

EDITH STEIN
AND MARTIN HEIDEGGER:
On the Meaning of Being

METTE LEBECH

Appended to Stein's "spiritual testament" *Finite and Eternal Being: An Attempt at an Ascent to the Meaning of Being*, we find a long essay entitled: *Martin Heidegger's Existential Philosophy*.¹ A shorter essay on the *Castle of the Soul* by Teresa of Avila is also appended.²

An appendix is always an awkward thing to analyze because its status remains somewhat unclear. The author deemed the appendix important enough to append it to the main work, yet it was not directly included in it. It is clear from a letter to Conrad-Martius that the appendices were written after the main work was completed,³ however, to judge from the level of importance the other appendix has for the understanding of Stein's thought, this one should also provide insight into an important aspect of it. The appendix on Teresa of Avila's *Interior Castle* gives an analysis of the soul's experience of its own depths in the context of mystical life, which confirms Stein's early phenomenological analyses. If the Heidegger

appendix gives us something of equal importance, what is it?

The following essay will discuss the reasons Stein had for writing about Heidegger, after which it will turn to Stein's discussion of Heidegger's project. The discussion will conclude by outlining Stein's and Heidegger's alternative phenomenological inheritance and their relationship to the meaning of being.

Why Did Stein Write about Heidegger?

The appendix provides a key to *Finite and Eternal Being*, which can be read, because of it, as a response to Heidegger's *Being and Time*,⁴ such a reading on its own, however, would not do the work justice, since its investigation of the meaning of being points to the meaning of being itself for its meaning. Reading the work as a reply to Heidegger must remain an afterthought, since the positive content of the work does not directly concern Heidegger's work. When the thought inevitably occurs, it is because *Finite and Eternal Being* answers the same question concerning the meaning of being addressed by *Being and Time* but, in contrast with the latter, retains a focus on being as such and not only on the human being in its ascent to the meaning of being.

Stein had first met Heidegger at the Husserl's in Freiburg, then later on several occasions while she was working as Husserl's assistant. She had found him charming, but had also noticed that his writings contained "unmistakable digs at phenomenology."⁵ She understood

Heidegger to take the phenomenological inheritance in a direction that led away from Husserl's original insights, and she warily observed Husserl placing his full trust in Heidegger.⁶ As she associated herself with Husserl's vision for phenomenology as the foundation for future collaboration in philosophy, she saw Heidegger's "digs" as an attack on what she had found most valuable in phenomenology.⁷ Writing about Heidegger was an opportunity to speak for phenomenology against the direction in which he took it. It was also an opportunity to address the question of being as Hedwig Conrad-Martius and Roman Ingarden had done.⁸

Heidegger's turn toward being or toward the meaning of being was a turn toward *Dasein* as the meaning of being, in prolongation of Husserl's transcendental idealism. To Stein, the subordination of eidetics to transcendental phenomenology in Husserl's later philosophy, in contrast, constituted a problem. She saw the essential structures and the consequent foundation of a science of phenomenology as necessary for the Cartesian starting point to be of any consequence, and understood the possibilities for future research into axiology and the normative sciences to rely on this. The investigation of essences took up a prominent place in Husserl's early philosophy: formal ontology was understood to determine the regions of the various regional ontologies, in the same way as the science of essence (*Wesenswissenschaft*) was a necessary presupposition for the sciences of reality (*Tatsachenzwissenschaften*). That formal ontology should rely on the constituting function of the transcendental ego for the constitution of the formality it

obeyed was clear to Stein in the sense that the constituting function is required in order to identify this formality; that this formality, however, should rely on the constituting function of the transcendental ego in order to be what it is *in itself* could be possible only if this ego were infinite. If conceived as temporal, the idea was parallel to Heidegger's reduction of being to *Dasein*, and of being to time. Discussing the meaning of being—finite and eternal being—would allow one to clarify this and to focus on being and its meaning without reducing it to the human being.

