Climate Change Policy Narratives and Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa: New Concerns, Old Arguments?

Thomas Campbell, N.Dip; MSc.

Thesis submitted for the Award of PhD.

School of Law and Government

Dublin City University

Supervisor: Dr. Niamh Gaynor

March 2021

Declaration

I hereby certify that this material, which I now submit for assessment on the programme of study leading to the award of PhD is entirely my own work, and that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and does not to the best of my knowledge breach any law of copyright, and has not been taken from the work of others save and to the extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged within the text of my work.

Signed:

ID No: **15213015**

Date: 15/03/2021

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

List of Abbreviations

ADA	Adaptation Consortium
AF	Adaptation Fund
AR	Assessment Report
AfDB	African Development Bank
ASAL	arid and semi-arid lands
ASDS	Agricultural Sector Development Strategy
ASF	ASAL Stakeholder Forum
AU	African Union
BRACED	Building Resilience to Climate Extremes and Disasters
CA	content analysis
CCCF	County Climate Change Funding
CDA	critical discourse analysis
CELEP	Coalition of European Lobbies for East African Pastoralism
CEMRIDE	Centre for Minority Rights and Development
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CIDP	County Integrated Development Plan
CLA	Community Land Act
COP	Conference of Parties
CO2	carbon dioxide
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CRGE	Climate Resilient Green Economy
CSA	climate smart agriculture
CSO	civil society organisation
DA	discourse analysis
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DLCI	Development Learning and Capacity Building Initiative
EDE	Ending Drought Emergencies
EIAR	Ethiopian Institute for Agricultural Research
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EPACC	Ethiopian Programme of Adaptation to Climate Change
EPD	Ethiopian Pastoralist Day
EPF	Ethiopian Pastoralist Forum
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations
FCDC	Frontier Counties Development Council
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
EPCC	Ethiopian Panel on Climate Change
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GES	Green Economy Strategy
GESIP	Green Economy Strategy and Implementation Plan
GGGI	Global Green Growth Institute
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
GHG	greenhouse gas
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GoK	Government of Kenya
CRGE	Climate Resilient Green Economy
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
HABP	Household Asset Building Programme

HU	Haramaya University
HoA	Horn of Africa
IBLI	index-based livestock insurance
ICG	Isiolo County Government
ICIPE	International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology
IDDRSI	IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
ILRI	International Livestock Research Institute
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
INDC	Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
KALRO	Kenyan Agriculture and Livestock Research Organisation
KLIP	Kenyan Livestock Insurance Programme
KPW	Kenyan Pastoralist Week
LAND	Land Administration to Nurture Development
LAPSSET	Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor
LCDA	LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority
LMP	Livestock Master Plan
LTWP	Lake Turkana Wind Power
MALF	Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries
MDNKOAL	Ministry for Development of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MEF	Ministry of Environment and Forestry
MEFCC	Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change
MENR	Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources
MoFPDA	Ministry of Federal and Pastoralist Development Affairs
MoFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MoWIE	Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Energy
MLD	Ministry of Livestock Development
MLPP	Ministry of Lands and Physical Planning
MP	Member of Parliament
MRI	Minority Rights International
MTP	Medium Term Plan
MU	Mekelle University
NACOSTI	National Commission for Science Technology and Innovation
NAP	National Adaptation Plan
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action
NCCRS	National Climate Change Response Strategy
NCCAP	National Climate Change Action Plan
NCCFP	National Climate Change Framework
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions
NDMA	National Drought Management Agency
NEDI	North and North-Eastern Development Initiative
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NLC	National Land Commission
NLP	National Livestock Policy
NLUP	National Land Use Plan
NRT	Northern Rangelands Trust
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OPA	Oromia Pastoralist Association
PASC	Pastoralist Affairs Standing Committee
PDNK	Pastoralist Development Network Kenya
PES	payments for environmental services

PFE	Pastoralist Forum of Ethiopia
PIF	Policy and Investment Framework
PM	Prime Minister
PO	pastoralist organisation
PPG	Pastoralist Parliamentary Group
PRIME	Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement Through Market Expansion
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
REDD+	Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation Plus
RPLRP	Regional Pastoralist Livelihood Resilience Project
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation
SNNPR	Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples' Regional State
TEV	total economic value
UN	United Nations
UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme

Acknowledgements

This thesis would not have been conceived or completed with the help, support and encouragement of many people.

First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Niamh Gaynor for her encouragement, patience, advice, insights and guidance throughout all stages of this research. Most of all for always keeping me focused on what was important and allowing me to improve my work. Niamh: without your incredible support this research would not have been completed! Many thanks also to Dr. Diarmuid Torney for your invaluable feedback on chapters reviewed.

I would like to thank my colleagues in the Department of International Development, Maynooth University – Dr. Eilish Dillon, Niamh Rooney, Patrick Marren, Paddy Reilly, and Maria Heneghan - for providing me with the space and time to complete this research and for your support and words of encouragment over the last five years.

There are many people whose work and ideas in the field of pastoralist studies and pastoralist development have inspired me to embark on this journey. I would like to thank in particular Alais Ole Morindat, Ann Waters Bayer, Eamon Brehony, Fiona Flintan, Saverio Krätli, Michael Odhiambo, Ced Hesse and Thomas Sommerhalter for their encouragement to pursue this project and for suggesting contacts and resources. Many thanks also to all informants in Ethiopia and Kenya who were so generous with their time and whose perspectives were essential to completion of this research.

Special thanks to Dr. Jemal Yousef Hassen, President of Haramaya University, and to the Institute of Pastoral and Agro-Pastoral Studies, for providing me with a letter of introduction in Ethiopia and suggesting contacts. And to Oliver Noonan and all the staff of the Shalom Centre for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation in Nairobi for kindly hosting me during my field work in Kenya.

My sincere gratitude to the Board of Kimmage Development Studies Centre and to Shanahan Research Group for their financial support for my research. A special word of thanks to Dr. Rob Kevlihan for encouraging me to pursue a PhD.

Last - but by no means least - I am eternally grateful to my family – Roisi, Eoin and Cormac – for their patience, encouragement and love throughout. Without you this research would not have been possible.

Abstract

'Climate Change Policy Narratives and Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa: New Concerns, Old Arguments?'

Thomas Campbell

While there is a growing body of knowledge on the effects of climatic and other forms of change on pastoralism in Africa, less is known about how recent policy responses and development interventions in the name of climate change and pastoral area development are shaped by certain discourses and narratives and by political interests. This is important because the simplifications that are often a characteristic of environmental policy narratives can fail to acknowledge the politicised nature of many environmental problems in local contexts. The pastoral drylands are no exception as claims to land and other resources remain contested by different actors.

Through content and discourse analyses of national policies, supplemented by interviews with key informants, this research examines the discourses and narratives around pastoralism found within contemporary policy in Ethiopia and Kenya, the interests of actors and actor-networks shaping those narratives, and their consequences for pastoralism.

The findings reveal that while concerns around climate change and calls for strengthening resilience of dryland communities have given a new impetus to pastoral development, old narratives that depict pastoral areas as unproductive and in need of modernisation remain deeply embedded in policy making. These open up spaces for the state, investors, and local elites to extend control over natural resources previously managed under customary institutions. The resultant climate policy solutions and dryland investments are, in turn, leading to new patterns of social differentiation and vulnerability among pastoralists. While providing some level of climate-risk preparedness, climate adaptation and resilience-building interventions on their own are insufficient to meet the needs of pastoralist communities. I argue that the extent and nature of dynamic change in the drylands of the HoA calls for political responses that address social inequities and power imbalances, that safeguard pastoralist's resource rights, and that allow for more inclusive forms of governance.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

While there is a growing body of knowledge on the effects of climatic and other forms of change on pastoralism in Africa, less is known about how recent policy responses and development interventions in the name of climate change and pastoral area development are shaped by certain discourses and narratives, and what the consequences of these narratives are for pastoralist communities. This is important because the simplifications that often characterise environmental policy narratives – around climate change or land degradation, for example – can be inadequate in acknowledging the institutionalised and politicised nature of many environmental problems in local contexts. The pastoral drylands are no exception – where claims to land and other resources remain contested by different actors and interests (Flintan, 2011; Scoones *et al*., 2019; Lind *et al*., 2020).

Central to this understanding is the need to identify and unpack 'policy narratives': how particular discourses are 'framed' within policy, what forms of knowledge count, and whose understandings and interests predominate (Roe, 1991; Hajer, 1995; Adger *et al*., 2001; Dryzek, 2013). In the Horn of Africa (HoA), pastoral dryland areas (and pastoralism) have long been equated with narratives of poverty, low productivity, environmental degradation and conflict, despite a growing acceptance of pastoralism as a legitimate land-use system. More recently, new policy narratives have emerged, built largely around 'climate resilience', 'green economic growth' and the need for 'climate-smart agriculture'. These are being invoked by policymakers, as the state, donors and other development actors seek to respond to global and national concerns about climate-change, food-security and political-security imperatives (Krätli, 2013; Yirgu *et al*., 2013; Maina *et al*., 2013; Odhiambo, 2014; Death, 2015). Combined with the availability of climate finance, these narratives allow greater scope for the state and other actors to generate consensus and mobilise resources for the development of pastoral areas in the face of climate change. In turn, the policy prescriptions and investments that flow from such narratives and funding streams have far-reaching implications for the livelihoods of mobile pastoralists.

It has been suggested that some of the narratives driving current climate-change and green-economy policies in Ethiopia and Kenya are not necessarily 'new', but are instead rooted in the same historical discourses around 'unproductive' drylands, the poor as 'agents and victims of environmental degradation' and the need for modernisation (Odhiambo, 2014; Weissser *et al.* 2014; Krätli, 2019). Yet there has been little research to date that systematically analyses the kinds of discourses and narratives found within Ethiopian and Kenyan national policies related to climate change and pastoral area development or - in turn - examines what the consequences of these

narratives are for pastoralist livelihoods and future pastoralist development pathways. This research aims to address that gap. It does this through examining the kinds of assumptions and arguments around pastoralism found within contemporary climate-change and drylands-focused policies in Ethiopia and Kenya, with a view to identifying what discourses and narratives are dominant and if discourses have evolved over time. In addition, it explores the interests of actors and actor networks driving those discourses and narratives and, ultimately, their consequences for pastoralism.

The findings reveal that, while concerns around climate change and calls for strengthening resilience of dryland communities have given a new impetus to pastoral development in the HoA, old narratives that depict pastoral systems and pastoral areas as unproductive, and in need of modernisation, remain deeply embedded in policymaking. Combined with climate-change arguments, these narratives open up spaces for the state and other actors – private investors, local elites, conservation organisations – to extend control over natural resources previously managed under customary institutions. Climate-policy 'solutions' and dryland investments are, in turn, leading to new patterns of social differentiation and vulnerability among pastoralists, as well as accentuating existing ones. I argue that predominantly apolitical and technocratic climate-adaptation and resilience-building interventions on their own are insufficient to meet the needs of pastoralist communities. The extent and nature of dynamic change in the drylands of the HoA calls for political responses that address social inequities and power imbalances, that safeguard pastoralists' resource rights, and that allow for more inclusive forms of governance.

In doing so, this study adds empirical evidence in support of what has been observed elsewhere, as well as offering new insights. Based on a systematic content and discourse analysis of Ethiopian and Kenyan national policy documents relevant to pastoralism over a period of time, supplemented by interviews with policy actors, it provides evidence to support claims that old arguments and assumptions are being reiterated within contemporary policymaking – allowing for some nuances and differences between the two cases. It also adds further evidence in support of the argument that narratives shift to suit the needs of actors as new opportunities and contexts arise (Maina *et al.*, 2013, Otto-Naess *et al.*, 2015; Death, 2016) – the process of devolution and the accelerated economic development of northern Kenya's arid and semi-arid (ASAL) counties, or the promotion of a 'green economy' in Ethiopia, being cases in point. And that 'dominant narratives' have the ability to absorb the language and concepts of 'counternarratives' (Toulmin and Brock, 2016) – where a discourse of 'modern, mobile and green pastoralism' has now become more central to how policymakers, in both Ethiopia and Kenya, envision a pastoralist sector that is both 'climate resilient' and 'modern'. What this research adds – and what is only beginning to be explored elsewhere (see Lind *et al.*, 2020) – is insight into the extent to which local indigenous capital –

local pastoralist elites – and local political interests play a prominent role in driving the kinds of economic and social change in formerly peripheral pastoral drylands of Kenya and Ethiopia.

This chapter sets out the main parameters of this thesis. The first section provides an introduction to the heterogeneous nature of drylands and pastoralism in the HoA, as well as the historical context for pastoralist marginalisation. The second section outlines the existing literature on policy narratives as they apply to climate change and pastoralism in the HoA, and where gaps in the research remain. The third section sets out the methodological approach taken. The final section is an outline of each chapter, synopsising key findings and arguments.

1.2 Why drylands and pastoralism matter

Drylands comprise around 43% of the African continent's landmass, albeit with significant variations between countries (AU, 2010)[1]. Pastoralism, agro-pastoralism[2] and dryland farming are the dominant forms of land use, although opportunities also exist for trade, tourism, extractive industries and environmental services (Anderson *et al*., 2009; McPeak *et al.*, 2011). Pastoralism is a livelihood strategy and system of mobile livestock production that takes advantage of the marked variability and associated uncertainties in the spatial and temporal distribution of pasture and water resources in dryland areas (Naimer-Fuller 1999; Mortimore *et al*., 2009; Notenbaart *et al.*, 2012; Lind *et al*., 2016; Krätli, 2015; Davies *et al*., 2016). Pastoralists move not only to meet the nutrition needs of their livestock, but also to access markets, avoid disease, escape conflict and enhance exchanges with other land users (Nassef *et al*., 2009; Mortimore *et al*., 2009; Turner and Schlecht, 2019). While the drylands of the HoA (Map 1) are characterised by low and erratic precipitation, it is important to stress that they are also highly heterogeneous. Climate conditions range from hyper-arid to sub-humid, and vary considerably in rainfall variability, even more so in 'El Nino' years (Notenbaert *et al*., 2012; Ericksen *et al*., 2013). Years of high rainfall may be followed by years with very little rainfall. Soil characteristics and fertility also show highly varied spatial patterns. Variation can also be seen in population density, the size of settlements and the composition of different communities who inhabit them – different ethnic groups, pastoralist and agropastoralist, mobile and sedentary (Catley *et al*., 2013; Catley 2017; Lind *et al*., 2016; Randall, 2015).

[1] In addition to 'drylands', the terms 'rangelands', 'arid and semi-arid lands', and 'pastoral areas' are also used in this thesis, depending on the context of the discussion. Rangelands refers to an expanse of land covered in natural vegetation, suitable for wild herbivores and domesticated livestock to graze and not generally suitable for growing crops. Not all rangelands are arid. 'Pastoral areas' is a term used in both Ethiopia and Kenya to describe regional states, counties and dryland areas more generally, where the predominant livelihood is pastoralism.

[2] Agro-pastoralism refers to a system of agriculture that includes both crop production and livestock production that is practiced amongst settled, nomadic, and transhumant communities. Kratli observes that many pastoralist groups practiced more or less opportunistic crop farming at certain times in the past, not just shifting to agro-pastoralism as an adaptation to recent constraints as is widely believed (Kratli, 2019).

Map 1. Dryland areas in the Horn of Africa



Source: World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF).

The HoA is a region where different countries have very different political histories, cultural and religious affiliations, geopolitical positioning and development pathways (Catley *et al*., 2013; World Bank, 2020d). The colonial period reconfigured traditional socio-economic and spatial units within new state borders. As a consequence pastoralists often found themselves displaced to the peripheries of these new states and in a situation where traditional movements in search of pasture and water, as well as markets, were disrupted or prohibited (Catley *et al*., 2013; Odhiambo, 2014). Colonial policies further isolated pastoralists from development, privileging agrarian highland areas, with some element of livestock ranching promoted in the lowlands (Sandford, 1983; Odhiambo, 2014). African administrations in the post-colonial period often adopted or re-enforced these colonial policies, and old attitudes and misunderstandings around pastoralism remain remarkably persistent (Catley *et al*., 2013; Odhiambo, 2014; Krätli, 2019).

Despite increased recognition of the economic contribution made by pastoral production (Hesse and McGregor, 2006; AU, 2010; King-Okumu, *et al.*, 2015; Nyariki and Amwata, 2019),

pastoralists in the HoA, and to varying degrees elsewhere in Africa, still remain largely marginalised in national politics, with little input to decision-making processes (Catley *et al*., 2013; Hesse and Pattison, 2013; Schlee, 2013), although somewhat less so in Kenya (Elmi and Birch, 2013; Odhiambo, 2017; Manzano, 2019). The provision of government services and economic and social investment in the drylands has, up until recently, also lagged behind other areas, while pastoralists remain poorly protected from conflict and lawlessness (McPeak *et al*., 2011; Odhiambo, 2014; Catley, 2017; Mkutu, 2019). Human development indicators for pastoralist populations are reported to be lower than average than for their fellow citizens (McPeak *et al*., 2011; Catley *et al*., 2013; Devereux and Tibbo, 2013). Recurring droughts would appear to leave pastoralists disproportionately dependent on food aid for significant periods (Eriksen and Lind, 2009; Blackwell, 2010; Schilling *et al*., 2014; FEWS-NET, 2019, 2017; World Vision, 2019). For some, the increased incidence and frequency of these droughts, along with pressures of increased fragmentation of rangelands, has raised concerns over the future of pastoralism as a viable livelihood system (Headey *et al*., 2014; Oba, 2013; Morland, 2017). Others maintain that pastoralists are not simply 'coping' with climatic and other forms of change, but constantly innovating and embracing new forms of 'mobility' – such as accessing new markets, making use of mobile technologies, availing of mobile veterinary services, and even using trucks for transporting animals (Catley *et al*., 2013; Krätli, 2019).

1.3 Environmental policy narratives and pastoralism

An environmental policy narrative approach acknowledges that large-scale policymaking and planning – such as that favoured by donors and national governments – needs large-scale simplifications, or 'crises narratives', to generate political consensus and make action possible in the face of uncertainty (Roe 1991; Krätli, 2013; Weisser *et al, 2014*). Narratives not only convey storylines of cause and effect – they often have embedded the advocacy of a particular policy solution (Kronenburg-Garcia, 2018). Moreover, narratives establish 'frames of reference' that define and bound what forms of knowledge count, and whose understandings and interests are legitimate (Hajer, 1995; Dryzek, 2013; Whitfield 2016).

A number of studies to date have gone some way towards identifying and deconstructing policy discourses and narratives about drylands development (and to lesser extent, climate change) in the HoA. These studies are focused on, for example: the persistence of drylands narratives in Kenya (Odhiambo, 2014); the influence of global climate-change narratives on agricultural policy, including pastoralism, in Kenya and Ethiopia (Maina *et al.*, 2013; Yirgu *et al*., 2013); localised climate-adaptation interventions in pastoral areas in Ethiopia (Eriksen and Marin, 2015); climate adaptation as a form of capitalist growth in Kenya (Symons, 2014); and green-economy discourses and the role of the state in Ethiopia and Kenya (Jones and Carabine, 2013; Death, 2015). These

(and several earlier) studies[3] point to the fact that, for decades, dominant dryland narratives of 'tragedy of the commons', 'desertification' and 'overgrazing' underpinned conventional pastoral-development policies and did little to strengthen pastoralist livelihoods. At worst, they led to displacement and marginalisation (Swift, 1996; Fratkin, 1997; Little *et al*., 2008; Catley *et al*., 2013; Abbink *et al*., 2014). In recent years, the state and their development partners have sought to respond to increasing regional concerns about climate change, food security and political security. It has been suggested that, while the language may have evolved, some of the narratives driving current climate-change and green-economy policies in Ethiopia and Kenya are not necessarily 'new', but are instead rooted in historical discourses around 'unproductive' drylands, the poor as agents and victims of environmental degradation, and the need for modernisation (Odhiambo, 2014; Weisser, *et al*., 2014; Krätli, 2019). According to Weisser *et al*. (2014: 114), "old 'problems' are being presented as new ones, often with an undertone of urgency." However, there has been no systematic research to date that specifically analyses the kinds of discourses and narratives around pastoralism found within Ethiopian and Kenyan national climate-change and green-economy policies or, in turn, examines what the consequences of these narratives are for pastoralist livelihoods and future pastoralist development pathways. What research that has been conducted has largely been focused on influencing policy (see for example, policy briefings by: Elmi and Birch, 2013; Odhiambo, 2014; Maina *et al.*, 2013; Yirgu *et al*., 2013). These studies – discussed in Chapter 2 – need to be updated in light of what is a rapidly evolving policy context.

Policies, furthermore, do not cause outcomes in a linear fashion. They interact with other factors. The kinds of changes underway in pastoral areas are driven as much by demographic growth, changes in market supply and demand, and regional security concerns, as they are by policymaking and political processes. Growing urban settlements, new roads, renewable energy projects, oil and mineral extraction – even wildlife conservancies – are increasingly linked in a modernist vision of economic and social transformation (Mosley and Watson, 2016; Lind, 2018; Regassa, *et al*., 2019). Combined, these factors have profound implications for pastoralism, as large expanses of grazing land are no longer accessible, and mobility – pastoralists' key strategy for managing variability – is restricted. Yet these developments are generally perceived by policymakers as part of a wider – and necessary – dynamic of commercialisation and (green) growth, and even as a precursor to enhancing climate-resilient livelihoods "outside of pastoralism" (Krätli, 2019: 12). Important questions remain, nonetheless, as to who are the 'winners' and 'losers' from policy processes, and if the interests of some actors are being privileged over others.

Thus, further research is justified to answer a number of critical questions. These form the basis for this study:

[3] For a history of dominant dryland narratives in the HoA, see also: Swift, 1996; Fratkin, 1997; Little *et al*., 2008; Catley *et al*., 2013.

- What are the dominant discourses and narratives found in current national climate-change and drylands policies in Ethiopia and Kenya, and have these changed over time?
- Who are the principal actors, actor networks and institutions shaping and driving these policy narratives, and what are their motivations and interests?
- What are the consequences of these policy narratives for pastoralist livelihoods and for the future of pastoralism in the two countries?

1.4 Thesis approach

This research employs a comparative case-study approach composed of two macro-units of analysis, Ethiopia and Kenya. While climate change is clearly an 'all-Africa' issue, there is much to be learned by focusing on the policy dynamics in a particular region and in just two countries. Ethiopia and Kenya were intentionally selected, as they have much in common but also have quite different contexts. Both are prominent adoptees of policies favoured as part of the new international consensus around 'green development' and climate change (Death, 2015; Jones and Carabine, 2013; Held *et al*, 2013; Redda and Roland, 2016; Yirgu *et al*., 2013). They share similar dryland zones, with significant populations who identify themselves as pastoralists or agropastoralists. Both have been considered relatively successful in economic development terms, experiencing high levels of economic growth (World Bank, 2020a; World Bank, 2020b, World Bank, 2020c), yet are experiencing similar development and climatic challenges. In recent years, Ethiopia and Kenya, like other countries in the HoA, have both seen increased frequency and severity of drought – albeit with impacts and consequences that are site-specific, varied and uncertain (Funk *et al*., 2012; Ericksen, *et al*., 2013; Carabine, 2014; Herrero, *et al*., 2016). At the same time, these countries have quite different histories of state formation and have clearly followed quite different political and national development trajectories.

This study makes use of – and builds on – an analytical framework devised by Keeley and Scoones (1999; 2003),[4] designed to make sense of complex policy processes. The framework distinguishes between discourses and narratives, actors and institutions, and the politics and interests that together shape policy processes. To this I have added a fourth component: focused on the consequences of policy prescriptions for pastoralist livelihoods and the future of pastoralism more generally. This is important because it helps give insight into the complex "political economy of winners and losers" (Adger *et al*., 2001: 688) from policy processes that might otherwise be hidden within (simplistic) policy narratives. These overlapping elements allow a deeper understanding of how national environmental and development policy change has a bearing on pastoralist livelihoods, and on the drylands more generally, in Ethiopia and Kenya. This research also benefits from insights from political ecology, which seeks to understand the ways in which social relations,

[4] Later developed by Wolmer *et al*. (2006).

institutions and power produce particular types of environments and patterns of resource use at the local level (Blakie and Brookfield, 1987; Adger, *et al*., 2001; Forsyth, 2003; Robbins, 2012). Political ecology is helpful in tracing the genealogy of narratives concerning pastoralism and climate change, and the power relationships that support them (de Wit, 2015; Goldman *et al*., 2018).

1.5 Thesis outline

Chapter 2 reviews some of the recurring debates about pastoralist livelihoods and resource-management strategies in the HoA and the narratives underlying these, as well as shedding light on wider governance and livelihood dilemmas posed by policies and interventions in the name of climate change, 'resilience' and the 'green economy'. It argues that the effects of climate change on pastoralist livelihoods cannot be separated out from broader political, economic and social processes underway in the drylands.

Chapter 3 sets out the analytical framework for this research. This framework provides a systematic way of understanding the dynamic interactions between narratives and discourses, actors and networks, and politics and interests, within environmental policy processes, as well as the consequences of those policies for future pastoralist development pathways. I identify how emerging policy narratives around climate change broadly correspond to three broad discourses on pastoralism and pastoral area development: 'pure pastoralism'; 'transforming pastoralism and pastoral areas'; and 'modern, mobile and green pastoralism'.

Chapter 4 outlines the research design and methodology used in this study. It establishes the epistemological perspective that informs my study and why a two-country comparative case study is appropriate. Secondly, I elaborate on the appropriateness of the research tools – content analyses (CA), discourse analysis (DA) and semi-structured interviews – used to answer the three research questions, and justify the sources of data chosen for analysis. These mixed methods collectively help to address the shortcomings of each should they have been used individually. Interviews, for example, provide insights - into different policy actors interests, how policy is manifesting through development interventions at local level, as well as other kinds of dynamic change underway in the drylands of the HoA - that are unlikely have emerged should the study have been confined to just CA and DA of written policy. Finally, I outline my approach in analysing and interpreting the data collected from fieldwork, while highlighting some ethical issues and methodological limitations.

