Making Hui: The minoritisation, performance and place of Islam in contemporary Beijing.

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ABSTRACT

In today's geopolitical climate, when the West's gaze is fixed on radical Islam, the U.S.-led "Global War on Terror" is used to control Muslims everywhere. Set in this context, this research examines how the Chinese State co-created the ethnicity and place of the Hui, China's largest Islamic minority group. Attention is focused not upon the production of minoritisation but upon its lived experience, with specific reference to Hui food cultures. These distinctive food cultures provide an analytically useful and empirically accessible route into wider reflections on how Hui perform their identities by constructing, claiming, and negotiating practices, spaces, identities, and subjectivities. Adopting a feminist political geography approach, this project examines how processes of minoritisation and place impact on the identities, experiences and everyday geographies of Beijing's Hui. Specifically, it explores how Hui identity is performed, made public, othered, negotiated, and contested through its food cultures and associated places. This was done through implementing participant observation, semi-structured interviews and semiological analysis of visual referents. Drawing from twelve-months of fieldwork conducted in Beijing City between 2015 and 2019, it is argued that the Hui's food cultures and understandings of *Qingzhen*, or "pure and true", are central to individual and group identities for Beijing-based Hui. These identities are publicly performed and manifested spatially in places of Hui food culture. Through analysing these places and their meanings for participants, an empirically-driven conceptualisation of place is presented which I have termed *Qinqie* places. Analysis of Hui identity performances exposes the place-specific and gendered nature of minoritising processes, while simultaneously demonstrating the usefulness of a focus upon food cultures. Ultimately, this thesis demonstrates the usefulness of a feminist political geographical approach and epistemology when researching geopolitics in a Chinese context.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED.

- CCP: Chinese Communist Party.
- EU: European Union.
- GWOT: Global War on Terror.
- NHAR: Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.
- PRC: People’s Republic of China.
- SOI: Securitisation of Islam.
- UKIP: United Kingdom Independence Party.
- UN: United Nations.
- US: United States of America.
- XUAR: Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
- NRT: Non-Representational Theory.

LIST OF FREQUENTLY USED MANDARIN CHINESE TERMS.

- *Ahong*: 阿訇。Eng: Imam.
- *BaBaoCha*: 八宝茶。Eng: Eight Treasure Tea.
- *Chi Shenme Bu Shenme*: 吃什么补什么。Eng: Eat something to fix/mend something.
- *Chuan'er*: 串儿。Eng: Barbecues meat skewers.
- *Gaitou*: 盖头。Eng: Head scarf or veil.
- *Huihui*: 回回。Eng: A term used to refer to the Hui people.
- *Huijiao*: 回教。Eng: The religion of the Hui. The term was commonly used to refer to Islam up until the mid-twentieth century.
- *Huimin*: 回民。Eng: The Hui people. The term was commonly used to refer to Muslims up until the mid-twentieth century.
- *Huizu*: 回族。Eng: The Hui ethnic group. The official name assigned to the Hui ethnic group.
- *Hutong*: 胡同。Eng: Lane, alley. Narrow alleys that are formed by the joining of *siheyuan*.
- *Jianbing*: 煎饼。Eng: Thin pancake made of millet flour.
- *Jianshi*: 监视。Eng: Detailed concise histories written about each ethnic minority group in a series of documents as part of the Social History Research Investigation.
- *LaMian*: 拉面。 Eng: Hand-pulled noodles.
- *Mianshi*: 面食。Eng: wheaten food products.
- *Minzu*: 民族。Eng: ethnicity, nationality
- *Qingzhen*: 清真。Eng: Pure and True. See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion.
- *Qinqie*: 亲切。Eng: Cordial, kind, close, familiar, warm, intimate, dear.
- *Ronghe*: 融合。Eng: The assimilation of non-Han people into the Han.
- *Siheyuan:* 四合院。Eng: A compound of houses around a square courtyard.
- *Youxiang*: 油香。Eng: Oil Fragrance. A round deep-fried pastry.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION - MAKING HUI.

> "And what about these decorations? What about them makes people feel *Qinqie*?[1] Can you elaborate?" I asked pointing back to the large Arabic sign hanging on the wall by the door, before taking a sip of the iced vanilla latte that he had given me. My companion took a moment before replying, looking out of the dome-shaped window to the dusty, quiet street outside. The sweet smell of the freshly baked chocolate gateaux filled the heavy, humid air. After a few seconds he replied, breaking the silence that had fallen over the two of us as we sat in front of the air conditioner in his small western-style bakery.
>
> "There is a sense of belonging. For example, you are Irish. In China, if you see an Irish flag, you will feel very *Qinqie*, and you will have a sense of belonging. Just like I am Chinese, but when I see a Chinese flag in the United States, or when I see the Chinese Embassy, I have a feeling of *Qinqie* and a sense of belonging".
>
> He paused again, but it was clear that he had more to say. I knew from our previous interactions and his body language that he wasn't finished.
>
> "You know, but it's even more significant for us Hui. When we see these signs, especially *Qingzhen*[2] signs or Islamic signs, we feel even more *Qinqie*. We know that we are safe, we are connected. We know that we belong. We know that it is our place."[3]

That conversation took place on a hot July day in 2017 with the owner of a small bakery in Beijing's Chaoyang District. This was my third time meeting with him and although this meeting hadn't been pre-arranged, he was nevertheless happy to talk with me about Hui culture, food and identity - as he always was. Our conversations always proved to be insightful, as he was by nature very kind and eager to share his ethnicity's culture, beliefs and traditions. But this brief exchange detailed in the vignette above is particularly poignant as it perhaps encapsulates the central recurring theme of this project; namely, the impact that processes of minoritisation have had on the lived

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[1] 亲切。Eng: Cordial, kind, close, familiar, warm, intimate, dear.
[2] 清真。Eng: Pure and True/ Halal. See Chapter 5 for detailed discussion.
[3] Extract from field journal dated 28th July 2017. Written in English. Conversation took place in Chinese.

experiences, emotional knowings, identities, attachments to place and everyday geographies of Hui minority subjects in Beijing. In this thesis, I argue that these minoritising processes and practices play a central role in shaping how the Hui, China's largest Islamic minority group, come to view not only themselves and their identities, but also their place within Chinese society and the world. These processes, however, are not static, nor are they confined to the Chinese context. Rather, as global geopolitics have shifted following 9/11 and the subsequent Global War on Terror [GWOT], the Islamophobic practices and discourses of the West have had a knock-on effect for China's internal Islamic Other and the places that they make, feel, know and perform in Beijing. Partly because I want to approach my subject through the lens of geopolitics, I begin with this global setting before moving to the Chinese context in which it allowed, without much international protest, the severe minoritisation (see section 2.5 below) of Islamic people, most notoriously in the case of the Uyghur, but, as the dissertation will demonstrate in detail, also in the less spectacular case of the larger and more widespread Hui people.

1.1 DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMOPHOBIA AND ORIENTALISM.

Islamophobia is not a new concept in the European/Euro-American psyche, although it is certainly one whose popularity appears to be increasing as Western politics are shifting towards the conservative Right. Islam and migration are increasingly being securitised, and the "Global War on Terror" continues to be used as justification for state racism, increased militarisation and discrimination against minority populations. In order to understand the current socio-cultural and political climate that Muslims face in Europe and the West today, it is necessary to first consider the historical factors that have led to this point. Specifically, it is important to look at how Islamophobia has developed over time and how Muslims have come to symbolise and embody *otherness* for Western societies within the Euro-American, colonial, Christian-centric, racist, patriarchal, capitalist world system.

Beginning at the end of the 15^{th} century, Muslims became the subaltern internal Others in Europe following the re-conquering of Islamic Spain by the Spanish monarchy. Prior to this and stemming from the conflicts of the crusades from the 11^{th} to 15^{th} centuries, the Islamic and Christian struggle characterise what Mignolo (2000) has called "imperial difference", whereby European empires came into conflict with non-European empires. From the 17th century, as European empires' relations with their Islamic counterparts turned into colonial aspirations and conquests, Muslims came to be viewed through a "'scientific evolutionary hierarchical civilisation' imaginary that turned the late 15th century 'people with the wrong religion' (imperial difference) into the inferior 'savages and primitives' of 'people without civilisation' (colonial difference) in the 19th century" (Grosfoguel and Mielants, 2006: 3-4). This shift in meaning is significant as it represents a change from the inferiorisation of religions into an inferiorisation of the people who practice those religions, i.e., a racial one. As the Eurocentric racial hierarchy and the Christian-centric hierarchy became increasingly entwined, distinctions between being racially inferior and Muslim became lessened. During the 20th century, in the wake of social rights movements and the defeat of Nazi Germany, this form of biological racism declined. However, racism persisted and cultural racism replaced biological racism (Grosfoguel, 2003). Cultural racism works as a practice by focusing on the cultural inferiority of groups, naturalising and essentialising the cultures of the inferiorised and racialised people while fixing them in a "timeless space", similar to the naturalising practices of biological racism (Grosfoguel and Mielants, 2006). Religion plays an important role in this process, as modern tropes about the primitiveness, underdeveloped, terrorist and authoritarian qualities of the Other are concentrated in their religious beliefs.

Globally, Islamophobia has been used as the dominant cultural racist discourse against Arabs, with this anti-Arab racism escalating following the 9/11 attacks. However, representations of Arabs as violent terrorists by the US and Israel were commonplace long before the 9/11 attacks (Said 1978; 1981). Within the West, there has been a conflation between the terms Arab, Muslim and terrorist, with Arabs often being perceived as the majority of Muslims in the world despite accounting for only 1 in 5 of Muslims globally (Grosfoguel and Mielants, 2006). The longstanding image of Arabs and Muslims as dangerous, violent and terrorists in the Western media plays a key role in shaping the new wave of anti-Arab racism. These representations are linked to an Islamophobic discourse through cultural racism preceding and following 9/11 (ibid: 6; Said, 1981). When discussing the representations of Arab people in Hollywood movies, Shaheen (2013) notes that Arabs, particularly Arab men, are usually represented as dangerous and incompetent villains. Added to this are the stereotypes of Arab men as being fanatical, cruel and despotic, Arab women as being emotionless, voiceless and lacking in agency (Said, 1978; 1997; Barker, 2008: 266, Sharoni, 1993: 431) and of Islamic people as being irrational fanatics and terrorists (Said, 1981; Shaheen, 2013).

In his work on Orientalism, Edward Said (1978: 40) examined how Europe historically represented the Islamic Orient's presumed cultural, religious and social inferiority in such a way as to legitimise colonialism, while at the same time creating a shared European identity based upon European superiority. He defines Orientalism as “a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident’” (Said, 1978: 2-3). Orientalism encapsulates the more general issue of understanding and representing other cultures from North Africa and Asia, and our interactions and relationships with them (McLoughlin, 2007; Rane et al., 2014). Stereotypes of Arab people contrasted them with the European ideals of what constitutes a European. Similarly, Croft (2012) has argued that British identity and Britishness are created in opposition to an imagined Islamic identity, placing them in an oppositional binary, while Shaheen (2013) has claimed that all aspects of American culture are aimed at projecting the Arab subject as a villain.

Jasbir Puar’s (2007: 67-76) work adds another layer to this by arguing that the stereotypical category of the Arab terrorist exceeds the normative boundaries of deconstructing the Other. Through her discussion of Mr. Slave, a fictitious character from Comedy Central’s adult cartoon South Park, Puar (ibid: 75) argues that this character’s visible queerness as a typified leather bottom, leads to the children in the show mistaking him for another historically prominent figure of perversion, the Muslim Other. Drawing from Said (1978) and Afary and Anderson’s (2005) discussion of Foucault’s “Romantic Orientalism”, Puar contends that “the Orient, as interpreted from the Occident, is a space of illicit sexuality, unbridled excess, and generalized perversion, ‘dangerous sex and freedom of intercourse’, and afflicted with nonnormative corporeal practices”, with Mr. Slave exemplifying what Foucault calls “pursued pleasures” – i.e., “bodies, practices and energies both sought after and searched out”.

When discussing the image of Muslims in the Western media, Morey and Yaqin (2011: 1) describe them as “unenlightened outsiders”. Following the attacks of 9/11, many scholars have identified a new Orientalism. New Orientalism mirrors the original version almost identically, but it places an emphasis on the inability and failures of

Islamic civilisation to adapt to modernity, removing them from the contemporary and placing them in a timeless confine of backwardness and barbarism. This perception of Muslims as being detached from modernity partly explains why they are viewed as being so dangerous: “they are medieval (from the Dark Ages) and yet diabolically advanced” (Cole, 2011: 133). These arguments of Islam’s incompatibility with modernity are particularly evident in relation to its presumed incompatibility with gender equality, human rights and democracy (Yamaguchi, 2012).

One central aspect of Orientalism, both the original and new forms, and its inherent cultural racist arguments is the depiction of Islam’s patriarchal and sexist abuse of women (Grosfoguel and Mielants, 2006). Muslim women are continually portrayed as being the voiceless victims of their male counterparts’ violent and abusive natures. They are perceived as needing to be saved from the brutality of Islam, with Euro-American (non-Muslim and non-Arab) men viewed as the saviours. This discourse of coloured women needing to be saved by white men from dangerous coloured men is not a new one, although it is certainly one that has found new vigour following 9/11 and the ensuing GWOT (Ahmed, 2014; Bartolucci, 2012; Bhattacharyya, 2008). Historically, this rhetoric has been used as a means of justification for colonization and as a way of masking the true reasons behind the colonial aspirations of Western nations (Grosfoguel and Mielants, 2006). This familiar narrative was employed by the Bush administration in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in an attempt to justify the global War on Terror and its corresponding wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, while covering-up American imperial military and economic designs (Grosfoguel and Mielants, 2006; Bhattacharyya, 2008). Following an era in many western countries of progressive social movements for women’s rights and sexual minority rights, the Islamic Other is seen as being sexually dysfunctional and oppressive in opposition to the West’s supposedly open and healthy attitude towards sexuality and gender equality (Bhattacharyya, 2008). This complete openness and equality in the West is of course fictitious, as oppressive patriarchies continue in Europe and North America, particularly in regards to Christian fundamentalist groups (many of whom supported Bush’s administration during the GWOT) (Ibid, 2008; Grosfoguel and Mielants, 2006).

1.2 THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR.

The reassertion of the West as liberal and inclusive was part of a broader practice of reinvigorating American nationalism following 9/11, a reassertion that had global implications (Bhattacharyya, 2008). The language used by the Bush administration in rallying support from America's allies defines a political and cultural border not a national one, by implementing a cultural "us" versus "them" global imaginary: "either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists", "they stand against us", and "they hate our freedoms – our freedom of religion" (Grosfoguel and Mielants, 2006; Bhattacharyya, 2008; Bartolucci, 2012: 571-567). In so doing, these allied nations are tied together through an appeal to shared values and culture, specifically orientated around Christian unity (Graham, Keenan and Dowd, 2004; Kearns, 2008). Bhattacharyya (2006: 9) writes "as with all cultural alliances, it can only exist through constant reaffirmation of key myths and narratives. Ideas about gender identity, sexuality and affective relations play a central role in this process".

The pronouncement of these new cultural alliances – the US and its allies versus the "rest" and the "axis of evil" – brought about new interest in Huntington's (1993) Clash of Civilisations theory and Lewis' (1990) "Roots of Muslim Rage", with some neoconservatives claiming that this clash is a new normal akin to the earlier Cold War (Bonney, 2008). Lewis' (1990) work claims that the anti-American sentiments felt in certain parts of the Muslim world could only be explained as civilisational jealousy, whereby members of these once proud Muslim civilisations now consider themselves to be overcome by civilisations that they consider inferior. As Kearns (2008: 236) asserts, Lewis' (1990) work is representative of a branch of scholarship that "explains Arab identities solely in terms of religion, and understands as the principle context for the expression of those identities the relations between those countries and the West". In a similar fashion, Huntington's (1993) theory views culture and religion as the fundamental bases of international relations and national alliances, and in so doing it essentialises and naturalises cultures while speculating that these cultural divisions will be future (and inevitable) causes of conflict (Rane et al., 2014; Huntington, 1993). The theory was very influential within US and UK policy following the attacks of 9/11, and the US-led GWOT was shaped greatly by it. For Richard Bonney (2008), however, this claim of a permanent clash of cultures is nothing more than a "false prophet", another way of exploiting a history of hostility between the West and Islam. Rather, the Global

War on Terror is rather a clash of fundamentalisms or a clash of patriarchies than a clash of civilisations (Ali, 2002; Grosfoguel and Mielants, 2006).

The GWOT, according to Bhattacharyya (2008), not only entails the military actions of warfare, but it also involves a distinct and important cultural project that aims to not only legitimise these military actions but also rewrite the terms of law and citizenship along sexualised racial lines. This is done through the refuting of multiculturalism and the suspension of international law. Behind both of these instances, there is an underlying suggestion "that there are absolute and impassable differences between cultures and if progressive western values are to be preserved then alien threats must be ruthlessly contained" (ibid, 2008: 12). These foreign policies and security procedures inevitably draw heavily from, and have strong implications for, geographical imaginaries (Agnew, 2003; Bialasiewicz et al., 2007). Such imaginaries of places, and by extension the people who inhabit those places, act to reinforce rhetoric and discourses that support the GWOT. These imaginations of place as produced for and by the GWOT, create political and spatial realities for those people inhabiting them (Gregory, 2004; Bialasiewicz et al., 2007). These effects of the War on Terror and the discourse of Islamic terrorism are truly global in nature, extending beyond the borders of western nations. Countries such as China, Morocco, and Russia also use these legitimising discourses when targeting their own internal opponents and in furthering their own domestic agendas in relation to controlling dangerous groups and territorial expansions (Bartolucci, 2012).

On November 29th 2001, two months after the attacks of 9/11, the government of the People's Republic of China [PRC] released a document called "Terrorist Activities Perpetrated by 'Eastern Turkistan' Organisations and their Ties with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban", which claimed that China faced an imminent threat from existing Uyghur terrorists within the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region [XUAR] (Clarke, 2010). Throughout this report, and in subsequent reports such as the January 2002 report "East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away With Impunity", Chinese authorities claimed that China has faced, and continues to face, a security threat from Uyghur terrorists since the 1990s (Clarke, 2010; Roberts, 2018). Since the 1990s, there had been a number of incidences of unrest and violence in the XUAR involving the Uyghur, many of whom are unhappy about China's rule of their homeland. However, as Roberts (2018: 232 - 233) has noted, there is little proof that at that point any organised

Uyghur militant group existed in XUAR or elsewhere, and the incidents of violence were by and large spontaneous and non-premeditated clashes between Uyghurs and security forces, or protests that escalated when faced with suppression.

Throughout the 1990s, in particular following the Tiananmen incident of 1989, numerous human rights violations were reported in China, not only in relation to pro-democracy protesters, but also involving Tibetans and Xinjiang's Uyghur (UNHCR, 2019). Of particular importance were the Gulja Massacre in 1997, the short-lived riots in Baren County in April 1990 and the Government's "strike hard" anti-crime campaigns (Amnesty International, 1999; Human Rights Watch, 2005; UNHCR, 2019). In light of these human rights violations the European Union - and to a lesser extent the United States (primarily under the Clinton administration) - attempted to coerce the PRC into protecting the human rights of its citizens and minority groups. However, as the decade progressed, both the EU and US were increasingly faced with a stark dilemma between their human rights principles and economic engagement, and as such, lessened their demands on the PRC (Baker, 2002; Dittmer, 2001; Shen, 2013).

Following 9/11, and despite the questionable nature of the PRC's claims and its history of human rights violations in Xinjiang, they garnered enough international support to convince the US and UN that the Uyghur group, East Turkistan Islamic Movement, posed a terrorist threat to China's security. In September 2002, the group were recognised as a terrorist organisation by the UN and subsequently categorised as an enemy in the GWOT. The implications of the re-branding of Uyghurs from "separatist threats" to "terrorists" reach beyond the merely rhetorical. The labelling of Uyghurs as terrorist threats in the context of the GWOT has altered the relationship between the state and the group, increasingly rendering their conflict irresolvable. Whereas separatists may be reintegrated and reformed into society, terrorists are uncivilised, unchangeable and without grievances (Roberts, 2018). Following the work of Michael Foucault (1997), Roberts (2018: 234) argues that in the context of the Uyghur and PRC relations, the term "terrorist" evokes a biological threat to society which needs to be eradicated: "Terrorists are viewed not merely as a threat to state sovereignty but as a threat to all of society if not to all of humanity. Consequently, they must be suppressed, eliminated, or quarantined to save society itself".

Under the guise of the GWOT, the PRC has been suppressing unsanctioned "extremist" religious practices in the XUAR as a means of countering terrorism. Between 2001 and

2005, thousands of Uyghur people were reported to have been arrested or detained in XUAR, with a reported 18,227 people arrested over a twelve-month period for "endangering national security" by early 2006 (Clarke, 2010). Following a string of violent "terrorist" attacks in XUAR and other areas of China, which the PRC government blamed on religious extremists, the "people's war on terror" was launched in 2014. Largely resulting from this, the number of Uyghurs being withheld is even higher today, with some sources reporting that as many as one million Muslims (mostly Uyghurs) are being detained today in numerous detention centres around the region (Wen and Auyeziv, 2018). Outside of these internment camps, Muslims also feel the pressure of government suppression, with increased military presence, regular security checks taking place, and numerous attempts to ban XUAR residents from participating in Ramadan (Aljazeera, 2015; Mortimer, 2017).

In recent times, the suppression of Islamic extremism appears to be an increasing priority for other provinces too, particularly in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region [NHAR]. Like in XUAR, the authorities in NHAR are concerned that established ties between Chinese Muslims and Muslims outside of China may lead to Islamic extremism and terrorism. As such, they've taken a number of measures to halt what they deem to be an Arabisation and pan-Islamisation of Chinese Muslims. For NHAR's Hui population, 2018 saw the unfolding of two important events. The first significant anti-Arabisation and anti-pan-Islamisation event came when the NHAR's authorities announced that all *Qingzhen* food labels must be changed in accordance with new guidelines. The former labels, which included Arabic writing, must now be replaced by labels that feature *pinyin* characters (Latin alphabet). The move is believed to be an attempt at countering pan-Islam and the Arabisation of Islam within the region, which has previously enjoyed good relations with many Arab countries (Liu, 2018). Secondly, in August 2018, NHAR authorities prepared to demolish the newly built Weizhou Grand Mosque, citing improper building permits. The mosque, which is not built in the traditional Chinese style, features several minarets and domes, and has a distinctly Middle Eastern appearance. Contrary to the authorities' claims, many spectators and locals believe that the reason behind the decision to demolish the mosque was because the local authorities viewed the mosque as an example of the Arabisation of Chinese Islam (see Chapter 4 for a consideration of the links between Chinese Islam among the Hui and Middle Eastern sects). In response to the attempted demolition, hundreds of local Hui protested outside the mosque, engaging in a tense standoff with authorities and resulting in the authorities reluctantly halting their plans (BBC: 2018a; South China Morning Post, 2018; Stroup, 2018). Both of these events show that the PRC's concerns with Islamic extremism, stemming from international networks, is not confined solely to XUAR, although it is certainly strongest felt by the Muslims who reside there.

1.3 "NEW" RIGHT-WING POPULISM

Another area where Islamophobia has been developed within the contemporary world structure is the increasing popularity of right-wing populism, particularly within western societies. Over the past number of years, there has been a sharp rise in right-wing populism and extreme far-right movements in the United States and in many European countries. These developments made it more difficult for civil society in Western countries to put effective pressure upon their governments to raise with the Chinese government human rights issues that relate to Muslims in China. This, alongside the broader GWOT, is another geopolitical context for the relative impunity with which government of the PRC could marginalise and discriminate against Muslim citizens at this time. In 2009, the people of Switzerland narrowly voted in favour of a ban on the construction of minarets nationwide, followed in early 2010 by Belgian and French bans on the wearing of burqas in public (Kallis, 2013). On 22 July 2011, Anders Breivik, a far-right extremist and a fascist terrorist, carried out the deadliest mass shooting by a single gunman anywhere in the world in Norway, murdering 77 people, including 33 people under the age of 18 (BBC, 2017a). In 2014, far-right political parties across Europe won a record number of seats in the European Parliament, with huge gains for parties such as the French Front National [FN], the Danish People's Party, the UK Independence Party [UKIP], the Austrian FPÖ, the Greek Golden Dawn, the Hungarian Jobbik and the True Finns (Elgot, 2014; Traynor, 2014; Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou, 2014). In March 2016, in the midst of Europe's "migrant crisis", the European Union [EU] and Turkey struck a deal to return migrants arriving to Greek islands to Turkey in exchange for EU funding and other concessions, with specific policies put in place for Syrian refugees (Corrao, 2018). On June 23rd, 2016, 51.9% of British voters chose to support the "leave" side in the Brexit referendum, voting to remove the United Kingdom from the European Union following notably anti-immigration campaigns from parties such as UKIP (Durrheim et al, 2018; Hunt and Wheeler, 2019). On 20 January 20, 2017, President Donald J. Trump assumed office as the 45th President of the United States of America, followed shortly after by his issuing of Executive Order 13769, dubbed the “Muslim ban”, precluding immigration from ten predominantly Muslim countries (Pyle et al, 2018). On 18 March 2019, a 28-year-old far-right Australian gunman named Brenton Harrison Tarrant used Facebook to live-stream footage of his shooting rampage as he murders 50 people during Friday prayers in two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand (BBC, 2019a).

These events along with numerous other similarly disconcerting acts and discourses were brought about by, and contributed to, the “new right-wing populism” in Europe, whereby once taboo views and narratives have increasingly found a place within the mainstream Western political sphere. Yet, despite certain nuances in form and practices, right-wing populism is not a “new” phenomenon. Rather, it can be traced back to the Second World War (Wodak and KhosraviNik, 2013). What is new, however, is the recent surge in support for far-right movements and the means by which many of the disparate (and often conflicting) right-wing populist thoughts and ideologies have established themselves as mainstream political narratives within many of Europe’s liberal democratic societies. Contemporary right-wing populism does not convey a single, coherent ideal but rather, it encompasses a diffuse range of stereotypes, beliefs, and attitudes that mobilise disparate portions of the electorate. Right-wing populism splits society into “us” and “them”, based on religious, ethnic, regional and national lines (ibid, 2013: xx).

As Kallis (2013) explains, extremist ideas begin as marginal counterpropositions to mainstream values. By transgressing the boundaries of acceptability and by subsequently breaking taboos, right-wing populist parties are attempting to “remap these established cognitions and subvert the mainstream ‘frames’ that support them” (ibid: 55). Central to this process of mainstreaming and taboo breaking is the intersection of supply and demand. Here, Kallis (2013) borrows from the field of economics, using supply and demand theory to explain a political process. As far-right ideas, parties and movements become visible to wider audiences, they tap into previously suppressed demand within the broader population. The more relevant the counter propositions are to the fears, insecurities and perceptions of the audience, the more likely they are to relate to underlying, implicit demand and to appeal to sentiments that may sustain or magnify future demand. This demand is not an innate, biological or naturally occurring feature; rather it is the by-product of the historical development of racism and Islamophobia in the West, whereby western people are conditioned to view the racial and religious Other as a dangerous potential threat. This concept involves the transference of ideas and associated practices from certain places and times to others, while adapting and transforming them to fit with context-specific factors and histories (Wodak and Fairclough, 2010: 21 – 25). Concurrently, the supply being offered by the populist right, as exacerbated and disseminated through the media, gains momentum by accessing wider social audiences and demonstrating the appeal of the counter-frame.

The subsequent result of this demand-supply dialectic is the breaking of taboos and the mainstreaming of either the entire counter-frame or parts thereof (Kallis, 2013: 56). As has been seen across Europe, particularly during the European Union Parliamentary elections of 2014, the mainstreaming of extreme far-right ideas has often garnered electoral successes for far-right populist parties. However, the successes of the far-right parties are perhaps underrepresented by such electoral wins as actors from the traditional political mainstream respond to these emerging demands by making concessions to the far-right ideas (Eatwell, 2000: 416-418; 2005: 101-120; Kallis, 2013; Price and Tewksbury, 1997: 173-181; Ruzza and Fella, 2009). This process has contributed greatly to the legitimisation of extreme ideas within the realm of mainstream politics and has unearthed massive demand for such sentiments. It is this supply-demand dialectic that has allowed for the ongoing securitisation of Islam [SOI] in Europe and the increasingly discriminatory treatment of Muslim minorities.

1.4 SECURITISATION OF ISLAM.

Although institutional racism is not a new development in many European countries, since 9/11, the 7/7 London bombings and the 2004 attacks in Madrid, Muslims have found themselves becoming increasingly victimised by the conflation of Islam, immigration and terrorism across Europe (Cesari, 2009; Karyotis, 2007). Muslims are increasingly portrayed as the dangerous Other. Simply put, the SOI builds upon the West’s history of racism towards Muslims, supplying anti-Muslim and anti-immigration far-right actors with sufficient evidence to transgress borders of acceptability, break taboos and make their extreme rhetoric mainstream.

Within the field of security studies, there are two schools of thought relating to the labelling of an issue as a security concern: the Copenhagen School and the Critical School. According to the Copenhagen School, the naming of an issue as a security threat is the speech act (Waever, 1995a). This speech act signals the securitisation of an issue by the power holders, whereby they move it “into a specific area, and thereby claim a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it” (Waever, 1995b: 55). Followers of this school believe that the securitisation of an issue represents a suspension from the field of normal politics (Buzan et al, 1998; Fierke, 2007; Waever, 1995a) requiring “emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal boundaries of political procedure” (Buzan et al, 1998: 24). As a result, securitisation implies urgency and it grants an issue high priority (Waever, 1995b). Contrary to the Copenhagen School's claims that securitisation involves a suspension of normal politics, scholars of the Critical School view securitisation as a continual technique of governance, meaning that the “state of exception” becomes the norm (Fierke, 2007: 112). They believe that securitisation should not, and cannot, be understood as a simple speech act but rather as a process (Balzacq, 2005; Stritzel, 2007; Christou et al, 2010).

The security framing of an issue involves the distribution of fear and trust, whereby people and societies can be divided into the culturally similar and dissimilar; or “us” and “them”. The culturally dissimilar are often viewed as having the capacity to corrupt the cultural identity that reinforces trust amongst the culturally similar, marking them as a threat (Huysmans, 2006). Security and insecurity are bound together, meaning that security must constantly reproduce images of insecurity in order to retain its meaning (Burke, 2002). These shared threats or insecurities can create unity within a group (Huysmans, 2006). In relation to the SOI, it is the Critical School which is most useful in explaining how Islam has been moved into the realm of security using the distribution of fear and insecurities as well as the narratives of identity.

Within Europe and its contemporary security arena, Islam and Christianity would appear to be resurgent, as Christian values are re-emerging at the level of European self-definition in relation to their Islamic neighbours (Gündüz, 2007). Many scholars refute conventional understandings of secularisation (Berger, 1967) as religion is believed to be “the emerging political language of our time” (Agnew, 2006: 183) and “international politics is being increasingly scripted in the spatial grammar of a millennial struggle between good and evil” (Bialasiewicz, 2006: 172). It has been argued that religion has become delinked from culture, developing in decentralised ways as it encounters its new global environment (Roy, 2010). The decentralised nature of religion, combined with the increasingly global flows of people, has resulted in the religious, cultural and ethnic composition of European nations being far more complex and diffuse than many conservative governments and right-wing parties care to admit. Bogus claims of the EU being a union of Christian states suddenly appeared during discussions surrounding Turkey's desire to join the EU (Gündüz, 2007), and recent security measures within the EU have been undeniably aimed at tackling the threat of Islam (Cesari, 2009). This threat of Islam is one that academics have had a role in fostering, with many acting as scaremongers, forewarning of impending clashes between Islam and the West (see - Huntington, 1993; Buzan, 1991).

Muslims and their communities have been unfairly targeted by a number of security measures under the guise of counter-terrorism and immigration control (Mythen et al., 2012; Cesari, 2009; Benotman, 2012), as western media and political discourses depict Muslims as a dangerous Other (Said, 1978; Gündüz, 2007; Mavelli, 2013). This fear of Islam has led to a rising level of Islamophobia, racially motivated crimes and the marginalisation of Muslim communities across Europe (Mythen et al., 2012; Mavelli, 2013). The SOI has contributed to a recent upsurge in support for far-right political parties across Europe (Elgot, 2014; Traynor, 2014). Muslims in Western societies are now expected to fall into categories on a spectrum of Islamism (Fekete, 2011), fulfilling the roles of a “good Muslim” or a “bad Muslim” (Mavelli, 2013: 165), attending either a “good mosque” or a “bad mosque” (Brown, 2008: 487).

The conflation of Islam and terrorism in political and popular discourses has meant that distrust for Muslims has continued to grow (Karyotis, 2007), particularly as the perpetrators of many of Europe’s recent terrorist attacks were “home grown” (Benotman, 2012). Muslims living in the EU are increasingly targeted by counter-terrorism measures (Mythen et al., 2012) as the “War on Terror” becomes increasingly referred to as the “War on Islam” (Barrett, 2013). As in China, anti-terrorism statutes in Europe have been invoked overwhelmingly against Muslims, resulting in increased surveillance of Muslims, banning of Islamic groups and deportation of radicals (Cesari, 2009). This precarious situation is complicated further, and indeed worsened, by the simultaneous conflation of migration with Islam and terrorism.

Migration first became a prominent feature on the security agendas of numerous European countries, during the 1990s following the dismantling of the EU's internal borders and the breakup of the former Yugoslavia (Huysmans, 2006; Fierke, 2007; Van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007; Marsh and Rees, 2012). Post 9/11, the threat posed by migration seemed to intensify as it became entangled in the same discourses as terrorism (Fierke, 2007; Huysmans, 2006; Marsh & Rees, 2012), with the scale of migration to European countries being drastically exaggerated by the media and politicians (De Haas, 2008). Non-EU Migrants are generally represented as a dangerous collective with different religions, languages, cultures and races to Europeans (Huysmans, 2006; Buzan, 1991; Weiner, 1993; Fierke, 2007), posing a threat to the cultural identity and economic stability of the welfare zone (Van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007). If migrants wish to make it past the "White Wall" into Europe's "Gated Community" (Van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007: 303) then their ability to assimilate is important (Huysmans, 2006). These facts, combined with the EU's newly rediscovered Christian values, has meant that Muslim migrants are being increasingly restricted access to Europe (Cesari, 2009; Gündüz, 2007) and Muslim diasporas in the West face constant marginalisation and discrimination, even if they are second or third generation migrants (Benotman, 2012). Furthermore, the anti-immigration rhetoric of many extreme right-wing parties in the Europe, including the British National Party, has become markedly anti-Muslim (Cesari, 2009). This mainstreamed anti-migrant and anti-Muslim stance became blatantly apparent during the EU discussions and negotiations which aimed to address Europe's escalating "migrant crisis" from 2015, where the SOI, racialized nativisms and entrenched Islamophobia resulted in the issue of migration and asylum being framed as a security "crisis" by the European powers (De Genova, 2017).

According to Cesari (2009), SOI is now no longer within the realm of security, rather it inspires policies that simply target the securitised minority for discrimination. This evermore volatile and Islamophobic political realm has had, and is continuing to have, a drastic impact on the lived experiences of Muslims in the West, making public displays of Islamic identity a precarious and increasingly risky activity. According to the monitoring group Tell Mama's annual report, 2017 saw a huge surge in the number of hate crimes reported against Muslims in the United Kingdom. Throughout 2017, there were 1,201 verified reports of Islamophobic attacks, an increase of 26% from the previous year. Muslim women accounted for 6 out of every 10 victims of these hate crimes, with their greater visibility making them more vulnerable to perpetrators (Marsh, 2018). This bears similarities to the work of Puar (2007) where she found that Sikh men in the US were frequently targeted in violent attacks because of their traditional turbans, which perpetrators mistakenly took as signifiers of the men's presumed Islamic devotion. Similarly, the advocacy group the Council on American-Islamic Relations, reported that in 2017 anti-Muslim hate crimes rose 17% in the US

(Malone, 2018). According to the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (2018), attacks against women wearing headscarves are numerous, as are those against Islamic public spaces such as mosques and community centres.

Alongside attacks on public displays of Islam there is, in many countries, a legislative and political assault. Within the European context, there have been three key political "successes" for the far-right's campaign against public visibility of Islam. Firstly, in relation to the visibility of mosques, a 2009 referendum in Switzerland banned the construction of minarets, a move that was praised and supported by far-right parties across Europe, including in Denmark, Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Austria (Betz, 2013; Kallis, 2013). This landmark event boasts similarities to the move by Chinese authorities to counter what they consider to be the Arabisation of mosques in XUAR and NHAR. The Swiss referendum was quickly followed by another two pivotal events in early 2010 in relation to public displays of Islamic identity. In quick succession first Belgium, and then France, introduced a ban on wearing the burqa in public spaces (Betz, 2013; Wallach Scott, 2007). These three landmark events against public visibilities of Islam are significant for at least three reasons. To begin with, they mark a change from divisive and radical anti-Muslim rhetoric to political exclusionary practices (Kallis, 2013; Krzyżanowski and Wodak, 2009: 71-122). Secondly, by repressing religious freedoms, they unleashed political and social demand for similar actions in other countries. Thirdly, the effects of the 2009 and 2010 bans have impacted on the political mainstream parties, causing a shift in rhetoric to undeniably more anti-immigration, anti-Islam and anti-multiculturalist discourses. In sum, there has been a fundamental shift in the boundaries of acceptability and belonging. Kallis (2013: 62-63) calls this "a political and societal 'paradigm shift'" across Europe.

For some far-right leaders, the matter of religious – specifically Islamic – intrusion into secular society and the public arena goes beyond the issue of places of worship and clothing. For Marine Le Pen of the Front National in France, the sight of Muslims praying on the streets of Paris is representative of a territorial conquest, comparable to Nazi occupation during World War 2 (Betz, 2013; Chabrout, 2010). Le Pen went further still in her attack on Islamic visibility in public spaces by campaigning against what she claimed was the advancement of halal meat into canteens, school cafeterias and elsewhere, which she viewed as a further example of the intrusion of religion into France's supposedly secular society (Betz, 2013; Le Bars, 2012). Le Pen's attack on public displays of Islam recall France's 2004 ban on "conspicuous signs" of religious affiliation in public schools; which as Scott (2007) has argued, was aimed at Muslim girls wearing the headscarf. Rather than being a solution to a problem, Scott (ibid: 181) asserts that the ban is "a symptom of France's inability or unwillingness to face racism – the continuing power imbalance based on ethnic/religious difference – that has characterized its dealings with North Africans for so long." Similar to Le Pen, Boris Johnson, Prime Minister to the United Kingdom and former Foreign Secretary, has likewise criticized public displays of Islam, by saying that burqa wearing women "look like letter boxes", a comment that he refuses to apologise for (BBC, 2018b). These examples further prove what was suggested above, that there has been a shift in the nature of public spaces in Europe, specifically ascertaining to the newly redrawn boundaries of acceptability and belonging relating to visual displays of Islamic identity.

The changing political landscape of Europe, specifically the rise of right-wing populism and the increasing SOI that accompany the GWOT, are redefining how "public" spaces should look, what activities should take place there, and which members of society belong. Muslims, their places of worship, and their religious life practices, including clothing and eating habits, are being contested, debated, regulated and discriminated against in unprecedented ways across Europe's "liberal democracies". Similarly, Muslims in China's north-western regions are also coming under pressure from the GWOT and the PRC's harsh crackdown on all activities, individuals and groups that it deems to be religiously extreme and that fall under its loosely defined conceptualisation of "terrorism". Given similar developments in Europe, China is subject to very little international criticism for these attacks on human rights.

My own research considers how the most basic and necessary life practice – eating – of Muslim minorities has become a security issue within current geopolitics. Specifically, I ask if the securitisation and politicisation of public displays of Islamic identities are solely an European/Western/Western Chinese issue, or whether the Global War on Terror impacted on the lived experiences of Muslims in other, more "harmonious", parts of China? Are other provincial authorities in China using the free pass awarded to them by the GWOT to label their Islamic minorities as terrorists too? If so, are life practices of these Muslim minorities elsewhere subjected to similar discriminatory and exclusionary practices and policies? What about those that are deemed to be "good Muslims" (Mavelli, 2013:165) or model minorities (McCarthy, 2009)? Do they have to endure the same levels of oppression from the majoritarian population surrounding them? If so, how does this affect the lives, experiences and identities of minority groups and how are these factors played out spatially?

1.5 COMING TO BEIJING:

With these questions in mind, the capital city of the PRC and the epicentre of Chinese politics, Beijing, was selected. As the political and cultural centre of the PRC, Beijing is of great significance not only to Chinese affairs, but also in terms of global geopolitics. Given Beijing's role as the national seat of power for the Chinese Communist Party [CCP], it holds great symbolic and political power. So much so, that when referring to the PRC's government and its actions many spectators will simply refer to the CCP government as "Beijing". This is because the CCP's power is largely consolidated in Beijing. Although there are Communist Party secretaries for each province, these individuals are appointed by, and answer to, the Beijing-based CCP government, meaning that Beijing is the symbolic site of CPP authority and rule. Internationally, Beijing is also recognised as the site of Chinese political strength as it is from here that decisions are made regarding international relations, geopolitical affairs, and economic trade.

With a population of more than 21.5 million people at the end of 2018 (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics, 2019), Beijing is one of the most populous cities in both China and the world. According to the sixth national census in 2010, which showed the population of Beijing to be 19.612 million people at the time, the Han accounted for 18.811 million individuals. The remaining 4.1% of the population, accounting for 801,000 people, belonged to minority groups. Of these 801,000-minority people, 90.2% of them belonged to the Manchu, Hui, Mongolian, Korean or Tujia ethnic groups. Of these five groups, the Hui are the second most populous minority group and the largest Islamic group in Beijing, representing 249,000 people, which was 31.1% of the minority population of Beijing in 2010 (Beijing Statistical Information Net, 2011). As such, the Hui accounted for 1.27% of Beijing's total population in 2010. Although the number of Hui in Beijing has grown 35% from 184,693 people according to the 1982 census, they now represent a smaller percentage of Beijing's overall and minority populations. In fact, they now represent just 1.27% of Beijing's total population, down from 2% in 1982, and 31.1% of the minority population, down from 57% (see Figure 1.1).

The growth in the minority population of Beijing mirrors a wider national one and is not resulting purely from increasing birth-rates. Rather, as Gladney (2004: 20 - 23) points out, there has been a process of ethnic “coming out” in China in recent times, especially in Beijing. This process has meant that it has become commonplace for Han people to “come out” as ethically Manchu, Tujia or other ethnicities – explaining in part the huge increase in these minorities’ populations both in Beijing and nationally. It had become particularly popular for people in Beijing to make claims of Manchu ethnicity, partially explaining why the Manchu now represent a higher percentage of the minority population than the Hui at 41.9% (Beijing Statistical Information Net, 2011). The reason for this “coming out” phenomenon is due to the privileges awarded to ethnic minority groups in modern China since the mid-1980s. The most significant benefits include lower tax rates, the opportunity to obtain better education, having greater access to local office, the rights to practice their native religions and speak their native languages, and importantly, the right to have more children (albeit not in urban areas) (Gladney, 2004).

Year	1982	2010
Total population of Beijing (approx)	9.231 million	19.612 million
Minority population of Beijing (approx)	323,000	801,000
Minorities as percentage of total population (approx)	3.50%	4.08%
Population of Hui in Beijing (approx)	184,693	249,000
Hui as a percentage of Beijing total population (approx)	2.00%	1.27%
Hui as percentage of Beijing minority population (approx)	57.2%	31.1%

Figure 1.1: Comparison of census data from 1982 and 2010.
Source: Beijing Statistical Information Net (2011).

The Municipality of Beijing is divided into 16 districts, with each district being home to at least 30 ethnic minority groups. These districts range from urban to rural areas, with each possessing different demographic, infrastructural, developmental and economic attributes. For the purpose of this study, I decided to focus solely on five of the city's central/urban districts: Chaoyang District, Haidian District, Xicheng District, Dongcheng District and Fengtai District. These urban districts were selected as the project focuses on Beijing City, as opposed to the Beijing Municipality and its rural districts. This is an important distinction as it is likely that Hui communities in rural districts encounter very different socio-cultural and eco-political contexts than urban Hui, and as such would provide a greater profusion of experiences, understandings and identities than the confines of this project might allow adequate analysis of. Another reason for the selection of these urban districts is that they are home to greater numbers of minority populations. According to the Beijing Statistical Information Net (2011), all 55 minority groups could be found in Chaoyang and Haidian districts in 2011, more than 50 groups were found in Xicheng and Fengtai districts, and at least 40 groups were found in Dongcheng District. In relation to the Hui, 67.2% of the group are concentrated in the five districts of Chaoyang, Haidian, Xicheng, Fengtai and Tongzhou. Within these chosen districts, the Hui are widely dispersed, although there are certain areas that act as ethnic enclaves for them. Specifically, Niujie in Xicheng District, Madian in Haidian District, and Chaowai and Changying in Chaoyang District (Gladney, 1996; see – Wang et al., 2013 for a discussion of how Hui enclaves are changing in Beijing due to social and geographical factors).



Figure 1.1: Location Map.

Source: Author's own (2020).

1.6 MAKING HUI: THE MINORITISATION, PERFORMANCE AND PLACE OF ISLAM IN CONTEMPORARY BEIJING:

The aim of this research is to examine how, under the impress of the Global War on Terror, processes of minoritisation and place impact on the identities, experiences and everyday geographies of the Hui people. Specifically, the overarching aim is to explore how Hui identity is performed, made public, othered, negotiated, and contested through its food cultures. Thus, the following objectives have been identified;

- To gain an understanding of the minoritisation mechanisms experienced by the Hui population and to explore how minoritising processes are performed through Hui food cultures and their associated places.
- To explore public and visible 'outings' of Hui peoples through an examination of the ways in which they create distinctively Hui spaces and places.
- To explore how these above processes impact on the emotional geographies of Hui people, vis-à-vis the places of Hui food culture they frequent and the practices they engage in.
- To explore the cultural meaning of food in the establishing and performance of Hui identities and places and how these relate to gender.

Throughout the following chapters, these points will be explored, drawing upon fieldwork conducted in Beijing City between 2015 and 2019. Over the course of this time period, three trips were made to China for research purposes, varying in duration from 17 days to eight months. Altogether, almost twelve months were spent in the field researching this topic with Hui individuals and communities involved in the performance and production of Hui food cultures.

In chapter 2, the theoretical framework for this project will be laid out, detailing the conceptual lens and scope of this project. Specifically, an argument will be made in favour of an approach akin to the "feminist political geography" defined by Jennifer Hyndman (2019). Building from this, it will be argued that emotions are inescapably embodied phenomena that play a key role in shaping how we understand both our identities and our place-worlds, offering the potential for greater understandings to be gleaned into the socio-spatial relations of place and geopolitics. The chapter will begin by discussing the evolution of critical geopolitics and three of their associated concepts and their relevance to this project: feminist geopolitics, popular geopolitics and subaltern geopolitics. These sub-branches of political geography combine as a feminist political geography. Moving on from this, the development of emotional geographies will then be explored, paying particular attention to the work of feminist, phenomenological and post-structural theorists. After this, the concept of place will be explored, and an argument will be made for a post-colonial, or more specifically a feminist political-geographical, critique of dominant Anglo-American theory. This critique challenges hegemonic understandings of place by dismantling them and extracting relevant aspects to compile a conceptualisation of place that I term *Qinqie* places. Following this discussion, identity theory will then be examined, paying attention to the concepts of intersectionality and performativity. Literature relating to the processes of minoritisation, representation and othering will then be explored with a focus on how these practices have led to the creation of an Islamic Other in China and how this impacts upon the politics of belonging. The usefulness of using food as a tool for exploring political geography will then be discussed, focusing on the connections between food cultures and identity.

In chapter 3, the methodological aspects of the project will be discussed. It will be argued that a qualitative methodology is best suited to this project. The chosen methods of participant observation, semi-structured interviewing and semiological analysis of documentary sources and visual texts, will be detailed. These methods suit a feminist political geography approach and allow for the political processes of minoritisation and identity formation to be explored. They also take seriously the research participants' individual experiences, understandings and emotional knowings of their socio-cultural and political place-worlds.

Chapter 4 will then turn to the historical and political context of the Hui and the development of ethnicity within China. The importance of historical Chinese conceptualisations of nationalism to the establishment of both the Chinese state and the CCP's understandings of ethnicity will be investigated. How these understandings brought about the "Classification" project of the 1950s will be looked at, with due attention being paid to the importance of the classification team's vague and shifting interpretation of Stalin's (1953) criteria for ethnic classification. The important role of *Ronghe* and assimilation theory to CCP policy will then be explored. Following that, the chapter will focus on the specificities of the project's chosen group, the Hui, by first discussing the long history of Islam in China. The group's unique positioning and attributes will then be detailed using the criteria for ethnic classification mentioned above. It will be shown that unlike many of the other officially recognised ethnic groups in China, the Hui fail to meet all four criteria set out by Stalin and the initial classification team: that is to say, "a common language, a common territory, a common economic life, and a common psychological make-up manifested in common specific features of national culture". The last criteria, "a common psychological make-up manifested in common specific features of national culture" will be used as an entry way into the following chapter where it will be explored in greater depth through analysing the role that the Hui's distinctive food cultures and conceptualisations of *Qingzhen* play in the identities of Hui participants.

Chapter 5, "Hui Identity, Food Cultures and *Qingzhen*", looks at the development of a shared culture and identity among Beijing Hui based on their food culture and the concept of *Qingzhen*. In his book "Muslim Chinese", Gladney (1996) suggest that *Qingzhen* is central to Hui identity and culture, as was evidenced in diffuse ways among four Hui communities across China in the 1980s. Building on these claims, this chapter argues that for Beijing Hui it is the ways that *Qingzhen* has shaped the group's food cultures that are the most commonplace and significant performances of Hui identity today. Specifically, I argue that Hui identity, local understandings of *Qingzhen*, and Hui food cultures form an interlocked and inseparable triad of understanding and identification for Hui participants living in central Beijing. This triad is manifested in multiple ways along several axis of understanding, of which five are outlined: religion, "small" nationalism/ethnicity, "big" nationalism/state nationalism, cleanliness, and place. Importantly for this thesis' wider arguments, this chapter makes evident the ways in which this triad of identity draws from the group's diverse attachments and imaginaries of place.

The attachments of place discussed in Chapter 5 are built upon in Chapter 6, "Places of Hui Food Culture". This chapter focuses on the concept of place and on the place-making tactics employed by Hui in Beijing. In this chapter, I argue that a post-colonial, feminist conceptualization of place is needed, one that is more encompassing of place's multifaceted nature, and less exclusionary of the concept's complexities. Building from the conceptualisation of *Qinqie* place presented in Chapter 2, it is understood that: places are embodied; central to all places is their experiential and emotive imports;

places are not static, rather they are mobile and processual; places possess a bounded openness; they are connected and relational to other places and people; they hold multiple temporalities; they are historically and socially contingent "gatherings", or bundles; and they are undeniably political. Such an understanding challenges the dominant, gendered and western-centric understandings of place present within western academia, suggesting that an exploration of place-making processes within a non-Western context may enrich our understandings. This conceptualisation of *Qinqie* places forms the theoretical framework necessary for understanding how Hui places of food culture work. The chapter then explores the place-making tactics and representational practices employed by Beijing Hui in claiming places where they feel welcomed, safe and *Qinqie*. The visual referents used to demarcate these places as Hui are analysed using semiotics, exposing the politics and cultural meanings behind such representations. Participants' subjective decodings of these signs are also examined, as are their emotive resonances and attachments to these places. Ultimately, the concept of *Qinqie* places is empirically evidenced throughout this chapter, exposing the need for a more expansive, feminist political-geographical understanding of place.

The final empirical chapter, "Performing Hui Food Cultures", will explore performances of Hui food culture as expressions of Hui identity. Underpinned by the knowledge that food is consumed and produced within a variety of affective social and political arenas, from which we construct boundaries of self and other, identity and belonging (Isakjee and Carroll, 2019), this chapter aims to evidence how performances of food cultures can provide important insights into the lived geopolitical realities of Hui minority subjects. A number of performances will be examined which relate to various facets of Hui identity in contemporary Beijing. These performances are grouped into three themes. Firstly, dishes that can be understood as performances of place-based identities will be explored, exposing the ways in which people's emotive ties to places and geographical imaginaries impact on how they perform and consume certain dishes and foods. Of the numerous examples provided, three dishes or foods and their relationships to places are discussed in detail: Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Noodles and its ties to Northwest China; Meat from Beijing's Niujie neighbourhood; and chocolate cake and geographical imaginaries of the West. The chapter then explores the impact that assimilative forces and inter-ethnic relations are having on Hui food cultures in Han-dominated Beijing. Specifically, attention is focused on the increasing presence of alcohol within Hui restaurants, and on the moral and ethical precariousness that it entails for participants hoping to live a *Qingzhen* lifestyle. This change in status for many *Qingzhen* restaurants from being alcohol-free places to actively selling alcohol is the result of a two-fold minoritising and assimilative process. Firstly, restaurants increasingly have to sell alcohol as a means of economic survival in Beijing's competitive market. Secondly, discourses of modernity simultaneously play a role in changing many participants' views of the divisive product. The final theme to be discussed in this chapter is the performance of gender through food cultures. In this section, I argue that minoritisation is an inherently gendered and place-specific process, resulting in localised manifestations of gender roles and norms. Specifically, I argue that male dominance is reconfigured within the place-specific context of Beijing's Hui restaurants and eateries, as Hui patriarchy and minoritisation are synthesised to accommodate to life in a Han-dominated society where Muslims are increasingly treated as suspect under the guise of the Global War on Terror.

In the concluding chapter, Chapter 8, I begin by laying out the current geopolitical climate for Islam in the PRC today. I focus on recent developments relating to the Uyghur and other Muslim minority groups in XUAR, showing how the case for Muslims in China has unfortunately worsened throughout the duration of this project. Set within this context, I then reflect on what the main findings and contributions of this project are. I draw specifically from arguments made throughout the thesis' chapters, covering a range of empirical, methodological, and theoretical contributions, while also reflecting on my own experiences of conducting this research project.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW.

> "This time it's different. It feels different. It doesn't feel like the same place that I was once so comfortable, secure and happy in - the place that I shared with Denis, Bernie and Lara. This place is different to that one, its unknown and it feels foreign to me. Even though the street's physical structure has largely remained the same, it feels like I'm seeing it with new eyes. It's changed. Its little details have changed. Our apartment block has been painted a new shade of red, the restaurant we ate dinner at every day is gone (as is the *Disanxian* that they knew we wanted without us needing to order it), and the *baozi* lady by the bridge has been moved away – most likely as part of Xi's clean-up of Beijing. This Beijing is not the same one that I left just two years ago and that I looked forward to coming back to. This place feels different. This place is different" (Extract from field journal entitled "First Day Back" - dated Monday 31 August 2015).

As academic scholarship has taught us, emotions are powerful. They influence and shape our lives in ways that very few other phenomena can. They impact on how we come to view ourselves, our position within society, our memories of past experiences and our expectations for the future. How we engage with, and indeed understand, the world around us is greatly affected by how we feel. Our personal geographies are thus intimately linked with our emotional states (Davidson and Milligan, 2004; Davidson and Bondi, 2004; Lupton, 1998). Through our bodies, we come to be in the world and are inextricably bound up with the places that we inhabit. Each is a vital ingredient in the other (Casey, 2013). Our socio-spatial interactions, histories and familiarities with these places make them meaningful to us. As such they influence our emotions as much as our emotions impact on them. This interplay between our emotional states and our understandings of places became clear to me as I reflected on my own experience of having (re-)discovered Beijing, as the opening excerpt shows.

Throughout the course of this chapter, it will be argued that emotions are an inescapably embodied phenomena that form an essential part of how we know our place-worlds and our identities. Drawing from a range of academic literatures, an argument will be made in favour of emotional geographies, attempting to demonstrate the usefulness of this branch of geographic enquiry in understanding socio-spatial relations, specifically in relation to place and geopolitics (Bondi et al., 2007; Pain, 2009). In addition, attempts will be made throughout to justify the use of food and its associated embodied practices as sites of geographic studies. Specifically, it will be asserted that a focus on food may provide a means of exploring the complex, entwined relationship between emotions, identity, embodiment, place and the political (Isakjee and Carroll, 2019; Waitt, 2014).

The first section of this chapter will begin with a discussion of the development and evolution of geopolitics, specifically focusing on the sub-field of critical geopolitics. An argument shall then be made in favour of three concepts that have emerged from within, or in response to, critical geopolitics and an attempt will be made to justify their relevance to this project. Namely, these concepts are feminist geopolitics, subaltern geopolitics, as defined by Joanne Sharp (2011a, 2011b), and Dodds' (2007) understanding of popular geopolitics. The usefulness of these concepts to geographical enquiry will then be used to respond to Jennifer Hyndman's (2019) call for a "feminist political geography", which arguably addresses the lack of inter-sub-disciplinary engagement that I find quite problematic. Such a feminist political geography would take seriously "postcolonial critique, subaltern geopolitics, and a refusal of Orientalist rescue narratives", thus creating "more space for projects that take violence, exclusion, inequality, the materiality of the bodies, and their various subjectivities seriously" (ibid: 8).

The next section will work by examining the place of emotions within the Western tradition of academia, with specific references to its role (or assumed lack of) within geography (Anderson and Smith, 2001; Bondi, 2007). Tracing the history of emotions within academia, the work of particularly relevant individuals and approaches will be acknowledged: from the formal separation of emotions from knowledge associated with Descartes' mind-body dualism, to contemporary times and the influential work of feminist, phenomenological and post-structuralist theorists. The chapter will then engage with ongoing debates and discussions about what an emotion actually is, and the difficulties with representing their often-ineffable nature. Non-Representational Theory and its use of affect over emotion will be briefly discussed here, referencing both its productive emphasise on the performative, along with its shortcomings which have ultimately led to the use of emotion throughout this thesis (Smith et al., 2009; Bondi, 2005). Before progressing to the next section of the chapter, the unavoidable, yet often overlooked relationship between emotions and the political will then be considered (Pain, 2009; Gregory and Pred, 2007; Sparke, 2007).

The concept of place will then be discussed, specifically the contributions of phenomenologists in furthering understandings of our most intimately felt spatiality. Placing particular emphasis on the role of the lived body in the production of place, it will be established that bodies and places are mutually constitutive of each other (Casey, 2013). It will also be proposed that consideration of an emotio-spatial hermeneutic may be productive when thinking about the relationship between emotions and the places we inhabit (Davidson and Milligan, 2007). Specifically, a more expansive conceptualisation of place is presented, one which acts as a feminist political-geographical critique of dominant Western theories of place. This conceptualisation of place, which I term *Qinqie* place, is one that views places as: embodied; emotively felt and experienced; mobile and processual; possessing open boundaries; connected and relational; multi-temporal; historically and socially contingent; and political.

Identity, specifically the performative and multifaceted nature of it, will then be explored (Butler, 1990; Goffman, 1956). Following this, I will discuss the divisive concept of intersectionality, highlighting its usefulness to a geographic piece of research such as this. In this context, the concept of minoritisation will then be elaborated. Specifically, this chapter considers processes of exclusion, othering, and representation, and their place in the securitisation of Islam and the creation of the "Islamic Other". The concepts of belonging and the politics of belonging will then be discussed, with specific reference to how these processes unfold in place and in relation to minoritisation.

Before concluding, the area of food studies will be discussed, with particular attention being paid to the work of geographers. It will be argued that: food plays a central role in shaping both our individual and group identities, and may allow for important insights into the socially constructed nature of gender and ethnicity; that food is highly emotive and political; that food is intertwined with place and place identities; and that through consuming certain foods, we often simultaneously consume geographical imaginaries of place (Isakjee and Carroll, 2019; Di Giovine and Brulotte, 2016; Jansen, 1997; Bell and Valentine, 1997).

2.1 CHALLENGING THE LABELS – CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS.

Since it was first coined in 1899 by Rudolf Kjellen, the concept of geopolitics has undergone considerable transformation, largely resulting from the multiple changes to the structures of world order and the evolution of the concept's understandings historically (Agnew, 2003; Ó Tuathail, 1998: 1). These factors have resulted in the concept being exceptionally difficult to define, with any attempts to do so being highly contested (Ó Tuathail, 1998: 1). At the core of geopolitics is the two-way relationship between politics and geography; both human and physical. This relationship has varied over time and is usually driven by particular theories and state practices, such as imperialism, colonialism, Mackinder's heartland theory, the domino theory and the emergence of a new world order (Knox and Marston, 2004: 339). Geopolitics allows for the connections between communities and places to be analysed and understood (Dodds, 2007: 3), while also allowing local and regional dynamics and events to be related to the broader global system (Ó Tuathail, 1998: 1). This is an important argument for the usefulness of geopolitics in modern times considering the manner in which globalisation increasingly links localities and places together, regardless of geographical distances or time (Giddens, 1990: 64). Traditionally, geopolitics had been used to layer world space, creating a hierarchy of importance from the world scale downwards through four specific scales; global, international, domestic and regional. Understandings of these geographical scales, or representations, play a decisive role in the practices of world politics (Agnew, 2003).

In the absence of a single, agreed upon definition, Dodds (2007: 4-5) has identified two distinct understandings of geopolitics. The first understanding is that geopolitics offers a guide to the global landscape through the use of geographical terms and descriptions. Places are identified and labelled accordingly, creating a simple model of the world which can then be used to inform policy making. This dividing and labelling of global space based on perceived levels of importance by political elites is inherently biased as powerful individuals and groups act in pursuit of their own interests and identities (Agnew, 2003). By identifying, labelling and representing places in this manner, a geopolitical imaginary is created (Dodds, 2007: 10; Agnew, 2003). Within Western media, which is of course a powerful tool for distributing such imaginaries, this process is largely euro-centric as the dominant "Western" geopolitical imaginary is projected onto the rest of the world (Agnew, 2003). The creation of these imaginaries is gradual, evolving over time as a result of changing world politics. By identifying three specific eras between the early nineteenth century and the 1980s in which geopolitics developed, Agnew (1998: 86) highlights that although the leading geopolitical imaginary of each era is distinctive in its own way, there are many continuities as pre-existing themes are re-used in new contexts. In today's post-Cold War era, theories such as Mackinder's heartland theory and the domino theory continue to influence world politics as the US remains steadfast in its objective to prevent one power from controlling the Eurasian landmass as leading world powers continue to fight for global primacy (Kearns, 2008: 223; Agnew, 2003). The use of these theories in modern world politics can be referred to as "conservative geopolitics", whereby geopolitics and geopolitical imaginaries aim to serve contemporary imperialism by preserving existing global inequalities (Kearns, 2008: 223). As Dodds (2007: 4) points out, this first version of geopolitics, the belief that geopolitics offers a guide to the global landscape, is by far the most common and it continues to feature heavily in political, popular and media discourses.

The second understanding of geopolitics which Dodds (2007: 5) discusses is the one upon which this research is founded. It focuses on how geopolitics works as a practice by questioning the labels given to places and how these labels generate certain understandings of places, communities, and identities. This perspective of geopolitics is referred to as critical geopolitics (Ó Tuathail, 1996). The objective of critical geopolitics is to reveal the hidden politics of geopolitical knowledge. Critical geopolitics regards geopolitics as a discourse that is culturally and politically varied in how it represents geography and world politics, rather than simply defining it as an unproblematic description of the world political map. It views the creation of geopolitical imaginaries, knowledges and discourses as an intrinsically political act by a select group of individuals and institutions (Ó Tuathail, 1998: 3). Drawing from Foucault's (1980: 52) work on "Power/Knowledge", critical geopolitics acknowledges that those in power constantly create knowledge, and that this knowledge continually induces effects of power. In doing so, critical geopolitics examines the power relations involved in geopolitical representations while challenging the role of the state and how its institutions envision the world (Hague, 2004: 227). In order to accurately analyse geopolitical reasoning, a number of concepts have emerged from critical geopolitics (Sharp, 2011a: 271). These include formal geopolitics, popular geopolitics, practical geopolitics (Hague, 2004: 228), feminist geopolitics, anti-geopolitics and subaltern geopolitics (Sharp, 2011a: 271). Of these, feminist geopolitics, subaltern geopolitics and popular geopolitics are of most relevance to this research.

2.1.a Subaltern Geopolitics.

Inspired by Mohammed Ayoob's (2002) "subaltern realism" which aimed to challenge classical realism within international relations, Joanne Sharp (2011b) employs the term "subaltern geopolitics", melding together two rather opposing terms – one which unmistakably refers to powerful political optic, while the other connotes weakness. Subaltern geopolitics challenges accounts which reject formal politics and the state by acknowledging the importance of such scales, while also drawing attention to their spatial and social construction. As a concept, subaltern geopolitics references postcolonial understandings of power relations by "suggesting a position that is not completely other, resistant or alternative to dominant geopolitics, but an ambiguous position of marginality as the term is used by hooks (1990)" (Sharp, 2011a: 271). Specifically, geographers using subaltern geopolitics have looked at the various practices used by those people marginalised by dominant geopolitics; not simply critiquing dominant geopolitics, but offering alternative worldviews, experiences and imaginaries of geopolitics. To this end, Sharp (2011b: 298) turns to Bhabha's (1990) concepts of hybridity, and more specifically "mimicry"; which allows for subversion, strategy, and survival, or a "way of 'doing' world politics in a seemingly 'similar' yet unexpectedly 'different' way" (Bilgin, 2008: 6). By drawing from Bhabha's (1990) "mimicry", the binary categorised of "same" and "different" are destabilised (Sharp, 2011b: 298).

In Subaltern Geopolitics, the marginality of the groups considered is understood in largely metaphorical terms. Yet there is also a geographical basis to marginality and in the context of world-system of global capitalism that produces its cores and peripheries through processes of combined and uneven development, it is important for Critical Geopolitics to learn from knowledges produced outside the core and to reflect upon this peripheralization as a constitutive process of forming and validating research as Taylor (2012) proposes for the cognate field of International Relations.

As an intersection of political, post-structural and post-colonial geographies, subaltern geopolitics is concerned with the spaces of geopolitical knowledge production "which are neither dominant nor resistant", as the study of these accounts serves to reiterate and strengthen this “binary geopolitical structure rather than challenging it” (Sharp, 2011a: 271). Through placing an emphasis on the post-colonial, those voices and accounts which are normally made marginal are brought to the fore. As such, it allows a way of “doing” the political which is neither limited to, nor completely distinct from, the binary of dominant and resistant geopolitical imaginaries. Such an approach to geopolitics necessarily involves a post-colonial emphasis by bringing into the geopolitical realm those views that are normally rendered marginal (ibid, 2011a).

2.1.b Popular Geopolitics and Representation.

The concept of popular geopolitics is also particularly relevant given its focus on geopolitical representations and discourses (Dittmer and Dodds, 2008: 438). Popular geopolitics recognises that political life is fused with the mass media, that representations of global political geographies circulate within and beyond national political cultures, and that the media both circulates and produces images of global politics (Dodds, 2007: 17). These geopolitical representations influence our understandings of the world and are therefore often subjected to government regulation and control. The production, consumption and circulation of media representations is inherently uneven as certain individuals and groups are in better positions to either produce or gain access to different sources. In regard to the production of such representations, large Euro-American corporations tend to be dominant (Dodds, 2007: 148-149), which generally results in the continuation and preservation of the “conservative” geopolitical imaginary. However, that is not to say that such conservative geopolitical imaginaries are reproduced solely by Euro-American corporations and regimes, as many “Second” and “Third” World states continue to produce such imaginaries for their own benefit.

2.1.c Feminist Geopolitics.

Since the mid-1990s, the concept of feminist geopolitics has been developed in response to the lack of engagement between the sub-discipline of political geography and feminist scholarship (Hyndman 2004). Prior to the mid-1990s, feminist scholarship had been making significant contributions to various other sub-disciplines and areas of geography, yet its theories had not been adopted by political geography (Dowler and Sharp, 2001), with Staeheli (1996) claiming that the boundaries between political and feminist geographies were actively being maintained and reinforced through academic practices. Feminists had long argued that women were actively excluded from the political as their actions were confined to the private sphere and spaces of home. Traditionally, these private spaces were considered to be feminine, while public spaces were deemed to be masculine. However, as Dowler and Sharp (2001) have rightly pointed out, the political can be housed in the home, challenging this binary.

