A Tale of Two Sisters:

Social movement mobilisations in response to acts of violence against women in Argentina and Ireland.

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Abstract

One in three women globally will experience violence in their lifetime: violence against women (VAW) is a multi-layered human rights issue. This research internationalises the social movement perspective and employs a 'political process' approach to compare two social movement organisations (SMOs), the Argentinian SMO, Ni Una Menos (*not one (woman) less*) and the Irish SMO, ROSA (*for Reproductive Rights, against Oppression, Sexism and Austerity*). Both are currently engaged in mobilisations seeking radical social transformation, with a strong focus on eliminating VAW. Theoretically, pivotal moments in the struggle can be best understood through an analysis of the interaction of political opportunities, mobilising structures and framing processes. This research focuses on two national pivotal protests in Argentina and in Ireland, when these SMOs identified a political opportunity, and by utilising both traditional and digital mobilising structures shaped their 'framing processes' in response to VAW. This is achieved through the analysis of social media platforms utilised during these pivotal protests and interviews with members of both SMOs. This analysis makes a contribution to understanding how political opportunities shape mobilisations and rely on strong mobilising structures and resonant framing strategies in achieving concrete political outcomes.

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Introduction

My interest in this subject was reflected in my undergraduate and master theses which focused on, respectively, the portrayal of sexual assault cases in Irish newspaper media, and the way in which Ni Una Menos was mobilising in response to VAW in Argentina. The 2010s were marked by an emergence of social movements mobilising in response to a variety of issues, particularly after the 2007-2009 economic crises which had damaging effects throughout the world. Mass demonstrations in response to corruption and socio-economic inequality emerged in 2011, i.e., the Arab Spring and Occupy protests. Racial inequality and police brutality were highlighted by the Black Lives Matter Movement, emerging in 2013, gaining global attention particularly in 2020 after the murder of George Floyd. In relation to sexual and reproductive health rights, the 2010s saw a re-emergence of reproductive rights movements in Latin America and Europe, as well as LGBTQIA+ rights movements, making gains through the creation of same-sex marriage legislation and recognition of gender identity laws.

Femicide, sexual violence and harassment took centre stage with the emergence of Ni Una Menos in 2015 in Argentina and the MeToo Movement in the United States in 2017. The Global Climate Change Movement began to achieve more traction in 2010s with the People's Climate March in 2014 and the Global Climate March in 2015 but gained significant attention around the world with the influx of young people protesting in the School Strikes for Climate starting in 2019. All these movements have been influenced by previous movements in terms of protest form and tactics; however, there were some differences, particularly in the use of digital technology i.e., social media platforms. This research is focusing on two feminist SMOs which emerged in the 2010s, Ni Una Menos, in 2015, and ROSA, in 2013.

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The structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter One provides some basic historical context relating to the women's and feminist movement influence in Argentina and Ireland as these have influenced tactics and strategies utilised by the two SMOs which are the focus of this research, Ni Una Menos and ROSA. I introduce these SMOs and the two main protest events that I will analyse in the subsequent chapters, namely the *Justicia para Micaela (*Justice for Micaela) protests in Argentina and the *I Believe Her* protests in Ireland. Chapter Two provides an overview of policy related to VAW at an international, regional, and national level as they relate to Argentina and Ireland. The purpose being to highlight the relationship between women's and feminist movements and international institutions who play a significant role in guiding nations on the actions that need to be taken to combat VAW. This particularly points to the role of the State in combatting VAW. Chapter Three will outline the conceptualisation of VAW, femicide, and sexual violence in sociological literature, which will assist in understanding the framing of violence at these two pivotal protest events. Chapter Four outlines the political process theory approach and the way social movement theory assists in understanding how these contemporary feminist SMOs mobilise, specifically, it examines the importance of political opportunities. The way in which the political context influences mobilisations is elucidated in order to highlight the influence of these external factors in shaping SMO activity.   Chapter Five outlines the analytical and methodological approach taken in this study. It is shaped by feminist and social movement frameworks and, utilises secondary social media data and primary interview data with members of the SMOs.

The analysis of the data generated is carried out in Chapters Six to Nine. Chapter Six outlines the external factors which facilitated the movement activity in each context, paying attention to the elements of political opportunity which arose for both SMOs. It examines opportunities

arising from: (a) changing political alignments, (b) influential allies, (c) the presence of new actors in the institutionalised political system, (d) the State's capacity for repression and (e) the policymaking capacity of the State. Chapter Seven outlines the mobilising structures in each SMO's repertoire and describes how they were utilised in their calls to action. These are contemporary feminist SMOs, so both traditional and digital mobilising structures are examined, along with their utilisation in each protest event. Chapter Eight applies framing theory to analyse the mobilisations of both SMOs within a specific timeframe. The concepts of a master frame and a collective action frame are applied, alongside sociological understandings of VAW, to interrogate the framing processes at play during each protest event. Chapter Nine discusses the political outcomes of SMO activity, that is, it examines the way in which each SMO influenced legislative processes related to VAW in each country after these protest events. Chapter Ten summarises the key research findings and insights from taking a comparative approach, the original contribution this thesis is making to knowledge and makes some recommendations for further research.

By comparing the protest events *Justicia para Micaela* led by Ni Una Menos and the *I Believe Her* protests led by ROSA, this research aims to answer questions regarding how and why contemporary feminist SMOs mobilise in response to acts of VAW. It does this by applying social movement theory, specifically the political process theory approach, in two different national contexts. There is a lack of comparative studies on feminist SMOs and their mobilisations in response to VAW, especially of different SMOs, in different countries. There have been multiple studies related to Ni Una Menos, but ROSA as a feminist SMO in Ireland have little written about their actions, apart from those related to the Reproductive Rights Movement. Although previous studies have been conducted utilising social movement theory, the innovation in this research is to focus on specific protest events and to

utilise both online analysis of social media platforms and in-depth semi-structured interviews with activists. This has supported a deeper understanding of the dynamics at play in these specific mobilisations. This study illustrates the relationship between political opportunities, mobilising structures, and framing processes. It also provides insights into external impacts of movement activity in its discussion of the political outcomes of movement activity. Applying the same framework to each SMO facilitates comparison of the different circumstances and outcomes of movement activity in relation to the collective action that occurred.

This thesis sets out to uncover how and why these SMOs mobilised in response to acts of VAW. It answers these questions by, first, identifying the protest events during the SMOs' protest cycle which were of particular importance in influencing concrete political outcomes. Second, it identifies the changes in political opportunity structures that facilitated the emergence of the SMOs Ni Una Menos and ROSA. Third, it outlines which mobilising structures present in each SMO's repertoire were utilised during these core protest events. Fourth, it identifies how each SMO conceptualised the issue of VAW and how this informed their framing in relation to these core protest events. Finally, it outlines what impacts, if any, these protest events have that were external to the SMO, that is, what policy changes occurred. It concludes that the interaction of political opportunities, mobilising structures and framing processes resulted in political outcomes in both countries, with some similarities.

Overall, this study shows the value of a comparative perspective insofar as two SMOs confronting VAW show considerable similarities despite the significant differences between Argentina and Ireland. It also demonstrates the increasing importance of social media in framing for SMOs and advancing their objectives, particularly through the example of Ni

Una Menos in Argentina. The thesis is also innovative in the way it couches its analysis in terms of specific protest events which decisively shape the subsequent trajectory and discourse of a SMO contesting VAW. The thesis in its detailed study of two SMOs within a comparative frame, shows concretely the complex relationships between political opportunities, mobilising structures, framing processes, and the diverse political outcomes of social movement mobilisations. It sets the mobilising activities of the two feminist SMOs in the context of the legislative framework of Argentina and Ireland, particularly in relation to reproductive rights showing the considerable (and similar) impact of the mobilisations in both countries. There are, as always, limitations to the study. Data collection was conducted during the Covid-19 pandemic, and this in fact shaped the methodological approach. This thesis identified and analysed the mobilisations that occurred in relation to specific protest events, and comparisons have been carried out to do this. It is, nonetheless, important not to over generalise across countries on how these SMOs operate and hopefully this study keeps an appropriate balance between specifics and generalisations while comparing the Argentinian and Irish mobilisations.

Chapter 1 - Contextualisation

It is necessary to provide some historical context for the women's and feminist movement in Argentina and Ireland. In social movement theory, the distinction between social movements and social movement organisations (SMOs) is crucial for understanding the structure and dynamics of collective action. Diani (1992) defined social movements 'as networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in political or cultural conflicts, on the basis of shared collective identities.' Social movements are broad, collective efforts by large groups of people aimed at bringing about or resisting social change. They are driven by shared goals and ideologies, such as gender equality, environmental protection, or civil rights, these movements often have long-term objectives that seek to bring about systemic change in society, e.g., The Feminist Movement, The Environmental Movement, and The Civil Rights Movement.

Diani defines SMOs as 'groups who identify themselves, and are identified by others, as part of the same movement, and exchange on that basis' (Diani 2003:305). These organisations are structured groups that actively work to promote the movement's goals through coordinated activities and strategies. Unlike the broader, informal nature of social movements, SMOs have a more formal structure and have specific functions such as organising protests and campaigns, participating in advocacy, fundraising, public education, policy lobbying and many more activities that advance the movement's objectives. In summary, social movements encompass a wide range of participants and activities, aiming for broad, systemic change with their informal and loosely organised structures. On the other hand, SMOs are specific entities within these movements, organised to carry out particular

tasks and strategies that aim to advance the movement's objectives. This research will focus

on two feminist SMOs, Ni Una Menos in Argentina and ROSA in Ireland.

First, I will outline some of the most relevant SMOs in Argentina, focusing on the influence

of Peronism, the *Madres de Plaza de Mayo* (Mothers of Plaza de Mayo), women (*piqueteras*)

in the *Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados (MTD)* (Unemployed Workers Movement),

women from the *Encuentro Nacional de Mujeres (ENM)* (National Meeting of Women), and

the Reproductive Rights Movement. Second, I will discuss some of the most significant

women's and feminist SMOs in Ireland, highlighting the influence of the Irish Women's

Liberation Movement (IWLM) and Irish Women United (IWU), the anti-rape and anti-Eighth

Amendment SMOs of the 1970s and 1980s, and the Reproductive Rights Movement in the

2010s. Third, I will outline the emergence of Ni Una Menos and ROSA in their respective

contexts, introducing the two protest events chosen for analysis.

1.1 Argentinian Feminist Movement

There is long history of feminist activity in Argentina which provides insight into the

emergence of Ni Una Menos. In the late 19th century, a feminist newspaper was launched

called *La Voz de la Mujer* (The Voice of the Woman). The creation of this newspaper was

'one of the first recorded instances in Latin America of the fusion of feminist ideas with a

revolutionary and working-class orientation, it differs from the feminism found elsewhere in

Latin America during the initial phases of industrialization, which centered on educated

middle-class women and to some extent reflected their specific concerns' (Molyneux

1986:199-120). Contemporary Argentina is still influenced strongly by the

nationalist/populist discourse of Peronism. This was embodied in the classical Peronism of 1945-1955 that resulted in strong industrialisation and unionisation, the 'later Peronism' of 1973-1976 when Perón returned to Argentina and post 2000 emergence of Kirchnerism (first Nestor, then Cristina Kirchner) as a contemporary more radical variant. From 1976 to 1983, a military dictatorship ruled Argentina and sought to eliminate anyone who was considered radical, socialist, or left-wing and who did not conform to the neo-liberal economic policies and ideology which was being enforced. This dictatorship was involved in corruption, anti-labour laws and increased the debt burden in Argentina. Known as the 'Dirty War', during this period 30,000 people 'disappeared', were captured and/or tortured and killed if they were seen as a 'threat' to those in power. Many children were taken from their parents at this time; if these parents were considered progressive or against the ideology of the military. Out of this atrocity came the *Madres de Plaza de Mayo* (Mothers of Plaza de Mayo). These women marched on the streets of Buenos Aires from 1977, during the military dictatorship, and still do, every Thursday, searching for and asking where or what happened to their children and grandchildren. By protesting in response to these human rights abuses conducted by the regime through peaceful resistance and subverting ideas regarding 'motherhood', *Madres de Plaza de Mayo* (Mothers of Plaza de Mayo) have been particularly influential on Ni Una Menos with regards to the use of a human rights discourse and acts of public mourning, which will be referenced throughout this research.

In the mid-1980s, the *Encuentros Nacionales de Mujeres* (National Meeting of Women) began, an event that has taken place every year since 1986, known as the '*Encuentros*' and is a crucial SMO in Argentinian feminist advocacy. The *Encuentros* are held in different cities throughout Argentina annually and in these meetings, women come together from different socio-economic, ethnic, and racial backgrounds to participate in workshops and debate issues

relating to women's rights. These initial meetings in the late 1980s and early 1990s were based in a grassroots popular feminism.

In the 1990s, some of the women from these *Encuentros* would go on to play a significant role in the *Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados* (MTD) (Unemployed Workers Movement), also commonly known as the *Piquetero/as*.   This term specifically refers to the tactic they frequently used—blocking roads and highways (*piquetes*) as a form of protest. This heterogenous group emerged in response to neoliberal reforms which saw many former State-owned companies being privatised and thousands of Argentinian people losing their jobs. The *Piquetero/as* was made up of a combination of groups who would carry out blockades and were a prominent presence in Argentina in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Their methods of protest, most notably, the blocking of streets highlighted the mobilising power of the working class and influenced other movements within the country, including the student movement. Initially, in the mid-1990s the *Piquetero/as* consisted of unemployed people blocking highways and conducting roadblocks in areas surrounding the nation's capital, Buenos Aires. Many of those who put their bodies on the line in these actions were women (*piqueteras*), especially since many of their husbands became disillusioned and depressed as they had lost their jobs or could not enter the labour market (D'Atri & Escati 2008:3). Therefore, initially women were able to 'incorporate demands related to everyday life into the list of grievances of the Piquetero Movement: gardens tended by mothers, neighbourhood nursery schools, higher budgets for popular dining rooms, health care improvements, and tax exemptions for unemployed families (D'Atri & Escati. 2008:3). Many of these women were elected as spokespeople at the assemblies and tasked with communication with government officials and authorities.

In the late 1990s, these unemployed workers formed their own organisations 'becoming an organised movement made up of territorial groups that came together in different coordinating bodies and political blocks', what was known as *Movimientos de Trabajadores Desocupados* (MTD) (Unemployed Workers Movements) (D'Atri & Escati. 2008:4). By this time, those in leadership roles were largely men but women played an important role, it was reported that in Buenos Aires in the late 1990s '70% of the movement were women… but their primary role was essentially reduced to the organization of tasks related to domestic stereotypes: responsibility for dining rooms, mothers' gardens, community orchards, micro-undertakings related to food preparation (bread, sweets), etc.' (D'Atri & Escati. 2008:7)

Another important collective in this research is *Movimiento Evita* (Evita Movement) which emerged in 2004. One of the primary concerns of *Movimiento Evita* (Evita Movement) is with the systemic poverty that occurs in Argentina due to neoliberal economic policies and the need for social transformation. The name Evita is a tribute to Eva Perón. They have some roots in the *Piquetero/as* and would adopt a left-wing Peronist ideology (Rossi 2015). It is evident that the *Movimiento Evita* (Evita Movement) was an ally of the Kirchner presidencies and the political coalition *Frente para la Victoria* (Front for Victory) (Rossi 2015). The youth group associated with *Movimiento Evita* (Evita Movement) is known as JP Evita, who also have a large following and associations with popular and feminist SMOs. The reproductive rights campaign was revived in 2000s with the *Campaña Nacional por el Derecho al Aborto Legal, Seguro y Gratuito* (National Campaign for Legal, Safe and Free Abortion), established in 2005. Feminist activism participation, particularly young women, has grown throughout in Argentina and Latin America exponentially in the 2010s (Lopez 2020). Molyneux (2011:181) highlights how 'Latin American feminism's achievements reveals a history of substantial advances but a striking persistence of gender inequality.'

Before the emergence of Ni Una Menos, there was evidence of feminist activism in response to sexual violence e.g., *Marcha de las Putas* (March of the Whores - Latin American version of 'Slut Walk'). The 'Slut Walk' Movement is transnational and emerged in the early 2010s in response to advice from authorities on college campus in Toronto, that if women do not want to be sexually assaulted or raped that they should not dress like 'sluts' (Carr 2013).

1.2 Irish Feminist Movement

The history of feminist activity in the Irish context informs the SMOs of today. Thus, Connolly (1996:44) identifies four stages of the Irish women's movement in the 20th century, each characterised as a stage of evolution; abeyance (1922-1969), advancement (1970-1979), reappraisal (1980-1988) and new directions (1989-1995). SMOs in Ireland in the abeyance period (1922-1969) such as 'Irish Housewives Association, Association of Business and Professional Women, trade unionists and the National Association of Widows' were important organisations in a period where the socio-political context was not as open to feminist activism (Connolly 1996:47). These organisations would prove to be important networks for the women's movement in the 1970s and many activists came from these organisations.   During the 1960s, the emergence of the Women's Liberation Movement, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Anti-War Movement (Vietnam) in North America provided inspiration for the Women's Movement in Ireland. On the island of Ireland, the Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland and the rise of Republicanism in the South also contributed to the development of the Women's Movement in Ireland (Smyth 1988:332).

It is evident that a more open political system began to be seen in the late 1960s with influence from external international institutions and ideas regarding gender, which was crucial for the emergence of the Women's Movement of the 1970s. The political opportunity

structure was more open to women's liberation and concerns. The Women's Movement in the 1970s was characterised by demands relating to contraception, labour rights, and property rights. Women's participation in the labour market in Ireland was lower than in other parts of Europe but rose dramatically from the 1940s to the 1980s, alongside higher levels of education (Burke 1984). Although there were many smaller groups formed in the 1970s, one of the most prominent SMOs at the time was the Irish Women's Liberation Movement (IWLM), that sought both to engage in protest activity but also to gain access to the media so they could share their ideas with ordinary women who were not within the movement or see themselves as political, giving them insight into their lives and what needed to change. Some women were more politicised than others, some being more moderate/conservative and others have a more radical/revolutionary view. They famously conducted a disruptive act in 1971 in response to the prohibition of contraceptives in the Republic of Ireland, what was known as the 'contraception train'. They travelled to Belfast, Northen Ireland, to purchase contraceptives which were legal there and bring them back to the Republic, which was against the law.

It is important to note how class affected women's participation in the Irish nationalist and feminist movements (Coulter 1993). The leadership was often dominated by middle-class women, which sometimes led to tensions with working-class women whose experiences and needs might have been different. This class division influenced the priorities and strategies, with middle-class priorities often overshadowing working-class concerns. Ireland's historical context is deeply rooted in ethno-religious conflict, primarily between the majority Catholic population and the minority Protestant community. Coulter (1993) explores how these tensions impacted women's roles in the movement and in Irish society at large. The alignment

of Irish nationalism with Catholic identity sometimes marginalised Protestant women, even as the feminist movement sought to bridge these divides. Additionally, the ethno-religious conflict in Northern Ireland (often framed as Catholic nationalist/republican vs. Protestant unionist/loyalist) further complicated the dynamics of women's activism in both feminist and nationalist contexts. Coulter's (1993) work highlights how these class and ethno-religious tensions intersect with gender, affecting the participation and representation of women in movements for social change in Ireland. She illustrates that while these movements aimed to address certain forms of oppression, they sometimes reproduced others, particularly in terms of class and religious identity.

The Irish Women United (IWU) emerged in 1975 and was a much more politicised group 'the prevailing ideological schisms within IWU were based on republicanism, socialism, lesbian separatism and radical feminism' (Connolly 1996:59). Although the IWU disbanded a couple of years after they emerged, they did have a long-lasting influence on the Feminist Movement in Ireland as their members split into different groups, most notably, the anti-amendment group in the Abortion Referendum in 1983 in relation to reproductive rights and founding the first Rape Crisis Centre in Ireland (Connolly 1996:61) Through the 1980s a more victim-centred approach began to form in relation to VAW with influence from the Anti-Rape Movement and the first crime victimisation survey (Molloy 2018:693). The crime of rape was formerly viewed as a violation of a man's property rather than a violation of a woman's rights, as an individual, and this shift meant the victim was becoming more of the focus.   The Anti-Rape Movement in Ireland came about in 1977 and were known as the Campaign Against Rape (CAR), many of the members who were in this collective went on to start the Dublin Rape Crisis Centre (Molloy 2018:693).

The first half of the 1980s in Ireland was characterised by an economic recession with dramatic levels of unemployment and many emigrating to Britain and the United States. Gross emigration from Ireland was approximately 450,000 (Irish Abroad Unit 2017:3). Providing access to family planning in the 1970s was seen as a political loss for the conservatives despite being very conservative legislation. However, it did constitute a breakthrough in the system, but it also solidified an alliance between Catholic organisations and conservative groups regarding abortion (Kennedy 2022:3). It is evident that conservative groups generally approach the abortion issue from a broader ideological perspective, focusing on traditional values and political conservatism. These groups might include political parties, advocacy groups, and think tanks that support conservative social policies. On the other hand, Catholic organisations ground their opposition to abortion in religious doctrine and moral teachings of the Catholic Church. Despite their different foundations, these groups often form alliances to amplify their influence on public policy and societal norms regarding abortion. The backlash regarding the rise of the Women's Movement was due to a need for the establishment to remain religious and conservative and found the ideas of secularism as a threat to their way of life. Despite efforts from the Anti-Amendment group, in 1983 the Eighth Amendment was added to the Irish Constitution by Referendum. This amendment granted the unborn fetus an equal right to life as the pregnant woman, effectively prohibiting abortion in Ireland. The Referendum passed with 841,233 in favour and 416,136 against. It was not only illegal to have an abortion, but it was illegal to provide information about abortions or how to access one. Although no woman was ever prosecuted, there was a 14-year jail sentence threatened if they were to end their own pregnancy.

The X case protests in Ireland refer to public demonstrations and outcry following a landmark legal case in 1992, known as the "X case." This case involved a 14-year-old girl, referred to as "X," who became pregnant as a result of rape and sought an abortion. At the time, abortion was heavily restricted in Ireland. The girl's parents intended to take her to the United Kingdom for an abortion, but the Attorney General obtained a court injunction to prevent her from leaving the country, based on the Eighth Amendment of the Irish Constitution, which recognised the equal right to life of the mother and the unborn. The case went to the Supreme Court, which ruled that abortion was permissible in Ireland if there was a "real and substantial risk" to the life of the mother, including the risk of suicide. This ruling highlighted significant gaps and ambiguities in the country's abortion laws. The case sparked widespread public outrage and massive protests across Ireland. Many people were shocked by the State's intervention in such a personal and traumatic situation, and the case brought the issue of abortion rights to the forefront of public debate. Following the X case, there were several referenda aimed at clarifying and amending Ireland's abortion laws. Notably, the Thirteenth Amendment (1992) ensured the right to travel abroad for an abortion, and the Fourteenth Amendment (1992) allowed for the dissemination of information about abortion services available in other countries. Several feminist groups played pivotal roles in organising and leading the protests during the X case in Ireland in the 1990s.

In the 1990s, many advancements were made that were symbolic, e.g., Mary Robinson was elected the first female President of Ireland in 1990 and Mary McAleese became President of Ireland in 1997. In 1995, women from Northern Ireland attended the Fourth UN World Conference on Women in Beijing. There was also an emergence of many local women's groups throughout Ireland (Connolly 1996). In relation to gender equality, Ireland adopted

the principle of gender mainstreaming in the late 1990s and early 2000's, 'a European Commission requirement means that Irish projects supported by EU funds are obliged to promote equal opportunities. The Irish government has extended this requirement to cover all State funded projects' (ECC 2022).

1.3 Ni Una Menos

In March 2015, journalists and activists met with the families of women who had been victims of violence in Buenos Aires, this event was called 'Ni Una Menos' (*not one (woman) less*). A couple of months later, journalist Marcela Ojeda sent out a tweet in response to yet another horrific case of femicide, a 14-year-old girl, Chiara Páez, who while pregnant, was brutally murdered by her boyfriend.

> 'Actresses, female politicians, artists, businesswomen, social activists... women, everyone, aren't we going to speak out? THEY ARE KILLING US' (Tweet by Marcela Ojeda, May 11, 2015)

Ni Una Menos had their first major mobilisation in Argentina in June 2015 with a focus on femicide and VAW. It is estimated that the demonstration in Buenos Aires on 3 June 2015 had between 100,000 and 300,000 people in attendance. The phrase 'Ni Una Menos' was originally coined by a Mexican poet and activist Susana Chávez in the 1990s, in response to the murders of women in Cuidad Juárez, Mexico, her original slogan being *ni una menos, ni una muerte mas* (not one (woman) less, not one more death), Susana herself was murdered in 2011 (Friedman & Tabbush 2016). The organisers, to block the State from co-opting their event, purposefully did not allow politicians to stand on the stage for the main event and instead filled the stage with people 'from the world of culture…and the families of victims of femicide' (Annunziata et al 2016:59). Similar mobilisations were happening throughout

Latin America and in parts of Europe with iterations in Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, Mexico, Brazil, Italy, and Spain (Palmeiro 2020).

In October 2016, women in Poland went on strike, protesting a lack of reproductive rights and calling this '*czarny poniedziałek*' (black Monday), which was inspired by the women's strike in Iceland in 1975 where 90% of women went on strike from paid and unpaid labour. Inspired by this strike in Poland and looking to keep momentum going, Ni Una Menos organised the first mass strike of women in Argentina called '*Miércoles negro*' (black Wednesday) which consisted of a one hour pause from work, with women wearing black as a sign of mourning, after the femicide of another young woman, Lucia Pérez. On 8 March 2017, the International Women's Strike took place, which was a global initiative aimed at addressing gender-based violence, economic inequality, and social injustices faced by women and feminised people. Ni Una Menos laid the groundwork for this strike by building a robust network of activists, raising awareness about gender issues, and fostering a culture of resistance and solidarity among women and feminised people. This strike was supported by various feminist organisations, labour unions, and community groups, which collaborated to plan and execute the event. These groups worked together to ensure that the strike was not just a one-off protest but part of a sustained effort to challenge systemic inequalities and advocate for women's rights. This strike included the North American collective called the 'Women's March on Washington', in part a response to the election of Donald Trump; this collective cited Ni Una Menos as one of their core inspirations. Feminist movements around the world went on strike that day with thousands of women taking to the streets across fifty countries. These types of strikes and mass occupations of public plazas in Buenos Aires can be seen as a re-emergence and in some ways a re-invention of the strike. The strike from both paid and unpaid labour, highlighted the disproportionate number of women participating

in unpaid labour in the home (Fraser et al 2018). From 2018-2020, Ni Una Menos' focus was related to abortion, and they played a crucial role in the revitalisation of the reproductive rights movement in Argentina (Daby & Moseley 2022; Cohen 2022).

1.4 ROSA

The death of Savita Halappanavar in 2012 was a watershed moment in Ireland, prompting widespread protests and advocacy for changes to the country's restrictive abortion laws. Savita died of sepsis after being denied an abortion while suffering a miscarriage, highlighting the critical implications of the restrictive abortion laws in Ireland at that time. Abortion in Ireland had been prohibited since 1861 and in 1983 the Eighth Amendment was added to the Constitution by referendum vote which granted the unborn fetus an equal right to life as the pregnant woman, effectively prohibiting abortion in Ireland. The Abortion Rights Campaign (ARC) was formed in 2012 in Ireland and was influenced by her tragic death. This organisation was formed as a coalition of pro-choice groups and individuals in Ireland, aiming to campaign for broad access to safe and legal abortion services across the country. In 2012, the first March for Choice was conducted which grew to thousands of people each year. Other significant groups were the Coalition to Repeal the Eighth Amendment and Together for Yes. The Coalition to Repeal the Eighth Amendment brought together over 100 organizations, including feminist groups, health organizations, and human rights advocates, to work collectively towards the common goal of repealing the restrictive amendment. Together for Yes emerged as a national civil society campaign, effectively uniting various grassroots efforts under one cohesive campaign strategy, which proved pivotal during the 2018 referendum (Fitzsimons 2020). These grassroots organisations were instrumental in creating a broad and inclusive movement. They facilitated community

engagement through local meetings, information sessions, and public demonstrations, ensuring that the voices of women and marginalized communities were heard. Their relentless advocacy and grassroots organizing significantly contributed to the successful repeal of the Eighth Amendment, marking a monumental shift in Ireland's approach to reproductive rights (Fitzsimons 2020).

Alongside the major organisations involved in Ireland's Reproductive Rights Movement, several smaller, community-based, or issue-specific groups also played vital roles in the campaign to repeal the Eighth Amendment. These groups often focused on specific demographics or regional communities. Some of these smaller groups include: Migrants and Ethnic-minorities for Reproductive Justice (MERJ) who focused on the specific challenges faced by migrants and ethnic minorities in accessing reproductive healthcare in Ireland; Doctors for Choice, which included medical professionals who advocated for the repeal to ensure better healthcare and medical freedom in decision-making for both doctors and patients, and Termination for Medical Reasons (TFMR) who advocated specifically for those who had faced the traumatic experience of carrying a fetus with a fatal fetal abnormality under the restrictive laws.

ROSA emerged in 2013 also in response to the death of Savita, as a socialist feminist movement whose aim was to be explicitly pro-choice and fight to have a Referendum to Repeal the Eighth Amendment from the Irish Constitution and make way for abortion legislation in Ireland.   ROSA was established in 2013 by female members of the Socialist Party in Ireland. The name ROSA is a tribute to Rosa Luxemburg and Rosa Parks, it was

also initially an acronym 'for Reproductive Rights, against Oppression, Sexism and Austerity', although this is rarely used anymore, and they are known as ROSA. ROSA were an important voice in the re-emergence of the Reproductive Rights Movement. The election of one of ROSA's founders, Ruth Coppinger in 2014, gave ROSA a platform where some of their ideas could be heard, she remained a TD (*Teachta Dála -Member of Parliament*) until 2020, and is still a highly active campaigner. It is evident that ROSA have been inspired by actions of historical women's movements.   In relation to reproductive rights from 2014 to 2017, ROSA were focused on acts of civil disobedience with acts such as the 'abortion train' and the 'abortion pill bus' which will be discussed in Chapter Seven in relation to mobilising structures. Also, in 2017, ROSA contributed to the Strike4Repeal campaign for International Women's Day 2017, not 'an industrial strike in the traditional sense. It will be inclusive of all types of work, and we encourage participants to be imaginative in how they approach the action' (Strike4Repeal 2017). In 2018, while also playing a significant role in the Reproductive Rights Movement, ROSA were involved in two stand out campaigns related to VAW in Ireland, notably the *I Believe Her* protests (March 2018) and the This is Not Consent protests (Nov 2018).

1.6 Protest Events for Analysis

This research explores how these feminist SMOs mobilised in response to an act or acts of VAW in Argentina and Ireland in the years 2016-2020. Both Ni Una Menos and ROSA identify as anti-capitalist and feminist and reject liberal feminism as the panacea to the world's problems, particularly as they relate to violence. Despite the differences in political and socio-economic context, differences in the oppression experienced by women and feminised people, differences in the expression of the struggle, the targets are the same –

patriarchy and capitalism which have been institutionalised into State structures and have facilitated or caused violence. These two SMOs are being analysed in the context of the growing international feminist movement, which Fraser et al (2018) refer to as a 'feminism for the 99%'. During this period (2016-2020) Ni Una Menos were at the height of organising regarding femicide from 2016-2018 and reproductive rights from 2018-2020 whereas ROSA were at the height of organising around reproductive rights from 2016-2018 and more specifically around VAW and gender violence from 2018-2020. The protest events chosen for analysis are described below. The process of how these events were chosen is described in Chapter Five (Methodology).

Ni Una Menos and ROSA, both feminist SMOs, exhibit significant differences in size, recognition, and operational scope. Ni Una Menos is internationally recognised, mobilising hundreds of thousands across Argentina and Latin America, and is celebrated for its broad influence and extensive media coverage. It addresses a wide array of issues including femicide, domestic violence, reproductive rights, and economic inequality through large-scale protests and social media campaigns. In contrast, ROSA, while impactful within Ireland, especially Dublin and other urban areas, sees considerably fewer participants and remains less well-known internationally. Its activities are more focused on the Irish context, particularly in relation to gender-based violence and reproductive rights from a socialist feminist perspective, primarily engaging through grassroots organising and local community-based approaches. These disparities in scale, recognition, and methods between the two are crucial for understanding their respective impacts and the nature of their activities.

Justicia para Micaela (Justice for Micaela) Protests

Protests were held throughout Argentina in April 2017, led by Ni Una Menos, in response to the rape and femicide of Micaela Garcia, a 21-year-old woman from Entre Rios, Argentina, who was a Ni Una Menos and *Movimiento Evita* (Evita Movement) activist. Garcia was raped and murdered by Sebastian Wagner, an individual who had recently been released from prison early, having been incarcerated for the rape of two other women in 2012. Wagner had been released from jail by Judge Carlos Rossi, despite the advice from the prison services that he should not be released early. The judge released Wagner citing his perceived 'good behaviour' and the overcrowding in prisons. Garcia went missing on the 1st April 2017 after leaving a nightclub in Gualeguay, Entre Rios. Family, friends, and her boyfriend, contacted their various networks to try and find her. This also involved holding protests in the local area, engaging with political parties and groups, using the traditional media as well as social media, and networking with other families who had female relatives and friends who had gone missing. Despite these efforts, one week later, her body was found near a tree on the outskirts of Gualeguay on the 8th April 2017. Mobilisations occurred throughout Argentina on Sunday 9th April and Tuesday 11th April 2017.

I Believe Her Protests

Protests throughout Ireland in March 2018 were led by ROSA in response to the 'not guilty' verdict of the accused in what was known as the 'Belfast Rugby Rape Trial' (from this point on will be referred to as the Belfast Trial). These protests were centered on sexual violence, rape, the issue of consent and the treatment of the victim by the accused as well as her treatment within the court. In this trial, four Ulster Rugby players were on trial. Paddy Jackson and Stuart Olding were both accused of the rape of a 19-year-old woman at a house

party in Belfast in June 2016. Blane McElroy was accused of exposure at the same house party and Rory Harrison was accused of concealing evidence and perverting the course of justice. This trial played out over a nine-week period (*29 Jan 2018 – 28 March 2018*) wherein the details of the court proceedings were known to the public as citizens were permitted to attend. Reporting and commentary on the trial was generated in traditional news and social media. This was one of the most divisive trials in recent Irish history with many siding with the woman in the trial. There was shock expressed at both her treatment by the justice system, and the nature of the violence. Many were appalled by the misogynistic and sexually explicit text messages sent by the accused about the night in question, which were made public during the trial. Many also took the side of the accused and were angered that their names were made public, they questioned the complainant's testimony, and concluded that this case was about regret rather than rape. On 28th March 2018, all four men were found 'not guilty' on all charges. Mobilisations in response to the verdict and in support of the victim and other victims of violence under the '*I Believe Her*' slogan occurred throughout Ireland on Thursday 29th March and Saturday 31st March 2018.

In conclusion, this Chapter outlined some historical context for the women's and feminist movements in Argentina and Ireland. It is evident that in some ways the continuation of a similar fight can be seen in the contemporary feminist SMOs with the addition of different forms of activism, especially the inclusion of digital technology. These historical movements have had an influence on Ni Una Menos and ROSA in a variety of ways, from tactical choices, mobilising structures, and framing processes, the relevance of this will be discussed further in the analysis Chapters. Having this historical context provides insight into the actions taken by these SMOs, particularly during pivotal protests events. The two SMOs and the protest events described above are the cases which will be used in this analysis.

In order to carry out this analysis, there are some core issues that need to be established and addressed in Chapters Two, Three and Four. This research is concerned with pivotal protest events which had an influence on policy at a national level in each context, therefore, a brief review of policy related to VAW in each country will be discussed. This will be achieved by mapping the way in which this policy has been created over time and the influence that women's and feminist movements have had in making this policy come to fruition and the responsibilities of the State in combatting VAW. Second, this research is concerned with a specific form of violence, i.e., violence that is perpetrated against women and feminised people. The sociological literature that relates to this is important to interrogate as the framing of violence by these SMOs at these pivotal protests is understood through different conceptualisations of VAW. Third, the way in which SMOs mobilise can be understood through social movement theory, in these cases, the political process approach, which takes into account the external political environment in which a movement mobilises. More specifically, the literature regarding political opportunities, mobilising structures and framing processes informs the analysis of these pivotal protest events.

Chapter 2 – Policy Review on VAW in Argentina and Ireland

A comprehensive survey of relevant policy documents was carried out to identify the key policies at national and global level, and to extrapolate key policy decisions and shifts. It was necessary to identify what data is appropriate to understand the nature of action from the State in relation to VAW. The policy that is present in the national context regarding VAW has been influenced by international and regional conventions on VAW and these must be identified and read to understand the approach to combatting violence in each State. Identifying the institutions and groups who shape these policies starts at an international level, then regional (e.g., Latin America and Europe), then national (e.g., Argentina and Ireland). Htun & Weldon (2012) identified policy variation across countries, with feminist mobilisation in civil society being a significant contributor to policy development, particularly autonomous movements by institutionalising feminist ideals.

Htun & Weldon (2012) define autonomous movements as independent entities free from political parties, governments, and established institutions. They argue that such movements are more effective because they set their own agendas, pursue their goals, and mobilise independently, often through grassroots efforts led by civil society committed to gender justice. This independence is crucial for influencing State actions and advocating for substantial reforms in areas like VAW and gender equality, thereby driving progressive policy changes. Ni Una Menos, which originated in Argentina as a response to femicide and gender-based violence, illustrates autonomous organising. In its emergence, it operated independently of political parties and State institutions, relying on grassroots activism and broad-based support from civil society. ROSA's connection to the Socialist Party could be seen as potentially complicating its classification as an entirely autonomous under Htun &

Weldon's (2012) definition. However, it is essential to consider the nature and extent of this connection. Despite ideological alignment with the Socialist Party, ROSA maintains a distinct focus on feminist and social justice issues, operating independently through grassroots campaigns. Although there are organisational ties and overlapping memberships that suggest potential shared influences, ROSA predominantly acts independently, emphasising its identity in broader social struggles. Its campaigns on issues like reproductive rights and VAW, are often conducted with various grassroots and civil society groups, support its autonomy. Therefore, ROSA's operations generally align with the criteria of an autonomous SMO. Building on the insights of Htun & Weldon (2012) regarding the effectiveness of autonomous movements, it is crucial to explore how these dynamics manifest in specific national contexts. The survey of policy documents concerning VAW reveals the significant influence of both regional and international frameworks on national policies. It is necessary to review the policy relating to VAW in each State (Argentina and Ireland) in the context of regional and international instruments which have been created to combat VAW.

2.1 International Conventions on VAW

The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was drafted in 1979, opened for signatories by 1980 and ratified by many countries by 1981 and acts as the principle 'legal instrument' referenced when talking about combating discrimination against women. The primary objective of this Convention is to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women in the public and private sphere. CEDAW can be seen as both a product of and a response to the burgeoning global women's rights movement that gained momentum in the 1960s and 1970s. This period witnessed a surge in activism that advocated for gender equality and women's rights, significantly shaping international

agendas.   It is important to note that feminist movements were not merely supplementary to CEDAW but foundational in its creation. It is evident that feminist movements contributed to the formulation and effectiveness of CEDAW in shaping national policies (True 2003). A major gap in the original CEDAW was that it did not specify or see VAW as a priority. In a comparative study of State action on women's issues in seventy countries from 1975-2005, Htun & Weldon (2018:233-236) assert CEDAW ratification and the presence of strong feminist movements as key factors in creating progressive policy.

The 1970s saw increased international advocacy for women's rights, highlighted by the first World Conference on Women held in Mexico City in 1975, which was part of the UN Decade for Women (1975-1985). These conferences, which continued throughout the decade, were instrumental in raising global awareness about gender issues and were heavily influenced by women's movements. Women's movements pushed for more structured and legally binding frameworks to address systemic gender discrimination. This activism and advocacy provided the necessary political pressure that led to the drafting and eventual adoption of CEDAW. Feminists and women's rights activists contributed substantially to the content and direction of CEDAW. Their research, writings, and practical engagements highlighted critical areas of concern such as education, employment, and legal rights, which informed the specific provisions of the convention. Additionally, a network of advocacy that spanned across national boundaries, facilitated a collective push for an international treaty that would hold governments accountable to gender equality standards. The UN Decade of Women was created as a response to the burgeoning second-wave feminism, and it is evident that second-wave feminism influenced major UN women's conferences and initiatives, including the Decade of Women. (Pietilä 2007). This Decade was not merely a framework

for promoting global women's rights but was also significantly shaped by the ideas and pressures from these feminist movements. The UN Decade of Women facilitated the creation of transnational feminist networks, which were, in part, a response to second-wave feminist activism (Moghadam 2000). The UN Decade of Women from 1975 to 1985 was crucial in developing 'transnational feminism', a term popularised by Grewal & Kaplan (1994) and Alexander & Mohanty (1997). The neoliberal policies of the 1980s and 1990s had disastrous effects on the lives of women in the Global South and women in more precarious positions in the Global North. Foreign direct investment and free markets with little government regulation resulted in huge business for multinational corporations but social services and the gap between rich and poor in countries throughout the globe widened.

Year	Conference	Location
1975	First World Conference on Women	Mexico City
1980	Second World Conference on Women	Copenhagen
1985	Third World Conference on Women,	Nairobi
1995	Fourth World Conference on Women	Beijing

Table 1: United Nations World Conferences on Women

The ground-breaking project DAWN (Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era) was established in 1984 and produced the seminal piece 'Development, Crises and Alternative Visions: Third World Women's Perspectives' by Gita Sen and Caren Grown in 1987, gave a feminist critique of development, from women in the Global South. This piece highlighted the differing concerns of women from the Global South, coming from a postcolonial feminist perspective and gave voice to women in regions throughout Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Pacific.

This group set up to create economic opportunity and gender justice in countries in the Global South, linking women and the economic capitalist system. The focus at this time for

Argentina and many other Latin American countries was the amount of debt that they were facing which led to large scale unemployment. DAWN was established by a small group of around twenty-five women in 1983 in Bangalore who were interested women and development. This group included academics, Marxist-feminists, individuals from NGOs and women who were involved in the first two World Conferences on Women in Mexico (1975) and Copenhagen (1980). At the time, the branch of the women's movement who were discussing development and poverty was dominated by women from the Global North, primarily white, middle-class, college educated women coming from a liberal feminist perspective. Women from the Global South felt as though their specific concerns were not being discussed effectively and that the perspective of the women in the Global North was a liberal notion of gender equality, which was not compatible with the lives of women in the Global South. There needed to be a complete overhaul and discussion about what development means, depending on the country and the society, state capacity and cultural norms. DAWN's focus was not simply focused on women alone but related women's concerns and struggles to the debt crises and issues surrounding food production. This critique saw the global system as flawed, "What is the point of arguing for a larger share of a poisoned pie?"- Gita Sen (Tambe & Trotz 2010). Many of these kinds of questions resonated strongly with women from the Global South at the Third World Conference on Women in Nairobi in 1985. It is evident that women from the Global South saw the intersections of class, race and gender which were not being put to the fore by women in the Global North who were primarily concerned with gender alone.

In relation to violence, it would take up until the early 1990s for specific language related to VAW to be seen as a primary concern. As of 2020, many UN nation states have ratified CEDAW, countries that have not yet ratified include Iran, Palau, Somalia, Sudan, Tonga and

the United States (OHCHR 2019). There have been thirty-nine recommendations made to CEDAW since its creation. These recommendations are advisory and not legally binding, neither CEDAW, nor any UN treaty, speaks specifically about gender-based violence against women and former UN rapporteur Rashida Manjoo has argued the need for a legally binding UN treaty (McQuigg 2017:273-276). However, there are difficulties in creating a universal treaty on VAW given the different terminology used to describe this type of violence in various countries and the way in which it is measured (Sarkin 2018; Walby et al 2017).

Despite this, the recommendations are important, as they are an international acknowledgement of the violence perpetrated against women and have influenced conventions and policies at a regional level, which *are* legally binding. The two recommendations that relate most to VAW are General Recommendation No. 19 (GR19) in 1992 and General Recommendation No. 35 (GR35) in 2017. GR19 is particularly significant as it recognised gender-based violence as a specific type of violence that disproportionately affects women and connected this violence to other CEDAW articles. GR35 could be characterised as an update of GR19, with a particular focus on the responsibilities of the State in eliminating VAW (McQuigg 2017:268). This obligation of the State to actively construct policy and legislation to eliminate VAW is a vital part of these conventions and is one of the reasons why movements must keep pressure from below to ensure States are accountable to the public. It is important to note that these General Recommendations do not arise in a vacuum. They are responses to persistent advocacy and pressures from feminist movements, which not only influence but also are influenced by these international norms. This bidirectional influence facilitates an understanding of how international initiatives both respond to and provide new opportunities for feminist movements. Chinkin & Freeman (2012) highlighted how feminist advocacy shaped GR19 and GR35, and how these guidelines

subsequently influenced State policies. They illustrate the reciprocal relationship between international initiatives and grassroots movements, emphasizing the dynamic exchange that influences both policy development and the progression of global feminist activism. Friedman (2009) also highlights the mutual impact between GR19 and GR35 and regional advocacy movements in Latin America, showing how global norms and local actions continuously inform and transform each other.

In 1992, violence perpetrated against women was included within CEDAW as a form of discrimination and in 1993, the Declaration of Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW) defined the violence as physical, sexual or psychological violence perpetrated based on gender in both the private and public spheres. These shifts in the 1990s facilitated the emergence of a concern regarding VAW being promoted in international institutions and recognised as a human rights violation. Gender mainstreaming was formally featured in discussions at the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing Conference in 1995), which was considered a seminal moment in the advancement of women's rights (UN Women 2019). Twelve critical 'areas of concern' for women, one being 'violence against women' resulted from the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 (Beijing Platform for Action). This event attracted approximately 17,000 participants and 30,000 activists (UN Women 2019). This conference had an enormous effect on furthering gender equality around the world as practitioners and gender equality advocates, were able to associate with each other more easily and plans could be made to make new commitments. Due to ever changing global and economic shifts, this type of feminist mobilisation, from local to transnational level is vital (Cagna & Rao 2016). There are debates surrounding gender mainstreaming that argue whether there should be separate institutions fighting against different dimensions of

inequality, such as gender, class, and race, or if one institution should be responsible for addressing all types of inequality (Hobson et al 2015). There was some trepidation from Latin American women about attending international conferences as they were not familiar with the forums that would be used in these Western institutions (Alvarez et al 2003).

Year	Conference	Location
2000	Five-year review and appraisal of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action	New York
2005	Ten-year review and appraisal of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action	New York - 49th session of the Commission on the Status of Women
2010	Fifteen-year review and appraisal of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action	New York - 54th session of the Commission on the Status of Women
2015	Twenty-year review and appraisal of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action	New York - 59th session of the Commission on the Status of Women
2020	Twenty-Five-year review and appraisal of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action	New York - 64th session of the Commission on the Status of Women

Table 2: Follow-up to Beijing Conference – Beijing Platform for Action

The Fourth World Conference on Women resulted in the Beijing Platform for Action which has been reviewed in 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2020. Furthermore, comprehensive national reviews by governments and regional commissions on progress made and challenges that remain were encouraged.

International Goal Setting Agendas: Shifting focus to eradicating VAW as a global development goal.

From the 2000s onward, the focus from a Southern feminist perspective was crucial, since the 1990s was a time of neoliberal policies and neoconservatism. DAWN critiqued economic governance and the marketisation of governance in their platform volume on the theme of political restructuring and social transformation (PRST). Within the women's movement, a gap did begin to form, between those focusing on economic inequalities and poverty and

those fighting for sexual and reproductive rights. This can be seen in the focus of the women in the Global South and women in the Global North. There was also a shift in ideas about population control, initially the thought being, how the earth had a finite amount of resources. The introduction of rights-based approaches resulted in more individualistic rather than collectivistic sensibilities. Much of this is evidenced in the disastrous effects of climate change on both the environment and poorer societies who do not have the means to protect themselves during climate-related crises, such as natural disasters. Inspired by the World Conferences for Women and transnational groups pressure to have goals set out in the international community, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were established which set out eight goals to be completed from 2000-2015. The follow on from these are the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which were established and set out to be completed from 2015-2030. The MDGs and SDGs are not conferences but instead 'goal setting agendas' set out by the UN and used as a tool to form agreement among nations regarding certain development aims. Both have been criticized, particularly for the different indicators used, and on how they are compiled (ECLAC, 2006; ISCU, 2016:32).

The MDGs set out by the UN, starting in 2000 and targeted to be achieved by 2015, comprised of eight goals in total, Goal No. 3 Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women. There was only one main target within this goal, and it did not directly address violence against women. This target was 'to eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005, and in all levels of education by 2015.' Advances were made, as there was a significant increase in the number of girls in school in 2000 compared to 2015 in all levels of education. There was also a decrease in the number of women in vulnerable employment and a significant gain in parliamentary representation of women (UNDP 2019).

In 2006, a report by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the MDGs, specifically Gender Equality in Latin America and the Caribbean, many types of violence are noted including physical, psychological, sexual, and economic violence. Evidently, violence is experienced by women in every social stratum and is not, as some might assume, entirely dependent on income or education. Although there are slightly higher rates of violence perpetrated against women who are poorer and have no formal education, the rates of violence are high for both groups of women. For example, a woman may have a high income, but if the power relations in her intimate relationships are imbalanced and her partner controls the money, she cannot get to resources which may help her. These resources may include health services, and it is necessary to include access to these types of services to victims of all types of violence including sexual and psychological.

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set out by the UN, starting in 2016 with the aim of achieving these goals by 2030. According to the WHO (2017), approximately one in three women globally have experienced 'physical and sexual intimate partner violence or non-partner sexual violence in their lifetime' and approximately '38% of murders of women are committed by an intimate male partner.' The SDG No. 5 Gender Equality, Target 2 aims to: 'Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation' (Sustainable Development Goals 2019). Although it has been argued that the SDGs are building on the work of the MDGs, it is not entirely evident what progress was made in the MDGs in relation to VAW. The UN Statistical Commission set out to develop indicators to monitor the progress made. The measurement of violence and the gender dimensions are becoming increasingly more important; an appropriate measurement framework is necessary if the policy is to be

implemented effectively and in turn have an influence combating violence against women through a top-down approach.

2.2. Regional Conventions on VAW

Latin America

The main regional convention that facilitated the creation of laws and policies to protect women from violence in the Latin American region, was established in 1994, the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women *(Convention of Belém do Pará)*. This convention was constructed as the Vienna Declaration (1993) was adopted at the World Conference for Human Rights, which was pivotal in framing women's rights as human rights (Bunch & Reilly 2019). The *Convention of Belém do Pará* was developed by the Organisation of the American States (OAS) in partnership with feminist organising groups (Htun & Weldon 2012). The *Convention of Belém do Pará* contains 26 articles with Article 7 and 8 specifically addressing policy measures, however, the definition of VAW in this convention does not mention femicide or address the definition of gender. Despite this convention, the implementation of these laws and how they affect the lives of women in Latin America is being questioned, as the rates of violence against women is still prevalent. Argentina ratified the convention in 1996.

Europe

In Europe, the Council of Europe introduced the The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (*Istanbul Convention*) in 2011. Ireland ratified this convention in March 2019. One of the main

concerns of the *Istanbul Convention* apart from prevention, protection and prosecution is the idea of 'integrated policies' which asserts that no single agency can combat violence against women and that efforts must be made across government and State agencies. Since Ireland ratified the *Istanbul Convention* in March 2019, the *Istanbul Convention* is a legally binding document, Article 25 of the convention – 'Support for victims of sexual violence' states that 'parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to provide for the setting up of appropriate, easily accessible rape crisis or sexual violence referral centres for victims in sufficient numbers to provide for medical and forensic examination, trauma support and counselling for victims' (Council of Europe 2019).   It is clear that various conventions have drawn insights from one another, while also reflecting specific differences influenced by regional and cultural contexts.

The *Convention of Belém do Pará* contained 26 articles and Article 7 and 8 specifically address policy measures. The *Convention of Belém do Pará* defines "violence against women" as any act of violence that results in physical, sexual, or psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the public or private sphere. However, it's important to note that while the Convention was pioneering in addressing VAW, it does not specifically use the term "femicide" nor does it elaborate on the concept of gender as a social construct. The focus is more directly on the acts of violence and their impact on women. The Convention was adopted in 1994, a time when the specific term "femicide" and deeper discussions of gender as a social construct were less commonly included in international legal instruments compared to later documents like the *Istanbul Convention*. The development of these terms and their inclusion in legal frameworks evolved in later years as understanding and acknowledgment of these issues deepened globally.

The *Istanbul Convention* has 81 articles and could be considered more comprehensive than the *Convention of Belém do Pará*, but this may be due to resources and lessons learned from extensive research on VAW. In contrast to the *Convention of Belém do Pará*, and in line with a sociological understanding of gender, gender is referred to as a 'social construct'. The *Istanbul Convention* provides a definition of violence against women in Article 3, defining it as "a violation of human rights and a form of discrimination against women" and includes all acts of gender-based violence that result in, or are likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological, or economic harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life. This Convention is much more victim-centred than any other conventions and aims to put pressure on governments to assist and help to avoid discrimination against women which perpetuates gender-based violence. An important feature of these conventions are due diligence provisions. The concept of 'due diligence' which appears regularly in human rights law, is a legal principle that demands States act by enacting legislation and fulfilling the obligations agreed upon in conventions (Sarkin 2018).

> 'We ask for policies that will prevent murder: that reinforce education with the perspective of gender, the training of judicial and security forces, a speedier government response to reports. Increased penalization and prolonged sentences will not deter crimes against life. It is punitive demagoguery in response to social outrage' (Lopez 2020:42).

Although policy change plays a key role, it is necessary to ask whether policy change alone is enough to eliminate or dramatically reduce the incidence of VAW throughout the world. Gherardi (2016) argues that to combat femicide that structural changes must be made by the State to prevent these crimes and their due diligence provisions set out in international and regional conventions speak to this obligation. The purpose of the due diligence principle lies in the notion that the State plays a vital role in combatting VAW in the private and public

sphere. The State is obligated to enact legislation and promote policies which combat this violence at both an individual and structural level. This is of particular importance within the State institutions who have regular contact with victims of violence and whose actions or inaction can have dire consequences. These provisions and issues of State responsibility will be discussed further in relation to protest events in this study.