Chapter 5 presents the results of the CA and DA of Ethiopian and Kenyan policy documents related to climate change and drylands development, spanning the period 2007 to 2017. The analysis reveals that, while concerns around climate change and calls for strengthening resilience have given a new impetus to pastoral area development in Ethiopia and Kenya, old arguments and

assumptions that depict pastoral systems and pastoral areas as unproductive, and in need of modernisation, persist. Combined with the imperative of responding to climate change, these narratives amplify the perception that some kind of intervention needs to take place, opening up space for the state and other powerful actors to claim stewardship over land and other resources previously managed under customary institutions.

Chapter 6 draws on the results of interviews with key informants. It identifies the key actors, actor networks and institutions driving policy discourses and narratives, and explores why they hold the positions they do. It argues that the transformation of pastoral production towards a more commercial and diversified orientation remains the primary interest of policymakers (the state and donors, especially) in both cases, despite some differences in their political landscapes and where their discursive emphasis lies.

Chapter 7 examines the consequences of these policy narratives for pastoralist livelihoods and future pastoralist development pathways. It argues that, while some differences exist between the two countries – notably more political space for pastoralist communities and civil society organisations to engage in decision-making and /or to resist undesirable forms of development in Kenya, in contrast to Ethiopia – actions to address climate change or build 'climate resilience' and 'green growth' in pastoral dryland areas are leading to new social inequities and differentiated patterns of vulnerability, as well as accentuating existing ones. Combined with other forms of dyanamic change taking place in the drylands, these pose challenges for pastoral area governance and the future of pastoralism more generally.

Chapter 8 sets out the overall conclusions of this thesis and their implications for future rangeland governance and policymaking. It also highlights the contribution of this thesis to the literature, and identifies openings for further research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews some of the recurring debates about pastoralist livelihoods and resource-management strategies, and the commercialisation and 'transformation' of drylands in the HoA, as well as shedding light on wider governance and livelihood dilemmas posed by policies and interventions in the name of climate change, 'resilience' and the 'green economy'. The first part explores how new understandings of dryland ecology and the role of pastoralism emerged in the 1980s and 1990s to challenge deeply engrained narratives of desertification and human-induced land degradation. Despite this 'new thinking', old arguments and assumptions remain remarkably persistent within policymaking. Pastoralists are still perceived by some policy actors as ill adapted to 'modern' contingencies and in need of transformation. The second part sets out the current challenges and uncertainties facing pastoralists in the drylands of the HoA, within a context of climatic and other forms of dynamic change. It argues that the effects of climate change on pastoralist livelihoods cannot be separated out from broader political, economic and social processes underway in the drylands. While social inequity is growing in pastoral areas, and many herders are either opting to leave or are forced out of livestock keeping altogether, others are finding new ways to adapt and innovate, by taking advantage of new markets and technologies, or through livelihood diversification. This raises questions as to what the future for pastoralism and pastoralists in the HoA might look like. In the third part of the chapter, I trace how attitudes and policy responses with regard to the drylands, pastoralism and climate change have evolved in Ethiopia and Kenya over the last two decades. In doing so, I review a number of studies to date that have gone some way in examining how certain key actors – the state, donors and international development agencies – utilise particular discourses and narratives (notably those framed around 'pastoralist vulnerability', 'commercialisation of the livestock sector' and 'adaptation to climate change') in order to garner support for their policies and drive development decision-making regarding climate change and drylands development. The chapter concludes with a synopsis of key themes identified from the literature and the gaps in same, several of which form the basis for my own research in this context.

2.2 Changing attitudes towards drylands and pastoralism

Before examining some of the drivers of change in dryland areas, it is useful to set out how attitudes and policies towards drylands and pastoralism in Africa have been informed by certain assumptions and narratives around dryland ecology and land degradation – narratives that go back as far as the early 20th century.

2.2.1 'Desertification' as a policy narrative

While concerns over an 'advancing Sahara desert' and climate- and human-induced degradation of semi-arid and sub-humid savannah areas of Africa goes back to the early decades of colonial rule, they can also be traced to the influence of scientists such as Frederick Clements, whose ideas on vegetation succession and climate climax (the foundations of environmental 'equilibrium thinking') came to dominate ecological ideas about land use, from the 1930s on, particularly in the United States (Adams, 2009; Davis, 2016; Behnke and Mortimore, 2016). The fear of an 'advancing desert' resurfaced in the 1970s, at a time of successive severe droughts in the Sahel region. The concept of 'desertification' – the creation of deserts by people – was high on the international agenda in the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in an internationally agreed *United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification* (UNCCD) in 1996. Of influence were the ideas of Garett Hardin, whose 'tragedy of the commons' thesis upheld that common property resources shared by pastoralists led to 'overgrazing' and environmental degradation, as individual herders sought to maximise their herds with little concern for long-term sustainability (Hardin, 1968). Hardin's thesis had significant influence on public attitudes towards pastoralist land-use systems and provided the rationale for sweeping privatisation and commercialisation of livestock production in Kenya and elsewhere in the 1970s and 1980s (Fratkin, 1997; Swift, 1996). Writing the same year as the UNCCD, Swift (1996) argued that the 'desertification narrative' had become widely accepted because it served the interests of groups of policy actors, including national governments in Africa, international aid bureaucracies, especially the UN, and scientists. In the 1970s, newly independent African governments were restructuring their bureaucracies and seeking to gain central control over natural resources. Droughts, and the assumptions about human-induced degradation linked to them, legitimised such claims and made centralised top-down planning seem a logical strategy (Swift 1996). For many policymakers in the post-independence period, pastoralists and livestock mobility was associated with a primitive past, soon to be replaced by economic development and progress (Catley *et al*., 2013; Turner and Schlecht, 2019).

Adams (2009) makes comparisons between the human-induced desertification narrative and other simplified narratives of poverty–environment linkages that were a characteristic of mainstream sustainable development literature of the 1980s and 1990s (such as the *Bruntland Report*).[5] For Adams (2009), the linked narratives of 'overpopulation', 'overgrazing' and 'desertification' proved remarkably resilient in national government and international agency policies dominating in the

[5] Best remembered for popularising the concept of 'sustainable development', '*Our Common Future'*, more commonly known as the *Bruntland Report*, 1987, the outcome of the work of the World Commission on Environment and Development and set the agenda for the 1992 Earth Summit. Political ecologist Fiona Nunan suggests that the Bruntland Report's portrayal of the relationship between poverty and the environment as a 'vicious circle' (WCED, 1987: 27), or 'downward spiral', serves to direct efforts to reduce poverty or improve environmental management in ways that focus only on poverty reduction and/or environmental management in a narrow sense, "without taking sufficient account of a multitude of mediating factors, including governance, institutional arrangements and power relationships" (Nunan, 2015: 1).

drylands in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Such simplistic explanations were convenient to many parties. In Ethiopia, for example, the government and international donors found that a neo-Malthusian[6] explanation of the causes of famine ('too many people cause a degraded environment') could allow for technical interventions – such as large-scale land rehabilitation programmes – and provided a rationale for politically neutral food-aid programmes during the Derg regime[7] (Hoben, 1995) and later, following the fall of the Derg, 'green revolution'-type agricultural policies (Keely and Scoones, 2000).

As Adams (2009) and other scholars (see Fratkin 1997; Little *et al*., 2008; Catley *et al*., 2013; Behnke and Mortimore, 2016; Toulmin and Brock, 2016; Boles *et al*., 2019) observe, the influence of dominant narratives of desertification and overgrazing underpinned conventional pastoral-development policies for decades. As a result, orthodox rangeland management has, until recently, largely promoted a model that seeks to 'control' and manage 'fragile' rangeland resources (Hardin 1968; Lamprey 1983; Timberlake 1988; Grainger 1990). Strategies included enclosing land previously held as common property; controlling livestock numbers; providing year-round waterpoints to allow optimal livestock dispersal; seeking to manipulate rangeland ecology through controlled burning, bush clearance and reseeding; introducing livestock disease control and breeding; and encouraging rotational grazing (Timberlake 1988; Grainger 1990). None of these strategies tend to fit in with traditional pastoral livestock systems, so governments tended to emphasise instead 'sedentarisation' (the settlement of nomadic groups in one place), formal land-tenure arrangements and greater integration into commercial markets (Adams, 2009; Galvin, 2009; Catley *et al*., 2013; Gebeye, 2016).

A collection of scholarly essays, '*The End of Desertification',* edited by Behnke and Mortimore (2016), refutes the assumption that human factors were responsible for the Sahel droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, or that the degradation that occurred was irreversible. Instead, these droughts were caused by global changes in climate brought about by fluctuations in the composition of greenhouse gases and particulates. Many areas recovered their vegetation in the 1990s and continue to support sizable dryland communities and their livestock (Behnke and Mortimore, 2016; Toulmin and Brock, 2016). Overall, the book challenges the use of desertification narratives to justify top-down agricultural and environmental policies, which have allocated pastoral lands to other uses, and left dryland communities disempowered as a result.

2.2.2 Challenging the equilibrium model

In contrast to the desertification and rangeland control perspectives, outlined above, the 1990s saw

[6] Following the ideas of Thomas Malthus, the 18th century economist, who argued that population growth would eventually outstrip available resources and food supply.

[7] The Derg, officially the Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia, was a Communist Marxist-Leninist military junta that ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1987.

a new model of range ecology that took on board unpredictable variability as the defining feature of arid and semi-arid ecosystems (Ellis and Swift, 1988; Behnke *et al*., 1993; Scoones, 1995; Naimir-Fuller, 1999). This model, according to Krätli (2013: 3), "has fundamentally changed our understanding of pastoral production and its environment – from one characterized by scarcity to valuable, from fragility to resilience, from problem to asset." Krätli (2016: 488) further observes that pastoralists and their livestock have contributed to the development of rangelands through millennia of co-evolution, which is why when pastoral systems are effected, either positively or negatively, there is a knock-on effect in their ecosystems as a whole. The largely dominant view amongst rangeland ecologists today is that herd mobility is not only an effective strategy for risk management (allowing pastoralists to mitigate against, for example, a drought or flood, or a livestock disease outbreak); it also enables pastoralists to harness environmental and rainfall variability and enhance livestock production (Scoones, 1995; AU, 2010; McGahey *et al*., 2014; Krätli *et al*., 2015). Herds are mobile precisely because they can then access the best quality of grazing at all times (IIED/SOS Sahel, 2010). Pastoralists, furthermore, have a close relationship with, and knowledge of, their environment, which enables them to both protect and exploit the biodiversity on which they depend, (Homewood and Rodgers, 1991; Vetter, 2005; Notenbaert *et al*., 2012; Oba, 2013; Herrera *et al*., 2014). Understanding these benefits has also been shown to make economic sense (Hesse and McGregor 2006; Davies 2007; AU, 2010; Notenbaert *et al*., 2012; Nyariki and Amwata, 2019).

Rangeland ecologists make the case that Hardin's 'tragedy of the commons' thesis fails to recognise the variability and 'non-equilibrium' (Behnke *et al*., 1993) state of dryland ecosystems. Degradation is not inherent to common property regimes, but rather is caused by an absence of common property rules (Ciriacy-Wanthrup and Bishop, 1975; Ostrom, 1990). Hardin's 'tragedy of the commons' should instead be labeled the 'tragedy of open access' (Bromley and Cernea 1989).[8] While land degradation does occur in pastoral areas, this is due not to overpopulation *per se*, but to uneven population distribution, made worse by concentrations of people and livestock around boreholes and rural towns (Fratkin, 1997; Avery, 2014). This understanding of variability and the limits of equilibrium thinking led to the popularity of a new set of rangeland interventions. The emphasis of many agencies working with pastoralists has shifted towards livestock health and enhancing the capacity of animals to survive in times of disease and drought, supporting mobility where still possible – in particular, access to dry-season grazing reserves and traditional 'livestock corridors', targeted restocking following a drought, and strengthening pastoralist organisational

[8] Conventional common property theory posits that for effective governance of commons, there is a need for clear territorial and group boundaries and recognition by authorities of the rights of communities to manage the commons (Ostrom, 1990). More recent scholarly work on pastoral systems argues that these pastoralist systems do not necessarily conform to the principles of mainstream commons theories (Behnke, 2018; Moritz, 2016; Senda *et al*., 2020). Behnke (2018: 708) argues that a degree of open acess is a recurrent feature of many indigenous pastoral land tenure systems. Common property theory, furthermore, is also ill equipped to deal with the emergence of class interests and increased commoditisation of pastoralist resources that is now a feature of pastoral areas in the HoA (see also Chapters 7 and 8).

capacity (Catley *et al*., 2013; Flintan, 2014; Krätli *et al*., 2015).

Despite these strong arguments, and the dominance within the literature of new narratives on pastoralism and their relationship to climatic and other uncertainties, several commentators argue that 'old narratives' persist. Krätli (2013:1) maintains that the drylands and pastoralism are frequently characterised in contemporary discourse as, in some way, "unproductive, resource scarce, fragile, marginal and remote." According to McPeak *et al* (2011: 3), pastoralists are still commonly perceived as "following an outdated way of life and clinging to a production system ill adapted to 'modern' contingencies." Ruling national elites and international agencies continue to use the kind of 'problematising narratives' (Weisser *et al*., 2014: 114) about environmental degradation, resource scarcity and low productivity, as described above, to justify policies that promote the conversion of rangelands to other uses (Little *et al*., 2013, Scoones, 2018). These uses are often themselves major drivers of degradation, pastoralist displacement and, ultimately, failed economic development (Galvin, 2009; Catley *et al*., 2013; Krätli, 2013; Abbink *et al*., 2014; Krätli, 2019). With global climate change increasing, pastoralists are frequently portrayed as amongst the groups most 'at risk'. There is, however, "a new twist to this 'doomed-by-climate-change' storyline" (Krätli, 2013: 2), with pastoralists also seen as having the ability to 'repair nature', through, for example, their involvement in land-based carbon-sequestration schemes (McGahey *et al*., 2014).

2.3 Climate change and other uncertainties

There is broad agreement within the literature that pastoral systems in the HoA are undergoing significant change and face many uncertainties in terms of their future, not least the effects of a changing climate. It is impossible, nonetheless, to discuss the impacts of climate change on pastoralism – or the narratives around same – without giving due consideration to the wider context of political, economic and social transformation taking place in the drylands: most notably the 'fragmentation' and privatisation of formerly commonly held resources, the commercialisation of agriculture, and the increased investment in energy and other infrastructure projects, all within the context of globalised markets. While this brings new opportunities for some, others are being displaced or are pushed into greater poverty as a result. These key drivers of change affecting the drylands in the HoA are discussed below.

2.3.1 Non-climatic uncertainties

The role of land – tenure, access and enclosure – is fundamental to any discussion of dynamic change in the pastoral drylands of the HoA. In Ethiopia all land is vested in the State according to Article 40 of the Constitution of 1995. Citizens have use-rights and inheritance of use-rights is permitted, but land-use rights may not be mortgaged. Regional governments have the duty to

administer land and other natural resources in accordance with federal laws. Since land reform in 1998, registration and user-right 'certification' schemes are underway in a number of regional states (Senda *et al*., 2020). Nonetheless, informal or 'customary' land-tenure systems that have evolved over hundreds of years have continued to operate alongside the statutory framework, especially in remoter pastoral and agro-pastoral areas. While customary land-tenure system has been recognised under the 1994 Constitution (see 2.4.1 below), historically legislation has failed to clearly define communal rights to rangelands, and the specific roles and responsibilities for both communities and local government to administer and manage these resources (Bekure, 2018). This legislative deficiency prevents pastoral communities from fully exercising their constitutional rights to land.

In Kenya, in contrast, under the 2010 Constitution, all land belongs either to the people collectively (public land), to individuals (private land) or to communites (community land). Community land – formerly known as 'Trust Lands' - means land aquired, possessed and transferred under community-based or customary regimes, although in practice this can be a hybrid of traditional and contemporary practices (Alden-Wily, 2018). Administration of community lands in Kenya has been under the adminstration of, firstly locally elected councils, then (from 1968) centralised under the Commissioner of Lands in Nairobi, and eventually devolved back to the Counties following constitutional reform in 2010. While community land may encompass up to 60% of Kenya, mostly in the drier Northern counties, these lands have seen sizable areas reallocated by successive administrations to non-local communities for private purposes, or turned into local authority wildlife or forest reserves (Alden-Wily, 2018). Reconciling the conflicting, and seemingly incompatible, needs of secure tenure on the one hand, and mobility and flexibility on the other, is the "paradox of pastoral land tenure" (Fernandes-Giminez, 2002, in Senda *et al*., 2020: 2). The *Community Land Act*, 2016, in Kenya (see Chapters 6 and 7) is an attempt to overcome this challenge. The CLA is now the framework through which customary holdings are to be identified and registered. It is designed to not only protect the land rights of communities but also empower them to to make their own rules for regulation and administration of land (GoK-NLC, 2016). The implications of the CLA for pastoralists are discussed further in Chapters 6 and 7.

Galaty (2013: 144) argues that pastoralists' vulnerability to losing land can be attributed to their "systematic refusal to embrace a bounded, alienable and exclusionary notion of landed property, or to the attitudes of land seekers." Various scholars have pointed to the fact that pastoralists use negotiation, reciprocity and inter-clan bonds and networks as key processes to manage common property resources (Behnke and Scoones, 1993; Fratkin, 1997; Moritz, 2016; Pas Schrivejer, 2019). Rather than assumed 'open access' leading to degraded pastures, rights of use and access to resources are carefully defined and redefined through negotiation and other means. Nevertheless,

across most of the HoA, such customary institutions are being eroded.[9] That pastoral lands are increasingly being fragmented and converted to other forms of land use by both state and non-state interests has been well documented in the literature (Galvin, 2009; Galaty, 2013; Behnke and Kerven 2013; Little, 2013; Abbink *et al.*, 2014; Kidane *et al*., 2014; Korf *et al*., 2015; Lind *et al*., 2016; Catley 2017; Pas Schrivejer, 2019). Areas selected for appropriation and crop cultivation are invariably the more fertile and strategic lands, such as those close to rivers and other water sources, or areas offering potential for resource extraction and/or infrastructure development (Galaty, 2013; Schilling *et al*., 2016; Mosley and Watson, 2016; Regassa, *et al*., 2019). When pastoralists depend only on livestock, there is an advantage in managing the rangeland as a contiguous commons system. However, when alternative strategies – for example, cultivating crops or producing charcoal – become equally or more important, there is an incentive to seek ownership and 'enclose' a patch of land (Galvin, 2009, Tache 2013; Korf *et al*., 2015). Furthermore, the widening gap between rich and poor and the related inequalities in power dynamics, as effected by many internal and external socio-economic factors, are creating unprecedented social stratification within pastoral dryland areas (Galvin, 2009; Flintan *et al*., 2011; Catley and Akilu, 2013; Tache, 2013; Catley, 2017; FAO, 2018; Krätli, 2019). This encourages individualistic strategies over community interests, in turn favouring the (*de facto*) privatisation of common-pool resources. Korf *et al*. (2015) argue that land appropriation in the frontier region between Ethiopia and Somalia is co-produced through political claims to territory and capital investment by wealthy indigenous (pastoralist, Somali) merchants and politicians, who are in effect "complicit in the (Ethiopian) state's project of territoralisation and sedentarisation" (2015: 889). It is suggested that those with more knowledge, assets, and closer links to decision-making processes will invariably have greater control over resources (Catley *et al.*, 2013; Abbink *et al*., 2014; Scoones, 2018). Wealthier pastoralists are less likely to rely on traditional forms of social capital and customary institutions (Catley, 2017). While there is a growing 'pastoralist elite'[10] – pushed up by structural transformations and the ability of certain groups, as we have seen above, to take advantage of new investments and commercialisation of livestock production – Krätli (2019) reminds us that the vast majority of pastoralists in the HoA remain poor. And in times of drought, poorer pastoralists with smaller herds have fewer options (Catley, 2017). The emergence of large-scale social-protection

[9] There are efforts to counter this trend. The USAID supported Land Administation to Nurture Development (LAND) project in Borana (Oromia, Ethiopia) is an example of where a customary land-tenure system with traditional grazing area units *(dheedas)* has been formally recognised by local government planners (see Chapter 7). In a similar manner, organisations such as Farm Africa, SOS-Sahel, Care International, and others, have for the last decade been promoting a model of Participatory Rangeland Management (PRM) in areas of Oromia, Afar and Somali regions (Flintan *et al*., 2019).

[10] The term 'pastoralist elite' is frequently used in discussions on pastoralism in Kenya and Ethiopia. This refers to a growing class of wealthy, and usually politically well connected, herd owners (often absentee) or former pastoralists, who have made money from enclosing land (such as the 'Group Ranches' in the southern Kenyan rangelands) and /or from investments in other businesses (by, for example, Somali pastoralist traders in Ethiopia and Kenya). Or, who have taken advantage of rent-seeking opportunities resulting from policy change or political appointment (Catley 2017; Manzano, 2018).

programmes in pastoral areas of both Ethiopia and Kenya is symptomatic of this trend (Catley, 2017; Tsegay, 2017).

Globalisation, in the form of investment flows and the reach of private capital, new technologies and telecommunications, and changing flows of people, resources and information, along with alternative income sources, is now influencing formerly remote communities. Local livelihoods are increasingly connected with and dependent on other actors in a larger system (Adger *et al*., 2009; Carabine, 2014; Goldsmith, 2013; Mosley and Watson, 2016). One such capital investment is the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) project, set to open up large areas of northern Kenya –including pastoral rangelands – to infrastructure development and oil extraction (Goldsmith, 2013; Kirimi and Nijeru, 2016)[11]. For state actors, LAPSSET is "essential for growth and investment" (LCDA 2016:16). Various studies (Enns, 2017; Letai and Tiampati, 2015; Loduk *et al.*, 2016; Schilling *et al*., 2016; Kochore, 2016) have highlighted, nonetheless, that while such 'mega-infrastructure' projects may bring employment and business opportunities for some, they place restrictions on mobility of others, as well as aggravating new conflicts over land and other resources. Elsewhere in Kenya, domestic and foreign investors have targeted the ecologically sensitive Tana Delta – an important dry-season grazing reserve for pastoralists – for large-scale irrigation and farming projects, including biofuel production (Maina *et al*., 2013; Nunow, 2013; Neville, 2015).

Alongside converting pastoral land to other 'more productive' uses, restrictions on access are instigated through new forms of tenure systems, which favour landholdings by individuals or groups rather than more flexible traditional communal tenure described earlier. Privatisation, and allocating 'title' to land users, opens up customary land to non-traditional users – such as recently settled agriculturalists – most of whom are not tied to customary norms and rules in the way pastoralists are (Mwangi and Dohrn, 2006). Some land-tenure changes are coming from pastoralists themselves, with the goal of gaining control of their land before crop farmers, land investors or conservation organisations can get hold of it (Headey *et al*., 2014; Korf *et al*., 2015; Elliot, 2016; Greiner, 2017). Once the most valuable pockets of land are converted to other forms of land use, the wider functionality of pastoral production, which depends on mobility and access to seasonal grazing, is undermined (Letai and Tiampati, 2015). Changing property relations are also influenced by the process of sedentarisation, as described earlier, which has long been part of the standard formula for development of pastoral sectors the world over (Abbink *et al*. 2014; Fratkin, 2014). Services provided in towns such as education and medical care, new economic opportunities or even humanitarian relief provide a powerful 'pull' factor for pastoralist settlement (AU, 2010; Fratkin, 2004, 2013). The sedentarisation of pastoralists in Ethiopia has been a

[11] The Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport corridor is a $25 billion infrastructure investment that is designed to link Kenya with Ethiopia, Uganda and South Sudan.

deliberate government policy, ostensibly intended to improve food security and access to basic services (Yimer, 2015), but more often to make way for large-scale irrigation schemes (Abbink *et al.*, 2014; Fratkin 2014; Gebeye, 2016).

In contrast to the scenario outlined above – of pastoralists facing uncertainties in the context of socioeconomic and political change – Catley *et al*., (2013) offer a different outlook on pastoralist dynamics. They focus on the vibrant in-country and cross-border livestock trade and commercial networks that have emerged from pastoral areas in recent years responding to growing domestic, regional and international demand for livestock products. Livestock exports to Gulf countries in particular play a significant role in the economies of Ethiopia, Kenya and other HoA countries (World Bank, 2020d). Some of the fastest-growing towns in the HoA are linked to these trading activities (Catley and Aklilu, 2013; Catley, 2017; Korf, *et al*., 2015; Lind *et al*., 2016; Gebremeskel *et al*., 2019). Nyariki and Amwata (2019) have calculated the Total Economic Value (TEV)[12] of the pastoral livestock sector in Kenya alone to be worth US$1.4 billion. For these, and other scholars, it is a myth that pastoralists are disconnected from markets. The reality is that such trade remains undervalued at national level and is not captured in government statistics (Catley and Aklilu, 2013; Krätli 2019; Nyariki and Amwata, 2019). Pastoralists are often viewed as somehow homogeneous in terms of their livelihoods and assets, but many are taking advantage of new opportunities in this livestock trade to generate new wealth (Catley, 2017). For Catley *et al*. (2013), pastoralists are not simply 'coping with' or 'adapting to' climate and other forms of change, but constantly innovating – the use of mobile phones to transfer money, the occasional use of trucks to transport animals or fodder, shifting from keeping cattle to camels, as examples.

