


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RELIGION, STATE AND ETHNIC GROUPS

COMPARATIVE STUDIES ON GOVERNMENTS AND NON-DOMINANT ETHNIC GROUPS IN EUROPE, 1850-1940

Volume II

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1 Religion, State and Ethnic Identity

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The period in European history from 1850 to 1940 was one of unprecedented change. An increasing awareness of national identity led to the rapid growth of nationalism with the emergence of new states and new developments in the older monarchies. The French Revolution exalted the rights of the people at the expense of hereditary monarchies; the Romantic movement encouraged ethnic groups to seek their identity in the glories of their past. The religious creed of a community had always been a badge of identity and so as governments sought to absorb or to accommodate different ethnic groups within their jurisdiction their attitude towards the religion of these groups was of central importance. The reaction of Churches and religious leaders towards such government attempts to control or assimilate was just as crucial. In states claiming to be the heirs of the Revolution religion was often denied a public role and many functions it had previously monopolised were removed from its control, yet by the middle of the century it could not be said that its importance had diminished. Religion sometimes facilitated assimilation by the dominant group within a state. More often, however, because of its tendency to produce strong convictions and loyalties among its faithful, it worked towards maintaining the integrity of the group and consequently blunted the edge of government efforts to assimilate all groups into a uniform national entity.

This volume is a comparative study of the role of religion in the interplay between governments and ethnic groups. The case studies examine the situation in different European countries and while they do not claim to be comprehensive they are sufficiently representative of Europe in our period to illustrate the advantages of a comparative approach to the relationship among governments, non-dominant ethnic groups and religion. Similarities and analogies between countries as diverse as Russian occupied Poland on the one hand, and Catalonia on the other, cast light on one another. Just as revealing as the similarities are the contrasts that have also emerged. The areas covered in these case studies stretch from the Kven and

Sami homelands of the northern tip of Norway to the Albanian villages in the south of Italy, and from Ireland in the far west to the Armenian emigrant community in the east. The religions, creeds and Churches in this study embrace Orthodox Jews and Orthodox Christians, Armenians, Catholics both of Roman and eastern rite, Russian Old Believers, Congregationalists and Muslims. This general chapter seeks to draw together some of the results of these studies.

Although more attention is given to the period from 1850 to 1920, the studies cover almost a hundred years of great change throughout the whole of Europe. The First World War, especially because of the fall of the four great empires of Russia, Turkey, Austria-Hungary and Germany, or more generally the period from 1912 to 1922, was a watershed since it changed boundaries, established new states and saw radical changes in forms of governments. As a result of those changes many new dominant and new non-dominant groups were created. The classic case was the emergence of many non-dominant groups within the Habsburg empire as new nations, but the same is true of the Irish. For other minorities their non-dominant status was reinforced as, caught on the wrong side of the frontier changes, they saw themselves isolated from members of their own group. Some dominant groups were transformed into non-dominant groups as, for instance, Hungarians in Transylvania, Germans in Sudetenland and in Poland, Irish Protestants in the Irish Free State.

Governments, Religions and Minorities

European Governments' Attitudes to Religion

The attitudes of governments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries towards different religions had clearly identifiable roots in early European history. In earlier civilisations the prince was endowed with both secular and sacral power. The advent of Christianity did not fundamentally change this outlook, as the reigns of Constantine, Theodosius and Justinian bear witness. This attitude, in the form of Caesaro-papism, persisted in eastern Europe and remained that of the tsar throughout the Russian empire. In the west, with the emergence of the Carolingian and later the Holy Roman empire, a different situation evolved. Since the Church had taken the initiative in the creation of the western empire its relationship with it differed from its relationship with the Byzantine Roman empire. During the Middle Ages both Pope and Holy Roman Emperor claimed a superiority of power, but the long struggle between them resulted in a balance of power which favoured religious and political dissidence.

After the Reformation Protestant states saw a fusion of secular and religious power in the hands of the prince: a tendency counter-balanced, however, by the emergence of the right of private judgement and the growth of dissenting sects. Catholic princes also practised the principle of *cuius regio eius religio* though their recognition of the Pope as spiritual head of the Church tempered their power. In every Catholic country there were also powerful international religious orders, Franciscans, Dominicans and Jesuits, with headquarters in Rome which made it more difficult for the Catholic prince to exercise complete control over the Church. The Enlightenment, in its turn, modified further governmental attitudes towards religion. On the one hand it benefited religious minorities as it encouraged religious tolerance; on the other it strengthened *étatisme* (state consciousness) and absolutism within the nation-state and increased the state's power over the official Church.

Governments and Minority Religions

The empire states of nineteenth century Europe, and even the emerging nation-states, had a state religion which was normally the religion of the dominant group. The dominance of this religion was reflected in the country's laws and traditions and in the mentality of its people. In addition to the dominant group with its privileged religion, non-dominant groups of different religious persuasions persisted in all these states towards which different governments pursued a range of policies. Although politically, socially and economically, these groups differ widely from one another our studies show that in all of them the principal questions raised by the relationship among the groups, their faith and their respective governments recur. As such they offer a broad and colourful canvas for comparative historical study.

Differing State Models

All the case studies show a desire on the part of the state to control the religion of non-dominant ethnic groups. The extent of that control and the method of achieving it, however, differed from state to state. A first consideration, then, must be the difference between the types of states and governments. In 1850, when our studies begin, most of the ethnic groups studied lived in one or more of the five great empires that stretched from the Urals to the Atlantic - Russia, Turkey, Austria, Britain and Germany, though the German empire only assumed its final form in 1871. The remainder lived in nation-states, some with ancient imperial pretensions like Spain, others products of the French Revolution such as Italy, which was effect-

ively united by 1870. There was a wide difference between the regimes of Alexander III, Abdul-Hamid II, Franz Joseph, Wilhelm II and Queen Victoria, ranging from the strictly autocratic rule of Russia and Turkey to the constitutional monarchy of Britain.

An interesting illustration of both the similarities and differences of approach is provided by Professor Kumor in his study of the attitude of three different empires, Russian, German and Austrian, towards Polish Catholics. All three sought russification or germanisation but their policy was coloured by their history and religion. Because the religion of the Poles was the dominant religion in the Habsburg monarchy the emperor interfered least. The Prussian king, through persistent tactics, introduced German speaking bishops even to the primate see. As Bolesław Kumor describes the matter the tsars interfered most actively in Church affairs and deliberately kept episcopal sees vacant and in the hands of pliable administrators. Uncooperative bishops were deported and in places the government attempted to make Russian the language of catechesis and preaching.