2.3 National Legislation & Policy on VAW

National Policy – Argentina (*See Appendix A – Key Policy Changes in Argentina*)

There are some notable pieces of legislation relating to VAW in Argentina. The first is *Ley de Protección Integral para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra las Mujeres en los Ámbitos en que Desarrollen sus Relaciones Interpersonales* (Comprehensive Law on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women in their Interpersonal Relations**)** Argentina Law No. 26.485, created in 2009, which committed to measures to assist victims who are experiencing domestic violence. Protective measures such as restraining orders, shelters, and support as well as the creation of specialised courts and prosecution units to respond to these types of crime. In Latin America, since 2007, over a dozen countries have introduced legal reforms regarding criminalising 'certain female homicides as femicide or feminicide.' (Toledo 2017:44). These countries include Costa Rica (2007), Guatemala (2008), Colombia (2008), Chile (2010), El Salvador (2010), Nicaragua (2011), Peru (2011), Argentina (2012), Mexico (2012), Panama (2013), Bolivia (2013), Ecuador (2014), Venezuela (2014) and Brazil (2015) (Toledo 2017:44). In the Argentinian context, this piece of legislation was a bill that amended the Criminal Code (Law No. 11.179) in Argentina, *Ley de Modificación del Código Penal en materia de femicidio* (Law for the Modification of the Penal Code concerning Femicide) to include femicide as an aggravated type of homicide in 2012. However, Toledo (2017:51) points out that the word 'femicide' is

not actually within the legal text, instead there are four out of twelve different provisions under which life imprisonment may be given if an individual kills: 'No. 1 - His ascendant, descendant, spouse, ex-spouse, or the person with whom you maintain or have maintained a relationship, whether cohabitation or not…', 'No. 4 - For pleasure, greed, racial, religious, gender hatred or sexual orientation, gender identity or its expression…', 'No. 11. A woman when the act is perpetrated by a man and involves gender violence' or 'No. 12. With the purpose of causing suffering to a person with whom you maintain or have maintained a relationship under the terms of subsection 1.' Femicide as it is understood through much of the sociological literature would be punished under No. 11 as it is phrased 'a woman when the act is perpetrated by a man and involves gender violence'. The naming of this as a particular type of gendered crime, involved a push to retrieve more data on the rate of femicide, create public policies, prevention strategies and raise awareness regarding this form of violence. This also included promoting more response from law enforcement and the justice system.

However, despite this law being put in place, cases of femicide continue and the perpetrators of these crimes continue to be shown impunity. In November 2018, ECLAC released a report on femicide in Argentina after pressure from SMOs such as Ni Una Menos. ECLAC (2018) state the need to: 'Generate inter-institutional agreements to strengthen the analysis of femicide at the regional and national levels' to achieve SDG No. 5, Target 2. In this piece they specifically point out the need to achieve this target of that goal, along with Goal No. 16 – Peace Justice and Strong Institutions, Target 1: Significantly reduce all forms of violence and the corresponding mortality rates throughout the world'. Throughout the literature, the importance of coalition building between State actors, civil society and feminist movements is highlighted (Fletcher & Star 2018; Cagna & Rao 2016; Silva 2015; Alvarez et al 2003).

Although there has been debate around the definition of the term femicide, it is necessary, as one of the main aims of establishing consensus on its meaning, is to have an accurate counting of femicides throughout the world that are comparable (Weil, Corradi & Naudi 2018:24). The definition and conceptualisation of femicide will be discussed further in Chapter Three in relation to sociological literature. If victims of this type of violence are not counted, then the perpetrators of this violence aren't counted, and if you do not count, then States do not have to take responsibility or be accountable. The State's inaction on this type of violence is damaging to women throughout the country and signals a lack of interest in keeping women safe. It has been left to NGOs and organisations such as *Casa del Encuentro* (the Meeting House) and the National Council of Women to keep a record of these crimes. More recently, the Observatory of Gender Violence '*Ahora Que Sí Nos Ven*' (Now That They See Us) was founded by Raquel Vivanco in 2015 inspired by Ni Una Menos and the initial march on 3 June 2015 which began the annual protests. The purpose of this Observatory is to make visible the sexist violence experienced by women, trans people, lesbians, and non-binary people by collecting data which is aimed at contributing to public policies regarding violence, and produce knowledge, information, and training regarding sexist violence.

National Policy –Ireland (*See Appendix B – Key Policy Changes in Ireland*)

There are a few main pieces of legislation related to VAW in Ireland that are of particular importance; the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990 which reformed the legal definition of rape and sexual assault making way for victims of sexual assault and violence to be protected under the law. In particular, the recognition that rape can occur within a marriage and that consent is not a given just because there is a marital relationship. This legislation extended the 'definition of rape, criminalising marital rape, replacing the category

of indecent assault with aggravated sexual assault and sexual assault, extending the protection of anonymity to complainants in all sexual offenses trials, asserting that lack of physical resistance did not constitute consent, acknowledging that men as well as women could be raped, and recognising that boys under the age of 14 were capable of committing rape' (Molloy 2018:694).   This was the beginning of recognising that the State needs to play a role in protecting victims of sexual violence and appropriately prosecuting those who committed these types of crimes (Molloy 2018).   Changes in this type of legislation were influenced by the Anti-Rape Movement in Ireland and creation of Rape Crisis Centres in the late 1970s, early 1980s.   The Domestic Violence Act 1996 was a crucial step in addressing domestic violence and the challenges that victims face, specifically regarding the need for safety, barring, and protection orders, which can facilitate women's ability to leave abusive relationships.

In 2002, the Sexual Abuse and Violence in Ireland (SAVI) Report was published, which was the first comprehensive investigation about sexual violence, regarding attitudes and experiences in Ireland. Ireland signed the *Istanbul Convention* in 2015 and created an action plan to enable Ireland to ratify the Convention in 2019, this was a core feature of the National Action Plan (NAP) known as The Second National Strategy on Domestic, Sexual and Gender-based Violence (2016-2021). To ratify the convention several legislative actions were required including the creation of the Criminal Justice (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 and the Domestic Violence Act (2018).   The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 is particularly important in relation to sexual violence in Ireland which included some key reforms such as the clarification of what is meant by consent, challenging misconceptions about its definition. The Domestic Violence Act 2018 was an important development on the

previous Act reconfiguring who can apply for protection orders, the court process, and the introduction of coercive control as an offence under Irish law.

In conclusion, this Chapter outlined the international, regional, and national policy related to VAW in Argentina and Ireland. It is evident that the different perspectives which have shaped policy related to VAW at an international and regional level have primarily come from a liberal feminist perspective in the Global North and have a rights-based individualistic approach. Whereas the postcolonial perspective coming from the Global South is infused with a much more collectivistic approach and promotes the necessity of an intersectional view, which recognises that focusing on gender alone is not sufficient in achieving change. An important feature of these policies is the creation of 'due diligence' provisions through regional conventions which oblige States to act in order to combat VAW in each country through many different means, which include legislative processes. This is particularly important in this research as it demonstrates how despite State commitments, women's and feminist movements play a vital role in pushing State action. The impacts of SMO mobilisations in relation to the two protest events which are the focus of this study will be discussed in Chapter Nine, after the political process approach has been applied. The features of this approach will be discussed in Chapter Four and the application of this approach will be defined in the methodology chapter, Chapter Five.

Chapter 3: Violence Against Women (VAW)

Sociological feminist research has highlighted the different forms of violence women experience, how this violence ranges in both frequency and severity, and how it is experienced at both an individual and societal level. Violence can come in many different forms. It can include; social, economic, physical, sexual, psychological, coercive control, forced marriage, marital rape, denial of education, denial of healthcare, denial of reproductive rights, the right of the means of a livelihood, female genital mutilation (FGM), honour killing, infanticide, and femicide. This research is concerned with the way in which two feminist SMOs mobilised in response to VAW.

3.1 Social Processes and Women's Experiences

Various social processes impact women's daily lives and experiences. Kelly's (1987) concept of the 'continuum of violence' recognises that the different forms of violence perpetrated against women share a common character. This common character is rooted in male domination over women and feminised bodies. These many forms of violence mentioned above share a common character, which is rooted in male domination over women and other feminised bodies. Kelly's (1987) concept of a 'continuum of violence' posited that women's experience of sexual violence could not be limited to just legally defined offences and that women experience many different forms of violence throughout their lives. It is evident that the different forms of violence can be placed on this continuum as they are often connected and overlapping, particularly within intimate-partner relationships. Early work theorized violence perpetrated against women as 'rare, committed by deviant men and/or in dysfunctional families' (Kelly 2012). The continuum of violence has been used and reconceptualised multiple times to apply to a variety of distinct types of violence ranging from individual to structural levels of violence. The continuum also allows for linking the violence of everyday life to structural violence of economic systems (Cockburn 2004) and

now also benefits from the inclusion of an intersectional analysis (Kelly 2012). Inspired by this work, Boyle (2019:21) reconceptualised Kelly's continuum of violence to be plural and argues for 'continuum thinking', positing that its value 'is to see connections not equivalences, and so to insist on the importance of distinctions.' The seminal work of Dobash & Dobash (1979) argued that the physical violence perpetrated against women by men is based in 'patriarchal domination'. Although gender may not be the only lens through which to view VAW, it is fundamental to view gender as the principal component, although Dobash & Dobash (1979) were initially talking about incidences of 'wife battering' in their study regarding physical violence.

Carcedo (2011:27) explains that when using the term 'domestic violence', 'in reality a form of violence is not being identified, but an area where violence is exercised', i.e., different forms of violence within the home, which can include violence perpetrated against women, children, and can also include the elderly, people with disabilities or people who are unwell, physically, or mentally. The abusive practice of coercive control has more recently started to be discussed in relation to domestic violence (Stark 2009; Monckton Smith 2020). A study by Eriksson & Ulmestig (2021) involved in-depth interviewing of nineteen women experiencing domestic violence and linking this abuse to other types of abuse in their lives. The 'experiences of financial abuse continue across time, from their past into their present situation and molding beliefs about the future' (Eriksson & Ulmestig 2021:626). This again showing how the continuum is a useful concept in understanding violence within relationships over time.

Sexual violence can refer to any non-consensual or unwanted sexual contact. Studies relating to sexual violence have been discussed in the literature ranging from sexual harassment, sexual assault, and rape to a more contemporary form of sexual violence known as IBSA (image-based sexual abuse) (MacKinnon 1979; McGlynn et al 2017; Henry, Flynn & Powell 2019). It is evident that there are varying definitions of sexual consent but broadly speaking, 'there is general consensus that sexual consent represents some form of agreement to engage in sexual activity' (Beres 2007:97). However, it is evident that 'operational definitions of sexual consent vary regarding whether they refer to an internal willingness to engage in sexual behavior, the external communication of this willingness, or the interpretation of such communication made by one's sexual partner(s) (Beres 2007; Muehlenhard et al 2016)' (Glace et al 2021:2425). There are also legal definitions of consent versus individual understandings of consent which may be at odds with one another (Beres 2014). It has been argued that sexual consent should be defined as an ongoing process, consent can be withdrawn at any point within an encounter and individuals should have the autonomy to do so, rather than relying on the idea that as long as you have heard 'yes' at some point, that means consent has been given (Beres 2014; Jozkowski, 2015; Muehlenhard et al 2016; Glace et al 2021).

One of the crucial issues that has been attached to consent, is the idea that sexual violence occurs because of 'miscommunication'. Glace et al (2021:2425) discuss how miscommunication theory posited by Tannen (1990) has been influential in approaches to sexual consent in research and policy. This model relies on the notion that 'sexual violence occurs due to gender differences in consent communication (Kitzinger & Frith, 1999; O'Byrne et al., 2006).' However, it has been argued that 'miscommunication' does not

necessarily result in sexual violence as individuals often do not apply the idea of consent to their own sexual behaviour as they associate the idea of consent with sexual violence (Glace et al 2021; Beres 2014). Glace et al (2021:2425-2426) argue that Warren's study (2015) 'suggest that it is not misunderstanding consent which leads to violence, but rather that believing that nonconsensual sex is acceptable that is associated with sexual aggression. This complication reveals a further problem with the miscommunication model. Research indicates that even those who profess to misunderstand consent communications are capable of understanding social refusals in other contexts (O'Byrne et al., 2006, 2008).'

These claims of miscommunication are often utilised by those who may be accused of sexual assault or violence and are an important focus in this research given the nature of the protest event in Ireland which highlighted issues of consent and victim-blaming. In the Irish context, despite the progression in legislation regarding sexual violence, there are still many hurdles faced by victims of violence in relation to access to justice. It is evident that in the Irish context there are a few core issues related to the justice system including waiting times for court dates, the length of trials and low conviction rates (Molloy 2018; Hanly, Healy & Scriver 2009). Reporting incidences of sexual violence can also prove to be difficult for victims given their own fears of the court process and of being identified publicly (Henry et al 2020; Hlavka 2014).

The continuum can be used to include newer forms of violence that have emerged in recent years, particularly image-based sexual abuse (IBSA). Musso (2019:160) argues, 'what differentiates online VAW from classical forms of violence is the reproducibility, ubiquity

and uncontrollability of its dissemination.' IBSA is often referred to as 'revenge porn'. This involves the non-consensual distribution or sharing of intimate images without a person's consent. The term 'revenge porn' is very problematic as it implies blame on the part of the victim, as though they are being punished for something. This term reflects the way women are often shamed. It is evident that if a person takes a nude picture and/or video and sends it to someone, they can be shamed for it, especially in cases when the recipient feels "wronged", perhaps after a breakup or being rejected. This language is typical in victim-blaming, pointing blame to the victim of the crime rather than the perpetrator, the person who shared the image/video without the person's consent. McGlynn, Rackley & Houghton (2017:28) also include 'sexualised photoshopping', sexual extortion (often labelled as 'sextortion'), 'upskirting', voyeurism and many other similar forms of sexualised abuse' under the acronym IBSA. These relatively 'new', or newly named, forms of violence are mirrored within traditional forms of violence in the form of coercive control. For example, Harris & Woodlock (2019) find that individuals may threaten current or former partners with releasing nude photos or videos, to shame and control them.

The distinct types of violence that have been discussed, particularly in relation to intimate partner violence (IPV), are often the precursor to the most extreme form of violence, murder. This type of 'female homicide' is often referred to as 'femicide' which was possibly first coined by Diana Russell in March 1976 at the First International Tribunal on Crimes against Women in Brussels. The concept of 'femicide' was established later through the work of Radford and Russell (1992) who argue that femicide is at 'the extreme end of a continuum of antifemale terror that includes a wide variety of verbal and physical abuse', and 'whenever these forms of terrorism result in death, they become femicides' (Radford & Russell 1992:15). Further work by Stout (1992) examined factors within ecological settings relating

to femicides committed by intimate partners, focusing on the associations between the individual and State environment. The naming of this concept and identifying the environments in which it happens, was necessary to differentiate the way in which women and men experience violence. The definition of 'femicide' has grown and altered over time, and often the reasoning for this is to explain diverse types of murder that are specifically aimed at women. For example, the wording has changed slightly from the original definition, e.g., replacing 'females' with 'women', three common elements in the definition are; the killing of a girl/woman, by a boy/man, and the reasoning for the murder based in sexist/misogynistic hatred (Russell & Harmes 2001). There has been debate about which term should be used and how it should be used internationally. Russell (2012), who originally coined the term 'femicide' in 1976, has redefined it a few times, such as 'the misogynist killing of women by men' (1992), 'the killing of females by males because they are female' (2001:3), with the final definition being 'femicide as the killing of one or more females by one or more males because they are female' (2012).

Weil (2018:1) employs a definition that is widely used, 'femicide is the intentional killing of women and girls because of their gender'. However, there is a growing consensus that an intersectional approach to femicide would suggest that gender or gender identity is not the only factor that results in women being killed (Sosa 2017). While assessing intimate-partner violence it is necessary to adopt an intersectional approach. In a systematic review of risk factors for IPV, it was found that women from lower socio-economic and minority diverse backgrounds are more likely to be victims of IPV (Capaldi, Knoble, Shortt & Kim 2012).

Although the term femicide was initially conceptualised in a Western context, the conceptualisations from Latin America allow for a more nuanced understanding of this

particular form of violence. The concept of 'femicide' has not just literal explanations but theoretical ones, which is evidenced in the work on '*feminicidio*'. One of the leading Latin American scholars on '*feminicidio*' is Lagarde (2004:2006:2010) who has written extensively on the murders of women in Ciudad Juárez in Mexico. Lagarde (2004) initially translated the English word femicide into Spanish to become '*feminicidio*' and then in (2006) redefined the term building on Russell's (2001) definition 'the killing of females because they are female.' '*Femicidio*' is the Spanish translation of the English word 'femicide' meaning the murder of a woman because of her gender, whereas '*feminicidio*' signals 'the role of the State in enabling these crimes and impunity with which they are treated' (Neumann 2020:1).

Femicide/*femicidio* is often defined as a singular act whereas *feminicidio*/feminicide is a range of acts, which in a Latin American context, refers to the impunity shown to murderers of women or the omission of the State in relation to VAW. It is evident that in many societies patriarchal structures are present, but it has been suggested that the presence of a particular form of '*machismo*' within the Latin American context may contribute to the high rate of femicide within this region (Wilson 2014). Among the 25 countries with the highest rates of femicide in the world, there are 14 Latin American countries including Argentina (UN Women 2019). The conceptualisation of '*feminicidio*' is linked to the idea that this killing of women is related to structures within a patriarchal society that are based on privileging the male gender and that the violence is rooted in misogyny, ownership, and entitlement (Fregoso & Bejarano 2010). It is apparent that States have signed up to international and regional agreements regarding VAW and their failure to act on their obligations (i.e., due diligence provisions discussed in Chapter Two) makes them in some ways complicit in the femicides that occur (Sarmiento et al 2014). There has been much

debate around the terms 'femicide' (as in homicide) and 'feminicide' a term used in Argentina (see below) to denote not only gender-based killings but the complicity of the State in these acts, by commission and omission. Rashida Manjoo, former UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women had suggested adopting the term 'feminicide' to assess state accountability in relation to Violence Against Women. However, Russell has argued against this perspective because 'it's vitally important to stick with only one term, namely femicide, regardless of the primary language spoken in the country that adopts it' (2012:3). The issue of language arises because '*feminicidio*' emerged in Spanish and then was translated into English. Russell argued that this was not a user-friendly term (2012:2) but others such as Fregoso & Bejarano (2010:5) have argued that the translation of *feminicidio* to feminicide aims to "reverse the hierarchies of knowledge and challenge claims about unidirectional (North-to-South) flows of travelling theory". Be that as it may we should bear in mind the political intent of the term '*feminicidio*' as against the original 'femicide' as homicide committed against women.

Femicide is the final form of violence that a woman who experiences violence encounters, as there is often a lead up to the eventual murder. Current or former intimate partners are regularly the perpetrator of this crime and have previously committed other forms of violence against the woman, whether physical, sexual and/or psychological. Dobash & Dobash's (2015) research on femicide supported the notion that instances of femicide are not merely outcomes of snap decisions. Their research outlined how often there was a history of violence or disagreement between the perpetrator and victim, especially in intimate partner relationships. In fact, the perpetrator of the crime had usually a history of violence towards women specifically. This again points to the necessity of the concept of a 'continuum of

violence' where acts of violence can begin at one end of the spectrum and increase in severity. Since murder is at the end of this violence continuum, it is evident that policies to combat this violence and 'the logic of punishment is perpetuated, pushing aside strategic programs that would decrease patriarchal violence' (Lopez 2020:33). It has been argued that "selective infanticide and foeticide are the only types of lethal violence that literally respond to the original definition of femicide: the intentional killing of females exclusively because they are or will grow to be women" (Corradi and Bandelli 2019:140). It is necessary to be clear in the conceptualisation of 'femicide', either adopting 'the term femicide as shorthand for homicide of women, regardless of the motives of the perpetrator' or 'adopt the term only when female victims are killed because they are (born) female and not male— in other words, when the victim's sex is the sole motive to kill' (Bandelli & Corradi 2021:14).

In this thesis I will use the acronym VAW. Although perpetrators of violence against women can include women, in these instances I am primarily referring to the majority of recorded perpetrators of VAW, which are men. Gender-based violence (GBV) is often used to describe the type of violence that is experienced by women, but it is important to note that people of all gender identities experience GBV. However, the majority of GBV is perpetrated by cis-gendered men against women (WHO 2021; Dobash & Dobash 2017). Although my thesis would take the view that transwomen are women and should be afforded the privileges that the identity of 'woman' allows, it is necessary to distinguish the types of violence that are experienced by cis-gendered women and trans and nonbinary people. While cisgendered women may experience violence primarily rooted in misogyny, such as domestic violence, sexual assault, and workplace harassment, trans and nonbinary individuals face additional layers of violence stemming from transphobia and gender nonconformity (Serano

2007; Namaste 2000). Transphobic violence includes physical assaults, verbal harassment, and hate crimes specifically targeting their gender identity. For example, a transwoman may be attacked simply for presenting herself as a woman, or a nonbinary person may be harassed for not conforming to traditional gender norms (Bettcher 2007). Trans and nonbinary individuals frequently encounter discrimination in healthcare settings, where they may be denied necessary medical care, including gender-affirming treatments. This can result in significant physical and mental health consequences (Poteat, German & Kerrigan 2013). They also often face heightened risks of violence in public spaces, including bathrooms, public transportation, and social settings. They may be subjected to scrutiny, harassment, and physical assault simply for existing in these spaces (Doan 2010). Beyond personal interactions, trans and nonbinary individuals often experience institutional violence, such as discriminatory policies and practices in employment, education, and legal systems. This systemic violence can lead to economic instability, limited access to education, and challenges in securing legal recognition of their gender identity (Spade 2011).

The term femicide only being used to talk specifically about the gender of an individual may leave trans and non-binary female-presenting people out of the discussion. This could leave already vulnerable groups without prevention strategies to help them. It has been argued that using the terms 'transfemicide' and 'transvesticide' are appropriate to identify and record the crimes committed against these groups, considering trans women and *travestis* as distinct groups, addresses the particular type of violence that they experience (Radi & Sardá-Chandiramani 2016). In an Argentinian context, the term 'travesti' refers to a specific group, separate from those that would identify as 'transgender'. Sosa (2020:266) explains that 'unlike the English 'transgender,' 'travesti' articulates aspects of race, class, ability, and other

forms of difference'. Dobash & Dobash (2017:131) argue that 'unless the murders of women are examined separately from the murders of men, that is, disaggregated by gender, little can be known about this type of murder which is otherwise lost within the larger number of male-male homicides.' This may also facilitate identifying the incidence of specific forms of violence perpetrated outside the dominant norm of cisgender male perpetrating violence against cisgender women. Lopez (2020:22) asserts that 'womanhood is not a biological trait but a site of political articulation: a name given to a multitude of existences that go beyond the traditional construction of the gender called woman.' Men can experience GBV, but it is evident that much of the literature in place has been constructed with primarily cisgendered women in mind and therefore cannot simply 'add men to existing models - built on women's experiences of victimisation and survival - and stir' (Boyle 2019:33). I am using the word 'woman' to refer to VAW as it aligns with the measures and literature which I am referring to throughout my research. However, I use it with the understanding that the category 'woman' can be self-ascribed by an individual and recognised in society in different ways.

3.2 Processes of Social Movements and Linguistic Framing

In the landscape of contemporary social movements, linguistic framing plays a pivotal role in shaping public perception and driving policy change. Feminist SMOs, in particular, employ specific terminology to articulate the depth and nuance of issues such as VAW and reproductive rights. SMOs such as Ni Una Menos and the MeToo Movement strategically use language to define their causes, galvanise support, and advocate for systemic change. By examining these through the lens of linguistic framing, we gain insights into the processes by which SMOs not only communicate but also transform social and political landscapes.

For the purposes of this study, it is necessary to select the word *femicidio* (femicide) to mean the killing of a woman because she is a woman since that is the way in which Ni Una Menos and their adherents use it. It is particularly important as the femicides of women was the impetus for these mobilisations. The term femicide has been applied in a variety of different environments; adopted by international institutions, within legislation in different national contexts, and in activist spaces (Bandelli & Corradi 2021). For this research, the term femicide has been utilised by Ni Una Menos and in their framing of VAW. Therefore, the conceptualisations of femicide as used by this SMO are important to interrogate within this analysis. As established, VAW is a human rights issue, not merely a public safety issue, which can be mediated by higher police presence, or punitive measures dealt to murderers. The policies that are enacted are often too late, after the woman has been killed. Therefore, the policies that are brought in must be focused on preventing this violence happening in the first place, not merely carceral responses, e.g., what will be done to the perpetrator after the victim has been killed.

This issue of sexual harassment in the workplace and issues of consent was highlighted in contemporary literature in relation to the MeToo Movement and the nature of the boss/employee relationship was discussed. Where men are often in positions of power and the environment created is more susceptible to violence and harassment perpetrated against women. An important feature of addressing the issue of sexual violence is an understanding of the concept of consent. Through the proliferation of the 'metoo' hashtag and emergence of the MeToo Movement in 2017 there has been a heightened attention on issues of consent and what consent means. The focus of this research in the Irish context is the *I Believe Her* protests in 2018 which were one of the most highly publicised cases of sexual violence in recent Irish history. An interesting aspect of this case is the attention that it received. One of

the last cases which had a similar amount of attention in the Irish context was in 2013, an early case of IBSA which was known online as 'Slane girl'. This was a case where sexually explicit images of teenage girl were shared widely online, the discourse surrounding the publication of this image on Twitter was interrogated by Gannon (2022:8) and although there was evidence of sympathy, it was 'concluded that the majority of tweets displayed a lack of empathy for the woman as well as a lack of understanding of the SV in the case.' It is evident that since this time there has been a shift in the discussion of sexual violence, consent, and victim-blaming, particularly with the emergence of the MeToo Movement in 2017. Although the circumstances of the Belfast Trial and the *I Believe Her* protests are different from the 'Slane girl' case, the discourse surrounding sexual violence and victim-blaming has been altered by new actors in the political and social discourse.

Reproductive rights, including the right to access safe and legal abortion, are fundamental to women's autonomy and equality. This activism is closely linked to the broader struggle against VAW as both issues stem from patriarchal control over women's bodies. By advocating for access to contraception, safe abortion, and comprehensive reproductive healthcare, SMOs aim to empower women to make informed choices about their own bodies and lives. To understand the significance of reproductive rights activism, it is important to situate it within a feminist theoretical framework. Feminist theory posits that patriarchal societies exert control over women's bodies as a means of maintaining power and dominance. This control manifests in various ways, including VAW and the denial or restriction of reproductive rights. Weldon & Htun (2012) distinguish between these areas of feminist activism based on the nature of the issues themselves. VAW is often seen as a more universally identifiable violation of women's rights, which is publicly condemnable across various cultural and national contexts. In contrast, reproductive rights involve more complex

and divisive issues, such as contraception and abortion, which can be highly contentious and are deeply entwined with cultural, religious, and moral values.

The intersection of VAW and reproductive rights is evident in the ways that both issues reflect and reinforce patriarchal control. For instance, denying women the right to access safe abortions can be seen as a form of violence, as it forces them to carry unwanted pregnancies, often with severe physical, emotional, and socioeconomic consequences. Additionally, VAW can include reproductive coercion, where perpetrators manipulate contraceptive use or pregnancy outcomes as a means of exerting control. Both VAW and the restriction of reproductive rights are rooted in the same systemic inequalities, and efforts to combat one must include strategies to address the other. In Argentina, Ni Una Menos, which began as a campaign against femicide in 2015, quickly expanded its agenda to include reproductive rights, notably the legalisation of abortion. This SMO exemplifies how VAW activism can evolve to incorporate broader feminist goals, leveraging public support and momentum from one issue to propel another. Weldon & Htun's (2012) framework would suggest that this intersection is facilitated by a shared narrative of women's rights and bodily autonomy, which resonates widely with the public and policymakers. In Ireland, the activism of the revitalised Reproductive Rights Movement in 2010s, of which ROSA were a part, we saw intersections with anti-VAW efforts. Many activists framed reproductive rights as a continuation of the struggle against the historical oppression of women, including State-sanctioned practices like the Magdalene Laundries and restrictive laws against divorce and contraception. Both VAW and reproductive rights activism share a core aim of advancing women's rights and gender equality, often focusing on autonomy and bodily integrity to unify and strengthen collaboration within the feminist movement. The strategic use of language by feminist SMOs

underscores the power of words in the fight for gender equality and women's rights. As demonstrated by the activism of Ni Una Menos and the MeToo Movement, effective linguistic framing transcends mere rhetoric; it is a foundational strategy that informs public discourse and can compel legislative action.

3.3 Statistical, Conceptual, and Analytical Approaches

The statistical approaches used to assess the prevalence of VAW, through international and regional surveys highlights the differences in measurement tools and the impact these have on the data collected. The reporting on the prevalence of violence is relatively new as evidenced in Chapter Two. Despite CEDAW being created in 1979, naming violence as a primary concern did not start to emerge until the early 1990s, when it began to be established that VAW is a multi-layered human rights issue created by many different forms of violence. The collection of data has only become a priority after the creation of regional conventions such as the *Convention of Belem do Para* (1994), the *Istanbul Convention* (2011) as well goal setting agendas such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (2015).   There is not enough older data to compare it to.   However, the study, reporting, and analysis of this particular type of violence has increased dramatically in the past twenty years. The literature on this topic, which discusses and assesses the causes, solutions, and prevalence of violence, has increased dramatically within academia, but also from regional (EU/ECLAC) and international institutions (WHO and UN agencies, e.g., UN Women, UNODC, etc.) where a focus on these issues and reporting on them has grown. Empirical studies have been conducted, primarily through surveys at an international and regional level to assess the prevalence of violence perpetrated against women.   The WHO, reporting in 2017, found that approximately one in three women globally have experienced 'physical and sexual intimate

partner violence (IPV) or non-partner sexual violence (NPSV) in their lifetime' and approximately '38% of murders of women are committed by an intimate male partner.'

The International Violence Against Women (2015) study found that in Argentina, 26.9% of women aged 18-69 years experienced intimate partner physical and/or sexual violence at least once in their lifetime since age 16, 2.7% had experienced intimate partner physical and/or sexual violence in the last 12 months and 12.1% had experienced sexual violence perpetrated by someone other than an intimate partner at least once in their lifetime since age 16. In a study conducted by European Agency for Fundamental Rights (2014) it was recorded that in Ireland, 15% of ever-partnered women aged 18-74 years experienced intimate partner physical and/or sexual violence at least once in their lifetime, 3% of ever-partnered women aged 18–74 years experienced intimate partner physical and/or sexual violence in the last 12 months and 5% of women aged 18–74 years experienced sexual violence perpetrated by someone other than an intimate partner at least once in their lifetime. In 2013, the WHO added that the incidence of VAW was not just a violation of human rights but also a pervasive public health issue (WHO 2013).

There are two important critiques that emerge from the literature in relation to reliance on international and regional surveys to understand the prevalence and various forms of violence perpetrated against women; the measurement tools used to assess gender and violence, and the naming of the type of violence experienced. Firstly, the differences in measurement tools used to assess violence, and differences in definitions of gender and conceptualisations of violence, can hinder the ability to compare data cross-nationally and internationally. There is also evidence of a lack of consistency in data collection methods (Corbetta 2003). Walby et

al (2017) argue that appropriate measurement frameworks need to be available if progress is to be made in assessing the scale and type of violence that is occurring. International goal setting agendas such as the SDGs and the target to eliminate violence against women being set under the heading of 'gender equality' might 'run the risk of stretching the definition of violence so far that nothing is not violence' (Walby et al 2017:35). The lack of co-operation between different institutional bodies and departments can have damaging effects and slow the process down in eradicating violence against women. The bureaucracy and inability of distinct groups working together, even at an admin level, can make progress very challenging. These methodological challenges can result in 'a single push can be given the same statistical weight as repeated threats to kill' (Boyle 2019:22).

Secondly, the prevalence of violence may not be accurate given that many women choose not to disclose and therefore the rates could potentially be much higher. Statistical analyses of surveys related to VAW suffer from significant identification issues since many women may name their experiences differently in relation to VAW and might not align with legal definitions of violence, e.g., not describing their experience as 'rape' but instead 'pressurised sex' or 'coercive sex' or sometimes not even recognizing the violence they experience as a crime (Kelly 2012; DeKeseredy et al. 2019). The statistical findings on the prevalence rates of VAW from different studies links to the ongoing conceptual debates about what constitutes violence. The varying definitions of intimate partner violence (IPV) or sexual violence across different jurisdictions can influence statistical outcomes and perceptions of the severity and scope of the issue.

A nuanced understanding of the experiences of women who are victims of violence requires an intersectional approach. It must be recognised that the many ways in which women are subjected to violence is not based solely on their gender identity but also includes their race, ethnicity, social class, sexuality etc. For example, it is evident that there are cases where a woman's decision not to disclose abuse or IPV to authorities can be influenced by whether they are a woman of colour, and/or coming from marginalised or migrant communities (Decker et al 2019; Lombardi 2017). The violence highlighted in these surveys is primarily physical and sexual violence, and they often do not adequately address other types of violence that women experience. Specifically, they often did not address psychological violence, which ranges from emotional and financial abuse to coercive control (Bott et al 2012; WHO 2013; ECLAC 2014; FRA (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights) 2014). Neither have they been adequately vocal about a particular type of violence that is becoming a lot more prevalent utilising digital technology, that is image-based sexual abuse (IBSA).

It is evident that VAW is defined differently across studies and legal frameworks, and these definitions influence both the understanding of and the reported prevalence of violence. This can have influence on how international agreements and national laws recognize and address different forms of violence, and how these legal frameworks align or clash with the empirical data presented. The critique of existing methodologies, such as the different definitions of violence and the lack of consistent data collection methods, highlights analytical perspectives on the issue. These statistics are gathered and have implications about the underlying societal and legal structures. There are clear limitations of current methodologies in capturing the full spectrum of violence against women. For example, the reliance on self-reported data might

underrepresent the true prevalence of violence due to societal stigma or fear of retribution. It is evident that there is a vital need for an integrated approach that respects statistical evidence while critically assessing and pushing for more nuanced conceptualisations and robust analytical frameworks in relation to VAW.

Chapter 4: Social Movement Theory

This research is concerned with the way in which two feminist SMOs mobilise in response to VAW. The literature on social movements provides concepts and theories which assist in understanding how movements mobilise and how they have been analysed and understood in the past. The earlier models of 'collective behaviour' and 'relative deprivation' assist in explaining collective action based on shared grievances. Following on from this an understanding of the necessity of resources and organisational practices through resource mobilisation theory (RMT) was developed, as well as an understanding of the ways in which identity and culture can inform movement activity, through new social movement (NSM) theory. Another important development was the inclusion of the political context in shaping movement activity through political process theory (PPT). The development of these theories and concepts as well as their critiques will be discussed in this Chapter, which goes on to justify and clarify the selection of political process theory (PPT) for application in this research.

Social Movement Theories: Collective Behaviour, Relative Deprivation, New Social Movement Theory and Resource Mobilisation Theory

In the late 19th century, LeBon (1895) argued that people act irrationally and emotionally due to the influence of crowds, in what became known as contagion theory. However, in the mid-20th century (late 1950s and 60s), other scholars began to consider that crowds were more 'rational' than they once thought. In the literature in the 1960s regarding collective action, what would eventually become social movement studies focused on models such as 'collective behaviour' and 'relative deprivation'. Turner & Killian's (1957) emergent norm theory of collective behaviour argued that when people start interacting with each other in a crowd, norms begin to emerge, and there is rationality involved in this process. The 'collective behaviour' model focused primarily on how individuals act emotionally based on

a shared grievance. Whereas the 'relative deprivation' model primarily focused more on how deprived a person is, in relation to others, the more likely they are to join a movement. Another popular theory regarding collective behaviour was Smelser's (1962) value-added theory, also known as the structural-strain theory, which argued that for collective behaviour to occur, there must be certain conditions in place, i.e., structural strain, generalised beliefs, precipitating factors, and some lack of social control.

The collective behaviour and relative deprivation models proved to be insufficient in explaining the strategic and organisational processes at play within social movements (McAdam 1999). In the late 1960s, NSM theory argued how the focus and strategies of certain movements have formed around social and cultural issues since the 1960s/1970s, including women's movements, feminist movements, environmental movements, and anti-war/peace movements. A critique of NSM theory would argue that there is nothing especially 'new' about these movements, particularly as feminist or women's movements have strong historical roots (Kriesi et al 1995; Pichardo 1997; Bernstein 2009). However, the 'new social movements theory's emphasis on the importance of cultural change' and focus on identity, particularly by understanding 'identity as a tool for mobilisation, as a goal and as a strategy' contributes to a deeper understanding of social movement activity (Bernstein 2009:265-268).

A key theory which has had an enormous influence on social movement studies, and whose theorists attempted to resolve some of the weaknesses of theories of collective behaviour, is RMT. McCarthy & Zald (1977) argued that the success of a movement is determined on the resources it has; material, human, social-organisational, cultural, and moral. RMT highlighted that there were strategic choices being made regarding tactics, interactions with

the media, people in power and more formal decision-making practices within social movements. Collective action was framed by McCarthy and Zald (1977) as a process whereby 'rational actors' form strategies for mobilisations rather than responding to shared grievances. 'The vindication of protest strategies as politics by the emerging "resource mobilization" school led to a shift in the research focus from why movements emerge to how' (Meyer 2004:127). Different resources available to a movement can often influence protest cycles and the ability of the movement to survive (McCarthy & Zald 1977). These resources can include people, solidarity, legitimacy, and support (Goodwin & Jasper 2009). Authorities can play a role in limiting mobilisation as they can infringe on the ability of social movement actors to mobilise, which can reduce engagement with the movement. Therefore, this also reduces the ability of the movement to attract a larger audience or potential new activists, e.g., bystanders at protest events (McCarthy & Zald 1977). Some critics would argue that this theory overemphasises the need for resources, particularly financial resources, as some movements do well without the support of mainstream media and large financial backing (Goodwin & Jasper 2009). Additionally, there is an overemphasis on cases in the North American context and applying the RMT approach can sometimes result in treating those cases like companies rather than social movements.

4.1 Political Process Theory (PPT)

The ability of a movement to influence change is context-dependent and therefore the political context in which the movement acts, is important for analysis. This is known as political process theory (PPT) and this perspective has roots in RMT. The critique of RMT arises from its over-reliance on the analysis of resources and its lack of focus on the political context under which mobilisation occurs (McAdam 1983). The 'primary point of the political process approach was that activists do not choose goals, strategies, and tactics in a

vacuum. Rather, the political context, conceptualized broadly, sets the grievances around which activists mobilize, advantaging some claims and disadvantaging others' (Meyer 2004:128). McAdam's (1982) use of the political opportunity perspective in relation to the Civil Rights Movement in the United States over a 40-year period recognised that the RMT approach alone did not effectively demonstrate the necessity of external circumstances which allow for mobilisation. These circumstances related to changes in the political and socio-economic context such as the collapse of the cotton industry, and the racial segregation in schools being recognised as unconstitutional. This heightened the attention on the movement, and the endorsement of integration resulted in a sense of 'cognitive liberation' that encouraged action. McAdam (1982) argues that this 'cognitive liberation' is a process whereby marginalised groups have a shared grievance and understanding which influences collective action and mobilisation. Costain (1992), drawing on the work of McAdam (1982), researched the Women's Movement in the US and recorded how changes in women's participation in the economy and workforce assisted in successful mobilisations which coincided with a relatively new openness of the institutionalised government. This study also highlighted the way in which mobilisations can also provide opportunities for changes to policy. The timing in the mobilisations I refer to in this study has similarities which will be discussed in the analysis Chapters.

Political process theorists such as Tilly (1978), McAdam (1982) and Tarrow (1983) 'saw the link between institutionalised politics and social movements/revolutions', recognising the interaction between mainstream institutional politics and protests (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald 1996:6-8). This allowed scholars to identify the relationships more clearly between social movements and their external environment. The examination of different external features can give insight into the political context in which movements emerge, mobilising

structures, strategies and tactics, and political outcomes of social movement activity (Tilly 1978; Goldstone 1980; Tarrow 2011). In a cross-sectional study utilising the political opportunity structure, Kitschelt (1986:58) demonstrated how socio-economic and political context of a country influences social movement activity, i.e., "political opportunity structures influence the choice of protest strategies and the impact of social movements on their environment".

Tarrow's (1989) use of the political opportunity approach in Italian politics from 1965-1975 traced protest cycles, which refers to the rise and fall of a movement. A general overview of the cycle of a movement is described originally by Blumer (1969), and according to Della Porta & Diani (2006) this has now evolved into a framework for analysis of the development of movements in which it is seen that there are four stages. The first stage is described as 'emergence': this refers to the initial widespread feeling of anger/rage towards a certain power, but when there is no organisational strategy, it remains quite informal. The second stage is coalescence': the organisation of different actors and the beginning of demonstrations and discussion of strategy. Once this stage has been passed through a movement can move on to the third stage which is 'bureaucratisation': when strategy is being carried out by members and related organisations, the movement is becoming more formalised at this stage. The final stage is 'decline' which happens for several reasons. These include repression, co-optation, success, failure, and establishment within the mainstream. The concept of a protest cycle can be useful in identifying when political opportunities present themselves within a polity, and this seems very apt for the analysis of Latin American and European feminist SMO trajectories as activists come into being, or in to action, to respond to violence against women.

Kreisi et al (1995) focusing on opportunity structures highlighted how State action or inaction

can result in mobilisation as movements respond to political opportunities. It is argued that

movements which have a political orientation rely on the changes to political opportunity

structures for successful outcomes. McCammon et al's (2001) use of political opportunity

structures in analysing the ratification of women's suffrage in the US demonstrated how the

timing of this struggle was more important than the openness of government, that is that

changes to the understanding of gender within society was a more important factor. The

three major features of PPT which will be helpful in analysing the Argentinian and Irish

feminist responses to violent acts against women in this study, are political opportunities,

mobilising structures, and framing processes, and the next section goes on to outline these

features and their relevance.

4.2 Political Opportunities

Political opportunities refer to changes that occur in a political environment, i.e., external

factors which give opportunity for social movement mobilisation and often shape the

emergence of SMOs due to changes in the political climate. Previous research utilising the

concept of political opportunities has suggested that there are some core variables that should

be considered. These include the stability/instability of political alignments, the presence of

elite/influential allies, the relative openness of the institutionalised political system to new

actors, the State's capacity for repression, and the policymaking capacity of the State (Tarrow

1988; Kriesi et al 1995; McAdam et al 1996; Goodwin 2002).

Changing political alignments have a clear influence on the ability of a SMO to form and/or

mobilise. This also allows for challengers to the power structure to form alignments with the

movement in question. The presence of elite/influential allies for social movements is

important to note at both an individual and institutional level, as they have varying degrees of power. These intermediary actors can assist movements in facilitating change as well as increase access to the institutionalised political system. The political opportunity perspective has been utilised to understand how the openness of government structures could influence participation of citizens in mobilisations (Eisinger 1973). It was recognised that the ways in which movements choose tactics can be dependent on political openness within the national context and that activists optimize opportunities during particular moments (Tilly 1978). The ability to access the institutionalised political system depends on the relative openness of the government to new actors (Snow et al 2004).

The capacity of the State for repression of social movement activity is also important to consider as it is evident that the political climate can shape the type of repression that a State can engage in. The State's capacity for repression/facilitation is related to how and if the State attempt to stop challenges from social movement actors, (McAdam & Tarrow 2019:26-27). Social movement mobilisation can lead to policy reforms depending on the policymaking capacity of the government in power. It is evident that feminist SMOs in national contexts are crucial for progressive policy change as discussed in Chapter Two (Htun & Weldon 2018). Structural level changes in response to social movement activity would include instances such as the creation of new political parties but at a more intermediate level would be changes to policy (Amenta, Caren, Chiarello & Su 2010:289). Movements in a national context can be considered 'challengers' to the State and although they may not achieve everything they want, this does not indicate that the movement has failed (Amenta et al. 2005). This policymaking capacity of the State will be discussed Chapter Six alongside other features of political opportunities and the outcomes of the social

movement activity in relation to two protest events will be discussed after PPT has been

applied in Chapter Nine.

4.3 Mobilising Structures

Mobilising structures can be defined as 'those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal,

through which people mobilise and engage in collective action' (McAdam et al 1996:3).

Collective action is made possible by engaging with these structures and allows individuals,

groups, and organisations to mobilise through the sharing of ideas, planning action and

recruitment (McCarthy 1996). The means through which a social movement makes its

claims regarding their aims and goals include traditional and digital structures. Traditional

mobilising structures can include protests, strikes, assemblies, stalls, leafleting, in-person

meetings, and petitions but it is evident that digital activism, utilising social media platforms,

has altered traditional mobilization structures. Social media also plays a role in recruitment,

communication, interaction between members, and at times, the type of tactics that are used.

Given the speed at which individuals and groups can communicate with each other, there has

been a significant transformation in the way in which movements in the 21st century mobilise

around societal issues, and the way in which these issues are communicated and framed.

Tilly (1986:2) defined 'repertoires of contention' as a "whole set of means [a group] has for

making claims of different types on different individuals". Different repertoires available to a

movement can influence their success and diffusion of repertoires throughout the movement

also shapes the type of collective action taken. The "repertoire" is the "set of performances

available to any given actor within a regime" (Tilly 2003:45). Tilly (1978) recognised that

political opportunities fluctuate over time and therefore the tactics and strategies available to

a movement within their 'repertoire' was in part shaped by the political context. They are "at once a structural and cultural concept, involving not only what people do when they are engaged in conflict with others but what they know how to do and what others expect them to do" (Tarrow 1998:30). McCarthy (1996) argues that these 'collective action repertoires' alongside framing processes are the organisational base that movements possess and can facilitate or thwart mobilisation.

Meyer (2007:82) defines a strategy as 'a combination of a claim (or demand), a tactic, and a site (or venue)'. A tactic is an act that embodies the SMO's demands. Tactical choices can be both disruptive and non-disruptive e.g., strikes and candlelight vigils, and SMOs use several different tactics to attract diverse types of audiences. Instances of public claim-making consist of interactions which can be characterised as 'performances' (Tilly 2008). Some tactics are less combative and involve actions that show the commitment of the activists and communicates to bystanders and other activists (Meyer 2007). Four different audiences that SMOs need to reach have been identified by Meyer (2007): authorities, activists, bystanders, and the media. The tactical choices catch attention of audiences in different ways. However, it should be noted that the type of mobilising structures utilised by the SMO have an enormous influence on the types of audience that they are able to reach.

Having a strong social media presence and/or platform can serve as an important tactical tool and different social networks are vital for mobilisation (McAdam 1983), these are found both in-person and online. It is evident that 'feminists have increasingly turned to digital technologies and social media platforms to dialogue, network, and organize against contemporary sexism, misogyny, and rape culture' (Mendes, Ringrose, and Keller 2018:

236). Digital activism related to feminist mobilisations have been occurring since the mid-1990s, what was referred to as 'cyberfeminism' (Tuzcu 2016; Wilding 1998). In the 1990s, Latin America feminists utilised digital technology to facilitate programmes to achieve gender equality. In the 2000s, this continued with the creation of blogs promoting feminist ideas and raising consciousness about sexual violence.   In the Argentinean context, Red Informativa de Mujeres de Argentina – RIMA (*Women's Information Network of Argentina*) was established in 2000 (Freidman 2017). This project utilises email distribution lists 'dedicated to information and exchange between feminists, journalists, organizations of the movement of women, researchers, students, and activists in the country (Argentina) and also in Latin American countries.'

The emergence of social media platforms such as Facebook, established in 2004, and Twitter (now known as 'X'), established in 2006, became significant mobilising tools for feminist activism. The ways in which activists communicate and mobilise depends on the affordances of the platform they engage with. The concept of an 'affordance' is crucial in understanding the social meaning of platforms used by social movement actors.   An affordance describes what the environment/platform offers the user, which can be positive or negative. Gibson (1979) originated the concept in relation to the study of animal perception, which was adopted into design studies by Norman (1989) and then applied to technology by Hutchby (2001). Technology enables a form of communication and that is the essential 'affordance', these social media platforms are the space in which that communication occurs (Powers 2021). Social media platforms have different affordances, meaning they provide several ways of communicating with the public and information is spread differently according to the platform. The heightened proliferation of the #MeToo hashtag and the emergence of the MeToo Movement in 2017 has its roots in digital feminist activism, particularly in relation to

campaigns to stop street harassment/catcalling of women. One of the earlier examples of digital feminist activism would be the anti-harassment site in the USA, 'Hollaback!', established in 2005, which was created to highlight the prevalence of street harassment, encourage bystander intervention and sharing of experiences of harassment. The traditional and digital mobilising structures within each of the SMO's repertoires will be interrogated to understand mobilisations in response to VAW.

4.4 Framing Processes

A vital component of social movement activity are the framing processes at play and how they are connected to political opportunity and mobilising structures (Benford & Snow 2000; Diani & della Porta 2005). Framing processes are in part shaped by mobilising structures available to a SMO. The concept of a 'frame', according to Goffman (1974:10-11), was described as 'definitions of the situation [that] are built up in accordance with the principles of organization which govern events—at least social ones—and our subjective involvement in them'. This ability to frame certain events gives movements the ability to interpret situations and apply meaning to generate action (Benford & Snow 2000). This is apparent in the creation of what is known as 'collective action frames', which are 'aimed at mobilizing adherents and potential constituents, with the aim of having spectator support and demobilize antagonists" (Snow & Benford 1988:198; Snow et al 2004).

Collective action frames are crucial in understanding the framing processes utilised by social movement actors. The success of a collective action frame is often understood through the implementation of three core features, i.e., diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing (Snow & Benford 1988; 1992). Diagnostic framing involves identifying the problem that exists and assigning blame for that problem. Prognostic framing suggests solutions, tactics

and strategies which will reduce and ideally eliminate the problem. Motivational framing compels collective action, which is one of the main purposes of SMOs, providing a rationale for action, various calls to action are completed both online and offline.

Collective action frames created by SMOs are necessary to gain attention and signal their intentions to the public (Tarrow 2005). These are action-orientated, meaning that these frames provide a 'shared understanding' of the problem and provide channels for who/what is to blame, solutions and strategies and calls to action (Benford & Snow (2000). To assess success of collective action frames, certain features must be judged; 'problem identification and direction or locus of attribution; flexibility and rigidity, inclusivity and exclusivity; interpretive scope and influence; and degree of resonance' (Benford & Snow 2000:618). When all the features mentioned above are met, it can be argued that 'collective action frames', can become or are more likely to become 'master frames.' A master frame tends to be more generic and therefore can be adopted and adapted by many different social movements, whereas a collective action frame is more context-specific (Snow & Benford 1992). When frames have been adopted by two or more movements, according to Swart (1995), they can operate as master frames. Some of the most prominent master frames include equal rights, opportunities, justice, injustice, oppositional, hegemonic, imperial, anti-imperial, and market choice (Benford 2013). The master frame to be interrogated in this study is the 'violence against women (VAW) frame (Chapter Eight). The 'violence against women (VAW)' frame is a master frame that is gender specific, has primarily referred to cisgendered women and has been utilised to challenge gender roles and highlight the nature of the violence perpetrated against women. The conceptualisation of framing processes as they relate to social movement activity and collective action are important as they give insight into the identity of the SMO (McAdam 1996). The effectiveness of a SMO can be

due in part to its ability to frame issues that are resonant with their own audience and attract new audiences. It is evident that culture and a sense of collective identity play a role in these processes as SMOs do not just create new frames but often take inspiration from previous movements and their repertoires (McAdam 1995). The ways in which collective identity is constructed by a SMO is related to framing processes, as individual identity and collective identity are shaped by these frames and often need to connect with lived experience of the activists, e.g., frame alignment (Benford & Snow 2000). RMT stresses the importance of resources for SMO success. Symbolic resources in the form of cultural artifacts which are created through shared history and narratives are crucial for framing within national contexts (Snow & Benford 1992).

Critiques of the PPT perspective have argued that the conceptualisation of a political opportunity may be too broad in some cases and therefore have different interpretations, and that the agency of social movement actors is not given enough consideration (Gams & Meyer 1996; Snow et al 2004; Goodwin & Jasper 2003). Noonan (1995:84) argues that since the political opportunity model has been used primarily in Western democracies and in the Global North to explain opportunities regarding 'protection or extension of legal rights'. He argues 'that this makes it less applicable in non-democratic States or those in the Global South. For example, in Latin America social movements have been, in the past, more concerned with 'crises of "consumption," such as lack of food, health, and other basic resources (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992)', often the result of austerity measures. It is also evident that the power that women hold in Latin American countries has historically been outside of traditional structures, i.e., the political system (Jaquette 1991; Noonan 1995).

Despite the critiques, PPT remains a valuable model for this research because it provides a comprehensive framework to analyse how political contexts shape social movement activity. In both the Argentinian and Irish contexts, the model allows for an examination of how political structures, available resources, and collective action strategies interact to influence the success of SMOs who are anti-VAW. By using PPT, this study explores how different political environments impact the mobilisation and framing processes of these SMOs, highlighting the adaptive strategies that activists employ in varying contexts. This approach ensures a nuanced understanding of the *Justicia para Micaela* and *I Believe Her* protests, emphasising the dynamic interplay between political opportunities and social movement agency.

Chapter 5: Methodology

This Chapter conceptualises what a comparative approach to analysing the mobilisations of the Argentinian feminist SMO, Ni Una Menos, and the Irish socialist feminist SMO, ROSA, in response to VAW involves. The analysis of these cases provides an opportunity to investigate sociologically *how* feminist SMOs mobilise in response to acts of VAW and *why* they mobilise in these instances. First, I outline the conceptual framework and how a qualitative approach was applied in the analysis. Second, I outline the feminist research methodologies which influenced this research. Third, I describe how I examined protest cycles to select the sample protests which then informed this analysis of how activists interact within online and in-person frameworks. Fourth, I describe the methodology for generating and analysing secondary social media data through digital and digitised methods. Fifth, I describe the methodology for generating and analysing primary interview data. Finally, I discuss ethical considerations and positionality within this research.

Thesis Question: How and why do feminist SMOs mobilise in response to acts of VAW? A comparative analysis.

Research Questions applied in the methodological framework:

1. What protest events during the SMOs' protest cycle were of particular importance in influencing concrete political outcomes?

2. How did changes in political opportunity structures facilitate the emergence of Ni Una Menos and ROSA?

3. What mobilising structures are present in each SMO's repertoire, and how were they utilised during the protest events?

4. How does each SMO understand the issue of VAW, and how was this violence framed specifically in relation to the protest events?

5. What policies related to VAW were in place in Argentina and Ireland during and after these pivotal protest events?

5.1 Conceptual Framework

As outlined in the previous Chapter this study deploys a political process theory approach, as discussed in Chapter Four alongside sociological theoretical understandings of violence perpetrated against women and feminised people discussed in Chapter Three, in its comparison of mobilisations in Argentina and Ireland. The three central features of political process theory discussed by McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996) that are applied here are 1) political opportunities, 2) mobilising structures, and 3) framing processes. These distinctive features of political process theory give insight into the SMOs' influence on political outcomes, i.e., policy related to VAW at a national level. A distinct methodological framework was developed to address these questions.

Political Opportunities

Political opportunities refer to changes that occur in a polity, i.e., external factors which give opportunity for social movement mobilisation and often shape the emergence of SMOs due to changes in the political climate. The literature as discussed in Chapter Four will be used as a starting point in understanding political opportunities and the core features for analysis are the stability/instability of political alignments, the presence of elite/influential allies, the relative openness of the institutionalised political system to new actors, State capacity for repression and policymaking capacity of the State (Kriesi et al 1995; McAdam et al 1996).