In her influential and pioneering chapter "Feminism, Gender Relations and Geopolitics", Eleonor Koffman (1996) used the term feminist geopolitics to call for further feminist engagements and critiques of critical geopolitics, which she considered to be an important but flawed school of thought. Critical geopolitics has similar aims to feminist, and even post-colonial, theory in that it attempts to expose the "hidden and insidious workings of power throughout the structures of everyday life" (Dowler and Sharp, 2001: 167). Yet, as Jennifer Hyndman (2004: 312; 2001: 213) argues, although critical geopolitics is a useful and necessary departure point for a feminist geopolitical imaginary, it fails to articulate other, embodied and situated ways of seeing, and generally ignores the gendered landscape of dominant geopolitical debates. Dowler and Sharp (2001) extend this critique of critical geopolitics further by claiming that it is undifferentiated by various other markers of difference, including, but not limited to gender, race, class and sexuality (see also Sharp 2000). Further, they rightly point out that critical geopolitics often uses language as universal, yet it is a sub-discipline that has largely been dominated by Western, white, male academics (Dowler and Sharp, 2001: 167).

The rise of feminist and post-colonial scholarship within geography over the past few decades, or what has been referred to as "feminist geographies of difference" (Pratt, 2000: 259-262), marked a cultural turn within the discipline (Hyndman, 2001). The cultural turn within feminist geography drew attention to the spatialised processes of racism and racialisation by demonstrating how social relations and space are mutually constituted (Kobayashi and Peake, 1994). These post-colonial and post-structural feminist geographies interrogated the construction of social categories for subordination, including the categories of "woman", "ethnic minority", "immigrant", etc (McDowell and Sharpe, 1997: Hyndman, 2001). The work of feminist and post-colonial geographers concerned with the politization of the everyday required a reconceptualization of the political, something that the sub-discipline of political geography would benefit greatly from. Further, the cultural turn also called on feminist geographers to challenge the boundaries of their previously Euro-American-centric boundaries and imaginaries, and as such, allowed a renewed accountability to other places and peoples. Subsequently, questions of identity and difference came to the fore (McDowell and Sharp: 97; Hyndman, 2001: 211). Despite the ensuing shift of focus within political geography to the everyday exercises of power, it has generally been expressed in terms of the cultural turn, rather than through an acknowledgement of the feminist claim that "the personal is political" (Dowler and Sharp, 2001: 165). In light of this, Hyndman (2001: 212) began making a case for a "political turn in feminist geography", one which acknowledged that feminist geography was already political, but that brought together and enmeshed the "small 'p' political of feminist geography with the larger 'P' political of political geography".

Stemming from this, feminist geopolitics attempts to "bridge scholarship in feminist and political geography by creating a theoretical and political space in which geopolitics becomes a more gendered and racialised project, one that is epistemologically situated and embodied in its conception of security" (Hyndman, 2004: 307). For nearly 20 years, geographers have worked to flesh out Hyndman's (2001) call for a "feminist geopolitical imaginary" through: "complicating our understandings of key concepts such as corporeality, emotions and ethics; exploring new objects of analysis such as trauma and violence, terrorism, security and conspiracy; and reaching out to other disciplines, including psychology and literary theory, as well as politics/political science and international relations and postcolonial and development studies" (Dixon and Marston, 2011: 446). Feminist geopolitics allows a more embodied response to international relations, elevating visceral conceptions of security and violence (Dowler and Sharp, 2001; Hyndman, 2004). This embodied understanding of the geopolitical builds upon, and responds to, the disembodied work of critical geopolitics by resituating knowledge production as a partial understanding from somewhere; from particular "subjugated positions structured by gender, race, nation, and class" (Haraway, 1991: 193; Sparke, 2000; Hyndman 2004). Rather than being a new or alternative theory of geopolitics, feminist geopolitics offers an approach to global issues and international relations with feminist politics in mind through an emphasis on situated knowledge and spatialised conventions of "security" across multiple scales (Hyndman, 2001; 2004).

As a specific branch of geographical enquiry, feminist geopolitics exposes the production of inequalities and uneven power relations through a distinct methodological and analytical approach (Massaro and Williams, 2013; Williams and Massaro, 2013; Hyndman, 2019). Therefore, rather than merely re-writing women into geopolitics, feminist geopolitics offers a lens through which the everyday, lived experiences of subordinated and marginalised peoples can be made more visible (Dowler and Sharp, 2001). As Dixon and Marston (2011:445) have shown, feminist analysis has worked to bring to light the everyday, embodied practices that "make manifest the 'place' of traditionally disempowered people… within all manner of ostensibly geopolitical landscapes". Through de-centring geopolitics by attempting to develop a politics of security at the scale of the body (Hyndman, 2004), feminist geopolitics exposes the analytical possibilities of exploring the unavoidable links between the body and local with the national and international levels (Dowler and Sharp, 2001). Such an acknowledgement of the "alternative and multiple loci of power" challenges the traditionally global perspective of geopolitics, an approach advocated for by Anna Secor's (2001: 193) "Feminist Counter-Geopolitics". By challenging the scales at which the geopolitical is considered to operate, and by demonstrating the lived implications and manifestations of geopolitics through an appreciation of embodiment, feminist geopolitics has tried to make visible the previously invisible acts of violence taking place within private, "feminine" spaces (Hyndman, 2019). Thus, it reiterates the feminist stance that "the personal is political" (Dowler and Sharp, 2001: 165), through opposing the conceptual division between public and private spaces that previously framed political geography (Hyndman, 2001: 210). In light of this, Dowler and Sharp (2001: 171) suggest that if we are to begin thinking about "a feminist (or post-colonial feminist), geopolitics, it is necessary to think more clearly about the grounding of geopolitical discourse in practice (and in place) – to link international representation to the geographies of everyday life; to understand the ways in which the nation and the international are reproduced in the mundane practices we take for granted". The focus on the everyday practices and manifestations of geopolitics, as argued for by feminist geopolitical scholars, is of central importance to this thesis, and is a key analytical underpinning for the focus on Hui food cultures.

2.1.d Feminist Political Geography.

The above sections have outlined four key areas of political geography, or more specifically geopolitics, that are important in framing the issue of minoritisation among Beijing's ethnically Hui community and in understanding the lived implications, experiences and performances of such a political process. Together, they provide the important analytical and epistemological tools and frameworks necessary for understanding the complexities and multi-scalar manifestations of geopolitics within the chosen context. Drawing from critical geopolitics, subaltern geopolitics, popular geopolitics and feminist geopolitics, they shape a "critical, post-colonial, post-structuralist, feminist" approach to geopolitics. The difficulty, long-windedness and messiness involved in naming this approach to geopolitics is, I believe, representative of a broader theoretical issue within the sub-discipline of geopolitics, and indeed, political geography. When attempting to source literature that could relevantly frame the phenomena being explored by this thesis, I was struck by how seemingly disparate and isolated many of the sub-disciplines within geopolitics were, and how little they seemed to actively engage with one another, despite bearing analytical, methodological and epistemological similarities. Each had developed out of a critique of the problematic and universalistic conceptualizations and foci of traditional, or "conservative", geopolitics (Kearns, 2008), yet many of them operated in isolation from one another.

In light of the sub-discipline's seemingly fractured nature, I think that Hyndman's (2019) recent publication "Unsettling feminist geopolitics: forging feminist political geographies of violence and displacement", is a particularly rich and much needed contribution to the field. Hyndman acknowledges the contributions and usefulness of feminist geopolitics, while simultaneously attempting to bring subaltern geopolitics into the theoretical fold in order to better understand her case study of human displacement and refugee sponsorship in Canada. Yet, she suggests that "a bigger tent than just feminist geopolitics" is not only needed for understanding the geopolitical violence and the security of people "out of place", but that it is also indispensable to geographical thinking. To that end, Hyndman suggests that we need the broader, more inclusive, umbrella term of "feminist political geography".

This feminist political geography would not only draw from the rich theories of feminist geopolitics but would also take seriously subaltern geopolitics and critical understandings of power. In doing so, Hyndman (2019: 4) aims to "create more space for and provoke a wider range of feminist interventions related to embodied geopolitical phenomena, materialism, violence, displacement (of all kinds), and scale to consolidate a thoroughly feminist and anti-racist political geography that does not succumb to Orientalist rescue narratives or produce regimes of care and security that subjectify refugees". I find that Hyndman's (2019: 24) call to consolidate feminist work under the term of feminist political geography, and to "name, occupy, and transform this wide, deep and incisive assemblage of theory, ontology, and geographical analysis, and move forward", is of critical importance to both the theoretical framing of this project and also to the discipline of geography more broadly. This feminist, post-colonial, anti-racist, political geography recognises the "embodied, contradictory, messy, co-constituted illiberal subjects contesting multiple modalities of violence" (Hyndman, 2019: 23). By using feminist political geography here, and eschewing the singular framings and terminologies of the sub-discipline's fragmented variations, a feminist framework is being implemented that is committed to "postcolonial critique, subaltern geopolitics, and a refusal of Orientalist rescue narratives", thus creating "more space for projects that take violence, exclusion, inequality, the materiality of the bodies, and their various subjectivities seriously" (Hyndman, 2019: 8).

2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF AN EMOTIONALLY AWARE GEOGRAPHY – FROM KNOWING TO FEELING.

Within the social sciences, and indeed academia more broadly, academics have long claimed to have discovered facts about our world through objective, rational thought. These facts, it is often said, are void of any qualities that may be deemed subjective or unscientific (Bondi, 2007; Anderson and Smith, 2001). Leaning heavily on the Cartesian mind-body dualism, in which the body and mind are believed to be separate and distinct factors, Western academia has traditionally privileged the mind and its associated characteristics over other forms of knowledge associated with the body (Grosz, 1994; Johnston, 2009; Smith et al., 2009). Emotions and emotional knowing, given their presumed irrationality and embodied nature, have thus been silenced and excluded historically from the formal production of knowledge (Anderson and Smith, 2001; Rose, 1994; Bendelow and Williams, 1998).

The marginalisation of emotions and embodied knowledge has been an intrinsic part of the gendered politics of research, whereby "detachment, objectivity and rationality have been valued, and implicitly masculinized, while engagement, subjectivity, passion and desire have been devalued, and frequently feminised" (Anderson and Smith, 2001: 7). Within the discipline of geography, this gendered exclusion of the emotional and embodied has been just as pervasive as in other academic subjects, with many of its practitioners presenting the world as an emotionally barren terrain (Bondi et al., 2007; Bordo, 1993). As feminist geography has shown, this mind-body dualism both underlies, and is integral to, human geography (Longhurst, 2009). Furthermore, Rose (1993) has argued that geographical knowledge always assumes a male "knower" that can be disassociated from both his body and emotions, thus excluding feminised forms of understanding and knowing such as emotional knowing and embodied knowledge. However, as Bondi (2007) rightly points out, there is a very clear contradiction in the belief that researchers can successfully detach themselves from their emotions, which is that the very act of conducting research is often believed to depend on an initial moment of inspiration or creative thinking, both of which are emotionally intensive. "Thinking is never emotion-free: rather, our feeling states and our thinking are closely intertwined" (ibid: 236).

2.2.a Feeling in and through our bodies.

The notion that a "knower" can disassociate from their body is implausible, as both feminist geographers and phenomenologists have noted. Building upon Husserl's doctrine of pre-predicative experience and his explanation of being-in-the-world's centrality to *dasein*, Merleau-Ponty (1962) wrote of a matter-pregnant–with-form. As he explained, meanings grow from embodied structures and the experiential body's situation. In similar fashion, Edward Casey (2013) developed the notion of implacement, claiming that it is through the collusion of the lived-body and place that the spatial meaning-structures of directionality and dimensionality become known. Therefore, it is in and through our bodies that we are located and come to know our being-in-the-world. The body is an important site of identity, representation and socio-spatial relations (Johnston, 2009). It is also our most intimately felt geography and is considered the location, or place, of the individual and emotions. As such, our bodily movements are undeniably emotional and influential in how we understand our engagements with space (Davidson and Milligan, 2004). Feminist geographies have been particularly influential here in arguing the importance of embodied, or situated, knowledge; that is to say, an understanding of knowledge that recognises its embodied and situated subjectivity (Rose, 1997; Cook et al., 2005; Longhurst, 2009).

2.2.b Difference.

In addition to the valuable work done by feminist geographers and phenomenologists, post-structuralist critiques of science have been particularly revealing in challenging the dualistic separation of mind and body. Following from Derrida's (1976) work on *différance,* whereby he unsettled not just differences between the terms of a binary but also the co-constitutive character of their resulting hierarchies, many post-structuralists have argued that in having only "partial or context-determined access to reality", we may possibly be "socially constructing something that doesn't actually exist" (Jones III, 2013: 24; Hacking, 1999; Baudrillard, 1994). Such is arguably the case with the powerful, hierarchical binaries of Mind/Body, Rational/Irrational or Knowledge/Emotion. Post-structuralist explorations of identity have also been particularly fruitful in understanding academia's long-running denial of emotion. Derrida's (1970) work was once again influential here as his critique of identity exposed the presence of centres, peripheries and in-between grounds ("free-play) in the creation of one's identity. In asserting claims of positive identity, individuals attempt to control and manage differences, or in-between grounds. This is done in order to establish a stable referential subject or centre (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Jones III, 2013). In so doing, people, groups and categories are constructed as being different to the self, thus establishing them as the Other (Longhurst, 2009). These Others are necessarily forced to the periphery when constructing identities. However, the centres formed are not completely void of the peripheralised. In fact, by identifying against the Other and claiming difference to it, the resulting identity retains some of the marginalised (Jones III, 2013: 25; Longhurst, 2009). In line with this, dominant notions of knowledge, its objectivity and its location in the mind, are challenged by an awareness of the presence of emotions, subjectivity and embodiment. Therefore, attempts to exclude emotions from knowledge, did not just fail, but were in fact never an achievable reality (Bondi, 2009). The recent "emotional turn" within geography can subsequently be understood not as a re-direction to a newly found, foreign phenomena, but rather as an acknowledgement of what has always been present within our discipline (Bondi et al., 2007).

2.2.c Emotional Geography.

The geographies of emotion that have emerged from the above re-appraisal of emotions within our discipline can contribute greatly to how we understand our experiences and engagements with space, as well as the lived implications of geopolitics. Emotions are a key set of relations through which lives are lived and societies are formed (Neu, 2000; Pugmire, 1998). They play a vital role in shaping our life-worlds and identities, informing our personal geographies, influencing our sense of the world around us, and even how we reflect on the past or project the future (Davidson and Milligan, 2004; Davidson and Bondi, 2004; Lupton, 1998). In light of the important role that emotions play in our everyday engagements with space, emotional geography tries to "understand emotion – experientially and conceptually – in terms of its socio-spatial mediation and articulation" (Bondi et al., 2007: 3). In so doing, it must attempt to express something with language that is virtually indescribable using words, that is to say, the emotional attachments and engagements between people and places. Regardless of the representational difficulties that geographers engaging with emotional studies are faced with, a number of highly revealing, contextual studies have emerged which successfully highlight the conceptual and methodological gains of conducting emotionally aware geographical research.

Dias' (2003) study of anorexia and its "owners", is a telling account of the often-conflicting emotions experienced by those suffering from eating disorders as they navigate a place (Cyber-space) deemed safe for sharing their emotional pain. The study skilfully shows how the embodiment of emotion is both deeply personal on the one hand, yet also shaped by a sense of sharing with other people whose bodies are similarly placed. In her study of women of colour working on South African farms, Mathee (2004) shows that eating and its associated acts are embodied, social practices that are both meaningful and meaning making. By highlighting the enormous social significance of food, she demonstrates how food preparation and eating practices can produce spaces of resistance and relationality in her participants' lives. Drawing heavily on Valentine's (1999: 514) work on "the spatial dynamics of cooking and eating", Mathee shows how food practices can be (re)negotiated to allow for constricting narratives of identity to be challenged, transformed or replaced. Germann Molz (2007) uses the experiences of North American tourists who visited McDonald's restaurants while travelling to analyse how these places of food consumption are experienced and represented using a spectrum of emotions from comfort to guilt or even betrayal. Through analysing these emotional accounts, Germann Molz shows how these various emotions effect understandings of McDonald's as occupying multiple scales and sites: from home to away, and from local to global.

Although these three studies are but a small fraction of the work published to date within emotional geographies, they draw out many of the main arguments for emotional geographies being made in this research. Firstly, each study looks at the emotional experiences of its participants to gain a better understanding of their personal geographies and experiences in the world. Secondly, each project demonstrates how emotions and spaces are mutually constitutive as the participants are both affected by, and in turn affect, their spatial settings. Thirdly, each of the studies highlight the importance of embodiment when discussing emotions and the intrinsic link between what we feel and what we do. Fourthly, each one shows the emotionality of food and the usefulness of studying food practices when exploring socio-spatial relations, for eating is one of our most basic embodied movements, and is indisputably emotional (Bell and Valentine, 1997; Srinivas, 2013; Bordo, 2013). Finally, each illustrates the often over-looked and under-studied links between the embodied processes of food preparation/consumption, our emotional states and our personal geographies: whether those links take the form of personal and social empowerment through engaging in food preparation; varied emotional responses to physically entering a space of globalised food consumption while travelling; or intentionally refraining from eating practices and policing your intake of food in order to alter or gain a sense of control over your body.

2.2.d Emotions.

Despite a growing appreciation for emotions within academia, and the development of distinctively emotional branches of enquiry within most social science subjects, differences still remain regarding definitions of what an emotion *is* and what they actually *mean*. Nevertheless, a number of analytically useful conceptualisations have emerged from both within and outside of Geography. Although this chapter will predominantly focus on the theoretical advances made in geography, due to their emphasis on socio-spatial relations, relevant contributions made in other disciplines will also be considered, particularly those from sociology and psychology. Emotions are part of all of our lives, and they are essential to how the human world is constructed and lived (Davidson and Bondi, 2004; Anderson and Smith, 2001). Our emotional lives are characterised by the fluidity, mutability and multiplicity of emotions (Bondi et al., 2007). Rather than viewing emotions as objects or things to be obtained, it is productive to think of them as being intrinsically relational (Bondi et al., 2007). This non-objective approach would suggest that emotions should be viewed as events that occur in and through our world at the interface between people and their contexts (Smith et al., 2009; Bondi, 2009). As Sartre (2004: 61) has taught us, emotions are a mode of conscious existence, allowing our consciousness to understand its Being-in-the-world (to borrow Husserl's term). Within social settings, emotions can be considered as ongoing, developing responses to interactions with others (Boiger and Mesquita, 2012). These interactions shape and impact on emotions and as such, emotions are often understood as being "socially constructed" and dependent on social interactions (see – Averill, 1980; Harré, 1986; Hochschild, 1983; Lutz, 1988). These social interactions are always framed by prevailing cultural systems that often play a role in guiding emotional responses, influencing the emotional narratives chosen to describe feelings, and in determining the meanings that individuals extract from these emotions (Lutz, 1988; Mesquita et al., 2012; Markus and Kitayama, 1994). Essentially, our emotions are culturally specific, learned responses which one's consciousness chooses to perform, i.e., emotions are structures of consciousness (Sartre, 2004).

As Doyle McCarthy (1994: 268) has argued "emotions cannot be divorced from the sociocultural meanings in which they are expressed and experienced". Although it is undeniably true that emotions cannot be parted from their cultural and social settings, it is equally important not to overlook the most common setting for human interaction, place – and this is where geography can be most useful in furthering our understandings of emotions. After all, it is not just our emotions that effect how we perceive the world around us, but the spaces and places that we inhabit can greatly influence how we feel (Davidson and Milligan, 2004; Tuan, 1979: 409-410). Therefore, our emotions and the places we inhabit are mutually constitutive. Another important aspect of the close association between emotions and geography is made clear in Ho's (2014) paper "The Emotional Economy of Migration Driving Mainland Chinese Transnational Sojourning across Migration Regimes". Ho shows how the value of certain emotions is appreciated or depreciated as the emotions are mobilised geographically during transnational sojourning, demonstrating a nuanced spatial variation of the emotional.

2.2.e Representing the ineffable.

As with all research topics, there are certain difficulties and challenges to studying emotions. Namely, how do we accurately represent something linguistically that is often ineffable? If we are to stop for a moment and consider the difficulties that we might have in effectively communicating verbally how we feel during times of intense emotions – particularly relating to loss, love and uncertainty – then it becomes apparent that some emotions cannot be completely rendered into words. The language we use to communicate and represent our feelings, understandings and beliefs can be understood as being comprised of signs. Each of these signs are composed of two parts: a signified, i.e., the concept or object being represented; and a signifier, the language or image used to represent or communicate the signified (Saussure, 1983; see Chapter 3). We use words such as fear, delight, dread, hope and regret in attempts to communicate how we feel to others. However, beyond our limited emotional vocabularies, it becomes apparent that much of what we feel, or the signified, lacks an adequate signifier that can succinctly convey our emotional states. This limitation of representation has led many geographers to prefer Non-Representational Theory (NRT) and its use of affect over emotion. Resulting from language's failure to represent the ineffable, geographers who use NRT believe that affect is more suited to studying our immediate embodied engagements with space that lie beyond linguistic representation (McCormick, 2003; Paterson, 2005). NRT rightly highlights the importance of the performative and the necessity to consider what people do, and not simply what they say they do (Smith et al., 2009).

However, NRT is not without its own short-comings, and indeed, contradictions. The failure of language to represent our feelings and embodied spatial engagements lies at the core of NRT, yet as Thien (2005) points out, many of NRT's practitioners ironically employ incredibly dense and complex language to represent those performances which are supposedly beyond linguistic representation. More importantly however, NRT's denial of representation overlooks the important and inescapable role that representation plays in both the symbolic order and our self-understandings (Smith et al., 2009). Furthermore, performances are not simply silent, unspoken acts and as such the use of words to communicate experience may also be considered as performative and therefore worthy of further academic exploration. As with all performances, however non-verbally immediate, these linguistic performances cannot be meaningful if they are not related to certain interpretive pre-configurations (Bondi, 2005; Smith et al., 2009). Due to the short-comings of NRT and the necessity of representation, the word emotion will continue to be used throughout this thesis.

2.2.f Emotions as political.

At the cognitive level, emotions have been described as "language forms" for they allow the individual to represent aspects of themselves to others (Perinbanayagam, 1992; Goffman, 1983). The use of language to communicate feelings to others, particularly the use of our well-established yet limited emotional vocabulary, creates emotional narratives. In doing so, emotions are replaced by discourses about emotions, which may destroy both emotional knowing and its corresponding geographical knowledge (Bondi, 2009). Emotions and discourses of emotion are intensely political matters (Ahmed, 2014; Anderson, 2013). As Foucault (1990) has shown, power is not simply enacted at the macro-level of the State. Rather, it is through the tiny acts of micro-power, such as language and embodied practices, that power may truly be made. Technologies of power penetrate the body, producing "normal" bodies, psyches and emotions through self-regulation. This micro-power often operates a self-regulating form of bio-power, whereby the individuals themselves are involved in a form of self-policing and disciplining. Discourses are vital to this level of micro-power as they act as a form of linguistic regulation of normality and abnormality, the sane and insane, the appropriate and the inappropriate (Sharp et al., 2000).

Despite the profoundly political nature of emotions, formal politics often rely on, and therefore reinforce the belief in, traditional Western notions of an existing, emotionally-free, abstract space (Lefebvre, 1992). If we consider Foucault's (1990) work on the biopolitical management of populations by states and Agamben's (1998) account of how people are increasingly reduced to the category of "bare life", then it is clear to see that the abstract visualisation of space has resulted in an emotionally-void, statistical and politically-motivated view of human life. Within this view, only certain lives are deemed "grievable" or worthy of emotional response, whilst othered lives are considered expendable in order to protect the grievable (Butler, 2009). Within political regimes, emotions and emotional discourses are often viewed as resources to be exploited for political gains or for the biopolitical management of populations (Hochschild, 1983; Foucault 1980). Such biopolitical modes of emotional governance are not only enforced by political regimes at the scale of the nation-state, but rather at multiple and varied scales in societies. As Clara Ang and Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho (2019) have shown, emotions are actively used as tools of governance in schools in Singapore, exposing the links between emotions, space and social structures of power operating at local scales.

As Rachel Pain (2009: 304) has shown, emotions such as fear are drawn into geopolitical governance, in what has been called "the new geopolitics of fear" (see also – Gregory and Pred, 2007; Sparke, 2007). Stemming from a series of geopolitical events, such as numerous terrorist attacks in western countries and the Global War on Terror, fear and emotion have become increasingly political (Pain, 2009). However, the political use of emotions is not limited to such securitised or exceptional incidences as terrorism. As Nussbaum (2006) has shown, despite claims of objectivity and reason, the laws which govern and discipline us in our everyday lives are not only inextricably linked with our emotions but are also completely reliant on them. The emotions of shame and disgust are particularly important tools in maintaining social normality and order. The use of emotions in political contexts is not confined however to those governing our nation states, as many social movements and protests centre around the emotionally charged issues of "identity politics" (Blumenthal, 1992; Puar, 2007) and "life politics" (Giddens, 1991). Further, as Kath Browne (2007) has shown, emotions are political in ways that extend beyond the common use of fear, disgust and shame. For Browne, positive emotions such as enjoyment and fun should also be viewed as political, as they are so often central in the performance of politics. Browne demonstrates this point through the examination of LGBTQ Pride celebrations, arguing that discussions of discrimination and prejudices need to also recognise the importance of enjoyment in the political, and therefore the (re)constitution of sexed bodies, identities and spaces. In light of these arguments, emotional geography has the potential to offer great insights into both the political usage of emotions and emotional discourses, while also allowing those who are impacted by such political practices to show their lived and felt experiences, hopefully paving the way for a more human-centred notion of security (Hyndman, 2001; Fagan and Munck, 2009).

2.2.g The place of emotion- feeling places and placing feelings.

Emotions undeniably play a significant role in shaping our personal geographies. As we engage with the world around us, our emotions can impact greatly on how we come to view and understand our milieu (Davidson and Bondi, 2004). Thus, our emotional states can influence our socio-spatial interactions, specifically how we experience the places that we inhabit. As was argued earlier in this chapter, humans are embodied creatures and it is in and through our bodies that we come to know the world around us (Johnston, 2009). Rather than simply viewing places as locations, Whitehead challenged us to re-think the concept of place and the role that our bodies play in situating us within places, so that we become a part of that place (Casey, 2013: 214). As both Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Husserl have argued, it is primarily through the lived body that we have access to the "primary world" that we inhabit (Casey, 2013: 228). The body, Husserl has argued, is not merely a physical thing but is also the bearer of "I" and the locus of sensations. The way that our bodies move in and through a place affects how we experience that place (Casey, 2013: 217 - 219). Following from Husserl, Merleau-Ponty built upon the idea that our bodies are essential to how we live and know the pre-existing world that we inhabit. Specifically, he showed that it is our kinaesthetic feelings that constitute the most valuable evidence of the way the world, and indeed places, are known to us. The places that we inhabit are only known to us through the bodies that we live. So much so, in fact, that we cannot be implaced without being embodied and to be embodied is to be capable of being implaced. Furthermore, bodies (either real or virtual) are implicit to all places, and as long as somewhere could possibly be a habitat for human bodies, it has the potential to be a place. Therefore, the body and place are mutually constitutive (Casey, 2013: 233 - 234). The bodies that we live, Merleau-Ponty contended, act as our anchorages in the world, a world regionalised into a series of familiarised settings. These settings, however, are not merely sub-divisions of absolute space, but instead are the intimate, lived places that we inhabit. These places, he stated, have porous boundaries and lack specific orientations (Casey, 2013: 233). Elaborating further on the work of Merleau-Ponty, Casey (2013: 231) explains that "place, precisely because it is not merely positional and often has indeterminate boundaries, presents itself to us as an ambiguous phenomena – as ambiguous as the lived body by which it is experienced and known".

So given this ambiguity, how then do we concisely define place as a fixed thing? The answer, of course, is that we don't. Places are not fixed, rigid or reducible to simple materiality or to any formal structure outside of an appreciation for the mutually-constitutive nature of bodies and places. Naturally, there is a certain pre-given materiality in places that has been impacted on, and sedimented by, its historicity but this materiality can hardly be considered a place without being animated by the lived body (Merleau-Ponty as discussed in Casey, 2013: 240). In light of this inability to define place as a fixed object, the final chapter of Edward Casey's (2013) highly influential book “Fate of Place” looks instead at how recent philosophical thinkers have concerned themselves with the “faces” of place, that is to say the everyday workings and manifestations of place as it is made known to us. Given our discipline’s innate focus on the spatial, it is perhaps unsurprising then that the concept of place has long stood at the core of our subject and that it, and indeed its many “faces”, have been a central topic of enquiry for many geographers interested in understanding people’s interactions with the world around us. Of these geographers, it is perhaps those from humanistic geography that have been most influential in furthering our understandings and conceptualisations of place as it is experienced, specifically the work of phenomenological geographers such as Yi-Fu Tuan (Adams et al., 2001). He was undeniably at the forefront of developing an experiential perspective within geography, one where individual experience and knowledge of place became valued (Tuan, 1979). This experiential perspective of place allowed for the more intimately felt geographies of home and private places to be explored (Tuan, 1982), which was an essential step in the development of an emotionally aware geography. Emotions are believed to be both personal and environmental, stemming from within us while also being linked to the environments around us (Smith et al., 2009) Therefore, our emotions are intimately tied into the places that we inhabit (Urry, 2007).

In order to understand this relationship between emotions and place it is useful to consider what we might term an emotio-spatial hermeneutic. Whereby, emotions are sensible and knowable to us, but only in and through the contexts of the places and spaces that we inhabit. Likewise, places must be felt in order for them to be knowable to use. Our sense of space emerges only from the embodied, and indeed emotional, interactions between people and places (Davidson and Milligan, 2004). Through our lived bodies’ implacement “place can be felt, like the weave of a cloth, yet we are, after all, part of that weave” (Adams et al., 2001: xxvii). Tuan (1979) was once again influential in developing an understanding of how we feel place. Sense of place, he explained, could only be experienced by human beings as we know the world through our senses, similar to Merleau-Ponty’s assertion of the importance of kinaesthetic feelings (ibid: 410).

However, the insertion of emotions into academic study challenges an inadequacy of affect that had allowed people to describe the most appalling violence and poverty as anchored in local conditions and not relating at all to the colonial relations that depressed living standards in one place, the more easily to exploit its people and resources for the benefit of people in another place. Ling (2014: 582) proposes that: 'Taking emotions seriously involves decolonizing our minds and our world politics, away from a single hypermasculine model that banishes all that is feminine and emotional, towards a cross-cultural model of understanding that accepts multiplicities, including multiple emotional worlds.' I have noted above some of the work on emotional worlds from outside the historical core of global capitalism system (Ang and Ho, 2019; Ho, 2014; Mathee, 2004) and there is a growing literature on the emotional force in the colonised spaces of colonialism and its legacies (Nandy, 1983; Scott, 2019). This study makes its own contribution to this work on the study of emotions in non-Western contexts.

2.3 PLACE AND PLACEMAKING

The concept of place is central to Geography. However, it was not until the 1970s that Western geographers began conceptualising it as a particular location with a distinct set of meanings. Specifically, it was the influential work of phenomenologist and humanistic geographers such as Yi-Fu Tuan (1974), Anne Buttimer (1976) and Edward Relph (1976), among others, that argued for the importance and richness of geographical enquiry into the experiential perspectives of our "being-in-the-world". Despite over four decades having passed since its re-emergence in academic geographical writings, place is still a conceptually contested topic within both Anglo-American geography and other Western academic disciplines, while remaining under theorised within Chinese academia. There has been some work theorising urban places from the perspective of scholars situated outside the so-called core of the world system. This development of Urban Studies within Southern Theory offers many valuable insights into the way Euro-American models of cities have occluded the examination of other socio-spatial formations (Lawhon et al., 2014; Robinson, 2006; Sheppard et al., 2013). Little of this work has specifically focused upon aspects of place-making.

This ongoing debate has resulted in a diffuse array of approaches and imaginings of place, with several noteworthy and conceptually important contributions being made about the nature and constitution of places. Today, places are often understood as the settings of people's everyday lives (Knox and Marston, 1998: 3), and as consisting of a combination of three interrelated aspects: locale, location and sense of place (Agnew, 1987: 28). Yet, place offers a breadth of analysis beyond these somewhat simplistic, be they important, understandings. This depth of place, according to Adams, Hoelscher and Till (2001), is captured particularly well by humanistic geographers in their attempts to explore how place acts as a context for human experience.

For geographers like Seamon (2018) and Relph (1976), and philosophers such as Casey (2013), places provide the context for all human existence and experience. As such, they include our emplaced memories, imaginations and emotions, making them far more than mere physical locations. This "more than" quality has caused considerable debate among scholars, with many advocating for the importance of an oft-overlooked facet of place's complex, existential, multivalent construction. Despite the richness of arguments put forward – particularly in relation to places as sensorial/emotive, relational/networked, temporal, political, processual, mobile, open and as gatherings – authors often advocate for one such aspect of the phenomenon at the expense of the others, or at the very least, without giving due credit to the full complexities and depths of places. This point somewhat echoes that of Pierce, Martin and Murphy (2011) who claim that place-making is an inherently networked and political process, yet the three concepts of place, networking and politics are rarely discussed together within academia, something that their notion of "relational place-making" aims to address. Although these authors are correct in their assertion that the three concepts are inextricably linked, their focus on these select points omits other aspects of the processual nature of place-making that I contend to be equally important; specifically the emotive/sensorial. Drawing from the work of several key theorists on place, the following sections aim to demonstrate the complexities of place by setting out a more expansive version of the concept. Specifically, it will be argued that: places are experienced in and through our bodies; a fundamental property of all places is their emotive and experiential imports; places are mobile and processual rather than static; they possess a bounded openness; places are relational and connected, both to other places and people; they are multi-temporal; they are historically and socially contingent "gatherings", or bundles; and they are inescapably political. Such a conceptualisation of place, I argue, is more suitable for framing places of Hui food cultures as it is empirically driven and evidenced. Further, it acts as a post-colonial, or more specifically a feminist political-geographical, critique of hegemonic Anglo-American theory, challenging dominant concepts by dismantling them and extracting relevant facets to compile a view of place that I term *Qinqie* Places (Chapter 6).

2.3.a Embodied Implacement

As was discussed in Section 2.2.g above, Casey's (2013) arguments that bodies and places are mutually constitutive and that we are always in place/implaced are central to how I understand place and how this project is framed theoretically (see also Seamon, 2018). Stemming from Aristotle's teachings, place is understood here as the starting point for all other existence, as everything that exists must have a place. According to Aristotle, place takes precedence over all other things as it is "that without which nothing else can exist, while it can exist without the others, must needs be first" (Casey, 2013: 52). Building from this, Heidegger (1993) insisted that "to be" is "to be somewhere", a concept for which he proposed the term "*dasein*" – or "being there". For Heidegger, all human existence takes place "in the world" with this notion of being-in-the-world developing out of his work on "dwelling". Dwelling, in the Heideggerian sense, means more than simply residing or living in a place, but rather, it refers to the ways in which we exist in the world and how we make it meaningful through attachments and experience.

Drawing from phenomenological approaches such as this, along with the work of earlier cultural geographers such as Carl Sauer and Paul Vidal de la Blache, the humanistic geographers of the 1970s argued that geographers needed to reconceptualise the human subject: i.e., humans needed to be thought of as knowing and feeling subjects rather than as objects or as wholly rational beings. In line with this, human engagements with place became central to humanistic geography, with Yi-Fu Tuan (1977: 9) writing that the "given cannot be known in itself. What can be known is a reality that is a construct of experience, a creation of feeling and thought". Therefore, places are meaningful contexts of personal attachments and intimate knowledges, bearing connotations both positive and negative, both individual and shared (Seamon, 2018; Smith, 2018a; Tuan, 1977).

If we accept that the body is the locus of an "I", and that it is in and through our bodies that we experience, feel and know our being-in-the-world (Section 2.2.g above), then our bodies are inextricably and unavoidably bound up in place. Through arguing for an understanding of knowledge that is embodied and situated, feminist geographers such as Longhurst (2001), Rose (1999), Shilling (1993) and Thomas (2009), have highlighted the co-constitution of bodies and the spatial, and as such, have shown the necessity of conceptualising places as embodied. The body is what links the self – i.e., agency and identity – with place through its sensory and perceptive abilities (Casey, 2013; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Seamon, 2013; Tuan, 1977). To turn again to Edward Casey (2001: 684), the self, body and place are all tied together in diffuse ways, with each playing a role in the making of the other; a phenomenon that he calls "constitutive coingredience".

2.3.b Places as Mobility and Processual

Despite the significant contributions made by humanistic geographers, their definitions of place are not without their limitations and critiques. Specifically, humanistic geographers often conceptualised place as static and rooted. Tuan (1977) puts forth an understanding of place in which, if space can be understood as lending itself to movement, then places are "pauses" in that movement. Relph (1976) elaborates further on the relationship between places and movement by claiming that places are becoming placeless due to increased mobility, along with mass production and the creation of "disneyfied" and "museumified" places. Both Relph's (1976) placelessness and Tuan's (1977) "pauses" maintain that too much mobility works against place as it disallows for sense of place, and that places are thus static. Anthropologist Marc Augé (1995) mirrors these sentiments by claiming that spaces of transit and high-mobility are "nonplaces", while true places are marked by their bounded and rooted natures. Such understandings of place are arguably too narrow in their scope and fail to capture the important theoretical contributions made elsewhere in relation to place, particularly in relation to places' "constitutive coingredience" (Casey, 2001). If we understand all existence as happening "in place", and all human experience as being implaced, then these "nonplaces" and "placeless" spaces are in fact different sorts of places; as they are nevertheless being experienced through our embodied and sensorial engagements with them.

Building from the work of Merleau-Ponty (1962), who asserted that our being-in-the-world was primarily about the body and not the mind, Seamon (1980) developed a humanistic notion of place that centred on movement. He argues that our embodied movements and "time-space routines" (a term he uses to describe our habitual embodied practices throughout the day) contribute to the making of places as much as their static and bounded characteristics do. Pred (1984: 279) also counters the traditional account of places as static by proposing a view of place as process. For Pred, places and actions are locked in a co-constitutive process that are tied to social structures and saturated with power. In a manner similar to Seamon's (1980) time-space routines, Pred suggests the idea of "paths". For Pred, as people move through time and space, they create paths. These paths then make human and object biographies, which coalesce to create places. "Place is therefore a process whereby the reproduction of social and cultural forms, the formation of biographies, and the transformation of nature ceaselessly become one another at the same time that time-space specific activities and power relations ceaselessly become one another" (Pred, 1984: 282).

2.3.c Connected and Open Places

Another major critique of humanistic geography's definitions of place is that they imply that places have fixed borders. If we are to conceptualise place as mobile, we not only challenge understandings of places as static and rooted, but we also need to reassess traditional understandings of places as bordered. Thinking of places as bounded is a highly political act involving problematic practices of boundary making. The drawing of lines between places and the labelling of them as distinct often results in the association of such places with specific, usually majoritarian, assumptions of group identities and histories. Such associations between assumed homogenous identities and places creates a reactionary sense of place and belonging, whereby individuals and groups lying outside the "norm" are seen as being "out of place", or as politically, socially and culturally threatening to the dominant group and place. Such a bounded and static view of place often excludes mobile individuals and those that have crossed the imagined, socially constructed and often politically enforced borders - including the broad spectrum of people labelled as migrants; such as refugees, travellers, homeless people, tourists, migrant workers, etc.

In response to this view of place as static, bounded and rooted, Doreen Massey (1993) proposed a conceptualisation of places as being constituted by mobility and as being inherently relational. For Massey (1993, 1994a, 2005), places are: processual; mobile; connected to other places; not limited by a space's physicality; and they lack fixed boundaries. Rather than viewing places as being fixed with closed borders, Massey (1991: 24) argues that places are "outward-looking" due to their innately relational composition. These places are produced through connections and relations to the rest of the world, facilitated through the movement of people, commodities and ideas. As such, they are the sites of heterogeneous identities and senses of belonging and attachment, rather than being tied to assumed homogenous identities (1993). Massey (1993) calls this rich and informative conceptualisation of place a "global sense of place", or a "progressive sense of place".

In her arguments *For Space*, Massey (2005: 130) contends that if we understand space as being "a simultaneity of stories-so-far, then places are collections of those stories, articulations within the wider power-geometries of space". As such, Massey (1994a, 2005) contends that these stories happen in places that are ever-changing, relational and dynamic, but which maintain their specificities through the linkages formed in and from each place. All places are relational in Massey's conceptualisation (Callard, 2011), stemming from the movement of objects, people and ideas between places. These relations add further specificity to places, particularly as each is shaped by its own unequal power geometries (Massey, 1991). Places can therefore be defined as "articulated moments in networks of social relations and understandings" (ibid: 28).

Jeff Malpas (2012, 2017) develops this relational understanding of place further while also adding complexity to places' boundaries. For Malpas (2012), places are embedded within each other through their connecting relations – places are positioned in networks of other places, they have other places embedded in them, and they impact on, and are impacted by, the places that they relate to. Importantly, Malpas (2012) contends that places have boundaries, although he believes that these boundaries are open and changeable. This open boundedness is central to the relationality of places, as these open boundaries not only provide a certain orientated locatedness to places, which in turn allows for relationality, but they are also created by the relations themselves. As places are connected or differentiated, boundaries are created which are open, porous and dynamic.

2.3.d Multi-Temporal Places

If we are to accept the preceding conceptualisations of place, that is that places are processual, full of movement and relational, then questions arise around temporality and the associations between places and time. As was discussed above, Pred (1984) presents an understanding of place as a historically contingent process, intimately tied to the time-space specific activities of people and objects. Pred draws from time-geographies to stress the inseparability of time and space in the making of places: if places are processual, then they are always in a state of becoming. This point is mirrored by Massey (2005), whose concept of space as the "simultaneity of stories so far" and of places as collections of these stories, encapsulates the importance of space-time relations and the inseparability of the two concepts. Consequently, Massey (1994a: 141; 2005) proposes a view of places as bundles of time-space trajectories, or as “temporary constellations”. These bundles of time-space trajectories allow for places to be empirically analysed according to how they are “drawn together by individuals through cognitive and emotional processes” (Massey, 2005: 119).These bundles are like Casey’s (2013) notion of gatherings, whereby places are viewed as gatherings of people, emotions and discourses. Pierce et al. (2011) build on Massey’s (2005) conceptualisation of places as bundles of time-space trajectories by asserting that the bringing together of multiple and diverse “bundles” creates places.

Hamilakis’ (2017) work complicates Massey’s (2005) notion of bundles of time-space trajectories somewhat by placing an emphasis on the multi-temporality of assemblages, rather than focusing simply on the present. Although Hamilakis’ (2017) work deals with assemblage theory, it holds great insights for those of us engaging with place and place-making. For Hamilakis (ibid: 169), assemblages are “temporary and deliberate heterogeneous arrangements of material and immaterial elements, [and] are about the relationship of in-betweenness”. Further, he contends that “sensoriality and affectivity, memory and multi-temporality are key features of assemblage thinking, and that assemblages also imply certain political effects”. All of these aspects of assemblages, as defined by Hamilakis (ibid), and as argued for throughout this chapter, are also relevant for place: places consist of material and immaterial elements; places are primarily about the relationships that form them; that the sensorial and felt experiences of places are important; that they are inherently political; and that they are constituted by multiple temporalities. For Hamilakis (ibid: 174), time can be viewed as a co-existence, rather than as successive, resulting in the co-presence of multiple temporalities. As we experience, and indeed make, places in the present, we draw from multiple memories and temporalities in the process. This not only impacts on how we experience and know these places in the present, but it also shapes the very constitution and nature of these places through our engagements with them. To refer back to Pred’s (1984) work once more, if it is the coalescence of human and object biographies that make places, then the multiplicity of temporalities present in these biographies needs to be taken into account.

2.3.e Places as Political

Places are political. Unlike the somewhat apolitical understandings of place proposed by the humanistic geographers of the 1970s, place here is understood as being inseparable from politics. As Marxist, feminist and post-structuralist geographies have shown us, a critical view of place is needed, one which is aware of the social processes that are involved in the construction of places. Specifically, a view is needed that is mindful of the fact that matters of power are inextricably bound up with place: in how places are constituted and made; in how they are represented; in how their borders are imagined and controlled; in how they are experienced and felt; and in which bodies are perceived as belonging “in” place and who is viewed as “out” of place.

Pierce, Martin and Murphy (2011: 54) suggest that “Place-making – the set of social, political and material processes by which people iteratively create and recreate the experienced geographies in which they live – is an important but oft-neglected part of political theory”. As places are (re)created, both through altering the material settings and by governing the embodied engagements with those physical settings, they are impacted by, and impact on, social processes. When discussing place, Harvey (1993: 5) claims that “The first step down the road is to insist that place in whatever guise, is like space and time, a social construct. The only interesting question that can be asked is, by what social process(es) is place constructed?” Although I do not agree with Harvey that a focus on the social processes behind a place’s construction is the “only interesting question that can be asked” – as I would view the experiential and emotional knowings of places to be just as important – he does rightly identify the socially constructed nature of places and attributes importance to the social processes behind place-making. The ability to change a place’s physical setting and materiality, and to inscribe meaning to these places through representational and discursive practices, is most often possible only to those people who hold power over the place. The politics of place making, in this regard, often surround a struggle over the “defining” characteristics of a place. This practice is an important tactic in the creation of place-based identities and group mobilisations, creating a normative, and usually homogenous, notion of place and belonging – as is often seen in relation to nationalist movements and groups.

By attributing a specific, normative identity to a place and by determining who should be in that place, an exclusionary practice is also happening, whereby those lying outside of the norm are deemed “out of place” in rather reactionary or regressive ways (Harvey, 1993; Massey, 1994). Such reactionary senses of place often result in the drawing of either imagined or physical boundaries, which is of course, a politically charged practice. The construction of borders around places, either imagined or materially enforced, is a powerful act of exclusion that works through interrupting, influencing or preventing embodied engagements with certain places. By creating physical borders, the very materiality and corporeality of one's body becomes a political matter as people are either permitted or denied the opportunity to physically engage with that place, often based on their embodied qualities – i.e., race, class, ethnicity, gender, age, (dis)ability, or even religious dress. These embodied distinctions are also relevant for imagined borders, whereby individuals and groups may be made to feel "out of place" because of their corporeality, thus impacting on how they experience and interpret their emplaced engagements.

Politically and socially constructed borders rely on a static vision of place, one where places are seen as being natural and authentic and where mobility is viewed as threatening. The creation of borders, along with other social, economic, cultural and political factors, contributes towards a person's ability to move through places. These "power geometries", to borrow the term from Massey (1994a), refer to the spatially differentiated opportunities and mobilities afforded to people depending on social structures that either allow or disallow an individual to move across space and thus engage with places. Similarly, Pred (1984) also draws attention to operations of power in his work. For Pred (ibid) "paths" occur within the contexts of social structures and processes, with social structures being both produced by, and producing, these "paths". Therefore, for both Massey's (1994) and Pred's (1984) mobile and relational conceptualisations, matters of power are central to how we understand place.

The politics of place is made evermore clear when the aforementioned temporalities of place are considered. Practices of remembering and memory are undeniably political acts. As Hamilakis (2017: 175) explains, "the actualization of distinctive modes of time, the mnemonic selection of certain instances and the forgetting of others will produce political effects, as distinctive times can operate instrumentally to valorise events, ancestors and situations past and present, whereas the forgetting of others can erase difficult or inconvenient truths". Thus, as places are physically shaped by those holding power, discursive and representational referents indicate which temporalities are to be inscribed in the material fabric of the place. Subsequently, certain temporalities are remembered and particular emotional responses evoked, engendering and supporting particular political effects (ibid, 2017: 175; see also Section 2.2.f for a discussion of emotions as political). However, that is not to say that this political practice of provoking memory and emotion is wholly successful in its attempts to shape group remembering. Rather, as will be discussed in relation to specific representational practices in subsequent sections, these signs are often decoded in divergent ways by different individuals, resulting in a diffuse array of emotional and remembered responses.

2.4 IDENTITY.

Questions relating to identity – both individual identity and group identities – have long been an area of interest and a topic of enquiry for those working within the social sciences and indeed, academia more broadly. Given its history of defining and labelling places and people, the discipline of Geography has often had an obsession with racial identities. Fortunately, the move from conservative geographical practices to more critical stances was not confined solely to the sub-discipline of geopolitics. Cultural and social geographers engaging with the topic today have largely moved away from the once colonialist and racist practices of our predecessors. As such, the discipline has become less involved with the assigning of rigid and fixed collective identities to people and places, shifting the focus instead to a more fluid and experiential understanding of identity. Informed by the work of Butler (1990) and Goffman (1956), identity is viewed by many as something that is decentred, anti-foundational and performed, rather than an as innate, biological or fixed trait. Approaching identity-making as a processual work of performance enables insights to be gleaned into the ways in which people manoeuvre between identity poles depending on their spatial contexts and their interactions with others. As people move between different social and spatial settings and encounters, they may figuratively shift between poles of their identities, thereby successively performing different versions of the Self (Butler, 1990; Goffman, 1956). Emotions play a dominant role in shaping these performances as they continually impact on our understandings of who and what we are (Davidson and Milligan, 2004).

Feminist geography – following feminist studies within the social sciences more broadly - has once again been particularly beneficial in aiding theoretical advancements in this area and in highlighting the relevance of identity as an area of geographical investigation, particularly since the 1990s. As geographical work on embodiment has shown, the body is the primary locus of the Self: it is where we, the individual, and our identities are placed (Longhurst, 2001; Shilling, 1993). Many aspects of our identities are linked with the physical and material qualities of our bodies, or rather, with the socially constructed *truths* that these traits are believed to signify, such as race, sex, ability/disability, etc (Rose, 1997; Cook et al., 2005; Longhurst, 2009). This point leads onto what is arguably the greatest contribution made by feminist studies to the field of identity studies over the past three decades: that is, intersectionality.

2.4.a Intersectionality.

McCall (2005) views intersectionality as one of the most important developments in women's studies (McCall, 2005). Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989, 2016) first employed the term intersectionality to bring light to the fact that individuals are often impacted by multiple forms of discrimination at any one time. These social inequalities overlap at particular points, like roads meeting at an intersection, hence the metaphorical term intersectionality. Although the term intersectionality did not emerge until 1989, the idea of multiple systems of oppression occurring at once was not a new one (Lutz et al., 2011).

Prior to Crenshaw's coining of the term, a number of other scholars and groups were actively engaging in debates surrounding the multiple levels of discrimination faced by certain people. Of particular importance to English language academia are the Combahee River Collective (1981: 213) whose assertion that they "find it difficult to separate race from class from sex oppression because in our lives they are most often experienced simultaneously" has been hugely influential in shaping contemporary understandings of intersectionality, and arguably, the triad of race-class-sex that so often pervades intersectional studies (Lutz et al., 2011; Phoenix, 2011). Despite being focused on intersectional topics, these early works differ from more recent intersectional studies in that they were not carried out from a theoretically intersectional perspective (Lutz et al., 2011). Such a perspective only became available once Crenshaw (1989) coined the term, subsequently allowing for a new platform for the disparate theoretical approaches within feminist scholarship to come together. Specifically, intersectionality allowed for two distinct currents of thought from within feminism to come together: post-structural feminist theory and critical feminist theory (Davis, 2011: 45).

Intersectionality addresses the central concern of feminist scholarship, that is to say, it is concerned with difference (Zack, 2007: 197). Due to the history of exclusion of the feminine within academia, the difference between the male and female experience has been of principal importance to feminist scholars (Davis, 2011). Intersectionality, however, brings this emphasis on difference a step further by providing a theoretical perspective to challenge notions of a homogenous female experience through acknowledging that gender is simply one dimension of oppression faced by women. At any given time, the individual may be discriminated against due to an infinite number of perceived characteristics such as race, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, age, and so on. As Crenshaw (1989: 139) defines it, intersectionality is "the multidimensionality of marginalized subjects' lived experience". Minnow (1997: 38) elaborates further, explaining that intersectionality is "the way in which any particular individual stands at the crossroads of multiple groups". It can be understood epistemologically as a development of feminist standpoint theory which argues that it is important to account for the social agent's positioning while challenging the assumed hegemonic, masculine positioning of the subject (Yuval-Davis, 2011). It illuminates clearly the consequences that social categories have on people, but it does so through using methodologies that work in line with the post-structuralist project of deconstructing categories and exploring the dynamics of power (Brah and Phoenix, 2004: 82; Davis, 2011).

As our identities shift depending on our social interactions and geographical contexts, so too do the systems of oppression which we operate in relation to. The term "intersectional invisibility" (Knapp, 2011) is of relevance here, whereby one aspect or face of our identity is given more significance or higher meaning than another, depending on our context. Put another way, we identify or disidentify with certain traits or characteristics depending on where we are and who we're engaging with (Valentine, 2007). Echoing Villa's (2011) call to view intersectionality through a somatic lens, we should note that these identifications take place in and through the lived body, as was discussed earlier in the chapter. Within the discipline of geography, intersectionality was largely overlooked until the last two decades, with geographers turning to the concept later than many other social scientists (Valentine, 2007; O'Neill Gutierrez and Hopkins, 2015). Fortunately, the concept is now far more prominent within contemporary geographical enquiry and as Valentine (2007: 18 - 19) points out, intersectionality not only provides feminist geography with the theoretical framework to develop geographical thinking about the relationship between multiple categories of oppression, but geography can also supplement intersectionality with a focus on the spatial.

Intersectionality has been described as a catchall phrase for the everyday multiple positionings of subjects (Phoenix, 2006: 187). Over the past three decades a number of other terms have been deployed to address the same topics such as, “interlocking systems” (Collins, 1990), “axes of difference” (Yuval-Davis, 2006), and “dynamic processes” (Staunaes, 2003). However, Crenshaw’s metaphoric phrase is best used here given not only its useful – albeit simplistic and somewhat misleading – imagery, but also its widespread understanding within academia. Often, the scholars who employ intersectional theory focus (too heavily, I would argue) on the triad of race-class-sex. Although these three categories are undeniably important when trying to understand an individual’s experience in the world, a focus solely on these inevitably omits other important factors. This has led to some academics incorporating additional categories such as age and sexuality into their intersectional analysis (Bradley, 1996; Kitzinger, 1987). As Yuval-Davis (2011) points out, some scholars even began compiling lists of categories; with Bunch (2001) listing 16 categories and Lutz listing 14. Attempts to list possible traits or potential systems of oppression are, I would argue, futile due to the immeasurable number of identities which people may relate to. Resulting from the concept’s potential to be applied to an incalculable number of categories, attempts to list the traits of an individual often end with an ‘etc’. In “Gender Trouble”, Butler (1990: 143) mocks the ‘etc’, claiming that it is an admission of a “sign of exhaustion as well as of the illimitable process of signification itself”. In light of this “illimitable process of signification”, questions surrounding representation arise. Namely, does this acknowledgement lead us to a representational dilemma? If we approach this question from a performativity theory perspective – that is to say that representations or naming are an act of performance – then it is understandable to assert that these self-representations are important, similar to the dilemma of representation discussed above in relation to emotions. Given the ambiguity surrounding who, or more precisely when, intersectionality applies to, many have argued that it is too vague a term and requires a concrete, definitive, clear definition. This ambiguity, however, is what has ultimately led to the concept’s success as different groups have been able to interpret and apply intersectionality differently (Davis, 2011).

2.5 MINORITISATION.

The term minoritisation relates to the political, cultural and social processes and practices of creating a minority group and rendering them as distinctive. A minoritised group is one that is in a position of inferiority based on any number of markers of difference, including but not limited to: political, social, cultural, religious, linguistic, economic, or sexual (Atkinson, 2000; Montaner, 1988). Atkinson (2000), borrowing from Montaner (1988: 16), explains that minority groups are an endemic phenomenon in modern nation states. Ultimately, differences are asserted and maintained between the majoritarian population and the minority group. The minority group are usually seen as a threat to the dominant group as they are perceived to be a polluting body (Sibley, 1995). As was the case in the relations between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, especially in the period between 1922 and 1998. The majoritarian group is usually in the more powerful position in relation to the minority group and as such, often holds a great deal of influence over them – although there are some notable exceptions, such as the apartheid regime in South Africa. Specifically, majoritarian groups may play a central role in the drawing of spatial and social boundaries, the cultural practices of representation and stereotyping, the determining of notions of belonging, and in shaping the politics of belonging (Yuval-Davis, 2011). It is important to acknowledge the difference between the two terms of "belonging" and "politics of belonging" at this point.

2.5.a Belonging.

Belonging is best understood as a dynamic and ongoing process rather than as a rigid, fixed status (Yuval-Davis, 2011). This process in multi-scaled, occurring at different levels (Antonsich, 2010). Importantly for this study of the Hui, belonging at one scale does not necessarily equate to belonging at another – for example, participants alluded to belonging at the national level but having felt excluded at a more localized level in Beijing. As Ho (2011: 731) has pointed out through the example of highly skilled migrants in London, places of inclusion and exclusion (or belonging and not-belonging) are largely mediated by intersecting axes of identity such as ethnicity, gender, nationality and class. By establishing places where people belong, alternative spaces of otherness and marginality are often produced. Through an examination of womyn's separatist spaces, Browne (2009) argues that critical engagement with marginalised spaces of difference allows us to consider tensions and affectivities while also acknowledging relations of power. In spaces and places of marginality and exclusion such as these, intersectionality is of great importance as often these places of exclusion act to further marginalise vulnerable people. In the case of the Michigan Womyn's Music Festival studied by Browne, the womyn's spaces created acted to further marginalise trans women.

According to Yuval-Davis (2011: 10), belonging refers to emotional attachment to spaces, it's "about feeling 'at home'". "Home" is linked with projections of hope for the future (Hage, 1997: 103), and these hopes are believed by some to be linked with notions of safety (Ignatieff, 2001). This notion of safety is particularly relevant when the concepts of minoritisation and securitisation are taken into account, specifically in relation to Islam. Belonging is part of our everyday lives; it has been naturalized. However, during times when safety is threatened, belonging may become not only a political issue (Fenster, 2004) but also a securitized one. This is arguably the case with Muslim minority populations in many countries across the globe today. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the 7/7 London bombings Muslims have found themselves becoming increasingly victimised by Western, and indeed other, governments' conflation of Islam, immigration and terrorism (Karyotis, 2007).

2.5.b Politics of Belonging.

Within the context of minoritisation, the politics of belonging may refer not only to the classification of majority/minority labels, but also of their assumed territories and places. Processes of inclusion and exclusion are central here, with those in power – i.e., the majoritarian population – determining where the differentiated groups belong or do not belong (Yuval-Davis, 2011). Concepts of power are useful in understanding the politics of belonging. Foucault's (1995) "disciplinary society" refers to a concept within which "power increasingly operates through impersonal mechanisms of bodily discipline and a govermentality which escapes the consciousness and will of individual and collective social agents" (Yuval-Davis, 2011: 19). Foucault's theory, however, would suggest that power only operates when resistance occurs which is perhaps too monolithic. Bourdieu's (1984; 1990) theory of "symbolic power" shares Foucault's emphasis on the role of bodily practices yet avoids the same shortcoming of Foucault's "disciplinary society". The subject, according to Bourdieu is both socially constituted and embodied. Symbolic powers are vitally important when addressing concerns of belonging and not-belonging. As Favell (1999) has stated, the politics of belonging may be viewed as the "dirty work" of boundary making. The concepts of "us" and "them" are used by groups to reproduce symbolic, and occasionally physical, boundaries between political communities. It is here that Anderson's (1991) work on imagined communities is crucial. The politics of belonging involves both the reproduction of various communities of belongings' boundaries by presumably homogenous majoritarian political powers and also their contestation by other groups (Yuval-Davis, 2011). Such productions and contestations are central to how belonging is defined for communities at multiple scales, from ethnic groups to national citizenship. Such projects are powerfully emotive. As Ho (2009: 789) has shown in a study of Singaporean transmigrants in London, the politics of belonging involved in citizenship-making practices is both challenged and produced through the emotions, in what they have termed "emotional citizenship".

2.5.c Representation, Othering and Stereotyping.

Culture can be defined as "the systems of shared meanings which people who belong to the same community, group or nation use to help them interpret and make sense of the world" (Hall, 1995: 176). These meanings are not fixed, and it is their interpretation by participants that creates a culture (Hall, 1995: 176; 1997a: 2). Meanings may be conveyed in a multitude of ways and can be implicit or explicit. It has been argued that the visual is central to the cultural construction of social life in Western societies as we are constantly surrounded by images in our everyday lives (Rose, 2001: 6). Representations are immensely powerful as they shape how people make sense of the world and can influence people's actions and practices (Orgad, 2012: 3). These representations render the world in visual terms and are never innocent (Rose, 2001: 6). Global media outlets are a common source of representations, presenting viewers with authoritative messages that make socially constructed boundaries seem natural and unavoidable. Ideology is a system of representations that underpins social and cultural life, mediating between people and their relationship to society as well as their social identities (Spencer, 2006: 2-3). These ideologies are constructed in such a way as to legitimise social inequalities (Rose, 2001: 70).

Representations can help to form individual and group identities through a process of "othering"; the creation of "us" and "them" (Spencer, 2006: 3). Questions of difference are essential to this process, as binary opposites are used by social groups to impose meanings on their worlds by organising things into a classificatory system (Hall, 1997b: 236). Ideals are created and those holding characteristics dissimilar to our own are classified as the Other. Interaction with the Other is necessary for the forging of identities; both individual and group (Spencer, 2006: 8). Stereotyping is a representational practice that reduces people to a select number of distinguishable characteristics, which are made to appear fixed and natural (Dyer, 1999: 1-6; Hall, 1997b: 257). Within stereotyping, there is a connection between representation, power and difference as the ability to represent someone or something in a certain way holds great cultural and symbolic power. Race is one characteristic that is often the base for stereotyping. Stereotypes based on race may be referred to as a racialized regime of representation (Hall, 1997b: 250). In his work on Orientalism, Edward Said (1978: 40) examined how Europe represented the Islamic Orient's presumed cultural, religious and social inferiority in such a way as to legitimise colonialism, while at the same time creating a shared European identity based upon European superiority.

2.5.d Securitisation of Islam.

In contemporary times, it is argued that a new form of Orientalism is taking place across the West, one where European and American identity is being increasingly founded on its difference to Islamic fundamentalism (Rose, 1995: 95). In many countries, Islam has been undergoing an increasingly intense process of securitisation in recent years as Muslims and their communities have been unfairly targeted by a number of security measures under the guise of counterterrorism and immigration control (Mythen et al., 2012; Cesari, 2009; Benotman, 2012). This process of securitisation is fuelled by Western media and political discourses which continue to depict Muslims as a dangerous and culturally different Other (Gündüz, 2007; Mavelli, 2013). The security framing of an issue involves the distribution of fear and trust through a process of othering, with the culturally dissimilar being viewed as having the capacity to corrupt the cultural identity that reinforces trust amongst the culturally similar, making them a threat. By creating a domain of insecurity in which a fear of Islam holds political merit, a shared identity can be created amongst the non-Muslim population. This fictitious identity is believed to be homogenous and salient, and in need of constant protection from the dangerous, Islamic Other (Huysmans, 2006). Croft (2012) elaborates further, claiming that Britishness is created in direct contradiction to a perceived Islamic identity founded upon negative stereotypes and reinforced by media representations. Despite being far-less researched than the links between Western politics and Islam, Muslims in China are increasingly being subjected to similar unequal security measures and a securitization of their religion. Under the guise of anti-separatist and anti-terrorist actions, Muslims in China are progressively being faced with intense policing and monitoring by authorities, with members of these minority groups and international organisations claiming that they are being targeted because of their religious affiliations (Gladney, 2004; Bovingdon, 2010). According to Amnesty International (2018) the Chinese authorities are carrying out an "intensifying campaign of mass internment, intrusive surveillance, political indoctrination and forced cultural assimilation" against the Uyghur, Kazakh and other Muslim groups living in XUAR. Human Rights Watch (2019) have reported that these actions, which are part of China's "Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism" campaign, have resulted in an estimated 1 million Muslims being arbitrarily detained in XUAR's political education camps, with a further unknown amount being held in detention centres and prisons.

2.5.e Belonging in practice - identifying with and against places.

As Adams, Hoelscher and Till (2001: xxi) explained, Tuan's assertion that home is an intimate place "leads directly to questions regarding the politics of identity and processes of identity-formation". Through examining how individuals and groups identify with or against a place, it becomes clear that identities are bound up in the spatial (Rose, 1995). As with the production of all knowledge, questions of difference once again play a role here in establishing traditional notions of where places are, what lies within and outside of their imagined boundaries and who belongs, or does not belong, in and of those places (Hall, 1995). Said's (1978) work on Orientalism is a prime example of this politically motivated alignment of place and identity. European identity, and by extension Europe as a place, he argued, were created in direct opposition to presumed differences between it and the Orient. The use of negative and racist stereotypes not only shaped how European people came to view the Orient as a place, but in doing so it also constructed an idea of what Europe was using hierarchical binaries. In contrast to the Orient's apparently cultural and religious inferiority and its barbaric nature, Europe was seen as a superior, civilised place, thus legitimising the "civilising" force of colonialism. Furthermore, a shared sense of European identity was created as people did not merely identify with Europe, but rather, they identified against another place and its seemingly racially and religiously different people, i.e., the Orient and its inhabitants.

The relationship between an individual's identity and place is not, however, solely due to their immediate identifying against other places. In fact, people may also primarily identify with places (Rose, 1995). That is to say, that the linking of identity with a place need not be exclusively based on the othering of another - although questions of difference are still central in deciding what the place's boundaries are and who belongs within them. Identifying with one's home-place or hometown is perhaps an example of when we might, at least primarily, identify with a place rather than against another as these connections are ones based on personal histories, familiarity and socio-spatial ties with the place. Bennet's (2009) investigation of nostalgia and identity in a small British village successfully demonstrates the role of such socio-spatial engagements and practices in the formation, and indeed maintenance, of a community's shared identity. Narratives of "belonging to" and "being of" certain places are undeniably contentious issues. As with emotional narratives, these discourses very often take on a political form, whereby certain people and groups are claimed to "not belong" in what Massey (1994a) calls a "reactionary" notion of place. Unfortunately, one does not have to look far to see such discourses at work, simply take note of the language being used by Western politicians and media outlets in response to the "migrant crisis" of the past two decades (see - Huysmans, 2006; Fierke, 2007; Van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007; Marsh & Rees, 2012).

2.6 CONSUMING PLACES, CONSUMING IDENTITIES: FOOD PERFORMANCES.

As a branch of social scientific enquiry, food studies involve the exploration of food and its inherent relationship to human experience, allowing researchers to investigate the deeper meanings underlying the everyday practices of food preparation and eating (Almerico, 2014). For geographers, food is seen as holding deep political and sociological meaning, extending beyond the biological and physical realm (Isakjee and Carroll, 2019; Waitt, 2014). Further, food and meals are central in the communication, performance and reproduction of cultures (Tellström et al, 2006; Barthes, 1975; Douglas, 1982; Bell and Valentine, 1997; Handelman, 1998). As Di Giovine and Brulotte (2016: 1) argue, "we all must eat to sustain ourselves. Yet, how we eat, and what we eat, and when we eat, and with whom we eat, all uniquely vary from place to place, group to group, time to time – thanks to longstanding geographic, economic, social, and cosmological differences throughout the world". Preparing and eating food are socially, temporally and geographically dependent practices that are deeply political and inescapably personal, yet social.

2.6.a "You Are What You Eat": Food and Identity.

Our choices of food and food practices take place "within an array of affective social and political engagements" from which "we construct boundaries of self and other, identity and belonging" (Isakjee and Carroll, 2019: 2). As such, food can be a significant marker of group and individual identity (Di Giovine and Brulotte, 2016). Jansen (1997: 87) argues that through acting as a marker of difference and distinction, food and meals simultaneously express identity as processes of differentiation and identity are bound together: "They not only differentiate but also define 'us' versus 'them'". Borrowing from Bourdieu (1979: 192), Jansen (1997: 87) reminds us that "social identity is defined by as well as defines difference". In their paper "Food, gender and Irishness", Kneafsey and Cox (2002) showed how Irish identity for Irish women living in Coventry was intimately tied to food consumption and preparation practices. Through their involvement in the preparation and performance of food, Irish women played central roles in the construction of a collective Irish identity in Britain. More recently, Turkkan (2019) has shown how upper middle-class women in Istanbul involved in alternative food networks, are increasingly linking their identities as mothers and food activists, while using discourses of motherhood to distinguish themselves from others and thus reinforcing socio-economic boundaries.

