The Subject in Question
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The essays above let us see what kinds of knowledge are incited by the later works of Michel Foucault? These essays, in turn, invite us to find how those knowledges may be been implicit in earlier colonial and postcolonial self-reflection. Let me begin with subjectivation. Various branches of the Social Sciences have at times posited a universal subject, the agent whose preferences interact with circumstances to produce behavior. The most notorious of these universal subjects is perhaps the construct known as Rational Economic Man (Hollis and Nell 1975). A similar strategy is evident in the ideologies justifying colonialism, or legitimating the bourgeois social order. Here, we are presented with a teleology, the civilizing process through which the savage evolves into the civilized subject. The savage shows itself in the form of the indigenous peoples of external lands to be conquered (Césaire 2000) or in the form of the dangerous classes (Chevalier 1973) internal to the core. Already in *Les mots et les choses* (1966), Foucault (1971, 386) took this universal subject as his target concluding that: 'One thing in any case is certain: man is neither the oldest nor the most constant problem that has been posed for human knowledge.' This universal subject, then, is a historical creation. By historicizing this notion, Foucault added to the scholarship that challenges the Eurocentrism of the Enlightenment project.

Of course, this challenge had multiple sources. In a chapter above, Prathama Banerjee describes as developmentality the set of interests that I have outlined as the civilising mission. Banerjee says that, as a form of governmentality, developmentality claims a knowledge of the lack among the people who need developing. Being interpellated as inadequate can, particularly when reinforced by spectacular violence, produce an identification with the Master that elicits mimicry (Bhabha 1984). Yet, inadequacy and shame is an uncomfortable position and, as Srila Roy shows in her chapter above with her description of the feminist Action Hero blog, they directly excite resistance.

In the eighteenth-century Jonathan Swift felt he had been consigned to the periphery when the best position offered him was as Dean of St Patrick's cathedral in Dublin. Although born in Ireland, he would have preferred a position in one of the great English cathedrals. With time, he came to identify with the plight of his Irish neighbours and saw very many of their problems as due, not to their backward character, but to British misrule. He felt this misrule as a personal insult and he expressed his anger not only through the famous essay, 'A modest proposal' (Swift 1984), that satirised British rule as leaving the Irish nothing to eat but their own children, but also in a set of essays about the Irish economy showing that the universal 'truths' of economics simply did not apply in a colonial economy. In one essay, he referred to these universals as 'Maxims Controlled in Ireland' (Swift 1971), that is truths controverted by Irish circumstances.

In this case, the colonized subject recognises that the supposedly universal principles of economic relations do not apply in the same way to the colony. They are in fact both a projection and an ambition. In Economics, methodological individualism (Hodgson 2007) serves a clearly ideological purpose. Mitt Romney, running for US President, when challenged to raise money for social welfare by taxing corporations, responded with precisely this sort of methodological individualism: 'Corporations are people, my friend' (Rucker 2011). Basking in the glory of her third-time election as British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher also rejected higher social spending in exactly these terms: 'There is no such thing [as society]! There are individual men and women and there are families and no government can do anything except through people and people look to themselves first' (Thatcher 1987). If production is a collective enterprise, then, the holders of wealth owe obligations of fairness to the collective of which they

are a part. If, on the other hand, wealth is made by individuals, then, it should, it might seem, be appropriated by those same individuals.

This individuation is, in ideological terms, what Ritu Birla in a chapter above, refers to as disembedding the economy. To produce an economy of individual subjects, the law sawed through the ties between ownership and social formations. Birla names the production of a 'liberal governmentality,' 'the improving mission of British Utilitarians.' If Indian economic subjects were made over into liberal economic subjects, then, the British could, they believed, trust that market imperatives would serve their interests by inducing Indians to export to Britain raw materials and import British manufactures. The civilizing process required that the initial conditions for a liberal economy be established, if necessary by force (Nally 2011). In this respect, at least, Vivek Chibber (2013, 100) is right: 'Capitalism universalizes market dependence.' As Michael Watts (1983) and Mike Davis (2000) show, individualizing property titles and imposing money taxes, undermined the resilience of indigenous societies, converting peasants into proletarians at each famine, and as James Scott (2009) documents, indigenous peoples have very often understood monetary taxes as nothing less than just this attack on their independence. Birla (above) gives a stupendous example of this disembedding. It was the practice of wealthy Hindu families to give funds to local charities but with the proviso that should the family firm meet temporary setback the funds could be reclaimed until once again they could be repaid. Rather than accept that gifts might be conditional, might reinforce and sustain a set of social interrelations, the British passed a law that recognised as a legal entity, the deity of the local charity and treated the charitable gift as a permanent alienation of funds to the deity. Better God than Society.

