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“Can Ireland keep us safe?” – a view from the Latin American community. This dissertation, submitted in partial fulfilment of the MA Comparative Criminology and Criminal Justice degree requirements, delves into the Latin American community's perception of policing in Ireland. The significance of this research lies in its potential to provide valuable insights into the security attitudes of a specific community in Ireland, thereby contributing to a more comprehensive understanding of policing in a multicultural society. It also underscores the urgent need for further research on this topic.

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

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## **Abstract**

This study, distinguished by its unique approach of considering the central cultural values, migration reasons, and prior experiences of a particular community in Ireland, aims to fill an existing gap in the perception of risk and the security attitude. By examining these factors, the study promises to shed new light on the complex relationship between cultural values, migration, and perceptions of policing, making it a compelling and intriguing research for the academic community.

Groups of immigrants, including the Latin American community, bring with them a rich tapestry of cultural values and prior experiences that significantly shape their perceptions of policing. As Arisukwu (2012) argues, the experience in the country of residence is as significant as that of those from their hometown, which remains deeply ingrained. Immigrants often view and interpret their present insights using their home countries as a point of reference (Menjívar & Bejarano, 2004), a perspective crucial to understanding their unique and significant perceptions of policing.

In this sense, over the past two decades, most Latin American countries have been struggling to create or reform their police forces while simultaneously confronting intense increases in violent crime. Reformers have gravitated toward community-oriented policing practices, which aim to rely on preventive tactics rather than repressive ones and build close ties between police members and the public. Still, unfortunately, these reforms occurred against a backdrop of rising problems and insecurity (Malone & Dammert, 2021).

As a result, citizens across the region have identified insecurity as a top priority and rank insecurity as the most pressing nationwide issue in some countries. This high level of violence and antisocial behaviour have made it extremely difficult for many nations to abandon repressive policing practices, and the political system came around by reacting against what it was called 'soft on crime', which aftermath could eventually benefit the interests of criminals over the rights of people. What matters most to people in Latin America is the effectiveness of police in achieving goals such as arrest, detention, and forfeiture. Similarly, some argued that the policing paradigm should prioritise increasing control as the principal mechanism to consolidate police legitimacy (Hough, 2013).

Ultimately, this research not only aims to understand the Latin American community's perception of policing in Ireland but also intends to explore the origins and justifications of this position deeply. In doing so, it raises important questions about these people's feelings about Garda's role, their stance concerning firearms, police discretion of search and arrest, deprotection perception, and emotional background.

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## **Introduction**

The Latin American community has historically migrated to the United States of America. However, deteriorating economic conditions throughout the continent, increasingly restrictive US visa requirements and post-9/11 border control policies, favourable visa exemption and dual citizenship policies in southern Europe have helped shift 21st-century flows elsewhere. These flows notably move toward Spain, Portugal, Italy, other European states, Canada, Japan, Australia and Israel.

Despite their significant presence in other parts of the world, Latin Americans are not prominently represented among Ireland's immigrants. No Latin American country emerged among the most critical groups comprising the 'foreign-born stock' in the 2006 Irish Census of Population. Brazilians are the only Latin Americans to appear anywhere in recent Irish population figures. However, their representation could be more robust, with only 0.5 per cent of non-Irish nationals reporting 'Brazilian' in the 2002 Census of Population, and only 1.0 per cent did so in 2006. This underrepresentation of Latin Americans in Ireland is a topic that warrants further exploration, as it highlights the unique experiences and challenges they face in this new cultural context (Marrow et al., 2012).

These factors explain the need for more comprehensive literature addressing the perceptions of the Latin American population regarding Irish government policies. The existing research, while valuable, is mainly based on reception perceptions at the turn of the 21st century and how this has shaped community patterns, as it is unpacked in the study titled *Latin Americans are Kind Cool: Evaluating a National Context of Reception with a transnational lens*, developed by B. Helene Marrow. However, the evolving nature of immigration and cultural diversity in Ireland necessitates a more current and in-depth understanding of these perceptions, making further research a pressing need.



## Literature Review

### The notion of 'Community.'

As a South American who has found a new home in Ireland, my journey has been deeply intertwined with the vibrant Latin American community I became a part of upon my arrival. This personal connection not only underscores the significance of discussing the concept of 'community' within the Latin American context but also invites the audience, who may share similar experiences, to join the discussion. This discussion viewed both ethnographically and analytically, provides a lens through which we can gain a deeper understanding and appreciation of the diverse cultural tapestry of our world and the importance of community in shaping our experiences and identities.

When referring to the 'Latino community' in the USA, Flores (2000: 193) draws on Benedict Anderson's concept of the 'imagined community'. This concept suggests that 'community' is not just a physical entity but also a social construct that exists in the minds of its members. Flores argues that 'community' depends on the viewpoint or position of the group, implying the existence of both a 'Latino community' and a 'community' in the Latino sense of the word. He further emphasises the semantic construction of 'community', wherein 'comunidad' in Spanish comprises 'común' (standard) and 'unidad' (unity). While 'común' denotes shared aspects among cultural groups, 'unidad' signifies the bonding that transcends these commonalities. Flores distinguishes between 'común', representing the community itself, and 'unidad', reflecting the community's self-conception and imagination.

Flores (2000) describes 'unidad' as a sense of bonding, emphasising that individuals are not mere participants but active creators and sustainers of these communities. Their active role in constructing and reconstructing cultural worlds through interactions symbolically articulates and animates communities over time and space. This underscores the importance of each individual's contribution to the community, making them feel empowered and integral to its existence.

The 'Latin American community' is discussed as a 'symbolic construction' with defined boundaries and forms to which people attach personal meanings. Additionally, everyday interactions are crucial in fostering a sense of togetherness within this community.

The Latin American community in Ireland is not just a static entity but a dynamic and evolving one, shaped by many events and groups. This ever-changing landscape of interactions and connections,

which constantly brings new perspectives and experiences, lends vibrancy and depth to the community and makes it a captivating subject of study and analysis.

Individuals from different nationalities participate in events organised by WhatsApp Groups such as 'Uruguay en Irlanda' (Uruguay in Ireland), 'Chilenos en Dublin' (Chileans in Dublin), 'O clube das calçinhas' (Female Brazilian Club), 'Latinos en Irlanda' (Latin in Ireland), among others. These digital platforms have become crucial in fostering a sense of togetherness within the community, especially in a foreign land where physical proximity may not always be possible. This ever-changing landscape of interactions and connections, facilitated by technology, lends vibrancy and depth to the community.

Some individuals engage with the Latin American community in Ireland through formal events, such as the 'Latinfever' party (which takes place every Friday at River Bar in Dublin), the 'ATR' event, which is monthly organised by Argentinian and Uruguayan people (mainly because of the common music and dance they share), the 'Brazilian Party' in Limerick or even the 'La Fiesta del Mate' organised by South American Shop, where people from Uruguay and Argentina meet up in some green environment within Dublin for sharing typical food such empanadas and drink mate (the traditional infusion). Others develop their relationships more personally, no longer related to the community's symbolic markers or the group's shared interests. This variety of engagement methods reflects how individuals connect with the Latin American community in Ireland.

However, what does define the idea of community according to the regional criteria? Following Janina Onuki, Fernando Mouron and Francisco Urdinez, when writing about the Latin American perception of regional identity (2016), for regional integration to advance, two conditions must be met: countries must perceive themselves as belonging to a shared region, and regional leaders must be willing to assume the role of financial contributors (Ikenberry, 1996).

The authors mentioned above explored the intricate interconnections between these issues based on rich data from a survey conducted across seven Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru. This survey, part of The Americas and the World (TAW) initiative, represents a pivotal component of an ongoing research project. Led collaboratively by the esteemed Mexican Centre for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE) and in partnership with selected universities in each country, the survey ensured meticulous representation of each nation's population, adhering strictly to rigorous methodological criteria for sample sizes (Onuki, et. 2016, pp. 434).

‘Region’ is not a static or objective concept but rather a politically contingent—and hence contested—phenomenon (Hurrell, 2007, p. 241). The fluidity of a region's geographical boundaries, which are not inherently clear or natural but arise from ongoing political struggles influenced by key regional actors' perceptions, interests, values, and identities (Spektor, 2010, p. 31), underscores the complexity and dynamism of regional identity.

From a constructivist standpoint, ‘regionalism’ expresses ideas states employ to pursue regional goals (Pietro, 2003, p. 274). This continuous construction process, heavily influenced by social interactions within a dynamic environment (Legro, 2000), underscores the collective influence in shaping regional identity. The factors shaping actors’ interests, motivations, ideas, and identities are not fixed or externally imposed values; instead, they are flexible constructs shaped by multiple agents in response to the actions of others and changing contexts (Hettne & Söderbaum, 2000, p. 460).

The idea of a Latin American region has deep historical roots, dating back to the independence era when some leaders in Spanish America aimed to unite former colonies into a confederation and form a single nation (Ardao, 1980). This rich historical backdrop adds depth and richness to Latin American identity.

Two main factors have shaped a collective identity among Latin American countries: the wars of independence, which fostered a sense of unity among the colonies against central powers and conquerors, and opposition to North America's increasing influence since the early 20th century (Eakin, 2004).

However, the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the 21st century have dramatically altered regional dynamics. In the past three decades, regional trade blocs have emerged, American influence has declined (Saraiva, 2012), and regional power dynamics have shifted (Schenoni, 2012). Consequently, given these changes in traditional dynamics, there is a keen interest in understanding the extent to which modern-day Latin Americans perceive a regional identity or sense of belonging.

To explore this, Janina Onuki, Fernando Mouron, and Francisco Urdinez analysed data from The Americas and the World (TAW) project to examine perceptions of regional identity across the seven countries involved. The dataset includes 10,544 observations, enabling us to determine the percentage of respondents in each country identifying as ‘Latin American’ (Onuki et al., 2016, p. 437).

The research findings reveal that Latin American identity was the most prevalent self-identification among participants in most countries studied. On average, 43% of respondents considered themselves primarily Latin American, ranging from 59% in Colombia to 38% in Chile. While citizens of all Spanish-speaking countries in the survey demonstrated a sense of 'Latin American-ness' to some extent, Brazil presented a notable contrast, with only 4% of respondents identifying this manner (Onuki et al., 2016, p. 439).

Breaking down the Brazilian data further, 79% of respondents identified themselves primarily as 'Brazilian', followed by 'world citizen' (13%), Latin American (4%), and South American (1%). This divergence in self-identification between Brazilians and their Latin American counterparts underscores Bethell's concept of 'Brazilian exceptionalism'. Bethell attributes this divergence to Brazil's unique colonial history, longstanding intellectual rejection of Brazil as a typical Latin American nation, and the historical reluctance of successive Brazilian military governments to assume a regional leadership role (Bethell, 2010, p. 481).

## **The 'Latino' Identity**

"Identity" refers to how individuals and groups understand who they are through their life experiences, social interactions, and how others perceive them. Identities are never unified and, particularly in contemporary times, increasingly fragmented and diverse; they are constructed in multiple ways across various, often conflicting, discourses, practices, and positions. Identities are subject to significant historical changes and are constantly evolving. (Hall 1996: 4, own square brackets).

Therefore, 'identity' is not a static entity but a dynamic and ever-evolving 'product' that can only be comprehended within a specific context and discourse through continuous differentiation. 'Identities are not constructed outside of difference, but through it. They exist only about the Other'. Derrida (1973: 141) refers to this as the 'dynamic difference': 'Différance is the non-full, non-simple, structured and differentiating origin of differences'. Thus, identity is not defined by what it is but by what it is not, 'to precisely what [one] lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside' (Hall 1996: 4-5).

For instance, my self-identification as 'Latin American' is not a standalone label but a result of understanding what it means not to be Latin American. Community is a 'symbolic construction' with boundaries that are 'relational rather than absolute; that is, they define the community concerning other communities' (Cohen, 1985, p. 58).

Rapport and Dawson (1998: 4) highlight 'contemporary identity' as a physical and cognitive search characterised by fluidity and movement across time and space. One can physically cross borders and, through imagination, revisit one's past or future, different places lived in, and other past experiences. Similarly, Braidotti (2011: 34, own square brackets) introduces the idea of the "nomad's identity" by contrasting it with the condition of a migrant who chooses to become a nomad, a subject in transit yet sufficiently anchored to a historical position to accept responsibility and accountability. Therefore, "the nomad represents movable diversity; the nomad's identity is an inventory of traces" (Braidotti, 2011, p. 41). Braidotti, following Cohen, emphasises that globalisation involves the mobilisation of differences and the de-territorialization of social identity, challenging the dominance of nation-states and their claims to exclusive citizenship (Cohen, 1997).

In this context, members of the Latin American community outside their home region perceive themselves through various identities at different times, each deeply personal and unique. Some Latin Americans explicitly used 'identity'; others discussed their sense of self more broadly. These identities, shaped by individual experiences, are not merely labels but deeply ingrained aspects of their being. Many community members discovered their Latin American identities after immigrating and the national identities they held before migrating. The meaning of these identities varies among individuals, reflecting Latin Americans' self-awareness and consciousness as they perceive themselves and others through shared similarities. This involves a collective representation system, Latin American dynamics, and imagined stereotypes. Latin American identity is a 'nomadic identity' that evolves throughout life, representing a personal journey of self-definition (Sokól-Klepcka, 2016, p. 68).

Even though the whole continent is America, when people say "I am American," they typically refer to the United States. Therefore, I could also say, "I am American," but the term has been monopolised and altered by the United States. This is a common occurrence with imperialism. The misrepresentation persists and is particularly impactful because it involves the United States. However, we do not use the terminology 'Americans' when referring to people from the United States [in Spanish: Los Estados Unidos]; we use the term *estadounidense*, which is derived from the name of the country and does not have a direct translation into English (Sokól-Klepcka, 2016, p. 52).




Figure 1: A picture taken from the 'Being Latino' Facebook page differentiates the United States of America and the whole American continent.

Latin America is complex and multifaceted, encompassing diverse people from various countries with unique histories and characteristics. To truly understand any specific situation, it is essential to reconsider and re-contextualize what 'Latin America' and 'Latin American' mean. These are 'emic' categories, requiring a deeper and more nuanced understanding (Sokól-Klepcka, 2016, p. 52).

The 'idea of Latin America' is tied to the colonial power matrix, impacting knowledge and subjectivity. Knowledge pertains to the redrawing of world maps. At the same time, subjectivity refers to the emergence of new identities (Mignolo 2009: 69). In Latin America, "Pan-latinidad" is a concept associated with the 19th-century independence movements and decolonisation, notably advanced by Simón Bolívar at the Congreso Anfictiónico de Panamá in 1826. French intellectual Michel Chevalier further shaped the idea of "Latinidad" in the Spanish Americas (Sokól-Klepcka, 2016, p. 53).

'Latino' is a diminutive of 'latinoamericano,' which means 'Latin American' in Spanish. It refers to individuals from territories in the Americas that were colonised by Latin nations such as Portugal, Spain, and France, whose languages are derived from Latin (Oquendo 1995: 97). Therefore, Brazilians, Mexicans, and Haitians are considered 'latinoamericanos.' However, people from former British colonies like Belize, British Guyana, the Falkland Islands, or Dutch colonies such as Suriname or Tobago are not included in this category.

Another term, 'Hispanic,' likely derives from 'hispanoamericanos' and refers to individuals from Spain's former colonies in the New World. As seen from these definitions, the 'Latino' category, in its strict sense, is more inclusive than the term 'Hispanic,' as it encompasses those from the possessions of Spain, Portugal, and France. The terms mentioned change their meanings in informal use. 'Latino' is sometimes treated as equivalent to 'hispanoamericano' or 'iberoamericano.' In the USA, 'Latino' is primarily used to describe immigrants and residents of Latin American origin. The term 'Latino' holds significance mainly within the context of the U.S. Outside the United States, people refer to specific nationalities, such as Mexicans, Cubans, or Puerto Ricans, rather than using the term 'Latino.' The term 'Latino' emerged from the U.S. experience, reflecting the need to categorise and understand the diverse Latin American population in the country (Suárez-Orozco and Páez 2009: 4).

As observed, the US government generally uses the term "Latino" to refer specifically to individuals from former Spanish colonies. However, some US government organisations, such as the Vermont Agency of Transportation, broaden this definition to include those from former Portuguese colonies and descendants of former Spanish colonies (Oquendo 1995: 97).

For convenience, politicians, the mass media, and others have adopted the umbrella term "Latino" to describe various Spanish-speaking people living in the USA. However, it is essential to recognise that neither "Latino" nor "Hispanic" represent actual nationalities, as Latin America consists of numerous diverse countries (Oquendo, 1995).

These terms are not just for categorisation but also self-identification. For instance, some individuals prefer the term 'Latino' over 'Hispanic' to distance themselves from the brutal history of Spanish colonisation in America (Oquendo, 1995, p. 98) or to reject the 'Hispanic' label imposed by the U.S. government (de Genova and Ramos-Zayas 2003: 6). The term 'Latino' excludes Spanish or Portuguese people. Community members have the power to define their own identity (Oquendo 1995: 98). Therefore, using the term 'Latino' in the USA or 'Latin American' in the UK can be seen as part of a broader process of self-definition and self-assertion (Oquendo 1995: 98). Choosing which term to

identify with invites re-thinking and re-defining what it means to be part of this community (Oquendo, 1995, pp. 97-98).

In Latin America, racial categories are more fluid than in the USA, allowing for negotiation and change (Pozzi 2007: 55). Although skin colour and physical appearance are essential, other social factors like education, social class, employment, and socioeconomic status also play a significant role. When one or more of these social factors change, the perceived race or cultural definition of a person's skin colour and that of their children can also change (Pozzi, 2007, p. 55).

Latin Americans living in Ireland have pointed out that racial and class differences among them tend to diminish in their new environment as immigrants. Living abroad changes their perspective on these differences, making "being Latin American" a unifying concept. For instance, Latin American immigrants in Ireland find common ground in their shared experiences as immigrants from Latin America. They acknowledge the diversity of ethnic groups and ethnic differences within each Latin American country.

Ethnicity is viewed as "a social construction primarily concerned with identifying both differences and similarities" (Wade 2010: 15). It functions as "a means of categorising complex cultural differences and thus determining how individuals are identified and treated" (Wade 2010: 16). While Latin Americans in Ireland recognise national differences among Latin American countries and the diversity of races within Latin America, these distinctions are less crucial in defining 'Latin American-ness' in Ireland.

The 'Latin American identity' among members of the Latin American community in Ireland is not solely defined by race. Instead, it is a multifaceted tapestry woven from collective and individual similarities and differences. What truly unites this identity are the shared experiences and the sense of 'communitas' that arises from them. This unique aspect distinguishes Latin Americans, transcending any official racial categorisation, often seen as external ('etic').

Delving into the intricate question, scholars often ponder the applicability of the Latin American category to over twenty countries, each with significant internal diversity. While some literature shows progress in understanding how such categories relate to participants' self-representation, it is crucial for researchers to critically evaluate the use of this pan-ethnic category in other studies. Data from interviews, focus groups, or desktop research presenting various life narratives



of individuals identifying as Latin Americans, Chilenos, or other group identities are utilised (Dewey, 2022, p. 208).

Erez Cohen's PhD dissertation thoroughly examines the diverse collective dynamics of identification within a Latin American community in the context of Australia's official multicultural discourse. By employing Arjun Appadurai's concept of ethnoscaples, Cohen shifts the interpretation of the Latin community from an ethnically homogeneous entity to what he terms "Latinoscaples"—a revelation of the varied experiences and perspectives within this community. Rather than historicising or describing fixed spaces of representation, Cohen, guided by Bourdieu's logic of practice, seeks to present the practical significance of the 'community' for its members as they navigate, reproduce, and transform their social structure. His notable contribution is mapping these Latinoscaples as contested and contradictory spaces inhabited by groups and individuals with diverse national, political, cultural, and social interests.

Cohen's notion of Latinoscaples challenges broad, pan-national categories like Latino or Latin American, highlighting a consistent analytical approach in the second thematic group of publications that examine Latin American migrants through contrasting categories. Zuleyka Zevallos contends that the idea of a Latin American community often results from internal mechanisms where Latin American migrants, who do not integrate into the Anglo-Australian scene, develop a pan-ethnic Latin identity as a form of resistance to assimilation. Zevallos critically views this identity as an outcome of external exclusion mechanisms that, within the official multicultural discourse, create communities based on stereotypical and romanticised images of Latin Americans, detached from their internal realities and experiences.

The literature critiques the monolithic concept of Latin America, represented under various labels like Latin or Latin American Australian, encompassing all twenty region countries. These categories are derived from data collected through diverse research methods, including oral history interviews, archival research, and autoethnographic approaches. For example, Zevallos discovered a shared sense of belonging to a pan-ethnic Latin identity from data gathered from twenty-five young second-generation women from six Spanish-speaking Latin American backgrounds. This data reveals shared family values, a common perception of the "Latin persona," and the need for these minorities to express their voices and demonstrate solidarity in the Anglo-Australian context.

Based on historical and political similarities observed across national borders, supported by archival research and 15 oral history interviews conducted over five years of fieldwork, Mason argues

that Latin Americans share a collective sense of injustice and emotional engagement. However, some scholars challenge the idea of a unified Latin American category, suggesting that internal diversity and everyday experiences demonstrate how local knowledge is represented in diverse and contested ways. This diversity is not simply seen in contrast to non-Latinos but as multiple intercultural expressions that must neatly fit into predefined cultural groups or national identities.

The process of self and group identification, coupled with the classification of migrants into ethnic groups, paints a complex picture that reveals overlapping paths and conflicting definitions of identity and belonging. National identity labels do not always signify unified collective identities but reflect divisions rooted in class, religion, ethnicity, and regional distinctions. While scholars often focus on specific national identities like Brazilian, Salvadoran, Chilean, or Colombian, their goal is to illustrate how diverse Latin American identities are situated within a social landscape characterised by multiple identity positions—a concept Cohen terms *Latinoscapes*.

Viewing Latin America as a singular category can oversimplify the diversity among Latin American migrants, particularly in diaspora contexts where Latin America frequently serves as a unifying national identity. The literature reflects the tension inherent in this labelling process, presenting a range of perspectives from a pan-ethnic viewpoint to more fragmented and decentralised identities that resist rigid classification (Dewey, 2022, pp. 210-215). This complexity calls for a nuanced understanding of Latin American identity.

## **Migration Trends and Influencing Factors**

The reasons behind immigration are varied and complex. Galeano (2005) points out that while borders are opened for the flow of money and goods, they are often closed to the movement of people. Scholars argue that migration is closely linked to historical, economic, political, social, and cultural processes on a global scale, influenced by different stages in the history of capitalism (e.g., Glick Schiller, 2009, Yépez del Castillo 2014; Wallerstein, 1974).