For many societies, food and food practices are closely entwined with concepts of gender: "Food helps to draw lines between men and women, and masculinity and femininity in many different ways" (Jansen, 1997: 88). Food and food practices hold many possibilities for furthering our understandings of "gendered social relations, knowledge construction, and cultural identity in communities" (Beoku-Betts, 1995: 535). Although food and food work have been rightly analysed by feminist scholars as sites of oppression and subordination for women, as they often act to reinforce unequal gender roles, these gendered meanings of food are challenged and made more complex when intersections with ethnicity, race and diaspora are taken into account (D'Sylva and Beagan, 2011: 279). In her study with African American women in Gullah communities, Beoku-Betts (1995) showed how food work was simultaneously reaffirming women's subordination through reproducing unequal gender roles, while also acting to empower women and provide them with a source of valued identity. Similarly, D'Sylva and Beagan's (2011: 279) study among Gaon Canadian women also demonstrated the ways that gendered food roles were viewed as "having particular power or 'currency' within the family and community, valued for fostering and supporting Goan identity." Therefore, although Western feminist scholars have rightly highlighted the ways in which gendered food roles can act to exacerbate women's subordination, a post-colonial consideration of other ethnic, racial or national experiences highlights the ways that these gendered roles may also be empowering when the links between identity and food are taken seriously.

Taken as a potentially unifying or differentiating set of practices, food not only reinforces boundaries along the lines of gender, but also registers other markers of difference, such as ethnicity. Central to ethnic classifications are concepts of difference (for a discussion of the development of ethnicity within the Chinese context see Chapter 4). Eriksen (1992) argued that ethnicity is processual, relying on continual acts of differentiation and reidentification. Boundaries are established between groups to distinguish between "ethnic insiders" and "outsider Others", creating notions of belonging (Di Giovine and Brulotte, 2016: 3; Barths, 1969). As with other social categories of difference, the construction and reproduction of ethnic identity is carried out through "a relational dialectic of negotiation, contestation, self-fashioning, and re-presenting" (Di Giovine and Brulotte, 2016: 4). Food and food practices play a central role in allowing for these socially constructed categories of belonging (Lu and Fine, 1995; Bell and Valentine, 1997).

The proverb "you are what you eat" is one that is frequently used within food studies, and with good reason. Food not only becomes part of who we are in a socio-cultural, or socially constructed, sense of identity, but it also has an embodied, biological aspect. As Di Giovine and Brulotte (2016) point out, food biologically becomes part of us when we consume and digest it. By eating, and thus digesting, certain foods, we are physically impacting on the composition of our embodied Self, directly linking our food practices and our embodied states. This physical embodiment and biological link to food holds symbolic, or even religious, meanings for many people. In their paper "Blood, body and belonging: the geographies of halal food consumption in the UK", Arshad Isakjee and Brídín Carroll (2019) explained how for their Muslim participants, ethical and theological understandings of halal food entail an embodied response. Halal food, which is considered cleaner and purer by their participants, is ultimately viewed as being healthier for both participants' bodies and spirits (ibid: 14). This religious perception of the embodied qualities of food consumption demonstrate the inseparability for many people between what we eat and who we are.

Given the impactful role that food can play in shaping our identities, both individual and group, it is unsurprising that food and food practices are extremely emotive (Di Giovine and Brulotte, 2016; Dias, 2003; Mathee, 2004; Germann Molz, 2007). This viscerality is inherently political as our food choices are shaped by social norms and networks of governance (Isakjee and Carroll, 2019: 7; Hayes-Conroy and Hayes-Conroy, 2010). The politics of food are made evermore apparent when we consider: the associations between food, identity and belonging; the limitations on access to food and the uneven distribution of it globally; and the governance of food, food production and food certification at different scales. Within Europe, numerous political controversies have arisen over the past decade in relation to religious, specifically Islamic, foods (Chrisafis, 2015; Isakjee and Carroll, 2019). As such, food ethics and production have become an area for cultural and identity politics, a phenomena that Appadurai (1981) has termed "gastropolitics" (Isakjee and Carroll, 2019). Such controversies and emotivities, specifically surrounding halal food, are not confined to Europe. As Matthew Erie (2018: 390) writes, "the symbol of *Qingzhen* [taken here to mean halal] has proliferated in the course of China's economic modernization such that it pervades the public sphere, creating anxiety among Han Chinese that Chinese society and government is becoming 'Islamicized'". This "anxiety" surrounding the symbol of *Qingzhen*/halal food and its perceived signalling of an Islamicising wave sweeping over China, shows the ways that food can be both highly emotive and political, but also how it also can bring about a fear of the Other and ignite discourses of belonging and exclusion.

2.6.b "You Are Where You Eat": Food and Place Identity.

Food and place are tied together in complex ways in geographical imaginations, which are central to our "lifeworlds" (Feagan, 2007), and individual and group identity (Bell and Valentine, 1997). As a meaning-loaded and powerful set of beliefs and practices, food can tie people and places together (Lin and Lin, 2014). "People's visceral experiences of food – tastes, textures, and aromas – can tell us a great deal about their emotional and affective relations with place" (Longhurst et al, 2009). As Bell and Valentine (1997) rightly pointed out in their landmark geographical text, "we are where we eat".

Rather than being innate, biological, fixed traits, people's identities are decentred and performed. Depending on the socio-cultural, and indeed spatial, contexts that we inhabit, we may perform a diffuse number of roles in our enactments of identity as we figuratively manoeuver between poles of our identity (Butler, 1990; Goffman, 1956; Johnston, 2009). This means that as we move between contexts, we perform different versions of the Self. Emotions play a dominant role in shaping these performances as they continually shape our understandings of who and what we are (Davidson and Milligan, 2004). Due to the mutually constitutive nature of places and the people that inhabit them, it is reasonable to assert that we lend ourselves, our traits and our identities to places. Places, in turn, reciprocate by impacting on what we identify as and how we perform the Self. As such, some places are believed to be synonymous with the identities of certain individuals and groups.

Rather than being mere objects, the materiality of these things resides in the sensuous processes of "human interaction with things", often resulting in emotional responses from people (Pels, 1998: 100; Spyer, 1998; Hockey et al., 2007). These material referents work by acting as synecdochal signs for certain places, fulfilling the role of signifier for the places that they are believed to be part of (Peirce and Hoopes, 1991). As such, the embodied act of eating certain foods in in specific places may be viewed as not only consuming food, but also as the consumption of place and place identity, whereby a place is "sold" to consumers (Philo and Kearns, 1993; Bell and Valentine, 1997). This consumption of foods associated with place is an essential practice through which individual and group identity is formed (Bell and Valentine, 1997; Ohnuki-Tierney, 1993). As Ho (2018a) has shown in a study of African student migrants in China, people may seek out certain dishes and foods associated with different places in an attempt to demonstrate aspects of their identities that may counter more distressing aspects of social relations. In the case of the African students in Ho's study, they not only consumed foods that reminded them of home, but they also actively sought out foods associated with the West in an attempt to demonstrate their cosmopolitan identities, thus countering racialisation in China. Further, through exploring food, food practices, and the socio-cultural meanings of food in non-Western contexts, insights may be gleaned into how space, place and other geographical concepts happen outside of Anglo-American geography. This point was made evident in Low and Ho's (2018) introduction chapter to a special edition of the journal "Food, Culture and Society", where they demonstrated the usefulness of examining food in Asian cities as a lens for challenging Western interpretations of urban space.

Places, identities, food and emotions are bound together in complex ways (Feagan, 2007; Bell and Valentine, 1997; Longhurst et al, 2009). The act of eating, which is one of our most basic embodied functions, is closely linked to our personal identifications and attachments to place, and is highly emotive (Di Giovine and Brulotte, 2016; Kneafsey and Cox, 2002). Given the inescapably political nature of places (Massey, 1994; Pierce et al, 2011), emotions (Ahmed, 2014; Pain, 2009), identity performances (Butler, 1990) and concepts of belonging (Yuval-Davis, 2011; Anderson, 1991), it is unsurprising that practices of food preparation and consumption also hold deep political meaning (Isakjee and Carroll, 2019). The political nature of food is evident at multiple scales: from the controversies surrounding halal food (Erie, 2018; Chrisafis, 2015; Isakjee and Carroll, 2019); to the subordinating, yet often empowering effects of food preparation (D'Sylva and Beagan, 2011; Beoku-Betts, 1995); to the role of food in demarcating group identity and belonging (ibid; Ho, 2018a). Food studies therefore offers a great deal of theoretical insights that may be of use to this project given its political focus, feminist political geographical approach and its goal of exploring the everyday, lived implications of global geopolitics.

2.7 CONCLUSION.

As Chapter 1.6 stated, the aim of this research project is to examine how, under the impress of the Global War on Terror, processes of minoritisation and place impact on the identities, experiences and everyday geographies of the Hui people. Specifically, the overarching aim is to explore how Hui identity is performed, made public, othered, negotiated, and contested through its food cultures. As such, a theoretical framework needed to be developed which would not only allow for the lived realities of global geopolitics to be explored, but which would also justify such a focus as a serious line of geographical enquiry.

Addressing this need, this chapter has presented a theoretical framework that builds upon an eclectic, yet interlinked and synergistic, collection of theoretical and conceptual developments from within geography, while also drawing from other relevant branches of academia. The resulting approach, which is underpinned by the feminist teaching of "the personal is political" (Dowler and Sharp, 2001), allows for the inescapably (geo)political dimensions of Hui people's everyday lives and seemingly mundane practices to be explored. Borrowing the term feminist political geography from Jennifer Hyndman (2019: 4) such an approach attempts "to consolidate a thoroughly feminist and anti-racist political geography that does not succumb to Orientalist rescue narratives or produce regimes of care and security that subjectify" minority people. Further, such an approach takes "violence, exclusion, inequality, the materiality of the bodies, and their various subjectivities seriously" (ibid: 8), something which is important given the project's aims.

The feminist political geography approach implemented throughout this research and as discussed in this chapter is hinged upon a number of key theoretical and conceptual understandings. Emotions are important (Neu, 2000; Pugmire, 1998). How we feel directly impacts on what we know (Bondi, 2007). Our emotional states undeniably influence how we view ourselves, our social positionings and the world around us. They are essential to how we come to know the world within which we live, and they play a central role in shaping our personal geographies, either enabling or limiting our engagements with our spatial settings (Davidson and Milligan, 2004; Davidson and Bondi, 2004). As with our identities, our bodies act as the locus of our emotions, providing them with an embodied form through which we can engage with space. Subsequently, places are produced that are far more than a mere location or sub-division of space. These places are intimately known to us as they are closely intertwined with, and indeed mutually constitutive of, our lived bodies (Casey, 2013). In this way, such places become meaningful to us, eliciting emotional responses (Tuan, 1977; Seamon, 2018). As we live out our lives in these settings, we come to know them, to feel and sense them, by means of our bodily, and indeed emotional, engagements with them (Longhurst, 2001; Rose, 1999; Thomas, 2009; Davidson and Milligan, 2004). Just as our emotions help to shape our sense of Self, so too do the places that we are inextricably bound to (Casey, 2001). Feelings of belonging and not-belonging are equally important in the establishment of identities. These place-based identities may be profoundly personal at the level of the individual, resulting from intimate and experiential understandings of that place. Alternatively, there may be a sense of a shared identity amongst multiple people, whereby a group's collective identity is believed to be linked to a particular place. In return, that place is believed to be synonymous of that particular group (Yuval-Davis, 2011; Rose, 1995). These identities are fluid and context-dependent, and as such, their performances vary across socio-spatial settings as people navigate between differing poles of their identities (Butler, 1990; Goffman, 1956). Despite its seemingly benign, apolitical surface, food and its associated practices of preparation and consumption are highly emotive and irrefutably linked to questions of identity, belonging and place (Isakjee and Carroll, 2019; Bell and Valentine, 1997). So much so that eating, despite being one of our most basic embodied functions, is a highly political and emotive act of self-identification (Di Giovine and Brulotte, 2016; D'Sylva and Beagan, 2011).

Taken together, these theoretical and conceptual understandings provide the theoretical framework necessary for further developing a feminist political geographical approach and advancing it through a study of Hui identity. Further, it provides the theoretical tools necessary for exploring geopolitics through embodied practices, food cultures and place. Yet, significant questions remain in relation to how such a study can actually be carried out methodologically. Chapter 3 will build upon the feminist political geographical approach developed here, by contributing an epistemological framework and methodological approach that is informed by the theoretical underpinnings above. Specifically, an argument will be made in favour of applying qualitative methods when engaging critically and reflexively with Hui food cultures in Beijing to better understand the group's lived realities of the geopolitical.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY.

As was stated in Chapter 1.6, the aim of this research is to examine how, under the impress of the Global War on Terror, processes of minoritisation and place impact on the identities, experiences and everyday geographies of the Hui people. Specifically, the overarching aim is to explore how Hui identity is performed, made public, othered, negotiated, and contested through its food cultures. In order to achieve these aims, a number of key objectives were set out:

- To gain an understanding of the minoritisation mechanisms experienced by the Hui population and to explore how minoritising processes are performed through Hui food cultures and their associated places.
- To explore public and visible 'outings' of Hui peoples through an examination of the ways in which they create distinctively Hui spaces and places.
- To explore how these above processes impact on the emotional geographies of Hui people, vis-à-vis the places of Hui food culture they frequent and the practices they engage in.
- To explore the cultural meaning of food in the establishing and performance of Hui identities and places and how these relate to gender.

Given these aims and objectives, a qualitative methodology using the methods of participant observation, semi-structured interviews and semiotic analysis of local materials was implemented. This methodology, it is argued, allows for the political processes of minoritisation and identity formation to be examined, while also taking seriously the research participants' individual understandings, experiences and emotional knowings of their socio-cultural worlds. Further, such a methodology is useful for demonstrating how Hui identity is performed, made public, othered, negotiated, and contested through its food cultures, and in arguing for the usefulness of using food as a method for researching the lived realities of geopolitics. Therefore, through discussing this project's methodology and chosen methods, this chapter demonstrates the ways in which the aims and objectives were addressed.

The methodology chosen for conducting this research project is aligned with the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2. As was discussed in that chapter, this project's theoretical approach is closely aligned to what Jennifer Hyndman (2019) has called a “feminist political geography”. This theoretical framing is one that is feminist, post-colonial, critical and anti-racist in its approach to knowledge production, and which takes seriously people’s emotive and lived experiences of the (geo)political. Such an approach faces serious methodological and epistemological challenges, which are discussed in this chapter. Namely, the conceptualisation of feminist political geography implemented by this research project understands knowledge as anti-foundational, embodied, situated and as being actively made in the field – an epistemology that draws on post-structuralist and post-modernist approaches, such as those developed by feminist, post-colonial, anti-racist and queer scholars. Yet, despite actively trying to articulate their epistemologies, these scholars, according to Browne and Nash (2010: 1) “are seemingly less inclined to consider the implications of these approaches to methodologies and methods”. As such, this chapter aims to address this critique by focusing on a discussion of its methodology and methods, as guided by the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2.

Although the current project does not employ queer theory explicitly, its attempt to develop a feminist political geography owes much Browne and Nash’s (2010) “Queer Methods and Methodologies”, and to the broader invitation to understand “queer” as “a mode of thinking that questions how social norms are formed and created” (Browne and Brown, 2016: 2; Browne, 2006). In their introductory chapter, Browne and Nash (2010: 1) raise questions around: how to gather data from fluid and unstable subjects through methods such as interviewing; how to make sense of data when it is only momentarily fixed; and “how does this perpetual destabilising position us as researchers and what can we make of this destablisation”? Although these questions are being raised in relation to queer methods and methodologies within the social sciences, their questioning of researching unstable and fluid subjectivities and of researchers’ positionalities are useful methodological guides for a political feminist geography approach to research.

This chapter aims to address these concerns, while showing the relevance of qualitative methods and methodologies in overcoming them. This qualitative approach, as is discussed throughout this chapter, is underpinned by certain epistemological understandings that are linked with a feminist political geography approach. Firstly, as knowledge is both situated and socially produced, fieldwork is a dialectical process. The knowledge gathered during fieldwork neither arise wholly from the body, nor are they purely social and detached from our embodied states. Rather, this research's approach acknowledges that knowledge is produced in response to both our corporeality and our social contexts and relations. This is not only true for research participants, but also for the researcher. My own situated knowledge, interpretations and understandings come from my own positionality, my embodied state and my emotional knowings, all of which happen within specific socio-cultural, emotive and political arenas (Harraway, 1988; Limb and Dwyer, 2001; Walsh, 2009), an important point given the personal and health difficulties that I faced throughout the research process (see Section 3.3.h). Secondly, a feminist political geography approach to qualitative research allows for the messiness and co-existence of experiences, identities and subjectivities to be taken into account. This acknowledgement of the complexities of experiences, identities and understandings challenges those Western, masculinist, methodological approaches that attempt to "clean-up" or "tidy" accounts of phenomena that are unavoidably messy and multifaceted (Cope, 2002; Walsh, 2009). Thirdly, as this qualitative methodology is one shaped by a feminist political geography approach, it entails a certain genre of interpretative and meaning-making methods and ethical practices, stemming from the longer histories of feminist, post-colonial, anti-racist, queer and critical scholarships within geography and the social sciences. More specifically, the project entails and is centred around an ethics of care (Tronto, 2017). This ethics of care is an important aspect, especially given the increasing precariousness of life for Muslims in China. Further, it has been influential throughout all stages of the project, including: the choice of ethnic group and the focus on food cultures; the forms of consent requested from participants; the anonymising practices implemented; the data security procedures used to ensure safety; the translation and transcribing practices carried out; the interpretation of data and choice to include Chinese characters as footnotes; the attempts to continually re-visit and re-engage with the field; and my own reflective practices as a co-producer of knowledge. Such a methodological approach is, I believe, well suited for such a feminist political geography.

Epistemologically speaking, there is an important distinction to be made between methodology and method before this chapter can proceed. Methods can be understood as the tools or techniques used to produce knowledge during the research process, such as interviewing. Methodology, however, is the justification for selecting those methods or particular approach. As such, this chapter will be structured in two parts, with both being framed by the theoretical approach of feminist political geography outlined above. Firstly, in order to make the case for the suitability of qualitative research methods to this project, this chapter begins with a discussion of its research methodology, focusing on the value of qualitative methods, while also examining some of their limitations. The chapter then discusses how the chosen methods of participant observation, semi-structured interviews and semiotic analysis were applied in this study of Hui food culture in Beijing.

3.1 WHY A QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY?

In order to achieve the goals of this research project, a qualitative methodological approach was deemed to be most appropriate due to the emphasis placed on the lived experiences of the participants, and on their personal understandings of their social worlds. As Limb and Dwyer (2001:6) argue, rather than understanding the world as an objective context into which people must fit, qualitative methodologies view the social world as dynamic and changing, and as constituted by this social action. As such, projects that implement qualitative methodologies – including this one – view our social worlds as being continually produced through the intersection of political, cultural, social and economic processes. An emphasis is placed by qualitative methodologies on understanding lived experiences, and on interpreting the shared meanings that frame people's everyday social worlds.

Smith (1988) suggests that there is no "real" world that exists independently of the relationship between the research subjects and the researcher. In this spirit, this project considers existing theoretical work, but it also attends to the complex explanations that local experts develop. In other words, the project aims to explore what Glaser and Straus (1967) term "grounded theory". The positivist inductivism of the earliest versions of grounded theory has been addressed in later developments. Clarke (2005) takes up the challenge of postmodernist epistemology and asks the researcher to attend to the hierarchical contexts in which they practice their field research, suggesting that the original formulation fail to interrogate positionality. Charmaz (2014) incorporates constructivist perspectives insisting that the categories with which we apprehend the world are already theoretical, embodying assumptions about what we value. This is an important aspect as throughout the research process an effort was made to avoid simply projecting Western theory into Beijing. Another important factor is that qualitative methodologies acknowledge the importance of reflexivity in the research process

(Clarke, 2005), viewing the relationship between the researcher and subject as being influential to the production of knowledge and understandings. As Kearns' (1998) work on "the virtuous circle of facts and values" shows, we can understand knowledge production as a continuous relationship between one's values and facts. As such, it is important that we allow our political and moral stances to be informed by what we learn about the world, and similarly, that we "set up theoretical categories so that we can draw ethically relevant conclusions from our studies (idib, 1998: 378). Such practices show the need for researchers to be reflexive of their subjugated positionings and agendas. Further, by choosing qualitative methodologies Smith (2001) argues that a political choice is being made, whereby "non-dominant" knowledges are placed at the centre of geographical studies, something that this project is actively trying to achieve. Such an approach is particularly well suited to this project given the de-colonising aspirations of a truly feminist political geography that is post-colonial and anti-racist.

The suitability of qualitative methodologies to this research becomes ever more apparent if the historical associations between such methodologies and their uses within the discipline of geography are taken into account. Specifically, their development within branches of geographical thought that have been influential to this project (see Chapter 2). With the emergence of humanistic geographies in the 1970s, and their critique of geography's reformulation through a Quantitative Revolution, geographers were faced with a methodological crisis (Limb and Dwyer, 2001). Humanistic geographers reviewed qualitative methodologies in an attempt to elaborate what Tuan (1977) termed a "truly human geography." This was one which stressed the importance of understanding people's lifeworlds, meanings and experiences (Buttimer, 1976; Relph, 1976), and which allowed for the development of "grounded theory" (Ley, 1974). Developing from this, social geographers attempted to use qualitative ethnographic methods to interpret human experience (Pile, 1991; Limb and Dwyer, 2001). In their pioneering text *Qualitative Methods in Human Geography*, Eyles and Smith (1988:2) proposed that "much of our experience of everyday life is shared and an investigation of this experience and world requires methods which allow the acquisition of 'insider knowledge' through interaction, observation, participation in activities and informal interviewing."

In bringing back into geography and geographical knowledge, the subjective experience of people, these approaches proved valuable for feminist geographers who sought to not only include women as topics of geographical research, but to rework the fundamentally masculinist premise of the discipline itself (Rose, 1993). Beyond this, feminist geographers extended qualitative methodologies developing collaborative work to challenge unequal power relations (McDowell, 1992; Limb and Dwyer, 2001). Qualitative methodologies would prove important to the emergence of even more branches of geography from which this research draws inspiration: post-structural geography, post-colonial geography and the "cultural turn" in geography. The successful use of these methodologies by post-structural geographers to explore the multiple subjectivities of research subjects has, for obvious reasons, been a source of inspiration for this project's use of qualitative methodologies. So too has the qualitative research carried out by post-colonial geographers on the politics of knowledge construction and representation of the Other (Geetz, 1983; Marcus and Fischer, 1986). Further, the use of psychoanalytic approaches to identity, and the exploration of embodied knowledges, subjectivities and practices so often associated with the "cultural turn" in geography, all call for a qualitative approach.

Despite the suitability of qualitative methodologies to this project, there are certain issues associated with such an approach that needed to be consideration if the research was going to be successfully carried out in an ethical manner. Specifically, the main concerns for this project are issues related to reflexivity and the role of the researcher in the production of knowledge, the difficulties and concerns of representation, acknowledgement of the inherent power relations, navigating the roles of insider-outsider, confidentiality and anonymity of data and participants, and gaining consent. Each of these concerns are discussed in the following sub-sections in relation to the methods selected for use.

3.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.

In order to carry out the research, a multi-method approach was implemented using several qualitative methods. Namely, participant observation, semi-structured interviews, field diaries, and analysis of local materials were chosen as suitable methods. This multi-method qualitative approach was deemed necessary if a reasonable understanding of Hui identity, food culture and the impacts of minoritising processes on them, were to be gained. By implementing this range of methods, it was hoped that an understanding would be gained of not only how Hui identity is performed at the nexus of minoritisation, food culture and ethnicity, but also how these processes are impacting on the emotional geographies and lived experiences of the Hui. Further, this triangulation of methods ensures the validity of the research through establishing findings in more than one method while leading to a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomena being investigated (Hastings, 2010).

3.2.a Participant Observation.

Originating within the discipline of anthropology, participant observation is perhaps most simply explained as an attempt to understand the everyday lives of others from their perspectives (Bennett, 2002). As a method, it involves spending time in particular socio-cultural spaces with those who occupy them in order to gain a better understanding of the phenomena being studied. The focus with participant observation is on what people do, not merely what they say they do (Walsh, 2009). This means that the researcher must be willing to situate themselves in the lives of others accepting that they inevitably influence the research agenda (Bennett, 2002). As a method, there is no pre-set list of steps to carrying out participant observation, rather the approach that the researcher takes is context dependent (Laurier, 2003). As Bennet (2002:139) has argued, participant observation is not about retrieving answers to questions framed by specific knowledges. Instead, it is about "opening oneself to different ways of constructing social life and knowledge. This implies not only learning to unravel and interpret behaviour and coded meanings, but also striving to think and behave in a way which makes sense to those you're living with". The extent to which one either participates or observes the researched will vary depending on the project, with some arguing that too much observation will diminish a fuller understanding of the researched, and an excessively participatory role will result in "going native", thus not being critical enough of the researched culture (Thornton, 1997).

Despite the aim of participant observation to understand other people's everyday worlds, it must be acknowledged that there is in fact nothing natural about such an effort. By inserting ourselves into the lives of our research subjects, we are establishing a distinct space where we may engage with relevant people in order to conduct our research. As Katz (1994: 67) explains, "to have these conversations in a way that is distinct from everyday life, we must have a 'field' marked off in space and time". In other words, by attempting to conduct research in the field, we are in fact involved in shaping the field with our presence, our words, our actions and our objectives. As such, “the field” is a construction, a setting that has been intentionally and deliberately chosen and delineated by the researcher and the researched. The field where we attempt to conduct participant observation may therefore be seen as a space of “betweenness” (Katz, 1994) as it is the space between ourselves and the researched, not the unmediated world of “others” (Hastrup, 1992: 117; Bennett, 2002: 141). It is, rather, the “interworld” (Crossley 1996) where the subjectivities of the researched and researcher become enmeshed. Further, any attempt by the researcher to be “herself/himself” or “natural” in such a space is unrealistic (Okely, 1983). As Till (2001) has shown, researchers often construct spatial, temporal and emotional boundaries between spaces that we consider the “field” and the “home”. Yet, the field and home are unstable categories and as such, we must acknowledge “that research spaces are always hybrid; they are complex social spaces of dislocation” (ibid: 46). This is a particularly important point for research that involves multiple visits to the field as our repeated moving between shifting homes and fields involves unpredictable changes in our research relationships, agendas, and understandings of ourselves.

As one might expect, such an acknowledgment of the researcher’s role in the shaping the field raises some issues. Specifically, surrounding the issues of reflexivity, positionality, situated knowledge, inherent power relations and the navigation of insider-outsider roles. Given the manner in which the researcher inevitably influences their fieldwork, it is important that they are reflexive, critical and maintain an awareness of the ways that they are affecting the researched individuals, communities and places (Coffey, 1999: 74). As Gregory (1978: 146) made clear in his defining work, “Ideology, Science and Human Geography”, if geography is to reclaim its “traditional attachment to particular places and the people that live in them, geography will have to dismantle the oppositions between subject and object, actor and observer, and emphasise the mediations between different frames of reference”. This can be done, Gregory argues, by bringing ourselves into the situation. Kobayashi (2009) defines reflexivity as “the practice on the part of a researcher of reflecting upon his or her own identity or positionality in relation to those studied, the recursive practice of self-examination and self-transformation in the exchange of knowledge between the researcher and those studied”. By adopting a reflexive approach to fieldwork, the researcher is allowing for the challenges to their theoretical positions that so often accompany fieldwork (England, 1994: 89). Such a reflexive approach to participant observation inevitably entails an awareness of positionality and situated knowledge. All knowledge, Haraway

(1988) argues, is the product of the setting within which it has been developed, and as such, these "situated knowledges" are always local, partial and embodied. Further, positionality recognises that each of us are differently positioned subjects with different biographies. We are not in fact disembodied, dematerialized entities (Bennett, 2002). As such, it is important that the emotional, sensual and embodied experiences of the researcher are taken into account (Walsh, 2009).

In addition to these concerns, due consideration needs also be given to the roles of both the researcher and researched within the participant observation process. Traditionally, these roles are perceived as an insider-outsider binary. However, thanks in part to feminist research, there is now a growing awareness of the need to acknowledge the manner in which people may shift between positions, or even hold several positions at once (Walsh, 2009). This is of particular importance to research such as this, where the participants (and researcher) often shifted between various positions and subjectivities. Such positionalities and subjectivities inevitably have an influence on the inherent power relations of the research process. Given the role of the researcher to study the researched, there is undoubtedly a power imbalance involved. However, that is not to say that the researcher is always in the dominant position. In fact, efforts can be made to shift the position of power onto the research participants. One example of this might be the recognition that the participant is in fact the expert on the topic of enquiry and that the researcher starts off knowing relatively little. Such inequalities of power need to be taken into account when conducting research.

A further concern with participant observation is the matter of informed consent. Within the social sciences, there is much debate regarding the matter of gaining informed consent from those being researched. In relation to consent, two distinct approaches to participant observation may be assumed. Firstly, overt participant observation occurs when the researcher is forthcoming with the project's details and their own research agendas, making their desire to conduct research clear to their perspective participants and seeking their consent. Commonly, researchers engaging in overt participant observation will seek either written or verbal consent from participants, asking them to clearly show their agreement to participation. The other approach commonly used is covert participant observation (Hoggart et al, 2002). This form of participant observation is far more contentious than its overt counterpart, with many researchers arguing that it is dishonest. This method may be understood as the practice of carrying out participant observation without having informed the researched of the researcher's identity or intentions, and without having gained consent. Although viewed by many researchers as being unethical, such a covert approach is often required to gain access to certain individuals or knowledge, with many other researchers arguing that it is a necessary compromise to achieve access to certain socio-cultural spaces that would otherwise be unavailable (Walsh, 2009). As such, some researchers may decide to use cover participant observation as a method for either gaining all, or part, of their data.

3.2.b Semi-Structured Interviews.

Semi-structured interviews are perhaps most simply understood as verbal exchanges between the interviewer and the interviewee, whereby the interviewer attempts to gain information through the process of asking questions that are deemed relevant to the research topic (Longhurst, 2009). Very often, the interviewer may prepare a pre-set list of interview questions or topics to help guide the interview and to allow for continuity between interviews. Such interviews generally unfold in a conversational or fluid manner depending on the interests and experiences of the participants (Valentine, 1997). Unlike structured interviews, the interviewer is not limited to the prepared list of questions and topics and the interviewee is allowed to steer the conversation depending on what they deem to be important. Such an approach often involves asking open-ended question which allow for the in-depth exploration of the research topic from multiple angles (Longhurst, 2003; 2009). Although semi-structured interviews are often guided by the interviewee, they nevertheless involve a certain degree of direction by the interviewer but in ways that are self-conscious (Longhurst, 2009). As Eyles (1988) explains, interviews are conversations with purpose. A major benefit to this method is that it allows interviewees to describe their social worlds, opinions and experiences in their own words (Bryman, 1988). Another strength is that it allows for the interviewee to raise issues and concerns that the interviewer might not have otherwise considered (Silverman, 1993). As a result, the data gathered by semi-structured interviews is detailed and multi-layered (Burgess, 1984). The gathering of such data is not intended to be representative of a larger group or community. Rather, it is designed to gain an understanding of how individuals make sense of their own lives and the meaning that they attach to their life-worlds (Valentine, 1997).

As with participant observation, there are certain ethical concerns with using semi-structured interviews. In fact, each of the ethical considerations discussed in the preceding section may also apply here; that is to say the need for critical reflexivity, an awareness of positionality, an acknowledgement that knowledge is situated, careful consideration of inherent power relations, the navigation of insider-outsider roles, and obtaining informed consent from participants. There are, of course, other ethical questions raised by such a method. Specifically, in relation to representation, confidentiality, and anonymity. These three issues also apply to participant observation; however, they are perhaps most clearly seen in relation to semi-structured interviews. As was mentioned above, semi-structured interviews allow the interviewee to describe in their own words their individual views, understandings and experiences. As such, any information obtained is solely representative of that individual person. It cannot be assumed that such information is representative of any broader group or community (Valentine, 1997). Just as the individual experiences of interviewees cannot be considered representative of a larger group of people, the actions and practices witnessed during the participant observation cannot be assumed to take place in every other relatable field. The two remaining ethical considerations, confidentiality and anonymity, are particularly important for semi-structured interviews. Interviewees should be assured that all information gathered will remain confidential and that they will remain anonymous (unless they choose otherwise). Specifically, interviewees should be provided with details of how the data will be stored after collection and of any security measures being taken to safeguard their involvement in the research (Longhurst, 2003). For an account of this project's security procedures see Section 3.3.l.

3.2.c Semiotic analysis of local materials.

Visual representations are powerful and can play a role in shaping how we view and understand people, cultures and places, thus impacting on our sense of self and our relation to the places that we inhabit (Orgad, 2012). These representations render the world in visual terms and are never innocent. By analysing such representations, an understanding may be gained of the cultural practices that help form group identities. As such, the gathering and analysis of relevant local documentary sources may be extremely beneficial when conducting research on identity. However, visual analysis of such sources is a contested issue with a number of methods available. Each of these methods involves its own set of methodological and theoretical debates. As such, the decision to implement any of them requires an acknowledgement of their associated theoretical and methodological assumptions. Further, given the ethical concerns discussed above surrounding reflexivity, positionality and situated knowledge, it is important that any visual method chosen allows for a critical approach to analysing images. Rose (2001: 15) sets out three criteria for approaching an image critically: that visual representations be taken seriously, that consideration be given to their social effects, and that reflexivity is necessary. In light of this criteria, semiotics was chosen for the analysis of local documentary sources.

Semiotics offers analytical tools and a precise vocabulary for analysing visual representations and tracing their relationship to broader systems of meaning (Rose, 2001). The most important tool offered by semiotics is the sign, as semiotics can be most simply described as the science of signs (Saussure, 1983; Peirce and Hoopes, 1991). These signs are intrinsically linked with human culture and are extremely important. As Bal and Bryson (1991: 174) explain, "human culture is made up of signs, each of which stands for something other than itself, and the people inhabiting culture busy themselves making sense of those signs". It is often claimed that semiotics is a scientific approach to the study of meanings as it offers certain analytical precision through the use of a refined set of concepts (Rose, 2001: 70). An ideology is knowledge that is constructed in such a way as to legitimize unequal power relations. Dominant groups in a society represent the world in such a way as to reflect their own interests, in hopes of retaining their structures of dominance (Hodge and Kress, 1988: 3; Williamson, 1978). The representations found in local documentary sources are ideologies, and semiotics can be used to reveal the ideological statuses of them (Williamson, 1978; Goldman, 1992; Rose, 2001). However, in choosing to denaturalise relations of dominance, semiotics takes a stance of its own and thus, while the current research is self-critical and aspires to be fair-minded, it cannot claim the absolute separation of science and ideology that some have. It is important here to once again remember Kearns' (1998) work on "the virtuous circle of facts and values"; whereby our semiological readings cannot be considered an objective science, but rather, the facts that we are faced with are in a continuous relationship with our values. It is therefore important to acknowledge our subjugated positions and ideologies when looking to examine the "facts" that we see in visual materials.

Saussure (1983) points out that a sign is formed from the union of the signifier and the signified. The signified is the object or the concept that is being represented while the signifier is the image, or the sound, attached to the signified. The relationship between the two parts of a sign is crucial as it means that the relationship between the signifier and its meaning (signified) is conventional (Rose, 2001: 74). Depending on the relationship between the signified and the signifier there are three types of signs. Each of these involve some level of social convention. The three types are symbolic, iconic and indexical. A symbolic sign is one that is based upon a purely arbitrary relationship between the signified and the signifier. An indexical sign involves an inherent relationship based on the occurrence of co-presence within a particular context. While an iconic sign is one whose relationship between its signifier and signified is based upon resemblance (Peirce & Hoopes, 1991). Examples of these signs, to borrow from Rose (2001:78), are:

- Iconic: A photograph of a baby is an iconic sign of that baby.
- Indexical: An image of a baby soother might be understood by Western readers as signifying a place for baby-changing facilities.
- Symbolic: A picture of a baby may represent notions of the future.

Signs work in relation to other signs, and this consideration leads to a further distinction between syntagmatic signs and paradigmatic signs (Rose, 2001: 78). A syntagmatic sign is one which gains meaning from the signs that surround it in a sequence, while a paradigmatic sign is one which gains its meaning from a contrast with other signs. Another distinction between signs can be made depending on how symbolic they are: a denotive sign is one which is descriptive of something while connotive signs carry higher meaning. These connotive signs can be further broken down into two kinds; metonymic (meaning that it is associated with something else, causing it to represent that thing) and synecdochal (this sign represents something that it is part of or that is part of it). An image can often hold more than one possible denotive meaning (Rose, 2001: 81). According to Barthes (1977: 38 – 41), an image's accompanying text plays a decisive role in determining which denotive meaning a reader takes; these texts are called anchorage whereby the accompanying texts are even more important to the image as they are complementary and have a relay-function. As was mentioned earlier, the vocabulary provided by semiotics is extensive. The above terms are the ones that proved most useful during this research. It is also important to note at this stage that signs are complex and can be described using several terms at once (Rose, 2001).

Many of the signs discussed during this research refer to broader systems of meaning. These systems have been given a variety of names. However, this research will use

Barthes' (1973: 117) term "myths", and to a lesser extent, Hall's (1980) term "codes". Barthes' (1973: 123) notion of mythology suggests that a myth is a second-order semiological system, whereby a myth builds upon denotive signs. Consisting of a signifier and signified, a denotive sign is quite easily understood. These denotive signs then become the signifier at the second, or mythological level of meaning, creating second-level signs. Barthes (1977) provides a set of vocabulary for these different elements of signs. The sign at the first denotive level is called "meaning", but when this sign is referred to as the signifier of a mythical sign it is called a "form". The mythical sign's signified is the "concept", while the second level sign becomes the "signification" (see Figure 3.1). A myth enters as a non-historical truth, appearing natural, thus myths are ideologies (Rose, 2001: 89 - 91). Rose gives an example of mythical signs, borrowing from Barthes (1973: 125), when discussing an image Barthes saw in "Paris-match": a young black person "in a French uniform is saluting, with his eyes uplifted, probably fixed on the fold of the tricolor". This is the denotive sign's meaning at the first-level. However, this sign becomes the signifier, or the form, at the second-level. The second-level meaning of this myth is, according to Barthes, "France is a great Empire, that all her sons, without any colour discrimination, faithfully serve under her flag, and that there is no better answer to detractors of an alleged colonialism than the zeal shown by this…[black person]…in serving his so-called oppressors".

Figure 3.1: Mythical Sign.
Source: Author's own (2016).

This research will also refer to Hall's (1980) codes where relevant. A code is a set of accepted methods of meaning-making that are specific to a certain group of people, similar to myths (Rose, 2001; 88). Images are "encoded" with meanings which may be "decoded" differently by groups, depending on their social positioning (Chandler, 2014). “Aberrent decoding” occurs when a text has been decoded by means of a different code to that used to encode it (Eco, 1965).

Given the nature of this method, there are of course a number of difficulties. Firstly, the signs within the images have to be identified. As Bal and Bryson (1991: 193) point out, it is often difficult to differentiate between signs in an image due to the absence of boundaries between different parts of the image. This issue is further complicated when we consider the relationality of signs (Bal and Bryson, 1991: 177). As a result of this, any point of entry will be unavoidably “artificial and arbitrary” (Rose, 2001: 91). Secondly, there is the matter of how representative the chosen texts are. As with the data gathered from interviewing and participant observation, the texts that are chosen for analysis are representative of themselves and their contexts only. In cases where a text or visual image was offered by an individual or group to the researcher for consideration, these texts will be seen as representative of that individual or group’s understandings. In addition to these issues, the ethical issues of reflexivity, positionality and situated knowledge also emerge. As was already stated in relation to the earlier methods, all knowledge is situated and each of us approach research with differing biographies and positionings. As such, when analysing images, we inevitably decode the texts from our specific viewpoints, often resulting in aberrant decoding. As such, it is essential that the researcher recognize this and recognize how their own decodings may very well differ from those of the research participants. Lastly, unlike other methods, there is no clear guidelines to follow when carrying out semiotic research. The claim that semiotics is a science rather than an ideology must thereby be qualified in a manner similar to the cases of most other understandings of society. In light of this, Rose (2001) offers some helpful suggestions;

- Decide what the signs are.
- Decide what each sign signifies in itself.
- Consider how they relate to other signs, both within the image and in other images.
- Explore their connections to wider systems of meaning; myths.
- Then return to the signs via their codes and explore the precise articulation of ideology.

3.2.d Fieldnotes.

Ultimately, the aim of writing fieldnotes and reflections is to provide the researcher with a detailed record of the research process. This record is written as the research process unfolds. It allows for the documentation of what the researcher observes and what they have come to learn and understand as a result (Cook, 1997). It is an essential part of the research methodology where participant observation is being used. Such fieldnotes or field diaries generally consist of three main elements: descriptive notes about field observations and engagements, interpretative notes that attempt to make sense of these observations, and reflective notes that explore the researcher’s emotions in relation to the research (Bennett, 2002). In addition to such descriptive, interpretive and reflective fieldnotes, researchers often draw maps and sketches, and formulate questions about the social spaces, everyday geographies and emotions faced during the research process (Till, 2009). Although each of these forms of fieldnotes are valuable, when writing it is important for the descriptive notes to be written separately from the interpretive and reflective ones (Hoggart et al, 2002). This is because the true meaning behind certain behaviours may not actually become clear until it has been observed in multiple settings (Schensul et al, 1999). Thus, it is important to distinguish between what is observed by the researcher, and what they interpret the meaning to be.

The writing of fieldnotes ideally takes place during the research encounter. However, this may raise concerns. As Miles and Crush (1993) have made clear, if it is known that part of your role is to write and document what you observe as it occurs, this may heavily influence how the research participants come to view you. Ultimately, it potentially reaffirms the roles of researcher and researched, manifesting unequal power relations and alienating participants. As such, it may be necessary to avoid writing fieldnotes until after the research encounter, in which case the notes should be written immediately afterwards to avoid the loss of details. In order to minimise the loss of details during longer periods of participant observation, it is helpful to write short notes down at every opportunity. One way of achieving this is by removing yourself temporarily from the research space and jotting down brief notes or reminders to aid with later discussion: some have termed this “ethnographer’s bladder” (Cook, 1997).

3.3 RESEARCHING THE HUI – METHODS CHOSEN.

Following the decision that a qualitative methodology based on participant observation, semi-structured interviews and analysis of local materials was most suited to this project, it needed to be applied to the Beijing context. When attempting to implement this methodology, a number of obstacles were faced, which required changes to be made to the originally proposed method in order to make it locally suitable.

3.3.a Gaining Access to the Field -

From an early stage of research design, the issue of access had to be resolved before this project could hope to progress. Gaining access to the field in China is often a complicated and difficult task for non-Chinese researchers. Further, once access is gained, it is often difficult to navigate the field as one attempts to achieve one's research agenda while respectfully adhering to the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Chinese authorities. This is usually made even more difficult when the research focuses on any subject area deemed to be "sensitive" by the Chinese authorities –generally speaking, the subjects of ethnicity and religion are considered sensitive by most municipal governments. Subsequently, this project was faced with the issue of access early on given its focus on Chinese Muslim minority subjects. As such, a necessary process of narrowing the research subject was undertaken during the design phase in order to minimise the apparent sensitivity of the project, while still allowing for the subject to be researched. As a result, it was decided that the project would focus on the Hui, rather than other Islamic minority groups, in part for the following reasons:

- Gaining physical access: The Hui are the largest and most widespread of China's ten Islamic minority groups, consisting of more than ten million individuals. Further, they are the largest Islamic minority group in Beijing with a population of more than 200,000 people (Gladney, 2004). As such, gaining access to them was practically more feasible than for other groups.
- Ability to access them alone: As the Hui are the only minority group in China not to possess their own distinct language (Gladney, 1996), access could be gained to the group without the need for a translator. This was an important aspect given the project's emphasis on participant observation and the financial limitations of the project.

- Gaining official access: The Hui are widely perceived in China to be less "troublesome" than other Islamic minorities, such as the Uyghur. Therefore, it was expected that they might be subject to less governmental control and as such, easier to gain access to for research purposes.

Once the Hui had been identified as the subject for this research on minority identity, a decision had to be made regarding which aspect of their identity would be focused on. This, again, carried a number of issues related to access. Specifically, how would I be able to gain access to relevant cultural practices given my positionality and "outsider" status? Further, which identity "hooks" would be less sensitive and thus less monitored by the authorities? Considering these questions, and the importance of their dietary traditions highlighted in the limited existing literature, it was decided that a focus on Hui food cultures would not only allow access to the group but would also be theoretically fruitful and context appropriate. By focusing on the Hui's food culture, alleyways were opened to researching other topics that might have been off-limits had they been explicitly stated: such as ethnicity, religion, gender, etc. Participants were also more willing to engage with the researcher once they learned that the focus was on food cultures and not other sensitive issues. From a logistical perspective, the project was no longer deemed sensitive by authorities and as such, could be carried out without needing special permission or documentation. For both of the initial phases of the field research, student visas ware obtained by enrolling in language courses at Chinese universities: a X2 visa was obtained for the longer period from Beijing Normal University (August 2015 – April 2016), and a X1 visa from China Youth University for Political Sciences for the second field visit (June 2017 – August 2017).

3.3.b Positionality.

Given the nature of this research project, its focus on the Hui, and its Beijing context, one of the key concerns that needed to be address was the researcher's positionality. Specifically, my positioning as a white, Irish, Western-educated, gay man who was raised a Roman Catholic but is now spiritual but not religious, and who is a non-native speaker of Mandarin Chinese, needs to be made explicit. As was discussed earlier in this chapter, when attempting to conduct research in the field, we are actively shaping the field through our presence, our actions and our objectives. Therefore, the dataset that is co-produced in the field is influenced largely by the researcher's positionality. Further, the researcher's positionality is also central to how the dataset is analysed, understood and interpreted. In light of these conceptual understandings, it is vital that the researcher's positionality not only be made explicit, but that it is also taken seriously and critically reflected on throughout the research processes in order to challenge potential biases. As such, a central component of this research's methodological approach was active reflexivity, which was implemented at all stages of the project in order to better understand my own engagements with, and interpretations of, the dataset. These reflexive practices will be discussed in greater detail in Section 3.3.e.

Further, through critically reflecting on my own positionality as a researcher, measures could be taken in an attempt to lessen potential power imbalances between the participants and myself which might place participants in a vulnerable position. In an attempt to minimise risk or discomfort to participants, and to negotiate the power relations inherent in my positionality and "outsider" status, a number of measures were implemented. Specifically, the uneven power relations surrounding my positioning as a western, non-Chinese, white, non-native Mandarin speaker were somewhat countered through the hiring of an interpreter for the interviews, and through seeking help from a Chinese friend in recruiting restaurants (see sections 3.3.f and 3.3.i for details). Additionally, the uneven power relations stemming from the positionings of "researcher" and "researched" were offset somewhat through placing an emphasis on my status as a student and their roles as local experts. Through stressing my student status and highlighting the participants' role as local experts, an attempt was being made to shift the power relations by placing the participants' in a superior position through emphasising the fact that they knew more than me about the research topic and that they were helping me to learn (see Section 3.3.e).

One further obstacle raised by my positionality was my non-Muslim status, something which was problematic for only a small number of participants. Occasionally when recruiting participants, I would be asked if I was Muslim or if I was religious, to which I would answer honestly saying that I am not. Although this was not an issue for most participants, early in the research some individuals refused to participate as a result, including the owner of a restaurant selected for participation (see Restaurant 3 in Section 3.3.g). During a discussion with one restaurant manager, he declined the invitation to participate, while also describing me as non-religious. After reflecting on this interaction, I began to suspect that for this man, it was my assumed non-religious status that was most problematic for him rather than my positioning as a non-Muslim.

Following this, I began telling participants that I was raised a Roman Catholic but that I was no longer of that religion when they asked if I was religious. After I began disclosing this aspect of my positionality with potential participants, they were more willing to participate in the research. Through reflecting critically on researcher positionality, obstacles surrounding uneven power relations such as these could be addressed, allowing for the research to be conducted in an ethical manner.

3.3.c Language Competency.

Due to the nature of this project and the research methods chosen to carry it out, a working knowledge of Mandarin Chinese was essential. Among China's 55 officially recognised minority groups, the Hui are the only group not to possess their own shared language and as such, they predominantly speak Mandarin Chinese. Further, given its status as the official language of the People's Republic of China, Mandarin Chinese is the language that most of the local documentary sources that were gathered are in. Therefore, it was important that I be sufficiently able to communicate and work through Mandarin Chinese.

Prior to commencing the PhD programme in October 2014, I had lived in Beijing for 13 months (August 2012 – September 2013), during which time I learned a foundational level of Mandarin, successfully passing the state-operated HSK[4] level 2 exam. Following my enrolment in the PhD, and in preparation of the project's fieldwork, I began taking second-year undergraduate, Mandarin Chinese classes in Maynooth University's Department of Chinese Studies, beginning in November 2014. I continued to take classes in Mandarin Chinese during the first two research trips. Eight months were spent studying at Beijing Normal University (2015 – 2016) during the first research trip. Throughout this eight-month period, I studied at a high-intermediate level: between HSK level 4 and HSK level 5. A further two months were spent studying the language at the China Youth University of Political Sciences (2017) in Beijing, where I studied HKS level 4. By continually studying Mandarin Chinese, both in preparation for fieldwork and throughout time spent in Beijing, I ensured that I was proficient enough

[4]汉语水平考试。Eng: Chinese Proficiency Test. HSK is the standardised test for assessing the language proficiency of non-native Mandarin Chinese learners. The test is administered by Hanban, which is an agency of the Ministry of Education of the PRC. There are six levels of HSK, with each increasing in difficulty.

in the language to hold meaningful conversations with participants, comprehend menus and other materials gathered, and translate generated data.

3.3.d Knowing the Local Foodscape.

Once access had been gained to the field, the task of familiarising myself with the Hui foodscape in Beijing was undertaken. This was achieved in part by collecting local documentary sources, which were then analysed using a semiological method in order to gain a better understanding of local representations of the Hui people and their food cultures. The collection and analysis of local documentary sources has continued throughout all phases of the research process, but collection was particularly active during the three phases of fieldwork.

Although the use of documentary sources was valuable when familiarising myself with the Hui foodscape in Beijing, even more important was the initial scouting and covert participant observation phase that was carried out during the first five months – from September 2015 to December 2015 inclusive. During this phase, Hui restaurants were located, visited and documented across five districts of the city, usually with rather brief sessions of participant observation being undertaken. These sessions usually lasted less than one hour – the time it took to slowly consume the meal ordered. Given the size of Beijing and the socio-economic differences between the inner districts of Beijing City and outer districts of Beijing Municipality, it was decided that the research would focus on five of the city's inner districts: Haidian, Chaoyang, Xicheng, Dongcheng and Fengtai. In order to locate Hui restaurants, a number of tactics were employed. To begin with, key Hui neighbourhoods and ethnic enclaves within the city were identified. The restaurants in these neighbourhoods were visited, with participant observation taking place in the form of observing, documenting and occasionally photographing (with permission) what was seen, while participating in such activities by ordering and consuming the food, thus engaging with the performance of their food culture. Usually this participant observation was done covertly, whereby I assumed the role of customer, conversing primarily with the waiting staff as they took my order and payment. On occasion, I would inform the staff that I was a student and that I was researching Hui food culture. This overt approach was largely limited to the first few encounters as it became apparent that such an approach often acted as a deterrent for the restaurant staff, subsequently disrupting conversation. As such, the covert approach was used more frequently. It was also found that the staff were more likely to engage in conversation if

I assumed the role of customer by ordering food, instead of simply approaching them to ask questions. Although I would not generally inform the staff that I was researching the Hui, I would tell them that I was a student in China and that I was interested in Hui food culture. This proved to be fruitful, opening a dialogue between the staff and myself. During such conversations, they would often offer advice about the menu or provide me with more general information about Hui culture, Hui life in Beijing and the restaurant's history and décor.

Another benefit to these conversations was that they allowed me the opportunity to ask the staff for advice about which other areas had Hui residents or restaurants, and which restaurants they recommended that I visit. Given the negative response received to the overt approach mentioned above, writing in field diaries was avoided during these short covert participant observation sessions. Instead, I would wait until I had left the restaurants before writing descriptive and highly detailed passages in the diaries. Sketches were also drawn of the restaurant layouts and décor. This was generally done immediately after leaving the restaurant to minimise the loss of information and details. On occasion, short notes would be typed into my phone during longer covert sessions. These notes would act as a reminder, aiding with the writing of fieldnotes later on. By carrying out covert participant observation in this manner, I gained an understanding of the range and nature of Hui food cultures in Beijing. I also familiarised myself with the local linguistic and cultural specificities, while beginning to establish a recurring presence in restaurants that I would later return to for the following overt participant observation. Prior to conducting covert participant observation, ethical approval was granted by Maynooth University. It is important to make clear that although covert participant observation was used to familiarise myself with the range and style of food available in restaurants, no conversations were audio recorded during this phase, nor were these conversations written into the final thesis. The omitting of such data was done in an effort to mitigate the inequitable power relations involved in conducting the initial covert research.

Once the above restaurants had been visited and documented, a new approach was needed to locate further establishments. This approach primarily consisted of the use of online search engines and applications to locate restaurants. Specifically, the Baidu Map[5] application was used. This application was particularly useful as it allows you to

[5] 百度地图。

refine your search using key words or neighbourhoods. In order to find relevant restaurants on the application, several key words were used: Hui,[6] Huizu,[7] Huimin,[8] HuiHui,[9] Qingzhen,[10] Halal, Ningxia,[11] Xibei,[12] Xibeifang,[13] Lanzhou,[14] and Gansu,[15] to name but a few. Further, its mapping format showed the locations of all relevant restaurants within the search area, allowing you to see which neighbourhoods had the highest number of Hui restaurants (Figure 3.2). Also, many of the restaurants listed displayed their menus on the application in addition to reviews and photographs (Figure 3.3). This application was primarily used to identify neighbourhoods that contained the highest number of relevant restaurants, or to identify restaurants that were significantly different from those more commonly found. The restaurants in these neighbourhoods were then visited and short participant observations were undertaken, similar to those described above. Often, it was found that these neighbourhoods contained more relevant restaurants than shown on the application. As such, once an area was chosen, it would be explored extensively with this exploration often extending into neighbouring areas. This rather random and time-consuming method of locating and observing restaurants was without doubt the most effective and its documented findings formed the largest part of the early dataset.

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[6] 回。
[7] 回族。
[8] 回民。
[9] 回回。
[10] 清真。
[11] 宁夏。
[12] 西北。
[13] 西北方。
[14] 兰州。
[15] 甘肃。



Figure 3.2: Screenshots of Baidu Maps 1.

Source: Author's own (2020).



Figure 3.3: Screenshot of Baidu Maps 2.

Source: Author's own (2020).

As was mentioned above, in order to conduct these short sessions of participant observation, I would assume the role of a customer and consume a meal in the restaurants. At times this was quite a daunting task, especially at the beginning of the first fieldtrip as it was my first time to engage directly with potential research participants. Further, during this scouting phase of the research, I was particularly apprehensive of my status as an outsider while eating in these establishments. This awareness of my positionality was often brought about by the visibly surprised and even nervous reactions of some restaurant staff when I entered their establishments. Unsurprisingly, these nervous reactions were most commonly encountered in the residential areas of Fengtai, Haidian and Chaoyang districts, rather than other areas that were more accustomed to international residents, tourists and students. Initially, when faced with these reactions, I would become quite self-conscious. However, I quickly realised that by conversing with the staff while ordering food, both the staff and I would become less hesitant and more comfortable. Specifically, I found it very useful to ask the staff for suggestions as to what dishes I should order. This tactic of asking staff for recommendations proved to not only put us both at ease through starting a conversation, but it also acted as a productive method of familiarising myself with the dishes and ingredients that Hui restaurant staff considered to be most typical or representative of their ethnic group. Further, this approach to learning about the food that various staff considered to be significant was an important tool in familiarising myself with Beijing's diverse local foodscape.

In the early stages of fieldwork, and even during much of the overt participant observation, this method of asking for recommendations was the most common way that I chose dishes to order. While ordering and eating these dishes I would feel excited by the fact that I had gained an interesting insight into the staff members' views of Hui food cultures. Yet I would often also feel a sense of personal dissatisfaction and even disgust. These negative emotional responses were not due to the helpful suggestions of staff and our usually friendly conversations, rather they were because of the fact that I was being faced with the reality of eating dishes that contained meat. Since the age of 10, I have been a vegetarian and in more recent years have moved towards a plant-based diet. As such, the prospect of eating meat was one that caused me to feel uncomfortable, and at times repulsed. However, I felt that eating these small amounts of meat was a worthwhile sacrifice that I needed to make in order to gain access to potential participants in the initial stages of fieldwork. During the overt participant observation phase, I only ate meat in the participating restaurants when invited to do so by participants, which rarely happened as generally staff would be working. Even throughout the interviewing phase in 2017 when my interpreter and I occasionally shared a meal with interviewees, I rarely ate meat, instead I would eat the vegetable dishes that had been ordered. Following the initial phases of research, I would order vegetarian dishes from the restaurants' menus. By doing so, I not only avoided the negative emotions that I experienced when eating meat dishes, but I was also better able to observe my surroundings and engage with participants as I was not distracted by negative emotions.

3.3.e Active Reflexivity.

As was discussed in Section 3.2.a, issues of reflexivity, positionality, situated knowledges, power relations, and navigating insider-outsider roles, are of particular importance to this project given the research focus, theoretical approach and methods chosen. In attempting to insert ourselves into the lives of others, be it through participant observation or interviewing, researchers are creating a distinct, unnatural space, whereby our very presence shapes the field. Our level of influence over the research field, participants, communities and places depends largely on our positionality. Given my positionality discussed in Section 3.3.b, I had to be particularly mindful and considerate of how my positionality might impact on participants, their practices and the places that they allowed me to experience with them. As such, it was important that I be reflexive and self-critical at all times. In order to habitualise such reflective practices and incorporate them into my research methods, I continually wrote reflexive memos throughout all stages of the research process. Many of these memos were directly aimed at challenging my preconceived notions and eventual interpretations of the research and the data, along with reflecting on my emotional, sensory and embodied experiences of conducting research in place. As Figure 3.4 shows, certain questions were continually asked in my interpretive notes and reflexive memos, centred around the questions of "who", "why", "where", "what", "when" and "how". Such a practice of reflexivity was also important in addressing the issue of situated knowledges and in challenging my admittedly Western theoretical position. Further, this reflexive practice was essential in shaping my research methods, as they continually evolved in the field in response to obstacles faced, observations made, participant responses.

Core Question.	**Elaborated questions – taken from notes and memos.**	**Example from reflexive memos.**
Who	• Who said/did it? • Who was it said to? • Who was it said about? • Who was present? • Who was not present?	"I was a bit surprised that she spoke so honestly and frankly with me, I hadn't expected it. I didn't think that we had built up that level of familiarity yet – she

		had always seemed stand-offish. So, this made me wonder, what had suddenly changed? And I realise now, it's because we were alone for the first time. Is it possible that the problem up until now wasn't me? But rather, it was who was with me – the manager." – Dated 23 January 2016.
What	• What was said/done? • What was the context for it being said/done? • What are the details of it? (Check descriptive notes). • What was our relationship? • What were my initial interpretations/understandings of it?	"When we were speaking about *Qingzhen*, it became clear that I didn't fully understand his meaning at first. I misinterpreted it. Luckily though, I quickly realised that for him, *Qingzhen* means something deeper than what I expected. But what did I interpret it as at first? I thought he meant *halal*, but it's obvious that his understanding is much more complex. What does this initial misunderstanding tell me about my own western-centric understandings and applications of meaning? This is definitely something I need to be careful of." – Dated 15 December 2015.
Where	• Where did it happen? – Location in Beijing and in establishment. • Where is the person from?	"I feel tired today. Not just physically, but emotionally and mentally. It was a long day. I visited R1 and R2, they weren't

	- Where was I when it happened? - Where did I want to be?	very long visits, maybe an hour each, but they've really impacted on me. In R1 the chefs were taking their lunch. Unsurprisingly, they spoke about wanting to return home for Chinese New Year. That's something that I can relate to – wanting to go home. Did I want to be there? If not, how did this impact on my experiences? Although the four of us were in that place together, I think we all wanted to be elsewhere. It was a strange experience, being in place with others, yet we all longed for somewhere else." – Dated 5 February 2016.
When	- When did it happen? - When did the event they were talking about happen? - What memories does it bring up for me?	"I'll be returning to Beijing soon, for my last research visit. I'm feeling a mix of emotions, both positive and negative. It's strange how one place can hold so much emotional weight for a person. So, I've had to ask myself, why am I feeling like this? Or more to the point, when am I thinking of and what memories is this upcoming trip bringing up for me? On the one hand, I'm a bit worried, but I realise that these feelings are tied to my memories of early 2016.

		But even more than that, I'm excited and positive because my last visit in 2017 went so well. Also, I'm excited to see my friends, especially Sophia. So, I'm not just thinking of two time periods from the past, but my current emotions are also tied to predictions of the future." – Dated 29 December 2018.
How	• How was it said? • How was it done? • How did I/others respond? • How did I initially translate it? • How did I feel at the time? • How did I feel before it? – Was there a change? • How did they seem at the time of saying/doing it? – How did I interpret this?	"As she told me about her family, it was clear that she missed home – she didn't try to hide it. But how did I feel at that time? How did I feel listening to her stories of home? How was her story resonating with my own experiences? I miss home too. I miss my family. I wish I could go home, but I feel like I'm stuck here– just like her. These feelings of homesickness are something that we have in common, she suggested so herself. So, this makes me wonder, how do these emotional connections affect my research and research relationships?" – Dated 19 February 2016.
Why	• Why did they do/say it? • Why did this seem significant to me?	"This word *Qinqie*, I've been translating it as connected. But why? I know that that's how

	• Why did I translate it using those words? • Why did I respond the way I did? • Why did I feel the way I did? • Why have I interpreted it the way I have?	Shige translated it initially, but what if I'm missing a deeper meaning? After all, connected is how he interprets the word, but that doesn't mean that that's how I, or especially the participant, understand it." – Dated 4 August 2017.

Figure 3.4: Questions often asked during reflexive memos.
Source: Author's own (2020).

This positionality unavoidably, and unsurprisingly, positioned me as an outsider within the places of Hui food culture, a position that would be difficult, if not impossible for me to overcome. However, rather than attempting to ignore or dismiss my position as an outsider, I embraced it and tried to use it to my advantage in my negotiation of the power relations present in the research context. Given the fact that I am neither Chinese nor Muslim, participants could be established as local experts by explaining that as an outsider, I knew far less about the research topic than them, that I valued their opinions, experiences and insights, and that they were ultimately helping me to learn about something that they were experts in. These attempts at shifting power relations and positioning participants as local experts were aided by the fact that I was also a registered student at local universities. This student status acted to further affirm participants' dominant role. Such a position of inferiority in regard to expert knowledge allowed for participants to volunteer information, or for me to ask questions about topics, that participants might otherwise have assumed that I know. This fact allowed for more detailed accounts to be given of some of the Hui's, and indeed Chinese and Islamic, cornerstone events, practices and ideas, such as: *Qingzhen*, Ramadan, Eid al-Adha, Chinese New Year, conceptualisations of ethnicity and nationalism, and inter-ethnic differences. Further, the fact that I am a non-native speaker of Mandarin Chinese meant that on occasion I did not understand specific terms being used by participants to describe specialised topics. However, rather than remaining silent, I would use this as an opportunity to ask participants to explain the term to me in another way. This often resulted in a rich and descriptive account of specialised terms. In fact, this tactic proved to be so beneficial and fruitful that I often used it even when I understood the key term being used. This method allowed for detailed accounts to be given for some of this project's key issues, specifically *Qingzhen*, *Qinqie*, *Minzu*[16] or numerous terms relating to the Hui's food cultures. As was discussed in Section 3.3.d, the decision to assume the role of a customer during the initial covert participant observation phase, rather than fully disclosing my status as a researcher, was done in an attempt to navigate the inherent power relations faced. During this initial phase of research, I found that immediately disclosing my status as a researcher acted as a deterrent for restaurant staff. As such, when conversing with restaurant staff I would tell them that I was a student in China and that I was interested in Hui food cultures. Although such an approach was deemed to be necessary for familiarising myself with the local foodscape in Beijing, the decision to initially conceal my status as a researcher from restaurant staff undeniably involved inequitable power relations. As such, the decision was made not to record conversations from this time, nor to include any of these conversations in the thesis. This was done to mitigate such unequal power relations and to safeguard the restaurant staff.

3.3.f Selecting Sites for Further Study.

Before any of the located restaurants could be asked to take part in the extended overt participant observation phase, the compiled list of visited establishments first needed to be understood. In order to make sense of the extensive list of Hui food spaces found, it was decided that producing a typology of the restaurants found might be beneficial in narrowing the sample. As such, the restaurants that had been previously documented were grouped together depending on distinguishable characteristics and traits. Given the diverse array of restaurants and establishments found, the list of categories varied, including groupings based on size of the restaurant, average price, type of establishment, ownership, and referents to other places.

Size	Price	Type of Establishment	Type of Ownership	Referents to Place
Small,	Inexpensive	Restaurant,	State-owned,	Beijing,

[16] 民族。Eng: ethnicity, nationality.

Medium, Large.	Moderate or Average Priced, Expensive.	Street-food stand, Bakery, Butchers, University Canteen, Fast Food Restaurant, Snacks, Food Court, Café/ Teahouse.	Family / Privately Owned, Chain, Unknown.	Ningxia, Lanzhou/Gansu, Xinjiang, Xibei/ Xibeifang, Xi'an/ Shaanxi, West.

Figure 3.5: Typology of restaurants.
Source: Author's own (2017).

These restaurants were then further differentiated depending on the district that they were found in. Ultimately, it was decided that four restaurants would be asked to participate in the research. These four restaurants were each in a different district and each of them represented different groupings from the typology. For each of the districts, a list of restaurants was created and ranked in terms of preference. The first restaurant from each district was asked to participate and if they refused, the next highest ranked restaurant was asked. It was important to have a strategy that allowed for rejection given the likelihood – and indeed reality – that many restaurant managers would refuse to participate in an extended study. The task of gaining consent from restaurant managers to conduct research on their premises would prove to be one of the greatest methodological difficulties faced by this project. Despite showing interest in the project when first approached, many restaurant managers and owners were reluctant to agree to participate. Once asked to participate, these individuals would often become visibly uncomfortable and nervous. Many would refuse to participate, usually without giving a reason, while others would offer to think about it and contact me if they should decide to consent. On three occasions during these early interactions with potential participants, the restaurants' managers had initially agreed to participate but later declined once they heard that a consent form needed to be signed. In order to overcome this issue, a number of different tactics and alternate methods were used.

Upon careful reflection of the various outcomes, it became evident that it was not necessarily participation in the study itself that was concerning these individuals. Rather, it was participation in the study with me, a non-Chinese, and the requirement of written consent that were causing them the most concern. Therefore, it was decided that a gatekeeper of some sort may prove to be helpful when approaching these understandably cautious individuals. As such, I invited a friend to assist with recruiting participants. As this friend is a Chinese woman from Northwest China, her presence seemed to put them at ease somewhat. In line with this, a new method was devised when approaching potential participating restaurants. I continued to make the initial visits to the restaurants alone, building a presence, engaging in informal conversation with staff and explaining my interest in Hui food culture to them. Once I had then selected a restaurant for the next stage of participant observation, my friend would accompany me to the establishment, introduce both of us and the research to the manager, and would then answer any questions that they might have regarding participation. Rather than simply refusing to participate, the managers and owners willingly engaged in conversation with the Chinese friend about the practicalities and legalities involved in participation. Her positionality as a north-western Chinese woman seemed to reassure them somewhat and as a result, consent was given by the managers/owners of the participating restaurants. Despite having offered financial recompense to this friend for her help, she refused to accept, instead insisting that no repayment was needed. After some negotiation, she agreed that I compensate her by buying our meals on the days that she accompanied me for research – an extremely generous offer for which I am incredibly grateful.