The role of women in pastoralism is also changing. The dominant trend in pastoralist studies has long assumed that pastoralism and pastoral gender relations are inherently patriarchical - that elder men dominate the political sphere, and that men play the primary roles in livestock production with women relegated to the domestic sphere (Balehey *et al*., 2018).[13] Yet women pastoralists are increasingly recognised as playing a direct role in pastoralist production and in the complex social institutions and networks that are necessary for pastoralist systems (Hodgson, 2000; Flintan, 2008; Krätli 2019). With changing environmental, social and economic circumstances in the HoA, women pastoralists have an increasing and significant role in the management of diversified livestock, and in the marketing of high value livestock products (such as milk) (de Jode and Flintan, 2020). Pastoralist women are also increasingly vocal in asserting their rights through local civil society organisations and through participation in national and international pastoralist

[12] 'Total Economic Value' includes appraisal of the non-traditional pastoral values (the goods and services provided by the pastoral landscape) as well as conventional values of livestock (livestock products) (Hesse and McGregor, 2006; Davies, 2007; Krätli, 2015).

[13] The contributors to a seminal collection entitled *Rethinking Pastoralism in Africa: Gender, Culture, And Myth of Patriarchial Pastoralist*, edited by Dorothy Hodgson (2000), challenge such assumptions. They provide evidence instead to show that pastoralist gender relations are dynamic, relational, historical, and producted through complex local-translocal interactions.

womens' networks. According to Krätli (2019: 7), failure to recognise and build on women pastoralists' role as producers undermines this role, and consequently, women's status in pastoralist societies. Women in pastoral systems, nonetheless (just as with other rural women in the HoA[14]), face multiple disadvantages. As pastoralists, they experience economic, social and political marginalistion. As women, they face inequality in accessing resources, social services and participation in decision-making (Flintan, 2008; Krätli 2019; de Jode & Flintan, 2020). While local and customary resource management offered some protection to women, modern statutory tenure systems risk the loss of women's control over resources (FAO, 2017).[15] The process of sedentarisation, furthermore, has been linked with worsening conditions for women in terms of workload and social control (Fratkin and Smith, 1995). For de Jode and Flintan (2020: 5), "an important factor in how successfully women own, access and manage collective land and natural resources is how strong the collective governance body is, including in the protection of women's rights."

While issues of fragmentation, commercialisation, changes in land tenure and integration into global markets may appear at first to be not directly relevant to my study of climate change and pastoralist development narratives, they are nonetheless closely connected. Commercialisation of agriculture, the 'transformation' of formerly peripheral dryland areas more generally, and the desire to build a 'climate resilient green economy' (of which more below) are at the core of contemporary policy discourse and narratives in both Ethiopia and Kenya – as we shall learn in Chapter 5. A number of scholars point to the fact that the increased fragmentation and enclosure of the rangelands, as well as the breakdown of customary institutions that results from decision-making that is rooted in these policy narratives, has the affect of undermining pastoralists' autonomous 'adaptive capacity' (Eriksen and Marin, 2011, 2015; Lind *et al*., 2016). Restrictions on access to dry-season grazing reserves means pastoralists have less and less space to move with their livestock (Nunow, 2011; Oba, 2013) – a claim borne out in my own findings (see Chapters 6 and 7). In the same way, the enclosure of grasslands and dryland forests in the name of carbon sequestration (Fairhead *et al*., 2010; Bedelian and Ogutu, 2017), the damming of rivers to generate 'green' hydropower (Human Rights Watch, 2012; Yimer, 2015; Mosley and Watson, 2016) or the development of wind- and geothermal-energy projects (Mutiga, 2015; Williams 2015) all serve to restrict pastoralists from prime grazing areas and traditional livestock routes.

2.3.2 Climate change and pastoralism

In line with the kind of 'new thinking' on rangeland ecology and pastoralism described above, a number of scholars argue the pastoralists have been managing climate variability and climate risk

[14] While practices of female genital mutilation and child marriage are still prevalent among some pastoralist ethnic groups and clans in Ethiopia for example (Afar and Somali for example) (Balehey et al, 2018), they are also present in wider society and thus not specific to pastoralist communties (Kratli, 2019).

[15] http://www.fao.org/pastoralist-knowledge-hub/news/detail/en/c/1044193/

in the Africa for millennia (Ericksen *et al*., 2013; McGahey, *et al.*, 2014; Hill *et al.*, 2015). Traditional mobile pastoralism is regarded as an effective response to cycles of drought, floods and 'normal' rainfall years in areas that do not receive more than 600mm rainfall annually, and quite often make do with 200–300mm (Ellis and Swift, 1988). Pastoralists balance herd size, species and breed composition, grazing patterns, as well as other livelihood options, with an eye to managing climate risk, even if other risks are more immediate (Nassef *et al*., 2009; Ericksen *et al*., 2013; Hill *et al*., 2015; Bersaglio *et al*., 2015). These adaptation strategies and drought-response mechanisms are, nonetheless, considered to be increasingly under pressure from the kinds of non-climatic uncertainties and changes described earlier – not least restrictions on mobility (Levine *et al*., 2011; Lind *et al*., 2016; Herrero *et al*., 2016).

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) *5th Assessment Report* (AR), temperatures in Africa are projected to rise faster than the global average increase during the 21st century (IPCC, 2014). Warming and increased frequency of extreme warm events has already been observed for countries bordering the western Indian Ocean between 1961 and 2008 (IPCC, 2014; Williams and Funk 2011). While inter-annual variability of rainfall in Africa can be measured, longer-term trends are nonetheless difficult to assess. While Nicholson (2001) reported a 5–10% decline in precipitation generally for much of Africa in the latter half of the 20th century, this does not hold for localised areas of Eastern Africa and the HoA. Analysis by Washington *et al.* (2011) of multiple datasets finds disagreement in precipitation trends in Eastern Africa from 1961 to 2000. One dataset shows an annual drying trend, while another indicates no trend on an annually averaged basis (Washington *et al*., 2011). For the future, projected increases in heavy precipitation over the region in the mid-21st century have been reported with 'high certainty' by the IPCC (2012). The IPCC Working Group (WG) II AR5 provides evidence that climate change will interact with non-climate-related drivers and stressors to increase the vulnerability of semi-arid drylands in Africa (IPCC, 2014). Risk of reaching 'tipping points' for crop and livestock production in small-scale farming and/or pastoralist livelihoods is estimated as 'medium risk', with potential to increase to 'very high risk' by 2100 with a 4°C warming scenario, regardless of what adaptation takes place (ibid.). Under long-term 2°C warming and in the near term, high-risk levels may reduce to medium through adaptation action (ibid.). Nevertheless, adaptation options are judged by the IPCC WG to be limited because of "persistent poverty, declining land productivity, food insecurity and limited government support due to marginalisation" (IPCC, 2014: 811).

For Krätli (2016), it is misleading to simply aggregate pastoralism with crop farming when looking at the impact of climate change on the drylands, as the IPCC have done in the case above, and as many international agencies continue to do. By doing so, it overlooks the fundamental differences in the way pastoral systems make use of dryland environments – that is, by working with their characteristic variability rather than against it. The literature reveals that such simplifications are

central to environmental policy narratives, in that they try to bypass uncertainty and build a unifying storyline, (Roe, 1991; Keeley and Scoones, 2003; Whitfield, 2016), thus justifying some form of 'governmental intervention' by the state, or other institutions, in the name of development, conservation or climate-change adaptation (Weisser *et al*., 2013; Kronenburg-Garcia, 2018). Elsewhere, Semplici (2019: 67), in an examination of climate change and pastoralism in Turkana, Kenya, warns against "an univocal focus on climate change as the driver of all problems". Rather, climate change should be understood "within a broader context of high ecological variability, as well as considered in relation to political and economic factors that are co-responsible for the current risks faced by dryland inhabitants" (ibid.: 67).

While evidence for climate change resulting in surface-level warming would appear to be incontrovertible (IPCC, 2013), the consequences for pastoral production in the HoA are far less clear. Impacts pertaining to rangeland vegetation, herd dynamics and herd composition are thus likely to be varied, site-specific and uncertain (Ericksen *et al*., 2013; Herrero *et al*., 2016; Carabine, 2014; Sloat *et al*., 2018). One concern is that increased frequency of droughts will allow insufficient time for herd recovery in the years when there is no drought (Thornton and Herrero, 2010; Bersaglio *et al.*, 2015). Climate change is also likely to bring more frequent and intense disease outbreaks in both crop and livestock systems (Kumssa and Jones, 2010; Herrero *et al*., 2016). Increases in maximum and minimum temperatures, combined with more CO2 could, on the other hand, increase net primary productivity of grasslands in the presence of more rainfall (Herrero *et al*., 2016).

For Blackwell (2010: 1322), climate change is now the primary driver of poverty and conflict among pastoralists in the Greater HoA, as "competition escalates for shrinking pasture and water sources". With increased frequency of droughts, pastoralists' traditional "survival strategies" are overwhelmed, leaving people increasingly dependent on food aid (ibid.). The recent statistics certainly bear this out. Following the *El Nino*-induced droughts affecting parts of the HoA between 2015 and 2017, some 5.6 million people were estimated to need some form of food assistance in the predominantly pastoralist lowlands of Ethiopia, and 2.2 million in Kenya.[16] In contrast to Blackwell's study, research by Witsenburg and Roba (2007) in Marsabit District in northern Kenya found that, in times of drought and water scarcity, there was less violence between neighbouring groups, not more. Despite poverty, strong but flexible customary institutions governing water resources helped people adjust in times of scarcity. Elsewhere, Scoones *et al.* (2019: 231) observe that resource-based conflicts are more likely to take place where resources are relatively abundant, using the example of large-scale 'land grabs' in sub-Saharan Africa: "scarcity narratives do not merely describe, but justify changes in access to and control over resources, in ways that reallocate

[16] EU/ECHO Factsheet – Horn of Africa, March 2017. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/hoa_en_7.pdf

scarcities across regions and populations." This has relevance for my own research, as later chapters reveal, where we learn that narratives of transformation and commercialisation are, in part, driving the redistribution of resources in dryland areas.

2.3.3 'Climate resilience' and the 'green economy'

In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007/08, and in the context of an emerging consensus on the need to tackle climate change, the UNEP launched its '*Global Green New Deal'* report in 2009, followed by '*Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication'* in the run-up to the 2012 World Summit on Sustainable Development. Advocates of a 'green economy' present it as an unquestionable 'triple win' – an economic pathway that is 'low carbon, resource efficient and socially inclusive' (UNEP, 2011). The notion of a 'green economy' has since gained international traction, endorsed by many global institutions and national governments, mostly in the Global North, but also more recently in the Global South, including several African nations (Death, 2016).

'Climate resilience' is essentially a reaction to the multiple challenges of climate, energy and food security (SDC, 2011; UNEP, 2011; World Bank, 2019) – and is, as we shall discover later, a metaphor that is at the heart of both Ethiopian and Kenyan policy discourse around drylands development. This discourse brings the 'climate crisis' and the 'environmental crisis' to the forefront, together with their impact on what are perceived as particularly vulnerable societies in the Global South. A World Bank programme launched in 2009, entitled '*Making Development Climate Resilient in Sub-Saharan Africa',* puts emphasis on "adaptation and climate risk management as a core development component" (World Bank, 2009, cited in Death, 2015: 2212). According to Methmann and Oels (2014, cited in Death, 2015: 2212), a 'resilient green economy' is to be achieved by a "combination of technical interventions by the state and development institutions, together with 'empowered communities' who (it is hoped) can draw on their sources of resilience." Dominant forms of knowledge include development disciplines like crop science, water engineering and disaster-risk management (World Bank, 2012). Key interventions include development projects at the regional or local scale intended to provide renewable energy, food security and 'safety nets' for the core subjects of green resilience, namely 'vulnerable communities' (World Bank, 2012; USAID, 2014). A related discourse is 'green growth', which has been the dominant framing of the green economy since the financial crisis of 2007/08 (Death, 2015). In this discourse, environmental changes and programmes are viewed as an economic opportunity, not a threat (World Bank, 2012). Ethiopia and Kenya both clearly have strong growth-orientated visions of a green economy. Utilising funds newly available through climate finance

schemes such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF),[17] REDD+[18] and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), investment in sectors such as renewable energy and 'climate smart agriculture' are seen as paths to development and job creation (Yirgu *et al*., 2013; Maina *et al*., 2013; Otto-Naess *et al*., 2015).

2.3.4 Pastoralism and the green economy

How then are pastoralists affected by this new enthusiasm for 'climate resilience' and the 'green economy'? With global demand for meat and dairy projected to increase by 37% and 58% respectively between 2010 and 2050, there is growing concern about the livestock sector's continued demand on natural resources and its contribution to carbon emissions and loss of biodiversity (Gerber *et al.*, 2013, Willet *et al*., 2019). There have been calls for a 'livestock revolution', which can somehow meet growing demand for livestock products whilst reducing by half livestock's impact on the environment (Delgado, 1999; Steinfield *et al*., 2006). Such concerns, as we shall discover in Chapters 5 and 6, can be detected in current 'green economy' and 'climate smart agriculture' narratives, which – in the case of Ethiopia – include the desire to reduce overall herd size and produce more output from less animals (FDRE, 2011b). Yet, as the authors of the IUCN / UNEP report '*Pastoralism and the Green Economy – a Natural Nexus?'* argue, comparing the natural resource efficiencies of traditional pastoral systems against more intensive modes of livestock production is unconstructive (McGahey *et al*., 2014: 18). For McGahey *et al* (2014), extensive rangeland pastoral systems are multifunctional, providing economic value, but also contributing essential ecological services.[19] As more international climate funding becomes available, there is potential for pastoralists to benefit from schemes whereby they are rewarded for managing rangeland for its ecosystem functions, or to capitalise on the growth of new, certified, green 'niche markets' for high-value livestock products (McGahey *et al*., 2014). While the authors make an important contribution to debates around the role of pastoralism in a changing climate, their report makes no attempt to unpack any narratives underpinning a normative understanding of the 'green economy' as unquestionably good, or who is likely to benefit the most from such a transition, as this research does.

[17] The Green Climate Fund (GCF), an output of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) COP15 held in Copenhagen in 2009, set a goal of channelling over US$100 billion a year to developing countries by 2020 to support them in limiting and adapting to GHG emissions.

[18] Under REDD (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Land Degradation) – a tool of the UNFCCC – countries with extensive forest and/or grasslands are compensated if they agree to manage these lands in ways that reduce greenhouse-gas emissions and enhance carbon storage (FAO, 2009).

[19] Earlier work by Hesse and McGregor (2006), Davies (2007), and Nassef *et al*., (2009) has highlighted the important - and often undervalued - contribution of pastoralist mobility to natural systems – mobile grazing opens up pastures, stimulates vegetation growth, fertilises the soil, enhances the soil's water infiltration capacity by hoof action breaking the soil crust, aids in seed dispersal to maintain pasture diversity, prevents bush encroachment and enhances the cycling of nutrients through the ecosystem. The concept of TEV (see page 18) is designed to appraise such non-traditional values of pastoralism.

Concerns have been expressed elsewhere that the growth of global markets for 'green' products and ecosystem services will create new risks for extensive rangeland systems (Fairhead *et al*., 2012). Land in Kenya and Ethiopia – as Chapters 6 and 7 will reveal – is increasingly being alienated from pastoralists for renewable energy and conservation purposes. The term 'green grabbing' has been used to describe the process of appropriation of land and other resources, notionally for environmental ends, such as biodiversity conservation, carbon sequestration or eco-tourism, but in practice to meet commercial or other imperatives. For Fairhead *et al*. (2012: 251), "green grabbing constructs and rides on discourses of 'marginal land', assisted by satellite imagery that occludes people, livelihoods and social-ecological relationships from view, rendering land open to new 'green market' uses."

2.4 Policy processes and pastoralism in Ethiopia and Kenya

As we have seen above, uncertain resource tenure and restrictions on mobility, or denial of access to rangeland resources, are constraints to extensive livestock herding and can lead to environmental degradation and loss of livelihoods (IIED and SOS Sahel 2009; Galvin, 2009; AU, 2010). Limited formal education and lack of access to state services further disadvantage pastoralists. Some researchers have highlighted pastoralists' 'multiple marginalisations' within African states and lack of representation or 'voice' (Catley *et al*., 2013; Hesse and Pattison 2013; Schlee, 2013).

There has, nonetheless, been considerable political change in the HoA in the past 30 years. Notably, the federal division of Ethiopia along ethnic lines into nine Regional States in 1994 (see Map 2), and a shift to multi-party democracy and a new era of political and administrative devolution underway in Kenya since 2010. Little (2013) is of the view that not all these transitions have had the positive impact on rural communities, including pastoralists, that was anticipated. Devolution in Kenya is not immune to 'elite capture' (Faquet, *et al*., 2015) and corruption by local leaders, resulting in inequitable distribution of resources, especially for poorer and less politically dominant pastoralist communities in dryland counties (Catley *et al*., 2013; Little, 2013; Manzano, 2018), a theme explored in Chapter 7. As more international climate funds becomes available, concerns have also been expressed as to whether these will provide a new source of 'rent' for powerful elites, while offering little in the way of benefits to politically marginalised constituencies – such as pastoralists (Lockwood, 2013).

In the following sections, I trace how attitudes and national policy prescriptions towards the drylands more generally, and especially policies on climate change and the green economy, have evolved in Ethiopia and Kenya in recent decades. In tandem, I review a number of existing studies that have examined how these policies are being driven by certain discourses and narratives, by key actors and political interests.

2.4.1 Ethiopian policy towards pastoral areas

Since the overthrow of the Derg regime in 1991, Ethiopia has been ruled by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) – a coalition of four ethnically based political parties. While pursuing a predominantly market-based development strategy, the EPRDF retained close control of the economy and political system with little space for political opposition. This changed dramatically in 2018, with the appointment of Abiy Ahmed as Prime Minister (Roberts, 2019). Abiy Ahmed has embarked on a wide programme of political and economic reforms and opening of democratic space for opposition voices, although challenges remain – not least the re-emergence of ethnic-based conflicts within and between some Regional States (Minority Rights Group, 2019).

Map 2: Administrative Regions and Zones, Ethiopia



Source: Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC) Information Centre UN OCHA-Ethiopia.

Ethiopia is Africa's second biggest country by population – 112 million in 2019 (World Bank, 2020a). The rapid expansion of population[20] and the growth in services and in the agricultural sector have seen unprecedented levels of economic growth in Ethiopia over the last decade – averaging 9.9% a year (World Bank, 2020c). The share of the population living below the national

[20] Ethiopia's population has grown from 64 million in 1999 to 112 million in 2019 (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ET)

poverty line is reported to have decreased from 30% in 2011 to 24% in 2016 (World Bank, 2020a, 2020c). With more than two thirds of the population living in rural areas, large numbers rely on the natural resource base for their livelihood security. In recent decades, the country's agricultural systems have been subject to rainfall variability, leading to fluctuations in productivity, and to severe drought and food crises in parts of the country, most notably in 2011/12, and again in 2015/16 (EU/ECHO, 2017; Gebremeskel *et al*., 2019). While current evidence suggests that temperatures will continue to rise and climate change will mean greater rainfall variability – becoming drier in some areas but with higher precipitation in others – there is a great deal of uncertainty on how these trends will affect food and livelihood security (Conway and Schipper, 2011; Funk *et al*., 2012; EPCC, 2015). How the government and other actors respond to these climate uncertainties is significant for the country's future development and for pastoralists in particular.

In Ethiopia, arid and semi-arid pastoral areas comprise some 60% of the total land area with pastoralism estimated to support the livelihoods of close to 12 million people (FDRE-CSA, 2013), making it the country with the most pastoralists in Africa. The major pastoral areas include Afar, Ethio-Somali, parts of Oromia, Gambella, and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNPR) (Map 2). Smaller numbers of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists also reside in Benishangul-Gumuz Region and Dire Dawe Adminstration. Table 2.1. shows the growth in population in what have been described as pastoral *woredas* (administrative zones) in five regional states. The average population growth rate is about 2.6 percent - deemed a high figure for pastoral areas, which are traditionally characterised by sparsely distributed populations covering vast areas (Gebremeskel, et al. 2019). It is important to stress that some of this growth is accounted for by the influx and settlement of non-pastoralists in pastoral areas. Exact figures on the numbers who are currently 'settled pastoralists' are harder to gage (see also Chapter 7).[21]

[21] While some members of a pastoralist household (for example women, children and the elderly) may opt to 'settle' in one place, other members of the same household (young men for example) may continue to follow a predominantly nomadic lifestyle, moving with their larger animals. Former pastoralists living in towns will often continue to own livestock, which are herded by others in the pastoralist economy (Fratkin, 2013). Sedentarisation therefore is a process that operates along a continuum from highly mobile pastoral households to permanently settled households, of which individuals may move from one domain to the other (Spencer, 1988, cited in Fratkin, 2013: 200).

Table 2.1 Ethiopian pastoral area population projections, 2014-2017

Region	2014	2015	2016	2017
Afar	1,678,000	1,723,007	1,769,002	1,812,002
Somali	5,307,002	5,452,994	5,598,002	5,748,998
SNNPR	722,655	738,346	753,880	769,817
Oromia	2,022,309	2,074,007	2,126,327	2,178,734
Gambella	138,640	142,067	145,529	149,410
Total	9,868,606	10,130,421	10,392,740	10,658,961

Source: Gebremeskel et al., (2019). Computed from the FDRE CSA Population Projection of Ethiopia, 2014 – 2017 for the woredas provided by the regions as pastoral woredas.

According to the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) (cited in Abera and Abdulahi, 2015), Ethiopia's total livestock production contributes to an estimated 12% of GDP and over 45% of agricultural GDP. Anbessa (2015) reveals that 'mobility versus settlement' arguments have polarised policy debates on pastoralism in Ethiopia for some time. Those in the former camp argue for policies that delineate pastoral areas along with dry-season grazing areas and for designing clear land policies that safeguard collective and customary forms of tenure, while at the same time promoting improved public services in pastoral areas (Flintan, 2014; Anbessa, 2015). Those in favour of settlement and 'transforming' the drylands urge for the succession of pastoralism into agropastoral systems and non-agricultural activities, supported by greater market participation, and for increased livestock productivity through improved extension services (Anbessa, 2015; Yirgu *et al*., 2013). The current government's determination to transform the pastoralist way of life into a sedentary one continues, argues Yimer (2015). In recent years, the state has been planning to resettle up to 1.5 million pastoralists under its 'villagisation' programme, ostensibly intended to improve access to basic services, despite the often outright opposition of many communities to engage (Flintan, 2011; Addis, 2015; Oakland Institute, 2019).

In a working paper by Yirgu *et al.* (2013) entitled '*Warming to Change? Climate Policy and Agricultural Development in Ethiopia*', the authors identify a number of core climate and agricultural narratives at the heart of Ethiopian agricultural policymaking, namely: 'climate smart agriculture', 'intensification and commercialisation' and 'pastoralist transformation'. Yirgu *et al.* maintain that:

> The future onus will be on pastoralism fitting within a more commercial agropastoral narrative framing, in which rangelands are seen as high-risk (or degraded) areas, and the settlement of pastoralists a logical response to risk, mitigation and adaptation needs (2013:13).

Yirgu *et al*. (2013) make use – as this research does – of an analytical framework for understanding policy processes that highlights the dynamic interaction between narratives and discourses, actors and networks, and political interests (Keeley and Scoones 2003), a framework described in more detail in Chapter 3. Their research is similar to my own, but in a rapidly evolving policy landscape, there is scope for further research to bring it up to date, and to narrow the focus to the impacts of policy narratives on the drylands and pastoralism, rather than on agriculture in general.

The literature reveals that a predominantly 'top-down' approach to pastoral areas development in Ethiopia is not new – previous regimes undertook policy actions in favour of non-pastoral forms of land use, in particular irrigated agriculture (Morris, 1998; Dyer *et al*., 2008; Lavers, 2012; Behnke and Kerven, 2013; Yimer, 2015). According to some scholars, the 'anti-pastoralist bias' of the dominant highland agriculturalist culture has long persisted in Ethiopia (Morris 1998; Halderman, 2004; Anbessa, 2015) – firstly during the imperial rule of Haile Selassie and then from 1974 for two decades under the Derg regime (Halderman, 2004). According to Anbessa (2015), the restructuring of the Ethiopian state into ethnically based Regional States in 1994 gave hope that the longstanding sense of pastoralists being at the margins was finally being addressed. The Ethiopian Constitution (1995) formally recognised pastoralists for the first time. Article 40 (5) of the Constitution states that "Ethiopian pastoralists have the right to free land for grazing and cultivation as well as the right not to be displaced from their own lands" (FDRE, 1995). The establishment of the Pastoralist Affairs Standing Committee (PASC) in the Ethiopian parliament, the holding of an annual 'National Pastoralists Day' and the setting up of Pastoral Commissions in several of the major pastoral Regional States would appear to open up new opportunities for political representation (Anbessa, 2015). The formulation of a new *Pastoral Area Development Policy* in 2018 (see Chapters 6 and 7) would appear to open a space for greater state recognition of pastoralism. Nevertheless, the reality may not yet match the rhetoric. Customary claims to communal grazing land are not officially recognised, and the best land is being progressively taken over for irrigated cultivation as the agricultural sector becomes more commercialised (Dyer *et al*., 2008; Headey *et al*., 2014; Yimer, 2015; Regassa *et al*., 2019). Lands that may appear to some as 'empty', 'marginal' or 'unused' – or are claimed as such – are targeted for private and state investment, ignoring their function as critical dry-season grazing reserves for pastoralists (Galaty, 2013; Mulatu and Bekure, 2013; Yirgu *et al*., 2013; Abbink *et al*., 2014; Mosley and Watson, 2016).