Rapport (2003) introduces the concept of a 'life project,' where individuals' worldviews and goals drive their actions, allowing them to overcome obstacles through conscious efforts. The history of European and Latin American migration shows how countries can shift from immigration destinations to emigration sources. European colonisation of Latin America began in 1492, and by 1800, around one million Europeans had migrated there, enough to impose their languages, cultures,

and institutions (Bacci, 2012). The first significant wave of European migration to Latin America occurred between 1830 and 1930, driven by demographic changes and European conflicts (Yépez del Castillo 2014).

Between the 1960s and 1980s, many Latin Americans, including highly educated individuals, migrated to Europe, particularly Spain and Portugal, to escape political turmoil and seek better opportunities (Padilla & Peixoto, 2007). Spain and Portugal adjusted their immigration policies to meet labour market demands, benefiting from skilled Latin American migrants during their economic and labour market restructuring in the 1980s (Sokól-Klepcka, 2016, p. 23).

Latin American and Caribbean immigrants in Spain and Portugal have demonstrated remarkable adaptability. Initially filling skilled worker roles, they later transitioned into less-skilled positions in the construction, agriculture, hospitality, and domestic care sectors. The increasing demand for their labour, especially in traditionally feminine roles, is a testament to their resilience and adaptability, particularly in countries with strong historical ties to Latin America, such as Spain, Portugal, and Italy (Sokól-Klepcka, 2016, p. 23).

Since 2000, there has been a significant increase in Latin American migrants to Spain, Italy, and Portugal, driven by historical and cultural factors, such as post-colonial ties and language similarities, along with economic push and pull factors (Khoudour-Casteras, 2005; Alonso, 2008; Peixoto, 2009; Lafleur, 2011; McIlwaine, 2011).

## **Legal and Policy Frameworks**

The “Ibero-American community of nations,” established in 1991, includes Portugal, Spain, and their former colonies in Latin America. This community fosters annual meetings of heads of state and diplomatic links (Padilla & Peixoto, 2007). Portugal has special agreements with Brazil that grant additional political rights to Brazilians in Portugal and vice versa. Spain's significant bilateral labour recruitment programs are primarily with Latin American and Caribbean countries (Padilla & Peixoto, 2007). Latin American citizens have long been exempt from applying for tourist visas to enter Spain and Portugal.

The EU's free movement policy also encourages migration from Latin America, particularly from countries like Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil, whose citizens benefit from more effortless movement within the EU Schengen zone. Policies allowing dual citizenship and citizenship based on ancestry (*jus sanguinis*) have legally enabled many descendants of emigrants to migrate to Europe (Padilla & Peixoto, 2007).

Spain, Portugal, and Italy have become homes to many Latin American and Caribbean dual citizens who can live and work in any EU Member State. Spain's Civil Code allows Latin American nationals to obtain Spanish nationality after two years of continuous legal residence. Italy permits foreign descendants of Italians up to the second generation to apply for Italian citizenship (The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs). For example, Argentine nationals with an Italian grandfather can claim Italian citizenship.

## **Economic and Social Drivers**

Current Latin American and Caribbean immigration to Southern Europe, mainly from South America, is primarily driven by economic factors and the pursuit of better living standards. This migration responds to long-standing push factors such as high unemployment, political instability, and the weakening of social services in Latin American countries (Padilla & Peixoto, 2007). The significant income disparities between Latin America and industrialised nations are vital push factors, highlighting the economic challenges that drive migration.

Migration flows are influenced by economic cycles and short-term economic disparities (Khoudour-Casteras, 2005). Language similarities and a colonial legacy also facilitate migration. Spanish is spoken in most of South and Central America and Mexico; Portuguese is spoken in Brazil, and Caribbean nations have adopted the languages of their former colonisers. These language similarities help Latin American immigrants integrate socially in Spain (Alonso 2008: 37).

## **Neoliberal Globalisation and Migration**

The rapid economic growth of the 1960s began to slow, prompting governments to borrow heavily in the 1970s to sustain growth. This accumulation of foreign debt led to a liquidity crisis and

financial collapse, resulting in the "lost decade" of the 1980s. Structuralist analyses of internal migration lost momentum in this context, and the topic became progressively less popular in Latin American research circles. Ironically, this shift occurred just as regional migration flows were experiencing significant new transformations (Delgado-Wise, 2014, p. 646).

Like the Depression of the 1930s, the debt crisis of the 1980s triggered significant economic, political, social, and cultural transformations across Latin America. These shifts resulted in a radical paradigm change in the region, heralding a new development theory and practice era. Unlike the era of import substitution industrialisation, the neoliberal model aimed to achieve development through international trade and investment, advocating for lower trade barriers, deregulation of economic activities, privatisation of state enterprises, and reduced taxes and government spending. These reforms were intended to stimulate industrialisation through exports to global markets.

To comprehend the nature of neoliberal globalisation, its *modus operandi*, and the changes it introduced to migration dynamics in the region, we must look back to the early 1970s. During this period, large corporations faced declining profitability, stagnant productivity, labour militancy, and radical social movements at the core, alongside Third World nationalism and rebellion at the periphery.

## **Latin American Contributions to Migration Research**

The dominant narrative has been criticised for needing more depth and considering globalisation and migration's historical and political context. It disregards the complex realities migrants face and the socioeconomic costs of migration in sending countries. In collaboration with Global South researchers, Latin American scholars have developed a multidimensional framework to understand the migration-development nexus better. This southern perspective considers economic, political, social, environmental, cultural, racial, ethnic, gender-related, geographical, and demographic factors (Castles, 2008; Castles & Delgado-Wise, 2008; Faist, 2009; Glick-Schiller, 2009).

Latin American research on migration and development diverges from the dominant positions of Anglo-Saxon literature. Instead, leveraging the region's rich tradition of structuralist thought and the dependency theory (Kay, 1989), Latin American scholars strive to decolonise development theories and present alternative perspectives that include the viewpoints of sending countries and the experiences of migrants and their families. Unfortunately, these discussions have not reached beyond

regional confines, hindered by language barriers, the limited distribution of publications in Spanish and Portuguese, and the cultural dominance in academic and political spheres (Delgado-Wise, 2014, p. 644).

Unlike the narrow focus on migration and remittances that have dominated the literature since the 1990s, this review offers a comprehensive, multidimensional, and historically informed approach to migration and development in the region. It underscores significant Latin American theoretical contributions that examine the intricate relationship between various forms of human mobility and social changes in an area still characterised by development/underdevelopment and centre/periphery dynamics. This occurs against cultural dominance in academic and political arenas (Delgado-Wise, 2014, p. 645).

This perspective questioned the prevailing international trade regime, arguing that it was characterised by an unequal exchange relationship that hindered rather than promoted local development. The import substitution industrialisation era saw rapid urbanisation and geographically uneven economic growth, particularly relevant to the analysis of internal migration in Latin America, which primarily moved from rural to urban areas (Rodriguez & Busso, 2009).

## **High-Skilled Migration**

The migration of highly skilled workers from Latin America to OECD countries, especially the United States, has risen significantly. This shift is now viewed more as 'brain or talent circulation,' a concept that emphasises the positive impact of skilled workers' migration on both the destination and origin countries, rather than 'brain drain,' which suggests a loss of talent from the origin country. The belief is that disseminating knowledge benefits everyone and fosters development in the migrants' home countries regardless of their current location or employment (Meyer, 2011). This trend not only benefits destination countries but also promises to aid origin countries through remittances, knowledge transfer, and the potential return of skilled migrants, painting an optimistic picture of the impact of migration.

Historically, Latin America has transitioned from a region of immigration to one of significant emigration, with notable intra-regional movements and emigration to developed countries, particularly the US. European countries have introduced programs to attract skilled human resources from

industrialised and developing countries. Japan and other nations have also implemented selective immigration policies to attract highly skilled migrants.

Despite the challenges, Latin American migrants have shown remarkable resilience. The 1980s “debt crisis” caused a decline in per capita GDP for many countries, worsening living standards for the middle-income sectors and increasing poverty rates. Migration flows to Venezuela and Argentina, previously major destinations, stagnated, while flows to the US and other developed countries grew (Pellegrino, 2000a). In the late twentieth century, Latin America saw consistent negative migratory balances, with emigration to the US and other developed countries becoming dominant. This new migration phase could significantly impact Latin America's economy, society, and culture.

According to neo-classical theory, migrants aim to situate themselves where economic returns on their educational qualifications are highest. However, the link between migration propensity and the status of professionals and technicians in their home country's salary scales needs to be more conclusive. The common causes of emigration (wages, work conditions, social prestige) must be considered alongside the phenomenon's complexity and each country's unique historical context (Pellegrino, 2001, p. 119).

## **The Role of Political Ideology in Migration**

Political ideology plays a significant role in migration. Research in sociology and social psychology consistently shows that people tend to migrate to communities where they feel a stronger sense of belonging over time. Racial or ethnic backgrounds, lifestyles, and religious beliefs are well-known determinants of migration (see Dixon and Durrheim, 2003; McPherson et al., 2001; Rentfrow et al., 2008). However, the role of political ideology in migration is a relatively unexplored area that can provide a unique perspective on the factors influencing migration decisions.

Antonio Saravia and Andrés Marroquín researched to assess whether a difference or mismatch between individual political ideology and predominant political views in society significantly determines the intention to migrate to Latin American countries. The authors use data from the 2018 Latinobarómetro Survey and conduct logit regressions using intention to relocate as the dependent variable and political ideology mismatch as the independent variable. Just as ethnic, lifestyle and

religious differences drive migration, political ideology mismatches might also play a crucial role (Antonio et al., 2022, p. 98).

Although the data collected by the abovementioned authors did not reveal the destinations chosen by potential Latin American migrants, they wondered if political ideology mismatch is a significant push factor when controlling for other common migration determinants in the region. Traditionally, economic factors and violence have explained migration in Latin America. However, surveys show that differences in political ideology are increasingly causing social tension (Antonio et al., 2022, p. 98). To investigate this, a variable from their dataset was used to indicate the political ideology (right, left, or centre) of the most prominent governing political party based on the number of legislative seats. They analyse data from this variable and additional control variables to assess the impact of political ideology mismatch on migration intentions.

Antonio Saravia and Andrés Marroquín's research revealed that political ideology mismatch significantly influences migration intentions. After accounting for various demographic, economic, and social variables, the study found that individuals with right-leaning views are considerably more likely to express an intention to migrate when these views differ from predominant societal opinions. In contrast, left-leaning individuals or those whose views align with predominant societal opinions are not significantly more likely to express an intention to migrate.

Right-leaning Latin Americans have several attractive destinations that match their ideology, such as the US and various European countries, which generally score higher than most Latin American countries on economic freedom indices. While their primary goal was to control for other variables in our regression analysis, it is noteworthy that being younger, not being Indigenous, not being Catholic, having more years of education, worrying about job loss, not owning a home, having a negative view of the economy, fearing violence, having travelled abroad, and not favouring domestic production are all factors robustly correlated with migration intentions (Antonio et al., 2022, p. 103).

## **Myths and Reality**

Migration research often perpetuates myths, portraying migration as a free and voluntary act while ignoring structural conditions and migrants' significant contributions. This distorted view fails to acknowledge the socioeconomic burdens placed on origin countries and the true impact of migration beyond remittances (Puentes et al., 2010).



It is essential to develop critical indicators to demystify migration. These indicators, such as labour force contributions, wage discrimination, tax contributions, and social reproduction costs, reveal the unequal exchange and South-North subsidy inherent in migration dynamics. By understanding these factors, we can gain a more comprehensive understanding of the true impact of migration, enlightening us about its complexities and implications.

## **Latin American Migration towards the North**

Various factors, including social, economic, and political conditions in sending and potential destination countries, influence people's migration from Latin America to Canada. Canada, known for its favourable migration policies, attracts migrants seeking safety and economic opportunities due to violence and insecurity in their countries of origin.

The widespread economic and socio-political crises in Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s set the stage for increased emigration from the region. Despite facing economic downturns, political repression, and violence, Latin Americans displayed remarkable resilience, seeking refuge in countries like Canada, Europe, and Australia, even though they were not formally welcomed in the United States. Their resilience in the face of adversity is truly inspiring and a testament to their determination and strength.

The migration system benefits Canada and countries at the periphery, albeit to varying degrees. Canada, being closely linked to the United States, gains advantages from its proximity and strong ties, serving as a secondary destination for Latin American migrants. This is mainly due to Canada's inclusive migration policies, which have significantly contributed to its role in the migration system, offering a promising future for Latin American migrants.

Canada's unique position, balancing dependency on the United States with some policy independence, is a fascinating aspect of its role in the migration system. While aligning with significant American geopolitical policies, Canada has developed distinct social policies, particularly in immigration and asylum, due to its rising income levels and historical traditions. Canada's acceptance of immigrants and refugees surpasses that of the United States per capita.

In response to crises and violence at home, Latin Americans increasingly seek opportunities in the United States, with Canada emerging as a secondary destination, especially for those facing challenges accessing the United States. Other migration flows to Canada, including family

reunification and skilled professionals seeking better prospects, also contribute to its evolving and increasingly significant role in the hemispheric migration system. These changes underscore the growing importance of Canada in the global migration landscape.

Key points defining international population flows in the Americas include the United States as the primary destination, significant flows between contiguous nations, and the emergence of the migration bridge from Latin America to Canada under exceptional circumstances. While the United States remains the top destination for inter-American migrants, there has been a shift in recent years with Central American migrants seeking refuge in neighbouring countries due to violence. However, the United States remains their primary destination.

Country of origin	Emigrants in other countries (thousands)	Principal destination	Secondary destination
Mexico	2,218	USA (98%)	—
Colombia	673	Ven (75%)	USA (21%)
Chile	304	Arg (68%)	USA (12%)
Paraguay	283	Arg (98%)	Braz (6%)
Brazil	214	Para (46%)	Arg (19%)
Argentina	210	USA (33%)	Para (21%)
Bolivia	156	Arg (74%)	USA (9%)
Uruguay	155	Arg (70%)	Braz (13%)
El Salvador	125	USA (76%)	Guat (14%)
Ecuador	114	USA (75%)	Ven (19%)
Peru	100	USA (55%)	Ven (21%)
Nicaragua	98	C.R. (47%)	—
Panama	68	USA (88%)	C.R. (7%)
Guatemala	68	USA (96%)	—
Honduras	47	USA (82%)	Guat (11%)
Venezuela	39	USA (85%)	Arg (4%)
Costa Rica	36	USA (81%)	Pan (9%)

SOURCE: CELADE, 'Investigación de la migración internacional en Latinoamérica,' *Boletín Demográfico* 19, no 37 adjusted with data from the 1981 census of Canada (Statistics Canada, 1981 Census of Canada, place of birth, citizenship, period of immigration, Ottawa 1984).

Table 1: Emigrants from Latin American countries registered in other American countries.

Latin Americans have migrated to Canada in considerable numbers, particularly when accessing the United States became complicated or problematic. For instance, after the Pinochet coup in Chile in 1973, more Chilean emigrants chose the United States as their preferred destination. However, due to various factors such as the American government's lack of receptivity and Chilean refugees' resentment towards the US for its involvement in the economic collapse of the Allende government, as well as allegations of CIA involvement in the coup planning, many refugees sought asylum in other countries like Canada, where there was organised sympathy for their situation. This highlights the complex role of the United States in the global migration landscape.

Similarly, a more minor but noteworthy stream of migrants from Argentina to Canada has exhibited unexpected continuity and recent resurgence. Argentineans, a resilient community, migrated to Canada in significant numbers during periods of domestic violence, repression, and economic crisis, such as after the military takeover in 1976. While the flow of migrants from Argentina to Canada

decreased in subsequent years, it experienced a resurgence during economic hardship, such as in 1990. Although there are positive signs for a lasting return to peace and democracy in Central America, the situation remains uncertain. While the war in Nicaragua has ended and a democratic government is in place, unresolved social and political conflicts may lead to renewed violence.

In the United States, scholars and political analysts often debate the concept of a "Latino public opinion" or a "Latino constituency" despite the substantial internal diversity of this group (Leal, 2008). Similarly, Latin Americans in Canada—a smaller, less prominent, and newer community compared to U.S. Latinos—also lack homogeneity, showcasing the rich diversity within the Latin American diaspora. They have immigrated in various "waves" over several decades (Landolt & Goldring, 2009). The United States boasts a substantial body of literature that explores the complex and multifaceted issue of Latino identity. The debate over whether “Latino” should be considered a “race” or an “ethnicity” within North America and the defining features of this identity is contentious (Armony, 2012, p. 15).




Figure 2: Spaces of Latino-ness in the Americas Source: Canadian Ethnic Studies/Études ethniques au Canada

First, there are multiple, and sometimes competing, loci of attachment. Latino immigrants, when choosing between identifying with the United States or their country of origin, often show that “their American identity is not their first preference [but] this does not translate into a desire to return” (Fraga et al., 2010, pp. 133-134). Attachment to the country of origin does not seem to interfere with integration into the host society: “Maintaining a sense of national-origin identity does not impede the acquisition of and attachment to a pan-ethnic identification” (García, 2012, p. 207).

Dual nationality among Latin American immigrants in the United States “might indeed foster both political and economic assimilation in the receiving country, rather than impeding it or raising issues of divided loyalty” (Mazzolari, 2011, p. 147).

These findings indicate that being Latino often means retaining a foreign nationality (both legally and emotionally) while simultaneously integrating into the United States as a member of a pan-ethnic minority, thus becoming “Latino” rather than “Latin American.” However, some studies reveal strong incentives to assimilate or appear assimilated by shedding the Latino identity: “More than 2 million persons of self-acknowledged Spanish or Latin American ancestry answer ‘No’ when asked if they are themselves ‘Spanish/Hispanic/Latino’” (Emeka & Agius Vallejo, 2011, p. 1549).

Since the 1990s, and more notably in subsequent decades, most Latin American immigrants have entered Canada under the "economic category," with 70 per cent doing so in 2012. This indicates that most of these immigrants have been granted permanent residency based on their potential "employability" as "skilled workers," a status determined by their education level, work experience in eligible occupations, and proficiency in official languages, among other factors (Armony, 2012, p. 29).

Nonetheless, their understanding of "Latino-ness" is likely influenced by their nationality, socioeconomic and ethnic background, self-perception as middle class in their home countries, and their legal and symbolic status as permanent residents chosen through a merit-based point system. Additionally, the model of integration in the host society plays a significant role (Armony, 2012, p. 30).

## **Latin American Migration to Southern Europe**

Challenges in receiving immigrants are noticeable in Western and Northern Europe and are likely more severe in Southern Europe. Significant immigration to Southern Europe began only in the last two decades of the previous century, quickly altering the demographic profile of these countries. This period coincided with economic restructuring, affecting how immigrants were incorporated. Countries like Spain, Portugal, and Italy, previously emigration zones, now consider themselves immigrant-receiving societies and face complex challenges compared to their northern counterparts (Peixoto, 2009, p.76).

In recent decades, immigrants across Europe, including Southern Europe, have demonstrated remarkable resilience by primarily entering the lowest segments of the labour market. They take on

low-paid, precarious jobs with low social status, showcasing their determination and adaptability. The need for a cheap, flexible labour force has exacerbated immigrants' vulnerability, contributing to irregular immigration. As Calavita (2004: 369) notes, the same traits that make Third World immigrants attractive to specific sectors—their invisibility, marginality, and vulnerability—also make it challenging to regulate their employment or legalise them. This structural weakness is particularly intense in Southern Europe due to its long-standing informal economy and rapid immigration surge.

Latin American and Caribbean immigrants bring a rich diversity to many European contexts, with foreigners and foreign-born citizens from Latin American countries found across the continent. However, these movements' timing, conditions, strategies, legal statuses, and volume vary considerably. Disregarding colonial and postcolonial movements involving Western countries such as the UK, France, and the Netherlands, recent economic migration predominantly links Latin American immigrants to Southern Europe, especially Spain, Portugal, and Italy.

Various factors drive this migration, including economic push and pull mechanisms, political influences, and historical colonial ties. These historical ties, deeply rooted in shared cultural, religious, and linguistic similarities, significantly facilitate migration. Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian emigrants in Latin America also create potential migration flows. Some immigrants use family ties to settle or strategically gain EU access and citizenship. A shared Catholic tradition also aids recruitment, especially in Italy.

These factors contribute to a more favourable social reception for Latin American immigrants. Policy initiatives have also favoured immigration from Latin America. Southern Europe's diplomatic links, such as Spain and Portugal's commitment to an Iberian-American community of nations and the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, have led to policies benefiting these immigrants. Thus, multiple reasons explain why Latin Americans migrate to Latin Europe: economic disparities, historical links, cultural, religious, and linguistic affinities, family ties, and diplomatic channels. These factors account for the strong inflows to Southern Europe compared to other European destinations and suggest a more favourable reception for LAC immigrants, potentially reinforcing the flows (Peixoto, 2009, p.78).

Over the last decade, Spain has garnered particular interest among Southern European countries due to the significant scale of immigration and the notable shift towards Latin America as the principal source of recent immigration. According to Pellegrino (2004:20), "Spain is particularly relevant in that, in recent years, it has become the main destination of Latin American emigration to Europe." This

migration trend, sometimes referred to as the “Latin-Americanization” of migration (Izquierdo et al., 2002), has reached massive proportions in a short period, sparking renewed interest in this flow (Izquierdo et al., 2002; Martínez-Buján, 2003; Pellegrino, 2004; Pérez-Caramés, 2004; Sanabria, 2008).

Although the Latin American population in Spain has grown significantly in recent years, its origins date back to the 1970s and 1980s. Initially, the most distinguishable migration flows were from Argentina, which in 1991 represented almost one-third of the Latin American population in Spain, followed by Venezuela (12.8 per cent). These immigrants were mainly political exiles, well-off retired citizens, professionals, and descendants of overseas emigrants. By the mid-1990s, the relative presence of the Argentine population had diminished. At the same time, the numbers from Peru and the Dominican Republic had grown significantly due to political and economic instability in those countries (Hierro, 2013, p.70).

**FIRST AND CURRENT OCCUPATIONS OF LATIN AMERICAN IMMIGRANT WORKERS**

	Current occupation	First occupation	Difference
Agriculture	29,867	64,463	-34,596
Manufacturing	100,349	80,273	20,076
Construction	160,650	142,509	18,141
Trade	127,185	97,991	29,194
Accommodation and food services	138,352	132,203	6,149
Transportation	59,117	32,897	26,220
Business, building and other support services	103,334	87,219	16,115
Educational services	18,583	16,601	1,982
Health care and social assistance	49,053	38,254	10,799
Other social services and personal services	40,959	39,254	1,705
Domestic service	129,533	230,803	-101,270
Other services	14,449	8,963	5,486

Table 2: Data refer to Latin American immigrant workers who landed in Spain before 2004—source: National Survey on Immigration 2007 (INE).