Stein's Discussion of Heidegger's Project

Stein's essay is divided into four sections, each concerned with one of Heidegger's (until then) published works: *Being and Time*, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, *The Essence of Reasons*, and *What Is Metaphysics?* About two-thirds is taken up with an analysis of *Being and Time*, again simply divided into an "Outline of the Argument" and an "Evaluation." The latter part of this critique addresses three questions: "What is *Dasein*?"; "Is the Analysis of *Dasein* Accurate?"; and "Is it sufficient for adequately addressing the Question of the Meaning of Being?" The remainder of the analysis of Heidegger's work is concerned with testing whether the attempt at carrying through the threefold reduction outlined below is continually adhered to in Heidegger's subsequent work. Stein initially characterizes Heidegger's investigations as "often truly enlightening"⁹ and as accurate "in a certain sense"—"in the sense namely that [they] reveal something

of the basic constitution of the human being, and [he] sketches a certain way of being human with great clarity." She says she knows "of no better expression for this way of being; which he calls *Dasein* and understands to pertain to all human beings, than *unredeemed being*."¹⁰ It is unredeemed in both of its two different modes of "everyday" and "authentic" being; and although she describes Heidegger's description of the alternation between these modes as "masterly,"¹¹ she also regards it as flawed: "the human way of being as such is caricatured despite its being elucidated in its ultimate depths."¹²

She points to Heidegger's omission of any references to an I, subject, soul, or person as particularly critical. It results from his attempt to go beyond the "what" of the human being, but the lack of identification of important elements of the human being inevitably leads to an inexcusable confusion of ontology with anthropology, and of existence with *my* existence.

Stein understands Heidegger's project as an attempt to accomplish three impossible reductions: (a) reduction of the meaning of being to the human being; (b) reduction of the human being to its finitude; and (c) the reduction of being to time.

(a) *The Attempt to Reduce the Meaning of Being to the Human Being*

Heidegger starts as Aristotle did, by asking for the meaning of being,¹³ yet, instead of concentrating on the meaning of being, he enumerates the *conditions* for asking for the

meaning of being. The condition upon which he focuses in particular is the being for which its own being is in question—*Dasein*—literally “existence,” but which it can hardly be doubted that Heidegger employs to refer to the human being. He does that “without opposing the being, as ‘that which is,’ with being itself,”¹⁴ and this enables him to claim for the human being two things that are generally reserved for God: “the identity of essence and being,” and that it is that “from which alone information about the meaning of being is to be hoped for,”¹⁵ yet “the human being does not simply mean being, but a particular way of being, in contrast with which there are others: the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand”;¹⁶ and also the *being of Dasein*.

The identification of *Dasein* with the source of the meaningfulness of being¹⁷ as well as with a particular kind of being among others accomplishes the assimilation of *Dasein*'s inability to be defined with being's inability to be put in any genus. That the two kinds of being opposed to *Dasein*—being present-at-hand and being ready-to-hand—are understood to be dependent in their being on *Dasein* from whom they hold their relevance, situates *Dasein* on a par with being simply. That *Dasein* is simultaneously understood as a *kind* of being is underlined by the fact that Heidegger often talks about the *being of Dasein*, distinguishing it from *Dasein* itself.¹⁸ It is this being (simultaneously a kind of being and being simply) that has determinations (existentials). They must on the one hand remain very abstract in order to fit the dimensions of being in general and on the other be disconnected

from the human reality of body and soul, the limitations of which they reflect.

(b) *The Attempt to Reduce the Human Being to Its Finitude*

Stein objects not only to Heidegger's reduction of the meaning of being to the human being, but also to the human being being reduced to its finitude. Although Stein conceives of experience as laid out in the “now” of time—deploying itself in past, present, and future—she insists that experience is experience of *something* and that the human kind of experiencing is also *something* that we can and do identify by constituting it. Heidegger's rejection of engaging with *wahat Dasein* is leads him to understand the constituting function (experiencing itself as constituting in time) as the ultimate source of the meaning of being, and as the essence of the human being (*Dasein*),¹⁹ but for *Dasein* to disclose the meaning of being adequately, we must have an understanding of the whole of it; this we are supposed to have in death.²⁰ Death, in Heidegger's understanding, is the end of *Dasein*, but in such a manner that it leaves undecided whether there is a life after death. How can death be the end of *Dasein* if we cannot be sure that death is the end of *Dasein*? How can death provide us with a perspective that enables us to grasp *Dasein* in its entirety because it is the end of *Dasein*, particularly if we are not certain that it is the end of *Dasein*? If we are not sure that death is the end of *Dasein*, we are still lacking a feature that will enable

us to understand *Dasein* in its entirety and, with that, an element of the meaning of *Dasein*. This makes *Dasein's* being-towards-death insufficient for understanding the meaning of being. Death, or finitude in other words, cannot be the whole, or the end, of *Dasein*, nor can it be the meaning of being, if *Dasein might* continue to exist or might indeed exist as finalized by something else than death.