It is also worth mentioning that although two of the restaurant managers agreed to sign consent forms, many others refused to do so, even after initially agreeing to participate in the research. Following the refusal of numerous restaurant managers to provide written consent, it was decided that the remaining potential participants not be asked to sign consent forms. In such circumstances, verbal consent was given by the individual responsible for the running of the restaurant. Ultimately, four restaurants gave their consent for participation in the overt participant observation phase. The table below list some of the distinguishable characteristics used to select the four restaurants that agreed to participate.

Restaurant	Restaurant 1 – Haidian District	Restaurant 2 – Dongcheng District	Restaurant 3 – Xicheng District	Restaurant 4 – Chaoyang District
Size	Medium	Large	Small	Medium
Price	Inexpensive	Expensive	Moderate or Average	Moderate or Average
Type of Establishment	Fast Food Restaurant	Restaurant	Restaurant, Bakery, Butchers, Snacks	Restaurant
Type of Ownership	Chain	Part Privately Owned/ Part State-owned	Family / Privately Owned	Family / Privately Owned
Referents to Place	Lanzhou/Gansu	Ningxia	Beijing	Xinjiang

Figure 3.6: Restaurants selected.
Source: Author's own (2017).

3.3.g Overt Participant Observation.

Of these four restaurants, participant observation was carried out overtly in two of them from mid-January 2016 to March 2016. These restaurants were Restaurant 1 in Haidian

District and Restaurant 2 in Dongcheng District, with a several visits also being made to Restaurant 4 in February. Although Restaurant 3 and Restaurant 4 had given their consent, both had asked that I wait until after the Spring Festival to begin visiting their restaurants, before they eventually decided to pull out of the research. Restaurant 4 explained that they would be shut for a number of weeks as their staff were all from Xinjiang and would be returning home to celebrate the festival. Shortly after staff had returned to Beijing, and some visits were made to the restaurant, the owner explained that she no longer wished to participate in the project as the restaurant was facing some legal difficulties stemming from issues in relation to official certificates – the restaurant and its second branch have both since been closed down by authorities. The reason for non-participation by the owner of Restaurant 3 remains uncertain. The elderly owner continually provided excuses to postpone their involvement, before they ultimately pulled out of the project in February 2016. She chose not to explain the reasons behind her decision. Although I cannot say with any certainty why she chose to stop participating, I would expect that it may be linked to my "outsider" status, both in terms of nationality and religion. Throughout all of our interactions she seemed quite reluctant to speak directly with me, preferring to speak with my Chinese friend instead. Further, she responded rather negatively when told that I was not a Muslim, something which happened a few times in that neighbourhood but was extremely rare in all other areas of the city. Although only two restaurants officially participated in the longitudinal participant observation, with Restaurant 4 withdrawing consent in February after just a few visits, it should not be assumed that this limitation was disabling to the project's advancement. Despite not having officially consented to long-term involvement, several other key participants allowed me to visit their establishments regularly throughout the eight-month period, including a bakery, a *Jianbing*[17] stand, and a popular north-western-style restaurant. By carrying out near-weekly visits to these establishments over the course of a few weeks, along with the more frequent visits to officially participating restaurants, a sufficient dataset was compiled, supplemented by the semi-structured interviews and analysis of local materials gathered.

The first session of overt participant observation in participating establishments, both officially participating restaurants and the informal short-term participants, always took place with the manager or supervisor present. These sessions largely acted as introductory sessions whereby I was introduced to both the manager and staff, while

[17] 煎饼。Eng: Thin pancake made of millet flour.

also receiving an introductory “lesson” on the restaurants, their practices, menus, customers and histories. These first sessions began in similar ways, with the member of management acting as gatekeeper between the staff and I. Together we would walk around the restaurant to meet the various groups of employees, and the manager would briefly introduce of me, my role and the research. In all three consenting restaurants, the management encouraged the staff to speak with me during my visits and to help me with any queries that I might have. Although the managers were trying to help me by introducing me to the staff, such an introduction by the managers needs to be considered critically given the inherent power relations involved and the issue of informed consent. As such, I asked the managers to explain to their staff that they did not have to participate in the research if they did not want to, a point which I felt was important to make in order to avoid the staff feeling pressured or coerced into participation. Further, when speaking privately with staff, I would remind them that participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw from the research at any time if they wished to.

Once I was greeted by the staff, the managers walked me through the restaurants, introducing me to their establishments, their menus and practices. In all of these establishments, the “lesson” (as the manager of Restaurant 1 called it) provided an in-depth account of how the restaurants were run on a daily basis, what food and services the restaurants provided their customers with, and what their histories and clientele were like. During this first visit in Restaurant 1, the manager suggested that I audio record our conversation as he intended to provide details on all aspects of the restaurant. He also explained that he felt it was necessary to provide me with such a detailed tour in the first session, as he was unlikely to be available for all of my following sessions. With this in mind, I agreed that recording our conversation would be wise. At one point during this visit, he asked one of the chefs to demonstrate how each of the varieties of speciality hand-pulled noodles were made. The chef suggested that I video record his demonstration, which I did. Although my role as researcher to document my observations was particularly noticeable during this first visit in Restaurant 1, the recording of observations and interactions was done more discretely throughout the rest of the participant observations. In this regard, the writing of fieldnotes was done in a similar way to the covert method described earlier, whereby detailed accounts were written immediately after each visit. In addition to writing these descriptive fieldnotes, reflective and interpretive essays were regularly written.

Once the initial visits had been carried out, an effort was made to establish a regular presence in these restaurants. Restaurants 1, 2 and 4 would be visited once or twice a week, with the length of each visit varying between forty minutes to over two hours. The other informally participating establishments were visited once a week, or once every second week, for up to two months, with each visit lasting between 30 minutes and an hour. This was done in the hopes of developing a relationship with the staff while allowing the staff to become comfortable and familiar with my recurring presence. These visits, which were carried out largely in February and March 2016, were primarily sessions of observation, with very little active participation other than occasionally helping staff members with minor cleaning tasks. During visits to these establishments, I would generally occupy a position in the staff section of the restaurants. In Restaurant 1, I would often stand in the kitchen with the chefs, in a position that allowed for the rest of the restaurant to be seen through the large opening at the service space. At other times, I stood with the waitresses at the cash desk at the other side of the restaurant. In Restaurants 2 and 4, I would generally stand next to the service window with the waitresses.

Rather than directly approaching the staff, I would allow them to approach me in their own time. For the most part, the staff were extremely interested in both me and the research project. They often asked questions not only about the research, but also personal questions relating to my studies, nationality, family, life in Beijing, and even love life. Although many of their questions may have appeared rather personal and direct, my previous experiences of having lived in Beijing assured me that this was simply due to cultural differences. The questions that I may have initially considered too personal, weren't considered such by the staff. Despite being mildly uncomfortable, I tried to answer these questions in a way that was honest yet didn't disclose any information that I feared might negatively affect our relationship or jeopardise the future of the research, specifically surrounding my sexuality. Typically, once the questions of the staff had been answered, the focus could then progress onto matters that were more closely related to the research topic, such as their personal histories and lives, their work experience and roles in the restaurant, their opinions of the restaurant's décor, and their understandings and preferences of Hui food. Conversations with cooking and waiting staff were largely confined to quiet times, when there weren't many customers. As such, many of the visits to restaurants were intentionally scheduled to take place at these times. However, I also made a few visits during busy times, such as during lunch and dinner service. During these busier times, I would converse with members of the restaurants' management, particularly supervisors and managers.

3.3.h Suspension of Studies.

In late March 2016, the participant observation section of research had to be discontinued four months early due to ill health. Unforeseen changes in personal circumstances, combined with deteriorating health, led to the continuation of the project being an impossibility for me at that time. My declining mental and emotional wellbeing was resulting in an inability to conduct the research on a practical level, while my emotional state was also preventing me from engaging critically with the research. Despite having to cease fieldwork while I took a suspension from studies between April 2016 and September 2016, I continued to write reflective notes about the time spent in Beijing, about my emotional connections to the places that I had spent time in, about how I felt in relation to the research given my role as researcher and what I had experienced, and most importantly, about how my emotions may have impacted on how I understood and engaged with the project, participants and places. During this period, a lot of time was spent learning how to acknowledge, understand and accept my emotions and emotional states with the help of psychiatric and therapeutic professionals.

This period of personal learning was arguably an important period for this project as it allowed me to gain a better understanding of the importance of reflexivity, while teaching me the important tools necessary for reflecting on my own emotional knowing. The ability to identify, engage with, and reflect on my own emotional states and responses is important for this project, particularly in regard to the ethics of care discussed in the introduction. Such an ethics of care appreciates that self-care is an important step in being a more attentive, engaged, receptive and responsive researcher. I believe that in order to understand and take seriously the situated knowledges and emotional knowings of others, we must first be able to actively engage with our own through reflective practices. To this end, I find that there is a great deal of insights to be gleaned from mindfulness practices.

I began learning of mindfulness practices during my suspension of studies by taking part in an eighteen-month mindfulness-based course. This again, has had a methodological impact on this project. Specifically, the theories and practices of mindfulness influenced to a certain degree the method taken during the interview process, whereby interviewees were asked to engage in brief mindfulness exercises, such as: describing what they saw in the restaurant, along with the flavours, sounds and smells that they were experiencing. By asking interviewees to focus on their sensory experiences through brief engagements with mindfulness, interviewees were focusing on their present experiences. This not only helped the interviewees relax, but it also allowed them to focus on their current emotional states and embodied experiences. This was a useful technique when followed up with questions relating to the interviewees' personal attachments to the sensory stimulants that they were being questioned about, be it visual representations and décor, or their attachments to dishes, foods and flavours.

3.3.i Second Field Visit.

Once work on the project had recommenced, the methodology had to be reconfigured in line with the new timeline. Initially, it was intended that fifteen semi-structured interviews would be carried out in Beijing near the end of the participant observation phase from May to July 2016. However, as the participant observation had been stopped at such an early stage, the interviews could not be carried out. Therefore, a second research trip was undertaken between June and August 2017 to allow for the semi-structured interviews to be carried out. Not only was the time of the interview phase necessarily changed, but so to was the number of interviews to be conducted. Rather than conducting 15 interviews, it was decided that 30 interviews would make for a better dataset, compensating for any potential shortages in the data gathered from the overt participant observation. These 30 interviews were conducted with 34 individuals from nine provinces.

No.	Gender	Province of Origin	Occupation	Establishment Interviewed In	Age Range
1	Female	Shandong	Waiting Staff	Restaurant	30 - 40
2	Male	Gansu	Waiting Staff	Restaurant	Under 20

3	Male	Gansu	Chef	Restaurant	20 - 30
4	Male	Gansu	Manager	Restaurant	50 - 60
5	Male	Anhui	Manager	Restaurant	40 - 50
6	Female	Shandong	Waiting Staff	Restaurant	Under 20
7	Female	Shandong	Waiting Staff	Restaurant	20 - 30
8	Male	Heilongjiang	Owner	Bakery	30 - 40
9	Male	Beijing	Butcher	Butcher Shop	50 - 60
10	Male	Beijing	Butcher	Butcher Shop	50 - 60
11	Female	Gansu	Waiting Staff	Restaurant	20 - 30
12	Male	Gansu	Chef	Restaurant	20 - 30
13	Female	Gansu	Intern	Restaurant	20 - 30
14	Female	Shandong	Waiting Staff	Restaurant	20 - 30
15	Female	Shandong	Waiting Staff	Restaurant	20 - 30

16	Female	Ningxia	Waiting Staff	Restaurant	20 - 30
17	Female	Ningxia	Supervisor	Restaurant	40 - 50
18	Female	Ningxia	Manager/ Owner	Restaurant	50 - 60
19	Male	Gansu	Manager	Restaurant	30 - 40
20	Male	Gansu	Manager	Restaurant	20 - 30
21	Male	Shandong	Butcher	Butcher Shop	40 - 50
22	Male	Shaanxi	Owner	Bakery	50 - 60
23	Female	Ningxia	Manager/ Owner	Bakery & Butcher	60 +
24	Male	Gansu	Chef	Restaurant	20 - 30
25	Male	Shandong	Supervisor	Restaurant	20 - 30
26	Male	Gansu	Supervisor	Restaurant	20 - 30
27	Female	Beijing	Manager/ Owner	Restaurant	50 - 60

28	Female	Ningxia	Waiting Staff	Restaurant	20 - 30
29	Male	Qinghai	Manager	Restaurant	20 - 30
30	Male	Shaanxi	Owner	Restaurant	50 – 60
31	Male	Beijing	Owner	Restaurant	60 +
32	Male	Beijing	Intern	Restaurant	20 - 30
33	Male	Hebei	Imam	Bakery	50 - 60
34	Male	Ningxia	Customer	Bakery	20 - 30

Figure 3.7: Interviewees.
Source: Author's own (2020).

Total Number	**Gender**	**Province of Origin**	**Occupation**	**Establishment Interviewed In**	**Age Range**
34	Male: 21 Female: 13	Anhui: 1 Beijing: 5 Gansu: 10 Hebei: 1	Waiting Staff: 9 Chef: 3 Supervisor: 3	Bakery: 4 Butcher Shop: 3 Bakery & Butchers: 1	Under 20: 2 20 – 30: 16 30 – 40: 3 40 – 50: 3

		Heilong-jiang: 1 Ningxia: 6 Qinghai: 1 Shandong: 7 Shaanxi: 2	Manager: 5 Manager/ Owner: 4 Owner: 3 Butcher: 3 Imam: 1 Intern: 2 Customer: 1	Restaurant: 26	50 – 60: 8 60 +: 2

Figure 3.8: Overview of Sample.
Source: Author's own (2020).

Before the second leg of fieldwork began, a research assistant was hired. Originally, it was decided that an interpreter would be needed to assist with the interviews to allow for more in-depth topics to be explored and to avoid any misunderstandings or missed linguistic nuances. Also, given the difficulties faced during the first stage of fieldwork when attempting to recruit participants, it was decided that an assistant would also be needed to help successfully recruit interviewees. As such, a research assistant was hired using an internship website. The role of the assistant was to help with the recruitment of interviewees, interpret during interviews, transcribe all interviews, and translate the transcripts into English. Of the applicants, an ethnically non-Han Chinese male university student named Shige was hired, due not only to his English abilities and academic suitability, but also because of his positionality. By hiring a non-Han Chinese, it was hoped that similarities between the interpreter and the research participants may be drawn on, as was the case with my north-western Chinese friend during the first field visit. Further, given the positive responses that the restaurant staff encountered during the first field visit had when told that I was a student, it was hoped that the Shige's student status would evoke a similar response. Through enlisting the help of Chinese nationals, specifically a non-Han Chinese person, their positionings arguably helped to improve my credibility among the Hui, similar to how Ho (2013) enlisted Mainland Chinese researchers for her study of Southeast Asian “refugee returnees”.

Once access had been secured to the field through registering on a summer language course and obtaining a student visa, the second phase of fieldwork could begin. Before returning to Beijing, a number of cities across China were briefly visited that had previously been identified as significant centres of Hui food culture. The cities visited were Hohhot City in Inner-Mongolia Autonomous Region, Yinchuan City in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Xi’an City in Shaanxi Province, and Kunming City in Yunnan Province. The purpose of these trips was to observe, and document displays of local Hui food culture in order to better understand not only the regional variations referenced by participants, but also to better understand the distinctive qualities of Hui culture in Beijing by comparison. Local documentary sources were gathered, and brief sessions of covert participant observations were carried out, similar to Beijing. These non-Beijing sources were important in providing a broader framing of participants’ experiences and opinions, especially as many of the participants originated from these areas. Ultimately, the data gathered from these visits does not feature heavily in the empirical discussions, with the exception of the Hui’s cultural diversity discussed in Chapter 5, and the historical development of the Hui as an ethnic group in Chapter 4.

Before returning to China, an effort was made to prearrange some interviews. A number of previous participants were contacted and three agreed to interviews. These three interviews were carried out first, with the interviewees also acting as gatekeepers to further interviewees. This snowball approach resulted in four further interviews. Another approach taken to prearrange interviews involved me identifying suitable restaurants and Shige either visiting or phoning them to ask about participation. However, this approach was less successful, resulting in only one interview. The most effective approach for recruiting interviewees was cold-calling, where individuals were approached without having previously been consulted about the research. As with the early stages of the covert participant observation, certain areas were selected based on volume or quality of Hui restaurants. These restaurants were then visited, and Shige would introduce the project and myself to members of staff. It quickly became apparent that staff were more likely to agree during the restaurant’s quiet times. Specifically, the three-hour period between 2pm and 5pm was most productive for both approaching interviewees and conducting interviews. Before entering restaurants to approach individuals, preferences of their gender and position would be considered. This was done in order to gain a relatively representative sample. However, it should be noted that strict selection based on such characteristics was not always enforced, and on occasion no such preference was pre-decided.

Considering the difficulties faced in earlier stages of research, written consent was not asked for although the use of data was always discussed, and verbal consent obtained. This verbal consent covered all items included in the written consent form. This possibility had been discussed with my supervisors and with the ethics committee at Maynooth University. Given the experience of a previous doctoral student (Lin, 2016) in Geography at Maynooth University, this prospect had been anticipated. Lin's research into the Falun Gong had likewise found a deep suspicion of any written documentation of participation in the research project. Participants considered it safer to leave no record of their signature. In this case too, the questions on the ethics form had been put verbally to the local experts and their consent sought in this way.

All of the interviewees found through cold-calling, bar three, were interviewed immediately in the restaurants. As we visited the establishments outside of busy times, it was usually quiet enough to allow for privacy, meaning that the interviewees could speak openly without fear of being overheard. Although most interviews took place in the main area of the restaurants, five of them were carried out in private spaces, such as a manager's office, a staff room, a private dining room, and an enclosed outdoor space. Most interviews involved one interviewee, however, some involved two or more individuals being interviewed at the same time. These small group interviews were carried out at the request of the interviewees, who felt more comfortable being interviewed in the presence of another colleague. As the interviews were semi-structured, a list of topics was used to provide a very loose structure, which was deviated from as the participant led the conversation. Topics were added or removed from the list as their relevance and importance to the research became apparent. At the beginning of the interviews, simple questions relating to the participants' biographies and histories were asked, which not only proved informative but was helpful in putting the interviewees at ease. Shige was asked to translate all responses, even when I understood the answers. This was in done in order to ensure that no misunderstandings happened.

Given the project's interests in the emotional attachments of Hui people to food and places, a mindfulness-inspired and reflexive approach was taken when asking interviewees about their favourite dishes and the décor of the restaurants. At certain points throughout the interview, the participants were encouraged to focus on the present through bringing their attention onto their current sensory experiences. Specifically, they were asked to focus on certain aspects of the restaurants' décor and, where possible, the flavours of the food that we were eating. They were then asked to describe what they were seeing and tasting, an action that brought them into the present moment according to mindfulness theories. Once this was done, they were then asked what thoughts came to mind when reflecting on the particular visual aid or taste. Generally, the answers would relate to memories of home, family, childhood, religion and ethnicity. They were then asked to reflect on their emotional responses to these thoughts and memories. Such a practice proved very fruitful for discussions of emotional attachments to food and places, things that might otherwise have been difficult topics to approach.

3.3.j Translation, Transcribing and Coding Processes.

Once the interviews had been carried out, they needed to be transcribed and translated. As was discussed earlier, these were part of Shige's duties. This task was left to Shige not only to maximise time efficiency, but also to avoid the loss of any linguistic nuance or meaning. A format was provided which he was instructed to follow. This format included guidelines about how the English and Chinese sections should be written, and how it should be translated. Once these documents had been written, they were emailed to me. I then checked the transcripts and translations. Certain translations were highlighted and noted when the translation from Chinese to English possibly changed the original meaning. This was an important step, particularly in relation to the language used by interviewees to describe their emotional attachments to places and food. Many of the interviewees used the term *Qinqie*[18] to describe how they felt about Hui food and the décor of Hui restaurants. Originally Shige had translated this as meaning "closeness". However, as we discovered, the word was in fact being used to signify a range of emotions beyond such a simple translation to English (see Chapter 6).

[18]亲切。

Following the translation of transcripts, they were coded thematically using MAXQDA software. Rather than approaching the documents with a pre-set list of themes to look for, a blind approach was taken. Themes were allowed to emerge from the transcripts, and once identified they were documented. After the first coding of the field journals, reflections and transcripts, they were then read through again. This was done as some themes only emerged in the later transcripts and as such, it needed to be seen if they were also present in the earlier documents. This coding process resulted in 115 thematic codes being identified within the transcripts and field notes, categorised under 13 primary groupings. A further 54 thematic codes were used for photographs and visual materials, grouped into 15 themes. In total, there were 169 codes, with 28 main themes emerging which formed the foundations for this thesis' arguments.

When writing the thesis, I decided to include as footnotes all the Chinese characters from transcripts, fieldnotes and materials used. This again, is in line with my intended ethics of care. As Krzywoszynska (2015) has pointed out, there are many issues with how we translate research data, especially in the context of overseas research. I therefore believe that one should not only reflect upon the translation processes, but also be transparent about choices made. Such transparency allows for the interpretive nature of the translation process to be exposed, something that is important given the post-colonial aspirations of a feminist political geography approach. Once the chapters had been written, and the Chinese characters included as footnotes, they were given to Dr Zhouxiang Lu, who is a member of my supervisory panel. Dr Lu is a native Mandarin Chinese speaker. He read through my translations, ensuring that no misinterpretations or mistranslations occurred.

3.3.k Third Field Visit.

Once the dataset had been coded and analysed, and conversations were held with the project's supervisors and mentors, I began formulating arguments based on empirical data. It was decided that a third research trip would then be undertaken in January 2019. The trip lasted 17-days and its purpose was two-fold. Firstly, the validity of proposed arguments would be tested through further observation and conversations with Beijing's Hui residents. This approach was not only deemed to be the most ethical and methodologically-sound, but also necessary for certain arguments given the claims of temporal change being made. This is particularly true in relation to the arguments being made in Chapter 7.2 regarding alcohol and assimilation. The second reason for this return trip was to gather more photographic evidence of the place-making tactics discussed in Chapter 6. Although many photographs had been gathered during earlier phases of fieldwork, I felt as though more photographs were needed to evidence the specific visual referents used by restaurant owners in establishing distinctively Hui places.

During this field visit, 111 establishments were visited. Of these 62 were restaurants. These establishments were primarily located based on my past experiences of researching in Beijing. Many of the establishments and areas had previously been visited during the first two field visits – although I quickly realised that some restaurants had closed down in the interval. However, many of these restaurants were replaced by new establishments, although some had been completely demolished (see chapter 7.2.a for a discussion). Once all previously visited areas had been returned to, I once again turned to online search engines and applications (particularly Baidu Maps and the social media, micro-blogging site Weibo) to locate new areas of interest within the chosen five districts. As with earlier field visits, these restaurants were visited and informal conversations with staff were recorded. Photographs were also taken, with the permission of waiting staff or managers. Fieldnotes and reflective memos were continuously written, focusing specifically on the proposed arguments for the thesis, namely: gender and changing gender roles; the importance of visual references to places in the making of Hui restaurants; and the increasing presence of alcohol within Hui restaurants. These documents were then coded and analysed using MAXQDA software, once I had returned to Maynooth University. As of 7 February 2020, a total of 579 fieldnotes and reflexive memos have been written, comprising of: 280 descriptive fieldnotes; 82 interpretive notes; and 217 reflexive memos.

3.3.l Security of Data.

The security of data was of upmost importance throughout the entirety of this research project, particularly given its Chinese context and the sensitivity of Islam and ethnicity in China. Much of the project’s dataset, specifically interview transcripts, field-notes and personal reflexive memos, were initially saved as encrypted Word Documents, but later as encrypted MAXQDA coded files. Photographs were encrypted in JPEG format, and audio files were also encrypted. All audio files were deleted once I checked the translated transcripts for any errors or oversights. All written files were anonymised immediately. A metadata file was encrypted, containing the five potential indirect identifiers gathered for all interviewees (age range, occupation, gender, type of establishment they work in, and province of origin). All files were securely stored on an encrypted hard-drive, and my secure folder at Maynooth University. Therefore, data was backed-up with two copies, in two different mediums, with one copy offsite to ensure safety. All files were encrypted, as was my hard-drive and computer.

While in China, HEAnetFileSender was used to send encrypted files from my computer to one of the project's supervisors, Professor Boyle, in Maynooth University, who then stored them in an encrypted folder. These files were then deleted from my computer. Only I had the password for encrypted files. In regards to written consent, these documents were scanned, encrypted and stored separately from other files. Paper copies were shredded immediately thereafter. Participants were asked to consent to the archiving of the data. This anonymised data will be prepared for archiving following successful completion of the PhD and then made available through the Irish Qualitative Data Archive at the time of publication.

3.4 CONCLUSION.

In Chapter 2 of this thesis, a theoretical framework was developed which is feminist, post-colonial, critical and anti-racist in its approach to knowledge production. This feminist political geographical approach considers people's emotive and lived experiences as being important sites of (geo)political inquiry. Further, such an approach understands knowledge as being embodied, situated, anti-foundational and as being actively produced in the field. In line with this epistemology, this chapter set about discussing this project's methodology and methods.

Given this project's overarching aim – which is to explore how Hui identity is performed, made public, othered, negotiated, and contested through its food cultures – a methodology needed to be developed which would allow for a critical exploration of Hui food cultures. In order to achieve this, a qualitative methodological approach was devised, centred around the methods of participant observation, semi-structured interviews, semiotic analysis of local materials and the writing of fieldnotes. Together, these methods allowed for Hui food cultures to be analysed as performances of Hui identity, and for people's emotive ties to places of Hui food culture to be explored. Central to this project's methodology was an ethics of care which played a central role at all stages of project design and data collection, and which was integral in adapting the chosen methods to suit the Beijing context. When attempting to implement such a methodology in Beijing, a number of challenges needed to be addressed, as was discussed in sections 3.3.a to 3.3.l. Specifically, there were challenges regarding language and translation, gaining access to the field, selecting the sample, reflexivity and security of data. Through addressing these issues in line with the feminist political geographical approach of this project, the research's aims and objectives could be successfully achieved, as the ensuing chapters will demonstrate. However, before these aims and objectives can be addressed in the empirical chapters, it is important that the project be framed historically. As such, the following chapter will discuss the historical development of the Hui ethnic minority group and the political and ideological reasonings behind the Chinese Communist Party's classification of ethnic minorities.

CHAPTER 4: HISTORICAL CHAPTER.

Following the theoretical and methodological development of the feminist political geographical approach discussed in chapters 2 and 3, it is important that the historical and political context of the Hui be explored in order to better contextualise the empirical data. This chapter addresses such a need by discussing the political and historical development of ethnicity in China, specifically focusing on the history of Chinese Islam and the Hui. Structured in 4 sections, this chapter begins by first discussing the pivotal role that historical Chinese conceptualisations of nationalism have played in the establishment of both the Chinese state and the CCP's understandings of ethnicity, before then turning to the important "Classification" projects of the 1950s and the central role that *Ronghe* and assimilation theory play in CCP policy. Section 4.2 will then turn to the long history of Islam in China before Section 4.3 narrows its focus to the specificities of the project's chosen group, the Hui. In particular, it is shown that the Hui fail to meet all four criteria for ethnic classification set out by Stalin and the initial classification team: that is to say, "a common language, a common territory, a common economic life, and a common psychological make-up manifested in common specific features of national culture". Section 4.4 will focus on the last criteria, "a common psychological make-up manifested in common specific features of national culture", using it as an entry way into Chapter 5.

4.1 MAKING THE CHINESE NATION.

The concepts of nation, nation-state and nationalism were first introduced into the realm of Chinese politics in the late nineteenth century as instruments of defence and regeneration in the face of Western imperialism and the weakening of the Qing Dynasty. Within Western scholarship, Smith (2010: 13) has defined the concept of nation as "a named human community residing in a perceived homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a distinct public culture, and common laws and customs for all members". Despite there being similarities between nationalism and pre-modern Chinese sentiments, nationalism and the nation appeared with the establishment of the nation-state system, or Westphalian system, in Europe (Zhao, 2004: 16). As Hsü (1960: 13) has noted, "imperial China was not a nation-state" and as such, nationalism did not exist in ancient China. Rather than being bound by national consciousness, the people of traditional China were linked by culturalism and universalism,[19] whereby China was perceived as being the only civilisation in the universal world[20] and all those who adopted its teachings and principles could be incorporated within its culturalist bounds (Levenson, 1959; Zhao, 2004). The defeat of the Chinese by the British in the 1840-42 Opium War and by the Japanese in the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War, would prove to be major catalysts in fuelling Chinese nationalism and nationalistic movements. According to Liang Qichao (1935) one of China's most important and influential early twentieth century nationalists, the 1895 loss to Japan was a particularly poignant moment in Chinese history as he claims that it awoke the Chinese people "from the dream of 4,000 years", with many other scholars agreeing that it proved to be a watershed moment in the development of Chinese nationalism (Yahuda, 2000; Zhao, 2004). Although prominent Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaotong (1989) argues that China had existed as an "unconscious nation"[21] for thousands of years, he conceded that the Chinese nation only came into being as a "conscious national entity"[22] as a result of contact and conflicts with Western imperial forces in recent times. Following the Sino-Japanese War, Chinese nationalism was specifically centred on ethnic nationalism, whereby the nation is viewed as consisting of a single politicised ethnic group. At the turn of the twentieth century, this form of "racist and anti-imperialist" (Friedman, 1995) nationalism would be the defining quality of the Han nationalists' attempts to not only fight off Western powers, but also to topple the minority Manchu rule.

Following the fall of the Qing empire in 1912, Sun Yat-sen and other nationalist revolutionaries realised that their Han-centric version of ethnic nationalism risked the dissolution of Qing territories by excluding other self-identifying ethnic groups. Thus, Sun began to promote a vision of the newly established Chinese nation as being multi-ethnic while rejecting the ethnic nationalism that he had once argued so passionately in favour of; instead claiming that China was one country with five united ethnic groups (Zhao, 2004). Once again, the work of Liang Qichao (in Liu, 2000) is useful in understanding this development in Chinese nationalism as it spearheaded the change in Chinese nationalistic views of the nation-state by making a conceptual distinction between the nation and the state. Importantly, he claimed that a nation could be defined as the result of humans' natural tendency to gather in larger groups. Further, he believed

[19]天下主义。
[20]天下。
[21]自在的民族。
[22]自觉的民族实体。

that these nations may be spread across many states and a state may in fact contain multiple nations (Liu, 2000; Zhou, 2004). In relation to these distinctions, Liang (1935, 1999) developed and introduced two new Chinese terms: *xiao minzuzhuyi,*[23] or small nationalism; and *da minzuzhuyi,*[24] or big nationalism. Small nationalism may be understood as the nationalism existing among individual ethnic groups, similar to ethnic nationalism among the Han. However, big nationalism unites all ethnic groups within the state together, particularly in opposition to foreign powers and is thus comparable to state nationalism (Liang, 1999; Lu and Fan, 2014: 132). Liang's definition of Chinese nationalism prioritised territory as the most important criterion for Chinese nationalism, as opposed to the ethnic nationalism and expulsion of minorities pursued by Sun Yat-sen and other nationalists at the time. Although as Ho (2018b: 8) points out, Liang's nationalism still worked through excluding ethnic minorities from the majoritarian Han race, or the 'genuine yellows,' by normalising racial classification in Chinese society." Initially, Sun objected to Liang's definitions and views, however, following the fall of the Qing Dynasty and the subsequent separatist movements of China's frontier regions, Sun attempted to transcend his previously ethnic nationalist approach by establishing a "national people"[25] that was inclusive of certain non-Han groups (Zhou, 2004).

The Republican era was marked by a struggle between nationalists advocating for a centralised state system and those nationalists who sought to establish a federalist system, similar to the United States of America (Chen et al., 1987; Zhao, 2004). Those in support of a federalist system believed that provincial identity and autonomy should be preserved, as provincial traditions were the foundations for the nation-state. The contest between the centralists and federalists was particularly heated in the 1920s (Zhao, 2004). During this time, warlordism was rampant throughout China, with the years between 1916 and 1928 being referred to as the Warlord Era. Each of these warlords held tremendous political, military and economic power over substantial territories, and some were controlled by members of ethnic minority groups who consolidated power through uniting populations against the exclusionary Han ethnic nationalists. The north-western provinces of Ningxia, Gansu and Qinghai were controlled during this time by a group of Hui warlords known as the Ma family warlords (Lipman, 1997).

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[23] 小民族主义。
[24] 大民族主义。
[25] 国民。

Many federalists believed that a centralised state was too weak to challenge China's numerous warlords and as such, provincial forces would be better equipped to tackle the problem. Although the federalist movement was focused on provincial self-governance, it nevertheless became a tool used by these warlords in their struggle with each other, resulting in political crises for the fledgling state's government. In 1922, Sun Yat-sen began the Northern Expedition, a military campaign to unify China's feuding provinces and territories by establishing a centralised national government. The Northern Expedition was continued by Sun's successor, Chiang Kai-shek, and in 1927 a central government was established in Nanjing and territorial integrity and power was largely regained (Zhao, 2004: 70-78). Interestingly, despite the successful establishment of the Guomindang Government (Chinese Nationalist Party), warlordism continued to play a role. In 1934, the Guomindang Government allied with the Hui warlord Ma Zhongying to overthrow the separatist state of the First East Turkestan, which was established by the Uyghur nationality in western Xinjiang province (Lu and Fan, 2014). The willingness of the Hui warlords and armies to assist Chiang's government in overthrowing their fellow Muslim minority group held huge significance, especially in relation to the construction of a Chinese national concept. Their cooperation with the Han government in defending the territorial integrity of the Chinese nation shows that although the Hui were actively pursuing a type of "small nationalism" during the Warlord Era, by 1934 they were working with the Han nationality to practice "big nationalism," similar to that proposed by Liang (1935, 1999). Thus, the Hui consolidated their small nation identity while also working with the Han in defence of their common identity, their Chinese national identity.

4.1.a Classifying a nation:

Despite there being enormous cultural, geographical, linguistic and religious differences among China's Muslims, they continued to be grouped together under the term "Hui" until the 1950s. This notion of a homogenous Islamic population in China was further developed by Dr Sun Yat-sen and his idea of the "Five Peoples of China,"[26] which would prove vitally important in his efforts to topple the Qing empire. In order to unite the broader Chinese populace against the ruling Manchurian elite, Dr Sun devised the "Five Peoples of China", identifying five nationalities or *minzu*[27] and establishing the Han as the majority nationality. In addition to the newly united Han and Manchu nationalities,

[26] 五族共和。
[27]民族。

Dr Sun also identified the Mongolian,[28] Tibetan[29] and the Hui[30] (Gladney, 2004: 15). During Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist era, his government argued vehemently that there was in fact only one nationality in China, the Chinese people,[31] asserting that groups such as the Hui were in fact merely a sub-variety of the same *minzu*. Early communists in China began to dispute this mono-ethnic claim, promoting the belief that China was composed of a variety of distinct, yet politically equal ethnic groups (Mullaney, 2011). This multi-*minzu* stance was forged during the 1930s in an attempt to gain the support of those people that were discontented by Chiang Kai-shek's nationality policy. Crucially, it was during the Long March that communist leaders, faced with possible extermination, were forced to make promises of special treatment to the "barbarians" that they encountered on their 371-day trek. Specifically, promises were made to the Miao,[32] Yi,[33] Tibetan and Hui (Gladney, 1996). The commitment of the Chinese Communists to grant recognition to non-Han *minzu* was further emphasised in a series of treatises written during the 1930s. Most famously, the *minzu* policies of Republican and Imperial era China were criticised in "The Question of the Huihui Nationality". In this text, it was argued that the Hui constituted a distinct nationality, rather than being a mere religious sub-division of the Han people. It was argued that Nationalist policies were designed to impede the "national awakening"[34] of the Hui people and that by failing to recognise the Hui as a separate *minzu*, the Nationalist Government were avoiding the issue of political equality and representation for the Hui (Minzuwentiyanjiuhui, 1980).

Following the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese state set about documenting and categorising China's many nationalities, challenging both Dr Sun's notion of a "Five Peoples" nation and Chiang Kai-shek's mono-*minzu* version. Over the ensuing three decades, a series of extensive ethnographic and linguistic classification projects under the collective title of "Ethnic Classification Project"[35] would result in the identification of fifty-six nationalities using a criteria that Mullaney (2011: 106) has termed "ethnic potential." Beginning in the early years of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) rule, a team of ethnographers and linguists were instructed to

[28] 蒙族。
[29] 藏族。
[30] 回族。
[31] 中华民族。
[32] 苗族。
[33] 彝族。
[34] 民族觉醒。
[35] 民族识别。

categorise and classify China's diverse population using Stalin's four-point criteria for ethnic evolution (Sautman, 1999; Zang, 2015). This set of criteria requires groups to possess four shared traits in order to be considered a nationality: "a common language, a common territory, a common economic life, and a common psychological make-up manifested in common specific features of national culture" (Stalin, 1953; Gladney, 2006; Zang, 2015). However, the classification team quickly realised that many of the self-identifying groups they met across China did not in fact meet all four requirements identified by Stalin. Despite this, some of these groups were considered to hold sufficient cultural difference from the Han and other newly identified minority groups to warrant classification as nationalities. As such, the classification team leader, Lin Yaohua, devised a new approach for assessing the eligibility of applicant groups based on an enlarged definition of *minzu* (Gros, 2004: 278; Mullaney, 2011). Rather than requiring groups to already possess all four criteria, they would be assessed on their potential to acquire these traits, i.e., their potential to achieve nationality status. Further, this new approach aimed to allow for the self-identification of groups (Tapp, 2002: 67; Mullaney, 2004: 230). This liberal approach to self-identification would result in more than 400 applicant groups seeking recognition across China. However, by 1982, just 56 ethnic groups had been officially recognised, including the majoritarian Han population and 55 minority groups (Fei, 1981; Gladney, 2004). As such, people in China were then provided with a pre-determined list of ethnicities to choose from, resulting in the official amalgamation and exclusion of certain groups for political expediency (Mullaney, 2011). In line with the Stalinistic approach, these 55 non-Han groups are considered by much official and popular discourse to be fossilized remnants of early stages of the evolution towards socialism. Yet, it is apparent that these groups are by no means fossilised. Rather, they are in a constant state of flux and change, a continuum of reinvention and contention (Caffrey, 2004).

As Connor (1984) and Mullaney (2011: 20) have pointed out, Marxist writings claim that "nationalities are parts of the superstructure, ideational manifestations of underlying economic relationships and processes that are destined to wither away once the inherent contradictions within the economic structure resolve themselves dialectically". So why then would the newly formed government of the People's Republic want to classify and categorize that which is seemingly destined to disappear in time? Once again, Mullaney's (2011) insightful work is helpful in addressing this question as he points towards three reasons. Firstly, leading up to the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the

Communists had been engaged in a bitter battle for power with the Nationalists. From the 1930s on, the Communists devised an ethnopolitical platform that put them in opposition to the Nationalists in an attempt to garner support from the increasingly disgruntled people of China. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the Nationalists became evermore committed to their mono-*minzu* stance, claiming that China comprised of only one people, the Chinese people. The Communists set about placing themselves in opposition to this stance, proposing a vision of China as a composite of different, yet politically equal, groups. The second point is that the classification of China's nationalities needs to be situated within the broader history of the post-imperial transition in China and the historical issue of maintaining the territorial integrity of a diverse and vast empire. Throughout history, the communist party's predecessors had long struggled to incorporate China's western tribes and people into a unified polity. In order to overcome this problem, many regimes attempted to create policies that manipulated the various practices of the people whom they attempted to govern. From this standpoint, it is clear to see why the Communists wished to categorise the diverse people of Western China and document their cultural, economic and societal practices. Finally, the categorisation may be seen as an attempt to address the government's initial failures to live up to earlier commitments. Initially, the government adopted a non-interventionist approach of self-categorisation when dealing with the question of ethnicity. However, the astonishing proliferation of nationality categories that appeared on the first national census of 1953-1954 showed that a non-interventionist policy with regards to *minzu* categorisation would mean that the government's earlier commitments to proportional representation for non-Han people would be an impossibility. As such, they needed to establish a definable list of *minzu* in order to guarantee proportional representation. As the initial, extremely liberal, self-categorisation aspirations of the Chinese state proved to be unfeasible, the Chinese people were then be provided with a pre-set list of 56 options from which to choose their ethnonational identity. These options were in line with the earlier policy proposal of Fang Guoyu, whereby each group was to be given "one name, one spelling, one pronunciation, not to be changed at will" (Mullaney, 2011: 121).

4.1.b Ethnicity and *Ronghe* in China.

Although Mullaney's (2011) work certainly sheds light onto some of the possible political reasonings behind the CCP's decision to identify and document China's minority populations, it arguably overlooks a key point – minorities and their assimilation were not new issues in China. This is an important point if we are to fully understand the historical development of the minoritising processes at work in China today. By the 1940s, the term *minzu* was not one that at that time had a particularly long history in China, having only been introduced into the realm of Chinese politics by the Japanese in the early 19th Century (Zang, 2015). However, that is not to say that the idea of culturally distinct ethnic group did not exist before that time. Heberer (1989: 18) points out that the Han Chinese identified distinct non-Han groups of "barbarians" as far back as the Han Dynasty (260BCE – 220CE). According to Confucian philosophy, these barbarians could become part of the Han community if they adopted the Han culture. Confucianism promoted the idea of political, cultural and economic intermingling to encourage ethnic and cultural assimilation of "barbarians" into the Han community (Dreyer, 1976; He, 2004: 114-115; Mackerras, 1984: 188). In essence, the Confucian concept of cultural communities promoted the assimilation and acculturation of minority people into Han society (Zang, 2015: 19). Central to this assimilation process were military conquests, after which the minority group would eventually merge with the Han, adopting their cultural practices and language (Hansen, 2005; Zhu and Yu, 2000; Zang, 2015). Key to this interface is the notion of *ronghe,*[36] whereby non-Han minorities became assimilated to the Han majority (He, 2004: 112; Zang, 2015: 20). Dr Sun Yat-sen turned to this concept of *ronghe* when attempting to promote Chinese nationalism based on the unity of Han culture by arguing that the Han had a long-standing society that the Manchu "barbarians" had conquered. Despite playing a valuable role in the overthrow of the Qing Empire, Dr Sun's *ronghe*-inspired ideology would prove divisive and problematic in the aftermath, alienating minority groups and threatening China's territorial integrity. It was in response to this issue that Dr Sun began promoting the notion of *zhonghua,*[37] or Chinese nation, and the unification of China's five *minzu* groups and their territories. He claimed that these five groups were all subdivisions of the same people, the Chinese people,[38] and that they would ultimately be assimilated into a "single cultural and political whole" led by the Han (Shin, 2006; Barabantseva, 2008: 570-572; Hyer, 2009: 259; Gladney, 1996; Zang, 2015).

Following the fall of the Republic of China (ROC) and the emergence of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the CCP continued Dr Sun's *ronghe* approach, promoting a

[36]融合。
[37]中华。
[38]中华民族。

unified Chinese nation and encouraging assimilation and acculturation of minorities. In the 1950s and 1960s, the *ronghe* policy was promoted through socialist transformation with the CCP arguing that the Han had already achieved a coherent society and that the minorities were feudal and backward by comparison. By implementing this rhetoric of socialist development, the Han were legitimising their control of the minorities, leading them to a better stage of socio-economic development which "pre-determined the uniformity of interests of Han Chinese and non-Han peoples in the socialist transformation of ethnic minority groups and minority areas" (Zang, 2015: 22). It was argued that these minorities could only achieve socialist transformation and modernity through establishing a socialist system under the CCP by engaging in class struggle. Throughout this era, the CCP implemented a relatively soft approach to the assimilation of minority groups. In 1957 Zhou Enlai, the PRC's Premier, stated that "assimilation would not be welcome if it were achieved by force. Assimilation should be promoted if it were the outcome of mutual efforts of the majority and minority peoples. Successful examples of assimilation include the Hui people and the Manchu people" (He, 2003: 226; Zhu, 2012). This mild approach to assimilation was quickly replaced by the political extremism and forced assimilation imposed during the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution. During this turbulent era, efforts were made to forcefully assimilate minorities, with the CCP officially denying that China was a multinational country, thus resolving the minority issue (Clothey, 2001: Leibold, 2010). Despite a further shift in political governance after 1978, the *ronghe* ideology still lives on in the CCP's nationalities policy. Today, the term *Zhongguo Ren,*[39] or Chinese person, is used to refer to all Chinese citizens, as opposed to the term Han Chinese, and the CCP stresses economic development in its nationalities policies. Officially, China is viewed as consisting of many united nationalities, linked economically, culturally and historically (Mackerras, 2011a and 2011b; Hyer, 2006). Yet, the belief remains that *minzu* extinction is an inevitable consequence of China's modernisation as it is the final stage of *minzu* development. As China modernises, it is hoped that a national community will continue to be formed, whereby ethnic minority distinctions will become irrelevant as people assimilate and adopt a "higher level of identification – *Zhonghua Minzu*" (China's Ethnic Unity Textbook Compiling Team, 2009; Zang, 2015), a concept that is still fraught with political meaning and notes of assimilation as the Han are considered to be most central to the *Zhonghua Minzu* (Fei, 1989; Shin, 2006).

[39]中国人。

4.1.c Current Policy.

Despite their underlying ideology of *ronghe*, the CCP have, in theory, taken the protection of minority cultures, languages and religions very seriously. Following the end of the Cultural Revolution and its associated forced assimilation policies, the CCP partly restored the moderate approach to ethnic policies that it had taken pre-1957 (Lai, 2009). The government in Beijing have created a series of policies and laws to serve this purpose with Article 4 of the PRC Constitution of 1982 declaring that all nationalities have the right to preserve or change their own ways and customs, to develop their own languages, and that the state will assists them with their cultural and economic development (Zang, 2015: 59). Religious freedom of minorities is also, in theory, protected by the Chinese State under Article 36 of the PRC Constitution. With the exception of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang and Tibetan Buddhists, most minorities enjoy relative freedom of religion. The Hui are among such groups and their religious practices are neither encouraged nor discouraged as long as they do not affect government ideology or policy (Zang, 2015). However, religious institutions and places of worship or religious practices must be registered with the religious bureaus of local governments who ensure that they are run by patriotic individuals and groups, thus safeguarding the government's ethnic policies (US Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2005b). As Yang (2012: 45-50) noted, today's policies regarding religion are based on a branch of Chinese Communist atheism called enlightenment atheism. This form of atheism considers religion as both backward and non-scientific, believing that atheist propaganda, scientific developments and mass education are needed to eradicate religious ideas. One of the principle documents influencing religious policy in China today is the CCP circular "The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Affairs during the Socialist Period of Our Country", better known as Document No. 19 of 1982 (MacInnis, 1989). This document claims that religion in socialist China has five characteristics: that religion has masses of believers, it is complex, it will exist for a long time, it affects international relations, and it is entwined with ethnicity. Although the document states that religious freedom should be guaranteed, it insists that it will eventually disappear. Under Document No. 19, which "announced the beginning of religious governmentality to institutionalize and normalize religious activities between religion and Communism" (Lin, 2018: 4), legal existence is granted to five religions: Islam, Buddhism, Daoism, Protestantism and Catholicism. Following Document No. 19, the 1982 PRC Constitution reaffirms that religious freedoms are protected. However, only "normal" religious practices are protected, an arbitrary distinction to be decided by authorities, specifically the Religious Affairs Bureau, the Public Security Bureau and the United Front Department (Yang, 2012: 75). As Weihsuan Lin's work (2018: 2) on the domestic religious geopolitics of China post-1978 has shown us, "the PRC's authority to brand, ban and suppress religious movements or groups as 'evil cults' turns religion into an object of the Chinese Party-State's sovereign power". China's domestic religious geopolitics can be most evidently seen in the case of the Falun Gong (Lin, 2016) and their branding as an "evil cult", but also helps to explain the processes involved in branding certain Islamic practices as "extremist" or "radical".

4.1.d Representing *minzu*.

Throughout the 1950's and 1960's, the Chinese State ordered one of the largest ethnological expeditions in human history, the Social History Research Investigation.[40] From this investigation of the country's newly designated *minzu* groups, a series of documents were written, detailing the concise histories, or *jianzhi,*[41] of each group (Mullaney, 2011). These *jianshi* were to act as the basis of the state's official narratives of each newly recognised *minzu*, detailing the groups' histories as far back as possible in an attempt to make their classifications seem natural, as if it had always been that way. Through publishing the *jianshi* series, two parallel processes were taking place. Firstly, new knowledge was being produced to legitimise the state's classification of *minzu*. Secondly, a process of "silencing the past" was being carried out, a deliberate attempt to remove the Classification from public memory (Trouillot, 1995). In contemporary times, the US Congressional-Executive Commission on China (2005a: 15) has shown that the CCP Government in Beijing has continued to tighten control over how minority groups and culture are represented, while undertaking propaganda campaigns on the role of minority groups in the multi-ethnic and united nation. These representations do more than simply provide a stereotypical version of minority groups. Rather, the practice of reducing minority groups to a set list of definable qualities – such as passive, exotic, backward, erotic and often feminine in the Chinese context – is vital in constructing Han identity, and by extension, national identity. The minority subjects are placed in a binary with the majoritarian Han population and their represented traits not only highlight their difference to the Han, but in so doing they establish a sense of identity and unity among the Han (Gladney, 2004: 52-53). In relation to the Hui, they are rarely portrayed as the

[40] 社会历史调查。
[41] 监视。

"model minority," exemplars of the eroticized, passive ideal and feminine docility (McCarthy, 2009: 130). Rather, their exoticism to non-Muslim Chinese presents them as the "familiar strangers" (Lipman, 1997).

Many minority groups and individuals are dissatisfied with how they have been represented in mainstream culture and in official discourses in China (Baranovitch, 2001: 359). This discontent with official depictions of *minzu* has political ramifications. As Zang (2015: 123) has pointed out, those minorities that are willing to accept the state's official depictions of their ethnic groups and histories are treated favourably. These groups are awarded more freedom to practice their cultures and religions, while others are confronted with government repression (Zang, 2015; Hansen, 2005; US Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2005). Generally speaking, the Hui are a group that have largely accepted government representations and as such, have enjoyed and benefited from religious and cultural freedoms that are disallowed to other groups, such as the Uyghur. Further, the representation and commodification of minority groups, their cultures and histories has become, in many ways, a development strategy. Many groups choose to accept, and indeed perform state-imposed narratives as a means to benefit from the growing trade of ethno-tourism in China. This trade has resulted in the establishment of nationality parks throughout China, aimed at showcasing the traditions and histories of minority people (McCarthy, 2009; Schein, 2000; Gladney, 2004; Litzinger, 2000). One prominent example of these parks is the expansive Zhonghua Huixiang Wenhua Yuan[42] outside of Yinchuan City in Ningxia which claims to showcase all aspects of the Hui nationality, their culture and their traditions (Figure 4.1).

[42] Eng: China Hui Nationality Cultural Park.

Figure 4.1: China Hui Nationality Park, 2017.
Source: Author's own (2017).

4.2 ISLAM IN CHINA: THE HUI.

Islam in China has a history of 1,400 years, dating back to the Tang Dynasty (617BCE-907CE) in the eight century (Lipman, 1997). Many Chinese scholars claim that prior to this in 651AD, after the Tang military's push westwards into Central Asia where they encountered the Arabian armies, the Caliph Uthman presented gifts to the Tang imperial court as a "prelude to the establishment of friendly relations with China" (Farah, 2003; Jones-Leaning and Pratt, 2012). Following the loss by the Tang armies to the Arab and Tibetan forces in 751AD, many Arabian and Persian merchants and traders came to China via the Silk Road to engage in commerce, before eventually settling in China and intermarrying with native people (Jones-Leaning and Pratt, 2012: 308; Zheng, 2010:160). Initially, these Muslim traders were concentrated along the overland trade route that passed from Persia, through China's north-western Xinjiang province and into its ancient inland cities, such as Xi'an and Louyang. Later, with the development of maritime trade routes, these foreign traders began to reside in port cities along China's south-eastern coast, such as Chang'an, Guangzhou, Hangzhou and Yangzhou. These Muslim traders, along with other foreigners in China at that time, were known as *Fanke,*[43] or foreign guests (Zheng, 2010).

[43] 番客。

Following the fall of the Song Dynasty (960-1279CE) to Mongol armies, the status of these Muslims and foreigners was to change in China. From the thirteenth century, under the rule of the religiously-tolerant Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368CE), significant numbers of Arabian, Persian and Central Asian merchants and mercenaries spread to eastern Chinese cities such as Beijing, bringing their religious beliefs with them. However, that is not to say that there were no Muslims in Beijing before the thirteenth century. There are in fact many local legends which suggest that Islam arrived to Beijing much earlier than the Yuan Dynasty, with one stone tablet engraving at the Niujie Mosque in Beijing claiming that the mosque's history dates back to the tenth century (Gladney, 2004: 181 and 370). Under Mongol rule, a four-class system was implemented in China which delineated society based on class. At the top of this system were the Mongols, followed by the *semuren*[44] – miscellaneous foreigners including Muslims – who occupied roles as administrators and merchants, thirdly the northern Chinese *hanren,*[45] and lastly the southern Chinese *nanren*[46] – who accounted for the majority of the population (Lipman, 1997; Schirokauer, 1989; Jones-Leaning and Pratt, 2012). By the Yuan Dynasty, the term "Hui"[47] or "Huihui"[48] was used as an umbrella term for all Muslims in China, specifically denoting their religious affiliation (Leslie, 1986: 195-6; Zheng, 2010: 161). The Chinese term "Huijiao"[49] was used to refer to Islam up until the mid-twentieth century, and to call oneself a "Huimin"[50] was to call oneself a Muslim (Gillette, 2000: 11). Interestingly, as Gladney (2004: 188) points out, the term "Hui" may also be seen to reference Islam's foreign ancestry as the word "Hui" can mean "to return", suggesting that Muslims were never at home in China and are destined to leave.

The collapse of the Yuan Dynasty and the establishment of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644CE) was to prove to be another turning point for China's Muslims. The Ming Dynasty is often noted for bringing about a renaissance of Chinese culture following years of Mongol rule. During this time, the status of Muslim groups in China changed as they gained a sense of permanence and an acknowledgement of their distinctive culture, shifting their status from "Muslims in China" to "Chinese Muslims" (Dillon, 1999; Leslie, 1986; Jones-Leaning and Pratt, 2012). The history of Islam in China during China's final

[44] 色目人。
[45] 汉人。
[46] 南人。
[47]回。
[48] 回回。
[49]回教。Eng: the religion of the Hui.
[50]回民。Eng: Hui person.

dynasty, the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), is characterized by political instability, rebellion and oppression, particularly in China's western regions of Yunnan, Xinjiang, Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia (Atwill, 1997; Jones-Leaning and Pratt, 2012). Most notable of these rebellions are perhaps the Panthay Rebellion in Yunnan (1855-1873), the Dungan Rebellion in Northwest China (1862-1878) and multiple bloody conflicts in Xinjiang (Hsü, 2000; Jones-Leaning and Pratt, 2012).

4.3 THE HUI:

Of the 56 nationalities currently recognised, ten are officially considered Islamic. These are Hui, Uyghur,[51] Kazakh,[52] Uzbek,[53] Kyrgyz,[54] Tajik,[55] Tatar,[56] Dongxiang,[57] Sala,[58] and Bao'an.[59] Together these ten nationalities account for more than 20 million people (Gladney, 2003). However, it is important to note that the actual number of Muslims in China is unknown as the Chinese census does not include a question on religious affiliation. Nine of these Islamic groups, excluding the Hui, are found almost exclusively in China's north-western "Quran Belt" region. This region includes the normal administrative provinces of Gansu and Qinghai, along with two "autonomous regions": Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.

Although the term Hui was previously used to demarcate all Muslim subjects in China, it will be used here to refer to the specific ethnic minority group as identified and registered by the Chinese State, rather than all Chinese Muslims. Despite being the second largest ethnic minority group in China today, the Hui have largely been ignored by Western academic research. Considered by many as too Islamic for Sinological studies, the Hui have also been overlooked by Islamic studies – seen as too assimilated to Chinese society. The Hui were among the first nationalities to be recognised by the Chinese state, receiving their first autonomous county in 1936, no doubt a political gesture of recompense for their earlier allegiance. Today, the Hui possess more autonomous administrative areas than any other minority group in China. They constitute the second

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[51]维族。
[52]哈萨克族。
[53]乌孜别克族。
[54]吉尔吉斯族。
[55]塔吉克族。
[56]塔塔尔族。
[57]东乡族。
[58]撒拉族。
[59]保安族。

most populous ethnic minority group and the largest Islamic nationality in China, accounting for almost half of the country's 20 million or more documented Islamic subjects (Huizu Jianshi Editorial Committee, 1978; Gladney, 2004). According to the 2011 Census, the number of Hui people in China exceeded 10.5 million people.

4.3.a Religion and the Hui.

Of the many traits and characteristics associated with the Hui, it is arguably their presumed religiosity and ancestral connections with foreign Muslim migrants that are most commonly believed to be their primary unifying qualities. However, Islam in China is not homogenous and as such, the Hui adhere to a spectrum of different religious beliefs and Islamic orders. This diversity is the result of a long history of reforms and Islamic movements, stemming from ongoing interaction with the Islamic world. Although the entire complexity of Islamic history in China will not be discussed here, a brief introduction to the various orders will be helpful in understanding religious diversity among the Hui and the impacts that this religious heterogeneity has had on Hui culture, identity and practices. The Asian studies scholar Joseph Fletcher (1986) was the first to argue that the varied nature of Islamic orders in China can be linked with "successive tides of influence" that entered China during important periods of exchange with the outside world (Gladney, 1996: 36). Specifically, Fletcher (1986) claimed that throughout history there had been three major tides of Islamic influences and movements in China, with Gladney (1996) building upon this to argue that in contemporary times we are on the cusp of a fourth tide.

4.3.a.i The First Tide.

The first tide that is believed to have occurred is "*Gedimu* Traditional Chinese Islam". As was discussed earlier, Islam first arrived to China with Arab, Persian, Mongolian and Central Asian Muslims between the seventh and fourteenth centuries. These Muslim settlers followed traditional Sunni Hanafi Islam (Feng, 1985) and they generally lived in independent communities centred around a mosque. Eventually, these communities became known as the *Gedimu*, a term originating from the Arabic word *qadîm* meaning "old". These isolated and disparate communities took the form of enclaves, surrounded by the majoritarian Han society and were mostly disconnected from each other, often only linked through trade and a belief in a common religious heritage. Despite being enclosed enclaves, the *Gedimu* generally accepted integration with traditional Chinese society and culture. Islamic education was valued by the *Gedimu* and communities were led by travelling imam (Gladney, 1996). Although these enclaved communities may still be found in cities such as Beijing and Xi'an, previously established communities have been virtually removed from many other urban areas due to the Socialist Transformation of Industry Campaign of the 1950s (Whyte and Parish, 1984). This decentralisation has resulted in the mosque no longer acting as the central locus of urban Hui social organisation (Gladney, 1996).

4.3.a.ii The Second Tide.

The second tide to have impacted on Chinese Islam was "*Sufi* Communities and National Networks". *Sufism* is not believed to have made significant impact in China until the late seventeenth century (Gladney, 1996), although some authors have shown the presence of *Sufi* mystics as far back as the fourteenth century (Jin, 1984). Many of these *Sufi* movements were built around Islamic schools that were established by descendants of early *Sufi* saintly leaders. Often, these movements developed religio-political and socioeconomic institutions. These institutions became known as *menhuan*, meaning the saintly descent groups, referring to the descent line of the original *Sufi* founder (Gladney, 1996; Ma and Wang, 1985; Jin, 1984). According to Fletcher (1986), between the eighteenth and early twentieth centuries a number of these "saintly lineages" developed in China's northwest, gradually replacing the old *Gedimu* pattern by linking together *menhuan* adherents across the region. This extending of social integration made it easier for the "saintly lineages" to harness the economic and political potential of China's Muslim population, thus contributing to the rise of Muslim warlordism in the Northwest in the early twentieth century (Fletcher, 1986; Gladney, 1996). The ability that these *Sufi* orders possess for uniting previously disconnected Hui communities is a major reason for their rapid proliferation during the turbulent eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Unlike the isolated *Gedimu* communities, *Sufi* orders provided modes of leadership and organisation that helped the Hui to survive economically and politically (Lipman, 1984). Unlike Sufi orders in other countries which allow simultaneous membership to multiple orders, Chinese *Sufi* Muslims generally maintain membership and allegiance to just one *menhuan* (Trimingham, 1971; Gladney, 1996). Despite the previously vast array of *menhuan* present in China, today only four *menhuan* hold significant influence on the Hui. Pickens (1942 in Gladney, 1996: 42) referred to these as the four *menhuan* of China following his missionary work in the Northwest of China. These four main *menhuan* are the *Qadiriyya*, *Khufiyya*, *Jahriyya* and *Kubrawiyya*.

Qadiriyya - The founder of *Qadiriyya Sufism*, Qi Jingyi, emphasised poverty, withdrawal from society and self-cultivation. He deemphasised formal Islamic ritual, specifically the "five pillars of Islam", instead advocating the importance of private meditation. By emphasising ascetic withdrawal, Qi Jingyi was advocating "an inner mystical journey where the dualism of Islam and the Chinese world is absolved through grasping the oneness of Allah found inside every believer" (Gladney, 1996: 62). This dualistic approach to the relationship between Islamic and Chinese traditions and beliefs is further seen in the characteristics of *Qadiriyya* Sufism. Specifically, the way in which new Islamic content infused with religious terminology familiar to the Hui, Daoist mystical concepts, Confucian moral tenets, and Buddhist folk rituals (Ma, 1983; Gladney, 1996).

Khufiyya and Jahriyya - Through the establishment of the *Khufiyya* and *Jahriyyamenhaun*, the *Naqshbanditarîqa* became the most influential in China. As Fletcher (in Lipman, 1995) argued, the history of *Naqshbandiyya* is the history of Chinese Islam from the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. Unlike the *Qadiriyya*, the leaders of *Naqshbandiyya* accepted donations from their followers, often amassing huge wealth. These leaders were also more committed to political and social change in accordance with their views of Islam and Islamic principles, further differentiating them from the withdrawn *Qadiriyya*. This led to some orders having more "transformationist" perspectives and agendas. This is particularly true for the *Jahriyya*, whose repeated conflicts with Chinese rule inevitably led them to be singled out for persecution. By contrast to the *Jahriyya*, the *Khufiyya* stressed personal internal reform over political change, thus seeking more "conformist solutions to local conflicts" (Gladney, 1996: 47). Although both orders of *Naqshbandiyya* advocated for greater active participation in society than *Qadiriyya* Sufism, they differ in relation to how this should be done and in their Islamic practices and ideals. The *Khufiyya* encouraged the veneration of saints and the silent *dhikr* ("rememberance", the *Khufiyya* are the "silent" ones) (Schimmel, 1975; Gladney, 1996). However, the *Jahriyya* emphasise vocal *dhikr* (the *jahr* in remembrance means "vocal", hence the name *Jahriyya* means the "vocal ones") and their founder, Ma Mingxin opposed the strong focus on the veneration of saints that had become extremely popular in China (Gladney, 1996: 49-50). Following the failed *Jahriyya* uprisings of the nineteenth century, the order become more disconnected and dispersed, eventually leading to the establishment of five main sub-branches: *Shagou*, *Banqiao*, *Nanchuan*, *Beishan* and *Xindianzi*, of which the *Shagou* and *Banqiao* are most influential today. Although the development of both *Jahriyya* and *Khufiyya Sufism* in China primarily occurred in the Northwest, both orders have expanded beyond the region and can be found throughout China, including in Beijing where they have both established mosques.

Kubrawiyya -The final major *menhaun* that is still operating within China is the *Kubrawiyya*. However, of the four *menhuan*, this is far less influential for Chinese Islam, specifically among the Hui and as such it will not be discussed.

4.3.a.iii The Third Tide.

The third tide of Islam in China has been characterised as "Scripturalist Concerns and Modernist Reforms" (Gladney, 1996). Beginning at the end of the Qing dynasty, this third tide occurred due to accelerated exchange between China and the outside world, specifically interactions with the Middle East resulting from returning Hui *hajji* (meaning people who have completed the Hajj pilgrimage). Fletcher (in Lipman, 1995) noted that in China, it was the more remote Muslim communities that were most strongly influenced by the recent Islamic trends and movements occurring in the Middle East. Resulting from emerging foreign Muslim ideas and Chinese political events, numerous new Hui organisations were established during this time, such as the Chinese Muslim Federation[60] and the Chinese Muslim Mutual Progress Association[61] to name but two. During this period, a proliferation of Muslim publications also occurred to greater extents than ever before with more than 100 periodicals being published before the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 (Löwenthal, 1940). These events took place during what Ma (1989) has termed the "New Awakening of the Hui at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries," whereby Hui intellectuals were inspired by nationalism and overseas trips to question their identities, initiate reforms and engage in the contested space between Chinese culture and Islamic ideals.

Influenced by fundamentalist *Wahhabi* ideals encountered in the Middle East, Hui reformers introduced the Ikwan Muslim Brotherhood to China (Gladney, 1996: 55).

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[60] Established in Nanjing in 1912.
[61] Established in Beijing in 1912.

Unlike the fundamentalist and anti-modern depictions of the Muslim Brotherhood in other countries, the movement was not portrayed as such in China. As Lipman (1994) has noted, the fundamentalist and revivalist *Wahhabi*-inspired aspirations of returning Chinese pilgrims "was transformed into a nationalist, modernist, anti-Sufi solidarity group which advocated not only Muslim unity but Chinese national strength and consciousness". Eventually these returning Hui became known as *Yihewani* (Chinese for the Ikhwan al-Muslimin) (Gladney, 1996). Religious scripturalist orthodoxy was of upmost importance to these reformers to such an extent that many continue to refer to them as the *zunjingpai* or "venerate-the-scriptures fraction" (Lipman, 1994; Ma, 1983; Ma, 1982; Mian, 1981). In stark opposition to *Sufism*, the *Yihewani* denounced and forbade the veneration of saints and their tombs and shrines, while also attempting to curb the increasing influence of famous *Sufi menhuan* leaders and imam. Similarly to the *Gedimu*, and in contrast to the *Sufi* orders, the *Yihewani* believe in leadership through Islamic education and training, not inheritance. Advocating a purely non-Chinese Islam, the *Yihewani* were staunchly opposed to the integration of Chinese cultural traditions into Islamic practices and mosques, arguing for the removal of Chinese texts from mosques. The architecture of *Yihewani* mosques is modelled after the Arabian-style and features white walls, no inscriptions and a lack of adornments (Figure 4.2). This is in direct contrast to the Chinese style mosques of the traditional *Gedimu* which resemble Confucian temples, such as Niujie Mosque in Beijing (Figure 4.3). Also, the proscribing of mosques being adorned with Chinese or Arabic texts is strikingly different from *Sufi* mosques, whose walls often carry unique Hui art and calligraphy (Gladney, 1996). Another movement arising from the "third tide" is the *Xi Dao Tang*. However, as with *Kubrawiyya Sufism*, the influence of this movement within China is quite small and its relevance to the Hui is limited. Therefore, it will not be discussed here.

Figure 4.2: Yihewani mosque, Beijing.
Source: Author's own (2016).

Figure 4.3: Niujie Mosque, Beijing.
Source: Author's own (2015).