By 2006, Spain experienced a new wave of immigration from Bolivia, which by 2007 represented the fourth largest non-EU immigrant group. This recent wave of Latin American migration is notable not only for its magnitude but also for its critical role in transforming Spain into a significant immigration destination globally (Hierro, 2013, p.71).

The labour market participation of Latin American immigrants in Spain has shifted over time from predominantly white-collar workers, especially among Argentines, to more widespread participation in the service and construction sectors. This shift demonstrates the impressive adaptability and resilience of these immigrants, who, despite high educational levels, are willing to start in less-skilled occupations as a stepping stone to better jobs (Hierro, 2013, p.71).

LATIN AMERICAN POPULATION IN SPAIN: MORE REPRESENTATIVE ORIGINS (%)

	1991	1996	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Argentina	32.3	18.3	16.4	15.2	12.3	7.7	7.8	10.4	10.6	10.6	10.0	9.0
Venezuela	12.8	8.5	7.6	7.3	6.4	3.9	3.0	2.8	3.1	3.4	3.4	3.3
Cuba	5.3	8.3	8.8	9.3	9.4	5.8	4.4	3.7	3.2	3.1	3.0	2.9
Mexico	5.0	3.6	3.5	3.3	2.9	1.8	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.3
Peru and the Dominican Republic	4.7	13.2	30.9	30.9	27.6	15.6	11.3	9.6	9.4	9.8	10.5	10.8
Brazil	4.3	5.5	5.7	6.0	5.9	4.0	3.2	3.0	3.0	3.7	4.8	5.7
Ecuador and Colombia	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	11.9	14.8	24.1	53.4	61.7	60.6	58.5	53.2	48.4	43.9
Bolivia	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.6	1.9	2.7	4.2	6.8	9.3	12.8
Uruguay, Paraguay and Chile	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	9.8	8.9	7.4	4.6	4.1	4.5	5.3	6.5	7.6	8.5

Table 3: Source: Census (1991) and Register Office (1996, 1998–2007)

Several factors have influenced the recent waves of Latin American immigration to Spain. The economic expansion in Spain during the late 1990s, coupled with political instability, financial crises, and growing poverty in many Latin American countries, created conditions conducive to increased migration, particularly from Ecuador and Colombia. Additionally, migratory networks shared linguistic and cultural backgrounds, and colonial ties have made Spain an attractive destination for Latin American migrants. The United States' tightening of immigration controls post-September 11 also redirected many Latin American migrants to Spain (Hierro, 2013, p.75).

Overall, the mass immigration of Latin Americans to Spain has significantly impacted the country's demographic and labour landscape, highlighting the dynamic and evolving nature of migration patterns and their socio-economic implications (Hierro, 2013, p.76).

## Latin American Migration to the United Kingdom

The historical context of Latin American migration to the UK is significant despite the absence of direct colonial ties between the UK and Latin America. The city of London has served as a hub for numerous Latin American independence leaders and has hosted diplomats, business people, writers, artists, and politicians since the 19th century (McIlwaine, 2011; Miller, 1998). British companies also provided loans to newly independent Latin American nations, aiding their state-building projects (Miller, 1998).

The large-scale migration of Latin Americans to the UK began in the 1960s and 70s due to military repression, mainly from Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. This was primarily due to 'Operation Condor,' a covert intelligence and operations system established in 1975, which coordinated the persecution of political opponents across borders with the support of the United States

during the Cold War (McSherry, 2002). The regimes targeted dissidents, union leaders, intellectuals, and students, leading many to seek asylum in the UK, which was perceived as a haven with protected human rights (McIlwaine, 2007).

Colombians began arriving in the UK between 1974 and 1979 to work in low-skilled jobs through the work permit system. This trend continued into the 1980s and 90s, driven by armed conflict and the desire to join family members in the UK (Bermudez Torres, 2008). Later, Ecuadorians and Peruvians also arrived, primarily as economic migrants and asylum seekers, with more Brazilians and Bolivians arriving post-2000 (Bermudez Torres, 2008; Carlisle, 2006; Sveinsson, 2007; James, 2005).

Many Latin Americans arrive in the UK through various legal channels, including skilled worker visas, student visas, and family visas. Some enter with EEA or Swiss passports, bypassing more restrictive immigration requirements. Asylum seekers and refugees, mainly from Venezuela, continue to come due to ongoing political instability in their home countries (Sokól-Klepcka, 2016, p. 36).

In Edinburgh, the Latin American community is diverse and includes individuals with Spanish, Italian, or Portuguese passports, often complicating their recognition in official statistics (McIlwaine, 2011). The community comprises first-generation migrants who arrived as adults and their descendants. Many are well-educated but initially take up lower-status jobs due to language barriers or unrecognised qualifications. Over time, some have improved their English and gained UK qualifications, enabling them to secure better employment. Others, particularly in the oil industry, found jobs matching their current qualifications (Sokól-Klepcka, 2016, p. 37).

The small size of the Latin American community in Edinburgh enhances its visibility and the appeal of a broader Latin American identity, especially for individuals from less-represented countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, or Paraguay. This identity offers to belong in a multicultural but dispersed urban setting (Sokól-Klepcka, 2016, p. 33).

Regarding the concept that a person's beliefs may significantly influence international migration towards the UK. Wang (2005) is among the few researchers who have delved into this topic, examining the link between Chinese academics' ideological allegiance and their migration decisions. For example, some researchers have touched on the importance of ideological motives in Brazilian migration. Margolis (2013: 18) asserts that motivations for migration often extend beyond economic gain. She highlights cultural reasons for Brazilian emigration, connecting it to the "widespread



ideology that all that is modern is located abroad in the United States and Western Europe." For many Brazilians, emigration is the only way to achieve a consumerist lifestyle (Robins, 2019, p. 158).

Beserra (2003) explores this concept of ideological migration in her study of Brazilian migration to London, making two significant contributions. First, she examines the ideological motivations behind migration, linking these to the influence of American ideology on Brazilian society. Beserra argues that "migration is a clear outcome of economic and cultural disorders produced by capitalism" (210). Second, drawing on Bourdieu's (1987) idea that "capital" extends beyond the economic, she advocates for considering other types of capital—cultural, informational, social, and symbolic—in understanding migration. She emphasises that acquiring these forms of capital is often the goal, with economic capital serving as a means (Robins, 2019, p. 158).

Beserra notes that while economic reasons have primarily driven Brazilian emigration, these should not be simplistically understood as just "making money" and "improving life." She asserts that these economic motivations are rooted in a specific ideology that must be understood to grasp the immigration process from the immigrants' perspective. She argues that UK and capitalist ideologies are identical, suggesting that "Brazilian immigration to the United Kingdom should be understood in terms of how American imperialist ideology has penetrated Brazilian society." (Robins, 2019, p. 159).

## **Latin American Migration to Ireland**

As immigrants from outside the European Economic Area (EEA), Latin Americans have faced increasingly stringent Irish government policies that prioritise and select for high skills (Quinn, 2009: 2). These management and selection policies were implemented to address the growing influx of low-skilled workers, effectively closing the Irish work permit program to non-EEA unskilled labourers (Allen, 2007; Garner, 2004, pp. 52-60; Ruhs, 2005).

The intensification of these measures began with the Employment Permits Act of 2003. It continued with the Employment Permits Act of 2006, which further reduced the number of work permits issued to non-EEA nationals while increasing the entry of skilled non-EEA nationals through an expanded employment permit ('green card') system and as temporary intracompany/transnational transferees (Allen, 2007; Hughes et al., 2007; Quinn, 2009). By 2009, with additional tightening of the work permit system (Quinn, 2009), a 'crude form of geography,' as Allen (2007: 96) describes it, emerged, with Irish immigration and employment policies increasingly favouring higher-skilled non-

EEA nationals while excluding their lower-skilled counterparts.

In 2013, Helen B. Marrow gathered data through semi-structured, in-depth interviews with a non-representative sample of 40 Latin Americans in Ireland. These participants varied in nationality, socioeconomic and immigration status, and ancestry. Uniquely, they were recruited using a targeted snowball sampling method in January and February 2006. Conducting a representative survey was impractical due to the small number of Latin Americans in Ireland and the need for more comprehensive quantitative and qualitative data to establish a sampling frame (refer to Holder and Lanao, 2001; Leal, 2004 for two small case studies).

A small sample of Latin Americans in Ireland reported experiencing a neutral to positive reception. While respondents did perceive some discrimination and racialisation as "non-EU immigrants" in both Irish government policies and social interactions, they also felt "advantaged" by the neutral to positive stereotypes about Latin Americans in Ireland. Their relatively low population numbers and positively selected skills profile also contributed to this perception. These paradoxical outcomes result from increasingly strict Irish government policies that, in essence, "racialise" all non-EU immigrants (Marrow, 2013, p. 646).

The Latin American community in Ireland is diverse and culturally rich. As Galvin (2000) and Healy (2006 b) noted, Ireland hosts a small number of Brazilian, Chilean, Cuban, and Central American refugees. Irish work permit data shows South Americans are the most prominent group after Brazilians, excluding Mexicans. However, their numbers are still significantly smaller than other immigrant and refugee groups.

Among the respondents, seven Argentines had entered Ireland more recently than the Brazilians, generally after the 2001 Argentine financial crisis (Jachimowicz, 2003; Marrow, 2007). As middle-class professionals, all held university degrees, and their immigration statuses varied: some had work permits. In contrast, others gained EU citizenship through marriage to an Irish citizen or having a European citizen ancestor. The nine Colombian and 15 other Latin American respondents arrived more recently, generally between 2000 and 2006. They also had high levels of education, a trait they frequently contrasted with Latin Americans in the USA or Spain. A Mexican respondent highlighted the diversity within the Mexican community in Ireland, noting that "most of them are people who have education, come here to learn English, and are the middle class or wealthy class from Mexico, so their education is different from the Mexicans who are in the USA" (Marrow, 2013, p. 652).

Marrow's research data reveals that Latin Americans in Ireland form a small, recently established migrant population. The majority, including two respondents with over eight years of residence, are in the process of applying for five-year Irish residency permits. Many Latin Americans demonstrate relative privilege regarding education, occupational skills, and immigration status (Marrow, 2013, p. 653).

While some respondents came to Ireland as tourists, students, or dependents, and others had overstayed tourist visas, work permits, or work authorisations/visas and were working precariously in what some Ecuadorians called 'the other side of Irish life,' most had legal permission to live and work in Ireland. They were young and well-educated, from upper-working—to upper-middle-class backgrounds, and exhibited economic rather than political motivations for migrating, desiring upward mobility rather than economic survival (Marrow, 2013, p. 653).

The data also indicates that Latin Americans are integrated across various sectors of the Irish labour market. Regardless of industry or occupation, most work in diverse environments alongside Irish nationals and immigrants from different countries (Marrow, 2013, p. 653).

The structure of Irish immigration and employment policies described earlier created dual structural disadvantages for Latin Americans by being, first, immigrants rather than Irish natives, and second, non-EU rather than EU nationals. Consequently, respondents described their experiences integrating into the Irish labour market as similar to those of all immigrants, noting difficulties in overcoming language barriers, foreign credentialing hurdles, a lack of Irish work experience, a willingness to work temporarily for less money abroad than at home, a lack of the 'right' Irish social connections, and discrimination—including preferences by Irish employers to 'hire Irish,' to 'hire Irish' for managerial positions and to pay non-Irish less than Irish workers in the same jobs (Barrett & Duffy, 2008; McGinnity et al., 2009).

However, many described additional difficulties common to all non-EU immigrants; in Cuban respondent Elsa's words, getting a job is 'harder for everyone if they do not come from the EU.' Various studies have documented that this amplified respondents' powerlessness in Irish workplaces and could even lead to irregularization. In these ways, respondents perceived some discrimination and racialisation in Irish immigration and employment policies. Nevertheless, they expressed them as a function of being non-EU nationals, not Latin Americans in particular. Given that racialisation refers to the social processes that create and maintain systematic, unequal life chances between hierarchically ordered populations—including descent-based categories that majority groups often invest with

ideological content (e.g., stereotypes) to explain the inferiority of minority groups and to justify their disparate treatment and outcomes (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; Garner, 2004; Winant, 2000)—such perceptions of a stark 'EU/non-EU' dividing line in life chances in Ireland are telling.

Despite these structural disadvantages, respondents also reported that the requirements for non-EU nationals to enter and work in Ireland are stringent enough to have selected most Latin Americans for solid educational, occupational, and English language skills, which provides them with advantages over many other immigrant, refugee, and racial groups in Ireland, as well as over Latin Americans in the USA, Spain, and (for Brazilians) Portugal. Respondents argued that two positive consequences of their selection are improved chances to obtain good jobs within the mainstream Irish labour market and, combined with their low population numbers, enhanced opportunities to contact and develop congenial relationships with Irish natives. They noted that Latin Americans are often seen in a positive light compared to other immigrant groups due to their higher skill profiles and lower numbers.

Respondents also noted more significant tightening in border control and interior enforcement policies toward Latin American immigrants in the USA and Spain than in Ireland (Marrow, 2013, p. 660). The 40 Latin American respondents also perceived similar patterns of discrimination and racialisation in terms of their social reception as non-EU immigrants. However, most felt 'advantaged' by neutral to positive Irish stereotypes about Latin Americans. They believed these stereotypes gave them an edge over many other immigrants, refugees, and racial groups deemed 'less desirable' in Ireland, such as Travellers, Roma, Nigerians, refugees and asylum-seekers, Chinese, and Eastern Europeans (Amnesty International, 2001; Hughes et al., 2007; McGréil, 1996; McVeigh & Lentin, 2002; O'Connell & Winston, 2006). They also felt more positively perceived in Ireland than in the USA, Spain, and Portugal.

Even among those who perceived Irish government policies as disadvantaging Latin Americans as non-EU immigrants, there was a unique perspective. They noted that Irish natives often recognise cultural commonalities or draw parallels between Irish and Latin American struggles against (neo)colonial domination (Marrow, 2013, p. 656). This distinct viewpoint suggests that, despite sharing a non-EU experience of racialisation in some aspects, many Latin Americans in Ireland perceived a separate and milder form of racialisation in everyday Irish life compared to other groups, such as Nigerians, who have also fought against English (neo)colonial domination (Marrow, 2013, p. 656).

Likewise, interview data suggest that Latin Americans (especially among respondents from

Chile and the Andean countries) perceived a weaker form of racialisation in Ireland compared to the USA, Spain, and (for Brazilians) Portugal (Marrow, 2013, p. 657). Migrants' racial and ethnic identities in any given host country depend, in part, on how they are received and thus become critical measures of that country's 'context of reception' (Portes & Rumbaut, 2006). Members of my sample identified themselves primarily using national origin identifiers or some form of 'Latin' (Latin et al., or Latino) and less so 'Hispanic.' Moreover, in Ireland, they explained that such pan-ethnic terms do not carry the same racialised stigma that Hispanics and Latinos do in the USA, nor that Latinos and Sudaca do in Spain. In this way, their identifications signalled neutral to positive incorporation into Irish society, not early development of what Portes and Rumbaut called 'reactive ethnicity' (Marrow, 2013, p. 658).

Identification as Latinos in Ireland implied a neutral association with Spaniards or other southern Europeans versus a more derogatory association with low-class racial minorities in the USA or racialised ex-colonial subjects in Spain. Whereas Argentine respondent Erika reported that 'when a person from the USA says the word Hispanic, it is to discriminate,' Peruvian respondent Carolina clarified that, for the Irish, they 'mean you speak Spanish' (Marrow, 2013, p. 659).

On the one hand, these Latin Americans, as non-EU immigrants, faced substantial barriers to entering Ireland and to obtaining and maintaining employment after arrival. Despite these structural disadvantages, they persevered in their searches for employment and mobility, often earning less than similarly qualified Irish and EU nationals and finding themselves at the bottom of the Irish socio-legal hierarchy, where regularisation is a constant threat.

Nevertheless, paradoxically, Irish policies were also selected for their high skills and kept their numbers low, two things respondents regarded as advantageous in Ireland. This is particularly noteworthy when compared to the USA, Spain, and Portugal, where Latin Americans are more straightforward targets of those countries' increasingly restrictive policies and also rank lower down the social hierarchies. In short, respondents argued that strict Irish government policies—which certainly racialise all non-EU nationals in their effort to bar poor and third-world 'outsiders' from entry (Garner, 2004)—also select for high skills. Combined with neutral to positive stereotypes about Latin Americans circulating in Ireland, such selection lessened the sense of racial discrimination respondents felt.

Even those who self-identified or were identified as 'black' noted a positive reception once their Latin American origin became known. The use of pan-ethnic identifications such as Latino elicited little, if any, of the racialised stigma found in the USA or Spain. It should be noted that these findings

are based on a small and non-representative sample of Latin Americans in one new immigrant destination country. They provide a balanced view of the positive reception Latin Americans experience in Ireland, which is a stark contrast to the racialised stigma found in other countries. These conclusions also hint at potential future changes as racialisation constantly evolves (Garner, 2004). Racial distinctions can harden, decline, and sometimes even disappear over time (Alba & Nee, 2003).

In other words, even though Portes and Rumbaut's (2006) 'context of reception' approach was not originally built with a transnational dimension in mind, creating one is highly constructive. In the present study, we cannot fully understand the Irish 'context of reception' toward Latin American migrants solely using a domestic lens internal to that society. Instead, we must also consider flows of information and judgments about other receiving country contexts as they manifest directly among Latin American migrants who have lived in several different countries before coming to Ireland and also as they travel indirectly between Latin American migrants and friends and family members who are still located across a variety of national settings. Such flows of information, moving through transnational social fields, are an external factor that shapes these respondents' relative evaluations of the national Irish context of reception (Marrow, 2013, p. 661).

The results of these novel intersections may appear paradoxical. On one hand, most respondents in Ireland were acutely aware of how Latin American-origin people are treated and categorised in the USA, Spain, and Portugal. Many of them reacted at length to the racialised terms developed in those countries that they sadly admit have now entered the Irish lexicon, albeit with different associations and less stigmatised meanings. Such linkages confirm that existing Latino Studies scholarship will continue to provide a basis for understanding how Latin Americans' experiences in new destination countries might differ from, yet remain fundamentally connected to, those of Latino groups in the USA and the ex-colonial centres of Spain and Portugal (Marrow, 2013, p. 662).

## **Brazilian Population in Ireland**

The presence of Brazilians in Ireland can be traced back to an industry-specific program of direct labour recruitment. During the Brazilian meatpacking crisis 1999, several slaughterhouses closed, leaving many workers unemployed and frustrated (Chaves, 2004; Leal, 2004). 2006, Dublin's Brazilian population grew significantly (Murray, 2006). These Brazilians typically came from higher socioeconomic backgrounds and various regions and states in Brazil. They were more evenly

distributed by gender and were often temporary students, visitors, or employed in service or administrative jobs (Marrow, 2013, p. 650).

Despite this class bifurcation (Leal, 2004), Brazilians were arguably the most organised Latin American-origin group in Ireland in 2006 due to their large numbers and industry-specific patterns of geographic concentration, particularly in meatpacking and increasingly in housecleaning. Community leaders estimated their total number to be around 8,000 to 10,000. Brazilians comprised 25 to 30 per cent of the total population in the town of Gort (Healy, 2006a) and 70 per cent of the total foreign national population in Roscommon (Leal, 2004).

The 2016 census reveals a significant increase in the Brazilian population in Ireland, with 15,796 Brazilians now calling Ireland home. This marks the Brazilian community as the second fastest-growing group in absolute terms, with a staggering increase of 6,498 since 2011. Many Brazilians in Ireland hold dual nationality and may be registered as Europeans, underscoring the growing diversity and multiculturalism in the country.

Many younger Brazilians have moved to Ireland due to a thriving Irish drive to attract English language students. The excellent standard and value of language schools in Ireland are a significant draw, and the fact that registered students are allowed to work 20 hours a week further enhances the appeal.

This population increase and the patterns of movement illustrate several significant trends in the Brazilian community in Ireland:

**Educational Migration:** Younger Brazilians are particularly drawn to Ireland for educational opportunities, especially for learning English. The ability to work part-time while studying makes Ireland an attractive destination for students seeking to improve their language skills and gain international work experience simultaneously.

**Dual Nationality and European Registration:** Many Brazilians in Ireland possess dual nationality, often through European ancestry or marriage to European citizens. This dual nationality allows them greater ease of movement and work within the EU, which is a significant advantage given the stricter immigration policies for non-EU nationals.

**Integration into the Labor Market:** Students' option to work 20 hours a week while studying allows Brazilians to support themselves financially and integrate into the local labour market. This

work experience can be a stepping stone to more permanent employment opportunities and facilitate deeper integration into Irish society.

**Cultural Diversity and Multiculturalism:** Ireland's growing Brazilian population contributes to its cultural diversity. This influx brings various cultural influences, enriching the country's multicultural fabric. With the addition of the Brazilian community, festivals, food, music, and other cultural exchanges become more vibrant and diverse.

**Economic and Social Impact:** The presence of a sizable Brazilian community can have positive economic impacts, such as filling labour shortages in specific sectors and contributing to the local economy through spending on education, housing, and other living expenses. Socially, the interaction between Brazilians and the local population can foster greater cultural understanding and social cohesion.

Overall, the increase in the Brazilian population in Ireland reflects broader trends in global migration where education, work opportunities, and dual nationality play crucial roles in shaping migration patterns. This demographic shift also highlights Ireland's attractiveness as a destination for young, educated migrants seeking to enhance their language skills and gain international experience.

However, not everything has been peaceful and stable for Brazilians in Ireland. In March 2019, Brazilians organised protests in Dublin in response to a series of abuse and attacks on city streets. They reported an increase in verbal and physical abuse, particularly from large groups of teenagers in certain city centre areas. These teenagers target Deliveroo riders, who are often alone, visible, working late at night, and carrying cash. It is worth noting that hundreds of Brazilians work as Deliveroo riders (Deirdre, The Irish Time, 2019).

This situation highlights several critical issues:

**Safety Concerns:** The rise in attacks and abuse has raised significant safety concerns among the Brazilian community in Ireland. The targeted violence against Deliveroo riders, a role heavily occupied by Brazilians, underscores the vulnerabilities faced by immigrants in precarious job positions.