There was arguably less of a centralised role for government in the Habsburg monarchy. After the Counter Reformation Austrian Catholicism became a state Church and after the modernisation accomplished by Josephinism, that Church appeared as a useful adjunct to the civil service and police both in controlling the people and providing for their welfare, though the pattern was to be shaken after 1850. The Austrian state was a patchwork of different regions with different constitutions and after 1867 central government policy was complicated by the Dual Monarchy with Hungary. The new Hungarian government immediately attempted to regulate relations between the state and the Churches. They were granted a role in education and were responsible for the registrations of births and marriages. This benefited the many sizeable minorities in Hungary – Orthodox, Protestants, Jews and Unitarians. The Austro-Hungarian position is described in Robin Okey's chapter on the Serbo-Croats.

The relationship between Church and state in Germany had been one of close alliance ever since the German Reformation had maintained itself solely under the protection of the territorial prince. The absolute nature of the power of the state, conceived as being of divine origin, was not questioned even in the wake of the rationalist philosophies of Lessing, Kant and Goethe. According to Hegel's school of thought the state in itself represented the 'divine element' and 'the reality of the idea of morality'. Although efforts were usually made to avoid violations of conscience, organised religion of whatever faith was considered properly subject to state control and the representatives of religion were to be loyal servants of the state. Since Frederick William III had created the Prussian state Church, thereby making the Church an instrument of state power, the Church,

together with the army, the civil service and royal house of the Hohenzollerns, was one of the cornerstones of traditional Prussian-German society. By 1861, however, over one third of the population of 18 million Prussians was Catholic and there were more than a quarter of a million Jews. In 1870 Otto von Bismarck, Prime Minister of Prussia, began the *Kulturkampf* (cultural campaign) against the Catholic Church. The Catholic Bureau of the Ministry of Culture was abolished. Religious orders were expelled, priests were banished, schools and seminaries closed and episcopal sees remained unoccupied. Opponents of 'throne and altar' were declared 'enemies of the state'.

An interesting comparison can be made between the Christian empires and the Muslim empire of the Ottoman Turks. In Turkish lands Christians, while condemned to second class status, were allowed a separate identity under the *millet* (devolved local government) system, by which the authority of the heads of the non-dominant Christian groups received the backing of the state.

Nineteenth century England was profoundly influenced by its Protestant tradition and adopted a different approach again towards Welsh Nonconformists and Irish Catholics. Its attitude to religious minorities stemmed from the monopoly claimed by the Anglican state Church or Church of England as established by law, set up by Henry VIII on his break with Rome in 1534 and confirmed by Elizabeth I in 1558. The defusion of religious issues in the Hanoverian period left England (and Wales) with a privileged state Church but with an effective religious toleration of Dissenters which was extended to Roman Catholics in 1778 and 1791. There was a marked difference here with Ireland where the official established Protestant Church of Ireland was a small minority, mostly belonging to the landowning classes, and was almost equalled by another minority, the Scottish Presbyterian immigrant farmers who settled in Ulster in the seventeenth century. Irish Catholics were granted a partial religious toleration in acts in 1778 and 1793. The union of England and Ireland in 1800 also resulted in the fusion of their established churches at the very moment when the principle of establishment was increasingly vulnerable to the rapid growth of Nonconformity in England and in Wales (where the Dissenters became a majority of the population) and to the big increase in the Catholic population of Ireland.

English and Welsh Nonconformists were formally accorded new civic rights with the repeal in 1828 of the Test and Corporation acts. Strenuous Irish political agitation secured Catholic emancipation in 1829 so that Dissenters and Roman Catholics, non-Episcopalians and non-Protestants, had thenceforth full rights to sit in a parliament which was the supreme authority under the crown in the Church of

England and which now exercised the crown's rights over that Church. The Church of England survived as an establishment despite this, though further agitation led to the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland in 1869 and of the Church in Wales in 1920. The story is complicated by the three great religious conflicts of nineteenth century Britain: the debates between Catholic and Protestant; between (Anglican) churchman and Dissenter; and the division of Presbyterians in Scotland into three main bodies, only one of them connected with the state. Scotland is outside the scope of this volume but greater detail for England, Wales and Ireland can be found in the chapters by Sheridan Gilley, R. Tudur Jones and Donal Kerr.

Government attitudes in the non-imperial states differed from that of the empires insofar as minorities in those countries presented fewer problems, particularly on the international front. There, too, governments did seek to control their minorities. In Denmark and Norway the principle of *cuius regio eius religio* was realised in a way that integrated the Church into the state. So close was the connection between the Church and the state that the Church was often perceived as a government department rather than an institution in its own right. The Church was governed in the same way as other state bodies (school, health, foreign affairs) and the bishops and clergymen were state officials. The state adopted the 'evangelical-Lutheran' religion as its official religion. In Norway, the evangelical-Lutheran religion was very strictly practised until the 1840s and all religious activity had to be practised within the official state Church. In both Denmark and Norway laws restricting other religions were enacted during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Lay activity within the evangelical-Lutheran Church was sharply restricted. In Norway, however, the most restrictive laws were abolished in the 1840s. From 1842 religious meetings organised by persons other than clergy of the state Church were permitted and laymen were allowed to preach, but only if they belonged to the Church. In 1845 these rights were extended to dissidents. In 1851 the article of the 1814 constitution which excluded Jews from Norway was repealed. This period also saw the beginning of a tendency to consider the Church as an institution in its own right and not just as a state institution. A debate about the connection between Church and state began that has continued to the present day. More detail about this is to be found in Einar Drivenes' chapter on the Kvens and Samis.

Heirs of the French Revolution, many of the emerging nation-states in the west promoted the concept of a religiously neutral state expressed most attractively in the slogan of 'a free Church in a free state'. Most of those states, however, also had an official religion, as for instance Italy. The concept of a free Church in a free state had been put forward by British Nonconformists, then by Daniel O'Connell in

his campaign for Catholic emancipation in Ireland, and was taken up by Montalembert and liberal Catholics in France, Germany and Italy. What O'Connell had in mind was a Church free from state interference. After the Cologne affair of 1838 the distrust of the Prussian government felt by Rhineland Catholics made them sympathetic to the liberal Catholic programme of seeking complete separation from the state. Under the leadership of Archbishop Geissel, however, they opted for independence not separation, expressing their aim as being 'freedom for the Church, peace with the state'. During the *Risorgimento* Cavour and his successors, while proclaiming the ideal of a free Church in a free state, curtailed rather than promoted the freedom of the Church by suppressing religious orders and seizing Church property.

