, place, and especially places imbued with temporal resistance, tend to get short shrift, elided or simply not considered. In transitional space, temporal resistance clusters around particular places, particular thresholds, and particular interruptions to the dominant material futurities of transition and reconciliation. These thresholds are sometimes in the places we might have thought to look—official places of mourning, sanctioned monuments, curated physical memorials—but often they are found elsewhere, deeply embedded in vernacularly encoded environments. Often, unsettling thresholds are deep within local space and memory, in odd, out-of-the-way places where the visitor may never think to encounter and the researcher may never think to examine. Yet these vernacular places and the memories and ghosts that circulate about them still actively unsettle everyday life, everyday mobility, and defy the ubiquitous social and political pressure to move on that many victims, survivors and bereaved are perpetually subject to (Mueller-Hirth 2017).

Having introduced the main questions, starting points, and ultimate contributions of this dissertation, this introductory has two aims. The first is to contextualise and ground the reader in Northern Ireland's political, institutional, and temporal landscape following the 1998 Agreement, paying special attention to so-called "legacy issues." A legacy issue is a somewhat euphemistic means of referring to the thousands of unsolved cases of violent death and injury that occurred during the Troubles, not to mention questions of collective, institutional, and State responsibility and culpability for those cases. In it, I will take as my starting point the Conservative (UK) Government's introduction of the Northern Ireland

Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill in 2020. This Bill proposes to end all prosecutions, inquests (public and coronial), and civil actions for all Troubles-related killings and other crimes. Simply put, the Bill is a blanket amnesty for crimes allegedly committed by the British and Northern Irish State security forces and/or by Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries during the 30 years of The Troubles. The Bill, in the minds of many, cynically exploits and misstates the entire conceptual framework of reconciliation by unabashedly equating it with legal impunity. However, I will attempt to show that legal impunity is, in fact, the apotheosis of the reconciliation paradigm, and throughout the world, the reconciliation paradigm has, with varying degrees of success, been used to insulate the crimes of the past from justice in the present.

The final section will provide the reader with a plan of the dissertation manuscript and a focused chapter by chapter summary.

II. LEGACY AND RECONCILIATION IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

I do not wish here to recapitulate a history of Northern Ireland, from its inception as a consequence of the British partition of the island of Ireland in 1921 to the generally-agreed-upon "end" of the Troubles in 1998. I provide a truncated history elsewhere (Robinson 2018a) and there are many excellent historical treatments of twentieth-century Ireland and Northern Ireland (Bew and Gillespie 1999; Cochrane 2013; Coogan 2003; McKittrick and McVea 2001; McVeigh and Rolston 2022; Ó Dochartaigh 2004). Rather, my intention in this section is to provide an overview of the reconciliation paradigm through the lens of legacy issues in Northern Ireland after the 1998 Agreement. Specifically, I ask the question here, "How have we got to this?" the "this" being the Northern Ireland (Legacy and Reconciliation Bill) of 2020. How has the concept of reconciliation in Northern Ireland come to be

coterminous in the minds of the UK Conservative Government with an amnesty or legal

impunity for past crimes?

Answering these questions requires a truncated genealogy of transitional justice (TJ)

and its embrace of reconciliation in the latter decades of the twentieth-century. Perhaps the

most-cited definition of transitional justice remains Ruti Teitel's:

> The conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoing of repressive predecessor regimes (2003, 69).

The type of justice imagined by TJ, argues Teitel, is by necessity deeply cautious and

limiting, one "directed at preserving a minimalist rule of law identified chiefly with

maintaining peace" (69, for other foundational perspectives see Hayner 1994; Kritz 1995;

Minow 1998; O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1988; Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena

2006). In mainstream TJ therefore, transitional justice should be thought of as the scope or

potential of all primarily legal or legalistic initiatives in transitioning societies that do not

threaten the maintenance of peace.

Paige Arthur (2009) skilfully illustrates how this limiting, often-contradictory, and

conservative conception of justice so quickly assumed the power of a "field," or "an

international web of individuals and institutions whose internal coherence is held together by

common concepts, practical aims, and distinctive claims for legitimacy" (324). She argues

that within the field of TJ, only certain conceptions of justice could be accepted as legitimate,

whilst others (such as retributive, historical, or decolonial justice) were jettisoned as

unrealistic. For Arthur, while TJ was initially conceived of as Janus-faced, focused both on

reckoning with the past and ensuring a just and peaceful future, as the field increasingly came

to dominate international discourse, a somewhat nebulous transition *to* came to supersede

transition *from* (also, Robinson 2018a). Arthur locates this shift, in part, in the decline of

class-centric analyses of State violence characteristic of Marxist anticolonial perspectives and

the rise of liberal-internationalist human rights discourse. Justice could not be conceptualised as a radical rectification of colonial exploitation, argued many in the emergent TJ field, because it would empower leftist postcolonial leaders to deploy the power of the State to force social and economic redistribution at the expense of human rights. The preferable option, therefore, was a clean break with the past, which unfortunately entailed a jettisoning of half of TJ's original notion of "justice," the retroactive or past-facing one. Drawing a line under the past became the only way to help prevent future human rights abuses of successor regimes and create the necessary prerequisites for the transition to capitalist, liberal democracy. Politically, this emergent orthodoxy (Linz and Stepan 1996; McGarry and O'Leary, 2004; O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1998) arrived at the conclusion that transitions must be pacted transitions, with built-in guarantees of safety and continued participation in government for actors and institutions implicated in the crimes of the past. These pacts were the only mechanism to ensure transitional stability and work towards liberal democratic futures. The crimes of the past, in short, would be elided to prevent the crimes of the future.

In practice, however, murder, rape, torture, dispossession, etc., all remain crimes, or at least atrocities, in spite of changes in regimes and breaks in temporal periods. This speaks to one of the "irreconcilable" goals of transitional justice ably identified by Leebaw (2008). As Leebaw shows, TJ aims to break with the past through the delegitimation of past orders, orders built on authoritarianism, sectarianism, and State violence, but it then views the legal delegitimation of past orders as potentially upsetting the maintenance of the peace and the transitional order. Moreover, the primary mechanism for delegitimising unjust past regimes, the Law, is singularly ill-equipped to reckon with historical crimes, injuries, and injustices. The crimes of authoritarian, colonial, and/or collaborationist regimes cannot be neatly reduced to single clear events with clear individual perpetrators; the conduct of the past

regime is part of an architecture of violence, dispossession and control. While Law may seek to personify these architectures with a single individual or individuals, as in the Argentinian "trial of the generals" or the Nuremberg Tribunal after the Second World War, it cannot adequately grapple with pressing questions of larger collective culpability (Minow 1998). This growing realisation, beginning in the Southern Cone of South America in the 1980s, led to the formation of Truth Commissions as a means of articulating a more fulsome narrative of the genesis, perpetuation, and ubiquity of state violence (Minow 1998; Phelps 2005), but often at the expense of or as an alternative to legal justice.

Law also suffers from a *temporal* problem. In a criminal trial, the crime being prosecuted is one that must be proven to have been committed either at a given moment in time or over a temporally codifiable period, yet historical, colonial crimes and injustices are often perpetrated over the *longue durée*. Castillejo-Cuellar argues (2014, 56, original emphasis) that "in establishing a specific relationship between 'violence' and 'temporality' the Law renders *unintelligible* historical injuries." In other words, when the Law and legal language is grafted onto historical injustices, injustices whose duration may collapse distinctions between temporal periods or generations, it is forced to translate those injustices into what Veena Das (2006, 106) refers to as a "frozen slide," a forensically examinable single event. But a historical crime or injustice is defined by its temporal duration, its persistence and replication across time (Rothberg 2008b). To translate it otherwise, as Castillejo-Cuellar shows, is to fundamentally misrepresent it, to misrepresent its causes, its multiple occurrences, and especially its *persistence* and what that persistence represents.

Castillejo-Cuellar goes on to argue that TJ and its primary mechanism of Law seek to square the irreconcilable temporal circle by recruiting what I refer to throughout this dissertation as the reconciliation paradigm. I borrow the term from Damien Short:

> Reconciliation as a peacemaking paradigm gradually developed over the last two decades… as an alternative to traditional state diplomacy… [It's] primary concern has

been to develop mechanisms that foster state legitimacy, forgiveness, and social stability by attempting to atone for past injustices in novel and context-sensitive ways (2003, 291).

As Short notes, the crucial project of the reconciliation paradigm is to "foster state legitimacy," to protect and insulate present political arrangements from their origins in mass violence, unjust economies and societies, and/or colonial dispossession. Specifically, for Castillejo-Cuellar (2014), the paradigm finds form in the rhetorical ideal that the new nation-state can only be achieved by "assigning violence (defined in very particular ways) to a place 'behind,' in the aseptic reclusion of 'the past (62).'" By its very nature incompatible with the *longue durée*, Law obscures and sanitises its own deficiencies by yielding to the language of the reconciliation paradigm. Instead of accepting this, Castillejo-Cuellar rather suggests that we see the relationship between past violence and present transition not as conservative TJ would have it, as a "radical rupture," but instead as "continuity" (63). His arguments echo Wole Solyinka's well-known argument that the African present and all of its political, economic, and social arrangements, are always a form of "diabolical continuity (and inevitability) from an unexpiated past" (1999, 19-20). There is also a clear parallel to the contemporary work of North American Indigenous scholars and their allies. Noting that actual progress towards reckoning with colonial crimes requires "Action by governments that systematically examines the past, initiates a process of homeland restitution, and holds institutions, as well as individuals, accountable," Corntassel and Holder (2008, 487) note instead that the idea of reckoning seems to be bound up in North America in "draw[ing] a line" (487) between the unjust past and a healed, reconciled national future (within the Settler polity) (see also Moses 2011; Waldorf 2012). In this context, as Wakeham (2012, 2) argues, the reconciliation paradigm is a strategy of "containment," "substituting rhetorical gestures of atonement for more radical processes of redistributive justice or political power sharing."

I will have more to say on the genealogical origins of the reconciliation paradigm in the next chapter, especially its roots in Judeo-Christian theologies, but for now I note this rhetorical "containment" may be understood through what Short argues is the paradigm's "temporal dimension" (2008, 160). He summates the "temporal dimension" in Australia as follows:

> By acknowledging *past* colonial racism, [Australia] effective re-imagined Australia as *currently* post-colonial (original emphasis)."

In other words, reconciliation-as-paradigm conjures a temporal structure where the unfortunate, troublesome, violent past is over, bracketed, complete, what now remains for us to do in the present is to learn from it and move on. It legitimises contemporary Australia (and the United States, and Canada, and even Northern Ireland (McVeigh and Rolston 2022)) by its proclamation that it is no longer a settler colony, it might have been in the past, but it is not now. As currently postcolonial, Australia does not need to radically remake itself, what happened in the past is past, rather, it needs to look, always, towards the future.

Here, we can safely agree with Castillejo-Cuellar (2014, 248) that this futurism is a key characteristic of "discourses of national unity and reconciliation." Reconciliatory discourses that work to compel a society to "look to the future," "turn the page," "leave the past behind," and to "forgive and reconcile" (248), are all inevitable outgrowths of the minimalist, status-quo protecting temporal impulses of mainstream, conservative TJ and Law's structural inability to reckon with *longuee durée* architectures of violence, colonialism, dispossession, and oppression. By promising citizens a new future, reconciliation elides persistent structural violence and entrenched racial/ethnic/linguistic/cultural inequality in the present, and it conceals the roots of those inequalities and injuries in a past that is not past. Thus, the reconciliation paradigm is not merely a benign albeit superficial move towards settler enlightenment, but rather an active "vehicle for contemporary dispossession" (Short 2008, 8).

I hope to this point I have built a compelling case that mainstream, conservative TJ has recruited and deployed the reconciliation paradigm largely to paper over temporal paradoxes inherent in transitioning societies. And while I will have much to say on the many faces of reconciliation in the next chapter, my argument is that reconciliation must be seen as status-quo protecting, even if that insulating mechanism is often ideationally and rhetorically rooted in the fear of a collapse in the transitional order leading to a return to violence (Payne 2008). I want to turn now towards applying these insights to Northern Ireland in particular, with a closer look at exactly how Northern Ireland has tried to reckon and reconcile with the Troubles in the past 20-25 years.

III. LEGACY AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The 1998 Agreement contains next to nothing in its text regarding reckoning with Troubles-violence or mediating the justice-seeking claims of the conflict's survivors and bereaved. The reason for this lacuna is now well-known. The crafters of the Agreement, most importantly the US diplomat George Mitchell and then-Secretary for State for Northern Ireland Mo Mowlam, believed these issues to be volatile and so divisive they could potentially derail the entire Peace Process (Powell 2009). The Agreement simply avoids these issues, shunting them into a parallel forum, the desk of the then-Northern Ireland Victims' Commissioner, Sir Kenneth Bloomfield. Indeed, in the Agreement's text, a mere three points even reference "victims of violence" (6.11-6.13) and the text is already prefiguring the implementation of the reconciliation paradigm: "The participants believe that it is essential to acknowledge and address the suffering of victims of violence as a necessary element of reconciliation."

Mowlam specifically appointed Bloomfield to produce a report that could do what the Agreement couldn't, namely to "look at the possible ways to recognise the pain and suffering felt by victims of violence arising from the troubles of the last 30 years… [and] to examine

the feasibility of providing greater recognition for those who have become victims"

(Bloomfield 1998, 8). The reader should notice the choice of the word "recognition" here

throughout the mandate supplied to Bloomfield by Mowlam and similar phrases like

"acknowledgment" and "address the suffering." These nebulous notions are what will need to

be done to promote "reconciliation," and though a word like "address" could seem to suggest

material reparations, but there is not the slightest mention nor hint of "justice."

Indeed, in Bloomfield's completed Report (1998), he hews strictly to the framework

he has been given. Of the twenty recommendations he arrives at, none directly deals with

questions of accountability, blame, guilt, or justice for past violence. These are, as

Bloomfield somewhat defensively writes, "matter[s], in the civil sphere, for courts of law,

and in the moral sphere for a higher jurisdiction" (2.14). Later, he writes of his extensive

consultation with victims, survivors, and bereaved: "They asked me to register their firm

view that all questions of memorialisation or compensation were secondary in their minds to

the establishment of the full truth [of what had been done to them]" (5.32). Yet even after

hearing this, the bulk of Bloomfield's Report subordinates any such questions to an absolute

necessity of reconciliation. As he makes clear in his letter to Mowlam which introduces the

Report:

> In all of this I have been guided by a simple yardstick: we have created victims
> through violence, and we have produced violence out of division. It follows then, that
> any form of [victims' and survivors'] recognition likely to generate division rather
> than to foster reconciliation should be avoided (Bloomfield 1998, 5).

Rarely will one read a clearer indication that the reconciliation paradigm is to be,

paraphrasing Audra Simpson (2014, 25) "the only game in town." In lieu of what the

constituencies Bloomfield is tasked with representing openly tell him they want, namely,

truth, justice, accountability, what is on offer is better health care, better trauma care, possible

monetary reparations, acknowledgment, and studiously non-contentious memorialisation

(two entire chapters deal with the idea of a "national memorial"). Anything else is for the

Law, whether human or divine. And while I cannot comment on the divine in these pages, I have already expended a degree of effort in the prior section focusing on human Law's structural inability to deal with the crimes of the past. Bloomfield's defensiveness is part of a clear paradox: The Law recruits reconciliation to help it with what it cannot address, reconciliation in turn claims it is a matter for Law, and justice-seeking survivors, victims, and bereaved who focus their campaigns on official or State-sanctioned avenues and institutions mount their proverbial hamster wheel.

Yet in saying this, I must take care not to be overly naïve about the difficulties inherent in legislating or proffering tangible legacy recommendations. Post-Troubles Northern Ireland (and indeed, Northern Ireland during the Troubles as well) operates from within a near-constant lack of agreement on how the Troubles should be understood, narrated, and framed, what Northern Ireland scholars refer to as the "metaconflict" (Mallinder 2019). Additionally, one of the major tasks of reports like Bloomfield's (and others, as we shall see), was to arrive at a statutory definition of a "victim" of Troubles violence, and thus, a person who could be eligible for statutory aid and reparation (Hearty 2016; Jankowitz 2018). Attempts to legislate a statutory definition of a "victim" have proven one of the most divisive issues across all of Northern Ireland's post-Troubles landscape (Lawther 2014). Many survivors of Republican violence strongly reject the idea that those who belonged to Republican paramilitaries should ever be considered legitimate victims, the flip-side is true for survivors of State and Loyalist violence (L. Graham 2014; B. Graham and Whelan 2007; Lawther 2014). Again, this debate hinges on the metaconflict; if a person or group's narrative of a paramilitary group's larger actions and context is that of terrorists, they tend to see claims to legitimate victimhood emanating from former paramilitary members and their families quite differently from those who see former paramilitaries as primarily resistance fighters.

Just how emotive these issues are, and how prone to political manipulation, were on display during the official press launch of the so-called "Eames-Bradley" Report in 2009, referred to as such after the two chairpersons of the Group, Archbishop Rowan Eames and Denis Bradley. Eames-Bradley was the second time that a Northern Irish Secretary (Labour's Shaun Woodward) had commissioned a report on "dealing with the past" and "confronting legacy issues" in Northern Ireland. The Eames-Bradley Report, properly known as The Report of the Consultative Group on the Past (RCGP), however, signalled the Group also intended to assign what Bevernage (2012, 1) would call an "ontologically inferior" status to the past from its very epigraph. Citing a relatively obscure nineteenth-century Christian spiritualist, Margaret Fairless Barber, it begins: "To look backward for a while is to refresh the eye, to restore it, and to render it more fit for its prime function of looking forward" (4).

Again, firmly in keeping with the impulses of conservative TJ and the reconciliation paradigm, "look[ing] backward" is presented almost as a mere indulgence, as something perfunctory that must be done in order to get to work achieving "the prime function" of transitional societies, moving forward. Conscious perhaps of Bloomfield's failure to pay more than lip service to questions of truth and accountability, one of the primary recommendations of the RCGP was the establishment of a "Legacy Commission" "which would deal with the past by combining processes of reconciliation, justice and information recovery" (36). However, in the very next sentence, the authors move quickly to subordinate the second two goals to the first, writing: "Its overarching objective would be to promote peace and stability in Northern Ireland, and its activities and decisions would be guided by that perspective" (36). Clearly, uncovering information or seeking justice with that would unsettle the status-quo is not what the authors had in mind. They further betray their dependence on reconciliation's temporal dimension on the prior page (35), where after detailing a litany of failings of legal and criminal investigations for Troubles-related

incidents, they argue not for the difficult work of making these institutions and investigations more credible and responsive, but instead that "a way should be found to draw a line, in the future, while preserving the requirements of truth and justice." How Northern Ireland could collectively draw such a line whilst still "preserving the requirements" is left studiously vague.

In prior work (Robinson 2018a, 21-22), I dissected much of the reconciliatory language peppering the RCGP, arguing that the Report fallaciously operated under a larger portrayal that The Troubles were a sort of unavoidable collective madness that everyone in Northern Ireland shares the blame for, and thus shares the responsibility to transcend. This lens undoubtedly contributed to what the RCGP is most [in]famous for in Northern Ireland, a recommendation that the "nearest relative of someone who died as a result of the conflict… should receive a one-off ex-gratia recognition payment of £12,000" (RCGP 2009, 16). Again, I have provided a more fulsome treatment of where this recommendation ultimately came from and the response to it from a cross-section of victims' and survivors' groups (Robinson 2018a, 19-21), but this recommendation in particular provoked widespread fury among many victims and survivors of Republican violence, who reasoned that it morally equated their loved ones killed by the IRA with IRA-men killed during the commission of illegal acts. At the launch, survivors of Republican violence, egged on by hard-line Unionist politicians, interrupted and screamed at the panellists and directly confronted Sinn Féin president Gerry Adams, present at the launch. They were in turn challenged by survivors of State and Loyalist violence, leading to chaos and repeated disruptions (Cadwallader 2009). While I personally did not emigrate to Northern Ireland until 2013, colleagues in the peace and NGO sectors I worked in from 2013-2016, many of whom were physically present at the launch, repeatedly described the scenes at the launch to me as a dangerous and horrifying incident, the starkest example they knew of the imminent consequences of failing in the work of reconciliation.

But while many consider the ex-gratia payment recommendation of the RCGP profoundly misguided, or at least a failure of the RCGP to adequately justify or explain its reasoning, they do so whilst minimising the larger context in which the recommendation came to be made. A one-off, ex-gratia payment is firmly in keeping with the RCGP's overwhelming focus on drawing a line under the contentious past and especially promoting collective, society-wide, culpability for the Troubles. Yet it is well-established that Troubles violence was spatially uneven, with the overwhelming majority of violence concentrated in relatively small geographical pockets throughout the province (Cunningham and Gregory 2014; Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). It is well-established that the vast majority of the direct culpability for Troubles violence rests with a small minority of the population of Northern Ireland, Ireland, and Britain, together with the organisations and institutions within which they acted (Robinson 2018a). The RCGP's urge to collectivise guilt is a consistent feature of the international operationalisation of reconciliation paradigm. Former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, for example, in his apology for Canada's Indian Residential Schools, argued that the century-long policy of church and State collaboration to commit a cultural genocide of the Indigenous peoples of Canada (see Chapter 7) amounted to a "sad chapter in our shared history" (cited in Coulthard 2014, 125). Former British Prime Minister David Cameron, in his apology for Bloody Sunday, after emphasising a Trumpian "bad people on both sides" framing of the larger context of the massacre, calls for the "acknowledge[ment] of our shared history, even where it divides us. And come together to close to close this painful chapter on Northern Ireland's troubled past" (BBC 2010, n.p.). Upon being sworn in as Australian Prime Minister in 2007, Kevin Rudd delivered his well-known "Sorry speech" to Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. In it he promised to "rectify this blemished chapter in our national history" (cited in Hempenstall 2018, n.p.). And in the Republic of Ireland, Taoiseach Micheál Martin responded to the

recent Report of the Commission of Investigation into Mother and Baby Homes as a "dark, difficult and shameful chapter of recent Irish history" (Leahy and McGarry 2021). The sheer ubiquity of this language of a "sad" or "blemished chapter" in "our shared history" is remarkably similar (Amirahmadi 2014; Apuuli 2006) and attests to what Arthur (2009) describes as a fully institutionalised field of TJ.

In truth, the Eames-Bradley report and the 2009 scenes at its launch cemented in the minds of governments and NGOs officially tasked with implementing reconciliation in Northern Ireland that all future interventions in legacy issues would have to be based on what McGrattan (2013, 17) refers to as "moral relativism and craven pragmatism." McGrattan interprets this moral relativism largely through the prism of the ascendancy of the Ethical and Shared Remembering (ESR, see below) methodology that came to dominate Northern Irish memory-space in the 2000s and early 2010s and its conclusion that all narratives of the past must be given space to coexist. But I would add to McGrattan's conclusions the warrant underlying the shared memory-space conclusion. Because the Troubles represent a "sad chapter in our shared history," we are all charged collectively with transcending it, and no-one can claim moral superiority (of action, of identity, of narrative) over another from within the reconciliation paradigm.

In the years after Eames-Bradley, reconciliation became very much the only game in town in Northern Ireland. This was helped along by the indelible images of metaphorically frothing-at-the-mouth victims and survivors groups refusing the supposedly only way forward for Northern Ireland at launch of the Eames-Bradley report (for the clearest manifestation of this perspective, see: Brewer 2010). As Leigh Payne argues (2008, 291), reconciliation-as-paradigm is embedded in two major truisms, what she names the "fatal overdose of truth" and the "healing truth" truisms respectively. Both are deeply relevant to the Northern Irish and Irish landscapes after the Agreement, but as Ireland prepared for the

so-called "Decade of Centenaries" from 2012-2022, the 100-year anniversaries of foundational "chosen glories" and "chosen traumas" (Volkan 2001) in Irish histories, the first truism came to take centre stage. I will displace much of this discussion to the concluding chapter of this dissertation, but briefly the Decade of Centenaries Programme, operative on both sides of the border, was an official series of commemorative events, both national and local, coupled with artistic projects and performances that sought a new methodology for remembering the signal events of one hundred years prior. That methodology goes by the name "Ethical and Shared Remembering" (ESR) and was first developed and articulated in Northern Ireland's second city of Derry, under the aegis of a non-governmental organisation I worked for from 2013-2016, The Junction. From its theoretical and programmatic origins at the Junction, it rapidly spread to other NGOs both North and South of the border and was subsequently adopted (some might say co-opted) by Northern Ireland's Community Relations Council and the southern Republic's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade as the guiding rubric for the upcoming Decade. For all its intricate theory, methods, and praxis, the ESR guiding programme was firmly rooted in the fear that the centenary commemorations would lead to widespread, organised violence if they were allowed to be hijacked by organisations and individuals not singing from the proverbial reconciliatory hymn sheet (see Evershed 2015; 2014; Graff-McRae 2010). While Payne's (2008) insights are rooted in the unsolicited public confessions of former regime functionaries and the unsettling truths uncovered by truth commissions and journalists, this fear of what will happen if reconciliation falters is a central aspect of presenting the reconciliation paradigm as the only game in town across the global landscape of transitioning societies.

Thus, both ESR and Payne's (2008) "fatal overdose" truism coalesce around the idea that unmediated memory, memory not conducive to reconciliation, must be mitigated in order to protect peace in the present, allegedly promoted by the transitional order. The specific

praxis of ESR demands what McGrattan (2013) identifies, relativism and pragmatism. ESR is founded on the notion (see Chapter 7) that divisive, contentious memory must be officially "mediated," in Rigney's (2012, 251-2) words, to "become conducive of a just and peaceful future." Its specific praxis, with its genealogical roots in the work of Christian hermeneutic philosopher Paul Ricoeur (see Chapter 7), demands what ESR maintains is a "generosity of spirit" (McMaster and Hetherington 2010, 8) to encounter multiple narrations of the events of 100 years ago, including those which seek to exculpate, justify, or revise the brutality of both colonial and anticolonial violence on the island. All narratives of the past are considered equally worthy of witnessing and engaging with critically, but what is required of us as ethical rememberers is to recognise the power of the narrative in the minds and psyches of those who hold it and understand that peace depends on allowing multiple, competing, incommensurate narratives to share space.

In Chapter 7, I speculate as to why the ESR methodology eventually faltered in Ireland towards the end of the Decade, but from 2012-2016, while non-official commemorative spaces certainly existed (especially in the working-class sanctuary spaces of Republicanism and Loyalism, see: Robinson 2018a), officially, on both sides of the border, the ESR's particular operationalisation of the reconciliation paradigm brokered no significant challenge. The ascendancy of ESR, paradoxically, neither destabilised the past (in Hite and Jara's (2020) terms), nor did it destabilise the particularistic justificatory narratives of Irish Republicanism(s), Loyalism(s), nor British colonialism, rather, it insulated and protected them from sanctioned challenge by asserting that all narrations of the past had to be granted "narrative hospitality" (Kearney 2007) in post-Agreement space (McGrattan 2016a; Robinson 2020). For victims, survivors, and bereaved of Troubles violence, it implicitly argued for narrative encounters with the very narratives that justified and continue to justify their victimisation and bereavement (see Chapter 6).

In 2013, the Northern Irish Office published the draft "Haass-O'Sullivan" proposals,

now the third commissioned attempt to deal with legacy issues after Bloomfield and Eames-

Bradley. While the Haass-O'Sullivan talks, after the surnames of the two chairpersons, the

US academics Richard Haass and Meghan O'Sullivan, failed after their last-minute rejection

by the DUP and the UUP, their proposed framework for reckoning with the past would later

find its way almost wholly intact into the 2014 Stormont House Agreement (SHA). For many

observers at the time, it seemed that DUP and the UUP would accede to the latest drafts of

Haass-O'Sullivan, however, many victims, survivors, and bereaved of Republican violence

were deeply unhappy with what they viewed as a disproportionate focus on State wrongdoing

and the failure of State institutions. I will leave Haass-O'Sullivan and the SHA for the time

being, though I shall return shortly. At this juncture it is necessary to briefly describe and

interpret the 2014 disclosure of the so-called "on-the-runs" (OTR) scandal.

The perspective that the SHA and Haass-O'Sullivan were one-sided was

immeasurably strengthened in 2014, when the news of the OTR scandal broke. The OTR

scheme was revealed when the trial of former IRA-man John Downey for allegedly bombing

the Hyde Park Barracks in London in 1982 (killing four soldiers) spectacularly collapsed

when Downey's lawyers produced a letter from the PSNI to Downey that stated he was no

longer wanted for or at risk of arrest for Troubles-related crimes. Downey's letter had its

origins in a 2005 bill proposed by the UK government of Tony Blair called the Northern

Ireland Offences Bill. I remind the reader that my argument in this section is that the blanket

amnesties envisioned by the 2020 Northern Ireland (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill are

neither new nor, in fact, out-of-step with the reconciliation paradigm. What the 2005 Bill

proposed was to offer a "letter of eligibility" to anyone accused of committing Troubles-

related crimes, including murders, any time before the signing of the 1998 Agreement. These

letters, which came to be colloquially known as "comfort letters," would assure alleged

perpetrators that they were no longer at risk of arrest and prosecution. While the language is not as stark as the 2020 Bill, the 2005 Bill's crafter, then-Northern Irish Secretary Peter Hain (2014), very clearly states that the 2005 Bill was a full legal amnesty for all Troubles-related crimes. The 2005 Bill was never passed although it initially seemed to enjoy support amongst at least four of the five largest parties. But that support was withdrawn, first by Sinn Féin and then by the major Unionist parties. Here is where I must be somewhat circumspect, as perhaps the full truth surrounding at least Sinn Féin's withdrawal of support remains unclear. But according to Hain and the SDLP, the Sinn Féin leadership at the time was aware that the amnesty proposed in the 2005 Bill would also cover the State security forces, including 1 PARA who had perpetrated the Ballymurphy and Bloody Sunday Massacres, not merely former paramilitary men and women. Sinn Féin denies this and accuses Hain and the Blair government of misleading them, essentially pulling a bait-and-switch (Derry Journal 2014).

However, despite the Bill's collapse, 187 letters were issued by the PSNI to Republican on-the-runs, in a secret scheme agreed on by the Blair Government after equally secret discussions with both the Irish government and Sinn Féin, as the later Report of the Hallett Inquiry (2014) laid bare. Blair and Hain both defended their actions before the Hallett Inquiry, claiming that the Northern Irish Peace Process would have collapsed completely without the OTR scheme, saying Sinn Féin would have walked away from decommissioning its weapons and signing up to the St. Andrews Agreement of 2006 that restored the devolved Parliament. In his (2016) book that extensively interviewed members of the Blair government on this topic, Austen Morgan, a former Special Advisor to Northern Irish First Minister David Trimble, ultimately agrees with his interviewees' dominant main claims: that the OTR scheme was the first major attempt at a de facto statutory amnesty for all Troubles-related crimes in and about Northern Ireland, and that such an amnesty is a crucial and unavoidable aspect of achieving reconciliation.

Two things immediately jump out from this brief foray. The first is that at least as early as 2005, major elements within the British government, the Northern Irish Office, the Irish government, and the major Northern Irish parties were all prepared to, at the very least, countenance what Peter Hain contends is blanket amnesty (Tony Blair denied the Bill and the OTR scheme amounted to amnesty) (BBC 2005). The second thing to observe is that amnesty in the 2005 Bill was already being manoeuvred into the reconciliation paradigm, as insider accounts like Morgan's (2016) book make clear, buttressed by official documents, reports, and strategies such as the Eames-Bradley and Bloomfield reports.

Sinn Féin especially seems to have additionally realised in the aftermath of the OTR scandal that the reconciliation paradigm was the only game in town. In Chapter 6, I provide a short discussion of Sinn Féin's quasi-official reconciliation strategy, fronted first by former MLA and former Speaker of the Northern Irish Assembly Mitchell McLaughlin and later by current MLA and former Party Chairperson Declan Kearney. Here, I will simply note that Sinn Féin very much adopted (or co-opted) the ESR praxis and methodology pioneered by The Junction that also formed the basis of the "Decade of Centenaries." In their quasi-official Reconciliation Strategy (published as a collection of essays in 2015, (Sinn Féin 2015)) they even re-publish an essay on ESR by ESR's chief theoretical crafter, Rev. Dr. Johnston McMaster. I have argued elsewhere (Robinson 2020), and will again in Chapter Six, that Sinn Féin rather skilfully, if self-servingly, exploits the temporal dimension at the heart of the reconciliation paradigm by painting those not willing to share, encounter, or extend narrative hospitality to Sinn Fein's preferred version of Ireland's colonial historiography as anachronisms, as out of step on the journey towards a peaceful reconciled future.

Returning to Haass-O'Sullivan and the subsequent Stormont House Agreement of 2014, these represented the final attempt in Northern Ireland to date to maintain at least some official process of justice and accountability regarding Troubles-violence. Though these

mechanisms were again bitterly dismissed by many organised victims, survivors and bereaved of Republican violence (e.g. Southeast Fermanagh Foundation 2013) as being one-sided, both Haass-O'Sullivan and the SHA recognised that the existing legal, investigatory, and forensic processes had failed victims, survivors, and bereaved, which necessitated new or at least heavily reformed structures.

Haass-O'Sullivan specifically carried within it a far more robust and focused demand of "victim acknowledgment" than Eames-Bradley, though many of the specific draft proposals did not survive into the SHA. Moreover, rather than treating demands for "acknowledgment" from the state and former paramilitaries as nebulous and intangible, Haass-O'Sullivan actually tried to list and specify what would be considered acceptable forms of acknowledgment, including an unqualified acceptance of responsibility for past violence. In terms of justice, the Haass-O'Sullivan proposals largely survived intact into the SHA, and they had three primary thrusts. The first, the creation of a Historical Investigations Unit (HIU), the second the creation of an Independent Commission for Information Retrieval (ICIR), and the third the creation of an Oral History Archive (OHA). These could loosely be grouped under the headings of "justice," "truth," and "narrative/storytelling" respectively. The intent of the HIU would be to centralise all investigations of Troubles-related crimes in a wholly independent body and remove them from the purview of the police. It would replace the HET (Historical Enquiries Team), which was a special investigative body of the PSNI. The HET had been heavily criticised by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary for seeming to review cases in which the police and security services were alleged to be involved "less rigorously" (HMIC 2013, 16). One of the HIU's functions was thus to remove legacy investigations from the purview of the PSNI.

The ICIR would operate along a parallel, but distinct tract to the HIU. Information supplied to the ICIR would not be legally actionable, but would be used to help victims,

survivors, and bereaved find out finally who and what institutions specifically had been involved in the violence that directly affected them. Within the ICIR was also the ICLVR (Independent Commission for the Location of Victims' Remains), specifically set up to deal with Northern Ireland's "disappeared," sixteen Northern Irish Catholics generally believed to have been kidnapped and secretly killed by Republican paramilitaries during the course of the Troubles (Dempster 2016). The OHA in turn, was envisioned to be an archival space that anyone with a story or experience of the Troubles could contribute to and would be publicly available to all.

As we can see, taken together, the SHA's justice and acknowledgment sections (themselves largely a continuation of Haass-O'Sullivan) tried to implement a coherent material architecture through which the questions of justice and accountability, largely suborned by mainstream TJ and the reconciliation paradigm, could possibly be addressed. The problem with these provisions however, lay in their implementation. The justice and accountability provisions of the SHA would have to be legislated into existence. Almost a year after the ink had dried on the SHA, the Northern Irish parties and the British government finally agreed on an implementation proposal, worryingly entitled, considering reconciliation's temporal dimension, "A Fresh Start for Northern Ireland." A Fresh Start immediately specified that the HIU and ICIR would not be open-ended, rather they would have to complete their work in five years. The HIU in particular was envisioned having a caseload of 1700 open historical cases. Five years to investigate 1700 Troubles murders and crimes was a clear signal that the HIU would not be allowed to unsettle the status-quo. The Northern Irish Office ably added to this pre-emptive undercutting of the HIU and ICIR by insisting on language in the SHA that would prevent disclosure of information on grounds of "national security," as identified by a "relevant authority." The language was vague enough

to potentially define virtually any high-ranking official of the PSNI, the British security services, government ministers, or British military as a relevant authority (Moffett 2015).

Yet all of this is now potentially moot (at the time of this writing), because neither the HIU nor the ICIR has ever been established, nor will they ever be, if the 2020 Northern Ireland (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill becomes law. In January 2017, the Stormont government collapsed over a renewable heat incentive scandal. It was not reconstituted until January 2020. In the intervening period, no progress could be made on implementing the SHA. The "New Decade, New Approach" Agreement, the basis of the re-establishment of Stormont, committed the Stormont executive to the establishment of the SHA's three truth and justice institutions within 100 days. That deadline was summarily missed, forming the convenient excuse for the Johnson Government to introduce the 2020 Bill.

While it is important to state at the outset that the 2020 Bill is opposed, at the time of this writing, by every major political party on the island of Ireland, every organised victims, survivor, and bereaved group on the island, every major international human rights organisation, and the United Nations (Cadwallader 2021), many of the former at least may be being slightly disingenuous in their opposition. As we have seen, the 2020 Bill is simply slightly more blatant in its attempt to institutionalise impunity for past violence in the name of reconciliation than, for example, its predecessor in 2005. Also, instead of Blair's Labour Government that helped make the 1998 Agreement a reality, it was passed and championed by Johnson's Conservative Government, which many considered both mendacious and callously insensitive to Irish and Northern Irish concerns both during the Brexit process *and* as it campaigned to end "vexatious" investigations and prosecutions of British veterans of Northern Ireland. As of this writing (August 2022), the two contenders to replace Johnson as Tory Prime Minister, Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak, have both pledged to pass and implement the 2020 Bill. Also as of this writing, the 2020 Bill has been amended to include an

Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery (ICRIR) and an individual's immunity from prosecution is now contingent on cooperation with the ICRIR, thus allowing the Tory government to claim the 2020 Bill is not a blanket amnesty.

But I have argued strenuously throughout this section that the reconciliation paradigm generally works to subordinate the crimes and violence of the past in the interest of the idealised future. Then-Secretary for State for Northern Ireland Brandon Lewis describes this thusly, in introducing a second reading of the 2020 Bill before the House of Commons:

> This Government recognises huge challenges involved in seeking to address Northern Ireland's past. But we have a responsibility to ensure that future generations do not suffer in the same way as those who have gone before them… The current [historical justice] system [in Northern Ireland] is broken…[it does not] foster understanding, acknowledgment, and reconciliation (NIO 2022, n.p).

This temporal bracketing, peridocising, or suborning the past because it allegedly threatens peace and moving on, I have argued, underlies mainstream TJ's deployment of the reconciliation paradigm across the globe over the past thirty to forty years. Amnesty for past crimes in the interest of protecting the postconflict status quo is not some aberrant feature of the reconciliation paradigm, rather, it is its apotheosis. For Northern Ireland's victims, survivors, and bereaved who seek or hope for some semblance of justice and accountability, the temporal domination of the reconciliation paradigm has forced them into anachronism, into someone who both represents and is defined by something out-of-step with the transitioning present, an aberrance, an annoying interruption to progress, someone who must be overcome if Northern Ireland is ever to realise the future. The evidence abounds that the Northern Ireland (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill cannot wholly be defined as a cruel, ignorant, and calculating political attack emanating from the Johnson government nor the Tory establishment. Rather, it must be seen as part and parcel with repeated, insidious attempts to close off the legacy of the Troubles from present concern by those in positions of political power, both now and in the past, regardless of political party.

IV. THE ORGANISATION OF THE DISSERTATION

In the pages that follow, I will introduce or re-introduce readers to those who do not believe that keeping the violent, painful, and traumatic past alive in the present is transitional failure Rather, many of my research partners believe and state explicitly that refusal, specifically refusing to reconcile, is a powerful political corrective to an allegedly postconflict, authoritarian, and/or colonial status quo often far too eager to selective forget its culpability in a violent past through the imposition of accelerationist temporal frameworks. I am willing to accept that many proponents of the reconciliation paradigm genuinely believe it remains the only means of working towards peaceful, tolerant, and just societies. But I reject the temporalised denigration of those who are usually implicitly, but often explicitly, presented as standing in the way of this goal, namely, resistant victims, survivors, and bereaved.

In the final chapter (Seven) of this dissertation I will claim that, borrowing from First Nations' struggles in Canada and the Bloody Sunday March Committee respectively, "Reconciliation is Dead" and "There is no British Justice." Bound up within those slogans is the demand that the burden of confronting the past shift fundamentally, that it shift away from victims, survivors, and bereaved and onto the people, groups, organisations, institutions, and States most responsible for the infliction of longue durée architectures of historical and contemporary violence. Without this fundamental shift in our shared understandings, reconciliation will stay dead. It will become, as in the 2020 Bill, a mere rhetorical device bluntly wielded by the instruments of power seeking to insulate themselves from any consequences of wrongdoing, both past and present.

In this introductory chapter, I have tried to accomplish two primary things. The first was to give the reader a brief, yet satisfactory overview of legacy issues and the political contestations surrounding them from the 1998 Agreement up to the introduction of the

Northern Ireland (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill of 2020. Secondly, I introduced the reconciliation paradigm and its temporal dimension, shown how it has operated in transitional societies generally and Northern Ireland specifically, and credibly argued that the amnesty provisions of the Bill should be seen as not running in counter to reconciliation, but as that paradigm's apotheosis.

The second chapter engages with literature around big questions of time and temporality in allegedly postconflict, postauthoritarian, and postcolonial societies. I begin from two major propositions: The first, that control over time and temporality is a pronounced and oft-neglected form of social control and political power, and the second, that time and temporality are spatially uneven, that all lived, human space is asynchronous, not temporally uniform. To introduce the reader to these concepts, I interrogate the implicit geographies in the works of some major theorists of temporality: Karl Marx, Michel Foucault, Mikhail M. Bakhtin, and Johannes Fabian. I then move on to the uses and abuses of time and temporality in allegedly postsomething societies. Drawing heavily on Indigenous and Queer temporal criticisms, I argue that the reconciliation paradigm, coupled with mainstream trauma studies and trauma discourse, exerts a form of "temporal domination" over the social and political landscape of transition. By temporal domination, I mean two major things, first the power to institutionalise a particular chrononormativity, a standard modality of temporal-being-in-the-world that renders anachronistic those who either fail or refuse to conform to it, and second, a particular orientation towards the past, which I refer to as the periodicisation of the past. However, I argue that even within landscapes of temporal domination, there are places and people that cannot be recruited into the sorts of accelerationist temporalities favoured by the reconciliation paradigm, that perpetually stand and act as resistant interruptions to closing the books on the past.

The third chapter begins by presenting a brief illustration of my own practical and methodological difficulties and convolutions researching this topic with Northern Irish temporally resistant survivors. It then continues to outline my guiding methodological orientation, which I refer to as "geoethnography-as-inhabitation," borrowing heavily from the work of Michel de Certeau (1984) and Karen Till (2005). The second section describes my specific choices of research methods and illustrates my move towards what I refer to as "the walking family of methods." The final section attempts to illustrate in some depth what I did, where and when I did it, and with whom I did it (my research partners).

Chapters Four to Six represent the empirical contributions of this dissertation. Chapters Four and Five are rooted in Derry, in the spatial politics surrounding the memory of Bloody Sunday, the Annual Bloody Sunday March, and the restless spectres of those murdered in the city set against the transformationist narratives of a city overcoming its past. In Chapter Four, I begin with the public celebration on 15 June 2010 surrounding the Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, known incorrectly by many as the Saville Inquiry. I take issue with temporalities that argue or assume that the Report represented the last word over the contentious and ongoing politics of Bloody Sunday memory. Closely interrogating the so-called split in the Bloody Sunday Justice Campaign in the aftermath of the Report, I argue that this split may actually be a proxy for larger questions of control over time and temporality, that the Report itself is situated within a clear divergence in how to narrate the spatial story of the city of Derry itself. One major narrative presents the Report and the celebration as a key plot point in Derry's inevitable transcendence of its troubled, deprived past. But those who resist this narrative tell another story, a narrative of cosmetic and ineffective justice and a campaign and a city that remains radically unfinished.

While Chapter Four is Bloody Sunday told through the lens of the city of Derry itself, Chapter Five instead drills down to the spectrality of remembrance and mourning of the now

fifty-year-old atrocity. In it, I compare those who refused to stopped marching, those who refused to accept the narrative of the city as "transcending," to the Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, building a case that we must see both mobilisations as a form of temporal resistance rooted in "rebellious mourning" (Milstein 2017a). Surveying and criticising how the concept of "haunting" has been brought to transitional justice (and Northern Ireland in particular), I argue strenuously that those who seek to prolong the past in the present cannot be merely pathologised or dismissed by transcendental and/or reconciliatory temporalities.

Chapter Six leaves an urban commemorative landscape of State violence for a rural landscape of Republican violence, specifically the counties of Fermanagh and Tyrone along the Southwest run of the Irish border or the border on the island of Ireland. Here, I interrogate how and why former members of the Ulster Defence Regiment approach the past in their haunted lives and everyday mobilities. Ultimately, I find temporally-resistant survivors who deploy the power of wounded thresholds to resist being anachronised by the temporal domination exerted by the reconciliation paradigm, of people refusing to move on. As in Chapter Five, I focus on the specific places my research partners introduce me to, places "where history can be told in the present tense" (Basso 1996, 33) I close by arguing that prolonging the past in and through these places may be the crucial, yet under-studied weapon many survivors employ to resist being anachronised.

In the concluding chapter, I argue, borrowing from Indigenous resistance to the Translink Pipeline in Northern British Columbia, Canada, that "reconciliation is dead," that fact the reconciliation paradigm no longer (and never did) provides a template for the creation of just societies, not least of all in Northern Ireland. In its place, I then sketch out not a paradigm, but a preliminary understanding of how transitional societies might orient themselves to violent, colonial pasts and presents. Drawing on three central European

thinkers who refused to reconcile, I name this preliminary understanding "unmaking" and argue that it represents a wholesale refusal to build "reconciled" societies on the backs of those who have suffered the most from mass violence. I conclude by comparing "unmaking," grounded in principles of practical decolonisation and everyday-anarchism with the decolonial Republican lens of the recently published *Unfinished Revolution* (2022) by Robbie McVeigh and Bill Rolston. Arguing that Ireland is indeed potentially on the verge of radical transformation, I propose a research agenda for what may yet promise to be troubling, but hopeful times.

CHAPTER 2:
TIME, TEMPORAL DOMINATION, AND THE RECONCILIATION PARADIGM

I.   TIME AND POWER

In 1974, the US sociologist Barry Schwartz argued "Time itself is a generalized resource whose distribution affects life chances" (868). Schwartz proposed that time, and especially control over its allocation and uneven distribution, is integral to the architecture of sociopolitical power. Schwartz and his colleagues self-identified as part of a [re-] "discovery of time" (Toulmin and Goodfield 1965) movement in academic sociology, specifically exploring what Wallis (1970) termed "chronopolitics," "the relationship between the political behaviour of individuals and groups and their time-perspectives" (102). These sociologists built on a consistent if chequered feature of nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy, namely *chronosophy*, or the philosophical study of time and temporality (for surveys see Adam 1990; 2004).

Modern geographical literature has a somewhat uneven record on the systematic study of time and temporality. On one hand, critical chronopolitical and chronosophical insights abound in decolonial, Queer, Indigenous, and subaltern geographies. They were also central to Time Geography, which contributed to developing temporal perspectives within spatial science (Carlstein, Parkes, and Thrift 1978). Yet, as some scholars have argued (Aalto and Berg 2002; Heffernan 2000; Hom 2010), other sub-disciplines such as political geography and critical geopolitics have tended to subordinate the study of time to the study of space, without adequately conceptualising how the two are linked. Writes Klinke (2013, 675), "Temporal language contaminates geopolitical writing and collective identities are produced as much through temporal boundaries as they are through spatial ones." And as I noted in the

previous chapter, chronopolitical analyses have been strikingly absent in transitional justice and peace studies, despite the clearly temporal assumptions signalled by the adjective "transitional."

If, as Schwartz presciently noted, control over time and temporal assumptions are a key feature of socio-spatial power and stratification, it is long past time (pun intended) for the insights of critical temporal geographies to be extended to the study of transitional geographies and sociologies, those societies allegedly post-mass violence, authoritarianism, civil war, and/or colonialism. In the last couple of decades such a literature has begun to emerge that is starkly critical of temporal power-formations in societies in transition (Arthur 2009; Bevernage 2012; Hinton 2018; Mueller-Hirth 2017; Murphy and McDowell 2019). This literature is not yet as conversant as it could be with Indigenous, decolonial, and Queer critical theories of time and temporality (Berlant 2012; Carlsen 2010; Freeman 2010; Halberstam 2005; Iparraguirre 2016; Kidman et al. 2021; Mahadeo 2018; Muñoz 2009; Nanni 2011; 2012; Rifkin 2017) and closing the gap between the two is one of the tangential goals of this chapter. For now though, the critically temporal literature on transition asks key questions regarding what it means to inhabit spaces and places "in transit," how the assumptions of temporal impermanence structure and condition "post" something everyday life and political mobilisations, and how and why are certain groups of people "sociotemporally marginalised" (Reid 2013), or "temporally dominated" as I prefer to conceptualise it.

Having introduced the central insight of this chapter, that time and temporality are a pronounced and understudied facet of colonial, social, spatial, and political power, control, and conditioning, this chapter will proceed in six parts. In the second section of this chapter, I will introduce the key concepts of chrononormativity (Freeman 2010) and temporal domination. In the third section, I examine some key temporal insights in the work of four

major modern chronosophers, Karl Marx, Michel Foucault, Mikhail Bakhtin, and Johannes Fabien. I will focus on these thinkers' contributions to geography, especially to anticapitalist, Indigenous, Queer, and decolonial geographies, trying to interweave the foundational perspectives with those geographers who have sought to critique and apply them.

The fourth section switches gears to again return to the reconciliation paradigm in Northern Ireland. Here, I delve further into the paradigm's genealogical roots in Christian hermeneutic traditions. In doing so, I identify two separate understandings of the word "reconciliation," and, playing with the well-known Northern Irish concept of a "hierarchy of victims," suggest that from within the reconciliation paradigm, there is another "temporal hierarchy of victims" that is rarely addressed or studied.

The fifth- section addresses the problem of trauma. In it, I note that what I refer to as "mainstream trauma studies" has consistently buttressed and reaffirmed the dominant temporality of the reconciliation paradigm. Drawing extensively on the critical trauma studies literature, I suggest that trauma generally is a floating signifier, and its political and social operationalisations in postcolonial, conflict, or authoritarian space has tended to depoliticise and pathologise politically and temporally resistant victims, survivors and bereaved. In the place of depoliticising trauma, I instead adopt the concept of "rebellious mourning" (Milstein 2017a) to describe the politically- and temporally-resistant memory-work engaged in by victims, survivors, and bereaved of past violence.

The final section works to develop a preliminary theory of the threshold chronotope in Northern Ireland. Influenced by the pioneering work of the anthropologist Allen Feldman (1991) and the geographer Karen Till (2012; 2005), I argue that transitional space in Northern Ireland is pockmarked by spatial asynchronicity, that is to say time and the perceptions of time attached to places that have been wounded by Troubles-violence forever butt up against and disrupt postconflict accelerationist temporalities, the times of transitioning to

heteroproductive liberal capitalism. These resistant interruptions are places where the past can be prolonged, where, as Basso (1996, 33) puts it, "history can be told in the present tense."

In the previous chapter, I positioned this dissertation within what Hite and Jara (2020) call "the spectral turn" in Memory Studies, characterised by pressing political *and* epistemological questions relating to a "growing disjuncture between past and present" (247). This chapter seeks to also contribute to a "spectral turn" in geography by helping close some of the gaps and disconnects between the critical transitional literature and critical chronosophical geographies. But this chapter is also grappling with what these "growing disjunctures" look like in Northern Ireland specifically, where they erupt and concatenate, and why they matter in the lives of Troubles survivors and the places they inhabit. In short, I am seeking a better conceptual and epistemological language to criticise the reconciliation paradigm and interrogate the political prolongation of the past in the space of the present.

II.   BOUND BY TIME, BOUNDED BY IT

Albert Einstein's theory of relativity hinges on the proposition that an absolute time does not exist. Rather, Einstein argues that all conceptions of time are relative, specific to particular temporal systems (*Eigenzeit*). Clarifies Barnett (1957): "Relativity tells us that there is no such thing as a fixed interval of time independent of the system to which it is referred" (cited in Adam 2004, 61). While Einstein was referring to astrophysical temporal systems, those of us who remain Earth-bound can and should remember the crux of Einstein's theory of relativity. Different temporal systems have abounded on Earth and amongst Earth's societies and when places have been conquered, colonised, and re-settled throughout history, the colonisers have brought their temporalities with them and violently imposed them (Nanni 2012). Sociologists and geographers have used a variety of names and concepts to refer to

this colonially imposed temporality, including the "hegemonic metronome" (Hom 2010), "clockwork hegemony" (Kellert 1993), the "standardization of temporal reference" (Zerubavel 1982), and the "authority of the clock" (Harvey 1990a, 419) to name but a few.

In a surrealistic short story entitled *Ether, OR (For the Narrative Americans)* (1995/2010) the celebrated speculative fiction writer Ursula K. Le Guin conjures a character, Tobinye Walker, who claims to be a spirit-creature of the Indigenous Americans who inhabit and inhabited the land of the titular town in the US state of Oregon, simultaneously those Indigenous residents in the now, those who lived on the land prior to colonisation, and those whose spirits will remain forever in the land. Walker claims somehow to have become trapped in Ether, and prior to his entrapment, had been free to roam and wander the Earth at will, both across space and across time. It is Walker's musings that close the story:

> Man is the animal that binds time, they say. I wonder. We're bound by time, bounded by it. We move from a place to another place, but from a time to another time only in memory and intention, dream and prophecy. Yet time travels us. Uses us as its road, going on never stopping always in one direction. No exits off this freeway.
>
> I say we because I am a naturalized citizen. I didn't use to be a citizen at all. Time was once to me what my back yard is to Emma's cat. No fences mattered, no boundaries. But I was forced to stop, to settle, to join. I am an American. I am a castaway. I came to grief (247).

What Walker alludes to in this speech is not just his entrapment in a place, the town of Ether, but an entrapment in settler time, a linear chronology, a unidirectional movement from past to present to future. Walker has been "naturalised" into this temporal system, and it now binds him with its rules. The temporal system (or lack thereof) he enjoyed prior to entrapment was pluriversal, unfenced, temporal freedom of movement. This freedom was what was ripped from him when he was forced "to settle, to join" to become "American." He has been forcibly fused into "American" time, the only temporal system Ether's other residents understand or have reference to, the linear progression of seconds, minutes, hours, days, the repetitions of waking, work/school, returning home, sleeping.

Le Guin is arguably attempting to creatively and poetically describe the process of

colonising time studied and criticised by scholars like Zerubavel (2003) and Nanni (2012). The freedom of her chosen genre allows Le Guin to set up the clash of temporalities between Indigenous and settler through the mechanism of Walker's surreal and unexplained entrapment. Walker's positionality regarding the other inhabitants of Ether allows him to comment that they are all similarly entrapped ("bound by time, bounded by it"), he is just the only one who can see it.

Le Guin (through Walker) is also identifying and criticising what the Queer theorist Elizabeth Freeman refers to as "chrononormativity," or "a mode of implantation, a technique by which institutional forces come to seem like somatic facts" (3). The entrapment in time Walker describes is not "natural" to him or his experience of perceiving time, he is arguing in the speech that quoted above that he is trapped in a constructed temporal system, one constructed by human beings, one that is not naturally occurring (Zerubavel 1989). And if it has been so constructed, it must be maintained, replicated, and reproduced, its borders and boundaries must be controlled. Operating from particular places or points in social space, constructed human, capitalist, settler, and heteronormative institutions, created by humans, but now largely taken-for-granted, are asserting dominance over the range of possible understandings and usages of social time, imposing temporal frameworks over the lives and relationships of other groups of humans (and non-humans). This domination is also achieved by making particular systems of temporal control seem normal, unavoidable, natural, the essence of Freeman's (2010) concept of chrononormativity.

Chronormativity for Freeman is the time of heteroproductive capitalism, "Event-centred, goal-oriented, intentional, and culminating in epiphanies or major transformations" (5). It produces dominant "teleologies of living" that assign worth and value to bodies and behaviour that move through time in a linear fashion, accumulating, exchanging, and [re]producing in linear, "straight" (the double entendre is intentional in Freeman's work)

forms of temporal sequencing (also Halberstam 2005). Queer resistance, for Freeman, is the politics of Queer melancholia, Queer pain, and Queer absence, a politics that refuses to move in heteroproductive fashion, what she calls "Queer-becoming-collective-across-time" (11, see also Cvetkovich 2003). Building on Freeman's work, Mark Rifkin (2017) points out that Indigenous temporal orientations are "nonidentical" to the "dynamics of settler temporal formations," which he suggests are "reducible to participation in a singular, given time—a unitary flow—largely contoured by non-native patterns and priorities" (3). Halberstam argues something very similar in their study of Queer temporality, writing "Queer uses of time and space develop, at least in part, in opposition to the institutions of family, heterosexuality, and reproduction" (1-4).

The chrononormativity of heteroproductive capitalism, and especially its emphasis on stadial (re)production, or the notion that society is moving progressively through stages, has long been a target of critical sociologists like Eviatar Zerubavel (1985; 1987; 1989; 2003). Zerubavel argues that human beings are socialised and acculturated into learned temporal systems not rooted in "natural" constraints, but rather responding to the vicissitudes of history, culture, and politics. Nanni (2012; 2011) specifically takes aim at British settler colonialism for introducing and imposing a particular conception of social time in Indigenous space and argues that the colonisation of time and the colonisation of space and territory always go hand-in-hand. Stadial time, at the scale of history and teleology *and* at the scale of individual and group lives, forms and structures the "hidden rhythms" (Zerubavel, 1985, 1) of historicism, what Bevernage (2012, 4) following Jankélévich (1974) calls "irreversible time." Svetlana Boym (2007, 7; see also: Boym 2002) also insists we see nostalgia as "actually a yearning for a different time" or "refusing to surrender to the irreversibility of time that plagues the human condition." Boym distinguishes between nostalgia's reactionary (what she calls "restorative") and "reflective" nostalgia, the latter a more generalized "longing," always

unsettling "the contradictions of modernity," the former exclusionary, nationalist, historicist, revivalist, the yearning for a mythic and romantic home(land) that never actually existed. But whether in its restorative or reflective forms, Boym's work lucidly shows that nostalgic affects and behaviours are rooted in a longing for different temporal systems, outside the spacetimes of modern liberal capitalism and its stadial reproduction.

Extending the insights of scholars like Freeman, Rifkin, Zerubavel, Nanni, Bevernage, and Boym, I argue that transitional societies, societies struggling to emerge from forms of mass violence can impose particular forms of chrononormativity over the bodies of victims and survivors of political violence. Before I begin though, I wish to clarify and specify some terms. The thesis that forms of time can be imposed on marginalised groups of people is not new, the temporal experiences of Settler colonialism are a particularly massive and far-reaching temporal replacement, but at the more meso- and micro- scale, beginning with Schwartz and the "rediscoverers of time," scholars have long been concerned about imposed temporality and not strictly within the bounds of Indigenous and Queer scholarship.

In poverty studies especially, anthropologists, geographers, and sociologists like Javier Auyero (2012; 2010), Megan Reid (2013), Elliott et al. (2017), and Carswell, Chambers, and De Neve (2019) have all sought a means of conceptualising how and why the state expects and forces poor people to endlessly wait, queue, and creatively manage time to access rights and benefits. Reid (2013) refers to this experience through the concept of "sociotemporal marginalisation." Zoë O'Reilly (2020; 2018), from a perspective bridging carceral studies and refugee and migrant studies, refers to the temporalities imposed on people seeking international protection as "imposed liminality." Dominique Moran (2012) notes how embodied time, its measurement, structure, and control, is the central experience of those confined to carceral space. Deirdre Conlon (2011) argues that, for refugee and asylum seekers, we attune ourselves to "waiting as a distinct spatial and temporal dimension

of statis for migrants, as a dynamic effect of international geopolitics and a lived facet of social structures" (355, see also Mountz 2011; Tazzioli 2018). Temporality is even now beginning to be theorised in geography as a crucial component of austerity capitalism, often through Nixon's (2011) concept of "slow violence" and Povinelli's (2012, see below) "quasi-events." The basic thesis is that the violence of austerity is masked by extending and prolonging its brutal impact, a series of small cuts over time to both individual, communal, and ecological bodies. The iterative, durational character is a conscious strategy, designed to render the violence of austerity less socially visible than would be the violence of a single catastrophic event (Hall 2019; Pain 2019; Wilkinson and Ortega-Alcazar 2018). And finally of course, I shall devote an entire section of this chapter to traumatisation and "trauma time" (Edkins 2014).

The crucial thing that binds this diverse literature together is that it highlights the temporal lives and lifeworlds of people who are already spatially marginalised, both in terms of material peripheralisation, and in terms of their distance from productive power. As Schwartz (1974) argued, distance from political power is always coincidental with distance from temporal power. We can and should see that distance as manifesting temporally in two inter-related ways. The first, temporally dominated people are denied or excluded from the time necessary to reinvent, reimagine, work for alternative political, social, and spatial worlds (Povinelli 2012). The second, people and communities' temporal systems, whether they be precolonial, anticolonial, or merely potential prefigurations, are perpetually and systematically marginalised by the ubiquitous devaluation of any other temporal system besides colonial, heteroproductive capitalism. And in contrast to Reid (2013) and O'Reilly (2020; 2018), I suggest we need a stronger, more forceful conceptual language to describe the violence of imposed time, the time of the colonist, the settler, the capitalist, the patriarch. This is a spatiotemporality that extends beyond marginalisation and imposed liminality; it is

brutal and common to more and more diverse people and places across both geopolitical and intimate space. For this reason, I have chosen the term temporal domination instead of terms like sociotemporal marginalisation or imposed liminality. And whether we are discussing victims, survivors, and bereaved of political violence, or poor people struggling to access resources and support, or Indigenous communities working to refuse ongoing Settler colonisation, or Queer people seeking futurities distinct from heteronormative patriarchy *and* lives pasts and lives present fundamentally temporally altered by the AIDS epidemic, or migrants and asylum seekers endlessly disbelieved and imprisoned and forced to wait indefinitely, or precarious workers slowly being crushed by austerity, we are all dominated by the conditioning, multi-faceted chrononormativities imposed on us. As Tobinye Walker murmurs, we are all similarly entrapped, "bound by time, bounded by it."