The changing levels of stability/instability in relation to political alignments can facilitate the emergence of a movement or group who are in opposition to the ruling party or hegemonic discourse present in the polity. Levels of stability/instability in relation to political alignments can be beneficial to those who are in opposition to the ruling party or hegemonic discourse present in the polity. Changing political alignments have a clear influence on the ability of a SMO to form and/or mobilise. This also allows for challengers to the power structure to form alignments with the movements. When there is disruption in the government structure then this can be taken advantage of by movement actors. The shifting of political alignments allows for opportunities to arise for mobilisation (Tarrow 1998). For there to be shifts in political alignments, there often must be some sort of 'destabilizing event' which disrupts the status quo and makes room for the emergence of SMOs'. Examples of such events would be war or economic crises (McAdam & Tarrow 2019:27). Identifying and discussing the destabilising events present in the Argentinian and Irish context give insight into this variable.

To assess the presence of elite/influential allies, it is important to note that SMOs have allies at both an individual and institutional level with varying degrees of power. To identify the influential allies for each, I kept note of individuals and organisations mentioned in the data collected from social media platforms and websites utilised by each SMO to assess who with relative influence are mentioned most often. This initial assessment was necessary to identify the organisations and individuals who are allies of the SMOs more generally. I then identified the individuals and organisations whose allyship was of particular importance in relation to the *Justicia para Micaela* and *I Believe Her* protests. These influential allies were corroborated through interviewing members of each SMO.

Increased access to the political system as well as access to institutions that SMOs were otherwise excluded from, is an important feature of political opportunities, and the timing of the protests in these instances are vital in understanding why these protests caught the attention of those in power. In the 2010s in both the Argentinian and Irish context several new actors were brought into the polity mobilising based on progressive policy changes such as legislation related to gender identity, marriage equality and reproductive rights. This meant that new actors were being linked to the halls of power with connections to institutions as well as political parties. The access gained by Ni Una Menos and ROSA is evidenced in previous research as well as interviews with activists, which will be discussed in the Chapter Six. To assess State capacity for repression, it is necessary to identify the ways in which these States, Argentina and Ireland, have repressed social movement activity in the past as well as if they have engaged in repressive acts against these SMOs under study. The policymaking capacity of the State will be assessed by analysing four contextual factors outlined by Htun & Weldon (2018). They argue that certain conditions must be in place for the State to make any kind of progressive policy change are (1) vulnerability to international pressure (2) degree of democracy (3) policy/institutional legacies and (4) State capacity.

Mobilising Structures

Mobilising structures can be defined as 'those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilise and engage in collective action' (McAdam et al 1996:3). The more traditional mobilising structures associated with social movement mobilisation include meetings held in-person and the distribution of information about a SMO relied on leafleting, posters, press releases to local and national news media, putting up stalls in busy city centres distributing information and asking people to sign petitions. Although these all still exist,

new forms of mobilising structures in the digital space have emerged in recent years, particularly with the creation of social media platforms. Some of these are digital (social media platforms) and some are digitised (online petitions, leaflets, meetings (video calls and presentations via Zoom), and manifestos. This thesis has a particular focus on the necessity of strong mobilising structures for SMOs and how these are utilised both in-person and online. The mobilising structures were identified through in-depth semi-structured interviews with members of Ni Una Menos and ROSA and through analysing the SMOs' websites and social media platforms.

These mobilising structures inform the organisational structure of the SMOs as well as the tactical repertoires of each. The repertoire of each SMO has similarities and differences but the tactics, particularly disruptive tactics, within these repertoires are important for these particular protest events. Although this study did not employ a network analysis as this was not the aim of the research, I did use a technique commonly employed in the preliminary stages of network analysis by identifying the main social media page accounts for each SMO (i.e., the original/main account) and then identified the core groups related to this main social media page account and applied Diani's (2003) conceptualisation of network structures to identify the structure. This was achieved through a snowballing technique. By applying this technique, I was able to attain a preliminary/base understanding of the organisational structure of each SMO during this specific time period. These were in part corroborated through interviews with members of each SMO. By identifying the organisational structure and traditional and digital mobilising structures utilised by each, the SMOs' tactical repertoires emerged which allowed me to compare these features and how they relate to the specific mobilisation at the protest events in this analysis.

Framing Processes

The framing processes present in each protest event are an important focus in this research. Collective action frames created by movements are necessary to gain attention and signal their intentions to the public (Tarrow 2005). These collective action frames are understood through diagnostic (what is the problem), prognostic (what are the solutions to the problem) and motivational framing (call to action). The framing processes provide insight into the SMO's portrayal of VAW, the activists understanding of VAW as well as the type of feminism that informs their analysis. The frames that SMOs utilise are important not just in claim-making but also within mobilisations and mobilising structures in the physical and digital space. The effectiveness or the 'resonance' of a frame is connected to mobilising power as some frames are more resonant than others (Snow & Benford 1988). Some frames have the added advantage of being what is called 'culturally resonant' which connects to the culture of the nation in which the frame is being used (Marx-Ferree 2003). The framing processes are understood primarily through interview data and supplemented with secondary social media data and policy documentation, which will be described in the methods section.

Political Outcomes of Movement Activity

There can be methodological difficulties related to analysing social movement outcomes, in terms of 'defining and measuring social movement success or other outcomes' and 'the problem of causality, that is, the difficulty of assessing the extent to which the movement has contributed to producing a certain effect' (Kriesi 1995:207). Outcomes are not necessarily directly due to mobilisations but are also influenced by the political context of the protest activity and therefore political opportunities are important to consider (Kriesi et al 1995). It has been argued that 'outcomes of a social movement imply that its activities produce some

changes in at least one of the three following arenas: the movement itself, the political system, or the general public' (Kriesi et al 1995:207).

There are internal and external impacts in SMO activity, internal impacts are more associated with changes within the SMO and are related to identity and organisational structure, whereas external impacts refer to changes outside of the SMO which are procedural, substantive, structural and sensitising (Kriesi et al 1995). Kriesi's (1991) conceptualisation of a substantive impact can be split into two categories 'reactive' and 'proactive' impacts. A 'reactive' impact refers to 'prevention of "new disadvantages", i.e., challengers can 'exert a veto against a policy or against a decision taken by political authorities.' Whereas a 'proactive' impact refers to 'introduction of "new advantages" i.e., 'challengers obtain substantive concessions by political authorities.' In this case, they acquire policy-making power' (Kriesi et al 1995:210). Therefore, political outcomes of SMO activity involves assessing the influence of these protest events on legislative processes related to VAW in each national context. Policymaking is made possible through legislative processes, and SMOs often have the most influence in the initial stage, the stages of these processes are 'agenda-setting, legislative content, passage and implementation' (Snow et al 2019:453). The main source of data needed for this analysis are the NAPs on VAW during and after the protest events, alongside related policy documents.

5.2 Feminist Research Methodology

This research is concerned with how and why feminist SMOs mobilise in response to VAW to engender social change. It is evident that a positivist stance regarding knowledge was at the forefront of academic research up until the mid-20th century to understand the natural and social world, relying heavily on the idea that there was one 'reality' or 'truth' (Stanley &

Wise 1993; Letherby 2003). Broadly speaking ontology is concerned with the nature of reality and epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowledge and how it is produced. An objectivist ontology and positivist epistemology would argue that the primary way to research the world would rely on the idea that there is an objective 'truth' about the world. This was also primarily approached through quantitative methods of inquiry. A large amount of research in the past did not view the world through a gendered lens and the white male experience was privileged as the 'norm' (Morley 1996; Letherby 2003). The main points in the feminist critique of the male-centred approach includes: 'the selection of sexist and elitist research topics; biased research including the use of male-only respondents; claims to false objectivity; inaccurate interpretation and over-generalization of findings - including the application of theory to women from research on men; exploitative relationships between researcher and researched and within research teams' (Letherby 2011:4).

Within a feminist methodology, it is acknowledged that bias is inevitable when objectivity is not the goal of the research, '… it is better to understand the complexities within research rather than to pretend that they can be controlled, and biased sources can themselves result in useful data' (Letherby 2003:71). As a researcher, adopting a feminist methodological approach involves utilising theory and applying research methods to produce new knowledge about the social world (Stanley & Wise 2008).

> 'There is no such thing as a feminist method, rather what is distinctive about feminist research is a sensitivity to the significance of gender within society and a critical approach to the research process. Thus, rather than focusing on the methods (tools for gathering evidence/collecting data), feminists are concerned with the methodological reflection of the researcher(s)' (Letherby 2011:2).

This research offers a representation of feminist SMO activity in response to acts of VAW within the political context, including their subjective experiences and understanding of the

SMOs with which they engage. However, this is does not mean that by putting together all these subjective accounts that an objective account of the event has been created (Stanley & Wise 1993). As Letherby (2003:120) states 'the research process (from choice of project to publication of the 'findings') involves constant adaptation, re-evaluation and negotiation.' This research aims to understand more deeply how and why feminist SMOs mobilise in response to VAW.

5.3 Protest Cycles

I sampled the protest events chosen for analysis by analysing protest cycles which then influenced the analysis of how activists interact within online and in-person frameworks. In doing so, I can insert activist voices in the cycles model, as the periods in which these mobilisations occurred are important. The concept of a protest cycle allowed me as a researcher to identify heightened and lowered levels of activity within SMO mobilisations as they relate to VAW. An important aspect of studying any SMO is to measure their protest cycles and track the frequency of mobilisations based on certain issues. 'In survey research, each individual's opinion or characteristics are of equal importance, and thus a random selection method is most appropriate. Protest events, however, are not all of the same value; they have varying intensities, and their importance to politicians, to movement activists, to the media, as well as to researchers differs widely' (Koopmans 1998:101). Social movement theory allows for insight into processes that occur over a SMO's lifetime, particularly through the application of protest cycles. According to Tarrow (1994:153) these cycles have 'a phase of heightened conflict across the social system' and there are 'intensified interactions between challengers and authorities' depending on where the SMO is in the cycle. The boundaries of a protest cycle can be hard to define since these SMOs are not single-issue campaigns and therefore have been mobilising regularly in response to a variety of issues.

Often these are issues that directly affect/oppress women, gender non-conforming people and working-class people, i.e., VAW, reproductive rights, LGBTQIA+ rights, climate change, labour rights, access to education, housing, and healthcare. This both keeps them relevant and introduces them to new people consistently, which provides opportunities for recruitment. Protest cycles are shaped by the variables discussed within the political process theory approach, i.e., political opportunities, mobilising structures, and framing processes.

A form of content analysis known as protest event analysis (PEA) is a common method used in social movement studies to obtain information regarding protest cycles. My data from analysing the protest cycles contributes to an understanding of the level of activity that was present during these protest events which may help explain why these protest events got the attention they did. This method (PEA) is primarily used to collect data on protest cycles over lengthy periods of time across different countries (Hutter 2014) and can be extremely time consuming especially if utilising a manual coding technique. Hutter (2014) attests that PEA is adaptable and it is up to the researcher to define what is considered a 'protest event', what sources to use to collect data, and how to organise these. The main coding unit in my analysis was 'protest event' – this includes any activity promoted by the SMO that involved taking to the streets for some kind of action, this can include marching, rallies, vigils, pickets, occupations, disruptive tactics, mass mobilisations etc. The types of events which were excluded from the analysis were meetings, assemblies, stalls, and online events. It is important to note that the number of events held by a SMO is different from their capacity to mobilise. Defining what is considered a protest event has broadly been based around the 'action form' and the number of participants. Although some previous research (Beissinger 2002) has referred to a minimum number of individuals, this criterion is not possible in this

research, because in the Irish context particularly, ROSA is quite a small group in comparison to Ni Una Menos.

In relation to source selection, newspapers have historically been the main data source for PEA and selection bias can be an issue in this respect as newspapers may not report on certain protest events (Lorenzini et al 2022), unless there has been a particularly large turnout, or it has been disruptive in some way. I did not rely solely on the newspaper reports. The main sources of data for protest events in this analysis were social media platforms and then this was supplemented with national newspapers in each context. I focused on social media platforms associated with the accounts of the main branch of Ni Una Menos and ROSA, i.e., the main/original Ni Una Menos account and the Ni Una Menos 'Entre Rios' account, the province where Micaela is from as well as the main/original ROSA account. The main criterion for selecting protests to focus on was when the SMOs specifically addressed an act of violence perpetrated against a woman that garnered public attention. Excluded from selection were the annual days of protest that both SMOs participate in, such as International Women's Day (8 March) and the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women (25 November). Additionally, Ni Una Menos' annual day of protest (3 June) was excluded.

These were excluded because mobilisations were inevitable, are usually organised months in advance and are not organised in response to a specific act of VAW. The ability of both SMOs to mobilise was severely hindered by the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 as citizens of both countries were prevented from mobilising on the streets.

Following their social media platforms, a timeline of SMO activity over a five-year period from 2016-2020, was created. Two protests were then selected from this timeline for intense focus on the basis that they were characterised by large turnouts, were held in multiple locations, throughout each country in response to an act of VAW. The protests extracted from the figures below, were completed utilising the PEA (protest even analysis) technique and protest events chosen for analysis were the '*Justicia para Micaela*' (Argentina) protests and the '*I Believe Her*' (Ireland) protests. SMOs can have multiple cycles and usually go through the following stages described by Diani & Della Porta (2006): emergence, coalescence, bureaucratisation, and decline. It can be argued that both SMOs were in the bureaucratisation stage of a protest cycle when these protests occurred which is evidenced in their organisational strength. At this stage of bureaucratisation, the SMOs have already emerged, the organisation of different actors has begun, and demonstrations have already occurred, strategies are apparent and are employed by the SMOs, in a more formalised manner. In summary, these protests were identified through analysing the protest cycles of each SMO.

In Fig.1, 2 and 3 below, the number of protests conducted by each SMO is described. The figures are primarily extracted from described activities on social media platforms where the SMOs most often promote protest events and knowledge about the annual days of protest that they engage with annually. The protests being referred to in Fig. 1 are those held in public spaces by the main national Ni Una Menos branch and excludes online events and assemblies.   Protests in these incidences refer to times when they called for people to stand out in solidarity or protest, primarily in the plazas of Buenos Aires but there were also calls to have similar protests in your own *plaza* depending on your municipality. The protests being referred to Fig. 2 are those held by the ROSA Dublin branch and excludes online events,

meetings, and stalls.   Protests in these incidences refer to times when they called for people to stand out in solidarity or protest on some of the main streets of Dublin, primarily O'Connell Street. In Ireland in 2018 there is a rise in protest activity as this is at the height of the reproductive rights movement in which ROSA also played an important role.

Fig. 1: Ni Una Menos (main) - Number of Protests per year from 2016-2020

Fig. 2: ROSA (Dublin) - Number of Protests per year from 2016-2020

In Fig.3, a comparison is made between the number of protests held by each SMO. It is important to note that although it appears that Ni Una Menos have a fewer number of protests, the attendance at their protests is often in the thousands, whereas the attendance at ROSA protests is closer to fifties or hundreds. The greater Buenos Aires and the greater Dublin area each represent approximately a third of the population of their respective countries. Ni Una Menos is a much larger SMO with a wide-reaching social network, the population of Argentina is nine times that of Ireland so the pool of people that can be engaged is entirely different, protesting and/or taking to the streets is very much a part of Argentinian culture and active participation in protests is commonplace, whereas in Ireland, this is not as common. This data is taken from the main branches of each SMO, so it is

important to note that additionally other branches of the SMO would have protests in their locality which are not reflected in these figures.

Fig. 3: Comparison of Number of Protests per year from 2016-2020

Table 3: Protests identified for Analysis

Movement	Ni Una Menos	ROSA
Name of Protest (s)	Justicia para Micaela	I Believe Her
Reason for Protest	Femicide of Micaela Garcia	Treatment of victim and verdict in Belfast Rugby Rape Trial
Location	Argentina	Ireland

5.4 Methodology for Generating and Analysing Secondary Social Media Data

It is evident that technology shapes theory and method and sociology as a discipline has developed in response to broad socio-technological shifts. A critical perspective has helped to develop an understanding that there is a growing sense that there is a relationship between technology and society which can be both beneficial and destructive e.g., power to share ideas and campaigns all over the world which aim to achieve positive change as well as the presence of disinformation and hate speech. Selwyn (2019:7), notes that 'technologies are entwined with the social, economic, and political conditions of their times', therefore

technology evolves with society and is not independent of it. There is a connection between

online and offline activity for feminist SMOs and these activities mutually shape one another

(Vaccari et al 2015). The digital and empirical world are connected and interlinked, this is

particularly relevant for the two contemporary SMOs in this study who utilise digital

technology in their mobilisations.   It has been established that in the Latin American context

feminist SMOs increasingly utilise social media platforms (Laudano 2016).

In relation to online data a non-probability sampling approach was employed, meaning the

sample were chosen based on specific characteristics that are SMO-specific. Firstly, the

websites of each SMO were identified, initial documentary data sources were collected from

their respective websites which consisted of a collection of the manifestos published by Ni

Una Menos (www.niunamenos.ar) and blogs published by ROSA (www.rosa.ie). This initial

data gave insight into the mobilising structures and framing processes utilised by each SMO

at a more general level. From this initial documentary data, the specific data as it relates to

the *Justicia para Micaela* and *I Believe Her* protests were identified. Conducting preliminary

research on the SMO in each national context revealed several satellite groups throughout

each country. It is necessary to map the digital space by identifying the platforms utilised by

the SMO and their dependency on different social media platforms. To attain real-time data

which was produced by the SMOs during these specific protest events, I utilised a cross-

sectional approach, i.e., gathered data from social media platforms at one point in time, the

week when the protest occurred in each context.   During the period under which these

protest events took place, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter were the sites of pervasive or

concentrated political discourse and so samples from these platforms were chosen.   I chose

to focus on Ni Una Menos' and ROSA's 'main pages' for social media data. These pages had

most information on campaigns, calls to action, posters, and usually were the starting point

for the satellite groups to share resources and information. Therefore, these two 'main' pages on different platforms (Facebook, Twitter & Instagram) were used as the main source of data related to SMO-specific material regarding campaigns and calls to action. Social media data is wide ranging and constantly updated so a sample of specific data needed to be collected. Ni Una Menos' 'main' page, was supplemented by the 'Rosario' and 'Entre Rios' (province where Micaela is from) Ni Una Menos Facebook pages.

Digital research methods are characterised by digitised methods (pre-existing methodologies that have been digitised for online use) e.g., interviews via Skype and Zoom etc., and native digital methods (born out of—and hence unique to—the Web's medium (Rogers 2013)). Collecting data from social media platforms, also known as 'micro-archiving', in the digital space, by individual researchers is characterised by both manual and automatic means. I used both manual and automatic means.   Manually retrieving data from the internet 'can be done simply by saving a webpage in html format, by transforming it into an image (screenshot) or PDF, or by downloading the web elements embedded in it' (Mosca 2014:399). This technique was used for the Facebook, Twitter and Instagram posts made by each SMO in relation to the protest events.   Every post by the SMO, on each platform, pertaining to the protest event under study was screenshot, and transferred initially to a Microsoft Word document where they were dated. The details of each post were noted and inserted into an Excel Spreadsheet, alongside a screenshot of the post in Microsoft Word, which share a reference number relating to the Spreadsheet. This facilitates the analysis as some of the posts contained images and text.

Additionally, there was a hashtag used on Twitter in relation to each protest event and the tweets using these hashtags were chosen for analysis, to give insight into the discourse surrounding these protests in each national context, i.e., Argentina and Ireland. Previous studies related to Ni Una Menos have followed the hashtag '#niunamenos' (Belotti, Comunello & Corradi 2020; Piatti-Crocker 2021; Núñez Puente, D'Antonio Maceiras, & Fernández Romero 2021) whereas my research followed the hashtag '#justiciaparamicaela' which Ni Una Menos included in their Twitter post regarding Micaela's femicide on the day her body was found. I chose to follow this hashtag rather than the hashtag '#niunamenos' as it was more specifically referring to Micaela. There has also been research previously following the hashtag '#ibelieveher' (Prendergast & Quinn 2020) and the Belfast Trial, this was a comparative analysis of 'Twitter campaigns and print media discourse on two high-profile sexual assault verdicts in Ireland and Spain' with the hashtags #ibelieveher and #YoTeCreo (*I believe you*). I also followed the #ibelieveher hashtag but only from Twitter accounts in Ireland with a focus on the tweets relating to the trial for thematic analysis of SMO framing. These were supplemented by newspaper reports and official documents produced by State departments in response to these protest events.

Automatically retrieving data refers to using software. Since historical tweets are more difficult to retrieve than posts available on Facebook and Instagram pages, I utilised the Twitter API to retrieve tweets using a particular hashtag that was related to each protest event i.e., #justiciaparamicaela and #ibelieveher. Access to the Twitter API was gained through the Academic Research product track, which allowed me to gain access to historical data i.e., accessing the real-time reactions online during these pivotal protests. The software used to send API requests was Postman where I added the Twitter API v2 to a collection to send the query. Postman returns up to 100 results at a time, in JSON format, which I copied and

pasted into Notepad++, an uncomplicated text editor program that recognises different data formats and programming languages. Using Microsoft Excel, I then imported the data and converted it into tables. Postman gives a number or predefined parameters that can be edited to search for tweets regarding particular dates that you are trying to look for. It is also necessary to specify which information you want include in the returned data, for example, retweets and likes and authors of tweets (i.e., username), the country (Argentina and Ireland) and the specific hashtag.

The data sets compiled from Twitter were as follows:

- **Justicia para Micaela Protests -** the hashtag #JusticiaparaMicaela, in Argentina
- I examined a seven-day sample of the tweets with the hashtag #JusticiaparaMicaela, in Argentina (6 April – 12 April 2017 inclusive)

- **I Believe Her Protests -** the hashtag #ibelieveher, in Ireland
- I examined a seven-day sample of the tweets with the hashtag #ibelieveher in Ireland from (26 March - 1 April 2018 inclusive)

Once this data was scraped and cleaned (removing tweets which were not directed at these particular incidences), I began my analysis. The number of tweets varies in each case and different approaches in the literature calls for selecting tweets for an analysis through different processes. I chose to organise the tweets by the level of engagement (this engagement with each tweet is provided through the Twitter API data capturing tool used) the tweet received i.e., highest amount number of likes, also known as 'top tweets', commonly used in Twitter analysis (Steeves 2018).

Documentary research methods are important to consider within this analysis for SMO material. There are a variety of diverse types of documents, the main documents analysed in this research are visual (photographs) and official documents from organisations (manifestos/blogs produced by SMOs), and there are differences in approach regarding personal documents and official documents (Scott 1990). There are questions regarding representativeness when it comes to this type of data. The data that was collected in this research from social media platforms of each SMO and their respective websites was SMO-generated material and therefore has an intrinsic value. Visual materials can be split into extant photographs (not produced for the research by the researcher) and research-generated photographs (photos generated by the researcher) (Bryman 2012:547). Photographs taken from social media platforms are used within this analysis. Unless, where noted, most of the photographs in this research are extant photographs taken from social media platforms of each SMO or photos linked to tweets related to the protest events.

Analysis

Data from social media platforms including posts made by the SMOs on Facebook, Instagram and Twitter were analysed qualitatively to generate codes and thematic categories. The thematic analysis facilitated a comparison between how these two SMOs frame VAW and identify similarities and differences. Data was also analysed through quantitative methods focusing on activity around hashtag usage, most popular tweets, tweets per user average, etc. It is widely accepted among researchers that Twitter users are aware that posts made from their non-protected Twitter accounts are publicly visible and therefore traditional issues regarding consent are not the same, some of their handles (usernames) are used within the analysis (Bruns 2019).

5.5 Methodology for Generating and Analysing Primary Interview Data

The primary data in this research was collected through semi-structured in-depth interviews with members of each SMO. In data collection it is important to pick methods which best answer your research question, 'the most important criteria for choosing a particular research method is not its relationship to academic arguments about methods, but its fit with the question being asked in the research' (Oakley 2004:191). There is an exchange occurring which allows for a deeper understanding of the lived experience of social movement actors. Power dynamics are present in all relationships (Giddens 1985), and it is vital that the researcher, first, recognises this, and second, works to balance this power dynamic in as much as is possible given the circumstances (Stanley & Wise 1993). Qualitative in-depth semi-structured interviews allowed the activists to tell their story and allowed them to play an active role within the research and therefore as a researcher this can help to balance the power dynamic as the researcher is not the only one with 'knowledge' (Oakley 1981; Graham 1984; Stanley & Wise 1993).   The purpose of conducting interviews with individuals who were active within each SMO was to gain an understanding of how they mobilised in their personal experience and then more specifically their understanding of the two pivotal protest events. By adopting a semi-structured interview format, I was able to be more flexible in my approach, a particularly useful technique for interviewing social movement activists (della Porta 2014).

The criteria for inclusion in this study were as follows: participants must be aged 18 or over, participant must have either been present at one of the protest events being researched or has been active in the SMO either in-person or online. Through this semi-structured in-depth interviewing, I centred the voices of the individuals who have experience protesting with these respective SMOs. Snowball sampling was employed to gain access to interviewees.

One of the advantages of using snowball sampling means that you can utilise existing networks and get referrals from participants. Social movement actors are not necessarily an easy group to contact, and referrals were important. This type of sampling is subject to bias as participants who know one another may have similar characteristics and experiences. However, this was the sampling approach that would best help me attain participants given the circumstances.

It is not just quantity that is relevant to qualitative research in terms of the number of interviews, as this research did not just focus on the in-person interviews but also the online data related to the protest events. In my analysis I was interested in generating themes from the accounts of the interviewees as well as the relationship between the narrative that was generated from the online analysis. A total of thirteen in-depth semi-structured interviews were carried out, and one supplementary interview with a ROSA member for clarification on some points that came up during the interview. Six individuals associated with Ni Una Menos were interviewed, two are currently living in Argentina and four are living in Ireland. Five of these are Argentinian, one is from Uruguay and one of these individuals was a childhood friend of Micaela and was active during these protests. Six members active in the main ROSA collective in Dublin were interviewed, four of these are key organisers of ROSA, including founding member, Ruth Coppinger (former Socialist Party TD), and the two others who joined around 2017 and have become active members of the SMO, with important roles in organising.

Although the majority of the interviewees have remained anonymous. There are two exceptions, Ruth Coppinger is a well-known political figure in Irish society and her permission was sought to be named in this study and permission was granted. One of the Ni

Una Menos activists has not been named but has been described as a 'childhood friend of Micaela'. Permission was sought to make this distinction in the profile of the interviewee and permission was granted. It was necessary to distinguish between their experience as someone who knew Micaela and was present at the protest events from those who were active in Ni Una Menos but did not necessarily have a direct connection to Micaela in this way.

Other studies which have been conducted similarly to my own research include Cabas-Mijares (2019) who conducted a PhD study entitled 'Transversal Feminist Politics in the Digital Meditated Activism of the Argentine Collective Ni Una Menos' wherein she conducted a digital ethnography of Ni Una Menos social media platforms, which included analysis of 118 Facebook posts and 226 Tweets with four semi-structured interviews with well-known members of the SMO. Salvatori (2020) conducted a PhD study entitled 'Feminism in Transit: A study of the Transnational Feminist Movement Non Una Di Meno', an autoethnography, observing online discussions, participating in assemblies and demonstrations, conducting fourteen interviews, and analysing documents produced by the SMO. An innovation in my study was required as I aimed to focus on two specific protest events and gathered data from social media platforms at one point in time i.e., the week when the protest occurred in each context. This is the cross-sectional element of the research as data is being collected at one point in time in each context through online analysis. This analysis was the secondary data and supplements the primary data which consisted of interviews with members of each SMO, some of whom played a pivotal role in the protest events. Data that was analysed is summarised in tables (Table 4 and Table 5) at end of this Chapter.

This research was conducted during the Covid-19 pandemic and therefore the use of digital-based methods of communication was necessary to ensure safety of participants. The advantage of digital-based methods such as this allows the researcher to connect with participants in a 'time efficient and financially affordable manner' and although face to face interaction cannot be completely replaced, this model is 'a viable alternative' and proved to be a 'complimentary data collection tool for qualitative researchers' (Lo Iacono, Symonds & Brown 2016:1). There are some important considerations when conducting online interviews. Access to decent quality internet and digital devices is important. Knowledge of the diverse types of apps and platforms that are being used and an awareness of demographic differences of users are also important. Different demographics interact differently with digital media and platforms for a variety of reasons including age, gender, location, income, etc. There are benefits to online interviewing, particularly given the geographical dispersion of the sample in this research.

The ethical considerations are similar to those applicable to in-person interviews as the main issue was regarding recording of the individual and the transcript. The messaging app, Microsoft Teams, which I accessed through Maynooth University, has an in-platform recording and transcription system available in video calls, so it was convenient for the researcher. There are obstacles to online interviewing, particularly as some people might not have a good internet connection which can inhibit recruitment. Building rapport can be more difficult, and the location of the interview might seem intrusive for some, some individuals clouded their background, some did not, and observing participants body language can be more difficult as you are only seeing their head and shoulders. For example, in one interview, a participant was having difficulty with their camera, as it did not work, we continued with the interview, and I left my camera on, so they had someone to react to.

Some of the participants I interviewed had young children and these interviews were conducted during the Covid-19 pandemic, so I made myself available to interview at times that suited the participants; morning, afternoon, or evening. These interviews were conducted online through Microsoft Teams, where they were recorded and transcribed. I provided each interviewee with a link to the interview through Microsoft Teams and emailed an outline of the main points that would be discussed in the interview beforehand. This helped the flow of the interviews as they had some time to reflect on the core issues that were going to be discussed (*Appendices C & D*). Although there were some core interview questions for each group of activists, there were slight differences in the questions posed, to suit the nature of the SMO they are associated with and the specific protest event.

All interviewees were provided with an Information Sheet and Consent Form (*Appendices E & F*). All interviews were conducted in English, but the Ni Una Menos activists were provided with an Information Sheet and Consent Form written in both English and Spanish. Each interview lasted between 50 and 80 minutes. I began each interview by first discussing the SMO more broadly for the first 20-30 minutes then talked specifically about the protest event chosen for analysis. This line of questioning assisted in developing a rapport with the respondents as they were able to start off more broadly speaking about the SMO and what they thought the goal of the SMO was, and then more specifically on their own experience and understanding of the protest event. The interview questions were shaped in part by the research already conducted throughout the analysis of social media platforms and websites which informed many of the questions posed during the interviews. The primary data in this research are the interview transcripts that were attained through interviewing members of each SMO. This can result in participants sometimes overestimating the SMO's role in these specific protest events, some bias is understandable and expected in their descriptions, given

their connection to the respective SMOs. This bias can be avoided by analysing other

documentary sources.

5.6 Data Analysed in this Research

Table 4: Data Analysed for *Justicia para Micaela* Protests

	Justicia para Micaela Protests	**Number**
6 Interviews (Total)	Individuals who have been active in Ni Una Menos mobilisations including Micaela's childhood friend	6 transcripts
Facebook Ni Una Menos – Main	Posts on 7th April 2017	1 post and 101 responses
Facebook Ni Una Menos – Entre Rios	Posts from 6th to 8th April 2017	9 posts
Facebook Ni Una Menos – Rosario	Posts from 4th to 8th April 217	3 posts
Ni Una Menos Website	Manifestos	2 manifestos
Ni Una Menos Twitter	Tweet on 8th April 2017	1 tweet and 89 responses
Ni Una Menos Instagram	Posts on 8th April 2017 and 11th April 2017	2 posts
Twitter	#justiciaparamicaela	118 tweets

Table 5: Data Analysed for *I Believe Her* Protests

	I Believe Her Protests	**Number**
7 Interviews (total) **5 single interviews** **2 interviews with same participant**	Four key organisers of ROSA, including founding member, Ruth Coppinger. Two activists who have become active organisers.	7 transcripts
ROSA Facebook	I Believe Her Event Page (29 March 2018)	65 responses

ROSA Facebook	We Stand with Her Event Page (31 March 2018)	70 responses
ROSA Twitter	Tweets from 28th to 31st March 2018	13 tweets
ROSA Instagram	Posts from 28th to 30th March 2018	11 posts
Twitter	#ibelieveher	350 tweets

5.7 Ethical Considerations & Positionality

There are considerations that must be made in relation to power, ethics, and responsibility. The choices that researchers make need to be given consideration as they will influence the relationship dynamics in the research process as well as the research 'product(s)': the 'findings', the 'results', the 'knowledge'' (Letherby 2003:100). Before I completed the data collection for this research, this project went through an ethical review procedure through Maynooth University. It is important that any kind of research considers the ethical implications of the project. This research was reviewed by the Maynooth University Ethics Committee, specifically The Social Research Ethics Subcommittee (SRESC) which covers all aspects of social scientific research. It is tasked with assessing the ethical implications and provides guidance and support to researchers. An ethics application was submitted through the Research Information System (RIS) for review. The main concern of the ethical approval was regarding interviewees. As mentioned above, all interviewees were provided with an Information Sheet and Consent Form before the interview and were ensured confidentiality and anonymity as required. Throughout the findings, quotations have been used from the interviews, each interviewee was assigned a number, and a small profile was written up to accompany each interviewee to provide some context (*Appendix G*).

It is important to acknowledge my own positionality and how this may impact the research being undertaken. The claims I make within this research are made while acknowledging that I am a white Irish woman completing a piece of research for my PhD thesis with a focus on how feminist SMOs mobilise in response to VAW in Argentina and Ireland. I live in Ireland and have attended protests and meetings held by ROSA in the past and this is important to acknowledge within this research. The insider/outsider identity within the literature recognises broadly that inside researchers identify with the group under study and outside researchers do not identify with the group under study (Breen 2007; Shaw et al 2020). It is evident that 'researcher positionality and the researcher's status as an insider/outsider has implications for the topics we choose to study, the way we do research and engage with our research participants, how we analyse our data, and how we communicate our findings' (Shaw et al 2020:290). Ideally, it is important to gain a familiarity with participants within the study while also maintaining a suitable distance to reflect critically on my own position. I made every effort to understand each SMO in their own unique political and socio-economic setting.

The activists I interviewed from Ni Una Menos were of mixed Mestizo and European backgrounds, primarily from Argentina, and had participated in Ni Una Menos mobilisations. However, it's important to note that these individuals are mostly college-educated, English-speaking migrants from Argentina and Uruguay now residing in Dublin, suggesting a middle-class background. Consequently, this group is not fully representative of the broader SMO, as poorer, working-class, and indigenous voices are underrepresented in this study. This limitation arises from several factors, including my inability to travel to Argentina due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which hindered my ability to establish more connections there.

Additionally, my own Spanish language skills are not advanced enough to communicate with someone who does not have a good level of English. I would like to acknowledge that this is a limitation of mine as a researcher, not of the potential interviewees.   Although I have previously visited Argentina, it was not for research purposes. My knowledge of Argentina and Ni Una Menos primarily stems from researching the SMO through online analysis and discussions with activists and Latin American individuals who have been involved with Ni Una Menos. In other studies, on Ni Una Menos, some of the more well-known activists from Ni Una Menos have been interviewed multiple times whereas this study focused on these activists who I gained access to, in part because the majority are living in Ireland and have participated in Ni Una Menos SMO activity in Argentina. The activists I interviewed from ROSA were members with diverse backgrounds and experiences. I cannot specify their racial or ethnic backgrounds as this would compromise anonymity, as this is a much smaller collective than Ni Una Menos.   It is important to note that they are key organisers and activists within the SMO, playing significant roles in the protest event discussed in this study. Although I have attended ROSA events and protests in the past, I am not an active member of ROSA. Additionally, I am not affiliated with the Socialist Party and do not have any official political ties. From my discussions with ROSA activists, it is clear that being a member of the Socialist Party or identifying as a socialist is not a requirement for participating in their events or protests. While they do advocate from a socialist feminist and explicitly anti-capitalist perspective, they do not exclude individuals or groups who do not identify as socialists.

I do believe that my ability to interview these activists was bolstered by the fact that I was comparing Ni Una Menos to ROSA. It is evident that Ni Una Menos activists as well as other Latin American collectives often collaborate with ROSA on annual days of protest e.g.

International Women's Day (8 March) or International Elimination of Violence Against Women Day (25 Nov). Latin American collectives in Dublin participate in their own culturally specific activities and create new ones within the Irish context but also collaborate with ROSA on occasion. A couple of the Ni Una Menos activists commented on ROSA in Ireland, although they acknowledge differences in their own activities, they did see alignments with the types of activities that ROSA engage with in their mobilisations.

There is a relationship between researcher positionality and ethical work that takes place when conducting research in the social world which focuses on sensitive topics or vulnerable people (Shaw, Howe, Beazer & Carr 2020). I have been influenced by feminist phenomenological approaches to qualitative research and understand the importance of acknowledging my own positionality. The experiences social movement activists are filtered in part through my own experiences and understanding of mobilisations, however, my own identity does not eclipse the experiences of research participants. It is vital that feminist researchers make considerations regarding reflexivity and incorporate it into the research process. It has been widely argued by feminist researchers that it is vital to consider how the author of the research is positioned within the research process (Stanley & Wise 1993; Letherby 2003). It is also important to adopt an intersectional lens as the respondents and the researcher have different experiences of the world in relation to identity – gender, race, ethnicity, class etc. and there may be power imbalances present as the researcher ultimately has control over the data obtained during interview (Ramazanoglu, 1989; Stacey 1991; Letherby 2003).

I had a distress protocol in place to manage any potential distress among interviewees during the interview. In the event of this occurring, the protocol included providing interviewees

with information on support resources and ensuring that they could pause or stop the interview at any time if they felt uncomfortable. These reassurances were particularly important when interviewing Micaela's childhood friend, as discussing the mobilisations that occurred after her death could be challenging given their close relationship. I emphasised to this participant that the interview was focused on understanding how the SMO mobilised and was not an interrogation. I assured them that they could choose not to discuss any topic and we could move on at any point. This preliminary discussion was crucial, as it helped the participant feel comfortable and open, allowing them to provide valuable insights due to their proximity to Micaela, her family, and her community.

One of the ways I tried to give agency to the interviewees was to send them the quotations I used within my research along with context to check if they felt it was representative of what they meant. It is important to recognise that as a researcher, you are not intellectually superior to the respondents, however, it is important to highlight the privileges afforded to you as someone who has been trained in a discipline and involved in a process of interpretation (Stanley & Wise 1993; 2003; Letherby 2002). It is evident that PhD students as researchers have a certain amount of social privilege and access that others do not have (Millen 1997). My epistemological position as a feminist researcher lies in the understanding that my own positionality and subjectivity play a role in the research. However, I have tried to contextualise this research, in as much as is possible, in a framework which argues that the ways in which feminist SMOs respond to acts of VAW requires attention given the role social movements play in influencing changes to policy in State institutions. My research questions were purposively constructed to ask social movement actors about their own experience of mobilisation in response to VAW. Although I do not argue that a feminist

SMO's only role is to influence policy or reforms, I do argue that this process requires

analysis and is an important focus for social movement and VAW literature.

In conclusion, this Chapter outlined the methodological approach in this study. The

conceptual framework described within this Chapter will be applied within the next four

Chapters and are organised as follows: Chapter 6 (Political Opportunities), Chapter 7

(Mobilising Structures), Chapter 8 (Framing Processes) and Chapter 9 (Political Outcomes of

SMO Activity).

Chapter 6 - Political Opportunities: Analysis

This Chapter will focus on political opportunities as they relate to the '*Justicia para Micaela*' (Justice for Micaela) protests in Argentina and the *'I Believe Her'* protests in Ireland. Mc Adam et al (1996) draw our attention towards the significance of political opportunities, that is, to changes in the political system that make it 'more receptive' or 'more vulnerable' to protest impact. They encourage the analysis of available political opportunity as a structure which may shape the form and timing of collective action (McAdam et al 1996:10). In this Chapter, five dimensions of political opportunity, will organise the analysis; changing political alignments, the presence of influential allies, access of new actors to the institutionalised political system, State repression, and policymaking capacity of the State (McAdam 1996:27; McAdam & Tarrow 2019:25-26). These dimensions of political opportunity are useful in relation to examining the form and timing of the *Justicia para Micaela* and *I Believe Her* protests in each national context.

Changing Political Alignments

The changing levels of stability/instability in relation to political alignments can facilitate the emergence of a movement or group who are in opposition to the ruling party or to the hegemonic discourse present in the polity. When there is disruption in the government structure then this can be taken advantage of by movement actors. For there to be shifts in political alignments, there often must be some sort of 'destabilizing event' which disrupts the status quo and makes room for the emergence of SMOs (McAdam & Tarrow 2019:27). Two core destabilizing events that occurred in these national contexts were economic crises and the re-emergence of the reproductive rights movement in each country. Economic crises created disruption and had long-term effects on the lives of women in each context, in Argentina (2001) and in Ireland (2008). The re-emergence of the Reproductive Rights

Movement in each country also disrupted the status quo, in Argentina (2018) and in Ireland (2013).

6.1 Changing Political Alignments in Argentinian Context

Ni Una Menos' emergence in 2015 was during a time where right-wing political parties were starting to gain power again in Latin America, signalling an end to what was known as the 'Pink Tide', where Latin American countries began electing left-leaning governments after the authoritarian regimes and neoliberal models set up in the 1990s. The military dictatorship that ruled Argentina from 1976-1983 had long term effects on the socio-economic, political, and emotional lives of its citizens and since its return to democracy it has undergone changes to modes of collective action in response to social conflict (Gamallo 2020). From 1983-2001, neo-liberal economic policies were prominent in Argentinian society, with an increase in privatisation of public services with much of Argentina's economy built on foreign direct investment, particularly from the United States (Cantamutto & Wainer 2013). Between 1999 and 2002, Argentina had five different presidents, de la Rúa (10 Dec 1999 - 21 Dec 2001), Puerta (21-23 December 2001), Saá (23-30 Dec 2001), Camaño (31 Dec 2001 - 2 Jan 2002) and Duhalde (2 Jan 2002 - 25 May 2003). In the midst of these presidencies, a devastating financial crash occurred in Argentina, which peaked in 2001, leaving many people losing their jobs and homes; those hit hardest were the middle classes, and the poor (Lopez-Levy 2017:59).

Despite this collapse, Argentina's economy did grow exponentially from 2002 – 2011, which was overseen by the Kirchners' respective presidencies. From 2003- 2015, Argentina had two presidents, husband and wife, the Kirchners, who served consecutively, Nestor Kirchner from 2003 to 2007 (died in 2008) and Cristina Kirchner from 2007-2015. Both were

members of the centre-left Peronist electoral alliance, *Frente para la Victoria* (Front for Victory) and Peronist political party, *Partido Justicialista* (Justicialist Party). Nestor Kirchner on his arrival to office formed alliances with academics, left-leaning individuals, trade unions, SMOs and social movements, particularly the *Madres de Plaza de Mayo* (Mothers of Plaza de Mayo) (Lopez Levy 2017).   He also formed alliances with some of the organisations with roots in the Unemployed Workers Movement (often referred to as the '*piqueteros'* (picketers)). They had within their movement groups who were more 'reformist' and others that would be more 'contestatory' (Kaese & Wolff 2016:51). Argentina was affected by the international financial crash of 2008, but not as much as other countries throughout the globe.   After Cristina Kirchner became President (2007-2011), an anti-Kirchnerist sentiment began to grow, in part due to protests that occurred in response to government increasing fees on grain exports, that was met with resistance from the agrarian exporters but also the traditionally anti-Peronist urban middle class.   Also, the effects of the international economic crises increased the pressure on the ruling party, *Frente para la Victoria* (Front for Victory), in the midterm elections in 2009 when it lost control of Congress (Gamallo 2020).

Ni Una Menos emerged in June 2015 towards the end of the Presidency of Cristina Kirchner. Mauricio Macri, a centre-right politician, and leader of the political party, *Propuesta Republicana* (Republican Proposal), was voted in as President in December 2015 and saw the re-emergence of a neoliberal right-wing conservatism. However, Macri's was a more modern form of conservatism than the past and his party stood on Ni Una Menos platforms. It has been argued that when Macri announced to open a debate on abortion in Congress in 2018 that 'In *La Nación*…an article published on March 2 speculated that "it wasn't just that the President was motivated by calls from within his party in the legislature . . . [it was that]

feminism, through massive mobilizations and growing public adhesion to its demands, had provided a roadmap" (Ini 2018)' (Daby & Moseley 2022:374). These 'massive mobilisations' were led by Ni Una Menos, who were able to facilitate an awakening, and made possible conversations regarding VAW, femicide specifically, that otherwise would not have been had. Additionally, the reproductive rights movement in Argentina began to re-ignite because this movement placed feminism and gender on the political agenda.

> 'I would like to give a bit of context about how this started and how this boom of Ni Una Menos happened because it was during the time in Argentina, where progress in Latin America, not only Argentina, but particularly Argentina was on the centre of the agenda. We came after ten years of continued progress in government, through improvement, for the first time a woman was elected President, because we had a woman before, but she was not elected actually, so this was the first time. In those days where Ni Una Menos was made possible to be born…. Ni Una Menos kind of boomed and exploded, and it was a huge, massive success and allowed a couple of years later for the campaign for the legalisation of abortion to actually happen… because we have to sell or put the idea of feminism in the political and societal agenda.' (MUNUM02)

> 'Women have traditionally not accessed politics, even the left, you were a militant of the movement but with a class perspective, not with a gender or intersectional perspective… so I think feminism is key in the electoral agenda, before it wasn't. Now it's a very important topic.' (MUNUM05)

Historically, there have been fluctuations in the feminist movement within Argentina regarding struggles which directly affect women. In the early 1970s, *Frente de Lucha para la Mujer* (Front for Women's Struggles) conducted demonstrations regarding contraceptives, abortion access as well as other issues affecting women including unpaid labour, childcare, and LGBT rights. The military dictatorship from 1976-1983 ushered in an extreme right-wing Catholic fundamentalism that set back gender equity and the rights of women over their bodies in a dramatic way. This was to change with re-democratization in 1983 when a political opening also created the space for social mobilizations and a reassertion of the rights of women. With the return of political parties and the trade unions, social movements also revived not least the women's movement.

It was at one of the *Encuentros*, a crucial structure in Argentinian feminist advocacy, in 2003, where the green scarf first began to be used as a symbol signalling support for abortion rights (Sutton & Borland 2013). Governments throughout the 1990s, 2000s, and even the presidencies of the left-leaning Kirchner did not properly address the issue of abortion (Lopez-Levy 2017). Even though the reproductive rights SMO, *Campaña Nacional por el Derecho al Aborto Legal, Seguro y Gratuito* (National Campaign for Legal, Safe and Free Abortion) was established in 2005. The Catholic Church has an influence within Argentinian society, this may be especially true now as the current Pope is from Argentina, Pope Francis (Jorge Mario Bergoglio). It is evident that there is an overlap between politics and religion in Argentinian society, especially within public policy which may go against the Church's ethos, e.g., reproductive rights (Esquivel 2016). The Catholic Church reinforces ideas about women being subordinate and fulfilling the role of mother and wife within the household, not as autonomous individuals. The legalisation of abortion is against the Church's ethos, to the point that they even do not condone abortion even if the woman's life was in danger (Rabbia and Ruata 2014).

In 2018, a campaign was started called *Iglesia y Estado asunto Separado* (The Separation of the Church and State) in response to both the negative influence on the abortion legislation debate and the controversy surrounding the State using substantial amounts of public funds which were being used to pay bishops. A more liberal form of Catholic thinking has emerged in recent years which has changed the relationship between Church and State. However, still the Church has historically had considerable influence on decisions in Congress and the Senate, the Church opposed the laws on Divorce in 1987, Comprehensive Sexual Education in 2006, Same-Sex Marriage in 2010 and Abortion Legislation in 2018 and 2020 (Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy).

The *Campaña Nacional por el Derecho al Aborto Legal, Seguro y Gratuito* (National

Campaign for Legal, Safe and Free Abortion) had submitted bills to Congress for

consideration annually since 2007.   However, it was not until after the emergence of Ni Una

Menos and the centring of gender back into the legislative agenda, that the fight to

decriminalise abortion in Argentina took hold. As discussed above, President Macri

announced that the debate could happen in 2018, and a month's long national debate occurred

(Daby & Moseley 2022:9). Ni Una Menos' influence could be seen inside Congress where

the legislation was being discussed, as many politicians wore green scarves on their arms in

solidarity, often ending their contribution with 'Ni Una Menos!'. The legislation was passed

in the Argentinian Congress, at 129 for and 125 against decriminalisation, however, in

August 2018, this bill did not pass through the Argentinian Senate. When centre-left

politician Alberto Fernández was elected President in 2019, he promised, as part of his

campaign, to send another bill to Congress. Due to the Covid-19 outbreak in March 2020,

there was a delay in this legislation, it eventually passed in Congress and the Senate in

December 2020.   Both the *Encuentros* and the *Campaña Nacional por el Derecho al Aborto

Legal, Seguro y Gratuito* (National Campaign for Legal, Safe and Free Abortion) would

prove to be important allies for Ni Una Menos, which will be discussed later in this Chapter.

6.1.1 Changing Political Alignments in Irish Context

There have been changes in political alignments within Ireland over the past few decades.

Historically, Ireland has been considered a Catholic country with strong connections between

Church and State and this relationship has had damning consequences on the lives of women

in Ireland. Abortion in Ireland had been prohibited since 1861 and although the creation of

the Irish Free State in 1922 signalled a move forward in the lives of Irish people, it is evident

that the influence of Catholic doctrine became more pronounced in Irish society, which

restricted women's rights in many areas, including divorce, contraception, and reproductive healthcare. In line with the Irish Constitution, women's role in society was limited to wives, homemakers, and mothers. The constitutional prohibition on divorce in the 1937 Constitution did not allow women to leave their marriage, no matter how unhappy or abusive, and this was not lifted until a referendum in 1995. Divorce was legalised in Ireland in 1995 through a Referendum with a close margin, 50.28% in favour of legalisation and 49.72% against. The Marriage Bar created in 1932 required single women who were civil servants to quit their jobs once they were married and banned married women from joining the permanent civil service. This bar was not lifted until 1973, when European law made it illegal to discriminate on the grounds of marital status or gender.

The criminalisation of contraception in 1935 left women unable to regulate how many children they gave birth to. It was not until a provision, spurred on by the actions of the IWLM, within the Health (Family Planning) Act 1979 that contraceptives were available to women dispensed by a pharmacist but only with a medical prescription from a practising doctor. This provision came into force in 1980, providing women with legal access to contraception through pharmacies. In 1985, further amendments to the law liberalized access to contraceptives in Ireland. This included allowing individuals over 18 to purchase condoms and spermicides without a prescription, providing greater autonomy and accessibility in family planning. In the 1980s and 1990s, religion became a more divisive issue in politics and social life. In 1983, the Eighth Amendment was added to the Irish Constitution through a Referendum vote. This amendment granted the unborn fetus an equal right to life as the pregnant woman, effectively prohibiting abortion in Ireland. The referendum passed with 841,233 in favor and 416,136 against. It was not only illegal to have an abortion, but it was

illegal to provide information about abortions or how to access one. Although no woman was ever prosecuted, there was a 14-year jail sentence threatened if they were to end their own pregnancy.

In the 1990s, the widespread public demonstrations and outcry following a landmark legal case in 1992, known as the X case, as described in Chapter 1, Section 1.2, which involved a 14-year-old girl, referred to as "X," who became pregnant as a result of rape and sought an abortion, was crucial in energising the Reproductive Rights Movement in Ireland. The Supreme Court's ruling, which allowed for abortion in cases where there was a "real and substantial risk" to the mother's life, including the risk of suicide, exposed the deficiencies of the existing laws and further propelled activism (Fitzsimons 2021). The X case was a pivotal moment in Ireland's Reproductive Rights Movement, leading to significant legal and social changes and setting the stage for further debates and reforms.

The legalisation of male homosexuality in Ireland in the 1990s was a significant milestone in the country's journey towards equality and human rights. The push for decriminalisation gained momentum in the 1970s and 1980s, influenced by broader global movements for LGBT rights and significant legal challenges within Ireland. A pivotal moment came with the European Court of Human Rights ruling in the case of David Norris v. Ireland in 1988. David Norris, an Irish senator and gay rights activist, had challenged the criminalisation of homosexuality, arguing that it violated his right to privacy. The Court ruled in Norris's favour, stating that Ireland's laws were incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. Following the European Court's decision, Ireland faced increasing pressure

to reform its laws. The eventual change came with the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993, which decriminalized consensual homosexual acts between men aged 17 and older, aligning the age of consent for homosexual acts with that for heterosexual acts. This legislative change marked a significant shift in Irish society, reflecting broader changes in public attitudes towards homosexuality. The decriminalisation of male homosexuality was part of a broader movement towards greater recognition and protection of LGBT rights in Ireland. It laid the groundwork for further advancements, including anti-discrimination laws, civil partnerships, and eventually the legalisation of same-sex marriage in 2015 through a historic referendum.

The success of the Marriage Equality referendum in 2015 was a critical milestone that evidenced changing societal attitudes towards LGBTQ+ rights and broader issues of equality and personal autonomy. This campaign was marked by its grassroots activism, public engagement, and widespread support, setting a precedent for subsequent social movements in Ireland. The Marriage Equality Movement can be seen as a precursor to the Repeal the 8th campaign, providing a template for successful activism. The Reproductive Rights Movement similar to the Marriage Equality Movement shared strategies such as harnessing social media, engaging in door-to-door canvassing, and building broad coalitions across different segments of society. These approaches were crucial in shifting public opinion and challenging the traditional influence of the Catholic Church in Irish society. The Repeal the 8th campaign, which culminated in the 2018 referendum, was influenced by the momentum and organisational lessons learned from the Marriage Equality Movement. The success of these referendums demonstrated a continued shift in public attitudes but also reflected a broader trend of the diminishing influence of the Church on political and social issues in Ireland.

One activist pointed to the relationship between Church and State as important to consider when analysing decisions made by those in government. In Ireland, it is evident that the State have deep ties with the Catholic Church. The Church is still a big landowner within Ireland, it was reported that within the Ryan Report 'published in November 2009, found that the assets, including land, declared by the 18 congregations had a total value then of €3.743 billion (mostly based on valuations made for insurance reasons). Property declared did not include all assets held by the congregations.' (McGarry 2021). The Church is a landowner and present in vital social institutions within the country, particularly the education and healthcare systems.

> 'Obviously, capitalism is all pervasive but the nature of capitalism in Ireland is so weak, so sort of, they're so neoliberal. So many of these things that are huge problems for working-class women, particularly the housing crisis, the childcare crisis, they just have no actual view - that you can just have public housing or public childcare. They have to privatise it all in a way that's just a complete mess and can never deliver for needs, ever, and also, it's a complete waste of public money. But similar to the Church, it's gotten to that stage with the Church, that they (*State*) probably would like to have more moving and a better, more progressive, provocative direction with less Church influence, but they do not want to take them on and it's this very concrete economic fact that the Church is a massive landowner in the State.' (MUROSA04)

After the re-emergence of the Reproductive Rights Movement in the mid-2010s, cleavages in power were apparent, as even some of the most historically conservative politicians changed their view about the issue of abortion. Through interviews with the activists present at this time, who were actively campaigning for reproductive rights and following the decision-making of establishment politicians very closely, one activist argued that the decision to 'change' position by centre-right TD and future Taoiseach, Micheál Martin, was a strategic political move.