Other features of *Dasein's* finitude do not serve us any better to understand it as a whole. Authentic *Dasein*, marked by resoluteness and concern, understands its own possibilities and throws itself forth to meet the demands of the situation and the moment.²¹ Although this marks a relative independence, the momentary existence of *Dasein* depends on something beyond it: "In the moment . . . something meets us that perhaps no other moment will offer. To 'bring it out,' i.e., to take it up completely into one's own being, we must 'open ourselves to it and 'hand ourselves over' to it,"²² but that means that it comes with *something* for which we must be open, and that it comes to *something* that can be actualized or diminished by it. The moment, inseparable from the concern present in it, is—rather than a manifestation of *Dasein's* wholeness in finitude—a sign of the human being's openness to other kinds of being and, in particular, to the eternal fullness of being to which it can abandon itself in the present. Far from being the meaning of being, finitude is a characteristic of the human being experiencing itself as open to the eternal meaning of being.²³ As a result, finite beings and finitude cannot be understood in themselves without reference to eternal being, just as constitution

is unintelligible without that which is being constituted. Heidegger's attempt to reduce the human being to its finitude is intelligible only as an impossible attempt to derive what is constituted from constitution itself.

(c) *The Reduction of Being to Time*

Heidegger's attempt to reduce the meaning of being to the constituting function of *Dasein* reveals his desire to identify what lies before the "what," but it also entails that being as such is conceived according to the mode of being it has in the human person: being that is in time. To Stein it is significant that Heidegger never actually wrote the last section of *Being and Time*, which should have accomplished the reduction of being to time, but refers to it in several places as an aspiration to which the work as a whole tends. Some attempt to finish the project (upon which the rest depends) can be found in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*.²⁴ She interprets Heidegger to say: "The human being must, in so far as it is, be able to *let be*, and for this it must 'have already projected that which he encounters as a being.' Existence (i.e., the human way of being) 'is in itself *finitude* and, as such, is *only possible on the basis of the comprehension of being*. *There is and must be such a being only where finitude has become existent*.'" Insofar as Heidegger is attempting to derive being from finitude without it either being or authentically becoming a "what," he must understand nothing to be prior and original to being. He has, in fact, a tendency to go all the way and identify the being of *Dasein* with the nothingness it

experiences in its finite being.²⁵ Not only does he thus identify the being of *Dasein* with nothingness, but also "being itself," the being whose meaning we are seeking. "If we take all the passages quoted together [Stein says], and moreover remember what was said about original time, no other interpretation remains possible than that by nothingness is meant a being's constitution of being, which is projected with understanding by human beings, i.e., being itself."²⁶ Stein compares this distinction between a being's constitution of itself on the one hand and being itself on the other with the distinction between essence and existence, which she sees worked out in the *analogia entis* [the analogy of being]. Heidegger's reduction of the meaning of being to nothing remains severed from the Scholastic insight that existence is nothing in the sense that it is distinct and different from essence. Stein, in contrast, while sympathetic to the idea that being is no thing and also understanding how this nothing could be seen to be the temporalization inaugurated by the finitude of human experience, cannot extend this same finitude to being as such nor to the meaning of being, as the experience of it includes within it reference to different kinds of being that are not finite in the same way—Infinite Being, which is what it is, i.e., is its own essence, and also essences and essentialities, whose being is not temporal, although they are limited.

Two Versions of Phenomenology

The alternative proposed by Stein to Heidegger's continuation of phenomenology is one in which eidetics plays

a role complementary to constitutional or transcendental phenomenology, and in which analysis of the essence of constituted beings is necessary for the completion of the constitutional analysis. Put in terms closer to Heidegger's: the meaning of being (and of the being of *Dasein*) cannot be nothing *full stop* and still retain our attention; it must be a fullness in which our desire for meaning can find rest.