III. CHRONOSOPHICAL GEOGRAPHIES: GEOGRAPHICAL APPLICATIONS OF FOUR THINKERS

With the exception of the touchstone work geographers like Yi-Fu Tuan (1977) and Carl Sauer (1941), for most of the twentieth century much of the discipline of academic geography followed Kant in treating time and space as ahistorical and independent dimensions of reality. To begin this section, I shall briefly skim geography's relationship with time and temporality as an object of scholarly concern in the 20th Century, noting that over the course of the century, the idea that time and space were separate entities has gradually broken down and continues to break down. One key engine driving this productive collapse has been geographers' adaptations of key temporal theorists or chronosophers. This section will then move to examine four of these key chronosophers and the a select few geographers who have productively and adapted some of their chronosophical insights. This brief section is not intended as a comprehensive review of the entire body of these luminaries' thought, nor of

the myriad ways these thinkers have been brought to geography, that is far beyond the scope of this dissertation, rather it is a selective highlighting of some key features of chronosophical geographies that have deeply influenced the theories put forward in this dissertation.

The first major subdiscipline to consider time was Historical Geography, emerging around the turn of the twentieth-century, but it tended to consider time only diachronically, in terms of historical processes of landscape change that led, ineluctably, to the present (Jones 2014; Kurtz 2020). In its more extreme version, promoted by Darby (2002), it reduced Historical Geography to the study of static cross-sections and left to History the task of animating these with a connective narrative. An early challenge to this, at least in Anglophone geography, came with the cultural focus of Carl Sauer. As early as 1941, Sauer described the processes by which "cultural traits" "gained acceptance", arguing "these are processes involving time, and not simply chronological time, but especially those moments of culture history when the group possesses the energy of invention or the receptivity to acquire new ways" (8). Sauer was also at pains to point out in his Foreword that these "moments" are firmly emplaced, tied to particular places and landscapes.

Another major intervention in the history of the geographic discipline was the Swedish geographer Torsten Hägerstrand's "Time Geography" (1970), however, while it certainly bears mention in a review of time and geography, this version of time geography is not particularly germane to my study. For Hägerstrand, time was a key limitation on human behaviour and mobility routinely overlooked by quantitatively-minded geographers. The temporal durations on everything from everyday tasks to a human life are a crucial factor in conditioning human behaviour and often worked to "cascade" one type of action into others, in ways that escaped quantitative modelling. The key point was probably that every social and spatial context an individual found themselves present in was itself the product of the durational conditioning processes of time and the temporal relationship to crossing space.

This approach treats time as an instrumental resource rather than seeing it in experiential terms (Rose 1993) and thus does not really engage with my own focus in this study. However, I note Hägerstrand's work continues the collapse of space and time as discrete categories on analysis in academic geography.

a. **Karl Marx**

The experiential and material dimensions of time were impressed on geography more fully by the Marxist geographer David Harvey. However, as Marx if the first of my four chronosophers and his influence on Harvey is evident, I will begin with Marx. Perhaps unfortunately, when we think of Marx and chronosophy we often think of Althusser and Balibar's (1970) accusation that early Marx was besotted by Hegelian teleology. However, focusing on this somewhat well-known and tired debate distracts from the more intricate chronosophical insights that structure much of the Marxist oeuvre, nor is it particularly germane to my study. Rather, I wish to focus on those aspects of Marxist thought seized on and amplified by geographers like Harvey, specifically Marx's labour theory of value, outlined in *Capital* (1867/2013) and *Grundrisse* (1939/1973).

For Marx, capitalist mode of production "commodify[ies]" time, rendering each "instrument of production" the "objectification of a given amount of labour time" (1939/1973, 140). This objectification is a decontextualising abstraction of time from natural rhythms, the rhythms of the seasons, of growth and life, of age and decay. This is famously illustrated in the fictional conversation between a capitalist and a worker in the chapter in *Capital* entitled "The Working Day" (Vol. I, Chapter 10). Both seek what to each individually is the fair (in terms of market exchange) valuation of their "time," but both disagree on how that time should be constructed, and what should be included in any valuation, and this disagreement hinges on different class positions.

In *Grundrisse,* Marx notes that capital requires continuous spatial expansion. As "exchange value" comes to supersede "use value" as the primary means of accumulation, capital is forced to seek out markets further away. Yet transporting goods to market across greater distances devalues the goods and results in less surplus accumulation to be recycled back into wealth-generation. In other words, time in the form of distance continually acts as a check against unrestricted accumulation (Danyluk 2018; Harvey 1990b; Simpson 2019). Capital's solution, according to Marx, was technology, the technological "annihilation of space by time," "compression" of time in the form of distance, speed that allowed for the traversal of distance (or the extension of supply chains) in shorter periods of time. Historically, resistance to the compression and commodification of time has taken the form of a reclamation or a re-valorisation of slowness, both materially and aesthetically (Honoré 2004; Solnit 2006; 2001). For example, workers in Marx's era resisted commodified time through organised slowdowns and even industrial sabotage, however, neoliberal capitalism has made those disruption points less available. With capital's increasing dependence on efficient circulation of money, goods, and services, modern geographers have pointed out that many anticapitalist mobilisations now take aim at supply chains and logistics (including transportation) infrastructure (Chua 2018; Pasternak and Dafnos 2018). Even in the face of seemingly inescapable time-space compression, organised anti-capitalism always possess a power to resist through slowing things down (Chua 2018).

Harvey's work focuses on how time-space compression manifests in the built environment, how it changes, alters, and conditions the production of space and people's behaviours and attachments to places. On one hand, Harvey sees the attachment to place (what he refers to, following Raymond Williams, as "militant particularism" (Harvey 1996), as a form of anticapitalist resistance. He writes: "'Militant particularism' seizes upon the qualities of place, reanimates the bond between the environmental and the social, and seeks to

bend the social processes constructing space-time to a radically different purpose" (1996, 306). In this formulation, places act as a temporal anchor, rooting people in a slower, more natural time, one that binds together shared experiences, memories, imaginations, and inculcates a sense of hope in the face of capitalist dislocation and dispossession (Harvey 2000).

However, Harvey also sees this militant particularism in a disturbing light. Referencing Heidegger, he argues that place can also become a form of reactionary escapism, a retreat to locations bounded by specific markers of shared identity such as nation, religion, ethnicity, and race in the face of capital's relentless disintegration of geographical barriers (Harvey 1996). Ironically, this form of enclavement actually weakens place's protective walls against the threat of multinational capital. Capital simply recruits and reintegrates this form of militant particularism into "interurban competition" (Harvey 1989). This produces what Swyngedouw (2004) calls "glocalisation" a simultaneous descaling and rescaling of political power, economic mobility, and forms of anticapitalist resistance.

b. Michel Foucault

Like Marx, Michel Foucault is another major twentieth Century thinker capable of both inspiring and frustrating geographers and geographic applications (Philo 2000; 1992). Perhaps however, his most well-known single conceptual contribution to geography is through "heterotopia." Heterotopia is first mentioned in the introduction to *The Order of Things* (1966/2001) and later fleshed out in the 1967 lecture *Of Other Spaces* (1967/1986). Foucault begins from the antonyms utopia and dystopia, one a place defined by its infinite perfection, the other by its infinite imperfection. Both utopia and dystopia are *relational places*, that is to say one could not have either without a starting-place perceptually understood as 'real,' the utopia is the real reflected through a mirror, its perfection established relative to the 'real.' Heterotopia is also relational to the 'real' or the 'normal' but rather than

being defined by its relational goodness or badness, it is defined by its difference to the real or the normal place. Foucault sketches a brief typology of possible types of heterotopic places, but for our purposes the most important to understand are those he calls "heterotopias… linked to slices in time, [or]… heterosynchronies, for the sake of symmetry" (25).

A heterosynchrony begins from the understanding that all lived space is asynchronous, never temporally uniform, an uneven surface pockmarked by spatial articulations that vary in terms of their in-built temporal assumptions. Like other forms of heterotopia, the heterosynchrony functions as a contrast to dominant spacetime, in this case its seeming permanence. The festival, circus, or carnival accrues its significance from its *temporariness,* its "fleeting, transitory, precarious aspect" (26) in contrast to the implied permanence of the ordered space surrounding. Other heterotopias, like libraries, cemeteries, museums, have "accumulated time" and stored it, as opposed to the space surrounding them, where time has simply passed and is neither stored nor generally recoverable.

Foucault's fragmentary lecture may have invited geographers to read more into it than is actually there (Johnson 2013; 2008; Elden 2001), nevertheless the influence of the concept has been profound. First, heterotopia has helped geographers think about and conceptualise places that are defined not only by their seeming eccentricity, but also by the ways such atypical places may link up with one another or provide mutual inspiration across both space and time. For Kevin Hetherington (1997), the heterotopia represents the radical potential for experimenting with alternative ways of ordering spatial and temporal relations. Ed Soja's (1996) "thirdspace" is broadly similar, an "Other way of understanding and acting to change the spatiality of human life" (57). While it does not seem Foucault intended the concept to refer to connected loci of radical alterity (Johnson 2008), and this, at the very least, is an adaptation if not a conceptual stretch, the heterotopia in Foucault's work is intended to

disrupt a dominant spatial gaze. It forces researchers to reflect on spatial asynchronicity and places that are consciously built, maintained, and ordered as islands (or archipelagos) of difference.

Mathew Gandy's (2012) insightful essay further elucidates the potential of heterotopia as a geographical concept. Again, drawing on the concept's inherent relationality, Gandy points to the possibility of heterotopic alliances, or linkages of feeling, empathy, and action between very different social, cultural, and political groups intent on protecting or preserving the radical otherness of heterotopic places. In his paper, Gandy focuses on the heterotopic alliances of cruising gay men and urban ecologists in Berlin in protecting and defending urban wild places, places whose heterosynchronic qualities consist in remaining perpetually undeveloped, overgrown, resistant to capitalist futurity. Gandy's paper brilliantly illustrates that the possibilities of heterotopia as places of radical alterity depends not just on the otherness of a place, but the shared sense of spatiotemporal otherness that bridges and links different actors and groups. Heterotopes do not exist alone, as inherent reservoirs of subversive potentiality, rather they require these alliances and linkages in and through place.

c. **Mikhail Bakhtin**

The Russian linguist and literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of chronotope shares some aspects of the Foucauldian heterotope, but it is distinct and not interchangeable. It is unfortunate that the vast majority of Bakhtin's fragmentary corpus was not published in the West until the 1980s, as Foucault was not conversant with Bakhtin when he was developing the theory of heterotope. But Bakhtin defines chronotope (1981, 249) as follows:

> Points in the geography of a community where time and space intersect and fuse. Time takes on flesh and become visible for human contemplation; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time and history and the enduring character of a people.

In the essay "Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel" (1981), Bakhtin carefully delineates chronotope as exclusively "a formally constitutive category of literature," and

refuses to extend it to "other areas of culture" (84-85). However, modern scholars generally believe that Bakhtin, an anarchist writing under High Stalinism, obscured and self-censored the political character and real-world implications of his complex theories by grounding them solely in literary studies (Holquist 1990; Kostova and Brinkley 2011). Anthropologists and human geographers have not accepted Bakhtin's self-censorship, giving the concept a robust and burgeoning afterlife.

In Bakhtin's work, chronotope is superficially the spatiotemporal setting of any narrative. However, chronotope more properly refers to the bridging relationship between the spatiotemporal setting of "the telling" as it relates to the setting of "the told." In human geography, we often find the chronotope referenced in some works within Indigenous geographies. Richland (2008), in his study of Hopi legal customs, uses chronotope to describe the relationships between what Hopi parties to US legal procedure argue and what Hopi parties to the proceedings understand. Richland argues the chronotope binds the telling and the told together, allowing parties to superficially argue in the language of US legal evidentiary fact and custom, whilst simultaneously speaking in the Hopi traditional narrative form that employs a circular, collective understanding of time and event. Chronotopes thus refer to "time-space envelopes" (Richland 2008, 10), an *a priori* fusion of time and space through which colonial proceedings can be translated, re-emplotted, and culturally understood. The chronotope does not merely prefigure or pre-establish the intersubjective terrain of genre, narration, and storytelling as a setting would, it also functions as an analogic bridge, a way of linking (artistic/narrative) representation of the world with the world represented (Clark and Holquist 1984, 279). Bakhtin claims that "abstract elements – philosophical and social generations, ideas, analyses of cause and effect – gravitate towards the chronotope and through it take on flesh and blood" (1981, 250).

A key characteristic of Indigenous geographies is that they are always "place-based." As Lakota scholar Vine Deloria, Jr. explains: "American Indians hold their lands—*places*—as having the highest possible meaning, and all statements are made with this reference point in mind" (1972/2003 62, original emphasis). By this statement, Deloria, Jr. does not simply mean that land is held in high esteem by Indigenous people, rather he is arguing that Indigenous epistemologies, ways of knowing, are rooted in their relationships to the places they inhabit and the places that have been taken from them (also Smith 2012). Places are the fulcrums of Indigenous cosmologies, how they make sense of the world (Alfred and Corntassel 2005; Barker and Pickerill 2012; Coulthard 2010; Deloria, Jr. and Wildcat 2001). Places of significance in Indigenous geographies collapse and fuse times, in short, as Basso (1996) maintains, they are distinct chronotopes, and chronotopes are the dynamic temporal accumulations of the shared wisdom of a people. For Basso's Western Apache respondents, a place-name is not mere nominative utterance, but a repository that contains "conceptions of wisdom, notions of morality, politeness and tact in forms of spoken discourse, and certain conventional ways of imagining and interpreting the Apache tribal past" (1996, 32-33). They are reservoirs of community and historical wisdom, but crucially, not a wisdom of the past, but a wisdom that fuses past and present together, constantly spatialising re-enactments of how past events narrate the contemporaneous life of the community itself. This re-enactment, argues Basso, is done through language, narrative, and story, stories that are never fixed in space and time. Rather, place-stories are chosen, subtly re-emplotted in genres, ways of telling, and forms of temporal sequencing, intended to provide the best chronotopic bridge between the story and the type of wisdom, message, metaphor, or moral best applicable to the occurring context. As Basso argues (1996, 33):

> Place-making becomes a form of narrative art, a type of historical theatre in which the 'pastness' of the past is summarily stripped away and long-elapsed events are made to unfold as if before one's eyes. It is history given largely in the active present tense…

This idea of deploying chronotopic place to strip the pastness of the past and produce "history given largely in the active present tense" is a major theoretical orientation of this dissertation. However, we must guard against reading chronotope in Indigenous geographies as romantic or nostalgic. As Alfred (2005) reminds us, chronotopic places are *not* merely places of mystic romanticism, far from it, chronotopes and the knowledge communicated through them serve concrete purposes in Indigenous organising, from communicating and celebrating political actions across time, to communing with and seeking guidance from ancestors and spirit-worlds through ceremony, to generating shared solidarities across landscapes and temporalities of colonial dispossession.

Alfred and Corntassel's (2005) oft-cited definition of Indigeneous makes it clear that the chronotopic fusion of space that binds the teller and the told always takes as its starting point the idea and the acts of resistance. "It is this oppositional, place-based existence, along with the consciousness of being in struggle against the dispossessing and demeaning fact of colonization by foreign peoples, that fundamentally distinguishes Indigenous peoples from other people in the world" (597). Specifically, the resistant people-place nexus can be framed in terms such as those of mutual obligation, duties of reciprocity, and cross-temporal thresholds where community histories and ancestors touch, meddle with, and exert influence over the everyday lives and geographies of the human and non-human present (Deloria, Jr. and Wildcat 2001; Stewart-Harawira 2005; Thornton 2011). Johnson and Larsen (2013) refer to this as a "deeper sense of place," or place as "not fixed, stagnant markers of history but living stories that re-create the ontological and epistemological foundations of the community through their re-telling" (10). Thus it should be no surprise that, from within a deeper sense of place the chronotope invariably reflects, the bracketing, separation, or "periodicisation" of the past from the present is both impossible and anathema. Time is not linear at the chronotope, it is folded into itself. The chronotope resists attempts to move on, transcend, or

draw arbitrary temporal lines. As long as here, in this place, the past is told in the active

present tense, it is very difficult to confine violence to a completed past.

While chronotope has certainly been used extensively in Indigenous geographies, its

applications have not been confined to them. The chronotope has provided fertile conceptual

ground for scholars to examine other instances of spatiotemporal divergence in forms of

narration about land and place. The stories told in and through place, the genres, tenses,

temporal sequencing, archetypes, and arcs, shape real-world activity and elucidate the sources

of place-based conflict (Lawson 2011; Folch-Serra 1990). As Torop (2017; 2005) suggests,

the chronotope is especially useful as a tool for examining the conflict between, or

interconnectedness of, multiple semiotic systems, especially the key places and moments

where different spatiotemporal narrations fuse, abut, or border (Remm and Kasemets 2020).

In urban geography, scholars have employed chronotope to discuss varying temporal rhythms

and flows of the city and residents' multiple experiences in places of significance

(Beckingham 2016; Crang 2001; Prior 2011). Yet Schwartz's thesis that time is an

understudied weapon of social control and ordering is rarely better illustrated than in settler

colonial contexts, as we shall see from the work of the final chronosopher.

d. **Johannes Fabian**

The anthropologist Johannes Fabian's ground-breaking *Time and the Other* (1983/2014a)

argues that the colonisation, subjugation, and domination by Western colonial powers was

always undergirded by the "denial of coevalness," or the refusal to accept that colonised

peoples could be contemporaneous with their conquerors. To justify colonial conquest,

argues Fabian, "one assigns to the conquered population a *different* Time" (30, original

emphasis). This process Fabian names "allochronism." Allochronism is the creation of an

imaginary chronological spectrum; at the regressive end is barbarism and at the progressive

end civilisation. Colonisers assign the colonised to the regressive end, retarded by their lack

of cultural, scientific, and philosophical progress, thus necessitating the accelerating influence of colonial civilisation, the warrant underlying the infamous "white man's burden." "The savage," as Fabian puts it, "is *not yet* ready for civilization" (26, original emphasis). Against the colonising impulse to locate the conflict between peoples in differing positions on a developmental continuum, Fabian proposes we recognise "not the same societies at different stages of development, but different societies facing each other at the same Time" (155).

Fabian's analysis is not restricted to anthropology's "imperialist impulses," rather, he argues that allochronism should be generalisable across different times and space, wherever there is a stark divergence between the topoi of "knower" and "known." He argues that anthropology's use of an "ethnographic present" (143), creates distance between the writers and consumers of anthropological texts and the peoples described by those texts. The purpose of that distance is not simply to position the known as backwards or anachronistic, but also to place the known Other's culture as outside of historical dynamism, to create a descriptive present that is frozen in time. While the (presumably, white Western) anthropologist's culture grows, develops, changes, and evolves, the ethnographic object in turn is and has always been as described. However, Fabian's resort to "homochronism" has been justifiably criticised (see discussion between Birth 2008 and Fabian 2014b). Cultures in conflict do not face "each other at the same Time" but often from radically different cultural understandings of time, duration, and temporal movement (Nanni 2012). Fabian himself acknowledges (2014b, 2005, footnote 12) that "culturally different ways of thinking about, and experiencing time, were not the subject of *Time and the Other*." In spite of this lacuna, Fabian's work remains a powerful critique of how anthropologists construct power differentials between researcher and researched, self and Other, through recourse to temporal domination.

Fabian argues firmly that allochronism is "the ideological foundation of geopolitics" (1983/2014a, 143). Building on that insight, geographers and geopolitical scholars have used Fabian to criticise the neglect of chronopolitics within geopolitics and argue that geopolitical questions should treat space and time as fundamentally interconnected (Klinke 2013). Heffernan (2000) and Hom (2010), among others, point out that the critical geopolitics of influential scholars like Ó Tuathail (1996) prioritise spatial analyses at the expense of critical examinations of space's temporal underpinnings. Notions of progress, modernity, and decline are all assumptions of a particular temporal system, a particular 54ethod545454zed54io of space that is not always shared or even recognised by other states, territories, and communities. Mills (2014; 2020) argues these assumptions are characteristic of "white temporality, a racial Eurotime, demarcating the vanguard of humanity from its laggards" (2020: 308). Mills' concept of "white time" directly relates to the colonial urge to periodicise. By artificially and separating past from present, white modernity seeks to culturally, intellectually, and theoretically sever the crass racialisations of peoples so representative of the European past from how these racialisations fundamentally created and continue to create the basis for *both* the contemporary European liberal order *and* radical socialist alternative futurities. True decolonial and racial justice, Mills argues, is dependent on the rigorous chronopolitical contestation of temporal periodicisation, one that challenges not only racial allochronism, but also the temporal logics of Enlightenment liberalism and of "universal emancipation" rooted in the Marxist quasi-teleological ideal of "onrushing time" (2020, 313). Refusing temporal periodicisation, Mills argues, requires "a new mapping that redraws both the time and space of the modern world order" (2020, 314). Periodicisation's function is to protect the white status quo both politically and philosophically from the challenge of decolonial theory and praxis; by keeping the past firmly in the past, white time and white modernity become the default lens of contemporary temporal power.

e. Chronosophical Lessons

The above sections are a potted and whirlwind tour d'horizon of a small selection of chronosophical thinkers and how their ideas have been thought about and adapted in human geography. Marx, Foucault, Bakhtin, and Fabian all structure my contention that narrative fusions of space and time surround and discipline the possible constellations of sociocultural belief, understanding, and action. All, in their own ways, reinforce Tobinye Walker's statement: "We are bound by time, bounded by it." All illustrate the inadvisability of assuming or taking-for-granted the consistency, constancy and naturalness of time and temporality across lived, human space.

To close this section, I want to review the main lessons I am drawing from the chronosophers and how they have been adapted into Geography. From the discussion of Marx, I take the idea that the power to speed up or compress time can shrink the space of the present and further entrench the interests of dominant cultural and economic forces within any society. Foucault's geographical receptions teach us that social space is asynchronous, never temporally uniform, that within the space we traverse we pass through different narrative and temporal articulations whose borders (material and ethereal), structure the rhythms and politics of everyday life. Bakhtin has inspired the insight that the bridging chronotope provides the place through which actors can and do alter and reinvent spatial narratives, where linear historicism is most amenable to being broken and resisted. From Fabian and critical "chronogeopolitics" (Klinke 2013), I accept that the power to impose or articulate a temporal position of a group of people has historically and contemporaneously been a weapon of political and cultural domination. From other decolonial, Queer, and Indigenous writers, such as Freeman (2010), Rifkin (2017), and Mills (2020), I understand that "chrononormativity," or "settler", "straight", and/or "white time," the time of heteroproductive racial and colonial capitalism, entails an assumed proper, natural, taken-for-

granted means of moving in time through the world. This dominant time forms the "hidden rhythms" (Zerubavel 1985) of everyday life and structures the boundaries of possible political action. Within this space, resistance to the dispossessing and de-locating effects of heteroproductive racial and colonial capitalism often takes either implicit or explicit temporal form, a collapsing of boundaries between the space of the past and the space of the present that refuses to accept the periodicisation of violence, its confinement to a past that has been overcome.

IV.   TEMPORALITY AND THE TWO FACES OF RECONCILIATION

In the previous chapter, I introduced and discussed the reconciliation paradigm largely as the outgrowth of the paradoxically status-quo protecting (Leebaw 2008) impulses of the dominant conservative strand of Transitional Justice. I suggested that the reconciliation paradigm involved a specific conception of transitional time with direct consequences for people seeking justice for the crimes perpetrated in a violent period from which they are being pressured to transition from (Mueller-Hirth 2017). In this brief section, I want to return again to the genealogical roots of reconciliation in Judeo-Christian thinking and argue that both its religious and conservative origins lead to a "temporal hierarchy of victims" in Northern Ireland and other allegedly transitioning societies.

The Oxford English Dictionary Online provides several different definitions of the word reconciliation. The roots of the word are Judeo-Christian (Lederach 1997; Wilson 2001) to reconcile originally meant to restore a sinner or fallen person to God's favour. The more common usage of the nominalisation in a transitional justice context is "the action of restoring estranged people or parties to friendship" (OED). However, there is another definition of "reconciliation," namely "the action or an act of bringing a thing or things into agreement…; the fact of being made consistent or compatible… to bring (a person) into a

state of acquiescence with, acceptance of, or submission to…" (OED). It is the latter definition we would use when describing our submission to a state of affairs that is harmful or unjust, as in "I reconciled myself to the fact that this was all there was."

The second definition speaks to the word's clear roots in Christian theology. The sublime reconciliatory act is Christ's sacrifice, in Catholic theology, reconciliation is brought about through the sacrament of confession and priestly absolution. In Judaism and all Christian faiths, reconciliation is less about restoring ruptured inter-personal relations between people than it is about restoring a sinner or sinners to God's grace. As such, and this is crucial to understand, theologically speaking, reconciliation is an act or process of submission to God; this is why the word carries with it the connotation of accepting that a struggle is done, finished, no longer to be prosecuted. And, as Archbishop Desmond Tutu (1999) argues, this submission requires of the wronged that they let go of their grievance, accepting contrition and the promise of atonement.

For many survivors of political violence, the second definition of reconciliation is what is on offer by State-led reconciliation discourse. The reconciliation paradigm is an engine of 57ethod575757zed57ion, a demand that survivors of political violence 'acquiesce or submit to' the postconflict or colonial status-quo. In the Foucauldian sense, we might refer to this version of reconciliation as *disciplining* (Foucault 1982). It serves as to establish the boundary of what Foucault calls the "discursive field" (1969), the range of possible modes of political subjectivity, in a transitional society. Kirk Simpson (2009, 57) refers to reconciliation in Northern Ireland as a "master narrative" that "seek[s] to induce collective political, cultural, or social amnesia… of the past" that "risk[s] repeating the offences of despotic groups by revictimizing, objectifying, and restigmatising victims of conflicts." This is perhaps an exaggeration in Northern Ireland, though elsewhere, such as Spain (Encarnacion 2008) or Argentina (Levey 2016), reconciliation-as-mandated-forgetting has

been imposed. Rather, drawing on McGrattan's (2016a) critical discussion of reconciliation in Northern Ireland, we might argue instead that the reconciliation paradigm in Northern Ireland and other postauthoritarian, colonial, or conflict societies, constructs a discursive field of allowable engagement with the traumatic past. It privileges forms and modalities of engagement with the past that legitimise a particular order in the present.

While the genealogical origins (including spiritual origins) of reconciliation as a peacemaking paradigm are not exclusively Judeo-Christian and include many different theoretical, philosophical, and spiritual starting points (see Bar-Simon-Tov 2004; Bar-Tal 2009; Daly and Sarkin 2007; Graybill 2002; Minow 1998; Stover and Weinstein, 2004), figures like Tutu and the prolific American Mennonite writer and peace practitioner Jean-Paul Lederach (2005; 1997) were front and centre in the paradigm's institutionalisation from the late the twentieth-century. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP), for example, both a major funder of peace initiatives around the world and a leading publisher of peace studies textbooks, has officially prioritised religion as a source of peacemaking (Hayward 2012; Smock 2006) since 1999. Tutu, Lederach, and other 'peacemakers' firmly ensconced within Judeo-Christian traditions understand the promotion of reconciliation and forgiveness as a divine calling, one that cannot be turned away from. As Tutu insists with the title of his book, there will be "no future without forgiveness," forgiveness and atonement being quite literally part of God's covenant.

Thus, while it is possible to come to the reconciliation paradigm as a non-believer, or at least not as a Judeo-Christian believer, possible to promote reconciliation in other than a religious manner, the paradigm as a whole is underwritten everywhere by Judeo-Christian ideas and priorities that firmly shape its boundaries. Parent (2010) provides a welcome summary of the reconciliation within peacemaking circles, as opposed to strictly TJ circles. Here reconciliation is conceptualised as a "societal process where each party is supposed to

acknowledge the other and the other's sufferings, where antagonistic parties are to move onto constructive attitudes and behaviours, and/or where individual and collective relations of trust are (re)built" (278).

The Judeo-Christian necessity of reconciliation is also crucial to reconciliation's "temporal dimension" as identified by Short (2008, 160). While most perspectives on transitional justice, peacemaking, and contentious memory studiously (if superficially) acknowledge that reconciliation cannot or should not be imposed on a subject population, they tend to hinge on chrononormative frameworks, an imposed default or proper means to temporal progression through peacemaking stages (Hinton 2018; Mueller-Hirth 2017). In practice, these stages designed to guide antagonistic parties to move onto constructive attitudes and behaviours assign narrow durations for reckoning with the past and clear temporal boundaries for public expressions of individual and collective grief. While few are as open about it as Schaap (2005), Brewer (2010), or Rieff (2016), reconciliation as a peacemaking paradigm, in the same manner as reconciliation as a TJ paradigm, depends on a 'clean break' with the past, the strict temporal separation of violence, colonialism, authoritarianism and the liberal, tolerant, reconciled future in which a society is restored to God's grace (Robinson 2018a). In this paradigm, survivors who see the wounds of the past as radically present, unresolved, must be sacrificed on the altar of transition.

These sorts of temporal separations employ the techniques that I have been so critical of, as Till and Kuusisto-Arponen (2015, 301) put it, the "bracket[ing] of the past so as not to appear continuous with the present." Hinton (2018) suggests another source for this emphasis on stadial, discontinuous bracketing during the 1990s, besides or perhaps parallel to the Judeo-Christian overtones, namely the well-known work of Francis Fukuyama (1992). While Fukuyama was writing *The End of History* prior to the South African TRC, when the reconciliation paradigm was still emergent, it is easy to see how "Fukuyama's ideas directly

paralleled [the transitional justice] classic imaginary's aspiration for progress and teleological transformation" (Hinton 2018, 51). As Hinton argues, this imaginary shifts the blame for a failure to realise a just and democratic society onto the backs of those who suffered in the past. As Mueller-Hirth (2017) points out, transitional temporality projects survivors of political violence into the space of "permanent liminality" where they are forever out-of-step with the idealised futurity of reconciliation and transition. They become set against or are imagined to stand in the way of realising the future (e.g. Brewer 2010, Graham, 2014).

Much in Northern Ireland has been made of the so-called "hierarchy of victims" debate, or the argument that some victims of violence, due generally to their own actions or because they were members of paramilitary organisations, are not [as] deserving of being politically recognised as legitimate victims nor afforded social resources (Graham and Whelan 2007; Hearty 2016; Jankowitz 2018; McEvoy and McConnachie 2012). What my preceding criticism suggests is that the reconciliation paradigm itself creates a different, temporal hierarchy of victim. At the top of the hierarchy are those victims who have grieved for an appropriate amount of time and reconciled themselves to the postconflict order, whether through forgiveness or an acceptance of a societal pressure to move on. This "dominant linear temporality of peace processes and transitional justice" (Mueller-Hirth 2017, 187) constructs and imposes a set of social expectations that produces a different, much less-studied hierarchy of victims. Those victims and survivors unable or unwilling to conform to internalised social expectations, rooted in TJ, Judeo-Christianity, and liberal futurities such as Fukuyama's, are rendered anachronistic, out of place in a society determinedly moving towards the 'future' (Robinson 2020). Additionally, the dominant temporality of the reconciliation paradigm conditions and shapes the boundaries of what types of justice it is possible to expect and what appeals to justice are seen as reasonable. The durations of extended campaigns, lengthy court procedures, protracted forensic [re-] examinations, all of

these *longue durée* processes are deeply inconvenient to the futurity hardwired into the reconciliatory paradigm. Survivors for whom the search for justice is predicated on the *longue durée* will especially experience intense social pressure to "move on" and "leave the past behind, even to the extent of being labelled "peace spoilers" (Rios Oyola 2018). In Northern Ireland however, these reconciliatory expectations are paradoxically imposed on victims and survivors despite the fact that the consociational structure of the Irish Peace Process institutionally discourages political reconciliation and incentivises division at the macro-level (Brown and Ní Aoláin 2015; Graham and Nash 2006; Mac Ginty 2016). In this context, mobilising the reconciliation paradigm can be seen as a means of distracting from legal-institutional failings and shifting the blame for failing to realise 'a shared future' onto the backs of anachronistic and allegedly recalcitrant victims and survivors.

In the first two chapters of this dissertation, I have sought to demonstrate how the reconciliation paradigm tacitly imposes a circumscribed range of appropriate sociospatial temporalities and a discursive field of acceptable ways to engage with the traumatic past. Yet transitional societies almost by definition are places scarred by both the material and psychological legacies of traumatic violence. Trauma Studies, as a pronounced intellectual and practical concern, has demonstrated that traumatic wounding collapses simple distinctions, discrete periodisation, and clean breaks between past, present, and future. Coupling this with the fact that the warrant of the reconciliation paradigm hinges, in part, on reconciliation's ability to allow traumatised individuals, collectives, or places to heal or move on from past trauma, it seems logical that trauma studies should provide a clear intellectual basis for resisting dominant transitional temporality. In the subsequent section, I will argue that emergent, critical perspectives towards political and ecological trauma can indeed help provide a means of grappling with the dissolution of linear, historicist time in transitional societies. However, these perspectives have not, as of yet, adequately been translated into real

challenges to the spacetimes of transition in Northern Ireland, due to the unfortunate legacies of mainstream Trauma Studies.

V.   TRAUMA TIME AND REBELLIOUS MOURNING

This section is not intended as a comprehensive genealogy of Trauma Studies (see Fassin and Rechtman 2009; Leys 2000). While some grounding in the history of the discipline is necessary here, my focus in this section will be explication of two major categories of error in what I term "mainstream" Trauma Studies, the first a temporal error, the second a spatial error. I dichotomise for simplicity between "mainstream" and "critical" trauma studies, though of course the purported boundary is somewhat porous. By "critical Trauma Studies" I refer to "a critical approach [that] attends to the ways the category of 'trauma' reveals and unsettles social and cultural classification systems, including how we triage subjects for 'help' and intervention" (Wertheimer and Caspar 2016, 5-6).

Jenny Edkins (2003, 59) argues: "Trauma is that which refuses to take its place in history as done and finished with. It demands an acknowledgment of a different temporality, where the past is produced by—or even takes place in—the present." Elsewhere, drawing on Giorgio Agamben (2005) and Walter Benjamin's (1985b) criticism of "homogenous, empty time" (see Chapter 7), Edkins proposes two "forms or notions of time," "*linear time* and *trauma time*" (2014, 131, original emphasis). Working from a broadly Lacanian standpoint, Edkins argues that "linear time," is the time of the sovereign order, the Lacanian "fantasy" or "that which we call social reality" (2014, 132). Trauma, because it is not experienced in linear time nor amenable to translation into linear narrative, represents the limits of the Lacanian fantasy, the points where the existing social orders are most vulnerable to challenge (also Robinson 2018a, 53-59).

I argue throughout this dissertation that trauma time and rebellious mourning fundamentally take the form of a prolongation of the past into the present in and through place, a collapsing of the spacetimes of the past and present at particular chronotopic thresholds (next section). This collapsing is often catalysed by what Milstein (2017a) refers to as "rebellious mourning." Rebellious mourning casts grief not as a private journey or experience, but as an active, political force, a "struggle to undo the deadening and deadly structures intent on destroying us" (2017b, 4). It is a public, shared politics of refusing social and political pressure to get over, move on, or write over the multiple sources of historical and ongoing wounding. But seeking a different traumatic temporality runs up against a cultural genealogy of trauma-as-pathology that simultaneously depoliticises and periodicises, that "offers sympathy and pity in exchange for the surrender of any political voice" (Edkins 2003, 9).

Trauma studies is a distinctly modern paradigm, one that derives from a set of intellectual traditions influenced by Sigmund Freud. Prior to the Freud, the "trauma neuroses" variably referred to as hysteria, shell-shock, or railway brain were seen as the explicit fault of what today we would recognise as the survivor. Women and child survivors of prolonged sexual abuse, traumatised soldiers returning from the trenches, and workers witnessing or experiencing catastrophic industrial accidents were seen, respectively, as weak-willed women, cowards, or malingerers. While Freud's initial study on the aetiology of female hysteria seemed to recognise the roots of the so-called neurosis in sexual abuse, he abandoned that theory in favour of what Fassin and Rechtman (2009) term an "eventless" theory of trauma. Freud's second theory of hysteria, or "seduction theory," shifted the aetiology away from a traumatic event into a generalised trauma of childhood psychosexual development. While difficult to see Freud's shifting and exculpatory aetiology as a progressive development today, Freudian thought did at least recast survivors as not

responsible for their own trauma and rendered psychological trauma a socially and politically legitimate affliction (Fassin and Rechtman 2009).

By the 1970s, reckoning with the Nazi Holocaust and especially the lasting trauma experienced by survivors of the Holocaust had become a "pedagogical duty" throughout much of Europe and the United States (Novick 1999). The aftermath of the French and American wars in Southeast Asia also yielded a host of cultural materials purporting to examine the traumatic experience of returning American Gis. Aided by the ground-breaking work of the American veteran and psychologist Robert Jay Lifton (1973) and the widely reported supposed epidemic of alcoholism, drug addiction, suicide, and other bizarre behaviours among US veterans, a loose alliance of clinicians and veterans succeeded in forcing the insertion of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) into the third edition of the American Psychological Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (hereafter, DSM-III) (Dean 1992; Young 1995). Young (1995; 2002) argues that the incredibly rapid development of a medical and social consensus regarding the standardisation of trauma was caused by the political and social need of Americans to excuse and explain well-publicised atrocities committed by American soldiers in Vietnam, most notably the My Lai Massacre. Lifton's work allowed for the explanation that the Gis had committed mass murder because they were in a trauma-producing situation (Young 2002). Fassin and Rechtman agree, arguing that the DSM-III inclusion evidences a convergence of an evolving clinical paradigm and a social zeitgeist which "mutually reinforce one another, making trauma the universal language of a new politics of the intolerable" (2009, 93).

Both the burgeoning medical and psychosocial paradigms hinged upon a distinct temporal framework. In the DSM-III, the explicit causal sequence that could render a diagnosis of PTSD possible was an aetiological event, followed by some intervening period, to the manifestation of traumatic symptoms (Young 1995, 135-6). This temporal lag is rooted

in Freudian ideas of memory repression and disassociation. In the psychosocial field of trauma studies (as opposed to the medical field), the psychologist and Holocaust survivor Dori Laub proposed, drawing on Freud, that trauma represented a fundamental "afterwardsness" [*Nachträglichkeit*] (Caruth 2014; Laplanche 2005; Laub 1992). Key to this understanding was Laub's contention that the Holocaust was "an event without a witness" (1992, 80), that political, exterminatory violence at the level of the Holocaust destroys the physical and linguistic capacities of human representation (also Scarry 1985). In this understanding, both individual and social "recovery" from trauma coalesced around "testimony" and "witnessing." Traumatic testimony collectively recreated the language that had been shattered and forced the unspeakable into the open, where individuals could receive collective support for their traumatic truths and societies as a whole would be forced to confront their own collective actions. This was the strand of trauma studies that rapidly became imbricated into transitional justice, largely through the politics and rhetoric of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Boraine 2001; Hayner 2000), from whence it spread rapidly to other TRCs and other institutional attempts to reckon with mass violence (Humphrey 2013; Stover and Weinstein 2004). This temporal lag also manifested in theories of "cultural trauma," or significant collective events that collapse a cultural group's system of collective meaning-making (Alexander et al. 2004; Eyerman 2001; Sturken 1997). But at the level of the cultural group, the lag is generally found in the period of contestation over the cultural interpretation of the traumatic event.

Thus, theories of traumatic aetiologies in the twentieth-century gradually shifted from the Freudian non-event of seduction theory, to the demand for the return of the event (e.g., Herman 1992), to seeing trauma as the "afterwards" of an event. The renewed focus on afterwardsness raised questions of trauma's persistence across generations, what has come to be known as "intergenerational trauma" in peace studies. Intergenerational trauma theories

hold that even the secondary or vicarious proximity to an aetiological event can cause traumatic symptoms (Krog 1998), with explanations ranging from the epigenetic (Lehrner and Yehuda 2018) to more traditional psychological attachment theory approaches (Van der Kolk 2014). In cultural studies, Marianne Hirsch's well-known concept of "postmemory" perhaps parallels these approaches. Hirsch (2012) argus that inherited trauma is shared across generations by the aesthetic reactivation and re-embodiment of cultural memories and familial experiences.

But the problem with theories that accept both a "temporal lag" and an "event-based" theory of trauma is again a persistent tendency to periodicise the past, this time into a past of an event(s) of traumatic violence and unspeakability and a present of recovery and traumatic afterwardsness. Indigenous, decolonial, and Queer theorists have consistently challenged this paradigm, but before I outline their criticisms, it is important to reiterate just how central Trauma Studies came to be to Transitional Justice and Western notions of morality and self-worth. Fassin (2011a) argues that trauma has become an essential aspect of "humanitarian reason," or a mode of moral thinking that demands compassion towards the suffering of the Other. Humanitarian reason, he argues, is deeply embedded in the North American and Anglo-European white imaginary, or how Western societies imagine themselves to collectively be, to behave. Yet, as the assumptions of post-Holocaust and post-Franco-American-War-in-Vietnam Trauma Studies came to be widely internalised, they simultaneously allowed Western societies to cognitively insulate themselves from the contradictions between their imaginary and specific political actions, creating a hierarchy of traumatised bodies that directly influences and controls the government of precarious lives (Loyd et al. 2018). It entrenches relationships of power between those extending selective compassion and those "lucky" enough to receive it (Espiritu 2014; Nguyen 2012). Humanitarian reason is not simply an empty affect, as Fassin asserts it is "a language… [that]

serves to both define to justify discourses and practices of the government of human beings" (Fassin, 2011a, 2). The work of scholars who study the traumatic experiences of refugees and asylum seekers across international borders, scholars of carceral confinement, and scholars who focus on the everyday, slow violences (cf. Nixon, 2011) characteristic of colonial and late liberal governance provide ample support for Fassin's contentions (Espiritu 2014; Fassin 2011b; Hyndman and Giles 2017; Loyd et al. 2018; Pain 2019; Povinelli 2016; 2012).

As Stef Craps notes (2010, 52), led by the universalising tone and impulses of work in the vein of Cathy Caruth (1996), "trauma theory confidently announced itself as an essential apparatus for understanding the 'real world' and even as an essential apparatus for changing it for the better." Or, as Susannah Radstone (2007, 10) puts it, also referencing Caruth, trauma theory had become the "new theoretical orthodoxy." Yet for many subaltern or marginalised peoples, the trauma theory as represented by Caruth and fixated on the afterwards of the Holocaust, the Franco-US war in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, and other well-publicised examples of disaster, massacre, and suffering, was not rooted in any real world they understood or experienced. One correction came from the development of "historical" (Brave Heart 2000) or "lasting" (hooks 2003) trauma theories. These theories rubbished the mainstream focus on traumatic afterwards, arguing that trauma must be seen as an unfinished continuum of collective suffering persisting from original catastrophes (slavery, colonialism, genocide) to ongoing socio-structural inequalities and injustices, akin to Solyinka's (1999, 19-20) "diabolical continuity." In other words, while the aetiological source of lasting trauma may have occurred in the past, trauma persisted in communities because of ongoing structural and cultural violence endemic to colonial, racialised, patriarchal, and heteronormative societies (Cvetkovich 2003; Duran and Duran 1995; Evans-Campbell 2008). As Rothberg (2008b, 230) neatly concludes: "Canonical trauma theory

tends to locate trauma in the completed past of a singular event—while colonial and postcolonial traumas persist into the present."

But other complex criticisms of mainstream trauma theories reject even this temporal separation between foundational event and present manifestation. Veena Das (2006), for example, resists and refuses to conceptualise trauma as a temporally-bounded aetiological "event" at all. For Das, like Edkins, this intellectual and rhetorical move extracts trauma from the everyday lives of her research partners, placing it in the realm of sublime exception or singular catastrophe (2006, 101-107). She prefers instead to view traumatic violence as a "descent into the ordinary," which allows Das to focus on "how violence is produced and lived with," and "the way everyday life is engaged in the present" (205). Trauma theory's erasure of violence from the ordinary and present lifeworlds of her respondents, the focus on an afterwards which is not after at all, has the effect of silencing the devastated streets and terrifying geographies of sectarian violence in the urban India that her respondents navigate every day.

Similarly, Elizabeth Povinelli's friends in the Northern Territories of Australia are not experiencing trauma as a time-bounded event or set of catastrophic events. Rather, the traumatic suffering of her friends is "ordinary, chronic, and cruddy" (2012, 3), not catastrophic, crisis-laden, sublime. She conceptualises this continuity of suffering through the "quasi-event" or how "extraordinary events of violence are folded into everyday routines— and vice versa." A "quasi-event" doesn't occur in the same way an event occurs, it "never quite achieves the status of having occurred or taken place" (13). Unlike an event, it does not register in terms of its impact according to mainstream trauma rhetoric and it remains unrecognised and illegible as traumatic. Yet these quasi-events are manifold in the lives of her Aboriginal research partners. In one particularly searing chapter, Povinelli uses the example of a washing machine, the only washing machine for the entire village, breaking

down. The traumatic impact of this quasi-event can then be read on the staphylococcus sores emerging on her and her friends' bodies. The quasi-event is not a "frozen slide," it is surrounded by trauma time, marked and encircled by the continuous reoccurrence and recrystallisation of histories of colonial injustice and marginalisation. The quasi-event has no afterwards, rather, they can be present in the traumatic choice between sacrificing food or abandoning an alternative social project. Rachel Pain's work with survivors of intimate-partner violence in Northern England reminds us that these criticisms of trauma-as-event-based-afterwards are not confined to decolonising places. For Pain's research partners, even those who have escaped deeply abusive relationships, trauma is not an "uncanny return" or "unclaimed experience" (cf. Caruth 1996) but is rather "an ongoing relational dynamic between abuser and abused" (2019, 388).

In addition to its temporal error, mainstream trauma theory also makes what I would refer to as a "spatial error," rooted in its failure to see traumatic violence as spatial violence or "violent geographies" (Gregory and Pred 2007). Here, influenced by scholars such as Lauren Berlant (2016; 2012), Mindy Fullilove (2004), and Karen Till (2012), I define spatial violence as the uneven production, distribution, withdrawal, devaluation and/or destruction of resources, forms of capital, infrastructure, and social networks across space, the destruction of the "emotional ecosystems" (Fullilove 2004, 11) that provide people and communities with a "personal and social shell" (Till 2012, 7). Aetiologically, considering spatial violence provokes questions deeply germane to transitional societies that mainstream Trauma Studies, largely fixated on individual victimisation, does not adequately consider. For example, why are the legacies of traumatic violence in Northern Ireland so unevenly distributed across space (Cunningham and Gregory 2014; Robinson 2018a)? Could not "intergenerational" trauma also be the shared experience of inhabiting wounded places (Till 2012) or the entanglements of memory and forced displacement (Kuusisto-Arponen 2017). By seeing

trauma solely as a completed, finite past event or set of events wrought on the bodies of individuals, trauma elides the *ongoing injustices of the consociational peace* in favour of the completed past (Gilligan 2006; Mueller-Hirth 2017; Robinson 2018a). It fails to account for what Rachel Pain (2020) sees as "geotrauma," or the "relational clasping of place with the experience and impacts of trauma" (985). Geotrauma and Karen Till's (2012) related concept of "wounded cities" give us a new spatiotemporal lens to examine the prolonged, persistent past, the "non-absent past, or the past that will not go away" (Domanska 2006, 345). Within this emergent critical language of trauma time and trauma place, trauma is not to be sought solely in the bodies, memories, literary texts, and cultural artefacts where it has traditionally been sought in the medical and psychotherapeutic realms. In these realms, individualised trauma is a pathology, something to treat and hopefully eliminate in the medical realm, something to witness and pity (or empathise with) in the psychotherapeutic. Rather, as Muñoz (1997, 74) argues, drawing on a long tradition of resistant Queer melancholia, trauma is a political weapon, a weapon that:

> For blacks and queers of any color, is not a pathology but an integral part of our everyday lives… a mechanism that helps us re(construct) identity and take our dead to the various battles that we must wage in their names—and in our names.

What the emergent languages of spatial violence and rebellious mourning allow for is an inversion of mainstream trauma theory, both at the individual and spatial level. Traumatised people and places can no longer be treated as "broken" and in need of outside expert intervention, rather, we must see them as potentially active political agents (both people and places) capable of advancing their own resistant politics of trauma and memory.

This knowledge in turn demands a revised reading of postconflict Northern Ireland as a "deeply traumatised society," which Dawson (2017, 82) argues "has become established as a pervasive trope in discourse and practice concerned with the affective legacies of the Northern Ireland Troubles" (see also McGrattan 2016b). This discourse, as Hamber (2009)

notes, travelled to Northern Ireland via the South African Truth and Reconciliation Process, often carried directly by visiting South African luminaries. This discourse, as Gilligan (2006) argues, accepted the orthodoxies of mainstream Trauma Studies that I have been at such pains to criticise above. Specifically, it accepted the temporal lag and grafted it onto the urge to periodicise the Troubles, what Gilligan terms a "dichotomous" view of war and peace, neglecting the "continuities" of spatial violence that helped cause, persisted through, and remain today a disturbing facet of Northern Irish contemporary social reality. It accepted a discrete event theory of trauma-as-pathology, that a particularly identifiable catastrophic event or sometimes events of violence in the past led inexorably to post-traumatic stress disorder or PTSD-like symptoms. Trauma-as-pathology in turn sparked a cottage industry in Northern Ireland around "healing" "witnessing" "storytelling" (Kelly 2005), all carrying with them the assumption that survivors manifesting their political trauma and seeking justice or redress was something worthy of sympathy, yet not to be taken as a serious and devastating political critique of Northern Ireland's "diabolical continuities" calcified by the consociational status-quo.

Trauma discourses in Northern Ireland (and elsewhere) have, intertwined with the reconciliation paradigm, formed an insulating barrier around this status quo. As Gilligan (2006, 339-40) eloquently albeit minimalistically concludes:

> When we talk about healing war-torn societies we should recognise that healing is not a discrete process that only takes place in a therapeutic setting; it is tied up with wider questions of social justice and normative concerns about what type of society we all want to inhabit. Ultimately, these wider issues can only be addressed in the political domain.

Arguably, Gilligan does not go far enough in his criticism. Mainstream Trauma Studies and the reconciliation paradigm serve to politically domesticate and pathologise survivors; they form the discursive field of transitional empathy, and the range of structurally acceptable political engagement with the "Troubled" past. Like reconciliation and like transition, trauma

can be a floating signifier. As Didier Fassin (2011a; and Rechtman 2009) and others have so brilliantly shown, trauma has become a powerful but malleable moral and discursive tool signifying a set of ethical duties towards human compassion and the suffering of the Other, yet it is rarely turned to critically examine its own temporal, spatial and colonial assumptions.

In the concluding section of this chapter, I will turn my lens towards those spaces and places in Northern Ireland that have been, to adopt Fabian's term, allochronised, rendered "out-of-step" with the idealised transitional future. In examining Northern Ireland's spatially uneven "peace dividend" and place-based surfeits of past violence, I adopt the conceptual language of the chronotope to attempt to analyse how some parts of Northern Ireland have "moved on," now exhibiting the aesthetic and cosmetic trappings of the idealised futurity of liberal democracy so valorised by the reconciliation paradigm, and some parts of Northern Ireland have either never been allowed to integrate into transitional futurities, or have refused to.

VI.   NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE THRESHOLD

Critical studies of the temporalities of the reconciliation paradigm in transitional justice and societies in transition have been formative to my arguments throughout this chapter. However, many of these otherwise excellent studies (Arthur 2009; Bevernage 2012; Hinton 2018; Mueller-Hirth 2017) are not conversant enough with parallel criticisms in Geography, Indigenous Studies, Queer Studies, and Subaltern Studies, studies that begin from the crucial role of place as a chronotope of marginalised consciousnesses and strategies of resistance (Barker and Pickerill 2012). Following the ideas of Keith Basso (1996) down a phenomenological geographical tradition led by scholars like Edward Casey (2001), Lucy Lippard (1997), and Jeff Malpas (2012) suggests that human places of significance possess innate temporal multiplicity. As Lippard (7) beautifully argues:

> Place… is temporal and spatial, personal and political. A layered location replete with human histories and memories, place has width as well as depth. It is about connections, what surrounds it, what formed it, what happened there, what will happen there.

Contrary to the widespread tendency outside of geography to utilise spatial metaphors without fully understanding their conceptual depth (what Sparke (2005) calls "anaemic geographies"), place in this tradition is not reducible to a passive backdrop or a fixed stage on which things occur, it is an active mediator of human life and the intersections of past and present (Till, 2017; 2012; 2005).

Allen Feldman's (1991) dark and ground-breaking ethnographic study of Northern Ireland during the height of the Troubles employs geographic metaphors to argue that there are particular types of spaces in Northern Ireland that are temporally uncodifiable. These are the spaces he describes as "defiled" where an excess of death "transgresses the classificatory order" (67). Places within this space, he continues, cannot be recruited into linear time, they are places where the ubiquity of death and killing haunts every street corner, every bend in the road, they exist encircled and surrounded by trauma time. But the ubiquity of death is not a given; it is constantly being re-enacted and re-performed by local communities, in mnemonic practice, in political inscription, in everyday mobility and geography. Drawing on the notion of Feldman's discussion of "ghost stories" (see Chapter 5), I argue that local communities "that both produced and bore" (Robinson 2018a, 9) the brunt of Troubles-violence constantly reinscribe a living cartography of killing, death, and haunting. What Feldman calls "locales" (and I call places) within "defiled space" serve as clusterings and concatenations of performed narrative memory, to the point where the locales (places) are "deterritorialised" to such an extent that they are "detached… and appear out of place and out of time" (68). "Defiled space," he concludes, "never goes away," a haunting echo of Edkins' (2014) definition of trauma cited above. While Feldman was writing during the height of the active conflict, his conclusions have been extended to the postconflict city as well. Numerous

scholars have pointed out the prolonged persistence of these segregated, traumatised places and the way they continue to structure and condition life in postconflict space (Boal 2008; Cunningham and Gregory 2014; Davies et al. 2019; Graham and Whelan 2007; Roulston et al. 2017).

Feldman's deterritorialised and defiled places bear a clear resemblance to Bakhtin's "threshold" chronotopes. For Bakhtin (1984, 250), the chronotope is the "primary means for materializing time in space… a center for concretizing representation as a force giving body to the entire novel." In his analysis of Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment* (1984)*,* Bakhtin points out that that there is a defined chronotope reserved for the materialisation of the time of crisis, climax, catastrophe, what he names the "threshold." The threshold is "connected with the breaking point in life, the moment of crisis, the decision that changes a life" (248). The threshold is the material concretisation of the place where characters are faced with the loss of a known past and a projection into an unknown future. At these thresholds, these places of "falls, resurrections, renewals, epiphanies, decisions that determine the whole life of [people]… it is as if [time] has no duration and falls out of the normal course of biographical time" (248). For Bakhtin, the threshold chronotope is the place where existing narratives, metaphors, and temporalities cease to work, where they are forced into radical change.

The threshold is also a theme of some of the recent work of Karen Till (2017; 2012). Though Till's threshold is not coterminous with Bakhtin's, it bears many key similarities, chief among them its subversive, transgressive temporality. For Till, places "that have been harmed and structured by particular histories of physical destruction, displacement, and individual and social trauma" are "wounded" (2012, 6), bearing with them the material and representational scars of violence. But crucially, while many rebuilding, rebranding, resettling, or top-down reimaginings of wounded places can layer atop the aesthetic and narrative trappings of amnesia or "moving on," residents and former residents' embodied

knowledges, memories, and traumas persist and can be excavated through both creative and resistant practice (Till 2017; 2008; 2005; Jonker and Till 2009). Wounded places thus function as a threshold "through which the living can make contact with those who have gone before and those who have yet to come" (2017, 307). The threshold in Till's sense then is the place where it becomes possible to resurrect, name, and confront the injustices of the past. Artistic and activist-work at the threshold can of course be varied, diverse, and culturally dependant, but all memory-work at the threshold is done in "trauma time," a trauma time that fundamentally challenges and subverts linear time, and dominant temporalities that seek to bury and or periodicise the past.

In the places and neighbourhoods Till examines in her varied work such as Bogota and Cape Town (2012), Dublin (2017), and Santiago (Till and Kuusisto-Arponen 2015), there seems to be a similar spatial dynamic at work, namely, places of concentrated violence that bridge and collapse past and present, but are engaging in neoliberalist amnesiac project of urban "regeneration" or "renewal" or "rebranding." Much the same argument could be made and has been made about City Centre Belfast. Northern Ireland is sometimes conceptualised as spatially bifurcated (Robinson 2018a), a "tale of two cities" (Doak 2014) (the allusion has also been used to refer to Glasgow for very similar reasons (Danson and Mooney 1998)). Public space in Northern Ireland, especially urban space (though not exclusively), tends to be represented through the space of the future and the present and juxtaposed to the space where the troubled past continues to remain at the visual, narrative, and material forefront (Robinson and McClelland 2020b). Rather than, as in Till's work, the places where artist and activists work to resurrect and confront the past in the face of neoliberalism, gentrification, place-destruction, the latter are places that, following Fabian, we can argue have been "allochronised." These places-cum-thresholds exist in highly segregated and highly territorialised space that, according to the dominant planning discourses on contested space

outlined by Murtagh (2018), cannot be recruited into the temporally linear rebranding of postconflict city. Left behind and subjected to the hegemony of paramilitary memory-control and paramilitary veto, they remain widely portrayed as embittered geographies of paramilitary territoriality (Graham 2011; Graham and Whelan 2007).

I have argued elsewhere (Robinson 2018a, 25) that these two general categories of Northern Irish space are dominated by their own distinct spatiotemporal dialectics: "One that justifies and legitimises past violence, and one that suborns the past to the reconciliatory imperative." John Nagle (2020, 380) advances a similar argument, distinguishing between "twin forces" of a "cultural of amnesia to support the logic of political transitions" in the former space, and "memorywars," or the violent harnessing of memory to support ethnonational political goals in the latter. To walk or journey through Belfast, Derry, or other places where the Troubles is prolonged is a journey through each general type of space and their in-built temporalities, a journey through spatial asynchronicity (Robinson 2018b), through the radical abutments of different senses, perceptions, and visual/textual inscriptions of time.

In the space of Northern Ireland that has or is in the process of moving-on, of surmounting the past in the favour of neoliberal and neoliberalising consumerist orthodoxies, the reconciliation paradigm is operative, materialised and symbolised by (for example) the aesthetic "normalisation" of city Centre Belfast (Hocking 2015; McDowell and Switzer 2011; Murtagh 2018; 2017; Nagle 2020; Shirlow 2006). As Switzer and McDowell write, the contemporary urban landscape of centre Belfast now embodies a place that "has moved on or, perhaps more appropriately, has *been* moved on from that past" (2009, 348, original emphasis). In Murtagh's terms "modernising Belfast" represents a place where "difficult territories and pasts are sanitized with the zoning of new quarters that that tell of a different social and economic history" (2008, 9). But these zones where Northern Ireland's rosy, past-

transcending futurities are materially inscribed are made possible by both symbolically and materially cordoning off those spaces where other stories of a more violent past remain ascendant. Again, Switzer and McDowell (2009, 350) are eloquent:

> There is something almost schizophrenic about a city that wipes virtually all evidence of the Troubles from its newly polished centre, even as it finds that tours of the murals, monuments and painted kerbstones of some of its residential suburbs are among its most popular and distinctive tourist attractions.

The still highly-segregated and relatively-deprived neighbourhoods, communities, and suburbs that "both produced and bore the brunt of Troubles of violence" (Robinson 2018a, 9) are restricted to what Murtagh (2018) following Amin and Yifchatel (2016) refers to as "grey spaces," never allowed to integrate or be incorporated into the spaces of postconflict (neo-) liberal futurity (also, Nagle 2020). In much the same way that Fabian accuses (neo-) colonial anthropology of assigning peoples to different times, these spaces are assigned to deviant, backwards, and untreatable status (Murtagh 2017), firmly ensconced in a past that has been transcended in other, better, more evolved spaces. They are "increasingly presented as deviant and dangerous relics in a process in which some people and places simply fail to catch-up or embrace the opportunities presented to them by peace and economic modernity" (Murtagh 2018, 444).

It is in these types of places where time remains out of joint that the reconciliation paradigm and linear time stutters and falters. But, in keeping with Foucault's focus on the *relationality* of the heterotope to the dominant spacetimes that surround it, in this dissertation I propose to focus on the borders, abutments, and material contrasts between different spacetimes that one can still experience inside transitional landscapes. The empirical work of this dissertation takes place at the "temporal interface," not the overstudied and oft-exaggerated interface between spaces defined purely in ethnosectarian terms (e.g. Belfast Interface Project 2017; Heatley 2004). At the temporal interface, one can witness the work done by victims, survivors, and bereaved of Troubles-violence in resisting and delegitimising

the idealised futures of reconciliation and transition, we can witness how they work to refuse to be 78ethod787878zed.

In no small sense, the unevenness of the (attempted) application of Law (see Chapter 1) and the spatial unevenness of socioeconomic progress across the province have dovetailed with the schizophrenic consociational political institutions to render some temporal interfaces more visible, more pronounced, especially in urban spaces like Belfast and Derry. Considering my argument that the threshold chronotope is the place where people can best subvert the accelerationist temporality of the reconciliation paradigm, it would seem that Northern Ireland's dominant neoliberal and reconciliatory futurities have, to paraphrase Marx, helped create their own gravediggers. The next chapter I hope is something more than simply a "methodology" chapter, in it I will attempt to chart how I was able to encounter and learn from these people in these places, especially these people in these places I would never have thought of to work with or examine from within the reconciliation paradigm.

CHAPTER 3:

GEOETHNOGRAPHY, INHABITATION, AND WALKING METHODOLOGIES

I.   THE PRACTICE OF RESEARCH

A methodology chapter in a social science dissertation is generally set up to illustrate a clear and compelling research design with a set of distinct research questions, and a staged progression through that design using research techniques, or methods, the researcher is familiar with and can execute in the field. Unfortunately for me, such a chapter does not describe the reality of the research I did for this dissertation. The reality is far more messy, far more iterative, of initial research questions abandoned in response to the data I was generating and an evolution of my own thinking regarding the method I was most comfortable using, the semi-structured sedentary interview, that ultimately led me to abandon the sedentary interview completely while I was still "in the field." My research, which has always depended on face-to-face, person-to-person contact and the co-generation of data with research partners, was then subsequently derailed by the global Covid-19 pandemic, forcing me to abandon the preliminary research on what was to be a fourth empirical chapter on the spatiotemporal legacies of institutional abuse in Northern Ireland. Thus, while this chapter will faithfully report "what I did" to generate the data contained in this dissertation, it will also by necessity be a story, a partially autoethnographic narrative of the often-torturous and messy realities of seeking to co-generate data in troubled place. It will also be a story of failure, in Samuel Beckett's (1983, 1) sense of "ever tried, ever failed, fail again, fail better," of discovering my own limitations and the limitations I began to understand came part and parcel with the methodological techniques I had been trained in. It is also a story of the physicality of Northern Irish landscapes and places, the places in which both I and my

research partners are so thoroughly enmeshed. It is finally a story of my own journey towards humility, and how the creeping realisation that I was not the expert here meddling with the lives, memories, and trauma of others. This creeping realisation necessitated an epistemological shift, an abandonment of what I thought I "knew," and a willingness to be led to places I would never have thought to look. Humility is not merely a state of mind in social science research, I came to realise, it will alter, even destroy, pre-conceived research designs, lists of interview questions, and the relationships and power differentials between supposed "researcher" and supposed "researched."