> 'One of the things in Repeal that we did, was we made points about the political establishment… We feel now that a narrative has emerged in the post-Marriage Equality victory, post-Repeal victory, world of the State, that makes it out that there were some campaigners, they had to fight for this, but that really it was that they

campaigned and then they eventually changed the minds of the establishment politicians, who were slow, but they just needed some time. They needed a little bit of pressure, a little bit convincing, and now they're on board. That is just completely understating the degree to which the political establishment has to be fought, to win these rights, especially repealing abortion, to be honest. Then it's also their default position to be conservative, like whatever, forget about their personal views. Some of them, even the ones who had a personal (*position/view*), Micheál Martin was known for having a personal, very strong anti-abortion, anti-choice stance, but he shifted, and he actually <u>had</u> to shift for political reasons, for the sake of the party of Fianna Fáil. It was really, even now it's still damaged from the amount of politicians who were so ambiguous or clearly anti-choice in the Referendum, despite them officially having a yes position. So, he had to change, so forget about their personal views. The truth is, that their default position is to be conservative.' (MUROSA04)

The campaign to Repeal the Eighth Amendment which would allow for legislation on abortion to be created, passed by referendum on 25th May 2018, with 1,429,981 in favour and 723,632 against, two months before the *I Believe Her* protests. This shift in attitude towards reproductive health in Irish society signalled that the Church's influence in social and 'moral' issues was no longer as strong. In addition to these changes in relation to reproductive rights and divorce, the publication of reports such as the Ferns Report in 2005 which detailed clerical abuse of children in Ireland from 1962-2002, and the stories of women from the Magdalene Laundries who were imprisoned, forced into unpaid labour and subjected to sexual, psychological and physical violence, further cemented the changing attitudes towards the Catholic Church in Ireland. In 2019, another Referendum regarding divorce occurred, 82.1% of voters voted in favour of liberalising divorce laws in Ireland.

According to Marsh (2021), party attachment has declined from the 1970s to the 1990s, and the ideological position, i.e., right-left positioning, has shifted from centre-right in the 1970s to the centre in 2011. Additionally, there has been a steep decline in religious observance (Marsh 2021:561). In Ireland, the economic boom, known as the 'Celtic Tiger' during the

mid-1990s to early 2000s resulted in an economic crash in 2008, which resulted in many families slipping into poverty. The party system in Ireland became fragmented after the economic crisis in 2008. The devastating impact of the crash on women's lives and their home and financial security was also particularly evident in their employment.   Devaluing of care labour in the home and female dominated jobs such as nursing and midwifery became evident (Spillane 2015).   In the Irish Budget 2012, there were cuts to caring and disability benefits, the National Women's Council of Ireland (NWCI) had funding cut by 35% prioritising frontline services and not focusing as much on advocacy and agency, women's refuges and domestic violence shelters had funding cut by 40% (Murphy 2015). The policy to separate advocacy from service provision makes Ireland an outlier in European social policy and civil society and means national and local women's groups are dealing with funding cut-backs, and continued reliance of women on these services (Harvey 2014: 40). Women's organisations which deal with VAW took a huge hit in relation to funding of Rape Crisis Centres and Domestic Violence Centres. This lack of jobs and services including counselling left women who are in abusive relationships unable to escape them as they did not have access to support (Spillane 2015). The austerity measures taken after the crisis resulted in a mistrust of political parties in power, given the effects of increased taxation and cuts in public spending which are most detrimental to the poor and working-class in society. The re-emergence of the reproductive rights movement in 2013 alongside the rise of a working-class anti-austerity movement i.e., the Anti-Water Charges Movement in 2014 pointed to the relationship between institutionalised politics and protest.

In relation to voting, the Irish voter's behaviour has transitioned from 'party attachment, ideological positioning, and religious observance' (Marsh 2021:561). According to the findings of Muller & Regan (2021) there was a growing trend of the average Irish voter self-

identifying on the centre-left in the 2000s and 2010s, particularly among lower earners, contrasting with past right-leaning tendencies of the average Irish voter in the 1980s. Significant changes in leadership occurred in two political parties in Ireland in 2017 and 2018. In the centre-right Fine Gael party, Leo Varadkar became leader of Fine Gael and Taoiseach in 2017. In the centre-left Sinn Féin party, Mary Lou McDonald became leader of the Sinn Féin party in February 2018, succeeding Gerry Adams who was leader of Sinn Fein for 34 years. In the general election in Ireland in February 2020, centre-left party Sinn Fein became the 'largest party by vote share for the for the first time, failing to become the largest party in the Dáil (lower house) because it underestimated its own electoral potential and selected too few candidates' (Little 2021:714). The party system at this time (2020) was highly fragmented and the two main centre-right parties Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil refused to form a government with Sinn Féin and instead formed along with the centre-left Green Party, a three-party coalition. The shifts in political alignments signalled that parties which were once considered more conservative have shifted to being more socially liberal due to changes in society regarding social issues while remaining neoliberal in their outlook regarding economic policy.

6.1.2 Comparison of Changing Political Alignments in Argentinian and Irish context and how they relate to *Justicia para Micaela* and *I Believe Her* Protest

During the period (2016-2020) where the two protest events took place, in Argentina, there seemed to be a move towards a right-wing 'modern' form of conservatism in the political system during Macri's presidency (2016-2021). Whereas in Ireland, there was a push towards a more liberal positioning signalling a more tolerant social mood, as the Catholic Church lost much of the influence they once had in social and moral matters e.g., referendums on Marriage Equality (2015), and Repealing the Eighth Amendment from the Irish Constitution (2018), resulting in the legalisation of same-sex marriage, and making way

for reproductive rights legislation. During times of social upheaval, tension within the household and within the workplace is exacerbated and the imbalance of power is highlighted. The economic crashes in Argentina and Ireland are the result of a capitalist system, which is characterised by neoliberal policies. These policies deepened income inequality and led to financial ruin which hurt poorer people the most. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO) (2013) study, there is a correlation between poverty and gender violence, this poverty includes the stress that accompanies economic downturn for working-class families, alongside the removal of State services. The lack of infrastructure and increased privatisation of public services which is in large part due to neoliberal austerity policies leaves people in extremely dire situations when there is any sort of economic downturn or an unprecedented health crisis.

> 'In relation to the issue of violence against women, we think it's impossible to solve it solely under legislation in a capitalist State, and particularly a neoliberal State that loves to not spend money on social services. But it's a bit more that people can't grasp exactly what would be required to make a difference here, and therefore, long term activism can be more difficult.' (MUROSA06)

During the financial crashes in Argentina in 2001 and in Ireland in 2008, there was a rise in intimate partner violence. The women from the *Piquetero/as* Movement in Argentina, noted that during times of economic upheaval, incidences of domestic violence increased (Chejter 2004). In Ireland, there was a 21% rise in women seeking help from domestic violence services in 2008, that rose again in 2009. At the start of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, VAW increased dramatically throughout the world, what was termed the 'shadow pandemic' (UN Women 2020). It is well established that one in three women will experience physical, sexual, or psychological violence in their lifetime and during the pandemic, violence within in the home increased exponentially, with domestic violence hotlines and services overwhelmed. This is particularly evident in the Global South, including Latin American countries, where poverty and lack of access to resources furthered this inequality for already

vulnerable and marginalised people (Al-Ali 2020). It is evident that local realities for women in Argentina and Ireland are mediated by global influences, particularly in economic downturn when capitalist structures are shown to be ineffective in helping individuals who rely on social services.

The changes to the political landscape within Argentina contributed to the protests that happened in response to the femicide of Micaela. These protests occurred one month after the International Women's Strike on 8 March 2017 and a year and a half into the presidency of Mauricio Macri and the presence of a centre-right government in power in Argentina. Ni Una Menos brought the issue of gender and femicide into the discourse and became a key talking point for political parties and politicians. The issue of social class and poverty was at the forefront of political discourse after the economic crash in 2001, the growing discussions on gender and femicide, and the engagement of young people, particularly young women, forced the political parties to engage too, providing an opportunity for the Reproductive Rights Movement to be re-ignited.

The changes to the political landscape within Ireland contributed to the protests that occurred in response to the Belfast Trial, particularly the rise of the Reproductive Rights Movement. The political discourse was revolving around gender and women, more specifically women's bodies, and the autonomy they do/do not have over them. The changing attitudes towards the Catholic Church and the more left-leaning attitudes of the citizens of the State meant that political alignments had to shift in order for those in power to stay relevant.   The timing of when these protests occurred (March 2018) is important to note, the Reproductive Rights Movement was at the height of movement activity and had brought many new actors into the polity.

'That idea of, we have two months (*until the Referendum*), knuckle down, and get into this work, meant that people were just talking about politics. They were thinking about, 'Yeah, I'm going to put aside five hours this week to be knocking on doors for abortion rights' and then when a protest like this comes up, you think, yes, okay, 'I'm going to put two hours action into that instead. This is essential.' So, I think timing is everything. We can't replicate - that exact timing won't ever happen again. But I think whenever more intense political discussions are happening generally in society, that just raises the calibre of political discussions all over the place.' (MUROSA06)

Influential Allies

Although there are those who are considered 'insiders' and 'outsiders' within a polity, there are intermediary actors who can assist movements in facilitating change and their influence cannot be underestimated (McAdam & Tarrow 2019:26; Tilly 1978). The presence of influential allies assists with mobilisations as well as increases the access to the institutionalised political system. According to Tarrow (1998), the presence of influential allies is important in relation to mobilisation of this kind, as they increase the legitimacy of the movement and may facilitate access to State institutions. Ni Una Menos, since its emergence, gained several influential allies both within and outside State institutions, who have considerable influence within the political and social sphere in Argentina. ROSA have also gained many influential allies since their emergence but primarily outside State institutions and at a slower pace than Ni Una Menos. Feminist actors are often either working in a policy/advocacy or grassroots/activist space in their efforts to combat VAW, many social movement actors occupy both spaces (Cohen 2022). It is evident that Ni Una Menos and ROSA have had the ability to occupy both spaces and to be a more radical voice within the State, particularly in relation to the issue of VAW and the *Justicia para Micaela* and *I Believe Her* protests. The allies that Ni Una Menos and ROSA have garnered is also reflected in their mobilising structures, which will be discussed further in Chapter Seven, but in the following section I examine their allies.

Ni Una Menos emerged as a SMO with a core demand on the issue of VAW, more specifically femicide, the demand being 'stop killing women'. This initial stance was not a divisive statement and therefore allies could be found both within and outside of State institutions. A variety of external allies began to emerge early on in Ni Una Menos' case.

> At their first demonstration on 3 June 2015, 'major civil society organizations, including La Casa del Encuentro and the National Campaign for Legal, Safe and Free Abortion' as well as 'smaller civil society groups, some defending the victims of femicide and others LGBT causes, student groups, the Buenos Aires Universities Federation (FUBA), cultural centers, groups of theater actors, women's groups from different regions, etc.' were in attendance (Annunziata 2016:56).

The initial group of prominent journalists and artists that came together under the name 'Ni Una Menos' had significant social networks and connections with the media which facilitated the proliferation of the movement activity throughout both traditional and digital media (social media platforms) (Friedman & Tabbush 2016). This allyship helped to boost the profile of the movement throughout Argentina and quickly throughout Latin America. Allies are not just in the political sphere but those in the sporting and entertainment world as well. For example, Lionel Messi, world-renowned Argentinian football player, posted his support for Ni Una Menos at their initial march on 3 June 2015 and artists including famous actors and singers also signalled their support for the SMO early on. An NGO known as the *La Casa del Encuentro* (The Meeting House), established in 2003, compiled their own statistics on the rates of femicide in Argentina starting in 2008. In 2013, these statistics were published and are responsible for the statistic most associated with femicide in Argentina, that a woman is killed every 35 hours. This work was built on by Ni Una Menos after their emergence in 2015.   This collaboration was vital for understanding the rate of femicide in Argentina.   One of the founders of *La Casa del Encuentro* (The Meeting House), Fabiana

Tunez, became the President of the National Council of Women under the Macri government from 2015-2019.

It is evident that mainstream traditional media played a pivotal role in the beginning of the movement during the time when Kirchner was President (2007-2015). Luengo argued that 'taking the protection of women's rights (under the label 'femicide') as a master frame (Benford, 2013; Benford and Snow, 2000; Cannata, 2016), the media discourse had the ability to encompass a broad spectrum of institutions, political parties, and social movements, integrating different political ideologies in a larger frame unit of the public discourse. The #NotOneLess media discourse could have become a question of being for or against the government of Cristina Kirchner. But in the event, no such division manifested itself. The march was neither governmental nor oppositional (2018:412).' One activist interviewed believes that during this time, the media were much more supportive of the movement and its aims. However, they suggest that the media tried to put the blame for the violence at the feet of Kirchner, when in fact the blame was being put at the whole society and the State.

> 'I think back then, especially the media, also played a huge role. This is my personal belief, I don't know if it's checked, but there was a huge intention from mainstream media to turn this into something against the government of Cristina Kirchner. Back then, which was quite obvious if you ask me, everything that happened in Argentina back then, and after she left government and before, everything that is wrong, is because of her, in that mainstream space. Everything is linked to her, and her government, but no one is surprised since she was the only female President. But I think that backfired because they gave so much (*attention*) to these women going to the streets because of this violence. I don't think they expected this, and no one was actually saying 'the President should be doing something', no one was talking to the President, we were talking to society and the State, we actually marched to Congress, to government.' (MUNUM02)

This interviewee argues that initially, the traditional news media were much more reliable and supportive of the SMO, and it is where activists would get information regarding

movement activity. However, she argues, once Macri became President at the end of 2015 (2015-2019), the mainstream media's narrative regarding Ni Una Menos changed. According to this activist the narrative transformed from describing women taking to the streets demanding a stop to violence as positive, to a more negative take on women who were themselves being violent and destroying public property.

> 'It changed a lot when Macri came into government and then it was the mainstream media saying 'oh look at these women across the country… they're very violent because they're destroying public statues', for example, which is like one scratch or just one graffiti on one street in Parliament saying 'stop killing us.' This is my personal opinion, but I was there and have this background so I can give you that context.' (MUNUM02)

Also, according to this activist, the media initially appeared to support Ni Una Menos while also targeting Kirchner. However, when Macri came to power, they supported characterizations of Ni Una Menos, and the women participating in protest activity, as dangerous. This shift in narrative from the traditional media emphasizes how the media can act as both a powerful and influential external ally, and as an arm of the State.

During the first national women's strike named *Miércoles Negro* (Black Wednesday) which was held in Argentina after the brutal femicide of Lucia Perez in October 2016, one particularly important external influential ally came in the form of the *Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT)* - (General Confederation of Labour). Through consultation with their Gender Secretary, they facilitated female workers' participation in the national women's strike, organised by Ni Una Menos, which consisted of a one hour pause from work or study. They also helped to spread information on a vital piece of legislation created in 2009 - Law 26,485 on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women. This

strike facilitated discussions between union representatives and members of Ni Una Menos and other feminist organisations (Rodríguez 2020:168).

There is a long-standing tradition of social and political activism within Argentina. The *Madres de Plaza de Mayo* (Mothers of Plaza de Mayo) are emblematic of the human rights movement in Argentina who demonstrated during a military dictatorship. The *Madres de Plaza de Mayo* (Mothers of Plaza de Mayo) was initially a single-issue campaign but have since developed their influence into different campaigns, the one common thread is their opposition to State violence. Like Ni Una Menos, they offer a damning critique of the State, particularly of the State's complicity in the violence that women experience as well as its austerity policies which negatively affected their lives (Chenou & Cepeda 2019). The *Madres de Plaza de Mayo* (Mothers of Plaza de Mayo) have been one of Ni Una Menos' most important allies and influences, as their position in Argentinian culture is of such importance. The 'green wave' which struck in 2018 in the revitalised fight for reproductive rights became symbolised with green scarves (initially used by those involved in the *Encuentros*), which is a tribute to the Madres de Plaza de Mayo, who wore white headscarves.

The networks that Ni Una Menos have been able to form are based on the ability of individuals with different identities coalescing around a common purpose, despite differences in gender identity, ethnicity, class, race, sexuality etc. This common purpose has allowed people within the SMO to rise above some of the more contentious issues that occur in feminist spaces. An important note is that initially, there were people using the phrase 'Ni Una Menos' who would identify as pro-choice and pro-life, two groups you rarely see

standing side by side or being part of the same collective. However, this waned over the years as the conversation regarding reproductive rights became more polarized, 2020 was a particularly polarised year. The existence of influential allies in the Argentinian context, laid the foundation for Ni Una Menos to flourish. Although influential allies are often seen as external to the SMO (Ni Una Menos has a non-hierarchical structure and no defined leader) there are many ways in which individuals and groups use the slogan 'Ni Una Menos' and therefore there are external groups who use the phrase but are part of their own movement/political party/union/collective (Lopez 2020).

> 'There's not a leader… We don't have a queen of universal feminism, it's everywhere, it's in the singers, it's in the researcher, it's in the actress, it's in the militant, it's everywhere, it's in the professional, it's in the teacher, it's everywhere.' (MUNUM05)

This ability of Ni Una Menos to stretch across diverse groups is particularly relevant to the case of Micaela Garcia, who was herself an activist linked to Ni Una Menos and the *Movimiento Evita* (Evita Movement). The *Movimiento Evita* (Evita Movement) and the JP Evita referred to in Chapter One, would prove to be a vital ally in the *Justicia para Micaela* protests and their role will be discussed later in this research.

6.2.1 Influential Allies: ROSA

ROSA emerged as a SMO in 2013 and primarily focused on reproductive rights. They emerged alongside a number of other groups and SMOs in response to the death of Savita Halappanavar with the goal of reigniting the Reproductive Rights Movement in Ireland. There was support for this from both within and outside State institutions e.g., left-leaning political parties such as People-before-Profit and the Socialist Party (the founding members of ROSA are women from the Socialist Party).   There was also support from individuals and groups who were working within the fields of women's rights such as those specifically

within NGOs related to domestic and sexual violence such as, Domestic Violence and Rape Crisis Centres. Members of these NGO's were often called upon to speak at rallies including the '*I Believe Her*' protests. Also, an ally in well-known Irish feminist activists such as Ailbhe Smyth, who is known for her association to Reproductive Rights and LGBTQIA+ Rights Movements.

The National Women's Council of Ireland (NWCI), which has within it over 190 member groups, are also seen as allies to the ROSA activists. A lot of those within the NWCI would be considered to be informed by a liberal feminist ideology. ROSA, in 2018, were a part of the larger Reproductive Rights Movement in Ireland and are now in the process of trying to build back up a strong socialist feminist movement in Ireland. They are aware that influential external allies are necessary to build the type of struggle which can effect change. They are also aware that their brand of socialist feminism will be a smaller part of a larger movement, such as was the case in the Repeal campaign where feminist activists from different ideological backgrounds came together to fight for a common goal – Repealing the Eighth Amendment from the Constitution.

> 'I think our role is to try and aid building a struggle and a movement, obviously we would like to see a very active, organised feminist movement that would probably be quite broad, with lots of different strands in it and within that, then we want to build the socialist feminist wing.' (MUROSA04)

The political aspect of ROSA being a socialist feminist SMO does not necessarily bring people to their events as much as the consistent activity they have engaged with on issues which directly affect the day-to-day lives of women, gender non-conforming people, LGBTQIA+ people and working-class people. ROSA would also see the Latin American collectives in Ireland as allies as they are the ones that come together for International

Women's Day in Ireland and regularly share information of each other's events on social media.

> 'There are loads of other groups I know, who love to have us on board because we'll go out and put up posters, we'll get stuff done to make these protests happen, to make these events successful, and to get people to participate because we're just used to being around young people, getting into working-class communities, getting into colleges, and trying to build for events that way.' (MUROSA06)

ROSA sees the need for a larger active feminist movement on the island of Ireland. There is also an awareness that this type of movement needs to be broad based and inclusive of many diverse types of groups including voices from the LGBTQIA+ community, working class communities, groups that are actively anti-racist, promoting the rights of indigenous groups such as the Traveller community and other voices.

> 'You actually have to fight the root of the inequality and injustice and the funny thing is obviously women and gender non-conforming people are going to be central to that struggle and that fight, that we actually, if we're going to be able to build a challenge to the system of capitalism, we also have to try and bring those people who might have sexist ideas or men who might have sexist ideas with us because they have a vested interest in going against this system that's impoverishing and destroying the planet for them too. So that's kind of some of the reasons we're socialist feminists. Obviously, we will stand and march in demos with liberal feminists, there's no issue there and if liberal feminists do anything, in terms of campaigning, or whatever, we will be there, and we will raise our own politics and our own views about how to take a movement forward but we don't have any illusions, and probably have a lot of different ideas to them.' (MUROSA04)

So, it is known by these ROSA activists that they are a small part of a bigger picture, but currently, or at least at this time (during the *I Believe Her* protests), they believe they were a more radical voice in the Irish feminist landscape. ROSA activists understand that NGOs and other organisations which assist victims of violence are restricted in some ways because they receive some funding from government. Therefore, they feel other organisations must temper their criticism of government, but ROSA are not restrained in the same way. Often the

funding offers from the State must be negotiated by organisations. This was consistently

evident in interviews with members of the SMO.

> 'All of these organizations are still 50% fundraising or relying on funds, they're
> certainly still, if not 50%, it was 50% before, but it's still pretty much (*the same*).
> They still have to go out and raise their own cash, these should be part of the public
> system - Rape Crisis Services. Why should they be provided by charities, you know?
> This was another problem… the Rape Crisis Network, Women's Aid, Rape Crisis
> Centres, they're all quite hidebound about what they can say or do because of that
> reliance, as NGOs, on State subvention. (MUROSA01/Ruth Coppinger)

It is evident that there are strengths and limitations to being reliant on the State for funding,

and there are differences in approaches in from a SMO without assets and from an

organisation with assets who are reliant on State funding.

> 'Those other organisations definitely are our allies, and sometimes they're able to get
> things done that we just can't, and we're able to get things done that they just can't.'
> (MUROSA06)

> 'They have to be specific on what they've agreed they're doing in advance and things
> like that, and we can just be much more fluid because we are really small. Whereas
> they have loads of participating local women's groups around the country and stuff
> like that, but obviously, having full-time staff, it's a bit different. And we're, in terms
> of people, solely or almost always volunteer based, absolutely.' (MUROSA06)

Improvement on the current standards (action on VAW) are welcomed with open arms, but

often the offers from the State have to be negotiated.

> 'It's so difficult, Ireland is so small. The National Women's Council, the Rape Crisis
> Centres, they want to be able to go into the Dáil (*the Irish parliament*) and talk to
> politicians, and they want funding and need funding from those politicians. They,
> even if it's not specifically in their rules, they're not allowed to get up and say
> Minister such and such is doing a terrible job, and we hate him. That's just difficult
> for them and that's the reality. But those organizations are with us on these marches…
> so I would absolutely see them as allies, you can have growing pains with any big
> campaign that involves people from different backgrounds. Absolutely. And I know
> ROSA, as an organization, drives other people demented sometimes, because we are
> just harping on and on about particular ways of doing things, but we put our money
> where our mouth is…' (MUROSA06)

ROSA also work with other organisations who help victims of violence, as they are aware they don't have the tools to help them. The structure of organisations and their proximity to the State requires that they act in a certain way.

> 'One of the ways that we would definitely be working with other organisations. We are not counsellors or therapists. We just absolutely try our best to be sensitive to the trauma people have experienced but we're not equipped to deal with becoming a support service for people. We just don't have the training, so linking people with services that can help them etc, which are run by amazing, feminist activists, and their organisations are different, and they have to be slower, and they have to do things differently, because of the way they're set up.' (MUROSA06)

A particularly important external influential ally for ROSA during the fight for reproductive rights was Dr. Rebecca Gomperts, a Dutch physician who created the NGOs, Women on Waves in 1999, and Women on Web in 2005. The mission of these was to bring reproductive health services such as abortion pills and medical abortions to women in countries with strict abortion laws. Dr. Gomperts encouraged ROSA members to take abortion pills in front of cameras to make a statement regarding the use of abortion pills in Ireland and their safety. This act of civil disobedience, taking abortion pills in front of cameras, was a strategic and provocative action that heightened the political salience of the Reproductive Rights Movement in Ireland. Having allies such as Dr. Gomperts and Women on Web gave ROSA the encouragement to be ambitious with their protesting and this heightened ROSA's profile in the Irish consciousness.

One of the founding members of ROSA, Ruth Coppinger, was elected as a TD in the Socialist Party in the Dáil from 2014-2020 and was a prominent voice in the Reproductive Rights Movement. Coppinger was one of the people who took these abortion pills in front of the cameras, further legitimising the consumption of these pills and their safety. Coppinger

would also become a core figure and ally in the organisation of the I Believe Her protests. Although it is evident that socialist feminists do not see their role in parliament about alignment with liberal feminist ideology, they did see that Coppinger could utilise their platform to fight oppression and expose the State's oppressive nature. ROSA have shown that their ideology being based in a socialist feminist analysis is grounded in being critical of the State and viewing the Irish State as largely comprised of conservative establishment politicians.

6.2.2 Comparison of Impact of Influential Allies for the *Justicia para Micaela* and *I Believe Her* Protests

Evidently, there are some common types of allies for both SMOs, including; political parties and core politicians (primarily centre-left and left-wing), other social movements including the student movement and labour movements, trade unions, the traditional news media, the LGBTQIA+ community and women-led or focused organisations, particularly those who focus on issues related to sexual and/or domestic violence and reproductive rights. Although these SMOs share common 'types' of allies, the power that these allies hold in each national context differ in terms of resources and influence within the State. Also, the consistency of the allyship varies. In the analysis for these protests, it is evident that Ni Una Menos had more influential allies with significant organisational and mobilising power than ROSA. However, the influential allies that ROSA had have been utilised appropriately for the type of organising and mobilising that they engage in. The presence of influential allies in both cases was vital during the protest cycles in which these protest events occurred.

One of the most important allies in *Justicia para Micaela* protests was *Movimiento Evita* (Evita Movement). Micaela Garcia, the victim of femicide, was an active member of both the

Movimiento Evita (Evita Movement) and of Ni Una Menos. *Movimiento Evita* (Evita Movement) provided support from experienced activists who had organisational knowledge, resources, and access to a well-formed large network throughout Argentina. Although Peronism has a strong presence in Argentinian society, and an activist may agree with Ni Una Menos they might not identify as Peronist or agree with the Kirchner administrations.

> 'Peronism, the movement in Argentina, they have a lot of influence in our society in a good way, from the point of view that it's social justice. I am not Peronist. I like the left side and everything but I'm not part of any party.' (MUNUM04)

Other activists who I interviewed admitted that they may have some bias as they identify as Peronist, but they did feel that Garcia's membership of *Movimiento Evita* (Evita Movement) bolstered the activity that occurred around her femicide.

> 'She (Micaela) was in the Evita Movement… and Peronism is well known for trying to transform reality. So, I think that is also something that shouldn't be forgotten, because I don't know if it would have happened the same way if it was another movement.' (MUNUM03)

The expertise provided by previous movements in Argentina cannot be underestimated in understanding how Ni Una Menos grew so rapidly. For example, the organisational knowledge coming from those involved in left-wing political parties and in their associations with groups such as the Evita Movement was no doubt vital. Similarly, the historical knowledge and strategic choices made by the *Madres de Plaza de Mayo* have had a direct impact on the way in which Ni Una Menos present themselves.

ROSA as a SMO was at the height of their political relevance and mobilising power during this time, having both the legitimacy with their relationship to the Repeal movement, their radical voice in the feminist landscape in Ireland, and having a founding member as a TD in

parliament as part of the opposition.   One of the most important allies in the *I Believe Her* protests was Coppinger. When the verdict of the Belfast Trial and the resulting '*I Believe Her*' protests were held (29 and 31 March 2018), the Referendum to repeal the Eighth Amendment from the Irish Constitution was less than two months away (25 May 2018). There had already been a long-fought battle to get the Irish government to allow for a Referendum in the first place. Activists holding elected office is common and it must be recognised that feminist activists often occupy numerous roles. The distinction between policy/advocacy and grassroots/activist feminism can often overlap as, although this SMO's aim is social transformation, they also welcome reforms which alleviate suffering and oppression.   The initial *I Believe Her* protest was set up by students, but it is noted through online analysis and interviews with activists, that the original organisers were said to have been threatened/intimidated into removing their protest event page from Facebook (online) where thousands of people had agreed to attend. They contacted Coppinger's office a couple of days before the initial *I Believe Her* protest (29th March 2018), asking if she would host it, as they had cancelled their event online due to the intimidation they were feeling.

> 'I think that was quite significant because it showed the authority that ROSA had gained during (*the Reproductive Rights Movement*)… but they just reached out to ROSA and Ruth because she saw Ruth and ROSA as the people who are actually fighting on this issue the most seriously.' (MUROSA02)

> 'So, even the fact that they contacted Ruth to then kind of take over, it does speak to the impact that Ruth had I think, which obviously is testament to her and also, I'm sure she, you know, she didn't do it in a vacuum. It was also part of the collective that we did in ROSA… So yeah, that was a good example actually, of the role that, if you prove yourself on the issue, you speak in a way that shows that you really understand and you have a view as to what kind of program for change we need on the issue of gender violence, and abortion etc. It can then be a point that makes the difference whether something happens.' (MUROSA04)

The feminist landscape in Argentina and Ireland is marked by feminists who are both activists involved in policy/advocacy work and in grassroots activism. These two types of

work need to work together to achieve change. The radical voice is necessary in the landscape, and it is evident that Ni Una Menos and ROSA had the ability to be a more radical voice at these protests given their proximity to the State. This forces political decisions as politicians recognise new actors with influential allies can gain power in the polity.

Access of new actors to the institutionalised political system

Increased access to the political system, as well as to institutions that movements were otherwise excluded from, is an important feature of political opportunities. Also, the timing of the protests in these instances are vital in understanding why these protests caught the attention of those in power. In the Argentinian case, Ni Una Menos' access to the political system can be traced back to the mass mobilisations they consistently hosted over a two-year period, particularly the strikes and the influential allies who accompanied them. In the Irish case, ROSA's access to the political system can be traced to the women from the Socialist Party who are founding members of ROSA. In particular, the fact that they had a founding member of ROSA in parliament as part of the opposition, during this period, whose platform was used to discuss VAW and reproductive rights, increased their political access.

Policymaking as it relates to VAW is largely shaped by the National Action Plans (NAP) on VAW that is put in place by government actors (Walby 2018). The action on these plans, and the mechanisms used to oversee these plans, depend on the commitment of the government in power. A gender perspective must be present in the polity for plans of this type to succeed, and the new actors that came into the polity during these time periods were vital in changing the focus of political actors.

6.3 Argentina: Access of New Actors to the Institutionalised Political System

The emergence of Ni Una Menos put the gender perspective into focus in the Argentinian

political landscape and given the popularity of the SMO, shifting political alignments were

inevitable for political actors to remain relevant. Ni Una Menos put the discussion of

femicide into the public sphere where it became a topic of debate throughout the country.

While many acknowledge the urgency of reducing the alarming rate of VAW, there remains

contention regarding the gendered nature of these killings and acts of violence. Pointing to

structural changes that need to occur to combat this specific form of violence necessarily

involved society as a whole. Ni Una Menos were instrumental in bringing discussion on the

issue of femicide into the national discourse and onto the national stage in an effective and

impactful way. Even though, in 2012, three years before the emergence of Ni Una Menos,

legislation was enacted to combat femicide in Argentina, there hadn't been a societal

discussion about the nature of femicide.

> 'During that discussion, we never had that idea (why women were being killed)
> because it was brought by the government. You know? It was like, OK, it's part of the
> changes that has (law on femicide in 2012) been included but society was not even
> aware of it. But… then we had the work, we had it in our (*criminal*) code. We started
> having statistics… So, we started saying this is the amount of women that are being
> killed due to gender-based violence, a woman every single day or every single month
> or every single year. That was the first point, I think personally. Then you will have
> this social discussion at family dinners and in workplaces and in schools and
> universities, and that broader discussion around society was what made it so huge
> (*after the emergence of Ni Una Menos in 2015*) - (MUNUM02)

At first (1986), the *Encuentros* attracted small groups of women in their locality to meet and

start a meeting based on their own concerns. Over the decades, the *Encuentros* have been

revived at different points by the influx of women from different movements, including the

Piquetero/as (D'Atri & Escati. 2008:11), the initial revitalised reproductive rights campaign

(2005), and more recently Ni Una Menos. The attendance at these 'meeting houses' grew

particularly between 2005-2015, about 10,000 women were meeting in these various centres

to voice their concerns and demands to engender change and help one another (Lopez-Levy 2018). Since Ni Una Menos officially entered the public consciousness in 2015, these numbers have grown, reaching almost 60,000 women per year (Lopez-Levy 2018). The insurgent consciousness which characterised the emergence of this SMO resulted in a well-formed political critique of the State which has become a part of political life in Argentina. Ni Una Menos activists focused on challenging structural inequalities that restrict women's participation and representation in politics by advocating for inclusive policies and raising awareness about gender-based discrimination. These efforts targeted power cleavages—divisions within society based on differential access to power and resources, often manifesting as disparities based on gender, class, race, ethnicity, and economic status. By addressing these entrenched power dynamics, the activists created greater access to political life for women through effective feminist advocacy.

> 'From my experience of these meetings, they really are a space of creation, let's put it that way because, it's something that has a schedule, but it also leaves space for new things to happen. (MUNUM01)

> 'Women from all over Argentina, from different parts, also, for example, many girls from Uruguay went there or go there every year… all the different types of feminist activists get together and there are fights and there are debates, so there are all these different points of view.' (MUNUM05)

Ni Una Menos revitalised established spaces (*Encuentros*) which were crucial for feminist advocacy in Argentina but also created new spaces. These spaces were where communities could gather and speak about issues that concern them without the accusations of 'overreaction', where the term 'feminazi' was used to describe people engaging with feminism, particularly women speaking about the link between gender and violence. It also inspired those who were interested in feminist ideas, but not yet fully realised in their identity, that they were feminists.

'Because sometimes for feminism, it is very hard not to be… pointed out as very left-wing or very extreme. In Argentina, we are called 'feminazis', the irony of the movement trying to overcome oppressive measures and an oppressive system, to be called 'feminazis''. (MUNUM02)

'At that time, I was working in a logistic company, so mostly men, not really a lot of women in positions of power in that company, and I had a managerial role, you could say. I remember all the comments of 'yeah, oh, you are going to start talking like a crazy feminist', a 'feminazi'. That was a typical thing that people used to call me, and call us, if you were talking about those issues.' (MUNUM03)

'I always considered myself a feminist, but I never read about it, I never tried to understand more about the movement or what was the real meaning of being a feminist before Ni Una Menos. I also had this idea of I don't like your forms, or you hate men, and I don't like that. That misunderstanding of what feminism is. I recognize that I had that in my discourse as well. But I think Ni Una Menos, helped to broaden the meaning, helped to reach a bigger audience.' (MUNUM03)

'I was at all the marches for Ni Una Menos from almost the beginning, that was when I found out what feminist was, by definition, I knew I was… but it was not until I found myself among others, marching in the streets.' (MUNUM02)

'Somehow they helped to disseminate ideas that, for me, from my point of view, make this bridge between the more theoretical ideas of gender struggle, and the lived experience of people.' (MUNUM01)

'This movement touches your emotions, you know, there is an emotional connection that has been made during these years. That is very nice. Even though I'm not so informed on some things or whatever. It's a feeling.' (MUNUM01)

In the past, political parties and the State have often viewed women's groups as an 'untapped source of political currency' and movements have been manipulated by the elites and the State to further their agenda (Alvarez 1990:11-20). It does seem that Ni Una Menos' influence has been used by the elites to further their political prospects, as to go against them would be damaging to their political careers. The machismo attitudes of well-known Argentinian politicians are well documented and their positive response to the emergence of Ni Una Menos was met with cynicism from the activists. This particularly relates to the comments made by President of Argentina from 2015-2019, Mauricio Macri, who was Mayor of Buenos Aires in 2014. In response to a campaign against catcalling which used

misogynistic phrases and taunts that men say to women, he was reported to have said… "All women like to be complimented, even if they are told what a nice ass they have… Those that say they don't, that they get offended, I don't believe them at all" (Vallejos 2014).

The gendered nature of the phrase 'Ni Una Menos' ('una' indicating they are referring specifically to females) can connect to many different forms of oppression ranging from acts of gendered violence to the gendered nature of the division of labour within the household. Kelly's (1989; 2012) 'continuum of violence' ranges from everyday experiences of violence to the most extreme. In discussing the changes they have noticed since the arrival of Ni Una Menos, and its influence on Argentinian culture, activists spoke of their everyday experiences.

> 'There is a sense of political correctness. That although many people would like to shout to something, they would be quiet. Even if something like this happens… you are walking and someone shouts at you 'nice ass', you would say, if you're alone, I don't know (*what you would do*), but if you're with a group of friends, or more people you would say 'Ni Una Menos!'… it condenses a lot of feelings.' (MUNUM01)

> 'For my generation, I'm almost 38, I think it was the first time that we allowed ourselves to walk in that way. Because before that, I'm talking only about my experience or the experiences of my friends at the time, feminism or any fight for women's right and so on, were just looked at like, you're hysterical, you're too loud or you need a man, all those phrases that were detrimental to the women's fight, but Ni Una Menos gave us the opportunity to say, 'I know I'm not crazy. I'm not alone in thinking all of these things.'' (MUNUM03)

> 'It's very present in every activity, in everything related to gender struggles and it's always present, it's like a slogan and not only a movement. A slogan or like a motto, that we always have in mind. Even when reading, for example, reading a piece of news or whatever related to gender violence, and it always happens, it comes to your mind.' (MUNUM01)

> 'If you are in a conversation with someone, with a man, for example, who says something very misogynist or whatever, even in your family, your father says, 'go wash the dishes', because they are from that generation that they won't change and

you would say, 'ah, Ni Una Menos'. It's very incorporated, or very ingrained in every day.' (MUNUM01)

Through interviewing members of the SMO, it is evident that Ni Una Menos made a space and filled a void where women did not feel they had a voice previously without being shut down. This space made way for new actors to enter the polity and engage with the political system in a way they had not before.

6.3.1 Ireland: Access of New Actors to the Institutionalised Political System

The emergence of ROSA put reproductive rights into focus in the Irish political landscape. More specifically, the discussion of women's bodies put the autonomy of feminised people at the forefront of the debate. Shifting political alignments were necessary for political actors as the Referendum that occurred was one of the most anticipated Referendums in recent Irish history. Additionally, within political parties there were tensions regarding pro-choice and pro-life stances. The debates relating to reproductive rights were not limited to inside government buildings but had grown to be discussed on traditional and digital media as well as dinner tables throughout the country. The initial movement that was made by the activists such as ROSA on the ground were co-opted by establishment politicians when the conversation became a prominent issue for the citizens of the country. The increased access to political and social institutions was due in part to the changing political alignments but also because of the re-vitalisation of the reproductive rights campaign and the centre-left leanings of a young population.

> 'In 2017 (*March for Choice*), I remember there was this chant, 'not the Church, not
> the State, women must decide their fate.' It's stems back from a long time back. But,
> that was being chanted and some of the newer, young girls on it were saying 'fuck the
> Church, fuck the State' because they didn't realize what the chant was, so it was a bit
> like the 'Sue me Paddy'(*I Believe Her protest*) , you know, it's always when you hear

people, you kind of have an idea, oh this is a very fresh layer of people on it.'
(MUROSA01/Ruth Coppinger)

There had been decades of feminist advocacy on the issue of reproductive rights in Ireland, but now the political alignments discussed earlier began to shift on this issue. The general election in 2016 saw a further shift of the electorate to a left-leaning position, in opposition to the political parties in power such as Fine Gael and Fianna Fail who did not have a pro-choice or pro-referendum position at that time (de Londras & Markicevic 2018:89). In 2013, the Constitutional Convention was established to decide whether there would be a Referendum on Marriage Equality in Ireland. This Referendum did occur in May 2015 and passed overwhelmingly. This initial Constitutional Convention in many ways made way for further possibilities in relation to changes to the Constitution. The Citizens Assembly was created in 2016 to establish recommendations for the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament) regarding changes to the Constitution to make way for legislation on abortion rights.

> The assembly consisted of "99 'citizens' selected by a polling company using the electoral register, and chaired by a judge of the Irish Supreme Court, Ms. Justice Mary Laffoy," and "as well as having monthly meetings at which solicited views were received and discussed, the Citizens' Assembly put out a call for submissions from the general public. Approximately 13,000 such submissions were received (Citizens' Assembly, 2017, 76–78). These submissions made remarkably little impact on the Assembly, at least in the formal proceedings. While the secretariat to the Assembly prepared a sample of some of the submissions and distributed them to the members, and while they expressly identified the submissions that were made from advocacy groups and from people who declared firsthand experience of abortion care (or the lack thereof) (Citizens' Assembly, 2017, 78), there was no systematic engagement in the formal and public sessions with these submissions, although it seems they were discussed in private session (Citizens' Assembly, 2017, 78)" (de Londras & Markicevic 2018:90).

The introduction of these new actors into the political system made clear that the Citizens Assembly may have been in part, a performative act, a way for the State to 'appear' to be acting on reproductive rights. However, the recommendations made by the Citizens

Assembly in 2017 to the Oireachtas were a lot more liberal and extensive that the State had

anticipated.

> 'These recommendations went far beyond what the political 'establishment' had
> anticipated and certainly beyond what was considered to be the popular and political
> consensus around introducing limited and conservative law reform for so-called 'hard
> cases'. The Assembly's discourses and recommendations were largely centered on an
> understanding and appreciation of the inadequacy of the current law, the reality of
> Irish reproductive life (including abortion travel and illegal abortion), and a sense of
> the unsustainable and objectionable nature of the law and the burdens it imposed on
> pregnant people in Ireland (de Londras & Markicevic 2018:95)

As one ROSA activist commented regarding the weariness that occurred after the

Referendum:

> 'I think there was obviously fatigue, but also (*in relation to*) the government. I think
> people probably thought X and Y is going to follow now… the journey that they were
> talking about going on, that we all heard about a million times during the Repeal
> campaign. That journey ground to a pretty abrupt break, because they didn't really do
> anything after that, when you look back. So yeah, they brought in the legislation and
> made it, well, it's not conservative legislation, but they made it more conservative
> than obviously the Citizens Assembly had advocated for, as we know.'
> (MUROSA01/Ruth Coppinger)

It is evident that new actors within the political system are necessary to push for what is

considered 'radical' by the State. This seems to assist with achieving more progressive

policy decisions in the end.

The *I Believe Her* protests occurred on 29th and 31st March 2018 and less than a month later

the Cervical Check scandal erupted, wherein the Irish State had once again demonstrated its

own misogyny in the treatment of women and their health. In April 2018, Vicky Phelan, a

woman who had received a negative test result by Cervical Check and was then diagnosed

with cervical cancer, settled a High Court case against the US laboratory who were used by

Cervical Check to assess tests. Ms Phelan refused to agree to a gagging order and went

public with the scandal. The Irish Health Service Executive (HSE) confirmed that 206

women had misdiagnosed smear tests and had developed cervical cancer. The HSE had

known that some of the test results from 2011 were inaccurate and knowingly concealed this

information by not informing the women affected (Drążkiewicz Grodzicka 2021:80). There

is a parallel to be drawn between the treatment of the women in the Cervical Check scandal

to those in the Magdalene Laundries, wherein the State knowingly took autonomy from these

women and paternalistic attitudes were evident.

6.3.2 Comparison of New Actors in the Institutionalised Political System in Argentina and Ireland

Luengo (2018:413) states that in relation to the discussion of femicide that came from Ni Una

Menos, 'the organizers of the movement show how, to some degree, women made the

transition from 'women' to 'human' over the course of the summer of 2015 in Argentina.' Ni

Una Menos revitalised feminist spaces and created new ones, through the *Encuentros*, and the

adoption of the phrase 'Ni Una Menos' into discussions in the household, community groups,

workplaces, schools and universities, trade unions, and political parties. A month before the

Justicia para Micaela protests in April, was the International Women's Strike in Argentina

on International Women's Day 2017 across the world. As discussed in the influential allies'

section, Ni Una Menos' ability to create relationships with diverse groups, particularly union

representatives during their first national strike in October 2016, made it possible for this

strike to occur, with over 50 countries around the world participating in this strike, including

Ireland.

In Ireland, the question of women's autonomy over their own bodies was the main throughline in all the events that occurred over a two-month period from end of March to end of May 2018 (the *I Believe Her* protests, the Cervical Check scandal, and the Referendum to Repeal the Eighth Amendment from the Constitution). Paternalistic and misogynistic attitudes towards women and their bodies permeate throughout all layers of society and reach women at distinct stages. Whether the specifics were that they were not believed about their own sexual assault, or not trusted with information regarding their own health, or denied healthcare entirely based on their reproductive organs, the lack of autonomy was represented politically in this period. The centring of a feminised body into the political discourse in the 2010s in Argentina and Ireland is in large part due to the new actors in the political system, which was primarily an influx of young people, women and LGBTQIA+ people, who were at the heart of the struggle during this time.

State's Capacity for Repression

The capacity of the State for repression of social movement activity is important to consider as it is evident that the political climate can shape the type of repression that a State can engage in. The type of repression/facilitation that a State engages in varies across time and space depending on political factors (Tilly 1978). Although it has been established that democracy often results in lower levels of violence by the State against their citizens, it does not mean that all authoritarian regimes are violent towards their citizens in the same way or to the same degree (Chen & Moss 2019:667-671). Often repression is thought of as most regularly occurring through some kind physical control, however, Earl (2003) posits that protest control is not just violence from authorities i.e., police or military, but is also shaped by the links between the State and the elites in that nation. There have been many types of social control identified which are not just physical or direct violence against social

movement actors e.g., 'legal prosecution, employment discrimination, hearings. surveillance, infiltration, and other forms of harassment' (Boykoff 2007:36). Tactics employed by States to undermine the authority or standing of a social movement which are not explicitly violent can be more damaging in some cases as it may draw resources away from the movement including participants (Moss 2014). Additionally, States may alter their responses to social movement activity for fear of being called out or sanctioned by international institutions and other States (Ron 2000; Chen & Moss 2019:667-671).

According to the Democracy Index which assesses electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture and civil liberties, there are four types of regimes; full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes (Economist Intelligence Unit 2020). From 2016-2020, Argentina was categorised as a 'flawed democracy' in 2020, 2017 and 2016 and a 'full democracy' in 2019 and 2018. Whereas Ireland was categorised as 'full democracy' for all five years. The measurement for regimes is as follows: Full democracies: 8.0 – 9.0, 7.0 – 8.0, Flawed democracies: 6.0 – 7.0, 5.0 – 6.0, Hybrid regimes: 4.0 – 5.0, 3.0 – 4.0 and Authoritarian regimes: 2.0 – 3.0, 0 – 2.0 (Economist Intelligence Unit 2020:4)

	2020	**2019**	**2018**	**2017**	**2016**
Argentina	6.95	7.02	7.02	6.96	6.96
Ireland	9.05	9.24	9.15	9.15	9.15

(Adapted from 'Table 3. Democracy Index 2006-20' Economist Intelligence Unit 2020:21-22)

6.4 State Capacity for Repression: Argentina

Argentina has a long history of activism and is steeped in a human rights tradition, particularly due to the presence of repressive regimes. The last military dictatorship ruled

Argentina from 1976 to 1983, and sought to eliminate anyone who was considered radical, socialist, left-wing, or who did not conform to the neo-liberal economic policies and ideology which were being enforced. During this period, 30,000 people 'disappeared', often meaning they were incarcerated, tortured, and killed if they were seen as a 'threat' to those in power. Many children were taken from their parents at this time, where these parents were considered progressive or against the ideology of the military (Nash & Safa 1986). In an authoritarian or repressive State, the type of collective action that social movement actors engage in may be shaped by this and choices regarding violent/non-violent or disruptive/non-disruptive tactics are important to consider. This repression by the military dictatorship shaped the emergence of the *Madres de Plaza de Mayo* (Mothers of Paza de Mayo), whose nonviolent tactics and acts of public mourning would go on to have an enormous influence on future social movements in Argentina.

There were also incidences of repressive action against movements during the Kirchner presidencies. The *Piquetero/as* who emerged in the 1990s and peaked during the economic crisis in 2001 were challenged by Nestor Kirchner who introduced government policies which aimed to undermine *Piquetero/as* organisations. Particularly, in his effort to stop roadblocks *(cortes de ruta),* one of the primary tactics employed by the *Piquetero/as*, which caused a disruption for commuters. Kirchner made a distinction between "legitimate" and "politicized" protest and the inter-class solidarity that once existed at the height of the protests in December 2001 'when inter-class solidarity was so high that it inspired the phrase "*piquete y cacerolazo, la lucha es una sola*" (piquete and cacerolazo, the struggle is the same)… The loss of middle-class support for *piqueteros* is also a result of the stigmatization of *piqueteros*' (Birss 2005). This delegitimization of the *Piquetero/as* assisted the State in appearing as though they were being the reasonable actor (Gamallo 2020). They was forced

into decline, 'through repression, at first, and then through cooptation, the government was able to fragment, dismember, and demobilize the Piquetero Movement' (D'Atri & Escati. 2008:10)

In Argentina, there is a rich history of protest, and according to the Americas Barometer biannual survey between 2008-2012, 16.8% of those surveyed in Argentina had participated in protest. The right to protest is protected within the constitution in Argentina. However, during Mauricio Macri's presidency, excessive force was being used against protestors. This was commented on as well by Amnesty International in 2017, who criticised the 'Protocol for Government Law Enforcement Authorities in Public Demonstrations' (2016) which encourages law enforcement to use force against demonstrators, in contradiction of international human rights law. It was reported that during a demonstration against pension reform outside Congress in 2017, 'law enforcement authorities… used undue force against them. Security forces deployed tear gas and fired rubber bullets in order to disperse and chase anyone in the area, including members of Congress, journalists and even passers-by.' (Amnesty International 2017).

State repression is also evident in the treatment of the Mapuche people, who are an indigenous group who struggle against land dispossession in the South of Argentina/Chile. In Argentina, the State considers the lands these groups live on to be State-owned and have sold them to private corporations, leading to protests which have resulted in violent repression from the State. In 2007, Argentina passed an Anti-Terrorist Law which was aimed 'initially at containing indigenous demands', however, during Macri's presidency in 2017, this was used in 'identifying specific Mapuche individuals as 'terrorists' based on their links with 'more

extreme' Chilean political organizations became increasingly common. Arrests were made that raised the question of the previously unconsidered possibility of Mapuche 'political prisoners' in Argentina. At the same time, a policy of repression was implemented that resulted in the two deaths' (Briones & Lepe-Carrión 2023:9). It has been argued that the State has been involved in targeting female activists who challenge the State. One of the most well-known is Milagro Sala, an indigenous activist, who began her activism with the Peronist movement, a well-known figure with associations related to the *Piquetero/as*, and leader of the Tupac Amaru association in the province of Jujuy, who was detained for holding a vigil and street protest in 2016 and has since been arrested on charges of sedition, corruption, and murder (Tabbush & Gaona 2017:314-315). Sala was an ally of the Kirchners during their presidencies and it has been reported that her arrest was a 'political move by provincial Gov. Gerardo Morales and other political allies of current President Mauricio Macri' (Henao 2016). Since these charges, the Tupac Amaru association has lost all State funding and legal recognition of their organisation with damaging effects on the lives of people in this province (Tabbush & Gaona 2017:314-315). Sala was sentenced to thirteen years in prison in 2019. International human rights organisations and NGOs have called for her release.

6.4.1 State Capacity for Repression: Ireland

The history of repression in social movement activity in Ireland can be seen in relation to political repression and violence. From the 1960s to the late 1990s, the 'Northern Ireland conflict,' also known as 'The Troubles,' resulted in over 3,700 deaths due to political violence, primarily in Northern Ireland (White 2017). State repression during this period significantly contributed to the shift from peaceful protest to the violent tactics employed by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), as repression disproportionately affected

working-class and student activists, fostering conditions conducive to violent protest (White 1989:1277; Bosi 2012). This era highlights how State responses not only escalated conflict in Northern Ireland but also shaped distinct anti-republican measures in the Republic of Ireland. In contrast to the overt violence in Northern Ireland, the Republic's approach involved legal, political, and social strategies to manage State security threats. This included the Offences Against the State Acts, first enacted in 1939 and later amended, which granted extensive powers to detain, search, and try suspects in non-jury courts to counteract IRA activities and related groups (English 2003). Additionally, less overt forms of repression included marginalising those associated with republican ideologies through media, political discourse, and civic restrictions, contributing to a broader stigmatization of republicanism (Hillyard 1993). These actions, though less violent, represented a significant form of structural violence with deep implications for civil liberties and political activism in the Republic.

Another example of State repression is in relation to the installation of a high-pressure gas pipeline and its effects on the townlands in the Erris peninsula of Co. Mayo, that was being constructed without the consent of the community. Despite the project being refused planning permission in 2002, the Taoiseach at the time, Bertie Ahern, intervened.   In 2005, members of the community refused to let Shell begin work on their land and 'the company pursued proceedings for contempt with the result that five of those involved – three landowners and two figures in the community known to be influential in the emerging campaign all men, Shell choosing to ignore opposition from female landowners – were sent to Dublin's Mountjoy prison indefinitely. Under Irish law they would have to remain there until they 'purged their contempt' and agreed not to interfere with the construction of the pipeline' (Darcy & Cox 2019:2-3). They remained in jail for 94 days. The resistance to this pipeline resulted in State violence as well as demonisation of activists in the media (Darcy &

Cox 2019). It should be noted that it was not just the Gardai who were doing surveillance on these activists, but 'Shell initially made use of private prosecutions; it also has its own security firm, IRMS, which is regularly filmed and photographed operating in close collaboration with the police' (Cox 2015:237).

Another example of State repression to social movement activity can be seen in the Anti-Water Charges Movement which emerged in 2014, in the context of a working-class anti-austerity struggle in Ireland. The Anti-Water Charges Movement had gained a lot of media attention given their use of disruptive tactics including preventing Irish Water workers from installing meters in housing estates. Cox (2017:183) described the State's response as 'one of limited, show-piece events rather than effective repression.' This included a few hundred arrests, but most notably 'a deputy, two councillors and 10 others were charged with "false imprisonment" (carrying a sentence up to life imprisonment), along with 14 charged with "violent disorder" or "criminal damage" (the "Jobstown 27")' (Cox 2017:184). The charges that were given out appear to have been politically motivated and an attempt to make 'an example' of the social movement actors. This effort of repression did not result in a decline of movement activity.

One ROSA activist commented on the difference between organising protests in advance versus a more spontaneous protest and their experience of dealing with authorities in Ireland.