This somewhat ambiguous concept of an emergent secular state which still in fact gave privileges to certain Churches was to become the standard approach of the new nation-states and of many of the older ones in the process of modernisation. A further ambiguity arose in Orthodox states where the slogan of 'a free Church in a free state' took on a new significance. There it meant freedom for the national Church from foreign Church control and in particular independence from the patriarch of Constantinople/Istanbul, thereby ruling out also any indirect influence the sultan might attempt to use through the patriarch. This outlook constituted a type of eastern Gallicanism or Febronianism. The new Church, free indeed from Istanbul, then became dependent on the national government.

Although there is no study in this volume of non-dominant ethnic groups in France that country's attitude towards religion was of great significance for it constituted a model for many of the new national states. Under Napoleon III the French state had considerable power over the Church through the *Concordat* and the Organic articles under which the Church was restored in 1802. From 1879 on governments showed a growing tendency to a laicisation whose expressed aim was to prevent the Catholic Church from reestablishing the *ancien régime*. From 1899 on the governments of Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes went further, and their attempts to exclude religion from public life and to confine it solely to the private sphere, culminated in the separation law of 1906. Given the strength of the Church in France and its alliance with the monarchists this battle was a bitter one and, despite an effort by Pope Leo XIII to rally Catholics to the republic, lasted up to the end of the First World War. These anti-clerical policies had little effect on the religious minorities in France, Protestant and Jewish, except insofar as they reduced the privileged position of the dominant Church. A curiosity of the situation was the exemption of Alsace-Lorraine from French anti-clerical legislation as a consequence of German rule from 1871 to 1918.

Modernisation was a key concept in the nineteenth century and governments gave it general support. This implied pressure on ethnic groups to abandon certain traditions and conform to the new age. The effect of modernisation on the religious outlook of ethnic groups varied greatly from one country to another. Parts of Europe, especially some new urban and industrial centres, experienced a sharp reduction in religious practice. In other parts of Europe such as Wales, Ireland, Catalonia, northern Norway and Transylvania, religion remained strong or underwent a revival and expansion and even increased its influence, in part through its identification with new political and national mass movements. This in turn created difficulties for the state religion, as in Wales where Nonconformists increasingly attacked the established position of the Church of England and in Norway where the lay Laestadian movement came into conflict with the official Church. Moreover when a minority resisted a secularist metropolis or the centralising tendencies of the nineteenth century secular state, the Church was on the side of that minority and religion gained in strength. In many cases the Church played a liberal role as the voice of the minority in its discovery of its distinctive identity in religion and in its cultural life.

Far from becoming a matter of private devotion religion in the modern period in Europe often assumed a public political role. The period 1798–1970 has recently been described as one which witnessed the construction of ‘self-built ideological ghettos’ – Catholic, Protestant, liberal and socialist – which ‘combined aggressive evangelism with the attempt to mark out sharp and clear boundaries between their own community and the world beyond’.¹ Over most of the continent Catholic, socialist and Protestant populations, cohesive, blocklike and usually impervious to outside influence, gave large numbers of people the strongest basis for their social identity by maintaining ‘over several generations a network of institutions, and a body of collective memories, sacred rites, battle songs, devotions to legendary heroes’ plus separate political organisations and a separate press. Protestants only sometimes formed blocks with their cohesive sub-cultures, but the model looks good for those areas in which a monolithic Catholicism, often in a Christian Socialist form, was from the late nineteenth century in conflict with the socialist religion of humanity.

The emergence as political forces of these two blocks, the Blacks and the Reds, is more precisely dated by Norman Stone to the 1880s when a massive extension of the franchise reinvigorated the political expression of Catholicism throughout Europe. According to Stone this embraced ‘practically the whole of Catholic Ireland; virtually all of Catholic Germany; half of the Italian parliamentary deputies; . . . in 1885, two-fifths of the French chamber; and, after 1884, the Belgian

government in perpetuity’ and some subject nationalities such as those in Brittany and Polish Austria and Prussia. In opposition to classical liberal governments priests promoted savings associations and peasant cooperatives and competed with the socialists in founding political parties and trade unions. Indeed to European liberals Black clericalism could appear more publicly threatening than Red socialism, and Professor Stone argues that, as if in some mirror image war, the Catholic and socialist collectivisms looked very much like each other, as blueprints competing to become the new social order of the future.²

This pattern of politicisation of religion differed in England where after 1850 the Liberal party was increasingly identified with the Protestant Nonconformist churches and the Roman Catholic Church, in opposition to the Conservative or Tory party which was largely identified with the established state Church of England. There was a small anti-religious element in English liberalism as in the Labour party which invaded the Liberal constituency after 1890; but the Labour party also inherited from the Liberal party most of the Nonconformist and Catholic vote, giving a definite semi-religious complexion to English politics and a political tinge to English religion well on into this century. In Great Britain as a whole, religion has retained a public role.

Ireland provides an example where the disestablishment of the minority state Church in 1869 did not remove religion from the public arena. Indeed Catholics became more and more identified with Irish nationalism, to the point that in 1886 the Catholic hierarchy publicly endorsed the agitation for Irish Home Rule as a legitimate aspiration of the Irish people. Conversely Irish Protestants, Anglicans and Dissenters, became more identified with opposition to this aspiration, summing up their fear in the catch-phrase – ‘Home Rule means Rome Rule!’ There appears to have been a different pattern again in the Habsburg empire. The Serbian Orthodox Church, which had been accustomed to exercise political power, was under siege from lay liberal nationalists of secular temper and a similar tension appears to have developed among the Croats in spite of the radical leadership of Bishop Strossmayer.

The Religious Dimension of Government Policies

As governments, with differing degrees of intensity, pursued a policy of establishing uniformity within the state, the religions of their minorities frequently presented problems. Religion usually became involved in this policy. If the minority did not conform to the religion of the majority its Church or confession had to be content with a subordinate position within the state. Government attitudes

varied from the extreme of forceful suppression to that of full toleration. A useful classification of the forms of government policy towards minority religions can be enunciated under the following headings:

- suppression or forceful assimilation
- integration
- autonomy.

Suppression or Forceful Assimilation This had been attempted by most states in earlier centuries and although such open attempts to suppress the religion of the minorities had become less common by the nineteenth century, far from being abandoned they were revived with greater ferocity in the twentieth century in Russia and Germany. In 1875 Russia suppressed the last Roman Catholic see; in Latvia and Estonia Protestants were severely discriminated against and from 1905 on Old Believers and Evangelicals were persecuted. Jews had suffered most as in the Moscow *pogroms* of 1892. Although Turkey guaranteed freedom of religion in 1849, Christians were massacred in 1860, 1876, 1895 and 1915. Some of those massacres were locally inspired and often had political as well as religious motivations, as in 1915 when Armenians who were seeking autonomy suffered the most intense persecution. Although the rights of small nations was one of the slogans of the First World War it did not end the forceful assimilation of minority religious groups. With the Bolshevik triumph in 1917 all forms of religion came under attack in Russia. The Ukrainian Catholic Church was suppressed in 1930 after the execution or exiling of many of its clergy and laity. In Germany after 1933 the Nazi government, hostile to all religions, began a violent persecution of the Jews that was to culminate in a well organised attempt to exterminate the whole race not merely in Germany but in every country it could influence.