**Community Response:** The protests orchestrated by the Brazilian community in Dublin are a powerful demonstration of their solidarity and determination to combat violence and discrimination. This collective action not only brings attention to the plight of immigrant workers but also inspires and garners support from the local community and authorities to address their safety concerns.



**Vulnerability of Gig Economy Workers:** Despite their challenges, Deliveroo riders, who often work late hours and handle cash transactions, demonstrate remarkable resilience. Their determination to overcome these obstacles reflects broader issues within the gig economy, where workers frequently face precarious working conditions and lack adequate protection.

**Social Integration Challenges:** The increase in abuse incidents indicates underlying social integration challenges. While many Brazilians contribute positively to Irish society, these attacks reveal tensions and difficulties in the full acceptance and integration of immigrant communities.




Figure 3: Screenshot of Risk based on Dublin Google Map created by Brazilian users for Deliveroo riders called 'Areas de Risco' (Portuguese translation for 'Risk Areas')

## A Violent Democracy: Criminality in Latin America

In much of Latin America, the criminal justice system's inefficiency in prosecuting organised crime and severe delinquency has a significant impact on the population. The investigative capacity of the police and security forces is minimal, and only a tiny percentage of criminal cases reach the courts. Additionally, state security agencies have historically been responsible for human rights violations and excessive use of force, predominantly affecting marginalised social classes, which constitute the majority of the population (Iturralde, 2010, p. 309).

Over the past thirty years, there has been a shift as most Latin American states have embraced democracy and free markets. However, this transition has been challenging, as the region remains the most unequal globally, with half of its population living in poverty without access to healthcare, education, social welfare, and the labour market. Meanwhile, power groups controlling the political and economic spheres have primarily benefited from recent transformations. The adoption of the neoliberal model, which prioritises free market principles and limited government intervention, has significantly widened the gap between the wealthy and the underprivileged, exacerbating socio-economic disparities and creating a sense of empathy towards the needy.

Understanding the configuration of Latin American punishment institutions and their shortcomings requires a historical account of the formation of Latin American nation-states after independence from Spain and Portugal in the eighteenth century and their struggle to cope with the modern Western project. This complex and ongoing process includes the ambitious economic, political, and legal reforms enacted over the last three decades to leave behind a violent past characterised by authoritarian regimes and keep pace with globalisation (Iturralde, 2010, p. 312).

Country	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Argentina	4.3	4.1	4.5	4.7	4.7	5.2	5.8	6.9	7.5	7.3	5.8	N.A.
Brasil	20.2	22.7	23.4	24.0	24.5	24.7	25.7	26.8	27.4	27.7	25.9	25.2
Chile	2.9	3.3	3.0	2.6	2.8	3.0	5.2	5.5	5.4	5.3	5.4	N.A.
Colombia	77.4	64.4	67.0	60.1	64.2	66.0	72.2	74.3	77.3	61.3	52.6	43.8
Ecuador	11.4	13.4	13.0	12.3	15.1	14.8	16.6	15.6	15.9	13.5	17.5	18.0
El Salvador	N.A.	45.5	44.7	38.0	44.2	38.3	35.8	35.1	30.8	32.3	39.6	48.8
México	17.3	16.8	15.4	14.1	14.0	12.4	10.7	10.0	9.7	9.6	8.8	9.3
Nicaragua	5.7	N.A.	6.3	6.2	5.5	6.5	6.8	7.3	6.8	9.4	10.0	10.4
Panamá	N.A.	N.A.	7.8	10.7	8.9	8.6	9.9	7.3	6.8	9.4	10.0	10.4
Paraguay	9.7	10.5	12.0	10.0	10.3	9.8	12.0	11.9	11.2	12.0	12.3	N.A.
Uruguay	4.5	4.7	4.4	4.8	5.8	5.8	5.4	5.6	N.A.	N.A.	4.5	N.A.
Venezuela	15.9	N.A.	15.2	12.8	12.4	17.4	27.1	27.5	30.9	35.8	29.5	30.1

Table 4: Murder rate by region and continent per 100,000 population. Source: Julio Jacobo Waiselfisz, *Mapa de la violencia: los jóvenes de América Latina* (2008).

Latin American legal fields mirror the hierarchical and discriminatory practices that have traditionally marked social relations. This trend persists despite political and legal changes over the last three decades. The end of military dictatorships in the 1980s and the broad reforms of the 1990s did not result in a substantial consolidation of the rule of law. The gap between the law and its actual practice remains significant, as evidenced by high levels of impunity. This underscores the urgent need for further reforms (Iturralde, 2010, p. 313).

Authoritarianism refers to the persistent use of state force through legal and extra-legal mechanisms. Latin American states have often addressed their weaknesses by continuously using force through military dictatorships or systematic emergency mechanisms, such as the state of emergency in Colombia. The constitution of their legal fields has been significantly influenced by sociocultural factors stemming from colonial times and the routes to modernity, underscoring the depth of historical roots (Iturralde, 2010, p. 315).

Modernity was a partial and often painful experience for Latin American countries, marked by conquest, genocide, and widespread violence during the colonial and independence periods. The transitional period from colonial rule to independence in the early nineteenth century is crucial to understanding the legal fields and the ambivalent attitude of citizens toward state law. The 'criollo' elite, who led the independence movement, adopted and transformed Enlightenment and revolutionary ideas, blending them with conservative Spanish and Portuguese traditions. This combination resulted in adopting liberal economic ideals while maintaining most colonial legal structures to ensure political stability (Iturralde, 2010, p. 316).

International assistance to judicial reform often promotes donors' and elites' interests rather than those of justice system users and providers. This trend is evident in labour, commercial, and criminal laws, with the United States and other global North countries imposing policies on Latin American countries that often weaken the rule of law and increase violence. The region continues to experience high levels of violence, with countries like Venezuela, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Jamaica among those with the highest murder rates (Iturralde, 2010, p. 319).

Penal institutions in Latin America have primarily punished petty crimes committed by the poor and marginalised, while crimes by state agents and elites often go unaddressed. Leftist governments have struggled to differentiate their criminal policies from their right-wing predecessors, partly due to a lack of original ideas and fear of appearing soft on crime or confronting powerful state security forces (Iturralde, 2010, p. 320).

The tendency to adopt authoritarian measures in response to global economic instability has weakened Latin American democracies, with essential decisions often made unilaterally by the executive branch. The global demand for safety has focused on crime control, promoting conservatism and the rise of the New Right, which combines free market economics with solid state control over social instability (Iturralde, 2010, p. 321).

Country	1992–1993	1995–1996	1998–1999	2001–2002	2004–2005	2007–2008
Argentina	63 (21,016)	75 (25,852)	100 (35,808)	109 (41,007)	140 (52,472)	154 (60,621)
Bolivia	N.A.	71 (5,412)	86 (6,867)	110 (9,145)	79 (7,310)	82 (7,682)
Brasil	74 (114,377)	92 (148,760)	102 (170,602)	133 (233,859)	183 (336,358)	220 (422,590)
Chile	155 (20,989)	155 (22,023)	181 (26,871)	225 (34,717)	238 (38,064)	276 (45,843)
Colombia	100 (33,491)	107 (37,428)	127 (51,693)	126 (54,034)	152 (68,545)	150 (69,979)
Ecuador	74 (7,998)	84 (9,646)	78 (9,439)	61 (7,859)	86 (11,358)	126 (17,065)
México	98 (85,712)	102 (93,574)	133 (128,902)	164 (165,687)	183 (193,889)	193 (212,841)
Nicaragua	85 (3,375)	103 (4,586)	134 (6,535)	N.A.	N.A.	107 (6,060)
Panamá	178 (4,428)	249 (6,607)	300 (8,290)	333 (9,643)	353 (11,292)	295 (10,036)
Paraguay	N.A.	60 (2,972)	75 (4,088)	N.A.	86 (5,063)	95 (5,889)
Perú	71 (15,718)	90 (20,899)	106 (26,059)	105 (26,968)	115 (31,311)	141 (39,684)
Uruguay	97 (3,037)	100 (3,192)	121 (3,927)	N.A.	N.A.	193 (6,947)
Venezuela	111 (23,200)	102 (22,791)	97 (22,914)	77 (19,368)	74 (19,853)	79 (22,000)

Table 5: Prison population rate per 100.000 inhabitants in Latin American countries. Source: International Centre for Prison Studies (World et al., 2007).

Neoliberal reforms have yet to improve the situation as promised, with poverty and inequality persisting despite economic growth. The lack of social security nets in Latin America has made the transition to modernity more traumatic, with collective social and economic rights remaining unfulfilled political aspirations. The neoliberal model has also influenced penal systems, prioritising severe punishment to maintain order and support free markets (Iturralde, 2010, p. 331).

## Policing Approach in Latin America

Three main factors shape the police reform initiatives in Latin America. The first factor is the democratisation process that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s across many countries in the region. This process highlighted the clash between democratic and human rights norms and the actions of Latin American police forces. The second factor is the significant increase in crime across nearly all Latin American countries, which has made crime a pressing issue for public authorities. Public opinion polls reflect a widespread desire to reform police forces seen as inefficient or corrupt. The third factor is the broader context of state reform that has recently been prevalent in Latin America and globally

(Frühling, 2007, p.126).

A factor driving the initiatives to reform the police in Latin America is the increase in crime that has affected nearly the entire region in recent years. According to the Pan American Health Organization, in 1998, Colombia had a homicide rate of 54 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, Venezuela 20 (which rose to 33 in 2000), Ecuador 15.1, Brazil 26, and Mexico 15.7 ([www.paho.org/English/HCP/HCN/VIO/violence-graphs.htm](http://www.paho.org/English/HCP/HCN/VIO/violence-graphs.htm)). Additionally, certain cities in these countries have significantly higher homicide rates than the national average. For example, Cali, Colombia, has a rate of 94 per 100,000 inhabitants, and Caracas, Venezuela, has a rate of 71 per 100,000 inhabitants. Even in countries with lower homicide rates, other crimes have shown increased victimisation rates. For instance, Chile has a high robbery victimization rate, according to the Urban Victimization Survey 2003 ([www.seguridadciudadana.gov.cl](http://www.seguridadciudadana.gov.cl)).

This rise in crime has led to a parallel increase in distrust of the police and widespread insecurity. In Argentina, Dammert and Malone argue that mistrust of the police significantly contributes to the prevalent feelings of insecurity within the community (Dammert & Malone, 2002, p. 285). As crime levels have increased, there has been a public debate on the need for better-trained and more accountable police forces and changes in law enforcement strategies. One perspective emphasises the need to expand the police forces' functions and powers of control, while another advocates for generating channels of citizen participation to encourage law enforcement accountability to the community. The progressive implementation of community policing programs aligns with the principles of the state reform process in Latin America (Frühling, 2007, p. 128).

The North American community policing model, which has become a focal point in the recent debate on policing, incorporates several vital elements. It emphasises preventive policing that focuses on neighbourhoods and fosters a close relationship with the community, including consulting with citizens to ensure their perspectives are considered (Sherman, 1995, pp. 327–348).

Additionally, it focuses on resolving specific security issues affecting community members and crime prevention rather than merely responding to calls for help. This model addresses citizens' subjective fears by revising law enforcement priorities and recognising that the community plays a central role in solving neighbourhood problems regardless of how they are defined. Finally, it acknowledges that police forces must decentralise to effectively implement this strategy (Rosenbaum, 1998, p. 7).

In contrast, the processes of police reform underway in Latin America display considerable variety. Some initiatives seek closer involvement with the community but are not termed 'community

policing' as the institutions involved do not accept this model's premises. On the other end of the spectrum are community-based programs that aim to transform law enforcement entirely. Police agencies with higher levels of professionalisation are more likely to shift to community policing. However, while law enforcement institutions in Latin America will undergo significant change, resistance to this transformation will be much more excellent than in more developed countries. The North American model emphasises the role and responsibility of the police officer on the street, enabling officers to acquire skills and abilities through training. However, in Latin America, the police force as an institution is very resistant to change. This resistance is compounded by the lack of quality training, poor pay, low motivation, and severe management problems police officers face (Frühling, 2007, p. 134).

Community policing programs in Latin America face severe internal and external challenges. The impact of these programs must be measured in terms of their ability to reduce fear of crime and levels of victimisation and their ability to produce significant changes within the police itself. The programs struggle with resource limitations, fear of radical institutional transformation among police leadership, and the characteristics of the dominant police subculture. Community policing requires enough officers to manage relations with neighbours, patrol the area on foot, and hold regular community meetings. Often, there are not enough personnel to carry out these initiatives effectively.

A further obstacle is the reluctance of lower-ranking officers to identify with community policing programs and their need for appropriate training for problem-solving. In Belo Horizonte, for example, senior officers are well-prepared for community policing, but street-level officers need more understanding of the program. Evaluations showed significant differences in knowledge about community policing between senior and subordinate officers, particularly regarding the role of Community Councils (Beato, 2004).

The difficulties facing community policing programs partly stem from deficiencies in their implementation processes. Not all programs are preceded by careful planning to maximise impact and usefulness. Implementing these programs requires a well-designed, adequately funded plan targeting strategic areas with independent, ongoing evaluation.

## **The Ideological Impact of 'Zero Tolerance' Paradigm**

The fear of crime has significantly influenced the layout of Latin American cities. In regions with stark economic disparities, the upper-middle classes have created gated communities or "cities of walls" (Caldeira, 2001) to exclude the "other." Middle-class homes are often surrounded by gates and

concrete walls topped with jagged glass or barbed wire. Inside these barriers, guard dogs roam, ready to confront potential intruders. Private security guards patrol neighbourhood streets, blowing whistles hourly to reassure homeowners of their vigilance, even at night. Outside these secure enclaves, some residents have resorted to using armoured and bulletproof vehicles to protect themselves from perceived threats such as attacks, robberies, and kidnappings (James, 2011). These extreme measures reflect societies burdened by high crime rates and a perceived lack of state protection.

Given the high levels of fear, it is no surprise that politicians seek quick fixes for urban crime. Many have looked to the so-called “New York miracle” for answers. Under the leadership of “Supercop” Chief William Bratton and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, named Time Person of the Year in 2001, New York City saw significant crime reductions in the 1990s. This decline was attributed mainly to zero-tolerance policing strategies. Bratton and Giuliani have since become iconic figures, seen as conquerors of crime in one of America’s most infamously violent cities. Their success is especially resonant internationally, given New York’s portrayal in numerous mob, ghetto, and gangster movies. The tabloids suggest that if Bratton and Giuliani could conquer New York City, they could conquer any city. (Swanson, 2013, p. 973).

The logic behind Giuliani and Bratton’s zero-tolerance policing strategies is often viewed as “common sense.” Inspired by James Wilson and George Kelling’s broken windows theory, New York-style policing operates on the belief that minor offences like graffiti, abandoned cars, broken windows, and other “untended behaviours” can lead to a “breakdown of community controls” (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). The authors of the broken windows theory assert that a citizen's fear of ill-smelling drunks, rowdy teenagers, or aggressive beggars is not just about disliking such behaviours but is also a correct generalisation that serious street crime thrives in areas where disorderly behaviour is unchecked. They argue that rigorously policing minor offences can alleviate community fear and prevent more serious crimes, stating, “The unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first broken window.” (Swanson, 2013, p. 974).

It can be argued that a significant part of the issue lies in Latin American politicians and police chiefs adopting zero-tolerance policing as a quick fix without implementing the necessary reforms. For example, Mayor Jaime Nebot of Guayaquil hired William Bratton as a crime consultant in Ecuador in 2002. Although Bratton recommended comprehensive changes to the city's anti-crime strategies, the reforms were minimal, likely due to a lack of funds, political will, or both. Like Copacabana, Guayaquil increased high-tech surveillance, boosted the number of police officers in key tourist areas, and cleared the streets and plazas of street children, vendors, transvestites, and others deemed in

violation of loosely defined municipal codes of “proper moral conduct and decorum.” Numerous reports of police violence and abuse emerged as the city’s most marginalised residents were forcibly removed from public spaces (Swanson, 2013, p. 977).

New York City’s zero-tolerance policies cannot be directly transferred or replicated to suit the different realities of Latin America. Poverty, inequality, and social exclusion in places like Guayaquil and Copacabana are experienced on a scale that is markedly different from the United States. Furthermore, local police forces lack the resources and training to implement American models effectively. Even if Latin American police forces were to adopt Bratton’s extensive reforms, the region’s deep-rooted race and class divides mean that these punitive policies would continue to target marginalised and racialised groups. When policies are transferred across different contexts, they inevitably mutate, adapt, and evolve to fit local conditions. In Latin America, zero-tolerance policies tend to become significantly more punitive (Swanson, 2013, p. 978).

Despite evidence of zero tolerance’s failure in Mexico City, Giuliani continues to be hired as a crime and security consultant in Latin America. For example, at the end of 2009, Giuliani Partners secured a contract with the municipality of Rio de Janeiro to assist with preparations for the FIFA 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. In anticipation of these global events, Rio has developed two strategies to address crime: the Pacification Police Units (UPP) and the Choque de Ordem, or Shock of Order operation (Swanson, 2013, p. 978).

Scholars have demonstrated that the logic behind Wilson and Kelling’s broken windows theory is flawed and lacks empirical support. Even James Wilson, one of the theory’s co-authors, acknowledged that it was based more on assumptions than data (Harcourt & Ludwig, 2005). Some researchers have tried to test the broken windows theory empirically. After analysing comparative data from New York and five other cities, Harcourt and Ludwig concluded that there is “no empirical evidence to support the view that shifting police towards minor disorder offences would improve the efficiency of police spending and reduce violent crime” (Harcourt & Ludwig, 2005, p. 33).

Bowling’s research (1999) showed that “aggressive enforcement is neither necessary nor sufficient to produce reductions in crime” and suggested that Wilson and Kelling’s theory is essentially a “euphemism for ‘fixing’ ‘disreputable’ people through the use of aggressive policing” (547–548). A 2008 paper in *Science* used six field experiments in the Netherlands to test the broken windows theory. While the authors found that minor disorders (such as graffiti and litter) can lead to further low-level disorders (like littering and petty theft), their results do not justify the punitive policing of beggars,



street vendors, and other informal workers (Keizer et al., 2008). Instead, punishing those perceived as disorderly tends only to affect low-income individuals.

Given the academic research and practical evidence demonstrating the flawed logic and ineffectiveness of broken windows theory and zero tolerance policing in addressing severe crime, why do Latin American politicians continue to adopt these policies? According to Manning (2001), the public performance of policing helps maintain the appearance, or myth, of control, thereby boosting public confidence in crime control efforts. Wacquant (2003, 198) suggests that such policies are popular because they are “ideally suited to dramatising publicly their newfound commitment to slay the monster of urban crime,” and they align with negative stereotypes that portray the poor as the primary source of street deviance and violence. Cleansing the streets of beggars, street children, and street vendors fits into common assumptions about marginality, crime, and violence.

This phenomenon may also be an example of agnotology, or the cultural production of ignorance, as Tom Slater (2012) describes regarding British politicians. Do Latin American politicians ignore clear evidence to pursue their goals and dramatise their tough-on-crime approaches? They may overlook Giuliani’s failures in securing New York and Mexico City because his strong personality resonates with their constituents. For instance, a Peruvian presidential candidate hiring Giuliani to bolster her campaign indicates that many still view him as a crime and safety expert despite evidence to the contrary (Swanson, 2013, p. 980).

The rise of zero tolerance as a powerful policy narrative in Latin America may also be due to its simplicity and symbolic value, appealing to “common sense” logic and prevalent fears. It is also highly adaptable, allowing politicians to interpret and implement it as they see fit (Newburn & Jones, 2007, p. 234). Like other transnational policy flows, zero tolerance has gained symbolic strength from its perceived origins in New York City, despite Bratton’s claims that it was never “practised, engaged in, supported or endorsed” there. The term “zero tolerance” has become a potent political catchphrase, convincing politicians and their constituents that it is the solution to urban crime. Through its transnationalization, politicians in Latin America have transformed zero tolerance into a more punitive strategy that often exceeds America’s “get tough on crime” approaches (Dammert & Malone, 2006).

Pervasive fear in Latin America has significantly influenced the region, prompting politicians to adopt zero-tolerance policing and *mano dura* policies. These strategies are perceived as straightforward, flexible, and common-sense solutions to crime control. Despite substantial evidence demonstrating the flaws in zero-tolerance logic, it retains symbolic power in the region. However, in

Latin America, zero tolerance has morphed into a much harsher measure than initially intended. Deep social and racial inequalities, high levels of police violence, and underfunded police forces lead to an overly punitive approach that further marginalises low-income individuals, particularly young people of Indigenous and Afro-Latino descent (Swanson, 2013, p. 983).

In Latin America, zero-tolerance functions more as a social and racial cleansing strategy than an effective crime control method. To adopt a less punitive approach, Latin American cities should prioritise poverty alleviation and community collaboration for lasting change. Bogotá, Colombia, offers a potential model. The city has tackled high crime rates without criminalising poverty or minor offences. Instead, Bogotá has reduced crime through police reform, increased social services, and community policing initiatives, striving to create a safer, more egalitarian city (Swanson, 2013, p. 983).

## **Legitimacy of the Police and Public Trust in Latin America**

The relationship between citizens and the police is a central topic in social analyses, as the police represent both the moral authority and legitimacy of the state (Tyler, 1990). Studies have shown that positive perceptions of the police influence citizens' sense of obligation to obey the law, attachment to democratic institutions (Tyler et al., 2015; Karakus et al., 2011), willingness to cooperate with the police (Skogan, 2006), and development of informal social control (Triplett et al., 2005). Confidence, trust, and satisfaction with the police are three key concepts often used to describe this relationship. Confidence and trust involve a general feeling of security based on rational or perceived risk (Cao, 2015, p. 241), while satisfaction with the police is a personal feeling based on individual experiences (Cao et al., 2012; Karakus et al., 2011).

Understanding satisfaction with the police is essential for developing public policies favouring community policing over zero tolerance and "iron fist" strategies, which are common in many Latin American countries (Frühling, 2012; Malone & Dammert, 2021). Satisfaction with the police also provides insights into citizens' expectations of their authorities, especially those with the power to use force. Given the high levels of violence, organised crime, and street protests in Latin America, satisfaction with the police is a crucial element in evaluating the quality and potential of democratic processes in the region (Dammert et al., 2021, p. 127).

Recognising the significance of citizen-police interactions is crucial for discussing the most effective police organisational structures for crime control and prevention while respecting human

rights. The current police structures in Latin America are typically highly centralised and hierarchical, focusing more on crime control than prevention, and often need more practical training and de-escalation techniques (Dammert et al., 2021, p. 127).