2.4.2 Ethiopian climate-change and green-economy policy narratives

Ethiopia is one of only a handful of African countries to have embedded climate-related objectives into the heart of their national development and growth plans (Death, 2016; Redda and Roland, 2016; Held *et al*., 2016). Ethiopia embarked on a '*Climate Resilient Green Economy'* (CRGE)

strategy in 2011, a key plank of the Ethiopian Government's wider and ambitious *Growth and Transformation Plan* (GTP), the aim of which is to achieve middle-income country status by 2025 (FDRE-MoFED, 2010). The two strategies are designed to be complementary, with implementation of the CRGE contributing to the delivery of goals set out in the GTP. From 2015, the CRGE strategy has been more closely integrated into the second phase of the GTP, 2015–2020, (GTP2), taking a 'sector-specific approach' (GGGI, 2016). These plans are being rolled out in a context of a growing population and concerns around how climate change will impact on Ethiopia's agriculture and long-term food security. The CRGE strategy builds on earlier work done to prepare a Climate Change *National Adaptation Programme of Action* (NAPA) (FDRE, 2007). Ethiopia was the third African country to submit its *Intended National Determined Contributions* (INDCs) in the run-up to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 21st Conference of Parties (COP 21) held in Paris (FDRE, 2015). The CRGE strategy has been backed by a number of donors, including UKAID, USAID and the UNDP and, until recently, drew on technical support from the (South Korean-based) Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI).

Death (2016:11) highlights Ethiopia as one of the African states that use "discourses of environmentalism" to legitimate their development politics. The prospect of becoming a "green economy front-runner" (FDRE 2011d: 1), of attracting international climate finance, and the opportunity to carefully frame the climate and development discourse within Ethiopia as an opportunity for modernisation and growth, led to this notable commitment from the highest levels of government. Both Death (2015; 2016) and Jones and Carabine (2013) maintain that the 'top-down' and politicised nature of the CRGE's original design are not dissimilar from the institutional arrangements in the development of past environmental plans and policies in Ethiopia, to address, for example, desertification or the challenge of food insecurity (see Hoben, 1995; Keely and Scoones, 2000). Central government, in this case, retained the direct control of the consultative process, with little room for meaningful participation or willingness to engage with other actors, other than donors or external consultants (Jones and Carabine, 2013; Redda and Roland, 2016). Death (2015, 2016) further observes that the discourse of 'green resilience', such as that found in Ethiopia's CRGE, can never be confined to technocratic programmes and always has political impacts. In Ethiopia's case, a green-economy strategy would seem to involve "strengthening the bureaucratic and coercive capacity of state institutions at the expense of local communities" (Death, 2015: 2213). While not made explicit, we can assume he is referring here to (among others) those pastoralists and agropastoralists who have been displaced from critical resources by large-scale renewable energy projects, such as Gibe III on the Omo River, and associated irrigation schemes (see Chapter 7).

On a more positive note, Jones and Carabine (2013) maintain that the CRGE strategy could be considered to have engaged the participation of powerful ministries that would otherwise not have been concerned with climate change. Nonetheless, Jones and Carabine (2013) argue that there is a greater likelihood of undesirable or 'maladaptive' outcomes with transformative approaches to climate policy, such as that found in Ethiopia's CRGE strategy, compared with incremental policy formulation. The authors acknowledge that their study is limited – to the extent it does not incorporate many of the underlying historical and socio-political factors that influence the Ethiopian policy environment. They conclude that further research to determine to what extent implementation of Ethiopia's CRGE leads to "fair distribution of benefits, particularly with regards the economic, political and social trade-offs at the local level… would be of considerable benefit" (Jones and Carabine, 2013:19). In later chapters, I explore the assumptions underpinning these 'green-growth' and 'climate-resilience' policy discourses and narratives, the key actors shaping them and their interests, and what, if any, the ramifications are for pastoralists.

Taking a different line of enquiry, Eriksen and Marin (2015) discuss the findings of a research project focused on two sites in the Afar region of Ethiopia in 2010. The study offers insight into how various government-led processes – the construction of the Tendaho dam on the Awash River, prioritising irrigation cultivation over extensive livestock keeping, sedentarisation, and the appropriation of land for biofuel production – all serve to undermine the autonomous adaptive capacity of local pastoralists. Participants in the research felt that they were not consulted and their local knowledge was ignored in development planning decisions that affected their livelihoods, including programmes rolled out under the Ethiopian NAPA from 2010 and the *Afar State Adaptation Plan* (2010). It was found that these programmes and interventions were leading to more, rather than less, vulnerability (Eriksen and Marin, 2015). Eriksen and Marin's research is relevant to my own, in that they too argue that seemingly apolitical narratives of environmental change – such as those around climate vulnerability – may serve the interests of certain constituencies, or obscure the impacts of national policy and politics at the local level, including politicised and competing claims to land and other dryland resources.[22]

2.4.3 Kenyan policy towards pastoral areas

Like Ethiopia, Kenya has experienced high levels of economic growth in recent years, driven by agricultural exports and the growth in services, and boosted by the discovery of oil and new investments in formerly peripheral dryland counties (World Bank, 2020b; Lind *et al*., 2016). Devolution and improved public services are widely regarded as the biggest gains from the Constitutional reform process of 2010 (World Bank, 2020b). Significant development challenges remain, nonetheless, including high levels of extreme poverty and inequality, corruption, and

[22] For further critique of 'depoliticised' understandings of climate-change adaptation, see also: Eriksen *et al*., 2015; Canon and Muller-Mahn, 2009; Weisser *et al*. 2013; Taylor, 2015.

vulnerability to internal and external shocks (Daily Nation, 2015; Njoka, 2016; World Bank, 2020b). Droughts are generally perceived by various policy actors (see Chapter 6) as having increased in frequency and intensity in recent decades, with particularly severe droughts experienced in 2010/11 and 2015/16 (Njoka, 2016).

Kenya's drylands – or 'arid and semi-arid lands' (ASAL) as they are more commonly referred to - occupy some 80% of the landmass and are home to an estimated 4–5 million pastoralists and agropastoralists (out of a total population of 51 million), most of whom live in border areas.[23] The ASAL counties are illustrated in a map below (Map 3). There has been significant migration of non-pastoralists into the ASAL in recent decades, as people from high-density agricultural areas look for land for crop farming (Njoke, 2016), part of a broader trend of demographic growth in Kenya.[24] Extensive livestock production contributes significantly to GDP, and market opportunities for pastoralism are growing as the regional economy expands (Catley 2017; Nyariki and Amwata, 2019). There is a consensus within the literature that state policy towards its drylands is marked by years of neglect, by both colonial and post-colonial regimes (Galaty, 1992; Elmi and Birch, 2013; Odhiambo, 2014; Kirimi and Njeru, 2016; Njoka, 2016). Resources that were directed towards the ASAL in the post-independence period were largely spent on security and imposing the law of the state, with little investment in service delivery or economic development (Njoka, 2016). What investment that did go towards crop farming and livestock development in post-independence Kenya was targeted towards the 'modernisation' of agriculture, predominantly export-orientated crop production, and dairy farming in the 'high-potential' areas (Odhiambo, 2014; Maina *et al*. 2013; King-Okumu *et al*., 2015).

[23] Enumerating the exact number of 'pastoralists' and 'agro-pastoralists' in Kenya and elsewhere in the HoA in national census and other data-gathering exercises is a notoriously difficult task, not helped by the difficulties of classification (Randall, 2015).

[24] The population of Kenya has grown from 31m in 1999 to 52.5 m in 2019 (https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/KEN/kenya/population-growth-rate) .

Map 3. Kenya's Arid and Semi-Arid (ASAL) Counties



Source: DLCI, Kenya.

In a report entitled '*The Unrelenting Persistence of Certain Narratives*: *An Analysis of Changing Policy Narratives about the ASAL in Kenya'*, Odhiambo (2014) reviews the evolution and content of policy narratives surrounding the ASAL and pastoralism in Kenya. He argues that, for many years, the absence of state investment and recognition of the value of ASAL meant that the "interaction between these areas and development actors revolved around emergencies… this in turn fed a narrative of vulnerability about ASAL that characterised them purely in terms of disasters and food aid" (Odhiambo, 2014:10). Despite a noticeable shift in thinking, deeply held negative narratives depicting the ASAL as degraded, unproductive and prone to endemic conflict still persist today.[25] These narratives have the potential to undermine the gains represented by what he identifies as "a new policy framework", namely, *Vision 2030* (Kenya's overall national development strategy, subsequently being implemented in successive five-year plans) and the *National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands*, 2012 (commonly referred to as '*The ASAL Policy'*) – all of which refer to the ASAL and the role of pastoral systems in a more positive light. Also significant, was the establishment in 2008 of a dedicated Ministry of State for the Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands (MDNKOAL) – the Ministry behind the *ASAL Policy.* This policy essentially sets out to close the 'development gap' between the ASAL and the rest of the country and opened up space for non-

[25] Not least in the media. A study in 2013 reported that, in Kenya, 93% of news articles on pastoralists are about drought and conflict, with about 51% of these articles presenting pastoralists as the cause of the conflict (IRIN, 2013).

state actors to engage in the policymaking process (Elmi and Birch, 2013; Odhiambo, 2014). Mobile pastoralism is recognised for its important contribution to dryland livelihoods (GoK, 2012). While the MDNKOAL set out to align its own ASAL policy more closely with the interventions envisaged in *Vision 2030,* it argued at the time for a dedicated approach to the development of the ASAL, based on "appreciation of its unique ecology and livelihoods and culture of its people" (Odhiambo, 2014:14).

In a parallel process, the promulgation of a new Constitution in 2010, which includes articles "to protect the interests and rights of minorities and marginalized groups" – including "pastoral persons and communities, whether they are (i) nomadic; or (ii) a settled community" (GoK-ICG, 2016: 5) – has been welcomed by many.[26] In tandem with this, has been a drive towards devolution of political power and budgeting processes to the county level. In theory, ASAL communities now have a stronger voice in local decision-making and in national government. The emergence of the Pastoralist Parliamentary Group (PPG) and an attempt to establish a pastoralist political party in Kenya are other notable developments. *County Integrated Development Plans* (CIDP) outline strategies to integrate local economic development and environmental management (King-Okumu, 2015).

Odhiambo (2014) maintains that *Vision 2030,* the establishment of the MDNKOAL and the *ASAL Policy* constitute a notable shift in discourse on the ASALs – away from their being seen as 'problem areas' that need to be treated separately, to instead a perspective that regards them as an integral part of the national economy. While this is welcome, he continues, there is also now an underlying narrative within Kenyan policymaking that views the ASAL as 'the new frontier', with enormous 'unexploited' subsurface wealth in minerals, oil and gas, or with potential for large renewable energy infrastructure projects and tourism. Projects such as LAPSSET, mentioned earlier, are described in government documents as a means to 'open up' pastoral regions to investment by "improving national interconnectivity and even enhance market opportunities for pastoralist livestock producers" (LCDA, 2016: 42). In contrast is the argument that only those who have greater access to resources and capital in its various forms are able to use these to secure further benefits (Symons, 2014; King-Okumu, 2015; Mosley and Watson, 2016).

2.4.4 Kenyan climate-change and green-economy policy narratives

The increased frequency, magnitude and severity of droughts and floods in Kenya in recent years have seen new narratives emerging around climate change. One holds that the ASAL, and the people who live there, are 'fragile' and 'vulnerable' in the context of a changing climate (World Bank, 2012; Netherlands MFA, 2015; Practical Action, 2016). A second 'counternarrative' seeks to

[26] More recently, the *Community Land Act* (2016) also includes provision for securing pastoral community land rights (see Chapter 7).

frame ASAL communities as 'resilient' rather than vulnerable, with mobile pastoralists in particular better equipped with the traditional knowledge and experience to deal with climate variability and climate change which has long been a feature of the ASAL (IIED/ SOS Sahel, 2011; Hesse and Pattison, 2013; Odhiambo, 2014). In Chapter 5, I examine how prevalent these – and related – narratives are within national policies and strategies.

One (short) section of the paper by Odhiambo (2014) focuses on the key national actors responsible for defining policy on climate-change adaptation in Kenya, as well as how climate-change discourse has influenced ASAL policy and programming. Odhiambo observes that climate change has, to some extent, fed the 'age-old narrative' that views the ASAL as degraded and blames pastoral land use as a contributing factor. At the same time, an emerging counternarrative – one that seeks to address climate challenges in a way consistent with the ecological reality and that appreciates mobile pastoralism as an appropriate land-use system – is gaining ground. This narrative, which emphasises 'resilience' instead of vulnerability, can be detected in the Kenyan *National Climate Change Response Strategy* (NCCRS) of 2010, which recognises "the need to ensure sustainable pastoralism" in the ASAL (GoK, 2010: 52). While strong on context, and on identifying the multiple – and sometimes conflicting – narratives about the ASAL, Odhiambo's review lacks a clear framework for analysing drylands and climate-policy narratives and policy processes. More rigorous and systematic research is needed to build on his important contribution and to bring his analysis of the policy context up to date. In particular, new policy frameworks, such as Kenya's *Nationally Determined Contributions* (INDC) (2015), a *Green Economy Strategy and Implementation Plan* (GESIP) (2015), the *National Climate Change Action Plan* (NCCAP) from 2013, various national *Ending Drought Emergencies* (EDE) strategies from 2014 on, and a national *Climate Smart Agriculture Strategy* from 2015, all have implications for the ASAL and pastoralism. These are examined for their discursive content in Chapter 5.

Elsewhere, Maina *et al.* (2013), in a paper entitled '*Agriculture and Climate Change in Kenya: Climate Chaos, Policy Dilemmas*', examine emerging policy discussions on climate change and agriculture (including the livestock sector) in Kenya. The paper highlights how climate change and agriculture linkages are framed and the key actors and interests in relation to certain narratives. These narratives include both 'climate change as a threat to food security' and 'climate change as opportunity to access new finance'. As in the study by Yirgu *et al*. (2013), discussed earlier, Maina *et al*. (2013) make use of Keeley and Scoone's (2003) analytical framework for examining policy processes. Their paper argues that a lack of policy coherence between national climate-change and agricultural policies opens "significant space for powerful actors to influence and direct the climate change-agriculture agenda in the country" (Maina *et al*., 2013: 4). The authors suggest that the ways in which certain food security and carbon-funding objectives are currently being pursued would appear to favour some interest groups over others, notably those engaged in intensive

farming, irrigation and biofuel production, rather than extensive pastoral systems. By narrowing the focus to pastoralists and the drylands (rather than Kenyan agriculture in general), my research aims, among other things, to build on the work of Maina *et al*. (2013), and to look at whether, six years on, their thesis that certain powerful actors are shaping the climate-change agenda for their own interests, while other groups, notably pastoralists, are being excluded, still holds.

Elsewhere, Symons (2014) offers a critical appraisal of the 2010 NCCRS. While Kenya has been praised internationally as 'an early adopter' of climate policy, its plans, she argues, are driven "by particular imaginaries, specifically: (climate) adaptation as a 'universal apocalypse' and adaptation as a technical-economic problem" (Symons, 2014: 266). These discourses work together in a deliberate 'anti-political' strategy aimed at obscuring the "highly charged realities of adaptation" (ibid.: 266). For Kenya's political elite, she continues, 'adaptation' is predominantly a matter of reducing the perceived climatic risks to economic growth and enhancing opportunities to gain from international climate finance sources (ibid.: 266).

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has examined how attitudes towards and understandings of pastoralism amongst policy actors, development practitioners and dryland scholars have evolved over recent decades. In doing so, it has sought to identify some of the discourses and narratives that underpin those understandings. I have also set out the broader context of environmental, political and economic changes currently being experienced by pastoralist communities in the drylands of the HoA, as well as flagged some of the policy responses being promulgated and implemented by the respective governments of Ethiopia and Kenya. In turn, I have touched upon some of the consequences of those policies for pastoralists – benefits accruing to more commercially-orientated livestock owners and local elites, while poorer pastoralists are increasingly losing access to the critical resources required to maintain mobility as the pastoral rangelands become increasingly fragmented (see also Chapters 6 and 7).

It is clear that pastoralists, while facing many uncertainties, are responding to climatic and non-climatic changes taking place in the drylands of the HoA in different ways. While the gap between wealthier and poorer pastoralists would appear to be growing, with many herders either opting to leave or forced out of livestock-keeping altogether, others are finding new ways to adapt and innovate by taking advantage of new markets and technologies or through livelihood diversification. At the same time, there is an increased focus by the governments of Ethiopia and Kenya, and by the donors who support them, on designing development strategies and policies that ostensibly seek to build 'resilience to climate change' and promote a 'greener' form of economic growth. A number of scholars have begun to unpack the narratives and discourses that underpin these policies and interventions. It has been suggested that, while the language may have evolved,

some of the narratives driving current climate-change and green-economy policies in Ethiopia and Kenya are not necessarily 'new', but are instead rooted in historical discourses around 'unproductive' drylands, the poor as agents and victims of environmental degradation, and the need for modernisation. Pastoralists are still perceived by some as ill adapted to 'modern' contingencies and in need of transformation. To what extent this is a fair and accurate reflection of contemporary discourse and narratives is examined in Chapters 5 and 6. A further theme emerging from the literature is that narratives of 'climate resilience', 'climate adaptation' and 'green growth', as currently articulated, are largely framed in apolitical or technocratic terms, often serving to mask the impacts of national policy and politics at the local level, including politicised claims to land and other resources.

While there has been some important work done on identifying and deconstructing drylands development (and to lesser extent, climate-change) policy discourses and narratives in the HoA – focusing, as we have seen, on new forms of dryland policy narratives in general (Krätli, 2013; Odhiambo, 2014), climate-change narratives within agricultural policies (Maina et al, 2014; Yirgu et al, 2014); localised adaptation interventions (Erickson and Marin, 2015); climate adaptation as a form of capitalist growth (Symons, 2014); or on green-economy discourses and the role of the state (Jones and Carabine, 2013; Death, 2015) – it is evident, nonetheless, that there are still some shortcomings in the research to date, all of which is in need of updating. There are no academic studies that specifically look at the kinds of discourses and narratives around pastoralism found within national climate-change and green-economy policies or, in turn, examine what the consequences of these narratives are for pastoralism, now and in the future. Nor are there any studies that have done a comparative analysis of the Ethiopian and Kenyan contexts which might reveal similarities and differences between the two cases in terms of the kinds of discourses and narratives that are dominant, the role of the state and other actors in shaping policy narratives, and resulting outcomes.

Thus, further research is justified to answer a number of critical questions – questions which form the basis for this study: What are the dominant narratives found in current national climate-change and drylands policies in Ethiopia and Kenya, and how do these compare? What actors are shaping and driving these narratives, and what are their interests? What are the consequences of the resulting policies for pastoralist livelihoods and the future of pastoralism in the two countries? In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I endeavour to answer these questions. But first it is necessary to set out an analytical framework for my research (Chapter 3), before moving on to document the research design and data-collection methods used (Chapter 4).

Chapter 3: Analytical Framework

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to develop a framework for the analysis of Ethiopian and Kenyan climate - and drylands-related - policy narratives that are the focus of this research. In the first section, I draw from, and add to, an analytical framework that helps to make sense of the dynamic interactions between narratives and discourses, actors and networks, and politics and interests (Roe, 1991; Adger *et al.*, 2001; Keely and Scoones, 2003; Wolmer *et al*., 2006). In the second section, I identify how emerging climate-policy narratives broadly correspond to three different discourses on pastoralism and drylands development, and the way in which certain narratives and associated concepts 'frame' what forms of knowledge count, and whose understandings and interests are taken into consideration, or excluded from, policy processes. These narratives and key concepts form the basis of the content analysis (CA) and discourse analysis (DA) of Ethiopian and Kenyan climate-change and drylands policy documents, the results of which are presented in Chapter 5.

3.2 Environmental policy processes, discourses and narratives

It is useful at the outset to distinguish between the terms 'discourse' and 'policy narrative' as I employ them in this research. I define discourse as a shared meaning of a phenomenon. This phenomenon may be small or large, and the understanding of it may be shared by a small or large group of people at local, national and international or global level (Adger *et al*., 2001). The actors who adhere to the discourse participate in various degrees to its production, reproduction and transformation through written and oral statements (Adger *et al*., 2001). In turn, 'dominant discourse' privileges certain ways of seeing and acting in the world and by doing so legitimates the power of specific groups (Roe, 1991; Gilbert, 2008).

Hajer defines discourse as "a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorisations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities" (1995: 44). For the French philosopher Michel Foucault (1980), such 'ideas, concepts and categorisations' are expressions of knowledge and power controlling human subjects by the categories imposed on them. In other words, discourses are 'frames' that define the world in certain ways and, in the process, they exclude and marginalise alternative perspectives (Lakoff, 2014; Keeley and Scoones, 2003). Foucauldian writings on 'governmentality' (see also Chapter 4) emphasise the values and expression of power concealed in the neutral language of policy (Foucault, 1991; Zhang, 2015; Death, 2016). The concept of governmentality, furthermore, allows space to consider diverse 'technologies of rule' (Morton, 2010). Pastoralists, for example, are governed "not only by the laws of the state and the ways these

are enforced…. but also by policies made at various levels, property rights constructed and recognised in various ways, and different ways in which knowledge about them and their environment is defined, collected and fed back to them" (Morton, 2010; 16). 'Discourse analysis' (see Chapter 4) can help to identify such technologies of rule, and puts forms of knowledge at the centre of the study of power (Keely and Scoones, 2003; Morton 2010; Joseph, 2014).

Within discourse analysis, 'expressive means', or the way the message of a discourse has been communicated, has been analysed in terms of 'narratives' – a storyline with a chronological order and often involving the archetypes, *heroes*, *villains* and *victims* (Roe, 1991; Adger *et al.,* 2001; Hajer, 1995). An environmental policy narrative approach acknowledges that large-scale policymaking and planning – such as that favoured by donors and national governments – needs large-scale simplifications, or 'crises narratives', to generate political consensus and make action possible in the face of uncertainty (Roe 1991; Krätli, 2013). Narratives not only convey storylines of cause and effect; they often have embedded the advocacy of a particular policy solution (Kronenburg-Garcia, 2018). Moreover, narratives establish 'frames of reference' that define and bound what forms of knowledge count, and whose understandings and interest are legitimate (Hajer, 1995; Dryzek, 2013; Whitfield 2016). James Scott in his book '*Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed'* argues that: "the simplifications that state actors make to categorise and bring order to a complex and dynamic socio-environmental reality so they can manage, govern and implement policies, are integral to the way states 'see' their territories" (Scott, 1998, in Kronenburg-Garcia, 2018: 2). For Catley *et al*. (2013), it is critical that pastoralists, pastoralism and pastoral development are included and recognised as ways of 'knowing about' or doing development. In other words, moving our gaze from "seeing like a state" or "seeing like a development agency" to "seeing like a pastoralist instead" (ibid.: 21).

Keeley and Scoones (2003) argue that, in the contemporary policy world, the intersection of national and international policy processes is particularly important, not least in the context of climate change. Policy is, in effect, "co-constructed across space, through particular networks and connections linking global and local sites" (ibid.: 3). Discourses of 'climate smart agriculture' and 'green growth' for example, are shaped not only by national policy imperatives but by powerful coalitions of donors, research institutions, UN agencies and private interests (Whitfield, 2016), a theme highlighted in later discussion (see also 3.3.3 below, and 7.3.2). While the influence of global policy actors can be strong, the located or contextualised nature of particular policy processes is also vital. Hence the changing nature of the state and associated bureaucracies, as well as the role of civil society and other actors, merit attention when examining national policies (Keeley and Scoones, 2003). The role of science and research – and what is claimed as 'fact' – is also central in policy processes. Particularly when it comes to the promotion of certain initiatives around agriculture, the environment and natural resources – often resulting in particular

recommendations on how farming and land management should be conducted (Whitfield, 2016). The largely technocratic, 'one-size-fits all' type responses to desertification that were characteristic of drylands interventions in the 1970s and 1980s, as discussed in Chapter 2, being a case in point. For Keeley and Scoones, understanding policy processes therefore means: "understanding the interaction of networks and relationships, agency and practice, and knowledge and power dynamics in particular contexts" (2003: 5).

The most 'successful' or 'dominant' narratives are generally those that serve the interests of powerful constituencies. Historically in the HoA, these have been governments, aid bureaucracies and scientists (Roe 1991; Adams, 2009; Keeley and Scoones 2003; Whitfield, 2016). Emery Roe (1991) observes that the simplicity and political power of narratives makes them very persistent. Institutionalisation of narratives can thus occur over a long time. In Ethiopia, for example, the modernising and technocratic approach to agriculture and natural resource management that is a characteristic of state-led rural development policy, has its roots in the imperial era, but became embedded in successive regime institutions and the practices of government bureaucracies (Morris, 1998; Halderman, 2004). In such cases, 'scientific expertise' helped to legitimise and shape the promotion of a range of interventions, with far-reaching consequences for dryland communities (Keeley and Scoones, 2003; Adams, 2009; Behnke and Kerven, 2013).

If we take the issues that have been discussed in this thesis so far, we can see that dominant narratives typically have a storyline, with a crisis scenario at the beginning ('the food crisis' or 'climate crisis'), a central section outlining the problem and its causes ('mobile livestock herding is no longer viable due to climate change and resource scarcity') and a final section defining or advocating a range of politically neutral, often technical, solutions ('water development', 'rangeland management', 'climate smart agriculture'), as well as offering fertile ground for scientific research (Krätli, 2013). As Keeley and Scoones (2003: 37) note, however, it is impossible to talk about policy neutrality. Rather, whatever a policy says carries assumptions and is in some sense prescriptive. The language in which it is framed is as significant as the actual content. As we have learned, certain all-encompassing narratives have been found to be inadequate in acknowledging the institutional and politicised nature of many environmental problems as experienced by different people in a variety of locations and circumstances – the drylands being no exception (Forsyth, 2003; Flintan 2011; Scoones *et al*., 2019).