We can sketch the difference between Stein's and Heidegger's alternative continuations of phenomenology by contrasting ideas of theirs that play comparable roles, as well as looking at some shared ideas that come to play opposite roles. The role of the *eidōs* in Stein's version of phenomenology can be seen as parallel to the *existentials* in Heidegger's (a); the function of constitution can be seen as comparable to the idea of projection (b); Stein's understanding of the I, self, soul, and person parallels Heidegger's *Dasein* (c); her understanding of empathy his *Mitsein* (d); interpretation, in contrast, bears for both a relationship with values, which is of importance to Heidegger's opposition of authenticity and inauthenticity, and for Stein's opposition of sentient contagion and rationality (e). Death, likewise, and in particular the experience of the death of the other, is understood by the two authors to play opposite roles for the understanding of the meaning of being (f).

(a) *Eidōs* and *Existentials*

Heidegger's existentials—the structures of the being of *Dasein*—mark the dimensions of *Dasein* and explain its involvement with the world. They explain the world as

much as they explain the being of *Dasein*, insofar as they constitute the meaning of the world as *Dasein* opens it up or clears it by or in its being. The existentials—concern, being-in-the-world, and being-towards-death—reveal the world in its truth as projected with them and as dependent for its meaning on their projector, *Dasein*. Existentials structure the world, and it is in this capacity that they play the role played by essence in Stein's view. To Stein, essences are understood to be dependent for their translation into mental being of an I, but in themselves their being is essential, a priori, and not reducible to mental being. What they are constituted *as* can be the object of an eidetic analysis (an analysis of a particular understanding of something), but it remains distinct from an analysis that investigates them as such, i.e., investigates what pertains to them and what does not.²⁷ Heidegger's existentials, although having the same function of being that in terms of which experience is intelligible, cannot really be said to be of a kind of being distinct from that of *Dasein*. What they are is thus neither more nor less difficult to define than *Dasein*, which we seem to be prohibited from not identifying with nothing.

(b) *Constitution and Projection*

The world is, for Heidegger, dependent on *Dasein*, whether as deteriorated or as authentic. It is projected by *Dasein* as either by virtue of *Dasein's* own possibility. The projection is itself projected with the self-initiation that belongs to *Dasein* in the same way as constitution

is itself constituted by the constituting function of the I according to Stein. The constitution of things is consequently dependent on the I in the same way as the world is dependent for its projection on *Dasein*, but the things themselves, in what they are, i.e., in their essences, are co-constituted by others and a priori meaningful. Constitution and projection are, according to both authors, fundamentally structured by intentionality, but whereas Heidegger's projection emphasizes the dependence of the projected on the projector, Stein's constitution emphasizes the dependence of constitution on its constituting something objective. To her, only a type of constitution that is infinite can be unlimited by what it constitutes. We can know about such constitution from the possibility of negating the finitude of our own constituting activity, but the fact that we must negate it shows that it is not simply our own.

(c) *I, Self, Soul, Person, and Dasein*

It is the fundamental differentiation between my I and other I's, regarded by Stein as requisite for the inauguration of (human) experience as we know it, which makes me able to access the objectivity of the constituted and puts my ability to access the *a priori* in relief. It is also this differentiation that enables the I to constitute itself as *an* I, one among others, experiencing itself as embodied, and as visible to others as being beings of a certain kind.²⁸ These embodied, animated beings constitute their world and are motivated by it. This means that they constitute

values to motivate them, which they might share with others, and which energize them in characteristic ways closed to beings who do not constitute the same values to motivate them. The dimension of openness to the realm of values is according to Stein what makes us constitute human I's as persons. As human personal I's experience themselves as embodied, the feeling of the energy of the values resonating in the psyche opens up a space of depth, which she calls the soul. The constitution of the human person as a personal I having a body and a soul is for Stein warranted by experience as we know it. Her account contrasts with Heidegger's account of *Dasein*, which supposedly does not constitute itself as one of a kind, nor as anything specific at all; in its world projection it is neither a person nor even an I, and it does not have a body or a soul. Such ontic designations would compromise its universality as the meaning of being.