The research that finds its way into this dissertation was conducted between 2016 and the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in March of 2020. I had developed many of what I thought were the key research questions before I was accepted to a postgraduate Geography programme beginning in 2016. I, however, had not previously studied Geography in the academy before my acceptance and exposure to such a rigorous postgraduate environment fundamentally altered the way I wished to examine the phenomena I wanted to study. When I then took to the field, as it were, my initial presuppositions, assumptions, questions, and choice of methods all suffered further erosion and necessitated reflection and reconstitution. As such, I cannot describe in this chapter a clear and straight-forward progression from formulating research questions to choosing methods to executing those methods and collecting data. By research was circular, often frustrating, and always iterative. But out of the bonfire of my failures and naïveté, I hope that I have stumbled towards ways of travelling through traumatised, thanatological places and landscapes that others may appreciate and learn from.

As I noted in the preceding chapter, I came to believe that time and temporality were deeply implicated but somewhat understudied in postconflict, postauthoritarian, and postcolonial spaces, ironically so, considering their common temporal adjective. This

orientation emerged through the data I co-generated with my respondents so strongly that sometime between the end of 2017 and 2018, I completely rewrote my research "questions." I employ the scare quotes because they were not, strictly speaking,81ethod8181ns at that point, they were "findings," but "findings" I had completely failed to anticipate. These unanticipated "findings" were provoked by or deeply enmeshed in my abandonment of sedentary qualitative interviewing in favour of what I will continue to refer to, with reservations as to the adjective's ableism, as the walking family of methods (Evans and Jones 2011; Springgay and Truman 2017). My friend and colleague Andrew McClelland was coincidentally, at the same time as me, experimenting with and implementing elements of a walking family of methods in his research design. Despite the fact that our research had very different starting-points, we were able to collaboratively document the similarity of our experiences and processes transitioning to the walking family of methods (Robinson and McClelland 2020a, 2020b). That collaborative work informs this chapter, and will be referenced where appropriate, however, this chapter is broader than a discussion of the walking family of methods and focused directly on the methodologies and methods that led to the production of this dissertation.

What emerged from my research was a series of findings regarding the role of time and temporality in conditioning the political and social possibilities of survivors of violence and survivor campaigns and structuring a dominant orientation towards reconciling with the past and depoliticising contested memory and trauma. In the prior chapter, I reviewed a small but growing literature in this field written mainly from a sociological perspective. I then concluded that even this otherwise excellent research had failed to account for what I had found walking, driving, being in peripatetic motion with participants and occasionally, by myself, through the haunted landscapes of Derry, Tyrone, and Fermanagh. As I began to write the dissertation itself, a central question began to emerge, long after the time

traditionally a central research question should emerge from a standard research project: Why were these survivors and their justice-seeking campaigns and behaviours that I had already concluded were rooted in "prolonging the past" so ineluctably place-based? So rooted in particular chronotopic threshold-places within the spaces and landscapes where they lived? Places where the dead, and stories about the dead, injured, wounded, traumatised, continued to circulate despite multi-pronged and often-oppressive demands that the past had to be kept in the past? And crucially, for a methods chapter, the places where these questions spilled out I do not think I would have ever found, let alone sought to examine, absent a shift towards walking methodologies.

But walking methodologies, in and of themselves, are no panacea (Robinson and McClelland 2020a), they do not necessarily prefigure alternative places of encounter where narratives that resist dominant temporalities and conflict framings can emerge. This prefiguration may also depend on how specifically a researcher chooses to implement their methods, and it depends on a process of what I call "geoethnography-as-inhabitation." This, I stress, is deeper than adding an "ethnographic sensibility" (McGranahan 2018) to geographical inquiry, rather it is a process of learned, mutual belonging and recognition in the place of the research inquiry. By necessity, inhabitation requires a lengthy process of trust building, safety reinforcement, and humility-learning with groups of people that, in addition to collectively living with the perpetual re-emergence of traumatic memory, are often deeply suspicious of external "experts."

These considerations will be the subject of the second section of this chapter. The third section will examine the benefits I believe I gleaned from a switch from sedentary to mobile methods and methodologies and why I believe those benefits accrued. The fourth section describes and discusses a host of other methodological techniques I used during the course of this research, including participant-observation, ethnographic vignettes,

photography and visual analysis, media analysis, and even some limited archival work in the Derry City Library and the Linen Hall Library in Belfast.

Throughout this chapter, I would like the reader to be aware that as difficult as it was for me to do research in this time and this place, I was capable of deploying a range of embodied dispositions and privileges, especially my gender, my race, and perhaps most crucially, my North American accent. Other people with different embodied dispositions seeking to this type of research may have faced additional hurdles and difficulties that I did not. My accent especially assisted me in demonstrating (though not always successfully, as I shall describe) that I did not belong to and was not representative of the two dominant ethnonational traditions in Northern Ireland, allowing, perhaps, an easier and franker flow of discussion and a lesser hurdle to the minimal levels of intimacy and trust needed to do geoethnography in a thanatological landscape (see below).

II.   GEOETHNOGRAPHY, PLACE, INHABITATION

The legacies (and temporal continuations) of violent conflict are legion and can take both material, tangible form and abstract, emotional, psychological and spectral form. Neil Jarman (2003) refers to the former as "troubling remnants;" in Northern Ireland these can include large architectural structures such as former military bases, police stations that remain highly securitised, and former prisons such as the Long Kesh/Maze prison. But it also extends from these large, imposing sites all the way down to persistent peacelines still snaking through working-class communities, the planned layouts of these neighbourhoods themselves, and even the remnants of stray bullet holes still speckled into concrete (Catterall 2011; Coyles 2017; Jarman 1997; McAtackney 2014; McAtackney and Baucher 2021; Pubrick 2013). The latter forms Jonker and Till (2009, 306) refer to as "spectral traces," or the continuing reoccurrence in public space of "phantoms, histories, remnants, submerged stories and ways

of knowing." The spectral trace can be given materiality through artistic performance, physical memorials, protest and justice marches, pilgrimages, ghost stories, places, often mobile places, that are heterochronic and heterosynchronous, explicitly curated to interrupt or pause the progression of linear, irreversible time and allow the dead to resurface (Collins and Opie 2010; Drozdzewski, De Nardi, and Waterson 2016; Hite and Collins 2009; Maddrell 2013; Till and Kuusisto-Arponen 2015). Both material and spectral remnants can trouble attempts to institutionalise consensual memory after war, conflict, atrocity, and/or authoritarianism. These types of places perpetually raise questions that cannot be easily folded into consensus-producing tropes like the reconciliation paradigm: What to preserve, what to destroy, repurpose, or forget, why and for whom? And through whose voices shall the stories these places tell be narrated (White 2018), a political and spatial contestation I have referred to elsewhere (Robinson 2018a, 29-35) as "the politics of inscription."

The methodological question these heterosynchronous places provoke is how shall we, as social and spatial researchers, encounter them? Or, in many cases, will we ever encounter them at all? Often, as the subsequent three chapters will reveal, highly significant heterosynchronous and chronotopic places are socially encoded, exerting a major influence on local politics, community relations, and social possibilities, but largely unexamined when the larger stories of conflict and its aftermath are narrated. Troubles violence, as many scholars have pointed out (Cunningham and Gregory 2014; Shirlow and Murtagh 2006) was not spatially uniform, resulting in "small pockets of concentrated suffering" (Robinson 2018a, 27) surrounded by larger space where life was certainly often disrupted and inconvenienced, but where violence, surveillance, and enclosure was not an unremitting daily occurrence. Two of these "small pockets" will form the case studies for this dissertation, the Cityside, or West Bank, of Derry and the Southwest run of the Irish border encompassing county Fermanagh and parts of neighbouring Tyrone.

Within these landscapes, there is a particular micro-thanatogeography, a locally-known and understood cognitive cartography of death and dying that continues to influence everyday mobility and memory (Feldman 1991; Hocking et al. 2018). Geographers, especially "outside" geographers, seeking to accessing this micro-thanatogeography and the chronotopic places that give it shape and structure require what de Certeau refers to as "inhabitation," some degree of critical situatedness within this thanatogeography itself and at least a basic ability to read the social vernacular through which it is encoded. He writes:

> This is a sort of knowledge that remains silent. Only hints of what is known but unrevealed are passed 'just between you and me…'
>
> …Places are fragmentary and inward-turning histories, pasts that others are not allowed to read, accumulated times that can be unfolded, but like stories held in reserve, remain in an enigmatic state, symbols encysted in the pain or pleasure of the body (1984, 108)

To inhabit a place, de Certeau argues, means to be haunted "by many different spirits hidden there in silence" (108). This "knowledge" de Certeau describes could loosely be translated as a haunting "sense of place." Agnew's (1987) tripartite definition of sense of place is well-known in geography: Location, locale, sense of place. Here, "sense of place" is the capacity for a particular *here* to produce subjective, social, and emotional meaning. But a *haunting* sense of place is a vernacularly encoded modality of perception, of engagement with surrounding space and landscape, with human architectures and materiality, all attuned to the people, bodies, and material that "has been lost." By "lost," I stress, I mean only in the sense of being no longer corporeally or physically *here;* things that have been lost are still uncannily capable of influencing and meddling with the lived realities of *here.*

I will use the metaphor of a "shortcut" to describe the knowledge de Certeau is trying to elucidate (one might also refer to a "mazeway" following Fullilove (2004) and Till (2012). A shortcut is a locally-known trajectory through space passed down from generation to generation and also passed between inhabitants, former inhabitants, and perhaps a select few

visitors. A shortcut is also a mobile cartography, and not only of what is *here* but what is also *no-longer-here,* a trajectory through space that retains its fundamental character in spite of changes to the built environment, unless of course the environment and its people are displaced or obliterated. Space is this sense is like a palimpsest (Crang 1996), the shortcut slices across the changing temporal layers of parchment forming a mnemonic trajectory that can, unfortunately, be blocked, cut off, or destroyed, but can also pass down and pass between material and spectral cues and signifiers to ensure its communal reproduction across time. The point is that this haunting sense of place I describe through the metaphor of the de Certeauian shortcut can only be accessed or understood via some form of inhabitation, a socialisation into the spatiolinguistic vernacular passing "just between you and me."

Here I come dangerously close to suggesting that a researcher cannot know a place unless they live there, a fairly radical exclusion of the possibilities of etic knowledge-generation, but I maintain that "inhabitation" is not synonymous with "residency" and especially not with "citizenship." Rather, it is a critical geographical situatedness within a place that can only be achieved via the intimacy, trust, and the at least tacit welcome of the place themselves and the people that co-constitute it (cf. Casey 2001). To extend the metaphor, inhabitancy could be said to be achieved when a researcher knows the shortcuts. They have been shown them; they have been trusted enough, welcomed enough, to be shown them, these "sort[s] of knowledge that remain silent." Within the places I have chosen to study micro-geographically in this dissertation, there are locally-known cartographies of death and dying that influenced and continue to influence everyday mobility and memory (Dawson 2005; Patterson 2013). This thanatogeography is a "shortcut," a slice through lived space through heterosynchronous places that disrupt the linearity of time. These are chronotopic "thresholds" where the past continues to resurface in the minds, bodies, and memories of inhabitants. Because, as de Certeau again writes: "There is no place that is not

haunted by many different spirits hidden there in silence, spirits once can 'invoke' or not. Haunted places are the only ones people can live in" (1984, 108).

While microgeography is not the only way to study thanatogeographies, or geographies of death and dying, it is my hope that it is a lens capable of provoking new ways of thinking about postconflict space, the reconciliation paradigm, and temporal domination. But this type of microgeography is, almost by very definition, also geography with "an ethnographic sensibility," or "the conditions and experiences of life as actually lived… an attunement to worlds shared via participant-observation that extend beyond the parameters of narrowly defined research question" (McGranahan 2018, 7). In this sense, ethnography is not strictly a methodology, but more of an epistemology, in the sense that knowledge itself is generated by virtue of inhabiting the worlds we seek to describe and analyse. It is an *a priori* orientation not to a set of research questions, but to unexpected field-based discoveries and that what might be called "respondents" in more traditional qualitative work are actually entanglements of people, places, and landscapes possessing deep reservoirs of knowledge and experience.

From its inception in the 1970s, Humanistic Cultural Geography has been deeply entangled with ethnography (Kavanagh and Till 2020). The sub-field's emphasis on the co-constitution of place and people predisposes many scholars to adopt ethnographic and/or phenomenological orientations towards social research (Anderson 2004). Humanistic Geography was in part the inheritor of an older tradition of Cultural Geography, associated with the broadly anthropological focus on cultural hearths and dispersals of Carl Sauer (1963). In most of its iterations, Cultural Geography was hostile to the positivistic turn in Human Geography from the 1960s, which looked for basic spatial forms and processes (Cosgrove and Jackson 1987; Cresswell 2014; Katz 1996; Valentine 2001). The ethnographic flavour of Cultural Geography, dating back to Sauer, in many cases committed its scholars to

field-based ethnography (Bowen 1996). While a thorough review of the entanglements between ethnography and human geography is beyond the scope of this chapter (but see Anderson 2021; Crang and Cook 2007; Herbert 2000; Ghoddousi and Page 2020; Kavanagh and Till 2020), since the 1990s there has been a surge of geographers "taking to the field" to interrogate a dizzying range of social constructions (e.g. Katz 2004; Till 2005; Megoran 2006).

Rather than "ethnogeography," a term used by colonial anthropologists to describe the study of the intergenerational transmission of geographical knowledge amongst Indigenous people (Barrett 1908), I refer to my larger methodological orientation as "geo-ethnography" following the work of Karen Till. She argues that geo-ethnography "focuses on why people make places to create meaning about who and where they are in the world" (2005, 11). In Till's particular geo-ethnographic study of Berlin, this resulted in a set of methods she summates, drawing on Avery Gordon (2008), as "following the ghosts." This technique, she argues, is necessary in places scored by the living memories of death and political violence. She writes: "One must talk and listen to those individuals who wish to connect their actions, feelings, dreams, desires, and social relationships in some way to past worlds through place" (24).

This again circles us back to de Certeau's contention that to inhabit is to be haunted. Gordon's work, drawing on Horkheimer and Adorno's (1972) call for a "theory of ghosts," is a demand to take seriously that which is "not-there" but actively intervening in social life, to develop new methods in social and literary analysis that can understand and elucidate that "which appears to be not there" but "is often a seething presence, acting on and meddling with taken-for-granted realities" (2008, 8). Gordon, however, is not a geographer, and she generally articulates what is "not-there" as gaps or absences in particular texts or artefacts that signify larger gaps or absences in authoritative systems of knowledge or dominant

histories. Geographers and archaeologists applying her theories and methods note that in the lived, material world, the "not-there" often leaves behind a tangible mark on the landscape (Doss 2012; Foote 2003), what I suggested earlier could be best conceptualised as a "remnant" or a "trace" (Anderson 2021; DeSilvey and Edensor 2012; Jonker and Till 2009; Kearns 2014; Soto 2016). The "spectral trace," the haunting remnant that is not *here,* is very much a presence *as well as* an absence, what Maddrell (2016; 2013; 2009) has aptly termed an "absence-presence." And Maddrell, like de Certeau, concludes that these ghosts, these hauntings, these material and spectral traces are generally communicated in "vernacular spaces" (2013, 503), often invisible, easily overlooked, or inaccessible to those who do not speak the vernacular, who do not know the shortcuts, who do not inhabit a place.

I myself am a migrant to Northern Ireland. I grew up in the United States and arrived in the city of Derry in 2013. By 2014 I considered myself a resident of that city and of Northern Ireland. Thus, geo-ethnography became not only a research methodology, not only an epistemology or a critical orientation to the types of knowledge present around me, but it also came to be a means through which I attempted to truly *inhabit* Derry and Northern Ireland. I have already touched on what I believe to be the three crucial and inter-related *processes of inhabitation*, intimacy, trust, and welcome, and I will close this section by illustrating and giving brief examples of how these processes functioned for me and for my research, while simultaneously maintaining that these processes, and geo-ethnography itself, transcends research design to become, in essence, a way of life or a modality of perception (McGranahan 2018; Shelemay 2020).

The first process of inhabitation, *intimacy,* is invariably mutual, and borrows heavily from Herzfeld's (2009) idea of attaining "cultural intimacy" through a "fellowship of the flawed." Like me, Herzfeld does not conflate "intimacy" with personal identification with a culture (or in my case, a place) but rather:

> By 'cultural intimacy' I do not simply mean close acquaintance with a culture but, rather, the zone of internal knowledge whereby members of a society recognize each other through their flaws and foibles… I call this mutuality a 'fellowship of the flawed' (133).

This idea of the ethnographer becoming recognised through personal failings is, I would argue, especially important in Northern Ireland. The role of humour, and especially a certain bleak, self-deprecating humour often referred to as "slagging," is understudied in the context of Northern Ireland (but see Dickson and Hargie 2006; Hargie, Dickson, and Nelson 2003; Robinson 2018a). Slagging plays a number of social and political roles, including managing workplace and everyday sectarianism, helping construct or denote shared spaces of inter-communal conviviality and respite, and coping with the lasting legacy of traumatic experience. And as a form of mutual recognition, being welcomed into a certain ongoing humorous dialogue can signal a sense of intimate inhabitation, especially when it comes to researchers and migrants who do not possess Northern Irish accents, such as myself. Of course, slagging in this sense is more than simply humour; it is also a politics of friendship and signifying a mutual amalgamation of trust and sincerity that anthropologists like Allan Silver (1990; 1989) have long argued functions as a crucial check against the alienating effects of societies and economies constructed on instrumental and contractual norms. And in Northern Ireland, the cultural specificity of the self-, other-, and place-deprecating humour of slagging works to undercut and delegitimise inherent power relations between researcher and researched. To be sure, much of my direct experience of slagging in Northern Ireland comes from within male homosocial relationships (both with research partners and others), though not all, I have slagged and been slagged in heterosocial relationships. But I am conscious of at least the potential of what I have argued here regarding slagging as a key aspect of a particular [Northern] Irish "fellowship of the flawed" to be deeply gendered.

To generate geo-ethnographic data in Northern Ireland, especially micro-geographic data, I would strenuously argue is often contingent on the researcher demonstrating

inhabitancy or cultural intimacy through some performance of self-deprecation, such as slagging oneself, though this is not the only route towards culturally appropriate displays of humility. A willingness to self-deprecate in public via an understanding of appropriate cultural vehicles and techniques can signify a willingness to engage in the types of intimate sociality necessary to be trusted and welcomed in a given microgeographical research context. This is not to suggest in the slightest that the perspectives and experiences of research partners, especially in thanatological landscapes, should not be received seriously, even reverently, but rather to suggest that microgeography often depends on repeated close interactions with research partners over an extended timescale. Generating rich ethnographic perspectives as opposed to the *pro forma* re-enactments I will refer to, following Taylor (1997), as "bad scripts" depends on the construction and nurturing of friendly relations.

The process of trust is of course deeply intertwined with intimacy. Every methodological textbook or reader featuring ethnography will invariably mention the role of trust and trust-building in any ethnographic research context (Kavanagh and Till 2020; O'Reilly 2009; Tracy 2013). The ethics of trust and trust building, especially when an ethnographer works with marginalised populations, are well-established (Pawluch et al. 2005; Valentine et al. 2001), but trust and trust-building is also inseparable from inhabitation. Feminist and poststructuralist research has long stressed that emotions and emotional geographies structure our epistemologies, our means of generating and evaluating knowledge (Ahmed 2004). Absent trusting research partnerships, complex emotivities present in people and places cannot be truly shared. To continue the metaphor further, trust turns inhabitation into cohabitation, the researcher and the researched briefly, and to varying degrees, inhabiting together.

In my own research for this dissertation, I can safely say that I was initially not trusted amongst the victims and survivors' communities I was researching. Building trust is an

iterative and often face to face process. In Derry, people bereaved by Bloody Sunday and/or

seeking justice for Bloody Sunday can feel themselves and their stories to be over-researched,

especially the high-profile campaigners. The recent so-called "split" in the Bloody Sunday

Justice Campaign (see Chapter 4) has heightened many campaigners' feelings of paranoia

and danger. As I shall demonstrate in the next chapter, campaigners in the BSJC often feel

that researchers have some sort of agenda or affiliation with Irish political parties or the Irish,

Northern Irish or British governments and security services.

Here is how one respondent, "Chloe," recollected my initial meeting with her in 2015.

Chloe's statement here is not verbatim, but reconstructed from my field notes as I was not

interviewing Chloe at the time.

> When you first started coming round trying to talk to us [the Bloody Sunday March
> Committee, see Chapter 4] we all just assumed you were MI5. So nobody wanted to
> talk to you. But I'll talk to you, I'll talk to MI5 agents, I haven't got anything to hide.

Chloe told me this on the sidelines of a Bloody Sunday March Committee-sponsored

community event in 2019. I first interviewed Chloe in 2015 for another project (Robinson,

2018a). If Chloe had said that to me at the time, it might have been the most surprising thing I

had ever been told in my life. I might have considered Chloe mentally ill or unsound. I do not

think I present myself as a British spy. In 2019, while unexpected, it was not surprising. At

that point, I had been researching Bloody Sunday for four years. Some of my research

partners, including Chloe, had overcome their initial presuppositions about researchers who

wanted to investigate the sorts of things I was investigating. My initial project (Robinson,

2018a) paid only cursory attention to the microgeographies of Bloody Sunday in Derry, so I

reinterviewed Chloe in 2017 for the work that would become this dissertation. In the

intervening two years, the trust between us was such that Chloe felt comfortable illustrating a

set of experiences in which her paranoia about me made sense. I do not remember exactly

how I responded to Chloe's aside in 2019, but I remember I made a self-deprecating joke to her about being a "really shitty spy." Chloe laughed and clasped my arm.

I find it hard to rigorously detail the mechanisms of trust-building that went into my work not only with the March Committee, but also with those Bloody Sunday campaigners who oppose continuing the Bloody Sunday March. Not everyone trusted me, many still don't. In addition to being thought to be a British spy, I have also been told that I was assumed to be a schill for "the Shinners" (Sínn Féin) and was told people figured I was "in bed with the dissies" ("dissident" Republicans opposed to Sínn Féin, see Chapter 5]. Clifford Geertz once called ethnography "deep hanging out" (1998) and that is essentially what I did, I kept showing up at both formal and informal events and gatherings related to Bloody Sunday over a period of five years (2015-2020). Through this deep hanging out, I was able to shed my initial imposter syndrome, to feel comfortable in the presence of research partners *as people,* as "ordinary Derry ones" thrown together by the shared experience of mass trauma on the streets of Derry now 50 years ago. The data I report in the following two chapters is inseparable from this sociality, from trudging up and down Creggan Hill to interview and walk with people along the route, from sharing my thoughts and my photographs and my writing with them, to contributing my thoughts in question-and-answer sessions, from buying a raffle ticket in a community fundraiser, to hoisting a pint with survivors not as *survivors* but as people. I feel this data is more intimate, more emotional, and closer to the proverbial coalface. As such, I believe it presents a different, more nuanced portrait of these people in this place.

I was similarly deeply distrusted by many UDR survivors of IRA violence along the Southwest run of the border (see Chapter 6). Many of these people, rightly or wrongly, associate US accents with performative Irish heritage, a view of the IRA and Irish Republicanism generally as heroic, and a self-delusional and romantic connection to a semi-

mythic Ireland. Any researcher born in the US or Canada must first work to demonstrate that this prejudice does not apply to them. I had initially met several key figures in the main survivors' group in the area, the Southeast Fermanagh Foundation (SEFF), as far back as 2014, when I was working as a project organiser and researcher for The Junction in Derry (see Chapter 1). Because I had worked in the past with people they trusted, when I reapproached SEFF about working with them as a Ph.D. researcher, I was already at least a slightly known quantity in the local area.

My initial round of qualitative interviewing and "deep hanging out" with SEFF members and other survivors in the local area went fairly badly, at least from the perspective of a researcher seeking something new to contribute to the discourse surrounding the legacies of violence in Fermanagh and Tyrone (Henry Patterson's (2013) is the essential book for these perspectives). For one, I did not reside in the area, but, by this point, in Dublin, and I did not have the sort of spatial and social familiarity I enjoyed that stemmed from three years residing in Derry. But my initial analyses of my interview transcripts and ethnographic data returned a sense that my partners' narratives, memories, and perspectives were or had been somehow standardised, rehearsed even, that membership in SEFF produced a closed lexicon for remembering Troubles violence. That is not to say that the narratives of ex-UDR people I spoke to who had "lost someone belonging to them" at the hands of the IRA were not harrowing and evocative, they were, but they lacked the loose spontaneity and discursive depth and reflexivity I had grown accustomed to experiencing with my Derry partners.

As I mentioned above, by 2018 I had decided to completely shift this dissertation's key methods from ethnography coupled with sedentary interviews to geoethnography and walking research. I will detail walking in the next section of this chapter, and ultimately, I chiefly credit walking and driving together with my partners to and through their wounded landscapes with provoking the key spatiotemporal "questions" of this dissertation. But the

point here is that it takes a significant degree of *trust* between research partners for a partner to accompany a researcher on a meandering walk or drive. As I shall again detail further, I approached potential partners by asking them if they'd be willing to simply "take me to places in the local area that you think are important that I understand and tell me about them." This is an extremely unstructured and non-directive approach to generating place-based knowledge and from a logistical perspective, tends to require that partners give up much of their day. The seven respondents who ultimately joined me on these hybrid journeys through the border areas of Fermanagh and Tyrone did so for a variety of reasons I'm sure, but these reasons were all rooted in a sense of mutual trust, in a willingness to welcome me, however briefly, to cohabit these viscerally affecting places with them.

I don't know or at least cannot report a blueprint for how I built these relationships. I kept showing up, like in Derry, I remember much of the year of 2018 being spent in my car rattling up the M3 between Dublin and Lisnaskea, Enniskillen, Castlederg. I was invited to charitable dinners, to attend local theatre performances, to attend Royal British Legion events and ex-UDR SEFF members and associates I believe spread the word that I was a "decent fella" who seemed genuinely interested in what they felt to be their marginalised experiences of death, place, bereavement, and seeking justice. In keeping with an orientation in participatory-action research (PAR) not to simply take knowledge from communities but to try to re-circulate it so the community can benefit, I introduced SEFF to the idea of digitally mapping some of their projects, such as their guided bus tours of survivor experiences (see Chapter 6 and Edwards 2017). There were also key moments where I learned not to fear disagreeing politically with SEFF or other ex-UDR partners, partners who can be politically conservative or narrate Troubles-violence through absolutist, uncompromising lenses (see Robinson 2020), but rather to simply trust in their human decency. And to trust that they were as interested in my perspectives on these issues as I was in theirs. While the fellowships of

the flawed we built in those tour buses and those car rides or walks was certainly modally different from the ones I tried to cultivate in Derry, it was rooted in the same urge to inhabit, to cohabit, to do geo-ethnography.

The final component of what I have referred to as geoethnography-as-inhabitation is welcome. Of the three, it is perhaps the most difficult to describe and can often be thought of as simply as a precursor to intimacy and trust. But for me, welcome is a mutual entanglement of emotion and affect, before, during, and after the research encounter. As many practicing ethnographers have concluded, ethnography is a method of making sense of lived experience (Bourdieu 2013; Van Loon 2000; Willis and Trondman 2000) and if we are to take seriously the arguments of feminist geographers and other scholars of emotional, intimate, mundane, and everyday encounters (De Leeuw 2016; Mountz and Hyndman 2006; Pain 2019) we must, methodologically, create a situation where the ways we make sense of the world that surrounds us are permitted to circulate, and to be recognised between researcher and researched. This is the sort of welcome I mean when I argue that welcome is a central tenet of geoethnography-as-inhabitation, the creation of a welcoming context for knowledge transmission, including knowledge and experience not directly related to, but always surrounding, a research question or questions.

To sum up, in this section I have sought to describe my guiding epistemological and methodological orientation towards my research partners who have been so generous in sharing their time, and often their fragility, with me on the move through Derry and the Southwest run of the border. I name this guiding orientation geoethnography-as-inhabitation and suggest that doing geoethnography in wounded places (Till 2012) requires an often lengthy and rarely clear process of the researcher coming to inhabit the places they study themselves. Inhabitation, I claim, is categorically not coterminous with residency, and especially not with citizenship. Nor it is a dismissal of outsider or etic knowledge or

knowledge-generation. Outsiders can inhabit, insiders can be shunned or (usually metaphorically) exiled. Rather, I claim it is by finding or stumbling towards a "fellowship of the flawed" that we can share, as cohabitants, with our research partners. I have suggested that this geoethnographic fellowship can be stumbled towards by the inter-related processes of intimacy, trust, and welcome and I have tried to support these contentions with some short anecdotes from my time in the proverbial field.

The next sections will come down slightly from the clouds as it were and focus on methods as opposed to guiding methodological orientations. Chiefly, I shall briefly describe my own gradual shift away from what I term "sedentary" qualitative methods and towards methods rooted in shared movement. I detail my use of these types of methods and argue that they may be well-suited to prefigure alternative place-narrations in postconflict space that can challenge "bad scripts."

III.   WALKING, BUT NOT ALWAYS WALKING

There is a host of qualitative methodological literature that points to the importance of the "place," "setting," "ambience," or "location" of the semi-structured qualitative interview (Elwood and Martin 2000; Rose 1997; Rubin and Rubin 2005). Chief amongst geographical insights here is the contention that the interview itself and the data possible to glean from it are inexorably intertwined with the place of the conversation, who chose it and why, and how the place, site, or setting shapes, challenges, or possibly reproduces existing power-geometries and prior relationships between researcher and researched. Tuck and McKenzie (2014), drawing on Torre and Ayala (2009) and Fine (1994) argue that these spatial power-relations always "leak" into the relationship, into the co-presence of research partners through the land and places in which conversations occur. Every credible qualitative methodological

textbook that I have ever encountered, especially in geography, returns always to (the) place (of the research encounter) matters mantra.

These insights are particularly apposite when lived geography is also sectarian geography, as it is in Northern Ireland. In the working-class urban areas of Belfast and Derry, visible markers and signs of ethnosectarian territoriality abound (Graham and Whelan 2007; Hocking et al. 2018; Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006), however, in rural areas, markers are often less visible, but no less etched into the cognitive geographies of residents (Robinson 2018a; Roulston et al., 2017). Participatory researchers must therefore possess at least some spatial understandings of the places they are researching if they hope to do research ethically. Additionally, when one researches legacies of violence with those directly affected by the Troubles, many partners can be elderly or have mobility issues stemming from a violent experience. In the past, I have met partners in their own sitting rooms, in comfortable hotel lobbies, in a private room of the large, bustling building where I formerly worked, in coffee shops and even in pubs, and I have always been extremely careful to allow respondents to choose the place of the research encounter.

In a controversial blog post on the website *Writing the Troubles,* Martin McCleery (2018) argues that interviews are "counterproductive" when it comes to researching oral histories of The Troubles. Referencing Northern Irish meta-conflict, McCleery suggests that interviews do nothing more than reproduce "the same familiar people relating the same familiar stories" (n.p.). In response to this charge, we argued (Robinson and McClelland 2020b) that while in many ways McCleery was correct about the "same old stories," this could also be explained by the failure of qualitative researchers and oral historians to seek out and learn from different voices. But McCleery's provocation also started me wondering how much the places and locations where we interviewed people produced much of the same discursive familiarity and reproduction, especially considering Tuck and McKenzie's (2014)

idea that the power-relations always undergirding qualitative research can be instantiated by locations in which interviews are conducted (also Smith 2012). In the previous section, I described what I felt to be the often formulaic, practiced narratives of my partners in the Southwest of Northern Ireland, I now strongly believe that the nature of these narratives was in no small part due to the sedentary interviews taking place in the offices of SEFF and not where we could both could both experience and directly reference "micro-geographies of meaning" (Buscher and Urry 2009) that would help to facilitate conversations on the dynamic relationships between people and place (Bergeron et al. 2014; Sheller and Urry 2006). At a personal level, I was deeply frustrated with McCleery's "same old stories," and was experiencing a roiling internal contradiction about how I could respectfully curate these narratives of often extreme violence and suffering when I had heard so many before; in retrospect, I realise I had likely reached a point of both narrative saturation and emotional disassociation from these stories. Probably around the beginning of 2017, I had begun actively searching for methodological alternatives, a way to facilitate a mutual "breaking-out" of these "bad scripts" and generate new data and perspectives that had, at least the potential, to provoke a new way of thinking about the legacies of Troubles-violence and the justice campaigns of survivors and bereaved.

I also realised that my own, generally solitary, ambulatory movement through Derry and my trips to photograph specific places my respondents were telling me about along the border had fundamentally changed my own ways of seeing traumatic places and landscapes. In Derry especially, as I detail in the first chapter, my rambling walks had begun to attune me to the belief that highly significant and emotive memory-places were often overlooked, out-of-the-way, or hidden in plain sight (I autoethnographically document this in Robinson 2018b). Over the first half of 2017, I began actively researching and experimenting with the "walking family of methods" in the field. By the end of 2017, I had completely abandoned

"sedentary interviews" with UDR survivors in favour of geo-ethnographic "go-alongs" (Kusenbach 2003) and "walking interviews" (Evans and Jones 2011). As I had by then completed the interviewing phase of the Bloody Sunday chapters, I went back and re-incorporated walking into the programme there, mainly by asking several of the research partners I had already interviewed to "come take a walk with me" (Carpiano 2009) and by systematically collecting and organising notes, vignettes, and photographs generated on my own solitary walks in the Bogside and Creggan. Because I had not at the outset of this research programme considered my solitary walking a "method," I had never thought to do this before.

In the remainder of this section, I will briefly summarise "walking" as a geographical orientation, introducing many of the strengths and weaknesses of the methods family in terms of spatial research. This section will be truncated, but I have co-written much more extensively on these issues elsewhere (Robinson and McClelland 2020a; 2020b). I will also focus specifically on *how* I believe walking methods did, in fact, help facilitate a "breaking-out" and it was only through movement-based, multisensory co-experience did I ever begin to truly approximate the practice of what I call geoethnography-as-inhabitation.

There is no, as of yet, wholly inclusive label for what I term here "the walking family of methods." Foley et. Al (2020) discuss what they name "in-situ research," or "data-gathering techniques and modes of analysis carried out with research participants as they experience and move through settings in the context of the research question together" (Foley et al. 2020, 515). This is a welcome stab at encapsulation and avoids a too-prominent focus on walking, however it neglects the long history of non-participatory or solitary forms of movement, chiefly ambulatory movement (Bates and Rhys-Taylor 2017; Ingold and Vergunst 2008; Solnit 2001) not to mention forms of research that are less focused, that may not (yet) have a research question, that are more exploratory and generative. Thus, I retain walking or

the walking family as my preferred adjectives. There is a growing realisation that this denotation can be ableist, at least discursively excluding all manner of differently abled bodies from a research encounter (Bell 2019; Grove 2022; MacPherson 2016; Parent 2016; Springgay and Truman, 2021). Nor is "walking" strictly accurate, as much of the data I have generated has come whilst driving together and even more often while standing or sitting still together, engaging in purposeful yet unplanned rest or non-movement in place (Pinder 2011). I will not settle the terminological debate here, however, I shall retain "walking" for simplicity and define the family as "those [methods] focused on how people create social meaning *in situ,* through both purpose and mundane mobility and peripatetic practice, whether on foot or with a mobility aid, such as a wheeled vehicle" (Robinson and McClelland 2020b, 655).

The history of walking as a geographic concern arguably has three formative strands, a transcendentalist, emancipatory, and everyday strand (respectively) (Robinson and McClelland 2020a). The first draws from Anglo-American and French romanticism, poet-hikers, *flanêurs*, hobos, wanderers, and nomadic travel-writers (Bates and Rhys-Taylor 2017; Solnit 2001). The second we call the *emancipatory strand* and encompasses what is often termed psychogeography (Richardson 2015), a term most associated with the French Situationist movement and the Marxist polymath Guy Debord. Situationists engaged in what they referred to as *101ethod101,* spontaneous explorations of urban space designed to fill out and expand the known geography of the city. Situationists believed that encounters with the often phantasmagorically extreme margins of urban space could provide radical alternatives to capitalist spatial conditioning and expand the possibilities of collective action (Debord 1994; Wark 2011). Emancipatory walking is also a major theme in De Certeau's celebrated "Walking in the City" essay (1984) and of the work of the feminist writer, historian, and theorist Rebecca Solnit (2001). De Certeau argued that the modern city was a totalising

endeavour, an administrative regime believed to be (in the minds of its imaginaries) a complex rationalist system capable of imposing strategic and panoptical order over the lives, bodies, and trajectories of its citizens. He termed this ideal the "Concept-city." Here he may have been playing with his contemporary Henri Lefebvre's notion of "conceptualised space" or "the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers… the dominant space in any society (or mode of production" (1991, 38-39). The concept-city, according to de Certeau, was belied and resisted by a "chorus of idle footsteps" that manipulate and transgress this totalitarian urban planning, thus representing a "multiplication" of urban possibilities. Ultimately, "Walking in the City" becomes an exercise in radical hope that sees the "traverses" of its inhabitants as the perpetual disruptors of "prescribed syntaxes (the temporal modes of schedules, paradigmatic organisations of places, etc.)". Solnit (2001) in turn also sees walking as a modality of resistance and potential emancipation, both in terms of a radical re-appropriation of public space and as a temporal slowness capable of subverting the oppressive spacetimes of modern capitalism (see Chapter 2).

The third strand we have named the "everyday" and it consists of work that can be loosely grouped under the "new mobilities paradigm" (Sheller and Urry 2006). This research is often dismissive of transcendentalist or emancipatory philosophising. As Middleton puts it , these strands ignore or dismiss people "who navigate, negotiate, and traverse the city streets in their day-to-day life" (2010, 579). Everyday movement and mobility through space is both far more reflective of contemporary spatial practice and far more useful to study, inasmuch as it can illustrate the complex geographical competencies embedded in seemingly quotidian practice (Binnie et al. 2007; Edensor 2008). An over-emphasis on the potentially emancipatory quality of walking ignores the relational contingencies between walker and traversed space (Macpherson 2016), especially the heterodox norms, prejudices, and

exclusions that govern differential access to public, walkable space (Warren 2017). Finally, as Middleton (2010; 2011) argues, the research in the preceding strands offers little to struggles over contemporary transport policy and issues of access to public space.

We have argued (Robinson and McClelland 2020a), that perhaps the emancipatory and the everyday are not as removed as they may at first appear, especially as much work in the everyday strand similarly focuses on means of "multiplying urban possibilities" through the study of quotidian movement. But wherever a researcher falls on the spectrum of walking-as-radical-praxis, there are clear strengths and clear weaknesses to deploying the walking family of methods in the field, especially in postconflict space such as Northern Ireland. Firstly, a host of research, often in the phenomenological and/or non-representational traditions, argues that walking or assisted movement facilitates better multisensory engagement with the surrounding environment (Finlay and Bowman 2017). They provide a better, more fulsome, modality of encounter, allowing researchers to explore the emotional, symbolic, rhythmic, narrative, haptic, and mnemonic qualities of space, place, and landscape (Carpiano 2009; Degen and Rose 2012; Foley et al. 2020; Holton and Riley 2014; Palmgren 2018; Springgay and Truman 2017). As practices of encounter, they are capable of accessing overlooked, mundane, or less familiar places that may still provoke powerful narratives (Holton and Riley 2014; Robinson and McClelland 2020b). Secondly, scholars argue that walking facilitates a more natural and more egalitarian research encounter (Kinney 2018; Kusenbach 2003; Pinder 2011), however others have pushed back against this argument, maintaining that any natural or egalitarian character of a walk is contingent on the relationships of the walking bodies to the surrounding space. In other words, not all bodies are equitably comfortable, safe, secure, or able to access walkable space (Macpherson 2016; Robinson and McClelland 2020a; Warren 2017). The third proposed benefit of walking or other mobile methods as opposed to sedentary methods is in their capacity to provoke "place-

based" scholarly readings. These readings can often reveal the discrepancy between different geographical value-systems, between the emotional and symbolic value people feel surrounding particular places and the demonstrated values of powerful institutions, such as governmental planning departments and official preservation or heritage regimes (Drozdzewski et al. 2016). In postconflict space where places associated with past violence and trauma are deeply etched into the cognitive cartographies of residents, walking methods are a suite 104ethodlgies more capable of exploring the haunting thresholds where the past perpetually resurfaces and meddles with transitional spatial orthodoxies. As we argued elsewhere:

> Walking methods 'trouble' dominant space, place, and landscape by revealing complex, heterodox demands to co-create, remember, preserve, traverse, and transgress the spatial entanglements that comprise [postconflict] social and political life (Robinson & McClelland 2020b, 656).

However, there are significant difficulties associated with deploying walking methods in the field. These difficulties are often part and parcel with conducting research in public space, where both researcher and research partners can be seen. On a purely pragmatic level, doing research outside in a dynamic environment can be difficult. Ambient noise, variable weather, restricted daylight, all can impact the qualities of recording and GPS equipment. One thing I found while researching was that it was extremely hard to take my ethnographic "jottings" (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 2011) while on the move, often trying to balance notebook and pen and camera and shield all from the wind and rain. There is a host of walking research programmes that utilises wearable GPS components or audio-visual equipment (e.g. Hocking et al. 2018, Pink 2008; 2007), this sort of technology can fail or not perform optimally in sub-par atmospheric conditions or if a research partner is expected to use them absent direct researcher supervision. Thankfully, my research did not employ these technologies, as I shall lay out in the next section, pen, paper, and camera were my primary research equipment throughout. But more importantly, as I have been at pains to introduce

above, all walking or participatory movement through space is conducted in fields of differential spatial and embodied power. As Macpherson (2016, 431) correctly states: "Walking methods can also close down certain possible research avenues… or limit who is likely to participate (not everyone can walk or would choose to participate in a walk. Walking is not a benign or neutral approach." In Northern Ireland especially, where people can walk publicly must be thoroughly considered when public space can be highly sectarianised (Hocking et al. 2018; Roulston et al. 2017). Researchers must closely consider partners' relations with their surrounding space before choosing to employ a walking method, spatial fear and insecurity pervades wherever we ask marginalised, traumatised, or differently-abled bodies to engage in research publicly (Warren, 2017).

I hope this short survey of the origins of walking or assisted movement as a geographical concern and some considerations on the modes of implementing this family of methods has shown two main things. First, walking methods may be especially well-suited for *geoethnography-as-inhabitation,* microgeography, and the short[er]-term, hyper-focused ethnographies that Pink and Morgan (2013) call "intense routes to knowing." This is due largely to their potential to uncover nexuses of people-and-place that may be overlooked in a given environment, that may tell different or divergent spatial stories than those of established constellations of spatial power. The suite of methods themselves are no substitute for the intensive processes of inhabitation, but once a researcher's inhabitation in a research place is at least partially established, they can help break respondents out of practiced, choreographed, or rehearsed narratives by exposing both researcher and researcher to a multisensory lived and built environment.

However, if a researcher focuses too closely on methods of ambulatory movement, they will sample only those respondents capable of taking a walk where they can be seen. In my case, that would exclude a significant number of those directly affected by the legacies of

Troubles-violence. I also had to consider the ethics of asking people to both identify and "return" to places that may have surrounded a traumatic experience or traumatic experiences (Muzaini 2015). How I specifically implemented participatory walking methods will be addressed in the next section.

IV. A RESEARCH MAP

The walking family of methods were not the only type of methods I deployed to generate the data that forms this dissertation, though they are often intersected with other methods I used. This brief section will introduce and detail a chronological research map, a breakdown of the specific, over-lapping phases of this dissertation. I will outline, analyse, and describe the specific methods chosen at certain times and in certain places and why they were chosen. I will also delineate how the participatory component of my programme was pitched to potential partners and my partner recruitment strategies and case selection. Again, as I described in the first section of this chapter, my perspectives, findings, and methods evolved and changed throughout the process; I abandoned certain methods entirely and threw myself into new approaches half-way through. The reader may refer to Table 1 to get a sense of what exactly I was doing over the course of 4+ years researching these topics.

I began working for a The Junction in 2014 as a researcher and project organiser. I was given considerable freedom while in this employ, and by the middle of 2015 realised that I seemed to be writing a book based on the research conducted for my work. During the course of researching the book (Robinson 2018a), I met several individuals and groups who had been active in the Bloody Sunday Justice Campaign (BSJC). The campaign greatly intrigued me, and I realised that the book's topics would not permit me a detailed microgeography of the legacies of Bloody Sunday in Derry.

Table 1: A PERSONAL RESEARCH MAP

Duration of Research Intervention	Type of Research Intervention	Location of Research Intervention
September 2016–June, 2017	Qualitative (Sedentary) Interviews, Bloody Sunday Memory Curators	Various locations in Derry
September 2016-December 2016	Archival Research, - Narrative Analysis- Bloody Sunday	1. Derry Public Library, Derry 2. Linen Hall Library, Belfast 3. Museum of Free Derry, Derry
January 2017–February 2017	Participant-Observation I, Bloody Sunday Week	Various locations in Derry
January 2018-February 2018	Participant-Observation II, Bloody Sunday Week	Various locations in Derry
June 2017–March, 2018	Analysis of Qualitative Interviews, Bloody Sunday Memory Curators	Desk Research
January 2018-February 2018	Qualitative (Sedentary Interviews), UDR survivors and bereaved ***ABANDONED***	Various locations, co. Fermanagh
April 2018–December 2018	SEFF-curated "Go-Alongs"	Various locations, co. Fermanagh
May 2018–October 2018	Participant-Observation III, UDR survivors and bereaved	Various locations, cos. Fermanagh + Tyrone
January 2019-February 2019	Participant-Observation IV, Bloody Sunday Week	Various locations in Derry
October 2018–April 2020	Hybrid Mobile (Walking) Interviews + Solitary ethnographic walking	Various locations, cos. Fermanagh + Tyrone
December 2018–April 2020	Solitary ethnographic walking + Walking informal chats, Bloody Sunday curators	Various locations in Derry
December 2018-April 2020	Visual/ Photographic analysis + Field note analysis resulting in Drafting of Ethnographic Vignettes	Desk work

The reader will meet three respondents I pseudonymise as "Chloe," "Colin," and "Ilsa" in Chapters 4 and 5. These three people were all interviewed for my book project (Robinson 2018a) and are quoted there under different pseudonyms. However, for this research, I

reinterviewed each of them again in 2017 after I had received ethical approval for this specific dissertation project and have only used the transcripts of the 2017 interviews.

What intrigued me most about the public memory of Bloody Sunday in Derry was its dynamic curatorship; how the atrocity of Bloody Sunday could be and was framed in so many diverse narratives within a small city (Conway 2010; Dawson 2005; 2007). So my first step in trying to get a handle on this was to create a database of journalistic reporting about Bloody Sunday and try to analyse how public narrations of Bloody Sunday had or hadn't shifted over time. I started with local perspectives, focusing on the local newspapers *The Derry Journal* and the *Londonderry Sentinel.* Unfortunately, no digital archive of these newspapers exists, so I was forced to systematically make my way through the microfiche records in Derry City Library. In order to not have to scan every single issue of these newspapers spanning nearly 45 years, I first created a detailed historical timeline of Bloody Sunday memory politics using secondary historical sources, and focused my article search to key dates within that timeline.

For every year between 1972-2013, I examined every issue of the newspapers during the month of January, as Bloody Sunday itself occurred on 30 January 1972 and the annual anniversary commemorations meant that there would inevitably be important data on the microfiches for January. All potentially relevant articles were photographed and categorised by year in my database. The Linen Hall Library in Belfast additionally holds a Bloody Sunday "box," as it was described to me, basically the "box" is a collection of paper and digital material, including news articles, political leaflets, campaign posters, photographs, and other political and cultural material. I travelled to Belfast in October 2016 and spent three days sifting through the Bloody Sunday "box." The contents of the "box" were integrated into my database. My third step was to examine a specific exhibit curated by the Museum of

Free Derry, namely their display of Bloody Sunday March leaflets and posters. These were dutifully photographed and added to the database.

The point of this archival work was to examine the changing narratives surrounding the public curatorship of Bloody Sunday memory and the campaign for justice. I wanted to better understand how the memory of Bloody Sunday was used, spatially, politically, in Derry and how it had changed over time. My primary method of examining the small digital archive I put together is known as *narrative analysis.* Narrative analysis is a specific suite of qualitative research methods that began growing in popularity after the publication of Jerome Bruner's seminal (1991) article and Riessman's highly influential (1993) textbook. Beginning from Bruner's, a social psychologist, contention that human understandings of the world, both individual and social, were invariably storied (Niles 2010), narrative analysis seeks to understand the form, function, and effects of those stories on human cognition, human behaviour, and human possibility. Narrative analysts generally start from a phenomenon, an idea, a discourse, a history, an artefact, or a text/textual interface, and seek to understand how this thing is narrated as it is, why it is narrated as it is, what the effects of these narrations are and to whom, and how have these narrations changed over time (Andrews, Squire, and Tamboukou 2013; Bal 2009; Bamberg 2012). In this sense, it is related to discourse analysis so popularised by Michel Foucault, but it is generally less concerned with the specificities and intricacies of language, utterance, and speech-act and more concerned with the holistic structure of a text, recitation, social memory. Some theorists, like Bal (2009), prefer the term *narratology* to better accentuate the differing emphases. There are many ways to "do" narrative analysis and many potentially fruitful vistas to employ the technique. I used primarily what Reisman (1993) names a "structural" approach, A structural approach looks primarily for the form and function of a narrative. The method itself helped me to reconstruct

the stages of Bloody Sunday public memory, largely confirming Dawson (2007) and Conway's (2010) prior work, but adding more detail.

I also began the process of recruiting partners in the form of sedentary interviewees in 2016. My sampling was a mix of purposive and snowball sampling. I wanted specifically to speak with representatives of the so-called "Bloody Sunday families," people who have spoken in the past publicly about Bloody Sunday backed by the authority of their murdered relative or loved one. In order to do so, I made a spreadsheet of all the victims and used personal and professional contacts to brainstorm who might be willing to speak to me. Of the 14 victims, I successfully spoke with at least one person associated with 11 of the victims. I then attempted to do the same with the 15 people wounded on the day. This was less successful, however I was able to interview three separate people known to be associated with the Bloody Sunday injured. My final category of purposively sampled interviewees was people not directly affected by Bloody Sunday (though this does not exclude people who were present in Derry during the atrocity), but who worked in some capacity with organisations related to the Bloody Sunday Justice Campaign, including the Bloody Sunday March Committee, the Bloody Sunday Trust, the Pat Finucane Centre, and British-Irish Rights watch. All told, I interviewed 27 people over 3 years from 2015-2017. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. My ethical approach to interview follow-up has always been to offer respondents a copy of their completed transcript and allow them to correct or restate anything that has not come out to their liking. All respondents were afforded this consideration.

I used a semi-structured approach to sedentary interviewing, following closely the guidance of fairly well-known textbooks, such as Rubin and Rubin (2005) and the interview chapters of Yanow and Schwartz-Shea's (2015) volume (Schaffer 2015; Soss 2015). Following these scholars, I attempted to craft discursive partnerships rooted in an ordinary

language approach. For interview preparation, I used Soss' suggestion of a "to-get list," meaning to come in not necessarily with pre-prepared questions but rather with a good sense of the types of data I wanted to elicit. Soss suggests that prepared questions can often blind interviewers to data-rich tangents and diversions in the discursive partnership. I split the proverbial difference as I knew there were certain questions I wanted to ask every discursive partner. The questions I asked every partner were versions of the following (allowing for slight linguistic variation):

1. Can you tell me what you remember from the day of 15 June, 2010 in Guildhall Square? What were your overall impressions of the day?

2. *[This question was only asked to family members of victims]* How would you prefer to see your loved one remembered?

3. What now for the struggle for Bloody Sunday Justice after the RBSI [Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry]?

I began every interview with Question 1 listed above. For the directly bereaved, Question 2 was the penultimate question of the interview, and for every research partner, Question 3 was the final question. I also attempted to steer a fairly similar general course through the talk, though I was never prescriptive or overly-directive. I started on the day of the Report of Bloody Sunday Inquiry, then I sought to elicit their narratives of how and why they began campaigning with or proximate to the Bloody Sunday Justice Campaign. These often elicited highly personal and highly emotive back stories that provided me the necessary background data to understand where their perspectives were situated in the larger memory-landscape. My next step was to inquire, very gently as this can be an uncomfortable subject (see Chapters 4-5), the so-called "split" in the Bloody Sunday Justice Campaign and how they viewed it. I attempted to finish the interview by eliciting my partners' summing up of "where the Bloody Sunday Justice Campaign is at," what justice for Bloody sunday meant to them, and what, if any, next steps were necessary, in their opinion. These were the four categories

to "to-get" data that I entered every interview with and while I expected my "to-get" lifts to shift and change over the three years and with different individuals, these four categories actually stayed the same throughout, even if the interviews themselves varied in how much data was elicited within each category.

I coded the interviews using fairly common-place qualitative coding techniques (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003; Saldana, 2021), though I generally do not use coding software, such as MaxQDA or its variants. My method of analysis was to create large thematic categories for the entire corpus of the interview text. These categories emerged out of close readings of the transcripts themselves, and while many were expected emergent categories, many others surprised me. In keeping with general preference towards narrative analysis and spatial stories, I coded according to the types of *stories* my respondents were telling, even if they didn't view themselves as relating stories, even taking to calling my categories *genres* in my own head. Some storied-categories included such things as "Bloody Sunday as heroic parable" or "The BSJC as cautionary lesson." I completed my coding in early 2018 for this major parcel of data in 2018.

The third larger data-generating component of the Bloody Sunday case was geoethnographic. As I have spoken at length in the prior section about geoethnography-as-inhabitation, this short description will focus more on the minutiae of data collection as opposed to the principles or ideals. This largest concentrations of data I collected here were during the "Bloody Sunday Weeks," or the last week in January that culminates in the Bloody Sunday Annual March on Sunday (the March occasionally occurs in February). Since the so-called "split" in the Bloody Sunday Justice Campaign there have been two different schedules of events, though many events are cross-listed, one schedule curated by the Bloody Sunday Trust and one curated by the Bloody Sunday March Committee. The public events during the week include lectures, film screenings, open discussions, readings, book fairs,

fundraising raffles, or pub quiz sessions. From January 2017 to January 2019, I attended as many of these events as I was humanly able, taking detailed fieldnotes and photographing exhibits and how meeting rooms were decorated, signposted, organised. I must note as well that when I was resident in Derry from 2014-2016, I also attended many of these events and observed all of the marches, though I was not formally researching Bloody Sunday memory at the time, but rather my book project (Robinson 2018a). But from 2017 on, I was especially attuned to who attended which meetings; my time spent recruiting and getting to know key people within both the March Committee and the Trust had furnished me with a sort of cast of characters and I was able to sort them in my own head as to their political alignment and their alignment towards continuing the Bloody Sunday March, which is very much the key issue animating the so-called split (see Chapter 4).

Finally, of course, there is the annual march itself, which forms the main subject of Chapter 5. I observed this march for seven years, from 2014-2020, though formally, only my geoethnographical research from 2017-2020 is reported in this dissertation. Here, my main geoethnographic focus in the field has always been to collect data relating to the framing and choreography of that year's march. My specific techniques are ethnographic, but they are invariably dictated by the conditions, both atmospheric and relational, on the day itself. At the most basic level, I try to photograph every banner at the start of the march near the Creggan shops and especially to visually record the order in which groups line up. I then run alongside as the march slowly winds its way down to the Bogside from the Creggan Heights, juggling camera and notepad, trying to note how both the March itself behaves, and how individual groups behave and present themselves. At the culmination of the March, I tape-record the speeches from the daïs and closely observe the reactions of the crowd watching. I try to also note who isn't there, depending on my general sense of the cast of characters involved. Ultimately, the day proceeds too quickly and too hurriedly for any concrete

research plans, on the day itself I focus on talking to as many people as I can who are participating in the march, even cursorily, and making sure that I have visually recorded the entirety of the march for later analysis. My photographs, transcripts of the culminating speeches, and the composition and comportment of the march is then comparatively analysed across the years and details are filled-in by the testimony given to me in the relevant sedentary interviews.

Generally, in the field, I take "jottings" (Emerson et al. 2011), or a quick, hardscrabble descriptive shorthand designed simply to serve as aide-memoire for me to reflect on further when I am in front of my computer. At some point in 2017, I read several articles about a technique called "ethnographic vignettes" and decided to adopt it. This technique is most associated with the anthropologist Jean-Paul Dumont (1992, but see also Humphreys 2005; Jacobsen 2014). Dumont champions vignettes as a way to surround "fragmented realities" and a "plurality of images that superimpose themselves upon each other to create an out-of-focus ensemble" (1992, 1). While from 2016-2017, I generally just typed up my handwritten jottings, jettisoning parts that seemed no longer very interesting or apposite and generally grouping key observations and moments together in a given software document or folder, switching to vignettes, like switching to walking methods, opened up a new possibilities of collecting and presenting data that I have found invaluable since.

The specific technique is largely my own invention, though I have no doubt that countless other scholars use and have used slight variations of this technique. In my jottings, I try to capture what I call "emplaced moments in the scene." In practice, this is a furious explosion of chicken-scratch on paper as I seek in an often-extremely limited time period to capture as much of the *mise-en-scène* of a particular moment in a particular place in the field that I think, at the time, will be a "small story" that can illuminate a larger phenomenon of interest (on "small stories" in narrative research see: Bamberg 2004; Bamberg and

Georgakopoulou 2008). Then, when I am out of the field and in front of a computer, I take out my jottings and use the notes and photographs to recreate the scene on paper in a narrative form. I let my latent memories of the moment in time and why I chose it for further study interact with my jottings and try to build what Joseph Williams (2006) calls a "reader-centric" narrative, that is a narrative that is meant to be read by an audience and not merely an interior monologue. This technique forces me to attempt to translate what I found in the moment was so important to signpost into something that a reader could potentially understand. When I struggle creating a story out of the moment organically, I realise that perhaps this moment was not so central to record and move onto another vignette.

Ultimately, my completed fieldnotes after I adopted this technique in 2017 consist of nearly 80 short (my vignettes usually range from 500 – 1500 words), richly descriptive, narrative stories of my experience with others in a place, what I was feeling, what I intuited they were feeling, and all of it grouped and organised on a file in my hard drive. I find when, often a year or more later, I sit down and try to reference or write an article based on my geo-ethnographies, re-reading the vignettes as opposed to simply fieldnotes, even carefully organised fieldnotes, transports me back to the reality of a time I am seeking to reference. In the empirical sections, the reader may notice that I have integrated many of these vignettes into the text of this dissertation itself.

I began working with ex-UDR survivors and bereaved in Fermanagh and Tyrone in 2017, though again, I had interviewed several people with ex-security force backgrounds for my (2018a) book project and was not a wholly unknown quantity in the area. In the UDR case, there is no overlap between the partners interviewed for my book project (2018a) and the research partners introduced in Chapter Six. The case was selected for several reasons, but convenience and accessibility were certainly high on the list of reasons. From the beginning of my dissertation, I knew I wanted to compare citizens and protesters massacred

by the British army in Derry to a group of people who were the victims of IRA violence and where that violence was overwhelmingly one-sided, at least in terms of deaths and injury. Of Northern Ireland's six counties, only Fermanagh provides anything close to this Troubles-backdrop. Of the estimated 116 people slain by Troubles-violence in Fermanagh, 111 died at the hands of the IRA (McKeown 2009).

With the case selected, I turned towards recruitment, reaching out to people I already had worked with in the past who were associated with the largest survivor group in the area, the Southeast Fermanagh Foundation (SEFF). I explained my project to them and SEFF's coordinator suggested I come up to Lisnaskea, where SEFF is based, and explain my project to a group of their members he would gather. This initial meeting took place in June 2017 and between that time and March 2018, I conducted five one to one interviews with ex-UDR residents of Fermanagh and held two focus groups that included both UDR and non-UDR SEFF members from Fermanagh and Tyrone.

I detailed above why I believe the data that came out of these interviews was unsatisfactory, and ultimately my plan to continue sedentary interviewing ex-UDR members in the area was abandoned. I confidentially destroyed any and all transcripts, notes, and other data that emerged from these interviews and focus groups. By 2018, as again I mention, I had resolved to implement some form of "walking methods" with my partners in Fermanagh and Tyrone. Towards the tail end of the sedentary interviews I ultimately ended up abandoning, I was asking partners to draw me a map of their local area and to mark places on that map that were highly significant to understand and tell me about them. This technique at the start of the interview was deeply ill-thought out on my part. Respondents generally responded in a bemused manner and despite all my efforts to explain to them that a "map" needed to be little more than a personal representation of congruences of space and experience important to them at that time, respondents clearly did not see the point of the exercise and either got

bogged down in cartographical details or recognised it for the incoherent and ham-fisted intervention that it was and generally refused to engage in any substantive manner.

But my urge to ask partners to map their local area had stemmed from both my growing fascination with how ex-UDR members described their local, lived landscape to me in interviews and informal conversations. In April of 2018, SEFF invited me to attend a guided minibus tour of the local area. These minibus tours were part of a larger project SEFF was working on at the time, which to me amounted to a thanatological deep mapping of killing along the Southwest run of the Irish border. My first go-along with the guided bus tour was revelatory, from a data gathering perspective, and further cemented the notion that I was going about doing research in this place and with these people all wrong. It was not so much the stories of killing that were related on the bus tour, nor how those stories were framed, nor even the shared emotional and affective feelings present with those men on that bus, rather it was how these stories and this experience was so relentlessly intertwined with the overlooked, out-of-the-way, and seemingly inoffensive places and landscapes that surrounded us. I was a late addition to that first bus tour I attended, the official guest was men from an ex-security forces victims and survivors' group from another part of Northern Ireland. The uncanny way that men who were not familiar with the border areas of Fermanagh read the landscape was profound; I have in my fieldnotes a very short vignette about the bus stopping and before our guide could begin the place we were at, the man I was sitting next to pointed up at the hill above us, quietly saying to me, "They'd have been up on that ridgeline," meaning an IRA sniper or snipers. Ultimately, that was indeed the story the guide related.

I ultimately was able to go-along on two bus tours. One guide was both ex-RUC and ex-British army, the second guide was ex-UDR. The second tour was curated differently as the audience included members of Southern Irish NGOs and journalists, it was less intensely local and more grasping at a larger narrative portrayal of violence along the border during the

Troubles. My first bus tour ranged from that part of the border between Belcoo and Rosslea, or southeastern Fermanagh, the second was intensely rooted in the land southwest of Enniskillen, between Lough Erne and the border and centred around the village of Belleek/Magheraboy, different names for the same village, a village literally bisected by the border.