> 'One thing that protest organizers, especially novice protest organizers, are so concerned about, is the cops, and shutting down roads and stuff like that. For us, reality takes hold, and we're no fans of the cops, but they tend to be practical people and when people are spilling out onto the streets, they'll block the road for you. They just accept the reality. You can have a nightmare of a time trying to talk to the head cops, who are the people that you talk to about having a big protest, it's really difficult, they are not co-operative or supportive. But when you're actually there, on

the day, and hundreds of people are spilling out on to the Luas (*tram system in Dublin)* tracks, the cops stopped the Luas.' (MUROSA06)

However, States capacity for repression in relation to protest is an important aspect of political opportunity, particularly given the recent Covid-19 pandemic which put a full stop to all forms of public mobilisation. A ROSA activist in Limerick was fined €500 for conducting an outdoor protest highlighting gender violence during the Covid-19 pandemic in 2021 (O'Rourke 2021). This was charged under the Public Health Act Covid Regulations.   These small (10-30 people), outdoor, socially distanced protests were conducted to call emergency action in response to what has become known as a 'shadow pandemic' and the femicide of Sarah Everard in England in March 2021, which made international news. ROSA mounted a challenge to these prosecutions and defended their right to protest, the charge was eventually dismissed after the activist was summoned to court after refusing to pay. The case was dismissed in February 2022. The incidence of women in distress due to violence increased dramatically during the pandemic with an increase of 25% of calls to Gardai and an increase of 43% to Women's Aid. ROSA activists pointed to how the State were choosing to prosecute activists highlighting a critical issue in society in a safe manner while Covid-19 deniers not taking health precautions were not being prosecuted. The outrage about these fines were also joined with reports that Gardai 'cancelled' more than three thousand '999' domestic violence calls over the years 2019 and 2020 (Lally 2021).

6.4.2 State Capacity for Repression: Comparison
It is evident that Argentina has a history of State repression, particularly during the military dictatorship in the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, the form of State repression alters depending on the type of regime in the State and the political party in power. This can be seen during Kirchner presidencies in the 2000s, despite being a democratic State with a left-

wing President, repressive acts were conducted against the *Piquetero/as* where social movement actors were co-opted. During the Macri presidency, the actions taken against the protestors during the pension reform protests in 2017 and bringing in legislation which encourages law enforcement to engage violently with protestors as well as the repression of the Mapuche people and Milagro Sala are another different form of repression which give permission for violent action from the State. In the Irish context, the history of State repression has been determined mainly by political violence but also forms of social control which depend on legal measures, surveillance, and intimidation. There is also evidence of collaboration between the State and private companies as well as State-owned companies, as can be seen in with the Shell corporation and Irish Water.

Policymaking Capacity of the State

As discussed in the policy review chapter, women's movements have played a significant role in pushing changes to policy regarding VAW at an international, regional, and national level. Although there are international and regional conventions that countries sign up to, in which they agree to certain conditions regarding changes that they will implement, the lived experience of those on the ground can be very different. National Action Plans (NAPs) on VAW, compiled by a dedicated agency assigned by the State, are an important feature of the State commitment to eliminating VAW and the steps they believe will ensure change. Despite the commitments to these NAPs there are numerous external factors which can hinder and/or facilitate the ability of the State to implement policy.

Htun & Weldon (2018) argue that certain conditions must be in place for the State to make any kind of progressive policy change.   The four contextual factors are (1) vulnerability to international pressure (2) degree of democracy (3) policy/institutional legacies and (4) State

capacity.   At national level there can be more, or less, vulnerability to international pressure; poorer countries 'seek financial capital and legitimacy' whereas 'autocracies and emerging democracies want to demonstrate their democratic and human rights credentials. These countries are therefore more vulnerable to external pressure than wealthier nations or established democracies' (Htun & Weldon 2010:212). In countries that are more democratic, civil society tends to be more developed and autonomous groups and movements can organise with less interference from government. In more authoritarian States civil society may be less developed or non-existent and the political party in power may be able to shape policy outcomes more directly without interference from citizens. In relation to institutional legacies, the types of institutions present in a polity are often shaped by conflicts within the State. The ways in which these conflicts are dealt with can affect policy and institutions in the future by accommodating certain groups in exchange for support or giving political representation (Htun & Weldon 2010). Regarding policy, the development of some core pieces of legislation regarding VAW, as discussed in Chapter Two, in each national context is also important to note.

In relation to State capacity, Htun & Weldon (2010) argue that the State must have the ability to intervene in society. The issue of VAW is felt both in 'public' spaces such as the workplace and in 'private' spaces such as the home. The commitment of politicians alone does not matter if the institutions in the State are not capable of reaching people in their lives. The ability to implement and enforce policies which lessen the incidence of VAW are difficult no matter the circumstances, but it is necessary to have stable effective institutions. Institutions within the State should be able to facilitate women's access to education, employment, housing etc., as well as co-ordinate with women's groups and organisations to push for change. When referring to State capacity, this means the ability of the institutions to

implement and monitor, what they have been assigned. This is different from the strength of certain political parties but instead the agency's ability to carry out its assigned role.

To assess State capacity in each national context, I will adapt the work of Franceschet (2010) with a focus on the degree of centralisation and variation in the resources and power of policy agencies tasked with overseeing NAPs on VAW. In the cases studied in this research I am referring to the *Instituto Nacional de la Mujer*; INAM (National Institute for Women) in Argentina and Cosc (*The National Office for the Prevention of Domestic, Sexual and Gender-based Violence*) in Ireland. The analysis of these factors gives insight into the circumstances in which these protests occurred in each national context and can be understood through the National Action Plans (NAPs) on VAW and the policies in place at a national, regional, and international level during these pivotal protests.

6.5 Policymaking Capacity of the State: Argentina

In a comparative study of State action on women's issues in seventy countries over the period 1975-2005, Htun & Weldon (2018:233-236) classify the policy issue 'violence against women' as a 'non-doctrinal status issue'. Within this study they assert that ratification of the international convention on VAW, CEDAW, and the presence of strong feminist movements as crucial factors in creating progressive policy. Vulnerability to international pressure from institutions can play a significant role in pushing for policy relating to VAW. As discussed in policy review chapter, one of the fundamental changes that has occurred since the creation of CEDAW in 1979 is the knowledge that VAW is not simply a private matter that should be dealt with within the home (private sphere) but instead is a public matter which is both a public health issue and a violation of human rights. Argentina ratified CEDAW in 1985. The

responsibilities of the State are set out in the 'due diligence provisions' as discussed in

Chapter Two, mentioned in regional conventions on VAW, in the Latin American context

i.e., the Convention of Belém do Pará, created in 1994, which Argentina ratified in 1996

(McQuigg 2017:267). In the Convention of Belém do Pará, Article 7b, the convention reads

that States must: 'apply due diligence to prevent, investigate and impose penalties for

violence against women.' The follow-up mechanisms for regional conventions can be a point

of contention as although the Convention of Belém do Pará was adopted in 1994, the

Organisation of American States (OAS) did not establish a follow-up mechanism until 2004,

called MESECVI.

Argentina has associations with many different international institutions including the United

Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In relation to financial assistance,

in response to the economic crisis in 2001, Argentina received a $39 billion dollar loan from

the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although international institutions have assisted the

country, they have also put limitations on the State's sovereignty. Similarly, partnerships

with the World Bank have assisted in developing infrastructure and public services.

Austerity policies pushed on the Argentinian State by the IMF resulted in thousands of

middle-class Argentinians losing their jobs. Although Argentina paid off the debts during the

Nestor Kirchner presidency (2003-2007), when Macri came into power in 2015 he vowed to

improve the economy by opening for foreign investment, but this resulted in increased

inflation and turning to the IMF again for assistance. In 2018, Argentina received the biggest

loan in the history of the IMF with $57 billion dollar bailout.

As discussed in the previous section, from 2016-2020, Argentina was considered a flawed democracy in 2020, 2017 and 2016 and a full democracy in 2019 and 2018, according to the Democracy Index (Economist Intelligence Unit 2020). In relation to institutional and policy legacies in the Argentinian context, the most obvious conflict in recent times which affected institutions in the State was the military dictatorship in Argentina from 1976-1983. This foundational conflict within the country meant that there were many steps that needed to be taken on the road to building a democracy and that the violence experienced by women was not a top priority. The *Consejo Nacional de las Mujeres* (National Council of Women) was created in 1992, a decade after the move to democracy in 1983 and seems to have been created in part by the influence of the international community with conventions such as CEDAW and the Belém do Pará Convention. The *Consejo Nacional de las Mujeres* (National Council of Women) will be discussed more deeply later in this section regarding State capacity to engender change regarding VAW policy. Since the ratification of the Belém do Pará Convention, there has been legislation developed regarding VAW in Argentina, most notably related to domestic violence, sexual violence/assault and femicide. *(See Appendix A – Key Policy Changes in Argentina)*.

Two of the most notable pieces of legislation are, *Ley de Protección Integral para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra las Mujeres en los Ámbitos en que Desarrollen sus Relaciones Interpersonales* (Comprehensive Law on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women in their Interpersonal Relations). Argentina Law No. 26.485 in 2009. The second piece of legislation was a bill that amended the Criminal Code (Law No. 11.179) *Ley de Modificación del Código Penal en materia de femicidio* (Law for the Modification of the Penal Code concerning Femicide) to include femicide as an aggravated type of homicide in 2012, as discussed in Chapter Two. As argued earlier in this

thesis, it was not until Ni Una Menos emerged, three years later in 2015, that the real discussions regarding femicide emerge in the public consciousness in Argentina, particularly the issue of the impunity shown to perpetrators of femicide (Luengo 2018). The effective implementation of both laws remains contentious.

The degree of centralisation within a polity is a crucial factor in policy making. It is evident that Argentina has been characterised in the past as a decentralised federal State and bureaucracy with low policy capacity (Franceschet 2010). Since Argentina is a decentralised federal State there is variation in laws regarding VAW depending on the province. For example, in some provinces the complainant must have legal representation which restricts access for poor women (Birgin and Pastorini 2005: 301-2). Due to political decentralisation, women in Argentina have access to varying degrees of protection and justice depending on the province they live in. There is also variation in the commitment of the governments within the provinces to commit to domestic violence policy. Because of the decentralised situation, there were no overarching National Actions Plans in place to combat this problem for a lengthy period. Although there was legislation relating to domestic violence created in 1994, *Ley 24.417 de Protección contra la Violencia Familiar* (Law 24.417 on Protection against Family Violence), the 2009, Law 26.485, discussed in Chapter Two, is the first federal law of its kind and has been an important piece of legislation for the State and for social movement actors. Ni Una Menos have made efforts to disseminate the information of this law throughout the country, to those who may not know their rights, as discussed in Chapter Six regarding influential allies and Ni Una Menos' collaboration with the CGT (Rodríguez 2020).

It is important to understand the power given to the agency to deal with VAW within a State, since how policy is implemented and if it is funded appropriately, directly relates to the quality and strength of this power. In Argentina, the *Consejo Nacional de las Mujeres* (National Council of Women) was created in 1992, a decade after the beginning of renewed democracy in Argentina. Initially it was headed by a well-known feminist Virginia Franganillo. The Council was not given many resources, power, or a legislative role within the State and therefore unable to act as an influential ally to movement actors. Just because there is a strong State does not mean that these agencies will be helped, in Argentina it is evident that the Council 'suffered institutional downgrading due to ideological conflicts, economic crises, and multiple changes in government' (Franceschet 2010:4).

Tensions emerged between Franganillo and President Menem in the 1990s, as he was aligning himself and the government with conservative Catholicism, while Franganillo was taking a more progressive stance in line with the Beijing Conference (*Fourth World Conference on Women*) which was upcoming in 1995. This Council made advances with changes in gender and health policies related to reproductive and sexual health. The Council was moved to the Ministry of Social Action in 1999 but downgraded again in 2002 following the severe 2001 economic crisis, also the budget for this plan was cut many times. When Law 26.485 was created in 2009, the Council were designated as the organising body as well as tasked with creating the Observatory on Violence. During this period, the economic crises of 2008 was having damning effects on the lives of many citizens throughout the country and VAW was not 'top' priority. After Franganillo left, the Council's ability to make change throughout the 2000s weakened and the women who were elected President of the Council in the following years were not known feminists in Argentina.

It was not until 2016 with the election of Fabiana Tunez as President of the *Consejo Nacional de las Mujeres* (National Council of Women), renamed the *Instituto Nacional de la Mujer; INAM* (National Institute for Women) that a well-known feminist was heading the Council again. Fabiana Tunez, was the former President and one of the founding members of *La Casa del Encuentro* (The Meeting House), an NGO created in 2003 who since 2008 co-ordinated the first Femicide Observatory named after femicide victim 'Adriana Marisel Zambrano'. *La Casa del Encuentro* (The Meeting House) were the only entity compiling statistics on femicide in Argentina until the historic first march of Ni Una Menos in June 2015, in which members of *La Casa del Encuentro* participated. After the first march the State announced the creation of *Registro Nacional de Femicidios de la Justicia Argentina (RGFJA)* (National Register of Femicides of the Argentinian Justice), highlighting the influential nature of this initial mobilisation.

The scope of the policies overseen by the *Instituto Nacional de la Mujer*; INAM (National Institute for Women) included; the Equal Opportunities Plan, the Observatory of Violence against Women, the formation of the Ad Honorem Advisory Council which monitors Law 26.485 and the National Action Plan on VAW.   The NAP in place at the time of the *Justicia para Micaela* protests (April 2017) was called the *Plan Nacional de Acción para la Prevención, Atención y Erradicación de la Violencia contra la Mujer* 2017-2019 (National Action Plan for the Prevention, Assistance and Eradication of Violence against Women). A crucial part of this NAP was the provisions of Law 26.485 (2009) which argued that VAW was considered 'any conduct, action or omission occurring in the public or private industries or spheres, that is, either directly or indirectly, based on an unequal power relationship, affecting a woman's life, freedom, dignity, physical, psychological, sexual, economic or

pecuniary integrity, as well as her personal safety'. This plan was compiled by the *Instituto Nacional de la Mujer; INAM* (National Institute for Women).

6.5.1 Policymaking Capacity of the State: Ireland

The Irish State has also been vulnerable to international pressure regarding various conventions on VAW as well as international institutions. Ireland ratified CEDAW in 1985. Ireland's obligations under CEDAW in relation to VAW encompass several due diligence provisions, essential under international law for States to take comprehensive actions against such violence. The purpose of these provisions is to ensure the State cannot evade responsibility by attributing acts of violence to private individuals. Key aspects of these obligations include legislative measures to enact and enforce laws protecting women from all forms of violence and ensuring their effective implementation. Access to justice is critical, enabling women to report violence and access legal remedies, with protections in place during judicial proceedings. Additionally, the provision of support services such as shelters and counselling is crucial for victim recovery and harm prevention. Preventative measures and public education campaigns which aim to shift societal norms that perpetuate violence against women. Data collection, which is vital for informed policy-making, while periodic reporting to the CEDAW Committee enhances transparency and accountability. Collectively, these measures require a proactive and holistic government approach to create a safer environment for women.

The responsibilities of the State are set out in the 'due diligence provisions' mentioned in regional conventions on VAW, in the European context, this would be the Istanbul Convention, which was created in 2011. Ireland signed the Convention in 2015 and ratified

the Convention in 2019.   In this Convention, due diligence is referred to in relation to State

obligations in Article 5:

> '1. Parties shall refrain from engaging in any act of violence against women and
> ensure that state authorities, officials, agents, institutions, and other actors acting on
> behalf of the State act in conformity with this obligation. 2. Parties shall take the
> necessary legislative and other measures to exercise due diligence to prevent,
> investigate, punish and provide reparation for acts of violence covered by the scope of
> this Convention that are perpetrated by non-State actors.'

The expert group associated with this convention are GREVIO (Group of Experts on Action

against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence). These due diligence provisions

include the necessity of States to create National Action Plans (NAP) which set out the

strategy the State will take in eliminating this type of violence (Irish Human Rights and

Equality Commission 2019).

Ireland also relies on international institutions, especially due to being a small island nation

with a majority English speaking population in Europe, making it a prime location for

multinational corporations, attracting foreign investment which has contributed to economic

growth. Ireland actively participates within institutions such as the EU, the UN, and the

WTO. There has been an influence of international institutions on Ireland's economic

policies. Ireland also required financial assistance in the form of a bailout package after the

severe recession that hit after the economic crisis in 2008 i.e., Troika - the European

Commission, the IMF, and the European Central Bank (ECB). This bailout package

primarily benefited the financial system and restored confidence in Ireland's economy.

However, austerity measures in the form of cuts to public spending and increasing taxes

disproportionately affected the most vulnerable in society including the already underfunded

services which are crucial in combating VAW such as Rape Crisis and Domestic Violence

Centres and refuges. As discussed in the previous section, according to the Democracy

Index, from 2016-2020, Ireland was consistently categorised as a 'full democracy'

(Economist Intelligence Unit 2020)   The relationship between State and Church in Ireland is

an important feature of institutional legacies regarding policy on sex equality in Ireland,

particularly since the Catholic ethos is not just present in government but also embedded in

the education and health systems.

There are a few main pieces of legislation related to VAW in Ireland that are of importance

as discussed in Chapter Two. The Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990, the

Domestic Violence Act 1996, and Criminal Justice (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 and the

Domestic Violence Act (2018), as discussed in Chapter Two. *(See Appendix B – Key Policy*

Changes in Ireland).   The Sexual Abuse and Violence in Ireland (SAVI) Report which was

published in 2002 was one of the most important documents of its time and signalled that the

State were taking violence more seriously. A new SAVI report has been consistently

requested since 2009 from Rape Crisis Centres and Domestic Violence Centres in the country

who saw the need for updated data and advice. This was ignored by government on

numerous occasions despite the unmistakable evidence that not enough was being done and

new data was badly needed.

In May 2009, a report was published which detailed the abuse of children who were placed in

religious institutions by the Irish State, the Report of the Commission to Inquire into Child

Abuse (Ryan Report). There was a significant increase in calls to the Dublin Rape Crisis

Centre after the publication of this report and the Centre argued that they would need more

funding to keep up with the calls coming in as well as a new SAVI Report. The government

did not commit to funding the new report which would have cost approximately €800,000 to €1 million euro and the author of the original SAVI Report, Prof. Hannah McGee had expressed her availability. SMO activity and the focus on VAW helped to reignite the support for producing another SAVI Report. The second SAVI Report is due to be published approximately 2024. The issue of consent was of particular importance in the *I Believe Her* protests and appeared regularly in the online analysis, pointing to the lack of understanding of consent and the necessity of comprehensive sex education in schools. The exchange between the Tánaiste, Simon Coveney, on Thursday 29th March 2018 in the Dáil, and the TD/ROSA Founding member mentioned in Chapter 8 also pointed to the need for a new SAVI report. For the State to have the ability to respond to violence in Ireland, investment is crucial, data which is over twenty years old is not sufficient and the necessity of up-to-date data is clear.

The degree of political centralisation within a polity is a crucial factor in policy making. It is apparent that Ireland has been characterised as a largely centralised government. It is evident that regional and local government are quite weak, and the power lies in the hands of those in central government, who control the political agenda (Social Justice Ireland 2018). Local government has had many of its responsibilities taken away over the last four decades and services such as health, education and infrastructure have been centralised to the national level e.g., Health Service Executive (HSE) (Social Justice Ireland 2018). Although Ireland is considered a centralised government, the way in which policy related to VAW has been developed is highly fragmented. There is no statutory agency tasked with overseeing policy related to VAW specifically and therefore the lack of communication between departments and service providers leads to a lack of effective monitoring of policies. A more collaborative approach with civil society groups with the inclusion of lived experience of

victims/survivors of violence is necessary for effective co-ordination and implementation of policies.

In Ireland, Cosc – the National Office for the Prevention of Domestic, Sexual and Gender-based Violence was created in 2007 and its role was to co-ordinate across the justice, health, housing, and education departments as well as community groups and NGOs in relation to domestic, sexual and gender-based violence. During my research (2021) the Cosc website was still up and running online, however, it came to my attention that the office had disbanded in 2019 and that the Department of Justice were now the main co-ordinating body of the NAP on VAW (Second National Strategy on Domestic, Sexual and Gender-based Violence) (2016-2021). It is evident that Cosc was never considered a standalone statutory agency and was an office within the Department of Justice. When the Department of Justice was reconstructed into three pillars; civil, transparency and criminal, the monitoring of the NAP on VAW Second National Strategy on Domestic, Sexual and Gender-based Violence) (2016-2021) was overseen by the Criminal Justice pillar and within that, the desk dealing with Community Safety policy.

In Ireland at the time of the *I Believe Her* protests, the NAP in place was the 'Second National Strategy on Domestic, Sexual and Gender-based Violence 2016 – 2021' which was compiled by Cosc. The primary implementing bodies in the NAP in place in Ireland in 2018 were Garda Siochana, Tusla, Department of Justice and Equality and Cosc. Cosc, it seems was responsible for many different actions and is noted as a 'co-ordinating body' and an 'implementing body' in the Second National Strategy on Domestic, Sexual and Gender-based Violence) (2016-2021). A monitoring committee met twice a year to discuss their progress at

achieving their goals. In the Second National Strategy on Domestic, Sexual and Gender-

based Violence (2016-2021), a gendered analysis of violence was not present and therefore

the roots of the violence based in power dynamics was not properly understood or legislated

for. One of the purposes of the Second National Strategy on Domestic, Sexual and Gender-

based Violence was to make it possible that the *Istanbul Convention* would be ratified.

Despite the victim-centred approach outlined in the NAP, in practice, there seems to be less

availability to victims of violence, the resources which enable them to escape violence and

recover from the trauma. For example, the waiting lists for access to Rape Crisis Centres,

particularly in Dublin, can be months and up to a year. This long waiting period can be

attributed to several factors: the lack of resources that Rape Crisis Centre have such as

available counsellors as well as the increase in individuals disclosing they have been abused.

The increase in disclosing can be, in part, attributed to protests such as the *I Believe Her*

protests, wherein, victims of violence may be 'triggered' and feel the need to disclose their

trauma.

During the *I Believe Her* protests, there was a substantial increase in donations to the Dublin

Rape Crisis Centre (DRCC) and it was reported that the centre received over 16,000

donations, varying in contribution amount, resulting in over €25,000 raised in the two days

after the 'not guilty' verdict was announced (Ewald 2018). The primary criticisms of the

First National Strategy on Domestic, Sexual and Gender-based Violence (2010-2014) and

Second National Strategy on Domestic, Sexual and Gender-based Violence (2016-2021) in

Ireland have been related to monitoring and implementation. The system in Ireland is highly

fragmented when it comes to VAW and the audit that was conducted about the Second

National Strategy on Domestic, Sexual and Gender-based Violence (2016-2021) concluded

that Ireland needs a dedicated office/agency to monitor and implement policy on VAW in Ireland.

6.5.2 Policymaking Capacity of the State: Comparison

Both States have ratified international and regional conventions on VAW. However, the details of how due diligence is performed is quite broad in each and the follow-up mechanisms are sometimes not as effective as hoped (Sarkin 2018). Membership of international institutions which promote social progress and justice have influenced progressive policy changes in each State regarding gender identity, marriage equality and reproductive rights. It is evident that there is more pressure from international institutions regarding gender status issues than class issues (Htun & Weldon 2018). Both countries have had to look to international institutions for financial assistance in response to economic crises, but the assistance did not seem to consider the damning effects economic crises have on women and frontline services for violence. It is well documented that at times of economic strain VAW increases, this was evident again during the Covid-19 pandemic where VAW increased throughout the world becoming what is known as the 'shadow pandemic'. Both Argentina and Ireland are classified as democracies, but Argentina is characterised primarily as a 'flawed democracy' whereas Ireland is characterised as a 'full democracy'. It is evident that in both States civil society is well developed and the ability of movements and groups to organise is done with relative ease. However, the Argentinian State's propensity for repression of social movement activity has been well documented in response to social movements and SMOs including the *Piquetero/as* and more recently, Ni Una Menos. Argentina's political system is characterised as a decentralised federal State whereas Ireland's political system is characterised more as a centralised government.

VAW is a public policy issue, however, given the nature of violence perpetrated against women, there are multiple actors involved, across many different departments within government. It is necessary for there to be a Ministry or Office which deals with these issues alone and not split amongst several departments and/or ministries. There are two general problems that occur when there isn't a single agency/ministry tasked with overseeing policy; gender policy bills sent to a greater number of committees/groups and therefore can stall or die, and implementation is difficult as there is no one department responsible for implementation (Franceschet 2010). Both States shared this issue, that the agency/office overseeing policy either had no legislative power, were underfunded or that the policy implementation was difficult given the fragmented way in which VAW was being dealt with. It is evident that the presence and power of such agencies are shaped by political dynamics including the government in power and the presence of autonomous movements within the country, who can push government to uphold their commitments. The creation of these agencies are important as they can empower women within the government or provide a blueprint of sorts, they can also start alliances with other groups.

This Chapter discussed the features of political opportunities which facilitated the '*Justicia para Micaela*' protests after the femicide of Micaela Garcia in Argentina and the '*I Believe Her*' protests held in response to the verdict of the Belfast Trial in Ireland. Both protest events focused on the individual act of violence as well as the broader issue of the violence perpetrated against women in their respective contexts. McAdam (1982) argues that to engage with a political opportunity, movements often mobilise based on an 'insurgent consciousness' and develop their organisational strength. Both SMOs emerged after the death of a woman and the insurgent consciousness was based on a sense of injustice, about the way in which women were being treated in each country. Their organisational strength

grew through the development of structures and aligning themselves with likeminded organisations, groups, and individuals. This was done in tandem with consistently inserting a political question into the conversation, primarily through signalling the role the State plays in protecting or not protecting women.

The changing political alignments that occurred in each context were influenced by destabilising events, i.e., economic crises and the revitalisation of the reproductive rights movement. During the period analysed (2016-2020), in Argentina there was a move from a centre-left to a centre-right government whereas in Ireland, there was a move from centre-right to a more centre government. By analysing the presence of allies for each SMO, it is evident at that Ni Una Menos had acquired several important influential allies within and outside State institutions, and in the case of the *Justice para Micaela* protests, *Movimiento Evita* (Evita Movement) would prove to be their most important ally. Although ROSA did not have allies with as much influence, the allies they did have were vital in the organisation of the *I Believe Her* protests, particularly the presence of Coppinger. Both Ni Una Menos and ROSA had the ability to occupy both policy/advocacy and grassroots/activist spaces due to their proximity to the State and these allies. The increased access of new actors to the political system was apparent in both cases. In Argentina, Ni Una Menos revitalised established spaces of feminist advocacy (*Encuentros*) and created new ones, and in doing so, brought new actors, particularly young women into the polity. In Ireland, ROSA were part of the larger Reproductive Rights Movement and the timing of these protests in Ireland are of particular importance as this was when a new group of young people, women and LGBTQIA+ people were active in the polity. Resource mobilisation theory argues that the resources available to a movement influence their ability to organise and the base that had been formed over the first few years of mobilisation was clearly influential (McCarthy &

Zald 1977). As Mannheim (1952) argued, in relation to the 'generational unit', different political generations are connected due to shared experiences which are often shaped by political, cultural, or social changes which are destabilising. It is evident that the identities of different generations engaged in activism are in part modelled by their shared experiences and this includes the political context (Cullen & Fischer 2014; Molyneux et al. 2020; Friedman & Rodríguez Gustá 2023). It is evident that the economic crises and revitalisation of the Reproductive Rights Movements in both contexts have engaged this generation in mobilisation due, in part, to shared experiences in political and social life.

The capacity for State repression of social movement activity differs in severity given the way in which Argentinian authorities use violence in social control.   Whereas in Ireland the repression of social movement activity can be more performative at times, however, this can also be damaging to movements as they may lose adherents. The policymaking capacity of each State has many of the necessary conditions such as having ratified international and regional conventions, however, the lack of an independent, well-funded agency, with political influence, dealing solely with issues of VAW makes the implementation of measures more difficult. Each of these factors gave insight into the political opportunities at play in each national context and help to shape the mobilising structures, which will be discussed in Chapter Seven.

Chapter 7 - Mobilising Structures: Analysis

This Chapter will analyse the mobilising structures utilised by each SMO and compare how these were employed in relation to each protest event. First, it is necessary to identify the organisational structure of Ni Una Menos' and ROSA, to understand how they operate, and the level of interaction between members, and then compare. Secondly, I will identify and analyse the traditional mobilising structures employed by the SMO, primarily through their tactical choices, both disruptive and non-disruptive, and as they relate to information sharing and recruitment, and compare these traditional mobilising structures. Thirdly, I will identify and discuss the digital mobilising structures utilised by each SMO employing the concept of an affordance to assess the strengths and weaknesses of social media platforms, according to the experience of Ni Una Menos and ROSA activists, and compare these digital mobilising structures. Finally, I will illustrate how the mobilising structures within each SMO's repertoire informed the strategy employed by Ni Una Menos and ROSA as they relate to the *Justice para Micaela* and *I Believe Her* protests.

The social networks available to movements can assist or hinder mobilisation and are crucial for diffusion of movement goals (Crossley & Diani 2019:151-161). These networks facilitate interaction between individuals and the movement, along with movement goals and ideas (Kriesi 1995; Rucht 1995). Additionally, they can generate social capital that movements utilise in their actions and mobilisations. Diani (2003) identified four main network structures which are wheel/star (core-periphery), policephalous, clique, and segmented-decentralised. It is assumed within these network structures that all actors recognise each other as part of the same movement (Diani 2003:306-307). Some networks can prove to be more open whereas some networks are closed and dense and not as influenced by external

factors. These four network structures are largely characterized by how centralized and segmented the networks are. (See Fig.4 Diani - Four Social Network Structure types).

Fig.4: Diani (2003) - Four Social Network Structure types

As described in Chapter One, Diani (1992) defined social movements 'as networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in political or cultural conflicts, on the basis of shared collective identities', and social movement organisations (SMOs) as 'groups who identify themselves, and are identified by others, as part of the same movement, and exchange on that basis' (Diani 2003:305). It is evident that SMOs play a significant role in co-ordinating protest events, constructing frames,

recruitment, and sharing resources (Swart 2008). The purpose of understanding the network structure is to attain an understanding of the interaction between activists in these SMOs. It is evident that social network structures can both facilitate and constrain movement activity and the ability to engage in collective action (Diani 2003). The concept of network centralisation allows for an understanding of the informal or formal nature of the network and helps to identify if there is a central person/group who plays a role in communicating with external actors, which gives insight into how the SMO operates. Whereas the concept of segmentation allows for an understanding of the level of communication between actors within the network, the higher the segmentation, the more distance between actors (Diani 2003:306).

The 'clique' structure described by Diani (2003) requires that the social movement actors continuously are in contact with one another and requires engagement constantly. The 'wheel/star / core-periphery' structure means that social movement actors don't necessarily have to network outside of the core actor(s). The policephalous structure is characterised by having multiple centres of power or leadership, but still shows some level of centralized coordination. The segmented-decentralised structure consists of multiple segments or clusters that operate relatively independently of each other but are connected by common values or identities. It is evident that various structural types can manifest within different segments of an SMO. For instance, at the level of core leadership and key organisers of the SMO certain structures are present compared to those found among the broader base of the SMO, which includes active members and occasional participants.

> 'With NUM, Argentine feminism achieved a central goal of many progressive social movements: a highly diverse, mass base anchored in a robust social network permeating all types of social groups in a range of locations' (Friedman & Gusta 2023:246)

Ni Una Menos largely aligns with the segmented-decentralised structure which enhances its flexibility and adaptability, allowing different parts of the SMO to swiftly respond to local issues and tailor strategies to meet specific needs. The low centralisation of this SMO signals that the network might not be densely connected across all segments. Instead, it may exhibit dense connections within individual segments but have weaker and less frequent connections between these segments. This allows for a degree of autonomy and flexibility within segments, while still maintaining a level of coordination and coherence across the SMO. This structure fosters local leadership by enabling autonomous operation of local groups, which in turn can develop campaigns that deeply resonate within their communities. By utilizing a segmented-decentralised structure Ni Una Menos exemplifies a strategic balance of centralisation and segmentation that effectively addresses the varied dynamics of feminist activism across different regions. In the context of Ni Una Menos, centralisation during this time period (2017) is relatively low. This minimal centralisation is important in allowing the different segments of the SMO to maintain autonomy in their operations. This structure empowers local groups to make decisions that best suit their specific regional challenges and community needs without waiting for approvals from a central authority.

By decentralising decision-making power, Ni Una Menos enhances its responsiveness to immediate issues, such as responding to incidents of femicide or organising local protests that address specific legislative or societal changes. The segmentation in Ni Una Menos is quite high as each segment within the SMO can operate independently but remains ideologically

connected to the goals of fighting against the rate of femicide and VAW while also advocating for women's rights more broadly. This high level of segmentation allows the SMO to cover a broader geographic area and demographic diversity, enabling tailored community engagement and specific local issue advocacy. This segmented-decentralised approach provides significant flexibility and adaptability, crucial for a SMO tackling a widespread issue such as VAW.

In essence, the segmented-decentralised structure of Ni Una Menos strategically utilises the benefits of both autonomy and a unified cause, allowing for a dynamic and robust feminist SMO that can adapt and react to both local and global challenges in real-time. Given how influential Ni Una Menos is in Argentina and the number of initiatives that it has created, both online and offline, this is to be expected. The non-hierarchical and egalitarian nature of Ni Una Menos as a SMO, and particularly the way in which they operated during the first few years of mobilisation (2015-2018), aligns with the segmented-decentralised network structure. This period is when the protests in response to the femicide of Micaela Garcia occurred (April 2017). Given how embedded the SMO is in Argentinian culture, the network maintains itself because of the prominent level of engagement throughout different forms of communication and information sharing, including traditional news media (TV, radio) and digital media (social media platforms, podcasts).   This network is decentralised because although there are women who have become faces/primary voices within the SMO they do not control the exchanges between others in the network. To sustain this type of network, requires the promotion of a non-hierarchical and egalitarian culture.

There is a strong participatory element to this model. The simple but powerful demand that men stop killing women, was a straight-forward and inspirational challenge to the establishment, given that the State was at the same time showing their murderers impunity. It did not bring the national ideological differences into focus but bypassed them. No matter their ideological differences, none could agree to persist in the support of men killing women and all had to be seen to be in support of it never again happening, or 'not one more'. There was also a cultural and emotional resonance with the integrity and classicality of the '*Nunca Más*' (Never Again) previous political slogan of the 1980's regarding 'disappearances' and torture echoed in the lack of adornment in the 'not one more' slogan. It can be argued that the ingenuousness of the slogan's simplicity has helped to facilitate the flow of communication across different social networks as it can be applied in a variety of settings, thus bolstering its utility as an organisational tool.

The period focused on here, shows the SMO starting out with a segmented-decentralised type structure which was present in 2017/2018. However, more recently, the SMO has elements of the wheel/star structure as it has become more institutionalised and a more top-down approach has been taken, especially as they became a force within the Reproductive Rights Movement in Argentina from 2018-2020. This shift of the focus of Ni Una Menos from VAW to reproductive rights was necessary in their strategy to attain reproductive rights legislation.   The crucial organisational base that Ni Una Menos provided in the reignited Reproductive Rights Movement in Argentina as well as the advocacy tactics employed by Ni Una Menos was crucial to the passing of abortion legislation in Argentina (Daby & Moseley 2022; Cohen 2022).

During the first few years of mobilisations, starting in 2013, ROSA's network structure could be considered to align most with the wheel/star (core-periphery) model, characterized by high centralization and low segmentation. Central to this structure is the Dublin group, which serves as a pivotal connector among the various local groups located throughout Ireland in cities like Cork, Limerick, Galway, and Belfast. Dublin acts as the hub for coordinating larger national events, such as the Bread & Roses Festival, which will be discussed later in this Chapter. The other groups act independently focusing on issues pertinent to their locality and all groups share information about each other's events and local concerns/issues on their social media platforms. Dublin and Belfast would have the bigger branches of ROSA and since the Belfast branch is operating in a different State, i.e., Northern Ireland, they would work even more independently. Both branches have assisted or worked with other branches of ROSA and other organisations and individual activists in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. More recently, in November 2022, ROSA has a National Steering Committee, who meet monthly to discuss plans of action, i.e., local and national initiatives.

> 'Of course, in instances of particular local events that ROSA decides to respond to/organise around, branches have the autonomy and authority to organise initiatives and ROSA nationally will always assist as much as possible.' (MUROSA02)

As these groups have become more independent it is evident that once ROSA had become more established, particularly during the Reproductive Rights Movement, this SMO aligns more with the clique structure, which would indicate low centralisation and low segmentation. This structure is characterized by close-knit, densely connected groups that facilitate cohesive and coordinated action.

Through interviews with members of the SMO, specifically those in the Dublin area, it was made clear that members are encouraged to bring forward to the group any concerns or ideas they have regarding what to protest.

> 'We take initiatives ourselves, but then sometimes an issue comes up and somebody might text some of the others and say, look, I think we should do something on this.' (MUROSA01/Ruth Coppinger)

This tight-knit group have known each other for quite some time and there is a comfort among the members that seems to have strengthened their links to one another, which does also align with the clique structure. Members are encouraged to bring forward issues and ideas directly to the group, fostering a sense of empowerment and collective ownership over the group's activities.

> 'I think because there is a regularity in meetings, there's a trust amongst each other in the sense (*that*) generally speaking, we agree. We've generally said that this is really important, we want to do something about it, then there's also an openness to people bringing (*other ideas*), she's got a better idea, oh yeah actually, you know, let's do that, it's a close enough group that trusts each other.' (MUROSA03)

Activists mentioned how they cannot protest or act on every issue as they do not have enough structures or active people in place. However, they agreed that some of the 'explosions' such as the Belfast Trial were undeniable. They knew something was going to happen but had to act quickly as they, like everybody else, were waiting for the verdict after a two-month period of hearing the details of this case through the traditional news media and online.

This is a tight-knit group, so in-group organising is usually managed through whatever is the handiest form of communication for most members. This informal communication is typically managed through the most convenient platforms available, such as WhatsApp or Facebook Messenger, which supports the group's agile and responsive organising style.

This can often involve setting up a 'group chat' and through this messaging events and/or meetings are organised. There are less than 50 core members of ROSA throughout Ireland (Fitzsimons & Kennedy 2021:178) but you do not need to be a member of ROSA or identify as a socialist feminist to attend or participate in events and protests. There is a constant shift in participation depending on the issue at hand and during the height of the Reproductive Rights Movement in March 2018, ROSA had hundreds of people attending meetings and events over those years.

> 'The normal sort of organizing that we would do… now in the last year or so (2021-2022) would be WhatsApp, it was probably Facebook Messenger before that… a decision might be made to go ahead with a particular event or a meeting.' (MUROSA01/Ruth Coppinger)

Details of any events or meetings that are arranged are then communicated to the general group as well as on social media pages and by directly contacting those who have attended in-person meetings and events through text messaging.

> 'It will be advertised on ROSAs social media. People would be contacted through text messages, who've attended previous ROSA events, whose names and numbers we have permission to contact.' (MUROSA01/Ruth Coppinger)

Overall, ROSA's structure effectively combines elements of both the wheel/star and the clique models, with a centralised hub in Dublin that facilitates broad national coordination and action, while also fostering strong, trust-based relationships within and between local groups, enhancing their capacity for grassroots activism.

7.1.2 Comparison: Structures of Ni Una Menos and ROSA

In comparing the networks of Ni Una Menos and ROSA it is evident that their social networks function in diverse ways, which is to be expected, given the differences in size and scope. It is not just that there is a size difference in these SMOs, but the decision-making processes are different and are shaped by the repertoires available to the SMO, which will be discussed in the next section. Both Ni Una Menos and ROSA are transnational and have groups throughout the world, but this study is focusing on the SMOs in their national context i.e., in Argentina and Ireland.   The analysis of each network reveals how the protests in response to the femicide of Micaela Garcia and the verdict of the Belfast Trial emerged. The social networks along with the traditional and digital mobilising structures facilitated the ability of the SMO to circulate information quickly and widely to their own audience as well as other groups.

The differences in terms of centralisation are due in part to Ni Una Menos emerging as one of the biggest contemporary feminist SMOs in the world and it being rooted in Argentinian culture. This SMO bled into so many parts of society that the individual becomes the creator of what Ni Una Menos means to them and this may differ depending on their positionality but there is a common bond between all, which is the demand to stop killing women. On the other hand, ROSA are a socialist feminist SMO, part of the larger feminist movement in Ireland and represent the socialist feminist wing of that movement. It is evident that ROSA have benefitted in many ways from having a tight-knit network, as evidenced by the trust that is shared among the activists. However, they also acknowledge the limitations of being so tight and try to encourage and support other groups or people who are organising in Ireland including external allies as discussed in Chapter Six.

Ni Una Menos predominantly adopts a segmented-decentralised structure, enhancing its flexibility and adaptability. This allows various segments of the SMO to respond swiftly to local issues and tailor strategies to meet specific needs. The low centralisation indicates that the network might not be densely connected across all segments, but exhibits dense connections within individual segments, facilitating a degree of autonomy and flexibility. This structure empowers local leadership, enabling autonomous operation of local groups, which can develop campaigns that resonate deeply within their communities. In contrast, during the initial years of mobilisation starting in 2013, ROSA's network structure aligned more closely with the wheel/star (core-periphery) model, characterised by high centralisation with a central hub in Dublin coordinating actions across Ireland. This structure facilitated broad national coordination, while the local groups focused on issues pertinent to their localities. Over time, as these groups became more established, ROSA's structure evolved to resemble a clique structure, indicative of low centralization and segmentation, characterised by tight-knit, densely connected groups that facilitate cohesive and coordinated actions.

Both SMOs exhibit low segmentation, enabling easy communication within their networks. The Ni Una Menos network is broad and has multiple ties across Argentinian society which enables bridging with other groups. This ability to interact with external groups, such as the relationship of Ni Una Menos and the *Movimiento Evita* (Evita Movement), is particularly important in relation to this protest event. Meanwhile, ROSA have a tight-knit network but given their ties to the Socialist Party, many founding members, including Coppinger, have been active for long time, they have a strong connection to the Reproductive Rights Movement, and frontline workers, i.e., domestic and rape crisis centre workers, throughout

the country. Their commitment to continuous activity has kept the network, although small, a vital force for feminist activism in Ireland.

The differences in centralisation reflect the unique cultural and operational contexts of each SMO. Ni Una Menos, deeply embedded in Argentinian culture, operates with minimal centralisation, which is crucial for maintaining autonomy across its segments. This non-hierarchical approach supports a dynamic and robust feminist SMO, adept at tackling local and global challenges. ROSA, on the other hand, benefits from a structured approach where centralised decisions can spur national initiatives, yet local autonomy remains respected and essential for addressing specific local concerns. In summary, Ni Una Menos's segmented-decentralised structure and ROSA's evolving network from a wheel/star to a clique model illustrate their distinct approaches to organising and mobilising within their respective national contexts. These structures not only reflect their strategic operational choices but also their adaptability in responding to the evolving dynamics of feminist activism.

Traditional Mobilising Structures

Mobilising structures can be understood as 'those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilise and engage in collective action' (McAdam et al 1996:3). A tactic is an act that embodies the SMO's demands. Tactical choices can be both disruptive and non-disruptive i.e., strikes and candlelight vigils and SMOs use several different tactics to attract several types of audiences. Meyer (2007) identified four different audiences that SMO's need to reach: authorities, activists, bystanders, and the media. The tactical choices by SMOs catch attention of audiences in different ways. However, it should be noted that the type of mobilising structures utilised by the SMO have an enormous influence on the types of audience that they are able to reach. Some tactics are less combative and involve actions that show the commitment of the activists and communicates to bystanders and other activists (Meyer 2007). The different tactics used by the SMOs in this research are influenced by both historical movements and contemporary movements. It is evident that this modularity means that 'tactics are not only historically conditioned, but are already interactively co-produced by social movements and public authorities: they do not therefore "belong" to any one group (Doherty & Hayes 2019:272).

7.2 Traditional Mobilising Structures: Ni Una Menos

Through interviewing people who would identify themselves as members of the SMO it is evident that Ni Una Menos cannot be reduced to a single cause or type of SMO. The notion of 'Ni Una Menos' is simultaneously; a phrase used in response to acts of violence and sexism, a call to action, a space for communities to gather safely around the issue of violence and has many other possibilities. The way in which the phrase has been adopted in the political discourse in Argentina has meant that the way in which people hear about events or protests related to acts of VAW can be from quite different sources. This can be through

social media platforms, but often the traditional news media, for example, radio stations are an important communication medium in Argentina and seem to be one of the main ways in which activists hear about upcoming protests, particularly in the provinces in Argentina.

> 'Friends, for sure, social media… I always listen to the radio, it's something that I really like, is the radio… Maybe podcasts they were just starting at the time… about Ni Una Menos. Many people from the cultural movement in Buenos Aires were involved. So, in any interview, an actress or actors or writers or radio figures, they were talking about that, so they were mentioning this all the time, comedians as well. Yeah, I think that was the way I heard about that (*mobilisations*) and then friends.' (MUNUM03)

The traditional news media played a role in mobilization and framing processes. In terms of mobilization, the media helped Ni Una Menos by giving attention to the issue and giving details of when the next mobilizations were going to occur etc.

> ''I think social media was not as present (*at the emergence of Ni Una Menos)*, but WhatsApp played a really huge role, and mainstream media, not because they wanted to, just I think that backfired then. They did a lot of huge shout outs about these kind of things (*mobilisations*). It's like 'Oh my God, these women are in the streets across the country because they're demanding (*change*)', and well, that's how everyone knew that this was going to happen and then once it started, it was always kind of the same dynamic.' (MUNUM02)

This is also reflected in the influential external allies discussed in Chapter Six, which Ni Una Menos gained early in their mobilisations which included left-wing political parties and coalitions, other prominent social movements and NGOs and women's groups nationally and internationally. The way in which activists engage with the SMO through attendance and participation in marches and protests reflects the political cultural fabric of protest in Argentina. Since protest is common, one activist described that there is process in Argentine mobilisation, especially on big days of protest i.e., International Women's Day (March 8) or the Day of Remembrance for Truth and Justice (March 24). By this is meant that different movements and political groups organise who will be at the head of the march. The group that usually is at the front of the march is the movement or group most associated with that particular issue/day.

'I would always go to the marches, and I meet with my friends, and I join one column, the marches are organised by columns, we call 'columna'. So, you have the MST (*Movimiento Socialista de los Trabajadores*) column, many political parties have their columns, then the Students Union has its own, Ni Una Menos obviously will have one, so there are a lot of actors in the march, so probably, I will hear about the march from any of these movements and I will go.' (MUNUM01)

'The column that is in the front of the march will be the most important organization regarding that date. For example, if it is June 3rd, it will be Ni Una Menos at the front… and this is also something that they negotiate, I don't know much. I don't know how they do it, but someone will go first then there will be another one and so on.' (MUNUM01)

The revitalised feminist advocacy spaces (*Encuentros*) and new spaces created through Ni Una Menos have close links to one another and are complementary to each other. The attendance at the *Encuentros* has increased since the emergence of Ni Una Menos, and it is worth considering that the way in which this SMO engaged with social media contributed to the broadening of the attendance at these meetings, particularly for young women.

'But I think Ni Una Menos, gave them the massiveness, that the other movements, maybe were more sectorial, more to a specific group that were really interested in that. Maybe it's also because Ni Una Menos arrived to a moment when social media exploded. So, I think it's a confluence of different factors, but definitely the Encuentros and other movements created the momentum for it, but I started to listen to it (*feminism*) since Ni Una Menos and since what happened with Micaela.' (MUNUM03)

These discussions were not limited to 'feminist spaces' but also reached the workplace and community groups. It is evident that there is no one organisation or space, online or offline, that they engage with to participate in mobilisation. Ni Una Menos does not necessarily 'belong' to any one person or group and the ability of individuals to create the meaning to suit their situation means that those within the network might have views which are considered ideologically different but come together under the slogan 'Ni Una Menos'. One activist recounted her own experience working in a law firm, where she did not expect to

find common ground regarding feminist ideas, and another commented on how they found space through their volunteering.

> 'I used to work as a corporate lawyer. I worked for one of the biggest firms in Argentina and there were no people with social conscience there at all. However, when a lot of them were like, yeah, 'we are going out today, we are leaving at 6pm because we are going to march because they need to stop killing us', and no one would say absolutely anything against that. It was just talking with colleagues that I might not have anything in common, that I wouldn't even share a pint with after work, but we found ourselves saying, 'oh, so you think like that as well' and oh yeah, another person was listening, and said, 'yeah, can I go with you'? etc., and we went out to the streets.' (MUNUM02)

> 'I used to be part of an NGO, volunteering, focusing on homelessness and helping people who were living in the streets. I remember that there was a group that were really socially involved in different things, and we used to talk about that, especially women. We had a nice group who tried to talk about things and recommend meetings and that type of thing.' (MUNUM03)

These meetings and assemblies have provided a space for activists to recruit new activists, share information, and discuss issues that are important to them. These spaces are important features in the SMO's repertoire as they can be non-disruptive and provide space and comfort for activists and communities, but they also can act as the base for informing tactical choices.

The type of tactics utilised by a SMO are important for mobilisation. Disruptive tactics have been particularly important in Ni Una Menos' repertoire. These include mass mobilisations on public squares, strikes, '*escraches*' (see page 186 for a detailed explanation), acts of public mourning, and artistic performance. The mass mobilisations that Ni Una Menos have organised have seen 200,000-300,000 people take to the streets, primarily in the *plazas* in the big cities i.e., Buenos Aires and Rosario. There is a history of mobilisation in Argentina wherein people on different sides of any given debate know where they are going to take up space, i.e., squares and *plazas* in the city centres. This is a core feature of mobilisations that occur, in the sense that there is a designated space where activists gather.

'It's something really Argentinian to go to the Plaza Congreso, which is the square that is in front of the Congress during every debate. The Congress is debating and deciding about a new law and it's really common that the groups who support one side or the other go to that square, waiting for the results. That is really typical of my country.' (MUNUM03)

'(*in Argentina*) our way of struggle has always been going to the streets and demanding change.' (MUNUM02)

In October 2016, the first mass strike of women, headed by Ni Una Menos in Argentina called *Miércoles Negro* (Black Wednesday) consisted of a one hour pause from work with women wearing black as a sign of mourning, after the femicide of another young woman, Lucia Pérez. There is evidence of innovation in tactical choices in Ni Una Menos' repertoire as they combine the strike action with public mourning, this type of mourning has a rich history in Argentina and will be discussed further below. In March 2017, five weeks before the femicide of Micaela Garcia, Ni Una Menos participated in the International Women's Strike on International Women's Day (March 8). Feminist movements around the world also went on strike that day with thousands of women taking to the streets across fifty countries. These types of mass occupations of squares such as the one in Buenos Aires, as well as the inclusion of strike action can be seen as a re-emergence and in some ways a re-invention of the strike, given the inclusion of striking from unpaid work, which is primarily done by women (Fraser et al 2018; Gago & Mason-Deese 2019).

Another tactic which is utilised and performed in the public realm are '*escraches*', a tactic wherein public officials are publicly shamed as activists often congregate at their home or workplace, with the goal of highlighting the injustice and encouraging their community to shun them (Popescu 2021:367). These were popularised by the HIJOS *Hijas e Hijos por la Identidad y la Justicia contra el Olvido y el Silencio* (Daughters and Sons for the Identity and Justice against the Forgetting and Silence), a human rights movement which emerged in the

1990s in response to those who committed human rights abuses during the dictatorship (1977-1983) and were not jailed or were waiting to be summoned to court, pardoned by former president Carlos Menem. Similarly to the HIJOS, Ni Una Menos use these kinds of tactics 'against systems of power, specifically state institutions' as part of a 'strategy to overcome the lack of public justice' (Popescu 2021:374). There is intergenerational pain present in the tactics employed by movements in Argentina with links to the aftermath of the military dictatorship. The *Madres y Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo* (Mothers and Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo) formed in 1977, were initially protesting in response to their children and grandchildren's 'disappearance' during the dictatorship. The HIJOS, formed in 1995, are the children of those people who were disappeared. Both groups were responding to the pain of their loved ones' disappearance.   This form of activism aims to increase visibility, apply social pressure, and demand accountability in cases where the legal system may not provide justice.

In 2017, Ni Una Menos used the *escrache* tactic alongside other feminist groups as they organised a protest outside the Buenos Aires Province Court to call attention to the case of Lucía Pérez, a 16-year-old girl who was brutally raped and murdered in 2016. The case sparked widespread outrage, especially after the court acquitted two men of sexual abuse charges linked to her death, citing insufficient evidence. The feminist activists, deeply dissatisfied with the judiciary's handling of the case and its broader implications for the fight against gender violence, used the *escrache* to publicly denounce the court's decision and the judges involved. They gathered outside the court, chanting slogans and displaying banners to highlight the injustice and the need for systemic change in the handling of VAW cases in Argentina. This public shaming aimed to shame the justice system and to rally public support for more effective legal protections against gender violence.

The trauma of the past informs the present in the tactics they choose. Acts of public

mourning are common in Argentinian culture, most famously by the *Madres de Plaza de*

Mayo, who did not have bodies to mourn in private as their children and grandchildren were

'disappeared' during the military dictatorship, so they mourned publicly in the streets of

Buenos Aires (Lopez 2020:31).   Ni Una Menos is an intergenerational collective

(Friedman & Rodríguez Gustá 2023) and acts of collective and public mourning are an

important part of their repertoire. When femicide was characterised as a human rights abuse

by Ni Una Menos, they framed the violence as the ultimate expression of patriarchal

violence.

> 'Femicide is not merely a public safety issue to be dealt with using the logic of
> punishment and prison sentences. It is the bloodiest expression of patriarchal control,
> which assigns each person a position and a normative definition and kills those who
> do not comply. Upon stating that this is a human rights issue, the movement
> establishes a genealogy in which the Mothers and Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo
> figure as the central node. Both movements draw nourishment from the practice of
> public mourning' (Lopez 2020:29).

Collectives related to Ni Una Menos also utilise artistic expression in their tactics.   In May

2017, a few days before the annual Ni Una Menos march on 3 June, and a month after the

Justicia para Micaela protests, a collective known as *Fuerza Artística de Choque*

Comunicativo - F.A.C.C (Artistic Force of Communicative Shock) held a protest known as

'Femicide is Genocide' where more than 100 demonstrators stripped naked outside President

Mauricio Macri's residence in Buenos Aires and formed a pile of bodies, representing the

women who are victims of femicide. Simultaneously a piece of performance art and an act of

public mourning for the lives lost. While this is occurring, another activist reads out statistics

related to femicide, the different ways in which women have been killed, and the need for

women to have autonomy over their bodies. This action was also performed in front of

Parliament buildings and the Supreme Court. (*See Fig.5 – Femicide is Genocide*).