3.2.1 A framework of analysis

Before identifying and examining in greater depth what discourses and narratives are shaping current climate-change and broader drylands-development policies in Ethiopia and Kenya (Chapter 5), the role and influence of certain actors, interests and institutions (Chapter 6) and the ramifications and consequences for pastoral areas (Chapter 7), it is necessary to set out an

analytical framework through which such an analysis can take place. Understanding the consequences of policy processes for pastoralists requires an approach that can help identify both what – and how – particular policies on climate change and the drylands are adopted by the state in Ethiopia and Kenya. Furthermore, it enables us to locate the emergence and framing of these policies within a broader political economy context of agrarian change.

The framework employed here draws on the work of Keeley and Scoones (1999, 2003), later refined by Wolmer *et al*. (2006). It starts by deconstructing the notion of policy itself. A conventional view of policymaking sees it as a linear process that proceeds from the stage of researching and identifying a policy problem, weighing up the costs and benefits of different policy options, through to implementing policy (Keeley and Scoones, 2003; Maina *et al*., 2013). In contrast, Keeley and Scoones (1999) and Wolmer *et al*. (2006) start with the premise that policy processes are best described as 'incremental, complex and messy', involving actors with competing agendas and interests. Their analytical framework (illustrated in a simple diagram – Figure 3.1) helps make sense of complex policy processes by distinguishing between:

1. Discourses and narratives – how different forms of knowledge and expertise are articulated and how these shape and guide policy problems and courses of action;
2. Actors, institutions and networks – gives primacy to the roles and agency of different actors in policy processes;
3. Politics and interests – examines the underlying power dynamics in policy contestations and negotiations, and the why actors hold the positions they do.



Figure 3.1 Conceptual lens for analysing policy processes (adapted from Wolmer *et al*., 2006).

These three overlapping elements, or 'lenses', allow greater understanding of policy change through different dimensions of power, and different scales and disciplinary foci. An actor–orientated approach to policy formulation would highlight the contribution, or 'agency', of individual policy actors, their networks and the power relations embedded in them (Scoones, 2015). Networks, coalitions and alliances of actors (individuals or institutions) with a 'shared vision' are important in spreading and maintaining narratives through chains of persuasion and influence, such as conferences, journals and policy documents (Wolmer *et al*., 2006). At the same time, actor's agency makes sense only in the context of broader narratives and frames of reference, as well as political and historical contexts (McKeon, 2015; Scoones, 2015). In the centre of the diagram are 'policy spaces'. Actor networks are able to establish discourses in policy by taking advantage of policy space (Gaventa, 2005). Policy spaces may 'open up' or 'close down', depending on the configuration of narratives/discourses, actors/networks and politics/interests in any particular policy process (Scoones, 2015)[27]. Nonetheless, policy spaces can also allow room for

[27] Early work by John Kingdon is influential here. Kingdon (1984) proposed a means of understanding public policy processes by highlighting how different problem, policy and political 'streams' flow along different channels and remain more or less independent of one another until, at a specific point in time, a 'policy window' opens. Under certain circumstances, policy-windows can be used by particular actors in a policy sub-system, in order to advance the engagement of issues they care about (Beland & Howlett, 2016)

alternative perspectives to be heard and gradually result in challenges or shifts in the knowledge and practices associated with previously dominant discourses (Keeley and Scoones, 2003; Otto-Naess *et al*., 2015). In Chapter 2, we learned that the establishment of a new Ministry for Development of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands (MDNKOAL) in Kenya in 2008, along with Constitutional reform in 2010, opened up a space for pastoralist organisations to input into policymaking (Elmi and Birch, 2013). Thus, policy spaces are also, in effect, 'livelihood spaces' (Scoones, 2015), in that some may benefit from a particular policy change, while others lose out.

The first of these lenses relates directly to the first of my three research questions: what are the dominant narratives found in current climate-change and drylands policy in Ethiopia and Kenya? Lenses two and three relate to my second research question: what actors (including influential global actors) are shaping and promoting these narratives, and what are their interests? In order to address my third research question – what are the consequences of these policy narratives for pastoralist livelihoods and for the future of pastoralism in the two countries? – I have modified Keeley and Scoones (2003) original framework, by adding a fourth element, namely, 'policy outcomes'. This fourth element allows my research to move beyond the identification and understanding of discourses and narratives, actors and political interests currently shaping climate-change (and dryland) policy processes in the HoA to look at the consequences of policy prescriptions for pastoralist livelihoods. This is important because it helps us to gain insight into the complex "political economy of winners and losers" (Adger *et al*., 2001: 688) from policy processes that might otherwise be obscured within simplistic policy narratives.

3.3 Three discourses on pastoralism and climate change in the drylands

Drawing from the literature, I identify three broad discourses that characterise much of the scholarly and development debate around pastoralism more generally, but are also relevant to the intersection between climate change and pastoralism. While there is a consensus that the uncertainties brought about by climatic (and other) changes in the drylands have implications for future pastoralist pathways (see Chapter 2), there is far less agreement on what sectors merit substantive investment, or where the constraints lie. One view – which I have categorised here as a 'pure pastoralism' discourse – is that mobile pastoralism is the most ecologically and economically appropriate form of land use in dryland areas. Restrictions on mobility therefore constitute the chief constraint, and removing this constraint is the main solution. In contrast, a 'transforming pastoralism and dryland areas' discourse holds that nomadic pastoralism is no longer tenable in the face of the uncertainties brought about by climate change, food insecurity and increasing fragmentation of rangelands. Instead, these areas offer an opportunity for other, more 'productive' forms of investment. Distinguishing between a 'purist' position on the one hand, and a 'transforming' position, on the other, is not new in scholarly work on pastoralism (see for example:

McPeak *et al*. 2011) but provides a useful basis on which to develop an analytical framework. I have added a third, perspective – what I refer to as a 'modern, mobile and green pastoralism' discourse. The term 'modern and mobile' comes from a title of a book by IIED/SOS Sahel from 2009. I have added 'green' to reflect more contemporary concerns around climate change and the role of pastoralism in a green economy. This takes the middle ground, recognising pastoralists as entrepreneurs and innovators, and advocating for an improved policy environment, greater diversification of livelihoods, and for pastoralists to play a role in the 'green economy' and 'climate smart agriculture'.

It is important to stress that these three discourses on the connections between climate change, pastoralism and drylands development are not necessarily mutually exclusive, or always clearly distinguishable. Nor are their associated narratives. Contemporary development and environmental policy will invariably be constructed around more than one narrative (Hajer, 2005). The case for sedentarisation and transforming the drylands may, for example, be built on certain green-economy or 'climate-resilience' narratives. Elements of a 'pure pastoralism' discourse – the idea of improved governance of pastoral areas for example – can be found in 'modern, mobile and green' perspectives. Narratives may be overlapping or contradictory. Dominant narratives have the ability to absorb the language and concepts of counternarratives (Keeley and Scoones, 2003). Narratives are constantly shifting and evolving to suit the needs of actors as new opportunities arise, or as new contexts unfold (Otto-Naess *et al*., 2015; Whitfield, 2016).

For each discourse, I suggest a corresponding or associated set of climate change and pastoral development narratives, within which I identify keywords or metaphors, the latter which form the codes for my CA (the findings of which are presented in Chapter 5). These keywords and metaphors are summarised at the end of this chapter (Table 3.1). It is necessary to provide a caveat here that many of the keywords – 'resilience' and 'adaptation' for example – cannot easily be isolated to fit a single discourse or category. They may be associated with more than one discourse, depending on the context in which they are used. While at first glance keywords such as 'climate resilient' and 'renewable energy' would appear to be more obviously associated with a 'modern, mobile and green' perspective, I have deliberately elected to place them in the 'tranforming pastoralism and drylands' discourse, for the very reason that some climate-resilience narratives in this context, such as that found in Ethiopia's CRGE (see Chapters 2 and 5), and the drive for renewable energy (as manifested in the construction large infrastructure projects such as dams - see Chapter 7), subscribe to the view that 'pastoralism and drylands needs to be transformed' (see 3.3.2 below). At the same time I acknowlege that the decision to place these keywords here has an influence on the results of the CA (Chapter 5). Such analysis provides only partial insight and therefore needs to be tested, as is done through the DA and interviews that follow.

Analysis of single words may reveal frequency of use but not much more. By examining them

together with the words that precede or immediately follow can give greater insight. Hence I distinguish, for example, between 'resilience' and 'climate resilient' and between 'autonomous adaptation' and 'planned adaptation'. I have also left out certain ubiquitous words that cut across all three discourses, such as 'climate change', 'food security' and 'sustainable development. A detailed description of the methodology of CA and DA and how sources of data (policy documents) were selected is provided in Chapter 4.

3.3.1 'Pure pastoralism'

The first discourse can be labelled a 'purist' position than advocates the maintenance of pastoral mobility with minimal change to age-old pastoral livelihoods and practice (McPeak, *et al*., 2011). From this understanding, nomadic pastoralism – with its mobility and commonly managed resources – is a dynamic and sophisticated land-use system appropriate both economically and ecologically for the drylands (Behnke *et al*., 1993; Naimer-Fuller, 1999, Scoones, 1995; Vetter, 2005; AU, 2010; Krätli, 2015). Pastoralists have a close relationship with and knowledge of their environment that enables them to both protect and exploit the rangeland's biodiversity on which they depend (Notenbaert *et al*., 2012; Krätli, 2015). Pastoralists have been managing environmental variability and 'adapting autonomously' (adaptation undertaken informally or spontaneously by individuals, households or communities) to climate variability and other uncertainties in Africa for millennia (Ericksen *et al*., 2013; McGahey *et al*., 2014). Deviation from the traditional way of life is a threat to the system itself, will further marginalise and impoverish herders, and has negative consequences for dryland ecosystems – if, for example, mobile livestock-keeping is replaced with other inappropriate forms of land use (Behnke *et al*., 2013; Krätli, 2015). In this discourse, pastoralism is not a 'problem to be solved', but rather an inherently sustainable production system that needs to be acknowledged and protected. One way to do so would be to ensure pastoralists' access to 'key resources' – such as crucial dry-season grazing reserves – and livestock mobility is safeguarded (Catley *et al.*, 2013; Gebeye, 2016; Krätli *et al*., 2015).

The emphasis here on 'livelihoods' and 'pastoral systems' draws not only on 'sustainable livelihoods' thinking – a concept to which the ideas of capabilities, equity and sustainability are central (Tanner *et al*., 2015)[28] – but also the idea of 'resilience'. Manzano (2017) maintains that pastoralist mobility is an inherently 'resilient system'. Resilience can be defined as the amount of change a system can undergo and still retain the same function and structure, while maintaining the capacity for self regulation and adaptation (Berkes *et al*., 2003; Folkes, 2006). For the IPCC, resilience is understood as the "ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb,

[28] The idea of 'sustainable livelihoods' – and associated approaches and frameworks – has featured strongly in development thinking and practice since its emergence in the early 1990s. Scoones (2015) has argued that, while livelihoods approaches remains an essential lens for examining questions of rural development, such analysis needs to be situated with a wider political economy of environmental and agrarian change.

accommodate, or recover from the effects of hazardous events in timely and efficient manner" (2012: 5). McPeak and Little (2017) argue that 'pastoralist resilience' in the drylands is best conceived as a heterogeneous concept, with different sub-groups experiencing and responding to climatic and other 'shocks' in different ways. Other literature has tended to focus on resilience as less of a final outcome, or goal, of development and more of a process, involving learning, adaptation, anticipation and improvement in basic structures, actors and functions (Nelson *et al*., 2007; Carabine, 2014; Bahadur *et al*., 2015). Hence the current preoccupation by many in the humanitarian and development sector with 'resilience building' – commonly regarded as a means to bridge the divide between emergency relief and long-term development (Levine, 2014; Joseph, 2014). The danger here, clearly, is that, if pastoralist resilience is depicted as something to be 'built' rather than just observed, then it increasingly becomes an "externally defined imperative" that is shaped by "state agencies and expert analysts" (MacKinnon and Derickson, 2012, in Felli, 2016: 276) rather than a reflection of how pastoralists themselves are responding to change.

A system's 'adaptive capacity' is a measure of how it adjusts (incrementally) to changing circumstances while continuing to function effectively in terms of providing and maintaining ecosystem services and how it recovers from a crisis and develops new pathways (Béné *et al*., 2014). In theory, the more adaptive capacity a system has, the greater the likelihood that the system can reorganise back to a 'desirable state' after a hazardous event (such as a drought). Resilience thinking often focuses on maintaining and strengthening adaptive capacity and assumes that the extent to which social actors and institutions can effectively 'manage resilience' will determine how successful or otherwise they are in crossing back to a 'desirable state' (Walker *et al*., 2004). On the other hand, the very notion of a 'desirable state' somehow assumes an agreed set of priorities among actors and vested interests towards some kind of 'rational transformational change' and adaptive management. This ignores the realities in many sites – the pastoral drylands being no exception – where significant conflicts exist over resource access, control and management due to unequal power relations (Flintan, 2011; Beymer-Farris *et al*., 2012; Pas Schrijver, 2019). While the difficulty of resilience in addressing issues of power, human agency or inequity has led to questions being raised about the utility of the concept in development and climate-adaptation contexts (Bahadur *et al*., 2010; Canon and Muller-Mann, 2010; Pelling, 2011; Beymer-Farris *et al*. 2012), there is little doubt that resilience has now become an "all-embracing mobilising metaphor" (Pain and Levine, 2012: 21) for many actors, not least in relation to the drylands of the HoA.[29]

Within a pure pastoralism discourse, emphasis is put on the 'rights' of pastoralist peoples. Pastoralist peoples have a 'right to sustainable development' and a 'right of participation' in

[29] An illustrative listing of recent and current donor-led programmes in the HoA that focus on 'resilience building' of pastoralist and dryland communities in Ethiopia and Kenya can be found in Appendix G.

development endeavours that effect them (Gebeye, 2016) – rights that are enshrined in the Ethiopian Federal Democratic Republic Constitution (Art. 43(1) and 43(2)), for example, but not necessarily protected. Advocacy groups and pastoralist organisations have called for improved forms of 'governance' in pastoral lands (Herrera *et al*., 2014; Jenet *et al*., 2016; Davies *et al*., 2016; Manzano, 2018) – affirmative action to be taken by the state that builds on pastoralists' existing (customary) institutions, knowledge and aspirations, and which involves giving greater decision-making power and resource rights to pastoralists (Davies *et al*., 2016; Gomarasca and Nori, 2016). Elsewhere, there are debates as to whether pastoralists should be recognised within national constitutions and legislative frameworks as 'indigenous peoples' (Sena, 2015). This has important implications for the extent to which local pastoralist communities in the drylands give their 'free, prior and informed consent' to private investments that affect them, and for the state's responsibility to prevent human rights abuses by third parties (ibid.).

In summary, the narratives associated with this discourse include the following: mobile pastoralism as a resilient and appropriate system for managing environmental and climatic variability in the drylands; pastoralists have been adapting 'autonomously' to climatic and other changes for millennia; restrictions on mobility and access to key resources are a bigger threat to pastoralist livelihoods than climate risk; improved governance of pastoral / rangeland areas is necessary to safeguard the rights, culture and aspirations of pastoralists.

These narratives include a number of key concepts or keywords, including: 'environmental variability'; 'mobility'; 'pastoral systems'; 'livelihoods'; 'resilience'; 'rights'; 'adaptive capacity, 'autonomous adaptation'; 'customary institutions'; 'key resources'; and 'pastoral governance'. These – and other keywords identified below – form the basis for the CA conducted in Chapter 5. We now turn to a contrasting discourse.

3.3.2 'Transforming pastoralism and dryland areas'

The second discourse might be labelled a 'transforming' position – one often held by policymakers who feel that pastoralist mobility is the antithesis of modernity and the goals of a modern state (McPeak *et al*., 2011). Within this discourse, mobility is understood as being driven by lack of resources and as a 'coping strategy' vis-à-vis environmental instability, and as a limit to productivity. Consequently, stability – and by extension sedentarisation – are considered a rational response (Krätli, 2013). Governments, furthermore, require that pastoralists are somehow 'settled' in order for them to be 'visible' and taxable, and to benefit from the provision of modern services such as education and healthcare (Little *et al*., 2008; Catley *et al*., 2013; Krätli, 2013; Krätli, 2019). It would appear that Ethiopia's official policies in recent decades have been largely intent to encourage pastoralist settlement, irrigated agriculture and commercialisation of the livestock sector (Galaty, 2012; Lavers, 2012; Abbink *et al*., 2014; Gebremeskel *et al*., 2019; Krätli, 2019).

Although Kenya has no official policy on sedentarisation, it has, nonetheless, continued to promote non-pastoral investments in the drylands, at the expense of pastoral mobility (Odhiambo, 2014; King-Okumu, 2015; Schilling *et al*., 2016; Lind *et al*., 2017).

There is a powerful discourse here that pastoralists need to be 'transformed for their own good', or at the very least, kept somehow confined to those 'leftover' areas perceived as having 'marginal value' for other, 'more productive' forms of land use (Krätli, 2013; Shete and Rutten, 2015).[30] On the other hand, 'high-potential' areas – along rivers, for example, that serve as key dry-season grazing reserves – are, as we have seen in Chapter 2, are targeted as ideal for commercial agriculture and other forms of development (Behnke *et al*., 2013; Krätli, 2015; Jenet *et al*., 2016; Mosely and Watson, 2016; Oakland Institute, 2019). An associated narrative, found in both Ethiopia and Kenya, is that the dryland areas – and livestock production – need to be integrated into the national economy if they are to play a strong role in national development (Odhiambo, 2014). Such a position can be found in both the Ethiopian government *Policy Statement for the Sustainable Development of Pastoral and Agro-Pastoral Areas of Ethiopia* (FDRA, 2008), as well as the Kenyan *National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands'* (GoK, 2012) – documents among those examined in Chapter 5.

For this position, a corresponding climate narrative is what Krätli and Enson (2013) refer to as the 'doomed-by-climate-change' narrative: nomadic pastoralism is essentially no longer tenable in the face of the uncertainties brought about by climatic change, food insecurity, rapid population growth and increasing fragmentation of 'fragile' rangelands (Headey and Kennedy, 2012; Headey *et al*., 2014; Cervigni and Morris, 2016). This view is re-enforced by national and international media and aid agency reports that frquently portray pastoralists as 'victims of climate change', as dependent on food-aid, engaged in endemic conflict over diminishing or 'scarce' resources, and that use testimonies of pastoral 'drop-outs' to perpetuate a common perception of the drylands as 'failed areas' (Shanahan, 2013; Odhiambo, 2013; Morland 2017). It follows therefore that, within this discourse, the kind of traditional 'autonomous adaptation' strategies, described earlier is imagined to be insufficient to deal with the enormity of projected climate change. Instead pastoralists increasingly resort to negative 'coping strategies' – cattle raiding, joining militant groups, 'illegal grazing' inside areas set aside for conservation – so having a harmful or 'maladaptive' effect on others (Tanner and Horn-Phathanothai, 2014; Cervigni and Morris, 2016). Hence the need for the 'transformation of pastoralism', and externally directed and managed climate-change adaptation. Within the transforming discourse, climate adaptation is viewed predominantly as "a process of

[30] The Government of Ethiopia (GoE) justifies the transfer of large tracts of land – including lands occupied by pastoralists and/or that may serve as critical dry-season grazing reserves – to investors by claiming such land is 'unused' and therefore suitable for large-scale commercial farming (Lavers, 2012; Shete and Rutten, 2015).

coordinated transitions to meet the demands of a changing external environment, directed by appropriate governmental institutions" (UNFCCC, 2007, in Taylor, 2015: xi).[31]

Another associated climate-change narrative builds on the assumption that livestock contribute significantly to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and that there is a need to reduce the national herd size, while simultaneously intensifying and increasing 'livestock productivity'. While this can be considered as part of a broader 'climate smart agriculture' (CSA) approach (World Bank, 2011; FAO, 2013) – as described under the 'modern, mobile and green' discourse below – it falls in line with both Kenya's and Ethiopia's ambitions to transform and commercialise their agricultural sectors more broadly (discussed in Chapter 5). The idea of commercialisation of livestock production as a pathway to modernisation in the HoA is not new. In the 1960s and 1970s in Kenya, for example, World Bank-financed 'livestock development' programmes led to the dismantling of traditional rangeland governance systems and institutions, and benefited only a small number of wealthier livestock owners (McCabe, 1991; Zael and Dietz, 2000).

A parallel 'twist' to the transforming discourse is when the drylands are seen as the 'new frontier' – sites for resource extraction, commercial agriculture and infrastructure development (Odhiambo, 2014; Lind *et al*, 2016; Mosley and Watson, 2016). This narrative has taken on even greater significance with the discovery of oil, gas and mineral resources in Kenya's northern ASAL counties, as well as plans to develop the LAPSSET Corridor. Referring to the 'frontier' areas, Mosley and Watson maintain that both Ethiopia's and Kenya's respective national development strategies "articulate a desire to no longer just control and contain these regions, but also to transform them" (2016: 453). Arguably, the kinds of 'green-growth' investments in renewable energy (Danwatch, 2016; Yimer, 2015; Sena 2015), carbon sequestration projects (Fairhead *et al*., 2012) or biofuel production (Nunow, 2013), which were described in Chapter 2, are also a manifestation of the 'new frontier' narrative, albeit in a new guise. In this discourse, environmental changes and programmes are viewed as an economic opportunity, not a threat (World Bank, 2012). Ethiopia and Kenya, as discussed in Chapter 2, both clearly have strong growth-orientated visions of a green economy.

Conceivably, some climate-resilience narratives, such as that found in Ethiopia's CRGE (see Chapters 2 and 5), subscribe to the view that 'pastoralism needs to be transformed'. 'Climate resilience' is essentially a reaction to the multiple challenges of climate, energy and food security (SDC, 2011; UNEP, 2011, World Bank, 2019). This discourse brings the 'climate crisis' and the 'environmental crisis' to the forefront, together with their impact on what are perceived as particularly vulnerable societies in the Global South. Dominant forms of knowledge and

[31] There is an assumption that planned adaptation is something that only the state or their 'development partners' can do – and that people's own participation is not something that results out of their own analysis and planning (Levine *et al*., 2011).

technologies include development disciplines like crop science, water engineering, the use of satellite imagery to map changes in vegetation cover, and 'disaster risk management' (Cervigni and Morris, 2016; World Bank 2012; IGAD 2013). Key interventions include development projects at the regional or local scale intended to provide renewable energy, food security and 'safety nets' for the core subjects of climate resilience, namely 'vulnerable communities' – Ethiopia's *Productive Safety Net Programme* (PSNP) being a high-profile example (Devereux and Tibbo, 2013; Lind and Birch, 2014). Nevertheless, as more international climate finance is made available, concerns have been expressed as to whether such funding will provide a new source of 'rent' for powerful elites and offer little benefit to already politically marginalised constituencies (Lockwood, 2013: 664).

In summary, the climate-related narratives associated with this discourse include: climate change and degradation are fueling conflict over diminishing natural resources; 'doomed-by-climate-change' (mobile pastoralism is no longer sustainable in the face of climate change and rapid population growth); mobile pastoralism is unproductive and environmentally destructive; adaptation requires deliberate policy decisions and planned action on the part of public agencies; extensive livestock systems contribute to GHG emissions; the drylands offer a 'new frontier' for economic growth, private investment and commercialisation of agriculture. Keywords and metaphors identified within this category include: 'degradation'; 'desertification'; 'climate risk'; 'conflict'; 'coping strategy'; 'vulnerability'; 'unproductive'; 'sedentarisation'; 'integration'; 'transformation'[32]; 'climate-resilient'; 'planned adaptation'; 'commercial'; 'renewable energy'.

3.3.3 Pastoralists as 'modern, mobile and green'

In between these two somewhat polarised positions we can identify a third position on pastoralism – what I call a 'modern, mobile and green pastoralism' discourse (see also 3.3 above). While sharing with a 'pure pastoralism' position that value needs to be placed on the importance of mobility, a 'modern, mobile and green' discourse focuses on the changing nature of that mobility – the responses of pastoralists as they continue to adapt to changing circumstances. In this discourse, pastoralists are considered "active agents of change and as entrepreneurs rather that as passive recipients of development…." (Moritz, 2013: 2). For those who hold a 'modern and mobile' position, a purist approach, outlined above, fails to acknowledge the considerable innovation of herders and ex-herders, who are quite likely to embrace new livelihood opportunities offered by the growth of urban centres, livestock markets and entrepreneurship possibilities, as described in Chapter 2 (Catley *et al*. 2013; Little, 2013; IIED/SOS Sahel, 2009; Catley, 2017). Notably, these pastoralist responses have little to do with development aid or government projects but are driven by market demands and pastoralists' own innovation (Catley, 2017). As pastoralism is

[32] I have excluded the word 'transformative' as a synonym in my framework for CA as this generally implies a more radical project of structural change to unequal systems of power. Instead 'transformation' in this context implies the desire to change or 'modernise' pastoral production into a more commercially orientated system, or fundamentally transform the drylands economically - which may or may not include room for livestock keeping.

characterised by a low degree of dependency on external inputs and a high degree of resilience to shocks, it can switch relatively flexibly from a subsistence to a market orientation, without being radically transformed (Jenet *et al*., 2016). Nonetheless, the extent to which certain groups can taken advantage of these new opportunities and innovations in different contexts frequently depends on their asset status, connections to centres of political and economic power, and even ethnicity, as will be explored in Chapters 6 and 7.