(d) *Empathy and Mitsein*

As *Dasein* is not one of a kind, Heidegger's *Mitsein* (being-with) designates an existential which structures experience, but it does not open the possibility for another self to make itself manifest as *other* and as *like* me, nor does *Mitsein* make me constitute myself as an I who is another I for someone else. For Stein, in contrast, empathy enables the I to constitute itself as one among many, and it also enables the I to test, confirm, and enrich its own perspective by that of the other. *Mitsein* for Heidegger is a semi-inauthentic state of *Dasein* in which it co-sees

the world with others, but not with others who, like it, are themselves *Dasein* and can correct my worldview by opening a space of objectivity. This air of inauthenticity makes it different from Stein's understanding of empathy as an act that is indispensable for the full constitution of the individual I and the person, one's own as well as that of the other, without which authentic objectivity or science is impossible.

(e) *Interpretation, Authenticity, and Rationality*

The contribution of empathy toward the constitution of individuals whose experience is open to one another enables Stein to conceive of values as motivating activities, i.e., as spiritual forces of direction available to all. Values manifest themselves on the one hand in the feelings of the individual human person and on the other as explanatory factors of the emotional life and the character of others, who, like myself, are exposed to their motivating power. Stein understands interpretation as the explanation of the motivation of a text, event, object, or institution (itself in turn motivated), in contrast with Heidegger who considers interpretation to be projected by *Dasein* as its own possibility—the mediation of values being subsumed into *Dasein*'s possibility, hence losing their objectivity and consequent intelligible availability as objective for others, who could also want to realize them. The only measure of the authenticity of the interpretation is, according to Heidegger, whether responsibility for the projection is assumed. To Stein there are other, more

important, criteria: an interpretation has to do justice to what is being interpreted, i.e., account for the motivations that govern it. There is a way to remain below the level of taking responsibility for the interpretation, and that is when opinions are absorbed by sentient contagion and no longer personally tested for their rationality.

Not having an understanding of value-objectivity and its importance for explaining social cohesion, Heidegger will see all collective normativity as an assault on personal independence and an occasion for inauthenticity. *Das Man* is the fallback position of inauthentic *Dasein*, in which it drowns responsibility in unconscious behavior. In contrast, Stein maintains the possibility of adequately corresponding to the motivating power of values, thus being rational, no matter whether these values are valued by others.

(f) *Death and the Meaning of Being*

For Heidegger, death is the end of *Dasein*, i.e., the end of being-in-the-world (irrespective of the question of a life after death). It is the transition from being *Dasein* to no longer being *Dasein*, and it can be undergone only in my own case because *Dasein* is always mine; it cannot be experienced as it is the transition from experience to non-experience. In contrast, my possibility of not-being is experienced in anguish. An understanding of the totality of *Dasein* is not advanced by the death of the other, thus the understanding of being cannot be completed and we cannot advance toward the meaning of being, except

provisionally, by existential analysis which in principle cannot be finished except perhaps at our own death. The awareness of the possibility of not-being has a sobering effect in that authentic living is being-toward-death in resoluteness or un-guaranteed self-investment, whereas fleeing in front of death leads to inauthentic hiding in "the they."

For Stein, death is not the proper end of the human being, although it is the occasion for its facing finally the question of "being or not being." Death can be experienced in my own near-death experiences, such as in anguish, severe illness, or imminent threat to my life, and it can also be experienced through empathy for the death the other is experiencing, or even from seeing the other already dead. The experience of the different types of death of the other: the fight, the victory, and quiet glory shining through, might contribute to our experience of the meaning of being.

The meaning of being cannot for Stein be answered simply by *Dasein*, no matter how well explained it would be in terms of its existentials. Being, for Stein includes different kinds—finite and eternal, personal and non-personal—and reducing being to one of its types is an answer that mistakes a part for the whole. Such a mistake is bound to ignore important features of being as we experience it, first and foremost essence, but also the independent being of natural being, personal individuality, values, community, and eternal being.