Assimilation by less violent methods was practised or encouraged by other governments and conversion to the religion of the dominant majority was one of the preferred methods. Whereas assimilation could mean no more than a passive absorption into the culture of the majority, while conversion normally implied a radical change in religious belief, the reality was that conversion normally led to assimilation. Conversion or proselytism was common to most religions, which have a Messianic character, a belief in a divine command to preach a message of faith and to present themselves as indispensable to happiness in both this world and the next, in the attempt to win over more people to their beliefs. This zeal, however, could have serious political consequences in view of the subsequent tendency to assimilation. A large scale increase in adherents to one

faith or another could change the ratio between groups, either transforming a minority into a majority or completely absorbing the minority into the majority. Conversions, therefore, were of grave concern for groups both for religious and ethnic reasons.

Education, missions, street preaching and the distribution of religious tracts were some of the many methods used to win converts. More negative methods were also employed, such as discriminatory treatment of adherents of the minority religion and the preferential treatment of, and advancement for, those who conformed to the majority religion. Such methods were denounced as proselytism but the distinction between conversion and proselytism often depended on the perception and religion of the observer.

Conversion was a touchy matter both because of the change that it could bring about in the community and because of the pastoral concern of the clergy for the spiritual welfare of their people. To change one's religion could be seen as betrayal and denounced as apostasy and could cause ostracism. In Great Britain Anglicans who, like the later Cardinal Newman, 'went over to Rome' were shunned. A similar attitude was adopted in Catholic rural Ireland towards those who converted to the Anglican Church. A more complete ostracism was adopted by Protestants of the Reformed tradition such as the Scottish and Irish Presbyterians. On the one hand some Anglicans set up homes to bring up Catholic orphans and waifs in the established Church; on the other Cardinal Cullen encouraged the foundation of a religious order of nuns to prevent it and when the foundress of this latter order was thrown into jail she was visited by the archbishop of Armagh. An international outcry broke out against Pope Pius IX when in 1858 a Jewish child, Edgardo Mortara, who had been secretly baptised when ill by a Christian servant, was removed from his family by papal police and brought up as a Catholic. In Poland the tsar forbade proselytism by Catholics. Conversion to Catholicism was forbidden and converts risked economic sanctions. Elsewhere the Russian government pressurised Catholics of the oriental rite to convert to Orthodoxy.

To ensure that religious conversions were genuine some governments introduced regulations governing them. In Austria-Hungary towards the end of the nineteenth century intending converts were normally obliged to report to the priest of their original persuasion. He had the right to interview them a second time but was then obliged to issue a certificate which the converts took to the political authorities. A delay of two months and a minimum age were demanded. If requested by the community a supervisory body would verify age, physical and mental fitness, and the free will of the convert.

Integration Union between churches was, to some extent, coterminous with integration when it attempted to preserve the integrity of both churches. This solution, however, came under pressure as in the case of Catholics of oriental rite in communion with Rome. The Orthodox accused them of abandoning their eastern ecclesiastical identity. Orthodox complaints about union with Rome or alleged pressures towards union had a role in nineteenth century Serb ecclesiastical politics in the Habsburg monarchy. The accusation of 'uniatising' was a standard one in the arsenal of invective directed by the more demagogic Serb radicals against unpopular members of the hierarchy. The case of Patriarch Anđelić in the 1880s provides an example. Fear of union with Rome and suspicions on this score were also part of Serb nationalism in Bosnia in the 1880s. Such fears though were groundless by this time. Their historical roots lay in the earlier Habsburg pressure to apply the tactics that had resulted in the successful union among Romanians at the end of the seventeenth century to the Serbs as well. However, Strossmayer's campaign for the Slavonic liturgy in the Catholic Church presupposed union on the lines of an integration which would do justice to both Churches.

Latin Catholics on the other hand believed that the union did not go far enough and, insensitive to eastern sensibilities and traditions, tried to latinise their rites. Conversely in parts of Poland ruled by Russia a policy of russification forced Catholics to use Russian hymns and Russian sermons during the service. In eastern Europe after the First World War some Orthodox and Catholic countries were alike anxious that the minority should conform to the religion of the majority, hoping that it would promote unity within the state.

Autonomy This was often translated as pluralism. The approach to toleration could be either ideological or pragmatic. Here again differences of approach were visible. Some religions were recognised, others merely tolerated, though this toleration often led to a *de facto* recognition. The concept of 'a free Church in a free state' came close to the ideal of autonomy. Even in countries which professed this ideal, however, the reality did not always match it. Furthermore, unrestricted freedom did not imply that all groups had equal constitutional rights. In Christian countries the main Christian Churches enjoyed, at least at the beginning of our period, constitutional rights denied to Jews and other non-Christians. In the Ottoman empire, although Christians and Jews enjoyed a considerable degree of independence in education and in many aspects of citizenship, yet the patriarchs, bishops and rabbis had also to receive their institution from the Turkish ruler for their dealings with the state to be valid. Furthermore, since their rights as citizens were expressed as part of their religious affiliation, within the *millet*

system, if they wanted to keep those secular rights they were obliged to remain members of the *millet*.

Education: A Battleground Between Church and State

Education had traditionally been in the hands of the Churches. Yet from the Enlightenment on the importance of a literate and numerate industrial workforce, as Adam Smith forcibly argued for in *The Wealth of Nations*, was generally accepted by governments.³ Anxious to promote progress and modernisation among their vastly increased populations they believed that they had a Messianic role to enlighten their subjects. In addition education was seen as a major instrument in achieving national unity and promoting the value system of the state. In the words of Adolphe Thiers, the French statesman, '*Il faut que l'éducation soit donnée par l'État à son effigie*' (It is necessary that education be given by the State in its own image). Fears that the traditional role in education of the various churches might stand in the way of these aims encouraged many governments to try to control their influence. Some governments attempted to gain control over the education of the clergy and where this could not be accomplished determined instead to control the education of the masses and so generally opposed separate education. This was not the case in all states. In the United Kingdom conservative governments in particular favoured Church involvement in education and the same was true of Belgium and the Netherlands after 1884.