In this discourse, 'pure pastoralism' – if ever such a thing existed – may only be viable for a small number of herders given the increasingly limited availability of rangeland resources (Lind *et al*., 2016). In other areas, with competing forms of land use, customary institutions are no longer sufficient to ensure land-tenure security (Bollig and Österle, 2008; Tache, 2013; Greiner, 2016). For some pastoralists, combining herding with new 'non-pastoral' and diversified income-generating activities may offer a more viable pathway (McPeak *et al*., 2011; Little, 2013; Lind *et a*l., 2016). Advocates of a 'transforming' approach, on the other hand, fail to recognise that extensive livestock systems hold a comparative advantage over other forms of land use in the drylands (IIED and SOS Sahel, 2009; Behnke and Kerven, 2013). Pastoralists may settle in towns to take advantage of new opportunities, or because hardship has forced them to do so. However spatial-temporal variability in water, forage and pasture still requires continued livestock mobility (Behnke and Mortimore, 2016: Yimer, 2015; Turner *et al*., 2019). Livelihood 'diversification' within a modern, mobile and green discourse is seen not so much as a 'coping strategy', or a 'way out' of pastoralism, but rather as a means to add value and complement existing livestock-keeping (Dyer, 2012; Fratkin 2013). At the same time there is recognition that, in light of the uncertainties brought about by climate change, certain groups of pastoralists may need a more sophisticated level of 'social protection' beyond those offered by food aid or by long-standing 'safety-net' programmes, such as the PSNP in Ethiopia (Devereaux and Tibo, 2013; Herrero *et al*., 2016; Tsegay, 2017). Index-Based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) schemes, such as those currently being piloted in both Kenya and Ethiopia by government agencies with support of the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), are heralded by some as an innovative means of offsetting climate risks (Laursen, 2017; MacMillan, 2017).[33]

Within the 'modern, mobile and green' discourse, climate change and the move to embrace an 'inclusive green economy' (Bass *et al*., 2013) offer an opportunity – rather than a threat – to dryland communities. Climate change can help 'focus minds' on the drylands and is an opportunity for donors and national governments to support appropriate climate-change mitigation and adaptation strategies (Hesse and Pattison, 2013). The new (post COP 21 Paris Agreement) political consensus to tackle climate change offers potential to attract international climate finance for

[33] Index-Based Livestock Insurance, (IBLI) works on the basis that payments are triggered when remote sensing indicates rainfall shortages and /or a scarcity of forage, or vegetation cover on the ground that will lead to livestock losses.

'resilience building' (Joseph, 2014), carbon sequestration (FAO 2013; McGahey *et al*., 2014; Dabasso *et al*., 2014), 'climate smart agriculture' (FAO, 2013), biodiversity protection and renewable energy schemes, as well as to provide greater recognition of the role of extensive livestock systems in drylands management and food security (Stull-Lane and Carabine, 2015; Jenet *et al*., 2016). It opens up spaces for pastoralists to connect better with domestic and international markets, and in particular to capitalise on the growth of new, certified, green 'niche markets' for high-value livestock products (King-Okumu, 2015; McGahey *et al*., 2014). There is potential, furthermore, for pastoralists to benefit from REDD+-type schemes, whereby they are rewarded for managing rangeland for its ecosystem functions, such as carbon sequestration. It follows that pastoralists should be acknowledged in their role as 'custodians of the commons' (Lane, 1998) and should be compensated for the environmental services and public goods they provide.[34]

Another associated climate-change narrative is the call for 'climate-smart' livestock systems. Given the enormity of the climate challenge facing humanity, 'climate-smart agriculture' (CSA) is seen by its advocates as offering a 'triple win' – simultaneously increasing agricultural productivity to support food security, building adaptive capacity at multiple levels and contributing to a reduction of GHGs (Campbell *et a*l., 2014; World Bank, 2016). CSA puts great emphasis on the mitigation potential that exists in the soils and forestry systems of developing countries (World Bank, 2011; FAO, 2013).[35] Typical low-emission strategies for livestock, according to the FAO *Climate Smart Agriculture Sourcebook* (2013), include grassland restoration, manure management, improved feed and crop-livestock integration. Just as with 'climate resilience' and the 'green economy', it is not hard to gauge how narratives of 'climate-smart agriculture' and 'sustainable intensification' appeal to the governments of Ethiopia and Kenya, which are intent on tackling the twin challenges of climate change and food insecurity, while simultaneously investing in agriculture-led economic growth (Yirgu *et al*., 2013; Maina *et al*., 2013). The endorsement of CSA by a wide array of influential global actors, including the World Bank, FAO, CGIAR, AfDB and USAID, and the potential for CSA finance, adds a further incentive.[36]

Within most mainstream policy discussions on climate-change adaptation that advocate a top-down or externally led approach (see the 'transforming' discourse above), there is an assumption that adaptation, and a transition towards a green economic trajectory, will occur in a linear sequence, given sufficient political will, the transfer of new technologies and adequate financing (Eriksen and Lind, 2009). However, evidence shows that expected adaptation actions, in terms of longer-term

[34] Proponents of a 'pure pastoralism' discourse, such as some Pastoralist Organisation representatives (see Chapter 6), on the other hand, are likely to be sceptical of claims that converting pastoral lands to new green market uses and REDD-type initiatives, will bring benefits to local communities, pointing instead to examples of 'green land grabbing' (Fairhead *et al*, 2012).

[35] Critics view CSA as a 'false solution' to climate change, whereby the burden of mitigation is shifted from developed to developing countries (Stabinsky, 2014).

[36] In Kenya, for example, the WB are providing funding of $1.5 billion for the 'North Eastern Kenya Initiative (NEDI), which includes investment in infrastructure, renewable energy and 'climate smart agriculture' (World Bank, 2018).

adjustments in practices and ecological and socioeconomic systems in response to actual or perceived changes in climate, do not necessarily take place (Smit and Pilfosova, 2003). This, according to O'Brien *et a*l. (2006, cited in Eriksen and Lind, 2009: 818), is because any decision-making is 'nested' in a wider set of institutional and societal changes and relations between actors. Within the 'modern, mobile and green' discourse, adjusting to climate change is therefore not considered to happen in isolation from the way people – in this case, pastoralists – continuously respond to a multitude of pressures, uncertainties and 'regular' seasonal changes (Eriksen and Lind, 2009; Scoones, 1995; Mortimore 1998). These dynamics are particularly apparent in the drylands, where, as we seen, different groups have developed sophisticated local production strategies in response to environmental variability. Eriksen and Marin argue that there is need to "reframe policy towards responses that shift, rather than reproduce, the development paradigm causing the climate problems and vulnerability in the first place" (2011:9). They maintain there is a need for 'sustainable adaptation' rather then 'adaptation as development as usual' – adaptation that recognises the broader context of vulnerability, that thinks critically about what types of adaptation are desirable and which groups or interests are being promoted at the expense of others, and that integrates local knowledge into national responses (Eriksen and Marin, 2011; 2015).

Proponents of a modern, mobile and green discourse are also likely to advocate for improved governance, as outlined in the 'pure pastoralism' discourse above, along with greater investment by the state in 'public goods and services' such as health and education in pastoral areas. In addition, some agencies have called for a 'territorial approach' to rangeland management and climate adaptation in the drylands (Jenet *et al*., 2016; GIZ, 2017). As pastoralism is by definition mobile and occupies vast territories, agreements and 'policy harmonisation' between neighbouring counties and countries is necessary to promote livestock trade, facilitate movement of pastoralists and their herds (especially during periods of drought), control transboundary diseases, mitigate conflict, etc. In this case, efforts to support pastoralism need to be focused on regional as well as local areas or territory – rather than just on national-level policies (AU, 2010; Gomarasca and Nori, 2016; Odhiambo 2017; World Bank, 2020).

In summary, the climate-related narratives associated with this discourse include: pastoralists are innovators and entrepreneurs in the face of climatic and other uncertainties; pastoralists as 'custodians of the commons', who have an important role in climate mitigation and adaptation and who can benefit from schemes in which they are compensated for protecting environmental services; efforts and policies to support pastoralism call for a regional or territorial approach.

Keywords and/or metaphors within this category are: 'entrepreneurs'; 'diversification'; 'green economy'; 'climate-smart'; 'sustainable adaptation'; 'sequestration'; 'payment for environmental services (PES)'; 'cross-border'; 'policy harmonisation'; 'social protection'.

Table 3.1 summarises the keywords and their synonyms for each of the three discourses on pastoralism and pastoral area development discussed above. These discourses and keywords form the basis (codes) for my content analysis and discourse analysis of Ethiopian and Kenyan climate-change and drylands policy documents, the results of which are presented in Chapter 5.

Table 3.1 Summary of pastoralist discourses and associated keywords

Discourse	Associated keywords	Synonyms
'Pure pastoralism'	**Variability**	Variable *(climate, rainfall, environmental, rangelands);* Heterogeneous; Heterogeneity
	Mobility	Mobile (*pastoralists / people / livestock / health / education – excludes mobile communications*)
	Pastoral system(s)	Pastoral economy; pastoral production
	Livelihood	Livelihoods
	Customary institution(s)	Traditional / community / local / pastoral(ist) institution(s)
	Autonomous adaptation	Community / community-based / local / pastoralist / endogenous adaptation(s)
	Adaptive capacity	
	Resilience	
	Rights	
	Indigenous	*(people, knowledge, livestock, technology – excludes crops, trees, enterprises)*
	Pastoral governance	Rangeland governance; Governance in /of pastoral(ist) / rangeland areas
	Key resources	Pastoral resources; Dry-season / drought grazing areas / reserves / resources / retreats / refuges
'Transforming pastoralism and dryalands'	**Climate risk(s)**	Climate (change) risk(s) / hazards(s) / shock(s) / impacts(s) / disaster(s) / event(s) / emergency(ies); Climate (change) related risk(s) / hazard(s) / shock(s) / disasters(s) / event(s) / impact(s); Climate (change) induced risk(s) / hazards(s) / shock(s) / disaster(s) / impacts(s) / event(s); Drought risk; Extreme (climatic) events
	Vulnerable	Vulnerability; Vulnerabilities
	Degradation	Degraded; Fragile; Scarce / scarcity *(of resources*); Desertification; Overgrazed / overgrazing
	Conflict	Conflicts *(communal, resource based, people and wildlife)*
	Insecurity	Insecure *(Food, livelihoods, land tenure)*
	Coping strategy	Coping strategies / mechanisms(s); Maladaptive; Maladaptation
	Transform	Transformed; Transformation; Transforming; Modernise; Modernize; Modernization; Modernisation (*of drylands / rangelands, of pastoral*

Discourse	Associated keywords	Synonyms
		areas / production only – excludes 'transformative')
	Sedentarise	Sedentarize; Sedentarisation; Sedentarization; Resettle; Resettlement; Villagization
	Integration	Integrate(d); Mainstream, mainstreamed *(of policy / programmes / planning; of drylands / rangelands / pastoral areas / livestock production)*
	Irrigation	Irrigated; Irrigate
	Commercial	Commercialise(d); Commercialize(d); Commercially; Market based / led /driven; Private sector / investment / investors *(applies to adaptation, agriculture, livestock, forestry and drylands only)*
	Value chain(s)	Value addition; Value added; Add value *(related to livestock and agricultural products only)*
	Productivity	Productive *(applies to agricultural, livestock, forestry and drylands productivity only*
	Climate resilient	
	Rewable energy	Clean energy; Green energy; Renewables; Alternative energy; wind / solar / geothermal / hydro (electric) energy / power
	Planned adaptation	Adaptive planning
'Modern, mobile amd green'	**Pastoral(ist) entrepreneurs**	Pastoral(ist) innovators / innovation / enterprises; Local innovation
	Diversify	Diversification; Diversified; Diversifying *(of Livelihoods, Income, livestock only);* Complementary livelihoods
	Green economy	Green economics; Green / low emissions growth; Green / Niche markets
	Sustainable adaptation	
	Carbon sequestration	Carbon credits / trading / markets / sinks / stocks / initiatives; REDD; REDD+
	Climate-smart	(*agriculture / livestock*); CSA; sustainable intensification *(of crops, livestock, land use)*
	Payment(s) for environmental services	Payment(s) for ecosystem services; PES
	Cross-border	Trans-boundary / cross-boundary; Inter-county
	Social protection	

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has developed an analytical framework employed in subsequent chapters, examining Ethiopia's and Kenya's climate-change and pastoral area policies. This framework, which builds on the work of Keeley and Scoones (2003), provides a systematic way of understanding the dynamic interactions between narratives and discourses, actors and networks, and politics and interests within environmental policy processes. Only by examining such dynamics can we gain a fuller picture of emerging national climate-change, green-economy and development policy

processes in Ethiopia and Kenya and their consequences for pastoralist livelihoods in local contexts. In the first part of the chapter, I introduced the elements of Keeley and Scoones' framework and their relevance to each of my research questions. I also added a fourth element – policy consequences. In the second part, I identified how emerging climate-policy narratives broadly correspond to three broad discourses on pastoralism and drylands development, and the way in which certain narratives and associated concepts 'frame' what – and who – is taken into consideration, or excluded from, policy processes. Keywords were then extracted from these discourses and depicted in tabular form (Table 3.1). These discourses and keywords form the basis (codes) for my CA and DA of Ethiopian and Kenyan climate-change and drylands policy documents, the results of which are presented in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, I examine the extent to which different policy actors and institutions in Ethiopia and Kenya are promulgating these discourses.

Chapter 4: Research Design and Methodology

4.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the research design and methods used in this study. First, I set out the epistemological perspective that informs my study and my own positionality. Second, I discuss why a two-country comparative case study is appropriate for this research. Third, I elaborate on the appropriateness of the research methods used to answer the three research questions – content analyses (CA), discourse analysis (DA) and semi-structured interviews – as well as justifying the sources of data chosen for analysis. I give particular emphasis to the strengths and limitations of using CA and DA, drawing from a number of different approaches and theories. Finally, I describe the systematic approach that was taken to analysing and interpreting the data that emerged from the interviews, while highlighting some ethical issues.

4.2. Epistemological perspective and positionality

My research follows a constructivist epistemological perspective. Constructivists believe that facts and values are always intertwined and that most concepts can be contested, particularly in the social sciences: "outside a field of reference there is simply no fact of the matter" (Kratcochwil, 2008: 88). From a constructivist perspective, 'adaptation to climate change', for example, is not simply a response to meteorological parameters, but it is primarily driven by discourses about these phenomena in a society (Cannon and Muller-Mahn, 2010). In my study, I am not disputing the realities of climate change or the need for mitigation and adaptation, but rather seek to explore how the narratives about climate change and pastoralism are constructed and moulded, how these narratives influence decision-making, and what repercussions these decisions may have on pastoralist livelihoods. As Carswell and Jones (2004: 205) note, suggesting that the environment, and environmental problems, are socially constructed is entirely different from suggesting that 'there is no real nature out there' or that environmental problems do not exist.

I am also interested in how social construction of knowledge about the environment can in itself be the means by which power is exercised over both nature and society. To this extent, I draw on the ideas of 'political ecology' – a field of study that seeks to provide a framework for understanding the interrelations of politics and power, structures and discourses with the natural environment (Robbins, 2012). There are numerous strands within political ecology but useful to this research is the 'post-structural' strand that explores the genealogy of global environmental narratives (why certain narratives become dominant), and that emphasise political economy as a causal theme (Adger *et al.*, 2001; Peet *et al.*, 2011; Robbins, 2012). In this sense, almost all political ecology

research is engaged with what has been described as a "broadly defined political economy" (Blaikie and Brookfield (1987:17). In other words, no explanation of environmental change is complete without some analysis given to "who profits from changes in control over resources, and without exploring who takes what and from whom" (Robbins, 2012: 59). This has relevance to my study when we consider how access to and control over land and other key resources in pastoral drylands is increasingly being contested by different state and non-state actors – as will be explored in Chapters 6 and 7.

Poststructuralists tend to employ discourse analysis and deconstruction as their primary analytical tools. In political ecology, the exercise of power has to be understood at a discursive as well as at the material levels (Bryant and Baily, 1997; Carswell and Jones, 2004) (see also Section 4.4 below). Political ecology, furthermore, allows me to add an interpretive dimension to my research, rather than relying entirely on an empirical evidence-based approach. Robbins (2012) maintains that, in contrast to a 'hard constructivist' epistemology, which holds that it is social context alone that conditions and determines our concepts for understanding the world, most political ecologists align themselves with a 'softer' form of constructivism, one that "holds that our concepts of reality are real and have force in the world, but that they reflect incomplete, incorrect, biased and false understandings of empirical reality" (Robbins, 2012:128).

In research there is a need for reflexivity, both during data collection as well as when interpreting qualitative research. Acknowledging the researcher as an actor in his/her own right is critical (Gilham, 2000). Not only am I a white European 'outsider' who had never spent a long period of time in either country, I am cognisant that my own views over the last decade have been shaped by my membership in the pastoralist advocacy network CELEP[37], by personal encounters with pastoralists though my work, and by having been influenced in my reading of scholars who have challenged historical discourses on pastoralism (see Chapter 2). To claim I hold no 'value judgments' (May, 2011: 48) through the research process – around the role and interests of the state or other powerful actors in displacing pastoralists from formerly communally managed rangeland, for example – would be disingenuous. Interpretative researchers and constructivists, nonetheless, recognise that value-free knowledge is impossible (Edge and Richard, 1998). They acknowledge they are asserting their beliefs when they chose what they want to research and how they interpret the findings. Notwithstanding the need to be sensitive to, and minimise, personal bias (see also 4.4.6 below), a degree of personal interpretation is still integral to the research output.

[37] The Coalition of European Lobbies for Eastern African Pastoralism (CELEP) is a network of European members and Eastern African partners focused on communication and lobbying in favour of pastoralism in Eastern Africa – www.celep.info

4.3 A two-country case-study analysis: Ethiopia and Kenya

This research employs a comparative case study approach composed of two macro-units of analysis (Ethiopia and Kenya). Yin (2003: 13) defines a case study as "…an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident". Case studies are frequently bounded by, for example, time, location or activity (Creswell, 2014). While a case study is by no means representative, or 'typical', of all cases, what it tells us about the case may suggest wider implications (Grey, 2009; Rowley, 2002). While Yin (2011) warns against efforts to use single case studies for statistical generalisation, as is common in quantitative studies, Bartlett and Vavrus (2017) assert that qualitative work, particularly comparative case studies, allows for generalisability through the generation of theoretical insights. Case-study methodology, notes Yin (2003), is particularly relevant when the researcher believes the context to be highly pertinent to the subject under study, hence my rationale for choosing such an approach that allows for 'cross-national' (Hakim, 2000: 71) comparisons between policy narratives and processes in Ethiopia and Kenya – two countries that have much in common but also have quite different contexts. It is important to stress at this point that this study is not an exercise in direct comparison with a fixed set of variables, as is often used in comparative studies, as the complexities of each country's individual policy processes would not allow for such as approach. Instead, for both cases, the different contexts are explored, policy discourses and narratives unpacked, actors and actor networks mapped and policy consequences considered by applying the same analytical framework and research questions. Similarities and differences between – and across – the two cases that emerge in the findings (as presented in Chapters, 5, 6 and 7) are highlighted as they arise, and conclusions drawn where appropriate.

While pastoralism and livestock-keeping have been – and continue to be – a livelihood strategy of both necessity and choice for millions of people across the Sahel, the HoA and West Africa, and climate change is an 'all-Africa' issue, there is much to be learned by focusing on the policy dynamics in a particular region and on just two countries. Ethiopia and Kenya were intentionally selected for a number of reasons. Focusing on discourse and narratives; actors and institutions; and pastoralist experiences, in climate policymaking processes in these two neighbouring countries allows me scope to compare and contrast experiences and perspectives across two states in the one region – the HoA. These countries are of interest as they represent two of the most prominent 'early adoptees' in the African continent of policies favoured as part of the new international consensus around green development and climate-change governance (Death, 2015; Redda and Roland, 2016). As we saw, both countries have embarked on ambitious national green-economy and climate-resilience type strategies and are investing in renewable energy, carbon-sequestration projects and irrigated agriculture in dryland areas (Death, 2015; Jones and Carabine, 2013; Held *et al.,* 2013; Redda and Roland, 2016; Yirgu *et al*., 2013). Both share similar dryland zones, with

significant populations who identify themselves as pastoralists or agropastoralists. Certain pastoralist groups, such as the Borana, dwell on both sides of the Kenyan–Ethiopian border. Both countries have been considered relatively successful in economic development terms, experiencing high levels of economic growth (World Bank, 2020b, 2020c) and similar development and climatic challenges. In recent years, both countries have seen increased frequency and severity of drought – albeit with impacts and consequences that are site-specific, varied and uncertain (Carabine, 2014; Funk *et a*l. 2012; Herrro *et al*., 2016).

At the same time, Ethiopia and Kenya have clearly followed quite different political trajectories and show differences in their approach to national development planning and local natural-resource governance (see Chapter 2). Both countries have quite different histories of state formation. Ethiopia was never colonised, and despite a brief occupation by Italy between 1936 and 1941, was ruled as an empire before the removal of the last Emperor, Haile Selassie, in 1974. Ethiopia does not have a history of the peaceful transition of power (Clapham, 2004). The country was in effect a 'one-party state' from 1991 up until 2018, marked by a crackdown on opposition parties, civil society and independent media (Burke, 2017; HRW, 2017)[38]. While a recipient of large amounts of official development assistance (ODA) from a number of donors, Ethiopia sees itself as a 'developmental state' taking an active role in managing its own economic and social development (Shumuye, 2015). In contrast, Kenya was colonised by England but maintained favourable relations with the West after independence in 1963. Kenya is a multiparty democracy and, unlike in Ethiopia, power has changed hands through electoral processes. The country has maintained relative political stability despite low-level conflicts and insurgency in some border districts. Nevertheless, elections (most notably in 2007) have been marred by civil unrest and violence. Kenya is a wealthier country than Ethiopia, with a per-capita GDP for 2018 of US$1,711 compared with Ethiopia's US$772 for the same year.[39] Both countries suffer from high levels of inequality. Whilst Ethiopia does not receive quite the same level of net ODA *per capita* as Kenya (US$45 compared to US$48)[40], this needs to be considered within the context that Ethiopia's population is almost double the size of Kenya. Table 4.1 below illustrates key statistical data for the two case-study countries.

[38] The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has won every major poll for more than 20 years and, at one stage (2017), occupied every seat in the 537-strong parliament (Burke, 2017). Reforms in 2018 led by Prime Minister (PM) Abiy Ahmed have opened up space for a more open multi-party system.
[39] World Bank figures: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=ET-KE
[40] World Bank figures: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?locations=ET-KE-

Table 4.1 Ethiopia and Kenya key statistics

	Ethiopia	**Kenya**
Total land area:	1.104 million km²	580,367 km²
Area covered by arid and semi-arid lands:	60%	80%
Population (2019):	112 million[41]	52.5 million[42]
GDP *per capita* (2018):	US$772[43]	US$1,711[44]
GDP growth (2018):	6.81% (10.4% in 2015)[45]	6.3%[46]
Levels of Net ODA received (2018):	US$4.732 billion[47]	US$2.401 billion[48]
Levels of Net ODA *per capita* (2018):	US$45	US$48
Human Development Index (2019):	Ranked 173 out of 189 countries[49]	147 out of 189 countries[50]
GINI coefficient index (2015):	35.00 (ranked 104 out of 159 countries)[51]	40.80 (ranked 56 out of 159 countries)[52]

There were also theoretical reasons why I chose these two countries. On the basis of my first reading of the literature, I anticipated that, as Ethiopia's official policies in recent decades would appear to be intent on encouraging pastoralist settlement, irrigated agriculture and commercialisation of the livestock sector (Galaty, 2012; Lavers, 2012; Abbink *et al.*, 2014; Kratli, 2019), then a 'transforming pastoralism and drylands' policy discourse (as identified in Chapter 3)

[41] https://data.worldbank.org/country/ethiopia
[42] https://data.worldbank.org/country/kenya
[43] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=ET
[44] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=ET-KE
[45] https://data.worldbank.org/country/ethiopia
[46] https://data.worldbank.org/country/kenya
[47] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?locations=ET-KE-
[48] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?locations=ET-KE-
[49] UNDP National Development Report 2019 (http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/ETH.pdf
[50] UNDP Human Development Report 2019 (http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/KEN)
[51] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=ET
[52] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=ET-KE

would be more to the fore. In Kenya, in contrast, Constitutional reform and the parallel process of devolution from 2012 on, are considered to be reasons for the kinds of 'deliberative inclusionary processes' (Njorge *et al*., 2017: 541) in climate-change and drylands-related policymaking (Njorge *et al*., 2017; Odhiambo, 2014; Elmi and Birch, 2013), not found in Ethiopia. Therefore I expected that narratives more in line with the 'pure pastoralism' and 'modern, mobile and green' discourses, described in Chapter 3, might feature more prominently in Kenyan policies and strategies, and among Kenyan policy actors. In Chapters 5 and 6, I reveal that this hypothesis proved correct.

In sum, while sharing commitments to reorient their economies towards a 'climate-resilient' green development trajectory, these two countries represent different types of states: a one-party developmental state in the case of Ethiopia, and an electoral democracy committed to free-market capitalism in the case of Kenya. There are also different political, economic and social dynamics in each. Nevertheless, in terms of the climate-change policy and pastoralism nexus, there is much that can be learned by examining the two together. By analysing discourses and narratives, actors and institutions motivations and interests, and policy consequences across these two countries, both variation and uniformity can be assessed – across time, actors and policies. In the following sections, I explain how the methods of CA, DA and interviews can illuminate these issues.