These bus tours and the revelatory data they yielded coincided with my increasing determination to "get-into-place" with my research partners. I went back to my initial interviewees and asked them if they would agree to be interviewed again, but this time, the format would be different. Ultimately, I was able to recruit seven partners to engage in a mobile journey with me, including two who were not part of my initial interview pool or members of SEFF but contacted me out of an urge to tell me what it was like "in their neck of the woods," Castlederg, County Tyrone.

In preparing for these mobile interviews, I made a decision to go in completely unstructured, to not prepare anything in advance. I wanted to avoid any temptation to lead the local experts (my partners) and I wanted my partners to have full control over the route of our journeys and the places we visited. I wished to emphasise the fact that when it came to their lived environment, I was the neophyte, thus minimising any potential power imbalances between researcher and researched or discomfort from being researched (Bergeron, Paquette, and Poullaoec-Gonidec 2014; Evans and Jones 2011). The decision was also fed by my own intellectual curiosity. Where would my partners take me if it was completely up to them? Would it be like the guided tours, discovering haunted chronotopic thresholds in a ridgeline or a ruin, or would they take me to traditional places of UDR memory, cemeteries or Orange halls (all Orange halls in the area have a memorial display of servicepeople killed).

Thus, before the journeys, mobile partners were given only one piece of guidance from me. I requested that they, using some variation of the phrase, "Please take me to places in the local area that you think are important for me to understand and tell me about them." These hybrid, walking/driving interviews ended up ranging from two hours to an entire day in duration and ultimately, did both of what I suspected they would, but they fused the traditional memory-place and the unexpected memory-place in ways that were highly significant. Again, throughout my go-alongs and mobile interviews, I used my geo-ethnographic technique of "jottings-into-vignettes." The bulk of the data presented in Chapter Six comes from these two types of interventions.

The relative success of walking methods in Fermanagh, especially after almost a year of relative research frustration, caused me to attempt to recreate some facet of them in Derry. I first began to look at my regular solitary walks in the city as a research method (Pierce and Lawhon 2015) and treat them as such, taking fieldnotes and storing photographs and writing vignettes. These solitary walks as method were inspired largely by the work of James Sidaway (2021; 2009) and his colleagues (Paasche and Sidaway, 2015; 2010), who use solitary walking as a means of encountering everyday affective geopolitics and colonial traces. I also re-contacted partners from my sedentary interviews and asked if they would like to come take a walk with me sometime. These occasional walks with research partners were friendly and only semi-formal, though I did take jottings and photographs of things they showed me along the march route or in out of the way places of Creggan I would never have discovered without them. I have not included any direct data in this dissertation directly from those participatory walks but they have added immensely, albeit indirectly, to my analysis of the palimpsestic space of Bloody Sunday memory, especially in Chapter 5.

This section has sought to sum up my entire research programme from 2015-2020 in Derry and the Southwest of Northern Ireland. It hinges on both an epistemological and

methodological shift, the former a creeping realisation that I needed to inhabit the places I was studying if I wanted to add anything remotely original to the discourse surrounding reconciliation and the complex spatial legacies of Troubles-violence, I could not simply be an "impartial" academic passing through, hoovering up what surface-level data I could. In the case of the latter shift, I hope I have described an iterative process of trial and failure, one that ultimately and luckily opened up an entire new vista of research design, and research methodology, especially in postconflict space (Robinson and McClelland 2020b).

CHAPTER 4:

HAVE WE OVERCOME?: DERRY, BLOODY SUNDAY, AND

THE "GREAT SEA-CHANGE"

I.   HAVE WE OVERCOME?

Nearly ten years after the Bloody Sunday Inquiry first convened in Derry, its final Report was

publicly revealed on 15 June 2010 in front of a crowd estimated to be over 10,000 people in

Derry's Guildhall Square (Campbell 2012). The Report wholly exonerated thirteen of the

fourteen victims of the original massacre and placed the blame for Bloody Sunday squarely

on the shoulders of the 1st Battalion, Paratroop Regiment (hereafter, 1 PARA) of the British

army. In contrast to how the victims of Bloody Sunday had been portrayed by successive UK

governments and elements of the British media (McLaughlin and Baker 2015), the Report

claimed explicitly that "None [of the victims] was posing a threat of causing death or serious

injury." It concluded that:

> [Bloody Sunday] strengthened the Provisional IRA, increased nationalist resentment
> and hostility towards the Army, and exacerbated the violent conflict of the years that
> followed. Bloody Sunday was a tragedy for the bereaved and the wounded, and a
> catastrophe for the people of Northern Ireland" (Saville, Hoyt, and Toohey 2010:
> I.5.5).

A short note on terminology before I begin. The official name of the Report cited

above is the Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, though many readers may be familiar with

it as "The Saville Report," after the Inquiry's chairperson, the British Law Lord Mark Saville.

It is generally referred to as The Saville Report in Irish, UK, and international media.

However, some advocates I spoke to object to the moniker "The Saville Report," arguing that

it overstates the contribution of Mark Saville and underestimates the contribution of the

Bloody Sunday Justice Campaign (hereafter, BSJC). Out of respect for this perspective, I

refer to it as the Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, or, for simplicity's sake, the Report, throughout.

Ever since the first anniversary of the original Bloody Sunday (1972) massacre, different people, campaign groups, relatives of the deceased, and political parties have organised an annual Bloody Sunday March on the Sunday immediately following the last full week in January in Derry. Usually, this means the last Sunday in January, but rarely, the last Sunday is too early in January and the March will actually occur on the first Sunday in February. The March re-traces the route of the original anti-internment march that ended on the bloody killing ground in and around Rossville Street in the centre of Derry's Bogside neighbourhood. On Friday, 28 January 2011, a little more than six months after the celebratory release of the Report, the largest circulation local newspaper covering the Derry catchment area, the *Derry Journal,* carried an editorial penned by Tony Doherty (2011) entitled "Come March with Us—For the Last Time." Doherty is the son of Patrick (Paddy) Doherty, one of the fourteen victims of Bloody Sunday. He is also a former IRA-prisoner and a Sinn Féin activist (Doherty 2017). In his editorial, Doherty expressly claimed that the 2011 march, the first since the release of the Report, would be the "end of an era." "The family-led struggle," he argued, had been successful; the victims "vindicated," and the final line of the editorial hearkens back to one of the well-known slogans of the US Civil Rights Movement, an inspiration for the Northern Irish Civil Rights Movement (Dooley 1998): "We have overcome."

However, not everyone agreed with Doherty's assessment. Crucially, for the first time in the March's history, the "last" 2011 march would not end at the local landmark of Free Derry Corner, mere metres from where many of the original slayings occurred, rather, in Guildhall Square, where the Report was issued. The spatial symbolism was obvious. The original march, kettled in the Bogside before 1 PARA descended, had been prevented from

reaching its intended destination of the Guildhall, the symbolic governing centre of Derry. The 2011 March would do what none of its predecessors had done, it would breach the Walled City to lay claim to the deeply resonant and contested symbolic space of "Derry-within-the-walls" (Cohen 2007). Through this spatial trajectory, the 2011 march would inscribe a triumphant culmination of the long arc of the BSJC in Derry. The original 1972 march would, finally, be complete, the struggle concluded, the dead metaphorically laid to rest. And no longer would the Bloody Sunday dead and their living curators be confined to the Bogside, the Creggan, and other working-class Nationalist neighbourhoods in Derry. Through the occupation of the Guildhall Square, the 'last' march would lay claim to the tell the final, exclusive story of Bloody Sunday on behalf of the entire city of Derry. The essence of that story powerfully contained on the single word of the banner that fronted the "last" march: "Vindicated" (Figure 1).

However, as the march wound its way east down William Street, a small number of marchers led by the sisters Kate and Linda Nash (Linda Nash was formerly known as Linda Roddy but has since returned to using Linda Nash) broke away from the main march in protest. These women are the sisters of 19-year old William Nash slain on Bloody Sunday and the daughters of Alex Nash who was also shot and injured on the day. Kate and Linda Nash reject, in part, the findings of the Report, but their small breakaway in 2011 was a protest against the closure of the BSJC symbolised by the "last" march. To this day, the sisters continue to march on the Sunday following the last week in January, curated now by an entity called The Bloody Sunday March Committee. And on that small breakaway in 2011, it is no coincidence that the sisters and their supporters marched to Free Derry Corner, where every prior Bloody Sunday march had culminated, to the place where the spatial story of Bloody Sunday is not complete, but rather *unfinished* and incomplete.

Figure 1: Vindicated, 2011 Bloody Sunday March, Derry, ©CAIN and ©Martin Melaugh. Used with permission.

 "Vindicated" is a slogan intended to be read either in the past simple tense, as in "we were

vindicated," or the present perfect tense, as in "we have been vindicated." The past simple

tense, in English, linguistically marks a completed action in the past, the present perfect, in

turn, marks a current state whose relevance to a past condition is unchanged and ongoing (we

were vindicated on 15 June 2010, and through this vindication, we are vindicated in the

current moment). Tense constructions like the past simple and the present perfect connote

completions, completed events, completed acts, completed states. In the context of the

emergent march dispute, they accentuate Doherty's "for the last time" rejoinder. They

function as a declaration of "overness" (Ahmed 2012; Bentley 2021), a form of temporal

power, namely the power to declare something over, part of a completed past. Yet, as we

shall shortly see, this declaration of overness was not universally shared.

There are several compelling studies of the spatial stories and public memory of

Bloody Sunday, however, all seem to have been written and published before 15 June 2010

and the unveiling of The Report (Conway 2010; 2009; 2008; Dawson 2007; 2005; Herron

and Lynch 2007), excepting Bentley's (2021) recent excellent intervention. Yet even in the

years before the issuance of the Report, scholars such as Dawson (2007) and Herron and Lynch (2007) were already warning that any party's attempt to impose narrative and temporal uniformity through the vehicle of the Report was bound to be disputed. Herron and Lynch caution (2007, 71):

> It is often asserted that the establishment of a final and singular truth of what happened on [Bloody Sunday] will allow for a process of closure and resolution, and perhaps for those involved such an aspiration is understandable. But there is a danger that what is being pursued is something which will ultimately smooth over the actual and very real inconsistencies, partialities and blank spots of an event such as this.

A story that narrates The Report as "the establishment of a final and singular truth" that ineluctably leads to a "process of closure and resolution" is, by very definition, a story that can be told only in the past simple and present perfect tenses. My perusal of the relevant academic and non-academic literature after the Report suggests that these tense constructions have been uncritically adopted. Aiken (2015) is one particularly illustrative example. His interviews with survivors and other respondents uniformly confine the BSJC to a completed past; together, he and his respondents reflect back on the Bloody Sunday Justice Campaign as something over, something finished. Yet this approach uncritically accepts the temporal assumptions that Doherty and others attempt to impose over the possible range of discourse; it can only succeed by actively ignoring the vocal minority in Derry who view both the Report and the BSJC as radically incomplete (Bentley 2021). This chapter avoids relegating the BSJC to the completed past. Rather, I consider the spatially and temporally contested politics of inscribing the Bloody Sunday into the ongoing political and material life of the Bogside, Creggan, and Derry itself.

This chapter argues that the fractious spatial politics of Bloody Sunday are not purely a product of disagreements about the Report and the way the Report relates to the temporal arc of the BSJC. Drawing on de Certeau's (1984, Chapter 9) concept of "spatial stories," I contend that the 15 June 2010 and the Report are uniquely situated within a particular

"theatre of action," in this case the city of Derry itself. Specifically, they are situated within an attempt to fundamentally alter the dominant spatial story of the city and its residents. 15 June 2010 represents a key plot point, perhaps *the* key plot point, in a burgeoning transcendentalist "Great Sea-Change" narrative of Derry, one in which the allegedly victorious arc of the BSJC does not merely reflect the vindication and overcoming of the victims, bereaved, and survivors of Bloody Sunday, but rather the city itself.

The Great Sea-Change is a story whose narrative climax interweaves three major events. First, the triumphant culmination of the BSJC beginning with the issuance of the Report on 15 June 2010 and ending at the supposed denouement of the last celebratory Bloody Sunday march in Guildhall Square on 30 Jan 2011. Second, Derry's designation as the inaugural UK City of Culture in July 2010 and the generally successful showcasing of the city during its tenure in 2013. Third, the attempt to popularise a "Derry Model" of postconflict reconciliatory and culture-led peacebuilding in which Derry is presented as having solved many of the supposedly intractable political and sectarian issues that continue to plague the rest of Northern Ireland, especially Derry's chief rival of Belfast. The "Great Sea-Change" label I have taken from the poem *The Cure at Troy* by Seamus Heaney (1991).

> History says, don't hope
> On this side of the grave.
> But then, once in a lifetime
> The longed-for tidal wave
> Of justice can rise up
> And hope and history rhyme.
>
> So hope for a great sea-change
> On the far side of revenge.
> Believe that further shore
> Is reachable from here.
> Believe in miracle
> And cures and healing wells.

The reasons why I choose these lines from this poem will become clear when I turn to discussing the Culture Year. But for now, to challenge any of the three mutually entangled

strands of the Great Sea-Change narrative, especially publicly, becomes a challenge to the transcendental trajectories and idealised futurity of Derry itself. It undermines the notion of a city and its residents who have been vindicated, who have overcome, who have a new story to tell about themselves. Thus, when some Bloody Sunday family members united with other political actors to break away from the supposedly final march in January 2011, they went far beyond merely disrupting the supposed triumphant social catharsis of the 15 June 2010. This disruption ultimately provokes the major questions of this chapter and the next: Who gets to narrate the story of not only Bloody Sunday and its ghosts, but post-Report and post-Culture Year Derry itself? And what are the emotional, political, and geographical consequences of splintered justice movements, fractured along narrative and temporal fault lines? My ultimate contention is that the BSJC cannot be adequately understood absent its imbrication within changing, evolving, and politically contested spatial stories of the city of Derry.

II.   SPATIAL STORIES OF DERRY

Spatial stories are a concept I take from Michel de Certeau (1984). Specifically, de Certeau argues that "narrative activity" structures, organises, and renders intelligible human representations of territory, order, and mobility. Yet these stories, especially at the level of individuals and small groups, can be highly idiosyncratic for de Certeau, operating merely as one in a chaotic, splintered multitude of other story-journeys, all dependent on heterogenous spatial referents, different markers, signs, and mnemonics. However, when a story acquires what he calls as "enunciatory focalization" (118), it coheres and takes shape, transcending the boundaries of individual movement and experience and becoming part of the spatial "practice" of groups and communities. These spatial practices are essentially the woven-together fragments of individual, cultural, and spatial references and signs into an operative narrative trajectory. De Certeau is never particularly clear on how some spatial stories acquire

an "enunciatory focalization" and jump to the level of spatial practice. Henri Lefebvre, as part

of his discussion of "trial by space" (1991, 416-417) suggests that those that fade away are

those that fail to make "a mark on space" and fail to generate "an appropriate morphology." I

suggest (Robinson 2018a, 29-35), following Lefebvre, that spatial stories acquire coherence

and become spatial practice through what I refer to as the "politics of inscription" or the

contested politics of making "a mark" on public space.

O'Dowd and Komarova (2013; 2011) are perhaps the most well-known scholars who

have tried to apply de Certeau's spatial stories to urban Belfast (but see also Hickey 2014;

Lane 2019; Mulholland, Abdelmonem, and Selim 2014). They write that Belfast itself is a

city:

> Structured by interweaving ontological narratives that reflect attempts by organised
> groups to impose order and coherence on a fluid and often incoherent urban reality
> (O'Dowd and Komarova 2013, 526-7).

Generally speaking, while narrative inquiry or narratology (as a field, see Chapter Three), is

often more text-bound than spatially-sensitive (Baynham 2015; 2003), these sorts of *roles* for

narrative and story abound in that literature. For Cronon (1992, 1349), stories organise and

render coherent a "crowded and disordered chronological reality." For Price (2010, 205) they

"create value through the coherence of unity." For Trouillot (1997), stories also silence their

potential competitors, and the power and reach of a particular story, or history, is the result of

what emerges from the contested universe of possible narrations. Thus, spatial stories are

attempts to impose narrative order on space and movement, generally in the form of an

intelligible sequence of events, senses, and impressions, that in turn promote a shared

understanding of what this space fundamentally means to these people in this context.

But not all spatial stories are equal. This is why I refer to the process by which some

spatial stories become ascendant and some get forgotten as a "politics of inscription"

(Robinson 2018a), following Lefebvre. Those stories best able to contest the politics of

inscription, to contest "trial by space," are always bound up in questions of storytellers' proximities to established constellations of discursive power. Sociologists of storytelling have long noted that successful stories tap into and reflect culturally-specific and institutionalised-learned genres, frames, moralities, and forms of sequential ordering (Jacobs 2000; Polletta 2009, Smith 2006). The ultimate power of a spatial story, its ability to contest the politics of inscription, to affect perceptions of lived space, is thus often a function of its adherence to the narrative conventions of culturally-learned genres and modalities of address.

Peter Doak's (2020, 2014) work attempts to analyse post-Culture year Derry using this starting-point of spatial story, but his work simplifies and reduces complex and multi-faceted social narrativisations of lived space down to a dichotomous two grand stories: The "old story" of a "contested and/or divided city" and the "new story" "encapsulated by its riverside regeneration and proffered at the expense of alternatives" (2014, 490). This is a reductionist misreading of post-Culture Year Derry, I argue, as I shall attempt to illustrate throughout this chapter. The "new" and "old" stories of Derry Doak imagines are far messier, pluralist, intricate, and hyper-local as O'Dowd and Komarova (2013) demonstrate so ably in Belfast.

Specifically, the "old story" Doak references can be paralleled with Rousseau's (2009) discussion of some European cities as "loser cities." Rousseau's designation refers to cities that suffer two distinct but inter-related deficits. The first is an economic or material deficit. "Loser cities" are generally postindustrial cities struggling with things like demographic decline, persistent unemployment, and high rates of urban violence. The second deficit is a symbolic deficit, a persistent bad image. Rousseau argues this persistent symbolic deficit motivates local politicians, and boosters to attempt to build a counter-image rooted in creative urban regeneration and neoliberal economic gentrification. While the specific characteristics of a "loser city" are somewhat open to debate, within the UK and Ireland,

cities like Glasgow (Boyle and Hughes 1994; MacLeod 2002), Liverpool (Boland 2008; Cox and O'Brien 2012), Cork (O'Callaghan 2012), and Hull (Umney and Simon 2020) all have tried to use the European or UK City of Culture designation to ameliorate negative place-stereotypes and re-brand through telling a new story of the city.

The "old story" that Doak seeks to correct is a story of Derry as Northern Ireland's distant second city, dwarfed in population, attention, and resources by its larger neighbour of Belfast. It is a story bound up in the decline of textile production, its relative multiple deprivation (NISRA 2010), but perhaps most crucially, in Derry's external reputation as the locus of a "whining and whingeing" mentality and the infamous "culture of poverty" hypothesis regularly employed to stereotype Derry's working-class residents (Boland, Murtagh, and Shirlow 2019, 252). The material fabric of the city remains saturated with the imagery of past violence in the form of large murals, sites of paramilitary commemoration, transient graffiti, and violence-justifying sloganeering (Robinson 2018a). Derry also has a reputation as an ongoing hub of 'dissident' Republicanism (Morrison and Horgan 2016; see also Chapter 5). In short, the "old story" of Derry that Doak references is that of a postindustrial backwater still trapped in the shadow of its past and populated by a people eternally dependent on public welfare.

But while I agree with Doak to an extent about both the power and ubiquity of the "old story" of Derry *and* Derry inhabitants' widespread desire to change it, as we shall shortly see I consider his "new story," rooted in the legacies of Derry's culture year, highly suspect, if not simply incorrect. As I shall detail later in the piece, I consider Doak's "new story" to be rooted in a literature critical of European culture-led gentrification that does not fit in Derry, an attempt to shoehorn Derry into this literature that bears little resemblance to the city's modern spatial and economic realities. In the place of Doak's "new story," I offer the multi-faceted and locally situated "Great Sea-Change" described above.

The Great Sea-Change narrative represents a dynamic, transformative challenge to the old story of Derry. But while this has been examined in the context of the Culture Year, scholars have generally neglected to situate the Culture Year itself within the larger Great Sea-Change. I do more than this; I attempt to situate the Great Sea-Change itself into the chronotopic places of Derry, the fusions of space and time through which old orders and narratives can be challenged, subverted, and ultimately broken down. Here I argue that *the* central chronotopic place in the Great Sea-Change is Guildhall Square, 15 June 2010, that time when, for much of Derry, it seemed "a farther shore was reachable from here."

The next section will attempt to illustrate the absolute centrality of Bloody Sunday and the Bloody Sunday Justice Campaign, its multiple arcs, trajectories, and narratives, in all the spatial stories of Derry. I will then move on to showing how imbricated and centralised it is to the story of both the Culture Year and the Derry Model, the three main warrants of the Great Sea-Change.

III. "A PLATFORM FOR THEM TO SPEAK ON PLATFORMS": 15 JUNE 2010 AND THE TRAJECTORY OF BLOODY SUNDAY MEMORY

The main commemorative space for Bloody Sunday in the city has always been the "Bloody Sunday Weekend," a series of events leading up to the annual march. The Weekend itself has, as Conway terms it, a "career" involving four recognisable chronological phases (Conway 2010; 2009; 2008; Dawson 2007; 2005). The first phase encompasses the direct aftermath of the atrocity, 1972-1974. Two major social actors competed for the right to stage Bloody Sunday in the streets of Derry: a number of civil rights-based organisations clustered under the NICRA umbrella and the political party that functioned at the time as the political arm of the PIRA, Provisional Sinn Féin. The NICRA march was a silent march and participants were

asked not to bring flags or banners or engage in any activities that would "discredit" the memory of those killed (Conway 2010, 81). NICRA made a formal request to Sinn Féin to yield the commemorative space but were rebuffed, and the latter march was highly militarised, featured Republican marching bands and speeches that framed Bloody Sunday as another atrocity in the bloody history of British imperialism and emphasised the legitimate right of Republican resistance.

The decline of NICRA left Sinn Féin as the only political actor with both the ability and willingness to curate the memory of Bloody Sunday in public space. In the second stage, Bloody Sunday became "a Republican issue; its memory at once sustained and also limited by Sinn Féin's support and commitment" (Dawson 2007, 154). Many of my research partners acknowledge the problematic nature of Sinn Féin control during this period, but many also see Sinn Féin as a surrogate memory curator, not necessarily a usurper, one whose undeniably narrow political motives for curating Bloody Sunday still kept the memory of the atrocity alive. "James" (family member) perhaps articulates this common narrative best:

> If only for Sinn Féin, the [Bloody Sunday] issue could have probably died… you could turn around and say they used it for their own personal reasons, in other words, a platform for them to speak on platforms and so on. But at the same time… they kept it in the public domain.

However, with the (still secret) emergence of the Irish Peace Process in the late 1980s, Sinn Féin may have sensed a need to step back from their central role in organising the march and weekend. Republican curatorship of the march had begun to alienate potential allies, especially non-violent nationalists on both sides of the political border in Ireland. Irish President Mary Robinson snubbed the BSJC when she failed to lay a wreath at the Bloody Sunday Monument on a visit to Derry in 1992. Republican curatorship also insulated British and Unionist official memory of the atrocity (e.g. Dudley-Edwards 2002; 2000) (McLaughlin and Baker 2015) and supposedly confirmed the false narrative of the victims-as-gunmen-and-nail-bombers (Dawson 2007; Ó Dochartaigh 2010). As one family member recalls: "It was

pretty clear to us that [Bloody Sunday] couldn't be sufficiently uplifted if it was seen to be a party-political issue or an issue for just one community" ("Ryan," family member). What Ryan refers to as "uplifting" was also a conscious strategy to return a presentist quality to Bloody Sunday memory. As Dawson notes, under SF-curatorship, "Bloody Sunday was becoming a *historical* event of the past rather than a living memory with real relevance to continuing politics" (2007, 154, original emphasis). Sinn Féin's withdrawal from their public facing role as the chief commemorator of Bloody Sunday was also hastened by the local revulsion surrounding killing of local teenager Charles Love in 1990. During the March itself, the IRA planted a bomb on Derry's city walls targeting the security forces. The debris from the explosion flew down towards the Bogside and killed Love, who was walking down the street with two friends.

The signal shift away from strict-SF curatorship occurred during the 20th Anniversary March in 1992. Prior to the march, several key family members had begun regularly meeting and took the decision to form the BSJC and craft and publicise its signal three demands: 1) That the British government acknowledge the unambiguous innocence of those killed and injured on Bloody Sunday, 2) an official repudiation of the Widgery Report, 3) the prosecution of those responsible for the atrocity (Campbell 2012). As the reader may be aware, the Widgery Report referred to above, known throughout Derry as the "Widgery Whitewash," was the Report of the first British tribunal convened to address the massacre. It absolved 1 PARA and their commanders of any responsibility for Bloody Sunday and falsely accused the victims of firing weapons and handling bombs. It was formally superseded by the findings of the Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry in 2010, but remained official UK government narrative of Bloody Sunday between 1972 and 2010. As "Cillian" (family member, see also Campbell (2012)) argues, outreach to other family members, the SDLP, and

eventually, the Irish government was only made possible by the human rights language of the three demands and the stated lack of political affiliation of the BSJC.

`	[The demands] let people see that we were sincere and honest about what we were doing. And to say, respectfully, to Sinn Féin, that we were not people who were involved with the IRA, because that was very important for people to see. Because people thought for 20 years when they looked at the commemoration march with tricolours and everything else, 'Our government must be right, these people are the IRA.'

The new public framing of Bloody Sunday as an internationalist humans-rights issue proved extremely effective and forms the third stage of Bloody Sunday public memory. As many scholars have argued, human-rights based approaches (HRBA) can be used as powerful mechanisms to delegitimise State claims to justice, equality, and benevolence, especially in advanced democracies. Publicly highlighting the inconsistencies in how a democratic state treats portions of its citizenry can expose the fundamental gap between state legitimising discourse and actual state practice (Hearne and Kenna 2014; Khor 2016; Riise and Sikkink 1999). Dawson (2007) claims the HRBA approach "widened the net" of people, parties, and state institutions that could now safely support the BSJC. Conway (2009; 2008), drawing on Teeger and Vinitzky-Seroussi (2007), claims a HRBA facilitated a carefully-controlled memory consensus, where politically divergent narratives of the past could shelter under the same framing umbrella. But Sinn Féin had not completely ceded logistical control of the commemorative agenda, as "Jake" (directly affected) explains to me (see also Conway 2010; Dawson 2007).

	No, the [BSJC] didn't really 'take it over.' You had a Bloody Sunday Weekend Committee, which was organised by Sinn Féin. They'll tell you different… but it was Sinn Féin running the March. It was Sinn Féin brought the bands from all over the place.

What the Weekend became after 1992 was HRBA-focused, symbolically fronted by family members and the directly affected. The new outward-facing staging of the Weekend allowed Sinn Féin to scale back its public presence whilst retaining a significant control

within the organising committee and over the speakers (Sinn Féin was represented every year on the speaker's daïs). This shift dovetailed with the publication of an exhaustively researched forensic reports (McCann 1992; Mullan 1997) that further subverted the untenable Widgery Report. The collected testimonies of family members and eyewitnesses spurred international feature films such as Paul Greengrass' *Bloody Sunday* (2002) and searing TV dramas like Jimmy McGovern's *Sunday* (McDougall 2002) (see Herron and Lynch 2007; Pötzsch 2012). These films and narratives translated the monumental injustice of Bloody Sunday and Widgery into resonant popular speech-genres that decisively challenged British and Unionist official memory, especially in the eyes of British and American audiences (McLaughlin and Baker 2015). This challenge allowed the BSJC to become intertwined with the emergent Irish Peace Process. Leading BSJC campaigners were invited to the United States to campaign around St. Patrick's Day, where they met and secured the support of Irish-American politicians and businessmen (such as Edward Kennedy and his sister, Jean Kennedy Smith, then US ambassador to Ireland) with the ear of US President Bill Clinton. Julieanne Campbell cites her uncle Gerry Duddy, a leading figure in the BSJC, to that effect: "The [BSJC] and the Peace Process worked hand in hand" (2012, 125). Successive Irish governments led by Taoisigh Albert Reynolds, John Bruton and then Bertie Ahern adopted into their negotiation positions a demand for a second Inquiry to supersede Widgery.

By 1997, the BSJC's three demands seemed to have crystallised into one demand: a second Inquiry. For family member Liam Wray, one of the first to publicly object to this simplification, this was the first clear evidence that the BSJC was being taken over from the outside: "Somewhere along the line there seemed to be this notion that we had campaigned for an inquiry. We did *not* campaign for a new inquiry. It was not one of the campaigns three aims—that still annoys me to this day" (cited in Campbell 2012, 130). In January 1998, a new UK Labour government led Tony Blair announced a new Bloody Sunday Inquiry (BSI).

The BSI proceedings were interminable, lasting nearly six years (1998-2004), the length largely due to the legal decision taken by the tribunal not to admit evidence originally given to the 1972 Widgery Tribunal, necessitating the wholesale reinterviewing of witnesses and reconstruction of events gathered decades prior. The BSI would then take another six years to issue its Report. The official energies of the BSJC during this time were largely taken up by the official Inquiry proceedings (Campbell 2012). However, it was also during this time that cracks began to appear in the "carefully-controlled consensus" presented to the public by the BSJC. In addition to bereaved family members such as Liam Wray publicly disassociating the BSI from the original goals of the BSJC, the Bloody Sunday Weekend itself became a forum for public controversy over the Republican aspects of the Weekend, from Sinn Féin's presence on the organising committee to larger post-Agreement questions over Sinn Féin's ongoing legitimacy to represent Irish Republicanism in the city.

In 2006, Sinn Féin signed the St. Andrew's Agreement, which restored political devolution in Northern Ireland. In the negotiating process, Sinn Féin approved the devolution of police and judicial powers and accepted the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) as the official law-enforcing organisation in the province. Irish Republicanism as an ideological tradition has long refused to be policed the forces of States that they consider illegitimate (Bean and Hayes 2009; Hayes and Norris 2015; Mulcahy 2006). This controversial stance towards the PSNI was approved by Sinn Féin *Ard Fheis* (party conference) on 28 January 2007, *the exact same day as the annual Bloody Sunday March.* Unsurprisingly, the *Ard Fheis* decision provoked rioting during the 2007 march. Local Sinn Féin MLA Martina Anderson denied any relationship between the decision and the rioting: "If anyone thinks these actions were a reaction to the historic vote being held at the same time then they're sadly mistaken. These young people are devoid of anything remotely political." For leading justice campaigner John Kelly, whose brother Michael had been killed on Bloody Sunday, "These

people have tarnished the memory of those who died on the original march… The march is a dignified and peaceful act of protest" (both cited in McLenaghan 2007, n.p.). Both Anderson and Kelly adopt incredibly similar language to that used in 1973 by NICRA to protest Sinn Féin's parallel commemorations. The public politics of Bloody Sunday memory had come full circle and now it was Sinn Féin advocating for consensus, depoliticisation, and respectful protest. As Anderson and the SDLP speaker, Sharon Haughey, rose to speak on the march daïs, a sizeable minority of the crowd gathered turned their backs on them in protest.

Between 2007 and 2010, Bloody Sunday commemorative events became the scenes of sometime heated disagreements between pro- and anti-St. Andrews republicans over how to control or monitor the dissenting graffiti that inevitably lined the march routes (Derry Journal 2009; 2008). The UK government was widely seen to be stalling on releasing the RBSI until after the May 2010 UK General Election, in which Labour was widely expected to lose power to the Conservatives, leading to added fear and tension that the new Conservative government would further subvert the RBSI (McCann 2010). However, on 15 June 2010, the long-awaited RBSI publicly issued its findings in Derry's Guildhall Square. At 3.30 in the afternoon, large television screens carried the live feed of Cameron's speech.

In that speech, Cameron said he hoped that the RBSI would "close this painful chapter on Northern Ireland's troubled past." He went on to clarify: "That is not to say we should ever forget or dismiss the past, but we must also move on… with all the people of Northern Ireland to build a stable, peaceful, prosperous and shared future" (BBC 2010, n.p.). Cameron's statement also casts Bloody Sunday as an isolated act, arguing that it is "not the defining story of the service the British Army gave in Northern Ireland." In doing so, he somewhat testily reminded his audience that "the overwhelming majority [of the 3,500 people were] killed by terrorists" and he and reminded them that the British army was and is engaged in "defending democracy." It is clear which tense here that Cameron wishes to

narrate Bloody Sunday in. While presented aspirationally, "to have closed a chapter" is of course a statement in the present perfect tense. Like Tony Doherty would in his *Derry Journal* editorial the next year, Cameron sought explicitly to position the RBSI as the end of the era, to link the action (the ending) to the new reality or new state of being (the "stable future") and thus to draw a line under Bloody Sunday and the BSJC as a whole.

The Report was initially and widely framed as an unqualified victory for the BSJC and a comprehensive repudiation of the British military policies that caused Bloody Sunday (e.g. Campbell 2012). However, cracks emerged in that framing after the initial afterglow had worn off. The narrative framing of 15 June is crucial to closely examine; while I have suggested that the roots of the current schism in the BSJC controlled consensus can be located much earlier, the most evocative divergence is over the Report itself. The chronotope of the Guildhall becomes key to this divergence; the details of the organisation of the ceremony and the celebration, where a storyteller was and what they felt, and even the uncharacteristically beautiful weather (weather in Derry is rarely sunny and warm), are all deployed in respondents' memories to evoke the clean temporal break with the past, the day everything changed.

> When we walked out through that doorway and into the Guildhall and you seen the mass of people-like. It was incredible. Seeing all those happy smiling faces and that blue sky. (James, family member)

> When I stepped out and the sun was shining, my initial thought was it was shining down [from] Heaven [on] us… and you would nearly have seen a black veil lifting over the heads of the Derry people. ("Mia," family member)

> And coming down off that stage they had made, a little boy, who would have been the same age as I was when me daddy was killed… he just… looked up at me, and he put his hand out and I shook it. And then the petrol station man just looked at me and he said, 'I'm so proud of you.' ("Una," family member)

Julieanne Campbell's first-hand journalistic account of the day opens her book *Setting the Truth Free* (2012). Her prose is similarly evocative, similarly transcendental:

> Just a few minutes later, the families and wounded emerged shell-shocked and triumphant to a hurricane of acclamation… It seemed like an age before the cheering subsided so the families could speak… In all, twenty-eight families bared their souls, the repeated cries of 'innocent' resonating across the city and the world (20).

Campbell's breathless account of the day contrasts sharply with the memories of those who would later reject the Report, whole or in part. For them, the day was choreographed by the Northern Irish Office (NIO) of the British Government and the Bloody Sunday Trust, an NGO that many of them feel is a vehicle for the preferred narrative of Sinn Féin. Members of the Bloody Sunday Trust strenuously disputed this categorisation to me during interviews. The Bloody Sunday Trust, as of this writing, is chaired by the same Tony Doherty who penned the Derry Journal op-ed cited in the first section, though it counts SDLP members and among its trustees as well as people not affiliated with a political party.

Perhaps the loudest voice condemning the "choreography" of 15 June 2010 is the Derry-based socialist activist, author, journalist, former MLA (2016-17), and former local councillor (2019-21) for the left-wing People Before Profit party Eamonn McCann. My archival research suggests that McCann may have been the first to publicly allege that 15 June 2010 had been expressly intended to close the books on Bloody Sunday. His voice carries added weight not only due to his status as one of Derry's foremost living public intellectuals and his decades-long work within the BSJC, but also due to his physical presence in the Guildhall and on the daïs on 15 June 2010 and his chairpersonship of the Bloody Sunday Trust at the time. He writes the following from the perspective of a direct eyewitness:

> Within minutes of my having read out a statement on the report for approval by the families, a senior official of the Northern Ireland Office confronted me at about six inches range to say that my remarks were out of order. She explained: 'Everybody was agreed this was to be a day of reconciliation…'
>
> …I have on a number of occasions wondered… who she could have meant by 'everybody' and how 'everybody' could have agreed on a response to [the] report if nobody had been briefed beforehand on what it would say (McCann 2012, n.p.).

Later, McCann would expressly claim that 15 June 2010, the Report, and Cameron's subsequent apology, had been a "stitch-up." He continues:

> In exchange [for Cameron's apology], there would be no more Bloody Sunday marches—and no attempt to push for prosecutions… the British authorities were trying to put together an overall deal by which the past would be put in the past and we'd all 'move on.'

McCann believes that Sinn Féin's interest in stopping the Bloody Sunday March has to do with secretive negotiations between then-British PM Tony Blair's government and Sinn Féin over the status of IRA fugitives still wanted in connection with Troubles violence, the so-called "On the Runs" (see Chapter One). However, McCann's specific charge was rubbished in a letter to the *Derry Journal* (2016) signed by Doherty and three other Bloody Sunday family members, John Kelly, Gerry Duddy, and Jean Hegarty, who claimed McCann "knows full well" that no such deal existed. I do not possess the evidence nor the inclination to adjudicate between these uncompromisable perspectives.

However, my interviews with activists in the BSJC suggest that specific disagreements such as allegations of informal negotiations and secret understandings, whether to accept Cameron's apology, or how much justice the RBSI represents, may in fact be deeply intertwined with larger disagreements over who would get to control the story, and the larger narrative arc, of the BSJC itself. The following testimonials, again from the chronotope of the Guildhall on 15 June 2010, work to concretise an alternative spatial story by evoking a narrative starkly at odds with the transcendental story, a narrative of being steamrolled by events and a celebratory framework beyond their control.

> It was choreographed; I was aware that people were trying to orchestrate a certain portrayal of the day. It would have been very difficult for me to go out onto the Guildhall and say to the people of Derry… to rain on their day, in a sense. (Colin, family member)

> I remember when I seen all the platforms, I had seen them getting built the night before when I called down, and I remember thinking to myself, this is all getting staged! So we were just pawns in it. ("Finn," family member)

I felt we were just absorbed in the whole furore of the event… I think it suited 'some people' that 15 June appeared to be the end of [the BSJC] ("Cillian," family member).

While certainly underwritten by the divergent political opinions regarding the Report's impact, the split in the BSJC spilled into the open over the Trust's 2011 decision to attempt to end the annual Bloody Sunday march. The first public mention in the archives that I could find of stopping the march dates to 7 September 2007 and a two-paragraph article fragment in the *Derry Journal* entitled "Future of Bloody Sunday march 'up for discussion'." The fragment quotes only leading campaigner John Kelly and could perhaps be read as a product of Kelly's frustration with the disturbances and contentiousness at the 2007 March discussed above. However, talk of ending the annual March, even before the release of the RBSI, did not stop at Kelly's musings. Those who had grown uncomfortable with the increasingly contentious public symbolism visible on the march used a series of meetings held in or about Derry in 2009 and 2010 to build a case that a majority of the so-called "Bloody Sunday families" were in favour of the move. After the RBSI, two meetings were held in Creggan's Ráth Mór Centre in January 2011 which supposedly resulted in an agreement that the 2011 march would be the last. This was bitterly disputed by some family members and activists, as Colin here details:

> I remember going to the meeting and I heard what they said, and I turned around to the platform and I said, 'Why stop the March?' And it got onto a bit of an argument and one of them says, 'It's alright for you to say. Do you know how much work this takes?'... And I says, 'That's fine.' I says, 'I do appreciate what you've done… And see if you're retired now, I respect that too. Just resign and let other people [organise it], because other people want to carry on.'
>
> I can't prove it, but there was a political drive to stop the March, and that was even just before the Report came out. I was very vocal… that the March would continue. And quite a lot of pressure was applied, they put it out in the paper."

What Colin refers to is an open letter placed in the *Derry Journal* in January 2012, the first year after the fracture of the BSJC and prior to the first Annual March chaired by the new Bloody Sunday March Committee. The body of the letter is attributed to the Bloody Sunday

Trust and the Bloody Sunday Weekend Committee, and it is signed by various family members of the original casualties (Figure 2), who, it is purported, represent the "vast majority of family members and wounded." The letter claims to be responding to the "confusion" surrounding the 2012 march, referring back to a statement released after the second Ráth Mór meeting in 2011. It reads: "For some, the exoneration of our loved ones means the time for protest has passed; they would prefer to grieve privately in future… Others… mindful of the shortcomings of the Saville Report… have asked the Bloody Sunday Trust to consider other ways of marking the future anniversaries." Again, the letter explicitly positions 15 June 2010 as the "end of an era," an explicit break between a past characterised by "protest" and a present in which there is no further need for the March and its contentious, fractious, polyphonic politics of inscription. It also attempts to position the Bloody Sunday Trust (and the Trust's public Museum of Free Derry) as the only legitimate curator of Bloody Sunday official, post-15 June 2010 memory. The lengthy signatory list appears to be an attempt to delegitimise any dissenters from this temporality and this symbolic ownership. The letter re-appeared in the Derry Journal in 2013 and again in 2014, both times prior to the Annual March. Shortly I will present and analyse some of the justifications respondents conveyed to me both for continuing the march and for stopping the march, but what should be clear from the brief discussion is that there was an organised attempt after 15 June 2010 by actors within the former Weekend Committee and the Bloody Sunday Trust to take control over the public performance of Bloody Sunday memory and commemoration in the city and inaugurate a new, less-openly transgressive phase in the Bloody Sunday trajectory.

By the beginning of 2012, after the small protest led by Kate and Linda Nash, the dissenters had organised themselves into the Bloody Sunday March Committee and publicly stated their intention to organise a continuing march.

Figure 2: Letter to editor of the Derry Journal, 2012. Photographed by the Author in the archives of the Derry City Library, 2016.

When the Bloody Sunday Trust refused to acknowledge the new march in their official schedule of commemorative events, then-Chairperson Eamonn McCann resigned in protest, along with three other members of the organising committee.

I will now turn towards analysing the perspectives on ending or continuing the Bloody Sunday March post-June 2015, when I began my preliminary background research into the Bloody Sunday March. Despite the often-heated disagreements between those on opposing sides of the issue; my purpose here is not to adjudicate between them, but rather, to explicate how the divergences between them are only intelligible in terms of the preferred narrative arc of the BSJC and the message this arc refracts about the larger spatial story of Derry. I will begin with those family members and activists I interviewed who continue to march, or who favour continuing to march.

In this interview from 2017, Colin describes his political reasons for rejecting the call to end the March. Drawing on Bloody Sunday's symbolic power in Derry and in Ireland generally, Colin believes the commemorative space of Bloody Sunday should be offered as a stage for other groups campaigning for justice for state-sanctioned violence.

> [The March is] under the banner of Bloody Sunday, right, because that was obviously a tragic and seminal event in Northern Ireland, but it's got that resonance and it's got that resonance internationally. So it's a good thing to give people an opportunity, oxygen for their causes. People from England, people from all over the world, for different issues. People on the last couple of [Marches], Tottenham, over the [Mark] Duggan shooting… so that's all it is, [the march] is a heading. It's a mechanism, a means, for people to highlight their concerns, and some of them got redress from it, they got the opportunity for their supporters to speak and I think it brought fruit. *There's a wee bit of justice for [my loved one]*. (Emphasis added)

The Mark Duggan Colin refers to was a 29-year old Black British man shot and killed by police in disputed circumstances in London on 4 August 2011. His argument about the Bloody Sunday March and Weekend being a stage for other campaigning groups was a fairly-consistent argument communicated to me when I asked those who continued to march why they chose to do so.

> There are so many other people who had harms and wrongs done to them that needed an outlet and they are coming to Derry for the Bloody Sunday March. At the end of the day, there's Bloody Sunday people there alright, it is still called the Bloody Sunday March, but it's every ship, shape, and colour. ("Jack," family member)

The other main reason Colin identifies for continuing the march speaks directly to the politics surrounding the attempted ending of the March, the temporality of Bloody Sunday and the Troubles, and the ongoing battle over what constitutes Irish Republicanism after the St. Andrew's Agreement.

> Justice for [my loved one] is justice for the [Nationalist] community. When we get to the stage where we can say, right, we were formed in conflict, right or wrong, so some of us took up arms. That's what annoys me about the [Gerry] Adamses and the [Martin] McGuinnesses and the [Gerry] Kellys and all, they still maintain what they done was a war and whatever, but they're sorry and regret the deaths. To me, you see if I'm truly sorry, I'm a big enough man to say we were wrong, there was another way, we could have listened to what the SDLP and NICRA were doing, there was another way…

…I was a Republican in 1966, one of the few Republicans in Derry. You're a Republican! [The conflict in Northern Ireland] wasn't about civil rights, it wasn't about housing, it wasn't about anything else, Republicanism was a 32-county free and unfettered from British control! Our destiny! These boys [Sinn Féin] have revised it now, like they were protectors of those crowd [the Civil Rights Movement]. So it's a revisionism and if we don't come to terms with it, [my loved one's] murder has been futile, that's the biggest injustice!

Here Colin continues a thread of argument also voiced by Eamonn McCann. The attempt to end the Bloody Sunday March, for Colin, was spearheaded by Sinn Féin, because SF could no longer exert a behind-the-scenes discipline or control over the public performance of the March. In addition to the embarrassment of seeing a significant minority of march participants, including so-called "dissident" Republicans (see Chapter Five), turn their backs on Sinn Féin speakers in prior years, Colin also implicates Sinn Féin's larger role in the Northern Irish legacy process. He argues:

The reason people don't want to grasp the nettle [of actively pursuing justice for past violence] is not for any other reason besides they're the very people who are in government and are vulnerable if that process continues, because they might be [vulnerable], the cry might come out, what about you, what about you?

Chloe (family member), also a current march organiser, echoes Colin's sentiments:

[The March] represents democracy to me. It represents a voice. I think democracy, freedom, freedom not just from the British, not just from the British State, but freedom, if you like, from Sinn Féin. People I call perpetrators and colluders and I've absolutely no trust in those people!...

She continues:

I was a wee bit weepy [when the March split in 2011] because to me it was a sad thing. All of them people that followed that march for years, and they [Sinn Féin, she alleges] were going to end it before we even had justice! Before we had even achieved justice not just for us but for all these other victims that we have in Northern Ireland! And I seen that [continuing to march] was the only vehicle, the only voice we had.

Colin, Chloe, and Jack's arguments must be seen in the context of Sinn Féin's sometimes contradictory and evolving stance on legacy of violence issues in Northern Ireland (see Bean 2007; Hopkins 2015; Whiting 2016). Politically, Sinn Féin seeks simultaneously to retain its occupation of the space of anti-imperial armed revolutionism whilst simultaneously

transforming into a palatable mainstream Irish political party, north and south of the border. Generally, this has resulted in a strategy of pursuing a truth and reconciliation agenda whilst simultaneously casting the IRA's role in the Troubles as legitimate armed resistance (Alonso, 2016; McGrattan, 2016a). In the context of Bloody Sunday, what Eamonn McCann charges is that Sinn Féin's alleged role in seeking to stop the march is tied into its continuing desire to seek legal indemnity for IRA actions, both before and after the Agreement, even at the expense of indemnifying British soldiers, including 1 PARA (see Chapter One; Robinson, 2018a: 95-6). This is, of course, an explosive charge, and one that is strenuously denied by Sinn Féin.

But regardless of the empirical truth of the charge, which again I do not purport to adjudicate here, these perspectives of those who seek to continue the March reflect deeply-held political and emotional investment in the continuance, the prolongation, of Bloody Sunday public memory performance. Continuing to march along the same route as the original March now almost 50 years in the past allows them to hold what their loved ones must stand for in radical unfinishedness. As such, while the praxis of marching may be framed in any number of political ways and with any number of political affiliations, it is at its core a protest against the materialised temporality of the reconciliation paradigm, against the entire concept of the violent past in Northern Ireland *having an end* at all, performed every year on the streets of the working-class Nationalist Cityside.

Thus, the struggle over ending or continuing the Bloody Sunday March is not reducible to a cynical attempt to insulate former members of the IRA and/or current members of Sinn Féin from their role in past violence. Nor are the many Bloody Sunday family members and former BSJC campaigners who do favour ending the march mere schills for Sinn Féin machinations. The most strenuous and oft-repeated argument I heard for ending the march is due to its alleged usurpation by physical-force Republican groups, what many refer

to as Republican "dissidents." Dissident presences and shows-of-force on the march will be taken up in the next chapter. Here I will restrict my analysis of respondent testimony to their deeply-held emotional investment in the tense of the BSJC and what the maintenance of the past simple and present perfect tenses say about their struggle and about the public reputation of their city.

I will begin with two interviews, the first with Mia and "Ilsa" (family members, Ilsa is Mia's younger relation), and the second with "Ben," a justice advocate. Mia, like all of those directly affected by Bloody Sunday, is elderly, and throughout our interview, her sense of fatigue was palpable. By fatigue I do not mean mere physical fatigue, but rather an emotional fatigue emanating from re-remembering and re-curating Bloody Sunday and the BSJC for several decades. The co-presence of Ilsa in the interview space repeatedly seemed to trigger Mia to demand that her struggle not be passed down to Ilsa, to the next generation of justice advocates.

> Mia: Well I'm very fortunate now that I have this lovely wee [relative, referring to Ilsa], so if I have to give up [die], she'll take over [laughs]. You [the Author] have to remember this: I am the second generation [of family members], I don't want to hand it over to the third generation.

> Ilsa: God, I never thought of that. I would have thought of you as first-generation. So your mammy and daddy…

> Mia [Interrupting]: If the law is anything other than an ass (which it is most of the time) it [the struggle for Bloody Sunday justice] has to be done, unfortunately, it has to be done [lightly pounds fist on table], it has to be *finished* [original emphasis].

Mia's pounding on the table at the word *finished* put me in mind of some of the arguments made by Marianne Hirsch (2012) in her well-known study of the "postmemory generation." Hirsch's work interrogates the aesthetic and political impulses of the "generation after" that "bears the personal, collective and cultural trauma of those who came before" (5). Ilsa, who was born after Bloody Sunday, bears no direct lived connection to the original atrocity, yet Hirsh would argue that there is a risk that Ilsa's life story can be overwhelmed, colonised, or

taken-over by the experiences, memories, and traumas of Mia's life and Mia's generation. Hirsch's interest in postmemory aesthetics and narratives is especially in those interstices where the postmemory generations reconstitute anew the suffering of the past and form affective and political resonances across space and time. The postmemory generation must be empowered to create new material, visual and performative representations in order for past atrocities to truly live on in the vibrant present.

Ben, a justice advocate, frames his criticism of the post-2011 march implicitly in these sorts of postmemory frames. Ben argues that the meaning and resonance of the march is intimately bound up in a time and space that has past.

> The march is *over* (original emphasis). There was a democratic decision taken to stop marching and I think anyone still marching is illegitimate, in terms of speaking for the Bloody Sunday families and their struggle. This thing [the March] couldn't just be allowed to peter out… there was always a fear it would end up as 400 people trickling down the Southway…

For Ben, it is now time for the BSJC to cede the space to other people, movements, and mobilisations in Northern Ireland utilising new tactics, strategies, and initiatives. Pre-2011, the March was an appropriate form of grassroots public politics, but it was bound up in a time and a place that has passed. The March that was pre-2011 was a form of grassroots public politics that had its time and whose time has passed.

But there is more to Ben, Mia, and Ilsa's criticism of the continuing march than merely fatigue and the charge of anachronism. Rather, they repeatedly suggest throughout the interviews that the continuing march reflects badly on not only the legacy of BSJC, but on Derry itself. Ben's "400 people trickling down the Southway" is a clear denigration of how badly, in his opinion, the current March and the current March Committee, have curated the outward-facing spatial story of Bloody Sunday in the city. They have allowed it to simply run out of steam and peter out. From the triumphant portrait of tens of thousands of people on the 2011 march piercing the Walled City and celebrating the anniversary of the Report in

Guildhall Square, Bloody Sunday memory, to Ben, is at risk of devolving into a story of a few old crotchety leftists and dissidents marching lamely down a hill. Likewise, Ilsa is at her most animated when she describes the divergence between what the Bloody Sunday March has become and what Mia's generation of justice advocates stood for and what that has meant "for the people of Derry:"

> You know what annoys me? On the day of the Saville Report, everyone besides the Donaghys (which I didn't know about until a couple hours later), everyone was happy with their lot and thinking, 'Oh my God, see what we've done...!' It was just all of a sudden they didn't believe in the *entire* Report, *which called into question everything that you had worked for...!"* [original emphasis]
>
> …You kept [the March] family-led whereas now the March seems more led by politics, and it was always a family thing, a thing for the people of Derry…
>
> …I'm thinking of the families as well, as long as the wider world would still see the families as united!… I just want people to think well of you and not think ill of you!

James (family member) also conflates the ongoing march with a challenge to Derry's public image.

> The march to me has served its purpose and I haven't marched since… But there certainly is a split within the families in relation to the aftermath of Saville. Some families say that Saville wasn't a great day, most families say it was a brilliant day, as the city itself does.

For all of these respondents, the grand narrative of the BSJC *has* to culminate in the transcendental celebration of 15 June, 2010, and it *has* to do so not due to any nefarious political machinations, but because of what the arc and genre of the spatial story *say* about Derry and Derry-people. In their eyes, the BSJC is populated everywhere with heroes, namely, their much-loved family members, small, plucky individuals who were willing to stand up against the sheer might of the British establishment, against all odds (e.g. Campbell 2012). And crucially, they won, they were vindicated, they have overcome. To have the BSJC 'tarnished' by the lack of a triumphant conclusion, a clean temporal break, diminishes not only the BSJC and the accomplishments of their loved ones, but the larger spatial arc of the city of Derry itself.

Both sides of this debate are haunted by the spectres of those fourteen young men killed on a barbaric Sunday in January almost 50 years ago. The emotional register of this debate is feverish and it is hard not to genuinely share Mia's fatigue. But at stake is not only the murdered, the injured, the witnesses, but the "Great Sea-Change" itself, the very tense in which Derry will perform its troubled past. Less than a week after 15 June, 2010, The Derry City of Culture Steering Group boarded a plane for Liverpool to formally present the city's bid to be the inaugural UK City of Culture. As Boland, Murtagh, and Shirlow (2019, also Doak 2014) argue, "for seasoned commentators and local people, securing [City of Culture] was a direct response to [the Report]" (250). Gordon-Nesbitt (2013), while she does not reveal the source of her information, goes further, arguing that the actual bid presentation was fairly shambolic (n.p.). She heavily implies that the City of Culture Working group chose Derry over favourites Birmingham and Sheffield due to the bid's temporal proximity to the Report and the Guildhall celebration. Regardless of how and why the city came to be chosen, the City of Culture Year represented a unique alternative to host a major UK-wide year-long festival, a unique opportunity to decisively write a new story of the city.

IV. "A NEW BEGINNING FOR THE ENTIRE CITY": DERRY CITY OF CULTURE 2013

The Steering Group arrived in Liverpool with a short video produced by the local collective The Nerve Centre. Entitled "Voices," it was the official film commissioned to support Derry's Bid (It is available to watch here: www.youtube.com/watch?v=RAdeXkZZLiU). It is a fascinating and slickly produced short film. It begins with Seamus Heaney himself reading the lines from his poem *The Cure at Troy* I cited above. Heaney would sadly pass away in 2013, but in terms of the Great Sea-Change, his passing could not have come at a more apposite time. After a montage of images of Derry's people and places, Heaney returns to the

screen to finish the stanza, before yielding to the final image of the video, a young girl in a white dress with an instantly recognisable Derry accent. She walks towards the camera, smiling and saying to the viewer: "I have a new story to tell. I *need* to tell a new story" (original emphasis).

The symbolism here is readily apparent. The voice of the passing generation, Heaney's, with its stories of the past, yields to the virginal figure of the maiden in her white dress, not so-subtly symbolising Derry's nickname "The Maiden City," but also a flowering, a blooming, a coming-of-age. The girl represents the new story, Heaney's journey to that "farthest shore;" she rises, transcendent, towards the camera, smiling, supplicating the viewer (and the UK City of Culture decision-makers) to *allow* her to break free of the troubled past. The video is perhaps the clearest indication of how both the campaign for the City of Culture designation and the Culture Year itself were metaphorically framed. They were framed as a city transcending, one that if just given the opportunity, would reveal itself to the world as a vibrant and luminous centre of cultural and historical production.

The Culture Year I have named the second strand of the Great Sea-Change narrative. The UK City of Culture, inspired by other European Capital of Culture designations, is part of a larger motif arguing that celebrating, showcasing, and incentivising cultural production within a given locality can stimulate local economic development, tourism, attract external investment, and increase residents' senses of belonging to a city or a region (European Commission 2009; Garcia, Melville, and Cox 2010; Garcia 2005) among a host of other "curative" qualities (Gibson and Stevenson 2004). The designations have been used, especially in the UK context, to stimulate the place-marketing and rebranding of deprived, postindustrial urban places as centres of vibrant cultural production and to open them up to urban redevelopment and external investment. As discussed above, the cities chosen to

receive culture's curative qualities are often postindustrial cities suffering from a symbolic image deficit.

While every paper I have read referencing the political context of the Culture Year in Derry notes its relationship with 15 June 2010 (Doak 2020; 2014; Boland, Murtagh, and Shirlow 2019; McDermott, Nic Craith, and Strani 2016; Boland, Mullan, and Murtagh, 2018; Murtagh, Boland and Shirlow 2017; Nolan 2014), none save perhaps Gordon-Nesbitt's (2013) brief paper actively interrogate the political and narrative interlinkages between 15 June 2010 and the Culture Year. Gordon-Nesbitt's (2013) paper does not appear to be peer-reviewed and is currently only available on a blogsite. I thus cannot ascertain the empirical grounding of Gordon-Nesbitt's work. Regardless, it is fair to say that there seems to be a dearth of empirical literature examining what is uniformly believed, in Derry, to be the connections between 15 June 2010, the Report, and the Culture Year.

Consider how "Emma," a former local politician and both a supporter of the BSJC and local driver of the Culture Year, frames 15 June 2010.

> I think that day, there was a relief across the city, and like a black cloud has lifted, and it was nearly like a new beginning for the entire city…
>
> …And as a city, I think we have a new story to tell, which was the theme for the City of Culture in 2013, and I think the new story started the day Cameron gave that apology. There's new confidence back in the city, from an economic point of view the city's on its knees… but we got a confidence that day. And our pride instilled back in our city that day.

Emma gives perhaps the most explicit framing I heard in my interviews of the imbrication of 15 June into the Culture Year and the Great-Sea Change. Emma frames 15 June 2010 as something for the entire city, and her recourse to the "black cloud lifting over the city" metaphor I heard so many times I began to expect some combination of those words whenever I asked a respondent to describe 15 June 2010 (see Chapter 3).

There is a very clear disagreement within the small literature on the Culture Year, largely hinging on the arguments of Peter Doak (2020; 2014). That disagreement concerns

how the legacy of the Culture Year should be understood, however, all agree the Culture

Year represented an attempt to re-write the dominant spatial story of the city. Additionally,

the literature also agrees that the Culture Year failed to deliver in the long-term on the most

grandiose claims about the economically regenerative power of signal cultural events,

especially in terms of sustainable employment, investment, and infrastructure in the city

(though they disagree on why that is (compare Boland, Murtagh, and Shirlow 2020 to Doak

2020). Rather, the disagreement comes from how we should understand and characterise the

more-intangible aspects of the Culture Year legacy. Boland, Murtagh, and Shirlow (2019)

argue that focusing Derry's experience through the lens of other European Capital of Culture

recipients such as Liverpool and Glasgow is misleading. They charge Doak with failing to

understand how in Derry, the Culture Year designation morphed quickly away from any real

expectation of pronounced economic improvement to become a "peace resource." Thus, the

analysis of Derry should diverge from the literature on Glasgow and Liverpool, which largely

debates the role of the Culture Year in promoting "urban regeneration" and "rebranding"

those cities. Instead, the legacy of the Culture Year was re-framed as promoting

peacebuilding in the city, of entrenching Derry's progress towards inter-communal tolerance,

healing, and shared space. They write (2019: 259):

> There is clear evidence of genuine transformative change regarding image
> improvement and civic pride; enhanced community relations and sense of unity;
> intercultural dialogue and cultural exchange… the key finding from our research is
> that there is more evidence of success as a 'peace resource' than its limp legacy as an
> 'economic resource.'

McDermott, Nic Craith, and Strani (2016) share this conclusion, and their more descriptive

paper focuses explicitly on the specific events within the Culture programme that promoted

and facilitated "new intercultural narratives" (621). However, Doak (2020) rejects these

findings, arguing that only those "wealthy enough to avail of the seemingly endless

continental markets" experienced the Culture Year as a triumph for interculturalism. But as I

suggested above, Doak's findings here are extremely problematic, not supported by empirical evidence, and do not reflect my own experience living in Derry during the second half of the Culture Year. Rather, these findings seem to be guided by Doak's seemingly unrepresentative respondent sampling and a predilection to view the Culture Year legacies from a standpoint of UK and European cities with far more of an internal class divide, and far less geographically peripheralised than Derry. Indeed, Doak's findings read far more like an attempt to shoehorn the Derry Culture Year legacies into a literature deeply critical of culture-led development in other UK and European cities, where culture-led regeneration programmes and events have been part and parcel with urban gentrification, displacement, and a growing wealth divide (e.g. Belfiore 2009; Boyle and Hughes 1994; Evans 2003; Gibson and Stevenson 2004; McCann 2007). Boland, Murtagh and Shirlow's (2020; 2019) major explanation for the "questionable" economic legacy of the Culture Year is the in-built propensity within the competitive bidding process "to inflate expectations regarding [the] socio-economic transformation of the host city" (2020, 802).

Yet in spite of some of the more questionable arguments , my findings support Doak's (2020) larger argument regarding the *narrative* legacy of the Culture Year, an argument also supported to a degree by his other critics. The widespread perception in Derry, several years after the Culture Year, is that it had failed to deliver on the admittedly grandiose promises of socioeconomic transformation. Boland, Murtagh, and Shirlow (2020) acknowledge this narrative legacy is compelling, especially amongst young people (Boland, Mullan, and Murtagh 2018). To cite one of their youthful respondents (Boland, Murtagh, and Shirlow 2020, 802): "It's like a depression. To come back to the legacy, it's a depression… a massive event, once that left and everybody went… it's just back to reality then." One could interpret this respondent as suggesting that the Great Sea-Change never took hold. It proved to be unsustainable. After a brief but cosy legacy, a brief flirtation with the promise of a new

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spatial story of the city and all the new opportunities it presaged, the old story returned once more to prominence. As Doak puts it (2014, 494):

> It is this sense that [Derry] can be understood not through proclamations of successful or failed regenerations, but rather as sandwiched somewhere between the old story and the new.