To the colonizer, the colony is, as Banerjee says, a place of lack, a place that is, as Johannes Fabian (1983) remarks, from an earlier time. The colonized begins by seeing itself through the eyes of the dominating colonial power. In this sense, James Joyce has Stephen in *Ulysses* offer a number of images for the work of the Irish artist, one of which plays on the criticism of realism offered by another Irishman, Oscar Wilde. In the Preface to *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, Wilde, referring back to the character that represents the indigenous savage in Shakespeare's *The Tempest*, suggested that:

> The nineteenth century dislike of Realism is the rage of Caliban seeing his own face in a glass.
>
> The nineteenth century dislike of Romanticism is the rage of Caliban not seeing his own face in a glass (Wilde 1994, 5).

Wilde preferred Romanticism. In one essay, 'The Decay of Lying,' Wilde had Cyril concede to the Wilde alter ego, Vivian:

> I can quite understand your objection to art being treated as a mirror. You think it would reduce genius to the position of a cracked looking-glass (Wilde 1913, 30).

This is the image that Joyce picks up and refracts. In the first chapter of *Ulysses*, Buck Mulligan, while shaving, holds out to Stephen a cracked mirror, one that Mulligan had earlier lifted from the room of his mother's domestic servant. Stephen asks himself if the fractured image is actually how others see him, and at that point Mulligan invokes Wilde:

> Laughing again, he brought the mirror away from Stephen's peering eyes.
> — The rage of Caliban at not seeing his face in a mirror, he said. If Wilde were only alive to see you!
>
> Drawing back and pointing, Stephen said with bitterness:
> — It is a symbol of Irish art. The cracked lookingglass of the servant (Joyce 1986, 1.141-6).

This is a complex and dense rendering of the colonial subject but it is clearly an account of subjectivation.

Caliban, an anagram of cannibal, the contemporary Dutch term for the inhabitants of the Caribbean, has been a central figure in postcolonial readings of Shakespeare (Lamming 1960; Retamar 1989; Greenblatt 1990). There are two accounts of Caliban in *The Tempest*. The first is similar to Deana Heath's account above of the colonial construction of the colonized as being inherently violent. This version is given by Prospero and by his daughter Miranda. Prospero says that he when he came to the island, he found Caliban a filthy beast who could be directed only by whipping, and that he took him into his own home as a servant, until Caliban attempted rape upon Miranda whereupon Prospero used his magic to confine him to a cave. Miranda, likewise, claims to have treated Caliban kindly, teaching to him her language, but that it later became obvious to her that Caliban was of such 'vile race' that 'good natures | Could not abide to be with' (*Tempest*, 1.2, 359–61). The violence and prejudice of Prospero and Miranda are self-evident, but Shakespeare also gave Prospero's slaves, Caliban and Ariel, their own accounts of their capture and treatment. Caliban says Prospero dispossessed him of the island, which he had inherited from his mother. Caliban asserts that Prospero could not have survived on the island without Caliban's assistance and that at first this help had been given willingly in return for kindly treatment: 'When thou camest first, | Thou strokedst me and madest much of me| […] and then I loved thee' (*Tempest*, 1.2, 333–4, 337). He implies that it was only natural that he should want to father children with the only woman on the island, Prospero's daughter Miranda. He accepts that he learned from Miranda to speak in her language but that the chains of Prospero's magic made his life such misery that having learned their language 'my profit on 't | Is I know how to curse' (*Tempest* 1.2.364-5). If Caliban is bestial, it is clear that Prospero is much to blame: 'Hag-seed, hence! | Fetch us in fuel, and be quick […] | If thou neglect'st, or dost unwillingly | What I command, I'll rack thee with old cramps, | Fill all thy bones with aches, make thee roar, | That beasts shall tremble at thy din' (*Tempest* 1.2.366-7, 369-72).