If the state saw education as a means of creating a literate and numerate workforce who would also be good citizens, religious groups saw it as possessing a spiritual and otherworldly value. On occasions, religious leaders could cooperate with governments, as in Hålogaland after the First World War. Often, however, such leaders opposed the state and set up their own educational system more in conformity with their own scale of values. Priest and teacher competing for the loyalty of the same group was not an uncommon phenomenon. Even in countries where the union of Church and state was close, as in Norway, differences arose as to how the mission to the Kvens should be conducted. It was in Norway in one period that the state Church resisted state pressure to use the Norwegian language in its work and insisted for pastoral reasons on using the vernacular. Even when the state laid down educational criteria the Churches, despite this apparent control, often frustrated state efforts and taught their own programme. This was true particularly of higher level education. For a more comprehensive study of the relationship among governments, ethnic groups and education reference should be made to the first volume in this series edited by Janusz Tomiak.

Internal Factors: Opposition from Other Religious or National Groups Apart from the difficulties which government experienced in dealing with the religious minority and its evangelists, there were other limitations on its freedom of action. Some were internal and could be either religious or politico-ethnic factors, though as often as not the two were closely enmeshed. In its policies towards the Orthodox Slavs and Romanian Catholics the Habsburg monarchy at Vienna had to keep in mind the susceptibilities of Hungarians. Rival religious and ethnic ideals clashed sharply in Ireland where British government policies towards Irish Catholics had to take into account the bitter antagonism of English, Scottish and Irish Protestant opinion towards Catholicism, as the riots in British cities in the 1850s and 1860s demonstrated. The measure of reform governments could offer had to maintain this difficult balance between conciliating the minority and offending the majority.

External Factors: The International Dimension

- Political and commercial factors: governments had also to take international relations into account. Russia had to consider Austria in its dealings with Catholic Poles and Lithuanians. Equally Austria had to weigh possible reaction in Prussia when dealing with Protestants, and in Russia when dealing with the Orthodox community. Norway also had to have regard for possible reaction to its policies in Finland. Elsewhere trade and commercial pressure generally forced more consideration for Jews and Armenians.
- Pressure from expatriates: similar pressure, political and economic, could result from expatriates as in the case of Jews, Armenians and Irish. The growth of powerful expatriate groups in the USA and other new countries was of particular importance. When dealing with Irish Catholics Britain had to take into account Irish-American and Irish-Australian Catholics, with their cardinals and archbishops in the new countries. The strong Jewish community in the USA was also able to exercise pressure in favour of Jewish communities in Europe and the near East.
- International spiritual leaders: many minorities could rely on support against state encroachments from their international spiritual leadership. The feeling of belonging to a powerful international group was a major psychological support for minorities. In Orthodoxy the ecumenical patriarchate became the object of rival Austrian and Russian pressures on issues like the ethnic allegiance of bishops to be appointed to the Ottoman

character. The Bosnian Serbs appealed to the ecumenical patriarchate in their struggle for cultural autonomy against Austria. The *concordat* with the ecumenical patriarchate in 1880 had been intended to make Istanbul's role vestigial and ceremonial only but Serbian nationalists sought to use it for their own purposes. Similarly the Muslim autonomy movement appealed to the *Sheikh-ul-Islam* the highest Muslim authority in Istanbul.

Catholic minorities could claim support from the Pope. In Rome national groups – Poles, Slavs, Irish – had seminaries for training their clerical elite, religious orders had their head houses and bishops their agents. Their influence ensured that the considerable diplomatic skill of the Roman *curia* could be mobilised to protect the interests of the ethnic groups they represented against undue government pressure. There were papal protests against the treatment of Catholics in the Russian empire and negotiations over Catholic groups in the Habsburg monarchy and in the United Kingdom.

Conversely, governments alive to the importance of papal support used their negotiating powers with the Papacy to bring pressure on Catholic ethnic groups. In response to government pressure or out of its own wish for *rapprochement* with powerful states, the Vatican intervened in Polish, Romanian, Prussian and Irish affairs in order to induce the Catholic community to cooperate more with governments. Such interference, however, could prove a double edged sword and have the effect of sharpening rather than weakening national consciousness. Thus Leo XIII's efforts to influence Irish Catholic attitudes during the 1880s, inspired partly by sections of the English Catholic aristocracy, had the effect of stimulating a resentful protest from the Irish nationalists including the Irish bishops. The hierarchy delicately but firmly advised the Pope to accept only its own account of Irish affairs and warned that collusion with government would damage religion.

In Prussia, Windthorst was reluctant to accept Leo XIII's direction to come to terms with Bismarck. Leo's successor, Pius X, on the other hand was criticised by Russia and Britain for his sympathy with the Poles and Irish. In the 1920s the Vatican was pressurised by the Spanish government to control the use of the Catalan language within the Church in Catalonia. A full account of this affair is to be found in the chapter by Santiago Petschen. Equally, Pius XI's pragmatic political approach to the policies of the Italian state led him to acquiesce in the dismissal of Slovenian and Friulan bishops in territory acquired by Italy after the First World War. Vittorio Perì's study of minorities in Italy provides further detail of this. The five

popes of this period – Pius IX, Leo XIII, Pius X, Benedict XV and Pius XI – differed considerably in the emphasis they placed on pastoral or political concerns. Papal preoccupation with its own position *vis-à-vis* the new Italian state (the 'Roman question') coloured its attitudes towards many European problems. Catholic sympathy for the Pope's plight combined with the growth of Ultramontanism made this preoccupation a live issue in states with large Catholic populations.

Ethnic Groups, National Identity and Religion

General Remarks

Since the fundamental motivation of a religious faith springs from the individual conscience a proper assessment of a religious body should place the devotional life of its faithful first. In some cases this has been crucial: the very survival of the Albanian minority in Italy, according to Dr Peri, has been a consequence of a distinctive linguistic form of liturgy, catechesis and devotion. In this study, however, where the emphasis is on the interaction between governments, ethnic groups and their religion we have stressed the phenomenological and organisational aspects of religion and thus the public and political face of the Church. This also involves an examination of the part played by those who bore most responsibility for that public image – the religious leaders of the ethnic group.

The concept of non-dominant ethnic group can be applied to a specific social group only at a precise historical moment. Cultural, technical, social, institutional and political modifications and especially a change in the population structure can transform a non-dominant ethnic group into a dominant one and vice versa. After the First World War many non-dominant groups became dominant groups, as happened in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland and Ireland. Important though population size was, however, in the earlier period it did not always determine which group was dominant in a particular area. Germans constituted the dominant group in the Austrian portion of the Habsburg empire, although they were not the majority of its citizens. Similarly the elites and the higher clergy were often of a different ethnic origin from that of the majority as in Friulia, Poland and the Baltic where many bishops were German speaking. In Catalonia too many bishops were Castilian and particularly during the periods of dictatorship they, and even some Catalan speaking bishops, promoted Spanish nationalism generally, including the use of the Castilian language in the seminaries and in preaching. Dr Petschen's chapter provides more detail on the subject.