Again, while the two schools of thought on the legacy of the Culture Year disagree on much, they converge over the issue of spatial narrative and popular perception. The Great Sea-Change and the subsequent widespread disillusionment reflects a transcendentalist story that has largely failed to materialise, failed to alter Derry's socioeconomic situation or peripheral status. The final strand of the Great Sea-Change, which I am calling the "Derry Model," will look at the viability of both 15 June 2010 and the Culture Year as part of a larger set of "peacebuilding resources" and "conflict transformation" in the city.

V.   THE DERRY MODEL

"The Derry Model" refers broadly to a particular methodology designed to steer cities away from urban inter-communal violence and hostility supposedly pioneered in the city of Derry beginning in the 1990s (Bentley 2021; McClements 2018). Crucially, this methodology is presented as a successful and *exportable* model, one that other cities outside of Ireland plagued by inter-communal hostility can adapt and emulate. It is also the title of a four-year project funded by the Special European Union Programmes Body (SEUPB) under the Northern Ireland PEACE (IV) Programme. The PEACE Programme has been one of the major funders of reconciliation and peacebuilding projects in and about the region throughout its lifespan, beginning with PEACE (I) in 1995. PEACE (IV) is scheduled to continue paying out money through 2023. The Derry Model project is administered by the Bloody Sunday Trust and its chairperson is a former Sínn Fein MLA for Derry Maeve McLaughlin. The

Trust, again, is the organisation that spearheaded the efforts to stop the Bloody Sunday March in 2011 and helped organise the logistics for 15 June 2010.

The Derry Model (the project) puts it this way: "Derry has addressed many of the difficult issues which remain unresolved elsewhere in the North and aims to share, reflect upon and debate the learning from the 'Derry Model' of dialogue and reconciliation" (Museum of Free Derry, no year, no page). What precisely the Derry Model (generally) entails is rarely rigorously specified, but it seems to hinge mostly around the issue of contentious parading and the comportment of local Unionist-Loyalist groups such as the Apprentice Boys and associated Loyal marching bands (for overviews of contentious parading in Northern Ireland see: Bryan 2000; Jarman 1997; Melaugh and McKenna 2013).

Throughout the Troubles, the River Foyle was commonly thought of as the dividing line between the Catholic "Cityside" (west bank) and the Protestant "Waterside" (east bank) of Derry. In the 1970s, during the most lethal years of the Troubles in the city, the minority Protestant population either left or were driven out of the Cityside, where the historic walled city is located. Many settled in the Waterside, a population movement known evocatively by some Protestants as "The Exodus" (Burgess 2011; Cohen 2007; Shirlow et al. 2005). Many Protestants in Northern Ireland claim this population movement is tantamount to "ethnic cleansing," and though this framing is not widely accepted, Hansson and McLaughlin's (2018) report documents a precipitous drop in the presence of Protestants in the Cityside from 1969-1980 in particular. While they demonstrate this out-migration occurred for a number of reasons, perceptions of feeling unsafe in the Cityside was a major factor. As of this writing, the Cityside remains overwhelmingly Catholic in terms of demographics, but the Waterside is more evenly mixed (NISRA 2012). Derry's local parading tradition centres on performing a general claim of Protestant-Unionist historical ownership over the Walled City (in spite of its Catholic-Nationalist demographic majority). That historical performance of ownership in turn

inscribes a particularly modern grievance into Derry's sectarianised geography, the displacement of Protestants from the Cityside (Cohen 2007).

The 1969 Apprentice Boys march, featuring 15,000 Apprentice Boys, associated bands, and other Loyal Orders, sparked the fiercest sustained inter-communal rioting seen to that date in Northern Ireland (known today as "The Battle of the Bogside") (Ó Dochartaigh 2004). The parade directly resulted in the forcible expulsion of the RUC from the Bogside and the Creggan, leading to the British army taking over most security provision in the city. In the aftermath of the Citysiders ultimately pyrrhic victory, Ó Dochartaigh (2004) argues that Catholic-Nationalist distrust and alienation skyrocketed and the hand of Derry's Republicans inexorably strengthened. While today these cascading events are seen as products of their time and unique context, scholars should not understate the import and symbolic and territorial challenge the Apprentice Boys' parade represented and may still represent. Parading in Northern Ireland is provocatively spatial, as Dominic Bryan reminds us (2000, 95), parading is a form of territorial transgression; an extension of claims to symbolic, ritual ownership over the spatial stories of a given place, in spite of who currently inhabits it. Thus, far from being in continuity with a given, selective history of a Northern Irish place, they are in fact contemporaneously designed and structured to provoke. To triumphantly parade Derry's city walls, in full view of the Bogside below, and in spite of the Bogsiders' furious resistance, rioting, and counter-mobilisation, meant that Apprentice Boys' parades often represented the low point in terms of inter-communal violence and hostility in the city throughout the Troubles.

The Derry Model is thus structured on the alleged cessation of inter-communal hostilities after the 1998 Agreement due to direct, face-to-face, negotiation between the Apprentice Boys and the Bogside Residents' Group. It is important here to note that the Bogside Residents' Group should not be seen as wholly separable from Sinn Féin. It's

founder and chief spokesperson was Donncha Mac Niallais, a former IRA prisoner and blanketman and son of a former Sinn Féin local councillor. The BRG was and is widely understood in Derry to be a group with close ties to Sinn Féin, though this is rarely mentioned in journalistic or academic sources. Additionally (see Cohen 2007), early negotiations hardly enjoyed the fulsome support of the Apprentice Boys as an organisation, but rather seem to have been an initially individual (and deeply controversial) step taken by Alistair Simpson, the then-governor of the Apprentice Boys and later continued by his successor, William (Billy) Moore. Thus, I suggest here that these negotiations should be seen as between a divided Apprentice Boys leadership and an organisation that at the very least was guided by Sinn Féin party activist. The actual composition of the groups and individuals party to the negotiations is important because it further elucidates the *types* of stories told through the vehicle of the Derry Model and *who* exactly it is who tells them. The Derry Model is ultimately also a set of stories told in the past simple and present perfect cases, stories of overcoming and transcending inter-communal violence, hostility, and mistrust.

Shaul Cohen's (2007) essay is especially useful here. He argues that Simpson and Moore's strategy to negotiate an end to the parading standoff gradually won over the larger Apprentice Boys' leadership because it offered the Apprentice Boys, as an organisation, a unique opportunity to re-brand its external reputation. If they could secure the parade route as well as access to the Walls and City Centre through a negotiated settlement, the Apprentice Boys could present themselves as an organisation at the forefront of cross-community peacebuilding and cooperation. Though it would be unduly cynical to suggest this was the primary reason for negotiated settlement, re-branding would also help the Apprentice Boys and their surrogates attract external funding. Throughout Northern Ireland, as I suggested above, Loyal Orders can be perceived as sectarian, triumphalist anachronisms, throwbacks to the days of Unionist political and spatial domination over the Catholic minority, and an

ongoing threat to peace in the province to this day. While the Apprentice Boys may not have altered this perception of all Loyal Orders, Cohen (2007, 962) convincingly argues they "undertook a reworking of their public persona, their needs, and the meaning of the parade."

At the time of these parade negotiations, 1998-2001, Sinn Féin was not in government and was not considered to be a central party to the Irish Peace Process, but rather a potential "spoiler" of that process. Thus, not only could the Bogside Residents' Group negotiate a removal of many of the most contentious aspects of the parades for their erstwhile local constituency, they could also assist Sinn Féin's legitimation efforts by demonstrating that a Sinn Féin-centred group could successfully and peacefully negotiate with a Loyal Order (Cohen 2007, 963). Thus, both parties to the negotiation had a vested interest in re-branding themselves through the Derry Model vehicle.

In terms of the Great Sea-Change and the narrative "rebranding" of Derry that the Derry Model supports, we must also be cognisant of a pronounced resentment towards and rivalry with Derry's larger urban neighbour of Belfast. A catchphrase often heard in Derry and its environs is: "Investment stops at the [River] Bann," the River Bann forming a large chunk of the territorial border between County Derry and County Antrim. Many Derry-people view Northern Ireland as a Belfast "city-state" in which the Northwest is chronically deprived, underinvested in, and ignored by a governing mentality focused on promoting jobs and regeneration in the larger Belfast area (e.g. Bradley 2018; Doak 2014).

Circa the time of the parade negotiations in Derry (1998-2001), a deeply contentious parade in Portadown, co. Armagh threatened the wholesale disruption of the Peace Process (Ryder and Kearney 2001). In the Ardoyne area of Belfast proper, the Holy Cross dispute began in 2001 and witnessed horrific scenes of frightened Catholic schoolgirls being escorted to school by the British army backed by RUC riot police through a gauntlet of sectarian abuse and dangerous projectiles (Heatley 2004). Post-2001, after the Drumcree standoff largely

dissipated (though Loyal Orders continue to press for full parading access to the disputed Catholic Garvaghy Road area to this day), attention shifted to fraught parades in the Ormeau Road area of Belfast, where contentious parade routes routinely resulted in violent clashes, militarised escorts, and public displays of sectarian and paramilitary imagery. The parades negotiations, which forms the backbone of the Derry Model narrative, thus allowed Derry to present itself as further along the temporal continuum of postconflict dispute resolution than Belfast and the East of the province, *in spite of* shabby treatment and under-resourcing by the Belfast-centric Executive.

The Derry Model, while certainly mentioned prior to the Culture Year, gained added symbolic weight during the Year itself. Several high-profile events within the Culture Year programme, generally music events, were explicitly positioned within the framework of Boland, Murtagh, and Shirlow's (2019) "peacebuilding resource" or McDermott, Nic Craith, and Strani's (2016) framework of promoting "intercultural tolerance." Tens of thousands of residents and visitors watched, enjoyed, and participated in musical events that had been, up to that point, directly associated with either a Catholic-Nationalist or a Protestant-Unionist identity exclusively. These included a Loyalist flute band participating in the *Fleadh Cheoil na hÉireann,* an annual all-island Irish traditional music celebration held that year in Derry to coincide with the Culture Year, numerous Catholics in attendance for the inaugural Walled City Tattoo, a theatrical music performance closely associated historically with the British military and held in Ebrington Square, a former British army base (see Robinson and McClelland 2020b). The Walled City Tattoo, claim McDermott, Nic Craith, and Strani (2016), was an open and explicit attempt to merge Irish and Ulster-Scots tradition and heritage through the medium of dance and music.

The Culture Year thus represented a coordinated attempt to entrench the Derry Model narrative of difficult yet fruitful intercultural cooperation and tolerance. In February, 2014,

the various Protestant organisations responsible for parading in the city (The Apprentice Boys, the City of Londonderry Grand Orange Lodge, the Royal Black Preceptory, and the Londonderry Bands Forum) resurrected, updated, and re-signed the Maiden City Accord, a set of principles designed to ensure peaceful parading in the city. A year later, in March, 2015, the US artist David Best constructed a massive structure known as The Temple on a hill overlooking the city. Best's more well-known work is the centrepiece of the annual US counterculture festival Burning Man, and like those temples in the Nevada Desert, this one was also erected to burn. Implicitly tying into both Ulster Protestant and Irish Catholic bonfire traditions (see Santino 1998), the Temple was visited by an estimated 60,000 visitors during its brief weeklong existence. McDowell and Crooke (2019) argue the Temple worked to invert traditionally contentious public symbols such as bonfires in Northern Ireland and to destabilise often contentious binaries of victimhood (see Jankowitz 2018; Robinson 2018a). Events such as these clearly drew on the foundations led by both the Culture Year and the Derry Model; by 2015 it seemed clear to most that Derry was now firmly ensconced in the Great Sea-Change.

But I maintain that the central catalyst of the Great Sea-Change in Derry remains 15 June 2010. While the role of 15 June 2010 in promoting peace and intercultural tolerance is minimised in the subsequent literature, my conversations with some of the days' main curators reveal it was a central concern of the Bloody Sunday Trust, especially with regard to the days' subsequent reporting by international media (see Campbell 2012). "Ryan," (family member) one the main curators of the day with the Bloody Sunday Trust, is very clear on how the day was meant to be positioned within the Derry Model frame of inter-community peacebuilding.

> I was certainly very, very eager, and the [Bloody Sunday] Trust was also very eager, that the day be seen not just as a day for the Nationalist community but for the whole of the city.

In the days running up we [the Bloody Sunday Trust] had basically sent out signals to the Protestant community sector in the city that we wanted to talk to them. And at the same time they were sending stuff to us that they wanted to talk to us. And I think some of them saw it as an opportunity to reconcile differences. Because the city was divided and very, very much so [over] what happened on [Bloody Sunday]. And that continued on for 40 years.

[15 June] wouldn't be a Nationalist event, it wouldn't be a Republican event, there wouldn't be flags flowing, none of that… I think there was a range of achievements brought out before, during, and after the Report come out. The crowd in the Guildhall Square wasn't just the usual Nationalist or Republican crowd. There was that sizeable minority, and a very visible minority, of people who would describe themselves as Unionists. So, for me, that was a step forward.

Earlier in this chapter, I noted the complex emotivity still provoked by remembering that uncommonly sunny June day in Guildhall Square. I have maintained throughout that we must view memories and narrations of the day as deeply embedded in a respondents' relative investment in larger spatial narratives, stories of the city itself, as crystallised in the chronotopic place of the Guildhall. In the Great Sea-Change, 15 June 2010 is perhaps the key plot point in an instantly recognisable genre. It is the triumphant culmination of the struggle over the central conflict in the story, a culmination that inexorably leads to a Seamus Heaney yielding to a young girl smiling at the camera "with a new story to tell." I understand with Boland, Shirlow, and Murtagh (2019) and McDermott, Nic Craith, and Strani (2016) that the Culture Year should be examined more as a peacebuilding resource than an economic resource (or even a cultural one). Thus, in many ways, the Culture Year becomes the primary instantiation of the supposed Derry Model. However, it is nearly impossible to countenance the Culture Year even occurring or the performative fiction of some distinctly Derry "model" of peacebuilding gaining the traction that it did absent the triumphant climax on 15 June 2010, when, as Séamus Heaney might suggest, it was finally possible "to believe a farther shore was reachable from here" in Derry.

In the conclusion, I will examine the perhaps inevitable disappointment of the Great Sea-Change and return once more to those who refused to cease marching. I will argue that

the act of refusing to stop the annual Bloody Sunday March represented not just a rejection of the "justice" offered by the British state through the Report, as an act of rebellious mourning, it also represented a politically inconvenient and public refusal to conform to the Great Sea-Change and its politicised temporality.

VI.   THE RECONCILIATION PARADIGM AND BLOODY SUNDAY

One day in late January 2011, a small crowd of protesters deviated and broke away from the triumphant, raucous, celebratory March headed for the Guildhall, a place where approximately six months prior, thirteen of the fourteen victims of the atrocity known as Bloody Sunday had been publicly exonerated to joyful support from Derry residents and glowing coverage in the Irish, UK, and world media. Their much smaller march returned not to the place now chronotopically marked by triumph, vindication, and completion of the BSJC, but the chronotopic threshold where the atrocity remains perpetually present and unfinished. In doing so, this small breakaway procession fundamentally altered the cognitive cartographies of Derry's Cityside and rejected not merely the alleged lack of justice in the Report, but the rapidly-consolidating Great Sea-Change narrative of Derry's transcendence and transformation.

The Great Sea-Change is underwritten by a particular form of political temporality that I have argued binds or constricts the discursive and material space of political action. It both reflects and contributes to powerful political programmes that often depend, for their very authority, on the bracketing or periodicisation of past violence, a severing of the continuity, both real and analogic, between past violence and present conditions. For many people, groups, and institutions in Britain and Ireland, including many justice campaigners, particular moments in space and time such as 15 June 2010 represent a narratologically appropriate juncture in which to publicly perform an "over" or an "end," to force a bracketed

transition away from past violence as a liminal, open wound, into a healed or healing contemporary vision of reconciled catharsis. Yet two issues remain, first, how in many cases such understandable urges buttress and conform to the transitional programmes of state and sub-state actors often cynically over-invested in bracketing a contentious past, and second, how the periodicisation of past violence works to deafen and delegitimise those rebellious mourners who view keeping the past alive as inseparable from any possibility of meaningful political change.

A very helpful recent paper by Tom Bentley (2021) specifically applies Sara Ahmed's (2012) concept of "overing" to the Bloody Sunday march debate. Ahmed eloquently articulates the implicit violence and marginalising effects that invariably occur when people, especially women and people of colour, are told either implicitly or explicitly to "get over" their complaints about abuse, historical injustice, and/or mistreatment. Bentley's paper is narrowly focused on justice campaigns through a specific study of the BSJC, thus what it neglects is the broader implications of overing or periodicising discourses, their protection and insulation of status-quos through the comforting fictions of teleological "triumphs" and "new stories to tell." These, indeed, are the same charges that I have levelled at the reconciliation paradigm in Northern Ireland throughout this dissertation.

In places and cities saturated by memories of political killing, what Karen Till (2012) refers to as "wounded cities," a "decision taken" to stop a march is also an attempt to impose a particular temporality of grief, mourning, commemoration, activism and public inscription. In this context, refusing to comply with this imposed temporality threatens the transcendentalist arc of justice campaigns and may even "insult" their memories and stories of past activism. It also functions as a stark reminder in Derry, that for many, the city has failed to meaningfully transform.

On a personal note, my empathy for the survivors, bereaved, and affected of Bloody Sunday is beyond my capacity for language. My admiration for those who have chosen to campaign or taken political decisions to refuse to campaign likewise is not conditional on their own individual politics nor their own individual interpretations of the Report. I have not sought to adjudicate the truth or falsity of allegations of backroom deals between Sinn Féin, the Bloody Sunday Trust, and the British government surrounding 15 June 2010, such as those levelled publicly by Eamonn McCann and many of my respondents in our interviews and walks together. However, what I do argue is similar to what Herron and Lynch (2007) argued before the result of the Inquiry was known, organised attempts to impose a single master narrative dependent on a story told in a particular tense are not only misguided and exclusionary, they are also bound to fail.

The next chapter moves away from a broader narratological approach to a more microgeographical study of the Bloody Sunday march and weekend itself. In it, I will closely examine the multidimensional character of resistant Bloody Sunday memory and the attempts at co-opting the material space of Bloody Sunday by what are often termed "dissident" Republicans. I will suggest that the unruly, anarchic, and at least partially violence-promoting character of the current march is a direct product of the current march organisers determination to maintain the spatial story of Bloody Sunday as "unfinished," which in turn grafts neatly onto physical-force Republicans determination to see Bloody Sunday as the key site of an unfinished anticolonial revolution. Thus, while this chapter looks at the risks of attempting to impose political temporalities over wounded cities and chronotopic places, the subsequent chapter examines the risks and possible usurpations of refusing to police the types of stories allowable in the charged and emotive space of Bloody Sunday memory.

CHAPTER 5:

THE SPECTRAL CONVOCATION, PERPETUALLY PRESENT GHOSTS, AND THE AMBIGUITY OF JUSTICE CAMPAIGNS.

I.   THE SPECTRAL CONVOCATION: GHOSTS OF BLOODY SUNDAY

One of the first things that may strike any visitor to the Bogside and Creggan neighbourhoods of Derry is the visual omnipresence of the faces of the 14 young men murdered on Bloody Sunday (Figure 3). Within this space, the faces live a post-corporeal life as public symbols, symbols violently alienated from the very different yet similarly interrupted lives that they lived. Katherine Verdery (1999) argues that post-corporeal lives of deep significance within political communities can be "ambiguated" to perform multiple meanings, thus working to reconfigure and re-signify political space and time (39-40). For Herron and Lynch (2007; 2006), the faces of the Bloody Sunday dead have a similar post-corporeal function. In Derry, they argue, they form a "spectral convocation," a sort of Greek chorus that accompanies residents and non-residents alike throughout any journey through the Bogside and Creggan. The faces are the primary spectral accompaniment to the spatial stories of these communities. Their imbrication everywhere into the material architecture and symbolic landscape, argue Herron and Lynch, perform and guide a materialised obligation to remember them.

Thus, the Bloody Sunday dead and the cultural landscape they inhabit function as what Schein (1997, 663) calls "discourse materialized." Schein argues that these sorts of politicised discursive landscapes exert a dual force on residents, inhabitants, visitors, this force being "simultaneously disciplinary… and empowering in the possibilities for individual human action upon the landscape" (664).

Figure 3: Faces of the Bloody Sunday Dead, Lecky Road, Derry. ©CAIN and ©Martin Melaugh. Used with Permission.

As the primary part of the disciplining landscape of the Bogside and Creggan, they demand what Paul Ricoeur (2004) refers to as a "duty of memory" [*devoir de mémoire*] amongst all who inhabit the space or interact with the landscape. Crucially, for Ricoeur, a duty of memory is not to provide a forensic or authoritative recollection of past traumatic events, rather it is to compel history to stand for the idea of justice in the abstract, specifically justice for those whose lives have been violently interrupted. But, in keeping with Schein's analysis,

the spectral convocation constrains some possibilities of human action as much as it empowers others.

Symbols like the 14 faces that form the spectral convocation, argues Verdery, are ultimately *silent* throughout their post-corporeal public lives. This silence renders them open to what Verdery calls "ambiguation." She writes:

> Dead bodies have another great advantage as public symbols: they don't talk much on their own (though they did once). Words can be put into their mouths—often quite ambiguous words—or their own actual words can be ambiguated by quoting them out context. It is thus easier to rewrite history with dead people than with other kinds of symbols that are speechless. (29)

And while it may be a long way from the politics of post-corporealism in post-Communist East-Central Europe to the Creggan and the Bogside, I argue that scholars like Verdery, Schein, and Herron and Lynch can help lay the groundwork for examining how and why visual, spectral, and haunting representations of dead bodies can live on long after they are corporeally dead. Their work also introduces the idea that materialised, discursive obligations can work to contain and discipline alternate possibilities of public memory and spatial inscription. Finally, Verdery's concept of post-corporeal *silence* opens up the analysis to questions of co-optation, usurpation, and ambiguation across space and time. In short, as a spectral convocation, the Bloody Sunday dead demand honour, reverence, and a duty to remember, but the specific content of that duty must be ambiguated into their silent mouths by other individuals, groups, and organisations and that content is rarely fixed across space and across time.

On the Bloody Sunday March, the spectral convocation has been held and borne aloft through the streets of Derry for 50 years (as of this writing). They have been transfigured into grainy black-and-white photographs (Figure 4), they have been restlessly and temporarily entombed in crosses (Figure 5), they have been laid to rest at the foot of the obelisks (Figure 4), and then taken up again, re-vivified, in multiple voices and in multiple places.

Figure 4: Relative of a Bloody Sunday victim laying a wreath at the Bloody Sunday. Image courtesy of CAIN, no copyright.

Figure 5: Bloody Sunday March, Creggan Shops, Derry (2017). Photo by author.

They have demanded civil rights, demanded one person, one vote, a right to fair housing and

end to internment and employment discrimination. They have also stood for the violent

reunification of Ireland, an Ireland free from British and Unionist domination. They have stood in for the victims of other systems of colonial domination and violence, they have stood in for other victims of the Troubles. They have demanded violence, vengeance, retribution, they have demanded closure, peace, tolerance, understanding. And what they have demanded has always been done through the voices and symbolic ambiguation of others, others who purport to speak through them or speak for them. Thus, the spectral convocation can and does stand for a universalised "duty of memory" (at least within the spaces they post-corporeally inhabit) but the myriad ways in which such a duty has been conceptualised and publicly performed resists and complicates attempts to impose unitary, consensual understandings of what notions like "justice" and "duty" in fact are.

This chapter examines the spectral convocation and its political and spectral ambiguation after 15 June 2010 on the streets of Derry. As I have throughout this dissertation, I make what at its core is a spatiotemporal argument. The ongoing political fractures and uncomfortable allegiances visible on the Bloody Sunday march are caused by differing perspectives on the *duration* of the post-corporeal lives of the spectral convocation. Will the silent faces continue, in Avery Gordon's timeless turn of phrase (2008, 8), to "seethe" in the present, to "meddle with" taken-for-granted post-Report spatial realities, or has the time for such public unsettlement passed by and passed on? Did the Report inaugurate a new, less transgressive role for the spectral convocation, one in which they stand anew for the progress made towards relative political normalcy in Derry and Northern Ireland more broadly? For the evolution of violent protest into new opportunities for civil and political equality for Catholics, nationalists, Republicans? Are the labours of their memory mostly complete or radically unfinished?

Some very similar questions, I argue, animate and have animated justice struggles and scholarly research in Spain, the Southern Cone of South America, Mexico, and Central

America, specifically research into the *Desaparecidos* (Disappeared), men and women kidnapped by right-wing *juntas* and/or narcoterrorists. One of the crucial questions often facing organised groups of survivors and bereaved in these places is the duration and symbolic meaning of disappearance. Will the campaigns of survivors and bereaved focus on finding, naming, memorialising, interring, laying to rest the corpse of a loved one, by very necessity with the assistance and imprimatur of the allegedly postauthoritarian State, or will survivors and bereaved reject the symbolic closure of their struggle through the corpse and the authoritative sanction of forensic knowledge (Collins 2020)? Will they keep, hold, and maintain the liminal status of disappearance in public space to rebelliously mourn, to prolong the past (Domanska 2006)?

The first half of this chapter examines the duration of justice campaigns, specifically comparing the BSJC to the campaigns of *Las Madres y Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo* (Mothers and Grandmothers of May Square, hereafter shortened to *Madres)* in Argentina. I make a somewhat controversial argument that the well-known ruptures in the *Madres* that caused a split into two separate organisations, known as the *Asociación* (Association) *Madres* and the *Línea Fundadora* (Founding Line) *Madres,* closely parallels the ruptures in the BSJC and thus gives us a new theoretical and conceptual framework to study rebellious mourning in Northern Ireland. I do not, of course, claim that the *Madres* decades of public activism and transgression are in any way the same as the BSJC's decades of public activism and transgression, but I do claim that we can benefit from comparing the *spatiotemporal* struggles, splits, and questions of the co-optation and usurpation of public justice movements across geopolitical contexts. The second half of this chapter takes on the Bloody Sunday march itself, focusing on the uneasy question of "physical-force" Republicans (often known as dissidents, I will specify my terminology below) on the Bloody Sunday March. I use the violent presence of physical-force Republicans to illustrate the sorts of co-optations and

usurpations that can occur when justice movements demand that a violent past be kept very much alive. I conclude with a discussion of the murder by physical force Republicans of journalist Lyra McKee in April, 2019 in Creggan, and ask if or how McKee's ghost may haunt the enduring chronotopes of Bloody Sunday into the future.

II.   DEATH DOES NOT EXIST: *LAS MADRES DE PLAZA DE MAYO*

Most studies of the *Madres* in English, or translated into English, tend to be written during or focus on the first two to three decades of their public activism (e.g. Bosco 2006; Bouvard 1994; Jelin 2003; Taylor 1997). Thus, like much of the literature on Bloody Sunday, the scholarly record slows a bit at a crucial juncture. In Derry this is 15 June 2010, in Argentina, this is 2003 with the election of President Nestor Kirchnér and the undoing of some of the state architecture of imposed forgetting, together with the subsequent decision by the *Asociación Madres* to integrate themselves with *Kirchnerismo* and abandon a struggle wholly independent of the Argentine State. The *Asociación Madres* "final march of resistance" (a phrase also reminiscent of the BSJC) took place in January 2006, with President Hebe de Bonafini declaring, "Ya no hay un enemigo en Casa de Gobierno" (There is no longer an enemy in the Government House) (cited in Adair 2020).

My focus in this short section is three-fold: 1) A potted history of Argentine state repression, 2) the spatiotemporal nature of *Madres* activism, 3) the 1986 split between the *Asociación* Madres and the *Linea Fundadora Madres* and its spatiotemporal characteristics. Throughout the section, I argue that it is these types of spatiotemporal lenses, studied in the *Madres* fairly extensively, that are of particular relevance to issues of Bloody Sunday public memory in Derry and Northern Ireland. The analytic component of the "potted history" which follows is based on the work of several scholars, including the geographer Fernando

Bosco (2006, 2004), the critical anthropologist Diana Taylor (1997), the sociologists Avery Gordon (2008) and Berber Bevernage (2012), and the archaeologist Ewa Domanska (2006, 2005). I weave this together with more general but less-critical histories of the pre-*Kirchnerismo Madres* (e.g. Arditti 1999; Bouvard 1994).

The beginning of anti-Leftist State repression in Argentina predates the 1976 *coup d'état,* and even the initiation of *Operation Condor* in 1975, a US-sponsored coordinated campaign of right-wing terror involving the governments or elements of the governments of Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. However, during the so-called *Guerra Sucia* (Dirty War) in Argentina from 1975-83, an estimated 15-30,000 supposed government opponents were disappeared, or kidnapped and detained for long periods without any record of said detention, repeatedly tortured, and secretly murdered. At least 500 babies and children were taken from parents in captivity and given to childless military couples to raise (Arditti 2002).

The *Madres* history of public activism and transgression arguably begins in Buenos Aires on 30 April 1977, when fourteen mothers sat down in the *Plaza de Mayo* and demanded that the military *junta* provide information on their disappeared children. Initially, the *Madres* did not see their movement as a protest, but rather as the creation of a space for people searching for their loved ones to share information and contacts (Bosco 2006). However, their regular meetings quickly evolved into purposive spatial transgression and protest. In the next year, the number of *Madres* ballooned to hundreds and they adopted a variety of protest tactics, but their central act of protest was the public, highly visible demand to return their children performed every Thursday in the *Plaza de Mayo.* While initially seeking to ignore and dismiss the *Madres,* writing them off as *las locas* (the "crazies")*,* the *junta* quickly became deeply threatened by their tactics. In December 1977, the *junta* disappeared twelve *Madres* and attempted to close the *Plaza* to their weekly emotional

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performances. But nothing dissuaded the *Madres,* ostensibly banned from the deeply resonant space of the *Plaza* they took to marching along the perimeter, or even waiting for lapses in attention of the security forces guarding the square and dashing into briefly re-occupy it (Bosco 2006). The *Madres,* like the Bloody Sunday families, bound up the legitimacy of their spatial transgressions with the act of visibly carrying, holding, bearing, the photographs of their disappeared sons, husbands, and relatives. Their major slogan during this period was "*¡Aparición con vida!,"* which can be translated as "Bring them back alive!" or "Make them re-appear alive!"

The Argentine *junta* ceded power to a transitional government in 1982 in the face of massive street protests. The first democratically elected post-*junta* President was Raúl Alfonsin, who initially took a tough line against the military, initiating the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (known by its Spanish language acronym, CONADEP). Based on CONADEP's findings, Alfonsin's government brought several military leaders to trial, resulting in some initial convictions for political murders. However, Alfonsin's initial willingness to take action against the military faltered in the face of organised military resistance supported by right-wing Argentine politics and society. In 1986, the Argentine Congress enacted the *Ley de Punto Final* and the complementary *Ley de Obediencia Debida* (Law of the Full Stop and Law of Due Obedience) that stated there would be no further prosecutions of any military, prison, or police figures because they were acting out of "due obedience" to high authorities, the authorities ultimately responsible for the Dirty War presumably having been jailed already. While initially opposed to the Laws, Alfonsin was ultimately forced to acquiesce under threat of another *coup.*

The process of "drawing a line" under Argentina's violent past accelerated in 1989, when Alfonsin was defeated by Carlos Menem. Menem, himself a former political prisoner, made no secret of what he thought about the proper place of past violence. Upon his election,

Menem referenced the Biblical story of Lot's Wife to inaugurate his political programme of "National Reconciliation:"

> The past has nothing more to teach us. We must look ahead, with our eyes fixed on the future. Unless we learn to forget, we will be turned into a pillar of salt (cited in Bevernage 2012, 28).

National Reconciliation, for Menem in practice, meant issuing over 300 pardons, mainly of military men, but also some for leftist subversives, that in many cases arrested trials already in progress, and freed the generals jailed under Alfonsin. Menem's programme was derailed by the public confessions to torture and murder by several former members of the security forces (Payne 2008), but the laws put in place were not repealed until after the election of Nestor Kirchner in 2003.

Menem's orientation to Argentina's haunted past was directly learned from a very similar programme in Spain after the demise of the Francoist dictatorship and the contemporaneous state of transitional justice and democratisation literature (see Chapter 2). After Franco himself died, the major political parties in Spain, both left and right, negotiated a pact designed to outmanoeuvre Franco's own official succession plan (Ferrándiz 2019; Jimeno and Fernández 2017). The result was a pacted transition to electoral democracy from 1975-77, but the pact hinged on an (at the time) informal agreement between Left and Right not to engage with the mass violence of the Francoist era. This [in]famous pact was known as the *Pacto del Olvido* (The Pact of Forgetting). In 1977, the Pact was codified into legal form with *La Ley de Amnistía* (General Amnesty Law). As the Socialist Party official Ramón Jáuregui would argue, looking back on the Pacto: "The transition to democracy demanded that we overlook thousands of memories and claims that weren't convenient to bring up because they could endanger the pact of the transition" (quoted in Encarnación 2008, 439). Thus, for Menem and people influenced by the Pacto, CONADEP's work in Argentina and the subsequent prosecution of the junta leaders were seen as an incendiary push-back against

the dominant international approach to political transition I described in Chapter One, an approach that jettisoned any examination of past crimes in favour of a relentless focus on protecting democratisation from left-wing over-reach and right-wing spoilerism. The Madres memory-work (cf. Jelin 2003) after the demise of the junta should thus be seen through the lens of resistance to *Menemismo* and the politics of forgetting through elite pacts, even as it must also clearly be seen as a clear continuation of the origin of the Madres and the Abuelas very existence, the question of ¿Donde Estan? (where are they, what happened to them, i.e., our children and grandchildren) (Bevernage 2012).

The split of the *Madres* into the *Asociación* and the *Linea Fundadora* formally occurred in 1986. At the surface level, the *Madres* who would form the *Linea Fundadora* objected to the leadership style and increasingly hierarchical collective organisation of the *Madres* (Bosco 2004). The name *Linea Fundadora* itself rooted in the idea that the original structure of the *Madres* had been radically decentralised and that the increasingly hierarchical leadership represented a betrayal of the *Madres* foundational core. However, as Bosco (2004) intimately details, the cause of the initial split rapidly coalesced into a conflict over *temporality* and political memory. Bosco writes (2004, 384): "Today, the *Madres* clash over how to place memory in the landscape appropriately." Specifically, for Bevernage (2012), this is a struggle over what the time, the temporality, is of the *Desaparecidos,* whether they are held, like ghosts, in a space of perpetual liminality (see also Gordon 2008), or whether their corporeal body is allowed to be found, returned, put to rest. The *Linea Fundadora* has accepted that the *Desaparecidos* are in fact dead, not coming back, thus their politics of public memory advocates for the forensic exhumation of mass graves, the identification and respectful burial of the bodies of the dead, the construction of memorials, the remembrance and honour of those lives as lives past, as lives violently ceased. As such, the bodies of the disappeared, both absent and exhumed, belong to a completed past (Bevernage 2012). In

stark contrast, the *Asociación* continued to gather under the banner of *¡Aparición con vida!* The leader of the *Asociación,* Hebe de Bonafini, famously argued that "The mothers of the disappeared will not be converted into the mothers of the dead." De Bonafini also used the thirtieth anniversary of the of the coup in Argentina to quote the words of Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano: "*La muerte no existe*" [death does not exist] (both quoted in Bevernage 2012, 23).

The *Asociación's* radical denial of death itself has often been interpreted through psychoanalytic frames (Femenía and Gill, 1987; Suarez-Orosco 1991), through the well-known Freudian dichotomy of mourning and melancholia, and through Taylor's (1997) notion of "bad scripts," or that the *Asociación Madres* are confined to such a performance because of the patriarchal frames of Argentine society. However, fusing the insights of Bosco and Bevernage reveals *¡Aparición con vida!* is also a radical politics of space and place and a radical politics of trauma, or rebellious mourning, which can be neglected by both a more "Northern" psychoanalytic and/or feminist lens. For Ewa Domanska (2005, 402) "The liminality and 'monstrosity' of the disappeared of whom we do not know whether he/she is alive or dead prevents the trauma of loss from being healed by means of rituals… The ambivalent status of the dead, their almost unearthly nature, endows them with great power." Domanska's (2005; 2006) work, as a material archaeologist, directly positions *¡Aparición con vida!* as a radical demand to hold places, architectures, and materials within what she calls the space of a "non-absent past" or a "past whose absence is manifest" (see also Crenzel 2020; Till and Kuusisto-Arponen 2015). Crucially, for Domanska, this is not an epistemological struggle, as in how shall we understand and represent the presence of ghosts of past violence in public space, rather it is an ontological struggle over the "spatial dimension of presence." Seeing de Bonafini's quotation of Galeando, "*la muerte no existe,*" through an ontological lens demands the engagement on de Bonafini's own terms; it refuses

to allow her purposive retention of the spatiotemporality of liminal disappearance to be written over by the dominant spatiotemporalities of transitional regimes or even other survivors. There is no getting over death that does not exist, death that did not happen, there is no closing the book as long as the *Desaparecidos* remain radically present, their lives unfinished, in public space.

Here, Cath Collins (2020) critical work on the "forensic turn" in transitional justice (see Hite and Jara 2020) is especially important. Collins similarly positions refusals to accept the ontological mortality of disappearance as a radical politics of time, place, and trauma. She writes: "To be disappeared is to matter, to be made visible… by comparison, to simply be deceased, or to (re) appear in a less than heroic manner… renders a person, and by extension, their loved ones, more routine, more ordinary, less important" (326). For Collins, the maintenance and constant public reperformance of the liminal, ambiguous places of disappearance represents a powerful political check on attempts to impose the temporal domination of the reconciliation paradigm.

Scholars like Bevernage, Bosco, Collins, Domanska, and Gordon give us a radically different lens through which to see the disruptive, transgressive and liminal politics of the *Madres,* specifically, as a rejection of transitional temporalities, a demand that the dead remain perpetually present. Within this radical politics of time, a justice struggle ceases to have an end-point. I explicitly argue here that we as scholars must examine Bloody Sunday justice politics and spatialities, the split in the BSJC, and their imbrication throughout the materiality of Derry's Cityside, through these sorts of spatiotemporal lenses. These lenses parallel, but do not wholly overlap with, the trajectory of the *Madres* complex public struggle, as well with those as other justice movements in other contexts around the globe (for other examples see Bevernage 2012; Hinton 2018; Mueller-Hirth and Rios-Oyola 2018). This is not to say that a spatiotemporal lens is the only way to examine the BSJC, but it is to

say that with the exception of a very recent paper by Tom Bentley (2021), in the aftermath of 15 June 2010, the spatiotemporal element of Bloody Sunday memory struggles remain largely unaddressed.

The final point to make here with regard to Argentina is similar to point I shall make at the end of my analysis of the Bloody Sunday march: A radical politics of time and perpetual liminality is very much open to co-optation, usurpation even, by organised groups of people deeply invested in using the unfinishedness of colonial, imperial, or authoritarian violence as a legitimation mechanism for their own political violence, as Verdery's (1999) work shows so clearly. This will become extremely important as I move on to discussing why and how physical-force republicans have attached themselves so strongly to the Bloody Sunday march in the following sections. It also may go a long way towards explaining why de Bonafini and the other leaders of the *Asociación* essentially merged their movement with *Kirchnerismo* in 2003, the political movement fronted first by former Argentine President Néstor Kirchner (2003-07), and upon his death, his wife, former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-15) (Kriger and Guglielmo 2017; Quintana 2016; Romanin 2012). There are arguments in both cases for the wholesale co-optation of both movements, the *Asociación's* by *Kirchnerismo,* the Bloody Sunday March Committee by physical-force Republicanism. However, I believe that these temptations should be resisted or at least complicated. In Argentina, while my command of the Spanish language is not sufficient enough to provide a thorough review of the literature on the alliance between the *Asociacíon* and *Kirchnerismo,* Romanin (2012, para. 30) argues that the *Asociación* still retains autonomous elements and has not been wholly co-opted:

> Pero el acompañamiento de la AMDPM no significó una aceptación a ultranza de todas las orientaciones del gobierno. Al contrario de lo que los defensores de la idea de cooptación sostienen, el vínculo entre las integrantes de la AMDPM y el gobierno continuó presentando momentos de distancia y autonomía de las primeras respecto al ultimo (original text).

But the integration of the [*Asociación Madres*] did not signify an unconditional acceptance of all the government's orientations. Contrary to what those who insist the movement has been coopted maintain, the link between members of the [*Asociación Madres]* and the government continued to present moments of distance and autonomy for the former in regards to the latter (translation by author).

In Derry, as shall become clear in Section IV of this chapter, the charge of co-optation can only be maintained by ignoring the statements and actions of the current March Committee and the recent history of the march itself. With this final point in mind, I now turn towards a short analysis of the haunting unfinishedness of the spectral convocation and a critique of how the concept of haunting has been utilised in mainstream transitional justice and the reconciliation paradigm.

III.   HAUNTING IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The major difference between the ghosts of Bloody Sunday and the ghosts of the *Desaparecidos* is the visibility of the violent cessation of their corporeal lives. The thirteen young male victims of Bloody Sunday were murdered in broad daylight (the fourteenth, an older gentleman named John Johnston, would die some months later from wounds inflicted on the day); hundreds of people witnessed them gunned down. They were not disappeared, kidnapped, killed, and their bodies secretly hidden from the public. *La muerte*, viscerally, *existe,* for the victims of Bloody Sunday in the forensic sense. On 30 January 1972, murder was witnessed, photographed, and later sworn to in legal proceedings. But in the spectral sense, throughout its existence, the BSJC was sustained by a profound sense that the dead, and through them the people of working-class Derry, as Don Mullan puts it (1997) the "eyewitnesses" to public murder, had never been granted the space to speak aloud outside of Derry's working-class nationalist space (McCann 1992). In other words, the spectral convocation was geographically confined to Derry's Cityside, and as part of the struggle for justice, they also had to be allowed to speak outsid*e* of Derry's Cityside. Citysiders knew what happened, but the rest of Northern Ireland and the world was prevented from knowing.

In the previous chapter, I detailed how this breaking-out of the Cityside occurred; through the transition from Bloody Sunday as "Republican issue" to "international human rights issue." The various stages and staged transitions in Bloody Sunday public memory I understand, again with Verdery, as part and parcel with the post-corporeal lives of bodies. The problematic, of course, is that these bodies speaking in unison, as part of a spectral convocation, necessarily shoulders out and marginalises other forms of post-corporeal speech and can usurp the right and ability of individual families to mourn in ways that they see fit (see Robinson 2018a, Chapter 7).

Herron and Lynch (2007), the originators of the term "the spectral convocation," use that term in such a way that I argue subtly but importantly misstates the conceptual architecture of haunting. They write (47):

> When Lord Saville finally produces his report… perhaps then [the spectral convocation] will be able to cease their annual journeys through the streets of Derry, and, as with all ghosts, when the wrongdoing to which they bear testimony is finally recognised, find peace.

While in many ways an eloquent cri de coeur, their desire here is for the ghosts of Bloody Sunday to inhabit the particular temporal trajectory of the reconciliation paradigm. As such, their elegy undermines the political prolongation of the past, the tactics of rebellious mourning. Herron and Lynch wistfully long for a past that "goes away," rather than Domanska's past "that will not go away." Their perspective idealises the end-point of the spectral convocation, even though it does not prescribe such an end-point, as does Doherty's editorial I referred to in the previous chapter. It presumes that the ultimate end of a spectre is to find peace and disappear. As such, it is also bound up both within the reconciliation paradigm and the frames of mainstream trauma theory I criticised in Chapter Two.

The noted Northern Irish transitional justice scholar Cheryl Lawther's (2021) recent work starts from similarly problematic assumptions. Lawther treats ghosts as post-traumatic spectres whose persistence in public space is due to a political failure in Northern Ireland to

adequately address the past. The ongoing presence of political haunting, to Lawther, represents a "destabilising impact on social and political life" (17). Lawther's work, in a way that is to be welcomed, shifts the blame for the ongoing presence of ghosts and the liminality they inhabit away from survivors to transitional political parties and institutions. In other words, Lawther rejects the idea that survivors must get over it, a disciplinary discourse extending from practices of temporal domination (Mueller-Hirth 2017), in favour of criticising the transitional structures that failed survivors and bereaved. However, she neglects the ways in which the literature on haunting explicitly positions the prolongation of the past as a form of political resistance to the futurist stability imagined by the reconciliation paradigm.

Both Herron and Lynch and Lawther are arguably operating from within a discipline of transitional justice that is both less familiar with and occasionally discomfited by the ongoing presence of ghosts. A recent textbook (Wale, Gobodo-Madikizela, and Praeger 2021) attempting to bring haunting into the study of transitional justice equates haunting with "trans-generational trauma" and "the perpetuation of injustice." While the editors claim to be closely following the work of Jacques Derrida (1994) and Avery Gordon (2008) on the concept of haunting, they, like Lawther and Herron and Lynch, attempt to enfold haunting into the temporal strictures of those reconciliation and mainstream trauma paradigms I have been at such pains to criticise. Haunting and the ongoing presence of ghosts is everywhere treated, like in Lawther's work, as a sociopolitical failure, a destabilising influence on the temporal progression of reconciliation. Wale et al. write (2021, 4), in the introductory chapter to the textbook: "The various contributors build into their analyses the challenges implicit in transforming the haunting power of postconflict memory instead to positive good." The dichotomy here between "haunting power" and "positive good" is fairly explicit and contrary to how their ostensible source material understands the "seething presence" of ghosts. Worse

still perhaps, it buttresses with multi-nodal disciplinary power of the reconciliation paradigm, reminding temporally resistant survivors of violence that their struggles to prolong the past are widely understood to be psychopathological manifestations of transitional failure.

To put it simply, the critical argument put forward by scholars like Gordon (2008), Domanska (2006), and Till (2005) is that public haunting, extended spectral liminality, the prolongation of the past, is itself a form of political resistance to postconflict or postauthoritarian memory-consensus and the liberal political stability imagined and idealised by the reconciliation paradigm. When the *Asociación* proclaims *la muerte no existe,* they are deploying ghosts and haunted memories in public space to resist the resolution of disappearance, to resist being subsumed into the reconciliation paradigm. When the current March Committee refuses to cease marching, as I shall discuss, they are resisting the idea that the work of the spectral convocation is over, no longer relevant, no longer speaking to the wider universe of state and colonial injustice. Hamber and Wilson (2002) refer to the urge ameliorate and smooth over the messiness and painfulness of the haunting memory of the past as "symbolic closure." Symbolic closure is a subordination of the diversity of collective experiences of being haunted to the "political expediency" (36) of the reconciliation paradigm.

Lawther (2021) correctly also employs Verdery (1999) to point out that where ghosts haunt public space in extended liminality, there is risk of their spectral voices being ambiguated or co-opted by those individuals and groups intent on violently derailing peace processes. Thus, for Lawther, the "haunting impact" of a sociopolitical failure to address the past requires us to think of ghosts as a negative presence in public space, as a visceral imperative to collectively work harder at the legal, scholarly, and political level to address and resolve outstanding legacy of violence issues. In the absence of such a resolution, she

argues, the way speechless spectres are invariably ambiguated will continue to perform and entrench hierarchies of victims, to selectively raise some experiences of victimhood over others and reinforce Northern Ireland's simplistic postconflict narratives of guilt, blame, and innocence.

But Ireland and Northern Ireland's complex thanatological cultures, exacerbated by the Troubles, unsettle the direct lines Lawther draws. One of the most common idiomatic ways of inquiring whether one knew or had a relationship with a deceased person in Northern Ireland, and Derry in particular, is to ask: "Did you lose someone *belonging to you?*" This is not merely empty idiom; Hepburn (2014, 198-9) argues that in Irish thanatological cultures, the "living and the dead belong to each other." The corpse does not circulate "of its own volition," rather, the living ritually perform and re-perform through rite and procession the political nature of death, the dead thus "sustain and consort with the living, and by doing so, nourish hopes of political deliverance" In Northern Ireland, victims of the Troubles sit uneasily in the between-spaces of belonging to those that loved them for the person that they were and the wider, presumed, political community that ascribes to their post-corporeal bodies larger political import (see Robinson 2018a, Chapter 7).

Perhaps nowhere is this tension better illustrated than in Sara McDowell's (2008) ethnographic work on gendered paramilitary funerals in Northern Ireland. McDowell illustrates this tension through the voices of the immediate families of dead paramilitary men whose bodies and post-corporeal lives exist in ambiguated space, between the intimate burial practices of the family and immediate community and the narratives of martyrdom and blood sacrifice deployed by paramilitaries. Here, McDowell describes the situation of one of her respondents, the mother of a paramilitary volunteer, who did not even know her son was a

member of a paramilitary until "paramilitaries turned up at the funeral and tried to impose

Republican burial rites on the ceremony." McDowell continues, quoting her respondent:

> 'A man just came to the house and said they were putting his name on a monument
> and that was that. I had no choice. It brought it all back…' Her story is not unique and
> was repeated by several other mothers interviewed (346).

McDowell's respondents report deep psychological wounds that stem from losing control

over their loved ones' post-corporeal bodies to both paramilitary and State commemorative

rituals. But while it can be tempting to simply view McDowell's article as further evidence of

Lawther's "social disintegration" through the inevitable ambiguation of post-corporeal

bodies, even these women's pain at seeing their sons' bodies taken from them destabilises

simplistic notions of possession and ownership and a presumed or ideal state of the "pure"

body free from political concerns. In the case of the spectral convocation, individual bodies

are rarely at the forefront, the silent procession through the streets of Derry is just that, a

convocation, the fourteen faces rarely separable from one another, only represented as part of

a whole (Herron and Lynch 2007; 2006). The individual ghosts may belong to those who

loved them as people, but the convocation belongs to Derry, and to Derry's complex,

competing, and multifaceted public memory-space. If, as Hepburn suggests, a central

principle of Irish thanatological cultures is the consorting of the living with the dead,

wherever these consortings take place in public, they are spatial consortings, and rather than

seeing the spectral convocation as arrested in time and space, we must understand the spectral

convocation, and all bodies of deep political significance, as enmeshed in a continuously

unfolding process of dynamic spatial reconstruction, or what Rothberg (2008a) calls

"multidirectional memory."

Seeing spectrality as multidirectional is, I maintain, a necessary corrective for how

haunting has been used in transitional justice and its deployment in Northern Ireland. Within

the folds of the reconciliation paradigm and its dominant temporality, it becomes difficult to

see haunting and the spectres of the unquiet past in any way save as a problem to be

overcome or a failure to be corrected. I suggest we instead follow the work of scholars such

as Claudia Rankine, whose work on the public spectacle of murdered black bodies in the

United States argues that the ghost should be seen as a remnant of an "event out of time"

(2017, 28). Drawing on the case of Mamie Till Mobley, the mother of lynching victim

Emmett Till, Rankine argues that Mobley's refusal to let Emmett Till's body become

subsumed by chronological time represented a politics of public refusal (see Chapter 7). This

refusal, Rankine argues, is a refusal of an "etiquette of grief" (28) that moves in a

chronological progression through predictable stages and eventually fades into the

background of both the bereaved's psyche and the focus of the public gaze. This refusal,

which is crucially temporal as well as political, vivifies the condition of black life in the

United States as one of perpetual, rebellious mourning. Rankine writes:

> By placing herself and her son's corpse in positions of refusal relative to the etiquette
> of grief… [Mobley] used the lynching tradition against itself. The spectacle of the
> black body, in her hands, publicized the injustice mapped onto her son's corpse (30).

Holding the presence of ghosts and refusing to let them fade away into chronological

time, the time of transition and the reconciliation paradigm, is, as Milstein argues, "resistance

against disappearance" (2017c, 387), a perspective very similar to Collins' (2020). They

manifest, as Karen Till (2005) suggests, in "returns" to places of both violence and

belonging, returns being both physical pilgrimages and mental yearnings. In these returns,

those called by uncanny spectres may find themselves becoming "part of an army of

phantoms" (Milstein, 2017c, 387) who fight for the radical re-presencing of the pain, trauma,

and wounds persistently etched into the material of cities and places (Till 2012). This radical

re-presencing, argues Milstein (2017b, 2017c), is fundamentally a struggle for the dignity of

the living and a struggle against deaths that did not have to happen. I argue this is the larger

contextual and theoretical grounding with which all those who study the ongoing presence of violent death in the landscape must approach victims, survivors, and bereaved. We must cure ourselves of the stadial, chronological models of apolitical grief we have learned that psychopathologise those for whom *la meurte no existe*, who perpetually consort with ghosts through returns to chronotopic thresholds (Till 2017). At these thresholds, we will find Emmett Till's mutilated body lying in an open casket, *Madres* holding pictures of their sons and demanding *¿Donde Estan?*, and 14 people bearing a spectral convocation of photographs and crosses, now turning down the Southway to see the entirety of the Foyle Valley laid out before them, enveloped in cold late January rain. These things they carry, the spectral slivers of lives violently arrested, are the tools of rebellious mourning, of pasts that will not go away, they belong to their bearers and their mourners, but their continuing presence in public space diversifies claims to ownership, decentralises and ambiguates their messages, and invites wider, polyphonic consortings. The one thing all who witness these spectral convocations may be able to agree on is that *in this place and time, there is something viscerally unfinished.*

Of all my interviews, Colin provides the clearest application of these principles to the Bloody Sunday March. Colin was introduced to the reader in the prior chapter, but just to remind us, Colin suffered the murder of a close family member on Bloody Sunday in 1972. Colin reports to me that he marched throughout the lifespan on the march in order to "keep Bloody Sunday alive" (Chapter 4). He may mean several things by this statement. His turn of phrase may connote the "keeping alive" of the justice struggle, the hope that 1 PARA, their commanders, and the British political establishment that ordered them to Derry will be called to answer for the massacre they both set in motion and perpetuated. Colin may also mean he "keep[s] Bloody Sunday alive" in order to keep Bloody Sunday at the forefront of public memory, as a living reminder perpetually re-embedded into the spatial story of Derry of the

potential of a State to massacre its citizens. "Chloe," also an advocate of continuing to march, explicitly cited this reason for marching, arguing that the presence of Bloody Sunday memory may help prevent other State massacres around the world, what she refers to as "Bloody Sunday by twos and threes." Colin's statement is undoubtedly contains both of those ideas within it. However, in the next excerpt, Colin's testimony begins to sound uncannily like the ideas of Hebe de Bonafini and the *Asocíación Madres,* at least from 1986-2003. "Keep[ing] Bloody Sunday alive" may also be a demand to hold Bloody Sunday in perpetual liminality, to hold the city, for that commemorative week at least, as a place for unquiet ghosts to haunt. On the march, for Colin, *la muerte no existe.*

> In a sense, [on the March] [my loved one's] not dead. You know what they say, you're truly dead only when you're name is never truly known again. When your name's forgotten. [My loved one's] not truly dead because his name's not forgotten. The Bloody Sunday March, aye, but *within that* [my loved one] exists. As do all the other… [here Colin pauses, searching for the correct words]
>
> Author [prompting]: Spirits?
>
> …Aye, spirits of all the others. And [marching] to me, it's a spiritual thing… it's like [my loved one] still lives because of that.

To merely read the words Colin chooses here, one could believe he is speaking purely metaphorically about "spirits" being "not dead." I, however, would disagree with that analysis. I believe that Colin, like the *Asociación Madres,* is engaging in what Domanska (2006) would call an ontological problematisation of the status of the spectral convocation. On the march, Colin occasionally carries himself, but more often walks directly behind, not the representational metaphor of his murdered relative, in the form of a photograph and a cross, but rather the non-absent, living, seething, presence of his loved one's ghost. The ghost is contained within those material objects and further projected onto the performative recreation of the streets and walls of the Bogside and the Creggan. As I shall shortly attempt to describe, during the Bloody Sunday Weekend and on the March, the Bogside and the Creggan feel like 1972 again, it is consciously curated to project chronotopic collapsing of

the past and the present. As Colin marches through the chronotopic places where it is expected that, for a short time, we pause to commune and consort with the ghosts, he rejects the dominant temporalities of reconciliatory mourning. He does not wish nor desire for his loved one's ghost to be put to rest or be at peace. To be at peace, for Colin, seems to be tantamount to "being forgotten," and "being forgotten," in turn signifies an end to the contemporary political significance of Bloody Sunday and an end to the relevance of Bloody as an analogic linkage across times and places of State massacre. Ending the Bloody Sunday March would be an end to the Bogside and Creggan as places of perpetual liminality; outside of those places, his loved one's ghost can be ambiguated and ripped from his control and curatorship. Outside of those places, his loved one's ghost can be forcibly laid to rest, its work done, its mission accomplished. The spectral convocation can fade from the viscerally non-absent to the generalised duty to remember.

Natascha Mueller-Hirth's brilliant (2017) study on the temporalities of victimhood in South Africa notes the myriad discursive, cultural, and political means in which victims of political violence are pressured to "move on" and put the past behind them. Hamber and Wilson (2002) add a psychological dimension to this pressure, noting that psychological 'healing' can be a lengthy and idiosyncratic process, one that does not conform to vested transitional interests in delineating a clear temporal break between past violence and present politics. What I would add to both excellent studies is a further emphasis on just how prevalent neo-Freudian discourses of chronologically staged progressions through grief and mourning have become in the transitional imagination (see Fassin and Rechtman 2009; Edkins 2003). Victims, survivors, and bereaved that refuse to conform to proper timeframes allocated for grieving within transitional temporalities are further temporally dominated by a widespread psychopathologisation of temporally non-conformist mourning. In other words, the re-staging of rebellious mourning in public space, the refusal to let the ghosts be laid to

rest, in dominant transitional and reconciliatory discourses becomes evidence of a disease or an affliction. Just as *Las Madres* are and were routinely tarred as *las locas* in Argentine political, cultural, and transitional discourses, so too are Colin, Chloe, and the directly bereaved who march with them. They become afflicted people to be pitied, their rebellious mourning purely a manifestation of enduring post-traumatic stress disorders (see Edkins 2003). "Ilsa" perhaps invokes this discourse the most clearly in my interviews:

> There's an element that just can't move on. They haven't been able to… well maybe not [achieve] closure, but to sort of put it away and compartmentalise it now and deal with it. There's certain people who were really involved in the Bloody Sunday Justice Campaign and they just can't let it go… They've been involved in it so long they find it hard to put it aside now, to get on with their lives… And that's psychological trauma, I think.

Here Ilsa conflates rebellious mourning with pseudo-Freudian melancholia, conflating refusal with pathology. But the spatiotemporal politics of refusal that circulate amongst colonised and oppressed people cannot be neatly laid at the proverbial feet of the disciplining diagnosis of post-traumatic stress (Edkins 2003; Robinson 2022; Simpson 2014). In its original Marcusian (1969) form, the politics of refusal is radical, a "permanent challenge" (ix-x), a ceaseless "protest against that which is" (6) (see Lamas, Wolfson, and Funke 2016). As I argued in the previous chapter, both factions of the so-called Bloody Sunday families have consistently misstated or misrepresented the other factions' beliefs and actions through these sorts of conflations. Refusal is not necessarily psychopathology or physical-force Republicanism, the desire to see the end of the march, and thus retain some degree of control over the public politics of Bloody Sunday memory, is not necessarily nefarious political manoeuvring. While the jump to these conflations certainly has its roots in interpersonal and political disagreements, it is exacerbated by a failure to apprehend the sorts of spectral entanglements involved in the March and the Bloody Sunday Weekend, in continuing to bear aloft the spectral convocation through the streets of the Creggan and the Bogside. The

spectral convocation both cannot be split into individual ghosts, all fourteen must haunt together. Additionally, it "belongs" not only to those who loved them in life but to all those who would consort with them, ambiguating and occasionally usurping their post-corporeal silence. For these reasons, for people like Ilsa, forcing a loved one to continue to haunt through the vehicle of the march is an unconscionable affront. For others, like Colin, the reverse is true, trying to stop the march is tantamount to silencing the ghosts once more. And amongst all of this, there sits the uneasy presence of physical-force Republicans on the march itself, who seek to ambiguate and usurp the spectral unfinishedness of Bloody Sunday to declaim an "unfinished revolution." It is to these actors and the march itself I now turn.

IV.   GHOSTS ON THE MARCH: CHOREOGRAPHY, PERFORMANCE, DISSONANCE

The Bloody Sunday March retraces the route of the original 1972 March, beginning at the Creggan shops on Central Drive midway up the steep hill overlooking the Foyle Basin on which the sprawling estate of Creggan is situated. From this mustering point, it then meanders south and west, skirting the large Derry City Cemetery, before it descends sharply east to the base of the Creggan hill and north into Bogside. Upon entering the Bogside, it traces the circumference of the original killing ground in 1972, before descending again to the former "Aggro Corner" at the junction of William and Rossville Streets and then striking into the heart of the Bogside to its ultimate destination, the Bloody Sunday Monument. At the Monument, there is a wreath-laying ceremony. The first wreath is lain by representatives of the official guest that year, during the years I observed the march, these official guests were, respectively, the Ballymurphy Justice Campaign, the Hillsborough Campaign Group, the Justice4Grenfell Campaign, and representatives of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanction (BDS) movement representing the occupied Palestinian Territories. Next, a wreath is lain at

the Monument by a representative of one of the fourteen people killed or injured in 1972, usually this representative is a child or a teenager. These wreaths join wreaths lain earlier that day at a morning ceremony sponsored by the Bloody Sunday Trust, generally a vigil and a space for those who do not wish to, or may be physically unable to, participate in the march that afternoon.

The wreaths lain with the imprimatur of either the Bloody Sunday Trust or the Bloody Sunday March Committee are the only sanctioned interaction with the memorial, however, at some point later in the day, wreaths will be lain by representatives of physical-force Republican groups, which are not removed or molested. After the wreath-laying ceremony, the March dissipates, some marchers and march-watchers head for home, but the majority crosses Rossville Street to Free Derry Corner where a temporary daïs has been erected directly in front of Free Derry Wall. On this dais, speakers invited to speak by the March Committee address the crowd.

Before I begin discussing the march ordering and choreography in any detail, I wish to specify how I am referring to what, in contemporary discourse, tend to be known as "dissident Republicans" or "dissidents." Their own preferred self-identification is with the adjective "radical" Republicans (McGlinchey 2019). I do not feel compelled to accept this self-identification. Loosely, "dissident" Republicans are individuals and groups who continue to believe that physical-force resistance is a legitimate means to oppose British sovereignty on the island of Ireland and who do not accept the consent principles of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement now officially accepted by Sinn Féin. This definition may sweep up some individuals and groups who believe in these ideals but would never engage in physical force themselves, thus I prefer (and have used thus far) the term "physical force" Republicans to describe those Republicans and Republican groups who occasionally

perpetuate and organise violent acts and civil unrest through recourse to what they believe are Republican principles.