4.4 Methods of data collection and analysis

This study is based on multiple sources of evidence, essential for ensuring validity in case-study design (Hakim, 2000; Yin, 2003), using a mixed-methods approach. The results of CA, DA and semi-structured interviews are used collectively to address the three core research questions outlined above. These methods complement and build on each other, allowing a comprehensive exploration of the topic. CA enables a search for use of keywords and patterns over time in relevant national climate policy and drylands-related documents. DA allows a deeper examination of how policy discourses around climate change, drylands, pastoralism and the green economy are constructed, and the assumptions on which such discourses and narratives are based. In turn, the interviews with key informants conducted during six weeks of fieldwork in Ethiopia and Kenya during May and June 2018 generated original data that illuminated the themes that emerged in the preceding document analysis. In this way, the methods collectively help to address the shortcomings of each should they have been used individually. These methods are discussed below.

4.4.1 Sources of data for content and discourse analysis and timeframe

As my study is interested in national policy discourses and narratives, it examines a number of key documents related to climate change, green economy and drylands that were produced in Ethiopia and Kenya between 2007 and 2017. Policy documents from this period that made no reference at all to pastoralism, livestock production and /or pastoral area development were excluded. As this

study is interested in recent and current policy narratives and current (and possible future) policy outcomes, it was necessary to set an appropriate timeframe for documents selected for analysis. 2007 was deemed an appropriate starting point, a significant year in terms of international climate negotiations. In the run-up to the 13th COP to the UNFCCC, held in December 2007, developing countries were being encouraged to commit to GHG emissions reductions as part of a strengthened Kyoto Protocol (Muller, 2008). Substantive finance for adaptation in developing countries was also being made available through a newly established global Adaptation Fund. Consequently, 2007 was the year Ethiopia's first *National Adaptation Programme of Action* (NAPA) was released. All of the policies reviewed are available in English and were in the public domain (and all but two available online) when the documents were analysed in 2017.[53] At no point was I made aware of other non-English language policy documents of relevance existing. Nonetheless it is quite possible that these may exist at the Regional / County level. If they do, they are not known to this researcher and were not deliberately excluded from the sample.

Of the 17 documents selected for Ethiopia (Table 4.2), 15 were, or are, national and/or sub-national policies or strategies, and include the main government climate-change mitigation and adaptation policies and plans, two Regional State climate plans, several documents specific to the agriculture and/or livestock sector, a national development plan, as well as a policy document specific to development of pastoral areas. The remaining two are an example of policy-relevant climate-resilience programme documents produced by donors and /or implementing partners in Ethiopia, chosen to provide insight into donor agency narratives.

Table 4.2 Sample of Ethiopian policy documents

Agency	Year	Title
FDRE-NMA	2007	Ethiopian National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA)
FDRE	2008	Policy Statement for the Sustainable Development of the Pastoral and Agro-Pastoral Areas of Ethiopia ('*Pastoral Areas Policy*')[54]
FDRE	2010	Afar Regional State Programme of Plan on Adaptation to Climate Change
FDRE	2011a	Somali Regional State Programme of Plan on Adaptation to Climate Change
FDRE–MoA	2010	Agricultural Sector Policy and Investment Framework (PIF) 2010–2020

[53] References, including online links, for all of the policy documents analysed are provided in a separate section within the Bibliography.

[54] At the time of conducting fieldwork (2018), the GoE was working on a new *Pastoral Development Policy and Strategy*, not included in the analysis of policy documents reviewed here. Reference to this new policy is, however, made in Chapters 6 and 7.

Agency	Year	Title
FDRE-EPA	2011	Ethiopian Programme of Adaptation to Climate Change (EPACC)
FDRE	2011b	Climate Resilient Green Economy Strategy (GES)
FRDE/WB	2013	Coping with Change: How Ethiopia's PSNP and HABP are building resilience to climate change
FDRE	2014	Growth and Transformation Plan 2 (GTP II) 2015–2020
FDRE-MoA	2015	Ethiopian Livestock Master Plan (LMP) 2015–2020: Roadmaps for Growth and Transformation
FDRE	2015	Intended Nationally Determined Contributions of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (EINDCs)
EPCC	2015	EPCC Climate Change Working Group First Assessment Report: Impacts, Vulnerability, Adaptation and Mitigation – Agriculture and Food Security
FDRE-MECC	2015a	CRGE: Agriculture and Forestry Climate Resilience Strategy
FDRE-MECC	2015b	CRGE: Water and Energy Climate Resilience Strategy
USAID / Mercy Corps	2016	Climate Resilient Development Case Study – Ethiopia: Integrating climate change into market-based development programmes
Farm Africa Ethiopia	2016	Market Approaches to Resilience
FDRE	2017[55]	National Adaptation Plan, Ethiopia's Climate Resilient Green Economy (NAP-ETH)

In the case of Kenya, while policymaking specifically directed towards the ASAL dates back to 2003, with the publication of the *Economic Recovery Strategy* and gaining momentum with the launch of *Vision 2030* (Kenya's national development plan) in 2008, the first dedicated climate policy document *The National Climate Change Response Strategy* (*NCCRS)* did not appear until 2010. Nevertheless, keeping in line with the 11-year timeframe used to analyse Ethiopian policies, my sample takes the *National Livestock Policy (NLP)* from 2008 as its starting point. Of the 16 Kenyan documents analysed (Table 4.3), 15 are national policies and include all key climate-change policies and plans during this time (excluding the 2016 *Climate Change Act*, a legislative document setting out the institutional framework for climate action), several important agriculture and/or livestock sector-specific documents, a national development plan, a national green-economy strategy, a national land-use policy, and a policy specific to the development of the ASAL. In addition, one local government livestock strategy is analysed to provide insight into discourses and narratives towards pastoral production at county level, through which implementation of Kenyan policies are increasingly channelled (see Chapters 6 and 7).

[55] The latest Ethiopian NAP was first published in 2017, which is the document analysed here. However, a revised NAP-ETH, with just some minor additions to the text, was prepared in 2019. Only the 2019 document is currently available online. See: https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NAPC/Documents/Parties/NAP-ETH%20FINAL%20VERSION%20%20Mar%202019.pdf (Accessed: 04/06/2019).

Table 4.3 Sample of Kenyan policy documents

Agency	Year	Title
Government of Kenya (GoK)-MLD	2008	National Livestock Policy (NLP)
GoK-MALF	2010	Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) 2010–2020
GoK	2010	National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS)
GoK-MDNKOAL	2012	National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands *('The ASAL Policy')*
GoK-MDP	2013	*Vision 2030:* Second Medium Term Plan (MTP) 2013–2017[56]
GoK	2013a	Kenya National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) 2013–2017[57]
GoK	2013b	Sector Plan for Drought Risk Management and Ending Drought Emergencies (EDE): Second Medium Term Plan 2013–2017
GoK-MENR	2014	National Climate Change Framework Policy (NCCFP)
GoK-MENR	2015a	Kenya's Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC)
GoK-MENR	2015b	Green Economy Strategy and Implementation Plan (GESIP)
GoK	2015	Kenya Climate Smart Agriculture Framework Programme 2015–2030
GoK-MALF	2014	Ending Drought Emergencies: Common Programme Framework for Sustainable Livelihoods
GoK-NDMA	2014	Ending Drought Emergencies: Common Programme Framework for Drought Risk Management
GoK-MENR	2016	Kenya National Adaptation Plan (NAP) 2015–2030
GoK-MLPP	2016	Draft National Land Use Policy (NLUP)
GoK-ICG	2016	Isiolo County Livestock Strategy and Action Plan 2016–2020

As is clear from the Tables above, the majority of documents are at the national level, partly because Regional (Ethiopia) and County (Kenya) level documents are harder to obtain, but also because the focus of this study is primarily on national level policy makers. The inclusion of more Regional / County level documents – additional county livestock plans in Kenya for example – may have resulted in slightely different findings. Nonetheless, taken together, these Ethiopian and Kenyan documents provide a comprehensive picture of how certain attitudes towards, and narratives around, pastoralism and the drylands, as well as the policy prescriptions that emanate from these narratives, are articulated within policies relevant for climate change and green economy over a specific time period.

[56] At the time of document analysis (2017), Kenya's Third *Medium Term Plan* 2018 -2022 was still in preparation and not available to review.

[57] At the time of document analysis, a new/revised NCCAP (2018–2022) was under preparation and was not available to review.

4.4.2 Content analyses

CA has been defined as "a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding" (Stemler, 2001:1). CA can reveal broad patterns of word usage within documents over time. These patterns can be used to infer meanings from the text and the emergence of ideas and concepts (Krippendorf, 2004; Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). It can be a useful technique for allowing us to discover and describe the focus of individual, group, institutional or social attention (Weber, 1990). An advantage of CA is that it is systematic and the boundaries of the analysis are clearly set, thus making it replicable (Stemler, 2001). By examining the frequency and patterns of word use over a sample of policy documents over an 11-year period (2007–2017) and across multiple governmental departments and agencies, CA was deemed an appropriate tool for my research, as it provides an insight into which discourses have greater dominance in policy processes and how these vary over time. These broad patterns form the basis for the DA and fieldwork (interviews) that followed, which in turn allow for a more detailed – or micro-level – understanding of the way in which these words, and the ideas they represent, are used to build certain narratives and policy prescriptions, and in whose interests such policy prescriptions lie.

My study uses 'qualitative content analysis' – one that "focuses on the characteristics of language as communication with attention to the content or contextual meaning of the text" (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005: 1278). Qualitative CA goes beyond merely counting words to examine language intensely for the purpose of classifying large amounts of text into a number of 'categories' that represent similar meanings or have similar connotations (Weber, 1990). As discussed further below, I grouped certain keywords (and their synonyms) into three categories that in my view represent three contrasting – and sometimes overlapping – broad discourses on pastoralism within policies related to climate change and drylands, as set out in the previous chapter.

Hsieh and Shannon (2005) identify three distinct approaches to qualitative CA: conventional, directed or summative. All three approaches are used to interpret meaning from the content of text data and, hence, could be said to adhere to the naturalistic paradigm (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). The major differences among the approaches are coding schemes, origins of codes, and issues of how to establish reliability and validity. In conventional content analysis, coding categories are derived directly from the text data. With a directed approach, analysis starts with a theory or relevant research findings as guidance for initial codes. A summative content analysis involves counting and comparisons, usually of keywords or content, followed by the interpretation of the underlying context (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005).

I use a deductive '*a priori'* coding approach (Stemler, 2001); in other words, categories were predetermined or established prior to the analyses, based on my familiarity with certain key

concepts through a review of the literature and existing theory. There is a danger here, as using prior theory has inherent limitations, in that I approach the data as informed, but also with my own biases. Asking my research supervisor, as well as a topic specialist, to examine the definitions before the CA started increased the validity of the predetermined categories. Using a-priori coding is in line with the kind of 'directed content analysis', as defined above; however, there is also a strong 'summative' element. A summative approach goes beyond word counts to allow for the process of interpretation of content. It is particularly appropriate when examining texts such as policy documents (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). While word frequency is taken into account, it is important to understand the underlying contexts for the use of explicit versus euphemistic terms. As with directed CA, codes or keywords are mainly derived in advance from a review of the literature.

For the purposes of my study, I used a framework or coding scheme designed to isolate keywords and associated synonyms that represent three contrasting – and sometimes overlapping – broad discourses on pastoralism within policies related to climate change and drylands – a 'pure pastoralism' discourse, a 'transforming pastoralism and drylands' discourse, and a 'mobile, modern and green' discourse (see Table 3.1). The rationale for selecting these particular keywords was provided in Chapter 3. As all documents, with the exception of one (*The Isiolo County Livestock Strategy*), were available electronically (as PDFs), and in English, it was possible to use a word or text search tool within Adobe Reader software to isolate and count keywords. Keywords in the remaining document were counted by hand.

As policy documents reviewed for this study were of varying lengths, word frequency was calculated by taking the total word count for a particular term (and/or its synonym) in a particular document and calculating it as a percentage value of all keywords counted in that document (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2). This then allowed a comparison of how frequently terms associated with each of the three discourses are used in relation to each other within documents and across documents by different government ministries or agencies over time. Bar charts were also created for each country, visualising the aggregate value breakdown for each of three discourses and for each document (see Fig. 5.1, and Fig. 5.2), allowing for a further comparison across time.

4.4.3 Discourse analysis

In Chapter 3, I clarified the difference between 'discourse' (a shared meaning of a phenomenon) and 'narrative structures' (the ways in which a discourse is communicated – often in the form of a storyline, with a chronological order and involving archetypes such as *heroes, villains* and *victims*) (Hajer 1995; Adger *et al*., 2001). I also discussed why an analysis of discourses and narratives can help reveal how governments and other actors (donors and development agencies, for example) often need large-scale simplifications in order to generate political consensus and make decision-

making possible in the face of uncertainties (Roe, 1991; Krätli, 2013). Here I provide an overview of 'discourse analysis' (DA) as a methodological tool and why I feel it is appropriate to my study.

DA enables me to address the ideas, arguments and assumptions that underpin drylands development and climate governance in a way that content analysis cannot. Rather than identify broad patterns of word use only, DA adds another level to the study and addresses the substantive issues raised by my first research question – what are the dominant discourses and narratives on pastoralism found within national climate-change and drylands policies in Ethiopian and Kenyan policies? DA can help to understand "what narratives shape activities in a particular policy sector or policy domain, how they are used strategically by various actors, and how they effect material practices and outcomes" (Robinson and Crane, 2016: 4).

DA draws from the constructivist epistemology I referred to earlier, which focuses not directly on a specific phenomenon itself, but rather on claims concerning the phenomenon, the claim makers, and the claim-making process (Adger *et al*., 2001). DA is appropriate for my study as it builds on the content analysis by examining how certain 'global' discourses of climate governance and the green economy are used in drylands development policies and, in turn, how certain development discourses (in this case, particular discourses and narratives around pastoralism) are evident in climate policies. While not adhering strictly to a specific type of discourse analysis, it is influenced by the work of Fairclough and Wodak (1997) and van Dijk (2001) – theorists generally associated with the 'Critical Discourse Analysis' (CDA) school – by Foucault's understanding of power and his concept of 'governmentality', as well as drawing on Hajer's (1995; 2006) guidelines for 'doing discourse analysis'. Each of these theoretical elements is discussed in turn.

4.4.3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis

CDA theorists, such as Fairclough (1992), Fairclough and Wodak (1997) and van Dijk (2001), understand discourse to be represented by written text and spoken communication, whilst also recognising that discourse is shaped by social practices. Fairclough's (1992) analytical framework involves three levels that make up the discursive event: text, discursive practices and social practice. 'Discursive practice' is how texts are produced and how texts are consumed.[58] 'Social practice' represents the non-discursive element of institutions and is connected to the text by discursive practice. In this way, discourse can shape social practice but is also shaped or constituted by social practice and context (McConnon, 2015: 55). CDA is 'critical' in the sense that it focuses on how "discourse structures enact, confirm legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of power and dominance in society" (van Dijk, 2001:353). By analysing discourse, these relationships can be exposed and ultimately changed (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). This understanding is useful for this study when we see how certain discourse and narratives – around climate vulnerability and food

[58] How texts are consumed in pastoralist contexts is not examined in this research.

insecurity, for example – are used by the state and other actors to legitimise policy change in favour of non-pastoralist forms of land use, leading in many cases to unfavourable outcomes for pastoralists (see Chapters 2, 6 and 7).

This conception of discourse distinguishes the approach from more radical poststructuralist approaches, such as Laclau and Mouffe's 'discourse theory', which treats all social practice as discourse (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002). In CDA, "language as discourse is both a form of action through which people can change the world and a form of action which is socially and historically situated in a dialectical relationship with other aspects of the social" (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 62). Ruth Wodak (2001) takes a 'discourse historical approach' to CDA by viewing every discursive act as being embedded in a number of previous discursive acts that it refers to and builds upon (a phenomena referred to as 'intertextuality'). Therefore, it is necessary to have an understanding of the historical context behind the discourse (Wodak and Meyer, 2009) – particularly appropriate when considering the Ethiopian and Kenyan policymaking contexts. An example of this would be Ethiopia's top-down, modernising and 'technocratic' approach to agriculture and natural resource management (see Chapters 2 and 3), an approach deemed to have its roots in the imperial era, yet which became embedded in successive regime institutions, with 'scientific expertise' helping to legitimise and shape the promotion of a range of interventions with far-reaching consequences for dryland communities (Adams 2009; Hoben 1995; Keeley and Scoones, 2000). This understanding is useful for studying a number of different documents from different agencies over a period of time, as is the case with my study. 'Interdiscursivity' occurs when different discourses and genres are combined and recombined in new and complex ways (Fairclough, 1992). According to CDA theory, a 'high level of interdiscursivity' is associated with progressive change, while a 'low level' signals reproduction of the established order (Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002).

It is important, nevertheless, to stress here that, while I accept that many of the social problems faced by pastoralists are based on unequal power relations, to adopt wholesale the assumptions found in a CDA approach would have restricted this study. To conceptualise power only in terms of 'power over' (or dominance), as van Dijk (1993; 2001) is inclined to do, negates the collective agency of those who resist, adopt and innovate, thereby creating their own 'power from below' (Morton, 2010).

4.4.3.2 Foucault's understanding of power

For theorist Michel Foucault, the term 'discourse' does not refer to formal linguistic aspects, but to how the social world, expressed through language, is affected by various sources of power. According to Foucault:

> …there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse (1980: 93).

In other words, the use of language is not neutral but can be used to establish or legitimise social values and practices (van Dijk, 2001; Given, 2008). Foucault's ideas on the production of discourse raise broader questions about the practices of government, and how "public policy is formed, shaped and reshaped" (Hewitt, 2009: 5). Analysis of discourses has the potential to show the link between political rhetoric and how discourses are created and maintained. Foucault's concept of power acknowledges the diverse influences of social and political relations on policy, beyond the immediate political arena (Hewitt, 2009).

For Foucault, power is not solely something that states, institutions or individuals can exercise over other individuals or citizens, but instead "comes from everywhere" (Foucault, 1990: 93). This has relevance for my own study when we consider that power is rooted in society as well as in the state – for example, forms of power lie within pastoralist organisations, traditional leaders and civil-society platforms (Morton, 2010) or can be found emerging from pastoralist social movements, a theme explored in Chapter 6. Power, furthermore, is not a finite resource that can be held by some and taken away from others. Discourse "transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile, and makes it possible to thwart it" (Foucault, 1990: 101). Through DA, we can become aware of the "contingent nature of the policy process" (Hewitt, 2009:7) – in other words, that certain policy options are rationalised by deciding whose and what knowledge to include, and whose and what to exclude. This is particularly important when it comes to considering if and how 'pastoralist voices' are heard in the policy and decision-making processes that affect them.

4.4.3.3 Governmentality and pastoralism

The term 'governmentality' offers a broader concept for understanding all the mechanisms (including forms of knowledge and discourses) through which we are governed (Foucault 1991; Dean, 1999, Joseph, 2014). Foucault's work on governmentality is concerned with the intersection of 'rationalities' (the reasoning underlying the way people govern others and themselves) and the 'technologies' (or practices) of governance (Foucault, 1991). Foucault reworked the concept of government to distinguish a new form of power (governmentality) from two older forms, sovereignty and discipline, by which he refers to any calculated activity "employing tactics other than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics – to arrange things in such a way, that through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved" (Foucault, 1991:95). As states promulgate systems of governance (often indirectly) through populations, people and actors come to internalise the responsibilities and norms of state actors themselves. They become self-

governing (Robbins, 2012). Morton (2010) argues that there are a number of good reasons why governmentality is useful for the study of pastoral development. Firstly, the emphasis on specificity and contingency found in governmentality thinking relates to the fact that the situation of pastoralists across Africa is hugely different, not only in relation to ecology and political economy, but also in the context of history and political cultures. These combine in contingent ways. This is relevant to my own study when we consider the heterogenous nature of pastoralists, and pastoralism, in Kenya and Ethiopia. It is important to ask how power is functioning in specific situations and contexts and what kinds of knowledge are 'taken for granted': Secondly, a governmentality approach pays heed to multiple actors, including the governed and their own contribution to governance – through for example traditional leaders, community-based pastoralist organisations and representatives and advocates at different levels (Morton, 2010) – also of interest to this research (Chapter 6). The concept of governmentality further allows space to consider diverse 'technologies of rule'. Pastoralists are governed: "not only by the laws of the state and the ways these are enforced…. but also by policies made at various levels, property rights constructed and recognised in various ways, and different ways in which knowledge about them and their environment is defined, collected and fed back to them" (Morton, 2010: 16). This is especially pertinent when we consider issues relevant to pastoral area governance, as I do in Chapters 7 and 8. DA can help to identify such technologies of rule and puts forms of knowledge at the centre of the study of power.[59]

4.4.4 'Doing a discourse analysis'

Environmental policy discourse analysts, such as Hajer (1995) and Dryzek (2013), whose work is influenced by Foucault's concepts, have devised their own methods of carrying out DA. Hajer (1995; 2006) has proposed three tools to help identify discourses within research materials – 'metaphor', 'storyline' (narratives) and 'discourse coalitions' – a framework I found useful for my own analysis. Metaphors are generally 2–3-word phrases or rhetorical devices – such as the 'green economy' or 'climate resilience' – that symbolise the key ideas of a discourse. In my study, most of these metaphors were identified at the CA stage. Storylines, or narratives, encapsulate the essence of a discourse in shorthand, using the metaphors. Actors operating within the discourse may use the same narratives in communication but this does not mean each use is based on the same understanding or depth of knowledge. Nevertheless, together they can produce "meaningful political interventions" (Hajer, 2005: 301). 'Discourse coalitions' are defined as "groups of actors that in the context of an identifiable set of practices, share the usage of a particular set of storylines over a particular period of time" (Hajer, 2005: 302). In addition to the three tools above, Hajer (2006) has prescribed a number of steps for doing a DA. These include: desk research (a first

[59] See Joseph (2014) for a discussion of 'resilience' – as promoted in the HoA by the EU and other international agencies – as a form of 'soft power' or 'governmentality at a distance'.

chronology and reading of events); document analysis – to identify metaphors, narratives and discourse coalitions, as well as 'sites of discursive struggle' (Wodak and Meyer; 2009:10); interviews with key players to enable the researcher to identify the interviewees' discourses and their recognition of alternative perspectives; analysis of actors' positioning; and interpretation – the researcher's own account of the discursive structures, practices and sites of production (Hajer, 2006: 73-74). Hajer's tools and steps for conducting a DA were useful to follow in my study because they provided a clear approach to addressing my first two research questions: What are the dominant discourses and narratives on pastoralism found within national climate-change and drylands policies in Ethiopian and Kenyan policies? And, what are the interests of the actors and actor networks driving these discourses and policy narratives? Hajer's steps also allow space for my own interpretation of findings in light of theory and the broader political economy context.

For my study, I am particularly interested in the following three aspects of DA: the way the messages of the discourses have been communicated – in other words, the narratives used to 'frame' a particular discourse; analysis of the actors and actor networks, producing, reproducing and transforming discourses (the 'discourse coalitions' that Hajer refers to); and the policy prescriptions and outcome – or consequences – of the discourses. Drawing on these methods, relevant policy documents from the two case-study country governments were analysed using CA and DA, with the purpose of identifying common themes and discourses, and unpacking the assumptions, arguments and evidence that underpin them, as well as examining what actors and networks and policy prescriptions connect these discourses to local outcomes. Themes emerging from this analysis, combined with pertinent issues derived from the literature, were then used as the basis for formulating an interview schedule (Appendix E). The interviews in turn, by generating additional data, illuminated and developed themes that had emerged in the preceding analysis, and were examined for their own discursive content.

4.4.5 Limitations of discourse analysis and content analysis as research methods

This chapter has so far discussed the strengths of CA and DA and argued why they are appropriate methods to look at how policy discourses around climate change, drylands, pastoralism and the green economy are constructed and evolved over time, as well as unpack the assumptions on which such discourses and narratives are based. However, there are some limitations. DA is largely a qualitative and interpretive method. Its application in this thesis is challenged when faced with the difficulty of moving beyond the specific text-based materials (the policy documents) to address the wider context and discourses within which they are located. A criticism of DA is that it only operates at the 'micro' level of social order (i.e. language use, writing, verbal interaction and communication) and can lead to an over-representation of what are minor shifts in language (van

Dijk, 2001).[60] In this case, CA is useful because "it allows micro-level DA to be placed in the context of broader shifts in language use over time, across different organizations or agencies, and across documents" (McConnon, 2015: 44). In turn, CA has been criticised for decontextualising the words from the text being examined, or that mere counting can lead to attaching too much significance to certain words that are used most frequently, leading to misleading conclusions (Billig, 1988). Nevertheless, CA provides an empirical grounding for the in-depth DA that follows. At the same time, it is important to stress here that the results of the CA in this study are a function of the sample of policy documents for each country (where, as flagged above (4.4.1), the addition of additional regional state (Ethiopia) or county (Kenya) level documents may have led to a different set of results), the ordering of documents examined, as well as the categorisation of keywords within each of the three discourse (Table 3.2). This is acknowledged as a limitation of the methodology.

One strength of DA is that it allows a deeper level of examination to just patterns in word use, allowing an investigation into the way these words are used to frame issues, and the ideas and assumptions they represent. By using interviews, another level of analysis was added. Had the study been limited to just content and discourse analyses of written policy, there would have been a danger of it, firstly, confining itself to 'old data' and, secondly, becoming too self-referential and bearing no resemblance to how that policy is articulated through development planning and interventions at the local level. By conducting interviews with key informants, the findings from the CA and DA were tested (Chapter 6), actors' positions identified (Chapter 6), and the question of how climate-change and green-economy policies are manifesting in terms of their implications for pastoralism explored (Chapters 6 and 7).