Such treatment will produce a beast but also a subjectivity. In his chapter above on the subjectivation of animals, Jonathan Saha gives an account of the mastering of an elephant, Ngwe Maung, that in its horror recalls Caliban's roar. Brutality towards both animals and humans were part of colonial rule and in both cases a subjectivation was the object of the regime of pain. In his chapter Stephen Legg writes of colonial truth regimes that not only demanded truth acts as loyalty tests but that also used psychological techniques of seclusion and isolation to break down political prisoners. The subject produced here is of the deranged body in pain (Scarry 1985). In her chapter, Deana Heath explores the contradiction between the colonial authority denying that violence should be part of liberal governance and yet presiding over a system where violence was a regular part of criminal investigation and even of tax collection. The colonial authorities concluded that the failure lay with the Indian people themselves who had been inured to violence by centuries of despotic rule and who understood very little else. Heath cites cases where the evidence of torture is dismissed as the self-harm characteristic of a depraved people. Once again, we see the lack that the colonizer sees in the colonized, and once again it produces a sense of superiority and innocence for the colonizer.

Wilde was living in England and set *The Picture of Dorian Gray* in London. In this context, to use the figure of Caliban to represent the artist, was to reclaim the subordinate, subaltern, position as the place from which to speak Beauty to Power. From the Realist, rather than Romantic pole, Joyce does something similar. He has Stephen ask how others see him, and recognises that it is only in this fashion that he can see himself, refracted by their gaze. Colonialism has stripped Stephen of a continuity of identity with the cultural heritage of his homeland and even his language is not his own for he must speak in English to be understood, not only by others, but even by himself. But common words will have local inflection. In *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, Joyce presents Stephen as a university student and, in

conversation with an English Jesuit priest, Stephen reflects on his resistance to English words and concepts:

> His language, so familiar and so foreign, will always be for me an acquired speech. I have not made or accepted its words. My voice holds them at bay. My soul frets in the shadow of his language (Joyce 1921, 221).

Faced with the force of the coloniser's view, the colonial subject may appear limited to mimicry or a sort of ironic exaggeration that might deflate colonial pomposity, as David Lloyd (1987) illustrates so wonderfully for the Irish poet, James Clarence Mangan. Yet Wilde's (1913, 38) Romantic purpose uses the mirror to a quite different effect: 'Life holds the mirror up to Art, and either reproduces some strange type imagined by painter or sculptor, or realises in fact what has been dreamed in fiction.' Art, then, might instigate utopia, 'refusing to affirm the miserable course of the world as the iron law of nature' (Adorno 2013, 68). The postcolonial subject might, then, think otherwise about a world that presents itself as mere necessity. As Spivak (1999, 37) concludes, the postcolonial subject 'cannot merely continue to act out the part of Caliban.'

In this respect, and as several chapters above suggest, 'care of self' (Foucault 1986) can elaborate a new subjectivity where a different external order is projected from novel control over the self. Legg, above, writes of Mohandas Gandhi elaborating a form of self-discipline that, in its adherence to non-violence, promised subjects a way to a truth undistorted by social antagonism. Legg also shows that this allowed the development of an alternative governance based on civil disobedience a radical separation from colonial structures. Subjectivation breeds power. In her chapter above, Srila Roy traces a similar set of strategies onwards to Indian feminism today, where cultivating the pleasures of just being in public space, can further the assertiveness and self-respect of Indian women in the face of a predominant rape culture that would drive them into privacy and invisibility. The anticolonial example of Gandhi might even now be deployed against a neoliberal governmentality shaped by the legacies of colonialism, and it is striking that the loitering campaign of Indian women, described by Roy, is not only about occupying public space, but does so in the cause of non-commodified sociability.