Notes

1. As the new, complete English translation of *Finite and Eternal Being* has not yet been published, I refer to the page numbers of the German work *Endliches und ewiges Sein (EES)* from the German series Edith Stein Gesamtausgabe (ESGA), vols. 11/12 (Freiburg: Herder, 2016), although I quote from my own translation of the Heidegger Appendix (HA) published in the *Maynooth Philosophical Papers, 2007* (<http://epjms.nun.ie/1005/>); hereafter referred to as *EES*, HA. *Finite and Eternal Being* was written in the years 1935–36, just after Stein had finished her novitiate in the Cologne Carmel. It is an extensive revision of her habilitation attempt *Potency and Act*, which was, when submitted in Freiburg in November 1931, read by, among others, Martin Heidegger. Also the Thomist Martin Honecker read the manuscript but did not think highly of it (Hugo Ott, "Edith Stein und Freiburg," in *Studien zur Philosophie von Edith Stein* [Freiburg-Munich: Verlag Karl Alber, 1993], 107–45). Heidegger discussed the manuscript of *Potenz und Act* with Stein for two hours (Stein to Ingarden, December 25, 1931, letter 152; and March 9, 1932, letter 153, in *Selbstbildnis in Briefen III: Briefe an Roman Ingarden*, ESGA, vol. 4 [Freiburg: Herder, 2001], 225–26; and in Stein, *Letters to Roman Ingarden*, trans. Hugh Candler Hunt, CWES, vol. 12 [Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 2014], 312–15. Heidegger and Honecker both advised Stein that she would be acceptable for habilitation on previous work, but that she should not proceed for political reasons. This attempt was her second, of which we have an extant written work (the first being *Beiträge zur Philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften*, ESGA, vol. 6 [Freiburg: Herder, 2010]). *Einführung in die Philosophie*, ESGA, vol. 8 (Freiburg: Herder, 2015), which Lucy Gelber regarded as a third habilitation attempt for Breslau (Edith Steins Werke [ESW], vol. 13 [Freiburg: Herder, 1991]) is more likely, as claimed by Wulf in her introduction to ESGA, vol. 8, to be the series of lectures held by Stein in Breslau, at which Norbert Elias, among others, assisted (Stein to Fritz Kaufmann, April 30, 1920, letter 31, and May 31, 1920, letter 32, in *Selbstbildnis in Briefen I*, ESGA, vol. 2 [Freiburg: Herder, 2010], 56–59. Although Stein herself talks about a revision, *Finite and Eternal Being* is, in fact, an entirely different work than *Potency and Act*. *Potency and Act* is a *Formalontologie* in the Husserlian sense and does not yet carry the large-scale *Auseinandersetzung*

- (dispute) with Aquinas and Aristotle, which makes up the middle part of *Finite and Eternal Being*.
- Both of these were left out in the first edition of Stein's works by Herder, Edith Steins Werke (ESW). The new critical edition Edith Stein Gesamtausgabe (ESGA) has amended this, and the English translation is catching up: the Heidegger appendix is due to be included in a new translation of *Finite and Eternal Being* by Walter Redmond to be published in a forthcoming volume in the ICS Publications edition of the Collected Works of Edith Stein.
 - Stein to Hedwig Conrad-Martius, August 20, 1936, letter 473, in *Selbstbildnis in Briefen II*, ESGA, vol. 3 (Freiburg: Herder, 2000), 221; letter 224, in *Self-Portrait in Letters*, trans. Josephine Koepffel, O.C.D., CWES, vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1993), 233.
 - Other investigations of the relationship between Stein and Heidegger include John Nota, "Edith Stein and Martin Heidegger," in *Edith Stein Symposium: Teresian Culture*, ed. John Sullivan, Carmelite Studies, vol. 4 (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1987), pp. 50–73 (a German version is found in *Denken in Dialog: zur Philosophie Edith Steins*, ed. Waltraud Herbstlich [Tübingen: Attempto Verlag, 1991], pp. 93–117); Antonio Calcagno, "Die Fülle oder das Nichts? Edith Stein and Martin Heidegger on the Question of Being," in *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 74, no. 2 (revised for Antonio Calcagno, *The Philosophy of Edith Stein* [Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2007], which is the edition we have used and refer to); Ott, "Edith Stein und Freiburg," in *Studien zur Philosophie von Edith Stein*, 107–45, also gives an account of Stein's and Heidegger's interactions in the early Freiburg years; Lidia Ripamonti, "Being Thrown or Being Held in Existence? The Opposite Approaches to Finitude of Edith Stein and Martin Heidegger," in *Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society*, ed. Fiachra Long (Maynooth, Ireland: Department of Philosophy, Maynooth University, 2008), 71–83. Marianne Sawicki's *Body Text and Science* (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1997) treats of Heidegger's publication of Husserl's *Time Consciousness* (which Stein edited), but not of Stein's Heidegger critique, which belongs to the writings of the later Stein. Alisdair MacIntyre is right in contrasting Heidegger's attitude to the relevance of philosophy for the living of ordinary life with Stein's (*Edith Stein: A Philosophical Prologue 1913–1922* [Lanham, Md/Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006], 5–6).