Although the exact number of Hui who maintain membership to these various Islamic associations is unknown, Ma Tong's (1983) pioneering work "Zhongguo Yisilanjiao Paiyu Menhuan Zhidu Shilue" provides one of the most comprehensive accounts. Of the 6,781,500 Hui individuals recorded by Ma, 58.2% were *Gedimu*, 21% were *Yihewani*, 10.9% were *Jahriyya*, 7.2% were *Khufiyya*, 1.4% were *Qadiriyya*, 0.5% were *Xidaotang*, and 0.7% were *Kubrawiyya*. Dru C. Gladney (1996) then builds upon Ma's statistics, while also drawing from several other sources, to provide estimated figures for Hui membership of these Islamic orders. According to Gladney, the approximate number of adherents to the various orders is as follows: *Gedimu* 4,000,000; *Yihewani* 1,500,000; *Qadariyya* 100,000; *Khufiyya* 491,500; *Jahriyya* 740,000; *Kubrawiyya* 20,000; *Xidaotang* 10,000. Given the range of Islamic orders that the Hui maintain membership to today, and the ideological and practical differences between them, it is clear that religion is not a homogenous, static and unifying trait for Hui in modern China. This religious heterogeneity is made even more apparent when one considers that many Hui today are not practicing Muslims, as was evident from the field research and which will be discussed in the following chapter.

4.3.b A Common Territory?

In light of the religious diversity evident among Hui today, it is perhaps helpful to apply Stalin's (1953) four-point criteria to the group when attempting to understand their current classification as an ethnic, rather than religious, group. That is to say, the need for a common territory, a common language, a common economic life, and a common psychological make-up manifested in common specific features of national culture" (Stalin, 1953; Gladney, 2006; Zang, 2015). Unlike the other nine Islamic groups, the Hui are not geographically confined to China's north-western territories and can be found throughout China (Figure 4.4). Having said that, the Northwest is home to substantial numbers of Hui, particularly in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region where they comprise one third of the population. Traditionally, they have been concentrated in historic port cities such as Guangzhou, or along historic trade routes leading from Western China into China proper. The Hui are the most widespread minority group in China and according to the 1982 census, they could be found in 2,308 of 2,372 cities and counties across China, inhabiting every region and province. Aside from in Ningxia, the Hui usually constitute a small percentage of the population in the areas where they live. However, in Han-dominated areas they are often the vast majority of the minority population. This is particularly true for urban contexts as the Hui are

China’s most urbanised minority group, making up the bulk of the minority population in every Chinese city, with the exception of cities in Tibet, Inner-Mongolia and Xinjiang (Gladney, 1996: 27 and 171). It should be noted at this point that these statistics are more than 30 years old, an unfortunate necessity as I was unable to source more recent census statistics on the distribution of the Hui during the research process.

The widespread distribution of the Hui is likely due to a number of reasons. Broomhall (1910) and Ekvall (1939) argued in their pioneering works that Hui people often add a spiritual significance to pilgrimage, both to Mecca and also to other religious sites and tombs. As such, they believe that the Hui value travel more than the Han, who have traditionally been tied to place due to strong Confucian and religious ties to kin and ancestry. Admittedly, there is a flaw in this comparison, which is that the Han have also traditionally had a strong history of migration – one simply needs to take into account the Chinese Diaspora to see that. This is especially true in contemporary times as advancements in transport have allowed for mass movements of the Chinese populace as a whole, and the lessening of distinctions between the migratory practices of Hui and Han. However, such an argument against Broomhall and Ekvall’s comparison is rather irrelevant at this point. What is important however is that the cultural and spiritual links between Hui people and pilgrimage is taken into consideration, and that such existing popular perceptions about the Hui are taken into account. In addition to these ties, stereotypes of Hui occupations may also shed some light on why the group are so widely distributed. Although no doubt embellished with popular perception, historic accounts have shown that there is a significant amount of truth in the traditional association between Hui people and the role of long-distance tradesmen and soldiers. By the end of the Song Dynasty, Hui merchants had become a well-established part of the social and economic world of Chinese cities that were connected with international trade routes (Lipman, 1997; Caffrey, 2004). These historic roles of Hui people as merchants and mercenaries throughout several dynasties is likely to be a major contributing factor to the widespread distribution of the Hui.



Figure 4.4: Distribution of main Hui centres in China showing populations in excess of 1,000 individuals.

Source: Pray4Hui.com (2018).

4.3.c A Common Language?

In addition to being China's most widespread minority group, the Hui are also the only minority group not to possess their own, shared language – except for groups like the Manchu, whose native language has now gone out of use. As a result, the Hui generally speak the dominant local dialects in the areas that they live. Across China, the Hui predominantly speak Han dialects, although some communities do speak Tibetan, Mongolian and the languages of the Bai and Dai people, among others. On Hainan Island, there is a group of people classified as Hui who actually speak their own Malayo-Austronesian tongue. Despite their linguistic difference from other Hui people, these Hainan Hui have not been recognised as a separate ethnicity, nor can their tongue be considered a shared language for the Hui more broadly due to its confines among Hainan Hui. Among Chinese scholars, many argue that groups such as the Hui do in fact meet Stalin's linguistic requirements for achieving nationality status if the criteria are applied in an historical sense. Many of these scholars claim that the Hui once spoke their own distinct language, separate from the Han, inherited from their foreign ancestors. However, the Hui's foreign ancestors did not in fact speak a single language – they spoke Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Mongolian. Furthermore, there is no proof that these languages were inherited by their Hui descendants past the Ming Dynasty. Therefore, even if applied historically, the Hui fail to meet Stalin's requirement for a common language. Interestingly, many Hui people across China use certain Arabic and Persian phrases and loan words. This is commonly referred to as *HuiHuiHua.*[62] These non-Han phrases are common across the Islamic world and include terms such as *ahong*[63] (from Persian *ahung* meaning imam), and the names of certain Islamic orders. As *HuiHuiHua* consists of Arabic and Persian words, it is likely that its roots lie in the foreign ancestry of the Hui people, while also being influenced by today's growing international networks and the religious significance and usage of these terms. Although such words and expressions are important signifiers of Hui identity, they by no means constitute a distinct language (Gladney, 1996).

This linguistic and geographical similarity to the Han has resulted in the Hui being referred to as the "Chinese Muslims" in much of the existing literature (Israeli, 1978). Furthermore, their lack of shared language, territory and uniformity of customs has led

[62] 回回话。
[63] 阿訇。

many to consider the Hui as a none-of-the-above or a catchall category: comprising of the Chinese Muslims that the Government considered too distinct from the other nine Muslim groups, yet not distinct enough to warrant their own nationality (Stewart, 2009). It is important here to remember the amalgamation of groups that occurred during China's ethnic classification program, whereby different self-identifying groups were classified under one ethnic title for political expediency (Mullaney, 2011).

4.3.d A Common Economic Life?

Despite lacking the distinct language and easily demarcated territory necessary to qualify for Stalin's model of nationalities, the Hui are often believed to possess the other two criteria to varying degrees. However, debate remains as to whether the Hui's diverse economic life and national culture are sufficiently uniform to be classified as shared features. Even though the Hui constitute only a small percentage of China's overall population, they have been known to traditionally dominate certain industries and trades. As was mentioned above, the Hui have stereotypically been portrayed as long-distance tradesmen and soldiers, a belief whose roots stem from the very origins of Islam in China. This historical truth has led to the popular perception of the Hui as being rural, nomadic people from China's north-western territories – a perception that is seemingly blind to the Hui's status as China's most urbanised and widespread ethnic minority group. Although the Hui are broadly associated with the roles of tradesmen and soldiers, Gladney (1996: 30-32 and 195) states that most urban Hui are employed in common labour and industry. In fact, according to the 1982 census, 29% of all Hui were in occupations of commerce, service, trade and transport, more than any other ethnic group in China, including the Han. Gladney's revealing study of a Hui ethnic enclave in Beijing pointed out several specialisations that the Hui in the city's Niujie neighbourhood – and in all other cities and towns - have become known for. Specifically, they are known for butchering lamb and beef, running small restaurants, carving stones and jewellery, tanning leather, processing wool, and cobbling shoes. Outside of the urban centres, the Hui are primarily engaged in agriculture, most notably wheat and rice agriculture. Throughout history, the Hui have occupied a variety of other economic niches, largely due to their Islamic restrictions in hygiene and diet, including roles such as restauranteur, butcher, innkeeper, jeweller, interpreter, clergyman, shepherd, cavalryman, caravaneer, tanner and tea trader (Gladney, 1996: 30). As such, it is clear to see that despite being known for certain specialisations and crafts, the economic and occupational situation of the Hui is just as diverse as that of the Han, casting doubt on the government's claims of a shared economic life among the group.

4.4 CONCLUSION: A COMMON PSYCHOLOGICAL MAKE-UP MANIFESTED IN COMMON SPECIFIC FEATURES OF NATIONAL CULTURE?

Throughout this chapter, the historical and political context of the Hui was explored with specific reference to Chinese conceptualisations of ethnicity. Specifically, it was argued that Chinese understandings of nationalism are central to how the CCP views ethnicity, influenced largely by Liang Qichao's (1935; 1999) concepts of "big nationalism" and "small nationalism". The "Classification" project of the 1950s was then examined, demonstrating how the classification team employed a vague and shifting interpretation of Stalin's (1935) criteria for ethnic classification to identify distinct ethnic minority groups across China, including 10 Islamic groups. Yet, as was shown in Section 4.3, the Hui failed to meet three of Stalin's four criteria for ethnic classification: that is to say a common language, a common territory, and a common economic life.

A question remains then as to whether or not the Hui meet the final criteria for consideration, which is the existence of a common psychological make-up manifested in common specific features of national culture. Once again, the extent to which the Hui meet this criterion is contested. Popular and political representations of the Hui continue to portray them as possessing a unified, shared culture by continually reproducing stereotypes of the Hui that stem from the Government's Social History Research Investigation in the 1950s and 1960s. These representations generally focus on the Hui's presumed religious worshiping practices, traditional dress and grooming habits, and their food culture: all of which are traditionally influenced by Islam. However, as one might expect given the Hui's religious heterogeneity and their status as the most geographically diverse minority, Hui culture and cultural practices are significantly varied, as will be discussed in the following chapter. This factor has resulted in many believing that the Hui do not in fact possess a common culture or psychological make-up, stating that they were simply grouped together for political expediency (Caffrey, 2004: 257). Further, Hui culture often reflects the cultural practices of the majoritarian (mostly Han) populations with whom they cohabitate, similar to the discussion above concerning language. As such, it has been argued that the Hui have been already acculturated to Han society (Zang, 2015: 9), suggesting that they not only lack a common culture, but that their culture is in fact not distinct from Han culture, including by the PRC's Premier Zhou Enlai in 1957 (He, 2003: 226; Leibold, 2008: 113-175; Zhu, 2012). Some authors, such as Banister (1984: 316), have subsequently claimed that the only distinction between the Hui and the Han is their religion. This physical, linguistic and cultural invisibility of the Hui has led to a questioning of Hui ethnicity. In "China and Its National Minorities" Thomas Heberer (1989: 73) claims that the Hui are "not ethnically and linguistically different from the Han". Similarly, Naquin and Rawski (1987: 128) state that the Hui are in fact part of the Han group, similar to the Hakka people. Although these claims seem appealing when attempting to explain the similarities shared between the two groups, they are failing to take into account the significance of the notion of *Qingzhen* to the Hui people and the central role that it plays in shaping their lives. As Gladney (1996: 6) writes, the concept of *Qingzhen* has become a "sacred symbol" marking Hui identity in China, drawing from the work of Clifford Geertz (1968:79).

This "sacred symbol" is, I believe, the cornerstone of Hui culture evident in Beijing today. While Gladney's (1996) influential book "Muslim Chinese" explored the myriad of ways in which *Qingzhen* has impacted on the lives and ethno-religious identities of various Hui communities across China, the following chapter will argue that within the Beijing context, it is the manner in which *Qingzhen* has influenced and shaped the Hui's food cultures that is the defining feature of Hui culture there and the most salient performance of Hui ethnic identity today. Specifically, it will be shown that Hui food culture in Beijing draws heavily from the group's diffuse attachments to places, while also being influenced by their individual emplacements and subsequent experiences within contemporary Beijing.

CHAPTER 5: HUI IDENTITY, FOOD CULTURES AND *QINGZHEN*.

In *Muslim Chinese*, Gladney (1996) explored the myriad of ways in which *Qingzhen* has impacted on the lives and ethno-religious identities of various Hui communities across China. This chapter proposes that, at least for Beijing, it is now the manner in which *Qingzhen* has influenced and shaped food cultures that is the defining and most salient performance of Hui ethnic identity today. Here, Hui food cultures and local understandings of *Qingzhen* are mutually dependent and in turn are co-constitutive of Hui identity (see Figure 5.5). This triad of Hui identity is expressed in many ways and five will be outlined below: religion, “small” nationalism/ethnicity, “big” nationalism/state nationalism, cleanliness, and place. The connections drawn here between domestic space and the commercial space of a restaurant around issues of cleanliness and the expression of religious practice unsettle once again the binary of public and private that Feminist Political Geography has done so much to trouble (see section 2.1.d above). Importantly for this thesis, this chapter argues that Hui food culture, identity and understandings of *Qingzhen* in Beijing draw heavily from the group’s diffuse attachments to places, something that will then form a conceptual foundation for, and act as a pathway into, chapters 6 and 7.

The chapter begins with a review of the elements of cultural expression that have been highlighted as elements of Hui identity. I find that some features that derive explicitly from a Muslim tradition, such as long beards, headscarves, caps, and gender roles within marriage are viewed by at least many younger Hui as no longer essential markers of Hui identity. However, other features, particularly around the treatment of food are affirmed as foundational. The chapter examines the relations between Halal and *Qingzhen* as disciplines of food making and consumption and finds here the fundamental core of Hui cultural expression, the Sinocisation of a Muslim heritage. The second half of the chapter takes this further and uses the triad of food culture, *Qingzhen*, and Hui identity to examine themes of religion, ethnicity, nationalism, cleanliness and place.

5.1 A COMMON PSYCHOLOGICAL MAKE-UP MANIFESTED IN COMMON SPECIFIC FEATURES OF NATIONAL CULTURE?

Stalin's (1953) final criteria for consideration as an ethnic group is the existence of a shared mentality manifested in common specific features of national culture. Once again, the extent to which the Hui meet this criterion is contested. As one might expect given their status as the most geographically diverse minority, Hui culture and cultural practices are hugely varied. This factor has led many to conclude that the Hui do not in fact possess a common culture or psychological make-up; that indeed they were simply grouped together for political expediency (Caffrey, 2004: 257). Further, Hui culture often reflects the cultural practices of the majoritarian (mostly Han) populations with whom they cohabitate, similar to the earlier discussion concerning language. As such, it has been argued that the Hui have been already acculturated to Han society (Zang, 2015: 9). Yet, a compelling case exists for arguing that the Hui do possess some distinctive qualities that are common across China. Specifically, the religious beliefs of the Hui have resulted in the evolution of certain cultural traits that are clearly distinct from those of Han people.

5.1.a Traditional Dress and Embodied Religious Grooming Practices

Traditionally, the Hui are believed to have been easily differentiated from the Han by their choice of clothing and characteristic long beards (Figure 5.1). As Gladney (1996: 24) has noted, many Hui men, particularly in the northwest of China, regard the cultivation of beards as a duty of Islam, allowing them to grow as long as possible while keeping them meticulously clean. Although this practice of physical demarcation could be seen in some of the cities visited for this research (especially in Yinchuan, Xi'an and Hohhot), it was generally more evident among older men and in Hui enclaves surrounding mosques. Within the Beijing context, it was quite rare to meet someone with a long beard. As one young male from Shandong told me in Beijing's central Chaoyang District, the cultivating of long beards is not a practice that many Hui continue to do, "especially not in Beijing."[64] According to this man, the practice is rarely found outside of Xinjiang. Similar to this man's suggestions that the practice is largely confined to history or to Xinjiang Province, other participants also mentioned temporal and geographical variation when asked about the stereotype of bearded Hui

[64] 尤其不在北京。

men. For some, the practice of growing a long beard is a distinctly north-western custom and is not a unifying trait shared across China, despite the stereotypes present in popular and political discourses. One view that is perhaps most representative of this is that of a middle-aged Beijing native who refuted the popular imagery displayed in the media and claimed that such practices are not representative of the Hui as a whole, but rather are only true of some Hui originating from north-western regions: “Beijing Hui don’t do it, only Northwestern Hui do it.”[65]

However, for many others these cultural practices are in fact shared traditions among all Hui and their prevalence in the Northwest is due to there being a larger concentration of Hui and other Islamic groups there, and because that area of China is home to more conservative communities. Many respondents also linked the geographical differences to the differing levels of modernisation between Beijing and north-western provinces. As one Qinghai-native man told me, “the difference is because here [Beijing] is a modern city, it is like Shanghai or the West. In those cities, traditions are not so important, [they] do not help people. But my hometown is not modern. My hometown is backwards, its people [are] *fengjian.*”[66] Modernisation was also used to explain generational differences and as a way to explain why bearded men are usually of an older generation. One view that continuously emerged was that younger people had embraced modernity and were more heavily influenced by Han and foreign cultures and ideas, thus choosing to have a more “modern” appearance. As one 30-year-old Gansu man told me, young people are children of modern China who want to “break free from tradition.”[67] Given the huge differences and disparities among the Hui discussed earlier, it is perhaps unsurprising then to find such differing views of cultural practices such as the cultivating of the Hui’s stereotypical long beards.

The movement away from cultivating long beards and the branding of the practice as a north-western, specifically Xinjiang, one is even more intriguing when one considers the precarious geopolitical specificities of Islam in China under the Global War on Terror, as discussed in Chapter 1. According to reports (Amnesty International, 2019; BBC, 2017b and 2019b; Reuters, 2017), the growing of long beards is now categorised as a “sign of extremism” in many parts of Xinjiang, given its association with religious

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[65] 北京回民不做，只就是西北回民。

[66]封建 Eng: Feudal - This section of the conversation took place in English at the request of the participant.

[67]摆脱传统。

practice. As such, men that choose to grow long beards often face disciplinary ramifications in cities, towns and villages across the province. According to one BBC report (2019b), the "banning" of long beards has resulted in a steep decline in the number of men visibly growing long beards in the north-western province. Although such a ban is not enforced in Beijing City, it may yet hold sway over Beijing's Hui population, especially given the fact that many of this project's participants came from China's Northwest region.

Figure 5.1: Bearded Hui man in Xi'an.
Source: Author's own (2017).

In addition to growing long beards, men are usually portrayed wearing white rounded caps on their heads, similar to the *taqiyah* seen across the Islamic world, while women wear headscarves, *hijabs*, or *gaitou* (Wang, 2015; Gladney, 1996: 140). Hui men and women across China do often wear such headdresses (Figure 5.2), particularly when attending mosque or during prayer time. Once again, this is especially true for those living in Northwest China, for older Hui, or for more religiously conservative individuals. However, not all Hui people choose to wear the traditional headwear, with many foregoing them as backwards or unmodern. This has been particularly true for young urban Hui in Beijing, although Wang (2015) suggests that in recent times the number of urban Hui women choosing to cover their heads is increasing. However, despite differences in people's decisions to wear such headdresses, their significance and relevance to Hui culture is not as disputed as the growing of beards. Such caps, *gaitou*, *hijabs* and headscarves are seen as being a shared tradition across China and a symbol of Hui culture. As such, stereotypes and images which represent the Hui wearing these items are not quite as divisive among Beijing Hui, although some participants did mention that such representations were perhaps outdated.

Figure 5.2: Hui traditional headwear in Xi'an.
Source: Author's own (2017).

Similar to common perceptions of the Hui's traditional headwear, the Hui are also occasionally represented as wearing all white clothing, further distinguishing them from the Han (Figure 5.3). Although there is a certain amount of truth in these depictions of Hui clothing, they are by no means all encompassing. The all white clothing often associated with the Hui is generally only worn by men when attending mosque, during prayer time, or during times of Islamic festivals and celebration. In urban centres such as Beijing this is particularly true. Once again, the universality of this cultural practice was questioned by some participants who claimed that such clothing was only worn by particularly religious individuals and was not adhered to by all Hui, even some of those attending mosques. According to several participants, the practice of wearing all white clothing is now largely limited to elderly males. This is even true for some of those participants that come from rural areas of China's north-western provinces, once again drawing doubt on the universality and commonality of this "shared" cultural trait. It also exposes a generational difference among the Hui, similar to the theme of modernity discussed in relation to the cultivation of beards and wearing of traditional headdresses; whereby wearing all white clothing is seen as unmodern and therefore not favoured by younger Hui. Further, many people explained that the white clothing is purely related to religion and is a symbol of devotion to Islam, similar to white clothing worn by Muslims in other countries. As such, some Hui in Beijing viewed these religious garments as being unrepresentative of, and unrelated to, Hui identity and cultural practices, with many referencing the differences between the labels of Hui and Muslim. While for others, the association of white clothing with Islam is in fact the quality that establishes them as a cultural symbol of Hui identity.

Figure 5.3: Hui man wearing all white clothing at mosque in Xi'an.
Source: Author's own (2017).

With the exception of certain restaurant employees, select mosque attendees, visitors at tourist sites and some residents of ethnic enclaves, traditionally dressed Hui are quite a rarity in Beijing. Even amongst restaurant employees, who are often encouraged (and indeed expected) to perform certain ethnic stereotypes, there are varying levels of commitment to their "traditional" dress. Among these workers, the decision to wear the headdress is arguably tied not only to religiosity, but also to various other obligations. In some instances, this obligation was often a familial one, rather than being directly tied to personal religious affiliation, with one young waitress explaining that she wore a headscarf at the request of her father. For some others, their employers compelled them to wear headscarf or cap (Figure 5.4). As one devoutly Muslim manager said when asked if the employees had to wear the traditional dress; "Yes. Look at these girls, they are Huizu. This is what they wear. They have to."[68] Interestingly, despite this manager's insistance that the bulk of his staff should dress conservatively, management staff were exempt from the rule. Neither the manager, the two male supervisors nor the female member of management wore the traditional headdress sported by the waiting and kitchen staff. This exemption from the uniform, I believe, exposes a quite interesting power dimension whereby the lower ranking staff were forced to perform the role of a stereotypical "Hui" for the customers, while management were allowed to dress in a fashion more akin to the broader populace, perhaps indicating a desire by management to be taken seriously by the restaurant's non-Hui patrons. When asked why he didn't wear the uniform, the manager explained "because I am [the] manager, so I need not wear these clothes. [It's] Not professional."[69]

[68]This section of the conversation took place in English at the request of the participant.
[69]This section of the conversation took place in English at the request of the participant.

Figure 5.4: Traditional dress in chain restaurant in Beijing.
Source: Author's own (2015).

The manager's preference for traditional dress was shared by some employees. When speaking with three young female staff members from Gansu Province regarding their clothing in January 2016, they explained that they chose to wear headscarves not because it was part of their asigned uniforms but because it was prescribed in the Qur'an. This personal decision and religious commitment to wearing traditional and modest dress, as opposed to managerial or parental enforcement, was common among many Hui women that participated in this project. Often, I would be told by female participants that they chose to wear the headscarf because they felt as though it was their religious duty and obligation. For many of them, the headscarf was a symbol of their personal commitment to Islam, a link between themselves and God. One elderly woman described her headscarf as a symbol of her devotion to God and her commitment to following God's will and the teachings of the Qur'an, a desire that was echoed by several other participants. Other participants explained that they felt obliged to wear the headscarf due to societal pressures or expectations stemming from its cultural connotations. As was explained to me several times by participants, the headscarf and white caps made their status as Hui visible to others, something which they felt was important. These societal and cultural pressures also have a geographical element to them, with some participants referencing geographical or place-based differences in the need to wear traditional headdresses. During a conversation with two female street food vendors they explained to me that their choice to wear the headscarf was a personal one and that they had to wear headscarves because "we are Muslim, we are north-western people."[70] These geographical dimensions were elaborated on further by others, including a young Hui man who explained that in his north-western hometown he felt a greater pressure to wear the white cap than in Beijing where wearing the cap was not considered to be as important.

Interestingly, many of the respondents' explanations for choosing to wear headdresses of various kinds involved the presence of external pressures or expectations. Specifically, these were parental and familial pressures, managerial and work-related requirements, societal expectations, and religious obligations and commitments. Within each of these, there was a strong gender dynamic, as women more often reported feeling a greater pressure to conform to traditional dress codes than was reported by men. Further, the pressure to conform to traditional dress often stemmed from male figures of power (fathers, managers, husbands, brothers, male co-workers). In some restaurants, this gendered dimension was clearly visible as the uniforms for women employees included the headscarf, while the male employees were not expected to wear white caps. In many of these cases, religion once again played a role with management referencing the gendered aspects of Islamic dress. When asked to explain this gendered difference, one male manager explained that women were expected to wear the headscarf because it is instructed by Qur'anic teachings, whereas the Qur'an does not say that men should wear the white caps.

Although many participants did discuss their decisions to wear headdresses within the context of external pressures, some participants offered counter-narratives to this. For some, the decision to wear traditional headwear was solely down to personal choice and was often linked with themes of empowerment and pride. Some participants explained that for them, traditional headdresses and clothing were symbolic of their ethnic difference to the Han, something which many of them prided themselves on. One middle aged male baker from Beijing summed this view up quite succinctly when he

[70]我们是穆斯林，我们是西北人。

explained that he wore the cap because he wanted people to see that, "I am a Hui, not a Han, not a Manchu nor a Mongol. I am Hui."[71]

5.1.b Religious Practice and Family Structure

As with their traditional dress, embodied cleanliness and the cultivating of beards, other aspects of Hui culture are also influenced by Islamic beliefs, specifically the need to attend mosque and its impact on family structure and life. Despite efforts being made by most Beijing mosques to include women by providing separate prayer halls or spaces for them, as with elsewhere in China, there is often a gender imbalance of mosque attendees. In some areas of China, there are women's mosques which are led by female *ahong* and cater solely to Hui Muslim women in an effort to make attending mosque for prayer more appealing and accessible for women. Some of these women's mosques are centuries old (Jaschok, 2012; Jaschok and Shui, 2000). Yet, there is a notable difference between the number of men and women attending mosques, something which was very apparent in all cities visited during this project's fieldtrips and which was mentioned by several participants, including the *ahong* of a Beijing mosque. One explanation for this is the inherently gendered roles of Islamic practices which prioritise male participation. This has helped to shape the traditional gender roles within the Hui family structure and organisation. As one elderly Ningxia-native woman informed me in her small restaurant in Beijing, attending mosque is traditionally considered to be the "duty"[72] of men, while women are expected to "care for their families."[73] She went on to explain that this division of duties based on gender was how men and women cared for their families together: i.e. the women cared for their families' practical needs while the men attended to their spiritual and religious obligations. However, once again this practice is no longer universal among the Hui, with several interviewees in Beijing explaining that family life has changed over time, especially in cities.

Many informants linked the changing gender roles within the family unit to China's modernisation and the demands on both parents to work; something which they claimed was the case for all Chinese people, not merely the Hui. For some, this change was seen as being a negative consequence of modern China, disrupting the family structure and

[71]我是回族。不是汉族，不是满足，也不是蒙古族。我是回族。
[72] 义务。
[73] 照顾家人。

preventing both men and women from carrying out their traditional roles as parents and as heads of their households. Further, some argued that the demands of modernisation were placing the practical needs of life in Beijing in opposition to their spiritual duties and traditional beliefs, with many men complaining that they felt as though they were making spiritual and religious sacrifices in order to work and survive. For others, however, this change was welcomed. As one young mother explained, many women now seek the independence offered to them by working outside of the family home and as such, they are increasingly choosing to join the workforce: "women want independence now, so we work."[74] According to this woman, this shift is a relatively recent one and is only made available by the diminishing role that tradition and religion are playing in the lives of Hui living in Beijing. This theme of changing gender roles and women's involvement in the workforce will be explored further in Chapter 7.

5.1.c Qingzhen and its Cultural Significance

Given the diversity of these cultural practices, and the varying degrees in which people perform and adhere to them, it is perhaps unsurprising that so many scholars have questioned the existence of a shared culture among the Hui and the extent to which the group meets Stalin's (1957) fourth criteria for ethnic classification. Yet, the Hui do possess some shared commonalities that may be considered as cultural traits. Specifically, the words *Qing* (清 - Pure) and *Zhen* (真 - True) are of importance here. Or rather, it is their compounding into *Qingzhen* (清真 - Pure and True) that holds the most significance. When carrying out field work in Beijing, I noticed that these characters usually signalled the presence of the Hui, Hui products or Hui spaces, such as mosques, restaurants, cafes, bakeries, butcheries, markets, food wrappers, literary works, etc.; although it is also used by other Islamic minority groups including the Uyghur, Kazakh and indeed foreign Muslims in China. The term *Qingzhen* is often translated as meaning Halal, however it exceeds such simplistic definitions (as will be discussed below). The significance of the concept to the Hui is so great that Gladney (1996) has argued that it has become a "sacred symbol" – borrowing from Geertz (1968) – marking Hui identity, while acting as a cornerstone of their shared cultural and ethno-national practices and identifications.

[74] 女人现在要独立，所以我们工作。

In his landmark study *Muslim Chinese*, Gladney (1996) conducted fieldwork in four distinct Hui communities across China: Na Homestead in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Niujie (Oxen Street) in Beijing, a suburban village called Changying east of Beijing (now a part of Beijing's Chaoyang District), and a Hui community in Southeast China. He contended that Hui identity was centred on the belief that the Hui were descendants of foreign Muslims. Further, he noted that across these different social settings, the ethno-religious expressions of identity differed, as did their cultural practices. These expressions of Hui identity and local understandings of *Qingzhen* varied as they were adapted and altered to fit with their social contexts. As such, prominent cultural symbols such as the pork taboo, religious rituals, endogamy, genealogy and occupational specialisation varied depending on their understandings of *Qingzhen*. Further, they became salient for each community when expressing their ancestral heritage. Specifically, Gladney points out a rather interesting geographical dimension to his findings of the importance of these cultural symbols. For the Na Homestead community in Ningxia, religious rituals were of particular importance, while for south-eastern Hui genealogy was of upmost significance. For the Hui of Changying, endogamy was the most salient way in which the Hui adhered to a *Qingzhen* lifestyle, while for Beijing Hui, occupational specialisations, and most importantly, the avoidance of pork, were how they expressed their Hui identity.

Although having been originally written nearly 30 years ago (with a revised version published in 1996) following fieldwork carried out in the late 1980s, it is arguable that Gladney's thesis that *Qingzhen* is central to Hui cultural practices and identity still rings true today for Beijing Hui. However, as one might expect given the almost 30-year period since the research was conducted, a great deal has changed in relation to the cultural importance of *Qingzhen* and its manifestations through cultural practices in Beijing. Firstly, within the context of contemporary Beijing, this research refutes the notion that Hui invariably ground their identity in the notion of descent from foreign Muslim ancestors. Rather, participants in this research project offered a greater array of definitions and understandings of Hui identity, which will be discussed in further detail in a later section. Secondly, Gladney's geographical distinctions between the differing levels of importance associated with cultural practices and understandings of *Qingzhen* are perhaps no longer as clear-cut as they were. Rather, within Beijing (including Changying), respondents did not merely reference occupational specialisations, endogamy and food taboos as being important cultural practices for maintaining

Qingzhen lifestyles. In fact, fewer participants discussed occupational specialisations or endogamy than those who mentioned genealogy and religious rituals, or indeed, other practices. This diversification of cultural practices is unsurprising when we consider Beijing's huge development over the past three decades, its role as an epicentre of internal Chinese migration, and the diverse backgrounds and places of origin of this project's research participants. Thirdly, as Beijing's urban sprawl spread over the past 30 years, Changying Village has become a neighbourhood of urban Chaoyang District, rather than a suburban village. As such, it is perhaps unsurprising that residents' understandings of *Qingzhen* and the importance that they've attached to its associated cultural practices does not vary noticeably from those of other areas in Beijing. This is representative perhaps of assimilation into the broader Beijing Hui culture as the village became further connected and enmeshed within Beijing's urbanity. Lastly, of the two cultural symbols that Gladney identified as being important for Beijing Hui, the pork taboo is unquestionably still an important practice for Hui today. However, rather than focusing solely on the avoidance of pork, most participants referred to the Hui's distinctive food culture more broadly when discussing their understandings and interpretations of *Qingzhen*, Hui identity, and Hui culture. Therefore, although Gladney's emphasis on the Hui's pork taboo is still relevant for Beijing's Hui today, the practice is better framed within the context of adherence to Hui food cultures more broadly considering the multiplicity of dietary practices mentioned by participants.

5.1.c.i Qingzhen as Halal?

Given the importance of *Qingzhen* to the Hui cultural practices and identities discussed above, the question arises: what is *Qingzhen*? Or more importantly, how is *Qingzhen* understood and interpreted by the Hui? The term *Qingzhen* is most commonly translated as *Halal* and it is this understanding that is most often used by academics, and indeed by the PRC state. The word halal itself is usually translated into English as meaning "lawful" or "permitted", although most Muslims relate the labels of lawful and unlawful to concepts of purity and pollution (Gillette, 2000). Islamic dietary restrictions are based on God's revelations to Muhammad and are listed in chapters two, five, six, sixteen and eighty of the Qur'an (Ali, 1984; Esposito, 1995; Gillette, 2000). According to these passages, most plant and animal life are permitted for Muslim consumption. However, there are certain foods that are deemed impure or *Haram* (unlawful or polluted). According to Gillette (2000: 116), God prohibits only four types of food: "(1) animals that have not been consecrated to God and properly slaughtered (including those that die of disease and old age, are killed by another animal, or have been improperly killed by humans, for example, strangled or beaten to death); (2) blood; (3) pork; and (4) alcohol". In relation to alcohol, it is commonly debated whether God forbids all intoxicating substances or merely certain types of alcohol. Murata and Chittick (2013: 24), in their insightful exploration of Islam, elaborate further on the restrictions that are dictated by the Shariah (Islamic law or revealed law);

> "Muslims are forbidden to consume intoxicating beverages and narcotics. They are also forbidden to eat pig, dog, domestic donkey, and carrion, which is defined as the meat of any animal that has not been ritually slaughtered. Animals are slaughtered ritually by cutting their throats while mentioning the name of God. This ritually slaughtered meat is then called halal (permitted). Many jurists maintain that meat prepared by Jews or Christians is halal for Muslims, while others disagree. On this point the Koran gives a general ruling: 'The food of the People of the Book [those who have been given scriptures, such as Jews and Christians] is permitted to you' (5.5), although it is understood that this food, if meat, must be slaughtered in the name of God. Kosher meats in particular seem to fit this category. In general, the Shariah declares that it is forbidden to eat any wild animal that has claws, nails, or tusks with which it overcomes its enemies, such as lion, tiger, wolf, bear, elephant, monkey and cat. However, one school of law maintains that it is reprehensible to eat these animals, not forbidden. Minor differences of opinion among the jurists are quite common. Thus, most of them maintain that all animals that live in the sea are permitted, whereas one school makes an exception for sea animals that do not take the form of fish – such as shellfish, crabs, alligators, or walruses".

In light of this definition of halal, there are a few noteworthy points in relation to the Hui. Specifically, Murata and Chittick (2013) reference the contested and interpretive natures of Halal among Muslims and Islamic schools of law. This is an important point as the scriptures of Islam are often interpreted in very different ways by followers of the religion. As such, the religious, and indeed cultural practices relating to halal will vary, as will people's understandings of it. This is particularly relevant for the Hui, whose views and opinions of Shariah law pertaining to dietary restrictions varied significantly. Consequently, their understandings of *Qingzhen*, and the Hui's food culture more generally, were diffuse, numerous, and often conflicting. Interestingly, Murata and

Chittick (2013) also mention several key topics that are pertinent to the Hui and Hui food cultures; such as the type of meat permitted for consumption (including wild animals, seafood and meat prepared by non-Muslims), and the issue of alcohol and intoxicants.

5.1.c.ii Qingzhen: A Sinocisation of Halal

Despite often being translated as meaning halal, *Qingzhen* is arguably better understood as “pure and true”, incorporating the dietary restrictions and associated practices of halal while also exceeding such simplistic definitions. In addition to compliance with Qur’anic teachings regarding what are deemed lawful to eat, many participants explained that *Qingzhen* also draws from broader Chinese teachings, specifically from Chinese medicine, the Chinese humoral system, and the notion of *chi shenme bu shenme,*[75] or “eat something to fix/mend something”. According to the Chinese humoral system, all foods are divided into two categories; cold (*liang*[76]) and hot (*re*[77]), or Yin (cold) and Yang (hot). The consumption of foods with either hot or cold energies is believed by many to affect the balance of hot and cold within the human body. When an imbalance occurs, people may become sick or begin displaying certain symptoms. However, people may strategically alter their internal balance by consuming foods with the desired hot or cold properties (Gillette, 2000; Kaptchuck, 2000; Wiseman and Ellis, 1996). As with Gillette’s (2000: 127) participants in Xi’an, all of the Hui that I spoke with in Beijing were aware of this concept, with many claiming that they actively practiced such an approach to health and diet. Similarly, and interlinked, the Chinese medicinal principle of *chi shenme bu shenme* also professes a strong unavoidable link between human diet and an individual’s embodied state of being. Drawing upon her exchanges with a Hui professor of Hui culture named only as Zenglie, Gillette explains that in line with this teaching, a person with poor eyesight might increase their intake of eyeballs as a way of improving their vision. This teaching continues to influence understandings and dietary practices of *Qingzhen* by directly associating the innate attributes of an individual’s food with their embodied physicality and characteristics.

In line with these principles, many Hui, like their Han counterparts, believe that eating food with certain characteristics will impact on the body in such a way as to pass on

[75]吃什么补什么。
[76] 凉。
[77]热。

those traits. As such, the food cultures of the Hui are considered to have an embodied element, whereby eating *Qingzhen* foods will cause a person's body to become a purer body, or, a *Qingzhen* body. The belief in the Chinese medicinal teachings of *chi shenme bu shenme* and the humoral system have led to a hybridization and sinocisation of halal, placing *Qingzhen* at the interface between the majoritarian traditionally Confucian society and the Islamic beliefs of the minority. Hui people not only believe that they are living a righteous lifestyle by eating foods deemed lawful in the Qur'an, but they believe that they are actually transforming and purifying their bodies in the process. Further, this direct association between one's diet and one's bodily characteristics has led to *Qingzhen* restricting the consumption of foods that are not necessarily considered unlawful in Islam. Many interviewees explained how foods from animals that are considered "ugly", "dirty", "wild" or that possess "unwanted", "mean" or "unkind" characteristics are prohibited by *Qingzhen* as they will pass on those characteristics to the individual. These animals included fish with teeth, fish without fins or scales, more than 3.5Kg (7 斤 *Jin* – a traditional unit of weight; 1 斤 isapproximately 0.5Kg) of fish, crocodiles, eagles, dogs, rabbit, loaches, tigers, leopards, turtles, foxes, squid, snakes, lizards, birds with curved beaks, shrimp, crabs, and of course, pigs. It should be noted that not all research participants mentioned most of these animals when discussing prohibited foods (although all did mention pork), showing a similarity to the diverse understandings of Qur'anic Law mentioned by Murata and Chittick (2013). Furthermore, many of those that did list these additional animals explained that these animals were prohibited because of their potential to pass on unwanted traits, rather than with reference to religious and Islamic doctrine.The direct correlation between what people eat and their embodied state of being, combined with understandings of the morality of animals and Qur'anic teachings pertaining to halal, are arguably the defining pillars of contemporary understandings of *Qingzhen* dietary restrictions for many urban Hui in Beijing, and thus play a vital role in their self-identifications.

5.2 QINGZHEN, HUI IDENTITY AND FOOD CULTURES.

As a hybridisation and sinocisation of Halal – which is itself a contestable and interpretative religious and dietary practice – *Qingzhen* is a rather loose and open concept that is understood in a variety of fluid, diffuse and contested ways. Among Beijing Hui, understandings of *Qingzhen* vary from it being a practice deriving from religious doctrine, to a set of cultural traits that define and reaffirm the biological difference of an ethnic minority group. This is awkward and dangerous territory for, in affirming a biological difference in the context of their broader denigration through a process of minoritisation (see section 2.5 above), the Hui people of Beijing seek to reverse the hierarchy that marginalises them as Other to the hegemonic Han identity in China. As Bhabha remarks, minoritisation is a stain upon citizenship: ‘the question of difference, the question of the failures of the democratic promises of nations’ (Anfeng, 2009: 164). Moreover, in taking biology as a basis for differentiation these Hui Chinese take a dimension of identity that is intrinsic to the most extreme versions of Othering and shameful abjection (Nussbaum, 2004). Indeed, Sedgwick and Frank (1995: 1) underline this suspicion of biology suggesting that the distance from ‘a biological basis’ of ‘any account of human beings or culture’ is generally ‘assumed to correlate near-precisely with its potential for doing justice to difference […] and to the possibility of change.’ To claim a biological basis for a civilizational superiority in the context of food and eating is a very radical response to the disqualification of minoritisation. Yet, as I show below, this is precisely what the Hui Chinese attempt.

At the core of *Qingzhen* for Beijing Hui, both conceptually and in practice, are notions of religiosity, cleanliness, place, and nationality – both “big” and “small” nationality. Continually during my field work, individuals and groups expressed different understandings and approaches to *Qingzhen*. Often individuals would offer an absolute and definitive interpretation of the concept that was dependent exclusively on one of the aforementioned core notions of cleanliness, religiosity, nationality or place, arguing that their version of *Qingzhen* was the “true” meaning of the term. While others defined the term in relation to a multiplicity or combination of some/all of these themes. Interestingly, two other central understandings were present in all of the participants’ conceptualisations of *Qingzhen*: that *Qingzhen* is central to Hui identity and culture, and that it is primarily associated with practices of Hui food culture. It is this imagining of *Qingzhen* (as understood by Beijing Hui) as being inseparable from the Hui’s food culture and the centrality of this food culture and *Qingzhen* to Hui identity that grounds this project. In this sense, it is perhaps useful to think of these three factors of *Qingzhen* as understood by Beijing Hui, the Hui food culture in Beijing, and Hui identity in Beijing, as being a triad – as demonstrated in Figure 5.5.



Figure 5.5: Triad of Hui Identity.
Source: Author's own (2019).

The three vertices of this triad are all inter-related and co-dependent in each other's understandings and meanings for Beijing Hui. For example, understandings of *Qingzhen* are central to how the Hui in Beijing view both their food cultures and their identity as a group. Likewise, their food culture plays a central role in defining not only *Qingzhen*, but also the group's identity. And finally, conceptualisations of the group's identity are linked with *Qingzhen* and their food cultures. In short, the three themes of *Qingzhen*, food culture, and Hui identity are co-constitutive for Beijing's Hui. When conversing with participants about their understandings of *Qingzhen*, Hui food cultures or definitions of the Hui as a group, it was commonplace for them to define each of these themes in relation to each other. Again, these terms were defined in a myriad of ways with individuals highlighting or omitting different relationships between the topics depending on what they deemed important. However, the inter-connectedness between them was always present with most participants explaining that adherence (of varying degrees) to the Hui's food culture was the defining feature of contemporary

Hui identity in Beijing, and that *Qingzhen* was central to this food culture and as such to Hui identity formation.

Throughout interactions with participants, a number of terms and phrases would repeatedly appear which best encapsulate this relatedness. For example, "We are *Qingzhen Ren*"[78] (*Qingzhen* People), "I eat Hui food, so I am Hui,"[79] and "Hui people have to eat *Qingzhen* food"[80] were three statements and notions that would often appear. "Of course I only eat *Qingzhen* food, I'm Hui,"[81] was the response of one male chef from Gansu Province working in a Lanzhou noodle restaurant in Central Beijing in early August 2017. He went on to explain that eating *Qingzhen* food is what makes him a Hui. When asked if failure to adhere to a *Qingzhen* diet meant that one couldn't be considered a Hui, he said that in his opinion, failure to adhere to a *Qingzhen* diet was equivalent to not eating Hui food and as such one couldn't be considered a Hui. This opinion was echoed by some others, including a young male Beijinger working in Changying but educated in the West who explained that "if you stop eating *Qingzhen*, then you quit being a Hui. Then you're just like everybody else, like the Han."[82] This man's view that Hui identity and status could be lost or given up if *Qingzhen* food is not consumed was not unique, nor was his emphasis on the Hui's food culture as being their distinctive trait. Similarly, many other participants explained that the group's shared food culture was the defining and distinguishing characteristic of the Hui and an essential requirement in qualifying and identifying as a member of the group. For some Hui, particularly those whose understandings of Hui and *Qingzhen* depended also on religious devotion to Islam, anyone who followed a *Qingzhen* diet could be called a Hui. One young Shandong waitress working in Dongcheng District perhaps best put the importance of this triad's inter-dependency into words when she said that *Qingzhen* food "symbolises us as Hui people."[83]

Entwined and enmeshed within this triad of Hui identity, food culture and *Qingzhen*, are the themes of religion, nationalism[s], cleanliness and place (see Figure 5.5). Each of these themes relate to one or more vertices of the triad depending on an individual's understandings, interpretations and identifications, with some connections and themes

[78]我们是清真人。
[79]我吃回民食物，我是回民。
[80]回民要吃清真的。
[81]当然我只吃清真的，我是回族。
[82]Interview was carried out in English at the interviewee's request.
[83]就是它是指象征着我们是回民。

being viewed as more important or relevant, while others are ignored or dismissed completely. For some, each theme relates to all three parts of the triad, while for others only certain themes, or even one theme, are relevant. Further, these themes are not only connected and related to the vertices of the triad, but they are also inter-connected to each other in intricate, diffuse and often confusing ways, again depending on individual understandings. For example, when interviewing a middle-aged female restaurant owner in Xicheng District in summer 2017, it became clear that her understandings of Hui identity, Hui food culture and *Qingzhen* were not only inter-dependent and co-constitutive, but that they were also hinged upon the themes of religion, cleanliness and place. These three themes were then not only connected to each other and the triad, but they were also linked in lesser ways to the themes of "big" and "small" nationality.

5.2.a Religion

"Are you Hui? Is he Hui?"[84] asked a young female waitress from Shandong Province working in Beijing's Fengtai District within the first few minutes of our interview together in July 2017 – the first full interview of this project. I was initially surprised by this question as I failed to understand how she might have mistaken a white Westerner for a member of her own ethnic group. However, I quickly realised that for her the term "Hui"[85] was interchangeable with that of "Muslim,"[86] and as such, she was in fact asking me if I were Muslim, not a member of an ethnic minority group. This conflation of terminology and meaning between "Hui" and "Muslim" was not unique to this woman; rather it is one that appeared time and again throughout the research project. Many participants, varying across ages, genders and occupations, switched between these two terms regularly when discussing the Hui, *Qingzhen*, their own ethnic identification, their religion, their food cultures, and their cultural practices. Often, when asked a question regarding the Hui, participants would answer using the term Muslim, demonstrating their belief that both terms signified the same connotation. One example was the response given by a middle-aged male butcher from Beijing when asked if he thought that his status as Hui was important for his occupation; "About this, it's important. Because Muslims are united throughout the world, he recognises this,

[84]你是回族马？他是回族马？
[85]回/回族/回民。
[86]穆斯林。

Qingzhen food is legal, Hui people are universal. Beef and mutton are universal."[87] More common still was the response we often received when recruiting participants. When asked if they were Hui, many respondents simply responded with "Yes, [I] am Muslim."[88]

For some participants, this conflation of terms happened instinctively, or at the very least, without them consciously making efforts to distinguish between them. While for others, the conflation was a deliberate and intentional move; these individuals understood both terms to be synonymous and actively made efforts to communicate this point to me. For many people, to be Hui means to be Muslim, and likewise, to be Muslim means to be Hui. When asked to explain who the Hui people are, one elderly Shaanxi native explained that he believed that "In China, as long as people believe in Islam [they] are counted as Muslim."[89] "It's your faith that determines if you're a Hui person or not a Hui person" explained a young Lanzhou Hui woman in English before asking me "do you understand? It's important that you understand that Hui and Muslim are the same. We are Hui because we are Muslim."[90] Other participants explained that these two terms did in fact hold very different connotations. Some participants explained that for them, the term "Hui" refers to all Chinese Muslims, regardless of official ethnicity. This is unsurprising given the fact that the term was historically used to denote all Muslims and Islam in China, as discussed in Chapter 4 (see also Leslie, 1986: 195-6; Zheng, 2010: 161). Several individuals said that although they understood and recognised differences between China's 10 identified Islamic minority groups, the term "Hui" could be used as an umbrella term to describe all of them, including Muslim Han; whereas the term "Muslim" refers to all followers of Islam globally. One young noodle chef in Haidian District explained,

> "The Hui people are one of 56 ethnic groups in China, [and their] symbol is the white hat. However, [while] this nationality is specifically called the general term 'Hui people', all Islamic believers in China are [also] collectively referred to as Hui people. Other [minorities] are not closely related to the Hui people. Once Han people join Islam, they can also be called Hui people. There are also

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[87]这个来说很重要。因为这个穆斯林是全世界统一，他这个认可，清真食品它是合法的，回民它是世界通用。牛羊肉是世界通用。
[88]是的，是穆斯林。
[89]在中国，只要信仰伊斯兰教的人都算回民。
[90]Interview was carried out in English at the interviewee's request.

> many Chinese Tibetans, for example Xinjiang's Uyghur, Kazakh, Bao'an, Dongxiang and Salar ethnic groups, these minorities are different but they all believe in Islam. Collectively they are known as the Hui people, and so on."[91]

This multi-scalar way of addressing identity raises once again the geopolitical context in which the personal is assembled, which is a fundamental insight of Feminist Political Geography (see section 2.1.d above). For many others the term "Muslim" refers to all followers of Islam globally, while the term "Hui" means a distinct Islamic ethnic group in China, rather than referring to all Chinese Muslims. What is interesting about this understanding of terminology is that although they are understood as signifying different meanings for some individuals, the concept of being Hui was still dependent on being Muslim. In other words, many Beijing Hui explained that although the terms held different meanings, you could not be Hui without also being a Muslim; although you could be Muslim without being a Hui. When speaking with young waitresses from Shandong Province working in a tourist area of Dongcheng District, I asked if "Hui" and "Muslim" meant the same thing. One eighteen year old waitress explained that for her, they were not the same thing but that in order to qualify as a Hui, people "must have strong faith in Islam."[92] This association between being Muslim and being Hui was paramount for many of the people with whom I spoke. When asked if the faith of an individual was important in either their qualifying as Hui or their ability to cook Hui/*Qingzhen* food, many participants would answer that one simply cannot be considered as Hui if one was not a Muslim. One male Gansu chef told me that "[if] he is a Hui person he must be a Muslim, [if] he is not a Muslim he is not a Hui person."[93] Many participants believed this. Some of these respondents would appear shocked or confused by the mere suggestion that a Hui might not believe in Islam, demonstrating how absolute they were in their understanding that in order to be a Hui, one must be a Muslim. One elderly Beijing-native who owned her own small but popular canteen immediately interrupted me once she realised what I was suggesting: "If someone is Hui but they don't believe in Islam [Interrupted],"[94] "That's impossible […] He is a Hui, he will definitely believe in Islam. Although he is a member of the Communist Party, they

[91]回民是中国五十六个民族之一，认为回民的标志就是带着白帽子。但回民这个民族具体统称，在中国所有的伊斯兰教的信徒被统称为回民。其他跟回族是关系不是很大。一旦有汉族加入伊斯兰教，也可以被称为回民，也有中国的藏族很多，比如像新疆的维吾尔族，哈萨克族，保安族，东乡族，撒拉族，这些民族不同，但他们都可以信仰伊斯兰教，统称为回民，这样的。
[92]就必须是非常信仰伊斯兰教的。
[93]他是回民他就必须得是穆斯林，他不是穆斯林他就不是回民。
[94]如果他是回民，但是他不信仰伊斯兰。

have their own belief."[95] The impossibility of a Hui being a non-Muslim was elaborated on by another restaurant employee who explained that if someone stopped believing in Allah, or if their faith weakened considerably, then they could no longer claim to be a Hui. Showing that for some individuals, not only was their status as Hui dependent on being Muslim, but this status was fluid and changeable, and that it could indeed be revoked from those whose faith in Islam wavers. This bears similarity to the claims of the young Beijing-native mentioned earlier when discussing the importance of consuming *Qingzhen* foods for the maintenance of one's Hui status.

The qualifying trait in determining the "Hui-ness" of a person for all of these people with a religious understanding of the Hui was the level of faith that a person held in their heart. "Everybody should have a strong belief in their heart,"[96] "It depends on your understanding of the belief,"[97] and, "Generally speaking, as a Hui, we have faith,"[98] are three responses that are representative of many of the replies given by people who view religion as the defining trait of Hui identity. However, there was consensus among all interviewees that this personal faith, although essential, was not enough to classify a person as Hui. Rather, these people contended that in order to call oneself a Hui, one must maintain a religiously appropriate lifestyle through performing certain cultural practices. Surprisingly, very few interviewees mentioned the importance of praying regularly as a criterion for being a Hui. In fact, out of 34 interviewees, only three men specifically stated that such practices were important for qualifying as a Hui. Rather, all of these individuals stressed the importance of following the Hui's food culture and practicing a *Qingzhen* diet. Unlike the broader definitions given by some other Hui participants, and indeed as understood in the preceding section of this chapter, these more religious Hui often understood *Qingzhen* through a purely Islamic lens.

For these people, *Qingzhen* could be understood as meaning halal, with its practices and rules stemming from the teachings of the Qur'an. What is important to mention here is that although these people understood *Qingzhen* to be in line with the teachings of the Qur'an that does not mean that they did not also practice the sinocised version of halal as argued earlier. It simply means that many of these people believed that the rules associated with the sinocised version of halal actually came directly from The Prophet

[95]不可能！[…]他是回民他肯定信仰伊斯兰教，虽然他是共产党员，他自己肯定也是有信仰的。
[96]每个人心中必须得有一个坚定的信仰。
[97]那要看他对这个信仰的认识。
[98]但是普通来讲，我们作为回族来说，我们就是有信仰。

Muhammad's teachings in the Qur'an. These people understood not only Hui identity to be pinned on Islam, but also *Qingzhen* and Hui food culture: "*Qingzhen* represents the corresponding, it can be said to represent Islam, Muslim,"[99] "According to the requirements of the Qur'an, we can only eat *Qingzhen* food, *Qingzhen* food is also translated into Arabic as Halal, translated into Chinese [it] is legal, that is, it is legitimate food among Muslims,"[100] "You see, the food [Hui] people eat, it depends on their belief in their heart. If they are Hui, then they will eat Hui food, *Qingzhen* food. These foods depend on the Qur'an to know what is clean. It is your faith that makes it clean."[101] The arguments made in these three quotations were neither unique nor isolated. Rather, the belief that religion is central to all three points of the triad – Hui identity, Hui food culture and *Qingzhen* – was quite common among Hui participants. In fact, all participants that stressed the important link between religion and one of the triad's points also emphasised that religion shaped the other two aspects. Therefore, for some, the triad of Hui identity discussed earlier is best explained through a religious lens: the Hui are an Islamic group, *Qingzhen* means lawful in the Qur'an, and Hui food must follow Qur'anic teachings.

5.2.b "Small Nationality"/Ethnicity

Despite religion being the most common directly referenced theme through which the project's participants claimed to understand their identities, food cultures and *Qingzhen*, ethnicity also arguably played a dominant role in shaping many individuals' perceptions, either directly or indirectly. For many, the concept of *minzu*, or ethnicity, was far more relevant and appropriate than religion for explaining who the Hui are and the importance of their distinctive food culture. Many of these people would directly refer to their ethnic status or (small) nationality during conversations, while others would imply it through their discussions of a shared culture and history among the Hui – two features that are considered important in their qualifying as an ethnic group. This shared culture, specifically their shared food culture, was mentioned by every participant throughout the research. As was discussed earlier, *Qingzhen* has become a "sacred symbol" (Gladney, 1996) for the Hui as a collective group, and both it and its

[99]清真代表着相对应来说，可以说是代表伊斯兰，穆斯林。
[100]还有一个就是按照古兰经对我们的要求，我们是只能吃清真的食品，情真的食品也翻译成阿文是 Halal，翻译成中文是合法的，就是在穆斯林当中它是合法的食物。
[101]Interview was carried out in English at the interviewee's request.

associated food cultures have come to represent essential traits for qualifying as a member of the nationality for Beijing Hui.

Although many participants understood the concepts of Hui identity, Hui food culture and *Qingzhen* through the frame of religion, many others downplayed these religious associations, or even refuted them entirely. "First of all, Hui people are only one nationality in China. The Hui and Muslims who believe in Islam are two concepts. Most of the traditional ideas are that the Hui people are Muslims who believe in Islam. But there are also a small number of Hui people who do not believe in Islam,"[102] was a response given by the middle-aged male owner of a small bakery in Xicheng District when asked if Hui people are all Muslim. He went on to explain, "I just said, the difference between Hui and Muslim is; one is an ethnic one, a nationality of the Chinese Government, a name for this category, [and it] became a nationality. [This] And faith are two different concepts, faith is Islam."[103] This man's insistence that the concepts of Hui and Muslim were distinct from one another was one that appeared throughout the research's field trips. These two statements from this baker arguably summarise many of the key points that were made by several Hui with whom I spoke; that the concepts and terms of Hui and Muslim were not synonymous, that Hui people did not have to be Muslim, and that the Hui were in fact an official ethnic group designated by the Chinese authorities.

Often, people would refer to China's other officially classified nationalities when attempting to explain their understandings of the Hui as an ethnic group rather than a religious one; "We [have] 56 nationalities, there is a Hui nationality, it is the Hui nationality, but it is not necessarily Muslim"[104] and "[We are] divided into many nationalities. The Hui are a single nationality, my understanding is this."[105] By comparing the Hui to other officially recognised nationalities, these individuals were legitimising the group's official state imposed classification and strengthening official narratives and discourses which have defined the Hui as a distinct ethnic group and which have subjected them to the government's nationalities policies. At times I was struck by how pressing it was for some people to explain to me that the Hui held the

[102] 首先，回民在国内只是一个民族。回族和信仰伊斯兰的穆斯林还是两个概念，大多的传统的思想就觉得回族是信奉伊斯兰教的穆斯林。但是也有少部分的回族不信仰伊斯兰。
[103] 我刚说了，回民和穆斯林的区别，一个是民族的，中国政府对民族，对这一类的一个称呼成为民族。和信仰是两个概念，信仰是伊斯兰。
[104] 我们五十六个民族，有回族这个族，它是回族，但它不一定是穆斯林。
[105] 分成好多个民族。回族呢就是单一的一个民族，我的理解是这样。

status of an official ethnic group akin to any other in China, until one Hui woman elaborated on this point by suggesting that their ethnicity is often mistaken for religion or disregarded by many non-Hui. This association with religion is unsurprising given the close association between the Hui and Islam as discussed earlier, and the term's history of being an umbrella term for all Muslims and Islam in China until the modern era (Gladney, 1996; see also "Islam in China" in Chapter 4.2 above). When conversing with non-Hui in Beijing, particularly the Han or other Islamic minorities, this uncertainty around the Hui's status as a nationality occasionally appeared. When recruiting interviewees in Beijing's Chaoyang District in August 2017, my interpreter and I visited a *Qingzhen* restaurant that was run by a Salar family. After speaking separately with different people, the interpreter later told me that the male manager of the restaurant, and the patriarch of the family, said that we should be conducting our research with the Salar, Uyghur or another minority group as the Hui aren't a real nationality, exemplifying the disregard experienced by some Hui for their ethnic status.

When discussing their ethno-nationalist understandings of Hui identity, lineage and genealogy were prominent factors, with the status of Hui being something that one inherits from their parents at birth: "You are born a Hui, you are a Hui,"[106] "[His] Parents are so he is […] Because of your parents, it passes over to you […] You have Muslim bloodline,"[107] and "His parents are Hui, so he is also Hui."[108] This belief in the inherited nature of Hui ethnicity has led some to consider the Hui as holding distinct physical qualities from other nationalities. As one young female waitress from Shandong told me, "Hui characteristics, [are] large eyes, [and] high-bridged noses."[109] Claims of facial differences between the Hui and other groups, particularly the Han, were not frequently encountered when speaking with the Hui but were nonetheless relevant as they were more often mentioned by Han. Gladney (1996: 23-24) writes that physical differences between the Hui and Han are not uncommon in China's north-west where communities arguably better preserve their Central Asian genealogy and therefore possess qualities such as high-bridged noses and hazel-green eyes. He goes on to mention eastern cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, saying that one is often surprised to meet a Hui who looks unlike the majoritarian Han population. Within Beijing, there certainly are some individuals who possess these non-typical Chinese

[106]你出生是回族，打出生就是回族。
[107]父母是他就是[…]因为你的父母，你这么传承下来的[…]他有穆斯林你的血统。
[108]他父母是回民，他也是回民。
[109]回族的特征，眼睛大，鼻梁高。

facial features; however, they are a minority. Even the eighteen year old waitress that described the Hui as possessing different facial features from the Han admittedly possessed neither the large eyes nor high-bridged nose that she mentioned. Among the interviewees of this project, such features were only encountered among some participants that originated from China's north-western provinces, which perhaps lends itself to Gladney's comments regarding the continuation of Central Asian genealogies in that region. During one of our weekly conversations in 2015, a Gansu-native street-food vendor explained to me that in her opinion, these features aren't a shared trait among all Hui. Rather, she claimed that they were largely confined to people of the Northwest, both Hui and non-Hui, and that their association with the Hui was predominantly due to the fact that the Hui come from that region. This linking of Hui identity with the places of China's north-west will be discussed further on in the chapter and in chapters 6 and 7, however what is important to note here is the refuting of such physical ethnic differences by some Hui and the use of place-based discourses of belonging.

Although contention does exist between participants as to whether the Hui identity, *Qingzhen* and Hui food cultures are best understood through religion or ethnicity, some interviewees argued that these three points are best understood as the products of both concepts. For many of these individuals, the categories of religion and ethnicity are over-lapping and co-constitutive: religion is an ethnic "characteristic" of the Hui, and Hui ethnicity and ethnic difference is dependent on this religious practice and cultural trait. Therefore, Hui identity, *Qingzhen* and Hui food cultures can be understood through an appreciation of the inter-linked relationship between religion and ethnicity: "The Hui nationality has their own belief. Moreover, Hui people only eat beef and mutton, chicken, and don't eat other meats,"[110] and "We have been Hui people for generations, and then some of our beliefs, and what we usually worship, they are already customs."[111] Adding to these points, a young male from Lanzhou working as a supervisor in a large restaurant in Chaoyang District perhaps summarised it best by saying, "But in no way [are we] allowed to go to the Arab restaurant to eat if it is not *Qingzhen*. If [we] go in to eat, [it] will hurt our taboos, and there will be no difference

[110]回族有自己的信仰，而且回族只吃牛羊肉，鸡肉，其他的肉都不吃。
[111]我们世世代代都是回族人嘛，然后你像我们的一些信仰，还有那个平常我们礼拜什么的，那是就是已经习惯性的了就是。

from other nationalities. This is what is prescribed in the Qur'an"[112] and "The Hui nationality is Islam."[113]

5.2.c "Big Nationalism"/ State Nationalism

"Big nationalism", or nationalism at the level of the Chinese State, was yet another important lens through which people described their understandings of Hui identity, Hui food cultures, and to a lesser extent *Qingzhen*. When discussing these topics during interviews, it was explained three times to me that the most important facet of Hui identity was, according to these three individuals, that the Hui are Chinese people before all else. These individuals, two male and one female, insisted that Hui shared identity was similar to those of other ethnic groups in China in that individuals first identified as Chinese, and that ethnic and religious labels held less significance than the national one. The male interviewee, a manager of a small restaurant in Haidian District, answered that "First of all, we are Chinese people"[114] when asked to explain what the term Hui means. The precedence of their citizenship was mirrored by the responses of the other two, with the female interviewee referring to her status as Chinese several times. Admittedly, this repeated mentioning of her citizenship was most likely in response to a miscommunication between my interpreter and I, and his biases regarding Han festivals. Following her explanation of the Hui, I had intended to ask her about her participation or non-participation in various holidays and festivities. As the excerpt below shows, this miscommunication resulted in unintentional insult being caused:

Me: "Will you ask her if she also celebrates other festivals, like Chinese New Year?"
Interpreter: "Do you celebrate Chinese traditional festivals?"[115]
Interviewee: "Chinese?"[116]
Interpreter: "Yes, like Spring Festival, Dragon Boat Festival, Lantern Festival [Interrupt]."[117]

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[112]但是绝不允许到没有打着清真，没有打着阿拉伯的餐馆进去吃饭。如果说进去吃饭，就伤了我们的忌口，就等于的其他族别没有什么区别。这就是古兰经上规定的吧。
[113]回族就是伊斯兰教。
[114]首先，我们是中国人。
[115]你们会庆祝中国的传统节日吗?
[116]中国的?
[117]对，像春节啊，端午节，元宵节[Interrupt]。

Interviewee: "Like us Hui generally don't celebrate those holidays, because sometimes like […] we are also Chinese. Hui people are Chinese."[118]

Understandably, the interviewee appeared a little displeased, or possibly even annoyed, by the question being asked, or more specifically, the by the wording of the question and its insinuation that she was non-Chinese. I had, in my naivety at this early stage in my research, conflated Chinese and Han identities, repeating the very minoritisation (see section 2.5 above) that marginalised the Hui as Other to a hegemonic identification of Chinese with Han. After apologising to her for unintentionally causing upset, she accepted the apology and luckily confirmed that she was willing to continue with the interview. A good rapport was re-established quite quickly and she appeared to relax once again. However, she continued to reference her Chinese citizenship several times later in the interview. Although likely a response of the earlier line of questioning, her insistence on the importance of "big" nationality to Hui identity, food cultures and *Qingzhen* fits with her initial explanation of the Hui as being Chinese before all other categories.

Although only three individuals argued specifically for the importance of Chinese nationalism when asked to explain who the Hui are, many others did allude to the topic of state-level nationalism and Chinese citizenship. Most often, this was done by describing the Hui as either Chinese Muslims, or a Chinese ethnic minority group. Although both of these responses also define the Hui as either a religious or ethnic collective, they nonetheless demonstrate the importance of "big" nationalism in people's understandings of Hui identity. This implied national unity also appeared when discussing the Hui's food cultures and *Qingzhen*. Although the majority of participants focused on their food culture's differentiating characteristics as a way of exemplifying the Hui's ethno-religious individualism and uniqueness, some participants argued that Hui food was no different to that of the Han with the exception of their food taboos: "The difference, now [it is] a harmonious society, there is no difference. Except for our additional taboo, oh, things. I feel nothing [is different], now it's almost the same."[119] This culinary and cultural similarity to the Han and other minority groups was even more pronounced for others who didn't mention any differences between the groups. As the male manager of a Lanzhou Beef Noodle restaurant explained in relation

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[118] 像我们回族一般都不过些节日，因为有时像[…]我们也是中国人。回族人是中国的。

[119] 区别，现在和谐社会嘛，没有什么区别。除了我们那个比较忌讳的一些，呃，东西以外，我感觉没有什么，现在都差不多了。

to inter-ethnic differences, "Almost no difference, because all [are] the same. All are Chinese."[120]

5.2.d Cleanliness

Another key theme through which participants understood the triad's vertices was the notion of cleanliness. During the early stages of participant observation and interviewing, it was somewhat surprising to learn of the importance of cleanliness in the self-identifications and conceptualisations of Hui individuals in defining not only their identities, but also their food cultures and understandings of *Qingzhen*. Unlike the themes of ethnicity, "big" nationality and religion, which were often given precedence over one another by the denial of the others' relevance, cleanliness was most often mentioned in relation to the other themes, specifically religion and ethnicity. Cleanliness was viewed as being a central component in all three points of the triad in myriad ways. In relation to Hui identity, cleanliness was viewed as being an ethnic characteristic, religious necessity or both, depending on the particular participant's understandings of Hui group identity. Embodied practices of cleanliness were often considered to be nationality traits by participants, with personal hygiene and clean food practices being held in high regard as uniquely important to the Hui. The definitive and most unique quality of the Hui nationality, according to two young Gansu-native male employees in a Fengtai District restaurant, was the group's cleanliness and hygienic practices. As the younger eighteen-year-old explained, "The most special part […] It's what I feel, [for] Hui, is, clean,"[121] when asked what separated the Hui from other ethnic groups. After being asked if he meant the cleanliness of Hui food, he went on to explain, "Food […] in general my hometown [is clean], I haven't been to other places. For my hometown, we dress neater and tidier, relatively clean."[122] Other participants also attached significance to the neat and clean appearance of the Hui, with many claiming that a person's clean appearance, specifically a restaurant employee's, was a sure sign of them being a Hui.