Different Church Models

Just as different models of states influenced the behaviour of governments towards minorities, so too the different types of religious structure influenced the attitude of governments and religious groups to one another. An examination of attitudes and practices within the different religious communities brings into relief several important contrasts.

- Jews were the subject of much popular irrational prejudice and government concessions to them lagged behind concessions to other religious groups. Some governments, particularly those of the new nation-states, were more anxious to concede rights to them as citizens of the state rather than as members of a religion. Liberal Jews welcomed these rights but they led to assimilation to the dominant political society. As Mordechai Breuer's study reveals Orthodox Jews were concerned with religious rights no less than with civil rights.
- Armenians in the Habsburg empire generally tended to adapt well and be well accepted by government and society. It was different, however, in both the Russian and Turkish empires. Nicholas I's attempt to russify the Armenian Church in the 1820s and 1830s was followed by renewed persecutions in 1903. Armenians had to endure even more fierce persecution from the Turks in the 1890s and during the First World War. Their eastern Christian heritage appeared under threat from western Christianity. Rome was anxious to latinise them and Protestants sought to bring the Reformation to them and succeeded in establishing a Protestant Armenian Church at the end of the century.
- The Orthodox Church in the Balkans combined features associated with both Catholicism and Protestantism. It was, like the Catholic Church, hierarchical in its ecclesiastical structure. In its Church and school parochial communes, however, the laity played a role similar to that of the Congregationalists in Wales. In some Orthodox Churches in Austria-Hungary (though not in Bukovina) Church law restricted the responsibilities of these communes to the upkeep of churches and schools. This reflected an erosion in the Byzantine period of the earlier practice, which had given the laity a voice in the appointment of bishops and priests. Under Turkish rule, when the hierarchy was often alien, the laity again encroached on the sphere of ecclesiastical influence.

In the liberal era such lay claims became bound up with the issue of culture or Church and school autonomy, in which the privileges granted by Leopold I to the Serb patriarch in 1690 were

demanded after 1880 for a Serb National Church Congress now having a lay majority. Such demands were partly met by the Hungarian government in 1869 and 1875 and in Bosnia in 1906. The struggle for cultural autonomy provided training for political movements, certainly in Bosnia after 1906. In Hungary, where constitutionalism existed from 1867, the political character of Serb aims was always clear. The Romanian Orthodox Church also had autonomy from the 1860s. The lay communal organisation therefore provided a fruitful base for group mobilisation and lent a certain strength to the Orthodox peoples of the Austrian emperor. As Octavian Bârlea's study has shown, Romanian Catholics had, even before 1850, begun a similar movement.⁴ Their request for a similar autonomy, however, was refused on the grounds that the premise for autonomy was a majority role for the laity in various communal and confessional bodies.

- Apart from the Catholic churches of oriental rite, such as the Romanian Church, the laity in the Roman Catholic churches played a minor role in Church government. From the time of the investiture controversy in the eleventh century the clergy had taken on a dominant role. The Vatican Council of 1869–70 had no lay representation. Lay involvement was also limited at local level. Irish Catholics in Great Britain looked to their clergy for leadership and thus were partly responsible for reducing the role of the English Catholic aristocracy and gentry in the affairs of the Church. Monsignor George Talbot could write to Archbishop Manning that the province of the laity was 'to hunt, to shoot, to entertain . . . but to meddle in ecclesiastical matters they have no right at all'. This sort of comment evoked Cardinal Newman's rejoinder that the Church would look foolish without them. Although lay participation in Church affairs existed in many countries (for instance, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Switzerland), including lay political parties, the major exception to this non-involvement of the laity was Germany and in particular Prussia. There since the organisation of the *Katholikentag* in 1848 (inspired by O'Connell's earlier successful mobilisation of the laity in Ireland), the laity played a major role in the many Church *Vereins* (Societies).

The relationship between government and the Catholic Church was complex. Catholic teaching was conservative and generally favoured cooperation with government. In Ireland, Poland and in the USA a different attitude was noticeable. In his work Professor John Whyte has brought out the important variations in the political behaviour of Catholics in different countries, with Catholics in Ireland and Anglo-American countries favouring a more liberal and open approach than

continental Catholics.⁵ This did not preclude cooperation with government though it did mean that Irish and English speaking Catholics (many of whom were of Irish extraction) voted for liberal (or national) parties rather than conservative parties. Continental Catholicism had become more conservative in the period from 1850 to 1870 but showed signs of taking up a more central position in the subsequent period. While these were the attitudes in states with large Catholic populations such as France and Italy they also had an impact on countries with Catholic minorities such as the Netherlands and Switzerland.

For their part many governments regarded Catholic minorities with suspicion because they paid allegiance to a power outside the state. This alleged dual allegiance was both a constant cause of suspicion and a pretext for unequal treatment. Even in late Victorian Britain the liberal William Gladstone, though a supporter of Irish Catholic claims to civic equality, called into doubt the civil allegiance of all Catholics in Great Britain, including Ireland.⁶ Although Gladstone had other political motives in publishing a pamphlet on the affair, the intransigent line taken by Pius IX in the *Syllabus of Errors* in 1864 undoubtedly reinforced government suspicion. In the Russian empire Catholic affairs were not dealt with by the Ministry for Religion or Education. Instead both Catholics and Protestants were subjected to the Ministry of Foreign Relations or, after 1870, to the Ministry of the Interior. As we have noted above governments sought to solve their problems with Catholic minorities through negotiations with Rome and Rome often welcomed such negotiations.

- Because of the different emphasis of their ecclesiology Protestant communities left a far greater role to the laity than either Orthodox or Catholic communities. This was particularly true of Nonconformists who like the Presbyterians, Baptists and Congregationalists tended to have liberal suspicions of authority and power. In Northern Ireland, government and Presbyterians had generally regarded one another with mutual distrust.

The Mutual Reinforcement of Nationalism and Religion

Generally speaking religion reinforced ethnic consciousness and nationalism. In Catalonia, Romania and the Balkans the Churches were instrumental in preserving national identity. The Jewish religion preserved Jewish ethnic consciousness without normally promoting Jewish nationalism and the same was true for the Armenians, Old Believer Lipovaner, and other national groups who had no political state. In 1897, however, the first Zionist congress was held in Basel/Basle with the aim of securing for 'the Jewish people a

home in Palestine guaranteed by public law'. In Ireland during most of the period Irish and Catholicity were seen as one. A somewhat similar situation existed in Wales. In Poland national independence and Catholicity went hand in hand. Sometimes this mutual reinforcement had been assumed explicitly, sometimes it emerged from the historical circumstances.