This postcolonial character of South Asian governmentalities is far from settled in current scholarship. Chibber (2013) has argued that in the early scholarship of the Subaltern Studies group, the Indian middle class was convicted of failing in its historical mission to overcome the landed classes and thus it was unable to deliver at independence a proper bourgeois democracy, nor was it able to incorporate the subaltern classes in its national project. Chibber is astute on the ways a heroic (and inaccurate) version of bourgeois revolutions in England and France has been used normatively to establish Indian inadequacies. Nevertheless, there is a question here that requires an answer. Is there a postcolonial reason for the distance between formal constitutional equality promising individual rights and a post-independence practice that compromises individualism with group-based concessions? In his chapter above, Partha Chatterjee talks of an electoral populism in India that gives political society the character of a series of exceptions, as, in return for electoral quiescence, different groups receive special attention from a state that in this moment exercises what Foucault has taught us to recognize as pastoral governance. In their Introduction above, Heath and Legg refer to this as para-legal welfare in contrast to citizenship welfare. Indrani Chatterjee's chapter above proposes a pre-colonial origin for this pastoral care. Early communities of Buddhist and Jaina monks served communities with irrigation and health-care. This tradition provided one basis for criticizing the colonial state for its failure to sustain life. From anticolonial politics, this obligation to care was transferred to the independent state. Pramartha Banerjee's account of the antipolitics of the Party of the Common Man (Aam Admi) reports its emphasis upon people's right to the basic preconditions for good living, and advancing an everyday democracy of common services.

Partha Chatterjee's argument about electoral populism suggests a further postcolonial

possibility. In a brilliant analysis of post-Apartheid South Africa, Gillian Hart (2014) describes how the rights-based constitution of newly-independent South Africa met material and political obstacles. Having accepted that it would not nationalize the commanding heights of the economy, the new government found itself without the resources to fulfill in short order the egalitarian obligations for housing, electricity and education to which it had committed itself. Beyond this, the leaders of the armed struggle feared losing electoral majorities unless they mobilized the ethnic divisions that in constitutional terms they were committed to erasing. Having legitimated the new government in universalist terms, the African National Congress now finds itself migrating towards a Zulu identification as it tries to ensure continued governance. But, as the promise of egalitarian services is dashed, various townships mobilise violently against the new order (Gibson 2011). To meet these rebellions the state makes concessions of precisely the kind that Partha Chatterjee documents. Yet, in South Africa, the ethnic identities that are now mobilized and energized as political identities against universalism, had previously been inflected by the divide-and-rule practices of the colonial government (Mamdani 1996). Of course, the same techniques had been used in India and Banerjee's chapter notes a particular postcolonial legacy in that the recognition that the British had cultivated difference in order to rule more easily led many to assume that such inequalities would disappear with independence and, as Banerjee shows, it took some time before the continuing discrimination against lower castes was made an explicit concern of government. Furthermore, Banerjee shows that, as with a Zulu identity in South Africa, a Hindu identity in India has been invoked as a majoritarian right to determine social rights in a sectarian manner. Banerjee's account of B.R. Ambedkar leading a mass rally of Dalits in formal secession from the Hindu nation is both sad and telling. This disappointment is not really countered by the elevation of untouchables into uniformed collectors of plastic-bags, as described above in Sara Hodges' excellent account of the historical specificity of the manifestations of plastic in Indian cities.

Having been subjectivated in particular ways by a colonial power, colonial subjects have ever found ways to question the universal categories that seem to legitimate their own subordination and that offer as a civilising prospect only impossible assimilation to the master's culture. Richard Kearney (1997) describes various ways that Irish philosophers felt uncomfortable with the universals of British empiricist philosophy and Protestant theology. Given the importance of Foucault's period (1966-8) in Tunisia (Elden 2017), we should perhaps ask not only what profit postcolonial scholarship can derive from Foucault but we might follow the lead of Robert Young (2004) and ask to what extent the reflection and practice of colonial, and later postcolonial, subjects in very many contexts can itself ground many of the central concerns of post-humanist scholarship. In *Les mots et les choses*, Foucault anticipated the central figure of Man deleted from European thought when its historically-contingent conditions were undercut, 'then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea' (Foucault 1971, 386). Perhaps the tide that advanced upon that face was the swelling assertion of the damned of the earth (Fanon 2004), rejecting their colonial subjectivation so that they might claim the right to try for a world more free of European colonialism and its attendant Eurocentric ideology of the universal subject.

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