This attention to personal hygiene, although considered by many as an ethnic trait, also relates to religion in quite obvious ways. Within Islam, ablution is considered a

[120] 几乎是没有区别的，因为都一样。都是中国的。
[121] 最特别的地方 […] 就是我感觉，回族的，就是，干净。
[122] 食物，[…] 我们那儿，相对我们那儿，我也没到过其他地方。相对于我们那儿，就是比较衣装整洁那样的，比较干净。

requirement for many religious practices. Major ablution, or *ghusl*, which involves washing the entire body, is required after sexual intercourse, emission of semen, menstruation, touching a human corpse or childbirth. Without *ghusl*, a person cannot perform ritual prayer, touch the Qur'an or enter a mosque. In order to perform the *salat* (the prayers that are observed five times daily), one has to be free from all minor impurities also, including impurities that occur if one goes to the toilet, sleeps, breaks wind, and so on. These impurities are removed by carrying out minor ablution, or *wudu*, which involves washing the hands, mouth, nose, right and left forearms, face, head, ears, and right and left feet in that order (Murata and Chittick, 2013: 13). This washing for religious purposes was referenced by some of the project's participants, although many admitted to not carrying out the minor ablution practices regularly given restrictions on their ability to practice *salat* in the Beijing work environment and the limited ablution and prayer spaces available to them. Nevertheless, these participants maintained that the Hui's cleanliness, stemming from religious practices and doctrine, were defining features in not only Hui identity, but also Hui food cultures and *Qingzhen*. When asked why he considered *Qingzhen* foods to be clean, a Ningxia-native male chef explained:

> "Faith is faith. Because of the teachings of Islam, the overall outline is passed down. Because we have a week of Islam, we have to eat every day for lunch, wash our hands, wash our faces, wash our feet, and these [fore]arms. Wash it five times a day. Keep your body clean everywhere. First of all, your body is clean and [then] your mind can be clean. Including these clothes, because when you are praying, there is no dirt on your clothes. [You] must wear neat and clean clothes to worship."[123]

For this man and others, there was a link between the cleanliness of food and the embodied religious cleaning practices and appearance of Hui people. Of further significance here is the statement, "First of all, your body is clean and [then] your mind

[123]信仰，就是信仰。因为伊斯兰教的教法，整体大纲，流传下来的就是。因为我们伊斯兰教有一个礼拜，每天的午饭拜公，洗手，洗脸，洗脚，胳膊这些，每天要洗五次，你要随时保持你身体的任何地方的洁净。首先你身体干净了，你的心灵才能干净。包括你这些衣物，因为你做礼拜的时候，你衣物上有污垢是不行的。必须得穿整洁干净的衣物才能拜公。

can be clean,"[124] as it alludes to another commonly argued point: that there are two types of clean.

The belief in the existence of two types of cleanliness is one that was encountered time and again. Rather than viewing cleanliness as simply corresponding to sanitation or hygiene, it was commonly perceived by individuals that there was a deeper meaning to cleanliness, one more akin to purity. When asked if cleanliness was important to Hui people, a young Gansu-born waitress answered:

> "Yes, there are two kinds. Clean is clean on the surface, not clean in the heart, not clean in the body. It's [about being] clean in both parts. Clean is the surface, wipe it clean, [but] the heart is not clean, the inside is not clean. The cleanliness of the Hui nationality is from the bottom to the top: they are clean in their bodies, clean in [their] hearts, the things they do are clean, and it tastes especially different when you eat it."[125]

This understanding in the different types of cleanliness is one that was continually discussed by participants. For some, the deeper level of cleanliness possessed by the Hui was due to their religiosity, while for others it was a result of their *Qingzhen* diets. Generally, those who believed that this internal cleanliness was the product of religious devotion unsurprisingly considered Hui identity, food culture and *Qingzhen* to be defined by adherence to Islam. In this regard, the internal cleanliness described above and the clean taste of Hui food came from following Qur'anic teachings: "The food itself is clean, afterwards you are a Hui nationality. You perform the *ghusl*, what you do is clean, after you perform the *ghusl* you read aloud, Allah gave that food. After *ghusl* you read aloud while you cook […] after you have finished reading aloud, the food you cooked is especially fragrant,"[126] "In our Islamic classics, only *Qingzhen* is legal. The so-called *Qingzhen* is clean and tidy, from the inside to the outside,"[127] and "So in our family, [when] my mother cooks, she will read the Qur'an. After reading the Qur'an, it

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[124]首先你身体干净了，你的心灵才能干净。

[125]对，分两种，干净是表面的干净，不是心里面的干净，不是身里面的干净。是分两边的干净。干净就是表面，擦的干净，心里面不干净，内里面不干净。回族的干净是从下到上，他们身里面干净，心里面干净，做的东西也是干净，也吃起来也口感特别不一样。

[126]食物本身是干净的，然后你这个人就是回族嘛，你洗完大净做的是干净的，你做的是干净的，洗完大净你念，安拉给那个食物，洗完大净做那个食物的时间念 […] 念完以后做的食物特别香。

[127]只有清真是合法的，在我们这个伊斯兰教的经典中。所谓清真就是干净，整洁，从内心到外面。

will be especially clean and delicious. We Hui nationality think this is the case."[128] Therefore, in order to qualify as being clean both internally and externally, and to have your food meet these standards, one had to demonstrate religious purity through Islamic practice.

For most participants this internal and external cleanliness was the result of adherence to a *Qingzhen* diet rather than religious practices: "I think that maybe if the food is made real *Qingzhen*, so it must be clean. Because *Qingzhen* is a symbol of clean itself"[129] and "So-called *Qingzhen* is clean, tidy, from the heart to the outside."[130] As discussed earlier, some people understood *Qingzhen* to solely mean halal, or lawful in accordance with the Qur'an, linking their belief in *Qingzhen*'s resultant internal cleanliness with the views discussed above in relation to Islamic practice. However, more common was the broader sinocised understanding of *Qingzhen* put forward earlier in the chapter. As a result, religion played a lesser role for many individuals in their conceptualisations of internal cleanliness, with the purity of the *Qingzhen* diet being paramount. Of particular importance here is the notion of *chi shenme bu shenme,* or "eat something to fix/mend something". In line with the earlier discussion of this concept, many people believed that by eating *Qingzhen* food, which they considered to be purer and cleaner than non-*Qingzhen* food, they were transforming their bodies into cleaner and purer bodies from within.

In addition to having impacted on personal conceptualisations and embodied states, the notion of cleanliness has also shaped food preparation practices. Similar to Gillette's (2000) discussion of food preparations in a Hui neighbourhood of Xi'an, some people with whom I spoke explained that their methods of preparing food were cleaner than those of the Han. In addition to choosing only *Qingzhen* meats for consumption, some argued that Hui people also prepared their vegetables and fruit in a more sanitary and hygienic manner; although some others refuted these claims and believed that no inter-ethnic differences existed in relation to the cleanliness of food preparation practices. Specifically, it was claimed that the Hui only use running water when preparing food, unlike the Han who were often accused of using the same basin of water for several purposes. Another practice that many Hui claimed differentiated them from non-Hui

[128]所以我们家里面，母亲做饭也好，也会念古兰经。念了古兰经，做的就是特别干净，也比较好吃。我们回族自己认为是这样。
[129]Interview was carried out in English at the interviewee's request.
[130]所谓清真就是干净，整洁，从内心到外面。

based on sanitation was the storage and packaging of food. For some, a basic requirement in determining if food was *Qingzhen*, and by association clean, was how the food was stored before use. Some necessary conditions mentioned included, keeping all food dry and ventilated, storing it away from rubbish and animal stools, and keeping it covered at all times, even from air pollution. Although these practices are not exclusive to the Hui, many believed that they were, claiming that the Han do not hold the same regard for hygiene and sanitation as them and as such, do not follow these basic principles of clean storage. The need for covering food and the assumed inter-ethnic differences in cleanliness were taken further by some interviewees, with one male Gansu-native explaining that non-Hui, specifically the Han, could not touch any *Qingzhen* food or it would be contaminated and therefore unsuitable for Hui consumption. He claimed that this was the case as the Han would have previously come into contact with tabooed contagions and that they were not clean from the inside. An elderly Ningxia-native woman mirrored these sentiments and went on to add that this was why most Hui food came in sealed packages, so as to avoid it being touched by non-Hui people. Without these sealed packages and a clearly visible *Qingzhen* sign, these foods were not considered by many to be edible. Again, some people refuted these claims by saying that foods such as vegetables, rice, noodles and processed candies (with the exception of those containing animal derivatives) were by their very nature *Qingzhen* and therefore acceptable to eat as they did not contain any forbidden animal meats or blood. Given the association between these standards of cleanliness and *Qingzhen*, and the contested and multifaceted understandings of *Qingzhen* within Beijing's Hui communities, these differing views are unsurprising.

This strong emphasis and focus on cleanliness, and its role in understanding the triad of Hui identity, Hui food cultures and *Qingzhen*, has inevitably had an impact on the spatial, social and material composition and structuring of places of Hui food culture. Within many Hui restaurants, cleaning staff are employed in addition with waiting and cooking staff. The sole job of these staff members was to maintain the level of cleanliness in the restaurant by continually collecting and washing dishes, cleaning tabletops, sweeping the floor, and so on. In all restaurants that were visited, waiting and kitchen staff were also expected to assist with maintenance and upkeep by cleaning their work surfaces and equipment, and cleaning the floor of their workspace. In one key participating restaurant in Beijing's Haidian District, these efforts to maintain a high standard of cleanliness were undeniably apparent, continual and systematic.

Figure 5.6: Loop system of cleaning.
Source: Author's own (2018).

In an attempt to maximize efficiency and ensure high levels of cleanliness, the restaurant implemented a loop system (Figure 5.6). This system meant that plates of food were given to customers at the service window to the kitchen before being taken to the main space of the restaurant by the customer. The dishes were then collected by the cleaning staff and brought to the cleaning area in the far-left corner of the restaurant where they were scraped clean and separated before being passed through a window to the washing room. Dishes were then washed by other members of the cleaning staff and sent back into the kitchen to be re-used (Figure 5.7). Interestingly, this cycle of cleanliness and its inherent re-use of dishes may be seen as a performance of *Qingzhen*, and indeed, of Islam. As the manager of this restaurant explained, this process of washing and re-using dishes and chopsticks is important for the restaurant "because it's Islamic, it's *Qingzhen*. Washing, use again and again, again and again. Even for people's health, Islamic is very good."[131] Interestingly, he then went on to link the restaurant's cleaning practices with environmental consciousness, and how working towards a cleaner environment is an act of *Qingzhen*:

> "Not like the paper. You see in the Kentucky [Fried Chicken], in the McDonalds, all this some brands, famous brands' fast food. All use the paper.

[131]Conversation took place in English at the participant's request.

So, paper from where? From the trees. They [are] coming from trees. So, you see this always international brand they use this paper on the daily. They use daily, they waste how many? Even our chopsticks not one-time use. We can clean there. We can make three people, four people wash it for use it again and again, not the waste. So, if we waste chopsticks, daily we have around 2,000 people here. In a year that's how many trees? In Beijing we have more than a 1,000 restaurants. If every restaurant uses one time, how many? It's not *Qingzhen.*"[132]

Figure 5.7: Cleaning staff at the cleaning window.
Source: Author's own (2016).

This emphasis on cleanliness undoubtedly involved a certain spatiality. As the manager explained, the layout of the restaurant was designed to allow for the possibility of the circular cleaning system, in addition to the L-shaped queuing system used for ordering food. Most importantly, the layout of this restaurant, like some other *Qingzhen* restaurants in Beijing, included a large open window between the main space of the restaurant and the busy kitchen – an area that usually remains sealed off from the public in most non-*Qingzhen* restaurants (Figure 5.8 and 5.9). The manager explained that this

[132] Conversation took place in English at request of the participant.

was not only an important aspect of the restaurant's physicality but was an important part of their "model": that the kitchen was kept open to the public so that they could see that everything was being made fresh in a clean kitchen. Proudly adding that "this is [the] *Qingzhen* way. This is Islamic" and that as such "it is clean, and it is open. That's why people like us". Despite this being a trait of this restaurant's "model", it was by no means a unique feature. Open kitchens could be seen in many of the *Qingzhen* restaurants visited across Beijing, particularly in newer ones. Perhaps this is, as the manager of the aforementioned chain restaurant claims, one characteristic of his restaurant that has been copied by its competitors, or perhaps not. Regardless, it is certainly a trend among Beijing's *Qingzhen* restaurants and could be found in many of the observed *Qingzhen* restaurants and all of the participating ones. When asked why the restaurant's chefs could be seen working from the main seating area, the supervisor of another restaurant said that it was done to demonstrate the restaurant's cleanliness and that it played an essential role in building trust among diners and in garnering popularity.

Figure 5.8: Open service window to kitchen.
Source: Author's own (2015).

Figure 5.9: Open service window to kitchen.
Source: Author's own (2016).

Aside from the obvious visual aspects associated with good hygiene, some restaurants have taken further steps to make their "clean status" visually apparent. Specifically, some restaurants display their health and safety certificates and "certificates of high quality" on the walls of their establishments for customers to see (Figure 5.10 and 5.11). One restaurant advertised not only the certificates of excellence for their restaurant, but also for the quality of the products that their establishment produced, such as vinegar and chili paste. Pride in the cleanliness and quality of the restaurant's ingredients was not limited to their own produce, with many of the participating restaurant workers frequently advertising to customers their meat's freshness and their good relations with their meat suppliers. On numerous occasions, both restaurant workers and customers informed me that the high quality and cleanliness of *Qingzhen* meat was a major draw for customers.

Figure 5.10: Certificates.
Source: Author's own (2015).

Figure 5.11: Certificates and Awards.
Source: Author's own (2019).

5.2.e Place

The final lens through which the triad of Hui identity may be understood is place. Specifically, I argue that the triad's elements are often shaped by geographical imaginaries, emotive ties to places, and group and individual understandings of belonging. Importantly, these place attachments and imaginaries play major roles in local conceptualizations of both individual and group identity among the Hui and in their determining of what constitutes Hui food cultures and what qualifies as *Qingzhen*. As was previously discussed in Chapter 4, the Hui are a geographically diverse and widely dispersed group, occupying every region and province across the PRC. This geographical diversity was somewhat evident in the provinces of origin of the project's 34 interviewees. As Figure 5.12 shows, the interviewees' places of origin ranged from China's north-western provinces to China's most north-easterly province, Heilongjiang. Although none of the interviewees came from China's southern regions that is not to say that southern Hui did not participate in this project. In fact, during the participant observation phases, I spoke with Hui individuals from China's southeast and also from Yunnan Province, China's most south-westerly province.



Number	Province	No. of Interviewees
1	Qinghai	1
2	Gansu	10
3	Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region	6
4	Shaanxi	2
5	Anhui	1
6	Shandong	7
7	Hebei	1
8	Beijing Municipality	5
9	Heilongjiang	1

Figure 5.12: Map of interviewees' provinces of origin.

Source: Author's own (2019).

This geographical difference and migratory status is important for the discussion of place attachment and imaginaries as these migrants generally believed that their native food cultures were more "authentic" and *Qingzhen* than the local Hui food cultures in Beijing, specifically the Hui from China's Northwest. Many Hui, including some Beijing Hui and Hui from other eastern provinces, regarded the food cultures of China's north-western regions to be the most authentic, legitimate and pure examples of Hui food culture. For some, this was because of the assumed religious purity and orthodoxy of north-western Hui. These people's assumed higher level of Islamic devotion and practice has resulted in the belief that they are better qualified to make real *Qingzhen* food, similar to the discussions above in relation to religion and cleanliness. For others, the perceived authenticity of north-western food cultures stems from the Hui's historic ties to China's north-western regions, where Muslim groups were once the majority and through which Islam first entered China (see Chapter 4). While for some, ties to governmental discourses are clear, with many referencing these periphery border regions as the "home" or "place" of China's minority/non-Han populations, implying that the Hui are "out of place" in Beijing. This exclusionary, or reactionary (Massey, 1994), view of the Hui's place was evident in many people's perceptions of the Hui's food cultures in Beijing. Most often, when asked to describe Hui food culture, or when asked to name a typical or representative Hui dish, participants would name foods associated with China's north-western regions or define Hui food as north-western cuisine. Foods and dishes such as *Mianshi,*[133] Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles, BaBaoCha,[134] Chuan'er,[135] goji berries, and a range of beef and mutton dishes such as hand-grasped mutton, were most commonly identified by participants as being most representative or typical of Hui food culture due to their inherent association to China's Northwest. These dishes become performances of place-based identities for many Beijing Hui, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7. Many restaurants are modelled after those of other provinces and regions in the Northwest. These restaurants not only serve dishes from those places, but they also use language to signify those places in the names of restaurants and dishes, while modelling the restaurants' style of décor and uniforms on them, while often only hiring serving staff and cooks from these provinces. These representational and place-making practices, as is argued in Chapter 6, are intended to encode these signs with meaning, signifying the places that the Hui are

[133]面食。Eng: wheaten products - particularly noodles and breads.
[134]八宝茶。Eng: Eight Treasure Tea.
[135]串儿。Eng: barbecues meat skewers.

associated with and attached to, while exemplifying the provincial connections of *Qingzhen* places of Hui food culture in Beijing. Despite the insistence by some that the food cultures of China's north-western Hui are more authentic due to their belonging "in place", many Hui claim that their *Qingzhen* versions of Beijing cuisine are also authentically Hui. These Beijing Hui refute claims that Hui cuisine and food culture must be linked with Western China, insisting that *Qingzhen* versions of traditionally Han – or even foreign - dishes are also Hui and therefore deserve to be recognized as such. Beijing as a place not only impacts on how these individuals understand their food cultures, but also shapes their conceptualizations of *Qingzhen* and Hui identity. For them, they are not "out of place" in Beijing. Rather, they belong in Beijing and their places of food culture are linked to Beijing in unavoidable and inseparable ways.

5.3 HUI IDENTITY, FOOD CULTURES AND QINGZHEN.

In his landmark text "Muslim Chinese", Dru Gladney (1996) demonstrated the diffuse ways that the concept of *Qingzhen* had shaped the ethno-religious identities and socio-religious practices of four Hui communities across China. Further, he argued that for China's Hui, the concept of *Qingzhen* was as a "sacred symbol" marking Hui identity in China, borrowing the term from Geertz (1968). Building from this understanding, this chapter argues that it is the ways in which *Qingzhen* has influenced the food cultures of Beijing's Hui that is the most significant performance of Hui ethnic identity in the city today. Informed by the work of Gillette (2000) and drawing from empirical data, *Qingzhen* is understood here as meaning "pure and true", rather than the oft-used and overly simplistic translation of *halal*. This chapter argues that for this research's participants, the concept of *Qingzhen* not only refers to Qur'anic teachings surrounding *halal*, but it also draws from Chinese medicine, the Chinese humoral system, and the notion of *chi shenme bu shenme*, or "eat something to fix/mend something". Therefore, this chapter presents an understanding of *Qingzhen* as being a sinocisation of *halal*.

The importance of this sinocisation of *halal*, or *Qingzhen*, to Hui culture was explored in detail in Section 5.2. Specifically, it was shown that for Beijing Hui, it is now the manner in which *Qingzhen* has shaped the group's food cultures that is the most salient performance of Hui ethnic identity today. Building from this conceptual underpinning, I argue that local interpretations of *Qingzhen* and Hui food cultures are mutually dependent, and as such, are co-constitutive of Hui identity, forming an interlocked triad, as is presented in Figure 5.5. This triad of Hui identity, Hui food culture and *Qingzhen* can most often be understood through one, or several, of five key thematic lenses identified. These are religion, “small” nationalism/ethnicity, “big” nationalism/state nationalism, cleanliness, and place. However, it should not be misinterpreted or construed that I am proposing that only five absolute lenses of understanding exist or that they are all encompassing or definitive. Rather, it is possible, and indeed probable, that there are a multitude of other themes through which local Hui understand each of the triad’s points. It is important here to remember the fluidity and performative nature of identity and the subjectivity of understandings. The five themes suggested and discussed above, are better understood as the key themes to have been identified during the course of this fieldwork. Nevertheless, the value and space afforded to these five themes is warranted given their prominence and continued presence during this research project, and the strong emphasis placed on them by participants. Importantly Section 5.2.e showed how for Beijing Hui, this triad draws heavily from the group’s diffuse attachments to places, an important point for establishing a conceptual foundation for the next chapter. In Chapter 6, these attachments to place will be explored in further detail and the notion of *Qinqie* place will be developed.

CHAPTER 6: PLACES OF HUI FOOD CULTURE.

> "Does it bring up any memory for you?"[136]
> "Yes, it is the feeling […] just like seeing our own ethnic minority, Islam, it feels very *Qinqie*. [137] Then it seems to give people the feeling of returning home, especially the feeling of peace of mind, what we need is this kind of practical feeling."[138]

The above quotation was taken from an interview with a Shandong-native, Hui waitress working in Fengtai District in July 2017. Prior to this segment, she had been asked to explain what features made Hui restaurants distinguishable, and what material objects and representations she liked about the restaurant that we were in. The restaurant displayed a number of place-making features that will be discussed throughout this chapter, such as *Qingzhen* signs, Arabic writing, Islamic and Chinese artwork, and Arabic-style cutlery. This bricolage of references from diverse places bring with them a set of geopolitical significations that are assembled under the current pressure of the GWOT. In these ways, and others, the geopolitical becomes personal (Eken, 2019; Fluri, 2015) in the fashion that Feminist Political Geography has identified (see section 2.1.d above). This interviewee's reflection highlights several aspects of these place-making tactics and practices that are important for how we conceptualise and understand Beijing's places of Hui food culture, and their importance for Hui people. Specifically, that these material objects and representations are used to signify connections to people and places, to evoke emotional responses, and to provide a sense of belonging and safety for Hui.

This search for safety and belonging is over-determined by the geopolitical context. The events of 9/11 and the anti-Islamic and anti-Arabic ideology sanctioned by the US as the GWOT in its response (see section 1.1 above) set the context for the PRC to adopt with impunity public denigration of its own Islamic minorities and of the seeming Arabisation of elements of public Islamic cultures as described above (see section 1.2). Islamic scholars often study abroad and some Hui imams have fallen under suspicion in

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[136]会有什么样的，就是会想到什么样的一些东西吗？
[137]亲切。Eng: Cordial, kind, close, familiar, warm, intimate, dear.
[138]对，就是感觉 [。。。] 就是像见到我们本身那个少数民族啊，伊斯兰，就是感觉特别亲切。再就是看上去给人感觉回到了家的感觉，特别踏实的那种感觉，我们需要的就是这种踏实的感觉。

this regard (Stewart, 2017: 41). In this context, the expression of international Islamic culture in public places is now a risky business in the PRC and throughout this chapter and the next anxieties linked to this intense minoritisation (see section 2.5 above) will become evident (see also section 8.5 below).

In Chapter 5, I argued that Hui food cultures, local understandings of *Qingzhen*, and Hui identity form an interlocked triad for Beijing's Hui. Further, Section 5.2.e showed that this triad draws heavily from the group's myriad attachments to places. Building from this and guided by the theoretical underpinning that places and food are essential practices through which identity is formed (Ohnuki-Tierney, 1993), this chapter aims to take seriously the places of Hui food culture found in Beijing as important sites of meaning and performances of identity. Individual and group attachments to place are highly emotive (Davidson and Bondi, 2004) and may be performed through dietary practices (Longhurst et al., 2009). In light of this, and building from the conceptualisation of *Qinqie* place presented in Chapter 2, this chapter is framed theoretically by the understanding that: places are embodied; that experiential and emotive imports are central to places; they are not static, but are processual and mobile; they possess a bounded openness; places are connected and relational to other places and people; places hold multiple temporalities; they are socially and historically contingent "gatherings", or bundles; and they are inescapably political.

Working within this conceptual framework and drawing from eight months of ethnographic fieldwork in Beijing's Hui restaurants and *Qingzhen* foodscapes (see Chapter 3), the chapter explores the place-making tactics and representational practices employed by the Hui in establishing places where the Hui feel that they belong, are safe and *Qinqie*. The features used to demarcate a place as Hui are examined using a semiological approach, as are the ways that the objects and features are believed to signify Hui-ness, and why. This includes features such as menus, signage and restaurant names, uniforms, pictures and photographs displayed, artwork, utensils, and the physical layout of restaurants. Central to this semiological approach are practices of active reflexivity, which allowed me to challenge my initial decodings of signs. The emotional attachments and resonances of these places to Hui individuals are explored as are their individualistic and subjective decodings of these meaning-laden signs.

Structured in a way that highlights the relational and connected nature of places of Hui food culture in Beijing, this chapter will first discuss place-making as a connected practice, further developing the understanding of place discussed in Chapter 2. The following four sections will then continue to advance our understanding of *Qinqie* places by looking at the specificities of these places' connectivities. Specifically, through a semiological analysis of visual referents, it will be argued that places of Hui food cultures in Beijing are connected to people, connected to other places, connected temporally, and connected emotively. In addition to making these arguments of connectivity and relationality, there is another clear and over-arching conceptual thread running through each section. That is to say, that these places are undeniably political, something that will be evidenced through the chapter.

6.1 PLACE-MAKING AS A CONNECTED PRACTICE

Places are important. They are our most intimately felt geographies and the sites of our embodied engagements with the world around us (Casey, 2013). As we interact with the places that make up our lifeworlds, we experience a range of emotional, affective and sensorial responses. In consequence, our engagements with places are always framed by our emotional knowings (Tuan, 1979; Davidson and Milligan, 2004; Adams et al., 2001). These places, as was argued earlier (see section 2.3 above), are not static and rooted entities with fixed boundaries. Rather, they are processual and full of movement with open, porous borders (Pred, 1984; Massey, 1993; Malpas, 2012). Places are historically contingent processes that possess and draw from multiple temporalities at once, challenging linear conceptualisations of time (Hamilakis, 2017). Given their socially constructed nature, and the centrality of human bodies and experience in their composition, places are inescapably political (Pierce et al., 2011; Massey, 1994a). Places are always relational and connected to one another: they are simultaneously embedded within other places, while also having those places enmeshed in their own constitution (Malpas, 2012).

Each of these above assertions holds importance for understanding the geographies of Hui food cultures in Beijing. Specifically, it is argued in the following sections of this chapter that within Beijing, places of Hui food culture may be conceived of as connected places. Firstly, places are connected to individuals and groups. This connection not only happens through bodily engagements with places, but also through discursive and representational practices that act to link Hui places of food culture with localised understandings of Hui identity. These connections are, of course, the basis of the relations between collective memory and the making of places (Jones and Garde-Hansen, 2012). The understandings of the Hui discussed in Chapter 5 are once again of importance here: that the Hui are an Islamic group; that the Hui are an official ethnicity; that the Hui are Chinese citizens; and that the Hui are distinguished by their higher levels of cleanliness.

The final understanding of the Hui discussed in Chapter 5, that Hui identity is linked to certain places, is of significance to the next connection: that places are connected to other places. Following Massey's (1991) and Malpas' (2012) work, places are seen as inherently relational, with each place holding aspects of other places within it while also lending itself to those other places. These connected places draw from other places by using referents to signify their association in an attempt to establish them as authentic and legitimate. Specifically, places of Hui food culture in Beijing were most often connected to areas of Northwest China, Beijing, and even the Arab World and the West. These connections between places and their inherent geographical imaginaries and attachments to places, not only play vital roles in how the Hui perform their identities and understand their place within the locality of Beijing, but also their sense of belonging on national and global scales. As such, an analysis of these performances of place allows for the (geo)political nature of these places to be explored.

The final way in which these places of Hui food culture are connected is through the co-existence of multiple temporalities. Through representational practices and place-making tactics, references are made to other places and people. However, when places are being represented, superimposed, performed or modelled after another, they're not just re-creating, representing or performing a different place, but also a different time; a snapshot or impression of the original place at a particular time. This is important as minorities in China are not only seen as belonging elsewhere in China, but they are also seen as "backward". As such, they're not only segregated spatially but also temporally. This is the ethnographic gaze that ejects the exotic from the progressive train of modernity (Fabian, 1983).

In addition to these three types of connections, places of Hui food culture in Beijing are connected in two further, over-arching ways which frame the following arguments of places as connected to other places, people and times. Importantly, these places are connected emotively and politically. This concept of emotively connected places refers to the emotional knowings and experiences of the Hui people that engage with them, with specific attention being given to the feelings of safety, belonging and *Qinqie*. All of these places are also connected to the political happenings and discourses of both Chinese national, and international, politics. These connections are discussed in the following subsections, with specific focus on the representational place-making practices used by Hui individuals when creating places of Hui food culture in Beijing. The use of representations and material objects is analysed, and their meanings explored using a semiological approach.

6.2 CONNECTED TO PEOPLE: THE HUI

When attempting to locate and identify Hui restaurants in Beijing, the presence of *Qingzhen* signs and logos, or more specifically the characters 清真, was undoubtedly the most telling sign. These signs could be found adorning the entrances and exterior street-facing walls of all Hui restaurants and food-vendors. Often they would be featured on the name displays of establishments, or else positioned above, beside or on the door, clearly visible from the street (Figure 6.1). Further, it is also commonly featured on menus, cutlery and utensils, artwork, packaging, and so on (Figure 6.2). These signs, specifically the characters 清真, act as signifiers for staff and potential customers. Signage, its typography and placing, is an important element of the semiotics of place (Stroud and Jegels, 2014; Zabrodskaja and Milani, 2014). These signs signify different meanings for different people. It is important here to remember Hall's (1980) work on encoding and decoding: whereby a sign may be encoded with meaning, but this meaning is decoded differently by different people, depending on their own understandings and positionalities. In light of this, it is perhaps unsurprising then that various individuals and groups with whom I conducted research decoded these signs as meaning different things, especially given the multiplicity of understandings of *Qingzhen* and Hui identity expressed by participants.

Figure 6.1: Qingzhen Signs Outside of Restaurants and Vendors' Units.

Source: Author's Own (2015, 2019).

Figure 6.2: Qingzhen Signs on Plaques, Menus, Utensils, Chopsticks and Bags. Source: Author's Own (2017, 2019).

Initially, I had decoded the characters of 清真 as meaning *halal*, that is to say the set of dietary practices as outlined in the *Qur'an*. However, after discussing such a reading with Hui participants and after carefully reflecting on these conversations and my own initial reading, I realised that such an interpretation was a case of aberrant decoding resulting from my positionality as a non-Hui person. In fact, for most participants the characters 清真 acted as an indexical sign for the Hui as a collective: with the characters acting as the signifier and the concept of "the Hui" acting as the signified due to their culturally specific inherent relationship. This seemingly inherent relationship is not surprising given the importance of *Qingzhen* to the Hui and Hui identity discussed in Chapter 5. However, beyond this culturally specific connection between the Hui and *Qingzhen*, or 清真, the relationship between the two concepts was decoded in very different ways by individuals. For some others, the characters acted as a denotive sign for the concept of *Qingzhen*. The characters 清真 become a signifier for *Qingzhen*, making the concept of *Qingzhen* the meaning as this is a first-level sign. This sign then becomes the form (or signifier) of the second-level sign with the concept (or signified) being Islam, resulting from the close association between *Qingzhen* and Islam held by many people. As was discussed in the previous chapter, some people contended that *Qingzhen* derives purely from Qur'anic teachings, and as such, it is an Islamic concept. Therefore, the mythological, or second-order semiological system between 清真 and Islam, as understood by some, is unsurprising. In other words, a set of signs that at one level refer to Islam, in this context incite the broader reflection about the Islamic identity of the Hui people, their story of their origin.

6.2.a Hui as Islamic

Similar to the Islamic decoding of 清真 described above, a number of other traditional "Hui" representations and material objects are also often understood by participants as signifying the Hui's assumed Islamic nature and religious devotion. As was discussed in Chapter 5.2.a, many participants equated being Hui with being Muslim and they explained the particularities of Hui food culture in religious terms. Linked to the discussion above regarding the characters 清真 as signifiers of Islam, is the use of Arabic writing and the word "Halal" (written in Latin script) on signs surrounding entrances of restaurants, over street-food vendors stalls, on other material objects within restaurants, on food products, and on signage related to food. Often the signs featuring the characters of 清真, as shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2, would also contain the word "Halal" or Arabic script (see Figures 6.3 and 6.4). Similar to how the characters 清真 acted as signs for Islam as discussed above, the use of Arabic signs and the word "Halal" also act as signs for Islam. In particular, they can be viewed as second-level signs, or myths (Barthes, 1973), for Global Islam, rather than more localised or sinocised interpretations of Islam. In relation to the Latin scripted "Halal", it acts as a denotive sign at the first-level for the Islamic dietary practice of halal. This denotive sign then acts as the form/signifier for the second-level sign. The signified/concept of this mythological sign is Global Islam. This decoding of "Halal" as meaning Global Islam stems largely from its non-Chinese nature. The fact that the word is neither written in Chinese characters, nor is it translated as Qingzhen, contributes to this globalised decoding. Similarly, the use of Arabic writing may also be described as a second-level sign for Global Islam; however its meaning is derived in quite a different way. At the first level, the Arabic script acts as a denotive sign for the Arab World. This then becomes the form at the second-level of meaning for the concept of Global Islam due to the historical, religious and cultural association between the Arab World and Islam. These connotations of a global religious culture not only connect these districts of Beijing to other sites of Islamic significance but they also reinforce the interpersonal and gendered relations that Islamic culture in Beijing claims for itself on the basis of this global reach, even while these are contested in various ways in all parts of that diaspora (Aitchison et al., 2007). In general, these gendered implications of the linguistic landscapes of cities have been little researched (Milani, 2014), but it is one further dimension of the geopolitics of gendering to which Feminist Political Geography has drawn attention (see section 2.1.d above).

Figure 6.3: Arabic and English Featured on Qingzhen signs.

Source: Author's own (2015, 2016, 2017, 2019).

Figure 6.4: Arabic writing in artwork, on a menu and on packaging.
Source: Author's own (2017, 2019).

In addition to the above referents, Islam was also signalled through the use of other representational practices. As Figures 6.5 to 6.8 show, references were often made to mosques in the place-making practices of Hui restaurants in an attempt to signify Islam. Specifically, references were usually made to mosques through the use of images of mosques in menus (Figure 6.6), paintings, photographs, name signs, packaging of utensils (Figure 6.2, 6.5 and 6.7), and through the use of dome shaped, Islamic-style arches in the built environment of the establishments (Figure 6.5 and 6.8). These representations of mosques act as synecdochal signs, with the mosques symbolically standing in for that which they are part of; Islam. For these signs, the images of the mosques act as signifiers and Islam acts as the signified. In relation to the arches, domes and silhouettes used in restaurants' décor, they act as denotive signs at the first-level for mosques. These signs then become the form for the second-level signs with Islam becoming the signified/concept, similar to how mosques signify Islam above.

Figure 6.5: Restaurant with a name display shaped in the silhouette of a mosque featuring an image of a mosque, the characters of 清真, crescent moon and Arabic writing.
Source: Author's own (2017).



Figure 6.6: Representations of Mosques in menus.

Source: Author's own (2016, 2017, 2019).

Figure 6.7: Representations of Mosques used in restaurants: table number displays, photographs, artwork & name plates above door.
Source: Author's own (2019).

Figure 6.8: Arches and domes used in restaurants.

Source: Author's own (2015, 2017, 2019).

Representations of other aspects of Islamic practices and paraphernalia were also used to reference Islam by restaurateurs. In Figure 6.9, we can see a piece of art displayed on a wall in a small restaurant in January 2019. When asked about the artwork, the restaurant's owner explained that the script was "Islamic."[139] The Islamic script written on the pages of a book acts as a denotive sign for the Qur'an at the first-level of meaning. This sign then becomes the signifier for the second-level sign, with Islam being the signified.

Figure 6.9: Representation of the Qur'an in a restaurant.
Source: Author's own (2019).

One further symbol used to signify Islam in Beijing restaurants was, unsurprisingly, the crescent moon and star. For many in Beijing, and indeed globally, the image of the crescent moon and star act as symbolic signs for Islam, in a similar manner to how the cross might signify Christianity for observers. In Figure 6.10 the crescent moon acts as the signifier, with Islam being the signified for this symbolic sign. This sign is a

[139] 伊斯兰的。

symbolic one due to the conventionalised and historically contingent but clearly arbitrary relationship between the signifier and signified.

Figure 6.10: Crescent moon and star featured on a menu and front of restaurant. Source: Author's own (2019).

In evoking an Islamic culture, all of the elements mentioned already come freighted with implications for gendering identities. Beyond the specific gendering evoked by reference to mosques and their segregated spaces, the contradictory translation of the domestic work of cooking into the commercial world of the restaurant brings (as I will show below in section 7.3) further gendered-related to pressures to mark architectural space as gendered (Rendell et al., 2000). But, there is one final signifier of Islam that I will now discuss that is among the most visible markers of Islamic culture for many people: the headscarf (Scott 2007; see the discussion in section 5.1 above). Images of women wearing headscarves, and indeed the embodied wearing of headscarves, were often used in restaurants to reference Islam and appeared in a variety of forms; such as artwork, menus, on signs over restaurant doors and most often, as uniforms. As was discussed in Chapter 5.1.a, and as is seen in Figure 6.11, female staff often wore headscarves for a variety of reasons, with some being required to do so by their employers. In relation to these embodied materialities, the headscarves act as synecdochal signs for Islam, with the headscarves being the signifiers and Islam being the signified. As with the representations of mosques discussed above, the headscarves are synecdochal signs as they come to represent that which they are part of; Islam. For some participants, these signs also carried a higher level meaning. At the first-level, these signs could be understood as representing Islam. However, after discussing the meaning of these headscarves with participants, it became clear that for them, these signs had a second-level meaning. That is to say that through signifying Islam, they also could be decoded as meaning religious devotion, modesty, and even authenticity for participants.

Figure 6.11: Islamic dress as uniform.
Source: Author's own (2015, 2019).

Images of headscarf-clad women were also a common occurance in Hui restaurants in Beijing. These images usually featured alongside other signs of Islam, such Arabic writing (Figure 6.11) and images of mosques (Figure 6.12). The co-existence of these two (or sometimes more) signifiers of Islam together causes the image of the headscarve-adorned women to gain further meaning from the other signs, be they Arabic writing (Figure 6.12) or images of mosques (Figure 6.13). This means that these representations of headscarved women can be understood as syntagmatic signs for Islam. In other words, the headscarves receive their reading as Islamic in part from the context of the other signs—as Rose describes for syntagmatic signs (see section 3.2.c. above).

The Islamic character of these spaces, then, is signalled in different ways that will be more or less legible to different patrons. The Chinese characters of the Hui people are immediately taken by some patrons as indicating an Islamic context. This is given a transnational context with the use of Latin and Arabic script for Halal and also by the presence of crescent and moon as international icons of Islam. The religious character of these spaces is further signified by the presence in Arabic script of Qur'anic texts as decoration, by the illustrations of mosques, and by the wearing of headscarves by female staff.

Figure 6.12: Representation of a woman wearing a headscarf on a restaurant's name display that also features Arabic writing.
Source: Author's own (2019).

Figure 6.13: Islamic dress and mosques featured together on a menu and painting. Source: Author's own (2016, 2019).

6.2.b Hui as an Ethnicity

As was discussed in Chapter 5.2.A, many of this project's participants considered Islam to be an ethnic characteristic or trait of the Hui, linking the themes of religion and ethnicity and bearing considerable similarity to official discourses of the Hui as being an Islamic ethnic group. Although such a belief was not universal amongst the Hui in Beijing, it nevertheless deserves consideration when looking at representational referents and place-making tactics in Hui restaurants. Given these associations between Islam and the ethnicity of the Hui, as understood by participants and in official discourses, the above decoding of Islam may also hold a higher, second-level meaning. The signs discussed in section 6.2.a, such as images of mosques, headscarves, Arabic writing, the work "Halal", the Qur'an, and the crescent moon and star, act as signifiers at the first-level for Islam. These signs then become the form for the second-level mythological signs, with the Hui's ethnicity being the signified/concept. As Barthes (1973: 127) writes, a myth "postulates a kind of knowledge, a past, a memory, a comparative order of facts, ideas, decisions". In relation to these signs, the myth created is that Islam is a defining trait of the ethnic group known as the Hui and is important in their identification and differentiation as a group. Once again, considering the political, discursive and representational practices and interventions of the Chinese Government in the establishment of the Hui as a group and in controlling their portrayal in Chinese media, it is unsurprising that such a meaning is decoded by so many individuals. As one of my Han friends advised me in the early days of my fieldwork, "look for Islamic things; signs, pictures, clothes. Then you will know they are Hui people, because they are an Islam[ic] *minzu*."[140] Although I initially followed my friend's advice by employing such a decoding of "Islamic things" as meaning Hui when searching for Hui restaurants, this sweeping reading unsurprisingly proved to be an aberrant decoding as such Islamic paraphernalia could also be found in eateries of other Islamic groups. Further, such an interpretation of these signs as exclusively meaning Hui is telling of both my positioning as a non-Hui, along with the positionality of my Han friend, something which became evident through reflecting on my early semiological readings.

Similar to how the images and representations of women wearing traditional headdresses may be considered as signifiers of the Hui's ethnicity, the traditional white caps adorned by some Hui people also act as signifiers of ethnicity. As Chapter 5.1.a discussed, the small white caps traditionally worn by the Hui are often considered to be a symbol of Hui culture and ethnicity. These caps are not an uncommon sight among Hui communities in Beijing. This is particularly true in Beijing restaurants, where many members of staff are expected to wear the white caps as part of their uniform. Subsequently, it is unsurprising that these caps, whether in the form of clothing worn by staff members or representations and images displayed in the restaurants, act as signifiers for the Hui's ethnicity (Figure 6.14). These signs are indexical ones, given the culturally specific reading and decoding of the inherent relationship between the signifier and signified. In other words, the hat is not just a hat but, in this context, an indication, or what Pierce (Rose, 2001) called an indexical sign, that this person and this establishment affiliate themselves with a Hui ethnicity in a traditional and Islamic form.

[140] 民族。 Eng: Ethnicity. Taken from fieldnotes, dated 20 September 2015. This conversation took place in English.

Figure 6.14: White cap worn as uniform in restaurants and image displayed above entrance.

Source: Author's own (2015, 2019).

6.2.c Hui as Chinese

In addition to signifying the Hui's ethnicity, references were also often made to concepts of the Hui's "big" nationality, or Chineseness. Figure 6.15 shows the most blatant way in which the group's Chineseness was signified. The image shows the service window of a small *Chuan'er*[141] vendor in a popular tourist area of Beijing. Placed in clear sight behind the display of meat skewers is a Chinese flag. Displays and images of the national flag of the PRC act as metonymic signs for the Hui's Chineseness.

Figure 6.15: Chinese flag on display.
Source: Author's own (2019).

Figure 6.16 shows another rather overt way in which one Hui establishments was aligned with nationalistic ideologies and rhetoric. The poster visible in Figure 6.16 was displayed on the wall of one of this project's key participating restaurants. The restaurant specialises in Lanzhou Spicy Beef Noodles and is managed by a Lanzhou-

[141] 串儿。Eng: Barbequed Meat Skewers.

native man, who explained to me that this poster was "very important [for] all Chinese people [to] see. Important for, eh, *SheHui."*[142] The writing at the top of the poster reads "Socialist Core Value View,"[143] and consists of 12 pictures illustrating the fundamental societal values as advocated for by the Chinese Communist Party. Beginning in the top left-hand corner of the image and moving horizontally, these values are illustrated, and indeed named as: Prosperity;[144] Democracy;[145] Civility;[146] Harmony;[147] Freedom;[148] Equality;[149] Justice;[150] Rule of Law;[151] Patriotism;[152] Dedication;[153] Integrity;[154] and Friendship.[155] These core values were first presented in 2013 as part of a new ideological framework of the CCP (Pieke, 2016) with President Xi Jinping calling on officials in 2014 to make the values "all-pervasive, just like the air" (Zhao, 2016).

This poster (Figure 6.16) is laden with meaning and may be decoded in a number of ways using an array of semiological terminology. Firstly, the characters featured in each of the 12 red text boxes act as indexical signs for their corresponding core value, with the characters being the signifiers and the values as the signified. Yet, these may also be considered syntagmatic signs as they gain their meanings from the signs that surround them. Specifically, the cartoon images attached to them add further meaning to these signs, working with the characters to strengthen the meaning being signified. Each of these signified 12 core concepts also work as syntagmatic signs (or contextual) in another way as they relate to each other. In this regard, each of the signified core values (characters and cartoon images) gain meaning from each other. In sum, the signs are understood as one of the 12 Socialist Core Values, not only because of what the character and image represent individually, but also because they work together to signify the 12 values as a complete concept. The co-presence of these signs in a single poster also acts as a denotive sign at the first-level of meaning for the 12 Socialist Core

[142]社会。 Eng: Society. This section of the conversation took place in English at the request of the participant.
[143]社会主义核心价值观。
[144]富强。
[145]民主。
[146]文明。
[147]和谐。
[148]自由。
[149]平等。
[150]公正。
[151]法治。
[152]爱国。
[153]敬业。
[154]诚信。
[155]友善。

Values. This denotive sign then becomes the form/signifier at the second-level within the context of this Hui restaurant. The signified concept is the Hui's "big" nationalism/Chineseness. Once again, the specific context of the Hui restaurants is important here, as this decoding of the poster is very much dependent on its presence within this specific place.

Figure 6.16: Socialist Core Values Poster.

Source: Author's own (2016).

Within restaurants, references to the Hui's nationalistic identifications were also made in more subtle ways. Specifically, the artwork commonly displayed in restaurants acted to signify the group's nationalist identity in an interesting manner. Many restaurants, particularly restaurants owned and run by Beijing Hui or serving Beijing/North-eastern style cuisine, often displayed traditional Han Chinese art. Art such as calligraphy, Chinese-style landscape paintings, paintings of Beijing opera masks and people wearing traditional clothing from various dynasties, and even scenes from famous Chinese novels such as "Journey to the West", were often visible in Hui restaurants (Figures 6.17 and 6.18). Some participants mentioned that such artwork is generally associated with the Han and Han culture. When asked why his restaurant only featured Islamic art and not the types described above, the owner of one small north-western style restaurant argued that it was because those forms of art "are Han. The Hui have [their] own artistic style."[156] Yet, many other participants explained that these features and artistic traditions did not belong solely to the Han, claiming that they were simply traditional Chinese styles of art. For these individuals, such forms of art and artistic traditions belonged to all Chinese people, including the Hui. Within the context of Hui restaurants, these traditional forms of art act as signifiers for China's traditional art and culture at the first-level of meaning. This denotive sign then acts as the form for the second-level of meaning, with the Hui's Chineseness/"big" nationalism being the signified at the mythological level. In other words, something that at one level refers to traditional Han art, in this context begins a story about the Chinese identity of the Hui people.

[156]是汉族。回族有自己的艺术风格。

Figure 6.17: Chinese Artwork in restaurants.

Source: Author's own (2019).

Figure 6.18: Chinese Artwork in restaurants.

Source: Author's own (2019).

6.2.d Hui as Clean

As was discussed in Chapter 5.2.D, the concept of cleanliness is one that lies at the heart of self and group identifications for many Hui people, and is considered by many to be an ethnic trait. This association between the Hui and cleanliness is one that was openly embraced by all Hui participants throughout the fieldwork. As such, it is unsurprising that references to high standards of cleanliness and hygiene were frequently encountered in places of Hui food culture. Firstly, the plaques and certificates discussed in Chapter 5.2.D and seen in Figures 5.10, 5.11 and in profusion in Figure 6.19, act as denotive signs for the cleanliness of the Hui. The plaques and certificates are the signifiers, while the Hui's assumed cleanliness is the signified. Similarly, the open kitchens discussed previously may also be viewed as a signifier for the Hui's cleanliness (Figure 6.20). The example on the left is of a smaller establishment of more 'traditional' appearance (note the white cap, as discussed above in section 5.1.a) and on the right is a larger, more modern restaurant. Despite these differences the adoption in both cases of the open kitchen arrangement underlines its significance for the Hui food culture. This layout is by no means as common across non-Hui restaurants in Beijing. Once again, these can be described as denotive signs, with the large windows to the kitchens being the signifiers. Both of these denotive signs also arguably carry higher meanings; the ethnic superiority of the Hui over the Han. These first level-signs act as the forms for the second-level mythological signs, with the Hui's higher level of cleanliness (and therefore their superiority) being the signified. Such a reading was supported by numerous claims of superior cleanliness by participants. When asked about the purpose of the open windows, one waitress explained that they have the open windows because "we are Hui, we are cleaner [than the Han]".[157]

These signs in their context, then, tell a story of Hui ethnicity elaborated from diverse materials. The hat gives the notion that traditional Hui culture is Islamic. The flags, posters and traditional Han art are a claim upon a Chinese national identity. Finally, the open kitchen in this context underlines the Hui claim to the very highest standards of

[157] 我们是回族人，我们更清洁。

cleanliness and thus, even from their position of minoritisation (see section 2.5 above), to aspire to a position of civilizational superiority within Chinese society.

Figure 6.19: Certificates of Cleanliness.

Source: Author's own (2016, 2019).

Figure 6.20: Open kitchens in Hui restaurants.
Source: Author's own (2015, 2017, 2019).

6.3 CONNECTED TO PLACES

As has been argued in the previous sub-sections, places are inherently relational and connected phenomena. The connections between places and people (specifically the Hui) are often referenced, represented and manifested in a range of place-making tactics deployed by restaurant owners and managers in their attempts to establish Hui, or *Qingzhen*, places in Han-dominated Beijing. Yet, references to the Hui people in the form of their religion, ethnicity, nationality and assumed cleanliness, are not the only way that the group shows itself within Beijing. Rather, references to other places (places often more commonly associated with the Hui) are another powerful way that the group's presence is signalled. These place attachments, geographical imaginaries and subsequent connections between places, not only play vital roles in how the Hui understand their place within the locality of Beijing, but also their sense of belonging on national and global scales.

6.3.a Connections to Northwest China

When attempting to locate Hui restaurants, eateries and food vendors in Beijing, one of the most telling signs of their presence (other than the appearance of the characters for *Qingzhen*) was the use of geographical references and place names to denote the group. Words such as Northwest,[158] Western Regions,[159] Gansu,[160] Xinjiang[161], Ningxia,[162] Lanzhou,[163] Urumqi,[164] and so on were used to demarcate places of Hui food culture. Often the names of these north-western places would be visible above the entrances of restaurants, over street-food stalls and in menus, with restaurants and dishes being named after them (Figure 6.21). These names act as indexical signs for the places of China's north-western territories, or more specifically, geographical imaginaries of those places. In this sense, the characters written are the signifiers, while the places imagined or remembered are the signified. However, these signs may also be decoded in another way; a way that I would argue is particularly resonant for Hui restaurants in Beijing. In this specific context, these signs may also be considered as denotive signs at the first-level of meaning, with the relationship between signifier and signified remaining the same as above. However, these denotive signs, or signified places, carry a higher meaning, acting as the form at the mythological level. The concept of this second-level sign, or the myth, is the Hui, through their close historic and discursive association with these places (see Chapter 4). More specifically, it is belonging of the Hui in these places that is signified by this myth, and subsequently, their lack of belonging in Han-dominated Beijing. As one north-western restaurant owner explained when discussing the frequent use of referents to north-western places in his establishment, "[it is] because we are Hui people, the Northwest is our home."[165]

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[158]西北。
[159]西域。
[160]甘肃。
[161]新疆。
[162]宁夏。
[163]兰州。
[164]乌鲁木齐。

[165] 因为我们是回族，所以西北是我们的家乡。

Another powerful representational practice used to signify these places of China's northwest was the use of landscape paintings and photographs (Figures 6.22 and 6.23). Images of the Northwest's arid lands, plateaus, deserts, valleys and grasslands often hung on walls and featured in menus. Media and political discourses undoubtedly play important roles in making such landscapes known and recognisable to Chinese living in Beijing, as the Northwest is often depicted as a dry, barren and sparsely populated land. As such, the landscapes represented in the artwork and photographs act as iconic signs for the Northwest. These signs are iconic as the relationship between the signifier and signified is based upon resemblance. Once again, these referents to China's north-western lands may also be understood as denotive signs at the first-level, with the mythological concept being that the Hui belong to this place and not Beijing.

Figure 6.21: Place names and Geographical referents in names of dishes and establishments.

Source: Author's own (2015, 2017, 2019).

Figure 6.22: Scenic Paintings.

Source: Author's own (2016, 2019).

Figure 6.23: Scenic images in menus.

Source: Author's own (2019).

Maps were another representational tool used by restaurants to reference the imagined and remembered places of the Northwest. As Figures 6.24 and 6.25 show, maps of north-western provinces were often found in menus and hung on the walls of place-based restaurants, such as those specialising in specific regional cuisines. These maps can be understood as iconic signs, with the outline of the map representing the signified territory, whose shape the map is assumed to resemble. Again, these maps, as with the place names and images above, can be decoded as references to the home of the Hui within modern China and their being "out-of-place" in Beijing.

Figure 6.24: Map featured in menu showing source of meat.
Source: Author's own (2019).

Figure 6.25: Map of Ningxia displayed on wall.

Source: Author's own (2019).

6.3.b Connected to Beijing

Given the close association between the Hui and China's north-western provinces, the frequent references made to these places are unsurprising. However, the Northwest is not the only region of China that was frequently signified by visual representations and material objects within places of Hui food culture. The connections between these restaurants and Beijing were also common. In addition to the north-western style décor, designs and artwork found in many restaurants across the chosen 5 districts of urban Beijing, traditional Beijing and north-eastern styles were also evident in a number of restaurants. These styles of décor often resembled classic Beijing architectural designs; specifically, they were intended to resemble Beijing's famous *hutong*[166] districts. *Hutongs* are narrow alleys that are formed by the joining of *siheyuan,*[167] which are a compound of houses around a square courtyard. Throughout Beijing's *hutongs*, a number of Hui restaurants and eateries could be found in street-facing *siheyuan* (Figure 6.26). These establishments usually featured the dark slate-tiled roofs and grey stonework typical of traditional *hutong* neighbourhoods, with many also having the characteristic red wood and intricate paintwork. These characteristics were often replicated by places of Hui food culture that were not located in *siheyuan*, and even by those establishments outside of the *hutong* areas.

[166]胡同。

[167]四合院。

Figure 6.26: Hui restaurants in hutongs.

Source: Author's own (2019).

In Figure 6.27, it is clear how this traditional Beijing design was mimicked in the décor of several food vendors and restaurants. These features – the dark tiles roofs, the grey stonework, the red wood and detailed paintings – each act as synecdochal signs; with the features being the signifiers and Beijing being the signified. These signs are synecdochal as the come to represent something that they are part of. In other words, they come to represent Beijing. However, these signs may also be considered to carry a higher meaning. In this regards, they can be understood as denotive signs at the first-level of meaning. These denotive signs then act as the form at the mythological level of meaning. The concept being signified at this second-level of meaning is that the Hui belong in Beijing. This decoding is arguably justified when we take the arguments in Chapter 5.2.e and 7.1.b into consideration, where Hui participants claimed that they belonged in Beijing and that their *Qingzhen* variations of traditional Beijing cuisine was also authentically Hui.

Figure 6.27: Beijing style décor.

Source: Author's own (2019).

6.3.c Connected Internationally

As Massey (1994a) has argued, places are often connected globally. These global connections were signified in a number of ways by Hui eateries. Firstly, as was discussed in Section 6.2.a above, Arabic and Latin texts were often used by restaurants, with the written words acting as mythological signs for Global Islam (Figures 6.3 and 6.4). Furthermore, and importantly for the discussion here of connections to places, the Arabic texts act as denotive signs for the Arab World. The Arab World was also signified in a number of other ways by material objects within restaurants. Figure 6.28 shows a variety of material objects – including teapots, tiles and windows – that participants explained were "Arabic."[168] To these individuals, these items were synechdocal signs for the Arab World. Interestingly, however, as with all signs these items could be decoded differently depending on personal understandings and positionalities. For most of the staff within these establishments that I spoke with, these objects signified connections to the Arab World. However, one waiter countered his colleague's assessment by arguing that they were in fact western Chinese features, not Arabic, emphasising the subjective nature of interpreting these signs and the variety of potential decodings.

In addition to signifying the Arab World, references were also occasionally made to the West and Western nations. Similar to how the maps of Northwest China discussed in Section 6.3.a act as indexical signs for those places, the maps and flags of Western nations also act as indexical signs for their respective countries (Figure 6.29). Further, the statues of the Eiffel Tower and of the Queen's Guard act as synecdochal signs; the objects are the signifiers with the West, or more specifically France and the United Kingdom, being the signified. In other words, patrons were expected to be able to read these representations of elements of each country as standing in for the country itself and in that way to recognise the restaurant as claiming an affiliation, at least of friendship, with these other places.

[168] 阿拉伯的。

Figure 6.28: Referents to Arab World.

Source: Author's own (2017, 2019).

Figure 6.29: Referents to the West.

Source: Author's own (2015, 2019).

Another interesting, and seemingly contradictory way, in which the West was signified was through references to Christmas. When conducting research in Hui restaurants, I was surprised to see Christmas decorations being displayed in two restaurants, especially as the owner of one of these establishments identified as a devout Muslim. Nevertheless, as Figure 6.30 shows, Christmas decorations could be seen hanging in his restaurant. These decorations act as denotive signs at the first-level of meaning for the Christian holiday of Christmas. At the second-level however, the concept being signified is the West.

As discussed above (section 2.3) place-making is partly about assembling connections. In this chapter so far, I have reviewed the way the Hui represent themselves as a religious and ethnic group and then I examined what we might term the geographical imagination (Gregory, 1994) represented in the decoration of Hui restaurants in Beijing. The geographical imagination of these Hui restaurants claims three sets of affiliations. In the first place, with place-names, maps and landscape paintings and photographs, the Hui claim connection with North-West China. I explained above (section 4.2) the troubled genealogy of the Hui and the extent to which some view them as no more than Chinese-speaking Muslims (discussed also in Stewart, 2017: 82). In the geographical imagination represented in the restaurants they are a specific ethnic group that may originally have been aggregated from diverse migrant streams but which centred and reproduced itself in North-West China. The second set of links claimed in the architectural form of at least some Hui restaurants is with Beijing itself, particularly in the replication of the architectural forms of some of the older parts of city by restaurants located away from these historic districts. Finally, as the geographical imagination claims an ethnic identity in North-West China and right to belong in Beijing, it is also expressive of what Stewart (2017) calls a 'cosmopolitan' (p. 59) and elective, rather than inherited, Islamic identity, that 'transcend[s] the local' (p. 164). In this regard the third set of links are international and go far beyond the Arabic world to make links with the West more broadly through flags, synecdochic signs, and the use of Christmas decorations in even the most Islamic of establishments.

Figure 6.30: Christmas decorations.
Source: Author’s own (2015, 2019).

6.4 CONNECTED TEMPORALLY

As was argued in Section 2.3.d, places simultaneously contain multiple temporalities, with this co-presence of times meaning that places draw from multiple temporalities and memories at once (Hamilakis, 2017; Pred, 1984). These temporal connections to diffuse pasts and presents were referenced regularly within Hui restaurants and they played significant roles in the place-making tactics of restaurateurs. The black and white photographs seen in Figure 6.31 show scenes from Lanzhou, Gansu Province – or more specifically, scenes from Lanzhou's past. Photographs such as these featured in several restaurants, particularly in one of the project's key participating establishments. During my first prolonged visit to the restaurant in January 2016, the manager gave me a guided tour, highlighting the aspects that he thought I might be interested in for my research. After a tour of the kitchen, he quickly brought me to the photographs hanging on the wall in the main space of the restaurant. He explained that "This is Lanzhou. This is my hometown,"[169] before following in English "This is *LaMian,*[170] eh, noodle's hometown. Name [is] *Lanzhou NiuRou LaMian*."[171]

The images in the photographs can be viewed as iconic signs for Lanzhou's, or more specifically a Lanzhou of the past. Given the political discourses in China around ethnic minority groups as being "backward" and "feudal", this reference to the past carries a higher meaning, although this meaning may be decoded in very different ways. At the first-level, these images are denotive signs for Lanzhou's past. However, two distinct mythological level signs can be inferred. Firstly, in line with Governmental rhetoric, it is possible to decode these second-level signs as signifying the Hui's backwardness or feudal nature. However, after carefully reflecting on this initial decoding I realised that such a reading may be due to my outsider positionality and familiarity with Governmental rhetoric. Further, following conversations with Hui individuals, this is likely to be a case of aberrant decoding – at least for Hui participants. Rather, the Hui staff with whom I spoke in these establishments took great pride in showing me these pictures, claiming that they showed the historical authenticity of their food. For these people, the concept being signified by these mythological signs was one of authenticity. Specifically, it was the authenticity of their food cultures that was being signified.

The authenticity of Hui food cultures was also signalled by other referents to the past. Rather than including historical photographs, some restaurants chose to display paintings of scenes from China's past (Figure 6.32). These paintings act in a similar way to the photographs, with the scenes signifying either the Hui's backwardness or authenticity depending on the individual's decoding. Some restaurants made these

[169]这是兰州。是我的家乡。
[170]拉面。 Eng: Hand-pulled noodles.
[171] 兰州牛肉拉面。 Eng: Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles. This section of the conversation took place mostly in English at the request of the participant.

connections to history even more apparent by including plaques and images detailing their own histories and development. Figure 6.33 shows how two restaurants in Beijing advertise their histories to customers. The image on top includes English writing for tourists, while the bottom poster uses photographs placed in the shape of the company's name to make their restaurant's history clear.

In light of this focus on the temporal, certain representational practices and material objects discussed above take on a further meaning. Specifically, the references to the West and Christmas made in Figures 6.29 and 6.30. These signs of the West may also be decoded as signifying the modernity of the Hui; given the rhetoric of modernity in China in relation to minorities and the imaginary of the West as spearheading modernity globally. This decoding of these representations as mythological signs of Hui modernity show that it is not only through referencing times past that Hui restaurants are made, but rather, by also signifying different interpretations of the present. As Hamilakis (2017) points out, time can be understood as non-linear, and places are made up from the co-presence of multiple temporalities.

Figure 6.31: Historical photographs.

Source: Author's own (2016, 2017).

Figure 6.32: Historical paintings.

Source: Author's own (2019).

Figure 6.33: Restaurants' histories.

Source: Author's own (2015, 2016).

6.5 CONNECTED EMOTIVELY

Emotions and places are intimately linked (see Chapter 2). As we engage with the world around us, our emotional states impact on how we experience and come to know our places-worlds (Davidson and Milligan, 2004; Davidson and Bondi, 2004). Likewise, places can evoke emotional responses (Tuan: 1977). Contextually speaking, the material objects and representations evident within Beijing's places of Hui food culture hold great significance for this project's Hui participants. These place-making tactics and practices elicit emotional responses from those that engage with them as the various signs are subjectively decoded. Such emotional knowings are vital to how these places are experienced, known and performed by individuals and groups, exposing the important and oft-overlooked spatialities of Hui identity politics. As such, these places are not only connected to other places, people and times, but they are also connected to individuals on a more intimately felt and experiential level; they are connected emotively.

During the initial stages of covert fieldwork between August and December 2015, Hui restaurants, food stalls and other eateries were visited across Beijing (see Chapter 3). As time progressed, and more and more establishments were visited, a range of visual referents and material objects continually reappeared. Although I quickly learned to identify these features as possible referents of the Hui, it became clear that they were by no means trivial or irrelevant. Rather, their continued reoccurrence across the diverse array of eateries suggested that they carried higher meaning and significance for the Hui, one more closely linked to the increasingly apparent heterogeneous understandings of Hui identity and culture suggested by the early research.

The importance of these emotive connections to place became abundantly clear during the many visits to key participating restaurants. In mid-January 2016, during the quiet period between the lunchtime rush and dinner service, I stood in one restaurant's open-kitchen with four male chefs aged in their 20s and 30s. All four were specially trained in how to hand-pull noodles and each occupied a separate station in the rather cramped kitchen. The first chef prepared the dough and hand-pulled the noodles before throwing them into the large cauldron of boiling broth. The second chef – the youngest of the three – then timed the boiling noodles, keeping each portion separated, before scooping them out and adding them to a bowl. The third chef stood by the open window to the main part of the restaurant, taking orders and adding the beef, broth and the desired toppings of scallion, radish and chilli oil to each bowl as ordered. The fourth chef, the head chef, normally pulled the noodles while the first chef prepared the dough for him, but given the physicality of his role, he was taking a much needed rest during the mid-day lull. During busy rush hours this production chain of noodle chefs worked at a staggering speed, however at this time it was relatively quite so we could talk with very little disturbance. After describing the events of my previous visit to the four men – whereby the manager had given me a guided tour through the restaurant – I mentioned that I thought the decoration of the restaurant was interesting. The head chef agreed before adding that he especially liked the Islamic scroll painting because it made him feel safe.[172]

This feeling of safety summoned by the painting was mirrored by many other participants when discussing the décor of restaurants. When asked about these features (many of which are discussed above), many respondents also reported feeling safe, with most mentioning feeling at home, like they belonged, felt united, or most commonly, *Qinqie*. It is notable that that as in many studies of domesticity, the home is understood as a place where 'people feel secure and centred' (Blunt and Dowling, 2006: 9), but it also worth remarking that these Hui are referring to the presence in their homes of paintings that express a collective identity, in much the way Tolia-Kelly (2004) describes for the homes of South-Asian migrants in Britain, and that it is the presence of these homely objects that makes them feel comfortable in the public space of the restaurant. The security of a collective belonging being marked in this explicit way. These emotive ties were particularly evident during the interviews in the summer of 2017, where I often asked interviewees to explain why they liked certain features or what these features meant to them. The quotation used at the beginning of the chapter is worth mentioning here again as it encapsulates all of these feelings best:

> "Yes, it is the feeling, just like seeing our own ethnic minority, Islam, it feels very *Qinqie*. Then it seems to give people the feeling of returning home, especially the feeling of peace of mind, what we need is this kind of practical feeling."[173]

[172] Taken from field-notes, written in English.
[173] 对，就是感觉，就是像见到我们本身那个少数民族啊，伊斯兰，就是感觉特别亲切。再就是看上去给人感觉回到了家的感觉，特别踏实的那种感觉，我们需要的就是这种踏实的感觉。

These positive emotional responses to material objects and visual representations are extremely important if we are to understand how places of Hui food culture work in Beijing, and what they mean to the Hui living there. Gladney (1996: 189) has argued that within the urban context of Beijing, restaurants act as "centre[s] for cultural dissemination", forming important meeting points for cultural and social exchanges. However, the emotional attachments and engagements described by all interviewees and many other participants would suggest that these places hold even greater significance for the Hui than merely acting as centres for cultural dissemination. Rather, the narratives of safety, belonging, home, unity and *Qinqie* point to a deeper political discourse and rhetoric of belonging and minoritisation in Han-dominated Beijing, and indeed, China. Within the Beijing context, these representations and objects are encoded with further, more emotionally-laden and politically-charged meanings. Specifically, these various signs – be they *Qingzhen* signs, Islamic art, headscarves, certificates of cleanliness, etc. – act as denotive signs at the first-level of meaning, signifying these various establishments as Hui places. At the second-level, their meaning is that these are safe places of belonging for the Hui.

Of particular importance for this chapter is the feeling of *Qinqie* that participants described. "If I see it, I have a *Qinqie* feeling"[174] was the reply given by an 18 year old waiter from Gansu Province when asked why he liked the Qingzhen sign above the front door. This young man's feelings of *Qinqie*, were mirrored by 12 of the other 33 interviewees when asked about various features. In addition to being linked with the politics of minoritisation and belonging, participants' decisions to describe their affective experiences and reactions as *Qinqie* holds significance for this thesis' conceptualisation of places as connected and relational. Interviewees described not only feeling *Qinqie* to the Hui as a group (be it as a religious or ethnic one), but also as being *Qinqie* to the places themselves, and also to the other places referenced such as Beijing, the Northwest, or the places outside China.