The collective memory or mythology of religious persecution at the hands of the dominant group also promoted ethnic consciousness. Attempts to assimilate minorities were perceived against a background of religious persecution. This is evident for Jews in eastern Europe, for Poles, Armenians and Irish groups. A martyrology developed which was propagated in religious tract and in ballad and folklore. Marches, processions and, in Ireland particularly, funerals often served to promote and create an ideology around both political and religious consciousness at one and the same time.

Conflict Between Religion and Nationality

The relationship between ethnicity and religion is complex. In many European lands up to the nineteenth century common religious adherence, rather than linguistic or political ties, defined nationalities. The nineteenth century saw the emergence in some areas of a secular way of thinking. National or ethnic allegiance competed with religion or dynasty in the claim for allegiance. Some ethnic leaders looked forward to the foundation of a state based solely on national or ethnic grounds. In Ireland Wolfe Tone, in his bid to break the link with England and to establish an independent republic, made a plea 'to substitute the common name of Irishman in place of the denominations of Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter'. In the Habsburg empire the Orthodox nationality which had acted as a culturally uniform body came under attack from the leaders of the new nationalisms. Ethnic leaders often viewed the existence of competing religions within the nation as a sign of weakness and sought to eliminate this diversity. Romanian leaders brought pressure on Romanian Catholics of the oriental rite to abandon their allegiance to Rome.

Because of its universality religion was invoked against nationalism as a supra-national bond uniting different groups within the one political sphere. Since secular nationalism had many connotations where many diverse forces worked under a common banner, some religious leaders regarded it with suspicion. In their view the claims of nationalism and more particularly the means it adopted to achieve its aims were not always compatible with religion. Orthodox Jews opposed secular Zionism. Catholic bishops opposed oath bound revolutionary societies. Religious principles forced many religious

leaders to condemn the violence that often accompanied the efforts of ethnic groups to overthrow governments. Compelled to choose between the government and their people, they found themselves ill prepared. Their stand could make advanced nationalists see the Churches as conservative and the tools of a particular government. Serb patriarchs in Hungary complained that radical propaganda had made the people believe that they had sold their Church and nation to the government. The Yugoslav national idea, whose original main architect had been the Croatian Catholic Bishop Strossmayer, was taken over after his death by secular nationalists. In Ireland, Cardinal Cullen, although a convinced nationalist, was branded as anti-nationalist because of his opposition to the revolutionary movement of the Irish Republican Brotherhood or Fenians.

Many ethnic groups striving towards nationhood evoked the French revolutionary concepts of the liberty, equality, fraternity which had come to the fore more especially during the 1848 revolution. By the second half of the nineteenth century the Catholic Church had become hardened in its hostility to those concepts judging them by the secularism, anti-clericalism and positivism which they perceived to be their fruit. Following the example of his predecessor Gregory XVI, Pope Pius IX, after a brief flirtation with liberalism, had taken a firm stand against modern liberties in the encyclical *Quanta Cura* and its accompanying Syllabus of Errors. Some Catholic groups, however, took a different line. At almost the same date as the Syllabus the Poles rebelled in the name of liberty and the Catholic Irish successfully campaigned for the disestablishment of the Anglican Church whose legal predominance over their own majority Church they resented as a mark of conquest. In Belgium and also in Quebec, that off-shoot of French Catholicism, a different attitude prevailed, though there were strong Ultramontane movements in both.

If some Churches, and Catholicism in particular, opposed liberalism, it could not be said that liberalism was always well disposed to the identity of non-dominant groups. Liberalism in France, Italy, Germany and Switzerland was often as opposed to local minorities as it was to the Churches in its desire to promote national unity. Yet liberalism's charter, derived from the French Revolution, of the 'rights of man', sometimes made it easier for ethnic groups to claim those rights which led towards a recognition of their national identity.

Religious Instruction, Language and Ethnic Identity

The enshrinement of a group's literature in the written word gave its culture an authority and a standing in the group's own eyes. Some

older cultures – Jews, Armenians, Irish, Welsh, the Orthodox community in Balkan lands, had venerable cultures and a written literature that long predated their incorporation into the Habsburg, British or Ottoman empires. For others religion played quite an important and often direct part in the commitment of their literature to writing. The need to spread one's religion or to protect it was the motive that led to this development. Although this process has been true for centuries it made rapid progress after the Reformation. Protestant evangelists made extensive use of the scriptures in the native language and of catechisms. The Council of Trent enjoined the use of the vernacular in catechesis, preaching and the administration of certain sacraments. Vernacular catechisms multiplied. As a result of this religious activity many languages were written down for the first time and this commitment of their language to print made ethnic groups conscious of their identity. It brought home to them that long before they had become part of the structure of the state they had possessed a culture of their own.

Typical examples are the Italo-Albanians and Friulans. Bible reading and prayer in the vernacular defined the consciousness and aspirations of the lay Laestadian movement among minorities in Norway. For Catalans, Poles and Welsh national consciousness was expressed through their vernacular language. Of course this was not universally true. The Irish had tended to abandon their language but had maintained a national consciousness ever more closely linked with Catholicism. In general religious leaders, believing that ethnic cultures enshrined traditional religious values, emerged as the stoutest defenders of the ethnic culture. This especially happened when the leaders saw the threat as coming from a culture which they perceived as lacking these spiritual values.

A diversity of cultural background must also be taken into account. If the majority and minority within the same Churches came from different cultural backgrounds the difference hindered integration between the two. Orthodox Jews forced to leave eastern Europe found difficulty in fitting in with Orthodox Jews in western Europe. Irish Catholics found similar difficulties with English Catholics. In Great Britain English (and Scottish) Catholics, although vastly outnumbered by Irish Catholics, retained the leadership of their Church but the cost was to increase the difficulty for Irish emigrants in identifying with British Catholicism.

The Role of Religious Leaders

Since public responsibility for the religious minority generally fell on the group's religious leaders their role was a significant one. More often than not they were invested with a dual role – sacral and

secular. Thus attention has to be given to the secular aspirations of religious leaders and the religious aspirations of secular ones. In some groups there was a permanent union between secular and religious leadership. In its dominions the Ottoman government conceded to the heads of the Orthodox Churches both civil and religious power and the police were also under their control. The recognition of the authority of the rabbi and the rabbinical court was a necessary part of the Orthodox Jewish religion. In other countries this personal union did not exist yet religious leaders played a part that was perceived to be political. The major national role played by bishops such as Strossmayer in Croatia and Serbia and Cullen, Croke and Walsh in Ireland are cases in point. Norway also provides an interesting example. In the northern part of the country the Laestadian leaders stressed the religious aspects of their leadership although the political aspects of this leadership were obvious.