5. *Life in a Jewish Family* (1891–1916), trans. Josephine Koepfel, O.C.D., CWES, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1986, 2016), 409—she was referring in particular to Heidegger's inaugural lecture: *What Is Metaphysics?*
6. Stein to Roman Ingarden, October 15, 1921: "Heidegger enjoys Husserl's absolute trust and uses it in order to lead the students, upon whom he has a greater influence than does Husserl himself, in a direction that is far from Husserl's own position. Everyone knows that except the good Master" (letter 78, in *Letters to Roman Ingarden*, CWES, vol. 12 [Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 2014], 193).
7. Stein to Ingarden, October 9, 1926: "However, and this is the real tragedy of the matter, the whole thing [of Husserl's thought] is alive and well in his mind, and in good hours he is able to speak of it, though I doubt that he can put it on paper, never mind bringing it to print; and none of his students are in complete agreement with him. If he becomes professor emeritus, he will probably suggest Heidegger as his successor, and Heidegger is going off on his own way" (letter 100, in Stein, *Letters to Roman Ingarden*, 171–72).
8. Hedwig Conrad-Martius, *Zur ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Aussenwelt. Verbunden mit einer Kritik positivistischer Theorien, Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung* (JPPF), vol. 3 (Halle, Germany: Max Niemeyer, 1916): 345–542; *Metaphysische Gespräche* (Halle, Germany: Max Niemeyer, 1921); *Realontologie*, JPPF, vol. 6 (Halle, Germany: Max Niemeyer, 1923): 159–333; Roman Ingarden, *Essentielle Fragen. Ein Beitrag zum Wesensproblem*, JPPF, vol. 5 (Halle, Germany: M. Niemeyer, 1925): 125ff. Stein says in a letter to Ingarden, October 2, 1927: "I do not believe that working on the constitution problems (that I do certainly not underestimate) will have to or could lead to idealism. It seems to me that, in general, the question cannot be solved in a philosophical manner but that it is already solved, when one begins to philosophize. And because this involves a really personal attitude, it is also clear why for Husserl this point is not open for discussion" (letter 111, in *Selbstbildnis in Briefen I*, ESGA, vol. 4, 185; *Letters to Roman Ingarden*, 254). *Einführung in die Philosophie* also leaves the question undecided, but does not regard it as impossible for this reason to engage in formal ontology (ESGA, vol. 8 and ESW, vol. 13, sec. 1c).
9. EES, HA, "Being and Time," 445.

10. EES, HA, "Is the Analysis of *Dasein* Accurate?" 480.
11. *Ibid.*, 465.
12. The quotation on p. 480 continues: "Unredeemed is both its deteriorated everyday being, and that which he holds to be its authentic being. The first is the flight from authentic being; the avoiding of the question: 'being or not being.' The second is the decision for non-being against being; the turning down of true, authentic being." *Ibid.*
13. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.7; 6.2; 7.1.
14. EES, HA, "What Is *Dasein*?" 463.
15. *Ibid.*
16. "Heidegger justifies his taking his point of departure in the analysis of *Dasein* with the fact that one can only ask a being for the meaning of being; to whose meaning an understanding of being belongs. And as *Dasein* not only has understanding for its own being, but also for other beings, one must start with an analysis of *Dasein*. But does not the opposite follow from this reasoning? Because the human being understands not only its own being but also other beings, it is not referred to its own being as the only possible way to the meaning of being. Certainly the self-understanding of being can be laid bare in its root and critical reservations be encountered from the start. But the possibility of taking a point of departure in either the being of things or primary being always persists" (EES, HA, "Is the Analysis of *Dasein* a Sufficient Foundation for Addressing the Question of the Meaning of Being Appropriately?" 481).
17. "Thus transcendence is brought to the centre of the investigation: Because metaphysics—the questioning of being—lies in 'human nature,' the foundation of metaphysics must disclose that in the constitution of [the] being of human beings, which is the reason for their understanding of being. Fundamental ontology is therefore analysis of *Dasein* and especially of its transcendence" (EES, HA, "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics," 485).
18. *Dasein*, hence, "sometimes designates human beings (referred to as whom or self), sometimes the being of human beings (in which case the expression 'the being of *Dasein*' is used)" (EES, HA, "What Is *Dasein*?" 465).
19. She quotes Heidegger's *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*: "Time is pure intuition only in that it spontaneously performs the aspect of succession and, as an act both receptive and formative, proposes this