Fig.5: 'Femicide is Genocide' Protest – 30 May 2017
https://www.newsweek.com/naked-flash-mob-argentina-denounces-femicide-form-genocide-618257

7.2.1 Traditional Mobilising Structures: ROSA

ROSA, are one of the most consistently active feminist SMOs in Ireland in recent times,

having emerged in 2013.   ROSA use stalls to inform people about issues more deeply and

have more conversations with people individually. Initially these stalls were ROSA's way of

communicating with the public and mobilising people around the issue of abortion.

> 'One of the big things that ROSA does is stalls in the city centre's in Dublin, Cork,
> Limerick, wherever, where we would have information and placards, hand out
> leaflets, try to attract people to come up to the stall, try to talk to people and if they're
> interested, get them to leave their contact details, buy some merchandise or make a
> donation and those really basic things, and obviously then, if there's public events
> coming up, we would ask people to help, with postering city centres or to join us for
> leafleting at a transport hub in Henry St, Dublin or Patrick St., wherever it is…'
> (MUROSA01/Ruth Coppinger)

These stalls, in-person events/meetings and their annual Bread & Roses Festival, are the

cornerstone of ROSA's mobilising. Through them they engage, get phone numbers and

emails, give out information on their current campaigns, and ask people to assist with

campaigns, i.e., leafleting and raising funds for posters etc. ROSA have used innovative

tactics to gain attention for the issues relating to reproductive rights and VAW. They tend to be more ambitious than the liberal feminist organisations in Ireland. This is in part due to their proximity to the State, in that they don't receive State funding, but do their own fundraising and therefore are not answerable to State institutions, as discussed in relation to influential allies in Chapter Six.

ROSA also have utilised disruptive tactics, which are part of their repertoire. The most obvious examples of that would be taking abortion pills in front of cameras during the Reproductive Rights Movement. As mentioned in the influential allies section, ROSA had the support of Dr. Rebecca Gomperts and Coppinger was in parliament as part of the opposition during this period, adding legitimacy to ROSA and attention to the disruptive act. In 2014, ROSA recreated the 'contraception train' inspired by feminist activists in 1971 from the Irish Women's Liberation Movement. But in this case, it was the 'abortion train' where they collected abortion pills from Northern Ireland and then took them openly in front of cameras in Dublin, which was against the law. This tactic was important in raising awareness and gaining attention throughout the world, as key organisers described:

> 'It was politicising as well as providing.' (MUROSA01/Ruth Coppinger)

> 'What ROSA did was very significant and important, as part of this much, much bigger movement, but we were the ones that were very focused on pushing the abortion pills as a way of pushing the reality of abortion on Irish soil that had to be legislated for.' (MUROSA04)

> 'We went ahead (*with the action*) and their support (*Women on Web*) was actually critical because one of the things which I think have always taken on board since that, Rebecca Gombert said to me at the time when we said, 'oh, Jesus, can we go ahead? We're getting a lot of criticism', you can end up cancelling everything you do from fear, and it's always better to push ahead. If we had caved in, we wouldn't have had, we got national and international media for that event…I was interviewed on the train on RTE Radio in a debate with one of the Masters of the Maternity Hospitals, RTE News covered it, we had all of the newspapers there when we got off the train. We got

coverage in the North and international coverage and then the subsequent actions that we took with the abortion pill buses in the following year, which was actively bringing the pills to different places… we had international journalists on the bus with us, … BuzzFeed, Vice and different journalists. Ellen Coyne (writer/journalist) came on one of the buses with us. She was doing a lot of feminist issues at the time and I think Annie Hoey (Labour TD), was on one of the buses as well. (MUROSA01/Ruth Coppinger)

In Ireland, at the time of this debate regarding reproductive rights, a lot of the conversation was built around how many women had to travel to England for an abortion, whereas ROSA focused on acts of civil disobedience. These tactics involved engaging with the larger Reproductive Rights Movement network, external influential allies, co-ordination, and organisation, was key to the success of these events. Building on this, in 2015, they created the 'Abortion Pill Bus with Women on Web' and travelled throughout the country, giving consultations and medication, repeating this act in 2016 and 2017.

'We would have organised those through socialists in the North, who played a big role too, the pills couldn't come into the South and so we had to find people in the North who we could order the pills online for ourselves through the doctor's service but then we had to have an address in the North. So, between trade unionists and socialists in the North, we had to set all of that up and we had to get people to commit to going on the train or the buses in advance, so they could order their pills for themselves because we didn't want to break the doctor relationship, if you know what I mean? And so there was a lot of logistics and then obviously busses, tickets, trains, all of that sort of stuff, in all of them we would have organised with socialist feminists in the various locations to have an event when the bus arrived, have a rally in Limerick, or have a march, whatever it was.' (MUROSA01/Ruth Coppinger)

Many activists working on the ground, including members of ROSA, were critical of what they see as, the conservative establishment, who were out of touch with the changes that much of the country wanted. It was their view that young people, particularly young women and young LGBTQIA+ people, were seeking radical change and a socialist feminist analysis was needed in a time of economic crisis and stark inequality. They were critical of the focus on the X case legislation which they saw as 'a tactical error which fuelled the right-to-life/right-to-choose binary and was devoid of political analysis' (Fitzsimons et al 2021:103).

During this period, ROSA activists during some protests, wore the famous white hood and red cloaks used in the popular dystopian book/tv show, the Handmaids Tale, representing the oppression that women in Ireland were experiencing (*See Fig.6*).

Fig 6: ROSA activists wearing Handmaids Tale costumes

The *I Believe Her* protests were in March 2018, but in November 2018, there was another important campaign regarding VAW led by ROSA in Ireland called 'This is Not Consent' which emerged after a barrister in a rape trial in Cork, was accused of victim-blaming. In their closing argument to the jury, they were reported to have said 'Does the evidence out-rule the possibility that she was attracted to the defendant and was open to meeting someone and being with someone? You have to look at the way she was dressed. She was wearing a thong with a lace front' (O'Connell 2018). The question/suggestion caused outrage and Coppinger, who was a TD at the time, held a thong up in the Dáil and referenced the trial. This action resulted in a campaign wherein women posted pictures online of their underwear with the hashtag #thisisnotconsent (*See Fig.7*).

Fig 7: This is Not Consent – ROSA Poster

Although these protests also received a lot of media attention, and seemed to click into the

public consciousness, the '*I Believe Her*' protests were chosen for analysis given the attention

this trial received and the conversation surrounding sexual violence that followed, both in

society and at a policy level.

> 'The knickers that Ruth held in the Dáil, I picked up with my son on the way to
> school. We're just going to buy a thong… before I drop you off in your primary
> school. These things are just… you know…. I think because there is a regularity in
> meetings, there's a trust amongst each other in the sense of generally speaking, we
> agree, we've generally said that this is really important.' (MUROSA03)

Tactical choices will be interpreted differently depending on the audience. For example, some

tactics are non-disruptive and don't tend to worry politicians i.e., stalls on the streets or

events wherein people are invited to debate and discuss ideas. Whereas the types of

mobilisations which identify an enemy and sets out demands, like what happened during the

Reproductive Rights Movement or the protests that are being discussed in this research, do

catch the attention of politicians and people in power.

'There are things that we've initiated that nobody else was doing and obviously, as I said, the abortion pill actions that we took were completely novel, and the Bread & Roses festival, as an annual thing, that was a novel idea. The idea of discussion and debate, bringing people together to discuss those issues in a festival type way and a short, varied programme, that includes music, poetry and art.' (MUROSA01/Ruth Coppinger)

At the most recent Bread & Roses event (2022), there were 250 people who participated. Activists who were interviewed felt that this kind of participation is signalling a change in the public consciousness.

'We always get an influx from that (*Bread & Roses Festival*) because it's just an opportunity for people to get a more developed conversation going about why we're doing this, and why we actually think it's worthwhile being active around this issue, what you can achieve in terms of small changes, but also where you can achieve in terms of attitude changes.' (MUROSA03)

'When you have 250 people who show up at Bread & Roses, and 150 were brand new people we have never seen before. It's like, there's the potential!' (MUROSA02)

'There's no question that there is a huge interest in socialist feminist ideas and now because of the counter revolution that's taking place, as seen in the US, but which will (*happen*) in other parts as well.' (MUROSA01/Ruth Coppinger)

7.2.2 Traditional Mobilising Structures: Comparison

The tactics utilised by each SMO are similar is some respects, but also can be culturally

specific. Tactics may be disruptive and non-disruptive. There are a variety of tactics being

utilised by each SMO which involve a certain amount of innovation, borrowing from

historical movements and contemporary movements, and adopting and adapting those forms

to suit their aims.   Both SMOs have in the past utilised tactics from previous movements in

their national context. For example, Ni Una Menos have engaged in '*escraches*' popularised

by H.I.J.O.S. in the 1990s, which involves the public shaming of individuals guilty of crimes

against humanity who have been shown impunity by the State or are awaiting trial. ROSA's

'abortion pill train', in which they organised to purchase abortion pills in Northern Ireland

and bring them to the Republic, was inspired by, and echoed, the Irish Women's Liberation

Movement 'contraception train' of 1971. The SMO's use of historical repertoires are an

important feature of their mobilisations, demonstrating how SMOs do not exist in a vacuum

and rely on the previous actions of movements. These types of disruptive tactics are

important to gain the attention of the media and wider public, as one ROSA activist

commented regarding taking abortion pills in front of cameras:

> 'Of course they were stunts, but they were stunts with a very clear political purpose,
> which was to bring out the reality (*of Irish pregnant peoples' lives*).' (MUROSA04)

Ni Una Menos have an enormous following online (See Table 6), not just from the public but

from traditional news media, particularly those that are more left-wing. Therefore, potential

activists and rank-and-file activists, hear about a lot of the marches and protests from a

variety of sources. In contrast, ROSA are a relatively small SMO and although one of their

founding members is a well-known TD figure in Irish culture and political life, ROSA itself

is not as well known throughout the country. The stalls that ROSA are known for on the main streets in Dublin are the main traditional mobilising structure that ROSA utilise.

In Ni Una Menos' case, given how well-known the SMO is, the discussions and information sharing regarding organising of protests were occurring both inside and outside of movement 'spaces' and included friends and family circles, the workplace, and the traditional news media. The activists I spoke with, did speak about individual level experience of organising through friends utilising WhatsApp, sharing information regarding protests etc. Whereas with ROSA there is more of a tight-knit group, that are organising protests, meetings etc., were primarily conducted in small WhatsApp groups which included some of the core members as well as others who were engaged with the SMO at the time. ROSA don't enjoy the same amount of notoriety in Irish society and therefore needed to utilise the tight-knit structure.

In relation to more formal events, Ni Una Menos and ROSA have similar approaches to the creation of spaces to conduct discussions based on common concerns. Ni Una Menos have organised conferences which were in part inspired by the work of the *Encuentros* and ROSA created the Bread & Roses Festival to engage and recruit new members as well as provide a space to have deeper conversations regarding issues ranging from VAW, reproductive rights, cost of living crisis, healthcare, LGBTQIA+ people's rights etc.

Digital Mobilising Structures

Table 6: Social Media Platforms for each SMO *As of Sept 2023

Platform	Ni Una Menos	ROSA
Facebook (main page)	362K followers Ni una menos https://www.facebook.com/NUMArgentina	16K+ followers ROSA - Socialist Feminist Movement https://www.facebook.com/ROSAsocfemIE
Twitter (main)	82,014 followers 1,664 tweets *Last post 3 June 2018 NiUnaMenos @NiUnaMenos_ https://twitter.com/NiUnaMenos_	5,614 followers 5,380 tweets ROSA - Socialist Feminist Movement @RosaSocFem https://twitter.com/RosaSocFem?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor
Instagram (main)	166K followers 1,792 posts _niunamenos_ https://www.instagram.com/_niunamenos_/	5,910 followers 1,080 posts rosa_socfem_ie https://www.instagram.com/rosa_socfem_ie/
Website	http://niunamenos.org.ar/	http://rosa.ie/ (no longer in use)

7.3 Digital Mobilising Structures: Ni Una Menos

Previous research concerning Ni Una Menos has focused on the adoption of technology by Ni

Una Menos activists in a variety of ways. Their collection of data regarding sexist violence

(Chenou & Cepeda-Masmela 2019), their use of social media to memorialize victims of

femicide (Popescu 2021), their use of Twitter to discuss the issue of femicide through the

hashtag #NiUnaMenos (Belotti, Comunello & Corradi 2020), the diffusion of the same

hashtag during the Covid-19 pandemic (Piatti-Crocker 2021), and the use of the hashtag in

Spain to discuss gender violence on Twitter during the International Women's Day Strike in 2017 (Núñez Puente, D'Antonio Maceiras, & Fernández Romero 2021) have all been subject to academic scrutiny. There were gains made through digital activism, particularly the ability to disseminate data, one of the most concrete examples is the creation of the Observatory and the counting of femicides.

> 'We wouldn't have the numbers of how many femicides without Ni Una Menos. I know that and I recognise that Ni Una Menos helped us to produce the number and talk about that, to think about femicides, and men killing women specifically.' (MUNUM03)

The main social media platform that activists I interviewed engaged with was Facebook. Although all mentioned that they know it was popular on Twitter, it was not a platform with which they had much experience, but they do remember how popular the hashtag was in the early years of Ni Una Menos. The hashtags most associated with Ni Una Menos during this time-period (2017) would have been #niunamenos (*not one (woman) less*) and #vivasnosqueremos (*we want to be alive / we love ourselves alive*). McCarthy (1996:148) states that 'collective actors, probably most often, adopt mobilizing structural forms that are known to them from direct experience.' The adoption and adaptation of different forms of mobilizing structures is common in 21st century feminist activism, particularly, through social media platforms. Previous research on Ni Una Menos has argued that Twitter is an effective mobilizing tool in terms of the reach that it has and their ability to get a message out quickly through it, however, it is not really a space wherein patriarchy and VAW can be dismantled (Giraldo-Luque, Fernández-Garcia & Perez-Arce 2018). SMOs utilise both traditional and digital mobilising structures. It is evident that there is a connection between these structures in contemporary society wherein a large amount of our exchanges occur online or through online media. Activists hear about protests/marches regarding Ni Una Menos from a variety of diverse sources and share information with others. This ranges from social media to

traditional media and friends and family. There is also a connection between in-person

experiences and utilizing social media platforms to confirm times, locations etc.

> 'I was much more active in social media then. Facebook mostly… because everything circulates, also WhatsApp, or at university, I was doing my doctorate, so I was attending seminars, and people talk to each other, and the radio also. For example, I would know that there will be a march sometime soon and then to confirm the details I would go to Facebook.' (MUNUM01)

The messaging app, WhatsApp, was mentioned by all the Ni Una Menos activists

interviewed as one of the main tools used to organize in the early days of this SMO. An

important feature of this messaging tool is the protective and defensive measures that must be

in play during mobilizations.   There might be people who are upset that women are taking to

the streets and making these types of demands. These women were simultaneously taking to

the streets demanding a stop to VAW while also having to take precautions, as they too might

experience violence at the hands of those who are opposed to women's liberation from such

abuse.

> 'It was very much talked about, everyone was, sharing through WhatsApp, (*asking questions*) 'Are you going?', 'When are you going?', 'Who are you going with?', 'Do we meet outside?', or 'Do we meet to come back home?' That's another thing, there's a lot of sisterhood, in that we have to watch out for each other, because this was so massive. When we return from the capital to our homes, how do we manage to survive, you know? Because we shake this a lot, we shake society a lot by doing this and that might lure some people that you would not want to be there. They're expecting all these women to go back home.' (MUNUM02)

Ni Una Menos use a variety of ways to inform the public about issues and one of the most

prominent ways in which information is disseminated is through their main website where

they publish their manifestos.

> 'Our manifestos are appeals, urgently written texts but kneaded with the temporality of a long experience. Our manifestos are words to be used, disseminated, relaunched here and there. Several were translated into many languages. They inspired, provoked, and invited others. Through them, we continue to build a language of feminist revolt.' (http://niunamenos.org.ar/category/manifiestos/)

These manifestos are published every few months, usually around annual days of protest such as International Women's Day (8 March) and Ni Una Menos' annual march (3 June). There have been 35 manifestos published since their emergence, the last one posted on 7 October 2021 (Sept 2022). They primarily contain the main demands that Ni Una Menos want to achieve that year and/or any crucial issues that have not been getting enough attention. These manifestos are shared on their website and would also have been shared in the 'Notes' section of Facebook, this feature is no longer on Facebook but would have been during the time of the femicide of Micaela. These manifestos were compiled into a book called Political Friendship + Collective Intelligence: Documents and Manifestos 2015-2018 (*Amistad política + inteligencia colectiva. Documentos y manifiestos 2015-2018)* which is available on their website (Ni Una Menos 2018).

> 'That's why it's renewed every single year because the demands change, because the agenda changes, because society changes, and we need to give more and new discussions every single year. You need to update because otherwise the struggles all die, if you don't, any struggle that does not update to the current times that it's fighting in, it gets into the history, it's forgotten after a few years… So why is this movement continuing to have this presence and the strength that it has nowadays? I think it's because this capacity of renewing and perceiving what are the demands this year.' (MUNUM02)

Female journalists in Argentina utilised their cultural and social capital and used these as a resource to help the SMO compile and spread information.

> 'I think that Ni Una Menos was super important because it was promoted by female journalists, so they have a lot of impact in the media, the media is also a very traditional macho space. So, the good thing about that, is that reading the things or the manifestos of Ni Una Menos, it's a pleasure, because they're very well-written…. you notice that they are people that know how to write.' (MUNUM05)

The use of social media platforms, particularly Facebook allowed for meetings etc., to be organised. Mason-Deese (2020:2) highlights the 'intersection between the material practices of the feminist movement and its forms of knowledge production and digital presence.' This

revitalisation of spaces wherein feminist activists can mobilise both in the digital and physical world has politicised a new generation of women.

> 'It's easier to spread the speeches and it's faster, you can do it at home, you can see it at home, and expose other things, you start to read all the experiences that others have, so it's easier to connect. Also, it's easier to make contact with an author, easier to access information, organizations, to create campaigns.   I am a Communicator (*person who establishes and maintains relationships between an organisation and the media as well as the public*) too, it's my profession, so it was a huge change for social movements.' (MUNUM05)

> 'At the beginning social media was a window to reach more people and talk more about it, to get more information., You share links, and many meetings were organised through social media.' (MUNUM03)

In one activist's experience, they relayed that once Macri became President of Argentina, six months after Ni Una Menos emerged, social media drove the organising and mobilisations more, as Ni Una Menos no longer had the same support from the traditional mainstream media.

> 'The speech changed a lot in mainstream media, and it also changed the role of social media. When Macri was in government, Facebook and Instagram was, and especially Twitter as well, was at a huge different level and WhatsApp was more something that you used too, for sharing this kind of information, so I think it changed a lot over the years and across governments.' (MUNUM02)

Despite the advantages that come with social media, it is not a replacement for the in-person experience and the necessity of having physical bodies taking up space in the streets is clear.

> 'I think that feminism in this region of the world (*Latin America*) is connected with social media and networks, but it is not the only thing of course. You have to put the body (*in the streets*).' (MUNUM05)

7.3.1 Digital Mobilising Structures: ROSA

The relationship ROSA has with social media platforms has depended largely on the amount of engagement they have on the platform, which have different affordances and therefore they are engaged with in different ways. There is a strong focus on Facebook in this

research, as this is where there was largest amount of engagement during this time. The main theme that emerged concerning the use of social media platforms through the interviews with activists were how they functioned as an effective mobilising tool given their ability to distribute information quickly.

> 'They're hugely important, I don't think you can mobilize anymore without using them.' (MUROSA03)

The affordances of the different platforms were discussed with activists, and it seems there are pros and cons in relation to mobilisation. The way in which you can communicate is affected by the type of platform. You can communicate to different generations depending on which platform you use. These generational differences also influence who can use the platforms – knowledge, and the space i.e., the algorithm can influence who sees what. There are practical elements to the type of actions you can do using certain platforms. Facebook and Instagram are run by the same company (Meta) and therefore you can post on both platforms at the same time. Also, there are direct messaging options depending on the platform which gives the SMO the opportunity to 'speak' directly to a person who comments on a post.

> 'We mainly use Instagram and Facebook (*because*) you can do the double-posting. So, I think we are focusing more on Instagram, because it's just easier as well, when you post, the people that engage with the posts most with your Instagram you can directly send messages to them and then invite them and stuff like that, so Instagram is an easier platform to try to engage young people.' (MUROSA02)

In the Irish context, this study is focusing on 2018, when Facebook was a much more prominent platform used by younger people. One of the most important features of social media are the ability to reach a lot of people, and also, to diffuse ideas widely. This ability may be crucial to building a more outward looking consciousness among young people and potential activists.

'Instagram is an easier platform to try to engage young people. It's also an easier platform to get loads of likes and views, but that doesn't necessarily translate into people coming to things. Facebook, we get less responses but the response we get are more serious than on Instagram. We have some posts… sometimes hundreds or thousands of likes, but that's not the responsiveness they get at your meeting, you know? Which is just the reality as well of where consciousness is at, people not necessarily understanding the role of struggles because they haven't, for example, very young people weren't necessarily involved in Repeal.' (MUROSA02)

'I think one positive about social media is how it has made a lot of people very aware of international issues and actually, it's a much more international consciousness amongst a lot of people, which is very positive' (MUROSA02)

The affordances of the platforms are nuanced and there is always the potential to have a post become viral or start 'trending'.

'Social media is an important platform. We need to engage with it more because I think that Tik Tok, for example, is obviously a place where a lot of young people (*go/engage with*), it's a bit like Twitter, you can fall into a rabbit hole but if you fall into the right one you can engage with a lot of young political people on Twitter very easily.' (MUROSA02)

Activists have acknowledged the importance of social media platforms but also argue that the external influence of Big Tech i.e., the algorithms of certain social media platforms can work against movements aims, which could be seen as its weakness. Although ROSA do have a Twitter account, and more recently a TikTok account, they are not as active on Twitter, but they have acknowledged through interviews that they should be using it more often.

'They're also increasingly difficult to use. So, because of the algorithms and the way they just force you to kind of take ads and all that, they're increasingly just anti-mobilization as well, in the way they're designed.' (MUROSA03)

Social media platforms are useful for mobilization but are not necessarily going to solve the bigger issues that need action, so these platforms are not seen as a good replacement for in-person meetings or discussions, which are still the preferred way to engage people.

'We're still at a stage that there's times where people are active and there's this explosion of struggle and potential for a movement, but in between that, it's still very hard to actively build a movement. I'm absolutely not blaming social media for that. That would be facile… Put it this way, it's not going to overcome these sorts of ideas.

That's not a negative social media. I'm not saying it's the root of the problem. It absolutely isn't. But that's more an example of not a negative of social media but of a limitation of social media.' (MUROSA04)

There are both strengths and weaknesses in utilizing social media platforms. ROSA are a relatively SMO, and by their own admission, there needs to be more structures put in place. They need people available to actively post regularly and become more familiar with how to make the most of the different platforms.

'If we had the structures and the people who could spend time on social media, we would want to do a better job and we could have a better reach. I think we need to become better at pushing our ideas… on social media.' (MUROSA02)

One of the main talking points that emerged within the interviews with ROSA activists is the knowledge that one of the main facilitating factors in the SMO's ability to organise so quickly was due to the structures they already had in place, both in the physical and digital world. For example, ROSA's ability to build a platform during the re-emergence of the Reproductive Rights Movement in Ireland was crucial to their ability to respond to this event.

'The type of bases that we would have had on Facebook at the height of so many important points in the abortion rights struggle (2013-2018)… I think that that's more testament to the fact that ROSA was able to grow big social media platforms at a time where people were very engaged in the abortion struggle, whereas there's not one unified struggle in that type of way now (2022)' (MUROSA04)

Using social media platforms assist movements to reach a wider audience but given the nature of this issue i.e., VAW and sexual violence, it is necessary to be thoughtful about how you get attention on this issue.

'I don't want to sound flippant… when you're talking about gender-based violence, but there's an element of very consciously using your position, or wherever you have a public position to get the maximum amount of (*attention*) because it's nearly, you're consciously trying to break the algorithm, if enough people talk about it at the same time, then all of a sudden, you're trending on Twitter... you can see that for a day or two, you get to reach a much wider audience, you can literally see it on the page. So, it allows you to just actually start the conversation with many more people.' (MUROSA03)

7.3.2 Digital Mobilising Structures: Comparison

Digital mobilising structures have proven to be important resources utilised by Ni Una Menos and ROSA, particularly in relation to mobilisation, information sharing and framing processes. Ni Una Menos' emergence has often been characterised as a collective that 'started with a tweet'. However, it is evident that given the long history of struggle in Argentina, as well as the feminist knowledge that was dispersed among so many, that this would not have become the SMO it has become worldwide without the utilisation of structures and a varied and innovative repertoire. There was considerable agency and participation at play from activists to spread this knowledge throughout Latin America.

> 'It was also intentional. There was a lot of efforts from Argentina and Argentinian activists to export this movement, this experience that was so successful, to other countries in Latin America. This was not just, 'oh they realized in Argentina they're doing this'…. there was a lot of effort put into that.' (MUNUM02)

ROSA was able to build a large social media presence during the Reproductive Rights Movement and having consistent posts and activity on their Facebook account was particularly vital to their movement-building. Ni Una Menos and ROSA consistently keep up to date with current issues affecting society, which keeps them relevant in the national context. For example, manifestos for Ni Una Menos and associations with many other groups throughout Argentina and ROSA's continuous support for other groups in Ireland in response to VAW, worker's rights, LGBTQIA+ rights, etc.

There are several ways in which these SMOs' repertoires operate differently, primarily influenced by their network structures and their capacity to foster a flexible collective identity. Ni Una Menos, with its decentralised-segmented structure, facilitates participation from a diverse array of individuals and groups across different segments. In contrast, ROSA's

structure emphasizes close-knit, densely connected groups that enable strong, cohesive action but may limit the breadth of its collective identity. This difference can be explained as well by different access to resources in terms of the number of people who are active online as well as the ability of those people to utilise platforms. Young people tend to have a monopoly over what social media platform is successful at any given time. In turn, this means that the popularity of a platform can change quickly. Ni Una Menos' scope and connection to young people, and young women in particular, means that they are bringing with them newer platforms such as TikTok with their understanding and interpretation of Ni Una Menos. Although ROSA do have a connection to young people, working-class people and the LGBTQIA+ community, they do not have (or have not succeeded in producing) the same type of flexible collective identity in which all people in Ireland could reconfigure to suit their own situation.

Both SMOs utilise social media platforms in their mobilisations, but they are primarily used to share information quickly and widely and secondary is the discussion of VAW. The two protest events that are discussed in this research though, are prime examples of how when utilised appropriately, both traditional and digital mobilising structures prove to be crucial and can have a facilitative effect on mobilisation and framing processes. Activists interviewed from both SMOs did point to social media platforms as important tools for mobilisation and were seen to be the primary ways in which they hear about protests, marches, and meetings. The protest events that are the focus of this research occurred in 2017 and 2018, respectively, a period in which Facebook was still one of the primary organising spaces for social movements.

Movements employ different strategies based on the issue at hand. Meyer (2007:82) defines

a strategy as 'a combination of a claim (or demand), a tactic, and a site (or venue)'.

Strategies are adapted according to the political opportunities available, and the findings of

this research give insight into how strategies were influenced by the specific context of the

protest and the mobilising structures present in the SMO's repertoire.

7.4 Protest Event: *Justicia para Micaela*

Movement	Ni Una Menos
Name of Protest	Justicia para Micaela
Reason for Protest	Femicide of Micaela Garcia
Dates	8th April 2017 11th April 2017
Location (s)	Buenos Aires, Rosario, Entre Rios, throughout Argentina

Ni Una Menos were demanding justice for Micaela Garcia, a victim of femicide, and other

women who are victims of femicide and different forms of VAW. The targets of these

protests were the perpetrator of the crime (Sebastian Wagner), the judge (Carlos Rossi) who

was responsible for allowing this man to leave jail earlier than advised, and the State, for the

impunity shown to murderers of women and lack of accountability.   Protests were

conducted in response to this femicide throughout Argentina, some of the biggest

demonstrations were in Buenos Aires, and Rosario on 8th April 2017 (See Fig.8). The site of

these protests were primarily at the main urban *plazas*, a common meeting place for

demonstrations near government buildings. Thousands gathered for Micaela's funeral on 11th

April 2017 and participated in public mourning in response to the femicide of this young

woman, a tactic utilised by previous Argentinian social movements and by Ni Una Menos.

Fig 8: Picture of Protest in Rosario on 9th April 2017
https://twitter.com/Celina_Tuc/status/850846748864118784/photo/1

Neidhart (1992) argues that the co-ordination of mobilising structures is key to a functioning movement. My findings illustrate how the mobilising structures and repertoires utilized by Ni Una Menos were essential in the mobilisation that occurred in response to Micaela's femicide. The ability to mobilise so quickly did not just rely on Ni Una Menos' resources, but also *Movimiento Evita* (Evita Movement), of which Micaela Garcia was an active member. Activists who I interviewed agreed that they may have some bias as they also identify as Peronist, but they did feel that Garcia's membership of that movement bolstered the activity that occurred around her femicide.

> 'I think her friends and political group (*Evita Movement*) support the struggle as well and used the tools they used for any other situation – 'let's go to the street' and it's going to move, it's going to create a movement from this. I think that is something that I don't know if many people mention and it's, again, my belief, but I think the fact that she was involved in a young Peronist group (*JP Evita*), was a basis for the movement that was created after.' (MUNUM03)

These 'tools' were mobilising structures, political influence, large networks, resources to print posters and align with other groups. The broad social network described earlier facilitates the interaction between Ni Una Menos and *Movimiento Evita* (Evita Movement) given the crossover that is present with members of each.

In the Chapter Eight, I will discuss more deeply the relevance of Micaela Garcia being a member of each. For this research, I interviewed a childhood friend of Micaela who was present at the protests before she was found, when she was found and at her funeral. It is evident that political party and community ties that Micaela had were hugely important in this case.

> 'She was lost a lot of days. We started to share information a lot of the time, we contacted her boyfriend, her friends, her parents, and we started to share information at every hour to see if we could find her. We wanted her to appear, so it was like a

massive act, so a lot of people started to follow her parents. For example, they had a protest, I don't remember if on the Sunday or Monday after she disappeared, and her parents and her father called the protests, we have a lot of protests in the country.' (MUNUM06)

'She (Micaela) was in a political party…so all of those parties started to share information, and I think that it was very helpful in that case. We organised our protests the day before they found her, it was a Friday evening, because she was lost a week, an entire week, so it was the worst week of our life, and on Friday night, we organised this march. We put out a microphone and other people came to the microphone to say my friend is lost too, my friend's name is X… and we had TV channels doing interviews with us. It was a massive act. But I think that's the positive point about this, about her being in a political party.' (MUNUM06)

Text: 'We are looking for Micaela Garcia' '21 years old, dark/brunette hair, measures 1.63m, wearing animal print shorts and a white t-shirt (as in the photo). Disappeared on Saturday 04/01/2017 around 5.30am'
Fig. 9: Posted on the Ni Una Menos Concordia Entre Rios Facebook Page on 5th April 2017
https://www.facebook.com/1605441299698083/photos/a.1605442809697932/1865199843
722226/

*Entre Rios is the province where Micaela is from.

'Micaela did the same sport that I do, so all of the community of my sport, gymnasts, also started posting and sharing information so it was a lot of people here in

Argentina… and also we have friends from different political parties (*all left or centre wing – including members of the Evita Movement, and Las Rojas (socialist feminist organisation, also present was another feminist movement in Argentina known as MuMaLá" ("Mujeres de la Matria Latinoamericana"))… * so we called them and they also came to the protests and the march, so there were three different political parties in the protests, so it was more people from different communities, it was good too, because someone would talk with each TV channel. We got more diffusion.' (MUNUM06)

Influential allies are found outside and within State institutions, Fabiana Tuñez, the President of the National Women's Council of Argentina, and one of the founding members of the NGO, *La Casa del Encuentro* (The Meeting House), was reported to have said; 'There are two people responsible: the murderer of Micaela and the judge who released him despite being advised against doing so' (Clarín 2017). The naming of Judge Rossi in the Micaela Garcia case can be considered a form of *escrache*. His actions in releasing a previously convicted offender who subsequently was involved in the tragic murder of Micaela Garcia drew severe public and media criticism. The public outcry and specific targeting of Judge Rossi for his decision in the judicial process exemplify the characteristics of an *escrache*. The community used this method to express their dissent and to demand accountability, hoping to prevent future negligence and bring about changes in the handling of similar cases by the judiciary.

8th April 2017

Ni Una Menos utilised their digital mobilising structures in response to this femicide, particularly through the platform, Twitter, and their own website. On Ni Una Menos' Twitter page on 8th April 2017, there was a tweet with Micaela's picture, and the hashtags *#justiciaparamicaela* (Justice for Micaela) and *#niunamenos* (See Fig.10). The engagement

for this tweet included 2,512 likes, 2,485 re-tweets and 136 comments/replies (See Fig.11).
The analysis of this tweet and comments/replies will be discussed in the framing processes
Chapter as they give insight into the way in which activists were engaging with this SMO
during this time. For the analysis of how people were engaging with this particular femicide,
I chose to follow the hashtag specifically referencing Micaela, that Ni Una Menos used in this
tweet i.e., #justiciaparamicaela (See Fig. 12).

Fig 10: Tweet by Ni Una Menos referencing Micaela Garcia
https://twitter.com/NiUnaMenos_/status/850782601677811713

Fig 11: Replies (136) to Tweet by Ni Una Menos referencing Micaela Garcia

Fig. 12: Tweets using the hashtag #justiciaparamicaela in Argentina between 7th April 2017 and 12th April 2017

Ni Una Menos posted their 9th manifesto on 20 April 2017 titled 'Not in Our Name', which detailed their anger regarding the femicide of Micaela as well as a list of demands that they had and the changes that needed to be made. The most striking part of this manifesto was their accusation that the State was responsible for this femicide for several reasons. The end of this manifesto reads 'The femicide of Micaela, like that of Chiara, Melina, Daiana, and the 329 young women from 16 to 21 years old who were murdered in the last 9 years are the

responsibility of the State' (Manifesto No. 9 – Not in Our Name. 2017). This notion that the State is responsible for these femicides is present in all of these protests. '*el estado es responsable*' (the State is responsible) was a phrase on many of the posters/placards related to Micaela, which will be discussed further in the Chapter Eight.

11ᵗʰ April 2017 – Funeral

Protests occurred on the day after Micaela's body was found but it is evident that public mourning was the primary 'tactic' employed in response to the femicide of Micaela, especially on the day of her funeral with articulations of this throughout Argentina. Mourning is not just a tactic in Argentinian culture but has deep roots in historical repertoires. The notion of public mourning and participating in collective grief has a vital role in Argentinian society and 'the two last democratic governments (the Kirchner administrations) have attempted to align state policy with the position of the victims, and in doing so have made remembering a 'national duty' (Derrida 2001). The laws that granted impunity to the military were overruled and new trials have begun to prosecute those in the military responsible of the human rights violations' (Sosa 2011:64). The *Madres de Plaza de Mayo* initially gathered in the central square in Buenos Aires during the military dictatorship in 1977. The term 'never again' became the slogan used by human rights organisations after democracy was restored in 1983 and it was confirmed that these disappearances were part of the State terrorism. The *Madres de Plaza de Mayo* aimed to make visible the absence of their daughters and sons who were 'disappeared'. They repeated this act to this day on Thursdays every week. Their visibility in this public space, showing pictures of their children and grandchildren made visible the absence of their daughters and sons in person.

One of the most well-known journalists and activists associated with Ni Una Menos, Marta Dillon, was reported to have said while standing in the *plaza* in Buenos Aires, "It is a day of mourning, but we know how to turn pain into power. Our mothers and grandmothers taught us how to do that in this same square", (Centenera 2017), referring to the *Madres of Plaza de Mayo*. This public mourning included the family and friends of Micaela, the social movements, Ni Una Menos and *Movimiento Evita* (Evita Movement), political parties, musicians, artists, and numerous others who came to the streets to show their support (See Fig. 13 and 14).

> 'A lot of singers called her parents too. When we went to the funeral, a very famous a singer from Argentina (*Carlos Alberto Solari, known as 'Indio Solari'*) called her parents in the speaker, he sang for her too, and it was very emotional. She was a really good person and I think a lot of people loved her, so they tried everything to get in contact with this guy and other people to talk to her parents' (MUNUM06)

Fig.13 Pictures of Evita Movement activists on 11th April 2017 – day of Micaela's Funeral
https://twitter.com/MovimientoEvita/status/851822717980618753/photo/1

Fig 14: Picture of Protest Posters made by Left wing Political group
https://www.google.com/search?q=micaela+garcia+protests+argentina&source=lnms&tbm=i
sch&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwimyfPt67r-
AhUNhFwKHWKfCx4Q_AUoAnoECAEQBA&biw=1920&bih=969&dpr=1#imgrc=pgA_0dj
H0-6T-M

7.5 Protest Event: I Believe Her

Movement	ROSA
Name of Protest	I Believe Her Protest (a) We Stand with Her Protest (b)
Reason for Protest	Treatment of victim and verdict in Belfast Trial
Dates	29th March 2018 (a) 31st March 2018 (b)
Location(s)	Dublin, throughout Ireland

ROSA were protesting in response to the treatment of the victim in the Belfast Trial and demanding justice for victims of similar cases of sexual violence. The targets of these protests were the accused in the trial, particularly Paddy Jackson, and the *macho* culture which facilitated their actions; the State, more specifically, the justice system, for the treatment of victims in rape trials and the media; and the knowledge that this treatment is a contributor to why women are not believed when they assert that they have been sexually assaulted. Two sets of protests were conducted in response to this case, protests throughout Ireland, in Dublin, Belfast, Cork, Limerick, Galway and other areas on both Thursday 29th March 2018 and Saturday 31st March 2018. This research is focused on the Dublin protests and some of the activists who were part of the organising.

'I Believe Her' Protest – Dublin – 29th March 2018

As already discussed in Chapter Six, the original organisers of this protest were in contact with Coppinger, after being intimidated to delete their Facebook event page which had garnered thousands of followers. McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow (2001) identify 'brokerage' as a network effect and a key condition for mobilisation. Brokerage refers to the way in which an individual can act as a bridge (broker) by connecting a group to a SMO. In relation to

these protest events, Coppinger could be referred to as 'broker' between the original organisers of the protests and the SMO, ROSA.

> '(They) got overwhelmed and reached out… they saw Ruth and ROSA as the people who are actually fighting on these issues the most seriously, and so we ended up last minute, the night before, having to organize this rally.' (MUROSA02)

The original organisers didn't have the experience or structures available to them that ROSA did. The location of the protest for the initial protest was chosen as the original organisers had picked this location, a common location for protests in Dublin., the Spire on O'Connell Street. The new Facebook event page was set up and called 'Dublin Rally Against Rape Trials Failing Victims.'

> 'We just had the Spire because these students picked the Spire, it's an obvious space and there's so few spaces in the city centre now, that actually allow you to bring people together without blocking the road and then you're dealing with the Gards (*Irish police*) and then it just all becomes much more difficult and messy, you know? They'd already called for the Spire, so we just went with that' (MUROSA03)

Resource mobilisation theory (McCarthy & Zald 1977) argues that to be successful, a movement must have a certain amount of resources to succeed and maintain a position in the national consciousness. Coppinger was quite influential within the Reproductive Rights Movement at that time and was a key organiser in this protest. This resource of a political figure was an important feature of ROSA's mobilising power because of Coppinger's position as both a resource and a 'broker'. There is a need to act quickly in response to events as you don't know how long you can keep the public's attention around issues such as this. This case had received a lot of media coverage and social media speculation, which can be considered both positive and negative. Coppinger utilised her platform within the Dáil and the used the opportunity to speak on these issues. The speech that she made before the protest on that day was informed by other ROSA members as well.

'So, it becomes WhatsApp then, and it becomes just, let's go with this and a certain, review after the fact nearly… It's kind of a looser coordination if you know what I mean? In terms of the ins and outs, the exact detail of what Ruth said in the Dáil, and so on, would have been very much discussed on the hop, her in the car driving into the Dáil, kind of two or three people on the phone, literally, because you're just pulled all over the place… we all work full time.' (MUROSA03)

'We knew the Thursday would be big, it was just obvious, I remember walking from the Dáil over to the Spire with Ruth after she spoke in the Dáil and there was just these clumps of young people and… you just know that they're going to the Spire.' (MUROSA03)

Politicians from the Socialist Party and from People- before-Profit/Solidarity spoke at this initial rally. Additionally, speakers were included who shared their own experience of sexual assault and violence, contributions were made regarding Irish culture, and a poet recited a poem in response to this issue. A ROSA activist at this protest started their contribution with 'In Latin America, the movement to end femicide is called Not One More, and I think we need to say that today!'. This was in reference to Ni Una Menos, but instead of the fight against femicide, they were referring to victim blaming by the courts and the media. At this initial *'I Believe Her'* protest (Thursday), the suggestion to have another, bigger protest on the Saturday was put to the crowd who agreed, and this was an opportunity to build on the momentum.

'…(*there was*) just a certain electricity in the air that you kind of just know, this is significant! But then what do you do with it? Because our fear was people are going to get very angry, we're going to have this protest and then it would all die down again, so how do we make something more of this? And that's where our mobilization on the Saturday came from… It gives us two more days to discuss what do we do next? How do we actually… What do we propose to do next… which isn't straightforward…' (MUROSA03)

'I Believe Her' / 'Dublin Rally Against Rape Trials Failing Victims' - 29th March 2018
Considering the seven general categories mentioned in (See Fig. 15), there were 65 posts put on the discussion board, there were 4,871 reactions in total, with 4,194 likes and 336

comments in total on the various posts. A large majority of the posts were related to

solidarity, calls to action and posting of images and hashtags which related to #ibelieveher.

The analysis supports that ROSA used this Facebook event page primarily as a source of

logistical information regarding the protest i.e., time, location, and as a place to discuss the

appropriate slogans and phrases to be used at the in-person protests. There was a presence of

photos and videos of individuals and groups either at the marches or those unable to attend

showing solidarity through holding a page with the words '#ibelieveher' displayed on it. The

engagement metrics facilitate evaluating the success of a certain post, however, they do not

necessarily show how people act based on posts. The interviews in this study were used as a

more concrete data source for the influence of social media posts on activists' lived

experience.

Fig 15: 'I Believe Her' / 'Dublin Rally Against Rape Trials Failing Victims' 29th March 2018

ROSA - Facebook Event - Posts

Thematic Breakdown of Posts on Event Page

'We Stand with Her' Protest – Dublin – 31st March 2018

The speakers at this protest included influential allies such as Noeline Blackwell, CEO of the

Dublin Rape Crisis Centre, TDs from left-wing political parties such as the Socialist Party

and People- before-Profit/Solidarity, Roseanna Shanahan of organisation Consent at UCD

and Hazel Larkin of Action Against Sexual Violence Ireland.

> 'I think the conversation (*about reproductive rights*) had a huge impact on the
> turnout… this trial is something that exploded in the media and obviously had an
> impact. I think there would have had a turnout regardless, but I think the fact that you
> had eight thousand people in Dublin alone, marching on a very last-minute call, it was
> just a reflection of the general anger of, we can't take this anymore.' (MUROSA02)

The energy of the crowd on the Thursday inspired ROSA members to call another protest on

the Saturday as it gave them more time to contact other people and organisations, come up

with some concrete demands, have a larger march as more people would be off work, and

young people at school going age would be free.   The Saturday protest was held starting at

Barnardo Square and they marched to the Department of Justice. This protest was bolstered

by ROSA's mobilising structures, and their experience and knowledge were vital for this to

go ahead.

<u>'We Stand with Her' - 31st March 2018</u>

Considering the general categories identified (See Fig. 16), they are similar to the initial

protest on the 29th March 2018. There were 71 posts put on the discussion board, there were

2,819 reactions in total, with 2,418 likes and 186 comments in total on various posts. The

analysis shows that ROSA used this Facebook event page primarily as an organising tool.

Questions on the event page included questions about logistics as well as what sort of

signs/slogans should be used: For example:

> 'Hey, everyone. Will we march towards somewhere, or is it a stand on the spot kind
> of protest?' (Ref No. 35 / Facebook - ROSA - WSWH Rally)

> 'What do you want us to write on banners and cardboard? 'We Stand with Her'?' (Ref
> No. 37 / Facebook - ROSA - WSWH Rally)

Getting word out for the marches for these two protests would not have been possible were it

not for social media as a mobilizing tool. There wasn't time to make posters and distribute

them around cities, towns, universities etc.

> 'I'd be completely disingenuous if I said it wasn't an important tool because clearly…
> the way in which we've built some really big demos and really big marches that we've
> organised over the years was probably, for example, that demo on the 31st March, I'm
> fairly sure we wouldn't have had posters for that because it was organised so
> quickly…' (MUROSA04)

The thematic breakdowns of the posts on each event page will be analysed in Chapter Eight

to assist in understanding the framing processes involved at each of these protests and the

audience that was available to the SMO, i.e., those that were engaging with the posts and

event pages.

Fig 16: 'We Stand with Her' on 31st March 2018

Thematic Breakdown of Posts on Event Page

The Political Opportunities Chapter (Chapter Six) provided some insights into the external factors in each national context which had an influence on the mobilisations that occurred. The Mobilising Structures Chapter (Chapter Seven) identified the ways in which these SMOs mobilised, and the repertoires utilised, particularly in relation to these protest events. These events are prime examples of how when utilised appropriately, both traditional and digital mobilising structures prove to be crucial features of a SMO's repertoire and can have a facilitative effect on mobilisation and framing processes.

In comparing the flow of information sharing of Ni Una Menos and ROSA it is evident that their networks function in separate ways, which is expected, given the differences in size and scope. It is evident that the network structure of the SMOs had an influence on the ability to organise. Ni Una Menos' broad structure and flexible identity has enabled them to bleed into all facets of social and political life in Argentina and their large social network enabled them to act quickly with influential allies. On the other hand, ROSA's tight-knit structure has facilitated their ability to act quickly in response to pivotal events through the trust they share, their knowledge of the political realm, instincts they have on what and when to mobilise and at the time of this protest event, having connections to a TD who was in parliament, as part of the opposition.

> 'We are all kind of newsy people so we would instantly start communicating with each other and by we, I mean, dedicated ROSA and Socialist Party activists who've been working on these issues, would start communicating very quickly.' (MUROSA06)

The structure of the SMOs along with the traditional and digital mobilising structures facilitated the ability of each to circulate information quickly and widely to their own audience as well as other groups.

Traditional mobilising structures are the primary way in which these SMOs gain attention and disruptive tactics are important in their repertoires. In relation to the *Justicia para Micaela* protests, the act of public mourning is an important tactic in Ni Una Menos' repertoire, as it is both historically significant and informs the collective identity of this SMO. In relation to the *I Believe Her* protests, the tactic of taking up space in a busy public street in a city centre, with little time to plan, is an important part of ROSA's repertoire, demonstrating their knowledge of how to act quickly in such instances. Digital mobilising structures were also vital in these protest events in terms of how individuals heard about the protests and had a role in informing the framing processes. The role of digital mobilising structures in diffusion of movement frames, particularly through their respective social media platforms and the hashtag function, will be analysed in the next Chapter (Chapter Eight).

Chapter 8 – Framing Processes: Analysis

Both protest events give insight into how SMOs mobilise around the issue of VAW in Argentina and Ireland. VAW is a multi-layered human rights issue which can be characterised by many different forms of violence. Sociological research has highlighted these various forms of violence, how this violence ranges in both frequency and severity, and how it is experienced at both an individual and societal level, as discussed in Chapter Three. Kelly's (1987) concept of a 'continuum of violence' posited that women's experience of sexual violence could not be limited to just legally defined offences and that women experience many different forms of violence throughout their lives. These different forms of violence share a common character, which is rooted in male domination over women and other feminised bodies. It is necessary to utilise the 'continuum of violence' during these pivotal moments, as the conversation around VAW rarely focuses solely on the individual act of violence that was perpetrated, but instead on the structural issues which facilitate VAW more generally. In this research the types of violence being discussed are femicide and sexual violence.

Within framing theory, a master frame tends to be a flexible and broad frame that can be used by multiple movements whereas a collective action frame tends to be more movement and/or context-specific (Snow & Benford 1992). Collective action frames are crucial in understanding the framing processes utilised by social movement actors. The success of a collective action frame is often understood through the implementation of three core features i.e., diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing (Snow & Benford 1988;1992). Diagnostic framing involves identifying the problem that exists and assigning blame for that problem. In both these cases the general problem that these SMOs point to is a disproportionate and specific form of violence, i.e., violence that is perpetrated against

women and feminised people. Prognostic framing suggests solutions, tactics and strategies which will reduce and ideally eliminate the problem. The prognostic framing utilised will often reflect the values and ideology of the SMO in question, the type of feminism that characterises each SMO will be used in this analysis i.e., popular feminism and socialist feminism. Motivational framing compels collective action, which is one of the main purposes of social movements, by providing a rationale for action.

Social movement actors participate in meaning-making and draw on cultural materials to frame the issue of VAW. Similarly, the concept of 'discursive opportunity structures' (Ferree 2003; McCammon et al 2007) gives insight into which of the competing ideas regarding how to frame VAW has the most value and currency within the political realm, and therefore makes it more or less of a successful frame during pivotal protests. Both discursive fields and discursive opportunity structures can facilitate, or hinder, frames utilised by social movement actors. The changing political alignments and access of new actors to the institutionalised political system, as discussed in Chapter Six, affects the discursive field by challenging the hegemonic discourse surrounding VAW.   Framing processes and the discourse regarding VAW is shaped by numerous actors in both the political and social world. The cultural context affects these framing processes and creates in each context what are known as 'discursive fields.' These discursive fields utilise 'cultural materials (e.g., beliefs, values, ideologies, myths) of potential relevance and various sets of actors (e.g., targeted authorities, social control agents, counter-movements, media)' (Snow, Vliegenthart & Ketelaars 2018:398).

8.1 Master Frame: Violence Against Women (VAW)

The 'violence against women (VAW)' frame is a master frame that has been used by many SMOs, particularly within the women's and feminist movement and is gender specific. Historically, this has referred primarily to cisgendered women and therefore can be problematic. It has been argued that this frame no longer serves the purpose it once did and has limitations 'empirically, theoretically, politically and legally, and practically' (Goldscheid 2014:625). The main argument being that there should be a change to more gender-neutral terminology or be more descriptive i.e., intimate partner or sexual violence etc. The purpose of the VAW frame initially was to challenge gender roles and highlight the nature of the violence that was being used against a specific gender and in doing so, it would challenge these issues. It is evident the VAW frame has helped to centre the experiences of cisgendered women who have been victims of violence. Queer and gender theorists may resist this frame as it grew out of a specific period with a very binary view of gender. However, the argument that this frame can obscure the ways in which trans, non-binary people and same-sex couples experience violence is true, especially given the ways in which violence is measured, as discussed in Chapter Two. Additionally, without an intersectional view, the primary beneficiaries of the VAW frame tend to be white cisgendered women, to the detriment of the intersection of other identities related to gender identity, race, ethnicity, social class, sexuality etc.

Although this framing has faults, that does not mean it is useless, as it has inspired successful context-specific and movement-specific framing used by social movement actors. The 'ideal' frame depends on context and the frames in this research were strategically used as the best way to advance the concerns of the SMO, while also giving the context for the situation that

occurred. VAW has been established as a global problem and a human rights issue, but the experience of violence is different depending on your identity and the country in which you live. The differential access to assistance is affected not just by gender but also by social class, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation etc. There have been numerous efforts to raise awareness and intervention from policymakers at an international, regional, and national level but it is evident that social movement actors play a significant role in framing the issue of VAW.

Diffusion is the 'transfer in the same or similar shape of forms and claims of contention across space or across sectors and ideological divides' (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001:68). Essentially, it refers to the way in which norms are transmitted. Since diffusion involves the spreading of information, it is evident that SMOs adopt certain structures, both traditional and digital, to spread a message. This process of diffusion highlights how the affordances of social media platforms, as discussed in Chapter Seven, can shape the way in which movement actors communicate. The networks gained through mobilising structures are key in the process of diffusion. According to McAdam and Rucht (2003), there is a distinction between relational and non-relational models of diffusion. Relational models would classify interpersonal contact to be the main form of transmitting information, the relations between groups of people and these connections are defined by the formal and informal networks that allow social movement actors to co-ordinate and mobilise i.e., in-person meetings, assemblies, protests etc. Non-relational models are forms of transmitting information which do not rely on personal contact, an important development in non-relational models can be seen in the use of social media platforms overtaking traditional news media.

<u>8.2 Master Frame: Ni Una Menos / Femicide</u>

In the Latin American context, Argentina specifically, Ni Una Menos had already established a master frame relating specifically to femicide and the collective action frame utilised in the *Justicia para Micaela* protests was shaped by this frame. The diffusion of this frame was made possible through both traditional and digital mobilising structures i.e., assemblies, protests, and social media platforms, including the use of the hashtag function. Previous research has demonstrated how Ni Una Menos were successful in linking femicide with existing human rights discourse, creating a master frame and transforming the public discourse surrounding femicide in both the online and offline space (Garcia-Del Moral 2016; Luengo 2018; Belotti, Comunello & Corradi 2020). The connection with the human rights discourse is important in the Argentinian context more so than other places given the historical context which informs social movement activity in Argentina as described in earlier Chapters, especially in relation to the *Madres de Plaza de Mayo*.

The frame Ni Una Menos employed had variation in scope and interpretive influence, was flexible and inclusive as well as being culturally resonant. This frame was also utilised throughout Latin America and Europe. The concept of femicide and the notion of a gendered type of violence is present in Argentinian society and is used in several types of media.

> 'It's common here. We have a 'femicidio' (*femicide*) every day, so in the news or on the TV, you can see that word, that we use to reference that kind of violence. It's not a common 'homicidio' (*homicide*), it's something about gender. That a woman gets killed because she's a woman. It's common here. Yes, we hear it a lot and we use it a lot.' (MUNUM06)

> 'I do remember the cases before, what I remember were many cases before and Ni Una Menos was talking about 'they are killing us, and we need to be aware of what happened with violence against women', and then this was the last straw. I think Ni Una Menos was building, the glass was almost full when the Micaela case happened and with Micaela then, it was, 'this is enough'. I think that is what happened, I believe

every social situation or social phenomena happens after a confluence of different factors. I think Ni Una Menos was building this momentum. Social media helped to spread the word and then what happened with Micaela.' (MUNUM03)

The collective identity that has been created by Ni Una Menos as described in Chapter Seven, is one which is flexible and has been applied to many different contexts, bleeding into the political and social life of Argentinian people. This diffusion of this collective identity was present in revitalised spaces of feminist advocacy (*Encuentros*) and in new spaces, both in the physical and digital sphere.

> 'Social media, I think it helps to connect more people, where maybe we didn't have many things in common, but we have that in common (*wanting to end VAW*) and that generates community.' (MUNUM03)

Although Ni Una Menos has been led by young women and LGBTQIA+ people, there is also an intergenerational presence (Friedman & Rodríguez Gustá 2023) and the increased numbers present at the *Encuentros* provides some organisational knowledge for Ni Una Menos, some of those involved in the *Encuentros* have been active for the previous thirty plus years.