6.6 QINQIE PLACES.

Places are complex and multifaceted. They are our most intimately felt geographies and are known to us through our bodily engagements with the world around us (Casey, 2013). They are bound up with our emotional states and understandings, and these

[174] 我要是看到的话，有种亲切的感觉。

emotive imports are central to the constitution and experience of our place-worlds (Tuan, 1979; Urry, 2007, Davidson and Bondi, 2004). These places are constantly in a processual state of becoming, possessing open and porous boundaries (Pred, 1984; Malpas, 2012; 2017). These historically and socially contingent bundles are inherently relational and connected (Massey, 1994). A central component of places is the connections that they have to other places, people and times (Pierce et al., 2011; Hamilakis, 2017). Given the sensorial qualities of place and the importance of personal experience in place, they can also be understood to be connected in more personal, emotive ways to individuals. These connections, emotional knowings and individual engagements with places are inherently political, with our most personally felt geographies being affected by political discourses and imaginaries (Pierce et al., 2011; Harvey, 1993; Massey, 1994).

This conceptualisation is important for how we understand Hui places of food culture within Beijing. In order to carve out distinctly Hui places and spaces within Han-dominated Beijing, Hui minority subjects have used a range of material objects and visual referents in their place-making efforts. Each of these features is laden with meaning, signifying a plethora of concepts for those individuals that engage with them, depending on subjective and personal understandings of the Hui, Hui identity and the place of the Hui in China and the World. These signs work by focusing on connections between these places and four loosely grouped, and often overlapping, categories: other places such as China's Northwest, Beijing, and more global contexts; various understandings of the Hui as a group; multiple temporalities, specifically past and present; and subjective, emotional connections on an individualistic and experiential level. Framing all four of these connections is a fifth, over-arching one. Connections to the political are evident throughout, be it in the form of discourses: of (not) belonging; of ethnic, religious and national unity; of inter-ethnic relations; of place attachments and imaginaries; and most importantly, in the self-identifications, lived experiences and emotional responses of Hui minority subject.

CHAPTER 7: PERFORMING HUI FOOD CULTURES.

Food holds deep political, sociological and emotional meaning for people (Bell and Valentine, 1997; Bonnin, 2015, 2018; Bonnin and Turner, 2012; Waitt, 2014). We consume and produce certain foods within a variety of affective political and social arenas, from which we construct boundaries of self and other, identity and belonging (Isakjee and Carroll, 2019). Within geography, Sibley (1995) and Hall (1996) have shown that objects (such as food) are important in identity formation, while Bell and Valentine (1997) have demonstrated that such identities are often performed through demonstrations of food cultures. This performative nature of identity through food cultures will be evidenced by this chapter, focusing specifically on how certain dishes may be seen as performances of Hui identity. Specifically, this chapter will do so through exploring three themes that were found to be particularly relevant to the performances of Hui food cultures.

Firstly, this chapter will explore the performances of place-based identities through food, looking specifically at how people's emotive ties to places and geographical imaginaries impact on how they perform and consume certain dishes and food. Food and place are essential practices through which individual and group identity is formed (Ohnuki-Tierney, 1993) and is therefore a central component in conceptualisations of belonging. A further element of belonging is the personal attachment to place (Yuval-Davis, 2006), or sense of place (Tuan, 1979). This connection to place is highly emotive (Davidson and Milligan, 2004; Davidson and Bondi, 2004) and is often performed through food cultures and dietary practices, as Longhurst, Johnston and Ho (2009) have shown, and as this chapter will further develop theoretically with respect to Hui food cultures. The chapter will then look at how the distinctive food practices of Beijing's Hui have been impacted on by processes of minoritisation and inter-ethnic relations in the Han-dominated city. Specifically, section 7.2 will look at how places of Hui food culture are increasingly selling alcohol across five central districts in Beijing, a change that challenges individual desires to live a *Qingzhen* lifestyle. This shift, it is argued, is the result of a two-fold assimilative force. On the one hand, economic necessity requires many establishments to sell alcohol in order to survive in a hyper-competitive market, while narratives of modernity simultaneously influence Hui attitudes towards this contentious and divisive product. Finally, the performance of gender through Hui food cultures will be explored. This section argues that minoritisation is impacting on how

Hui gender and gender roles are performed and defined in Han-majority Beijing. Specifically, section 7.3 argues that gender and male-domination are reconfigured within the place-specific context of Beijing's Hui restaurants and eateries, as Hui patriarchy and minoritisation are synthesised to accommodate to life in a Han-dominated society.

7.1 PERFORMING PLACE-BASED IDENTITIES.

For Hui people living in Beijing, connections to places are important. As Chapter 5.2.e shows, these connections to places greatly influence each of the identity triad's three vertices of *Qingzhen*, Hui identity and Hui food cultures. Specifically, these concepts are shaped by geographical imaginaries, emotive and experiential ties to places, and notions of belonging. Connections to places are drawn upon and highlighted in the place-making practices of Hui restaurants and eateries through the use of material and representational referents (see Chapter 6). These signs are decoded differently by different individuals and groups. Often participants explained that they interpret these references to places as signifying the Hui's place or home in China. These narratives of belonging have direct impacts on understandings of Hui identity, both group and individual.

For many participants, China's north-western territories are the legitimate and primary home of the Hui, and of the other nine Islamic minority groups too. This identification of the Hui as belonging to the Northwest is one primarily based on historical affiliation and on the shared myth of common lineage and ancestry among the group. It is also fuelled by the fact that Muslim minority groups were once the majority population in many areas of the region, including Xinjiang and Ningxia. In particular, the Hui are often associated with specific north-western cities, autonomous counties and provinces; most notably, the city of Lanzhou in Gansu Province and, of course, the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. However, this narrative of belonging is not universal among participants, with many refuting it and offering a counter-narrative of Hui belonging that is noticeably wider in geographic scope. These individuals understand the Hui as hailing from across China, something which is perhaps more reflective of the group's position as the country's most widely dispersed minority group (see Chapter 4). Unsurprisingly, many (although not all) of these individuals were born in provinces outside of the Northwest, whereas many of the people advocating for a strictly north-western view of Hui origin came from that region. Specifically, participants named provinces such as Beijing, Shandong, Hebei, Anhui, Yunnan, and Inner-Mongolia when discussing the group, with some others simply explaining that they came from every province. Yet other participants associated the Hui with places that were far more global in reach. As Chapter 6.3.c shows, regions such as the West and the Arab World are also important for many Hui. This association between international places and the Hui frames many people's understandings of Hui identity and influences their food cultures in interesting ways, as will be discussed below.

These multiple interpretations of Hui identity and narratives of belonging are manifested and performed in diffuse ways through the group's heterogeneous food cultures. These food cultures are intimately tied to places, varying from region to region. Although this variance in food cultures across China's provinces is not unique to the Hui – as the Han's food cultures also change depending on location – what is particular to the Hui is the contesting discourses of group belonging and authenticity associated with the different foods. This varied array of Hui cuisines was evident in the establishments visited and is reflective of the plethora of understandings of Hui identity present among the city's Hui minority population. In this regard, the dishes offered in restaurants and the embodied practices of their making and serving are performances of place-based identities. These performances of place-based identities through food are distinctly apparent in relation to certain dishes and cuisines. Of particular importance are Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles and north-western cuisine, Beijing/north-eastern dishes, and Western foods. Dishes such as these sell place through food, along with the ideals and geographical imaginaries that are associated with those places. The production, performance and consumption of these dishes are, I argue, linked with place-based identities and perceptions of belonging.

7.1.a North-western Cuisine: Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles.

As Chapter 5.2.e discussed, when asked to name dishes that are considered to be representative of Hui food cultures respondents would often identify dishes from China's north-western provinces. In fact, ingredients and dishes such as Wheaten Products,[175] Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles, Eight Treasure Tea,[176] *Sanzi,*[177]

[175]面食。
[176]八宝茶。
[177]馓子。

Barbequed Meat Skewers,[178] Steamed Nine Bowls,[179] goji berries, and a number of mutton and beef dishes such as Hand-Pulled Mutton,[180] were the most common responses given - with the exception of *Youxiang*[181] (see Section 7.3.b for a discussion of *Youxiang*).

Wheaten products were among the most common examples of stereotypical dishes named by interviewees, particularly those from the Northwest. These dishes ranged from hot and cold noodle dishes, to *Tianpei*[182] to baked, steamed and fried breads and pastries. Some individuals named certain dishes as being most important, while for others it was the broad grouping of wheaten products that was most representative of the Hui and their food culture. When asked to describe Hui food, a male manager from Xining, Qinghai Province explained that it was "mainly wheaten products."[183] This understanding of Hui food was shared by other participants, with many drawing connections between wheaten products and the Northwest. During a visit to a Hui-run *Jianbing*[184] stall in November 2015, the middle-aged Gansu-native vendor explained that in her opinion wheaten products best symbolised the Hui's culture because both originated in northwest China. Two young waitresses from Shandong Province working in Dongcheng District also mentioned this association between the Northwest and wheaten products when asked if Hui food varied geographically: "There is not a big difference, but there are some differences. Like in Gansu [and] Ningxia, there's a little more wheaten products."[185]

Similar to wheaten products, certain dishes and ingredients are considered to be typical of Hui food culture due to their association with the Northwest. As was mentioned in Chapter 6.3.a, north-western China is often depicted as a barren and dry land, especially in comparison to China's southwestern "rice bowl" region of Yunnan, Sichuan and Guangxi Provinces. This rather harsh and agriculturally challenging landscape means that many of the ingredients popular in other areas of China were historically unavailable in the Northwest. As such, the Northwest's food cultures (including the

[178]串儿。
[179]蒸九碗。
[180]手抓羊肉。
[181]油香。
[182]甜胚。Eng: Sweet Fermented Grains.
[183]主要就是面食为主。
[184]煎饼。Eng: Thin pancake made of millet flour.
[185]区别不大，但是也会有区别。像甘肃宁夏那边，他们是面食多一点。

Hui's) rely heavily on a distinctive range of ingredients. Of these ingredients, wheat, mutton, beef and goji berries are particularly relevant to the Hui. Wheat, mutton and beef are popular ingredients across the entire north-western region and feature prominently in the food cultures of all groups across the Northwest, including the Han, Uyghur and other minorities. However, goji berries are particularly popular in Ningxia, with one female supervisor from the province explaining to me that, "Our specialty is goji berries. They are famous throughout the country. So, we [Hui] generally pick them."[186]

Although these ingredients are by no means exclusive to the Hui, their association with the Northwest means that they are commonly linked to the group. Further, their historical availability in the Northwest has unsurprisingly resulted in them featuring strongly in most dishes from the region – many of which are generally linked with the Hui. These dishes, specifically beef and mutton dishes, are better attributed to the Hui, despite their also featuring in Han cuisine. This is likely the result of the perceived superiority of Hui, or more specifically *Qingzhen*, meat. When discussing her opinions and experiences of Hui food cultures, a Lanzhou-born Han explained that, "If you want to eat real *LanzhouCai*,[187] you need to go to a Hui *Canting.*[188] Because in my hometown, all meat is *Qingzhen. Qingzhen* meat is better so their food is authentic."[189] Although ethnically Han, this woman's statement about the superiority of *Qingzhen* meat, and her claims of authenticity for Hui north-western dishes, encapsulates the sentiments shared by many of this project's Hui participants – and evidently many Han.

In addition to *Qingzhen* variants of common north-western dishes, there are a number of other dishes that are viewed as being distinctly Hui. Excluding *Youxiang*, two other specifically Hui dishes and one tea were frequently named by participants as being important to Hui culture. These were Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles, Steamed Nine Bowls and Eight Treasure Tea. Although considered by many to be representative of the Hui more broadly, these dishes undoubtedly have strong links with the region. Eight Treasure Tea is a tea consisting of eight ingredients, many of which have strong connections with the Northwest, specifically Ningxia (see Figure 7.1). Although ingredients occasionally vary depending on the restaurant or brand in question, the tea

[186]我们特产就是枸杞。最有名的，在全国都是有名的。所以我们一般就是，摘枸杞。
[187]兰州菜。Eng: Lanzhou cuisine.
[188]餐厅。Eng: Restaurant.
[189]Conversation took place in English.

usually contains Chinese tea leaves (such as jasmine or green tea), chrysanthemum, red dates, ginseng, goji berries, longan, rock sugar and rose buds or lotus seeds. Many of the ingredients in this tea, such as goji berries and dates, have strong ties with the region. Therefore, although this tea is generally considered a Hui speciality, its use of regional ingredients links it to the Northwest, once again drawing connections between Hui food cultures and the Northwest. This relationship with the Northwest was very apparent for some individuals, with one Shandong-born waitress in Dongcheng District claiming that the tea comes from Gansu and Ningxia: "Then there is the Hui nationality, in Gansu, [and] Ningxia that have a famous tea called Eight Treasure Tea."[190]

Figure 7.1: Eight Treasure Tea.
Source: Author's own (2017).

Another specialty dish of the Hui that has prominent connections to the Northwest is Nine Steamed Bowls (Figure 7.2). This dish is often prepared to mark important events, such as births, funerals, weddings and religious festivals like Ramadan. Nine Steamed

[190]再就是回族，甘肃吧，宁夏有一个比较有名的茶，叫八宝茶。宁夏的八宝茶。对，主要就是这些吧。

Bowls consists of nine separate, but equally sized dishes arranged in three rows of three, making a square. The nine dishes vary depending on individual interpretations of the meal, the event being celebrated and on geographical location, with different individuals and groups often claiming to know the authentic or definitive version of it. However, according to participants, there are some generally adhered to rules about the composition and placement of the nine dishes. Specifically, that the dishes must be arranged in a square, there must be four dishes of meat with one placed at each corner, that there must be a dish of green vegetables, and that the guest of honour must be seated in front of the vegetable dish. As one waitress from Shandong Province, but whose family comes from the Northwest, explained, "In particular, the Hui people are represented by Steamed Nine Bowls. […] There will be nine bowls. Four bowls of beef or mutton, there is chicken, cabbage or dried kelp, fried meatballs, and *ZhaOuHe.*[191] This food is particularly representative in our homes."[192] The specificities of the dish were elaborated on by a young male chef from Gansu Province, "There is a certain amount of attention paid to the way the dishes are placed. For example, the upper seat is given to the guests. The four corners must be four bowls of beef and mutton. On both sides are *ZhaOuHe*, croquettes, and both are placed on the sides. But all four corners must be four bowls of meat. And in our home, a bowl of cabbage in front of the person sitting in the upper seat."[193]

[191] 炸藕盒。 Eng: Bomb Box – battered lotus root with a meat filling.
[192] 就回族特别，有代表性的九大碗[。。。] 都会有九大碗。四碗牛肉或羊肉，就有鸡，白菜海带，再有炸的丸子，还有炸藕盒。在我们家里特别有代表性的这个食物。
[193] 它摆的那个方式，有一定的讲究。比方说咱，[。。。] 就咱说的上座，贵宾坐的上座，四角必须是四碗牛羊肉。两边是藕盒，炸丸子，两边那边放都可以。但必须四个角都是四碗肉。但是上席，你知道吗，上席必须是一碗白菜，在我们家。

Figure 7.2: Steamed Nine Bowls, including additional pastries (bottom left and right corners) and rice.
Source: Author's own (2017).

7.1.a.i Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles.

> "Lanzhou natives start their days with a bowl of beef noodles. With the Yellow River crossing the city, Lanzhou is home to over 1,000 Muslim noodle shops. Everyday more than 1,000,000 bowls of beef noodles are consumed. People have lavished praise on the tender and hot Lanzhou noodles. 100 years ago, a Hui ethnic person, Ma BaoZi, poured the water in which the beef and lamb livers were just boiled into a pot. Noodles made in that pot won popularity immediately. The clarity of the beef broth is the best way to check if the beef noodles are authentic. The best beef noodles should acquire the following five features: clear soup, clean white turnips, brilliant red chilli oil, green parsley, and yellow noodles. When kneading the flour, Ma BaoZi creatively added some special water. The main component of this water is potassium carbonate. It made

the flour more elastic. All the procedures are manual. Ma WenBin is the fourth-generation successor of Lanzhou Beef Noodles. He's been working in a noodle shop for 40 years. To pull the dough into noodles of different thicknesses, a chef needs to have extraordinary strong arms. They also need exquisite skills in controlling this strength. The same wheat and the same flour, but different noodles, and different wonders are produced"[194] (A Bite of China Season 1 (Eng.), 2014).

The above excerpt is taken from episode two, "The Story of Staple Food,"[195] of the hugely popular Chinese documentary series "A Bite of China."[196] This originally seven-part show, which was produced and aired by the Government-owned China Central Television (CCTV), gained tremendous popularity among viewers and achieved high ratings when aired on the network's main CCTV1 channel (Chow, 2012). Episode two focuses on the history and cultural importance of China's staple foods. As the above excerpt is being narrated, images of Lanzhou's mosques and traditionally dressed Hui people are continually displayed: with some praying, some eating noodles, and some hand-pulling noodles. Figures 7.3 to 7.5 show the opening scenes of the section dedicated to Lanzhou Beef Noodles. As the narrator explains that "Lanzhou natives start their days with a bowl of beef noodles,"[197] the images displayed alternate between Hui men wearing their stereotypical white caps and a landscape shot of Lanzhou City. In Figure 7.3, we see a man bowing in prayer, accompanied by the spoken words and written text of "Lanzhou people's early morning."[198] The men's white caps act as indexical signs for their ethnicity; with the caps being the signifiers and the men's status as ethnically Hui being the signified (see Chapter 6.2.b above). As Barthes (1977: 38–41) has argued, the text accompanying images is important, and may have a relay-function, adding to the meaning and influencing the particular decoding. In the case of Figure 7.3, the presence of the text "兰州人," or "Lanzhou people" is important, as it also works as an indexical sign. The words become the signifiers, while people from Lanzhou are the signified. Importantly, these two indexical signs may also be

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[194] A Bite of China, Season 1 Episode 2, "The Story of Staple Food", 23:35 to 26:31. English translation is taken from the English version produced by CCTV. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B8lTWruUaQc&list=PLEmk2mJtZJ7FIVleraLI2t9xhqYVkiWqU&index=2

[195] 主食的故事。

[196] 舌尖上的中国。

[197] 兰州人的早晨是从一碗牛肉面开始的。

[198] 兰州人的早晨。

understood as syntagmatic signs as they work together to produce a further meaning and potential decoding. Specifically, the co-presence of these two signs acts as a signifier for the belief that the Hui are from Lanzhou. Similarly, the text heard and seen in Figure 7.4, along with the visual image of Lanzhou City, also acts as a syntagmatic sign. However, in this instance it is the words "beef noodles" or "牛肉面" that work with the image of Lanzhou to signify the concept that Lanzhou is where beef noodles are from. These two syntagmatic signs, along with the image and text in Figure 7.5, may also be understood as syntagmatic signs in a broader sense. Together, the three visual images and the accompanying text act to signify a further syntagmatic sign. Specifically, the sequence of signs present in the clip suggests that the Hui are from Lanzhou and that their food is beef noodles.

Figure 7.3: Lanzhou natives start their days with a bowl of beef noodles 1.
Source: A Bite of China (2014).

Figure 7.4: Lanzhou natives start their days with a bowl of beef noodles 2. Source: A Bite of China (2014).

Figure 7.5: Lanzhou natives start their days with a bowl of beef noodles 3. Source: A Bite of China (2014).

This concept of the Hui belonging in Lanzhou and of beef noodles as being a Hui dish is evident throughout the excerpt, in particular when the narrator claims that “Lanzhou is home to more than 1,000 Muslim noodle shops” and when he discusses the history of the dish: “100 years ago, a Hui ethnic person, Ma BaoZi, poured the water in which the beef and lamb livers were just boiled into a pot”. This association between the Hui, Lanzhou, and Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles, was one that appeared time and again during fieldwork, especially in the many restaurants visited that specialised in the dish.

“You see these pots? This style of cooking is called, eh, I don’t know how to say [it] in English. It’s this character, maybe you know it?” explained the male manager of a key participating restaurant while he wrote the character 品 on the palm of his hand. “Shape is [the] same, look[s] the same. You see? That is how we cook our *LaMian*. It[s] Lanzhou style”. He was referring to the three large cauldrons standing in the centre of the small kitchen in his Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles restaurant (Figure 7.6). One cauldron was filled with beef stock, the same stock used for the broth of the noodles. “The beef [is] cooked in this soup [stock]. Then take[n] out. Now [there are] just bones in there. [We] cook bones for four hours or more. This is our special way […] Our beef comes from *Niujie*, very good quality. Best quality. Each day [we] use maybe 100kg of beef. Other restaurants’ quality is not so good. They can’t afford this much”. As the manager later explained, this beef stock is mixed with water to make the broth for the noodles at a ratio of roughly 30% stock and 70% water – although the manager pointed out that the exact recipe was a “secret. It’s our own special recipe: Lanzhou flavour. Just for us”. This broth was kept in the second cauldron, the one closest to the service counter with sliced vegetables and cooked beef added to it.

In the corner of the kitchen was a large metal worktop used for rolling and pulling the dough into noodles (Figure 7.6). As the noodles were pulled to shape and size, they were then thrown into the third cauldron, which was filled with boiling starchy water. The restaurant offered seven different sizes of noodles for customers to choose from, ranging in length and thickness. As the chef pulled the noodles, he alternated between dipping his fingertips in oil and thinly spreading flour on the work surface, with the amount of oil and flour varying depending on the type of noodle that he was pulling. As the chef pulled each of the seven types, the manager explained that different noodles were popular with different genders and ages. “You see this type, for the kids. For the old people too. Because it is thin, easy to eat […] This fat one [is] for the very young guy, they like it. Because their stomach is very strong and nice […] This normal model is for everyone. Everyone can eat [the] standard model […] This one, is for the lady. Maybe 40 or 50 year[s] old. The thickness is nice for them". Once the noodles had been pulled from the starchy boiling water, they were added to a bowl with a ladle full of broth and topped with radish, scallion and chilli oil before being handed to the customer. Pointing at the bowl of noodles, he went on to say "this is why our Lanzhou *Lamian* are so famous now in Beijing. [In] One day, maybe 2,000 people eat [it]. In Beijing, [there are] 1,000 *Lamian* restaurants. Taste is clean, and our chef[s] are very skil[ful]. […] Take[s a] lot of strong [strength] for these noodles. Only man can do [it]."[199]

Figure 7.6: Kitchen with 品 cauldrons and noodle-pulling table.

Source: Author's own (2016).

[199]Taken from fieldnotes dated 20 January 2016. Conversation took place in English.

The details of this performance of Hui food culture through the making of Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles are important for our understandings of the geographies of Hui identity in Beijing for several reasons. Firstly, the practicalities of cooking this dish, along with the high demand from customers, have resulted in a certain spatiality being arranged within the restaurants: the positioning of the staff around the 品 cauldrons, the workspace given to the noodle-puller, the circular cleaning system (see Chapter 5.2.e), and the L-shaped queuing system implemented by the restaurant to deal with the high volume of customers. These particularities mean that a similar spatial model was followed by many of Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodle restaurants visited. In this regard, these places of Hui food culture are structured according to the requirements of this dish. Closely related to this is the second point: that these spaces are structured and organised by gender, as are the consumption practices (a point that will be discussed in Section 7.4.c). Thirdly, the popularity of this dish among customers, both Hui and non-Hui, is significant as it means that this performance of Hui food culture is one that is often consumed by residents within Beijing. Lastly, and undoubtedly most importantly for this chapter, the production and consumption of Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles is a performance of place-based identity, directly associating both the Hui and their food culture with Lanzhou.

7.1.b North-eastern Cuisine: Beijing Specialities.

A second type of place-based identity often performed by the Hui through their food cultures is identifications with Beijing and Northeast China. Similar to the performances of north-western and Lanzhou identities discussed above, many Hui used their food cultures as a mechanism for performing their north-eastern and Beijing-based identities. Specifically, these individuals and restaurants offered a range of dishes that are more traditionally associated with the Han, given their origins outside of China's Northwest. Stir-fried dishes such as Deep-Fried Tripe,[200] Kung Pao Chicken,[201] Mapo Tofu,[202] *Disanxian,*[203] Fish Flavoured Shredded Meat,[204] and a range of other stir-fried vegetable, beef and mutton dishes, were often named by participants as being important and popular examples of their group's food. Several other non-stir-fried, and usually

[200] 爆肚。
[201] 宫保鸡丁。
[202] 麻婆豆腐。
[203] 地三鲜。Dish consisting of stir-fried potato, aubergine and green pepper.
[204] 鱼香肉丝。

Han-associated, dishes were also named by participants, including Dumplings,[205] Soya Milk[206] and *Lǘdagun.*[207] Further, a number of other, more locally specific and non-stir-fried delicacies and dishes were also named by participants and offered in their restaurants, such as Beijing Barbecue Meat,[208] Pea-flour Cakes,[209] Steamed Corn Buns,[210] Beijing Noodles with Fried Bean Sauce,[211] and even Beijing Roast Duck,[212] and Beijing Copper Hotpot.[213]

Although of Han origin, some of these dishes, specifically the vegetable dishes, breads and cakes, are considered by many as being *Qingzhen* and as such, Hui, because they don't contain any animal derivatives or meat. For others, however, even these dishes need to be prepared in a certain way if they are to be considered *Qingzhen*. Of particular importance here is the discussion about cleanliness and food preparation in Chapter 5.2.d. Despite differences in opinion regarding whether these dishes could be considered as Hui/*Qingzhen* or not, participants from both viewpoints did share a key similar belief. Specifically, when discussing these vegetable dishes, it was often explained that these dishes could only be considered as Hui dishes if they were cooked using clean vegetable oil, a point that participants claimed differentiated their versions of the dish from the Han, and which therefore excluded them from eating in Han restaurants. As a Hui Imam from Shandong Province explained to me in August 2017, "*Qingzhen* oil is included and must be *Qingzhen*. It must be used by our Muslims. It is not that we do not eat [non-*Qingzhen* oil], we may not eat [it]."[214]

In addition to using clean vegetable oil when cooking, and the apparently uniquely Hui method of cleaning and preparing vegetables before use, another important factor in making these previously Han dishes qualify as Hui is unsurprisingly, the use of *Qingzhen* meats. For some meat dishes, this process simply involved using *Qingzhen* beef, mutton or other meats in place of their non-*Qingzhen* equivalent. An example of

[205]饺子。
[206]豆汁。
[207]驴打滚。Eng: Pastry made of steamed glutinous millet flour.
[208]北京烤肉。
[209]豌豆黄。
[210]窝窝头。
[211]北京的炸酱面。
[212]北京烤鸭。
[213]北京铜火锅/北京涮肉。
[214]清真的油都包含在内，必须要是清真的。必须我们穆斯林用的可以，不是我们不吃，就不能吃。

this is the widely popular Kung Pao Chicken, which some participants explained was primarily made into a Hui dish by substituting the non-*Qingzhen* chicken with *Qingzhen* certified chicken. For other meat dishes, specifically dishes that are most often made by the Han using pork, some participants explained that they could be made Hui by replacing the pork with permitted meats. An example of this is the commonly found Fish Flavoured Shredded Meat dish which is often made using shredded pork in Han restaurants. However, it was offered by several participating restaurants in the form of shredded beef or shredded mutton. By making Hui or *Qingzhen* versions of Beijing and north-eastern dishes, the Hui are performing their place-based identities, making assertions of belonging, and challenging discourses that would otherwise confine them and their food cultures to China's Northwest.

The selling of *Qingzhen* versions of previously Han dishes was viewed by many participants as being a relatively new occurrence within Beijing. For some, this was an example of modern Hui cuisine and the inherent modernity of the group. When asked about this apparently recent trend most participants described it as a positive change, as something that broadens the Hui's gastronomic choices and allows the Hui to enjoy foods that were previously off-limits for them: "But as a *Qingzhen* customer, he won't go to a non-*Qingzhen* restaurant to eat Roast Duck or go to eat Kung Pao Chicken […] Although it is not the special feature of this restaurant, he can also taste the *Qingzhen* version of Kung Pao Chicken"[215] and "I see that a lot of Muslims in the local area can't eat authentic Beijing snacks. I have an idea to change it [the restaurant] into an old Beijing snack [restaurant]."[216] This acculturation of Hui food cultures through the adoption of Han dishes was consciously pursued by some individuals, who saw it as a part of joining Han-dominated society: "Plus if someone else lets you go to the Han world, we will also try hard to make some changes."[217]

Although many participants view this broadening of Hui food culture as a beneficial occurrence, other interviewees were less positive about the change and were somewhat more critical of the reasons behind this form of assimilation. When asked about the

[215]但是作为一个清真的顾客来说，他不会去到非清真餐馆里去吃烤鸭或者去吃宫保鸡丁[。。。]在我们餐厅里虽然说不是我们的特色，但是他也可以尝到清真版的宫保鸡丁。
[216]我看本地好多穆斯林吃不上正宗的北京小吃，我有这想法给它改成老北京小吃了。
[217]在加上别人如果让你去了汉族的世界，我们也会努力尝试着也去做一些改变。

authenticity of *Qingzhen* restaurants serving *Qingzhen* versions of traditionally Han dishes, two Hui waitresses explained to me that:

> "if it is from the side of Islam, it is not a *Qingzhen* restaurant, but now there is no [other] way […] After all, we have to live […] Whether it is consumption in Beijing or accommodation, it is too high [expensive]. [If the restaurant] simply sells to some of the Hui people, it completely can't keep up […] For example, [if] it is something [a dish] that is not *Qingzhen*, but they change the meat to *Qingzhen* and then sell it, it will improve business […] Islam does not allow it, but there is no [other] way. After all, the boss is also a businessman."[218]

This belief that Hui restaurants were being forced into selling traditionally non-*Qingzhen* dishes in order to survive economically was shared by many other respondents, and is reflective of a kind of forced assimilation and adoption of Han food cultures experienced by many Hui restaurants across Beijing (a point that will be discussed in greater detail in Section 7.2).

This narrative of the Hui's assimilation into Han food cultures as being a recent phenomenon, as described by many of the project's participants, was countered by the elderly, female owner of a small bakery and cooked meat shop. According to this interviewee, Hui and Han cultures developed alongside each other, and as such their food cultures are the results of this combination, which she claims has happened over a thousand years of inter-ethnic interactions and from ongoing Han-support:

> "There are the Hui people in China, [with] a thousand years of history. With a thousand years of history, its culture is here until now, and it is inseparable from the support of the Han people. In fact, 50% of the Han people lived together with the Hui people, and then merged with Han culture. Although its belief is Islam, its eating habits are still in Chinese culture. For example, you can say steamed bread, steamed white rice, and stir-fry. This is all Han culture, but the Hui people both eat and make [these dishes], and they are making very well. Why? This is a combination of two cultures. There is not much difference

[218]要是在伊斯兰教这边的话，就不算清真的餐馆，但现在没办法[。。。] 毕竟也要生活[。。。] 无论是北京的消费也好，住宿也好，太高太高了。它单纯的卖回族的一些，就完全就是，跟不上了[。。。]比如说它会上一些本来不是清真的东西，但它会把肉改成清真的，然后再卖那个，就会对生意提升一点[。。。]伊斯兰教的话，是不允许的，但是没有办法。毕竟老板他也是生意人。

between *Qingzhen* culture and life. [...] Why must he be tolerant? If it is not tolerant, it [Hui culture] will not be there anymore. Therefore, the predecessor of the Hui people in China is the Han nationality. […] Its halal culture is mainly a habit of eating, nothing else."[219]

7.1.b.i Niujie Meat.

Among the performances of Beijing-based identities, there are some even more localised attachments to place and demonstrations of place-based identities. These attachments to local places and performances of neighbourhood identities were particularly prominent in regard to one key component of Hui food cultures: meat. When discussing their restaurants' dishes or important ingredients in the group's food cultures, many of the project's participants would reference their restaurants' higher quality meat as a way of distinguishing them from competing establishments. These claims of superiority were generally legitimised by naming the source of their meat; be it through linking the meat to the region of its production (often Northwest China or Inner-Mongolia), or more commonly, through explicitly stating that they sourced their meat from butcher shops and wholesalers in Beijing's historical Niujie neighbourhood.

"You should go to Niujie,"[220] was one of the most common pieces of advice that participants would share with me during all stages of the fieldwork, and it was also said to me by numerous Han friends, teachers and acquaintances when they discovered the nature of my research. Niujie, or Oxen Street, is a predominantly Hui ethnic enclave surrounding one of Beijing's most historically important mosques in Xicheng District. Given the neighbourhood's historical role as an epicentre of Hui cultural and social life within Beijing, it is unsurprisingly often associated with notions of authenticity with respect to Hui food cultures and it was explicitly studied as such by Gladney (1996) some three decades ago. Specifically, given its close ties with the Hui, their food cultures, and consequently *Qingzhen*, the meat prepared and sold in the neighbourhood was considered by participants to be of higher quality and more authentic than meat

[219]这样中国这个回民，一千年历史。有一千年历史，它的文化在这里能到现在，离不开汉民的支持。其实百分之五十的都是汉民和回民生活在一起，然后融合了汉文化。它信仰虽然是伊斯兰教，它的饮食习惯还是汉文化里的。你比如说馒头，蒸的白米饭，炒菜，这都是汉文化，但是回民都吃都做，而且都做得特别好。为什么？这是两种文化结合了。清真文化和生活没有多大的区别，...为什么，他肯定是包容。如果不包容的话早就没有了。所以说中国的回族前身就是汉族[。。。] 它的清真文化就主要是吃的习惯，其他的没什么。

[220]你应该去牛街。

sold by butchers elsewhere in Beijing. As such, butchers and wholesalers in Niujie often sold their meats for a higher price than their out-of-neighbourhood competitors, with some establishments serving huge queues of patrons daily (see Figure 7.7 and 7.8).

Figure 7.7: Queue at Niujie Butcher Shop.
Source: Author's own (2015).

Figure 7.8: Queue at Niujie Butcher Shop 2.
Source: Author's own (2016).

"We only buy from Niujie, all our meat. Beef and mutton. Very high quality. Best quality. Very expensive. Other places [restaurants], they can't do [it]. [It costs] Too much money."[221] This male manager's emphasis on the higher quality of Niujie meat was mirrored by many other participants and offered as examples of their restaurants' superiority and authenticity. It was not only through word of mouth that the meats' source of origin was advertised to customers visiting restaurants across the city but was also often advertised within restaurants. By highlighting the connections between their food and Niujie, these individuals were performing a very specific and local place-based identity. This identity draws from the popular imaginaries and narratives of Niujie's meat as being superior in quality, authenticity and cleanliness, while also building upon local understandings of Niujie as being the Hui's historical place in Beijing. Thus, by performing Niujie-based identities through meat, these individuals and restaurants were stating claims of being more authentically Hui while simultaneously asserting themselves as belonging in Beijing.

7.1.c International Dishes: Cafes and Bakeries.

One further example of place-based identities evident in the food performances of Beijing Hui is identifications with international and global places. Similar to how some Hui restaurants chose to serve *Qingzhen* variations of traditionally Han dishes in order to broaden the food choices of local Beijing Hui, some establishments offered dishes from further afield when attempting to modernise and broaden Hui food cultures. In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the number of Western-style restaurants, cafes and bars across Beijing, serving an array of international dishes and drinks. Most often, these restaurants serve distinctively Euro-American style cuisines but as interpreted to appeal to the Chinese consumer base. This trend in establishing places of localised Western-style food cultures was also evident among the Hui in Beijing.

When scouting restaurants during the early stages of fieldwork in September 2015, I was somewhat surprised to find a *Qingzhen* Western-style café nestled among the *hutongs* in central Beijing. Clearly displayed to the right of the glass door was an English sign reading "Halal Food. Tea. Coffee", with a small green *Qingzhen* sign to the left of the doorway. After entering, I was directed to a seat near the window by a young

[221]Taken from fieldnotes dated 28 January 2016.

Hui waitress, who later explained that all of the staff in the restaurant were also Hui. After chatting for a while, she handed me a leather-bound menu and recommended that I try their coffee before walking to the back of the restaurant to chat with her colleague, leaving me to look through the thin menu alone. The contents of the menu were even more surprising to me than the existence of the café. On each page were images of typically Euro-American dishes, including margherita pizza, toasted cheese sandwiches, green leaf salad with mayonnaise dressing, creamy tomato soup, vanilla ice-cream, cheesecake, beef burgers, fries, and even chicken nuggets. Although it shut down soon after my first visit due to the café's failure to secure necessary certificates from local authorities, I spoke via phone call with the owner who explained to me that her intention for opening the café was to show that Hui people could also be "modern people,"[222] and to demonstrate that they were "global citizens"[223] like the Han.

These discourses of modernity and global identifications were also repeated by some other Hui working in four similar establishments visited between 2015 and 2019. For many of these individuals, Western dishes are considered to be a sign of modernity through their attachments with seemingly modern places; i.e., Western nations. By selling a Hui version of foreign foods, the Hui are not only selling "modern" dishes and contemporary understandings of modernity but are also selling a Sino-Islamic version of Western cuisine. By doing so, they are localizing the international and are expressing aspects of how their identities are tied to the "global" and "modern".

When asked for her opinion of these types of Hui cuisine, the elderly owner of a Beijing canteen explained that:

> "This [selling beef burgers] is normal, it's keeping up with the times. It is impossible to eat braised oxtail or sautéed ox tripe with coriander [all the time]. But no matter how many innovations are made, its core never changes, must be *Qingzhen*. *Qingzhen* scriptures, *Qingzhen* words, *Qingzhen* restaurants, how can you change us all? Without the *Qingzhen* signs, we certainly won't go in [to the restaurant]."[224]

[222]今人。

[223]世界公民。

[224]这个很正常，与时俱进，不可能老吃红烧牛尾或者芫爆散丹。不管一系列怎么创新，但是万变不离其宗，必须得有清真。清真的经文，清真的字，清真的餐厅，你怎么变我们都可以去。没有这些清真标识，我们肯定不去。

This acceptance of *Qingzhen* variations of Western style dishes was evident in the responses of many interviewees, although all also shared the belief that the dishes could only be considered as Hui if they used certified *Qingzhen* meat and/or followed the Qur'anic way of slaughtering animals. However, the acceptance of such interpretations of Hui cuisine was challenged by other participants, specifically by some elderly interviewees. When asked to comment on the recent trend of *Qingzhen* Western-style foods, specifically beef burgers, the male manager of one small restaurant in Beijing's Dongcheng District said "[I] can't accept those, there is no such thing [as *Qingzhen* beef burgers]."[225] Although this refusal of *Qingzhen* Western-style foods was occasionally found among some older participants, most respondents supported such food practices, agreeing that they demonstrated the modernity of the group and their international attachments and identifications with places. For some other interviewees, such performances of modernistic and place-based identities were unnecessary given the strength of the Hui's traditional food cultures: "You mean innovations? Yes, I think [they're okay] […] It doesn't have to be [innovative], but in fact traditions are also very good."[226]

7.1.c.i Chocolate Cake.

> "The original intention for investing in this [bakery] was to do something for our minority, because there was no such thing as a specific *Qingzhen* bakery in Beijing, no. And the ingredients we use in our bakery are made entirely from Millacin the UK and the Anchor Pure Cream in New Zealand. Then including our entire raw materials, we use the *Qingzhen* certification, which is the certification of Malaysia's global *Qingzhen*. Therefore, it is aimed at Muslims. Who [I] mainly want to target [are] Muslims in Beijing, thus we can give our Muslim brothers and sisters a little [more] convenience. Therefore, the original intention at the time was to establish a minority business, and at the same time provide our people with some useful services."[227]

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[225]接受不了，没有那样的。

[226]创新吧你是说？可以吧，我觉得, 可以吧。不一定非得，但其实传统的也挺好的。

[227]投资这个就是想做一些我们民族的事情，因为在整个北京没有专门针对 focus on 清真面包的这块，没有。而且我们面包房它现在用的原料都是完全从英国的南风车和新西兰的安佳纯清真的奶油制作的。然后包括我们整个原料用的都是用有清真的 halal 认证，就是马来西亚全球的清真的这样的认证。所以说主要想针对北京的穆斯林做一个就属于针对于穆斯林，然后呢又能够给我们的穆斯林兄弟姐妹提供一点方便。所以说当时的初衷是为了做一些民族的事情，同时给我们的民族提供一些方便才做的这个行业。

This interviewee, a 30-something year old, Heilongjiang-native, had opened this bakery five years previous after noticing a gap in the *Qingzhen* market and spurred on by his desire to give back to his minority group. Like many other Hui restaurateurs across the city, he took great pride in the high quality and *Qingzhen* certification of his ingredients, using their status to assert his food's authenticity. However, unlike most participants who boasted about their products' Chinese origins, the owner of this bakery proudly broadcasted (and indeed advertised) his products' foreign origins. Specifically, he highlighted the products' certification as *Qingzhen* by international agencies, in particular from Malaysia. By doing so, he was aligning his foods' *Qingzhen* status with that of other Muslim produce globally, legitimising its qualifying as Muslim food. Further, by emphasising its association with Malaysia, a predominantly Muslim country, he was identifying with other Muslims globally through the concept of Global Islam.

Of the many popular baked goods sold in his establishment, it was chocolate cake that proved to be most popular among his patrons. "What is the most popular product in the bakery?"[228] He repeated the question to the female server standing behind the cash desk before turning back to me and relaying the answer: "Chocolate cake."[229] "Because, as I have told you, most of our customers are young people […] The chocolate that we use is the top *Qingzhen* chocolate, so this may be [why] it is more popular. Whether it is Hui or not, there is basically a kind of chocolate [that gives you] a very special feeling. And we have very few *Qingzhen* chocolates, and there are very few [*Qingzhen*] chocolates on the market except for ours. And in fact, on the market, except for us, it is rare to buy *Qingzhen* chocolate, *Qingzhen* chocolate cake. So, our chocolate cake is really delicious. Chocolate cakes are the best-selling item in the cake category."[230]

As the owner makes clear, *Qingzhen* chocolate and baked chocolate goods are quite a rarity in Beijing, largely explaining the popularity of this dish among the bakery's patrons. However, the scarcity of *Qingzhen* chocolate among the city's Hui foodscapes is not the only reason behind the popularity of this dish. Rather, the foreign source of

228 店里面最受欢迎的产品是哪一些?
229 Answer was given in English.
230 因为刚才我谈到我们的顾客大部分以年轻人为主[。。。] 而且我们用的巧克力呢就是在清真内最顶级的巧克力，所以这种可能是受欢迎多一些，因为只要是，不论是不是回族，基本上对巧克力都有一种，很特殊的感觉。而且我们清真的巧克力又很少，市场上除了我们之外，很少有巧克力。而且像那个市场上，除了我们之外，很少能买到清真巧克力，清真巧克力蛋糕这样。所以说我们的巧克力蛋糕确实是比较好吃。巧克力蛋糕是在蛋糕类卖得最好的。

origin of the cake's ingredients, which is widely advertised within the bakery and is often explained by staff to customers, also plays a central role, as does the fact that chocolate cakes are associated with the food cultures of Western nations. These clear ties to non-Chinese places, along with the associated discourses and narratives of modernity, position the bakery's popular chocolate cake in an interesting way in relation to Hui food cultures and identity performances. By making and consuming these chocolate cakes, Hui participants were not only demonstrating their identities as modern people, but were also performing place through food, specifically places of the West, or more accurately, imaginaries of the West.

7.2 PERFORMING ASSIMILATION.

Hui performances of their food cultures in Beijing not only acted to signify place-based identities and senses of belonging but were also telling displays of the ways that the minority are being affected by political processes of assimilation and how individuals understand and internalise these approaches to minority cultures. Specifically, the performance of certain dishes and foods can be seen as reactions to increasingly assimilative forces impacting on Beijing's Hui minority as they attempt to carve out 'Hui' places in a Han-dominated society. This section argues that these performances of Hui food culture, particularly appertaining to what is deemed culturally and morally acceptable practice in contemporary *Qingzhen* restaurants, is shifting over time due to external assimilative factors. As Section 7.1.b showed, the serving of *Qingzhen* variations of north-eastern/Beijing dishes was considered by many to be a relatively recent occurrence, although some argued that it was the result of a longer shared history with the Han. Regardless of temporal differences, both accounts pointed towards the reasons behind the Hui's adoption of Han cuisine. For some, the reason was that such adaptations of Han dishes signalled the Hui's modernity and their aligning with Chinese discourses and conceptualisations of being a modern Chinese person. While for others, the serving of *Qingzhen* north-eastern/Beijing dishes was the result of economic survival and the need to cater to a predominantly non-Muslim, Han customer base. Rather than implying a binary understanding to such a phenomenon, this chapter argues that it is helpful to consider both processes as occurring simultaneously, especially as both are evident in participants' understandings. This two-fold approach to understanding the apparent changes of Hui food cultures in Beijing will be explored through the lens of one highly contentious, divisive and widely disputed performance: the selling and consumption of alcohol.

7.2.a Alcohol.

> “What makes a person Hui?”[231]
>
> “People with faith. The Hui people are those with Islam in their hearts, no smoking and no drinking.”[232]

The above quotes were taken from an interview with an elderly male manager of a small *Qingzhen* restaurant in Chaoyang District. This belief, that Hui people must not drink alcohol, was common among research participants in Beijing, as was his religious justification. As a 19-year-old waitress in Dongcheng District explained when asked directly why Hui people can’t drink alcohol, “Because the Qur’an stipulates, the Hui people can’t smoke, can’t drink alcohol.”[233] Elaborating on this religious taboo, a male chef from Ningxia explained that drinking alcohol “is absolutely forbidden. Because alcohol will make us temporarily lose our faith. The brain is in an unclear state. You don’t know yourself, [you] don’t know what your mission is; don’t know what your beliefs are. When the faith leaves your body, you can say that you are not a Muslim, because you haven’t done your own cleansing.”[234] For some individuals, such as the middle-aged Gansu-native female manager of a small restaurant in central Beijing, the adherence to the alcohol taboo is of upmost importance, taking precedence over other dietary practices and restrictions: “The sin of drinking is more serious than the sin of eating other foods.”[235] Although most participants explained the Hui’s alcohol taboo through a moralistic and religious lens stemming from Qur’anic teachings, the need for alcohol abstention was also understood through the more socio-cultural frame of *Qingzhen* and the embodied practice of becoming a *Qingzhen* person through the belief in *Chi Shenme Bu Shenme*[236] (as discussed in Chapter 5). In line with this belief, one male chef described the requirement for restaurant staff to be Hui by linking it with the

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[231]您觉得什么样的人可以称为回民？

[232]有信仰的人就行。就是内心信仰伊斯兰教就称为回民，不抽烟不喝酒。

[233]因为古拉经里规定了，回民不能抽烟，不能喝酒。

[234]是绝对禁止的。因为酒是会让我们暂时的失去信仰，大脑处于不清晰的一个状态，你都不认识自己，不知道自己的使命是什么，不知道自己的信仰是什么。当信仰离开你身体的一瞬间，你已经可以说不属于穆斯林了，因为你没有做到自身的洁净。

[235]喝酒的罪过要比吃其他食物的罪过还要严重。

[236]Eng: Eat something to mend/fix something.

Han's consumption of alcohol and their subsequent embodied impurity and potential to diminish the clean and *Qingzhen* status of food being produced:

> "If you are not Muslim, you can't work in the kitchen. For pure *Qingzhen*, *Qingzhen* represents the cleansing from the mind to the body, because we have faith and feel that it is clean. But for non-Muslims, they may have had it [alcohol] before. After work, they might smoke and drink alcohol. These are forbidden […]They're not clean from the body to the soul. [But] we are, and we will stop non-Muslim staff from coming into contact with our dishes and food. To ensure that it is absolutely pure *Qingzhen.*"[237]

Such strong beliefs in the necessity to avoid consuming alcohol have unsurprisingly had a direct impact on the way that *Qingzhen* restaurants in Beijing have traditionally operated. Traditionally, alcohol was not sold in such establishments, and was in fact often forbidden to be brought onto the premises, a practice that continues in some of the restaurants visited. The female supervisor of one of the project's key restaurants stated, "you can't take alcohol [to a Hui restaurant], they won't let you go inside […] For example, if you are not a Hui, you cannot go into a Hui restaurant with alcohol, they will not let you go in"[238] – a rather contradictory claim as her restaurant was known locally for selling high quality Ningxia-produced wine. These alcohol-free places were made publicly visible to customers not only through the advertising of *Qingzhen,* Islamic and Arabic signs, logos, clothing and decorations, but also through explicitly displaying notices on table-tops and walls that made the ban on alcohol clear.

Yet, over the course of three research trips conducted for this research project between August 2015 and January 2019, alcohol has increasingly become a feature within many of the Hui restaurants visited. During the phases of participant observation between August 2015 and April 2016, alcohol became increasingly noticeable in restaurants across the city. Specifically, Chinese beers such as *Tsingdao* and *Yanjing*, various

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[237]如果非我们穆斯林的人是不能做后厨的，对于我们纯清真来说，清真本来就代表着从心灵到身体所有的洁净，因为我们有信仰，觉得这是洁净的。但是非穆斯林呢，他以前或许会有，下班了之后或许会抽烟啊，喝酒啊，这些在我们是禁止的[。。。]不是从身体到心灵上，不洁净。所以我们就是，也杜绝非穆斯林人员，会接触我们菜品，食物。保证了它就是绝对的纯清真。

[238]你拿酒去都不行，它不让往里带的[。。。] 你比方说我不是回民，我拿酒去回民餐厅都不行的，它不让进

brands of Chinese Rice Wine, or *Baijiu*, and Chinese produced red wines, were being sold. Although the exact percentage of Hui restaurants selling alcohol across Beijing was not documented during the initial phase of participant observation (an unfortunate shortcoming of the initial fieldwork), field-notes and reflective memos from the later phases of participant observation shed some light onto the prevalence of alcohol in such eateries from late 2015. Following the initial stages of fieldwork, it became evident that alcohol was being sold in more *Qingzhen* restaurants than suggested by preliminary research or early informants. As such, I began documenting the number of restaurants that sold alcohol.

Of the 20 establishments initially shortlisted for possible further participation across five districts, one half sold alcohol. Of the final four restaurants recruited for in-depth participant observation from January 2016, one sold alcohol. During the second fieldtrip between June and August 2017, 34 interviewees were recruited from 26 establishments, including 21 restaurants, two butcher shops, and three bakeries. Seven of these establishments had previously been visited, while the remainder were randomly selected. Of these 21 restaurants, 16 sold alcohol, meaning that it was available in more than two-thirds of visited restaurants. This increased visibility of alcohol in Hui restaurants, along with interviewee accounts of the rising prevalence of alcohol among Hui eateries, was a key driving factor necessitating the third follow-up research trip in January 2019. The main focus of this fieldtrip (as was discussed in Chapter 3) was to follow-up on earlier research leads and to explore the validity of the thesis' proposed arguments. During the 17-day long trip, 62 restaurants were visited. Of these, alcohol was being sold in 49, or about four-fifths of them. Although these figures cannot be considered to be wholly representative of the wider situation in Beijing, they do nonetheless support the claims being made by this project's participants. That is to say, that alcohol is becoming ever more present in Hui restaurants and eateries, signalling a major shift in the moral and ethical practices of those involved in public performances of Hui food cultures.

Tracking and documenting the increased presence of alcohol in Hui restaurants across Beijing was complicated by the ever-changing urban landscape of the city. Initially, I had hoped to (re)visit the same restaurants during each of my fieldtrips so that temporal variances could be recorded. However, this proved impossible as upon returning, I discovered that many of the previously visited establishments had since been closed down, moved, or in some cases, that entire buildings had been demolished (see Figure 7.9). Among the establishments to have closed down was one of the key participating restaurants. This restaurant was owned and managed by a Xinjiang-born Hui woman who took great pride in its modern approach to Xinjiang-Hui cuisine and its popularity among a younger clientele, including numerous Chinese television stars. Upon discovering the closure of the restaurant in July 2017, I contacted the owner who explained that she had to shut down her two restaurants due to her inability to secure newly required business permits, and also as a result of the restaurants' financial difficulties in a precarious market. Rather than being unique, according to this informant, the economic difficulties faced by her restaurants were general. She went on to explain that Beijing's market was becoming increasingly difficult for *Qingzhen* restaurants to survive in. In addition to naming factors such as a diversified range of food choices available to customers and the local authority's shifting legal requirements, she placed particular emphasis on one other aspect: that modern Han people wanted to drink alcohol with their meals. Although hopeful that she would soon re-open her restaurants, she defiantly insisted that she would not sell alcohol, as to do so would not be *Qingzhen*.

Figure 7.9: Demolished Restaurants in former ethnic enclave.
Source: Author's own (2019).

In many areas or neighbourhoods where Hui restaurants had been shut down, new *Qingzhen* eateries often replaced them, either in the same business units or in a nearby location. Some of these new establishments served similar foods to the previous ones, were often decorated in a similar fashion, were sometimes staffed by the same people, and targeted the same local communities. However, there was one noticeable difference in the majority of cases: the new restaurants usually sold alcohol. Very often these new, alcohol-friendly restaurants would be replacing ones that had previously refused to sell alcohol, which resulted in an increase in the number of restaurants selling alcohol in several of this project's key research areas. This increase was also the result of changing practices within restaurants that had previously refused to sell alcohol, but which over time, began to sell it. Figure 7.10 shows the increased percentage of restaurants serving alcohol in three select research areas between 2017 and 2019.

Area	**2017**	**2019**
Niujie (& surrounding area)	3/6 Restaurants - 50%	5/7 Restaurants – 71%
Chaoying (& surrounding area)	8/10 Restaurants -80 %	10/11 Restaurants – 91%
Houhai Lake (& surrounding area)	2/4 Restaurants - 50%	5/6 Restaurants – 83%

Figure 7.10: Increase in alcohol vendors in chosen neighbourhoods.
Source: Author's own (2019).

Although one of the key participating restaurants had shut down, the other three remained open as of January 2019 with some changes occurring in relation to their approaches to alcohol. As was mentioned above, only one out of these four had been selling alcohol as of late 2015 and it continued to do so in early 2019. In fact, the manager of this restaurant explained that many patrons visited her business purely to purchase their specialty Ningxia-produced wine. The second restaurant, a fast-food style chain restaurant, did not serve alcohol at any time of the research. The manager, who was firmly opposed to the consumption of alcohol on religious and moral grounds, acknowledged the changing attitudes of both Han and Hui people towards alcohol and the increasing trend of drinking alcohol with meals in Beijing. Yet, he remained steadfast in his view that his restaurant would not bend to such a trend, claiming that it would not be necessary as his restaurant served fast-food, and as such, people didn't have the same desire to consume alcohol as they would in another type of restaurant where meals generally take more time. The final restaurant to have consented to participating in the project (but which never allowed me frequent visits) explicitly changed their stance on selling alcohol between the initial fieldtrip in 2015/16 and 2019. Initially opposed to the selling of alcohol based on the belief that alcohol consumption was not *Qingzhen*, this restaurant had begun selling Chinese beers such as *Tsingdao* and *Yanjing* by July 2017.

This shift in food cultural practices was repeatedly spoken about by interviewees and participants. One female manager of a small Gansu restaurant, who did not sell alcohol, emphasised the commonality of selling alcohol among Hui restaurants in August 2017: "But nowadays, many *Qingzhen* restaurants have alcohol, most of them have. Very few of these restaurants don't have alcohol and tobacco. It's really common now."[239] The pervasiveness of alcohol in *Qingzhen* restaurants was elaborated on by another male interviewee who said "Because a *Qingzhen* restaurant does not sell wine, you will find that there's very little *Qingzhen* in Beijing. Because you see this *Qingzhen* shop, if it doesn't sell [alcohol], it is true *Qingzhen.*"[240] Another interviewee, a male middle-aged manager of a busy restaurant in a popular tourist area, emphasised the widespread presence of alcohol in these establishments by claiming that he only knew of one restaurant in China that didn't sell alcohol, before erupting into laughter: "So far, it seems that in China, if you say that *Qingzhen* restaurants don't sell alcohol, I have only heard of one [like that] in China."[241]

This increasingly popular trend among Beijing restaurants has a distinctly geographical element as the shift from alcohol-free spaces to selling alcohol has not only changed over time, but also differs from place to place. All participants from areas other than Beijing, who mentioned the commonality of alcohol in Beijing, also discussed differences between their hometowns and the Chinese capital. These participants – from Shandong, Gansu, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Anhui and Heilongjiang – all pointed out that although alcohol consumption was a common practice among Hui in Beijing, it was not found in their home areas. When interviewing two waitresses in a predominantly Hui ethnic neighbourhood, one told me that "people in my hometown don't drink [alcohol], but Beijing Hui all drink alcohol."[242] These geographical variances are the result of a more complex set of conditions than a merely spatial differentiation. Rather, the specific ethnic compositions of these places are at the forefront of these differences, as are the

[239]但是现在很多清真餐馆都会有酒，大多数都会有，很少很少一部分是没有烟酒的这个餐厅。这是已经很典型的一个状态了。

[240]因为清真是不卖酒，你在北京能发现真正的清真非常少，因为你看到这个清真的店，如果说不卖酒它就是真正的清真。

[241]到目前为止，好像在中国来说，你要是说不卖酒的清真餐厅，我好像只听说过有一家，在中国。

[242]我那边回民是不喝的，北京的回民都喝酒。

exchanges occurring between the Hui and non-Hui, particularly the Han. One 30-something year old waitress in Fengtai District summed this point up when she explained, "Some of these things [consumption practices] are sub-regional […] In some places where the Hui are more concentrated, they will not [drink alcohol] […] Where the Muslims are not so concentrated, or those who are working away from home, or something like that. How do you say, it is understandable."[243]

The growing presence of alcohol in Beijing's Hui restaurants is telling of a shifting approach towards alcohol among these gatekeepers of Hui food culture. This change, as was discussed earlier, is the result of two simultaneous processes of assimilation: assimilation through economic necessity; and assimilation through discursive practices of modernity. Discourses of modernity were used less often than economic necessity by participants when explaining their views of alcohol's role in contemporary Hui food cultures. However, informants' aspirations of modernity were used as justification for alcohol consumption by the three male participants that admitted to drinking it, and also by some of the younger participants who could understand why another Hui person might drink it. While chatting with three chefs during their lunch break in February 2016, two of these men explained that they occasionally drink beer while living in Beijing because that's what young people do in China nowadays. The more senior of the group went on to say that most young Hui people drink now because the Hui are no longer a "feudal"[244] group.[245] When the third member of the group jokingly asked then if these two men would be drinking in a few days when they returned home to Gansu Province for Chinese New Year, both laughed at this seemingly outrageous suggestion.

Views of alcohol consumption as being a modern practice carried out by young people were echoed by several other participants. Such claims of modernity in relation to their choice to consume alcohol, positions these Hui individuals in an interesting position in relation to the Government's policies and narratives of modernity and development. In accordance with the communist state's development strategies and notions of assimilation, or *Ronghe* (as discussed in Chapter 4), the Hui are often seen as being less socially developed and more feudal than the Han majority. As the Hui minority develop

[243]这个东西也有一些是分区域性的[。。。] 就是清真回族比较集中的一些地方啊，他们就不会。我们回族不怎么集中的那些地方啊，或者说你像就像他们在外边什么业务啊，或者有什么他们是，也是有的时候也是，怎么说呢，你说情有可原吧。
[244]封建。
[245]Taken from field-notes dated 3 February 2016. Notes were written primarily in English with some Chinese characters.

overtime, it is believed that they will eventually assimilate into the Han and ethnic distinctions will become irrelevant. The role of the Chinese State in this development model is to act as the purveyors of modernisation, guiding the primitive minorities into civilisation (Zang, 2015). These performances of "modernised"[246] Hui food cultures are telling examples of how the Hui have internalised assimilation policies through their associated discourses of modernity. Similar to the participants in Gillette's (2000) study of consumption practices among a Hui neighbourhood in Xi'an, these Beijing Hui are using alcohol consumption as a mechanism for manipulating notions of social development while placing themselves strategically in relation to the evolutionary ideology of the Chinese State.

The second assimilative force driving this change in approaches to alcohol is economic necessity in a Han-dominated society. Although *Qingzhen* restaurants make food directed at the dietary needs of the Hui minority, restaurants in Beijing generally serve more Han customers daily than Hui according to all of the project's participants with the exception of those in Niujie and Changying neighbourhoods. Similar to the need for making *Qingzhen* versions of local Han dishes, many restaurant employees and managers explained that they had to sell alcohol in order to survive in Beijing's economically challenging business environment. In August 2017, I visited a small, cheap restaurant on a quiet backstreet in a residential area of what was formally a Hui ethnic enclave – a restaurant that has since been demolished, along with its neighbouring Hui businesses. The male manager of this restaurant spoke openly with me about the financial difficulties he faced trying to operate a *Qingzhen* restaurant in a neighbourhood that was increasingly becoming Han. He explained that in order to survive, the restaurant had to sell alcohol: "We are pure Hui people, but in order to make a living, there is no way to survive in Beijing if you don't sell alcohol. You can't do it. It is said that it is difficult to survive."[247] His need to sell alcohol in order to satisfy his customers' demands and survive economically placed this interviewee in a peculiar position in relation to how he understands his restaurant's qualifying as *Qingzhen*: "In real life[Han society] it can be called a *Qingzhen* restaurant, but it is not acceptable in the teachings of the Hui people, because this restaurant has violated the

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[246]现代化。

[247]因为我们是那个纯粹型的回族，但是为了生活，没办法，在这北京生存，不卖酒的话是不行的。就说是，很难生存的。

rules of Islam and cannot be called a *Qingzhen* restaurant."[248] By breaking the alcohol taboo, this man believed that his restaurant failed to meet the criteria for qualifying as *Qingzhen*, and this was physically manifested and visible in how the restaurant was decorated. Specifically, the Arabic signs, *Qingzhen* artwork and other Islamic artworks were not present in his restaurant (except for the small *Qingzhen* sign hung above the door), a decision that he consciously made as he believed his restaurant was not worthy: "There is no typical decorations […] Because of alcohol, we can't have some things."[249] Despite expressing remorse over his choice to sell alcohol, and his subsequent belief that the restaurant wasn't fully *Qingzhen* as a result, this interviewee explained how he navigated the morally precarious situation of operating a *Qingzhen* restaurant that sells alcohol through adhering to the other rules of *Qingzhen*. Specifically, he justified hanging the *Qingzhen* sign above the door by explaining that "this it's okay. Because our ingredients are all *Qingzhen*, except for alcohol, everything else is legal in Islam."[250]

Accounts like this interviewee's were not unique, with multiple participants describing a similar situation in their place of work, which filled many of them with a sense of regret at having to act in a way that they consider morally and religiously corrupt. Several interviewees expressed the conflict that they faced at being forced to sell alcohol to patrons; something which they believed was non-*Qingzhen*. Often, participants would tell me that although they firmly believed that no Hui should drink, but that it was ultimately a personal choice to be made by the individual. Two young waitresses from Xinjiang Province, working in a restaurant that sells beer in a Hui neighbourhood, explained that although their jobs involved selling alcohol, they also had a moral obligation to try and stop customers from drinking which positions them in a contradictory and difficult way. One of them explained that if "you have violated this [alcohol taboo], you will definitely be punished. But as a normal person, we are also obliged to stop them. If they can't be stopped, then we can't do anything about it."[251]

The economic strain faced by *Qingzhen* restaurants in Beijing's Han-dominated society is causing Hui individuals to reassess and redraw their lines of moral and religious acceptability by forcing them to sell alcohol despite their personal objections. Such

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[248]在这个现实生活来说是可以称为清真餐厅的，但在回族的教义来说是不可以的，因为这个餐厅已经违反了伊斯兰教的教规，是不可以称为清真餐厅的

[249]装修也就没有什么典型的[。。。]因为在饮酒这方面，我们是不能有的一些东西。

[250]这个可以。因为我们的食材全是清真的，除了酒这一样，其他的全是伊斯兰教合法的东西。

[251]你违反了这个，你肯定会受到惩罚的。但是作为一个平常人的话，我们也是可以有权利有义务去责令制止他，去制止他，如果制止不了的话，那我们也已经无能为力了。

practices are deeply troublesome for some participants who express great sorrow and regret at having to engage in the distribution of alcohol. The reluctant selling of alcohol stemming from economic necessity is a performance of forced assimilation, demonstrating the lived effects that an increasingly mono-culturalist and Han-centric society in Beijing is having on its ethnic minorities. Further, the increasing demand being placed on Hui eateries to sell alcohol shows the economic strains being placed on these establishments by Beijing's competitive and capitalistic marketplace.

7.3 PERFORMING GENDER.

The final performances of food cultures that this chapter discusses are those appertaining to gender and gender roles among the Hui in Beijing. The decision to discuss this topic last should not be viewed as representative of its possible insignificance in comparison to the other performances, or of it holding lesser importance or relevance to the thesis' arguments. In fact, the opposite may be said. Structurally, this thematic grouping of performances is placed at the end of this chapter, and indeed empirical contents of the whole thesis, as the topic of gender is one that applies to all of the arguments being made throughout. In addition to often being directly named by participants – be it through discussions of gender roles, gendered differences, or the place/belonging of genders – the topic of gender also ran through participants' discussions of other issues.

Drawing from the field of feminist geography and the work of geographers interested in gender studies, this section explores performances of gender through Hui food cultures in Beijing, the place-specific implications and influences of such performances, and the intersections of gender with other social relations, specifically inter-ethnic relations. This exploration of food performances is guided by several theoretical understandings about the nature of gender, and indeed geography. Firstly, gender relations vary both spatially and temporally, and distinctive gender roles may exist within groups that may seem to be culturally homogenous (Massey, 1994: 178). As such, it should not be assumed that all Hui in Beijing experience, understand and perform gender in the same ways, a point that is highlighted if the concept of intersectionality is taken into account. According to Crenshaw (1989: 139), intersectionality is "the multidimensionality of marginalized subjects' lived experience", whereby individuals are often simultaneously impacted by multiple bases of identity (Chapter 2). As was discussed throughout the thesis, Beijing's Hui population varies significantly in terms of migratory status and place of origin. These two factors influence individuals' performances, experiences and conceptualisations of gender and gender roles, as do the issues of age, religion, place of residence/work within Beijing (i.e., ethnic enclave or Han-dominated neighbourhood), marital and familial status, and occupation, to name but a few.

Further, if we are to understand that identity is performative (Butler, 1990; Goffman: 1956) and that it is an articulation of social relations which are themselves geographically varied, then we must also concede that these geographical variances must be acknowledged when making claims of how gender relates to social relations and processes. Put another way, although gender may be affected by, and be reflective of, a particular set of social relations in one place, that does not mean that it will be shaped in the same way by those social relations elsewhere, as these social relations vary geographically. In the case of the Hui in Beijing, their performances of gender are, as this chapter argues, heavily impacted by inter-ethnic relations, specifically with the Han majority. However, these inter-ethnic relations vary from place to place, meaning that gender performances of Hui elsewhere in China, or indeed in other parts of Beijing not visited during this research, may very well differ, as was suggested by the claims of many of this project's participants.

Gender and power reinforce each other in many ways, often limiting women's mobility. As Massey (1994b: 180) writes, "in general terms what is clear is that spatial control, whether enforced through the power of convention or symbolism, or through the straight-forward threat of violence, can be a fundamental element in the constitution of gender in its (highly varied) forms". Within the West, this spatial control traditionally worked to confine women to the domestic sphere, which was differentiated from the public, masculine sphere. Much of the early work on gender and geography was about the circumstances of women in the Euro-American world although there were early collections on gender and the spaces of colonialism (Blunt and Rose, 1994). Since this early work, here has been extensive work in may contexts and there have also been global overviews of the resulting literature (Garcia Roman and Monk, 2007; Oberhauser et al., 2017).

Explications of the gendered distinction of domestic and public sphere based upon Western experience do not necessarily apply to China, perhaps particularly during the socialist period when the CCP promoted collective labour while de-emphasising gender differences. There is some evidence that gender disparities have widened with the re-establishment of freer market relations (Fincher, 2016). Post-socialist China has seen the development of several distinct gender and family regimes varying with socio-economic contexts (Hu and Scott, 2016; Yingchun and Xiaogang, 2018). As Sean H. Wang (2019: 145) briefly writes in his review of recent work on gender in China (a topic that is too rarely critically researched within Western academia), in post-socialist times there is currently a "rise of hyper-heteronormativity, informed by traditional gender roles and enforced by the state" as "public expressions of gender and sexuality are vigorously policed" in China today. Given this shift of attitude of the Chinese State towards gender and as enforced by its actions and policies, the topic is becoming increasingly contested and overtly political among the Hui. As Chapter 5.1.b discussed, many Hui women now actively engage in the workforce, a change that is viewed as positive by some women who claim that it has granted them enhanced independence, yet is condemned by other people (often men) who see it as a violation of traditional roles and family structure. As one Qinghai-native woman explained of Hui people back home in Northwest China, "their thinking is that women stay at home, married, bringing up the children, cooking, and not working. Men make money outside and also spend it on their families,"[252] a common story that was re-told time and again, especially by participants from outside of Beijing.