One key point to be made here is that physical-force Republicans invariably agree that Sinn Féin has abandoned its Republican principles by participating in the Irish Peace Process and accepting the principles of consent. As such, they see themselves as the only true successors of the Provisional IRA and the INLA. But in Derry, and within the fraught politics of Bloody Sunday public memory, people who are not physical-force Republicans are sometimes classified as "dissidents" simply because they are Republicans who do not support Sinn Féin. Virtually every respondent on the current Bloody Sunday March Committee told me they have been referred to, falsely, according to them, as a "dissident" on several occasions. Thus, I refuse both the monikers "dissident" and "radical."

Physical-force Republicans, every year except 2018 when they boycotted the march (see below), represent the numerically largest faction participating in the Bloody Sunday March every year that I observed. Every member of the Bloody Sunday March Committee I interviewed had an at least slightly defensive perspective on their presence, a perspective that they had clearly had to deploy in response to numerous public challenges. These perspectives were different, generally in keeping with varying degrees of sympathy for Republican politics, however, they all coalesced around the belief that the Committee did not own the march and thus could not tell anybody or any faction to march or not to march under the banner of Bloody Sunday. My research partners asserted that attempting to control the March was exactly the tactics Sinn Féin had engaged in throughout its decades-long tenure as primary March curator, and as the current iteration of the March was formed in opposition to Sinn Féin's attempted projection of control, they could not make the same error. The current

march, for Chloe, has to be all-inclusive or it will simply become a vehicle for someone else to control.

> We had to say all-inclusive because we had to show the democracy that Sinn Féin didn't show all those years. We had to show that we would welcome Protestant groupings, victims from cross-community, we had to include all those people.

Yet Chloe, cannot bring herself or the Committee to cede the space over wholly to physical-force Republicans, to grant them pride of place.

> We have never given [physical-force Republican groups] a voice on that stage. And they will never have a voice, not as long as we run it, Joe, they will never have a voice on that stage. Nobody speaking violence. But people who are protesting, who believe in protesting, peacefully, we will give them a voice, we will certainly give them a voice.

> But the question must be asked, how does Chloe and the rest of the Committee

insulate, as it were, the spectral convocation from violent and potentially-violent shows of force, how do they seek to prevent the ghosts of Bloody Sunday from being ambiguated to speak to a particular form of unfinishedness, the unfinishedness of the Republican struggle and the necessity to continue the violence of the past? For many in Derry, including former members of the BSJC, they have failed to do so and the only way to prevent physical-force Republicans' usurpation and colonisation of the spectral convocation is to deny them the symbolically resonant space of the March, to stop it entirely. Here, "Finn" and Cillian, two people who are sympathetic to the Bloody Sunday March Committee, detail their reasons for no longer participating in the March itself. We will here from Finn first.

> I don't go on [the marches] now. I remember the dissidents starting to move in and starting to move up towards the front so that they would have been almost directly behind the families… My fear was then that they were going to start using the march for their own purposes… and I certainly didn't want to be seen along with the dissidents at the time.

Cillian's perspective is similar:

> I still don't like the tricolours [the Irish flag] on [the march], I still don't like the [Republican] bands on it, as far as I'm concerned there is no place for any of that… Have a dignified march in respect of what happened that day. Show respect for what

happened that day!... The dissidents in the Republican movement have their own commemorations at Easter and everything else!

For Finn especially, it is the spatial proximity of physical-force Republicans to the spectral convocation itself that is especially galling, the way they "move up towards the front." The choreography of the March itself, as I came to find out, is extremely important. Physical proximity to the spectral convocation, which invariably fronts the march, also metaphorically becomes the convocation's political proximity to a given cause, party, or group. The March ordering at the mustering and the raised daïs for speakers at the end are places where the current Bloody Sunday March Committee deploys spatial proximity and spatial distancing to demonstrate its own political preferences. And Chloe is very clear about where she and the current Bloody Sunday March Committee see as the appropriate place for physical-force Republicans on the March:

> But these groupings, you're talking about IRA groupings, and you know, even they accept [where in the march they are placed]. And if you look, Joe, they will go further back in the march. Even they accept that, that they're at the back. The back of the march. Yes, that's purposeful.

The preceding excerpt from Chloe took place in an interview in 2017. I believe, with Finn and Cillian, that physical-force Republicans had not always been as accepting of their distancing as Chloe reports, nor, as we shall see, were they as accepting of their spatial and metaphorical marginalisation from the spectral convocation in the subsequent years. While Chloe's attitude towards the large presence of physical-force Republicans is neither welcoming nor hospitable, both she balks at banishing any person, group, or faction from the March itself, nor is it clear if the current March Committee would have the power to banish physical-force Republicans entirely. Rather, they attempt to subtly signal their pleasure or displeasure through coded, but widely understood, spatial messages. I will flesh out these conclusions through some of this through my own ethnography on the 2017 march shortly.

But for many who no longer march, this coded signalling is insufficient. "Emily"

(family member) rejects the presence of physical-force Republicanism in the space of the

spectral convocation quite clearly.

> For me it's a funny one. Like the SDLP and Sinn Féin are there [on the daïs, prior to 2011] and people turn their backs, yet people will openly march with an organisation that are openly trying to kill people. What have we been doing the last [fifty] years but trying to get away from that!

When I put Emily's perspectives to the current March Committee, they argued it was

hypocritical. When the march was curated by Sinn Féin (1974-92), people such as Emily also

marched not only next to Sinn Féin, but in a march organised by them, the political wing of

the IRA, an organisation "actively trying to kill people." As Colin puts it:

> The March, for over 40 years had Sinn Féin there, had Máire Drumm [on the daïs, saying] "Send [the British] home in wooden overcoats! I wonder what the view [of people like Emily] was when Máire Drumm was up there saying that?

To briefly contextualise Colin's quote, Máire Drumm was the vice-president of Sinn Féin and

a leading ideologue of Irish Republicanism. She was assassinated by Loyalists in the Mater

Hospital in Belfast in 1976. The translation of "wooden overcoats" is, of course, "coffins."

Colin's point bears further reflection. To have marched carrying the spectral convocation

through the streets of Derry between 1974-1992 required marching alongside Gerry Adams,

Martin McGuinness, and other leading Republicans, it required listening to their speeches and

violent Republican perspectives, it required allowing violent Republicanism to claim, at least

in part, to consort with the spectral convocation, to speak for them. As we have seen in the

previous chapter, my research participants, on both sides of the March debate, acknowledge

the spectral convocation's demand for Ricoeur's "duty of memory" could not be sustained

without the ambiguation of their dead bodies into Republican justice frames. "Lily" (family

member), finds a way out of the seeming paradox with a quite simple riposte: That was then,

this is now.

Lily: There's a lot of dissident Republican banners and flags and I really don't support dissident activity in any way, shape, or form. They're using Bloody Sunday for their own ends, aye, for their own ends. Which you know, Sinn Féin did back in the day.

Author: Would there be something about dissidents as opposed to Sinn Féin?

Lily: Well, we have a peace now, and it's not a bloody perfect peace but people are not getting killed in the streets. And there's a lot to be said for that… Pardon the expression but what the fuck are we talking about now?

"Alex" is another close relative of a victim of Bloody Sunday who spoke to me. Alex, unlike most my other research partners, is not associated with a side regarding the ongoing march debate and makes no political-temporal distinction between marches before and after 2011. Remarkably, at least in terms of my own presuppositions and prejudices, Alex also sees little distinction, temporal or otherwise, among Republicans on the march, conflating throughout Sinn Féin and groups like Saoradh under the same Republican moniker, and distancing himself from both and all. The reason why Alex no longer marches has to do with his advancing years and decreasing mobility, but his perspective speaks directly to Verdery's and McDowell's points about the usurpation of bodies and voices.

You start off at the start [of the March], holding the photograph, and you look over your shoulder, and the people you see, you say, what the fuck are they? But what can you do? But because they want to be seen to be associated with the Bloody Sunday name and thing, you've got no choice [except to march with them]. You've got no choice. If I don't turn up, or one of my other family members wasn't there, who was to carry that photo?

Who indeed? While both Lily and Emily clearly reject any manifestation of physical-force Republicanism in *any* proximity to the spectral convocation, Alex's testimony poignantly complicates the simplicity of their rejection. Alex's testimony speaks to the historical entanglements of the spectral convocation with varieties of violent Irish Republicanism. Alex's testimony contains an acknowledgment of inevitable loss, an inevitable loss of control over the post-corporeal life of his loved one. If he and his family wish to retain some degree of ownership over his loved one's post-corporeal life, they must shoulder the burden marching amongst the spectres, regardless of the fact that the social legibility of their act will

always reflect not only their own, intra-familial duty of memory, but the multidirectional memory demands of the haunted city.

I argue Alex's testimony points again to that poignant acknowledgment that where the dead consort with the living in public space, they must inevitably depart from the at least full control of those who loved them in life. "Oscar," (community activist, march organiser) perhaps advances the clearest statement of inevitable loss of control. He begins with a deconstruction of the myth of the "Bloody Sunday families" as a unified collectivity:

> The construction of collectives like 'the families,' I believe is always strewn with difficulty. I think the families, when the families were not split, they were split, and now that they are split, they are split. But they were never all on the same page.

For context, it is commonplace in historical narratives of the BSJC to homogenise a diverse collection of related individuals into a "family" and then to upscale these collections into a larger campaigning unit, "the Bloody Sunday Families" (e.g. Campbell 2012). This largely functions as a narrative heuristic, a simplification of the complex story of the Campaign into a readable narrative chronology, but it was also a strategy of the BSJC itself. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the heuristic functioned as part of a carefully-controlled consensus (Conway, 2010) through which the BSJC translated the monumental atrocity of the Bloody Sunday into broken-down, widely communicable forms (McLaughlin and Baker 2015) in order to project the monumental injustice of Bloody Sunday and Widgery out of its spatial confines in the Nationalist Cityside. Oscar here simply points out how difficult it is in real-life to draw a box around who exactly gets to be counted as a legitimate "Bloody Sunday family member" and how such a box invariably reduces complex inter-personal politics to a single, unified unit. He then continues to point out how such a reductionist construction was wielded against those who wished to continue marching, through appeals to a supposed "majority of the Bloody Sunday Families." Oscar not only rejects this appeal, he rejects the

ownership of these constructed collectivites over the spatial memory-politics of Bloody Sunday in favour of the city of Derry as a whole.

> They cannot mandate that we don't march. And I don't think that's the Families' call, because anybody could have been shot on that [original] March, besides the people who were shot.

The visual manifestation of these politics and counter-discourses are especially visible during the Bloody Sunday Weekend in two major, mobile places. The first is at the march mustering and the carefully policed, but largely invisible, systems of control exercised over the order various groups line up behind the spectral convocation. The second place is throughout the March route, but especially at its culmination, Free Derry Corner, where the Bogside's most enduring chronotopic threshold is curated to reflect that year's march themes, but also surrounded by spatially anarchic "symbolic accretions" (Dwyer 2004; Foote 2003) that work to demand spatial proximity to the voiceless spectral convocation. I will examine the mustering first, followed by the chronotopic geographical curation of Free Derry Corner during the Weekend.

When I first observed the march, 2015, I noticed a loose and seemingly unspoken self-ordering of the various political groups presenting themselves at the March mustering outside of the Creggan shops. By the end of 2016, I had completed an initial phase of interviews with the March Committee, and had discovered that the order was regulated, but I remained unable to observe any formal regulating system at the march itself. However this regulation is done, it is done quietly and behind the scenes. It was successful in 2016 but ran into difficulties with physical force Republicans questioning their "place" in 2017, leading to a complete boycott of the march by those groups in 2018.

Generally, at the front of the March is a banner bearing the march's official slogan of that year. Immediately behind the banner walks the spectral convocation in the form of

fourteen wooden crosses, and often, photographs of the original victim. The crosses are often born by young people who may bear some familial relationship to the original victim represented, however, just how close that connection is may vary. Some of the acknowledged closest relative to an individual victim refuse to march and openly oppose the March, but there is never any thought of removing that representation. As a convocation, the fourteen must haunt together. Immediately behind the spectral convocation is the Ballymurphy Justice Campaign, whose loved ones were also murdered by 1 PARA in August 1971, five months before Bloody Sunday. Following Ballymurphy is the official invited guest group or campaign of that year, if there is one that year. Directly behind them comes the Parkgate Republican Flute Band from Glasgow that, according the organisers, was the only Republican band that rejected the 2011 attempt to end the march, hence their pride of place. After these closely regulated groups, the order loosens a bit and the next major cluster is what I have always referred to (a bit tongue-in-cheek) as "left-wing various." These groups can include reproductive rights campaigners, environmental campaigners, housing justice campaigns, economic justice campaigns, and campaigns associated with specific acts of Irish or British State and/or police injustice. The crucial characteristic of these groups is that they are all, for the most part, either non-violent or not openly advocating violent resistance on the March itself. The March organisers I interviewed were all especially keen to communicate to me they often included groups they personally disagreed with. For example, a conservative Catholic member made a special point to note they regularly marched with reproductive rights groups and LGBTQI+ groups. For another member, whose personal politics run to the Marxist Left, the reverse is true, and they also repeatedly pointed to pro-life or anti-reproductive-rights groups marching in that space. Both were quite keen to draw my attention to the March committee's policy of total inclusion as a not-so-oblique precursor to my questions about physical-force Republicans.

Prior to 2011, this would have been the space that Sinn Féin and the SDLP would have marched under their party banners. Now marching slightly behind "left-wing various" generally comes the smaller all-Ireland Trotskyist (McCabe 2015) political party, People Before Profit, and generally following them is the Workers' Solidarity Movement, which defines itself as an anarcho-communist organisation. Within this loose cluster mostly taken up (but not always) by the at least partially-organised Irish left, the lines become blurred as throughout the march people move up and back to talk to and march with friends, colleagues, and fellow travellers.

The final cluster is physical-force Republican groups and individuals, making up the single largest cluster numerically, save for the 2018 year they boycotted. Several factions are represented, but by 2017, the largest numerically became Saoradh and the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP). The former is largely the result of the unification of a number of smaller physical-force Republican groups and allegedly the political wing of the "New IRA," though Saoradh claims it is a stand-alone political party (Young 2016). The latter is the political wing of the INLA, which officially ended its armed campaign in 2009, but which has not ceased paramilitary activity (Jupp and Garrod 2019).

My personal experience observing and ultimately being drawn into regulating the marching order will reinforce the system that regulates spatial proximity to the spectral convocation, and with it, the right to speak through the Bloody Sunday atrocity. In 2017, I lived in Dublin and was a volunteer organiser with the Irish Housing Network (IHN), an umbrella group representing a number of localised campaigns for safe, affordable, and secure housing. In December 2016, the IHN catapulted into the news media by occupying a building known as Apollo House in City Centre Dublin, where they set up a functioning homeless hostel as part of a nearly six-week coordinated campaign of civil disobedience (O'Callaghan,

et al. 2018). Organisers of the Apollo House campaign that I personally knew and volunteered with were invited to Derry to speak as part of the Bloody Sunday Weekend and to participate in the march.

When my colleagues arrived at the mustering, wanting to be respectful to their hosts and to the event itself, the took a place in the mustering towards the rear. Having never participated, they were unaware of the regulation of the march order. I noticed immediately that they were in the wrong place, surrounded by the banners of Saoradh and the IRSP. My initial response, as an academic observer, was to quickly set up nearby with my camera, hoping to observe evidence of the regulation of the marching order which I had as of then been unable to document. But as this failed to materialise, I grew increasingly uncomfortable as a member of the IHN myself. I quickly abandoned my personal fiction of being an impartial observer and approached my friend and colleague to whisper in her ear. My friend's response conveyed to me that they too had been feeling increasingly uncomfortable. Ultimately, they followed me away from the place where they had initially set up. We walked forward casually, each of us instantly interpreting that there was no need to excite any attention about changing the IHN's place. Two men I also knew, representing an environmental campaigning group, beckoned the IHN contingent in behind them, in the appropriate "left-wing various" cluster, just in front of PBP (Figure 6). As I made my way back to the footpath, I was immensely happy to see the IHN contingent shaking hands and smiling, now safely in their proper place. I also noticed one of the March Committee had been observing the entire interaction. She said nothing to me directly, but walked up to me and lightly squeezed my arm in thanks.

Figure 6: Irish Housing Network on the Bloody Sunday March. Creggan, Derry, 2017. Photo by author.

Physical-force Republicans do not and have not always accepted the informal regulation of the marching order, as Finn intimated above. In 2017, during my observations, their relegation to the back of the March became quite contentious. In 2017, at the culmination of the march, a small group of people representing the "Free Tony Taylor" campaign occupied the area directly in front of the daïs at Free Derry Corner, symbolically and spatially demanding a place directly next to the invited speakers (Figure 7). Tony Taylor is a physical-force Republican activist and at the time was the spokesperson for a group styling itself Republican Network for Unity (RNU). Taylor is an ex-Provisional IRA prisoner released under the terms of the Agreement. In 2011, he was arrested again for possession of a rifle and sentenced to three years in prison with five more to be served on license. In 2016, however, Taylor's license was revoked and he was returned to prison.

Figure 7: Free Tony Taylor campaigning group at the Bloody Sunday speakers' daïs. The Bogside, Derry, 2017. Photo by author.

No reason was ever given publicly for the revoke of Taylor's license. Taylor's case quickly became somewhat of a cause célèbre amongst physical-force Republican groups, who argued that Taylor was interned without trial. Internment is a highly emotive charge in Northern Ireland, and especially in the context of Bloody Sunday, where the original March was an "anti-internment" march. After Taylor was re-imprisoned, a large billboard was erected at Free Derry Corner that counted the days Taylor had been "interned" (Figure 8). While Taylor was not interned under the strict definition of that term, rather, his license had been revoked, the fact that the PSNI and NIO refused to provide any evidence that could justify the revocation allowed the charge of internment to be easily deployed. While Taylor's case was championed most prominently by physical-force Republicans, outrage was not confined merely to those groups. Both Sinn Féin and the SDLP criticised his continuing imprisonment and Taylor's case was even raised by the right-wing government of the Republic of Ireland before the European Parliament and the ECHR. Taylor was eventually released in November 2018.

Figure 8: Tony Taylor internment billboard. The Bogside, Derry, 2018. Photo by author.

In 2017, as the speakers' dais was being set-up and Kate Nash was preparing to introduce the invited speakers for that year, five people cautiously marched forward and raised the "Free Tony Taylor" banner aloft. Their action was a silent protest against what they saw as their continuing distancing from the spectral convocation, from their right to ambiguate the voices of those fourteen post-corporeal bodies to speak for justice for Republican "internees" (Figure 7). The slogan on the banner: "45 years on from Bloody Sunday—What has changed?" explicitly challenged the March organisers along one of their key temporal themes. If Taylor's case proved that the weapon of internment wielded disproportionately against the Nationalist-Republican community was alive and well, then the same conditions present during the height of the Troubles persisted into the present. If the fourteen young men murdered on the original Bloody Sunday had died during an "anti-internment" march, and Taylor's circumstances proved there was no viable temporal break between internment past and internment present, then the marginalisation of physical-force Republicans from the powerful ambiguated presence of the spectral convocation was untenable. The radical unfinishedness of the Bloody Sunday Justice Campaign must also be

the radical unfinishedness of the Republican "revolution." Nash, in her introductory speech, did not call any direct attention to the temporary occupation, but she did reference Taylor's situation amongst a litany of other State injustices.

Later that year, in 2017, the Museum of Free Derry, an initiative of the Bloody Sunday Trust, curated an exhibit highlighting the names of every person who had lost their lives during the Troubles in Derry, including the names of British soldiers. In response, two of members of the Bloody Sunday March Committee, Linda Nash and Helen Deery, occupied the Museum and refused to leave until their loved ones' names were removed from the exhibit (McKinney 2017). Linda Nash and Deery's political motivations for their occupation were a refusal to allow their loved ones' ghosts to share in a remembrance space that also gave even tacit welcome to British soldiers, however, as I discussed in the previous chapter, tensions and mistrust between the Bloody Sunday Trust and the Bloody Sunday March Committee have been heated since the 2011 attempt to stop the march. Yet, in 2018, the Bloody Sunday March Committee, faced what on-the-surface seemed to be a similar challenge from physical-force Republicans led by Saoradh and the IRSP. This culminated in the 2018 march boycott by physical-force Republicans.

Continuing the more internationalist human-rights framing preferred by organisers such as Oscar, the 2018 official programme of the Bloody Sunday Week adopted the central slogan of the US Civil Rights Movement, "We Shall Overcome." The pamphlets, posters and other promotional materials for the 2018 Bloody Sunday Week featured this slogan superimposed over a white backdrop featuring a list of names and political campaigns (Figure 9). The names in the background form quite a provocative tableau.

Figure 9: 2018 Official Bloody Sunday March for Justice Leaflet. Available at: http://bloodysundaymarch.org/for_justice/.

The names forming the spectral convocation, for example, are given no particular pride of place amongst the cascade of other names. But more controversially, the image gives ample space to victims and survivors of Republican atrocities perpetrated during the Troubles, signalling a clear rejection of Sinn Féin's right to ambiguate the spectral convocation. Interspersed amongst the names of the victims of Bloody Sunday, one can find "Enniskillen," "Paul Quinn," "the victims of Scapaticci," "the Disappeared," "the Kingsmill Massacre," and the "Shankill Bombing," all direct references to IRA-perpetrated acts of deadly violence. While this was not the first time survivors or bereaved of Republican violence had spoken at events during the Bloody Sunday Week or taken part in the march, the 2018 programme marked the first attempt to systematically ambiguate the spectral convocation to also speak for these groups and communities. Many older members of physical force Republican groups, such as Tony Taylor, were also members of the IRA or the INLA, and as such, may have

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found themselves targeted by those references. However, two additional references, one to "William Best" and another to "punishment beatings" provided physical force Republicans with the justification for their boycott. William Best was a 19-year old Catholic Derry-man from Creggan who also, at the time of his killing in 1972, was serving with the Royal Irish Rangers regiment of the British army and stationed in Germany. He had never served in Northern Ireland. He returned to Derry whilst on leave to visit his family and on 21 May 1972, was abducted by the then Official IRA, allegedly "tried" by an IRA court, found guilty, and shot dead. His body was then dumped on William Street in the heart of the Bogside. Best's murder was met by widespread revulsion in Derry's Catholic neighbourhoods and is widely credited with being one of the factors that forced an Official IRA ceasefire later that year and ultimately led to the end of that organisation (Lesley-Dixon 2018) by 1975. Members of the Officials who opposed the ceasefire formed the INLA in 1974, others merely drifted into the Provisional IRA (Hanley and Millar 2010). The remnants of Official Sinn Féin first became the short-lived Sinn Féin—The Worker's Party and finally simply the Workers' Party of Ireland, which persists to this day in the form of a small, hard-left political party active almost exclusively in the southern Republic. In *War and an Irish Town*, Eamonn McCann (1993, 163) argues that Best's killing could not be subsumed into the simple killing of a British soldier:

> Best was not, of course an ordinary soldier. He was a local lad, the son of solid and inoffensive parents who lived in a council house in Creggan, and his killing outraged that very feeling of communal solidarity… that was absolutely essential to the maintenance of Free Derry.

However, for physical-force Republicans, Best's inclusion in the space of the official Weekend space was unacceptable, and tantamount to hypocrisy on the part of the March Committee after Linda Nash and Helen Deery's sit-in protest early that year. John Brady's name is also included in the programme art, a former member of the Real IRA (now superseded by Saoradh) who according to the PSNI committed suicide whilst in police

custody in Derry's Strand Row Station. Mr. Brady's family believes his suicide was staged to cover up his murder by the PSNI (Irish Republican News 2009; McDonald 2010). The Police Ombudsman's Report on Brady's death did not substantiate the family's claim, however, one officer was suspended for negligence. Brady's sister, Lorna Brady, deploys nearly identical language to Linda Nash and Deery in rejecting her brother's ghost's inclusion in the same memory-space as Best's and it is hard not to believe the language was carefully calibrated to call attention to the March Committee's supposed hypocrisy:

> There are different names on that poster that I don't believe should be on it… It's hurtful to see my brother's name on it. My brother was a Republican… there are names of MI5 agents, British soldiers, and different things on it. Our family's suffered because of this and they are putting his name up beside some of the people who caused it (quoted in McDonald 2010).

Late in 2018, I engaged in follow-up discussions with members of the Committee I had previously interviewed on the subject of the Free Tony Taylor Campaign's actions of the previous year and the controversial 2018 programme. Both Chloe and Oscar informed me that they saw the furore over Best as a convenient excuse for physical-force Republicans to boycott, saying they believed these groups' real agenda lay in undermining the inclusion of "punishment beatings" on the official art and the inclusion of a panel discussion entitled "Brutal Justice: The Community's View's." The Brutal Justice event featured William Allen, the uncle of Andy Allen murdered by physical-force Republican "anti-drugs" vigilantism in 2013, and John Lindsay, an author (2012) and local campaigner against paramilitary violence.

Both the INLA and the New IRA during this period were involved in a rash of paramilitary attacks in Derry, including beatings and shootings. While these organisations do not officially claim responsibility for these attacks, they have myriad ways of making their responsibility known, including social media, not-so-subtle coded leaks to local journalists, and using the inscriptive space of Derry's working-class neighbourhoods. For example, in

Figure 10 below, the masked paramilitary members in the photo are standing at a specific place in the Galliagh neighbourhood of Derry where a recent paramilitary attack occurred, having presumably painted fresh INLA graffiti there (see McKinney 2019). This is of course a local claim of responsibility, but one that allows the INLA to conveniently pretend it is still on ceasefire (Figure 11).

As I argued above and in the previous chapter, the material, inscriptive space of the Derry's Cityside, especially the Bogside and the Creggan, refract the multidirectional discursive tension surrounding who has the right to ambiguate and stand proximate to the spectral convocation. In the weeks leading up to the annual march, the inscriptive space of the Cityside resembles Schein's "discourse materialised," but the discourses are multiple, competing, oftentimes borderline anarchic. As both Sinn Féin and the Bloody Sunday Trust withdraw from attempting to exert control over the inscriptive space of the Bogside during the Bloody Sunday Week, and as the current March Committee remains ideologically opposed to attempting to exert full control, and as both physical-force Republicans *and* (generally) left-wing groups step up their transgressive inscriptive campaigns in an attempt to ambiguate the voiceless spectres, the Cityside's memory-space splinters into a borderline-anarchic canvas. While this inscriptive polyphony can be read throughout the route of the march, perhaps the inscriptive competition can be most acutely read at Free Derry Corner and on the central inscriptive threshold of Bloody Sunday and working-class nationalist Derry itself, the Free Derry Wall. The original and iconic "You are now Entering Free Derry" slogan was inspired, claims Eamonn McCann (1993), by the Free Speech Movement that took place from 1964-66 largely on and about the campus of the University of California at Berkeley in the United States (Cohen and Zelnik 2002).

Figure 10: INLA Graffiti and show of force. Galliagh, Derry. Photo shared widely on social media.

Figure 11: INLA Graffiti, Rosemount, Derry. Photo shared with author by an anonymous source. Used with Permission.

The slogan's origins, like the memory politics of Bloody Sunday itself, largely became lost after the demise of the Civil Rights and Free Derry movements, "Free Derry" became less associated with an internationalist civil rights struggle and more associated with a narrow Republican framing. Free Derry became the promise of "Free Ireland" (Ó Dochartaigh 2004). Free Derry Wall today regularly is re-painted and its slogan altered to temporarily reflect solidarity with different campaigns and political issues. Control over the most iconic inscriptive space is allegedly in the hands of a standing local "committee," though who comprises this committee and how they are selected I personally have never been able to discover (nor have others, see Fealty 2010).

For Kenneth Foote (2003), "symbolic accretion" is the "appending of commemorative elements onto already existing memorials" (231-2). For Foote, Dwyer (2004), and Post (2009), the process involves memory curators attempting to discursively expand an already "sanctified" memory-place to include another strand of memory that may be controversial, offensive, or simply not-yet sanctified. In figure 12, physical-force Republicans (presumably) have attempted to accrete onto the sanctified place of Free Derry Wall the slogan "#Free Hega," referring to physical-force Republican prisoner Neil Hegarty, who like Tony Taylor, they claimed was also interned at Maghaberry Prison. In another photograph I took (Figure 13) in 2016 at a highly-visible point along the march route, where the march first turns down the Southway, reproductive rights campaigners on the march have attempted to affix another iconic image, that of Savita Hallapanavar, who died in Galway 2012 after being denied a medically-necessary abortion, over or at least next to unruly graffiti associated with physical-force Republicans.

Figure 12: Free Derry Wall, accreted with #freeHega slogan, The Bogside, Derry, 2018. Photo by author.

Figure 13: Savita on the Bloody Sunday March. Creggan, Derry, 2016. Photo by author.

These sorts of complex, uneasy, and at least partially-encoded contestations are legion throughout the week, refracting the strange and uneasy tensions that now surround all aspects of Bloody Sunday public memory performance in Derry since the release of the Report.

To return to the quotation from Herron and Lynch cited earlier (2007), on whose work I have based the idea of the spectral convocation, I do not believe that the natural end-point of the ghosts and complex hauntings of Bloody Sunday is to ever "find peace," or be laid to rest. Perhaps, as Colin so eloquently argues, their role is to never die at all, *la meurte no existe,* to continue to stand and be borne aloft by as many different conceptualisations of duty and justice as the city itself can hold. In this formulation, there is always pain. Ghosts are painful, and the pain felt by those who loved them in life seeing their haunting presence constantly usurped, their voicelessness ambiguated, should never be taken for granted. Rather, perhaps, this struggle to let them, finally, in their myriad post-corporeal forms, die and be laid to rest, is merely another strand in the dizzying polyphonic cacophony of justice demands that their brutal, senseless, and horrifying murders so long ago unleashed. But the crucial error so many erstwhile curators of the spectral convocation make is to presume they can ever be ambiguated into a unified narrative. They will be made to speak in as many voices as the city can hold.

V.   THE GHOST OF LYRA MCKEE

On 18 April 2019, ahead of the annual Easter Rising commemorative parades in Derry that have proven to be flashpoints of physical force Republican rioting and violence in recent years, a 29-year-old journalist and essayist named Lyra McKee was shot dead by a bullet fired from a physical force Republican in the general direction of police officers in the Creggan. Originally from Belfast, McKee had recently moved to Derry to be with her partner, a Derry-woman named Sara Canning. McKee's written work focused on the consequences of

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violence, specifically about both Troubles violence and anti-LGBTQI+ violence in Northern Ireland and elsewhere. At the time of her death, McKee was preparing to propose to Canning, had just a signed a two-book non-fiction deal with Faber and Faber based on her investigative journalism, and been named as one of the "10 rising stars of Irish writing" by the Irish Times (Doyle 2019). In McKee's (2016) essay, *Suicide of the Ceasefire Babies,* she interrogates the sharp spike in suicides in Northern Ireland amongst the so-called "ceasefire generation," those, like her, "destined to never witness the horrors of war but to reap the spoils of peace. The spoils just never seemed to reach us." *Suicide of the Ceasefire Babies* is part sociological interrogation and part brutally honest memoir of the suicides of several of her friends amidst the homophobic abuse they suffered growing up Queer in Belfast. Considering her subsequent murder, McKee's conclusion becomes hauntingly and horrifyingly prophetic.

> Those who survived the Troubles called us the Ceasefire Babies, as if resentful that we'd grown up unaccustomed to the sound of gunfire, assuming that we didn't have dead to mourn like they did. Yet we did. Sometimes, I count their names on my fingers, quickly running out of digits. Friends, friends of friends, neighbours' relatives, the kids whose faces I knew but whose names I learned only from the obituary column. The tragic irony of life in Northern Ireland today is that peace seems to claimed more lives than war ever did (n.p.).

 While three people have been charged in connection with McKee's murder, the gunman himself remains unidentified. Nobody as of this writing (April 2022) has been convicted in connection with McKee's murder. Shortly after her murder, the unregistered political party Saoradh, speaking on behalf of the so-called "New IRA," claimed responsibility for the murder, stating: "A republican volunteer attempted to defend people from the PSNI/RUC… tragically, a young journalist, Lyra McKee, was killed accidentally" (quoted in Carroll 2019). Saoradh, as I have discussed, since 2016 has been the single largest physical-force Republican faction, and thus the largest single faction, on the Bloody Sunday March.

Predictably, Lyra McKee's murder provoked outrage and revulsion from across the formal political spectrum. Immediately after her murder, a group of her friends and family

protested outside of Derry's Junior McDaid House, the headquarters of Saoradh in Derry, by pressing red hand prints onto the mural outside of the office while alleged leaders of Saoradh looked on threateningly with their arms crossed. However, McKee's murder has not seemed to alter the public performances of Saoradh's physical-force Republicanism. Rather, Saoradh continues to hold illegal paramilitary-style marches every Easter in Creggan that degenerate into organised violence and rioting, often peculiarly timed to coincide with the annual vigil for Lyra McKee and other murdered journalists held annually since her death in front of Guildhall Square. McKee's family argues the rioting is part of a suite of tactics designed to divert attention away from McKee's memory (BBC 2022). In January, 2022, one of the three men currently charged as an accessory in McKee's murder, Peter Gearóid Cavanagh, requested and received permission from the Derry Magistrate's Court to temporarily suspend one of the conditions of his bail that prevented him from entering the Creggan Estate. Cavanagh asked for the suspension *in order that he could attend* the 2022 Annual Bloody Sunday March (MacDermott 2022), presumably to march in the Saoradh faction.

I wish to close these two chapters on a somewhat speculative note. In them, I have argued that the fourteen victims of Bloody Sunday form what Herron and Lynch (2007) refer to as a spectral convocation perpetually haunting the streets of the working-class Nationalist neighbourhoods of the Creggan and the Bogside in Derry. Their particular from of haunting comes in the form of a silent "duty to remember" (*devoir de mémoire)*, that in Ricoeur's well-known formulation, presents itself as a requirement to stand for the idea of justice. Yet justice within Derry and what it means are, and have always been, highly contested. During the different phases of Bloody Sunday commemoration in the city, actors have attempted to synthesise those multidirectional ideas of justice, and the sense of duty they provoke, into a unified political and social narrative. During the phase of Sinn Féin control and/or surrogacy, the duty of memory was to drive the British out of Ireland, only without the deleterious

occupying presence of British rule on Irish soil could justice for the spectral convocation ever be achieved. In contrast, the Bloody Sunday Justice Campaign, from 1992-2010, attempted to impose a different, more-consensual framework, one concerned with how the atrocity was perceived from the outside, especially in the Republic of Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Within the BSJC, the spectral convocation came to stand for the idea of human rights, shepherded by the original three justice demands publicised by the BSJC in 1992.

Yet my argument throughout these chapters has been that the historical memories and narratives of an atrocity as foundational to the public imagination of Northern Ireland can never be wholly controlled, never wholly unified, not in terms of the spatial story of Derry (Chapter 4) nor in terms of the post-corporeal lives of public symbols (this chapter). The texts, narratives, and perspectives that I have pushed back most forcefully on in these chapters are those that unproblematically assume (or try to force) an unwarranted historical or contemporary unity over the spatiotemporal politics of Bloody Sunday memory, eliding the radical multidirectionality of the city of Derry and its people.

The current guiding perspective of the Bloody Sunday March Committee, I argue, is one of radical unfinalisability. While publicly, most of their conflicts with the Bloody Sunday Trust and other Bloody Sunday curators have been over "stopping" the march, I have argued this may be a proxy for larger questions about the persistence and perpetuity of Bloody Sunday and the spectral convocation. As Colin puts it, they will not allow the radical memory and public politics of Bloody Sunday to be laid to rest, they will continue to bear the spectral convocation aloft, continue to be haunted, regardless of the findings of British or Irish juridical bodies, regardless of the preferences of British or Irish political parties. In a manner

reminiscent of the *Asociación de la Madres de la Plaza de Mayo* in Argentina (at least prior to 2003), they refuse the death of public memory.

Yet while I have consistently maintained that the ambiguation of foundational public symbols is inevitable, especially in the Irish thanatological context, and radical unfinalisability *invites* a particular form of usurpation, specifically the usurpation of physical force Republicans whose (albeit questionable) proclamations of continued relevance and legitimacy are rooted in Saoradh's slogan: Unfinished Revolution. Unfinished Revolution loudly and violently proclaims that there remains little difference between 1972 and 2022, Ireland is still not unified, and those fourteen young men who were murdered on an anti-internment march in 1972 must still stand for the continued internment of Republicans today, people like Tony Taylor and Neil Hegarty. Even in the words of their victims, the people Saoradh has murdered, people like Lyra McKee, we hear uncomfortable collapses of arbitrary temporal breaks between Troubles-past and the present of the Ceasefire babies. McKee's work, short and horrifyingly interrupted as it is, is rooted in this persistent questioning of the assumptions and proclamations of powerful people that Northern Ireland has indeed, moved on, that we should all be grateful for what has been accomplished. In the last essay published before her death, McKee (2020, n.p.) cuttingly and provocatively destroys what she identifies as three "promises" made by transitional politicians to her generation. The first two promises she names as "peace" and "prosperity." The third one, she writes, "was the one that hurt the most."

> It was felt mostly in the areas that had already been ravaged, the ones where the gunmen continued to roam. Your children, they'd told our parents, will be safe now. With the peace deal, the days of young people disappearing and dying young would be gone---Yet this turned out to be a lie, too.

> On the Bloody Sunday March today, now 50 years after the original atrocity, the

organisation that murdered Lyra McKee, including one of the people person currently

charged (but not convicted) of McKee's murder march behind the spectral convocation, demanding the power to be included in their voiceless demand for justice. They are certainly not welcomed by the Bloody Sunday March Committee, far from it, but the spatiotemporal qualities of their curation of radical unfinalisability dovetail and intersect in difficult and uncomfortable ways with the rebellious mourning of the March Committee. Lyra McKee's post-corporeal body, still haunting the streets of Derry, is not visible on the Bloody Sunday march, it is not present amongst the banners and the photographs and the crosses. The Bloody Sunday March Committee would, no doubt, say that she *is* present, she is present in the things she stood for and still stands for, and I can accept this argument to some degree. But if Lyra McKee's voiceless spectre stood beside the spectral convocation, her post-corporeal body would be marching amongst her very killers.

In my interview with Colin we discussed an incident that occurred during the 2012 march, the first since the attempted stopping of the march in 2011. Colin, whilst the speaker's daïs was being set up, was challenged by a woman in crowd regarding the murder of Kieran Doherty. Doherty, a member of the "Real IRA," was murdered by his own organisation in 2010, his bound and naked body dumped by the roadside. Colin remembers he responded: "What about it? That's what we're here for." He continues (in our interview):

> I'm happy to have [physical force Republicans] there [on the march]. I'll challenge people. Because my belief is this: [My loved one] was murdered, right. I don't believe that should happen to anybody. I don't believe that walking up behind a prison warder or a policeman or putting a bomb under a car is a heroic thing. I don't see that. But I'd like to convince those people to do to see that it isn't the way… And I hope someday they will see. And if you see them on enough Bloody Sunday marches, I think they have a better chance of seeing.

In Colin's particular ambiguation of the spectral convocation, and with it, the voice of his murdered family member, the spectral convocation can force a confrontation within violence-wielders. This confrontation is rooted in the stark and visible irony in a group that murders marching behind the ghosts of the murdered, just as Sinn Féin did for so many years. But

there is a subtle and perhaps unintended disingenuity in Colin's perspective. The disingenuity is in his elision of the unfinished *threat*. If the spectral convocation stands, at least in part, for the radical unfinishedness of Northern Ireland's troubled past, the collapse of powerfully imposed temporal delineations between *then* and *now* through the chronotopic thresholds deeply embedded in the material fabric of the Bogside and the Creggan, then that also demands acknowledgment of the radical and ongoing precarity of life in Northern Ireland, a precarity that Lyra McKee wrote so eloquently about, a precarity that saw her murdered with a bullet to the head. If, as Colin argues, the space of the Bloody Sunday march is a space of radical confrontation between the forces of the violence and the duty towards justice, its potential to challenge larger structures of temporal domestication and depoliticisation like the reconciliation paradigm is hamstrung by the absence of Lyra McKee's post-corporeal body, and someone to defiantly, yet safely, yet credibly, bear it aloft.

CHAPTER 6:

"WE HAVE LONG MEMORIES IN THIS AREA": THE UDR, PROLONGING THE PAST, AND THE BORDER

I.   RESISTING ANACHRONISM

We have been driving west for about 20 minutes now, away from the town where "Henry" and "Kathleen" live and towards the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic. The road itself is non-descript, like countless other sporadically-marked country lanes one could find oneself on in rural Ireland. Even though it is early July, the morning is grey and chilly, with a few isolated raindrops. The further west we go, the fewer cars we pass, the farmhouses grow sparser, and the countryside coheres into lines of fenced pastures dissolving into rolling drumlins. At an ordinary looking livestock gate, Henry directs me to pull onto the verge (Figure 14). Kathleen and I get out, but Henry tarries for a moment in the backseat, and when he finally does emerge, he's carrying a manila folder bulging with papers that he's held tight to his chest since he first got into the car.

Henry walks over to the livestock gate and gazes across the field in the direction of the drumlin belt to the west. Opening the manila folder, he begins to leaf through it, fighting the wind and the light drizzle. Kathleen reaches her hand up towards the sky, feels the drops, and returns to sitting in the passenger seat of the car. Looking at Kathleen, I feel certain that she has been here before, with Henry, witnessed how he performs and remembers this place. She is not bored, not frightened, more stoic almost, but the way in which she recedes into the car suggests that she is leaving the scene, exiting stage right, leaving the space to Henry and his spectral monologue.

Still not saying anything, Henry begins pulling photographs out of the folder and holding them up, framing them against the landscape (Figure 15). I stand slightly behind, watching his head move from the photograph to the landscape and back again.

Figure 14: Border Road A (specific location withheld). Photo by author.

Figure 15: Border Road A, past and present (specific location withheld). Photo by author.

I know what the photos are. They are photographs of this place, this place where we are right now, the place where in the 1980s (specific date withheld), Henry was blown up by a Provisional IRA bomb. The bomb caused the gash, the large crater, in the lower left of Figure 15, almost exactly where this gate is today. Henry survived the bombing, but barely, and two other members of his patrol, including Henry's loved one, did not. Henry's loved one passed away while Henry was lying next to her, unconscious, on the way to the hospital.

I knew the general story already, before Henry directed me to come out to the place where it happened, what I did not know was the specific environmental details. Henry begins explaining to me exactly how it happened. He says the bombers were lying face-down against the edge of the gully in Figure 14, that there's a small stream there that is used as the border here in this area. The night before the bombing, or perhaps over the course of several nights before, the men dug a trench the length of the field, inserted a trip wire into it, and concealed the bomb next to the road. Then they waited. They waited until Henry's unit patrolled that road once more.

But while these details certainly situate and vivify the scene of the bombing itself, I'm still unclear about why Henry chose to bring me here with him, why he continues to stand here, holding up photographs against the landscape and peering through them for nearly twenty minutes now. So I just decide to ask him. In lieu of an answer, Henry turns to face me, looks past me at the quiet farmhouses nestled into the hillside on the other side of the road, gestures towards them and demands of me: "Can't you see them?"

"Sorry," I say, a bit confused, "see who?"

Henry still doesn't answer directly. "They're there," he says, now pointing across the field, "digging." He thrusts the photograph in my direction. "You see this size of that crater?" And he spins on his heel to turn towards the farmhouses once more, gesturing with free arm in a wide and accusing arc, "You're telling me that none of those people saw anything?!"

I am troubled by Henry's contention. People standing at the windows of those farmhouses possess an untroubled line-of-sight over the road and the field, over what probably is their land. Yet the men came and they said nothing. But then it strikes me how, possibly without warrant, both Henry and I have assumed an unbroken temporal continuity across this place, these houses and their imagined people, as if the scene is the exact same now as it was over 30 years ago, that all of us enmeshed in this place are being stretched somehow, across time. In this place, the same intimate geographies of fear, suspicion, horror, and anguish that surrounded the planting of the bomb are surrounding us now, for Henry, the photographs he holds are always superimposed on this place, in this place, Henry exists in multiple times.

He still has not answered my question directly (nor would he), but I understand now why Henry chose to bring me here, out of the range of other possible places he could have brought me. He may not be fully aware of it himself, but he is clearly asking me to witness the violence inflicted on him and his loved one here as simultaneously past and present. This place, a chronotope of the threshold, emerges into meaning through Henry's performance, through his memory, through his documents and artefacts, through his persistent limp, through Kathleen's unreadable face, watching us keenly through the car window, ready, I think, to step in, if needed, to calm Henry if he gets too emotional. Henry has called a threshold into existence out of a scene, a landscape that could be almost anywhere in rural Ireland, a gate, a field, a stream, farmhouses, drumlins, the drizzle of rain. The threshold resists, it resists the narration of Northern Ireland in a linear manner, it resists describing Northern Ireland as a place progressing through postconflict interregnums towards liberal democratic normalcy and a shared future characterised by reconciliation (e.g. Aiken 2010; Brewer 2010). Trapped within this field, dominated by this temporality, Henry becomes not a resistant political actor but a transitional dilemma or a remnant of a troubled past to be

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resolved. He becomes *anachronism.* But through the vehicle of the threshold, Henry and Kathleen refuse to let the past stay in the past; they exhibit no desire to move on. And as I have argued throughout this dissertation, the return to chronotopic thresholds, physically or spectrally, to rebelliously mourn at the "place of the wound" (cf. Till, 2012), is a central tool of colonised, marginalised, and/or traumatised peoples (Alfred 2018; Bosco 2006; Doss 2012; Halberstam 2005; Hirsch and Spitzer 2011; Milstein 2017a; Till 2005), a central modality of resistance against the temporal domination of the reconciliation paradigm.

In this chapter, I will examine how and where Henry, Kathleen, and other former members of the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) seek to re-inscribe their stories of life and death into the land along the Southwest run of the border. A quick note on terminology: The border has different names, each associated with a particular constitutional politics, "the Irish border" and the "border on the island of Ireland," are perhaps the most common. I invoke neither and will simply refer to it as "the border" throughout. I argue that the men and women we will meet in this chapter call into existence chronotopic thresholds in the rural Southwest where time can be collapsed, where the past can be superimposed on the present, *in order to* resist the dominant temporalities of political 'transition' in Northern Ireland that seek to force its past into more sanitised and/or reconciliatory forms. I maintain that even the excellent work on temporalities of transition I have referenced throughout this dissertation does not always pay adequate attention to the *where* of resistance to temporal domination, the chronotopic threshold where the living consort with the dead (Till 2017). It may be that engaging with temporal resistance in postconflict societies such as Northern Ireland necessitates a micro-geographical lens rooted in methodological *inhabitation* (Chapter 3), one capable of a close examination of the specific places that stand athwart reconciliatory time.

The next section will present a short, contextual history of the UDR. The third section attempts to summarise the specific ways in which temporal domination is extended to

survivors of Republican violence, as opposed to the survivors of State violence I examined in

Chapters Four and Five. The final sections present stories from my collaborative research

journeys with ex-UDR partners through the wounded thresholds of the Southwest border. In

these journeys, I argue my partners work to *prolong* the past into the present in order to claim

the right for their stories, experiences, politics, hauntings, and intimate geographies to belong

in transitional space.

II.   THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF THE ULSTER DEFENCE
REGIMENT

Both Henry and Kathleen are former members of the Ulster Defence Regiment, generally

known by its acronym, the UDR. The UDR was an auxiliary unit of the British Army

comprised primarily of Northern Irish men and women serving in a part- or full-time capacity

near and in the areas where they lived. The predecessor of the UDR was the Ulster Special

Constabulary (the USC, also often colloquially referred to as the "B Specials," "B-Men," or

the "Specials"), which was formed in 1920, shortly before the Partition of Ireland. The USC,

though a reserve police force, was armed and organised along quasi-military lines, and was

intended to be deployed during times of provincial emergency, such as war or social unrest. It

was also comprised almost entirely of Protestants. The USC fought what were essentially

small-scale border wars against elements of the anti-Partitionist IRA both during the Irish

War of Independence (1920-21) and the ill-fated IRA "Border Campaign" from 1956-62 (see

Flynn 2009; Lynch 2006). Opinions on the USC's existence and comportment throughout its

50-year existence (1920-70) tend to fall along ethnosectarian lines. For many Unionists, the

USC performed heroically and helped save and protect their fledging state from Irish

irredentism, for many Nationalists, it was little more than a continuation of the brutal and

hated "Black and Tans," a counterinsurgency paramilitary deployed by the British during the

War of Independence that were notorious for lawlessness, attacking civilians, torture, and extrajudicial killing.

The Troubles famously "began" with the heavy-handed repression of the Civil Rights Movement in Derry by the RUC. By 1969, the situation in Belfast and Derry had degenerated further into near-nightly riots and vicious sectarian fighting, which drove thousands of people from their homes and permanently redrew the demographic maps of both cities (Darby 1986; Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). The uptick in protest and violence overstretched the RUC and the USC was deployed to supplement them. In their 1969 deployment, the USC came under heavy criticism for failing to restrain (and even joining) Protestant rioters attacking Catholic homes and neighbourhoods as well as in several unjustifiable shootings of Catholics (see Scarman 1972). The Harold Wilson government commissioned the Hunt Report in 1970, which recommended disbanding the USC due to their implication in sectarian repression and concerns over a police force carrying out military-style operations (Ryder 1991). Following the Hunt Report's recommendations, the USC's responsibility was transferred to a new unit, the UDR, which was intended to be a locally recruited auxiliary force integrated into the British military command structure and subjected to army discipline and vetting. The Hunt Report also emphasised the necessity of recruiting Northern Irish Catholics into the new UDR to counteract the Catholic minority's deep-rooted distrust in the USC. While initially some Catholics did join the UDR, perhaps making up as much as 20% of the initial composition of the Regiment (Ó Faoleán 2015) the deteriorating political situation meant that by the end of 1972, virtually all Catholics had resigned their commissions and left, either by choice or by intimidation (Ó Faoleán 2015; Potter 2008; Ryder 1991).

Like the USC, the subject of the UDR's comportment throughout the Troubles is a matter of intense debate across the island of Ireland. Yet even overtly sympathetic histories of the organisation such as Potter's (2008), a former Major in the Regiment, admit that the UDR

suffered from paramilitary infiltration throughout its existence. Potter (2008) claims the UDR gradually adopted more rigorous and more effective vetting processes to prevent this infiltration, and in this he is somewhat supported by Ryder (1991), however, the historical debate is not whether or not some UDR members overlapped with Loyalist paramilitaries, committed sectarian murders, and shared intelligence and weapons with Loyalists. That debate is settled, the debate now is over the extent and geographical distribution of that collusive overlap (Cadwallader 2013; Cassel 2006; McGovern 2017; Pat Finucane Centre 2014; Smith 2022). When the UDR was first formed, the UDA was not a proscribed organisation, and dual membership in both organisations was allowed (Potter 2008; Wood 2006). The UDA was proscribed in 1972, and 171 serving UDR soldiers would be purged between 1972-1975 over their links to the paramilitary group (Potter 2008, 376). An estimate by Cadwallader (2013) proposes that collusive crossover between the UDR and Loyalist paramilitaries was directly responsible for 120 deaths during the organisation's existence, the Cassel Report commissioned by the Republic of Ireland examined 76 killings and concluded that the UDR "colluded—and even overlapped" with "violent extremists" in these killings (2006, 4). Lethal collusion by all accounts was more significant in the 1970s, which Bennett (2010) claims was encouraged at some level by the British military command. If Bennett's argument is accurate, then, as Ó Faoleán (2015, 850) points out: "Maintaining control over loyalist paramilitary activities would have been next to impossible, particularly where locally raised forces [i.e. the UDR] were concerned."

Thus we see how difficult it is in fact to attribute final organisational responsibility to political killings and murders in Northern Ireland, especially in the 1970s. As far as actually pulling the trigger goes, while in uniform and on-duty, historians and journalists attribute a mere eight deaths to the UDR (McKittrick et al. 2008), by far the fewest of any belligerent party to the conflict. In the rural Southwest of Northern Ireland, there was simply little to no

Loyalist presence throughout the Troubles (Cusack and McDonald 1997), and thus few local opportunities for collusive crossover. Indeed, the statistical record is especially jarring. In Fermanagh, for example, the UDR was overwhelmingly the victim of lethal violence, not the perpetrator of it. In Fermanagh, 116 people were killed due to Troubles-violence (McKittrick et al. 2008) and 111 of them died at the hands of Republicans (McKeown 2009). There were more cases in Fermanagh and South Tyrone (6) of IRA-men dying at the hands of their own prematurely exploded bombs than there were of lethal UDR-violence (1) (McKeown 2009).

The UDR primarily served as border guards along the rural, porous 500 km border, but they could be and often were called out as auxiliary forces to assist in specific police or army deployments. They differed most acutely from the regular British army in one major way: Part-time UDR-men and UDR-women (known as Greenfinches) lived in the areas they patrolled and often in close proximity to the border they guarded. Part-time members, when not on duty, did not go home to fortified barracks but to corner flats in towns and villages or rural farmhouses. They also worked in these communities, as farmers, shopkeepers, clerks, delivery-persons, bus drivers, electricians, carpenters, etc. This integration into local places and communities enhanced their visibility and while most tried to keep their membership in the UDR a secret for reasons of personal security, in rural Northern Ireland during the Troubles, this was in most cases simply an impossibility. This status rendered the UDR, along with the RUC, uniquely vulnerable to Republican assassination. The vast majority of UDR men and women were killed while off-duty, unlike Henry's loved one, in targeted assassinations. In the rural borderlands of Northern Ireland, their geographic insecurities resulted in a perpetual sense of threat and hyper-vigilance, not to mention a forced disruption of daily rhythms and routines (Patterson 2013). Officially, 206 members of the UDR and the Royal Irish Regiment (formed in 1992 out of the amalgamation of the UDR and the Royal Irish Rangers) lost their lives during the Troubles, and this number includes several ex-

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members targeted and killed by Republicans despite having retired from the force (Patterson 2013). The preceding does not in any way seek to deny the darker corners of UDR or security force history in Northern Ireland, far from it, but rather to contextualise it, especially within the micro-geography of Northern Ireland. As I pointed out in Chapter 3, my choice of the Southwest run of the border, encompassing the counties of Fermanagh and the Southwestern part of Tyrone, was primarily driven by convenience and a prior relationship with survivors' groups in the area. However the selection had an additional benefit, it allowed me to fairly presume that UDR victims in the geographical area were not also current or former members of Loyalist paramilitaries.

Throughout this dissertation, I have employed theoretical frames learned in past from theorists within Indigenous, Queer, feminist, decolonial and/or subaltern traditions. For many, to continue to employ these theoretical frameworks in order to study the place-based resistances of a former unit of the British military, in what many Irish nationalists consider a context of past and ongoing colonialism, would be inappropriate. I do not agree. My own argument is that simplistic binaries of guilty-innocent, coloniser-colonised simply do not exist in Northern Ireland (Robinson 2018, Chapter 4; McVeigh and Rolston 2022) Yet those sorts of frames are routinely used to deprive, marginalise, and silence the narratives, personal experiences, and embodied memories of people from Northern Ireland, including ex-members of the UDR, who suffered profoundly and continue to suffer profoundly from often brutal and horrific violence. This violence is interlaced specifically with the meshwork of intensely local places, people, networks, and relationships.

In many ways my orientation here follows some of the ground laid by Catherine Switzer and Brian Graham in their (2009) study of RUC-memory in Northern Ireland, as well as Kirk Simpson's (2009) work on truth recovery. Switzer and Graham make the somewhat jarring claim that RUC memory-work in Northern Ireland can be seen as "subaltern" due to

the British government's "memorial agnosticism" and Sinn Féin's "manipulation of narratives of victimhood" (157). While I avoid the provocative and incorrect term "subaltern" in the UDR context, I claim that Switzer and Graham's characterisation of the factors marginalising RUC-memory from dominant narrative space could in fact better apply to the UDR (Robinson 2018a, 126). And when the narratives of a force such as the UDR are so marginalised, while they cannot be subaltern, they can be analysed through the insights of subaltern geographies. Subaltern geographies, as Jo Sharp puts it (2011, 272), are those that (among other things) carry with them a specific moral imperative: "Bringing in the voices of those usually rendered marginal or silent in other accounts."

Simpson's (2009) argument here is far better realised than Switzer and Graham's (2009). Rather than seeing security force memory as subaltern, Simpson instead criticises a "facile binary" that "essentialises" politicised survivors of all cultures and political ideals as supporting of either past authoritarianism or past and current paramilitarism (41). Especially when read with Sara McDowell's (2008) feminist examination of the commemorative landscape, discussed in Chapter 5, the picture of who exactly is marginalised in Northern Ireland's wider memory-space becomes much clearer: Those who cannot be placed, or refused to be placed, within the binaries of guilt and innocent, coloniser and colonised, heroic patriot and unwanted foreign occupier, these are the victims, survivors, and bereaved of the Troubles who have been systematically deprived of the opportunity to establish a foothold in the narratological contest over how to represent Northern Ireland's past (see Robinson 2018a). To further develop these argument and orientations, I now turn towards an analysis of how *both* dominant Republican conflict frames and the reconciliation paradigm can intertwine to anachronise and marginalise survivors of Republican violence.

III. REPUBLICAN RECONCILIATION AND "UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS"

By "memorial agnosticism," Switzer and Graham (2009) refer to the British state's refusal and/or unwillingness to fully intervene in Northern Ireland's "irreconcilable ideological mindsets on the Troubles" (155) at least within the borders of Northern Ireland. Though the British State was often anything but a "neutral" third party when it came to collusion with Loyalist paramilitaries and the disproportionate use of lethal and carceral force in Catholic communities and neighbourhoods, that State has courted an image of itself as a fair and even-handed arbiter seeking nothing more than a negotiated end between warring, violent tribes of Irish people (Ruane and Todd 1996; McGrattan 2010). This false image of neutrality means that in the post-Troubles political landscape, the UK government essentially refuses to officially support and cultivate RUC-preferred places of memory that could spatially inscribe RUC stories and narratives. These stories and narratives would presumably stand in opposition to the practiced and organised memory-work (or revisionism) of both Sinn Féin and the factionalised memories of larger Loyalism. In the absence of 'official' places of mourning in postconflict Northern Ireland, working class memory-space was essentially ceded to former paramilitaries to inscribe their visual and material version of the conflict. The memory-space of areas most supportive of the RUC, middle-class 'respectability' Unionism, were essentially left without a space of sanctioned counter-memory, which has led to their perspectives' increasing marginalisation. So goes Switzer and Graham's (2009) basic argument for the memorial agnosticism of security force narratives. But this perspective here is somewhat exaggerated and misinterprets the larger absence of RUC inscriptive public spaces. Lawther (2022) and Mulcahy and Ellison (2001) point out the relative silence of RUC memory in public space can be in turn seen not as enforced marginalisation but a chosen form of respectability memory-politics. In other words, staying silent, dignified, and reserved in

the face of the storied inscriptions of paramilitaries actually *is* a sanctioned entry into the contested politics of memory, one that promotes a narrative of the RUC as stoic, noble, loyal, and long-suffering, one that bravely held the line without needing or demanding external recognition or credit.

The RUC does have one official place of memory in Northern Ireland, the RUC George's Cross Memorial Garden contained within the Police Museum in Knock, East Belfast. However, the UDR, because they were officially a unit of the British army, does not, and can only be officially memorialised at the Lichfield National Arboretum in Staffordshire, England. Additionally, because the British government does not represent the Troubles as a "war," UDR men and women who lost their lives during the Troubles cannot be officially included on British war memorials present in virtually all larger Northern Irish settlements. In the last two decades, there have been several attempts by local councils in Northern Ireland to sanctify places of UDR memory, but these sites are curated by the Councils themselves and not official heritage bodies. The names of UDR dead in the local area are sometimes transgressively accreted to official war memorials, but for many ex-UDR this act is unacceptable because it accepts Republican designations of the Troubles as a war, which the British and Unionist establishments do not (Graham and Whelan 2007).

To return to Switzer and Graham's (2009) second contention regarding the processes of security force memory marginalisation, Sinn Féin and the larger Republican movement's "manipulation of narratives of victimhood," we need to look at Sinn Féin's supposed journey in postconflict Northern Ireland and how their evolving memory-politics inform this narrative trajectory. We also need to look at the simplistic and often-sectarian perspectives of Unionist parties towards this supposed journey. It has been widely established in the literature that Protestant-Unionists, especially Protestant-Unionist survivors and bereaved, are far more likely than others to display a deep-rooted mistrust of appeals to reconciliation and the

reconciliation paradigm (Dawson 2007; Lawther 2014; Simpson 2009; Southern 2007). For many, this mistrust is rooted in the belief that the Irish Peace Process has uniformly benefited Republicans and Nationalists to the detriment of Unionists and Loyalists. Republicans, goes the narrative, have exploited the equality and parity of esteem provisions of the Agreement to demand more and more access to state resources and symbolic capital, while Unionists have consistently been forced to give ground in a wide variety of political forums (Gallaher 2007; Hearty 2015; Jarman 2019). Previously, this argument was located mostly in questions of parading and public symbols, but increasingly it has been extended to Brexit and the Northern Irish Protocol (Murphy and Evershed 2020). This simplistic and sectarian narrative of peace as a zero-sum struggle is all the more accessible because the consociational underpinnings of the Agreement and subsequent St. Andrew's Agreement calcified formal politics in Northern Ireland into a zero-sum ethnosectarian game. But it has also been strengthened immeasurably by the statements of Sinn Féin politicians, most notoriously by former Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams, who stated in 2014: "The point is to actually break these bastards—that's the point. And what's going to break them is equality… that's the Trojan horse of the entire Republican strategy" (quoted in Carroll 2014). In publicly stating this, Adams confirmed the narrative of a more-paranoid Unionist that Sinn Féin was invested in gaming the system, that the equality provisions of the Agreement had always been coded attacks on Unionist political culture and the political link with Britain.

Sinn Féin's alleged gaming of the Peace Process, in this narrative, also extends to so-called legacy issues, including Sinn Féin's particular use of the reconciliation paradigm. The man most associated with crafting SF's official reconciliation strategy is Declan Kearney, Sinn Féin MLA for South Antrim and former Party Chairperson, who in turn built on the work of his predecessor, the former Assembly Speaker and South Antrim MLA Mitchel McLaughlin. In 2015, while serving as Party Chairperson, Kearney became the highest-

ranking Sinn Féin member to issue an apology of sorts for Troubles violence. The structure of Kearney's semi-apology is somewhat familiar, he occludes the subject or perpetrator of violent action and insists on a complete moral equivalence of lives lost regardless of status: "I am sorry for the pain experienced… the suffering caused to the Unionist section of our community… and equally for the pain of IRA volunteers killed… here in Derry and elsewhere" (cited in BBC 2015 n.p.). His statement also obliquely references another key SF trope, that there can be no "hierarchy of victims" (Hearty 2016; Jankowitz 2018; McEvoy an McConnachie 2012). In other words, all victims of the Troubles, regardless of who they were or what organisations they belong to, must be classed as at least legally equal, though for Sinn Féin, it is clear this is a moral equivalence as well (see Robinson 2018a, Chapter 4).