Concerning the factors that determine the trust in police, Dammert (2013, p. 128) highlights that researchers in Latin America have traditionally focused on addressing citizens' insecurity problems, emphasising crime control effectiveness, stronger legal punishments, consolidated police functions, increased police budgets and personnel, and new technologies. However, factors unrelated to traditional measures of police effectiveness are increasingly recognised as important (Karakus et al., 2011; Lai & Zhao, 2016).

Community disorder, a potent predictor of police dissatisfaction, significantly impacts residents' perceptions of the police. The high levels of disorder, violence, and insecurity in neighbourhoods often lead to lower satisfaction with the police, with residents attributing these issues to the police's perceived inability to manage or prevent them (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Jackson & Bradford, 2019). This underscores the pressing need for effective policing strategies to address community disorder urgently.

In 2021, Mary Fran T. Malone and Lucia Dammert published research on the relationship between policing practices and social trust in Latin America. Their work underscores the crucial role of community policing strategies in fostering trust between the public and the police. In the 1990s and 2000s, many Latin American countries adopted community-oriented policing practices to improve relationships between police officers and the communities they served. These reforms aimed to reduce the reliance on repressive measures inherited from authoritarian regimes and to establish new or reformed civilian police forces (Malone et, 221, p. 418).

However, these efforts coincided with rising public insecurity. Over the past two decades, insecurity has become a top concern for citizens across the region, often leading to a preference for “iron fist” crackdowns over reform efforts. The negative impact of public insecurity on reform efforts underscores the urgency of addressing this issue. Reformers have frequently been criticised as being “soft on crime,” which has sometimes led to the abandonment or dilution of community-oriented policing initiatives. This is unfortunate, as crime-fighting effectiveness and community trust are crucial (Lum & Nagin, 2017).

Traditional performance indicators, such as the number of arrests and drug seizures, remain the norm, while prevention strategies are underemphasised. As a result, community policing often becomes a secondary strategy, limited to specific units focusing on community engagement activities (Dammert, 2019). Historically, the primary complaint against police in Latin America was human rights abuses, and corruption charges have persisted under both authoritarian and democratic regimes. Reformers have turned to community policing to transform repressive and corrupt forces into ones that serve citizens' security needs, respect civil liberties, and reject corrupt practices (Malone et, 221, p. 422).

Public trust in the police is significantly shaped by how citizens perceive police treatment of themselves and their communities. This underscores the human aspect of policing, suggesting that confidence in the police depends on individual and community experiences with police officers, not just institutional effectiveness. When police treat community members fairly, people are more likely to support and defer to legal authorities (Tyler & Huo, 2002).




Figure 4: Latin American Homicide Rate per 100,000 (2016 estimate). Source: LAPOP's 2016 – 2017 AmericasBarometer

However, in regions facing severe security crises, like many parts of Latin America, the effectiveness of policing also matters significantly. Policymakers argue that by reducing violent crime rates, police will be seen as legitimate, prioritising control to establish police legitimacy (Hough et al., 2013). While theoretically, effective crime prevention and respect for rights can coexist, resource constraints in Latin America often prioritise immediate results over rights. Nonetheless, respecting citizens' rights can reinforce commitments to community-oriented policing, suggesting that both

effectiveness and fairness are crucial for building public trust. It remains essential to understand the roles of these factors in shaping public trust in the police (Malone et, 2021, p. 423).

The authors also include measures of police effectiveness to assess how public trust in the police depends on concrete results. In Latin America, police performance is often judged by their ability to combat crime, given the widespread concern over insecurity. Their analysis includes questions on victimisation, fear of crime, and expected police response time to a burglary to measure effectiveness. They aim to determine whether respondents' experiences with crime translate into varying levels of support for the police and whether high crime rates negatively impact perceptions of police performance (Malone et, 2021, p. 426).




Figure 5: Trust in National Police in Latin America (average). Source: LAPOP’s 2016 – 2017 AmericasBarometer

Nicaragua illustrates the challenge of stability. For community-oriented reforms to be sustainable, they must endure sudden political changes, such as shifts in the governing party. Nicaragua was long considered a policing success story for its integration of community-based practices and avoidance of militarized approaches, helping it steer clear of the high levels of violent crime and police abuse seen in its Northern Triangle neighbours despite its history of inequality and political violence.

Chile highlights the challenge of transparency. Community policing requires transparency and accountability to build community trust and institutional legitimacy. Before 2019, the Chilean Carabineros were highly regarded for their community initiatives. However, their militarised, bureaucratic, and autonomous nature could have improved their ability to promote transparency and accountability.

The third challenge is ownership of reforms. In Latin America, community-oriented reforms were viewed as solutions to corruption, inefficiency, abuse, high crime rates, and public fear of crime. Multinational institutions and donor agencies emphasised the importance of community-oriented policing and supported preventive police work. However, if domestic reformers are not committed, it is easy to abandon these strategies when international attention shifts. Sustainable commitment at the institutional level is essential for community policing initiatives to improve relationships with the community (Malone et, 2021, p. 431).

## **Methodology**

### **Introduction**

This research aims to explore the literature and uncover Latin Americans' security attitudes towards public safety and policing perceptions in Ireland, with a particular emphasis on Dublin. Existing literature primarily focuses on the identity of the Latin American community, their reasons for migrating from their continent, and the crime-related situations that have influenced their experiences and views on policing and crime control. While analysing this literature could provide qualitative insights into the origins and roots explaining their perceptions of crime, fear, and policing in general, there needs to be more data on Latin American people's majority stance and feelings once they settle in Ireland. This is beyond the scope of studies examining the impact of social and migration policies implemented by the Irish Government (Marrow et al., 2012).

This dissertation research was meticulously conducted using an online self-administered survey created with the Jisc Online Survey. The study aimed to collect quantitative and qualitative data, expanding existing research. This chapter comprehensively explains the rationale for using this technique, the importance of survey design, and its impact on respondent burden. It thoroughly outlines the sampling method, data collection procedure, and feedback from pilot tests conducted before data collection. Furthermore, it addresses possible ethical issues such as anonymity, confidentiality, and the use of workplace networks to recruit participants. Finally, the data analysis process and the overall limitations of the data are discussed in detail.

### **Theoretical Approach and Research Design**

Pragmatism, a philosophical approach, assesses the value of knowledge based on its practical impact, meaning the tangible and beneficial outcomes it generates. In research methodologies, pragmatism stresses their interaction with the natural world and the practical implications they provide. This approach guides the development of methods around the research questions and emphasises their real-world application and relevance, making the audience feel their importance and relevance to the study. Objective research perceives the social world through physical objects that can be sensed, such as population counts. Subjective research, conversely, focuses on people's opinions of objective things,

considering mental constructs that cannot be directly observed but can be inferred from what people say (Hjørland, 2007).

Positivism offers high reliability but is criticised for its low validity due to the artificial nature of scientific experiments (Guthrie, 2010). This research employed a subjective positivist approach based on individual experiences and perceptions. For instance, it aimed to uncover Ireland's Latin American population's views on public safety and crime control, reflecting individual experiences and perceptions. This perspective provides valuable insight into an under-researched area, yet it is based on personal experience. Therefore, this research used quantitative methods to examine attitudes towards security and policing.

Collecting quantitative or qualitative data empowers the researcher, depending on what they seek to discover (Karpf, 2012). Quantitative and qualitative methods can yield valuable results; however, each serves a different purpose. Quantitative research, for example, aims to answer questions using scientific processes designed to gather relevant, reliable, and unbiased information. This may include data on population demographics, economic indicators, or crime rates, often used in social science research (Karpf, 2012). In contrast, qualitative study aims to observe the world by immersing in it and interpreting phenomena in their natural settings (Davies & Hughes, 2014). The flexibility of research methodologies is evident in the planning and analysis stages.

Qualitative research aims to observe a more complex social reality, which refers to the intricate and multifaceted nature of social phenomena, compared to quantitative research. This emphasis on the value of qualitative research makes the audience feel the depth and richness of the research findings.

Qualitative data generates theoretical ideas, while quantitative data is collected based on a theoretical position (ibid). Quantitative research typically involves experimental or survey research (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Quantitative data is usually collected using closed-ended questions, which are less valid than open-ended questions due to their restrictive nature.

However, this data is more reliable as the questions and answers are fixed, making them easily replicable (Guthrie, 2010). Qualitative interviews take a long time to conduct and transcribe (Davies & Hughes, 2014). Quantitative data is seen as objective and produces generalizable results.

The objectivity of quantitative methods in this research allowed the researcher to maintain distance from participants and avoid biases. Using mixed methods can be beneficial in extending research reach and providing richer data (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Due to time constraints, this



research used only quantitative methods; however, future qualitative research could complement these findings.

## **Research Technique**

An online, self-administered survey was chosen for this research due to its cost-effectiveness and ability to reach many people quickly (Newburn, 2017). The speed of data collection using an Internet survey can also combat the issue of research becoming obsolete between the beginning of the study and its publication (Karpf, 2012). Surveys help gather data about attitudes, opinions, behaviours and personal characteristics (Karpf, 2012).

The distance between the researcher and participants created by a survey was suitable for this research due to the sensitive nature of questions about crime. This survey also considers the effect of social desirability (Cowles & Nelson, 2015). Participants may be unlikely to express opinions that are considered socially undesirable, such as racist or homophobic attitudes (Krumpal, 2013). This effect is more pertinent in face-to-face interviews, which is another justification for using an online survey for this research.

The survey data was collected to answer the following questions: How does antisocial behaviour in Dublin impact Latino American individuals? What do Latin American individuals believe regarding Garda's use of firearms? Do Latin American individuals support reducing the age of criminal responsibility? These questions were designed to provide a comprehensive understanding of the perceptions of safety and the experiences of the Latin American community in Ireland.

Participants were asked: "Do you feel unsafe walking in the street at night?" The options included in the blanks were 'Always, Sometimes, Never'. Participants were also asked to rate their perception of the An Garda Síochána legitimacy and authority on a Likert scale, a commonly used measurement tool in social science research. In this scale, one represents "very soft", two represents "somewhat soft", 3 represents "neither soft nor strong", 4 represents "somewhat strong", and 5 represents "very strong".

## Survey Design

Survey design is pivotal in collecting data that effectively addresses research inquiries and accurately measures intended concepts. As Ruel et al. (2016: 25) asserts, "The quality of the data obtained from a survey hinges on the survey itself." A well-crafted survey must be clear, precise, and user-friendly, ensuring consistent results when replicated (Iarossi, 2006).

Self-administered surveys, such as the one utilised here, necessitate careful attention to wording and layout. Participants must independently comprehend instructions, questions, and contextual nuances (Couper et al., 2001). Moreover, clarification of terms that may not be universally understood, such as specialised policing terminology, is crucial. Web-based surveys should also be compatible across different devices, ensuring accessibility and usability (Ruel et al., 2016), with tools like Microsoft Forms offering previews to ensure uniform presentation.

Survey questions should delve into nuanced aspects of the topic to capture a comprehensive spectrum of attitudes. For example, Cowles and Nelson (2015) demonstrate this approach using surveys on attitudes towards abortion, highlighting that asking solely about legality may overlook diverse viewpoints. Similarly, exploring attitudes towards working with individuals convicted of various crimes allows for thoroughly examining attitudes that vary across different offences (Cowles & Nelson, 2015).

The attitudes towards young criminality responsibility were collected using fixed-choice Likert scales. In a Likert scale, respondents are asked to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with a statement or question by assigning a number to their opinion along a scale of possible answers (Davies & Hughes, 2014). This method, which measures opinions or attitudes about specific people, topics, or experiences (Ruel et al., 2016), was instrumental in our research.

Response options must be relevant to the question and topic and include the most common answers. This ensures that respondents find it easy to align their opinions with the options provided. The Likert scale must also include an equal number of positive and negative responses to avoid weighting the reactions in one direction. Scales with five or seven points are the most reliable and commonly used (Ruel et al., 2016). Likert scales generally include a neutral midpoint answer, such as "neither agree nor disagree." Including a midpoint is unnecessary; it depends on the research topic and the question type (Kulas & Stachowski, 2013; Krosnick et al., 2002).

Considerable thought was put into the particular demographic data collected and the specific policing perception on which participants were asked to give their opinions. Participants were asked to rate their comfort level while walking along central streets in Dublin at night. This aspect was also included to illustrate how antisocial behaviour alters and affects their everyday activities.

## **Sampling**

The target population for this research was individuals over 18 who had migrated from Latin America and had resided in Ireland for at least one month. The choice of the Latin American community in Ireland as the target population was based on the need to understand the unique safety perceptions and experiences of this specific demographic group. This community was selected due to its growing presence in Ireland and the need for comprehensive research on their safety perceptions. The accessible population consisted of young people from the researcher's peer group. Nonprobability or non-random sampling was used to reach this group. The survey was distributed across four Latin American community WhatsApp groups, including Brazilian and exclusively female groups.

Participants received the following message: “Hello to all the Latin American Community; I request your participation in my dissertation research on Latin American Community Public Safety Perception and its Security Attitudes. It will not take you more than 15 minutes to complete this survey, and your participation will be constructive. The survey asks you to rate your satisfaction with An Garda Síochána’s use of force and views on antisocial behaviour situations in Dublin. The survey is anonymous, and all collected data will be kept confidential. Please feel free to share this post with anyone interested, but avoid taking the survey more than once. Thank you for your time.” The message was sent in Spanish and Portuguese.

The information sheet and consent form provided further details about data use, anonymity, and confidentiality. The initial message briefly introduced the research and invited potential participants to follow the survey link. It was also sent with its correspondent translation in Spanish and Portuguese to ensure an accurate understanding of the participants.

## Data Collection/Procedure

Participants were recruited from WhatsApp groups through a meticulously planned and executed process, ensuring the highest standards of research integrity. This non-face-to-face survey method is considered the best approach to eliciting honest responses. The survey was available for five days, from August 20th to the 25<sup>th</sup>.

Fixed-choice or closed-ended questions were used to ensure objectivity and avoid biased responses, resulting in easily quantifiable data that is straightforward to analyse (Ruel et al., 2016). The use of Likert scales further contributes to this objectivity. Careful planning, pilot testing, and feedback collection were essential to prevent questionnaire bias (Guthrie, 2010). Pretesting a survey is the best way to objectively assess respondent burden (Maxfield & Babbie, 2014).

Pretesting allows for necessary adjustments before the full-scale survey launch (Davies & Hughes, 2014). In this study, a small group of individuals from the target population was selected for the pretest. They were asked to complete the survey and provide feedback on the questions' clarity, the response options' relevance, and the overall user experience. The feedback was then used to make necessary adjustments to the survey instrument, such as rephrasing unclear questions and adding or removing response options. Ruel et al. (2016) emphasise the importance of pretesting, as it helps identify and correct errors before they affect the data. Pre-tests are particularly effective in highlighting potential issues such as participants' unfamiliarity with terminology or misunderstanding of ambiguous phrases or words.

Ensuring the survey instrument functions correctly and produces the data needed to answer the research questions (Converse & Presser, 1986). An issue highlighted was the scope of “antisocial behaviour,” which could range from public drinking to intimidation or verbal assault, depending on the cultural context; however, the meaning clarified in the question to specify that it refers to the legal definition given by the Criminal Justice Act 2006, which defines it as harassment, significant or persistent alarm, distress, fear or intimidation, as well as, significant or persistent impairment of the use or enjoyment of property. The same criteria were applied for clarifying concepts such as the ‘age of criminal responsibility’, which essentially is a legal definition referring to the age at which a child may be arrested, prosecuted and tried and, if found guilty, may receive disposal for a criminal court for an offence.

## **Ethical Issues**

### ***Processing of Data***

This research complied with the British Society of Criminology code of ethics. The survey was created using Jisc Online Surveys, a user-friendly survey creation tool, and analysed by its software to meet General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) requirements. Data collection, management, and processing were carried out in line with EU legislation, specifically the GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018, which involved handling sensitive personal data collected through surveys. Cloud data is securely stored on a Maynooth University server, and any files saved on the researcher's password-protected laptop will be destroyed after ten years, ensuring the utmost confidentiality and security of your data.

Participants were informed about the estimated time required to complete the survey and given any necessary instructions. They were also invited to share their opinions on the research process and request information about the findings. The information sheet provided contact details for the researcher and the supervisor to facilitate these inquiries (Ruel et al., 2016).

### ***Anonymity, Confidentiality and Informed Consent***

Anonymity ensures that no identifying information is collected from participants, and they are reminded not to include such information in their responses (Ruel et al., 2016). Confidentiality means that any private information shared will remain within the study and will not be attributed to any individual; it will only be used as part of the overall analysis (Ruel et al., 2016). From the outset, the survey was designed to be anonymous. Participant confidentiality will be maintained in all publications and presentations of the findings. There was no deception involved; participants were fully informed about the study.

Informed consent was obtained through a prompt on the social media post and an information sheet. The prompt briefly described the research to attract interested individuals to click the survey link. This link directed potential participants to an information sheet detailing the research purpose, eligibility criteria, the type of information collected, data handling procedures, assurances of confidentiality and anonymity, and how the results would be used. Participants were then asked to read the consent form and tick a box to indicate their consent before proceeding with the survey.

Due to the survey's anonymity, individual information could not be identified if a participant wished to withdraw after submitting their responses. To address this, participants were informed that their participation was voluntary before completing the survey. They also had the option to discontinue the study upon seeing the questions and could choose not to submit their answers, ensuring their comfort throughout the process.

### ***Ethical Recruitment of Participants***

The research received approval from the Maynooth University School of Law and Criminology Ethics Committee. The survey was shared in several WhatsApp groups, of which the researcher is a member. Work emails or contact information were not used to recruit participants.

### **Data Analysis**

Deductive reasoning involves using existing knowledge to create hypotheses and conduct research based on these hypotheses (O'Reilly, 2009). This expertise determines what data is collected and how it is gathered. On the other hand, inductive reasoning develops theories from data. This method involves observing patterns in the data, forming initial theories, and refining them through further data analysis, using the data as the foundation for knowledge (Karpf, 2012).

Although research can mainly follow deductive or inductive logic, it often incorporates both. This research employs inductive and deductive reasoning, which is essential and made possible by your interest and support. It drew on existing criminological theories to inform the tolerance of antisocial behaviour and its effects in the Americas. These theories and the continued interest guided the initial data collection, which involved gathering information on the prevalence of antisocial behaviour and its perceived effects. The data was then meticulously analysed to fill a crucial research gap, enlightening our audience on this pertinent issue.

The analysis was conducted meticulously, ensuring a balanced focus on overall satisfaction with An Garda Síochána authority and various perceptions of young people's attitudes across age, gender identity, and nationality. This comprehensive approach is crucial in instilling confidence in the validity of the research findings, assuring the audience of the thoroughness of the analysis.

## **Limitations of the Data**

As noted, the results of this research may need to be more broadly generalisable due to the small sample size. However, by exploring the public security attitudes of the Latin American community in Ireland and examining their environment, this study addresses a data gap regarding their perspectives and feelings towards policing. The Latin American community's unique experiences and perceptions are crucial in understanding Ireland's broader public safety landscape. More importantly, this study provides a robust basis for future, more representative data collection and opens up the exciting potential for further research in this area, offering a promising outlook and maintaining the audience's interest.

One limitation is that surveys may not provide as rich data as in-depth interviews. Additionally, low-budget surveys may result in a superficial analysis of the topic, as there is no opportunity to clarify issues for those unfamiliar with IT (Ruel et al., 2016). However, surveys allow for more extensive data collection in a shorter time, which can inform future research. They can provide actionable information, which other methods can enrich in subsequent studies. Awareness of these limitations is essential to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the research.

Web-based surveys also have limitations. Only some people have access to the internet or the IT skills required to complete an online survey, potentially excluding individuals in rural areas, low-income groups, or older populations (Davies & Hughes, 2014). Self-completion questionnaires also have disadvantages, such as the inability to clarify misunderstandings or misinterpretations. Respondents with literacy difficulties may be less likely to complete the survey, leading to response bias (Newburn, 2017).

The participants in this survey were likely young people living in urban areas with sufficient literacy and IT skills to complete the survey. While this does not provide generalizable results, it offers valuable insights into the attitudes of a segment of the population. Future research could use mixed methods, combining web and paper-based surveys, to reach individuals who need internet access or IT proficiency.

## **Conclusion**

The selected research method, an online self-administered survey, was chosen with great care to address the research questions about public safety attitudes among Latin American

individuals in Ireland. By utilising existing qualitative data on this community's perceptions of policing, this study aimed to enrich this understanding with quantitative methods, specifically through a closed-question survey. This method provided a comprehensive view of the community's attitudes towards public safety, ensuring that the audience is well-informed and enlightened.

While the findings of this research are not generalisable due to time and resource limitations, they lay a solid foundation for future research. This study is an initial step towards creating a framework to fill the data gap regarding Latin Americans' perceptions of safety risks in Ireland. The potential for future research to build on these findings and further understand how this community perceives antisocial behaviour is significant, offering a promising outlook.



# Findings


## Introduction

The chosen methodology proved effective, leading to 45 Latin American participants completing the survey. The study's results were analysed using Jisc Online Surveys. This chapter presents the research findings, starting with unique insights into participants' perceptions of safety while moving around Dublin and its outskirts, including the neighbourhood and city centre. It examines how secure they feel and how antisocial behaviour affects their routines or decisions regarding travel and socialising—followed by the findings related to the average levels of trust in the Gardaí, compared with the local police in their hometowns. This is further analysed in terms of reliability and effectiveness, based on the hypothesis that increasing the use of force in policing, such as using firearms and expanded stop-and-search powers, might have an impact. Finally, the findings explore participants' views on lowering the age of criminal responsibility and their feelings when walking alone at night.

## Ages

Most respondents were young, with over half falling within this group and an average age range of 35 to 44. Those aged 25 to 34 made up 38% of the participants. Only 2% of the interviewees were middle-aged, while the youngest respondents, aged 18 to 24, also comprised 2%. There were no participants over 65 in the survey.

Figure 6: Ages of the respondents



## Gender

The majority of respondents were female, representing 76% of the participants. This gender distribution is significant as it reflects the higher representation of women in the Latin American community in Ireland, providing the audience with a clear understanding of the gender dynamics in the community. This could influence safety perceptions and experiences, as women often have different safety concerns than men. Males accounted for 22%, while only 2% of the interviewees identified as non-binary.




Figure 7: Gender of the Participants

## Reason for Migration

Among the reasons for migrating to Ireland, the most prominent was academic interests, cited by 60% of respondents. This was followed by job opportunities, which motivated 47% of participants. Cultural interests attracted 42% of the respondents, while only 7% mentioned public safety as a factor. VISA accessibility also played a significant role in migration decisions, ranking higher than concerns about public safety or the economic situation, the latter influencing just 16% of participants. These reasons provide a deeper understanding of the participants' motivations and challenges in their migration journey.