Finally, in her chapter "A Woman's Place?", Linda McDowell (1994: 192) writes that:

> "capitalism presented patriarchy with different challenges in different parts of the country. The question was in what ways the terms of male dominance would be reformulated within these changed conditions. Further, this process of accommodation between capitalism and patriarchy produced a different synthesis of the two in different places. It was a synthesis which was clearly visible in the nature of gender relations, and in the lives of women".

Despite writing about capitalism and its relationship to gender in the United Kingdom, I find that McDowell's statement can be applied to a number of different contexts and social processes. We might, for example, ask how minoritisation presents patriarchy among the Hui with a distinct set of challenges in Han-dominated Beijing and

[252] 他们的这个思想嘛，女的就是在家，结完婚，带孩子，做饭，不工作。男的在外面赚钱，也都在家花。

reformulates male dominance in ways that are shaped by the specificities of this place. Gender relations among the Hui of Beijing are framed by this distinct synthesis of minoritisation and patriarchy. The synthesis comes out differently in different places. This section argues that minoritisation is an inherently gendered and place-specific process. These place-specific syntheses are performed through Hui food cultures and are visibly evident in the spatial demarcation and uses of places of Hui food culture across Beijing City. In sum, the three related themes of Feminist Political Geography that have run through this thesis come together here. First, the public/private binary with respect to space is unstable. Second, gender and sexuality are implicated in geopolitical relations at the broadest scale even while they are themselves formed under the pressure of geopolitical imperatives. The geopolitical is personal and the person is geopolitical. In this regard, bodies (Mountz, 2018) and their capacities (suggestively termed geocapabilities by Solem et al., 2013) are central to a Feminist Political Geography and it is to them that I now turn.

7.3.a Butchery and Hand-Pulling Noodles.

Although these two performances of Hui food culture – butchery and hand-pulling noodles – were discussed in earlier sections, they have been returned to here as they are inextricably and inescapably shaped by discourses of gender. In section 7.1.b.i it was argued that the origin of *Qingzhen* meat was of upmost importance for many Hui eateries and individuals across Beijing, allowing vendors to make claims of superiority, while linking the popular meats produced to localised and place-specific understandings of belonging and authenticity. In section 7.1.a.i, it was shown that Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Noodles are closely associated with the Hui, portrayed as being the group's signature dish by state media and resulting in it being among the most popular Hui dishes consumed in Beijing. Although both performances of Hui food culture differ in terms of food produced and skills required to do so, they do have some common features. Firstly, both produce food commodities that are highly popular and highly valued among Hui participants, and also by Han consumers. Secondly, both are closely tied to popular narratives of Hui identity, Hui food cultures and *Qingzhen*, viewed by most non-Hui as being representative and stereotypical of the group and their shared food cultures. Thirdly, meat and hand-pulled noodles, given their popularity, common representations as the Hui's signature food commodities, and their ties to places, are bound up within discourses of authenticity. Fourthly, both involve a high level of skill and are labour-intensive. Lastly, given their links to authenticity, their high public visibility and popularity, their famed and valued status, the high-level of skill involved, and their importance to narratives of Hui identity, it is significant that the performances of butchery and hand-pulling noodles are considered to be men's work. The gendering of these skilled and valued forms of labour as masculine is similar to way that certain forms of labour in the UK were considered to be men's work due to their skilled nature, as is shown in the work of Linda McDowell (1994).

"I knew from a young age that the chickens were slaughtered in the house, and the sheep were grandpa's, later they were dad's, and then husband's. This is the feeling that women do not slaughter, and women cannot slaughter. It's not *Qingzhen.*"[253] This was the answer given to me during an interview with an elderly female business owner in August 2017 when asked "Why is it only men that slaughter the animals?"[254] We later went on to discuss the preparation of meat for consumption and sale and she informed me that this also was a man's job, and that is why she only buys meat from male butchers. This belief in butchery, both the slaughtering of animals and preparation of meat, as being a man's role was shared by most participants of this research project, with the exception of three individuals (two of whom were female butchers and the third person was the husband of one of those women. It should also be noted that neither of the female butchers slaughtered animals). Although some answers did vary when individuals were asked why butchery was a man's job and not suitable for women, by far the most common responses were that "it's not *Qingzhen*"[255] and "It is men's work."[256]

The insistence of participants that butchery is the work of men as it is not *Qingzhen* for women to do so, illuminates an interesting aspect of the gendered power dimensions of *Qingzhen*. Whereby women are not only made subordinate to men through their exclusion from the highly valuable and culturally important role of butchery (as it is perceived to be masculine), but their subordination to men is also exacerbated by the heightened status given to men. The participation of women in butchery is seen as tainting the meat, with women themselves apprehended as a pollutant. In Beijing's Hui communities, men are entrusted within the socio-cultural and religious norms of

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[253] 从小就知道，家里面宰鸡，羊都是爷爷，后来就是爸爸，然后就是老公了。这是女人都是不去宰，女人宰的不能吃，这种感觉。
[254] 为什么只有男人们才可以做聚义？
[255] 不是清镇的。
[256] 这是男人的工作。

Qingzhen to prepare the most sensitive, profitable and publicly visible of *Qingzhen* commodities, meat. By making men the sole purveyors of *Qingzhen* meat, Hui traditions and norms are establishing men as the gatekeepers and preservers of authentic *Qingzhen* within public places of Hui food culture in Beijing. This role is significant given the strong links between *Qingzhen*, Hui food cultures, and Hui identity for Beijing Hui as discussed in Chapter 5.

Similarly, women are also excluded from making the Hui's signature dish, Hand-Pulled Noodles. However, rather than being excluded due to their inability to produce *Qingzhen* produce, they are considered too weak for the task:

> Interviewer: "Is there any dish that men make better than women?"[257]
> Interviewee: "Hand-Pulled Noodles. Women can't make them. And Stir-fry dishes and rice."[258]
> Interviewer: "Why do men make Hand-Pulled Noodles better than women?"[259]
> Interviewee: "Because this is what men do, women can't […] [men have] More power."[260]

This young male chef's opinion that women can't make Hand-Pulled Noodles was shared by the staff of all other Hand-Pulled Noodle restaurants visited, both male and female. Within these restaurants, the role of chef was solely given to male employees, while women acted as waitresses and cleaners, a trend that continuously reappeared in almost every restaurant visited (and which will be discussed in section 7.3.c). As the manager of one Hand-Pulled Noodle restaurant explained to me, "look here, this [needs] much strong [strength]. Woman cannot do. Only men."[261] The chef in one of these establishments did concede that he had previously seen a woman pulling noodles by hand, but he dismissed her efforts as "not tasty."[262] The belief that men were better able physically to pull noodles by hand than women reinforces traditional, divisive and binary forms of thinking about gender, whereby women are weak, and indeed unskilled, in comparison to their strong and skilled male counterparts. This point is similar to McDowells (1994: 195) discussion of the textile industry in the United Kingdom during

257 有没有哪些菜男人做的比女人更好？
258 面啊，女人就做不了。还有炒菜啊，米饭啊。
259 为什么男人做拉面比女人做得更好。
260 因为这就是男人做的活，女人做不了[。。。] 多的力量。
261 Taken from fieldnotes. Written in English.
262 不好吃。

the nineteenth century, whereby certain work is considered "heavy", and as such skilled, therefore making it necessary for men to complete. This point is made all the more salient by the conversation above with the young male chef where he even states that men are also better at stir-fried dishes and rice – two cornerstones of Chinese cooking.

Yet, when discussing gender roles in the domestic-private sphere of home and hometowns, interviewees and participants continually referred to their mother's home-cooked dishes and the role of women in preparing food in those places. The important role of women in performing and producing food cultures within the private sphere was particularly pointed throughout the interviews conducted in 2017 when interviewees would most commonly name their mothers' or grandmothers' home-cooked dishes as their favourite foods, explain how they learnt to cook from their mothers, or in many cases, especially for those interviewees from Northwest China, state that it was only women who cooked at home. As the male manager of a small Gansu restaurant in Chaoyang District explained, "Like us in Gansu […] Generally women do it [cooking], men don't. Like me, I can't even cook. I'm in my twenties, I can't cook. Usually women do it."[263]

Given that cooking is considered women's work in the private sphere, yet men's work in the public sphere in Beijing, a question arises as to why the role seems to have switched from a feminine one to a masculine one. Once again, the work of geographers working within the field of gender studies is helpful in understanding this spatial differentiation between the presumed femininity of cooking in one place, yet the masculinity of it in another. Hopkins and Gorman-Murray (2019: 302) state, "it is important to explore how certain 'ways of being a man' challenge – or not – dominant understandings of masculinities". Building on this, I contend that this change in gender roles is an example of the synthesis of minoritisation and patriarchy discussed earlier, and as influenced by McDowell's (1994) contribution: whereby minoritisation presented patriarchy with specific challenges which caused male dominance to be reconfigured as the two issues were synthesised in place. As such, this section argues that these roles were reformulated and re-gendered to support Hui patriarchy within Han-dominated Beijing. By positioning men as the only gender capable of producing profitable *Qingzhen* produce through highly skilled and labour-intensive means in the

[263] 像我们甘肃的话[。。。] 一般都是女士做，男的没有做。像我就是做饭都不会，二十多岁了，做饭都不会，一般都是女士来做。

competitive Beijing market, female subordination was being reconfigured and reinforced. Within Beijing's public spaces of Hui food culture, men are the only ones capable of authentically performing and producing Hui food cultures and dishes through their superior strength and skill, while the subordination of women continues in new manifestations.

7.3.b Youxiang.

> "Because this is not something that you can make casually in Islam. That's what makes this thing special and very particular. To make *Youxiang*, it must be [made by] a woman, it must be. […] Just to make it very clear. It must be very clean. You can't be sick, there are many rules, and then you can make it. And there must be important things happening, happy events and funerals before you can make it, which is very important. The most important thing is to share it, and to share the making of it. […] For example, if someone in your family is sick and hospitalised, and then they recover, then you can make *Youxiang* after it is done, but you have to share it with everyone. […] You can't hold [a whole] one to eat, because it is round. You have to split it and share the other half. The main thing is sharing."[264]

The above quote was taken from an interview with a young, Shandon born, female waitress in central Beijing and it captures many of the main aspects of the highly significant food, *Youxiang*. *Youxiang*, which literally translates into "oil fragrance" in English, is a round deep-fried pastry (Figure 7.11) which holds tremendous socio-cultural and religious importance and symbolism for Hui communities across China. During the 30 interviewees conducted in summer 2017 with 34 Hui interviewees across Beijing, each individual was asked to name the dish that they believed to be the most important to Hui food cultures. Of the 34 responses to the question, 20 people named *Youxiang* as either the most important food, or as one of the most important ones, with other dishes such as Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Noodles, 8 Treasure Tea, and various meat and wheaten dishes also being chosen. Even the 14 interviewees who did not initially

[264] 因为这个在我们伊斯兰教不可以随便做的，就是做这个东西特别的有讲究，非常有讲究，做油香，必须是妇女，必须要，[。。。] 就是要弄得非常干净。要干干净净的，然后不可以没有感冒的，然后很多很多要求，然后你才可以去做。而且必须有重大的事情，喜事丧事，才可以做，就是非常重要的事。还有一个最重要就是，这个东西要拿出去分享的，做这个东西要拿出去分享[。。。]比如说他们家有个人生病了住院了，然后好了以后，然后你就可以做油香，做好了以后吧，但是你要拿出去给大家分享[。。。]你不可以抱着一个吃，因为它是圆的嘛。你必须把它分开，送出一半才可以吃另一半。就是，最主要的就是分享。

identify *Youxiang* as the most important dish, later agreed that it was important to Hui culture when asked directly about it. "I think the most distinctive thing is *Youxiang* […] it is a kind of deep-fried pastry […] it is made at every festival,"[265] "*Youxiang*, yes, this is the most important. The Hui's *Youxiang,*"[266] and "I think *Youxiang* is the iconic food for Hui people."[267] These quotes are representative of the 20 answers given by interviewees in which *Youxiang* was named as the most important dish to Hui food culture.

Figure 7.11: Youxiang.
Source: Author's own (2015).

When asked why *Youxiang* is such a significant dish to the Hui, participants' answers could generally be classified into three inter-linked themes: its importance to religious

[265]我感觉最有特色的应该就是油香[。。。]就是一种油炸的面食 [。。。] 每个节日都会做那个。
[266]油香，对，这最重要的。回族的油香。
[267]油香我觉得对回民是一个标志性的食物。

festivals and important social and life cycle events; its emotive ties to “home”; and its role in fostering a sense of community among the Hui. The religious festivals and life cycle events listed included Ramadan, Eid al-Adha, births, deaths and funerals, weddings, or visits from special guests, imams, the elderly or relatives. Due to the important role that *Youxiang* plays in the celebration of these festivals and important events, all of which usually (or at least traditionally) involve spending time with one’s family, it is unsurprising that so many interviewees felt that the fried pastry reminded them of home while living in Beijing. These links to home and family are made evermore apparent if the way that *Youxiang* is made and consumed is taken into account. According to interviewees, and indeed other participants in the project, *Youxiang* must be both made and consumed through shared effort. When making *Youxiang*, it is customary for the women of the family to gather together to make the pastry as a group, and in some cases, they are accompanied by female neighbours. The finished product, as the informant quoted at the start of the sub-section explained, must be shared with other people as it is extremely rude, and not *Qingzhen*, to eat one by oneself. This need for sharing *Youxiang* is more than simply a traditional custom. Rather, it is due to Islamic teachings and practices. As one male supervisor explained, “This is in religion, because in religion there are our former saints and prophets. This is done in memory of the saints who have passed away. Its main importance is to give alms to the poor and to do good. These things will be given to the poor after they are made.”[268]

By coming together to make *Youxiang*, and indeed by sharing the finished product, many interviewees noted that the food built community. As one Ningxia-born female supervisor noted when asked about the importance of sharing *Youxiang*, “so it plays a role, a cohesive role, right? Very cohesive.”[269] This “cohesive” role is often challenged by the ethnic demographics of Beijing City, with two waitresses informing me sorrowfully that due to the small number of Hui in their area of Beijing, they could not share *Youxiang* with others at Ramadan. However, they went on to explain that they still made the pastry with their colleagues and that they shared it together. Although unable to deliver *Youxiang* to other Hui people due to there being so few in some areas of Beijing, these waitresses continue to engage in the performance of *Youxiang* and in the

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[268]这是宗教里边的，因为宗教里边会有我们以前的圣人先知。纪念逝去的圣人先知会做这个，它的主要意义在于施舍穷人，施善，这些东西做出来之后会给穷人送去一部分。
[269]所以它起着一种，有点凝聚力的作用，是吧。凝聚力很大的。

interactive and community-building aspects of the food by sharing it with their colleagues.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of *Youxiang*, at least from the perspective of this research project, is that “generally women make it at home.”[270] All interviewees that discussed the pastry agreed that it is made by “women in every family.”[271] Most stated that it could only be made by women, while three interviewees argued that men could also make it. Although claiming that men could make it, these three interviewees admitted that in their families only women make it and that “women make it more fragrant.”[272] The ability of women to make it more “fragrant” was elaborated on by one young male supervisor who explained that “men are not so attentive, women are more attentive, so it is more fragrant, tastes better. It is better,”[273] using a binary understanding of male-female difference. Given the subordination of women to men evident in the performances of Hui food cultures in Beijing, and as discussed in section 7.3.a, it is perhaps surprising then that the making of the group’s most important food product be left to women when all other foods are seemingly better made by men. However, the reason for this is evident if we look back at the statement at the head of this paragraph: “generally women make it at home”. What’s interesting here is not just who makes it, but rather, the place where it is made – “at home”. The narrative that women make better *Youxiang* is allowed to continue because it is a food that is made within the private sphere of home, rather than in the masculine public sphere. As one north-western middle-aged woman explained, within Hui homes (especially those of north-western Hui), women are inferior to men: “Qinghai men do not cook. There is no seat at the table for women, and she sits behind to eat, on a stool”[274] and “there is still a patriarchal ideology.”[275]

To some extent, I am generalising here from what men and women in the restaurants told me about their domestic circumstances and we must be careful not to read evidence of women’s lack of agency either from Western presumptions of the limited autonomy of Chinese women, or from testimony that describes the external appearances of

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[270] 一般都是家里的妇女来做。
[271] 每个家庭的妇女。
[272] 女人做得更香吧。
[273] 男士没有那么细心吧，女士比较细心，所以说比较香，味道也好，比较好一些。
[274] 青海男的不做饭。女的桌子上面没座位，坐后面去吃饭，那个凳子。
[275] 男尊女卑思想有还是。

practices, but not their contestability. Nor, as Mahmood (2005) cautions, should we assume that female autonomy everywhere takes a Western liberal form. For example, within Hui culture in central China there is a strong tradition of women-only, female-led mosques that bespeak a qualified but still effective autonomy for women (Jaschok, 2018). It is also clear that some seeming markers of subordinate status can be subverted, as where Hui women express their modernity by adopting fashionable Arab headscarves and in this manner display their Muslim identity (Gillette, 2005). As Ga (2017: 747–8) remarks in a study of headscarves in the context of rural Hui people in China, '[s]ignifiers […] do not simply point to their signified when they travel transnationally,' and in the case of rural women Ha studied, their headcovering, the *maozi*, was configured as mark of rural backwardness only after neoliberal reforms broke the socialist solidarity of urban and rural Muslim women.

There are at least two arguments to be made here in regard to the power dimensions of gender as performed through *Youxiang* and the synthesis of minoritisation and patriarchy. Firstly, women continue to be responsible for producing food within the private sphere of home as it acts to reinforce and strengthen Hui masculinities and Hui patriarchal family structures, while further diminishing the agency of women through assigning them to subservient roles. Secondly, and at the same time, women are specifically designated as the purveyors of *Youxiang* as it is a food product that has little monetary value or potential to enhance women's social mobility given the norms, rules and values associated with it by *Qingzhen* in Beijing. During the early stages of fieldwork, I was continually taken aback by the notable absence of *Youxiang* in the restaurants that I visited. In fact, during the initial eight months of fieldwork, *Youxiang* was found in only one establishment visited – a run-down food court which has now been relaunched. Later, when I asked staff in restaurants why they didn't sell *Youxiang*, I was always met by the same consistent answer, that selling *Youxiang* is not *Qingzhen*. As such, given the restrictions placed on *Youxiang* by the social rules of *Qingzhen*, whereby it's prohibited to profit from *Youxiang*, one can simply share it, women's role as purveyors of the socially important pastry does not challenge the patriarchy, and as such, gender roles do not need to be reconfigured.

7.3.c Spatial Divisions and Limitations on Women's Mobility.

The final point of this section regarding performances of gender through Hui food cultures is that the aforementioned syntheses of minoritisation and patriarchy have an embodied spatiality within Beijing's public places of Hui food culture. Given the reconfigurations of male dominance evidenced above, whereby men are most often positioned as the sole producers and performers of Hui food cultures within the public sphere, it is unsurprising that this division of gender is manifested in a certain geography. Within the majority of restaurants and eateries visited during fieldwork, there was a clear division of labour based on gender. Men generally held positions of authority within Hui restaurants, such as managers and supervisors, or occupied the higher-paying, skilled roles of noodle-pullers, butchers, and chefs. While women were largely confined to low-waged, un-skilled, and presumed temporary roles such as waitresses, cleaners, cashiers or servers at food counters and stalls. Having said that, it was not uncommon for restaurants to have young men and teenage boys employed as waiters, although according to participants, these young males quickly progresses to other roles while women were expected to continue as waitresses. This trend is one that was apparent in nearly every restaurant visited, although there were some exceptions.

In relation to chefs, female chefs were an extreme rarity and only encountered in very small, family-run eateries in residential areas. More often, Hui women were found cooking at street-food stalls – which are themselves becoming increasingly rare in Beijing as the city has prohibited them in urban areas. Another exception to the gendered norms of labour divisions can be seen in managerial roles. However, once again, female managers and supervisors were extremely rare in Beijing. Of the eight female restaurant managers met during the fieldwork, six were self-appointed as they owned their respective eateries, while two were hired by female owners: one managed a permanent *Jianbing* counter and one managed a food court. Female supervisors were more commonly found; however, these women were responsible solely for the waitressing staff and running of the dinning spaces in restaurants, had no role in overseeing the kitchen, and they ultimately answered to a male manager. Figure 7.12 shows the managerial breakdown by gender within the project's four key participating restaurants.

	Manager	Supervisor
Restaurant 1	Male	Male x3
Restaurant 2	Male	Female x1; Male x1
Restaurant 3	Male	Male x2
Restaurant 4	Female (Owner)	Male x1
Total	Male: 75%; Female: 25%	Male: 87.5% Female: 12.5%

Figure 7.12: Managerial breakdown by gender in key restaurants.
Source: Author's own (2020).

By dividing the Hui workforce based on gender, a clear spatial differentiation was being imprinted onto places of Hui food cultures. Ultimately, all spaces in the restaurants, specifically the main areas of the dinning space and kitchen, were male-dominated spaces, reinforcing the patriarchy and female subordination. In most instances, kitchens became male only spaces, with these places being occupied almost exclusively by men. In many cases, this male-only space was further strengthened by the existence of a separate space or room for cleaning dishes, a task generally reserved for women. However, even in the kitchens that did contain female-occupied cleaning stations, the majority of the kitchen was devoted to the cooking and preparing of food. Therefore, maintaining them as largely male only spaces, where women's presence was only accepted on the basis that they were there in service, to assist the men in their roles. While being excluded from the spaces of kitchen, women primarily occupied the dinning spaces, working as waitresses, cashiers, cleaners and servers. Yet, although being staffed predominantly by women, these spaces nonetheless acted to bolster male dominance, with women being once again subservient to men, as enforced through the presence of male managers and supervisors. This division of spaces within Hui restaurants based on gender acts to further constrain women while reinforcing male dominance in line with place-specific syntheses of minoritisation and patriarchy. Women have, in line with Chinese socialist-era ideologies, been allowed greater access and freedom to join the labour force, yet it is done in a way that supports modern reconfigurations of Hui patriarchy. Similar to the arguments made by Browne (2004) in regard to genderism and public bathrooms, I argue that within public spaces of Hui food culture the socio-cultural sexing of space is such that these sexed sites and bodies are mutually constitutive within sexed regimes of power.

7.4 PERFORMANCES OF FOOD.

The goal of this chapter was to explore the diffuse performances of Hui food cultures evident in Beijing to see what insights could be gleaned into the lived realities of Hui minority subjects. In doing so, this chapter made empirical contributions in three main areas. Firstly, performances of Hui food cultures are closely tied to places, emotive ties to place, and to geographical imaginaries. This was made evident through an exploration of dishes that could be understood as performances of place-based identities, exposing the myriad of ways that geographical imaginaries and places influence the ways that Hui people consume and perform certain dishes. Key arguments were made in relation to three distinctive dishes found in eateries across Beijing. These were Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Noodles and its ties to Northwest China; Meat from Beijing's Niujie neighbourhood; and chocolate cake and geographical imaginaries of the West.

Secondly, it was shown how minoritizing processes within Han-dominated Beijing increasingly impact on Hui food cultures, placing many individuals in a precarious situation between the need for economic survival, desires to modernise, and moral obligations to maintaining a *Qingzhen* lifestyle. Specifically, the impact that these assimilative forces and inter-ethnic interactions are having on Hui food cultures were discussed in relation to one highly contentious product: alcohol. The increasing demand being placed on Hui restaurants to sell alcohol is the result of a two-fold assimilative and minoritising process. There is an increasing need for these restaurants to sell alcohol as a means of economic survival in Beijing's competitive market, while discourses of modernity simultaneously play a role in changing many participants' views of the divisive product.

Lastly, the chapter discussed in detail the performances of gender through food culture evident in Hui eateries. Section 7.3 argued that minoritisation is an inherently gendered and place-specific process, resulting in localised manifestations of gender roles and norms. Ultimately, it was argued that the specificities of place in Beijing have resulted in male-dominance being reconfigured to produce unique syntheses of patriarchy and minoritisation in a Han-dominated society where Muslims are increasingly treated as suspect under the guise of the Global War on Terror. Gender and gender roles are re-imagined and performed in nuanced ways that act to support male superiority and female inferiority, limiting female mobility and confining female performances of food cultures to the private sphere.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION.

In recent years, Islam has become increasing securitised in many countries across the world as the Global War on Terror is continually used as a justifying discourse for the unfair treatment of Muslims, further conflating the concepts of Islam and terrorism. Although much of the scholarship on the Global War on Terror has been focused on either the military actions, security policies, or lived realities in the Middle East or Euro-American contexts, Muslims outside of these areas have also found themselves the targets of unjust and discriminatory policies and policing. In the People's Republic of China [PRC], the securitisation of Islam is felt particularly hard by those Muslims living in China's north-western Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region [XUAR]. Since 2017, the XUAR has experienced an unprecedented "re-education campaign" targeting its Muslim subjects (Zenz, 2018). In 2018, it was reported that over 1 million Muslims were being held in "political re-education" camps across XUAR (Wen and Auyeziv, 2018). Most of these Muslims belonged to the Uyghur ethnic minority group, although ethnically Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and other Islamic minority groups are also being detained. According to ex-detainees, Muslims are "encouraged to renounce their religion" in these camps (Brophy, 2019), learn Mandarin Chinese and swear loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] and President Xi Jinping (Nicolaci da Costa, 2019). Initially, Chinese authorities denied the existence of these camps, facilitated in part by their restricting of media access to Xinjiang. The CCP has since claimed that these camps are "vocational training centres" aimed at helping these Muslims integrate into Chinese society (ibid, 2019), and that they are intended for "voluntary re-education purposes to counter extremism" (BBC, 2019c).

The detainment of Muslims in XUAR, has been accompanied by other draconian policies and policing practices in what David Brophy (2019) has called "a sweeping campaign against Islam – what some activists decry as a total ban on the religion". Ethnic Uyghurs have been prohibited from wearing burqas or veils, growing their traditional long beards, or performing certain Islamic practices such as fasting during Ramadan or praying in mosques (Fathil, 2019). Further, the BBC (2019d) reported that the building of unprecedented "re-education" camps across XUAR was happening at the same time as a large-scale campaign by the Chinese authorities to build boarding schools for ethnically Uyghur children whose parents had been detained in the "re-education" camps. In July 2019, 22 predominantly Western nations signed a letter calling on China to end its detention programme in XUAR. However, this letter was quickly followed by a similar letter signed by 37 countries in support of China's "counter-terrorism" actions (Putz, 2019), many of whom are economically and politically linked, or even dependent, on China (Kelemen and Turcsányi, 2019). The change in both domestic and international perceptions, discourses and public images of the Uyghur, from an oppressed minority to that of separatist Islamic terrorists (Holdstock, 2015), has been largely enabled by the Global War on Terror (see Chapter 1.2). The PRC authorities claim that their actions in XUAR follow international norms of de-radicalisation and counter-extremism, and that they are therefore necessary to combat Islamic radicalisation (Brophy, 2019). These counter-extremism measures are not confined to XUAR, although that is undoubtably where they are most strongly felt. As Chapter 1.2 discussed, impacts of China's "people's war on terror" are being felt in other provinces of China, such as the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region [NHAR] where mosques have been demolished and regulations have been tightened for the labelling of *Qingzhen* food.

The geographic spread of these "counter-terrorism" measures, and the rapid decline of the situation in China for Muslims since the beginning of this project in October 2014, unfortunately stand testament for the relevance and value of this research into the lived geopolitical realities of Islamic minority identity in contemporary Beijing. As was outlined in Chapter 1.6, the aim of this research project was to examine how, under the impress of the Global War on Terror, processes of minoritisation and place impact on the identities, experiences and everyday geographies of the Hui people. Specifically, the overarching aim was to explore how Hui identity is performed, made public, othered, negotiated, and contested through its food cultures. These aims were achieved through addressing the following objectives:

- To gain an understanding of the minoritisation mechanisms experienced by the Hui population and to explore how minoritising processes are performed through Hui food cultures and their associated places.
- To explore public and visible 'outings' of Hui peoples through an examination of the ways in which they create distinctively Hui spaces and places.

- To explore how these above processes impact on the emotional geographies of Hui people, vis-à-vis the places of Hui food culture they frequent and the practices they engage in.
- To explore the cultural meaning of food in the establishing and performance of Hui identities and places and how these relate to gender.

Through employing a feminist political geography approach and methodology to the context of Beijing's urban Hui population, their food cultures, their public places of food cultures, and their experiences of minoritising processes, the above aims and objectives were achieved, as was evidenced throughout the thesis. This chapter will act as a conclusion for the thesis, drawing out the key contributions made by this project's findings, as will be discussed in sections 8.1 to 8.8. Finally, the chapter, and indeed thesis, will finish with a short reflection on the research project and research process.

8.1 TOWARDS A FEMINIST POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY.

In order to understand the complexities of the Hui minority identity, their food cultures, places, and experiences of minoritising processes, a new theoretical framework had to be compiled, drawing from a diverse range of sub-disciplines, theories and concepts. Broadly speaking, the theoretical framework for this thesis brings into conversation feminist, post-colonial, anti-racist, post-structuralist, and even phenomenological scholarship through piecing together a conceptual assemblage from various sub-disciplines within human geography and the social sciences. This medley of theoretical perspectives aims to bring together areas of geographical thought that can help us to understand the particular situation of the Hui in Beijing. As such, in order to better understand the Hui's precarious situations in Beijing, multiple aspects of numerous theories and concepts need to be reformulated into a nuanced, context-appropriate approach.

At the core of this approach are concepts from political geography, namely critical geopolitics (Ó Tuathail, 1998), feminist geopolitics (Koffman, 1996; Dowler and Sharp, 2001; Hyndman 2001; Massaro and Williams, 2013), subaltern geopolitics (Sharp, 2011a; 2011b) and popular geopolitics (Dodds, 2007). Although each provides important analytical and methodological tools for fostering a better understanding of how global geopolitics affect the Hui, each falls short of being able to completely address the complexities of Hui experience. As such, I suggest an approach that brings into conversation these different schools of political geography. Such an approach is one that is feminist, post-colonial, anti-racist, and post-structural in nature, and that takes seriously emotions, embodiment, and the performative and intersectional aspects of identity.

This eclectic theoretical assemblage was largely defined in terms of the postures of which it was suspicious. In trying to understand the social construction of identity against a geopolitics of asymmetrical power, wealth, and status, I found the recognition of the continuing legacies of colonialism necessary. The approach was postcolonial. Learning how research was inflected by a positionality that incorporated power relations and privilege, I profited from feminist epistemologies and methodologies. Finally, I accepted the claim that there was no position from which a researcher could produce an account of anything important without having to accept some partiality of perspective, and no explanation so complete that all relevant dimensions could be reduced to the action of only a few structures or forces. The research had to accept a post-structuralist epistemology.

The certainties and over-simplification against which I defined my approach have sometimes been identified with the European Enlightenment and its clearest expression has been developed out Kantian philosophy as Rorty (1983) describes. This set of ideas—that there is an absolute truth that is discoverable and that there is a singular humanity about which we can speculate—was criticised as Eurocentric by anticolonial scholars (Young, 1990) and as sexist by feminist scholars and activists (Alcoff and Potter, 1993). As a set of attitudes that sustained a sense of Euro-American superiority, this version of Enlightenment philosophy has sometimes been described as Western philosophy or Western theory, and there are now many attempts to displace this focus and learn differently about the world (Chatterjee, 2014).

It is in this regard that I find Jennifer Hyndman's (2019) recent call for a "feminist political geography" to be most valuable. This broader, more inclusive, umbrella term fits well with the approach outlined and employed by this research. By using the term feminist political geography, Hyndman (2019: 4) aims to "create more space for and provoke a wider range of feminist interventions related to embodied geopolitical phenomena, materialism, violence, displacement (of all kinds), and scale to consolidate a thoroughly feminist and anti-racist political geography that does not succumb to Orientalist rescue narratives or produce regimes of care and security that subjectify" vulnerable people. Such a feminist, post-colonial, anti-racist, political geography allows for the "embodied, contradictory, messy, co-constituted illiberal subjects contesting multiple modalities of violence" (Hyndman, 2019: 23). Further, as Chapter 2.1.d argued, by using the term feminist political geography to describe the approach taken by this project, and thus avoiding the singular terminologies and framings of political geography's fragmented sub-fields, a feminist framework is being implemented that is committed to "postcolonial critique, subaltern geopolitics, and a refusal of Orientalist rescue narratives", thus creating "more space for projects that take violence, exclusion, inequality, the materiality of the bodies, and their various subjectivities seriously" (Hyndman, 2019: 8).

Although Hyndman's (2019) call for a "feminist political geography" is a recent one, one which I only became aware of towards the end of the PhD process, I've nevertheless found it an important contribution to this project as it has provided the language necessary for framing the multifaceted approach implemented. The clarity of Hyndman's argument and its specific address to geographical scholarship are welcome, yet it builds upon a tradition of scholarship critical of Western-centric approaches to gender in non-Western contexts including subversive readings of Eurocentric assumptions to animate, for example, a Yoruba understanding of gender as not grounded in bodily difference (Oyěwùmí, 1997) or the over-turning of white readings of Black gender relations because they occlude the violence of white male slave-owners against Black women and displace this into an account of the pathology of Black families and their absent fathers (Spillers, 1987). These arguments for solidarities that transgress the borders of the West (Mohanty, 1986) have been taken up within Geography (McEwan, 1998; Mitchell, 2003). The synthesis Hyndman offers is particularly helpful because it explicates relations between geopolitical systems and gendered identities that were helpful in framing this work on Hui food cultures as overdetermined by state practices and the GWOT.

Borrowing the term "feminist political geography", this thesis argues in favour of such a theoretical and methodological approach for studying the complexities of Islamic minority identity in place, one that allows for the place-specific manifestations of geopolitical violence and marginalisation of vulnerable groups to be researched and for its lived realities to be taken seriously. As the feminist scholarship has taught us, the personal is political, and this is something that such an approach allows for. Further, such an approach is particularly well suited for researching in non-Western contexts, such as Beijing, through engaging with post-colonial, anti-racist and subaltern theories and by challenging the dominance of masculinist knowledges. Such feminist, post-colonial and critical challenges of Enlightenment philosophy allow for emotional geographies, embodiment, and the performative and intersectional aspects of identity to be taken seriously as academic lines of enquiry (ibid, 22-24). Perhaps more important yet, at least for further research endeavours, is that such an approach to research is open and versatile. It can be implemented in countless ways and in multiple manifestations depending on the specific contexts and places being researched. Such an approach allows space for critical engagement to happen between various sub-fields of political geography, meaning that new approaches can be formulated from previously disparate sub-fields. Thus, allowing for these new approaches to political geography to be reconfigured in line with what is contextually relevant and appropriate, something that is particularly important when researching non-Western peoples and places.

8.2 PERFORMING THE POLITICAL THROUGH FOOD.

The second contribution from this project that this chapter will discuss is closely related to the first. If we are to accept that a feminist political geography approach is a worthwhile and analytically fruitful undertaking for research into non-Western contexts and/or vulnerable people, then methodological questions arise as to how this might be carried out. With these methodological queries in mind, I contend that such an approach to geopolitics may be carried out through an exploration of the everyday, seemingly mundane practices of our lives. To turn again to feminist thought, the personal truly is political. Building from this assumption, and developing out of the feminist political geography approach, this section will argue for the analytical richness and methodological usefulness of using food as a method for researching geopolitics. Following the work of Low and Ho (2018) and Ho (2018a), I argue that researching food is a particularly fruitful method for researching geopolitics and geographies of power in Asian, or more specifically Chinese, contexts.

Informed by the understanding that geopolitics is multi-scalar, occurring at the level of the body and manifested in and through our everyday embodied practices, food is a route into exploring the lived realities of international geopolitics. As Chapter 2.5 discussed, geographers are increasingly becoming aware of the deep political and sociological meaning that food holds, and of the centrality of food in the communication, reproduction and performance of cultures and identities (Bell and Valentine, 1997; Isakjee and Carroll, 2019). Further, given the close association between food and identity for many people and groups, food is extremely emotive, and intimately tied to places. Food and dishes may therefore be viewed as performances of identity, which are inextricably tied to geopolitics. Through looking at performances of food, and through taking people's personal attachments and understandings of food seriously, we can gain an understanding of the lived implications and realities of global geopolitics. This has been proven to be particularly true for the case of the Hui in Beijing, as was evidenced by Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

Through examining the food cultures of the Hui in Beijing, an understanding was gained of how processes of minoritisation and othering have impacted on the lived experiences of Islamic minority subjects in China. Further, by using food as a method of exploration into Hui identity, intersections with other aspects of individual identity could also be investigated, including gender, religion, ethnicity, nationality, and migratory status. Using food as method also allowed for the Hui's use of places to be examined, specifically the public places of Hui food culture that they establish across Beijing. The usefulness of using food as a method for researching geopolitics, particularly when used as part of a feminist political geography approach, is evidenced by this research, and is a method whose usefulness may be applied elsewhere. Further, as many scholars within Western and Chinese academia attempt to bridge the gap between the two academies, I suggest that examining food cultures is a particularly fruitful, and context appropriate, method of conducting cross-cultural research, especially on topics that may otherwise be deemed "too sensitive" by authorities.

8.3 TRIAD OF HUI IDENTITY.

In his valuable and pioneering work "Muslim Chinese", Dru Gladney (1996) showed how the concept and socio-religious practices of *Qingzhen* impacted differently on the identities and lives of four distinct Hui communities across China. Informed by this work and presented as somewhat of a contemporary response to it, Chapter 5 showed how for Beijing Hui it is the ways that *Qingzhen* has shaped the group's food cultures that is the most salient performance of Hui ethnic identity in the Chinese capital today. Rather than understanding *Qingzhen* as simply meaning *halal* (a common and oversimplified Western interpretation), I argue that the direct translation of *Qingzhen* as "pure and true" is more appropriate and encapsulating of its complexities. For Beijing Hui, the notion of *Qingzhen* not only entails the dietary restrictions and associated practices of *halal*, but it also exceeds Qur'anic laws by incorporating aspects of broader Chinese teachings, specifically from Chinese medicine, the Chinese humoral system, and the notion of *chi shenme bu shenme*, or "eat something to fix/mend something". Subsequently, I argue that *Qingzhen* may be seen as a sinocisation of *halal*, whereby *halal* and its dietary practices have been localised over time, fusing with Chinese culture to produce a distinct set of socio-religious and cultural practices and beliefs for the Hui.

Building from this understanding of *Qingzhen* and its importance to Hui culture, I argue that for Beijing Hui, the defining performance of their identity is the way in which *Qingzhen* has influenced and shaped their food cultures. As such, I argue that Hui food cultures and local interpretations of *Qingzhen* are mutually dependent, and as such, are co-constitutive of Hui identity, forming an interlocked triad (Figure 8.1). This triad of Hui identity was expressed in many ways by participants, although five dominant and reoccurring lenses continually appeared. These were religion, "small" nationalism/ethnicity, "big" nationalism/state nationalism, cleanliness, and place. Ultimately, Figure 8.1 should not be viewed as an attempt to essentialise Hui identity, as such an attempt would be futile given the fluid, multifaceted and performative nature of identity. Rather, it is merely an attempt to visually represent and make sense of the complexity, and interpretive and individualistic nature of Hui identity in contemporary Beijing, while taking seriously the close relationship between Hui identity, Hui food cultures and localised interpretations of *Qingzhen*.



Figure 8.1: Triad of Hui Identity.
Source: Author's own (2019).

8.4 QINQIE PLACES.

Places are multifaceted, fluid and complex. Yet, many scholars writing about place have had a tendency to essentialise and simplify the concept to one or two select traits or aspect, often prioitising certain qualities of place over the others. Examples of this are Casey's (2001) emphasis on the body's "constitutive coingredience" and "implacement", Tuan's (1974) focus on "sense of place", Pred's (1984) "paths" and place's processual qualities, Massey's (1993) discussion of places as relational, Malpas' (2012, 2017) open and porous boundaries, and Pierce, Martin and Murphy (2011) focus on place-making as political and networked. While each of these examples have undoubtedly helped to further our understanding of place as a concept, they nonetheless have failed to fully capture the depth of place through their privileging of certain qualities while eschewing others. Although narrowing one's theoretical focus to a select aspect of place can be conceptually fruitful, particularly when presenting a new conceptualisation in opposition to established understandings, it is ultimately a potentially damaging endeavour to our understandings of place and identity more broadly. As Mills and Gökariksel (2014: 902) have shown in their exploration of Muslim identities outside of the West, "what it means to be Muslim is contextually specific and formed through relationships with others" and as such, entails a reconceptualization of place that is more dynamic than most single-factor explanations allow for – a similar claim to the one being made here in relation to the Hui.

The antifoundational logic of feminist and post-structuralist treatments of place is certainly helpful as a caution against any synthesis that promises a full account of places as bounded objects. Certainly, the relations that enable and constrain activities at any location extend well beyond that site and their interaction does not always or even often produce stable local arrangements; places are unstable (Hyndman, 2019; Johnston, 2018). Introducing one collection on *Feminisms in Geography*, Moss and Falcolner Al-Hindi (2008: 3) note that the central concerns of feminist geographers are somewhat orthogonal to the 'more discipline-based concepts of place, space, spatiality, and environment.' There might be a risk that place as a category gets dissolved into relations that leave very little conceptual room for thinking about co-presence and the references that get made to a past that is resonant because of its traces at a particular location, endowing it with meaning as a place. Ettlinger (2007: 320) notes this risk and suggests that we do not 'need to jettison boundaries or categories altogether, but to be more self-conscious about the problems of boundary construction and to understand how tendencies to essentialize might be constructively engaged.' One recent essay that develops a poststructuralist and feminist reading of place in a fashion that sits well with my ambitions here is Kofman and Raghuram's (2020) discussion of place in the context of gendered geographies of migration where they suggest that place operates difference and connection.

In light of the shortcoming of Western scholarship on place, and the lack of critical theoretical contributions of Chinese geographers, or other scholars in Southern Theory (Connell, 2014), in presenting new understandings of place to date, an in-depth conceptualisation of place was presented in chapters 2 and 6 of this thesis which draws from a diffuse array of existing Western theories. Although the concepts of place used are noticeably Western in their origins and viewpoints, that should not mean that they're incompatible with non-Western places when taken together. Following the research project's three field visits, and the analysis of empirical data, a multifaceted conceptualisation of place was developed in order to understand the phenomena of place-making among the Hui. The suggested concept of place is a feminist and post-colonial conceptualisation, drawing heavily from Chinese empirical research. Such an understanding of place is, I believe, in line with the feminist political geography approach and methodology of this project.

The resulting conceptualisation of place, which I call *Qinqie* place due to the emotive and relational qualities of Hui places and the term's frequent use by participants, is one that challenges masculine and Western-centric conceptualisations of place, while remaining grounded in academic literature and theory. Specifically, *Qinqie* place is a more wide-ranging and all-encompassing conceptualisation of place which argues that: it is in and through our bodies that we experience places; our emotive and experiential imports are fundamental properties of places; these places are not static, but are processual and mobile; places are not enclosed by rigid borders, but rather, they possess a bounded openness; places are connected and relational to other places and people; they are multi-temporal; they are socially and historically contingent "gatherings", or bundles; and they are inescapably political. This broader understanding of place is, I argue, essential in understanding the complexities of place and place-making practices within the context of public places of Hui food culture in Beijing. Although such a conceptualisation of place is undoubtedly the result of context-specific factors, I also contend that its wider and more encompassing approach to understanding place may be beneficial for other studies, both in China and elsewhere.

8.5 MINORITISATION.

As the introduction to this chapter discussed, minoritising practices and processes in China are becoming increasingly drastic and violent towards their Muslim subjects, spurred on by draconian policing measures and policies under the guise of "counter-terrorism", "de-radicalisation", and "counter-extremism" (Roberts, 2018; Brophy, 2019). Given the ongoing persecution of Xinjiang's Muslims, particularly the Uyghur, it is unsurprising that most of the academic focus on minoritisation in China in recent years has focused on the Uyghur (Clarke, 2010; Roberts, 2018). The focus of this research, however, has not been on the more overt manifestations of minoritisation experienced by Northwest China's Muslims. Rather, it has attempted to investigate the more mundane, "under the radar", processes of minoritisation affecting those living in China's political heartland. In doing so, an insight was gained into how minoritisation differs as a practice both spatially and socially.

Ultimately, the argument made in regard to minoritisation here is that it is an inherently gendered and place-specific process, as minoritisation and patriarchy are reformulated and synthesised in place. As these reformulations of minoritisation and patriarchy happen in place, they are unavoidably impacted on by social relations. Specifically, they are shaped by inter-ethnic relations, demographics and politics. As the case of the Hui has shown, minoritisation is impacting on how Hui gender and gender roles are performed and defined in Han-majority Beijing. Specifically, gender and male-domination are reconfigured within the place-specific context of Beijing's Hui restaurants and eateries, as Hui patriarchy and minoritisation are synthesised to accommodate to life in a Han-dominated society. These place-specific syntheses are performed through Hui food cultures and are visibly evident in the spatial demarcation and uses of places of Hui food culture across Beijing City (Chapter 7.3). The specificities of Beijing as a place have resulted in Hui patriarchy being reconfigured in unique ways, producing distinct syntheses of minoritisation and male dominance. These unique synthesis evident in Beijing cannot be assumed to happen in the same ways elsewhere. In fact, as participants often referenced, gender and gender roles were performed in very different ways in their home areas outside of Beijing. This fact, coupled with the minoritisation practices evidenced by Xinjiang-based research, bolsters this project's findings: that minoritisation is not only a gendered process, but is place-specific.

8.6 SECURITISATION OF ISLAM IN CHINA.

At the beginning of this thesis, and indeed at the start of my PhD journey in late 2014, I asked a series of questions relating to the securitisation of Islam and its possible implications for Chinese Muslims. Given the recent geopolitical developments in China discussed at the start of this chapter, and indeed the findings of this project regarding the minoritisation of the Hui in Beijing, I think it's worthwhile returning to these questions and addressing them more directly. Specifically, in Chapter 1.4, I asked:

- Has the Global War on Terror impacted on the lived experiences of Muslims in other more “harmonious” parts of China outside of the Northwest?
- Has the GWOT awarded other provincial authorities the right to label their Islamic minorities as terrorists too?
- If so, are the lives and everyday practices of Muslim minorities outside of Northwest China also subjected to exclusionary and discriminatory practices and policies?
- What about those considered to be “good Muslims”? Are they facing similar oppressive forces by majoritarian populations?
- If so, how have their lives, experiences and identities been affected, and how does this play out spatially?

Unfortunately, the answers evidenced by this research project are perhaps less comforting or reassuring than one might hope for. As was shown throughout, the securitisation of Islam is not merely a Western or western Chinese practice. Rather, the effects of the Global War on Terror are also being experienced by Muslims in Beijing, far from China’s turbulent Northwest. As the anti-Arabisation campaigns in NHAR have shown, along with the crackdowns following Uyghur “terrorist” attacks in Kunming and Beijing in 2014 and 2013 respectively (Holdstock, 2015), other provincial authorities are also applying the label of “terrorist” to Muslim (specifically Uyghur) subjects accused of carrying out violent actions. Framed by this geopolitical context, Muslims across China are increasingly being subjected to discriminatory and exclusionary practices. Fortunately, Muslims in areas outside of China’s XUAR are not routinely subjugated in the same harsh and violent ways by predominantly Han authorities. However, as this thesis has shown, the Hui are nevertheless experiencing ongoing processes of minoritisation within Han-dominated Beijing.

Throughout this dissertation, I have described a certain reticence in the expression of Hui culture in their restaurants. I have described the difficulties that some restaurant owners have described themselves as having experienced in getting licenses to operate restaurants (see section 7.2.a above). I have described the restrictions placed upon the use of Arabic script in denoting halal foods (see section 1.2 above). I have described the official attempt to demolish a newly-built mosque in Wanzhou, an effort understood by my informants as targeting public expression of Arabic architectural forms (see section 1.2 above) These forms are very commonly used in the decoration of Hui restaurants in

Beijing (see section 6.1.a.i above) and are now felt as being taken to identify an alien cultural presence linked to the GWOT.

The impacts of these processes are manifested in the group's distinctive food cultures, socio-cultural practices, gender roles, and performances of identity. These lived realities undeniably shape the ways that the Hui make places, use them, and connect with them. By establishing distinctly Hui places in Beijing through the selling and consumption of food, the Hui are marking out places where they feel that they are welcomed, safe and *Qinqie,* despite the worsening geopolitical climate. Yet, these spaces are not detached from the geopolitical, with assimilative discourses and practices impacting on how the Hui perform their food cultures and on the way they create Hui places. In light of this, this research has exposed an unfortunate reality: that Islam has become a securitised matter in Beijing, meaning that the securitisation of Islam is not confined to the XUAR but is more widespread in its geographic scope, affecting Muslims across the country.

8.7 ACTIVE REFLEXIVITY.

Throughout the research process, a large dataset was co-produced in place with participants, from which the findings discussed above could be interpreted. However, these are not the only contributions to be extracted from the project. Rather, there is great value to be gained from reflecting not just on the dataset produced, but on the process of co-producing the dataset in the field. As was discussed in Chapter 3, in attempting to conduct research in the field, we are actively shaping the field through our presence, our actions and our objectives. Therefore, it is vitally important that we, as researchers, continually implement reflexive practices to critically question our positionalities while challenging our situated knowledges and the inherent power relations involved in conducting research. Such reflexivity helps to ensure an ethics of care, for both the research participants and the researcher.

Given the nature of this research project, its non-Western context, and the subjectivities of the research participants, reflexivity was a primary concern, and indeed major obstacle, for me and was something that needed to be implemented methodologically. Given my positioning as a white, Irish, Western-educated, gay man who was raised a Roman Catholic but is now spiritual but not religious, my subjectivities needed to be taken seriously throughout the research process. Fortunately, the importance of reflexivity and positionality were something that I was made aware of from early in the research process through reading academic literatures and from conversations with my supervisors, mentors and lecturers. As such, I entered the field in August 2015 with an understanding of this importance and a reflective practice in mind. Yet, as the research process advanced and I began trying to make sense of my observations, I quickly realised how limited my initial understandings of reflexivity were and how significantly I had underestimated the importance of reflecting on my own positionality at all times. Rather than merely attempting to address the issue of my positionality through writing weekly reflective memos (as I had set out to do in the beginning), it became evident that reflexive practices needed to be incorporated into every single aspect of my research methodology. The more I began reflecting on my positionality, the more obvious it became that my pre-conceived, Eurocentric "knowledge" was influencing my interpretations of the daily occurrences and phenomena in ways that didn't necessarily match with the lived realities of my research participants. Thus, through practices of reflexivity, it became evident that more reflection and consideration of my positionality was needed in order to challenge my interpretations and allow room for the empirical data to challenge Eurocentric assumptions; not that reality can essentially speak for itself but that in attending the ways of, in Kearns' (1998) terms, making virtuous the circularity of facts and values we might appreciate how our theories make claims upon the world that may be challenged by empirical findings, while recognising that those findings are themselves directed in part by the presumptions and priorities of our theories. Through practicing reflexivity, my methodology continually evolved and adapted as I challenged not only my views of the phenomena I observed, but also the ways in which I engaged with people and places, and my role in actively shaping the field. The paragraph below was taken from a reflexive memo that I wrote on 25 November 2015 while in Beijing for my first field visit, and I think that it demonstrates a key moment in my realisation for the need to change my reflexive practices and in challenging my own situated knowledges:

> "After class today, I visited a north-western style restaurant in Dongcheng District. While I ate my Lanzhou *MianPian*[276] at my table near the service window, I watched the lunchtime rush unfolding. As I had observed before in other restaurants, the waiting staff were all female, rushing around between tables delivering dishes, taking orders and clearing plates. While the kitchen staff (from what I could see through the large glass window) were all male.

[276]面片。

Although this gendering of space is something that I've discussed already, I spent some time thinking about it today again. I had a thought then: how does this gendering relate to minoritisation? Does it? I think so. Up until now I had just been thinking about this gendering of space as a possible continuation of Hui gender norms. But I think it's deeper than that. I think it's representative of subversive processes of minoritisation. The more time I spent thinking about it today, while jotting notes into my notebook, the more I began to question minoritisation as a concept. At first, I did this by considering my observations, but then I had to turn the lens onto myself and my own understandings. From doing this, I realised some things. I realise now that my view to date of minoritisation as simply being a damaging process for all minority subjects is too simplistic. It's deeper than that. It happens at different levels. In this regard, I need to think more about how it's impacted by intersections with gender (and other things). Also, are there minority people who benefit from it? Now I find myself asking why I just viewed it as a negative process for everyone. Why didn't I consider previously that it affects people differently, or that some Hui might even benefit? Sadly, I think that answers are clear: I've been western-centric and masculinist in my views. I've even been somewhat Orientalist, viewing the Hui as people to be saved, rather than letting the reality speak for itself. And by viewing it as a universal process, my privilege as a white man is clear. This is definitely something that I need to be cautious of and reflect on more regularly."[277]

These reflexive practices drastically altered the project's methods of data production and analysis from the initial planned methodology. Rather than writing reflective pieces every week, I began structuring my notes in three parts after every interaction with participants or visits to research sites. These three types of notes were descriptive fieldnotes, interpretive notes, and reflective memos. Further, even when not in the field, I continually wrote reflexive memos, especially when analysing the dataset, translating documents or writing findings. These reflexive practices, which are detailed in Chapter 3.3.e, allowed for the obstacles faced by my positionality to be addressed. Reflexivity allowed me to learn to mitigate some of the power differentials of the interactions with local informants. As my language competence improved, I was able to appreciate more of the nuance in responses and pay more heed to the work being done for me by my

[277] Taken from reflexive memo dated November 25th, 2015.

translators. I was always aware that it was only the liberal generosity of the people I met in the restaurants that allowed me to do any work at all. My research was never their priority. It became more easy with time to be effectively respectful since I learned more about the acceptable mores of personal interaction across barriers of age, class, gender, ethnicity, and sexuality. Sometimes, I was the junior party in terms of some of these dimensions and at other times my own emotional and health circumstances disqualified any self-confidence I might otherwise have allowed myself. Of course, no exercise in reflexivity could cancel entirely the asymmetries of privilege that attached to me as a Western visitor with an income above that of most of the people whom I was asking for help.

These exercises in reflexivity allowed me to be more attentive to way my informants interpreted the world for themselves and to allow this to challenge my unthinking western-centric biases. Through actively practicing reflexivity, I increasingly became aware of the limitations of the geographical theories of place to explain the situation of the Hui in Beijing. From my informants I learned of the complexity of *Qinqie*, and found that complexity helpful in explicating what was involved in the place-making that was part of Hui food cultures. By allowing space for the development of a multifaceted and nuanced theoretical framework that draws from multiple theories and concepts, and accepting instruction from my local informants, a feminist political geography approach could be developed. This approach is one that strives to better understand the case of the Hui in Beijing through piecing together relevant concepts to make a context appropriate and empirically driven framework, rather than attempting to simply apply Western theory to the Chinese context.

Ultimately, reflexive practices have formed a cornerstone of this project, shaping the methods used, driving the ethics of care implemented, and allowing for the development of an empirically evidenced and context appropriate theoretical approach. Although the issues of reflexivity, positionality and situated knowledges are not new concerns within geography or the social sciences, I argue that reflexive practices need to be taken more seriously by academics, particularly those working in non-Western contexts. Rather than viewing reflexivity and reflexive practices as being mere supportive tools or secondary methods in research, thus under appreciating their importance, reflective practices need to be more actively carried out by researchers. Epistemologically speaking, many feminist, post-colonial, post-structuralist and queer scholars have been advocating for the importance of reflecting on one's positionality for quite some time. Yet, perhaps the methodological implications and practices of reflection need to be advocated for even more strongly within geography. Although arguing for the theoretical benefits of reflexivity is a worthwhile endeavour, the practical application of this understanding into methods and methodological practices need more transparent and detailed discussion. The active and regular engagements in reflexive practices throughout all stages of the research processes holds tremendous methodological, ethical and conceptual benefits for geographers, particularly those working in non-Western contexts. The contributions made by this research project were only made possible once I began actively reflecting on my own positionality and role in the co-production of the dataset, highlighting the importance of such a methodological practice in generating new geographical knowledge.

8.8 A MORE EMOTIONAL GEOGRAPHY.

The next contribution to be discussed is closely linked to the discussion in Section 8.7 regarding the importance of active reflexivity as a method. In recent years, there has been significantly increased interest in emotions and geographies of emotions within the discipline of geography. There is now a growing appreciation of the powerful role that emotions play in shaping our identities, impacting on our sense of the world around us, and in influencing how we reflect on the past or project the future (Davidson and Milligan, 2004; Davidson and Bondi, 2004; see also Chapter 2.2). The sub-field of emotional geography holds tremendous potential for our discipline, shedding light on how we engage with places as well as the lived implications of geopolitics (Davidson and Bondi, 2004; Urry, 2007; Pain, 2009). Yet, the field is not without its critiques, particularly from a methodological viewpoint. Many geographers working within the field of emotional geographies tend to place their focus largely, or in many cases solely, on the emotions and emotional knowings and experiences of the research participants. Although this is undoubtedly an important practice, particularly when researching a topic centred on participants' experiences of place, I argue that it falls short of being a truly emotional geography. Such an aspiration is, I believe, only achievable through the ongoing active reflexive practices discussed above. If we are to accept that our emotions and the places we inhabit are mutually constitutive as was argued in Chapter 3.2.d (Urry, 2007), and that researchers are also involved in the co-production of the research field (or places) as was argued in Chapter 3 (Smith, 1988; Harraway, 1988; Kearns, 1998; Limb and Dwyer, 2001; Walsh, 2009), then we need to be more mindful of our own emotional states when conducting research, particularly when we are in the places that we hope to study.

The importance of such a mindfulness and reflexivity of our emotional states and experiences was one that became increasingly apparent to me as I carried out the first field visit between August 2015 and late March 2016. As this field visit progressed, I experienced a decline in my mental and emotional wellbeing, brought upon by a series of changes in my personal circumstances and a deteriorating underlying health condition, which was exacerbated by my being in the field. Resulting from this, I began experiencing extreme feelings of homesickness, loneliness, anxiety and sadness. At first, in an effort to "battle through" the hardships I was facing and to distract from my emotional state, I was dismissive of such feelings, continually attempting (with little success) to ignore my emotional state through near-complete immersion in my research. However, I quickly realised that such an attempt to dismiss my emotions was not just proving detrimental to my own wellbeing, but rather, it was also damaging to the research and to the dataset that I was inescapably involved in co-producing. As I wrote in my reflexive memo dated 28 January 2016:

> "Up until now I've been making a point of briefly referring to my emotional responses and states in these reflexive memos. But admittedly, it's been more of a tick the box exercise than something that I've been taking seriously or attributed any real value to. I had a quick read back over some of my previous entries and words like "excited", "nervous", "happy", "worried" and so on, have been used to describe my emotional responses to situations and developments from the research. But I nearly always just add a short line naming the primary emotion I felt, without actually engaging with my full range of emotions or taking them seriously. But today, just before I left R1, I was so exhausted, drained and overwhelmed that I thought I might cry. I suddenly became aware that I just didn't want to be there, I couldn't be there, I couldn't focus. I had to take a deep breath, give an excuse and quickly walk to the subway – trying to ignore the sinking feeling in my stomach the whole time. After some time, while I was sitting on a train somewhere along Line 13 and had managed to finally breathe through the wave of emotions, I found myself asking a question: how can I claim to be researching the Hui's emotional geographies and experiences

> of place, without really paying attention to my own emotions? Especially when my own emotions are not just impacting on my ability to engage with participants, but they're also affecting my own experience of place to the extent that I had to physically remove myself from R1. I realise now, that it's not good enough to just talk about participants' emotions, or to briefly name my own emotions without really engaging with them. Going forward, I'm going to have to be more critical and detailed with my reflections. After all, I'm in those places too, I'm part of them, and my emotions are impacting in a big way on how I'm experiencing them. I need to be more attentive of my own feelings, my own emotional geographies."[278]

The realisation made in this memo was an important one in the development of this research project and is at the core of the argument being made here. That is to say, that as researchers engaging with emotional geographies, or indeed any engagements with place or feelings more generally, we should be taking seriously our own emotional states and understandings as they inevitably shape our engagements with place, with our participants and with our research projects and data. It is important to be actively reflexive and mindful of our emotions in order to not only provide more transparent accounts of our research processes and experiences, but also in order to provide a more honest telling of the complexities of places and our roles in "knowing" these places through our own embodied experiences. Therefore, I argue, that as geographers we need to be mindful of both the participants' and the researcher's emotions if we are to achieve a more emotional geography.

8.9 CONDUCTING FIELDWORK ABROAD.

A final key contribution of this project that I have become increasingly aware of as I reflect on the PhD process is the benefits of having completed fieldwork abroad. The benefits of conducting fieldwork abroad to this project go beyond the practicalities and logistics of researching the Hui in Beijing. As has been made clear throughout, much of this thesis has been devoted to challenging Eurocentric and masculinist theories and hegemonic Anglo-American thought through a feminist political geography approach that is contextually relevant and empirically driven. Such an aspiration would not have been possible without having conducted research in Beijing. In fact, at the beginning of

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[278] Taken from reflexive memo dated 28 January 2016.

the PhD process, I had somewhat underestimated the extent to which this project needed to critique the geographical concepts and theories that I brought with me into the field in order to better frame the Hui's lived realities. However, as the project developed and evolved to meet the requirements and necessities of the field, it became evident that many of the theories and practices that I had intended to employ were insufficient, or even incompatible, with the realities of the Beijing context. Throughout my field visits, and indeed later reflections of these visits, I became increasingly appreciative of the relationship between our conceptual and theoretical knowledge, and the everyday processes and phenomena of our lives. Our concepts were developed to explain our own everyday experiences. The assumption of a common experience already did violence to difference within Western society but it was the confrontation with the ideas of place that my Chinese informants tried to explain to me that gave me the insight that the geographical notions of place that I had studied up to now were seriously limited. This dissonance spurred me to think anew about the ways in which I tried to conceptualise the phenomena and processes I observed and experienced. As such, my experiences of conducting fieldwork abroad, specifically in a non-Western country, provided me with the opportunity (through necessity) to challenge the hegemony of Anglo-American geographic thought. Resulting in a re-conceptualisation of concepts such as place and minoritisation to better fit the lived realities of Beijing's Hui, and indeed, my experiences of researching with them. Such experiences of conducting international fieldwork not only shaped this project's findings in unforeseen ways, but have also undisputedly changed my opinions, approaches and practices as a researcher and geographer. As Sidaway, Ho, Rigg and Woon (2016: 786) suggest, "there might be something gained by plunging into new areas, leaving a disciplinary comfort zone, with familiar literatures, paradigms and people, to think, present and publish comparatively, venturing into reconfigured area studies communities or across disciplines, where we are in less secure territory".

8.10 CONCLUDING REFLECTION.

> *"Qinqie*? Why *Qinqie*? Why does this place make Hui guests feel very *Qinqie*?"[279]

[279]亲切？为什么亲切？为什么这个地方会让回民的客人会觉得非常有亲切的感觉吗？

> "First of all, diet is very important to everyone, but [for] Hui people, diet is very important to Hui people. *Qinqie* feelings can only come from your products, your food, your service, and your place. This is the point, which will make some people feel that, especially some Muslims, [that they] have this *Qinqie* feeling. The average person, a non-Muslim stranger, may not feel *Qinqie* [. . .] There is one big difference between Muslims and other Han Chinese or non-Muslims. When any Muslim arrives in an unfamiliar city, he first looks for the mosque, as long as he finds the mosque, the purpose is to facilitate worship, because Muslims have to worship five times a day. First of all, [they look] to facilitate worship. Secondly, there must be a *Qingzhen* restaurant near the mosque for convenient meals. But for us, this food is like home. Rest assured, because it's *Qingzhen*. Hui people feel relieved."[280]

The above excerpt was taken from an interview with the male owner of a small wheaten-product stall in mid-August 2017. At his busy stall, adjoined to a busy supermarket, this man and his small team of employees sold a range of fried, baked and steamed wheaten products: which were made in his private kitchen nearby before being delivered to the small stall several times throughout the day. The stall was staffed exclusively by women, who worked tirelessly to deal with the unrelenting queue of customers that snaked its way through the thoroughfare between the entrance to the supermarket and the building's exit. The kitchen staff were all male, as were the staff responsible for delivering the products to the stall. The male owner described his own role as managerial. He checked the kitchen in the morning, but otherwise left the male staff to operate it by themselves, while he monitored the female cashiers at the stall. The plastic barrier that divided the women and food from the customers was covered in small gold and green *Qingzhen* signs featuring both Chinese and Arabic characters, while on wall behind them there was a large piece of framed Islamic scripture and a black and white photograph of Xi'an's Great Mosque.

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[280] 首先呢，饮食对谁都是非常重要的，但是回族，饮食对回族是非常重要的。亲切感只能来源于你的产品，你的食品，你的服务，和你所在的这个位置，就是这个点，会让某些人会觉得，尤其是一些穆斯林会有这样的亲切感。一般人，陌生的一个非穆斯林他不见得有亲切感[。。。] 而穆斯林有一个和其他咱们汉族，或者非穆斯林有一个最大的不同是。任何一个穆斯林到了一个陌生的城市，他首先找清真寺，只要找到了清真寺，目的在于方便礼拜，因为穆斯林一天要有五次礼拜，首先是方便礼拜。第二，清真寺附近肯定有清真饭店，方便吃饭，如果你离开了这个区域，你想找吃饭的清真食品很难找，所以说这里的人看到了这样的，这有个清真超市，这有个清真食品，他觉得亲切，除此以外没有人会觉得亲切。但是对于我们来说，这个食物就相当于家的感觉。心里放心，因为是清真的。回族感觉心里放心那种。

I chose to end this thesis with the above excerpt by this interviewee and with a summary of my fieldnotes from my visit to his stall, not because they were especially distinctive from the rest of my dataset, but because the exact opposite is true. In fact, I failed to fully appreciate the significance of this man's interview until quite late in the writing process, after I had analysed and reflected on the dataset several times. In the end, what struck me as important about this particular male, our interview and my notes from that August day, was how seemingly ordinary they were and how often I had witnessed, heard and experienced similar statements, actions and places throughout my three field visits to Beijing. As with many other places of Hui food culture across Beijing, this one featured many visual representations that helped to establish and demarcate this stall as authentically Hui and *Qingzhen* by connecting it to other people, times and places. It was staffed by Hui men and women who were spatially separated as both sets performed their distinctive food cultures for the queue of predominantly Han customers, breaking with traditional gender roles and reformulating Hui patriarchy and minoritisation in context specific ways. This place and these performances of Hui food cultures were deeply emotive for Hui people, allowing Muslims and Hui to feel at home, assured, relieved and *Qinqie*. Such emotive ties to these places were uniquely Hui, meaning something more to them than simply spaces for food consumption. Rather, despite the worsening geopolitical climate surrounding them in China, and the assimilative forces and discourses surrounding them in Han-dominated Beijing, these emotive ties to places of Hui food culture provide them with somewhere they belong in an increasingly intolerant society. For Beijing Hui, their food and public places of food cultures are central to how they perform their identities and how they understand their place in Chinese society.

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APPENDIX 1: ETHICAL APPROVAL.

MAYNOOTH UNIVERSITY RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
MAYNOOTH UNIVERSITY,
MAYNOOTH, CO. KILDARE, IRELAND

Maynooth University
National University of Ireland Maynooth

Dr Carol Barrett
Secretary to Maynooth University Research Ethics Committee

13 July 2015

Dean Patrick Phelan
NIRSA
Maynooth University

RE: Application for Ethical Approval for a project entitled: Making Hui: the minoritisation, territoriality and performance of Islam in contemporary China

Dear Dean,

The Ethics Committee evaluated the above project and we would like to inform you that ethical approval has been granted.

Any deviations from the project details submitted to the ethics committee will require further evaluation. This ethical approval will expire on 31 December 2016.

Kind Regards,

Dr Carol Barrett
Secretary,
Maynooth University Research Ethics Committee

C.c Professor Gerry Kearns Department of Geography
Professor Mark Boyle, NIRSA

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SRESC-2015-057