Kearney's 2015 statement paved the way for the release of a document entitled "Uncomfortable Conversations" (Sinn Féin 2015) which in turn built on an essay in the Sinn Féin-affiliated newsletter *An Phoblacht* by Kearney (2012), and several presentations of the format across the province by McLaughlin and Gerry Adams. In Kearney's introductory essay to the collection (Kearney 2015), he argues that reconciliation depends on the two political blocs (Republicanism and Unionism) engaging in "difficult" or "uncomfortable" conversations about the Irish past (Hedges 2016; Kearney 2015; 2012). The Republican bloc, argues Kearney, has bravely begun these conversations, but they have not found a willing partner in Unionism. Regarding the killings of the Troubles, Kearney only refers to Republican violence obliquely, and without reference to any particular incident. Instead he refers to the criminal conduct of the British state and security forces, but he argues that the only mechanism for examining Troubles-violence is through a Truth Commission, which as he notes, Republicans favour and Unionists do not (Lawther 2014). He disingenuously argues that reconciliation does not require Republicans to critically interrogate or challenge IRA violence, any more than reconciliation would require Unionists to disown the police. Finally

Kearney reiterates Sinn Féin's demand that reconciliation cannot include a hierarchy of victims.

Of course, for many Unionists, the rejection of a hierarchy of victims is tantamount to demanding a moral equivalence between the bodies of paramilitary killers and "innocent" victims. In short, Sinn Féin's reconciliation strategy very carefully attempts to solidify the framework for what reconciliation in Northern Ireland must mean and must do, and this framework is squarely within Sinn Féin's preferred conflict narrative. The refusal to recognise Sinn Féin's preferred conflict narrative can in turn be framed as a refusal to reconcile, allowing SF to narrate survivors of Republican violence as backwards and anachronistic, as out-of-step with the temporal progression of transition towards reconciliation. In this context, the dual meaning of reconciliation I described in Chapter 2 vaults again to the forefront. Reconciliation can mean both "reconcile with" the other community, but it can also mean "reconcile yourself to" the current geopolitical reality and the harm that was inflicted on you.

Sinn Féin also widely engages in revisionism regarding the scale of the violence, brutality, and destruction of the Provisional IRA campaign (McGrattan 2016a). During the Troubles, Republicans and the Provisional IRA in particular were by far the most frequent and deadly purveyors of violence, yet this is never mentioned aloud by Sinn Féin figures (Bean 2007; Edwards and McGrattan 2011). The sanitisation of the Troubles also extends towards repositioning Sinn Féin both as the true architects of peace and the champions of the Civil Rights Movement (Kearney 2018), both of which are empirically false, or at least highly exaggerated. Eamonn McCann, a well-known figure within the Civil Rights Movement, suggests this is part of an ongoing strategy by Sinn Féin to "colonise history" (Walker 2018).

Sinn Féin's reconciliatory and sanitisation projects, however, are largely for external consumption (see Bean 2007). As I argued in Chapters 4 and 5, Sinn Féin also competes with physical-force Republican groups, many of whose members were also members of the Provisional IRA and INLA. As such, in areas where Republicans and Nationalists possess a demographic majority, such as Derry, Fermanagh and border Tyrone, the Provisional IRA campaign is not elided, but rather consistently valorised in public space. The image in Figure 16 shows a poster advertising a commemorative evening for Séamus McElwain (also spelled McElwaine), allegedly the Officer Commanding (OC) of the West Fermanagh Brigade of the IRA, a brigade so notorious for its brutality and lack of discretion it was allegedly disbanded by the IRA leadership in 1989, in the aftermath of the Enniskillen bombing (Leahy 2015; Patterson 2013). McElwain himself was directly linked to ten murders and numerous other acts of violence, including the shooting of the former First Minister of Northern Ireland Arlene Foster's father, a part-time UDR-man (Impartial Reporter 2021). He was captured and convicted of murdering RUC and UDR members in 1981 and sentenced to Long Kesh/The Maze prison, where he broke out along with a number of other IRA prisoners in the well-known Maze Prison escape in 1983. In 1986, together with another IRA volunteer, Séan Lynch, he was ambushed by the British SAS with the backing of the UDR whilst attempting to bomb a UDR patrol. McElwain was shot dead by the SAS. Lynch was seriously wounded but survived. Released according to the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, Lynch was elected Sinn Féin MLA for Fermanagh and South Tyrone in 2011, a seat he retained until he stepped down in 2021.

The visceral presence of the figures of McElwain, Lynch, and others in the landscape of Fermanagh and border Tyrone, for many ex-UDR and ex-RUC members, puts the lie to reconciliation paradigm's insistence that the past can be overcome and moved on from.

Figure 16: Seamus McElwain commemorative night, Donagh, co. Fermanagh. Photo by author.

Many of the research partners in the second half of this essay allege that their loved ones were personally assassinated by McElwain or men under McElwain's command. Many of my respondents drove or walked past the campaign office of Séan Lynch in the small village of Lisnaskea while he served in the Northern Irish Assembly. Being politically represented by one of the men you believe is directly responsible for the murder of your loved ones can make the reconciliation paradigm, in both the form preferable to the dominant temporalities of transitional justice and its republican analogue, a difficult sell along the southwest run of the Irish border. In such a geographical and geopolitical context, ex-UDR memory curators resist in a myriad of ways.

First, their testimony nearly always foregrounds the brutality of the Republican campaign in the area. My research partners insist on communicating to me all of the grisly and frankly extremely difficult to witness details of their loved ones' killings. This is a tactic of resistance, deployed consciously or at least semi-consciously to resist Republican sanitisation and resist Republican proclamations of the honour, justice, and bravery of IRA

volunteers, to undercut the warrants on which those discourses hinge. These narratives work to reframe McElwain, for example, as a psychopath instead of a hero, soldier, or volunteer. The other major form that ex-UDR resistance takes along the Southwest border is temporal, and we have already seen Henry's particular brand of temporal resistance. Henry and other ex-UDR survivors continuously use their memory and their rebellious mourning to insist on the temporal co-presence of past violence in the present places of their everyday lives. In the following series of ethnographic vignettes, the reader will witness how ex-UDR survivors along the southwest run of the border introduce local places of fear, threat, trauma, and devastation to me, how they allow these places and what they carry with them to resist the idea that the past, for them, can ever be truly left in the past.

As I discussed briefly in Chapter 3, I have chosen here to present these narratives in the form of "ethnographic vignettes," a method championed by several anthropologists, but for me, my chief influence is the work of Jean-Paul Dumont (2002). Chiefly, the recourse to vignettes represents an attempt to "operationalise" the places I witnessed with the people who introduced them to me. To connect our shared embodied movement and the practice of narrative storytelling through the materiality of place, through sensuous, affective, detailed recounting of experience (Lee and Ingold 2006; Lorimer and Lund 2003). I made an ethical decision not to audially record the journeys these vignettes are taken from, so all respondent speech presented here (including in the case of Henry and Kathleen's vignette above) is a reconstruction based on field notes and a personal shorthand. That said, all respondents referenced in a drafted vignette were invited to review it and ensure that the larger meaning and context of their speech was faithfully reconstructed. Hocking et al. (2018) and Carpiano (2009) point out that audio-visual recording in contested, dangerous, or segregated places can heighten memories of being subjected to unwanted surveillance in the past. Utilising audio-visual technologies can also force research partners to be more visible during the research

intervention than they may be comfortable with (Warren 2017). In light of these considerations, I used a more classical ethnographic approach, generating data through jottings, field notes, and photographs.

I have chosen five vignettes (including Henry and Kathleen's) out of the approximately 30 short vignettes I generated during the course of my research in Fermanagh and border Tyrone. The process of selecting which ones to use was arduous, and I regret that many poignant and powerful stories related to me by my partners will probably remain on the cutting room floor as it were. The first two vignettes below (entitled "The Dash" and "That's Monaghan") were generated on a go-along (Kusenbach 2003), or when I was invited to observe a previously scheduled bus tour sponsored by a local victims and survivors' group (Edwards 2017 and Chapter Three). Henry and Kathleen's vignette, as well as the final two reported here ("Over my Dead Body" and "Cutting Turf") were generated during hybrid mobile interviews.

IV.   THE DASH

"George" calls this road "The Dash" (Figure 17). Standing at the front of the bus speaking through the tinny microphone, he informs us "We were always running the gauntlet here. No stopping along the way." The Dash George is describing is a surprisingly straight road with few bends running between the small villages of Donagh and Newtonbutler. It's in a depression, not quite a valley, ringed on each side by sparsely-forested hillocks and copses. Hanging halfway up the hillocks are the occasional isolated farmhouses. It's called The Dash, George tells us, because this was the road they feared the most. The IRA would run trip wires from places of concealment in the hillocks down onto the road, trying to pick off the UDR or regular army vehicles on the straightaway. In the confusion after the blast, the IRA snipers could fire down into the depression at the men trying to escape the bomb. "Like a fishbowl,"

George says, I believe he's trying to say "like shooting fish in a barrel" but we all get the idea. The bus is already proceeding at a snail's pace, but George motions for the driver to stop here (Figure 17) and we all troop out.

"They were up there," and he gestures south towards a nearby hillock. "And they'd run the wire all the way down to here. Now I want you all to step out and look at where we've just come from. There used to be a bus stop there. Two ladies were sitting there waiting for the bus. From where they were hiding, they could clearly see them two ladies sitting at the bus stop." One of the soldiers, according to George, had just put his head out of the window to wave at ladies, and George makes a subtle indication that the soldier had probably been more interested in waving at the younger woman, when the bomb exploded.

"We were behind, in the trailing vehicle," George says, "we saw it all happen." And he pauses for a moment, steeling himself for what comes next. His jauntiness has vanished. "The crater it left," he says, his voice breaking, "it would have fit a double-decker bus." His voice gets louder, more angry, "Look at the line of sight from the road to up there. Perfect view. They saw them two ladies sitting there at the bus stop. And they didn't care. And they call themselves 'soldiers.'"

In George's anger, he has tellingly slipped tense. "They call themselves soldiers," accuses not just the actions of the past, but how those actions are defended, elided, justified, and ignored in the present.

Figure 17: The Dash, near Newtonbutler, co. Fermanagh. Photo by author.

V. THAT'S MONAGHAN

Rosslea is a small village in Fermanagh with a population of approximately 600 sitting directly on the border. Rosslea is an entirely Catholic-Nationalist village. The border here is formed by the River Finn, which snakes around Rosslea so that it is surrounded on three sides by the Republic of Ireland's County Monaghan. Approaching Rosslea, the coach hired for the day pulls to a stop near an abandoned building perhaps 500 metres west of the village (Figure 18).

Our guide today I will call "James." He tells us this was the last Protestant business in Rosslea, a general store. It was bombed four times and then, one day, IRA men simply walked in an executed the proprietor, a man named Douglas Deering. Deering was not a member of the UDR or the security forces; the IRA's explanation for his targeting was that Deering was a Justice of the Peace (Patterson 2013, 129-30).

Figure 18: Former Deering Family general store, near Rosslea, co. Fermanagh. Photo by author.

However, James, like many in the area, believe Deering's murder was purely sectarian, part of an IRA campaign of "ethnic cleansing" along the border. "You see," James begins, "what happened out here we see as ethnic cleansing. The family tried to carry on in the village after Mr. Deering was murdered but they was boycotted and put out of business."

James turns in front of us in a semi-circle, gesturing with his arms away towards the nearby hills surrounding us. "In that direction, those hills, that's Monaghan. That way, Monaghan as well. It was easy for them to slip away across the hills after they done their dirty deeds and then they're into the Republic where they're safe."

From this narratively convenient vantage point, we nervously peer down the road into Rosslea (Figure 19). There's a question from another participant in the tour: "Did the people in the area ever just feel the urge to pack it in and leave."

Figure 19: Peering into Rosslea. Photo by author.

James responds: "Everybody in this area, they couldn't just drop everything and flee. They were farmers, business owners, they were tied to the land. You see that's why I still hold a great deal of resentment towards the Irish republic. When they got across that border, they were home free. Not a Gard to be seen. But foot-and-mouth disease came along and they sealed every bloody road."

I am struck by how James' story has re-cast the quiet village away in the distance and the pretty, calm surrounding hills as a landscape from which terror and death can emanate without warning. A car drives by us on the road away from Rosslea, the driver peering at us curiously out the window, wondering no doubt about a strange crowd of men clustered around an abandoned building. In this perfectly innocuous passing, I feel surveilled, and looking around at the other men, many of them glancing up in trepidation at the hills or at the back of the now-disappearing car, I sense they feel the same. James moves to stand beside me. He reads the mood. "We won't be taking you into Rosslea" he reassures us all.

A little later, back in the coach, I am sitting towards the back next to a pleasant older man who looks curiously over my shoulder as I scribble frantically in my notebook. I look up momentarily and am smitten by the beauty of the narrow road we are now on (Figure 20). The lush vegetation interspersed with the awful, invasive Sitka spruces reminds me of roads where I grew up, in Northern California, roads we'd drive up on our way out to a camp site or a fishing hole. But this is a border road. After the trip, with the benefit of an internet connection and Google Maps, I discovered that it is barely marked at all. Border roads like these have incredibly complex intimate geographies. Every bend in it, every natural marker, is socially encoded into the landscape, its significance unavailable to all except for those who live the border, or who remember living the border. James lives the border, his loved one was shot dead directly on the border, probably near a road that looks a lot like this one. James tells us the road we're on regularly criss-crosses the border. He begins joking up front, hopping back and forth from one side of the coach to the other. "Oh, now we're in the Republic," he laughs, "we'll be issuing the flak jackets and bulletproof vests shortly." A moment later, "You can all breathe, we're back." I want to know how he can be so whimsical here. The only thing I trust in his whimsy is that *he knows exactly when we cross an imaginary line on a deserted country road.* I am struck by how he still lives here, a border person, surrounded by the memories of people he knew shot dead along it, of his own relatives displaced from it, forced to move towards the interior of Northern Ireland in the aftermath of his loved one's murder by the omnipresent thread of depersonalised death, like the Deering family. Monaghan, I realise, to James is not merely the place-name of an Irish county but a repertoire from which a cold brutality sits patiently, given succour in Rosslea and its surrounding hills, waiting to be unleashed.

Figure 20: Border Road B. Fermanagh/Monaghan. Photo by author.

VI. OVER MY DEAD BODY

I am sitting in a car at a T-junction with two people I shall call "Jenny" and "Daniel", waiting

for them to decide where we go first. To the right takes us into the village of Derrylin, the left

would take us to the border. For the most part thus far, Daniel has been the guide, and he's

been guiding authoritatively, with aid of a large binder of notes. Jenny holds the binder for

him in the back seat, and at virtually every place Daniel takes us, Daniel will turn to Jenny

and say, "Will you just check that, Jen?" ensuring that he has the right name or right house

number. It is endearing to me because I think it's mostly for my benefit, that the idea of going

about with a "scholar" made Daniel think he had to get all of the little details entirely

accurate. But it also is a testament to how much and how often he has researched these

landscapes, how much these places still haunt him.

Just to pass the time while they decide, I try to get a sense of their intimate geographies. "Would you ever go into Derrylin on a normal day?" I ask them. Derrylin is widely known as a Catholic-Nationalist village.

Jenny is the first to answer, "We live in [withheld], so we wouldn't have any cause to do so."

Jenny I think knows what I'm after, so I push just a little bit more. "Aye, but say you were heading through would you ever stop for any reason?"

Jenny has her sunglasses on the top of her head and in the rear-view mirror I see her face crinkle. Daniel lets out a short, staccato laugh. "No, I'd say we wouldn't," he says emphatically, "if we were heading this way and needed stopping, we'd probably stop in Belturbet."

"Belturbet," I say, quite surprised, I had expected the first part of the answer, but not the second. Belturbet is on the Irish side of the border, in County Cavan. "You'd feel safer or…" I search for the right word… "more comfortable, maybe, across the border?"

Jenny answers from the back before Daniel. "I used to cycle across the bridge, we'll show you the bridge, into Belturbet all the time when I was a girl. There was a lovely sweet shop just across the bridge, right on the other side of the border." Jenny is speaking of a childhood before the Troubles cratered these border roads to prevent crossing.

This is apparently not a normal day. We head for Derrylin. "What's the name of that school, Jen? St. Nin---, St. Nim---," Daniel asks.

"St. Ninnidh's," Jenny says, the difficult Irish name dropping cleanly off her tongue.

We sit in a cark park just across from the school, I park so that we are facing it across the road. Jenny's loved ones, a UDR-man and his wife, were both assassinated by the IRA near Derrylin in a savage cross-border home invasion. After their murder, the hearse

containing their bodies tried to traverse Derrylin to Enniskillen, the only town in Fermanagh. Jenny takes up the story there:

"On the way back [to Enniskillen], they were having a céilidh in the school there. When they heard the hearse was coming, they all come out and down into the road. They were laughing and cheering. They come down into the road and blocked the hearse. Couldn't get by. They had to get the [armoured] Land Rovers down from Enniskillen before [their] bodies could be buried."

I may be a relatively new arrival to the island of Ireland, but even I know what a shocking thing it is here to stop a hearse. Daniel splutters, "The young wans here, it's like they're indoctrinated, don't you think Jenny?" Jenny was a schoolteacher. She sighs deeply, "They don't know any better," she says, "it's all they get in the home, [my loved ones] deserved it."

"The abattoir, Jen—" Daniel prompts her gently. I have heard this story before from other ex-UDR partners, but until Daniel says those words I had not realised that the people in it were Jenny's loved ones. I brace myself for the horror. To understand this story, you must know that Jenny's loved ones had a surname reminiscent of a common farm animal. "The night they were killed," Jenny intones, "someone rung the local abattoir giving their address and saying there were two fat [surnames] ready to be collected."

Later, with my notes, looking at Daniel's gently prompting, it feels like he's saying to Jenny, "I know it's hard, but you've got to tell it, you've got to keep this out here." Jenny has flipped her sunglasses back over her eyes. She relates the story calmly, but she is sitting tense and wired, her hands gripping the car's upholstery tightly. In such moments, I feel people often struggle with silence and I am no different. I grope for something to say.

What comes out is lame and meaningless. "I suppose I see why you wouldn't want to go into Derrylin."

"We have long memories in this area," Daniel murmurs.

The road (Figure 21) up to the farmhouse where Jenny's loved ones were killed is a long straight stretch, hemmed in by the overgrown vegetation. The farmhouse is near the top of a hillock. From the farmhouse, you can look back and get a clear view of the straight road. I have driven with ex-UDR partners down so many roads like this this summer, and I am beginning to see them like they must. Because the road is so straight and long and hemmed-in, the threat would probably come on foot. Any car could be marked early and prepared for. Yes, they'd probably come across the fields and find a place where the hedge was lower to cross.

About halfway down the track, there's a house that Jenny tells me used to be a shed. Jenny tells me her loved one was always terrified that they'd use the shed to set up in and wait for her partner to come home so she checked it repeatedly while he was out on patrol. "She used to walk down from the house at night with a lantern. Other times, when [my loved one] was on patrol, she'd come to the top of the road, looking back down it, scanning for strange cars." "You see," Jenny continues to me, "she always said they'd come for her [partner] over her dead body. And when she opened the door, they shot her first, to get in to shoot [him]. So they literally did come for him over her dead body."

This is not the only story I have heard from ex-UDR partners where the details of the slaying are so unsettling that I have no coherent response to them either as a scholar or a human being. As I suggested above, I suspect that my partners and other ex-UDR bereaved and survivors foreground this brutality so that it can serve as an evocative counter-narrative to Republican sanitisations of violence and reconciliatory elision. But there is more to it than that. These stories only make sense in these places, in these landscapes.

Figure 21: Border Road C. Fermanagh/Cavan. Photo by author.

The foregrounded brutality only snaps into visceral reality when one is surrounded by the isolation of these farmhouses, when one encounters the encoded sectarian microgeographies of the border. When one stands in these places, one *feels*, rather than merely hears, lives lived in perpetual anxiety and terror, often for decades. In towns like Derrylin, as the memory of the céilidh illustrates, their neighbours, their colleagues, their tradespeople, even children, all might be agents of dehumanisation, even death. These landscapes become archipelagic, a network of islands of security and insecurity, this bend in the road, this section of the village, all known and categorised along a spectrum of fear. And the way Jenny sits in the backseat of the car, pulling her sunglasses down now so we will not see her tears, refracts her ongoing alienation from the rural borderlands that were and are her home. These places and these landscapes are not past, they remain radically present not only in Jenny's memory, but in the hyper-awareness of her body, her everyday mobility, and the ways in which she feels secure

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moving through space. To build on these insights, the final vignette below with a man I call William I hope will further vivify not only this ineluctable place-based reality, but also that it is a place-based reality that resistant survivors, rebellious mourners, are absolutely determined to communicate to me, me who is not of this place.

VII.   CUTTING TURF

William is a somewhat laconic man and I am not initially sure how he takes to the unstructured request I give to all my participants: "Take me to places in your local area that you think are important for me to understand and tell me about them." Together, we travel initially to what might be referred to as more "traditional" places of UDR-memory: A roll of honour in the local Anglican church, a cemetery where many UDR men and women are buried, a place on the border where his unit was attacked by the IRA. It is only at the end of the journey, when I think I am dropping him back at his home, that he surprises me. He directs me to turn into boggy hills above a certain part of Fermanagh where there is no permanent human habitation. At one point, William indicates I should turn onto a dirt track in a poor state of repair, through an open livestock gate, and further up into the hills. He offers no explanation as to where we are going and I am reluctant to press. After about two miles up the track, he suddenly requests I stop. Surrounding us is the furrowed, turned-over acreage of a turf bog (Figure 22). "This is where I come to cut turf," William explains.

I am a bit perplexed, which must be evident on my face, so William continues, "This is [my family's] plot. And when I was in the UDR, I would come up here occasionally, usually between May and September, and I cut my turf."

Figure 22: Turf Bog, Fermanagh (specific location withheld). Photo by author.

It finally begins to dawn on me why William has taken me up here. Up here, miles from any house, William was completely isolated. This is a perfect place for an assassination. "So if anyone knew you were coming up here…" I prompt.

"Aye," he says, nodding, "but that was something you lived with. Something you had to live with. I didn't stay long when I was up here. I varied my route, my times, you see, you never wanted to fall into a regular pattern of habits, that's when they'd get you."

A little too eagerly, I ask William a blatantly leading question, "Do you think cutting turf was somehow an act of resistance?"

William regards me keenly for a moment. "No, not really," is all he says.

I remain unconvinced, but I respect William's circumspection. Howsoever one sees the act of cutting turf, inviting me to share this place is a powerful story. William employs the

turf bog to vivify to me the perpetual sense of disruption he, his family and his colleagues had to continually live with. Earlier in our journey, William told me how he had never been able to leave his children at their school because of assassination risk and I sensed in him a profound regret at missing out on that mundane ritual of caregiving and love. But here, in this bog, William carved out a place where, in spite of the severe risk to this person, he would be able to commune with the natural rhythms of rural life he was perpetually denied. The turf bog is not any *more* meaningful to William than the roll of honour where he sombrely reads the names of his colleagues and friends who were killed, or their gravestones where we stood, but those are places I, who is not of this place, can intuitively understand. The turf bog is new to me, and it is a place he is completely insistent I also understand. Like so many places my partners have shown me over the course of these months, it is a place I never knew existed. A place sedimented by layers of temporality, a place where the past does not go away. As we stare together over the bog, William simply asks me, "You see?"

"No, I couldn't," is all I can reply.

William just nods. That seems to be the correct answer. And he gets into the passenger seat and we head off back down the hill, back the way we came.

VIII.   PROLONGING THE PAST

As I described in Chapter 3, it was my switch to a non-sedentary methodology resulting in these journeys with ex-UDR partners that finally crystallised many of the conclusions I had begun to arrive at in Derry. In two very distinct areas, one a working-class Nationalist urban area, the other a more-middle-class Unionist rural area, I was observing very similar forms of place-based temporal resistance rooted in the *prolongation of a traumatic past in public space.* Derry is a town that wears its past on its proverbial sleeve, especially in the Bogside and the Creggan, in Derry in the context of Bloody Sunday, one is consistently surrounded by

the reminders that the past has not gone away. But they can become sterile, they can be occupied, accreted, colonised as dead, frozen images and motifs of a reality that is no more, that bears no immediate relevance to the present of the city. The memory-work of the Bloody Sunday curators I described in Chapters 4 and 5 is fundamentally about demonstrating the ongoing relevance of the chronotopic places in Derry where the living consort with the violently murdered.

At first glance, Fermanagh and border Tyrone seem very different. This is not Derry, with its complex urban entanglements, these are quiet market towns, villages, and lush, rolling, isolated countryside. Yet here I also discovered what Feldman (1991) so brilliantly describes in Belfast, "detached places" (68) where an "excess of death" (67) fundamentally disrupts temporal linearity, "transgresses the classificatory order" (67). As in Derry, and in Feldman's Belfast, these are locally-created, fantastically-detailed, living cartographies of death and dying. But unlike in urban space, where chronotopic places often bulge with a dizzying variety of visual and textual inscription and accretion, along the border these cartographies still circulate relatively invisibly. But they are no less present, no less significant in terms of the post-Troubles political, cultural, and social reality of Northern Ireland.

In Fermanagh and border Tyrone, my partners showed me a network of threshold places that completely interrupted the seeming docility of the landscape. These thresholds were still inexorably tied into the exigencies of everyday life, everyday movement, everyday fear, everyday segregation. They are drawn forth out of a seemingly innocuous stock of trace material, a post that was once a bus stop, an abandoned farm shed, an isolated turf bog. Through the narration, through the communication of de Certeau's (1984, 108) haunting sense of place, a knowledge passed "just between you and me," they deepen and take on flesh, dissolving the delineations between past and present.

Thus, I feel I can begin to describe the outlines of a resistant strategy, both conscious and otherwise, amongst often marginalised victims and survivors' groups of all political and cultural stripes in Northern Ireland, one that transcends traditional and tired ethnosectarian and geographical categories. Rebellious mourning in Northern Ireland often takes the form of the politicised, performative *retemporalisation* of everyday places and landscapes. This retemporalisation is a place-based refusal, a set of narrations that demands that at the very least, *here,* at this threshold, we will not allow what happened to us to be recruited into a reconciliatory chronology. We will continue to demonstrate the relevance of the past *here* by prolonging it, stretching it across time.

Daniel's comment, "We have long memories in this area" struck me immediately when he said it and I will close this chapter by briefly reflecting on its import. So as not to extend Daniel's turn of phrase beyond what he intended, I will acknowledge that Daniel probably meant at the surface level something akin to: "We will never forget what happened here." But the adjective "long" is telling. It immediately reminded (and still reminds me) of Henri Bergson's idea that there are two separate forms of time, which he names "objective time" and the other "duration" (*la durée)* (Bergson 1910/2014; 1946/1999). The latter is the time of our own internal, subjective experiences. Bergson describes empathy as the ability to enter into another's duration, into the multiplicity of possible temporalities that people feel, intuit, live, and are surrounded by. I hear Daniel's "long memory" as inviting this sort of empathy, though I acknowledge Daniel may not have intended this meaning, his turn of phrase feels like an invitation to witness *his* duration, to see how ex-UDR survivors experience that past as "long" and how and why they work to "pro*long*" it.

The reconciliatory paradigm in Northern Ireland, among other things, has in the past at least performatively stressed the need for shared space, to figure out a way for people to cohabit space at least relatively free from violence, intimidation, and institutionalised

segregation. While somewhat ironic considering that political segregation is built-into consociational institutions (Gilligan 2017; Graham and Nash 2006; Mac Ginty 2016), an at-least quasi-Bergsonian lens suggests that shared space is also simply insufficient. It suggests that actually being able to share space, to live together with people with different social, political, cultural identities, requires us also to learn to live with each other's ghosts. That actual political empathy requires openness not merely to different political ideals, not merely to different narrations of the past and Ireland's fraught history, but also a radical openness to a multiplicity of temporalities and durations, to the different ways in which the past is lived and continues to be experienced in the present. Yet transitional regimes and the reconciliatory paradigm, as I have shown, consistently demand a single over-arching linear temporality, the dominant temporality of moving on and moving forward.

Yet whether it be on the Bloody Sunday March or standing silently at a turf bog in the middle of nowhere, there are a myriad of places, known and not-yet-discovered, where this dominant temporality is exposed and falls apart.

CHAPTER 7:
FROM RECONCILIATION TO UNMAKING

1. REFUSING RECONCILIATION

Audra Simpson argues that, for many North American Indigenous peoples and groups, "sovereignty may exist within sovereignty" (2014, 10). In other words, sovereign claims and rights asserted by Settler states stand in perpetual tension with the promise of Indigenous self-governance. Indigenous self-governance thus becomes akin to what Nguyen (2012) calls "the gift of freedom," though in place of Nguyen's archetype of the "grateful refugee" being given their freedom by the benevolent host country, we instead have the grateful original inhabitant, the grateful Indian, granted limited self-government on their own stolen land. This gift of limited and circumscribed sovereignty is given through the benevolent Settler state's *recognition* of it, rather than by virtue of any innate, spiritual, or political connection to dispossessed land and Indigeneity (Bell 2014; Coulthard 2014; Povinelli 2012). This myth of Settler benevolence is especially pronounced in Canada, where many argue it is a foundational aspect of the Canadian project (Carleton, 2021; Mackey, 2005; Regan, 2010). In the face of Settler claims to multiculturalism, benevolence, and the politics of recognition, Simpson studies and advocates for a "politics of refusal," or:

> A political and ethical stance that stands in stark contrast to the desire to have one's distinctiveness as a culture, as a people, recognized. Refusal comes with the requirement of having one's *political* sovereignty acknowledged and upheld, and raised the question of legitimacy for those who are usually in the position of recognizing: What is their authority to do so? Where does it come from? Who are they to do so? (Simpson 2014, 11)

> Crucially, for Simpson, many Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) and Kahnawà:ke (Mohawk)

people, in their Settler-border-spanning lands, engage in a multi-scalar and ceaseless politics of refusal. At the macro scale, this politics refuses to recognise Settler borders or customs and mobility laws and may engage in open rebellion against the Canadian state (e.g. the 1990 Oka

Crisis). At the micro scale, this politics manifests as myriad ways of rejecting and resisting the way white Settlers supposedly do things, or narrate things, in their everyday lives and sociality. What Simpson explicitly argues (177-8) is that the politics of refusal is both a real and potential alternative to the Settler politics of recognition. But the political work of refusal that Indigenous people do on *their land* often appears in the Settler eye as "anomalous, illiberal, or illogical and gets conflated with pathology, economic desperation, and depredation ('smuggling')" (178).

Deeply influenced by Simpson's landmark work, I want to briefly turn to Canada to argue that as this dissertation is being completed, Indigenous peoples and their allies in Canada are openly organising to refuse another gift from the Settler state, namely, the gift of reconciliation. Extending Simpson's thesis, the politics of refusal is now operating as a refusal to be reconciled, a refusal to be reconciled with the extractive, brutal, and gendered violence of the Canadian state. At the surface level, this manifests as a refusal to accept that the type of reconciliation on offer through the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, especially in light of the ongoing struggle against the construction of gas pipelines through First Nations' land. Settler reconciliation in Canada, for its refusers, hinges on a refusal or a denial of Settler temporality. If the colonial legacy is supposedly in the past, why does the Canadian state continue to use violence in the present against First Nations' people seeking to defend their own land from oil and natural gas extraction and transmission?

To help surround this burgeoning politics of refusing reconciliation in Canada, I draw on the semi-official slogan of Wet'suwet'en land defenders and their allies (see below), "Reconciliation is Dead." Reconciliation is Dead will be the third section of this chapter, after a recapitulation of the overall argument of this dissertation in the second section. The fourth section of this chapter returns to Northern Ireland and Derry in particular, where I shall discuss another but related politics of refusal, this time through the official slogan of the 2022

Annual Bloody Sunday Weekend: "There is no British Justice." I will discuss this Northern Irish/Irish politics of refusal in the context of the so-called "Decade of Commemorations," where I myself worked for the NGO most responsible for developing the "Ethical and Shared Remembering" methodology and curricula that became a de facto guide for Northern Irish and Irish governmental approaches to the centenaries of vigorously disputed history. I shall discuss how and why I became deeply critical of the reconciliation paradigm I argue the ESR framework was built upon. In the penultimate section, I sketch out the bones of not a paradigm, but a preliminary framework or set of ideas for approaching the past in allegedly 'post'-something societies, a framework I refer to as "unmaking." The final section employs the recent work of McVeigh and Rolston (2022) to argue that Ireland, north and south, is currently on the precipice of a potentially explosive moment in space and time, one that will require a fundamental break with the reconciliation paradigm and a new decolonial politics rooted in radical transformation. I finish by sketching out a preliminary research agenda focused on better conceptualising and exploring the changing, dynamic realities on this island.

II. THE ARGUMENTS OF THIS DISSERTATION: TEMPORAL DOMINATION, PLACE AS THRESHOLD, PAST PROLONGATION

Fundamentally, in this dissertation I argue that time, and especially the political and spatial control over senses of time, is a deeply understudied aspect of allegedly postcolonial, authoritarian, and conflict life and reality. While in Chapter Two I surveyed different contexts where the political control and manipulation of time and temporality is deeply relevant, this dissertation as a whole has focused more narrowly on a particular context of "chronogeopolitics" (Klinke 2013), namely the temporal assumptions and temporal demands of what I have referred to throughout, following Short (2008), as the "reconciliation paradigm."

Specifically, I argue that in transitional societies supposedly emerging from colonisation, war and interethnic conflict, dominant forms of political power employ a transitional temporality that seeks to bracket, periodicise, or sever the violent past from a reconciling present. Time in transitional societies becomes stadial, or stage-based. In these contexts, each stage is narratively and performatively separate from another, the violent past discontinuous with the supposedly non-violent present. The violent past gets a line drawn about it, it is presented as something transcended and left behind and no longer of active relevance to the political and spatial questions and pressures of the present. Those who seek to prolong the past into the present, through continued justice campaigns and other "rebellious mourning" practices (cf. Milstein 2017a), or the perpetual restaging of complex, political grief and the retention of haunting absence-presences, become inconvenient to the accelerationist transitional impulses of postconflict political orders. These postconflict orders themselves are often populated by parties and institutions directly implicated in the violence they now seek to bracket and periodicise. The primary weapon deployed against temporally resistant survivors and bereaved is the weapon of political anachronism, the persistent drumbeat of political discourse mixed with legal promulgations that perpetually reminds survivors and bereaved that the time for rebellious mourning and searching for justice is over, in and of the past, out-of-step with the transition to liberal democratic normalcy.

I argue throughout that what Short refers to as reconciliation's "temporal dimension" (2008, 160) is "crucial to understanding the cosmetic display of reconciliation." This temporal dimension, which I argue in Chapter 2 undergirds conventional transitional justice understandings of transition, offers survivors and bereaved a circumscribed timeframe in which to grieve, but after which they are socially and politically expected to move on, to integrate their violent experiences into the transitional imagination (Castillo-Cuellar 2014; Mueller-Hirth 2017). This widespread social and political expectation to temporally conform

renders resistant survivors and bereaved political anachronisms, those whose bodies and struggles can be safely diagnosed and pathologised as suffering traumatic stress disorders. Once pathologised, temporally resistant survivors can be depoliticised, or, in Jenny Edkins' (2003, 9) conceptualisation, "offered sympathy and pity in exchange for the sacrifice of their political voice." Here, what I have chosen to call "mainstream trauma studies" becomes deeply implicated in this attempted depoliticisation. As I argue in Chapter 2, rather than seeing violent pasts and violent presents as intermeshed in "diabolical continuity" (Solyinka 1999, 19-20), it presents trauma as "the completed past of a singular event" (Rothberg 2008b, 230), thus working with the reconciliation paradigm and transition's accelerationist temporality to sever the relevance of the past to current political institutions and questions, to current and ongoing issues of injustice and violence. In the process, intentionally or otherwise, it works to insulate and shield the postconflict political and institutional order from criticism and social resistance.

Thus, I understand time itself in allegedly postsomething societies as imposed on the bodies of survivors and bereaved, specifically, a certain form of time, which I refer to, following the work of Mueller-Hirth (2017), as the "dominant temporality of transition." This dominant temporality of transition becomes a form of what Elizabeth Freeman (2010) refers to as *chrononormativity,* or a widespread baseline of right, proper, institutionalised, temporality, the default temporality through which all other forms of temporal-being-in-the-world find themselves measured against, becoming aberrant. This transitional chronormativity exerts what I refer to as "temporal domination" over the bodies of survivors and bereaved. Temporal domination, or the idea of time as forcibly imposed on marginalised, colonised, and/or subaltern peoples has been theorised through a number of different, but related conceptualisations, such as Zoe O'Reilly's (2018) "imposed liminality," Megan Reid's (2012) "sociotemporal marginalisation," Charles Mills' (2020; 2014) "white time,"

and Johannes Fabian's (1983) "allochronisation." However, I suggest that "temporal domination" functions to better describe the pervasive, ubiquitous, and all-encompassing reach of dominant time, as a chronormativity capable of penetrating and annexing all aspects of postconflict everyday life and discourse.

Yet while enforced and seemingly endless waiting forms a central aspect of temporal domination, and especially in the lives of survivors and bereaved in Northern Ireland, I maintain that the concept, as I apply construct it from the work of Freeman, Mueller-Hirth, and Rifkin is broader than that facet. Temporal domination properly refers to a sociopolitical chrononormativity that strips the preferred time of a political subject from their control and renders it and them anachronistic. A political subject whose veritable lifeworld is rooted in addressing, combatting, or confronting their experiences in the past, and prolonging that past into the present to challenge what they perceive as an unjust status-quo, does so in the face of an all-encompassing presumption of the proper, right, and necessary way to move chronologically through the world, from grief to healing, from violence to reconciliation, from protest to transcendence.

However, where this dissertation departs from a small but growing literature on postconflict and postauthoritarian temporal domination (Bevernage 2012; Castillejo-Cuellar 2014; Mueller-Hirth 2017; Hinton 2018) is in its emphasis on place as the crucial engine of temporal political resistance. Drawing on the work of a number of scholars, including Karen Till (2017; 2012), Rachel Pain (2020; 2019), Avril Maddrell (2013), Fernando Bosco (2006; 2004), Lucy Lippard (1996), Keith Basso (1996), Allen Feldman (1991), and perhaps most crucially, Mikhail Bakhtin (1984; 1981), I argue that within "wounded" (cf. Till 2012) or "traumatised" (cf. Pain 2020) postsomething spaces and landscapes there exist places that are temporally "uncodifiable" (Feldman 1991, 67), places that cannot be recruited into linear, accelerationist transitional temporalities due to the surfeit of death and loss associated with

them in the minds of their inhabitants. These sorts of places I have understood through the lens of the Bakhtinian chronotope, places "where time and space intersect and fuse," where "time takes on flesh and becomes visible for human contemplation" (Bakhtin 1981, 249). Specifically, I the places I examine in Northern Ireland are akin to Bakhtin's "chronotopes of the threshold," or those "connected with the breaking point in life," places where "[time]… falls out of the normal course of biographical time" (1984, 248). The remnants of Bakhtin's fragmentary corpus do not adequately elucidate his intriguing sub-category of "threshold chronotopes," so I have used the work of Karen Till (2017; 2012) and Keith Basso (1996) to further flesh out the significance of place as threshold. In postsomething societies where a particular form of temporal domination is routinely and ubiquitously used to depoliticise and domesticate survivors and bereaved of political violence, namely, the dominant temporality of transition and the reconciliation paradigm, thresholds are those interstices in accelerationist temporal space where the living continue to commune with the dead, the places through which they demand acknowledgment of trauma time, rebellious mourning, and the unfinalisability of justice struggles. The chronotope represents a fusion of space and time that captures not just the inseparability of past and present, but the sedimented, to use Walter Benjamin's metaphor (2005), layers of the past that interlace everywhere with the soil of the present. They are places where the past remains very much alive, where the past can be translated in the present, re-emplotted within the micro-geographies of vulnerable human communities, and, fundamentally, imbued with ongoing resistance. They are places where the ghosts still, in Avery Gordon's turn of phrase, "seethe" and "meddle with" the lived realities of everyday life.

Through what I hope is a gradual turn towards the more dynamic and more creative methodologies I described in Chapter 3, I have been introduced to and allowed to discover threshold chronotopes pockmarking postconflict space in Northern Ireland. My research

partners have taken me to them, and they have shown me them, shown them to me in under-studied and more out-of-the-way places, or hidden, burbling underneath the places already well-studied by prior research. From the way the Bloody Sunday March is staged, presented, ordered, and performed, to an empty husk of a building outside of Rosslea where a man was murdered, chronotopes of the threshold do more to influence the shape the course of postconflict political and social life in Northern Ireland than has yet been acknowledged. I understand, following Casey (2001), people and place as "co-constitutive," and place itself as "storied" (Cameron 2012; Cruikshanks 2001; Robinson 2018a). Politically and temporally resistant survivors in Northern Ireland, and not merely in the places studied in this dissertation, are curating and will likely continue to curate and care for a dizzying plethora of thresholds interspersed throughout their everyday geographies and mobilities because these places are the chronotopic bridges through which they communicate their stories, the tragic and traumatic experiences and the viciousness and inhumanity of what was done to them. These chronotopic bridges prefigure not only the possibility of different futures, but also different pasts and presents. In a postconflict geopolitical context built on the transitioning and reconciling, these are places where the past never goes away in the minds and performances of its inhabitants. They are places where, as Basso (1996, 33) argues, history can be told in the present tense.

Throughout the empirical chapters of this dissertation, I have consistently noted how the political struggles of my research partners seem to be inexorably rooted in this question of tense. From the choice (and it is rarely a wholly conscious choice) to narrate and frame Bloody Sunday in a particular linguistic tense or tenses, my research partners betray their preferred temporality of Bloody Sunday, as, one on hand, mostly over, completed, of the past, the spatial story of Derry's and the BSJC's transcendence, as, on the other hand, radically incomplete, still open, and continuing to stand, even 50 years in the future, for the presence of

colonial state violence in Derry, but far beyond the city as well. Standing at the thresholds with my research partners in Fermanagh and Border Tyrone, listening to how they frame the landscape and their experiences, they are always happening now, again, forever, they are always resisting and criticising the past and the present together. At the chronotope, we are always slipping tenses.

If there is one contribution above all else that I hope the reader take away from my arguments in these pages, it is that the political memory-work that goes into prolonging the past into the present cannot simply be dismissed, elided, or avoided, as manifestations of either organised political spoilerism nor individualised (or communal) post-traumatic stress. These anachronising designations conveniently ignore the ubiquity and ordinariness of horrifying violence still enmeshed into the material and physical landscape, still carried on the backs and shoulders of people who inhabit these wounded places, people who must negotiate these micro-geographies in their daily lives. Throughout this dissertation, I have named the memory-work temporally resistant bereaved and survivors do at the threshold as "rebellious mourning," following the work of Cindy Milstein and her collaborators (2017a). In Northern Ireland, I argue that the "rebellious mourning" of the people, places, and communities I study is a manifestation of a burgeoning "refusal of reconciliation," a refusal to allow the books to be closed, for history, in Walter's Benjamin's (1985b) timeless turn of phrase, to be transformed into "homogenous, empty time." In Canada, Australia, Argentina, Northern Ireland, and many other places, this new and burgeoning politics of refusal manifests as the refusal to allow ostensibly new and reconciled societies to be constructed at the expense of and over the objections of, the victims, survivors, and bereaved of political violence.

III. RECONCILIATION IS DEAD: REFUSING RECONCILIATION IN CANADA

On 1 June 2008, the Conservative Harper government of Canada was forced by the promise of extensive and protracted litigation against the Canadian State to convene the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (Nagy 2014; Stanton 2011) to address the legacy of Canada's Indigenous Residential Schools (IRS) System. This system was intended to force the assimilation of all Indigenous children into Settler life, explicitly designed by its creators to "kill the Indian, save the man" (Churchill 2004). In practice, this meant separating Indigenous children from their families and communities, forbidding them to speak their languages or participate in any aspect of their Indigenous culture, what the Canadian TRC Report would later allege "can best be described as 'cultural genocide'" (2015, 1). Additionally, physical and sexual violence against Indigenous children was rampant, and between 2015-2021, more than 1300 unmarked graves have been discovered on the grounds of no fewer than five former residential schools (Voce et al. 2021).

The Canadian TRC Report, entitled "Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future," was published in December 2015. Its major contribution was its 94 "Calls to Action" on the legacy of Indian Residential Schools and reconciling Indigenous and Settler Canadians. Crucially, while the current Canadian government of Justin Trudeau has stated its intention to fully implement all the calls to action, none of the calls to action was backed by any forcing legal mandate and various independent assessments have concluded that a mere eight (Mosby and Jewell 2020), or 13 (Carreiro 2018) have been achieved. The criticisms of Indigenous scholars like Glen Coulthard (2014) however, are more in keeping with the themes of this dissertation. Coulthard argues that the TRC "historicises" the Indian Residential School system, treating it as an aberrant "sad chapter in Canadian history." The assignation of the IRS system to a completed past decouples the IRS from Canadian settler

colonialism, which may have begun in the past, but continues into the present. As such, the reconciliation paradigm in Canada functions similarly to the Australian reconciliation paradigm coined by Short (2008) and criticised so eloquently by scholars like Elizabeth Povinelli (2012): A cosmetic sheen designed to express regret and apology about past violence, yet incapable of altering the deleterious and poisonous legacies of settler colonialism. As Eve Tuck and Wayne Yang (2012) argue, reconciliation in settler societies is not, in fact, about Indigenous people at all, but rather about settler "moves to innocence," a white desire to become reconciled with the Native without doing any of the actual work of decolonisation that would necessarily precede any form of substantive, as opposed to cosmetic, reconciliation.

In Canada, as in Australia, evidence abounds that the colonial violence directed at Indigenous people continues and remains both a part of official government policy and an unfinished legacy of colonialism. There are any number of places to find this evidence, from the stark disparities in Indigenous incarceration rates (Chartrand 2019) to similar stark disparities in poverty rates (Macdonald and Wilson 2013), to mental health and suicide rates (Webster 2016), and many other determinants of racism and social exclusion (Kiepal, Carrington, and Dawson 2012). I will briefly focus on two arenas that have arguably contributed most to the widespread refusal of reconciliation in Canada in recent years, namely the ongoing resistance to the Coastal GasLink Pipeline, mainly concentrated in the lands and territories of the Wet'suwet'en peoples (Northern British Columbia) and what is referred to as The Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women (MMIW) crisis in Canada and the United States.

The Coastal GasLink Pipeline is a proposed 670-kilometre natural gas pipeline route through Northern British Columbia, Canada. The proposed pipeline route passes through the

territory of several First Nations peoples known collectively as the Wet'suwet'en. The Wet'suwet'en Hereditary Chiefs, the traditional, elder-based leadership model of the Wet'suwet'en peoples, refused to allow the pipeline to be conducted through their ancestral land. Recognising that the BC and Canadian government intended to begin construction of the pipeline anyway, Wet'suwet'en peoples and their allies began to plan an organised campaign of refusal to allow the pipeline to proceed. Deep in the interior of British Columbia, the Wet'suwet'en constructed checkpoints through geographical choke points where the proposed pipeline route was only accessible by forest service roads that could be easily blockaded. A succession of legal injunctions from 2019 to the current day have demanded the Wet'suwet'en cease blockading access to the pipeline route. The Wet'suwet'en have refused. In a series of actions between 2019-21, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) deployed in force to clear Wet'suwet'en barricades. The RCMP's tactics were brutal, included establishing a "media exclusion zone," arresting journalists, destroying buildings and structures with land defenders inside them, arresting a still unknown amount of land defenders, and authorising "lethal force" in the interest of "sterilizing the [barricade] site" (cited in Dhillon and Parrish 2019; see also Bowden and Chong 2021; Bracken 2021). In response to the RCMP invasion of the barricades, solidarity protests sprung up all over Canada, with protesters targeting crucial rail and transportation infrastructure, paralysing supply chains across Canada. As of this writing, Wet'suwet'en protests and blockades continue, however, they face increasingly intense harassment and surveillance by the RCMP, which continues to move aggressively to break up any attempted sit-ins or occupations of the pipeline route. Forcibly denied access, land defenders have again shifted their struggle, targeting pipeline banks and investors with boycotts and campaigns to disinvest. The pipeline construction, and the struggle against it, is ongoing.

In the immediate aftermath of one RCMP sweep, two upside-down Canadian flags bearing the slogan "Reconciliation is Dead" were displayed in front of the British Columbia Legislative Buildings in Victoria (Lafferty 2020). Meanwhile, at the remains of the main Gidimt'en encampment, land defenders held a ceremony to mark the "death of reconciliation." Over an open bonfire, Canadian flags were "cremated" to "honour" the passing of reconciliation in the shadow of hundreds of hanging red dresses, the primary symbol of Canada's Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women (Allaire 2021) (a short documentary of the ceremony is available at https://unistoten.camp/reconciliationisdead/).

Many Indigenous peoples and survivors of the IRC in Canada approached the Truth and Reconciliation Process with a deal of scepticism, considering that the Process was mandated upon the Canadian government by a legal settlement agreement and contained no mechanisms of judicial enforcement, no subpoena or arrest powers, and was even legally prevented from "naming names," or entering the names of specific alleged perpetrators into the Commission's Record (Nagy 2013; Nietzen 2017). I have already mentioned how none of its 94 "Calls to Action" were legal requirements. However, in spite of its built-in limitations, the actual proceedings of the TRC proved relatively popular amongst Indigenous and First Nations' survivors. Scholars such as James (2012) credit the popular chairperson, the Salteaux (Plains Ojibwe) jurist Murray Sinclair, as well as the intensely survivor-centric and ceremonial approach to the TRC proceedings for much of this initial popularity. For Sinclair, the TRC had two faces, its outward-facing approach was wholly pedagogical and directed at settlers, intending to reveal and illustrate the historical record and traumatic impact of Canada's cultural genocide. Its inward-facing approach, towards survivors and survivor communities, eschewed forensic investigation and detail and instead focused on valourising and celebrating survivors and their descendants (Stanton 2017).

Nagy (2013) and Regan (2010) both argue that the Canadian TRC mandate and proceedings, as interpreted and applied by Sinclair and his team, could help "unsettle" the foundational myth of Canadian settler benevolence, thus reinforcing "bottom-up pressure on the state to begin to decolonize the Indigenous-Settler relationship" (Nagy 2013, 56). While settler scholars like Nagy and Regan admit their portrayals are tinged with optimism and hope, the larger "unsettling" approach of the TRC under Sinclair attracted widespread participation amongst former IRS survivors and their descendants (Angel 2012) who seemed at least open to giving its transformative pedagogy approach the benefit of the doubt at its inception (see Czyzewski 2011; Rice and Snyder 2008).

In the intervening decade, perspectives like Nagy and Regan's seem to have proven not merely optimistic, but fatally flawed. The reason may be exactly what Tuck and Yang's (2012) fiercely critical essay first exposed: Decolonisation cannot be a metaphor. Decolonisation cannot be a promise, a call to action, a rhetorical flourish, an apology substituted or put in the place of the daily physical, tangible work of *unmaking settler colonialism*. When decolonisation is even speculatively harnessed to intangible and nebulous ideas like reconciliation, it becomes the fourth Settler "move to innocence" identified by Tuck and Yang: "Free your mind and the rest will follow" (2012, 19). While noting expressly that a Settler working to free their mind is not unwelcome, Tuck and Yang expressly reject a *conscientisation* approach that they attribute to Paolo Freire. This approach, they argue, disappears decolonisation within a larger rubric of "social justice." Decolonisation, they claim, "specifically requires the repatriation of Indigenous land and life" (21).

When Wet'suwet'en land defenders ceremonially immolated the Canadian flag to honour the death of reconciliation, they argued they had tried to engage with and respect Canada's particular operationalisation of the reconciliation paradigm and had tried on its

terms. In an open letter to Justin Trudeau and the government of British Columbia, Sleydo', a spokesperson for the Wet'suwet'en Hereditary Chiefs, argues "the so-called governments of British Columbia and Canada have paid lip service to reconciliation, claiming they respect Indigenous peoples' rights… [yet] they haven't stopped construction [of the pipeline] and haven't pulled RCMP [sic] off our territories" (2022). What Sleydo' and others argue is that what they initially feared would be the role of the TRC was has come to pass, reconciliation in Canada has become a purely cosmetic exercise, ensconced within a larger Settler move to innocence, and a larger inability to confront the violent and extractive actions and policies that are at the heart of Canadian Settler colonialism, past and ongoing.

Especially indicative of cosmetic reconciliation is the use of the RCMP to enforce injunctions in unceded lands. It is no accident that across Canada, protests against the Coastal GasLink Pipeline are inevitably saturated with the symbolism of the red dress, the primary cultural symbol of Canada's Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women (Allaire 2021). The two issues are inextricably linked, inseparable. The RCMP's origins are as a paramilitary force created for the specific purpose of asserting Canadian sovereignty over First Nations' people and land (MacDonald 2019). It was the RCMP who physically engaged in the project of removing children to Indigenous Residential Schools and the RCMP who tracked down and returned escaped children (Florence 2021). The RCMP, throughout its history, has been linked to repeated and ongoing allegations of rape and gender-based violence against First Nations' Communities (Human Rights Watch 2013), not to mention institutional failures of investigation regarding those same crimes. The Canadian government's own official Inquiry into the Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls argues the epidemic of gender-based violence against Indigenous communities in Canada "amounts to genocide" (NIMMIWG 2019, 4) and is scathing in its criticism of the RCMP, arguing that the force must be removed from investigating these crimes

Thus, it is difficult not to see the widespread adoption of the "Reconciliation is Dead" slogan in Canada as anything but a collective act of political refusal. The Coastal GasLink Pipeline, forced through unceded Wet'suwet'en land by a police force created specifically to advance the Canadian colonial project, named by its own TRC as "cultural genocide" and by its own subsequent MMIWG commission as facilitating "genocide," inextricably severs the temporal fiction of a line between Canadian colonial pasts and colonial presents. The IRS system becomes not a "sad chapter in Canadian history" but what Simpson (2014 77) likens to a temporal "Gordian Knot," the way she argues the Haudenosaunee people she studies conceptualise the circular and entangled connections between time and tense, past and present. Reconciliation is Dead is not merely the refusal to reconcile on the Settler's terms, rather, it is the refusal to accept the move to innocence that comes in the form of temporal periodicisation, of claiming that colonialism is a thing of the completed past, or that critical pedagogy or unsettling master narratives can ever be substituted for the difficult, material work of unmaking colonialism. In the subsequent section, I argue that a very similar refusal is happening now across the island of Ireland.

IV.   THERE IS NO BRITISH JUSTICE: REFUSING RECONCILIATION IN IRELAND

If, in Canada, reconciliation is dead, in Ireland it very much seems to be in its death throes, depending on where one focuses one's gaze. In the penultimate section of this dissertation, I want to begin with at least a quasi-insider account of my own entanglement in the reconciliation paradigm. From 2013-16, I worked for an NGO based in Derry that created and popularised what is known as the Ethical and Shared Remembering (ESR) Project. Focused on what is known in Ireland as the "Decade of Centenaries" (2012-22), the ESR project aimed to help inaugurate a new methodology of remembering some of the most contentious

events in Irish history, including the Easter Rising, the Battle of the Somme, and the Partition of Ireland. While this was the ESR project's explicit aim, its implicit aim involved forestalling the threat of violence associated in the minds of many with how these centenaries could be commemorated.

The project itself was deeply rooted in an interpretation of the Irish-American theologian and philosopher Richard Kearney (2007; and Fitzpatrick 2021), who himself adapts the ideas of Paul Ricoeur, especially his idea of "narrative hospitality." Kearney seems to have been largely guided by Ricoeur's theories of narrative (1984), memory (2004), and translation (2006). It is not my intention here to comprehensively summarise Ricoeur's voluminous oeuvre, especially as the ESR project stems from Kearney's interpretation of Ricoeur. But briefly, Ricoeur was a philosophical advocate of what I would refer to as the generosity of recognition through interpretative and hermeneutic flexibility and hospitality (Ricoeur 2007). In this formulation, Ricoeur repeatedly subordinates questions of spiritual, historical, and empirical "T"ruth to the question of mutual recognition. Recognition, in Ricoeur's formulation, is a struggle that is not transactional, it is given as a gift in the hope of reciprocity. Thus, when it comes to identity, history-as-narrative, contentious memory, and translation, what matters for Ricoeur is how mutual recognition of the intertangled subjectivities of Self and Other can be cultivated and a radical inter-relatedness of possibility allowed to grow. I briefly referenced Ricoeur's idea of "duty memory" in Chapters 4 and 5. To contextualise my discussion within this admittedly broad overview, Ricoeur argues that the duty of social memory is to a nebulous idea of justice, and represents a societal obligation to defend this ideal. However, Ricoeur, in his epilogue (2005), also firmly demands we hold the possibility of forgetting in reserve, through amnesty, through historical revisionism, and especially through forgiveness, if it becomes clear that a society needs to forget in order to achieve tolerance through mutual recognition. As he writes (2007, 19), "Where this mutual

recognition either remains an unfulfilled dream [it] requires procedures and institutions that elevate recognition beyond the friendship of face-to-face relations to the political plane." In other words, where societies remain stubbornly intransigent, divided, and at odds over contentious interpretations of the past, Ricoeur does not seem to be adverse to mandating, forcing, or manipulating memory and history into forms that will facilitate mutual recognition.

What Kearney adapts from Ricoeur are three principles of ethical remembering and commemorating violent pasts. These three principles in turn form the ideational core of the ESR programme: Narrative hospitality, narrative flexibility, and narrative pluralism. For Ricoeur and of course also for Kearney and the ESR project, it must be noted that these principles are firmly ensconced within a hermeneutical methodology. This is an approach to questions of the past rooted in investigating, uncovering, and disseminating the past in its historical context, with an eye towards the contextualised human intentionality of action that surrounds every event. For the ESR programme, this necessitates a pedagogical approach rooted in understanding that the "past is a foreign country… to remember the past as though it was the present is to delude ourselves and is an irresponsible way of remembering" (McMaster and Hetherington 2010, 5). The key historical, political, cultural, and revolutionary figures in the Decade acted in such a way that was inseparable from the contextual choices and ideologies that surrounded them at the time, a specifically hermeneutic method of bracketing the past. The three guidelines for remembering ethically "for the future" in turn demand (in a clear Ricoeurian way) "the generosity of the spirit to hear [other people's] narratives, especially those outside our conditioned historical and narrative framework." (8).

The ESR thus produced a series of training materials and historical booklets and set out to deliver a course across Northern Ireland and the border region. While the programme was open to the public, the coordinator of The Junction (my former boss) Maureen Hetherington, was very clear on who she viewed as the most important targets being. Hetherington is a former Good Relations Officer for the Derry City (now Derry City and Strabane) District Council, the chief non-elected official charged with administering and delivering a given Council's statutory duty to improve inter-communal relations established by the 1998 Agreement (Goldie and Murphy 2010). Hetherington targeted people like she had been in her former employ—good relations officers, bureaucrats, administrators, advisers, community organisers and spokespeople, non-governmental organisation and community-based organisation workers, elected councillors—people who would be instrumental in envisioning, administering, and delivering Centenary commemorations in a given catchment area. She called her general recruitment strategy "training the trainers" (personal communication), the idea that these types of people would take on board the ESR methodology towards commemoration and disseminate it further within their own local communities. The ESR course and methodology, chiefly funded by the Community Relations Council of Northern Ireland, the Heritage Lottery, and the Republic of Ireland's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, was rolled out in 2012 and as of this writing, has instructed thousands of participants across Northern Ireland and the border regions in a methodology of remembering genealogically traceable to Paul Ricoeur, as understood by Richard Kearney, and interpreted by the ESR project's chief theoretical architect, the Northern Irish Methodist minister and educator Rev. Dr Johnston McMaster. One major and influential disseminator of the ESR programme proved to be the Irish President Michael D. Higgins, who regularly requested the programme materials and incorporated them into his own speeches and writing

(see especially Higgins 2021; 2017). In 2019, Higgins invited McMaster onto the Irish Council of State, a constitutional but largely ceremonial body that advises the President.

By 2012, the ESR aims and methodology had become firmly adopted as the quasi-official commemorative approach to the Decade of Commemorations on both sides of the border, however, in many cases, their origins in The Junction's work became lost or co-opted. In Northern Ireland, the Community Relations Council affirmed that its funding priorities would be firmly geared towards "programmes dealing with the decade 1912-1922 [that] reflect the historical facts, seek to explode myths and propagandistic distortions and place events in their broadest historical perspective" (cited in Evershed 2014, 40). The Irish Government's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade adopted a similar approach, tailoring its approach as: "Encouraging multiple and plural commemorations which remember the past, while ensuring, as far as possible, that the commemorations do not reignite old tensions" (DFAT 2011, n.p.).

Radstone (2008) and Rigney (2012) both presciently argue that the reconciliation paradigm in postconflict and postauthoritarian societies depends on the institutional instrumentalisation of potentially divisive social memory (see Robinson 2018a). As Rigney (251-2) argues:

> The idea that the mediated production of common memory narratives can and should be 'engineered' (orchestrated, managed) in order to become productive of a peaceful and just co-existence, rather than the source of division, remains one of the underlying assumptions of (post-)conflict governance.

It is not difficult to see the indirect influence of Paul Ricoeur here, nor indeed his influence on more proximate advocates for the reconciliatory instrumentalisation of memory such as Michael Ignatieff (1994) and the Northern Irish sociologist John Brewer (2010). Writes Brewer, drawing directly on Ignatieff, "honouring the sacrifice of the dead/survivors, however, does not involve them becoming such a weight that they preclude the living from

moving on" (166). Later he advocates for a "redirection of society's public gaze" towards a form of social remembering he terms "re-remembering, turn[ing] that past into something pivotal for the future" (193). This instrumentalisation of the past through the reconciliation paradigm is achieved through the public purse strings for Brewer, by starving of funds victims and survivors' groups and those others who promote, divisive conflict memories. While the southern Republic did provide state funding for several artistic pieces that directly or indirectly challenged the Decade's reconciliatory imperative during its Decade of Commemorations programme (McIvor 2016; Murphy 2018; Till 2021), both the CRC and DFAT's funding priorities vis the Decade itself were very clearly articulated at the outset and seemed to parallel Brewer's suggestion.