Figure 8: Reason for Migration

### ***Time Living in Ireland***

Most participants (40%) have lived in Ireland for 1 to 5 years, followed by those who have resided there for over five years. Additionally, 16% of respondents have been in Ireland for 1 to 6 months, 9% for six months to 1 year, and only 2% have stayed for less than a month.


Figure 9: Time Living in Ireland



### ***Nationality***

The majority of participants were from South America. Uruguayans comprised 49% of the respondents, while 18% were from Argentina. Additionally, 18% were Chilean, 16% were Brazilian, and 4% came from other countries.


Figure 10: Respondent's Nationalities



### Overall Public Safety Perception


The average level of perceived safety was measured on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 indicating the highest level of safety and one the lowest. This scale assessed respondents' safety perceptions in various contexts. In their neighbourhood, 49% of respondents feel very safe, 36% feel somewhat secure, 9% feel somewhat unsafe, 2% feel very unsafe, and 4% are neutral. This strong sense of community and security in their neighbourhoods is reassuring. In contrast, when visiting Dublin's city centre, only 11% feel very safe, 33% feel somewhat unsafe, 36% feel slightly unsafe, 11% feel very unsafe, and 9% feel neutral. The results indicate that respondents generally feel safer in their neighbourhoods than in the city centre, considering that the most frequented areas visited are O'Connell Street and Temple Bar.

Figure 11: Level of Perceived Safety in the Respondents' Neighbourhood.




Legend: 1 = Very Unsafe, 2 = Somewhat Unsafe, 3 = Neither Safe or Unsafe, 4 = Somewhat Safe, 5 = Very Safe.

Figure 12: Level of Perceived Safety When Visiting the City Centre.



Legend: 1 = Very Unsafe, 2 = Somewhat Unsafe, 3 = Neither Safe or Unsafe, 4 = Somewhat Safe, 5 = Very Safe.

Figure 13: Areas Frequented by the Respondents in Dublin Key Findings: Trust and Effectiveness Perception Towards Gardai




### ***Trustworthiness Towards Gardai and Effectiveness Perception***

When asked how safe respondents would feel requesting assistance from the Gardai, 20% would feel very safe, 38% somewhat safe, 16% somewhat unsafe, 7% very unsafe, and 20% neutral. While the average general trustworthiness towards the Gardai reaches 40%, 27% of the respondents said feeling somewhat untrustworthy and 7% very untrustworthy. 11% feel neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy. Perceptions about effectiveness are quite divided across participants since 29% believe Gardai are somewhat effective, but 22% think Gardai are somewhat ineffective. At the same time, 18% believe Gardai are very ineffective, and only 2% think Gardai are very effective.


Regarding similarities in perceptions between Gardai and local police from their countries, most participants said they were very different (47%), while 29% believed they were somewhat similar. 16% think they are either different or similar.

Figure 14: Average Level of Safety Perception When Asking Gardai for Help




Legend: 1 = Very Unsafe, 2 = Somewhat Unsafe, 3 = Neither Safe or Unsafe, 4 = Somewhat Safe, 5 = Very Safe

Figure 15: Average of the Level of Trustworthiness Towards Gardai




Legend: 1 = Very Untrustworthy, 2 = Somewhat Untrustworthy, 3 = Neither Trustworthy or Untrustworthy, 4 = Somewhat Trustworthy, 5 = Very Trustworthy

Figure 16: Average of the Level of Effectiveness Perception of Gardai Performance



Legend: 1 = Very Ineffective, 2 = Somewhat Ineffective, 3 = Neither Effective or Ineffective, 4 = Somewhat Effective, 5 = Very Effective.

Figure 17: Perception of Similarities Between Gardai and the Local Police of Participant’s Hometown




Legend: 1 = Very Different, 2 = Somewhat Different, 3 = Neither Different of Similar, 4 = Somewhat Similar, 5 = Very Similar.

### Antisocial Behaviour Impact


More than half of the participants said they felt very threatened by antisocial behaviour in Ireland, as defined by the Criminal Justice Act 2006. This Act defines antisocial behaviour as any that causes harassment, alarm, or distress to others. 16% of the participants said neither felt threatened nor unthreatened. Only 4% of the respondents felt very unthreatened. 47% of the respondents consider antisocial behaviour when travelling or socialising somewhat considered, while 11% said they do not consider it.

Figure 18: Average Level of Threaten by Antisocial Behaviour



Legend: 1 = Very Threatened, 2 = Somewhat Threatened, 3 = Neither Threatened of Unthreatened, 4 = Somewhat Unthreatened, 5 = Very Unthreatened

Figure 19: Average Level of Antisocial Behaviour Consideration when Socializing and Travelling



Legend: 1 = Very Threatened, 2 = Somewhat Threatened, 3 = Neither Threatened of Unthreatened, 4 = Somewhat Unthreatened, 5 = Very Unthreatened


### ***Overall Security Attitude***

The Latin American community in Dublin holds diverse opinions on significant issues. For instance, when asked about the age of criminal responsibility, 27% strongly disagreed with lowering it, while 22% strongly agreed. This diversity of opinion underscores the complexity of the issue. Similarly, regarding Gardai routinely carrying firearms, 33% of respondents said they would not feel safe or unsafe, whereas 11% indicated they would feel much safer. This varied response underscores the diversity of perspectives among the Latin American community in Dublin, making the issue's complexity palpable.

When asked how they would feel about Gardai having the authority to stop and search individuals in public without suspicion, 29% expressed feeling unsafe, while 16% said they would feel much safer. Most respondents reported frequently walking alone at night, with 29% feeling unsafe while 22% feeling very safe. Regarding an increase in the number of stops and searches by Gardai, 29% somewhat agreed with the measure, while 16% disagreed.




Figure 20: Level of Acceptance with Reducing the Age of Criminal Responsibility




Legend: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Somewhat Disagree, 3 = Neither Agree or Disagree, 4 = Somewhat Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree

Figure 21: Level of Safety Perception if Gardai Carried Firearms Routinely




Legend: 1 = Much Safer, 2 = Somewhat Safer, 3 = Neither Safer or Unsafe, 4 = Somewhat Unsafe, 5 = Very Unsafe

Figure 22: Level of Safety Perception if Gardai Could Stop and Search People Without Any Suspicious




Legend: 1 = Much Safer, 2 = Somewhat Safer, 3 = Neither Safer or Unsafe, 4 = Somewhat Unsafe, 5 = Very Unsafe

Figure 23: Average of the Frequency of Respondents Walking Alone at Night in Dublin




Legend: 1 = Never, 2 = Rarely, 3 = Sometimes, 4 = Frequently, 5 = Always

Figure 24: Average Level of Safety Perception When Walking Alone at Night



Legend: 1 = Very Unsafe, 2 = Somewhat Unsafe, 3 = Neither Safe or Unsafe, 4 = Somewhat Safe, 5 = Very Safe.

Figure 25: Level of Acceptance with Increasing the Number of Stops and Searches by Gardai



Legend: 1 = Very Agree, 2 = Somewhat Agree, 3 = Neither Agree or Disagree, 4 = Somewhat Disagree, 5 = Very Disagree

# Analysis

## Introduction

This analysis will delve into the attitudes of the Latin American population in Ireland, particularly in Dublin, towards public safety and policing. By examining these perceptions, the study will draw connections to the existing literature on police legitimacy and public trust in Latin America, as well as the ideological implications of the 'Zero Tolerance' paradigm and its influence on policing approaches. The study will focus on how community members perceive anti-social behaviours, their stance on criminal policies, and how these perceptions compare with those observed in Latin American contexts.

The analysis will evaluate how the Latin American community in Dublin perceives public safety, specifically focusing on their trust in the Irish police (An Garda Síochána) and how it compares to their experiences with law enforcement in their countries of origin. Given the complex relationships many Latin American nations have with policing due to corruption, excessive force, or lack of resources, the study will investigate whether these historical and cultural factors shape their attitudes towards Irish policing. The unique perspective of the Latin American community can provide valuable insights that can contribute to improving policing strategies.

Existing research highlights that public trust in the police across Latin America tends to be low, with issues such as police corruption, human rights abuses, and inefficiency fueling public distrust. In this context, it is essential to examine whether these attitudes are transferred to the Irish context or whether the Latin American population finds Ireland's law enforcement more legitimate. The analysis will also explore how Irish policing strategies, such as community engagement and a less militarised approach, may contribute to higher or lower levels of trust within this community.

The 'Zero Tolerance' policing paradigm, which advocates strict enforcement of minor infractions to prevent more serious crime, has seen significant application in various parts of Latin America and the U.S. This ideology will be critically assessed in the Irish context, as it may influence how the Latin American population perceives Ireland's generally more lenient approach to minor infractions. The study will consider how these ideological differences may affect the community's perception of safety, law enforcement efficiency, and anti-social behaviours in Dublin.

The Latin American community's perception of antisocial behaviour, such as public disorder, will also be examined. Antisocial behaviour policies in Ireland, particularly those related to community policing, will be analysed to understand whether they align with or diverge from the views held by Latin American immigrants.

## Geographical Focused Area

Decades of empirical research demonstrate that crime is concentrated at various spatial scales, from neighbourhoods, census blocks, street segments, and street corners to individual addresses. This indicates that crime is consistently highly focused across a range of cities and crime types, with this being observed to be the case at various spatial scales.

The routine activity theory (RAT; Cohen & Felson, 1979) is a significant lens for considering crime occurrence. It suggests that direct-contact predatory crimes occur due to human interaction that emerges as a consequence of everyday activity. This theory's key findings are particularly relevant to our crime concentration and safety perceptions research, providing a solid foundation for our methodology and analysis.

People's routine activities largely dictate what they do at particular times of the day and, in turn, where they will be. Considering a city's population, the everyday activities of individuals lead to the concentration of people at certain places at certain times of the day and the absence of people at others.

The data from this scale highlights significant differences in safety perceptions between respondents' neighbourhoods and Dublin's city centre. In their local communities, a strong sense of safety prevails, with 49% of respondents feeling *very safe* and 36% feeling *somewhat secure*. Only 9% report feeling *somewhat unsafe*, 2% *very unsafe*, and 4% are *neutral* (Figure 11). This robust sense of community security and overall positive perceptions of safety at the neighbourhood level should reassure us about the strength of our local communities.

However, this sense of safety diminishes considerably when respondents visit Dublin's city centre. Only 11% feel *very safe*, while 33% feel *somewhat unsafe*, 36% feel *slightly unsafe*, and 11% feel *very unsafe*. A small portion (9%) feel *neutral* (Figure 12). It could be said that the perception of unsafety is geographically focused across the most frequented areas such as O'Connell St. (39%), Temple Bar (32%), Stephen Green (43%), Parnell Sq. (31%) and Trinity College (19%) (Figure 13). Despite these challenges, the Latin American community in Dublin demonstrates remarkable resilience and adaptability in navigating these safety concerns, inspiring us with their strength.

The research results underscore a stark contrast in feelings of security between familiar residential areas and the city centre. This contrast, where safety concerns are more pronounced in urban areas, suggests that factors like crowding, visibility of crime, and possibly less personal connection to the community may contribute to increased anxiety.

Dr Johnny Connolly's groundbreaking research report, 'Building Community Resilience ', offers a deep dive into the inner workings of major criminal networks in Dublin South Central. It

unveils the significant intimidation, stress, and fear experienced by local communities due to these networks, fostering empathy and concern for those affected. The comprehensive report, launched *in Dublin*, outlines how criminal and anti-social behaviour, though perpetrated by less than 2% of the population aged 12 to 40, has an outsized and corrosive impact on many more.

Dr Connolly notes that drug-related criminal activity and the accompanying anti-social behaviour have become endemic in pockets of Dublin South Central, and similar patterns can be observed in other parts of the country. The research emphasises that these behaviours are damaging the social fabric of communities and highlights the urgent need for holistic, community-focused interventions. This underscores the pressing need for immediate and comprehensive strategies to address these issues.

### **Belief in the Police Institution: A Recognition of the State's Authority and Democracy**

The survey results on respondents' feelings about seeking assistance from the Gardaí provide a detailed insight into how the community in Dublin perceives law enforcement. Here is a breakdown of the findings: When asked how safe they would feel asking the Gardaí for help, 20% of respondents reported feeling very safe, 38% felt somewhat safe, 16% felt somewhat unsafe, 7% felt very unsafe, and 20% were neutral (Figure 14). These responses show that most (58%) of participants feel safe contacting the Gardaí, indicating trust and confidence in the institution. However, 23% expressed concerns about safety (somewhat or very unsafe), indicating a notable level of apprehension among a portion of the community.

These responses show that most (58%) participants feel safe contacting the Gardaí. However, 23% expressed concerns about safety (somewhat or very unsafe), indicating a notable level of apprehension among a portion of the community.

The overall trust in the Gardaí stands at 40%. Still, scepticism is evident: 27% of respondents find the Gardaí somewhat untrustworthy, 7% perceive them as untrustworthy, and 11% neutral (Figure 15). This suggests that nearly one-third of respondents are uncertain about the Gardaí's reliability, posing a potential obstacle to fostering strong community relationships and cooperation. Nonetheless, it can be argued that the Latin American community seeks assistance from the Gardaí. This trust in police institutions reflects the community's belief in state authority and democratic processes, as the police symbolise moral and state legitimacy (Tyler, 1990).

Research has shown that positive perceptions of the police enhance citizens' willingness to

obey the law and strengthen their attachment to democratic institutions (Tyler et al., 2015; Karakus et al., 2011). Public confidence in the police is significantly influenced by how citizens perceive the treatment of themselves and their communities. This highlights the personal dimension of policing, indicating that trust in the police is shaped by both individual and community experiences with officers, not just institutional performance.

While the Latin American community tends to seek help from the Gardaí and recognises the police as a legitimate authority (reflecting a democratic mindset), it is essential to note that this trust is tied to the Gardaí's perceived effectiveness. This reliance on the Gardaí underscores the community's need for a trustworthy police force. In this regard, opinions on the Gardaí's performance vary: 29% consider them somewhat effective, 22% view them as somewhat ineffective, 18% rate them as very ineffective, and only 2% believe they are very effective.

Despite an initial inclination to trust the Gardaí, these figures show considerable doubt regarding their ability to effectively address crime and community safety concerns, with 40% viewing them as somewhat ineffective or even very ineffective (Figure 16). This underscores how the Latin American community assesses police reliability, which goes beyond faith in state authority and democracy. Instead, trust in the police is primarily based on tangible outcomes. As Malone (2021, p. 426) points out, researchers in Latin America also incorporate measures of police effectiveness when evaluating public trust. In this context, police performance is frequently judged by their success in combating crime, given the pervasive concern over regional insecurity.

On the other hand, it is worth considering that the difference in attitudes toward the Gardaí may not stem from a deep-rooted belief in the police as an institution aligned with democratic values and state authority but rather from a perception of the Gardaí as distinct from law enforcement in Latin America. Given that trust in police forces across much of Latin America is relatively low, and 47% of respondents believe the Gardaí differ significantly from their local police (Figure 17), this contrast could explain why many Latin Americans are more inclined to seek assistance from the Gardaí.

In Latin America, trust in public security forces is often low, leading many residents to rely on private security rather than the police. Police in the region are frequently perceived as corrupt and ineffective and, in some cases, as contributors to crime rather than preventers (Malone, 2010). Transparency International has reported that public sector corruption in Latin America ranks among the highest globally, particularly in countries like Venezuela, Paraguay, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guyana (TI, 2012). This systemic corruption extends to police forces, where bribes and kickbacks

supplement low salaries. Police violence, especially against youth, is also a significant issue; for example, in Brazil, state-sanctioned police violence disproportionately affects Afro-Brazilian males (Costa et al., 2010; Wacquant, 2008).

This contrast suggests that many respondents view the Gardaí as fundamentally different from the law enforcement they are familiar with (Figure 17). This may shape their greater willingness to engage with or trust the Gardaí. This is especially relevant considering that 40% of respondents have lived in Ireland for only 2-5 years, making their experiences in Latin America relatively fresh.

The survey uncovers a nuanced relationship between the Latin American community and the Gardaí, characterised by a cautious sense of safety, moderate trust levels, and critical views on effectiveness. The community's cautious trust in the Gardaí, while many feel safe enough to seek help, underscores the need for reassurance and transparency in policing. This trust is not absolute, with many expressing doubts about the Gardaí's effectiveness, particularly compared to the police forces in their home countries. This cautious sense of safety underscores the need for a more balanced approach that addresses the community's immediate security needs and the long-term goal of building trust.

### **The Scope of Police Effectivity in the Latin American Logic: The ‘Mano dura’ Philosophy**

For many Latin Americans, the effectiveness of police is closely tied to the use of force, primarily shaped by their experiences in regions where insecurity is prevalent. The association between force and safety is evident in their response to Gardaí carrying firearms: 33% of respondents felt it would not impact their sense of security, and 38% believed it would make them feel safer (Figure 21). This suggests that a force's visibility can significantly alleviate fear and enhance perceptions of police effectiveness.

However, the community's response was more divided when asked about Gardaí being granted the authority to stop and search without suspicion. While 38% said they would feel safer, 29% said such powers would make them feel unsafe (Figure 22). This ambivalence likely stems from their prior experiences in Latin America, where stop-and-search practices often led to police abuses and arbitrary detentions. These negative experiences shape a deep-rooted scepticism toward any police powers perceived as excessive or unchecked, even though some believe these measures could improve public safety.

The policing models in Latin America are characterised by centralisation and a focus on crime



control rather than prevention. Efforts to reform police institutions through community policing have failed mainly due to a variety of factors, including lack of resources, resistance from within the police force, and the persistence of high crime rates. As a result, Latin Americans often equate increased force with greater security. The failure of these reforms has been exacerbated by the criticism that reformers are “soft on crime,” leading to the dilution or abandonment of community-oriented initiatives. This context has instilled in the Latin American community an expectation of decisive action from the police, regardless of whether such action fosters long-term trust or security. This expectation underscores the crucial need for a more balanced approach that addresses the community's immediate security needs and the equally essential long-term goal of building trust.

Understanding public satisfaction with the police is crucial for shaping policies that prioritise community policing over more aggressive, zero-tolerance approaches prevalent in much of Latin America. However, the Latin American community's preference for more punitive measures, influenced by their experiences and criminology theories, may pose a significant challenge to implementing trust-building strategies. This preference could lead to the sidelining of trust-building initiatives in favour of immediate crime control measures due to resource constraints and the community's immediate security needs. This challenge underscores the crucial need for a balanced approach that addresses the community's preferences and the equally important long-term goal of building trust. It also highlights the need for innovative solutions to reconcile these seemingly conflicting priorities.

Factors that influence trust in police go beyond traditional crime control measures like arrests and drug seizures, although these remain central in many Latin American countries. In contrast, the Gardaí's focus on de-escalation and community engagement starkly contrasts the aggressive tactics that Latin Americans may be more accustomed to. Nonetheless, Latin Americans in Ireland may still view police effectiveness through the lens of their home countries' priorities, which focus heavily on force and punitive measures.

In summary, the contrast between policing paradigms in Ireland and Latin America is stark. Latin Americans are shaped by the insecurities and force-based policing they encountered back home, influencing how they perceive police effectiveness abroad. This stark contrast underscores the urgent need to move away from punitive crime control models and towards a more balanced approach prioritising trust and safety. This balanced approach is not just a theoretical concept but a practical necessity in the complex landscape of policing in Latin America, demanding immediate attention and action.

## **The View of Antisocial Behaviour and the Ideology Behind**

More than half of the Latin American participants (53%) reported feeling highly threatened by antisocial behaviour in Ireland, as defined by the Criminal Justice Act 2006, which includes actions that cause harassment, alarm, or distress. In contrast, 16% felt neutral, neither threatened nor unthreatened (Figure 18). A key factor driving dissatisfaction with police in Dublin in this community is environmental disorder. These high levels of disorder, violence, and insecurity in the city centre often lead residents to view the police as ineffective, perceiving their inability to manage or prevent such issues as a sign of weakness (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Jackson & Bradford, 2019).

High levels of disorder, violence, and insecurity in the city centre often lead residents to view the police as ineffective, perceiving their inability to manage or prevent such issues as a sign of weakness (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Jackson & Bradford, 2019).

As crime has escalated in Latin America, public debate has emerged over how to reform and improve law enforcement. One side of the discussion is a push to expand police powers and control. At the same time, the other is a call for more citizen participation to ensure that police are held accountable to the communities they serve. These perspectives have shaped the expectations Latin Americans bring with them regarding how to combat antisocial behaviour.

Their views are deeply influenced by criminology theories like the 'broken windows' theory and the zero-tolerance approach to policing. The 'broken windows' theory, developed by James Wilson and George Kelling and later popularised by figures like Giuliani and Bratton in New York, argues that seemingly minor offences, such as graffiti, abandoned cars, and public intoxication, create a sense of disorder. This disorder, they claim, not only causes discomfort but also fosters an environment where more serious crime can thrive. The theory suggests that unchecked minor offences signal a breakdown in community control, with the first sign of decay being something as simple as a panhandler left unchecked (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). This theory has significantly and profoundly influenced Latin American criminology and policing strategies, shaping their perspectives and adopting more aggressive, zero-tolerance approaches.

This disorder, they claim, not only causes discomfort but also fosters an environment where more serious crime can thrive. As the broken windows theory suggests, unchecked minor offences signal a breakdown in community control, with the first sign of decay being something as simple as a panhandler left unchecked (Wilson & Kelling, 1982).

Latin Americans often link the Gardaí's effectiveness to the visibility of antisocial or 'untended' behaviour. They still adhere to the belief that visible policing serves to maintain the appearance of control and bolster public confidence. 'Visible policing' refers to having police officers patrolling the streets, interacting with the community, and responding to incidents promptly. This concept is deeply ingrained in the community's expectations of law enforcement and their perceptions of safety and security. Wacquant (2003) explores this concept, noting that such policies appeal to public perceptions of control over urban crime. Understanding and addressing these perceptions is crucial in developing policing models that are both effective and community-oriented.

These policies, often aimed at 'cleaning' the streets of beggars, street vendors, and other marginalised groups, align with broader societal assumptions about poverty, crime, and violence. The rise of zero-tolerance policing in Latin America is mainly due to its simplicity and symbolic appeal. It resonates with citizens' fears and common-sense thinking, offering politicians a flexible, easily adaptable narrative that promises swift action against crime. Even though William Bratton, a key figure in New York's policing reforms, has stated that zero tolerance was never officially implemented there, the term has gained immense symbolic power. As a political catchphrase, it has convinced many Latin American leaders and citizens that it solves urban crime (Newburn & Jones, 2007). The 'zero-tolerance' approach to policing involves strict enforcement of laws against minor offences, believing that this will prevent more serious crimes. This approach has gained popularity in Latin America due to its perceived effectiveness and immediate results. However, it also raises questions about its long-term impact on community trust and safety.