> 'I say to my mum, you made me a leftist, but I made you a feminist.' (MUNUM05)

Ni Una Menos' creativity in their use of symbols and imagery, which are artistically generated, can be seen as cultural artifacts and are present at both in-person protests and assemblies while also being digitised for online sharing. These cultural artifacts are important for diffusion within the discursive field, they are adopted and adapted at an individual level and at the level of the collective. This can be individual actors creating what they believe Ni Una Menos to be, and then there is also material produced from the SMO as a collective, such as the manifestos available on their main website. The identity that was formed using symbols and colours that are associated with Ni Una Menos are apparent when

marching on specific days of protest. Activists look out for certain symbols which indicate

the SMO.

> 'flags, the colours and… banners and all of that' (MUNUM01)

Artists and performers, particularly females, also integrate 'Ni Una Menos' into their artistic

endeavours with a feminist viewpoint (Popescu 2021). This was an experience shared by

another activist I interviewed.

> 'I would bring my camera because I'm a photographer and take photographs and post on social media to help, that was my way to be there, and kind of showing what is happening in those situations.' (MUNUM04)

> 'Mobilizations are as or more important than social media, they are complementary tools. I think that the impact of getting together, here, the 8th March (*International Women's Day*) is huge. You don't feel alone, you feel more powerful, you feel a lot of energy in the streets. There are also women from everywhere, women from the cops, from the unions, the student movement and women from the theatre, the women that work in the office. It's a very special day. People get very emotional, you cry with others, you cry for all the violence that you have experienced in your life, for the pain that you've suffered and all that you have heard. It's a very cathartic, empowering moment. Also, you feel the bodies of the others, it's a very Mediterranean culture. So, you get lots of hugs and kisses and crying. You get together and, you know, in all revolutions and big changes, cultural changes, you need the arts, the cultural expression and the performances.' (MUNUM05)

Diffusion of symbols through social media could also be used to signal your solidarity with

Ni Una Menos through imagery. *(See Fig. 17)*.

> 'I remember with social media, you could put that (image) in your avatar, and anybody will know that you support this struggle. The same thing happened after with the green scarf.' (MUNUM03).

Symbolic resources in the form of cultural artifacts which are created through shared history

and narratives are crucial for framing within national contexts (Snow & Benford 1992).

Fig.17: Ni Una Menos
Avatar used in Social Media Profiles

Fig.18: Ni Una Menos – Green Scarf –
signalling pro-choice stance in reproductive
rights movement

During the Reproductive Rights Movement, in which Ni Una Menos played a vital role, the

green scarves, a tribute to the *Madres de Plaza de Mayo*, signalled a pro-choice stance in this

debate (*See Fig. 18*).

> 'Even here in Dublin, you saw so many people walking around, then you saw in their
> bag, or on their backpack, the scarf, you say 'oh wow, Argentinian' or 'supporting
> abortion.' (MUNUM03).

This collective identity is flexible, people could share a common bond with the green scarves

and their pro-choice stance. However, to highlight the heterogenous nature of Ni Una Menos,

this did not mean that the people who did were ideologically identical, or even similar.

> 'I think that is one of the problems we have, once we get abortion, we recognize, 'oh,
> wait now, we're really different, you and me, because you support neoliberalism and I
> do not', and now we recognize again the difference we have because we arrived to
> getting the law we wanted. But at the beginning we were so naive, idealistic.'
> (MUNUM03)

Many of these distinct cultural artifacts have been digitised for online sharing and are present in the in-person protests. Di Marco argues that the heterogeneity of social movements in Argentina after the 1990s helped to challenge neo-liberal discourses and produced the idea of a 'feminist people' (Di Marco 2017). This collective identity is embodied in Ni Una Menos, which identifies itself as a 'collective cry against macho violence'. The diffusion of information regarding Ni Una Menos' work can be seen through variety of channels which include social media platforms and their main website but also through the observatory which produces statistics on femicides (Chenou & Cepeda-Másmela 2019).

8.3 Master Frame: MeToo/Sexual Violence

While having different iterations throughout the world, in the European context and in Ireland specifically, the 'MeToo Movement' which boomed in October 2017 had an influence on the framing of VAW. The diffusion of this frame relied heavily on digital mobilising structures i.e., social media platforms and the use of the hashtag function. The proliferation of this hashtag made headlines throughout the world in 2017 after the allegations of sexual violence against Hollywood producer, Harvey Weinstein. This initial allegation was followed by numerous allegations of sexual violence and assault by men within the film and music industry which made headlines throughout the world. The 'MeToo Movement' spoke specifically about the prevalence of sexual harassment that women experience in the workplace. Gender violence has structural roots in both women's subordination with the gendered division of labour and the dynamics of capital accumulation. In this perspective, the 'MeToo Movement' represents a form of class struggle, as can be seen from the solidarity shown by immigrant farmworkers with the women in show business. Harvey Weinstein was not just a sexual predator, but also a powerful boss. The MeToo Movement had an influence

in the political system in North America, Britain, and Canada where many females in politics denounced the sexual harassment within political institutions (Krook 2019:89).

Previous research has pointed to the differential media frames of incidences of 'metoo' in the US, Japan, Australia, and India (Starkey et al 2019). Askanius & Møller Hartley (2019:19) analysed media coverage of the MeToo movement in Denmark and Sweden, finding that the coverage predominantly positioned #metoo within an individual action frame portraying sexual assault as a personal rather than societal problem in both countries.' Digital feminism has been criticised for lacking an intersectional lens as the experiences of white, middle-class, heterosexual, young, cisgendered women tend to be the most 'accepted' narratives regarding sexual violence (Loney-Howes et al 2021). Whereas the experiences of people of colour, working-class people, LGBTQIA+ people, elderly women, people with disabilities, and those with addiction issues are marginalised and their experiences are not considered the 'norm'. For example, the MeToo Movement has been criticised for centring white women's pain more so than that of women of colour, despite the originator of the hashtag being an African American activist, Tarana Burke, in 2007 (Tambe 2018). It is evident that 'although it may be technologically easy for many groups to engage in digital feminist activism, there remain emotional, mental, or practical barriers which create different experiences, and legitimate some feminist voices, perspectives, and experiences over others' (Mendes et al 2018:237).

Hindes & Fileborn (2020) analysing Australian news media found that media depictions of cases of sexual assault during MeToo Movement relied on stereotypes surrounding men as "naturally" aggressive, and sexual violence discussed as binary with little room for ambiguity

and construction of coercion as normal or "reality". Despite these shortcomings, the MeToo

Movement has still brought an enormous amount of attention to the issue of VAW.

> 'Well, like Me Too, for example, or Ni Una Menos… you notice that you are not the
> only one, that it is something that is systemic.' (MUNUM05)

The master frame that was created through the MeToo Movement brought people,

particularly women, together through collective identity formation. The 'MeToo' master

frame had variation in scope and interpretive influence, was flexible and inclusive as well as

being resonant. A core feature of this frame was the notion of sharing personal stories of

sexual assault and violence to 'break the silence' surrounding this issue and simultaneously

show solidarity with other victims of violence. The collective action frame used by ROSA in

the 'I Believe Her' protests mirrored the broader 'MeToo Movement', particularly given the

nature of the case involving public figures accused of sexual violence and misogyny. This

alignment positioned the protests as Ireland's own 'MeToo moment'.

8.4 Collective Action Frame: *Justicia para Micaela* Protests

Ni Una Menos had already established and brought into public consciousness the issue of

femicide as a particular form of violence being perpetrated against women and a violation of

human rights.   The collective action frame utilised during the *Justicia para Micaela* protests

was built on this master frame. However, the incidence of femicide in and of itself was not

the main frame used in this case. The key concerns that the Ni Una Menos activists pointed

to in relation to VAW and these protests was:

- the lack of safety for women in Argentinian society.

- the random killing of women.

- the State's role in this violence.

In the diagnostic framing that existed in the case of the femicide of Micaela Garcia, who is to blame is not limited to a single perpetrator (Sebastian Wagner) who was being blamed for her rape and murder, but also the judge (Judge Rossi) who released him from jail despite advice not to, the justice system for the impunity shown to murderers of women, the patriarchal attitudes present throughout society, and lack of accountability by the State. This is reflected in the interviews with activists, tweets using the hashtag #justiciaparamicaela, and the posters and placards present at the in-person protests. The discursive opportunity structure within the Argentinian context, and the conceptualisation of VAW that Ni Una Menos had brought into the political realm solidified an idea that femicide was an issue in Argentinian society.

Femicide was the main focus of Ni Una Menos from its emergence and in this case, like in the hundreds that occur every year. The intentional killing of a woman because she is a woman is one of the most accepted definitions of femicide. Garcia was raped and murdered for no other reason than she was woman walking home from a nightclub and this man wanted a woman to abuse, any woman. There does not seem to be any more specificity than that. It is hard to negotiate how to avoid such a situation when the category of 'woman' is the main criteria under which this violence occurs. Lopez (2020:22) asserts that 'womanhood is not a biological trait but a site of political articulation: a name given to a multitude of existences that go beyond the traditional construction of the gender called woman'.

8.4.1 Portrayal of the Victim (Diagnostic Framing)

Micaela was described by her friend as someone who wanted to change the world, an active member of her community, and involved in social movement activity, including Ni Una Menos and the Evita Movement.

'When we were young, and she was in school, she was a representative of the students, she was the person who would listen to others and take the information to the authorities. She was an activist at 10 years old. In my group of friends, she was the one who, if there was a problem, she tried to be in the middle and try to solve it… she was like the mediator of everything. She was very important, and it was a big important case here, because of what she was doing. She always cared about people and their needs, kids, and gender violence. It was like a joke that this thing happened to her, we all tried to say that it was, I don't know, her 'final message'. 'This is a big problem. Take it as it is…' She was not only about the political party, she had those ideas already, so she did what she wanted to, it's not just because of the political party. She was like that for years before, a really good friend. Yeah, we all loved her.' (MUNUM06)

It is evident that when women are victims of crimes, particularly of a sexual and/or violent nature, there are questions posed as to how they may be in some way to blame for their own assault, e.g., choice of clothing, flirting, consuming drugs and/or alcohol, etc. However, in this case, it is evident that activists believe that the perception of who Micaela was as a person contributed to the mobilisations that occurred.

'She was a "perfect victim" in terms of, it's not because when a woman is killed at the hands of her partner, well maybe she did something to deserve that. Of course, I do not think like that, but that's what a lot of people would say because that's what the system has told us for ages, for centuries, that it was our own fault. But what can possibly be wrong with a young woman going out to the club, and then never return home? There's no logical explanation.' (MUNUM02)

'I think it's because of her personal background, Micaela was a really young woman. She was really feminist, she was already fighting against gender-based violence, and she was kind of cute. So, you know, so it's not a "regular" case of a woman being killed by her partner, which no one minds.' (MUNUM02)

'We still had that narrative of… passion crime, there was jealousy, or, they were in a toxic relationship, or both are violent, those things. But with Micaela I think, again, my view, all those phrases fall apart because… she was what we will call 'a good girl'. She was working in her community to create a better world for people in vulnerable situations. So, she was such a beautiful girl. She was hoping to go to college and working during the weekends in her community, helping people, poor people, she was involved in a political group (*JP Evita*), trying to change and transform reality.' (MUNUM03)

'We couldn't find anything wrong with Micaela, that's the point. Micaela didn't have anything wrong, because in other cases, 'oh she's a slut', 'look at how she was

dressed', 'what was she was doing at that time in that place?', 'she provoked him', 'she was violent too', all these stupid phrases that we use to justify what has happened. We couldn't justify that. We couldn't find anything. So, all these phrases we had to calm us down, and to think 'oh, no, that's only happening, in that unique situation', they all fall apart, and we didn't have anything else to say. We couldn't find an explanation for what happened with that girl, and I think that pushed us a little bit, then pushed us out to the streets…' (MUNUM03)

The concept of frame bridging needs to be applied in the analysis of the framing of violence in the case of Micaela Garcia. The portrayal of Micaela as a militant feminist activist, affiliated with both the Evita Movement and Ni Una Menos, appears to have been pivotal in why her case garnered significant attention. Her involvement with these prominent groups, particularly the Evita Movement with its strong ties to Peronist ideology, played a key role. One of the reasons that there is now a law that bears her name, the Micaela Law (*Ley Micaela*) which will be discussed in Chapter Nine. The visibility of her parents also played a significant role in these mobilisations. Again, we can see similarities with the *Madres de Plaza de Mayo*, an important Argentinean historical movement and influential ally discussed in Chapter Six.

> 'It was (*also*) huge because of her parents, because they came out, that is another very Argentinian thing… in our culture, they've (*mothers*) brought huge, massive movements that have challenged the status quo, Madres and Abuelas of Plaza de Mayo, have literally tackled a dictatorship.' (MUNUM02)

> 'It was the struggle of women, mum's, saying they are taking my child's life, and I think that's the same concept that Micaela's parents brought into the fight, and it was a very powerful story, she was so young and… had a lot of very active friends and everything.' (MUNUM02)

> 'The parents, what they did, what they tried to transform - that sadness and anger into something productive for society, because that was what their daughter would have liked to do and that would overcome all the anger and the frustration and everything.' (MUNUM03)

8.4.2 Portrayal of the Perpetrators (s) - 'The State is Responsible' (diagnostic framing)

A prominent theme in the diagnostic framing in this collective action frame was pointing to the State as responsible for Micaela's death. Apart from the demand for justice, one of the

most prominent slogans that emerged during this time, was '*el estado es responsible*' (the

State is responsible), this phrase was found in tweets related to Garcia as well as posters

created by political parties which were used at the protests (*See Fig. 14).*

> 'In the case of Micaela, it was completely the fault of the system. The person who
> killed her was supposed to be in jail at that time, then that person tried to abuse a child
> the day before… They tried to make the complaint and the (judge/police) wasn't
> there… It's like a snowball, it was problem after problem. I think it's more like a lot of
> ignorance in between. The judge (*Judge Rossi*) assigned to the case of the man who
> killed Micaela, released him before his sentence was complete, and a lot of faults of
> the system ended with the femicide of Micaela. It was devastating. I think that if one
> of them had made (*the right decision*), that wouldn't have happened, so it's sad and it's
> more like, I don't know if I'm angry, it's a lot of things mixed but knowing that that
> person abused a lot of women before, and he was released and he was in the streets
> and you say, why are you releasing him? If he can do it again?... it's horrible. It's
> horrible.' (MUNUM06)

> 'She was participating in Ni Una Menos and trying to talk and raise awareness about
> that (*violence*) and the way she died, she was just… going back to her house and a
> guy who was in jail for a sexual abuse was free…So that I think was, put in our face,
> in a really explicit way, all the failures of the system.' (MUNUM03)

The perpetrator (Wagner) had previous convictions. He was a poor/working-class man, a

product of patriarchal entitlement, a convicted rapist, who was shown leniency by the judicial

system, despite the advice of prison services not to allow him an early release.

The State was in part responsible for Micaela's death, and it wasn't just one action, it was

many actions which were not carried out appropriately which facilitated her femicide.   This

inclusion of the State in the framing of this violence mirrors the concept of '*feminicidio*'

(feminicide) as described by Lagarde (2004: 2006: 2010) which argues that although

femicide is the intentional killing of a woman because she is a woman, '*feminicidio*' includes

the role of the State and the impunity shown to murderers.

Whether the word '*femicidio*' or '*feminicidio*' is being used within the State depends on the word being used by the feminist SMO in the country. Although there is reference to individual responsibility, the role of the State in '*femicidio*' is obscured. The purpose of using the term '*feminicidio*' is to highlight the role authorities in a State contribute to these murders through their inaction. A carceral response to these femicides is used by the State as their 'main' response to these crimes rather than preventative and protection measures that need to be taken by State institutions so that these murders don't take happen in the first place. The majority of femicides happen in intimate partner relationships and as evidenced in the statistics gathered by the Observatory on Femicides in Argentina, it is evident that these femicides could have been avoided if proper action had been taken by the State. Different interpretations of femicide throughout the world can result in issues related to the application of laws related to femicide within a country. Toledo (2017:56) argues that 'most of the interpretation problems are the consequence of a criminal understanding of violence against women that tends to transform a social problem of male violence into individual acts, without understanding the specificities of structural violence against women.'

The Observatory of Gender Violence in Argentina reported that in 2021, there were 256 femicides in Argentina and 182 attempted femicides. They obtain their data through graphic and digital media, and since 2015, they have registered 1,717 victims of femicide. Of the 256 victims, 42 had made a prior complaint and 24 out of 256 victims had a judicial measure, highlighting the inaction of the judicial system and the need for gender violence training and the inclusion of an intersectional gender perspective. It is also noted that 1 in 10 femicides was committed by the security forces which included 20 police officers. According to their data, 64% of these victims were killed by a partner or ex-partner and 90% of these victims were killed by someone within their inner circle i.e., partners, ex-partners, relatives, and

acquaintances. Since this Observatory began collecting data in 2015, it is shown that '2 out

of 10 victims had made at least one complaint prior to their femicide and only 1 out of 10

victims had a judicial protection measure' (Observatorio de las Violencias de Género 2021).

This again links to the 'continuum of violence' that women experience. Although Micaela

did not know the perpetrator and was not in an intimate relationship, the perpetrator was

previously convicted of rape and released early despite objections, then when he was

released, he tried to assault another young girl, and nothing was done about it. A reply to the

Facebook post on Ni Una Menos' main page, read:

> 'The State is responsible, because it is the one who delivers justice and in this case,
> like in many others, the one who failed was the justice system… reports said it was
> not advisable to give him freedom, Wagner would get out of jail in 2018, because
> before Micaela he was convicted of 2 violations… the one who sets the rules within
> our society, that is, the State. So, every time a judge releases a rapist, or a cop doesn't
> take a missing or gender violence report, or when they have 3, 5, 10 reports and do
> nothing, the state is responsible. (Reply to Ni Una Menos' Facebook post, Ref. No. 8)

Any institution that is in contact with victims of violence should be acting appropriately to

ensure that a femicide does not occur including; police, authorities, members of judicial

system etc. Toledo (2022) argues that additional structures should be taken into account such

as the education and health systems, as well as the workplace because children may disclose

incidences of violence at school, hospitals provide 'care to women and children, as well as to

men who may be aggressors' and in workplaces 'intervention is essential in those companies

and job positions where both the aggressors and the assaulted women work, in order to ensure

that the assaulted women have access to resources and answers to avoid the continuation or

the escalation of violence.'

8.4.3 Strategies and Solutions (Prognostic Framing)

The solutions posited by a SMO often reflect the ideology of the SMO. The interviewee below argues that popular feminism from below typifies this struggle, and is also reflected in Ni Una Menos' manifesto, published a week after Micaela's funeral. This popular feminism can be understood as 'the emergent gender consciousness of poor and working-class women of the popular sectors as it had taken shape over a decade of grassroots mobilizations in the context of deep economic crisis and repressive regimes and in relation to the diffusion of feminist ideas and activism' (Conway 2021:27)

> 'I'm a Peronist, so… I'm not the most objective, but I do believe the fact that this movement did not come from educated women, theories and so on, brought from the Global North, theories which I really admire. A lot of the feminists from the last century in Europe, like Simone de Beaviour and Virginia Woolf, of course, that was huge. But since this movement, since Micaela, she came from a really poor background and this was built from the bottom up, that's what changed the equation.
>
> It was very difficult, but this is a feminist movement built from the bottom, from women who may never have heard about the Second Sex or had never read it, but it doesn't matter. You don't need to read that to know that because you're a woman, you are subject to every single oppressive possibility that you have in this capitalistic, patriarchal system. I think that brought in a lot of people, especially because of the Evita Movement, which is a very militant, strong movement, who engage in protests in the streets, on struggling, on challenging the status quo, and that incorporation of women from a popular background, was what made it possible, so that this transversal movement, this amount of people from different backgrounds (*mobilised together*). I definitely think it was a factor in why it was so huge.' (MUNUM02)

'The incorporation of women from a popular background' (MUNUM02) refers to the inclusion of women from poor or working-class backgrounds. In the 1970s and 80s, popular feminism was constructed to bridge the divide in class and gender struggles by centring the struggles of poor and working-class women (LeBon 2014; Maier 2010). This popular feminist discourse connected feminists from NGOs, popular women's groups, and feminists in political parties (Espinosa 2011: Gonzalez 2018). Popular feminism emerged from left-wing feminist activists who were largely middle-class working alongside women from the

'popular' sectors. These grassroots women's movements were crucial in fighting against dictatorships throughout Latin America and feminist movements would see poor and working-class women as an important community in the struggle (Alvarez et al 2003:544). However, there was criticism from an activist about the more recent actions of Ni Una Menos and their role in Argentinian society.

> 'I'm critical right now, about the figures that represent the movement, because what I criticize is that we are losing intersectionality, and it's more a fight of white heterosexual women in Buenos Aires. That's one thing that I will criticize, but I can criticize that because I'll try to always be critical of something that I really like and appreciate, same will happen to me with Peronism because I'm a Peronist and I'm trying to be critical… I think, at the beginning, it was more including of every type of group, with time became more and more white and middle-class feminism and sometimes I don't feel that includes the fight of brown women or poor women.' (MUNUM03)

> 'I would love to see more representation of brown and poor people because the fights are not the same as the fight of a white middle-class.' (MUNUM03)

Ni Una Menos posted their 9th manifesto on 20 April 2017 titled 'Not in Our Name', which detailed their anger on the femicide of Micaela as well as a list of demands that they had and the changes that needed to be made. The first heading in the manifesto reads 'Neither punitive demagoguery nor misogynistic guarantees', and it goes on to explain that Ni Una Menos' goal has never been for more punishment, more violence but instead more freedom, more care, equality, and justice (Manifesto No. 9 – Not in Our Name. 2017; Lopez 2020). The carceral response to VAW that dominates the justice system is not supported by Ni Una Menos.   Instead, this SMO demands policies which reduce the number of murders, include a gender perspective within the education system, appropriately train judges and security agents in gender violence, and ensure that complaints of victims of violence are dealt with faster. Speaking specifically about Micaela, they write 'When Micaela's family went to report her disappearance to the police station, they told them that it could be a suicide, the

prosecutor followed that hypothesis. Those are the judicial responses that we find when we

ask for help' (Manifesto No. 9 – Not in Our Name. 2017). One of the most striking parts of

this manifesto was again the accusation that the State was responsible for this femicide. The

end of this manifesto reads:

> 'The femicide of Micaela, like that of Chiara, Melina, Daiana, and the 329 young
> women from 16 to 21 years old who were murdered in the last 9 years are the
> responsibility of the State' (Manifesto No. 9 – Not in Our Name. 2017).

Also discussed is the lack of prevention policies i.e., comprehensive sex education has not

been funded appropriately, the NAP on VAW in Argentina - *Segundo Plan Nacional de*

Acción para la Prevención, Asistencia y Erradicación de la Violencia contra las Mujeres

(Second National Action Plan for the Prevention, Assistance, and Eradication of Violence

Against Women) (2017-2019), the lack of acknowledgement of the structural issues that

underpin VAW and reducing the problem to criminal and public safety issues.

> 'Femicide is not merely a public safety issue to be dealt with using the logic of
> punishment and prison sentences. It is the bloodiest expression of patriarchal control,
> which assigns each person a position and a normative definition and kills those who
> do not comply.' (Lopez 2020:29).

8.4.4 Calls to Action (Motivational framing)

The *Justicia para Micaela* protests (8th and 11th April 2017) occurred one month after the

International Women's Strike on International Women's Day (8 March 2017) and two

months before the annual day of protest for Ni Una Menos (3 June). The call to action in this

case involved the participation of influential external allies discussed in Chapter Six, most

notably, *Movimiento Evita* (Evita Movement). Garcia was an active member of *Movimiento*

Evita (Evita Movement) and known in her community for her volunteer work with

disadvantaged and marginalised groups, as well as a member of the gymnastics community.

The social capital she had through her various networks ultimately provided a wider base for

spreading information. The calls to action (motivational framing) that occurred in response to the femicide of Micaela are strongly evident in the data collected through online social media platforms, which supports the interview data. Justice for the victim of the femicide in question is utilised by Ni Una Menos regularly - 'Justice for (name of victim of femicide)' is often a slogan after the femicide of an individual, in this case, '*Justicia para Micaela*'. On Twitter, three primary themes emerged in the analysis of the 118 tweets using the primary hashtag related to these protests #justiciaparamicaela.

- Blaming the judge and the State for Micaela's death.

- The hashtag #justiceformicaela alone calling for justice.

- Encouraging mobilisation/taking to the streets.

Of those 118 tweets, 36 had accompanying hashtags and of those 36, the hashtag #niunamenos appeared 25 times, other hashtags often associated with femicide appeared (#wewantusalive / #justice / #enoughoffemicides). Other hashtags used were referencing locations of protest and/or media outlets discussing the femicide.

The two top tweets that generated the most engagement:

1. Actress - Nazarena Vélez, *(@veleznazarena)* which had 1979 likes and 887 retweets, and was accompanied by the original picture Ni Una Menos used in their Twitter post. Here, she blames society for Micaela's death:

'PERDON HERMOSA POR ESTA SOCIEDAD QUE TODO LO HACE MAL #impotencia #QEPD #JUSTICIAPARAMICAELA (*Forgiveness beautiful one for this society that does everything wrong #impotence #RIP #justiciaparamicaela*')

2. The Evita Movement Twitter account (*@MovimientoEvita)*, which had 185 likes and 126 retweets and was accompanied by pictures from a protest. It includes a form of

public mourning and a commitment to continue the struggle for which Micaela was fighting: '

'El cielo llora tu partida y riega Nuestra Lucha, que fue la Tuya, por un País con Equidad Social. #JusticiaParaMicaela' *(The sky mourns your departure and irrigates Our Struggle, which was Yours, for a Country with Social Equity #JusticiaParaMicaela')*

A slogan which appeared, particularly among *Movimiento Evita* (Evita Movement) activists was '*Todos somos Micaela*' (We are all Micaela), which speaks to the collectivist nature of social movements in the Argentinian context (*See Fig. 19).* As activists interviewed put it, it is not just that women are being killed, it is that they are killing 'us'.

Fig.19: Todos somos Micaela – We are all Micaela

The primary frame utilised throughout these protests was the assertion that the State is responsible and complicit in the violence that Micaela experienced and that women more generally experience in Argentina. The diffusion of this frame was ascertained through both relational (in-person protest) and non-relational (online) models of diffusion and is reflected in the interviews with activists associated with Ni Una Menos.

8.5 Collective Action Frame: *I Believe Her* Protests

Some of the key concerns ROSA activists highlighted at the I Believe Her protests regarding VAW included connections with the Reproductive Rights Movement, misogynistic attitudes in Irish society, the role of social class, and the contributions of both the capitalist State and the Church to the violence women experience. This view, shaped by a socialist feminist perspective, reflects activists' belief that the ties between the Church and State in Ireland persist despite recent progressive policy changes.

Fig. 20: Posted on ROSA's Instagram page on 11 February 2018
Text accompany photo: 'At yesterday's rugby match #metoo #NotmyCaptain #feminism #TimesUp'

As the trial was ongoing, ROSA posted a photo from a rugby game where someone had written the words 'I Believe Her' on an Irish flag (*See Fig 20)*. The 'I Believe Her' frame was already very much in the Irish consciousness by the time the trial concluded just over seven weeks later (27 March 2018). In and of itself the 'I Believe Her' frame may not have been as successful if not for the presence and strength of the Reproductive Rights Movement in Ireland at that time and that the proliferation of the #metoo hashtag that began in October

2017, just six months before these protests. As discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, the

timing of these protests (29th and 31st March 2018) are important to keep in mind, as they

were two months before the Referendum to Repeal the Eighth Amendment (25 May 2018), at

the peak of organising around reproductive rights in Ireland. It is evident that the discussions

that were already occurring around reproductive rights and more specifically, women's

bodies, were present in the public consciousness and the discursive field in Irish political and

social life.

> 'Both issues fundamentally, are the same issue, abortion access and ending violence
> against women are the same issue. They're about bodily autonomy. They are about,
> other people shouldn't say what happens to your body, for any reason, for their own
> personal gratification, or sense of power, or whatever, or for their religious beliefs, or
> whatever nonsense reason they have against abortion. None of that is okay. Only you
> get to decide what happens to your body. You get to be safe all the time. You get to
> determine your future, it's the exact same issue, so they're inextricably linked.'
> (MUROSA06)

The discursive opportunity structure within the Irish context, and the conceptualisation of

VAW through the MeToo Movement alongside the Reproductive Rights Campaign made

clear certain ideas about violence in Ireland.

> 'It was actually quite an exciting year to move to Ireland, to be honest, because that's
> like, a real mood. I just remember you couldn't go to the toilet in a pub without these
> huge debates about abortion rights, it was like written onto the stalls. Anytime you
> talked to anyone remotely left-wing, remotely *(emphasised)*, you'd end up having a
> conversation about these kinds of things, that would never just stick to abortion rights,
> it's never just about that. So, I think that was the experience of how young women
> were just living their lives, were those kinds of conversations, so then when this
> happened (*Belfast Trial*), such a stark example of victim-blaming in the courts, how
> heinous it was, of course it was going to be a linked thing.' (MUROSA05)

The treatment of the woman in this trial, during questioning as well as the text messages that

were shared online afterwards, provoked a response from the public and spoke to a deeper

understanding of the way in which women are thought of by certain men in society. ROSA

activists do seem to recognise that they didn't create this movement activity, but they facilitated it.

> 'It's things that are happening under the surface, in terms of people's attitudes, burning anger on the issue, radicalization on issue, and then something just hits home and that's the basis for an explosion of struggle and that's really, very, very much the situation, rather than us being there, because we're always trying to build something more active, even between the explosions, but it's actually very hard to do that. To build a more sustained movement… I'd say yeah, I think absolutely, it (*national discussion about reproductive rights*) was a factor.' (MUROSA04)

> 'The fact that Repeal was happening and the fact that this happened, they're interconnected, they're not silos, issues aren't separated. So, the fact that this very defiant and bold movement happened after the Belfast Rape Trial was connected with the Repeal movement, because Repeal summed up the fact that women weren't going to put up with oppression and discrimination in general… the other thing was later on that year, there was another sort of movement, not as big, it was more online, the 'This is Not Consent' that sprang up after the Cork Rape Trial as well. So, definitely, 2018 was a big kind of reflection of the feminist movement in Ireland.' (MUROSA01/Ruth Coppinger)

The lack of autonomy women had over their own bodies due to Ireland's strict abortion laws and the way in which a woman's body was being discussed in the Belfast Trial highlighted the role of the State and patriarchal and misogynistic attitudes present in Irish society. These were all cited as sources of blame for the violence experienced by women.

> 'I did have somebody come up and complain after the Saturday protest (*31st March*) that I had talked about abortion too much. Saying 'that's not relevant' and 'we shouldn't be bringing it up.' Obviously, it's a very common thing, people go on about how rape survivors should have access to abortion and it's like, actually, that could be really harmful language because many, many survivors of rape continue their pregnancies and it shouldn't be a pushing of 'oh no, it would be better for you to have an abortion'. What? No? Someone's power over their own body has been taken away from them, you cannot push it, to have it taken away again. People have to decide what they do themselves. I think they're inextricably linked issues.' (MUROSA06)

8.5.1 Portrayal of the Accused (Diagnostic Framing)

In the Belfast Trial, the accused were depicted as well-known sports figures with significant social and cultural capital, whose careers were being 'threatened' due to the victim's

testimony. The case highlighted a specific display of white, Irish, middle-class, predatory masculinity. Social class is central to a socialist feminist critique and was a crucial element in these protests and this case.

Various campaigners against sexual violence including ROSA, hit back at comments made by the senior defence barrister during the trial who asserted: "Why didn't she scream the house down?... a lot of very middle-class girls were downstairs… they were not going to tolerate a rape or anything like that" (Irish Independent 2018). The insinuation here that working-class women might 'tolerate' this type of behaviour speaks to how violence perpetrated against women is often portrayed, as though some women are more deserving of violence, than others. The insistence of the media and members of the judiciary to split women into innocent/guilty, working class/middle class, virgin/whore, speaks to the highly gendered and classist view there is of victims of violence and the judgement placed on whether they are 'more' or 'less' deserving of protection.

Previous research in relation to the trial process and victim-blaming in this case, the Belfast Trial, has argued that 'trial narratives around consent and reasonable belief in consent 'responsibilise' the complainant while minimising the (in)actions of the accused' (Dowds 2022:501). The conceptualisation of consent and rape need to be better understood and articulated within State institutions as this case highlighted 'the need for careful intervention across multiple terrains, both legal and otherwise, if we are to trigger real and systemic change' (Dowds 2022:506). During the trial, it was reported that the young woman acknowledged having kissed the accused earlier on the evening in question (Irish Examiner

2018). However, as explored in Chapter Three, it is crucial to understand that this interaction does not imply consent to any subsequent activities. Consent for one act does not constitute consent for others, particularly in the legal context of the accusations made later that night. Sexual consent is an on-going process and consent can be withdrawn at any point (Beres 2014; Jozkowski, 2015; Muehlenhard et al 2016; Glace et al 2021). The socialist feminist perspective that informs ROSA's analysis of the State and their response to VAW informs diagnostic framing. There is a connection made between capitalism and gender roles, particularly the way in which *macho* culture is perpetuated by a capitalist system, which can contribute to, or generate, violence.

> 'It's just this point about the system, as if you're going to have a world without interpersonal violence when you have armies invading other countries, the whole macho culture is so necessary from the point of view of the capitalist State.' (MUROSA04)

Some core socialist themes emerged from interviews with activists from ROSA when discussing socialist feminism and its ability to combat VAW. It was felt that having a wider outlook on the world provided by a socialist feminist lens allows for a wider scope of issues to be highlighted compared to that of liberal feminism or a purely intersectional approach. Class is central to their perspective. The *macho* culture, that is blamed for violence that is perpetrated against women and feminised people, is created, and maintained by structures such as capitalism and patriarchy. The socialisation that occurs and reproduction of strict gender roles is a key way in which violence maintains itself in our society

> 'That system perpetuates that men should behave in a certain way, that women should behave in a certain way, and encourages macho culture, encourages and perpetuates sexism and violence against women and gender non-conforming people and what we've seen recently is a huge upsurge in gender-based violence globally, which accelerated during the pandemic.' (MUROSA01/Ruth Coppinger)

> 'Which actually brings home how capitalism is based on sexism and racism and has a gender and racist component, it is essential to it. But as well as that, even the unpaid

care work that women do, and one of the things that we would bring out… (*in relation to*) gender-based violence, is that if you have a system with rigid gender roles that are enforced as part of it, which this system does, which we're actually seeing right now in terms of trans people's rights and how important this is to the system that these kind of rigid gender roles are enforced in a binary way, and can't even include others.' (MUROSA01/Ruth Coppinger)

Intersectionality can be understood as a lens to understand explain the overlapping identities which form several types of discrimination and privilege (Crenshaw 1989). However, ROSA activists feel that while intersectional feminism is more dominant, a socialist feminist approach to action is necessary to meet the challenges ahead. Class, and a critique of capitalism, is central in their analysis. Although they find intersectionality, as a concept, a useful descriptive tool, it is not considered strong enough to explain what they want to achieve.

> 'For us, it's a starting point, and it's extremely important but we need to go further than that, and actually go back to the roots of the system that we live in, and how would you fight against it and the push that we need to take and that's why we wouldn't say we're just intersectional feminists, we would say we're socialist feminists, because it goes into an actual analysis of the system and how you're organised and stuff like that.' (MUROSA02)

> 'It does come up a lot, we will tend to extricate that concept (*intersectionality*), fully agree with it, but our framework for looking at the world can be different in ROSA to a lot of people who subscribe to intersectional feminism that might, I think, still have it in liberal feminist framework. It's not something that's imbued with a broader view of capitalism and a broader view of the need to build an active struggle as the key motor force for change. Lots of people subscribe to intersectionality that kind of have a lot of views that are different to us, or ways of campaigning that are different to us, and stuff like that. (MUROSA04)

> 'Intersectionality, as a concept, is really useful, the idea that people experience multiple oppressions at once, like a black woman will experience racism differently from a black man and some sexism differently than a white woman… That's a valuable analysis, but it doesn't necessarily go further, in terms of, how do you then fight a system that creates those oppressions, so it's a valuable analysis of the experiences of people that we have to take on board, but I think socialist feminism goes one step further. You're not going to have Hillary Clinton call herself a socialist feminist, but she did try to call herself an intersectional feminist, you know, which is laughable. I mean, even from the basis of intersectionality?' (MUROSA05)

The links to social class appeared throughout the Belfast Trial and even after the trial

concluded. When the accused were found 'not guilty', it was reported that one of their

solicitors threatened to sue anyone who tweeted the hashtag '#Ibelieveher' after the initial

protest on 29th March 2018 (McCurry 2018; Hayes 2018). This was a threat which would not

be available for a poor or working-class person accused of the same crime, who may not have

access to legal counsel. Ironically, this backfired, and only brought more attention to his

client, since the hashtag #suemepaddy began to trend on social media, with thousands using

the hashtag (Burke 2018). It was a trending topic on Twitter in Ireland that day. The use of

this hashtag was a sign of solidarity with the victim and other victims of sexual violence who

are threatened with litigation.

> 'The trial provoked huge anger and it tapped into something. It just spoke to how people who are victims are treated, degraded in society and by the State again and again and again, and this was symbolic of that. There was just huge anger and some people set up a Facebook page to have a protest and then actually contacted Ruth (Coppinger) because they were getting a lot of abuse. You know what I mean? Like all the Paddy Jackson 'stans' (*the term 'stan' is slang, refers to an obsessive fan*), and obviously he was threatening to sue everybody and all of those kinds of things.' (MUROSA04)

> 'We organised and we called the march 'We Stand with Her' (*Saturday 31st March*) and we announced it at the Spire on the Thursday (*29th March*). It was huge, there was about seven or eight thousand people who came, it was a really energetic march. It was so funny because you know you have things about 'Stand with Survivors' and you have certain slogans, but the biggest chant that went up just spontaneously throughout the march was 'Sue Me Paddy'… It was just very funny and it's always that way on marches, they are very kind of genuine and spontaneous. There are people who are on their first march or haven't been on many, you can see by the way they react, so, 'Sue Me Paddy', I think that just summed it up because it was this defiance, particularly by young women, that's there now, and that wouldn't have existed before maybe, and when we got to the end of that, obviously, there was a huge crowd and we had speakers etc.' (MUROSA01/Ruth Coppinger)

This hashtag, which was created online using the hashtag function, was present at in-person

protests on 31st March 2018, demonstrating how the online and offline are connected in

social movement mobilisation and framing (*See Fig. 21*).

Fig.21: Reference to accused suing those who tweeted #ibelieveher

> 'The specifics of the Paddy Jackson trial were obviously very much a motivating factor including the fact it was these; rugby, privileged, entitled types getting away with it, as per usual, you know what I mean? It kind of summed up things for people a lot… I mean, obviously, these are also, your own feelings, your own views on these things, you presume that somebody will get an easier time in court by virtue of the fact that they're connected and from "respectable" (*used air quotes*) kind of background etc., and obviously, that's infuriating. I absolutely think they're driving factors, there's something about celebrities and elite types and the entitlement they feel, obviously I'm under no illusion, I know, and we know in ROSA, that gender-based violence happens everywhere, in every social class, and all the rest of the sort of extra insult of the entitlement of more privileged types that might be able to get away with it more in court. I think it was a factor in the sort of anger a lot of women felt and a lot of young people felt.' (MUROSA04)

The possibility of legal action was a recurring concern in these protests. The original organisers of the protest on Thursday, March 29th, along with individuals active on social media, were warned that they might face legal proceedings.

> 'They rang us, they rang the Dáil office, and I picked up the phone, and I got these very distraught, very young (*people*) who said, 'I'm worried because I'm being told that I could be prosecuted by Paddy Jackson for saying 'I Believe Her', and so on and so forth'… just all over the place, but basically, they've been threatened, their career would be over before it even began if they took responsibility for this protest and they wanted Ruth to organize this instead.' (MUROSA03)

The accused attempted to use the legal system to silence people who were protesting about how women are often silenced when speaking out about their own experience of sexual violence. It is evident that the accused and their counsel did not fully understand that this

case was not about one victim or one perpetrator, but instead a system which retraumatises victims and a society which promotes misogynistic attitudes that allows these practices to continue.

Another feature that appeared relating to class through analysing the hashtag #ibelieveher on Twitter, was the connection between these men and the sporting institution, Irish Rugby Football Union (IRFU). The pressure from the public, it would seem, drove the institution to change their approach to these men. All four of the accused in this trial were acquitted and found 'not guilty'. The two men who were accused of rape had their contracts revoked after an internal review and this could have been in part attributed to the petitions which were created online. The petition to revoke their contracts were commonly shared in the tweets with the #ibelieveher hashtag. The sharing of misogynistic text messages that were released after the trial were also a cause for concern from sponsors. An image of some of the quotes from these text messages circulated online and appeared alongside many of the tweets with the hashtag #ibelieveher (*See Fig. 22*).

Their WhatsApp conversations:

"how was she?",

"she was very very loose."

"Any sluts get fucked?"

"There was a lot of spit roast last night."

"There was a lot of spit"

"It was like a merry go round at the carnival."

"we are all top shaggers"

"Love Belfast Sluts."

"Boys, did you pass spit roast brassers"

"What the fuck was going on. Last night was hilarious."

"Why are we all such legends?" "I know it's ridiculous"

"There was a lot of spit"

"It was like a merry go round at the carnival."

"we are all top shaggers"

"Love Belfast Sluts."

"Boys, did you pass spit roast brassers"

"What the fuck was going on. Last night was hilarious."

"Why are we all such legends?" "I know it's ridiculous"

"Mate no jokes she was in hysterics, wasn't going to end well."

"Really, fuck sake, did you calm her, where does she live?"

"Aye, just threw her home then went back to mine

Fig.22: WhatsApp Messages- excerpts of the WhatsApp messages sent by the accused in the trial, which were shared widely online.

A recurring theme observed in the tweets was the discussion around the interpretation of 'not guilty' as implying 'innocence.' Many debated how this terminology might influence public perceptions of the events described. It was noted that some people base their opinions solely on the judicial outcome, where 'not guilty' reflects the legal standard of not proving guilt 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' However, a 'not guilty' verdict does not equate to a declaration of 'innocence'; rather, it indicates that the evidence did not meet the threshold required for a criminal conviction. This raises questions about how society views those acquitted of VAW, potentially perceiving them as innocent if they are not convicted.

8.5.2 Strategies and Solutions (Prognostic Framing)

It is evident that prognostic framing 'involves the articulation of a proposed solution to the problem, including a plan of attack and the frame-consistent tactics for carrying it out, and

often a refutation of the opponent's current or proposed solutions' (Snow, Vliegenthart & Ketelaars 2019:396). There was an exchange between Coppinger, Socialist Party TD, and the Tánaiste, Simon Coveney, on Thursday 29th March 2018 in the Dáil, the day of the first protests throughout the country. Coppinger spoke of concerns from the Rape Crisis Centres that victims will fear coming forward with allegations of rape given the 'not guilty' verdict and coverage of this trial. She emphasised the need to challenge sexist attitudes in our culture, asking government to fund a sex education program where consent is at its core, called for a new SAVI Report, making the process in the court easier for victims given how low reporting is, reducing the time it takes for a case to reach a court, the need for victims to have representation inside the court, complaints about clothes of victims being passed around as evidence of consent, and bringing up sexual experiences of victim. A particular point she made which is relevant to this case and highlights how State inaction was actively participating in re-victimisation and trauma, is:

> 'Why has the Government not acted on provisions on sections of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017, which would afford vulnerable witnesses and children protection against adversarial cross-examination, for example through video-link? Consent was defined in that Act. Many of us lobbied for it to be defined in it. However, no training has yet been given to judges, lawyers or even juries.' – (Coppinger, 29 March 2018 (Houses of the Oireachtas 2018))

The Tánaiste, in response, argued that the government was taking this issue very seriously, but focused primarily on how there are differences regarding how rape trials are conducted in Northern Ireland compared to the Republic of Ireland, as these are different jurisdictions. In the Republic, the accused cannot be named unless convicted, and the victim's anonymity is protected throughout the trial and after the trial, unless they choose to speak out themselves. It is undoubtedly true that the publishing of the names of the accused men in the Belfast Trial was certainly a contributing factor to the amount of media coverage that this trial received,

especially given that the accused were in the public eye. However, the response from the Tánaiste did not adequately cover the actions that the State were taking to combat issues relating to VAW in the Republic, although he made an assurance that more money would be put into sex education in schools. However, one of the key concerns regarding training for judges, lawyers, and juries in relation to the definition of consent was not addressed. This purpose of training regarding the definition of consent is to avoid assumptions regarding consent and in doing so stop the victim-blaming that often occurs within the court room setting.

8.5.3 Calls to Action (Motivational framing)

The motivational (calls to action) framing will be understood specifically through the actions taken in relation to the *I Believe Her* protests. The use of the slogans 'I Believe Her' and 'We Stand with Her' were discussed with activists as the hashtag/slogan 'I Believe Her' was the most resonant at these protest events. There was a discussion on what to call the protest and the idea of using the phrase 'We Stand with Her' for the second protest on Saturday 31st March was to show solidarity while also recognising that this is not about one incidence of violence perpetrated against a woman.

> 'The immediate slogan that came up was, 'I Believe Her', and this was something, it wasn't the first time that phrase had been used, but it was definitely a time when it was called more to the fore, and I completely understand where that comes from, because women have been disbelieved, and still are.' (MUROSA01/Ruth Coppinger)

> 'The saying 'I Believe Her' is extremely powerful, because it's actually, the courts are not going to believe you, but there are thousands of people out there who will, and that's actually a very important sign of solidarity, standing with someone is another step of solidarity because it's like, okay, I believe you but I'm also going to fight for this as well so, yeah. I think they were both ('*I Believe Her' and 'We Stand with Her'*) that sense of solidarity.' (MUROSA02)

> 'In the end, it didn't really matter, at the time we said we'd do 'We Stand with Her' in Dublin because we wanted to, instead of provoking some detail over whether it's about the verdict of the trial, the point is, that's not even the point. The point is to stop

victim-blaming, stop insulting people, and also don't presume that just because somebody didn't get a guilty charge that they haven't been a victim. You know what I mean? Like, come on. It was in a context that was a lot of sorts of threats of suing and all that kind of thing, and that was the context in which we made it more general, and we tried to make it about the victim in this case. Of course we were standing with (*the victim in the case*) and of course we believe her, but also every victim, so it's trying to make it more generalized, but in the end it didn't matter, and to be honest with you, 'I Believe Her' was just such a strong sentiment that it became the main sentiment of the demo or the main slogan of the demo, one way or the other, and to my knowledge, ROSA in Belfast called it under 'I Believe Her' as well. So, that was the sort of, from my memory, the kind of genesis of how that happened but it wasn't the biggest deal in the world one way or the other.' (MUROSA04)

The use of '*I Believe Her'* was the main slogan of these protests and appeared to be the most resonant with those in attendance and online. Previous research which is related to these protests focused primarily on use of the #ibelieveher hashtag through the social media platform, Twitter (McFalone 2021; Prendergast & Quinn 2021). Prendergast & Quinn (2021) focused on traditional and modern media, utilising critical discourse analysis to compare both the 'mainstream' and 'social media reaction' to two cases of sexual assault in Ireland and Spain. The social media platform being focused on in these cases was Twitter, the Irish case is the same as is being focused on in this study i.e., '#IBelieveHer' and the Spanish case '*#YoTeCreo* (I Believe You)' was concerned with a case wherein five men were given a lesser sentence for the crime of sexual violence. The results of both cases were found to be in contradiction of 'popular opinion' and these hashtags that emerged seen as response to these verdicts. Their findings suggest that in the Irish case, the discourse was less nuanced and explicitly feminist than the Twitter campaign in Spain. Prendergast et al (2020) note that the conversation was focused on sexual violence, consent, and the judicial process. However, the mobilisation surrounding these protests or the way in which ROSA, played a pivotal role in the protests has not been investigated. Although ROSA were not the only feminist or women's group present at these protests, it is evident, that they played a key role in

organising, particularly through providing logistical information regarding protest activity, and co-ordinating speakers on both days.

Through online analysis it is evident that apart from #ibelieveher, one of the primary hashtags used in relation to these protests was #suemepaddy as discussed earlier in this section. After following the hashtag #ibelieveher and focusing on the top 350 tweets produced in Ireland. Of those tweets 112 had accompanying hashtags and of those 112, the hashtag #suemepaddy appeared 55 times, other solidarity hashtags (#istillbelieveher / #istandwithher / #westandwithher) appeared 32 times, the hashtag #metoo appeared 6 times and the hashtags #repeal or #repealthe8th appeared 5 times. Other hashtags used were referencing the trial or location of protest e.g., #Belfasttrial, #Spire.

Victims of sexual violence are regularly not believed and, in the instances, when they make it to a court trial, they are further re-victimised by the justice system, having to retell and relive their horrendous experiences and then be questioned, often in an adversarial manner. Although this case took place in Belfast, Northern Ireland, where there are slight differences in the way in which cases of sexual violence are dealt with, it is does not take from the core message of the hashtag which is solidarity with victims and acknowledgement of their trauma. The framing in this case took an individual act of violence and transformed it into a frame which encompasses the treatment of all victims of sexual violence, particularly in cases of rape, and highlighted the role of social class. The diffusion of this frame is reflected in the interviews with activists and was also present in relational (in-person protest) and non-relational (online) models. The non-relational models i.e., social media platforms did seem to

have much more influence given the speed at which these protests occurred and the use of hashtags to respond to the protest.

8.6 Comparison and Assessment of Frames

The portrayal of those involved in the two cases discussed above informs the way in which VAW is framed, diagnosis of the problem and who is to blame. The victims in these cases were outside of the 'norm' as they were not known to the perpetrators before the incidents in question, whereas the most common perpetrators of these crimes are former or current intimate-partners. This is one of the reasons why these events caught the attention of the public too, as the more sensationalist accounts of VAW catch media attention quicker. Both were young women, Micaela, 21 years-old at the time of her death, and the victim in the Belfast Trial was 19 at the time of her attack and approximately 21 years-old during the trial. In both cases, the violence centred on their bodies, transforming them into crime scenes. In Micaela's tragic situation, her body was discarded on the side of the road after her murder, exemplifying the dehumanising and sexualised nature of the violence. Such acts underscore how society often views and treats feminised bodies within these contexts. The existing conditions of a dominant and aggressive form of masculinity create an environment conducive to sexual and gender-based violence. The treatment and discourse surrounding the bodies of these women highlight a profound disregard for their humanity, further perpetuating these conditions.

Femicide and sexual violence which are the most brutal expressions of patriarchal violence on the feminised body. It is evident in the *Justicia para Micaela* protests, that discussion of the victim was more prominent than the discussion of the victim in the *I Believe Her* protests. This was due to anonymity of victims in rape trials, however, it has been reported that her

name was shared online, despite her right to anonymity (Morris 2018). It is evident that in the *I Believe Her* protests, the discussion of individual perpetrators was much more prominent whereas in the *Justicia para Micaela* protests, discussion of the State was more prominent.

In the *Justicia para Micaela* case, her portrayal as a militant feminist political young person and her perpetrator as a poor/working-class man who had been previously convicted of rape gives an insight into the framing processes. It is evident that members of society are less surprised when a poor uneducated man with previous convictions of rape commits more crimes, in this case, rape and femicide as this suits the narrative that we are sold about dangerous and deviant men. However, when the accused are middle-class privileged men on a national sports team, there is concern about how it will affect their careers and their lives. In the *I Believe Her* case, although there was not much information given about the victim of the crime other than her age, that she was present at a party, and that she had at one point kissed one of the accused. The accused were middle-class privileged rugby players with social and cultural capital which could be utilised in their defence. Additionally, since they had this social and cultural capital, it was being 'threatened' by the victim and those who were tweeting #ibelieveher. The connection of these men to an Irish rugby team has built into it a sense of national identity. The challenge wasn't just to the men on the Irish rugby team but a challenge to Irish men more broadly. Both cases highlight how the subject's position within society will shape the way society interprets them and their actions.

In both cases, the prognostic framing had to happen quickly as they were responding to an act of violence that caught the attention of the public. Resolution to the problems in these cases

require structural changes to the State and could not be rectified through just one action, but multiple actions. Ni Una Menos due to their expansive repertoire and mobilising structures including their manifesto published after the *Justicia para Micaela* protests offered solutions to the problem at hand. Many of these solutions were adopted within the National Action Plan on VAW in Argentina in the 2020-2022 edition and Ni Una Menos' influence is clear. In contrast, ROSA did not have the same type of mobilising structures available to them, however, their ally (Coppinger) did address the trial in the Dáil the day of the first protest, challenging government on why victims of violence are still being treated this way within the judicial system. The timing of these protests proved to be a key factor in limiting ROSA's ability to employ further action in the immediate future. Although ROSA did organise a meeting shortly after the *I Believe Her* protests, the focus of the general public at the time was on reproductive rights and it was not possible or politically viable to start another campaign at the same time. On the 14th April 2018, ROSA did organise a very well attended event in Liberty Hall, Dublin. However, the focus was largely on reproductive rights as the Referendum was the following month. The *I Believe Her* protests were alluded to and when a speaker mentioned that the accused in the trial were being let go from their jobs, it was met with loud cheers, but the primary focus was reproductive rights.

Assessment of Frames

In relation to Ni Una Menos, the problem identified is the killing of women, namely femicide, and the exploration of how the rate of femicide correlates with the State's role in facilitating this type of violence (referred to as *feminicidio*). In relation to ROSA, the problem identified is the treatment of victims of sexual violence, including victim blaming, inadequacies within the justice system, including the re-victimisation of rape victims and the role of social class in cases like this one. 'The State is Responsible' is a flexible and

inclusive frame. The use of 'Justice for X' is common in Ni Una Menos' activism, this is a flexible frame, in that the name can change i.e., '*Justicia para Micaela*'. The use of the phrase 'the State is responsible' supports the diagnostic frame of who is to blame for the rate of femicide in Argentinian society, pointing out that individual perpetrators are not the only ones to blame but the structures and institutions who are also products of a patriarchal system. 'I Believe Her' is a flexible and inclusive frame, and has other iterations throughout the world, it was not created by ROSA. ROSA tried to use the phrase 'We Stand with Her' in the Dublin protest to widen the frame and underline the solidarity with all victims of sexual violence, although it was used, the 'I Believe Her' frame was much more powerful and resonant and did still signal solidarity. The use of the phrase 'Sue Me Paddy' supports the solidarity shown by participants in these protests and although it could be argued that this frame is more individualistic in nature, there is clearly a signal of solidarity.   Overall, the Ni Una Menos' frame is more flexible and inclusive with collectivistic features and the I Believe Her frame is also flexible and inclusive with individualistic features while also demonstrating solidarity. The gendered nature of the violence and the victims of the violence are evident in both slogans as they are speaking specifically to women and feminised people with the use of 'una' and 'her'.