The reasons for this resolutely reconciliatory approach again hearken back to Leigh Payne's (2008) idea of "fatal overdose of truth" truism in transitional justice (see Chapter One), or the widespread belief within mainstream transitional justice that, without muting political contention over the past through instrumentalised memory, the society in question will return to violence. In Northern Ireland, as Evershed (2018; 2015) shows, the ESR methodology adopted by the CRC was presented as the sole alternative to the "hijacking" of the past by Loyalism and Republicanism. The proponents of ESR alleged that these potential hijackings would be based on purposeful mis-readings of Irish history, recommending repeatedly that commemorations "stick to the facts" of history and remove or avoid non-reconciliation-promoting interpretations (see Evershed 2015). Yet, as Graff-McRae (2010) compellingly shows, stripping or attempting to strip commemoration of its contentious, oppositional, or antagonistic character is itself another attempt to police the boundaries of acceptable and non-acceptable interpretations of the past. More importantly, if only "ethical," "shared," "inclusive" or "socially functional" (cf. Brewer 2010, 193) forms of commemoration are privileged and able to access state resources, then that calls into question

the very notion of mutual encounter, mutual recognition, and narrative pluralism on which the ESR's Ricouerian foundation is built. It is recognition only within the boundaries of what State power allows.

This is part of what Elizabeth Povinelli (2003) refers to as "the cunning of recognition" embedded deep within liberal and colonial appeals to "multiculturalism." Povinelli argues that at its heart, appeals to multicultural recognition politics are not an ethical commitment to celebrating difference, but a form of insulating liberal regimes from decolonising demands and decolonising political actions (Coulthard 2007; Short 2008). The cunning of recognition is to pre-establish the ideational and political box in which recognition can occur. Simpson (2014) argues that the politics of refusal are the alternative to liberal recognition, an outright refusal to participate in Settler-colonial attempts at managing difference on the land they stole. Kahnawá:ke Mohawks, she argues, refuse not only Settler systems of administrative governance rooted in recognition of limited tribal sovereignty, they refuse to be the subjects of the coloniser's "tolerance," to assuage the coloniser's guilt, to be extended the "gift" of colonial recognition.

As discussed in Chapter One, in 2020 the government of Boris Johnson introduced the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill that would end all investigations, inquests (public and coronial), inquiries, civil actions, and prosecutions into Troubles-era crimes, violence, and killing. In short, the proposals were a sweeping amnesty for British military and security forces and former paramilitaries. In a statement outlining and defending the Bill, the Northern Ireland Office explicitly equates "help[ing] victims of the Troubles in Northern Ireland towards reconciliation with the pain and trauma of the past" and "ending vexatious claims against veterans" (NIO 2020). While the Bill was and is currently being opposed by every major political party in Northern Ireland, not to mention the Council of

Europe, Amnesty International, and the United Nations Human Rights Council, and other leading international organisations (Cadwallader 2021), I argued in Chapter One that blanket amnesty is in fact the natural, legalistic end-point of the temporality of the reconciliation paradigm and it is no coincidence that Johnson's government felt safe in so crudely deploying its rhetoric. The reconciliation paradigm, in Canada (Coulthard 2014; Henderson and Wakeham 2009), in Australia (Edmonds 2016; Short 2008), in South Africa (Brudholm 2008; Wilson 2001), in Argentina (Di Paolantonio 1997; Salvi 2015), in Cambodia (Hinton 2018; Manning 2017), in Colombia (Castillejo-Cuellar 2014; 2013), wherever it has been deployed, has served as an apparatus of *legitimising* the allegedly postcolonial, authoritarian, orconflict state through the boxing, bracketing, and periodicising of the past. The "cosmetic display," in Short's terms (2008, 160), of reconciliation hinges on this temporal trick, the cunning of recognition. We, the beneficiaries, bystanders, perpetrators of traumatic violence recognise and feel your pain, but that was in the past and we have a responsibility to the future, which can only be liberal, multicultural democracy based on mutual recognition. Within this reconciliatory imaginary futurity, the responsibility for failing to realise the future is perversely reversed and placed on the shoulders of anachronistic, recalcitrant, justice-seeking survivors.

There is no British Justice (Figure 23), I argue, represents a gradual realisation by the Bloody Sunday March Committee that what they have campaigned for (at the time of this writing) thirty years is impossible. The original third demand of the BSJC was the [credible] investigation of the public murders on the streets of the Bogside, followed by the arrest, prosecution, and conviction of those responsible for the crimes. The Northern Ireland (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill, if it becomes law would immediately end the one ongoing prosecution in the Bloody Sunday case, that of Lance Corporal David James Cleary, codenamed Soldier F.

THERE IS NO BRITISH JUSTICE

KEVIN McDAID JIM WRAY MICHAEL McDAID JOHN YOUNG JOHN JOHNSTON PATRICK DOHERTY
MICHAEL KELLY WILLIAM McKINNEY HUGH GILMOUR BERNARD McGUIGAN GERARD McKINNEY
JACKIE DUDDY WILLIAM NASH
GERALD DONAGHEY

THE GLENANNE GANG MCGURK'S BAR AMRITSAR ORGREAVE 1661 BARBADOS SLAVE CODE
QISSA KHWANI BAZAAR LOUGHINISLAND MARK FLETCHER SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS SEAN
GRAHAMS BOOKMAKERS BALLYMURPHY THE BIRMINGHAM SIX INTERNMENT RICKI BISHOP
FOSTA ERROL THOMPSON AZZELLE RODNEY THE GUILDFORD FOUR STEPHEN LAWRENCE
PETERLOO ANNIE'S BAR DRUMBEG THE MAGUIRE SEVEN HILLSBOROUGH BOYLE'S BAR
SPRINGHILL/WESTROCK EDIR DA COSTA KAY'S TAVERN DARREN CUMBERBATCH TRAYNOR'S
BAR DUBLIN MONAGHAN BOMBINGS DONNELLY'S BAR FALLS CURFEW MIAMI SHOWBAND
ANGELA HALL DIPLOCK COURTS IAN GORDON CS GAS JEROME SCOTT THE B SPECIALS THE
HOODED MEN SALANGA CASTLEREAGH BATANG KALI COERCED CONFESSIONS COLLUSION
GREYSTEEL PSYOP'S EMERGENCY LAWS FRU CR GAS PARTITION GERRYMANDERING
H-BLOCKS INFORMERS MI5 OPERATION BANNER SHOOT TO KILL SPECIAL POWERS ACT
STAKEKNIFE PLASTIC BULLETS STRIP SEARCHES SUPERGRASSES THE PTA BLAIR PEACH
MARK DUGGAN DAVID OLUWALE COLIN ROACH CYNTHIA JARRETT OLIVER PRYCE REFUGEES
CAMERON WHELAN JASON LENNON BOER CONCENTRATION CAMPS BASRA BALFOUR
DECLARATION CHUMIK SHENKO AL-BASSA CHUKA AMKO SIMKO SHAKEE ARTHUR ALLISON
SARAH REED STALKER SAMPSON STOP AND SEARCH KEVIN CLARKE PINJARA......

BLOODY SUNDAY 50th ANNIVERSARY MARCH
30th January 2022 assemble Creggan Shops 2.30pm
WWW.BLOODYSUNDAYMARCH.ORG

Figure 23: There is No British Justice, 2022 Bloody Sunday March Official Programme. Available at bloodysundaymarch.org

While the anonymity of Cleary and the other paratroopers in question is protected by a UK legal injunction, I name Cleary here as a small act of both refusal and solidarity and an expression of respect for survivors.

In the aftermath of 15 June 2010 and the release of the Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, the PSNI opened a murder investigation, however, they were prohibited from using any of the findings of the Report and had to reinvestigate anew forty-plus-year-old murders. The file handed over to the Northern Ireland PPS found evidence recommending the prosecution of an additional seven soldiers along with Cleary, H, N, O, Q, R, S, and V. An additional soldier, G, was also implicated but was deceased. Two ex-members of the Official IRA who were allegedly involved in a sniper attack on soldiers on Bloody Sunday were also implicated in the PSNI investigation. However, the PPS, citing evidentiary issues and an

inability to determine which soldier fired the fatal or injurious bullets, declined to charge anyone except Cleary, citing no reasonably prospect of conviction. In 2021, in a separate case, the 1972 murder of Official IRA member Joe McCann in Belfast by 1 PARA, a judge ruled that statements made by the soldiers being prosecuted in the case, A and C, who had admitted shooting McCann to the Royal Military Police, were inadmissible because the RMP had not cautioned them. This caused the McCann case to collapse, and in the aftermath, the PPS also dropped the Cleary prosecution, arguing it depended on similar statements taken from soldiers not under caution. This PPS decision was appealed by the family of William McKinney, one of the 14 victims of Bloody Sunday, and in March 2022, the McKinney family's appeal was successful and the PPS were ordered to resume the prosecution of Cleary.

The PPS decisions have dovetailed with the introduction of the 2020 Legacy and Reconciliation Bill and leading campaigners in the Bloody Sunday March Committee I have spoken with or heard speak describe a creeping realisation that the British state and its political and legal apparatus are fundamentally unequipped to prosecute Troubles-related murders. The Johnson administration's intervention has been simply, in their minds, the formalisation of this inability coupled with Johnson's and the modern Tory Party's particular brand of pandering, cruel disingenuousness. This in turn led to the choice of the slogan and banner for the fiftieth anniversary Bloody Sunday Weekend: There is no British Justice (see the official statement of the March Committee and related video at: http://bloodysundaymarch.org/for_justice/events/event/there-is-no-british-justice/). Subsequent quotations from survivors used below are cited from this video unless otherwise noted.

On its surface, the slogan merely points to a realisation that there is no legal or statutory recourse left within the United Kingdom for criminal justice for Bloody Sunday. That reconciliation, in the minds of the British state, is legal impunity, it is not and has never been separable from it. Reconciliation as it comes to us from Judeo-Christian theology, has always been imbued with the requirement of submission. Reconcile yourself to what was done to you, stop seeking justice, and move on within the postconflict legal, political, and institutional status quo. But it is also, according to Liam Wray, Bloody Sunday March organiser and brother of 22-year-old James (Jim) Wray shot dead on the day by David James Cleary, a temporal trick, a temporal paradox. "[The Bloody Sunday dead]," argues Wray, "are a legacy issue because nothing was done about them at the time." The fact then that "nothing was done about them at the time" becomes the legal and political justification for why nothing can be done about them in the present. Wray is very clear that after quite literally fifty years of marching, testifying, and taking legal actions in search of justice for his brother, he is done playing the British state's temporal shell game. He embraces the epithet of "vexatious" levelled at those who refuse to reconcile by the Northern Ireland Office and the Johnson government. He will continue to vex, continue to refuse, continue to rebelliously mourn his brother and the other victims of the Troubles who are dead and would not have died except for the murderous choices of individuals, groups, institutions, governments.

The Bloody Sunday March Committee's original act of public refusal, the act that led to its very inception, was the refusal to stop marching on the anniversary of Bloody Sunday every year (Chapter Four). But There is No British Justice represents a broader refusal and an at least tacit acknowledgment that thirty years seeking "British Justice" in the form of prosecutions and incarcerations (the 2017 march theme was "Jail Jackson") would never produce the desired outcome. The March Committee is clear in their statement introducing the 2022 march theme, they need help, they need help figuring out where the campaign goes

from here in the face of the realisation that not only is there No British Justice (now), There was Never British Justice. British state power, with the help of the reconciliation paradigm, protects itself through severing past from present.

In this formulation, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry performs a similar function as the Canadian TRC's "Calls to Action", or an Australian or South African Reconciliation Day Holiday. It is an official act of recognition, a recognition that says you were "vindicated," you have our sympathy, but that is all you have, you especially do not have the right to interfere with or vex the consolidation and re-legitimisation of the liberal transitional state, the transitional present. You do not have the right to demand substantive political change, the radical unmaking of the colonial apparatus that killed you, stole your land, eliminated your culture. In fact, as the Ricoeurian framework that forms the basis of the reconciliation paradigm makes clear, in cases where no justice is possible, we are charged to collectively forget and move on. The Bloody Sunday March Committee thus could be said to have come to refuse the entire reconciliation paradigm with its choice of slogan. Paraphrasing the famous quote of Charles Stuart Parnell currently adorning the Parnell Monument on Dublin's O'Connell Street, they argue: "The state has no right to determine how far the search for truth will go. No-one has the right to say, 'This far and no further'" (Bloody Sunday March Committee 2022: n.p.)

As the sheen wears off the previously unthinkable novelty of a British Tory Prime Minister making a public apology (even a weaselly, defensive apology) for crimes committed in Northern Ireland by the security forces, more and more people in Derry outside of the March Committee have begun to refuse British justice and refuse the reconciliation paradigm. In the abridged trial of David James Cleary, Derry seems to have collectively refused to be injuncted, even to the extent that Colum Eastwood, the leader of the SDLP, named Cleary in

the British Parliament using his parliamentary privilege as the MP for Foyle (the district including Derry). Cleary has similarly been named under privilege in Daíl Eireann by TD Peadar Tóibín, formerly of Sinn Féin and now the leader of the right-wing Catholic Aontú party in the south of Ireland. In the immediate aftermath of the injunction, Cleary's name and photograph exploded across social media sites like Twitter, TikTok, and Facebook, and had long been freely available on several sub-Reddits. Perusing the subreddit r/northernireland will reveal that if a commenter refers to Cleary as Soldier F, they are quickly remonstrated by those insisting that all commenters refuse to obey the injunction. John Kelly, brother of 17-year old Michael Kelly murdered on Bloody Sunday, posted a picture of his brother to Twitter with a caption naming Cleary, purposively both refusing the injunction and rendering himself immediately liable for criminal sanction (Figure 24). While Kelly's account was suspended by Twitter, the screenshot remains freely available on r/northernireland and in an article by the Village Magazine (2022). Cleary's naming has not been confined to social media either. Placards such as those in Figure 25 below also began appearing regularly around Derry. These placards are removed by the PSNI once they become aware of them and their erection officially investigated as criminal activity (Hewitt 2021), but I have continued to observe them during my trips to Derry and I suspect the PSNI are playing a metaphorical game of "whack-a-mole."

It is tremendously important here to adequately describe the material manifestations of the politics of refusal that Simpson (2014) illustrates in Kahnawà:ke land. Refusal, in those lands which span the colonial borders of the US and Canada, Simpson argues is multi-scalar and ubiquitous. At the geopolitical scale, refusal might manifest as the refusal to carry passports when crossing international boundaries, refusing to accept the citizenship of Settler states, and the refusal to respect customs regimes, which colonial state's name "smuggling."

*Figure 24: John Kelly Twitter post (2021, exact date unknown)*

Figure 25: Placard appearing in Guildhall Square, Derry, July 2021 (exact date unknown). Photo by author.

At the meso-level, refusal manifests as a rejection of colonial or administrative recognition or

regulation of the geographical, temporal, and racist boundaries of membership in a given

Indigenous tribe or Band. For Simpson, however, these larger and more visible politics of

refusal are intertwined with seemingly smaller refusals, a politics of refusal hardwired into everyday Kahnawà:ke life. Simpson refers to this as "Refusing to Play the Game" (25) and, following Mark Rifkin (2010), a "refusal to stay in an ethnological grid of apprehension" (31), a refusal to have their culture and lives constituted by the settler gaze. These everyday refusals are regularly communicated to the reader in Simpson's text through ethnographic vignettes, where she illustrates the myriad ways her research partners wed "everyday historical memory" to "the constant critique of all things perceived as illegitimate or foreign" (43). Everyday refusal is both discursive and material, a constant drumbeat of delegitimising Settler modalities of governance and Settler presences in Kahnawà:ke lands.

Indeed, for me, Simpson's primary contribution to a theory of refusal is in its focus on everyday forms of refusal. Only with such as approach that collapses and intertwines geographical scales could I see the relevance of Simpson's work in these islands of Ireland and Britain. When I began to look with the lens of refusal, I found it in the now 33-year city wide boycott of the Sun newspapers in Liverpool (Cronin 2017), the booing of God Save the Queen whenever Liverpool FC fans are subjected to it (at cup finals or when they attend games of the English national team) (I owe this example to a conversation with Laura McAtackney). We can see the prohibitions on spoken English or English-language signage in Irish Gaeltachts through the lens of refusal, the refusal by many to rent or sell land or property to non-Irish speakers, the communal ostracising of *Gaeilgeorí* (Irish speakers) who rent their property to tourists using companies like AirBnB (Mac Oscair 2022), the widespread refusal to respect private property and trespassing laws by ramblers and roamers in England, where an estimated 92% of the land is not covered by limited right to roam legislation (Horton 2022). All of these acts, while seemingly small acts, are acts that are fundamentally seeking to delegitimise architectures of historical violence, the Hillsborough Massacre, the destruction and eradication of the Irish language through *both* colonial

conquest and postcolonial gentrification and touristification, the enclosure of the English commons (Shoard 1999) respectively in the examples I mention. Liam Wray, in his talk for the 2022 Bloody Sunday March, as almost an aside noted how during the Cleary's trial, he refuses to stand when the judge enters the courtroom. The reason Wray gives for his specific action here is the way the judge in the case acts deferentially to established experts and established institutional representatives, the same experts and institutions Wray argues have comprehensively failed to secure justice for his brother's murder, and, in the case of the Widgery Tribunal, "blackened [his] brother's name… and got away with it." "He's an expert," Wray argues, "[but] you don't count…. They don't see us as part of them, they are above us." Wray notes that he is increasingly being imitated by other Derry people in the gallery. The notion that There is No British Justice seems to be spreading and again, we must see Wray's symbolic gesture of refusing to stand for the manifestations of legal authority within Simpson's micro-politics of refusal, acts designed to delegitimise of colonial power.

In 2020, Ireland was gripped by two major commemorative controversies, the first, the decision by Minister for Justice Charlie Flanagan to host a commemoration service "marking" the centenary of the disbandment of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) and the Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP), the colonial police forces, at Dublin Castle. The second, Irish President Michael D. Higgins' refusal to attend a centenary event, again, "marking" one hundred years of partition and the establishment of Northern Ireland. In both cases, the events were organised and positioned squarely within the ESR methodology of the Decade of Centenaries, squarely within the reconciliation paradigm. In both cases, the sheer magnitude of the rejection of the events (and support for Higgins' stance) within Irish society seems to have taken the organisers completely off guard. While the government tried to hold firm on the RIC event, they were first forced to delay it, and then cancel it completely (Connolly 2022).

Briefly, the RIC and the DMP, often known colloquially as the "Peelers," were the colonial police forces from 1822 to 1922 in an Ireland under British dominion. They were comprised of Irish men, mostly Catholic, but over-represented by Protestants in comparison to the general population (Herlihy 1997). From the beginning of the Home Rule Movement in Ireland, through the Irish War of Independence (1918-22), the RIC especially (the DMP were unarmed) increasingly became perceived as an extension of the colonial military forces and fundamentally as counter-revolutionary in nature. Their reputation was not helped in this regard by being supplemented during the War of Independence by the Black and Tans beginning in 1920, British men, often First World War Veterans, recruited into the ranks of the overstretched RIC. The Black and Tans quickly became notorious for their extreme brutality against the rebellious Irish population. Today, the Black and Tans in everyday Irish parlance are used as a synonym for violent political oppression.

When news of the planned RIC centenary broke, reaction was swift and almost universally negative. The defence of the centenary event by leading figures in the right-wing governing party Fine Gael such as then-Taoiseach Leo Varadkar and then-Minister for Justice Charlie Flanagan is believed by some members of Fine Gael to have negatively impacted their subsequent election chances (Bray and Kelly 2020). The government used shifting justifications for the planned event, including trying to argue (falsely, according to the Group (Bray and Kelly 2020)) that the event had been conceived by their Expert Advisory Group on Centenary Commemorations—but they ultimately seemed to settle on language recognisable as squarely within the ESR's reconciliatory framing. Flanagan argued that the event was part of an attempt to inculcate "mutual respect and mutual understanding of the different traditions on the island," and Varadkar attempted to shift the debate away from the RIC as an institution and towards the individuality of RIC men who lost their lives (Kelly et al. 2020).

Indeed, Varadkar directly references the centenary commemorations of WWI and the Battle of the Somme, noting how major "progress" had been made through the Decade of Centenaries' rubric of acknowledging and commemorating Irish soldiers who fought in the British army (Kelly et al. 2020). It seems the relative "success" of the earlier centenaries resulted in Varadkar's government believing the RIC commemoration as well would pass off similarly unremarked. Bearing in mind that social memory of the past is always the past filtered through the lens of the present (Robinson 2018a), perhaps some explanation for the comprehensiveness of the refusal of Irish society to commemorate the RIC should be laid at the feet of the increasing unpopularity of the mainstream right-wing parties of government in Ireland and the 2016 Brexit vote in the United Kingdom. The Brexit vote especially, and the predicted negative impact on the border and many other facets of Irish social and economic life, seems to have undone much of the willingness to "re-remember for the future" with regards to Ireland's relationship with its colonial neighbour.

In March, 2021, the leaders of the four main Christian churches in Ireland announced that they intended to commemorate the centenary of the Anglo-Irish Agreement that had ended the Irish War of Independence and partitioned the six counties of Northern Ireland, as "an opportunity to affirm our common commitment to peace, healing and reconciliation" (Church Leaders Group 2021). While perhaps for the Churches and the other representatives of Irish, Northern Irish, and British religious, cultural, and political institutions invited to the ceremony, this again was simply an unremarkable event squarely within the Decades' ESR framework, Irish President Michael D. Higgins refused to attend. For me, who knew first-hand Higgins' embrace of the ESR methodology, his public refusal came as something of a surprise.

Higgins explained his refusal in these terms: "What began as a religious service or reconciliation is now the celebrating—the marking—[of] the partition of Ireland and the creation of Northern Ireland… [and that is] a different thing" (quoted in O'Connor 2021). This statement seems to suggest that if the commemoration, for Higgins, had stayed within the box of reconciliation he would have had no problem attending, but that once it strayed into "celebrating," he could no longer attend. A poll found 81% of Irish people sampled supported Higgins' decision (Leahy 2021). Later, as Higgins was criticised for his stance from those defending the event, Higgins' broadened his critique, saying that many of his critics "feigned amnesia" over the brutal realities of the British colonial project in Northern Ireland (quoted in Emerson 2021a). However, I believe it is fair to ask in this case, "What did Higgins expect?" While undoubtedly the ESR literature and methodology Higgins embraced and promoted throughout the decade represented a more-critical and more-nuanced treatment of the Decade of Centenaries than did that material and methodology repurposed in the hands of the conservative Irish government, the Northern Irish establishment, and the Churches, why did he draw the line here? The reconciliation paradigm, as I have been as such pains to show, brackets the past, demands that the past be remembered "in its context," and even in ESR's initial and arguably more historically nuanced conception (e.g. McMaster and Hetherington 2010), rubbishes and calls "delusional" the central tenet of the entire discipline of memory studies, that the past is always filtered through the lens of the present. The idea that any official commemoration can ever be apolitical, that there is a clear distinction between "marking" and not "celebrating," that it is not the promotion of a particular strand of social memory through the granting of institutional sanction and finance, is what might be more reasonably called "delusional" (McAtackney 2021).

Many of the criticisms of Higgins from conservative and establishment media pundits like Newton Emerson (2021a; 2021b) thus seem, to a degree, warranted. Emerson

rightly sees both the RIC and Partition commemorative controversies through the lens of (I paraphrase): "Why now when you were happy with the Decade of Centenaries ESR approach before?" But what Emerson fails to understand is that perhaps Irish and Northern Irish people were not so happy with it before. That, triggered by a new round of social and political crises in the present, such as Brexit, the Irish housing crisis presided over by mainstream Irish politics, and the introduction of the Northern Ireland (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill most people on the island simply gave voice to their refusal, instead of merely ignoring or not engaging with the Decade of Centenaries, in part or in full, as they had prior. That even people like President Higgins, who had acceded to it, promoted it, seemingly believed in the sanitisation of the past for the benefit of the future that the ESR programme represented, at some point realised just how much they had, in fact, been "feign[ing] amnesia" and began to refuse.

In broad brushstrokes, the reconciliation paradigm in Canada and Ireland has charted similar trajectories in the past decade. In both cases, a willingness to at least engage with the reconciliation paradigm, through the TRC in Canada and through the Ethical and Shared Remembering approach in Northern Ireland, has collapsed and been declared moribund, declared dead. The collapse has clearly come through a growing realisation that the violences of a colonial past are not, in fact, past. In Canada, a government that promises to reconcile continues to force through Indigenous lands an ecologically and culturally destructive gas pipeline, using a police force that its own official inquiries say is wholly inappropriate for the job to do so. In Ireland and Northern Ireland, the realisation that There is no British Justice [and there never was] is cemented in place by the British government's callous willingness to ignore the historically and contemporaneously traumatic border on the island of Ireland solely for their own internal political calculations (Brexit) and the British government's willingness to exploit the rhetoric of reconciliation to force through amnesty for murderers. In this

project, they have been assisted by their fellow travellers in the conservative Irish government and traditional establishment, who have tried to institutionalise as normal the idea that Irish society must respect and extend hospitality to narratives celebrating the partition of the island and honouring the police and paramilitary forces that undertook the brutal, everyday work of British colonialism.

In the penultimate section of this dissertation, I will sketch out a preliminary framework of a different mode of thought with which to approach the violent, colonial past, one rooted in the thinking of three Central European survivors who comprehensively, in their own ways, refused the reconciliation paradigm. In the final section of this dissertation, I shall take on the question, rooted in the first of Leigh Payne's (2008) transitional truisms, that rejecting reconciliation and working to unmake in Northern Ireland risks a return to widespread violence, or at least an unintentional valourisation of the justificatory narratives of physical-force Republicanism (see Chapter 5). I shall also provide the reader with a future research agenda, one seeking to critically examining really-existing unmaking in Northern Ireland, now and in the future.

V.   "FOR NOTHING IS RESOLVED": UNMAKING WITH ADORNO, AMÉRY, AND BENJAMIN

During my time working for Irish and Northern Irish NGOs under the reconciliation paradigm, I remember one instance where, after several colleagues and I had returned from a difficult residential with a Northern Irish victims and survivors' group, a colleague turned to me and asked: "What do they [survivors] want? What do they hope to get out of all of this?" While the residential operated under the strictest confidentiality, I can say that it did involve the victims and survivors' group in question meeting with representatives of the Irish and Northern Irish governmental bureaucracies to seek changes in how certain legacy issues

were legislated and addressed. The session had been difficult; members of the victims and survivors' group mistrusted their interlocutors and told them so on several occasions, in unusually direct language. It was this context my colleague referenced in her question. I thought for a moment. Then I told her: "They want for it not to have happened. They want their loved ones to not be dead." My colleague reflected on this for a moment, and told me later that my comment made sense, that maybe what was more important than achieving an outcome of sorts in the residential, was that the members of the victims and survivors' groups "felt heard." This was not what I had meant, though I did not pursue the conversation. What I had meant was a preliminary amalgam of ideas I had learned from primarily three scholars, writers, one who survived (Theodore Adorno), one who survived until he could simply survive no more (Jean Améry) and one who did not survive (Walter Benjamin). What I meant was not survivors needed to be "heard," what I meant was survivors, in my opinion, yearned for the political opportunity to *unmake* the past.

In his most well-known work *Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne* (which was first translated into English as *At the Mind's Limits* (1966/1986), Jean Améry directly confronted the reconciliation paradigm's temporal break between the violence of the past and the peace of the present. Améry was born in Vienna as Hanns Chaim Mayer, to a Catholic mother and a Jewish father soon to die fighting in WWI. Raised by his mother, he grew up fully assimilated into Austrian society and never considered himself Jewish. The anti-Jewish laws promulgated by the Nazis convinced him that it didn't matter for his own survival if neither he nor religious Jews considered him Jewish (Améry, 1966/1986, 94), and after the *Anschluss* in 1938, he fled Austria for Belgium. In Belgium, he became active in the anti-Nazi resistance. After being captured once and escaping from the Belgian collaborationist forces, he was captured a second time and sent to Auschwitz, later to Buchenwald and then to

Bergen-Belsen. He survived all the camps and was liberated from Bergen-Belsen by the British in 1945.

After the Holocaust, Améry changed his name in order to fundamentally break with Germanic culture and resided in Brussels, working as a journalist. *Jenseits* represented the first time Améry ever wrote about his experiences in the death camps, and he did so brutally, unsparingly, and comprehensively in the language of refusal (Thomas Brudholm's (2008) magisterial work on Améry interprets his refusal through Nietzsche's concept of *ressentiment*). After publishing his last work *On Suicide* in 1976, in which he philosophically justified recourse to a voluntary death, Améry ended his life in 1978.

In *Jenseits,* Améry creates an interlocutor who poses him the question: What about the [West] German youth of today, born after the Holocaust, who bear no direct guilt for genocide and cultural destruction, do they not deserve the chance to grow up free from guilt in a reconciled society? In one of his most spine-tingling passages (96), Améry writes:

> You don't want to listen? Listen anyhow. You don't want to know where your indifference can again lead you and me at any time? I'll tell you. What happened is no concern of yours because you didn't know, or weren't born yet? You should have seen, your youth gives you no special privilege, and break with your father.

Améry's exhortation here is both a metaphor and an absolutist *refusal to be metaphor at* the same time. And Améry, of course, is completely aware of the "logical inconsistency" within it, especially considering the chapter "On the Necessity and Impossibility of Being a Jew," where Améry describes the pain "breaking" with his own father caused him his entire life. He writes of his demand to "break with your father": "Absurdly, it demands that the irreversible be turned around… it desires two impossible things: Regression into the past and nullification of what happened" (68).

For Améry, it is very clear to whom the demand to "regress" and "nullify" is thrown. Améry has done his work, he has regressed into the past and laid bare his torture, shown it to

us, forced himself to remember and remember again. Améry now demands that the Germans and [West] Germany of today (and all of the other countries that slaughtered their Jewish populations) do their job, nullifying the past, disowning their fathers and all that their fathers did and stood for. Améry demands nothing less than a full-scale temporal revolution; only by reversing what was done to him will he ever be reconciled to the present. And while Améry freely admits the impossibility of materially unmaking the past, of corporeally resurrecting the ghosts of Auschwitz, he viscerally refuses all the frameworks that Europe in the shadow of the Holocaust has deployed for coming to terms with it, for reconciling with it.

Here is where we might read Améry with another half-assimilated-Jewish, half-Catholic German thinker: Theodore Adorno. Adorno's essay "The Meaning of Working Through the Past" (1959/1998) is directed at the is German concept *Vergangenheitbewältigung,* which can be translated as "working through" or "dealing with" the past and connotes "living with" or "living in the shadow of" the past. Directly, the concept refers to a sort of public debate that animated and to some degree still animates German cultural, literary, and political society about how to adequately denazify [West] German society, how to confront, analyse, and live with the past, and especially, how to confront questions of collective and inter-generational responsibility. Adorno uses the same temporal move as Améry in entering this debate, namely, both refuse to accept that the past is, in fact, past. Adorno begins by dismissing *Vergangenheitbewältigung* as a "modish slogan" or a "buzzword" [*Schlagwort*]. The work of *Vergangenheitbewältigung* was not to facilitate any sort of productive or corrective encounter with the crimes of the past, but rather, it represented a society-wide attempt to "close the books [*Schlußstrich*]" "to "remove [the past] from memory." Those who suffered during the Holocaust and continued to suffer into the present were told that "everything should be forgotten and forgiven" (90-91) in the interest of building a reconciled future. While acknowledging that [West] Germany needed to

find a way to "break out" of its past, for Adorno, *Vergangenheitbewältigung* was not that

way, rather, it served almost to guarantee the past's hold over [West] Germany:

> That fascism lives on, that the oft-invoked working through of the past has to this day been unsuccessful and degenerated into its own caricature, an empty and cold forgetting, is due to the fact that the objective conditions of society that engendered fascism continue to exist (98).

The "objective conditions" cited by Adorno are manifold, including trenchant

critiques of [West] Germany's place within post-war European geopolitics all the way down

to an equally trenchant critique of [West] German educational pedagogy. But perhaps more

relevant to Northern Ireland and other divided societies, Adorno also identified a persistent

tendency amongst transitional power-brokers to sanitise history and their own places and

actions within it. In the case of [West] Germans, Adorno identifies a powerful trend within

Vergangenheitbewältigung to present Hitler and National Socialism as an unfortunate,

unavoidable accident of history. These same power-brokers, argues Adorno, also deployed

the rhetoric of the post-war "economic boom" in Germany to avoid serious interrogation of

the pernicious roots (social, political, psychological, cultural) roots of National Socialism.

Such a thorough examination of the "objective conditions", not even to mention actively

attempting to undo those conditions, would interfere with [West] Germany's important

geopolitical role as a bulwark against the Soviet Union and its economic growth and

prosperity.

In regards to the economic shielding of interrogating the past, something quite similar

abounds in Northern Ireland, specifically falling under the name "the peace dividend." In

post-Troubles Northern Ireland, the argument goes, renewed economic prosperity as a

consequence of peace will eventually enable and ensure the attitudinal change necessary to

cement a peaceful future (Coulter 2018; Knox 2016; Murtagh 2017). I have jokingly referred

to this theory as the Citibank Peace, and it was the favourite argument of former UK Prime

Minister Tony Blair (Blair 1998). The Citibank Peace performs the exact same function as the economic component of *Vergangenheitbewältigung* identified by Adorno, it argues that any excessive digging into the past risks upsetting the transition to market-based prosperity; talk of the past frightens away potential overseas investment capital (see Nagle 2018; 2009). The Citibank Peace is also the "excessive overdose of truth" hypothesis identified by Payne (2008) in the dominant conservative strand of transitional justice.

Of course, Northern Ireland is not the key geopolitical bulwark in a bifurcated global Cold War, and predictably, the "at times evangelical faith" (Coulter 2018, 124) in the transformative power of a peace dividend has proven fairly misguided, especially as much of the literature rubbishes the idea that there even has been any sort of peace dividend (Coulter 2018; 2014; Gilligan 2016; Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2018; McCabe 2013; Murtagh 2018; Tomlinson 2016), especially in those communities in Northern Ireland that "both produced and bore the brunt of Troubles-violence" (Robinson 2018, 9) (Knox 2016). What Adorno darkly warned in his essay was that when the post-war economic boom petered out and stopped papering over [West] Germany's attempt to close the books on the past, all the causes of National Socialism would simply remain, ready to be drawn on again. While perhaps not exactly as Adorno predicted, the burgeoning modern far-right and/or neo-fascist movements across Europe, and the racist and xenophobic undertones that sustain them, should give everyone pause.

Adorno, like Améry, rejects rhetorical moves to innocence in post-war Europe. Only the material, psychosocial, and political work of unmaking will suffice. While Améry's complicated mind demands nullification and spectral resurrection, Adorno focuses on the material, cultural, psychosocial and discursive causes of National Socialism itself. At the end of the essay, he writes:

> The past will have been worked through [*Aufarbeitung*] only when the causes of what happened then have been eliminated. Only because the causes continue to exist does the captivating spell of the past remain to this day unbroken.

Adorno, as is characteristic of him, offers a dialectical approach. First, collectively, the causes of the violence, genocide, and expansionism are understood, illuminated, and impressed upon the perpetrators and perpetrating peoples. Then, these causes are eliminated. And they must be eliminated, because if they are not, the horror they led to will simply re-occur.

Both Améry and Adorno use violent prose to describe the jarring process of unmaking: "Break with" "break free," these phrasal verbs connote violent, final separations, Nietzschean in their belief that the transcendence of the horror of the past will require the emergence of a new cast of human in a new form of political society that bears no resemblance to what came before. Unsurprisingly, both Adorno's essay and Améry's *Jenseits* are polemics; unapologetically so, and their fire is directly trained at the perpetrator, the bystander, the wilfully ignorant. Walter Benjamin, on the other hand, demands a different orientation to the persistence or prolongation of the past in the present, one that believes the past cannot be transcended and that it is folly to try. Benjamin proposed (though his untimely death interrupted his work), in works like "The Storyteller" (1985a), "Theses on the Philosophy of History" (1985b), and in his unfinished "Arcades Project" (2002) nothing less than a new philosophy of historical time, one that refused chronological and teleological causal connections, refused to see time as linear, refused to see the present as the product of history. In the place of history as a factual record, the study of history as how the past led into the present, Benjamin proposed "the image:"

> It is not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its light on what is past; rather, an image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation… The relation of the present to the past, the

relation of what-has-been to the now is dialectical… Only dialectical images are genuinely historical (2002, 463)

This is not history as causal chain, but rather history as *montage:* A succession of images, moments, places, producing mutual intelligibility and mutual obligation. For Benjamin, these images immobilise the present, severing it from a historical continuum or chronology.

Benjamin, in *Theses,* focuses on how fascism uses a constructed "state of emergency" to justify its murderous actions (Thesis VIII). He argues that the images we dig out of the past and preserve through a "process of empathy whose origin is the indolence of the heart" can help mitigate and save us from the "triumphal procession" of history (Thesis VII). Benjamin uses the way historical "progress" seeks to obliterate or bury these "images" to provoke a "real state of emergency" that "will improve our position in the struggle against Fascism" (Thesis VIII). Emergencies, he maintains, are driven by proclamations of a threat *to the status quo*, that is to say to the present constellations of power built on the "triumphal progression" of history, the legitimacy that it gains by naming itself the apotheosis of historical time. The "real" emergency is not a threat *to* the status quo, *it is the status quo itself.*

In Benjamin's philosophy of time and history is symbolised by Paul Klee's *Angelus Novus* (Figure 26), The angel in the painting is how Benjamin pictures "the angel of history" (Thesis IX). The angel looks towards the past and towards the people killed and murdered, who are, as the angel watches, having wreckage piled over them by the catastrophic storm of history, of linear, irreversible time. The angel yearns to go to them, to "awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed" (Thesis IX). But the angel cannot, the storm is upon him, "it has got caught in his wings with such a violence that the angel can no longer close them" (Thesis IX). It throws the angel, unwillingly, violently, into the future, "while the pile of debris before him grows skyward" (Thesis IX).

Figure 26: Paul Klee (1920). Angelus Novus

That metaphorical pile of debris he elsewhere (2005, 576) refers to as "layers of sediment," blown by the winds, burying, rendering invisible, those who have been left prostrate.

If the sad, storm-wracked angel cannot help us reclaim our memories of a violent past from the storm of "progress," then maybe, Benjamin seems to suggest, the job is for those of left here on earth. It is the job of those of us who are or could be become storytellers or "historical materialists" to remind, to seek to resurrect, to dig, and to name. Benjamin's is a philosophy of time in which we, collectively, are unafraid (even in the face of the storm) to ceaselessly return to the cities and people that have been buried by catastrophic violence.

Rather than "breaking with" or "breaking from" the past, as Améry or Adorno would have it, we must always return and always dig (2005). Citing Flaubert, Benjamin reminds us how sad we will have to be to return and dig. *Peu de gens devineront combien il fallu être triste pour ressusciter Carthage,* he quotes in Thesis VII, ["few will guess how sad we had to be in order to resurrect Carthage"]. In the salted earth of Carthage, as underneath the various

transformations of the material space of the Bogside (Dawson 2005) or the amnesiac touristification of City Centre Belfast (Switzer and McDowell 2009), we will find images, not history. "To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it 'the way it really was' (Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger" (Thesis VI). These memories will "reside as treasures in the sober rooms of our later insights—like torsos in a collector's gallery" (2005, 576). The images in turn "yield an image of the person who remembers" (2005, 576), the storyteller, the digger, the survivor, the bereaved. The storyteller draws their authority not from history or historical justification, but from their proximity to death and catastrophe, their ability to preserve and care for the ghosts, their inexorable and unflinching challenge to the status quo and its notion of historical progress: You will not step over us on your way to somewhere else (Benjamin 1985a).

Here is where Benjamin fundamentally differs, not just from Améry and Adorno, but from Paul Ricoeur and the entire theoretical and temporal basis of reconciliatory memory. His is a philosophy of time where every intricacy of a life taken matters (Taussig 2006, 7), where our collective duty is not to an idea of historical justice or re-remembering for the living but to ceaseless digging amongst the bones of the past, ceaseless returns to wounded places, buried places, traumatised places to confront, demand, illustrate, preserve, and rebel. I am not pretending in this section that Benjamin's iconoclastic, wandering, and unfinished philosophy of historical time is not difficult to pin down and occasionally internally contradictory. I am claiming rather that it can help point the way towards a larger radical ideal of unmaking that can replace the reconciliation paradigm in transitional justice, one that begins in a politics of refusal and ends with a "duty of memory" that reclaims our obligations to the past from Ricoeur-inflected reconciliation, from the dominant conservative strand of closing-the-books style transitional justice.

Beginning from a politics of refusal requires us to collectively ask as Simpson (2014) demands: What is the legitimacy of appeals to reconciliation and its preferred accelerationist temporality? Where do they come from? Why should they be accepted? Are these appeals emanating from the agents and institutions and histories that killed, colonised, and dispossessed? If so, as both Audra Simpson and Liam Wray might say, "We're done playing that game." The reason why reconciliation and its preferred form of memory always arrive at the necessity to transcend, surmount, forgive, and/or forget is because their fundamental obligation is to protect the postconflict, authoritarian, or colonial status-quo. Reconciliation's temporal dimension, the severing of the past from the present through stadial bracketing or periodicisation, casts the present as separate, different from the 'unfortunate' past, rather than interlocked in "diabolical continuity."

Beginning from a politics of refusal, an ideal of unmaking would refuse to accept that violent, colonial, or traumatic pasts could in fact be reconciled with or reconciled to. That all of the instruments, institutions, individuals, and constellations of power that went into mass violence and dispossession were faulty and had to be replaced. That the Law, rooted in the sovereign proclamations of the expert, the authority, the coloniser, doesn't work, There is No British Justice. That the maps don't work, they're colonial maps, drawing lines through unceded land and borders through ancestral territories and severing cities like Derry from their hinterlands. That time itself doesn't work, their chrononormativity, the time of heteronormative capitalist self-reproduction, the white time of the coloniser, these forms of time are the weapons used to put us in our place. As Franz Kafka (1926/1998, 246), the artist Benjamin felt most spiritually akin to (Benjamin, 1985c) reminds us in *The Castle*: "Always starting all over again without any prospect of change will wear a man down and make him doubtful, and ultimately incapable of anything but that despairing standing about."

Maybe even, like the *Asociación Madres,* we should collectively refuse death itself. Proclaim *la muerte no existe* and refuse to be forensically converted from our demand to bring them back alive to merely the bereaved mothers of the dead. But Benjamin does not refuse death. He tried to live, ultimately, tried to walk across a border, not to safety, but to a less immediate death (Taussig 2006). Failing, he chose to die, wresting the terms of his own death from the status-quo in a last act of defiance, I imagine, I choose to hold that image, like Améry would several decades later. Unmaking is not a refusal that death happens, that violent death is inflicted on us, it is rather the ceaseless revitalisation of the ghosts, using their haunting faces, their spectral convocations, to delegitimise and rebel against the emergency that the status-quo represents.

The central image of Canada's Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls is the red dress (Figure 27). The red dress, hanging for all to see, reminds us of what is no longer corporeally there, but is always *there,* meddling with lived realities, seething, festering, reminding. Unmaking as a paradigm unravels every stitch in that dress, following them to the crucial *where,* the *where* she was taken from, the where her spirit seethes, the where she still consorts with the living, at the threshold, the wounds ripped into spacetime, the places that refuse to be converted to their time, their temporality. Every thread is a story, picking at the threads, unravelling them, these are the radical acts of unmaking, of deconstructing every constellation of power and coercion and control and dispossession that ultimately resulted in her being taken. Of digging for images that remind us of her, images that we can show to others. The images remind me of a man being blown up in a field in Fermanagh or a woman whose sunglasses remain firmly in place when we drive together down the road to the house where her loved ones were murdered.

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Figure 27: Jamie Black (The REDress Project) (Allaire, 2021)

They remind me that Lance Corporal David James Cleary murdered Jim Wray by firing two bullets into his back in Glenfada Park with the sanction and approval of the highest echelons of British institutional power, both then and now. In unpicking these threads, as Avery Gordon (2008, 22) reminds us, we are merely "following the ghosts," trusting them to lead us, trusting them to shape our inquiries. Following the ghosts might be the language of unmaking, of refusing the barbarous methods of historicism, the method which "dissociates" itself "from [them] as far as possible" (Benjamin 1985b, Thesis VII).

Unmaking demands a different starting point than reconciliation. Instead of reconciliation, acceptance, moving on, it demands nothing short of ceaseless rebellion, ceaseless mourning, ceaseless sadness. Jean Améry (1986: xi), in his refusal to be reconciled, reminds us of what that starting point must be:

For nothing is resolved, no conflict is settled, no remembering has become a mere memory. What happened, happened. But *that* it happened cannot be so easily accepted. I rebel: against my past, against history, and against a present that places the incomprehensible in the cold storage of history and thus falsifies it in a revolting way.

VI.   AFTER RECONCILIATION: TOWARDS A RESEARCH AGENDA

In the preceding section, using the work of three Central European thinkers, I argued that refusing the reconciliation paradigm in postcolonial, postconflict, or postauthoritarian societies may yield to a different, radical orientation towards the role of the violent past in the present. I name this orientation *unmaking* and, following the work of Walter Benjamin and Audra Simpson in particular, I have argued that the orientation of *unmaking* necessitates two alternative starting points. First, we must work to create "post" societies where the violent past is always held in radical continuity with the present, not as a separate, discontinuous, past that has been "overcome." Second, we must work to create "post" societies where our moral, social, and political obligations are not to the transition to some nebulous late-liberal capitalist futurity rooted in mutual recognition, but to the bodies and lives of those violently taken and to those left behind to pick up the pieces.

It is important for the reader to note here that in seeking to illustrate an outline of what I refer to as a framework of "unmaking," I am not seeking to replace one paradigm, the reconciliation paradigm, with another. Rather, I am seeking a conceptual language to challenge the metageographies, defined here as the "set[s] of geographical structures and frameworks through which space is conceived" (Oliveras González, 2010), of post or transitional societies. Specifically, I am seeking a conceptual language to alter the institutionalised, calcified, and ultimately, failing, imaginaries of postconflict space in Northern Ireland. In seeking a conceptual apparatus of unmaking, I am guided throughout by an underlying philosophy of action rooted in the "everyday anarchism" of Cindy Milstein (2012; 2010). In adopting this underlying philosophy of action, I reject a putatively teleological mindset that awaits or works towards or seeks to speed along an ideal-type "anarchism-to-come." Rather, I see everyday anarchism as "really-existing anarchism" (Robinson and Tormey 2012), a set of really-existing practices of inter- and intra-group

solidarity, reciprocity, care, cooperation, and especially, grief and mourning (Milstein 2022; 2017).

As I have repeatedly tried to illustrate throughout this dissertation, "closing the books" on the violent past is to attempt to build new societies on the backs of those who have suffered the most via a hyper-accelerationist transitional temporality. This is not simply morally unacceptable; it is practically unworkable. In Ireland, as I have argued in this final chapter, appeals to the reconciliation paradigm have lost their credence and whatever societal appeal they may have once had is increasingly rejected. Reconciliation today, in the minds of many Irish people of all political and cultural orientations, has devolved into cynical attempts to minimise or revise the culpability of the state, its agents, and paramilitaries, former and current. Outside of Ireland, as I argued in Chapter One, the "spectral turn" in memory studies and transitional justice has, finally, caught up to the reality that "Collectivities all over the world" are increasingly "seek[ing] both representation and recognition of the violent past, often held as intimately linked to the violence and injustices of the present" (Hite and Jara 2020, 246).

In Chapter Five, I argued that holding the ghosts of Bloody Sunday in a state of radical unfinishedness on the streets of Derry to some extent dovetailed with physical-force Republicans' proclamations of "Unfinished Revolution." While I support neither the stated goals of these individuals and organisations, nor their methods, McVeigh and Rolston's (2022) magisterial recent text, also subtitled *Unfinished Revolution,* makes a compelling case that Ireland, both north and south, has largely failed to complete the work of unmaking colonialism on the island. But McVeigh and Rolston's (2022) unabashedly Republican and decolonial work advances, and seeks to prefigure, a far more complex and comprehensive form of Republicanism than the magical thinking often advanced by both Sinn Féin and physical-force Republicanism, the magical thinking that says simply the political

reunification of Ireland will complete the Irish decolonial project. Rather, as they conclude, only a truly transformational Republicanism will ever suffice:

> While the Irish cannot and should not live as if colonialism had not happened, it is possible to aspire to a state which draws on this history to construct something better. It evokes commitment to a politics of transformation. In terms of decolonisation, we might suggest that this project is simply but powerfully expressed by the late Alisdair Gray's maxim that we should, 'work as if we live in the early days of a better nation' (405).

Gray's maxim cited above is what anarchists and social movement theorists refer to as "prefiguration" or "prefigurative politics" (Swain 2019), demonstrating that the gap between McVeigh and Rolston's brand of decolonial Republicanism and everyday anarchism may share many predilections.

McVeigh and Rolston (2022, 402) also explicitly claim that Ireland in 2022 is on the verge of another "revolutionary moment." "The context," they argue, "is uniquely propitious… whatever the tardiness of the Irish journey towards decolonisation… our analysis suggests that Ireland now finds itself in a relatively fortuitous place" (402). The "place" they refer to is a potentially decolonial place, but a decolonial place that is not reducible to the outcome of a border poll or the colour of a flag, rather, a wider decolonial fusion of space and time, a revolutionary chronotope as it were, where it is possible for Ireland, as an island, to reject the racial and economic "diabolical continuities" of British Empire and its own colonial *and* postcolonial history as a partial promoter and enabler of such systems.

This dissertation's central concern with "rebellious mourning" is rooted in both a theoretical and a practical commitment to Black, Indigenous, and decolonial anarchist theories of change (Alfred 2005; Anderson and Samudzi 2018; A. Simpson 2014; L.B. Simpson 2017) and to the "everyday anarchism" that Milstein (2010; Milstein and Ruin 2012) and Povinelli (2012) argue is the central aspect of *surviving* the myriad harms of late

liberal capitalism. Milstein's edited (2022) (2017) collections *There is Nothing so Whole as a Broken Heart* (2022) and *Rebellious Mourning* (2017), extend everyday anarchist principles of love, place, solidarity, mutual care, and political refusal to the practices and praxis of public mourning. Milstein brings together Black, Indigenous, Queer, decolonial, and Jewish anarchist traditions to demand that grief and mourning no longer be thought of as debilitating, private, and traumatic, but rather as a vibrant, diverse, and radical. The various authors' essays in *Rebellious Mourning*, which range widely from the politics of mourning Black death at the hands of police violence, to the politics of mourning migrants who have been killed on their terrible journeys across borders, to the politics of mourning settler colonial genocide, provocatively demonstrate that the emotion of grief, the feelings of trauma, the practice of mourning, and the prolongation of the past are revolutionary challenges to allegedly "post"colonial orders. As someone with both an intellectual and everyday commitment to rebellious mourning, rooted directly in everyday anarchism and adjacent concepts, ideals, and practices, while I share McVeigh and Rolston's (2022) magisterial argument that Ireland's decolonial revolution is horribly unfinished, I reject the idea that a unified Irish nation-state must be the vehicle for transformational political change on the island. This is not to reject the idea of Irish unity or self-determination, far from it, but that unity should not rest on fealty to a particular nation-state, but rather upon our common inhabitation of this island, its land, its places, its waters, and the love, solidarity, mutual care, and the myriad wounds of unfinished colonisation that score our shared, yet individualised, histories, experiences, and bodies.

At the present moment (November 2022), Sinn Féin seems poised to become the largest political party in both sectors of the island and may push for a border poll to alter Northern Ireland's constitutional status. They may believe that such a poll could be successful now that the most recent census has shown that Catholics now outnumber

Protestants in Northern Ireland. The Northern Irish executive remains collapsed and looks likely to remain so indefinitely, due to the DUP's intransigence regarding the Northern Irish Protocol of the Brexit Agreement. The island as a whole, but especially Northern Ireland, is sliding deep into economic recession with a severe economic and heating crisis looming, if not already here. In addition to the constant presence of low-level physical force Republican violence in Northern Ireland, very recently the Loyalist Combined Military Command, a vehicle for the contemporary UDA and UVF, stated it was "reviewing" its commitment to Loyalist ceasefire agreements (Barnes 2022), In this context McVeigh and Rolston's (2022, 402) conclusion, that Ireland in 2022 is on the verge of another "revolutionary moment, will not provoke optimism and hope for everyone. For some, especially those operating under what Leigh Payne (2008) identifies as the first flawed truism of mainstream-conservative Transitional Justice, or the "fatal overdose of truth" theory, this revolutionary moment is also a deeply dangerous moment, a moment when Northern Ireland may backslide towards Troubles-like widespread violence once more.

In such an allegedly dangerous context, both McVeigh and Rolston's (2022) and this dissertation's sweeping dismissal of the reconciliation paradigm and call for radical transformation (whether rooted Republican/Socialist decolonialism or the decolonialism of everyday anarchism) may seem reckless, an appeal to reopen a Pandora's Box of unmediated historical grievance filtered through the prism of contemporary tension. However, this criticism fails to countenance the fact that organised victims and survivors' groups have refused to be reconciled, whole or in part, since the ink was dry on the Agreement and even before. Rebellious mourning is not a new phenomenon in Northern Ireland and consistent demands to prolong the past in the space of the present, as part of a search for justice, can hardly be blamed for the state of the current moment.

Rather, the consociational institutions are collapsing, quite simply, because they were never fit for purpose to begin with, as a whole host of scholars have consistently argued (Graham 2011; Graham and Nash 2006; Mac Ginty 2016; McGrattan 2013). From this perspective, the prime function of the reconciliation paradigm, and not merely in Northern Ireland (Castillejo-Cuellar 2014; Coulthard 2014; Hinton, 2018; Manning, 2017), has been to paper over the "irreconcilable" (Leebaw 2008) characteristics of mainstream conservative Transitional Justice. This dissertation positions itself within that strand of argument, one that proposes that, in Northern Ireland particularly, the work of the reconciliation paradigm has been to obscure the fact that a consociational political order built on perpetual division and "postmodern iron[ies]" (Graham 2011, 88) like mandatory coalition could never be expected to repair institutionalised sectarianism and spatial division. To refuse reconciliation, in this context, is not a refusal to dream of a peaceful and tolerant society, rather, it may be the only way to prefigure any remotely just and tolerant alternative to the transitional status quo and the maintenance of the status-quo on the island of Ireland is what might be better named reckless. Transformational politics may be the only viable way forward.

Regardless of how one views the currently collapsed or collapsing Stormont institutions and the reconciliation paradigm, with trepidation or with transformative hope, it seems abundantly clear that Ireland is rapidly careening towards a postreconciliation future. It is beholden on scholars, community activists and organisers, and public institutions to work honestly towards a research agenda for these times on the island. To that end, I want to close this dissertation by identifying three strands of a research agenda for a postreconciliation future. This agenda is rooted in a larger philosophical and critical orientation towards unmaking the myriad deleterious legacies of colonial power on the island. As Simpson (2014) shows in her peerless study of Kahnawà:ke land and people, the imperatives of this agenda must be pursued at multiple scales.

The first strand of this proposed research agenda is to surround and develop a conceptual architecture of rebellious mourning specific to Ireland. As I argued following the work of Katherine Verdery (1999) and others (Gordon 2008; Lawther 2021) dead bodies have political afterlives, especially in Ireland, and the public inscription of and mobilisation around dead bodies, bodies that didn't have to die, to energise political change in contemporary Ireland. The Repeal the Eight Amendment Campaign, which successfully repealed the prohibition of reproductive rights written into Ireland's Constitution, coalesced around the body of Savita Halappanavar, a 31-year old woman who died after being cruelly refused the abortion that would have saved her life. In the words of the journalist Kitty Holland, Halappanavar's death "revolutionised Ireland" (2018, n.p; also Connolly 2018; Enright 2020), her face and image the central motif of the YES campaign, borne aloft at marches, affixed to murals, her body accreted next to other symbols of Irish *and colonial* injustice (Chapter Five). Even after the successful YES campaign, Halappanavar's body continues to serve as a mobilisation mechanism (O'Dowd 2022). A similar, though smaller-scale example is the death of Sylva Tukula in 2019, a transgender asylum seeker who died whilst confined in Ireland's brutal Direct Provision System and was subsequently buried by the Irish state with no notification given to her friends and family, dumped in the ground with no ceremony. Her case galvanised anew the anti-Direct Provision movement in Ireland, and like Halappanavar, Tukula's body again became a central motif of the demand for transformative political change (Melina 2022; Perryman 2019).

While Halappanavar and Tukula are certainly the most well-known case demonstrating the power of rebellious mourning in contemporary Ireland, their bodies, and the rebellious mourning praxis that surrounds them, is deeply ingrained within larger Irish thanatological culture. As I argued following Hepburn (2014), in Ireland the living consort with the dead and nourish hope for political deliverance. What we lack as scholars at this

juncture is a conceptual and historical architecture of the political, spatial, and cultural specificities of rebellious mourning in Ireland, one that traces the different public usages of dead bodies across time, community, context. Existing literature tends to examine the politics of dead bodies through or within specifically either Irish Republican cultures and traditions (e.g.. Cadhla 2017; Kennedy 2020; Ryan 2014) or within Irish literary cultures (Greenlaw 2021; Harte 2010). How have these long-standing thanatological traditions of rebellious mourning in Ireland fed into and affected mass contemporary Irish justice movements deploying the bodies of migrant women of colour? How do these bodies intertwine with the bodies of those killed and murdered in the Troubles, and the justice campaigns they inspire?

The second strand of a postreconciliation research agenda draws on, somewhat ironically considering the subject of this dissertation, Karen Lane's (2019) call for more research in Northern Ireland devoted to "Not-the-Troubles." Lane argues that an excessive academic focus on the Troubles and its underlying and persistent social, political, and cultural cleavages systematically marginalises the voices, stories, experiences, and character of Northern Irish everyday life. Here, she echoes the voices of several other scholars (e.g. Kitchin and Lysaght 2003; Komarova and Svašek 2018; McQuaid 2012; Nagle 2013) who argue that dominant strands of academic research have done Northern Ireland a major disservice by neglecting the types of research that could potentially point to other, alternative spatial stories of life, belonging, and the complex, multi-faceted identities of people in Northern Ireland. Again, echoing this call could be seen as ironic considering the subject matter of this dissertation is directly rooted in The Troubles writ large, however, what I have tried to do throughout this dissertation is to introduce less visible claimants to "mattering," both in terms of the Northern Irish "metaconflict" and of the often underexplored or out-of-the-way chronotopic places through which rebellious mourning practices are enacted. Rather than echo Lane's "Not-the-Troubles" agenda, I would rather advocate for an agenda focused

on how the ghosts, hauntings, and material afterlives of places imbricate and effect everyday life in postconflict and postreconciliatory Northern Ireland. In other words, this second strand of a proposed research agenda would fuse Avery Gordon's (2008) work with Lane's eloquent demand, focusing on how, where, and why the Troubles continue to seethe in the messy social, psychological, and political space of the present, how everyday life is, or isn't, affected by the material and spectral afterlives of violence. Rather than an explicitly "Not-the-Troubles" research agenda, it demands another version of the Troubles research, one rooted in lives, bodies, practices, and mobilities of peoples who, as Lane rightly notes, have been marginalised by an excessive academic and journalistic focus on the creeping catastrophe of Stormont, paramilitarism past and paramilitarism present, and ethnocultural conflict, violence, and division.

The third strand again returns to both my admiration for and productive disagreement with what promises to be a truly touchstone work of scholarship on Ireland, north and south, Robbie McVeigh and Bill Rolston's magisterial *Unfinished Revolution* (2022). This strand asks, explicitly, what does what I have called *unmaking* look like and where does it sit? How does an orientation rooted in decolonial everyday anarchism interact with and overlap with a context where Irish Republicanism has traditionally been the dominant framework for both understanding and transforming colonial and postcolonial oppression?

This research strand would, almost by definition, be highly critical of what we might call "Irish exceptionalism." As Stuart Hall (1992), Paul Gilroy (1992), and Edward Said (1993) have so compellingly pointed out, colonialism is not something that occurred or occurs in faraway places, but rather, as Said would have it: "At the heart of European culture" (1993, 221). Colonialism and postcolonialism have universal ramifications blended with localised specificities. As McVeigh and Rolston (2022) so compellingly demonstrate, Ireland

should be conceptualised through the lens of settler colonialism, sharing some characteristics Canada and Australia, two other cases that have provided much of the theoretical backbone of this dissertation.

It is important to note here that settler colonialism as a discipline, a paradigm, or an appeal to a really-existing reality (Wolfe 2006; 1999; Verancini 2013; 2011) is often criticised, either as overly broad and generalising or as tacitly presenting Indigenous peoples as helpless victims, lacking agency or future (Snelgrove, Dhamoon, and Corntassel 2014; Tuck and Yang 2012). These related criticisms are extremely important to hold when settler colonial analytics are extended to places like Ireland (McVeigh and Rolston 2022) or Palestine (Busbridge 2018; Lloyd 2012). Audra Simpson (2016, 3) urges us to consider settler colonial logics:

> As an analytic, as a social formation, as an attitude, as an imaginary, as something that names and helps others to name what happened and is still happening in spaces seized away from people, in ongoing projects to mask that seizure while attending to capital accumulation under another name,

Thus, a settler colonial analytic would do, as conceptualised by scholars like Simpson, would alert us to the distinctive manifestations of decolonial and postreconciliatory unmaking praxis emerging in Ireland while reminding us that some legacies of the seizure of Irish space and place will be common to other contexts of decolonisation (McVeigh and Rolston 2022). This analytic, I argue, helps us critically examine the myriad possibilities of learning from non-European decolonial mobilisation strategies, justice campaigns, rebellious mourning, and the politics of refusal. In short, this final strand of a research agenda for unmaking would critically examine the potential connections and overlaps between (and contradictions and divergences from) contemporary Irish decolonial possibilities and practices and the types of decolonial possibilities and practices now being mobilised across the non-European world.

Canada, Australia, and South Africa especially I have suggested in this dissertation seem likely cases of postreconciliatory comparison but there are certainly others as well.

   And while looking across oceans may be singularly productive, we may also be able to remain close to home. Ireland in 2022 is increasingly racially, culturally, and politically diverse, increasingly unrepresented by the pernicious and deleterious "two traditions" mentality that studiously ignores any perspective it cannot cram neatly into Catholic vs Protestant, Unionist vs Nationalist. The largest transformative social justice campaign on this island in the 21ˢᵗ century, as I pointed out above, was galvanised and impelled forward by the brutally callous death (some, including me, would say the State murder) of a young migrant woman of colour, Savita Halappanavar. As I illustrated in Chapters Four and Five, Savita haunts the Bloody Sunday March as well, trailing sadly yet defiantly beside the spectral convocation, along with so many others who come and go, intertwining with the silent procession of those 14 young murdered Irish men. In making these connections across time, space, and culture, rebellious mourning practitioners continue to expose and delegitimise the temporal dimension at the heart of appeals to the reconciliation paradigm in Ireland. I argue this is the work of unmaking, of slowly and painstakingly unravelling the multi-dimensional, multi-scalar, and multi-faceted architectures of persistent colonialism in Ireland.

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