Similarly, the preference for increasing the number of stops and searches conducted by Garda Síochána may reflect this broader appeal for visible and immediate action. As shown in Figure 25, 49% of respondents either strongly agree or somewhat agree with increasing the frequency of such police interventions, further underscoring the desire for a more proactive, hands-on approach to policing.

Through its transnational spread, the concept has evolved into a more punitive strategy in Latin America than in the United States (Dammert & Malone, 2006). The pervasive fear of crime in Latin America has played a significant role in the region's adoption of zero-tolerance and 'mano dura' (heavy-hand) policies. These strategies, though flawed, are seen as simple, adaptable solutions that can be quickly implemented to address crime. Despite substantial evidence suggesting these approaches' limitations and potential harm, their symbolic power remains strong in Latin America, shaping public and political responses to crime and insecurity.

Aligned with the ongoing reflection, the respondents' views reveal a nuanced and complex landscape of criminal policy. While there is a clear preference for more punitive measures—such as harsher punishments and a push to lower the age of criminal responsibility—the diversity of opinions remains notable. For example, 22% of respondents strongly agreed with reducing the age of criminal responsibility in Ireland, while an additional 20% somewhat agreed (Figure 20). This suggests that although a significant portion favours stricter legal approaches, there are varying degrees of support, highlighting the range of perspectives within the community. It also reflects a tendency to criminalise young people.

### **Consideration and Impact of Public Safety on Daily Decisions**

Although only 16% of respondents cited public safety issues in their hometowns as a primary reason for migrating to Ireland (Figure 8), it is clear that safety concerns continue to play a significant role in the lives of the Latin American community. Even after moving to Ireland, public safety remains crucial in their daily decision-making processes. For instance, 47% of participants indicated that they somewhat consider safety when deciding whether to socialise or travel, while 11% stated that they place high importance on it (Figure 19).

This highlights that, despite Ireland being perceived as relatively safer compared to their home countries, concerns about personal security still influence the social behaviours and mobility of Latin American migrants. Whether choosing which areas to frequent, when to travel, or even participating in social gatherings, these considerations reflect a persistent awareness of safety that past experiences in more insecure environments have shaped.

The fact that such a significant portion of the community prioritises public safety in their daily lives suggests that it remains a profoundly ingrained concern, potentially impacting how they integrate and navigate life in Ireland.

Moreover, this ongoing attention to safety may illuminate broader concerns about policing and crime prevention in Ireland, which could influence how Latin American migrants perceive law enforcement and public order in their new environment.

Despite their dissatisfaction with the Gardaí and concerns about antisocial behaviour, the Latin American community in Ireland displays remarkable resilience and courage. They partake in activities that are often considered dangerous or impossible in their home countries, such as walking alone at night—a freedom many Latin Americans are deprived of due to heightened

security risks back home. Notably, 27% of respondents reported feeling somewhat safe walking alone at night, and 22% stated that they feel very secure doing so (Figure 24). This resilience and courage in the face of adversity is truly inspiring and evokes empathy for their challenges.

The findings reveal that 36% of respondents frequently walk alone at night, and 22% declared they always feel comfortable engaging in this activity (Figure 23). This is especially striking considering that 76% of the participants are women (Figure 7), a group disproportionately affected by safety concerns, Latin America; with 14 out of the 25 countries with the highest femicide rates, it accounts for more than half of all femicides worldwide: an average of 12 women killed each day, nearly 4,400 per year. The fact that so many women feel secure enough to walk alone at night in Ireland highlights the stark contrast between their experiences of public safety in Ireland and those in their home countries, evoking a deep sense of empathy for their challenges.

These insights testify to the enhanced sense of personal safety many Latin Americans experience in Ireland. More importantly, they underscore the adaptability and courage of the Latin American community as they reclaim public spaces that were once inaccessible due to fear and insecurity. Despite lingering concerns about crime and dissatisfaction with local law enforcement, the ability to move freely and confidently in their surroundings marks a significant shift in their daily lives. This transformation, driven by their adaptability and courage, shows how safety—or the lack thereof—profoundly influences people’s decisions about mobility, participation in public life, and overall well-being.

## Conclusion

The Latin American perspective on the role of police in society is profoundly shaped by decades of policing strategies that prioritise significant police intervention and the use of force to address even minor incidents, particularly those that can incite fear among the public. This approach, heavily influenced by paradigms like zero-tolerance policing, has become deeply ingrained in the collective consciousness of many Latin Americans. These paradigms cast the police as central figures in maintaining public safety, where their visible and sometimes aggressive presence is deemed necessary to prevent disorder and crime. Consequently, the role of the police is often viewed through the lens of control and deterrence, emphasising enforcement over community trust or preventive measures.

As Latin Americans relocate to other countries, they often carry these ingrained expectations regarding law enforcement's role and function. Their belief in the necessity of a robust and authoritative police presence—rooted in the harsh realities of high crime rates and security concerns in Latin America—can shape their perceptions of policing in a foreign context. For instance, they may anticipate that officers should be more visible, proactive, or forceful in addressing minor offences, such as antisocial behaviour, graffiti, or loitering, believing this approach is critical to maintaining public order.

However, this transference of ideals can create a significant disconnect. When confronted with the different legal frameworks, social norms, and policing strategies in their new environment—where community-oriented policing, de-escalation, and crime prevention might take precedence—Latin Americans may struggle to reconcile these differences. This disconnect, often attributed to a 'cultural gap' in perceptions of policing, can result in more than just frustration or dissatisfaction with local law enforcement; it can also lead to misunderstandings, conflicts, and heightened social tensions. Bridging this gap is essential for ensuring smooth integration and long-term satisfaction with law enforcement.

Moreover, this perspective can lead to underestimating the cultural nuances influencing how different societies approach policing. In some regions, the focus may be on crime prevention and community engagement, where police visibility is not necessarily equated with effectiveness. Latin Americans, accustomed to a policing style that equates public order with forceful intervention, may find it challenging to adapt to less overtly aggressive models,

perceiving them as ineffective or even lenient compared to the hard-line approaches they are used to.

This clash of expectations underscores the cultural gap between how policing is perceived in Latin America and how it functions in other parts of the world. While Latin American migrants may carry a deeply rooted understanding of the police as enforcers of safety through control, they may require time to adjust to environments where the police's role focuses more on community integration, prevention, and proportional use of force. Recognising these differences and the need for cultural sensitivity can help bridge the gap between migrants' expectations and the realities of policing in their new homes, fostering better integration and satisfaction with law enforcement in the long run.

What creates a paradox is how these strong ideals regarding the importance of crime control and policing antisocial behaviour remain entrenched in the mindset of Latin Americans, even in light of the apparent failures of such approaches in their home countries.

Despite the evidence that heavy-handed policing and zero-tolerance policies in Latin America have often failed to reduce crime rates or improve public safety, these beliefs persist. The enduring trust in a policing model that has, for many, not only been unable to deliver the promised security but has also contributed to social unrest, human rights abuses, and a lack of community trust in law enforcement highlights the complexity of shifting public perception.

Several factors contribute to this persistence. One is the deeply ingrained fear of crime and insecurity that has long afflicted many Latin American societies. In environments characterised by violence, corruption, and crime, the idea of solid police intervention as a necessary evil becomes almost a cultural norm. Many Latin Americans, having lived under conditions of extreme insecurity, may equate safety with visible, forceful policing, regardless of the long-term consequences or systemic failures of such methods.

Another factor is the symbolic power of crime control narratives, often tied to political promises of quick fixes and immediate results. Zero-tolerance policies, with their "tough on crime" rhetoric, offer a semblance of order and control, appealing to the population's desire for immediate relief from the constant threat of violence.

Despite mounting evidence that these approaches can lead to over-policing, abuses of power, and the marginalisation of vulnerable communities, their symbolic value remains potent.

Even after migrating to countries with more balanced, community-oriented approaches to policing, many Latin Americans continue to believe in the necessity of a robust and interventionist police force. This paradox manifests in recognising the failures of such policing strategies in their home countries while simultaneously expecting and advocating for similar tactics in their new environments. It highlights the complexity of shifting public perception, particularly concerning deeply ingrained safety and law enforcement beliefs.

The enduring attachment to these ideals underscores the difficulty of overcoming the fear and insecurity that have shaped Latin Americans' views on policing. It also illustrates the challenges of recalibrating expectations when moving to a new context, where different approaches to law enforcement may challenge the assumptions many Latin Americans have grown up with.

Ultimately, this paradox serves as a reminder that public safety is not solely about policing tactics; it encompasses the deeper cultural and social narratives that inform people's understanding of crime, control, and security. These narratives, shaped by historical experiences and political discourses, play a significant role in how public safety is perceived and addressed.

The Latin American conception of public safety remains built on the perception of fear and the impulse to diminish citizen's feelings of insecurity, leading politicians in the region to seek quick fixes for urban crime. Many have looked to the so-called "New York miracle" for answers, with the decline in crime levels attributed primarily to zero-tolerance policing strategies.

However, policies cannot be imported easily, and New York City's zero-tolerance strategies cannot be directly transferred or replicated to suit the distinct realities of Latin America. Poverty, inequality, and social exclusion are experienced on a scale markedly different from that of the United States. Furthermore, local police forces often lack the resources and training to implement American models effectively.

Even if Latin American police forces were to adopt Bratton's extensive reforms, the region's deep-rooted race and class divides mean that these punitive policies would likely continue to target marginalised and racialised groups. Policies transferred across different contexts inevitably mutate, adapt, and evolve to fit local conditions. In Latin America, zero-tolerance policies tend to become significantly more punitive (Swanson, 2013, p. 978).



Finally, considering the large population of Latin Americans living in highly urban areas like Dublin, there often needs to be more awareness regarding how the Garda operates in counties such as Dundalk, Longford, and Waterford. A series titled “On the Beat” offers a closer look at this dynamic by taking viewers behind the front desks, inside the patrol cars, and alongside frontline Gardaí as they perform their duties. Filmed over three months, the series highlights the diverse challenges and issues faced by Gardaí while policing both urban and rural Ireland.

The series follows various Gardaí of different ages and ranks as they carry out their daily responsibilities, encompassing multiple activities. These include foot and vehicle patrols, managing station front desk operations, supporting community initiatives, and conducting criminal investigations. It also sheds light on community policing efforts, random stops, and detentions aimed at drug seizures.

This portrayal can help illuminate a vital aspect of policing that participants who advocate for increased Garda stops and searches may overlook: the distinct methods and challenges Gardaí faces in rural areas compared to urban settings. While many may believe that a more significant number of stops and searches will enhance safety, the reality in rural Ireland often requires a nuanced understanding of community relations, resource allocation, and the social context in which policing occurs.

By showcasing the varied experiences of Gardaí in different regions, “On the Beat” not only highlights the complexity of policing in Ireland but also serves as a potential bridge for Latin American communities to better understand the operations and realities of law enforcement beyond their immediate urban experiences. This awareness can foster a more informed dialogue about safety, policing strategies, and community engagement, helping to align expectations with the actual practices and challenges Gardaí faces in diverse contexts.

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## **Legal Instruments**

Criminal Justice Act (2006). (Antisocial behaviour definition).

Act. 2005, Section 6. – (1) The police force Garda Síochána.

Data Protection Act, 2018.

*EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)*: Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons concerning the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General et al.), OJ 2016 L 119/1.

## **Appendix A: Information Sheet**

**Can Ireland keep us safe? A view from the Latin American community**  
**INFORMATION SHEET AND CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS:**  
**SURVEYS**

**Information Sheet**

**Purpose of the Study.**

My name is Sabrina Cardoso Di Paolo. I am a postgraduate international student in Comparative Criminology and Criminal Justice at Maynooth University. I am conducting my final dissertation for my Master's Degree on the policing perception and security attitude of the Latin American Community in Ireland. The study is called: Can Ireland keep us safe? A view from the Latin American community.

**Who has approved this study?**

This study has been reviewed and received ethical approval from the Maynooth University School of Law and Criminology Research Committee. It is being conducted under the supervision of Dr Cian Ó Concubhair. You may have a copy of this approval if you request it.

**What will participation in the study involve?**

The study will involve answering questions about your level of safety and confidence or the threats you feel living in Ireland regarding public security and policing approaches. You will be given the legal definition of 'antisocial behaviour' and 'criminal age responsibility' to answer some questions.

**What information will be collected?**

You will be asked your age, gender identity, nationality, area where you frequent the most, position about Garda Síochána firearms use, opinion about reducing age for criminal responsibility, and whether or not you feel safe in your everyday life. All answers will be anonymous.

**Why have you been asked to take part?**

You have been asked because this survey can be completed by any Latin American person over 18 living in Ireland.

**Do you have to take part?**

No, you are not obligated to participate in this research. It is entirely up to you to decide whether or not you would like to participate.

If you decide to do so, you will be asked to sign a consent form and be given a copy of this and the information sheet for your records. If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time without providing a reason and withdraw your information until the research findings are anonymised.

**Will your participation in the study be kept confidential?**

Yes, all pre-anonymised information collected about you during the research will be kept confidential. Under the Irish and UK constitutions, human rights, and data protection laws, you have several legal rights to confidentiality. As principal investigator, I have corresponding legal duties to protect those rights. No names will be identified at any time. No information will be distributed to any other unauthorised individual or third party. If you wish, the data you provide can also be available at your discretion. It must be recognised that, in some circumstances, the confidentiality of research data and records may be overridden by courts in the event of litigation or the course of investigation by lawful authority. In such circumstances, the University will take all reasonable steps within the law to ensure confidentiality is maintained to the greatest extent.

**What will happen to the information which you give?**

Maynooth University will keep all the information you provide so that it will not be possible to identify you. On completion of the research, the data will be retained on the MU server. After ten years, all data will be destroyed. Manual data will be shredded confidentially, and electronic data will be reformatted or overwritten.

**What will happen to the results?**

The research will be written and presented as a dissertation for the MA Comparative Criminology and Criminal Justice masters. The aggregated findings may be included in future publications. A copy of the research findings will be available upon request.

**What are the possible disadvantages of participating?**

I do not anticipate any disadvantages.

**What if there is a problem?**

If you experience any distress following the survey, call Samaritans Ireland on 116 123, the Crime Victims Helpline on 116 006, or text HELLO to 50808 to text with a crisis volunteer. You may contact my supervisor, Professor Dr Cian Ó Concubhair, at [Cian.OConcubhair@mu.ie](mailto:Cian.OConcubhair@mu.ie) if you feel the research has not been done as described above.

**Any further queries?**

**If you need further information, you can contact me at [sabrina.cardoso.2024@mumail.ie](mailto:sabrina.cardoso.2024@mumail.ie). If you agree to participate in the study, please complete and sign the consent form overleaf.**

**Thank you for taking the time to read this.**

## **‘¿Puede Irlanda mantenernos seguros? Una visión de la comunidad latinoamericana’**

### **HOJA INFORMATIVA Y FORMULARIO DE CONSENTIMIENTO PARA PARTICIPANTES EM INVESTIGACIONES: ENCUESTAS**

#### **Propósito del estudio.**

Mi nombre es Sabrina Cardoso Di Paolo. Soy una estudiante internacional posgraduada en Criminología Comparativa y Justicia Penal en la Universidad de Maynooth. Estoy realizando mi disertación final para mi maestría sobre la percepción de la policía y la actitud hacia la seguridad pública por parte de la comunidad latinoamericana en Irlanda. El estudio se titula: *¿Puede Irlanda mantenernos seguros? Una visión de la comunidad latinoamericana.*

#### **¿Quién ha aprobado este estudio?**

Este estudio ha sido revisado y ha recibido la aprobación ética del Comité de Investigación de la Facultad de Derecho y Criminología de la Universidad de Maynooth. Esta investigación se conduce bajo la supervisión del Dr. Cian Ó Concubhair. Puede solicitar una copia de la correspondiente aprobación si lo desea.

#### **¿En qué consistirá la participación en el estudio?**

El estudio consistirá en responder preguntas sobre su nivel de seguridad y confianza o las amenazas que siente al vivir en Irlanda en relación con la seguridad pública y los enfoques policiales. Se le proporcionará la definición legal de "conducta antisocial" y "edad de responsabilidad penal" para responder a algunas preguntas.

#### **¿Qué información se recopilará?**

Se le pedirá que proporcione su edad, identidad de género, nacionalidad, área geográfica que más frecuenta en Dublín, postura sobre el uso de armas de fuego por parte de la Garda Síochána, opinión sobre la reducción de la edad de responsabilidad penal y si se siente seguro o no en su vida cotidiana. Todas las respuestas serán anónimas.

#### **¿Por qué se le ha invitado a participar en este estudio?**

Se le ha invitado a participar porque esta encuesta puede ser completada por cualquier persona latinoamericana mayor de 18 años que resida en Irlanda.

**¿Es obligatorio participar?**

No, no está obligado/a a participar en esta investigación. Es completamente su decisión si desea o no hacerlo. Si decide hacerlo, se le pedirá que responda un formulario de consentimiento. Si decide participar, puede retirarse en cualquier momento sin proporcionar una razón y retirar su información hasta que los resultados de la investigación sean anonimizados.

**¿Se mantendrá la confidencialidad de su participación en el estudio?**

Sí, toda la información pre-anonimizada recopilada sobre usted durante la investigación se mantendrá confidencial. Bajo las constituciones de Irlanda y el Reino Unido, los Derechos Humanos y las leyes de protección de datos, usted tiene varios derechos legales a la confidencialidad. Como investigador principal, tengo deberes legales correspondientes para proteger esos derechos. No se identificarán nombres en ningún momento. No se distribuirá ninguna información a ninguna persona no autorizada o a terceros. Si lo desea, los datos que proporcione también estarán disponibles a su discreción. Debe reconocerse que, en algunas circunstancias, la confidencialidad de los datos y registros de la investigación puede ser anulada por los tribunales en caso de litigio o durante una investigación por una autoridad legal. En tales circunstancias, la Universidad tomará todas las medidas razonables dentro de la ley para garantizar que la confidencialidad se mantenga en la mayor medida posible.

**¿Qué pasará con la información que usted proporcione?**

La Universidad de Maynooth conservará toda la información que usted proporcione de manera que no sea posible identificarle. Al finalizar la investigación, los datos se conservarán en el servidor de la Universidad. Después de diez años, todos los datos serán destruidos. Los datos en papel se triturarán de manera confidencial, y los datos electrónicos serán reformateados o sobrescritos.

**¿Qué sucederá con los resultados?**

La investigación se redactará y se presentará como una disertación para la maestría en Criminología Comparativa y Justicia Penal. Los hallazgos agregados pueden ser incluidos en

futuras publicaciones. Una copia de los resultados de la investigación estará disponible a solicitud.

**¿Cuáles son las posibles desventajas de participar?**

No se anticipa desventaja alguna.

**¿Qué hacer si surge algún problema?**

Si experimenta angustia o molestia después de la encuesta, puede contactarse con Samaritans Ireland al 116 123, a la Línea de Ayuda a Víctimas de Crimen al 116 006, o envíe un mensaje de texto con la palabra HELLO al 50808 para hablar con una persona que puede asistirle en momentos de crisis. Si considera que la investigación no se ha realizado según lo descrito anteriormente, puede contactar a mi supervisor; Profesor Dr. Cian Ó Concubhair, cursando un email a su casilla de correo electrónico: [Cian.OConcubhair@mu.ie](mailto:Cian.OConcubhair@mu.ie)

**¿Alguna pregunta adicional?**

**Si necesita más información, puede contactarme cursando un email a la casilla de correo electrónico [sabrina.cardoso.2024@mumail.ie](mailto:sabrina.cardoso.2024@mumail.ie) Si está de acuerdo en participar en el estudio, complete el formulario al inicio de la encuesta.**

**Gracias por tomarse el tiempo de leer esta información.**



**'A Irlanda pode nos manter seguros? Uma visão da comunidade latino-americana'**  
**FOLHA INFORMATIVA E FORMULÁRIO DE CONSENTIMENTO PARA**  
**PARTICIPANTES DE PESQUISAS: QUESTIONÁRIOS**

**Propósito do estudo.**

Meu nome é Sabrina Cardoso Di Paolo. Sou uma estudante internacional de pós-graduação em Criminologia Comparativa e Justiça Penal na Universidade de Maynooth. Estou realizando minha dissertação final para o mestrado sobre a percepção da polícia e a atitude em relação à segurança pública por parte da comunidade latino-americana na Irlanda. O estudo se intitula: A Irlanda pode nos manter seguros? Uma visão da comunidade latino-americana.

**Quem aprovou este estudo?**

Este estudo foi revisado e recebeu aprovação ética do Comitê de Pesquisa da Faculdade de Direito e Criminologia da Universidade de Maynooth. Esta pesquisa é conduzida sob a supervisão do Dr. Cian Ó Concubhair. Você pode solicitar uma cópia da respectiva aprovação, se desejar.

**Em que consistirá a participação no estudo?**

O estudo consistirá em responder perguntas sobre seu nível de segurança e confiança ou as ameaças que você sente ao viver na Irlanda em relação à segurança pública e às abordagens policiais. Você receberá a definição legal de "comportamento antissocial" e "idade de responsabilidade penal" para responder a algumas perguntas.

**Que informações serão coletadas?**

Será solicitado que você forneça sua idade, identidade de gênero, nacionalidade, área geográfica que mais frequenta em Dublin, posição sobre o uso de armas de fogo pela Garda Síochána, opinião sobre a redução da idade de responsabilidade penal e se você se sente seguro(a) ou não no seu dia a dia. Todas as respostas serão anônimas.

**Por que você foi convidado(a) a participar deste estudo?**

Você foi convidado(a) a participar porque esta pesquisa pode ser respondida por qualquer pessoa

latino-americana maior de 18 anos que resida na Irlanda.

### **É obrigatório participar?**

Não, você não é obrigado(a) a participar desta pesquisa. É totalmente sua decisão se deseja ou não fazê-lo. Se decidir participar, será solicitado que você responda a um formulário de consentimento. Se decidir participar, você pode se retirar a qualquer momento sem precisar dar uma razão e retirar suas informações até que os resultados da pesquisa sejam anonimizados.