Because of the influence of religious leaders over their people governments generally sought to control their appointment. A study of the pattern of Russian, Prussian, German, Austrian and Spanish appointments of bishops in Poland or Catalonia offers interesting comparisons and contrasts. Since it felt so strongly the importance of religious leaders loyal to its policies the state was prepared to impose members of other ethnic groups on troublesome minorities. In Prussian Poland, the state, after a sustained policy of germanising the bench of bishops, finally appointed a German as primate of the Church. Austria appointed many Czechs to Austrian Poland. In Catalonia the state tended to appoint non-Catalan or Valencian bishops who though Catalan in language were generally opposed to Catalan national feeling. In Norway the authorities saw to it that only bishops loyal to the official minority policy were appointed in Hålogaland after 1909. In Wales English bishops were appointed throughout most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In Ireland the British government made attempts in the early part of the century to exercise a veto on the appointment of Catholic bishops but was forced to rely on informal pressure on Rome in individual cases.

In turn the efforts of governments to secure a higher clergy loyal to its policies had important repercussions on the relationship of the higher clergy with the people of the non-dominant group. Where the religious leaders were of a different nationality from the non-dominant group the identity of the group could be submerged. Even where they were of the same nationality they did not always identify with the group. Their education, often in schools under state control, their more cosmopolitan outlook and their desire for modernisation made many of them favour assimilation. Politically the higher clergy were more conservative than the lower clergy if only because they belonged to an older age group. It was clergy with this type of outlook

that governments promoted to higher ranks in the first place. Examples are numerous in Russia, Poland and parts of Austria-Hungary.

Resistance to religious leaders is also evident. If they promoted assimilation or opposed the political aspirations of their group their leadership ran the risk of being discredited or rejected. Resistance to it often came from the lower clergy who promoted ethnic culture and wrote its literature. On other occasions resistance came from the laity who were critical of what they perceived as the higher clergy's subservience to government. Thus in Wales the continuous appointment of English bishops from 1727 to 1870 alienated the majority of Welsh people from the state Church. Irish Catholics followed Church leaders only when they led them in the direction they wanted to go and loudly proclaimed that they took their 'religion from Rome, their politics from home'. Pope Leo XIII's efforts to encourage *rapprochement* with governments met with resentment from Windthorst, the leader of the Centre party, in Germany and nationalists (including clergy) in Ireland.

A proper assessment of the role of religious leaders must take into account their motivation. When Church leaders engaged in public activities of an unfriendly nature to their governments the latter categorised these activities as political. Advanced national or ethnic leaders judged the activities of religious leaders in the light of the advancement of their own aspirations to independence. This was not the perception of the religious leaders for whom their activity was part of their pastoral ministry – that of defending their faith against the inroads of a government, sometimes Erastian, sometimes hostile to their religion, sometimes merely indifferent to religion in general. In resisting assimilation they saw themselves as defenders of spiritual values enshrined in the traditional culture. On the other hand confronted with the rise of zealous nationalism they often found themselves acting as a brake on what they saw as its excesses. To interpret their actions as merely political would be a mistake. Personal, political and pastoral motives were difficult to disentangle, even by the participants themselves. This different perception of motivation has to be borne in mind if one is to understand the different priorities of government, ethnic groups and religious leaders.

Conclusion

Some multi-racial empires were able to integrate their minorities more easily than others. When toleration was granted it was conceded more often than not as a prudential act in the public interest

rather than an acknowledgement of liberty as part of human dignity. The new nation-states, taking up the slogans of 'liberty, equality and fraternity', appeared committed to religious liberty as part of human dignity. In fact, although they proclaimed an ideal of neutrality towards religion, the separation of Church and state did not always make for the religious freedom of the non-dominant groups. Indeed the all-powerful nation-state often proved less tolerant of minorities than older empires such as that of the Habsburgs, for minorities appeared to detract from the new state's sovereignty and its prior claims of universal, even total, allegiance. Minority beliefs then came to be seen as an irritant or, indeed, a danger. Some modern states took extreme means to remove that perceived danger. In general the uneasy relationship between governments and religious minorities arose from a clash between the government's desire for uniformity with its claim to the undivided allegiance of all ethnic groups and the religious groups' belief in the inviolability or superiority of their distinctive creed.

Although the latter part of the period has not been covered in the same detail it reveals, nevertheless, that the attitude of non-dominant religious groups had its own ambivalence. This was often true in the period between the two world wars. When non-dominant these groups clamoured for complete toleration but when they achieved dominance they often refused that liberty to other minorities to the extent of using forceful methods to assimilate them. Although this attitude can be seen as deplorable double standards or political opportunism, as often as not it had to do with the vision of what they saw as the right religion or the overriding claims of their new state. Often insecure and lacking in confidence and obsessed by the need for national unity they found it difficult to accommodate groups with different religious traditions.

The terrible events after 1940, like the Jewish holocaust or, at a less tragic level, the suppression of oriental rite Catholic churches in Russia and Romania, the continuing strife in Ulster and more recent problems in Armenia, Yugoslavia, the Ukraine and the Baltic states, are the long-term echoes of the varied and difficult religious situations which the volume attempts to describe. Even since it went to press, the Yugoslav archives have changed their names, while the names of dioceses in Catalonia, formerly spelled in Castilian, are now spelled in Catalan. The fast-moving events since 1989 show that in these places, religion remains at the heart of the matter.

Notes

- 1 McLeod.
- 2 Stone.
- 3 Smith.
- 4 Bârlea.
- 5 Whyte.
- 6 Gladstone.

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Each case study in this work is provided with a bibliography, but it is difficult to indicate any overall studies corresponding to the area covered in this general chapter. Mention may be made of the works of Mews and Whyte. The work of Octavian Bârlea, a member of this study group, quoted in the bibliography, contains rich new material on the Romanian Uniate Church.

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2 Nominally Catholic Poland, 1795-1918

BOLESŁAW

The partitions of Poland in 1795 (among Orthodox inhabitants), Protestant Prussia (inhabitants) and Josephine Austria (inhabitants) were the result of the organisational structure of the Polish Church which existed in Poland before the partitions of 1815 at which a new division of the territory took place. The so-called kingdom of Poland was created from the Prussian and Austrian parts. After Russia had bloodily suppressed the 1830-1831 rebellion and 1863 it abolished the autonomy of the Russian empire as the result of the 1861-1862 reforms.

The abolition of the territory of Poland was followed by the reorganisation of the Polish Church by the occurrence of two metropolitan archdioceses around 4500 parishes. Within an area of around 230 000 sq km: the diocese of Cracow had 1000 parishes, the archdiocese of Gniezno 800 parishes and the diocese of Poznań 1500 parishes of the Catholic Church in