Chapter 9 – Political Outcomes of SMO Activity

In the previous Chapters, political process theory was applied in this analysis by identifying the political opportunities, mobilising structures, and framing processes in each context to understand more deeply how these protest events occurred and influenced policy. The changes to national policy were not simply responses by the State to the acts of violence perpetrated against these women but instead shaped by the political climate in which these protests occurred, the strength of the mobilising structures of each SMO and the framing employed by the SMOs regarding VAW. The actions of the State after these protests in both cases points to the influential power of social movement activity in relation to VAW and the reforms that can be won due to their mobilisations. However, it also points to how fickle the political system can be, as although these types of reforms had been requested over the previous decade, it was not until the *Justicia para Micaela* and *I Believe Her* mobilisations that some concrete changes and commitments emerged. I will analyse the stages of the legislative process in each national context and their relationship to the protest events highlighting how these protest events had varying degrees of success in influencing concrete political outcomes relating to VAW in Argentina and Ireland.

The policy outcomes which were in part related to these protests can been seen as steps forward in the fight to eradicate VAW. These SMOs have been mobilising now (2023) consistently for 8 (Ni Una Menos) and 10 (ROSA) years, respectively. It is important to reflect on what is considered a 'win' and a 'loss' in social movement activity and the concrete changes to policy which could benefit individuals who are victims of violence. To assess the impact of 'challengers' i.e., the SMOs, in relation to policy, it is prudent to analyse these legislative processes. Movements often have the most influence in the initial stage of legislative processes, the stages of these processes are 'agenda-setting, legislative content,

passage and implementation' (Snow et al 2019:453). It is evident that Ni Una Menos were able to influence the first three stages whereas ROSA played a role in the agenda-setting stage. Social movement activity can have internal or external impacts as discussed in Chapter Five (Kriesi et al 1995). It is evident that were substantive proactive impacts made in these cases, where the SMOs have had an influence on policy.

Legislative Processes

The agenda-setting stage refers to the ways in which 'challengers' place an issue on the political agenda and protest has been identified as most influential at this stage (King et al. 2005, 2007; Soule & King 2006; Olzak & Soule 2009). The features of political opportunity as discussed in Chapter Six, i.e., changing political alignments, the presence of influential allies and access of new actors into the institutionalised political system, State repression and policymaking capacity of the State can give insight into the role the SMOs played in the agenda-setting stage. Particularly relevant is the policymaking capacity of the State. Although changing political alignments have an influence on policy, the presence of influential allies and new actors in the polity are of particular importance in relation to policy change. Gender inequality and the issue of VAW is multidimensional and therefore there is no single feature of the national polity that will explain outcomes i.e., modernisation, level of democracy, percentage of women in government, patriarchy etc. (Htun & Weldon 2018). However, it is evident that the State's actions or inactions regarding the issue of VAW have real-life consequences for victims and can affect efforts to reduce the overall incidence of such violence. Additionally, given how these protest events were in response to an act of violence against a woman which caught the attention of the public, State response was imminent given the attention these cases got. Andrews (2004) refers to this as the action/reaction model in which political authorities respond to mobilisation quickly.

In relation to legislative content, it is evident that the diagnostic (identifying the problem) and prognostic (posing solutions) framing utilised by SMOs as discussed in Chapter Eight can have an influence on the policy produced by the State in relation VAW. It depends how resonant the frame is as to whether there will be impact on policy (Cress & Snow 2000). When there is a proposed policy, there often needs to be some empirical evidence, which identifies the problem and shows why this policy is worth legislating for (McCammon 2009). Feminist movements are crucial in mainstreaming feminist perspectives into policy making but once they are brought into that field, then their ideas can be shaped to fit the interests of that institution (Dodds 2012). Their influence on the policy itself can decline once they no longer have to the power to control what is being said (Htun & Weldon 2012:564-565).   In relation to passage of policy, when a bill or policy has been put on the legislative agenda, it is also possible for challengers and activists to encourage legislators to vote for the bill (Amenta et al. 2005). Influential allies as discussed in Chapter Six and wide-ranging mobilising structures as discussed in Chapter Seven can assist in this. One of the most challenging stages of these legislative process is the implementation of the policy, especially in relation to VAW as it is a multidimensional problem with numerous actors. However, having a National Action Plan or law in place gives movements the ability to demand the enforcement of the law that has been put in place, remind the State of the obligations, and promises they have made as discussed in Chapter Two.

9.1 Legislative Processes: Argentina

In relation to agenda-setting, in the Argentinian context, Ni Una Menos had at this point in the struggle (2017) put the issue of femicide and the feminised body on the political agenda. In doing so, they gained many influential allies inside and outside State institutions, as discussed in Chapter Six, as well as new actors into the polity, particularly young women,

were engaging with feminist advocacy in a new way. The strength of Ni Una Menos is evident with political parties, particularly those who are considered more left-wing aligning themselves with Ni Una Menos' message. Although femicide had been established as a gendered form of violence, it was evident that the State played a significant role in the way in which femicide was responded to Argentina.

Since Ni Una Menos' emergence in 2015, they have set out their demands in their manifestos which summarise the main demands of the SMO. In Manifesto 1 (June 3, 2015), the need for training judicial agents and other State personnel with a gender perspective is stressed. This training is essential to transform the ingrained misogyny within these institutions and improve their response to VAW. It states, what is needed, "mandatory training on the subject of sexist violence for State personnel, security agents and judicial operators, as well as professionals who work on the issue of violence in different official offices throughout the country." In Manifesto 3 (May 31, 2016), they again call for the training of judicial and State officials to address the systemic issues in handling gender violence cases. The argument being that proper training is essential to prevent dismissive and ineffective responses that perpetuate violence. In Manifesto 4 (October 19, 2016) after the brutal femicide of Lucia Pérez, which inspired a strike, mentioned throughout this research, which involved one-hour pause from work and study early in the afternoon, known as *Miércoles Negro* (Black Wednesday). The manifesto advocates for mandatory gender violence training for State personnel, emphasizing that it is a critical component in addressing the root causes and improving the effectiveness of responses to gender violence.

Lagarde's (2004: 2006: 2010) concept of '*feminicidio*' which draws attention to the role of the State in cases of femicide is applicable here. The inaction of the State to adhere to international, regional, or national laws relating to VAW or to actively try to engage in training which would oblige authorities to act in a way which would prevent these crimes is evident. Judge Rossi, specifically, symbolised how the power of the State is wielded and what seems like a simple decision can having damning consequences. In this case, the Judge went against the advice of the Prison Service, demonstrating lack of communication between departments and highlights a patriarchal arrogance, assuming he knew better. If femicide is the intentional killing of a woman because she is a woman, then *feminicidio* (feminicide) highlights State inactivity in preventing these types of crimes. This case of femicide could have been avoided if a member or members of the State acted appropriately in response to Prison Service advice. This is not singular, in the sense that, this is part of a continuum of violence wherein the State ignore cases of femicide in various ways i.e., not investigating the crime in the first place; when the crime is investigated, giving up quickly; showing impunity to perpetrators; and choosing to act on individual beliefs and ideals rather than advice from established authorities and/or experts on gender violence. Although the impunity of femicide perpetrators was well-known, the *Justicia para Micaela* protests sharply highlighted the role of the State, especially the judicial system, in enabling this impunity. The demonstrations exposed the pervasive patriarchal attitudes among powerful figures within State institutions.

La Cámpora is a youth political organisation in Argentina, aligned with the broader Peronist movement. It was founded in 2006 by Máximo Kirchner, the son of former Argentinian Presidents Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. The organisation is named after Héctor José Cámpora, a prominent figure in the Peronist movement who briefly served

as President of Argentina in 1973. *La Cámpora* gained significant influence during the presidency of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, particularly among young Argentinians. Members of *La Cámpora* have held various positions within the Argentinian government and have been involved in legislatures at both the national and provincial levels. On the first day of protests (8 April 2017), *La Cámpora* (2017) expressed their deep grief and anger over the murder of Micaela, symbolising the broader issue of VAW perpetuated by a patriarchal system. They criticised the justice system, specifically targeting Judge Carlos Rossi for releasing Sebastian Wagner, a previously convicted rapist. They demanded systemic change in the form of comprehensive reforms including a State that actively combats gender violence, a justice system that is not patriarchal, and policies that protect women's rights to bodily autonomy. They identify the Ni Una Menos framework as a rallying cry for action, emphasising the desire for women to live free from fear and violence. They linked Micaela's femicide to broader issues of systemic failure and the ongoing fight for women's rights and safety.

On the day of Micaela's funeral (11 April 2017), thousands gathered at *Plaza de Mayo* in Buenos Aires advocating '*Justicia para Micaela*' (Justice for Micaela). This event featured an open radio by the Women and Gender Equality Front of *La Cámpora*, along with other organisations (La Campora 2017). Speakers at the event highlighted the increase in femicides, particularly noting that such incidents escalate during crises and are exacerbated by reductions in public policies aimed at preventing and addressing violence. The activists criticized *Cambiemos* for defunding and de-prioritizing public programs that protect women, contributing to the vulnerability of women to violence (La Campora 2017). *Cambiemos* in Argentina refers to the coalition government led by President Mauricio Macri, who was in

office from 2015 to 2019. *Cambiemos* are a centre-right political coalition formed by *Propuesta Republicana* (Republican Proposal), *Unión Cívica Radical* (Radical Civic Union) and Coalición Cívica ARI (Civic Coalition ARI).   There was a critique of the judiciary's failure to apply laws from a gender perspective, which often results in re-victimizing and failing the women it should protect. Again, the rallying cry 'Ni Una Menos' underscored the activists' commitment to continue their advocacy against gender-based violence, using the victims' stories as a banner for their cause.

In Manifesto 9 (April 20, 2017) after the femicide of Micaela, Ni Una Menos highlight the initial State response to Micaela's femicide, which was to increase prison sentences. This Manifesto argues again that criminal law alone is insufficient to address gender violence and stresses the importance of training judicial and security agents with a gender perspective. This training is crucial to change the systemic misogyny that leads to ineffective responses to gender violence. It states, "We ask for policies that prevent murders: that they reinforce education with a gender perspective, the training of judicial and security agents, and increase the speed of the State's response to complaints." They offer a critique of punitive measures, arguing against increasing penalties as a solution to gender violence. They emphasize the need for preventative measures and better care for victims, highlighting the judicial system's failure to take complaints seriously and the need for timely and precise responses. Overall, they point out the ineffectiveness of previous reforms that focused on punishment rather than prevention. They advocate for comprehensive policies addressing the structural inequalities and specific nature of sexual crimes and aim to hold the State accountable for the lack of effective prevention policies and support systems for victims.

A month later, *La Campora* (2017), publish an article describing how since the *Justicia para Micaela* protests, it is evident that there has been an influence of Ni Una Menos. Thirteen legislative bills were introduced in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. These bills aimed to establish a comprehensive framework for preventing gender violence and femicide. A foundation was created by Micaela's family, the Micaela García Foundation, and was also actively involved in preparing these bills. Micaela's mother, Andrea Lescano, and father, Néstor "Yuyo" García, both played significant roles in advocating for these initiatives, emphasizing the need for preventive measures rather than just punitive responses. The legislative package includes bills proposing national programs for institutional training on gender and violence applicable to all public workers, including the President. Additionally, there were initiatives to promote sports as a way to integrate vulnerable youth, and another bill offers economic compensation for children of mothers killed by gender violence. The proposed bills garnered support from multiple political blocks within the Chamber of Deputies, collectively holding 126 seats, highlighting a broad base of political backing. These initiatives were driven by the memory of Micaela García and aim to cement 'Ni Una Menos' as a tangible reality in Argentina (La Campora 2017).

In relation to passage of policy, once a policy has been put on the legislative agenda, it is evident that having influential allies is beneficial. In December 2018, there was huge support for this bill in Congress with 171 votes in favour and 1 against. The *Ley Micaela* (Micaela Law) was put into legislation in December 2018, the main tenet of this piece of legislation is to ensure that there is compulsory training on gender violence for all people working in public service in the executive, legislative and judicial branches. As discussed earlier, it is important to note that after Micaela's femicide, the State's initial reaction was to implement

stricter measures such as prohibiting parole and increasing prison sentences for certain crimes, including gender violence and drug trafficking. Recognizing that women are often involved in drug trafficking, Micaela's parents and Ni Una Menos opposed these measures. They publicly declared their opposition with the statement "not in our name" (Lopez 2020:33). Despite this disagreement, the State proceeded with this initial measure. Htun & Weldon (2018) argue that policy that benefit women do not just occur under left-wing governments. In this case, there was a centre-right political party in power when the *Ley Micaela* (Micaela Law) was finally realised, dispelling the idea that policy on VAW can only be pushed forward under a left-wing government.

In an evaluation of the introduction of *Ley Micaela* (Micaela Law), it has been argued that 'the institutional violence that this femicide revealed took place within the framework of the mobilizations in support of Ni Una Menos and the debates that had been emerging as a product of social struggles, all of which became demands for institutional reconfigurations. Micaela's case highlighted the urgent need to provide comprehensive training on gender and violence against women to public officials, at all levels, throughout the country. The Micaela Law (No. 27,499) arose from this need, as a vital instrument that reflects a commitment of the three powers of the State, with the eradication of this violence that, like Micaela, hundreds of girls, adolescents and women suffer every day in the country' (ELA - Latin American Justice and Gender Team 2021:8). As Cohen (2022:127) asserts 'the intent of Ley Micaela is to infuse knowledge of gender-based violence into the fabric of society, specifically its major institutions. Thus, Ley Micaela reflects Ni Una Menos's ethos of working from the inside out to create a societal shift.'

The implementation of policy is a particularly difficult feature of legislative processes. However, it is evident that Ni Una Menos' influence was strong in the Argentinian context, and this was noticed by the incoming Presidential candidate, Alberto Fernández, a Peronist, who during his campaign made multiple promises to the SMO. These promises included sending another bill to Congress regarding reproductive rights and creating a Ministry which would replace the *Instituto Nacional de la Mujer*; INAM (National Institute for Women) discussed in Chapter Six and would be tasked specifically with overseeing policy related to VAW. This promise would include some legislative power and more funding. The creation of the *Ministerio de las Mujeres, Géneros y Diversidad* (Ministry of Women, Gender and Diversity) in December 2019 after the election of Alberto Fernández was a turning point in the influence of Ni Una Menos. This Ministry took over the duties of the *Instituto Nacional de la Mujer*; INAM (National Institute for Women). An activist interviewed argued that the reasoning behind the creation of this Ministry, which was promised by Fernández during his campaign, was in part, due to the fear that Ni Una Menos would create their own political party or join the opposition. It is not uncommon that political parties are aware that women's movements and groups can be utilised by the State to further their agenda (Alvarez 1990:11-20).

> 'It was a blueprint, because many of the women that are part of the Ministry were
> involved in Ni Una Menos… The problem was that they have the theoretical
> knowledge and everything, but the government didn't give them the political power to
> transform things… the pressure created by that (*Ni Una Menos*) was one of the
> reasons why we have the Ministry and in a more legal and strategic way, I think the
> government understood that the feminist movement needs to be absorbed for a
> political force. Because, otherwise, if, as a government, I don't give representation to
> that feminist group, I have two options, they create a new political party, which is
> going to take votes from me or they are going with the opposition, which is
> detrimental for me. So, I think the government understood that was the moment to
> give to that progressive group - political representation, and that political
> representation will be if you get a position of power in the government'
> (MUNUM03).

The Argentinian NAP on VAW - *Plan Nacional de Acción contra las Violencias por Motivos de Género 2020-2022* (National Action Plan against Gender-Based Violence 2020-2022) was assembled by the *Ministerio de las Mujeres, Géneros y Diversidad* (Ministry of Women, Gender and Diversity) and led by Elizabeth Gomez Alcorta, the Minister for Women, Gender and Diversity. Elizabeth Gomez Alcorta is a well-known human rights lawyer in Argentina, a feminist, and an influential ally of Ni Una Menos. Alcorta is also known for being the defence lawyer for Milagro Sala, discussed in Chapter Six in relation to State capacity for repression.   In October 2022, Alcorta resigned in protest as response to the treatment of Mapuche women and children (7 women, 5 children) from Villa Mascardi, Río Nego province who were imprisoned, one of whom was 40 weeks pregnant, and transferred 1500km away from their home by the State, during a security operation, which she described as 'serious violations of human rights' (Buenos Aires Times 2022).

This NAP was heavily influenced by Ni Una Menos as is evidenced throughout the report and a component of the NAP is to federalize the Micaela Law. In this context, to 'federalize' means to extend the implementation of the Micaela Law beyond the federal government level to include all provincial governments. It involves ensuring that the law is adopted and implemented uniformly across all 23 provinces of Argentina. This not a 'band-aid' or short-term solution but instead an attempt at inserting a gender perspective into the way which VAW is dealt with within State institutions, in the hopes of long-term change. The Ministry was tasked with establishing certified training programs on gender and violence with input from civil society as well as State departments. The training programs and guidelines are set out to assist public bodies at national, provincial and municipal levels for effective implementation of *Ley Micaela* (Micaela Law). This also includes follow-up and monitoring of training. As of December 2022, according to the *Ministerio de las Mujeres, Géneros y*

Diversidad (Ministry of Women, Gender and Diversity), '230,730 authorities and agents of the three branches of the State were trained' and '150 agencies of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Powers were advised and accompanied in the design and implementation of their training programs'.

9.2 Legislative Processes: Ireland

Although Ni Una Menos played a role in the agenda-setting, legislative content and passage of policy stages of the legislative process. It is evident that the *I Believe Her* protests and ROSA played a role in the agenda-setting stage. In the Irish context, ROSA played a pivotal role in the Reproductive Rights Movement in Ireland and autonomy women had over their bodies was centre stage. The Reproductive Rights Movement in Ireland facilitated the arrival of new actors into the polity, including young people, particularly young women, and members of the LGBTQIA+ community. Through this activism they acquired several influential allies and the presence of one of their members within the parliament at this time gave them a platform, this platform was crucial for why these protests occurred in the first place. The I *Believe Her* protests reflected the anger of young women, regarding the issue of sexual violence and consent. The treatment of the woman in this trial demonstrated the attitudes prevalent in Irish society where men, particularly men of privilege, assault women with impunity. The role of the State also became clear in this case, as the treatment of the victim within the court highlighted the lack of training for members of the judiciary who questioned this young woman. The lack of trauma informed training for those within the State highlights how the State can be part of the continuum of violence that women experience. In Ireland, a sizeable percentage of the country had their eyes on the activity of those in power and State response to these mobilisations had to occur, as no action would have been politically unwise.

Before these protests in April 2017, the Law Reform Commission of Ireland initiated an

examination following a request from the Attorney General to 'examine and make

recommendations on whether changes should be made to the element of knowledge or belief

in the definition of rape' (Daly 2020:478). However, it was only after the high-profile

Belfast Trial and the resulting *I Believe Her* protests throughout the country, that there

emerged a more comprehensive and broader review of the justice system in Ireland

concerning the protections for vulnerable witnesses in the investigation and prosecution of

sexual offenses. In September 2018, this broader review, which included the establishment

of an expert group chaired by Tom O'Malley BL, who was also involved in the report on

knowledge and belief in relation to rape, was clearly influenced by the public scrutiny that

arose from the Belfast Trial, highlighting systemic issues in how sexual offense cases were

handled (Daly 2020:485). This indicates a cascading effect where specific incidents can

amplify and expand the scope of legal reviews and reforms already under consideration, due

to public interest and pressure.

In relation to legislative content, it is evident that the *I Believe Her* protests were influential

drawing attention to the problem present within the State, primarily to reorganise the way in

which trials related to sexual violence are conducted. The Belfast Trial was the empirical

evidence demonstrating a problem that was worth legislating on. However, the protests or

the SMO were not acknowledged within the policy documents which were presented almost

two years after the *I Believe Her* protests. After the '*I Believe Her*' protests, organised in part

by ROSA, a report was ordered by Department of Justice in August 2018. This report was

published in August 2020, the 'Review of Protections for Vulnerable Witnesses in the

Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Offences' (O'Malley Report 2020). Although this

case was in Northern Ireland and there are some differences in judicial processes i.e., the

accused would not have been named in the Republic of Ireland and citizens would not have

been allowed to enter the court room, there are some core issues that are present in both

areas.

The main recommendations of the O'Malley Report (2020:8) are:

> '1. Promoting public awareness of victims' rights legislation; 2. Promoting education about the meaning and importance of consent; 3. Inter-agency co-operation and exchange of information, especially in relation to services for victims; and 4. Consistency in service delivery.'

The report addresses a wide range of issues related to the investigation, prosecution, and trial

of sexual offences. These include the investigation and prosecution processes, anonymity of

victims and defendants, public and media access to trials, preliminary hearings, trial

processes, victim information, use of intermediaries, reducing trial delays, and training. An

important focus for this research is the part of the report that reviews the trial process, where

it is recommended that those in direct contact with victims of sexual violence receive

appropriate training on gender violence.

> 'Judges and lawyers dealing with victims of sexual crime must be sensitive to the trauma experienced by all victims of sexual violence, irrespective of age, gender or capacity. Many (perhaps most) victims will still be experiencing such trauma when they report the offence to the Gardaí and when they are being interviewed about it. Rape myths, meaning erroneous beliefs or assumptions that sexual acts must have been, or probably were, consensual if they occurred in certain environments or within the context of a pre-existing relationship, continue to exist. Everyone dealing with victims of sexual crime should be acutely aware of such myths and of their own susceptibility to be influenced by them. Training provided for legal professionals should include a module on rape myths and on the emotional trauma experienced by victims of sexual crime. Training should also stress, as the courts have repeatedly held, that the manner in which a person dresses or the fact that she or he accepts an invitation to visit somebody else's dwelling is not under any circumstances to be treated as indicating consent to sexual activity.' (O'Malley Report 2020:122)

It is evident that this training is necessary and required under the EU Victims' Rights

Directive which EU Member States, including Ireland 'were required to transpose the EU

Victims Directive into law by 16th November 2015' but 'infringement proceedings (were)

issued against Ireland for its failure to communicate and implement the Victims Directive.

The Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act 2017 was signed into law on 5th November

2017' (McDonald 2017:3).

> 'The provision of training is no longer an option in view of the obligations imposed
> by Article 25 of the EU Victims' Rights Directive which provides: 1. Member states
> shall ensure that officials likely to come into contact with victims, such as police
> officers and court staff, receive both general and specialist training to a level
> appropriate to their contact with victims to increase their awareness of the needs of
> victims and to enable them to deal with victims in an impartial, respectful and
> professional manner (O'Malley Report 2020:124)

The O'Malley Report published in 2020 was influential in creating 'Supporting a Victim's

Journey – A plan to help victims and vulnerable witnesses in sexual violence cases' which

was published in 2021 by the Department of Justice.   Both reference the influence of the

Belfast Trial as the reasoning why these reports were compiled, pointing to how the 'trial and

its outcome undoubtedly focused attention on the conduct of rape trials' (O Malley 2020:4)

and that there 'was unease in the wake of a trial in Belfast Crown Court in 2018, which has

come to be known as the 'Belfast rugby rape trial' (Supporting a Victim's Journey 2021:12-

13).

> 'In August 2018, the Minister for Justice and Equality appointed this Working Group,
> with representatives from key criminal justice agencies, to review and report upon the
> protections available for vulnerable witnesses in the investigation and prosecution of
> sexual offences. The Working Group was appointed in the wake of a high-profile trial
> which had taken place in the Crown Court in Belfast earlier that year. At the
> conclusion of that 42-day trial, two of the accused who were charged with rape were
> acquitted, as were two others who had been charged with lesser offences. That trial
> and its outcome undoubtedly focused attention on the conduct of rape trials and the
> experiences of complainants on both sides of the border' (O Malley 2020:4).
>
> 'This Review was prompted by widely shared concerns about the experiences of
> vulnerable witnesses in criminal proceedings for sexual offences. In particular, there
> was unease in the wake of a trial in Belfast Crown Court in 2018, which has come to
> be known as the 'Belfast rugby rape trial'. The then Minister for Justice, Charlie
> Flanagan TD, requested the Review to examine key aspects of the criminal justice

process as it relates to vulnerable witnesses, and to identify ways in which the treatment of such witnesses might be improved' (Supporting a Victim's Journey 2021:12-13).

The 'unease' and 'the widely shared concerns about the experiences of vulnerable witnesses in criminal proceedings' is important to interrogate. This unease and concern had been present in Irish society and expressed by the Rape Crisis Centres and the Rape Crisis Network in Ireland for an extended period before the Belfast Trial. This could have been addressed sooner and the policy and actions suggested could have been in motion years ago.

On numerous occasions in traditional news media i.e., Irish newspapers, it had been reported that judges have insufficient training in relation to communicating with victims of trauma (Hickey 2009), the Rape Crisis Network Ireland compiled a report in which they highlight how victims are afraid to report for fears of how they will be treated by the system (Ruddock 2009), that in cases of domestic violence, judges were ill-equipped, giving long waiting periods for barring orders, not understanding the nature of domestic violence and the need for quick protective orders (Hough & McEnroe 2010). The reporting was not just focused on how the judicial system treats victims but also the inconsistency in sentencing perpetrators of sexual and domestic violence (Murphy 2012). In 2014, it was reported that no judges in Ireland accepted the specialised training provided by the Rape Crisis Centres which would assist them in understanding more deeply the experiences of victims of violence (RTE 2014). It is apparent that judges and the Department of Justice knew that the experts in violence i.e., frontline workers in Rape Crisis and Domestic Violence Centres had repeatedly suggested, requested, and offered training but this was resisted or outright refused. Even after the *I Believe Her* protests in March 2018 and the O'Malley Report being ordered in August 2018, there were still incidences where victims were being mistreated through the trial process. As

discussed in Chapter Seven, in November 2018, a campaign regarding VAW led by ROSA called 'This is Not Consent' emerged after a barrister in a rape trial in Cork, was accused of victim-blaming.

I would argue that many of the actions following the '*I Believe Her*' protests were not taken solely due to the State's unease and concerns about how the trial was conducted or how other victims and trials of sexual violence in Ireland are handled. Instead, these actions were shaped by the context in which this SMO operated, and by the protests on those two days (29 and 31 March 2018) following the 'not guilty' verdict. Action 1.700 of the Irish NAP on VAW 2016-2021 stated 'Liaise with the Judicial Studies Institute in relation to the provisions in the EU Victims Directive relevant to victims of domestic and sexual violence to raise awareness among the judiciary.'

In the minutes of the bi-annual meetings related to the NAP on VAW in Ireland (Second National Strategy on Domestic, Sexual and Gender-based Violence (2016-2021)), Action 1.700 is referenced in the 1 June 2016 meeting where it is noted that 'Cosc said that they had corresponded with the President of the District Court and submitted an article for circulation to District Court judges.' In the May 2021, Monitoring Report in relation to this Action, it is stated: 'The Review of Protections for Vulnerable Witnesses in the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Offences (Tom O'Malley review) recommends that appropriate steps should be taken to ensure that judges and lawyers are familiar with legislation and adequately trained in relation to victims of domestic and sexual violence, especially as it relates to the questioning of victims during sexual offence trials.' The Implementing bodies are Department of Justice (formerly Cosc), and the Courts Service. It is evident that although it

was stated in the original NAP (Second National Strategy on Domestic, Sexual and Gender-based Violence (2016-2021)) that Cosc and the Courts Service were due to 'liaise' with the judiciary, it was not until the *I Believe Her* protests and the resulting O'Malley Report that any real action occurred.

In the Third NAP on VAW (Third National Strategy on Domestic, Sexual & Gender-Based Violence (2022-2026) in Ireland (2022-2026:8) it states that 'a central element of delivering on the goal of the Strategy is the establishment of a statutory domestic, sexual and gender-based violence agency under the aegis of the Department of Justice.' However, this agency still does not exist, and it is evident that a lack of co-ordination of civil society groups and the inclusion of victim/survivor perspectives using an intersectional lens will be necessary for the agency to have an impact. Additionally, it is not clear whether the agency will have any power to oblige different departments to act based on their commitments within the plan. In March 2023, the Minister for Justice forwarded the General Scheme of the Domestic, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Agency Bill to the Joint Committee on Justice. The Oireachtas Report on Pre-Legislative Scrutiny of the General Scheme of the Domestic, Sexual and Gender Based Violence Agency Bill has recently been submitted with several civil society organisations recommendations. The Agency is meant to be up and running in January 2024.

Chapter 10 - Conclusion – Summarising Protests

This Chapter will conclude the study by summarising the key research findings, the original contribution this thesis is making to knowledge and recommendations for further research. This research compared the protest events *Justicia para Micaela* led by Ni Una Menos and the *I Believe Her* protests led by ROSA. In doing so, this research aimed to answer questions regarding how and why contemporary feminist SMOs mobilise in response to acts of VAW. This study has identified a gap in the literature regarding comparative studies of different feminist SMOs and their mobilisations in response to VAW in different contexts. This was achieved by applying the same conceptual framework to each SMO which facilitated a comparison of the different circumstances and outcomes of movement activity. The political process theory approach has been applied in previous studies. However, an innovation in this study allowed for an in-depth analysis of the relationship between political opportunities, mobilising structures, and framing processes in relation to specific pivotal protest events, utilising a comparative frame.

The concept of 'due diligence' in human rights law as discussed in Chapter Two, requires States to take active measures through legislation and policy enforcement to fulfil their obligations under international conventions, particularly those aimed at combating VAW. Under conventions like the *Convention of Belém do Pará* and the *Istanbul Convention*, States are mandated to prevent, investigate, punish, and provide reparation for acts of VAW. These include both acts perpetrated by State actors and non-State actors. SMOs play an important role in holding the State accountable. Through protests and advocacy, these SMOs put pressure on the State for the actual implementation of policies and legislative changes that the State has committed to under various international agreements. Protest events are vital as

they raise public and international awareness, potentially leading to increased pressure on governments to adhere to their due diligence obligations. These events can also spotlight the deficiencies in State responses to VAW and push for structural changes beyond mere policy adjustments. Protests bring attention to the issues of VAW and the need for State action, which can otherwise be neglected or minimised in public discourse. By organising and mobilising, SMOs can create pressure on the State to fulfil its international obligations, providing a check on the State's actions or inactions.

Ni Una Menos and *Justicia para Micaela* Protests (*See Table 7*)

The research findings in relation to the *Justicia para Micaela* protests are summarised in Table 7. The key findings are as follows; it is evident that certain features of political opportunity were more relevant than others in relation to this protest event. Ni Una Menos were mobilising for two years prior to the *Justicia para Micaela* protests and their emergence was supported by many influential allies both within and outside of State institutions. The *Movimiento Evita* (Evita Movement) proved to be an important influential ally in the *Justicia para Micaela* protests as both their organisational base and their links to Peronism makes them a powerful force in Argentinian society and the bridging with *Movimiento Evita* (Evita Movement) was vital. Ni Una Menos' arrival also brought new actors into the institutionalised political system, particularly young women who started to create new spaces of feminist advocacy while also revitalising older spaces of feminist advocacy, i.e., the *Encuentros*. This has resulted in the creation of a feminist SMO which is wide-ranging and intergenerational. They are connected by shared experiences influenced by changes in political and social life as well as the shared common purpose of wanting to stop violence perpetrated against women. The spaces in which these new actors mobilised were not limited to physical spaces but were also present in the digital space, particularly through their use of

social media platforms. This was bolstered due to the diverse organisational structure of the

SMO (*decentralised-segmented network*), which requires continuous activity by a large base.

Although Ni Una Menos, it could be argued, have become more centralised in the years

following this protest event, during this protest event they were not as centralised. The

relative ease with which different segments communicate is related to the SMO's repertoire,

as there are some defined actions that activists know to do, without having to go to a core

actor. Members of Ni Una Menos will use a picture of the victim of femicide on their social

media platforms and demand justice, there will often be acts of public mourning and in this

particular case, the State's involvement in the facilitation of the femicide was so evident that

there was a clearer target for blame, and this informed the framing processes and the eventual

slogan of '*el estado es responsable*' (the State is responsible).

Ni Una Menos employ a variety of tactics, which they have in their repertoire including mass

mobilisations on public squares, strikes, '*escraches*', acts of public mourning, and artistic

performance. However, in relation to the *Justicia para Micaela* protests, acts of public

mourning were crucial as this collective mourning brings people together while also

demanding justice for her death. The framing of Micaela as a militant feminist activist with

associations with *Movimiento Evita* (Evita Movement) and Ni Una Menos was crucial in the

collective action frame which blamed not just the perpetrator for her femicide but also the

State. Micaela did everything 'right' and yet she was still a victim of sexual violence and

murder. The action of the judge in this case, who freed her murderer early, informed the

diagnostic framing, and placed blame at the State and the role it plays in these murders. The

prognostic framing of Ni Una Menos which was contained in both the in-person protests,

online activity, as well as Ni Una Menos' manifesto regarding this protest all pointed blame

to the State. The resulting impact of these protests included the creation of *Ley Micaela*

(Micaela Law) which demands that there is compulsory training on gender violence for all people working in public service in the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Here we can see a direct link with the actions of the State in this instance.

Table 7: *Justicia para Micaela* Protest Findings

	Political Opportunities	Mobilising Structures	Framing Processes	Political Outcomes
Ni Una Menos / Argentina	Changing political alignments: economic crisis (2001), revitalised reproductive rights movement (2005 and 2018), move from centre left to centre right government in 2015. Allies: found both within and outside State institutions, who have considerable influence within the political and social sphere in Argentina. *Justicia para Micaela* Protests – key ally - the Evita Movement New Actors in the polity: NUM inserted the gender perspective into the discourse – femicide, revitalised spaces of feminist advocacy and created new spaces in digital and physical sphere. Repression of movement: not an issue in the *Justicia para Micaela* protests. However initial response from State was legislation which NUM rejected. Policymaking Capacity: The agency tasked with overseeing policy needs appropriate funding and political power to oblige actors involved.	Decentralised-segmented structure of NUM requires continued activity from a variety of different groups. Traditional mobilising structures: revitalised older spaces of advocacy and created new ones. Primary tactics in repertoire: mass mobilisations on public squares, strikes, 'escraches', acts of public mourning, and artistic performance. Digital mobilising structures: Strong presence on multiple social media platforms with multiple groups and global usage of #niunamenos hashtag, manifestos on main website. *Justicia para Micaela* Protests: Utilised both traditional and digital mobilising structures to bridge with other movements including Evita Movement and political parties. Repertoires – utilised historical tactics e.g., public mourning.	Master Frames: VAW and Femicide Collective Action Frame: 'The State is Responsible' is a flexible and inclusive frame. The use of 'Justice for X' is common in Ni Una Menos' activism, this is a flexible frame, in that the name can change i.e., 'Justicia para Micaela'. The use of the phrase 'the State is responsible' supports the diagnostic and prognostic framing of who is to blame for the rate of femicide in Argentinian society, pointing out that individual perpetrators are not the only ones to blame but the structures and institutions who are also products of a patriarchal system.	*Ley Micaela* (Micaela Law) – December 2018 Main tenet of this piece of legislation is to ensure that there is compulsory training on gender violence for all people working in public service in the executive, legislative and judicial branches.

The research findings in relation to the *I Believe Her* protests are summarised in Table 8. The key findings are as follows; it is evident that certain features of political opportunity were more relevant than others in relation to this protest event. ROSA were mobilising for five years prior to the *I Believe Her* protests and their emergence was shaped by the re-vitalisation of the Reproductive Rights Movement. The <u>timing</u> of this protest is of particular importance, as well as some of the features of political opportunity; changing political alignments due to the re-emergence of the Reproductive Rights Movement, the amount of young women who were new actors in the institutionalised system and made up the majority of those in attendance at the protests. This newly politicised generation were connected on a shared purpose in relation to Reproductive Rights Movement which was crucial in the turnout at the *I Believe Her* protests. Additionally, the presence of an influential ally in parliament with a big platform was vital to the successful mobilisation in response to this trial. The *wheel/star / clique structures* present in this SMO means there are elements of high centralisation where a core group who inform much of the decision-making and this was necessary in response to this protest event. This group is also quite small and therefore can communicate easily with almost everyone through a WhatsApp group.

In the Irish context, this case was singular, in the sense that it caught attention because of a long build up and it was during the height of organising around Reproductive Rights Movement. The organising and decisions made in response to the femicide of Micaela Garica were because Ni Una Menos are used to organising in response to this issue whereas the 'not guilty' verdict in the Belfast Trial was novel and needed to be responded to because of the attention the case received and the fact that the initial organisers were hindered due to

threats.   ROSA were able to facilitate a protest as they were already in a position to organise and had the resources, both in person and online to share information quickly and effectively. ROSA had a large following on social media during this time and therefore were equipped to take on organising the protests through their digital mobilising structures, the platform with the most engagement was Facebook as this is where the event pages were located. They also had an ally in Coppinger who proved to be essential and in terms of the network structure, Coppinger acting as a core activist through which others mobilised.

The influence of the Reproductive Rights Movement is important to note, but also the emergence of the MeToo Movement was crucial in relation to the framing processes, as this movement emerged just six months before the *I Believe Her* protests. This frame influenced much of the discussion online with regard to sexual violence and consent and was particularly fitting given the optics of men in the public eye being accused of sexual violence. The resulting impact of these protests included the request from government for a report to be published by Tom O'Malley regarding Protections for Vulnerable Witnesses in the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Offences. One of the key recommendations within this report was that gender violence training must be provided to judges and legal professionals who come into contact with victims of sexual violence and that rape myths should not be used within the court proceedings to indicate consent.

Table 8: *I Believe Her* Protest Findings

	Political Opportunities	Mobilising Structures	Framing Processes	Political Outcomes
ROSA / Ireland	Changing political alignments: economic crisis (2007), revitalised reproductive rights movement (2013), move from centre right to centre government. Allies: primarily outside State institutions. *I Believe Her* Protests – key ally – one of the founding members of ROSA who was also a Socialist Party TD Access of New Actors: revitalised reproductive rights movement (Repeal), MeToo Movement (2017), Citizen's Assemblies re: (Marriage Equality (2015) & Abortion (2018) State repression of movement activity: this was not an issue in these protests, however, the accused solicitors did threaten litigation. Policymaking capacity: Ireland has the capacity to make policy but lacks ability to implement it appropriately as it is so fragmented.	The wheel/star / clique structures of ROSA requires organising coming from top-down and/or from some core individuals and/or groups. Traditional mobilizing structures: stalls in city centres, in-person events, Bred & Roses festival. Primary tactics in repertoire: taking up public spaces, disruptive tactics i.e., abortion train, Digital mobilizing structures: Strong presence on Facebook during pivotal protest. Needs more engagement with 'newer' social media platforms i.e., Instagram, TikTok *I Believe Her* Protests: Digital mobilizing structures particularly important in these protest events – two Facebook event pages. Tactics employed – taking up public space in city centres throughout Ireland.	Master Frame: VAW and influenced by MeToo Movement Collective Action Frame: 'I Believe Her' is a flexible and inclusive frame, and has other iterations throughout the world, it was not created by ROSA. ROSA tried to use the phrase 'We Stand with Her' in the Dublin protest to widen the frame and underline the solidarity with all victims of sexual violence, although it was used, the 'I Believe Her' frame was much more powerful and resonant and did still signal solidarity. The use of the phrase 'Sue Me Paddy' supports the solidarity shown by participants in these protests and although it could be argued that this frame is more individualistic in nature, there is clearly a signal of solidarity.	The Review of Protections for Vulnerable Witnesses in the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Offences (O'Malley Report) – 2021 Influenced by O'Malley Report: Supporting a Victim's Journey – A plan to help victims and vulnerable witnesses in sexual violence cases' published in 2021 by the Department of Justice.

In both cases, there was a build-up before the movement activity, in the *Justicia para Micaela* case, friends and family were searching for Micaela for a week before she was found and it was confirmed that she was a victim of femicide. Whereas in the *I Believe Her* case, there was a nine-week trial before the verdict was announced. The process of 'cognitive liberation' begins when a group have a shared grievance that influences collective action (McAdam 1982). In the *Justicia para Micaela* case, the initial anger came from her body being found, another case of confirmed femicide and the added insult that the perpetrator had been released early by a Judge who ignored the Prison Service advice to keep him incarcerated. Whereas, in the *I Believe Her* case, the initial anger came from the treatment of the victim in the court process which was reported in traditional media and social media alongside the verdict of 'not guilty', the added insult occurred as the mobilisations began and threats of litigation emerged.

When the collective action began, both cases had events on two different days, in the *Justicia para Micael*a case, the first protest event on the 9th April 2017 called for 'justice' and was focused on the perpetrator, the Judge and the State for they were to blame for the femicide of Micaela. The second protest event on the 11th April 2017 was Micaela's funeral where collective public mourning was employed to mourn the death of Micaela but also other victims of femicide who were dead due to State inaction or complicity, as would be argued through the application of *feminicidio*, discussed in Chapter Eight. In the *I Believe Her* case, the first protest event on the 29th March 2018 was a reaction to the verdict in the trial and the anger regarding the treatment of women in Irish society through the court process and more broadly. The second protest event on the 31st March 2018 had a different tone and was more

defiant, as by this point, the accused's solicitor had started to threaten people with litigation if they tweeted the hashtag #ibelieveher and resulted in the creation of another hashtag #suemepaddy.

Contribution

The research highlights several key findings that underscore the dynamics and impacts of SMOs on policy and societal attitudes towards VAW. It emphasises the importance of examining political opportunities to understand the potential impact SMOs can have on national policies. It also points out the necessity for SMOs to have mobilising structures in both physical and digital spaces, enabling them to respond swiftly to last-minute calls to action. Furthermore, by adapting the VAW frame, SMOs are able to spotlight and attribute blame to the State for failing to act on obligations established in regional conventions such as the *Belém do Pará Convention* and the *Istanbul Convention*, as well as National Action Plans on Violence Against Women. This research also discusses the pivotal role of feminist SMOs in challenging the notion of impunity and public forms of patriarchy, especially within the justice system.

This research makes a unique contribution by comparing two feminist SMOs in two different contexts, internationalising social movement analysis of their mobilisations in response to VAW. This was achieved through methodologically combining comparative data using a mixed method's approach. This thesis draws on both in-depth interview data as well as real-time social media data to provide a detailed account of the mobilisations that occurred. There is a considerable amount of literature which has been previously conducted on Ni Una Menos and has been referenced throughout this thesis. The case of Micaela Garcia has been

mentioned but not an in-depth analysis of the mobilisations that occurred at the *Justicia para Micaela* protests. The influence of *Movimiento Evita* (Evita Movement) and their relevance in these mobilisations has not been appropriately highlighted either. The *I Believe Her* protests were one of the most well-publicised protests in recent Irish history and the previous research conducted regarding this case i.e., the Belfast Trial were focused on discourse in traditional media and social media (Prendergast & Quinn 2021), representations of rape culture in Northern Ireland's media (McFalone 2021) and how rape myths regarding consent are present in sexual violence trials (Dowds 2022). However, a sociological account of movement activity that facilitated these protests utilising a social movement perspective has not been conducted before. This research supports and updates the existing research in Ireland regarding feminist mobilisations in response to VAW.

Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research

There were limitations in this study and one of the main reasons was due to the data collection being conducted during the Covid-19 pandemic, which shaped the methodological approach. This thesis identified and analysed the mobilisations that occurred in relation to specific protest events, which could be applied in other contexts with the same SMOs as these SMOs are transnational. However, it is important not to generalise across countries with how these SMOs operate, this study was speaking specifically to the Argentinian and Irish experience.

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Appendix A – Key Policy Changes in Argentina

Year	Argentina
1994	*Ley 24.417 de Protección contra la Violencia Familiar* (Argentina Law No. 24.417 on Protection against Family Violence)
1994	*Convención Interamericana para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra la Mujer 'Convenio de Belém do Pará* (Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women - Belém do Pará Convention)
1996	Argentina ratifies the *Belém do Pará Convention* in March 1996.
2009	*Ley de Protección Integral para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra las Mujeres en los Ámbitos en que Desarrollen sus Relaciones Interpersonales* (Comprehensive Law on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women in their Interpersonal Relations). Argentina Law No. 26.485
2010	*Ley de Matrimonio Igualitario* (Equal Marriage Law). Argentina's Law No. 26.618.
2012	*Ley de Modificación del Código Penal en materia de femicidio* (Law for the Modification of the Penal Code concerning Femicide). This legislation amends Article 80 of Law No. 11.179 of 1984 to explicitly include femicide among the aggravating circumstances of homicide.
2012	*Ley de Identidad de Género* (Gender Identity Law) - Argentina's Law No. 26.743
2014	*Plan Nacional de Acción para la Prevención, Asistencia y Erradicación de la Violencia contra las Mujeres* (National Action Plan for the Prevention, Assistance, and Eradication of Violence Against Women). First National Action Plan on VAW (2014-2016).
2017	*Segundo Plan Nacional de Acción para la Prevención, Asistencia y Erradicación de la Violencia contra las Mujeres* (Second National Action Plan for the Prevention, Assistance, and Eradication of Violence Against Women). Second National Action Plan on VAW (2017-2019)
2018	*Registro Único de Casos de Violencia contra las Mujeres* (Unique Registry of Cases of Violence Against Women).
2019	*Ley Micaela de Capacitación Obligatoria en Género para Todas las Personas que Integran los Tres Poderes del Estado* (Micaela's Law of Mandatory Gender Training for All Members of the Three Branches of the State).
2020	*Plan Nacional de Acción contra las Violencias por Motivos de Género 2020-2022* (National Action Plan against Gender-Based Violence 2020-2022). Third National Action Plan on VAW (2020-2022).
2020	*Ley de Acceso a la Interrupción Voluntaria del Embarazo* (Law on Access to Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy) Argentina Law No. 27,610.

*Please Note: This list is not exhaustive but identifies the key policy shifts and changes in the national context referred to throughout this research.

Appendix B – Key Policy Changes in Ireland

Year	Ireland
1990	Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act
1996	The Domestic Violence Act 1996
1997	Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act
1997	The Bail Act
2002	SAVI (Sexual Abuse and Violence in Ireland) Report
2010	National Strategy on Domestic, Sexual and Gender-based Violence (2010-2014). First National Action Plan on VAW.
2011	Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (*Istanbul Convention*)
2012	Criminal Justice (Female Genital Mutilation) Act
2015	Marriage Equality Referendum (Passed May 2015)
2015	Marriage Act (May 2015)
2015	Gender Recognition Act (Sept 2015)
2016	Second National Strategy on Domestic, Sexual and Gender-based Violence (2016-2021). Second National Action Plan on VAW.
2017	Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act
2017	Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act
2018	The Domestic Violence Act 2018
2018	Referendum on the Thirty-sixth Amendment of the Constitution (Repeal of the Eighth Amendment) (Passed May 2018)
2018	The Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act
2019	Ireland ratifies the *Istanbul Convention* in March 2019.
2020	Review of Protections for Vulnerable Witnesses in the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Offences (Tom O'Malley Report)
2020	Harassment, Harmful Communications and Related Offences Act
2021	Supporting a Victim's Journey – A plan to help victims and vulnerable witnesses in sexual violence cases
2022	Third National Strategy on Domestic, Sexual & Gender-Based Violence (2022-2026). Third National Action Plan on VAW.

*Please Note: This list is not exhaustive but identifies the key policy shifts and changes in the national context referred to throughout this research.

Appendix C - Ni Una Menos Interview Guide sent pre-interview

- What do you think Ni Una Menos' role is, as a social movement in Argentina – specifically in relation to combating violence against women.

- The type of feminism, core values and goals of Ni Una Menos as a movement.

- Your experience of attending and taking part in protests, marches, online campaigns (social media) etc.

- If you were in attendance, your experience and/or recollection of the 'Justice for Micaela / Justicia para Micaela' march(es) in Argentina in April 2017 and/or 8M marches and 3J annual marches.

- The creation of the Ministerio de las Mujeres, Géneros y Diversidad / Ministry for Women, Genders and Diversity and Ley Micaela / Micaela Law.

Appendix D - ROSA Interview Guide sent pre-interview

- ROSA's role as a social movement in Ireland – specifically in relation to combating violence against women.

- The type of feminism, core values and goals of ROSA as a movement.

- The process of organising protests, rallies, online campaigns etc.

- If you were in attendance, your experience or recollection of the I Believe Her - 'Dublin Rally Against Rape Trials Failing Victims' held at the Spire in Dublin on 29th March 2018 and 'We Stand with Her' march on the 31st March 2018.

<u>Consent Form</u>

Please fill out consent form to be included in this study. Your participation and contributions are vital in developing a deeper understanding of how violence against women is framed by social movements.

I...agree to participate in Brogan Gallagher's research study 'A Tale of Two Sisters'.

Please tick each statement below:

The purpose and nature of the study has been explained to me verbally & in writing. I've been able to ask questions, which were answered satisfactorily.
☐

I am participating voluntarily. ☐

I give permission for my interview with Brogan Gallagher to be recorded and transcribed. ☐

I understand that I can withdraw from the study, without repercussions, at any time,

whether that is before it starts or while I am participating. ☐

I understand that I can withdraw permission to use the data right up to the time the

data has been analysed and anonymised (December 2022).
☐

It has been explained to me how my data will be managed and that I may access it on request. ☐

I understand the limits of confidentiality as described in the information sheet. ☐

I understand that my data, in an anonymous format, may be used in further research projects and any subsequent publications if I give permission below:

☐

I agree to quotation/publication of extracts from my interview ☐

I do not agree to quotation/publication of extracts from my interview ☐

I agree for my data to be used for further research projects

☐

I do not agree for my data to be used for further research projects ☐

Signed.. Date...................

Participant Name in block capitals ....

I the undersigned have taken the time to fully explain to the above participant the nature and purpose of this study in a manner that they could understand. I have explained the risks involved as well as the possible benefits. I have invited them to ask questions on any aspect of the study that concerned them.

Signed.. Date...................

Researcher Name in block capitals – BROGAN GALLAGHER

If during your participation in this study you feel the information and guidelines that you were given have been neglected or disregarded in any way, or if you are unhappy about the process, please contact the Secretary of the Maynooth University Ethics Committee at research.ethics@mu.ie or +353 (0)1 708 6019. Please be assured that your concerns will be dealt with in a sensitive manner.

For your information the Data Controller for this research project is Maynooth University, Maynooth, Co. Kildare. Maynooth University Data Protection officer is Ann McKeon in Humanity house, room 17, who can be contacted at ann.mckeon@mu.ie. Maynooth University Data Privacy policies can be found

at https://www.maynoothuniversity.ie/data-protection.

Two copies to be made: 1 for participant, 1 for PI

Appendix F – Information Sheet

<u>Information Sheet</u>

My name is Brogan Gallagher, and I am a doctoral student in the Department of Sociology, Maynooth University. I am undertaking a research study under the supervision of Prof. Honor Fagan and Prof. Linda Connolly. The study is concerned with comparing the framing strategies used by social movements when talking about violence against women (VAW) on specific days during the struggle. This study has been reviewed and received ethical approval from Maynooth University Research Ethics committee. You may have a copy of this approval if you request it.

Interview

For the purposes of your interview, I will be primarily asking about the protest/march on (insert day and year).   You have been asked because you are active in the social movement (Ni Una Menos/Rosa) and your input is vital in understanding how social movements frame VAW and how social movements contribute to social change. The study will involve an interview via Microsoft Teams, that will be recorded and transcribed, with your consent. I will be able to provide you with a link through your email and we will talk for approximately one hour. If you would rather complete the interview via the telephone, this can also be arranged.

You are under no obligation whatsoever to take part in this research, it is entirely up to you whether you would like to take part. However, I hope that you will agree to take part and give me some of your time to complete a one-to-one interview. If you decide to do so, you will be asked to sign a consent form and will be given a copy along with the information sheet, for your own records.   If you decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason and/or to withdraw your information up until such time as the research findings are anonymised and analysed (December 2021).

Data from Interview

The type of data that will be collected from the interview are as follows: the interview will be transcribed and anonymised and analysed by me (Brogan Gallagher), to ascertain the themes relating to VAW on specific days during the struggle, this interview will focus on (insert day and year). At the end of the interview, I will discuss with you how you found the experience. If you feel that the interview has not been carried out as described above, you may contact my Supervisor Honor Fagan <u>honor.fagan@mu.ie.</u>

The information that is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept confidential and anonymised. No names will be identified at any time. All hard copy information will be held in a locked cabinet at the researchers' place of work, electronic information will be encrypted and held securely on MU PC and/or servers and will be accessed only by me (Brogan Gallagher). No information will be distributed to any other unauthorised individual or third party. If you so wish, the data that you provide can also be made available to you at your own discretion.

It must be recognised that, in some circumstances, confidentiality of research data and records may be overridden by courts in the event of litigation or in the course of investigation by lawful authority. In such circumstances the University will take all reasonable steps within law to ensure that confidentiality is maintained to the greatest possible extent.

All the information you provide will be kept at Maynooth University in such a way that it will not be possible to identify you. Data will be collected and collated via Maynooth University password protected and GDPR compliant OneDrive. On completion of the research, the data will be retained on the MU server. After ten years, all data will be destroyed (by the PI). Manual data will be shredded confidentially and electronic data will be reformatted or overwritten by the PI in Maynooth University.

The research findings will be written up and presented as a paper at national and international conferences as well as part of the findings in my PhD. A copy of the research findings will be made available to you upon request. I do not envisage any negative consequences for you taking part but if you have any further queries, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Name: Brogan Gallagher

Ph: (087) 931 0360

Email: brogan.gallagher.2015@mumail.ie

If you agree to take part in the study, please complete and sign the consent form.

Thank you for taking the time to read this.

Appendix G - Profiles of Interviewees

Profiles of Interviewees – Ni Una Menos

Code	Profile
MUNUM01	Activist/Academic Doesn't identify with any particular political party but is left-wing Argentinian
MUNUM02	Activist/Lawyer Identifies as Peronist Argentinian Active in Latin American collective in Dublin
MUNUM03	Activist/works in Environmental Area Identifies as Peronist Argentinian Active in Latin American collective in Dublin
MUNUM04	Activist/Photographer Doesn't identify with any particular political party but is left-wing Argentinian Active in Latin American collective in Dublin
MUNUM05	Activist/Communicator Doesn't identify with any particular political party but is left-wing Uruguayan
MUNUM06	Activist/Teacher/Friend of Micaela Doesn't identify with any particular political party but is left-wing Argentinian

Profiles of Interviewees - ROSA

Code	Profile
MUROSA01/Ruth Coppinger	Ruth Coppinger /Founding Member Former Socialist Party TD I Believe Her Protest Organiser Speaker at I Believe Her Protests
MUROSA02	Activist/Organiser Identifies as a Socialist
MUROSA03	Activist/Key Organiser I Believe Her Protest Organiser Identifies as a Socialist
MUROSA04	Activist/Key Organiser I Believe Her Protest Organiser Identifies as a Socialist
MUROSA05	Activist/Organiser Identifies as a Socialist
MUROSA06	Activist/Key Organiser I Believe Her Protest Organiser Identifies as a Socialist