### **Sua participação no estudo será mantida em sigilo?**

Sim, todas as informações pre-anonimizadas coletadas sobre você durante a pesquisa serão mantidas em sigilo. De acordo com as constituições da Irlanda e do Reino Unido, os direitos humanos e as leis de proteção de dados, você possui vários direitos legais à confidencialidade. Como pesquisadora principal, tenho deveres legais correspondentes para proteger esses direitos. Nenhum nome será identificado em nenhum momento. Nenhuma informação será divulgada a qualquer pessoa não autorizada ou a terceiros. Se desejar, os dados que você fornecer também estarão disponíveis a seu critério. Deve-se reconhecer que, em algumas circunstâncias, a confidencialidade dos dados e registros da pesquisa pode ser anulada pelos tribunais em caso de litígio ou durante uma investigação por uma autoridade legal. Nesses casos, a Universidade tomará todas as medidas razoáveis dentro da lei para garantir que a confidencialidade seja mantida na maior medida possível.

### **O que acontecerá com as informações que você fornecer?**

A Universidade de Maynooth manterá todas as informações que você fornecer de forma que não seja possível identificá-lo(a). Ao finalizar a pesquisa, os dados serão armazenados no servidor da Universidade. Após dez anos, todos os dados serão destruídos. Os dados em papel serão triturados de forma confidencial e os dados eletrônicos serão reformatados ou sobrescritos.

### **O que acontecerá com os resultados?**

A pesquisa será redigida e apresentada como uma dissertação para o mestrado em Criminologia Comparativa e Justiça Penal. Os resultados agregados podem ser incluídos em futuras publicações. Uma cópia dos resultados da pesquisa estará disponível mediante solicitação.

### **Quais são as possíveis desvantagens de participar?**

Nenhuma desvantagem é antecipada.

**O que fazer se surgir algum problema?**

Se você sentir algum desconforto ou angústia após a pesquisa, pode entrar em contato com o *Samaritans Ireland* pelo telefone 116 123, com a Linha de Ajuda a Vítimas de Crime pelo 116 006, ou enviar uma mensagem de texto com a palavra HELLO para 50808 para falar com alguém que pode auxiliá-lo(a) em momentos de crise. Se considerar que a pesquisa não foi realizada conforme descrito acima, você pode entrar em contato com meu supervisor, Professor Dr. Cian Ó Concubhair, enviando um e-mail para: [Cian.OConcubhair@mu.ie](mailto:Cian.OConcubhair@mu.ie)

**Alguma pergunta adicional?**

Se precisar de mais informações, pode entrar em contato comigo enviando um e-mail para [sabrina.cardoso.2024@mumail.ie](mailto:sabrina.cardoso.2024@mumail.ie)

**Se estiver de acordo em participar do estudo, complete o formulário no início da pesquisa.**

**Obrigada por dedicar seu tempo para ler estas informações.**

## **Appendix B: Consent Form**

# Can Ireland keep us safe?

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## Consent Form

Formulario de consentimiento (Spanish)

Formulário de Consentimento (Portuguese)

1. I agree to participate in Sabrina's research study, ' Can Ireland keep us safe? A View from the Latin American Community.

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*Estoy de acuerdo en participar en el estudio de investigación de Sabrina, '¿Puede Irlanda mantenernos seguros? Una perspectiva de la comunidad latinoamericana.' (Spanish)*

*Eu concordo em participar do estudo de pesquisa de Sabrina, 'A Irlanda pode nos manter seguros? Uma Visão da Comunidade Latino-Americana.' (Portuguese) \**

Yes

No

2. The purpose and nature of this study have been explained to me in writing.

---

*El propósito y la naturaleza de este estudio me han sido explicados por escrito (Spanish)*

*O propósito e a natureza deste estudo foram explicados para mim por escrito (Portuguese) \**

Yes

No

3. I am participating voluntarily.

---

*Estoy participando voluntariamente (Spanish)*

*Estou participando voluntariamente (Portuguese) \**

Yes

No

4. I understand that I can withdraw from the study, without repercussion, at any time before I submit my answers using the 'submit' button at the end of the survey.

*Entiendo que puedo retirarme del estudio, sin repercusión, en cualquier momento antes de enviar mis respuestas utilizando el botón 'enviar' al final de la encuesta (Spanish)*

*Entendo que posso me retirar do estudo, sem repercussão, a qualquer momento antes de enviar minhas respostas usando o botão 'enviar' no final da pesquisa (Portuguese). \**

Yes

No

5. I have been explained how my data will be managed, and I may access the research findings on request.

---

*Se me ha explicado cómo se gestionarán mis datos y puedo acceder a los resultados de la investigación si lo solicito (Spanish)*

*Foi-me explicado como meus dados serão gerenciados e eu posso acessar os resultados da pesquisa mediante solicitação (Portuguese). \**

- Yes  
 No

6. I understand the limits of confidentiality as described in the information sheet.

*Entiendo los límites de la confidencialidad tal como se describen en la hoja informativa (Spanish)*

*Compreendo os limites da confidencialidade conforme descrito na folha de informações (Portuguese). \**

- Yes  
 No

7. I agree with the quotation/publication of extracts from my survey answers.

---

Estoy de acuerdo con la citación/publicación de extractos de mis respuestas a la encuesta  
(Spanish)

Concordo com a citação/publicação de trechos das minhas respostas à pesquisa  
(Portuguese) \*

Yes

No

8. My data can be used for further research/subsequent outputs.

---

Mis datos pueden ser utilizados para futuras investigaciones (Spanish)

Meus dados podem ser usados para pesquisas futuras/resultados subsequentes  
(Portuguese) \*

Yes

No

I, the researcher, have taken the time to explain to the participants the nature and purpose of the study in a manner they can understand (using Spanish and Portuguese language). I have invited them to ask questions on any aspect of this research that could concern them.

If, during the participation of this study, the information or guidelines you were given have been neglected or disregarded in any way, or you feel unhappy with the process, don't hesitate to get in touch with the Department of Law Research Committee at [avril.brandon@mu.ie](mailto:avril.brandon@mu.ie).

Please be assured that your concerns will be dealt with sensitively.



**This template has been adapted from the template designed by the Social Research Ethics Subcommittee (SRESC) at Maynooth University.**

*Spanish: Yo, el investigador, me he tomado el tiempo para explicar a los participantes la naturaleza y el propósito del estudio de manera que puedan comprender (utilizando el idioma español y portugués). Les he invitado a hacer preguntas sobre cualquier aspecto de esta investigación que les pudiera preocupar.*

*Si durante su participación en este estudio, la información o las pautas que se le dieron han sido descuidadas o ignoradas de alguna manera, o si se siente insatisfecho con el proceso, no dude en ponerse en contacto con el Comité de Investigación del Departamento de Derecho en [avril.brandon@mu.ie](mailto:avril.brandon@mu.ie).*

*Tenga la seguridad de que sus preocupaciones serán tratadas con sensibilidad.*

*Esta plantilla ha sido adaptada a partir de la plantilla diseñada por el Subcomité de Ética en Investigación Social (SRESC) de la Universidad de Maynooth.*

*Portuguese: Eu, o pesquisador, tomei o tempo necessário para explicar aos participantes a natureza e o propósito do estudo de forma que eles possam entender (incluindo nos idiomas espanhol e português). Convidei-os a fazer perguntas sobre qualquer aspecto desta pesquisa que possa preocupá-los.*

*Se, durante a sua participação neste estudo, as informações ou diretrizes que lhe foram fornecidas foram negligenciadas ou desconsideradas de alguma forma, ou se você se sentir insatisfeito com o processo, não hesite em entrar em contato com o Comitê de Pesquisa do Departamento de Direito no endereço [avril.brandon@mu.ie](mailto:avril.brandon@mu.ie).*

*Tenha a certeza de que suas preocupações serão tratadas com sensibilidade.*

*Este modelo foi adaptado a partir do modelo desenvolvido pelo Subcomitê de Ética em Pesquisa Social (SRESC) da Universidade de Maynooth.*

## **Appendix C: Survey**

## Security Attitude and Risk Perception of the Latin American Community Towards Antisocial Behaviour and Policing Approach in Ireland

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this research. Answering this survey should not take more than 15 minutes. There are some concepts whose legal definitions are provided in the question in which they are mentioned. Please base your answer according to its specific meaning.

Thanks for your time.

\*Required.

Spanish: Gracias por tomarse el tiempo para participar en esta investigación. Responder esta encuesta no debería tomar más de 15 minutos. Existen algunos conceptos cuyas definiciones legales se proporcionan en la pregunta en la que están mencionados. Por favor, base su respuesta atendiendo el tenor de dichos significados.

Gracias por su tiempo.

\*Obligatorio.

Portuguese: Obrigada por dedicar seu tempo para participar desta pesquisa. Responder a esta pesquisa não deve levar mais de 15 minutos. Existem alguns conceitos cujas definições legais são fornecidas na pergunta em que estão envolvidos. Por favor, baseie sua resposta nesse significado específico.

Obrigada pelo seu tempo.

\*Obrigatório.

### 9. How old are you?

---

**Spanish:** *¿Cuántos años tienes?*

**Portuguese:** *Quantos anos você tem? \**

18 – 24

25 – 34

- 35 – 44
- 45 – 54
- 55 – 64
- 65 +

#### 10. What is your gender identity?

---

Spanish: *¿Cuál es tu identidad de género?*

Portuguese: *Qual é a sua identidade de gênero? \**

- Male/Masculino
- Female/Mujer/Feminino
- Non – binary/No – binario/Não binário
- Prefer not to say/Prefiero no decir/Prefiro não dizer

#### 11. Which country in Latin America are you from?

---

Spanish: *¿De qué país de América Latina eres?*

Portuguese: *De qual país da América Latina você é? \**

- Chile
- Argentina
- Colombia
- Bolivia
- Venezuela
- Mexico

- Paraguay
- Peru
- Brazil
- Costa Rica
- Uruguay
- Guatemala
- Nicaragua
- Dominican Republic
- El Salvador
- Ecuador
- Other/Otro/Outro

## 12. Which area of Dublin do you frequent the most?

---

**Spanish:** *¿Cuál es el área de Dublín que más frecuentas?*

**Portuguese:** *Qual área de Dublin você frequenta mais? \**

- Rathfarnham
- Sandyford
- Drumcondra
- Finglas
- Temple Bar
- Stephen Green
- Trinity College
- Tallaght
- Clondalkin
- Grand Canal Dock
- Ranelagh
- Rathmines

- Dalkey
- Sandymount
- Ballyfermont
- Cabra
- Rathgar
- Artane
- Terenure
- Marino
- Abbey St.
- O' Connell St.
- Parnell Sq.
- Dollymount
- Riverside
- Clonsilla
- Clonee
- Rockbrook
- Ballinteer
- Drundrum
- Bluebell
- Merrion
- Palmerstown
- Island Bridge
- Howth
- Liffey Valley
- Other/Otra/Outra
- Outside Dublin/Afuera de Dublin/Fora do Dublin

### 13. How long have you been living in Ireland?

---

Spanish: *¿Cuánto tiempo llevas viviendo en Irlanda?*

Portuguese: *Há quanto tempo você vive na Irlanda? \**

- Less than one month/Menos de un mes/Menos de um mês
- 1 to 6 six months/De 1 a 6 meses
- Six months to 1 year/De seis meses a 1 año/De seis meses a um ano
- 1 to 5 years/De 1 a 5 años/De 1 a 5 anos
- More than 5 years/Mas de 5 años/Mais de 5 anos

### 14. What was your main reason for immigrating to Ireland?

---

Spanish: *¿Cuál fue tu principal motivo para inmigrar a Irlanda?*

Portuguese: *Qual foi o seu principal motivo para imigrar para a Irlanda? \**

- Study/Estudio/Estudos
- Work/Trabajo/Trabalho
- Cultural Interests/Intereses culturales/Interesses culturais
- Public Safety/Seguridad Pública/Segurança pública
- VISA facilities/Facilidades de visado/Facilidade de visto
- Relatives or friends already in the country/Familiares o amigos que ya estaban en el país/Parentes ou amigos já no país

- Migration Policies/Políticas de migración/Políticas de migração
- Economic and security issues in the country of origin/Problemas económicos y de seguridad en el país de origen/Questões econômicas e de segurança no país de origem

### 15. How safe do you feel in your neighbourhood?

---

Spanish: *Qué tan seguro te sientes en tu vecindario?*

Portuguese: *Quão seguro você se sente no seu bairro? \**

- Very unsafe/Muy inseguro/Muito inseguro
- Somewhat unsafe/Algo inseguro/Um pouco inseguro
- Neither safe or unsafe/Ninguno/Nem seguro nem inseguro
- Somewhat safe/Algo seguro/Um pouco seguro
- Very safe/Muy seguro/Muito seguro

### 16. How safe do you feel visiting the city centre?

---

Spanish: *¿Qué tan seguro te sientes al visitar el centro de la ciudad?*

Portuguese: *Quão seguro você se sente ao visitar o centro da cidade? \**

- Very unsafe/Muy inseguro/Muito inseguro
- Somewhat unsafe/Algo inseguro/Um pouco inseguro
- Neither safe or unsafe/Ni seguro ni inseguro/nem seguro nem inseguro
- Somewhat safe/Algo seguro/Um pouco seguro



Very safe/Muy seguro/Muito seguro

**17. How safe would you feel asking Garda Síochána help?**

Spanish: *¿Qué tan seguro te sentirías pidiendo ayuda a la Garda Síochána?*

Portuguese: *Quão seguro você se sentiria ao pedir ajuda à Garda Síochána?*

---

Spanish: *Ley de 2005, Sección 6.— (1) La fuerza policial llamada Garda Síochána continúa existiendo bajo esta ley como un servicio de policía.*

Portuguese: *Lei de 2005, Seção 6.— (1) A força policial chamada Garda Síochána continua existindo sob esta lei como um serviço de polícia. \**

Act. 2005, Section 6.— (1) The police force called the Garda Síochána continues in being under this Act as a police service.

- Very unsafe/Muy inseguro/Muito inseguro
- Somewhat unsafe/Algo inseguro/Um pouco inseguro
- Neither safe or unsafe/Ninguno/nem seguro nem inseguro
- Somewhat safe/Algo seguro/Um pouco seguro
- Very safe/Muy seguro/Muito seguro

## 18. How trustworthy do you believe Garda Síochána is?

---

Spanish: *¿Qué tan confiable crees que es la Garda Síochána?*

Portuguese: *¿Qué tan confiable crees que es la Garda Síochána? \**

- Very untrustworthy/Nada confiable/Nada confiável
- Somewhat untrustworthy/Apenas confiable/Muito pouco confiável
- Neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy/Ni confiable ni poco confiable/Nem confiável nem pouco confiável
- Somewhat trustworthy/Bastante confiable/Bastante confiável
- Very trustworthy/Muy confiable/Muito confiável

## 19. How effective do you believe Garda Síochána is?

---

Spanish: *¿Cómo te sentirías si la Garda llevara armas de fuego de manera rutinaria?*

Portuguese: *Quão eficaz você acredita que é a Garda Síochána? \**

- Very ineffective/Muy ineficaz/Muito ineficaz
- Somewhat ineffective/Algo ineficaz/Bastante ineficaz
- Neither effective nor ineffective/Ni eficaz ni ineficaz/Nem eficaz nem ineficaz
- Somewhat effective/Bastante eficaz/Bastante eficaz
- Very effective/Muy eficaz/Muito eficaz

**20. How different is Garda Síochána from police forces in other countries where you have lived?**

---

**Spanish:** *Qué tan diferente es la Garda Síochána de las fuerzas policiales en otros países donde has vivido?*

**Portuguese:** *Quão diferente é a Garda Síochána das forças policiais em outros países onde você viveu? \**

- Very different/Muy diferente/Muito diferente
  - Somewhat different/Apenas diferente/Um pouco diferente
  - Neither different nor similar/Ni diferente ni similar/Nem diferente nem parecido
  - Somewhat similar/Bastante similar/Bastante parecido
  - Very similar/Muy similar/Muito parecido
- 
- Very different/Muy diferente/Muito diferente
  - Somewhat different/Apenas diferente/Um pouco diferente
  - Neither different nor similar/Ni diferente ni similar/Nem diferente nem parecido
  - Somewhat similar/Bastante similar/Bastante parecido
  - Very similar/Muy similar/Muito parecido

**21. Do you feel threatened by antisocial behaviour in Ireland?**

Spanish: *¿Te sientes amenazado por el comportamiento antisocial en Irlanda?*

Portuguese: *Você se sente ameaçado pelo comportamento antissocial na Irlanda?*

---

Spanish: La Ley de Justicia Penal de 2006, el comportamiento antisocial implica acoso, alarma significativa o persistente, angustia, miedo o intimidación, así como un deterioro significativo o persistente del uso o disfrute de su propiedad.

Portuguese: De acordo com a Lei de Justiça Criminal de 2006, o comportamento antissocial envolve assédio, alarme significativo ou persistente, angústia, medo ou intimidação, bem como um prejuízo significativo ou persistente do uso ou desfrute da sua propriedade. \*

According to the Criminal Justice Act 2006 Antisocial behaviour consists of harassment, significant or persistent alarm, distress, fear or intimidation, as well as, significant or persistent impairment of their use or enjoyment of their property.

- Very threatened/Muy amenazado/Muito ameaçado
- Somewhat threatened/Algo amenazado/Um pouco ameaçado
- Neither threatened nor unthreatened/Ninguno/Nem ameaçado nem protegido
- Somewhat unthreatened/Bastante protegido/Bastante protegido
- Very unthreatened/Muy protegido/Muito protegido

## 22. How much do you consider antisocial behaviour when deciding where to socialise and travel?

Spanish: *¿Qué tanto tomas en cuenta el comportamiento antisocial al decidir dónde socializar y viajar?*

Portuguese: *Quanto você leva em consideração o comportamento antissocial ao decidir onde socializar e viajar? \**

- Very unconsidered in my decision/No lo considero en mi decisión/Não é considerado em minha decisão
- Somewhat unconsidered in my decision/Poco considerado en mi decisión/Pouca consideração em minha decisão
- Neither considered nor unconsidered/Es indistinto para mi/É indiferente para mim
- Somewhat considered in my decision/Bastante considerado en mi decisión/Bastante considerável em minha decisão
- Very considered in my decision/Muy considerado en mi decisión/Muito considerado em minha decisão

## 23. Do you think the age of criminality responsibility in Ireland should be reduced?

Spanish: *¿Crees que la edad de responsabilidad penal en Irlanda debería reducirse?*

Portuguese: *Você acha que a idade de responsabilidade criminal na Irlanda deveria ser reduzida?*

Spanish: La responsabilidad penal (o minoría de edad penal) se refiere a la edad a la que un niño puede ser arrestado, procesado, juzgado y, si es declarado culpable, puede recibir una sanción de un tribunal penal por un delito.

<https://www.open.edu/openlearn/education-development/youth-justice-the-uk-children-young-people-and-crime/content-section-overview>.

Portuguese: A responsabilidade criminal (ou minoridade criminal) refere-se à idade em que uma criança pode ser presa, processada, julgada e, se for considerada culpada, pode receber uma sentença de um tribunal criminal por um delito.

<https://www.open.edu/openlearn/education-development/youth-justice-the-uk-children-young-people-and-crime/content-section-overview>. \*

Criminal responsibility (or criminal minority) refers to the age at which a child may be arrested, prosecuted, tried and, if found guilty, may receive a disposal from a criminal court for an offence.

<https://www.open.edu/openlearn/education-development/youth-justice-the-uk-children-young-people-and-crime/content-section-overview>

- Very disagree/Muy en desacuerdo/Muito em desacordo
- Somewhat disagree/Un poco en desacuerdo/Um pouco em desacordo
- Neither agree nor disagree/Ni acuerdo ni desacuerdo/Nem de acordo nem em desacordo
- Somewhat agree/Bastante de acuerdo/Bastante de acordo
- Very agree/Muy de acuerdo/Muito de acordo

#### 24. How would you feel if Gardai routinely carried firearms?

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Spanish: ¿Cómo te sentirías si la Garda llevara armas de fuego de manera rutinaria?

Portuguese: Como você se sentiria se os Gardai carregasse armas de fogo rotineiramente? \*

- Much safer/ Mas seguro/Mais seguro
- Somewhat safer/Un poco mas seguro/Um pouco mais seguro
- Neither safer nor unsafe/Ninguno/Nenhum
- Somewhat unsafe/Algo inseguro/Um pouco inseguro
- Very unsafe/Muy inseguro/Muito inseguro

#### 25. Would you feel safer if Gardai could stop and search people without any suspicion?

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Spanish: ¿Te sentirías más seguro si la Garda pudiera detener y registrar a las personas sin ninguna sospecha?

Portuguese: Você se sentiria mais seguro se os Gardai pudesse parar e revistar as pessoas sem qualquer suspeita? \*

- Much safer/ Mas seguro/Mais seguro
- Somewhat safer/Un poco mas seguro/Um pouco mais seguro
- Neither safer nor unsafe/Ninguno/Nenhum
- Somewhat unsafe/Algo inseguro/Um pouco inseguro
- Very unsafe/Muy inseguro/Muito inseguro

**26. Do you ever walk at night alone?**

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**Spanish:** *¿Caminas solo/a por la noche alguna vez?*

**Portuguese:** *Você anda sozinho/a à noite? \**

- Never/Nunca
- Rarely/Raramente
- Sometimes/A veces/Às vezes
- Frequently/Frecuentemente/Frequentemente
- Always/Siempre/Sempre

**27. How safe do you feel when walking alone at night?**

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**Spanish:** *¿Qué tan seguro/a te sientes al caminar solo/a por la noche?*

**Portuguese:** *Quão seguro você se sente ao andar sozinho/a à noite? \**

- Very unsafe/Muy inseguro/Muito inseguro
- Somewhat unsafe/Algo inseguro/Um pouco inseguro
- Neither safe or unsafe/Ninguno/Nem seguro nem inseguro
- Somewhat safe/Algo seguro/Um pouco seguro
- Very safe/Muy seguro/Muito seguro

**28. Do you believe the number of stops and searches in public carried out by Gardaí should be increased?**

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Spanish: ¿Crees que se debería aumentar la cantidad de registros personales e inspecciones en la vía pública realizados por la Garda?

Portuguese: *Você acredita que a quantidade de revistas pessoais e inspeções em via pública realizadas pela Garda deveria ser aumentada? \**

- Absolutely agree/Totalmente de acuerdo/Muito de acordo
- Somewhat agree/Un poco de acuerdo/Um pouco de acordo
- I do not know/No lo sé/Não sei
- Somewhat disagree/Bastante en desacuerdo/Bastante em desacordo
- Absolutely disagree/Totalmente desacuerdo/Totalmente em desacordo