aspect as such to itself. This pure intuition solicits itself by that which it intuits (forms). Time is, by nature, pure affection of itself."²⁰ . . . Time is not an active affection concerned with the ready-to-hand self; as pure, it forms the essence of all auto-solicitation. Therefore, if the power of being solicited as a self belongs to the essence of the finite subject, time as pure self-affection forms the essential structure of subjectivity . . . as pure self-affection, it originally forms finite selfhood in such a way that the self can become self-consciousness.²¹ "Pure self-affection provides the transcendental ground-structure of the finite self as such" (EES, HA, "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics," 486). Note here Heidegger's use of the term "essence," which testifies to the fact that although he attempts to think without the "what" and without essence, he still has to use these ideas to make intelligible what he intends to do.

20. EES, HA, "Dasein and Temporality," 452.

21. "How should we understand this, if not in the sense of the realization of an essence or a specificity, which is given with being human (i.e., with which one is thrown into *Dasein*), that however, for its development needs free co-operation and hence is entrusted to one?" (EES, HA, "Is the Analysis of *Dasein* Accurate?," 477).

22. *Ibid.*

23. "It is clear, then, that the entire understanding of time given in *Being and Time* needs to be revised. Temporality, with its three "ekstases" and its extension, must have its meaning clarified as the way in which the finite gains participation in the eternal. The significance of the *future*, so strongly emphasized by Heidegger, must be explained in two ways. First as Heidegger does—as the *care* for its preservation stemming from understanding the flux and nothingness of one's own being; secondly as a direction toward a *fulfillment yet to come*, a transition from the dispersion of temporal being to the gathering of authentic, simple, eternity filled being. Moreover, the *present* must be seen as the *way of being of fulfillment*, which—like a flash of eternal light—opens up the understanding to being's fulfillment, as the *past* is the way of being that gives an impression of *durability* in the flux of our being." EES, HA, "Is the Analysis of *Dasein* Accurate?," 480.

24. EES, HA, "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics," 485–86.

25. According to Heidegger's explanations "what is understood by nothingness is not absolutely nothing. As there is talk of various forms of

nothingness and these are not further explained, it remains unclear what kind of nothingness was meant." EES, HA, "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics," 491.

26. *Ibid.*

27. Stein's analysis of essence is to be found in Chapter 3 of *Finite and Eternal Being*.

28. Calcagno, *The Philosophy of Edith Stein*, is correct when he writes: "Our being is constituted in such a way that we are fundamentally related because the very fullness of our person implies the fullness of the other—one cannot fully be without the other" (128); however, he is wrong in claiming that Stein affirms that "Each person, besides having his or her own *proprium*, is also a *Mehrheit von Personen*" (*ibid.*). For Stein, a person is not several—the mistake seems to stem from a mistranslation of a passage concerning *das Man*, which—in contrast with the person—can refer to a multiplicity of persons. The passage is referred to by Calcagno on p. 118, and he refers to it as "MHE 97"—i.e., the old edition of "Martin Heidegger's Existentialphilosophie," in *Welt und Person*, Edith Steins Werke (ESW), vol. 6 (Freiburg: Herder 1962)—in the new edition, which we have used, EES, ESGA, vols. 11/12, 469. It reads in our translation: "If it is recognised that the individual needs the community's support—right from becoming awake to his or her own identity 'as such and in a specific sense' (i.e., as a member)—and that to a community belong *leading* spirits, who form and determine its lifeforms, then it is no longer possible to see 'the they' as a form of deterioration of the self and nothing else. It does not designate a person in the strict sense of the word, but a plurality of persons linked in community who fit themselves into it."