There is also a concern that the documents analysed are somehow not 'representative' of the main actors in the area, or that some texts – propagating perhaps a different set of discourses and narratives – remain hidden. Conscious of this, I was careful to review as many national policies related to climate change, green economy and drylands that had been produced in Ethiopia and Kenya within a particular time period and made reference to pastoralism as was possible within the scope of the study (see Section 4.4.1 on 'Sources of data for document analysis' above). As all of these documents were produced for public consumption, they represent what certain key actors were thinking at a particular point in time. Again, interviews were a useful means of crosschecking if the actors who participated in the interview process were invoking similar discourses and narratives – in itself, evidence of the power of discourse.

[60] It should be noted that CDA attempts to overcome this limitation and in effect 'bridge the gap' between the micro and the macro, as it is also interested in power, dominance and inequality between social groups (at the macro level) (van Dijk, 2001). CDA does not limit its analysis to specific structures of text or talk, but systematically relates these structures to the socio-political context (Fairclough, 2001).

4.4.6 Interviews

4.4.6.1 Interviews as a source of data

The bulk of the analysis presented in Chapters 6 and 7 comes from the findings from semi-structured interviews with 68 key informants (Appendix A), most of which were conducted during six weeks of fieldwork in Ethiopia and Kenya during May and June 2018, with some follow-up by Skype. Their aim was to gather primary data that would provide answers to my second and third research questions: Who are the principle actors, actor networks and institutions shaping and driving policy narratives, and what are their interests? What are the consequences of these policy narratives for pastoralists and for the future of pastoralism in the two cases? Informants consisted of actors and stakeholders with knowledge and experience of climate change and/or drylands and pastoralist-related policy processes within the Ethiopian and Kenyan contexts. Care was taken to identify and select informants from a range of sectors, actor groups and perspectives, including: central government (different line ministries and departments); local government; statutory agencies; international donors; international and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs); pastoralist organisations (POs) and networks; pastoralist public representatives (MPs); and national and international dryland researchers and/or consultants who are usually resident in or have spent long periods in one or both countries. For convenience, these are classified into nine different categories (see Table 4.4). It is worth noting here the gender imbalance in interviewees, especially so in Ethiopia (only 1, compared to 9 women in Kenya) - reflective perhaps of the lower number of women professionals in the civil service and related sectors in Ethiopia.[61] The male/ female breakdown for each category is recorded in Table 4.4. It is impossible to speculate if this gender imbalance had any bearing on the kinds of responses given by interviewees, nonetheless the small number of women interviewed for this study is acknowledged as a limitation.

As the research was focused on the policy level, it did not involve any fieldwork with local pastoralist communities. This is acknowledged as a significant limitation of this research, in that the views of those groups who are being most impacted, or likely to be affected, by the material outcomes of policy narratives and processes are not heard directly in this study – but rather through the interpretation of intermediaries. To conduct such site-specific fieldwork – focus groups with local pastoralist community members, for example – would have added another valuable layer of data to the study, but was beyond the scope and time limits of this research project.

Interview participants were identified using purposive, convenience and 'snowball' sampling, which are all 'non-probability' methods (Mays and Pope, 1995; Denscombe, 2014). In this sampling strategy – often used in qualitative research – the researcher does not seek to establish a

[61] https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Preliminary%20Gender%20Profile%20of%20Ethiopia%20Nov%2017%20final.pdf

random or representative sample, and therefore focuses less on sample size and more on ensuring an 'appropriate' sample - one that is composed of specific groups of people who best represent or have knowledge of the social phenomenon being studied (Bowen, 2008; Mays and Pope, 1995). In my case, participants were identified on the basis of their work with relevant specialist governmental and non-governmental agencies and/or on the basis of their existing expertise on the subject area. Through my professional work and my membership of two pastoralist advocacy networks – CELEP (see 4.2) and the Pastoralist Knowledge Hub[62] – I already knew a number of participants in Ethiopia and Kenya who were considered to have experience or views related to the phenomenon. In this case, it was convenient for me to contact these participants, many who in turn recommended further potential informants. Denscombe (2014) states that, in such 'snowball sampling', the sample develops through a process of reference from one person to another. The process is repeated until the researcher has collected sufficient data for the scale and scope of the research (Jupp, 2006), or reached 'saturation point' – where enough data have been collected to ensure the research questions have been answered, a sufficient range of perspectives has been heard, or no benefit can be gained by adding to the sample (Baker and Edwards, 2012; Corbin and Strauss, 2008). In this case, I employed an iterative approach to data collection and analysis and did not set a fixed number of interviews in advance, preferring to reflect on the findings and themes being discussed as they emerged, to ensure the research questions were being answered and a range of voices or perspectives had been heard. Other participants who were not known to me, or who were not recommended by others, were identified independently through my reading of policy documents and related literature and by reviewing government and organisational websites for names of key contacts. This reduced the risk inherent in snowball sampling, in which participants might be inclined to recommend only those who share a similar perspective. Participants were contacted directly by email or by phone and invited to participate in the study, and the purpose of the study was explained to them.

The sample of respondents identified as ideal subjects for an interview across the two countries eventually grew to 162. Of these, 68 (58 men and 10 women) agreed to participate (32 in Ethiopia and 36 in Kenya), representing a broad spectrum of interest groups and perspectives. This was certainly an appropriate sample given that it was composed of specific groups of people who I believe have knowledge of the social phenomenon being studied. Interviewing all 162 subjects initially identified would have also have proved logistically impossible given the time contraints imposed on fieldwork and it is unclear what added value additional interviews with certain actor groups – INGO informants or dryland researchers for example – would have generated. Nevertheless, there were some gaps. It is very likely that more interviews with certain actors would have added further insights that are missing from the data. Requests for interviews with government officials in Ethiopia, whose responsibility specifically included the green economy or

[62] See: http://www.fao.org/pastoralist-knowledge-hub/en/

renewable energy, were ignored. In Kenya, I was unable to interview anyone from a donor or bilateral aid agency, despite these agencies' importance as policy actors (see Chapter 6). It also proved difficult to secure interviews with officials from certain government departments in Kenya where pastoral area affairs are not considered as part of their brief (members of the Climate Change Directorate, for example, or those in the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation responsible for water development). It is likely that those government officials who did respond and agree to be interviewed, especially in Kenya (see Chapter 6), are more favourably disposed towards pastoralist development. I surmise that central or local government officials working on, for example, a large-scale irrigation or renewable-energy project in Kenya's ASAL might offer a different perspective to those whose work is more directly focused on pastoral area development or drought management. In the same way interviews with more women informants (in Ethiopia especially) may have provided different perspectives not captured in the findings. These gaps in the interviewee sample are acknowledged as a further limitation of this research. A full list of the institutions and agencies from which interviewees were drawn can be found in Appendix B. Table 4.4 sets out the numbers of interviewees in each category across the two countries, as well as the male/female breakdown.

Table 4.4 Breakdown of interviewee categories

	Ethiopia			**Kenya**		
Interviewee category	**Total**	**M**	**F**	**Total**	**M**	**F**
Government official	**7**	7	0	**6**	6	0
Donor / bilateral aid agency staff	**4**	4	0	**0**	0	0
INGO staff member[63]	**7**	7	0	**6**	4	2
International researcher or consultant (includes UN agency staff)[64]	**6**	5	1	**10**	8	2
Local researcher or consultant	**6**	6	0	**5**	4	1
Local NGO / CSO[65] staff member	**0**	0	0	**3**	2	1
Pastoralist Member of Parliament (MP)	**0**	0	0	**1**	1	0
Pastoralist organisation representative	**2**	2	0	**4**	2	2
Private-sector organisation	**0**	0	0	**1**	0	1
Totals	**32**	31	1	**36**	27	9

[63] The category 'INGO' (international non-governmental organisation)) includes both 'local' Ethiopian/ Kenyan staff as well as expatriate staff working for INGOs operational in Ethiopia and/or Kenya.

[64] UN = United Nations; Interviewees in the category 'International researchers' were defined by the organisation they were working for rather than by nationality. It includes both citizens of Ethiopia and/or Kenya as well as expatriate researchers or consultants who currently live, or have lived for long periods, in Ethiopia or Kenya and have substantive 'in-country' expertise.

[65] CSO: civil-society organisation

In line with Dublin City University '*Guidelines on Best Practice in Research Ethics'*,[66] interviews were conducted with the full assurance of anonymity and based on the informed consent of participants. Participants were issued with a 'Letter of Information', outlining the aim of the research and how the findings will be used, and were asked to sign an 'Informed Consent Form' before the interviews took place (Appendix C). Interviews were, where possible, conducted face-to-face during two separate visits to the region: the first while attending a three-day seminar in Kenya in March 2018 (enabling me to 'pilot' the interview schedule with several informants known to me and make modifications accordingly), the second, more extensively, as part of six weeks of field-research in Ethiopia and Kenya undertaken during May and June 2018. In a small number of cases where a face-to-face interview was not possible, interviews were conducted using Skype.

Interviews lasted between 40 minutes and 1 hour, and all bar one were recorded with the participant's consent using a digital recording device. Notes were also hand-written by the researcher during the interviews, while memos on each interview were written up later the same day. Field notes are a type of data that contains some conceptualisation and analytical remarks, whereas memos are lengthier and more in-depth thoughts about the event and usually written up shortly afterwards (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). They can include observational notes describing the interview, the researcher's reflections on the interviews or new ideas that emerge, and reminders about some procedural or methodological aspect of the research. These memos proved helpful during the process of analysis and coding.

In retrospect, the time given for fieldwork was quite short – three weeks in Ethiopia and four weeks in total in Kenya, with some interviews done via Skype outside of that period. More time in each country may have allowed me to secure additional interviews with some officials in certain Ministries or state departments who proved hard to contact. It would also have given me time to visit pastoral areas and interview some more local government officials and local PO representatives, and gain a greater sense of the kinds of change underway. Nonetheless, assisted by careful preparation in advance of fieldwork and given the constraints of time and cost, I was able to meet and interview a significant number of informants, representing a broad spectrum of actor groups, in a relatively short amount of time.

4.4.6.2 Interviews as a method

Interviews were semi-structured, which allows the interviewer to casually guide the themes explored in the interview. The interviews followed a set of predetermined questions derived from issues that emerged from the content and discourse analysis, as well as from the themes discussed in the literature. In the interview schedule (Appendix D), open-ended questions were categorised

[66] https://www.dcu.ie/researchsupport/rec_guidance.shtml

under four main areas of enquiry: (1) Context – challenges and policy responses; (2) Actors' interests, motivations and sources of legitimacy; (3) Policy prescriptions and pastoralist outcomes; and (4) The future of pastoralism. The 'semi-structured' nature of the interview schedule allowed flexibility to explore certain key themes relevant to aims of this research in more depth, depending on the interviewee and the initial responses to core questions.

I employed several strategies to attempt to minimise personal bias. By interviewing a range of actors, I allowed space for multiple views. All interviewees, regardless of their role and interests, were asked the same set of interview questions (with some allowance for country-specific probing questions). When conducting interviews, I tried to detach myself from any preconceived notions of the topic and to remain open at all times to perspectives different from my own. By avoiding 'leading questions', by not expressing my own opinion during an interview and by allowing interviewees to express themselves in their own terms, I attempted to overcome limitations due to positional bias, discussed earlier. Sometimes it was necessary to ask more probing questions to move the discussion on to areas I felt were not being sufficiently addressed. Throughout the fieldwork and subsequent transcribing and coding, I constantly re-assessed my findings to ensure different voices that challenged my own assumptions and biases were heard and evaluated.

I was also conscious of certain cultural and political sensitivities, particularly when it came to issues pertaining to land and other forms of 'rights' or to pastoral displacement. I was careful not to ask questions that could be perceived as overtly political – about reported human rights violations for example. Civil servants – in Ethiopia especially, where policy and decision-making, have, up until recently, been largely top-down and tightly controlled (Chapters 2 and 6) – may have been reluctant to offer views that could be perceived as in any way critical of state policy.

While the (changing) role of patoralist women is discussed in Chapter 2 (see 2.3.1), gender inequality as a theme is not explicitly considered in the analysis of interview data (Chapters 6 and 7), just as it it not the focus of the CA and DA of policy documents (Chapter 5). The reason for this is that it is not the primary focus of this study - which is on the narratives and discourses and actors interests shaping policies in the drylands of the HoA their implications for pastoralist livelihoods. To do justice to the issue of the rights and changing roles of women in pastoralism would require a dedicated study on Gender and Pastoralism. Nonetheless the small number of women interviewed for this study (10 in Kenya but only 1 in Ethiopia) is acknowledged as a limitation. It is quite possible that different perspectives would have emerged should womens' voices have been more the fore.

4.4.6.3 Interview data analysis / coding

The content of each interview was transcribed in full directly following the period of fieldwork.

Key insights and points of view were highlighted through a process of data coding (done separately for each country) – using *NVivo* qualitative data-analysis software to organise and manage the data. Nvivo allows the user to import each interview transcript ('files'), create codes / categories (referred to as 'Nodes' in Nvivo) and hierarchies of codes / categories, and generate reports. 'Coding' is the process of gathering material by topic, theme or case – for example, a direct quote from an interviewee that the researcher deems matches a particular code. One quote or sentence (identified as a 'reference' in Nvivo) can be coded to more than one code or category. 'Cases' can also be created (for a particular interviewee category for example) and content coded to each case. Coding allowed me to identify, classify and categorise common themes and sub-themes using thematic analysis. I performed coding at two levels – Open and Axial (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Punch, 2009) – referred to as 'Phase 1' and 'Phase 2' in Nvivo - using a combination of deductive and inductive approaches. Open codes served to reduce the mass of textual data into manageable groups. To open-code the data, I started by using the three thematic elements of the research as set out in the research questions – discourses and narratives, actors and actor networks, and policy consequences – as the main categories for coding. Under each category, a number of sub-categories or codes were created – generated initially from key words, concepts and issues that had emerged from the literature review and document analysis. Paragraphs, sentences and words in the interview transcripts were then assigned under each code. Further open coding involved assigning more specific substantive labels or concepts, as well as '*in vivo codes'* (codes that emerge from respondents' exact words) to chunks of text. The process of assigning and revising codes eventually generated 75 open codes in the case of Ethiopia, and 57 in the case of Kenya (where several codes were merged for convenience). I constantly checked and rechecked the codes and concepts, aiming to identify patterns and discover theoretical properties. Codes were clustered into substantive sub-categories and these category codes were compared across interview transcripts, as well as with data from the policy documents reviewed earlier. The aim here was to identify "similarities, differences and general patterns" (Bowen, 2008; 144). If new categories were suggested by new data, then previous transcripts from the interviews, together with data from the policy documents, were re-examined to determine the presence of these categories – a process known as 'constant comparison' (Grey 2009). In turn, axial codes were used to capture the essence of the data in terms that are more abstract or theoretical than open codes (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Frequent and widespread use of key terms suggested their relevance as conceptual categories. With some merging of codes, the eventual number of axial codes generated for Ethiopia was 32, and for Kenya 31 (see Appendix E).[67] Coding was also used to assign references (specific

[67] Appendix E presents statistical reports on the axial codes generated by Nvivo for each set of interview findings. The column 'Name' lists all the axial codes, organised by theme or category and including sub-categories. For example, 'Vested interests', in the Kenya report is a sub-category of the theme 'Actors motivations and interests'. The column 'Files' refers to the number of interview transcripts from which a quote or reference has been taken. Of the 36 interviews conducted in Kenya, 25 have one or more references that explicitly match the code of 'vested interests'. The final column is the total number of sentences or paragraphs ('References') assigned to that code. While there were only

quotes taken from the interview transcripts) for each actor type (Table 4.4) that specifically matched an assumption or narrative in line with one of the three discourses on pastoralism identified in Chapter 3, so providing a basis for analysis of actors and their narratives (see Table 6.1 in Chapter 6).

As the analysis progressed, I moved beyond the actual words in the interview transcripts to interpretation of the content, or to making connections between categories and sub-categories (Grey, 2009). This interpretation is the narrative that is presented in Chapters 6 and 7. During data analysis, 'theoretical sensitivity' was maintained at all times – "the capacity to separate the pertinent from that which isn't" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, cited in Grey, 2009: 511). This was done by making reference back to the literature and by comparing and contrasting my findings with what previous studies have found, and by contextualising my data, just as had been the case for the preceding content and discourse analysis.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined my own epistemological perspective and positionality with respect to the research, together with the research design and specific methods used. While not disputing the realities of climate change or the need for climate mitigation and adaptation, aligning myself with a constructivist epistemological position allowed me to explore how narratives about climate change and pastoralism are constructed and moulded, how these narratives influence decision-making, and what repercussions these decisions may have on pastoralist livelihoods. I also draw on the ideas of political ecology – a field of study that seeks to provide a framework for understanding the interrelations of politics and power, structures and discourses, with the natural environment. Influenced by the work of Foucault, the 'post-structural' strand within political ecology explores the genealogy of global environmental narratives and emphasises political economy as a causal theme. This has relevance when we consider how 'new' narratives – around, for example, pastoralist vulnerability to climate change or the need for climate-smart agriculture – are rooted in historical discourses around pastoral areas, and how access to and control over land and key resources in dryland areas are increasingly contested by different state and non-state actors. Acknowledging my own positionality, I sought to minimise personal bias by careful sampling of policy documents, by interviewing as wide a cross-section of policy actors in each case as possible, and by ensuring that different voices that challenged my own assumptions and biases were heard and evaluated throughout.

The research is a comparative study of two cases that share much in common, but also have important differences – and draws its analysis from multiple sources of evidence. The results of

25 files that had one or more references assigned to 'vested interests' there were 52 references to 'vested interests' in total across those 25 files.

CA, DA and semi-structured interviews are used collectively to address the three research questions at the heart of this study. When used together, these methods address the possible shortcomings of each individual method. CA is deemed an appropriate tool for my research, as it provides an insight into which discourses around pastoralism have greater dominance in policy processes and how these vary over time and across different agencies. In turn, DA builds on the CA by examining how certain 'global' discourses of climate governance and the green economy are used in drylands development policies and, in turn, how certain development discourses (in this case, discourses and narratives around pastoralism) are evident in climate policies. While not adhering strictly to a specific type of discourse analysis, it is influenced by the work of several theorists associated with the CDA 'school', by Foucault's understanding of power, as well as by environmental policy DA. The possibility that policy exists in isolation from practice, and that content and discourse analysis can be accused of confining itself to 'old data', removed from how policy is actually implemented, was addressed by conducting interviews with key informants. This chapter has also highlighted research limitations, such as the gender imbalance in terms of the male/female breakdown of interviewees, the fact that the study did not involve any fieldwork with local pastoralist communities (only those speaking on their behalf), and that despite considerable care being given to ensure an appropriate sample of interviewees for this study, I was unable to secure interviews with certain government departments in Ethiopia and Kenya or with representatives of donors in Kenya. Allowing a longer period for fieldwork may have enabled me to gain access to these actors. In the following three chapters, I present and analyse the results of my research.

Chapter 5: Discourses and narratives within Ethiopian and Kenyan policies

5.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the results of a CA and DA of Ethiopian and Kenyan policy documents related to climate change and drylands development spanning the period 2007–2017. The background and context for these policies were outlined towards the end of Chapter 2, while a closer examination of the key actors, institutions and networks that shape these policies, and their interests, is provided in Chapter 6. The aim of this analysis is to identify and examine what discourses and narratives are dominant within contemporary climate-change and dryland-development policies in the two cases, to see if there have been any noticeable changes in these over time and to examine differences and similarities between the two countries. The chapter looks at each set of policy documents in turn. The first part presents the results of a CA and DA of Ethiopian policy documents, while the second part presents the results for Kenyan policy documents.

The results of this analysis are broadly congruent with my hypothesis when selecting the two cases (see Section 4.3): that a 'transforming pastoralism and drylands' policy discourse would be more to the fore in the case of Ethiopia, whereas narratives closer to the 'pure pastoralism' and 'modern, mobile and green' discourses were more likely to feature in Kenyan policies and strategies. What emerges from the CA is that, while there are some significant variations between different policy documents (reflecting the particular focus of certain policies, and especially the positions of whatever ministries or agencies are responsible for their production and implementation), it is more difficult to detect an obvious pattern in how each discourse has evolved over the time period examined, in either Ethiopia or Kenya. Based on the sample here, 'transforming pastoralism and drylands' remains the dominant discourse around pastoralist development in both countries, if somewhat more pronounced in Ethiopia. A 'pure pastoralism' discourse is less prominent, but does nevertheless have a strong presence within many of the documents analysed. Meanwhile, keywords and concepts associated with a 'modern, mobile and green' discourse appear less frequently, but are growing in significance, if slightly more so in Kenya.[68] The DA, in turn, reveals that deeply embedded 'environmental-crises' narratives of 'unproductive and conflict-ridden drylands' and 'climate-induced pastoralist vulnerability' remain at the heart of policymaking in both cases,

[68] As the previous chapter has highlighted, relying on CA alone would have significantly limited this study. To the extent that the results of the CA are essentially a function of: the sample of policy documents for each country (where, as flagged earlier (4.4.1) the addition of additional regional (Ethiopia) or county (Kenya) level documents may have led to a different set of results); the ordering of documents examined; and the categorisation of keywords within each of the threee discourse (Table 3.2).

despite greater acceptance over time of mobile pastoralism as a legitimate form of land use. These narratives amplify the perception that some kind of intervention needs to take place, and opens up space for the state or other actors to claim stewardship over land and other resources previously managed under customary institutions. There are calls to 'intensify and commercialise agriculture' (including livestock production) or to 'build pastoralists' resilience' through 'market-led approaches', livelihood diversification and – in the case of Ethiopia – sedentarisation. At the same time – and a trend that clearly not fully captured by the CA – the DA reveals that narratives that derive from new understandings of pastoralism and rangeland ecology, which emphasise the inherent adaptive nature of mobility and argue for greater support for the rights and livelihoods of pastoralists, have evidently gained currency among certain state ministries and agencies, particularly in Kenya. Meanwhile, newer narratives and messages around 'climate resilience' and the 'green economy' have emerged, driven by the imperatives of responding to climate change while maintaining economic growth, as well as the promise of new sources of donor funding. Trends, as we will see in Chapter 6, which are reaffirmed by the findings of the interviews with state actors in both counries.

These findings endorse what the existing literature has, in a limited manner, already highlighted (Chapter 2): that, while the language may have evolved, some of the narratives driving current climate-change and green-economy policies in Ethiopia and Kenya are not necessarily 'new', but are instead rooted in historical arguments and assumptions around 'unproductive' drylands, the poor as agents and victims of environmental degradation, and the need for modernisation (Maina *et al*., 2013; Yirgu *et al*., 2013; Odhiambo, 2014; Weisser *et al*., 2014; Kratli, 2019). And that narratives of 'climate resilience', climate adaptation' and 'green growth', as currently articulated, are largely framed in politically neutral and technocratic terms, often serving to mask the impacts of national policy and politics at the local level, including politicised and competing claims to land and other dryland resources (Eriksen and Marin, 2015; Symons, 2014; Death, 2015, 2016).

5.2. Analysis of Ethiopian policy

This section draws from a CA and DA of relevant Ethiopian policy documents spanning the period 2007–2017. A list of these documents (Table 4.2) and their rationale for inclusion can be found in Chapter 4.

5.2.1. Content analysis of Ethiopian documents

This section sets out the results of CA applied to Ethiopian climate-change, green-economy and dryland development policies that have relevance directly, or indirectly, to pastoralist livelihoods. As outlined in Chapter 3, the coding scheme isolated keywords that represent three contrasting – and sometimes overlapping – discourses on pastoralism within policies related to climate change

and drylands: ‘pure pastoralism’, ‘transforming pastoralism and drylands’ and a ‘mobile, modern and green’ discourse. The pre-determined keywords and associated synonyms (Table 3.1) were derived from an extensive review of the literature.

As Ethiopian policy documents reviewed for this study were of varying lengths (from 2-236 pages), word frequency was calculated by taking the total word count for a particular term (and/or its synonyms) in a particular document and calculating it as a percentage value of all keywords counted in that same document.[69] Table 5.1 shows these percentage values for Ethiopia. This allows a comparison of how frequently terms associated with each of the three discourses are used in relation to each other within documents, and across documents by different government ministries or agencies over time. For the full word-count, see Table 7, Appendix F. The final column in Table 5.1 shows the percentage value for each keyword (and/or its synonyms) in relation to the total keyword count across all the documents in the sample. Figure 5.1 is a bar chart visualising the aggregate percentage value breakdown for each discourse and for each document (for example, keywords asscociated with the ‘pure pastoralism’ discourse account for 25.3% of the total count of keywords in the Ethiopian National Adaptation Programme of Action – FDRE-NMA, 2007, while keywords associated with the ‘transforming’ discourse account for 69.6% in the same document) allowing a comparison across time. Keywords in the bibliographies and contents pages of documents were excluded from the word-count.

[69] An absolute word-count in any document is only useful for a comparison within that document and not across other documents.

Table 5.1 Breakdown of keywords in Ethiopian policy documents as percentage values.

Table 5.1 Breakdown of keywords used in Ethiopian policy documents as percentage values

		FDRE-NMA 2007	FDRE 2008	FDRE 2010	FDRE 2011a	FDRE-MoA 2010	FDRE - EPA 2011	FDRE 2011b	FDRE/ WB 2013	FDRE 2014	FDRE MoA 2015	FDRE 2015	EPCC 2015	FDRE - MECC 2015a	FDRE - MECC 2015b	USAID / MC 2016	Farm Africa 2016	FDRE 2017	Totals %
'Pure Pastoralism'	Variability	18.1	0	8.3	5.3	0.6	3.9	0.4	1.4	0	1.3	0	12	14.9	16.8	0	2.4	5.8	6.3
	Mobility	0	8.1	4.5	6.9	0	1.2	0	0	0	0.3	0	1.4	0	0	0	2.4	0	1.4
	Livelihood(s)	6.5	13.1	14.2	15.6	1.2	9.8	0.4	15.2	0.8	2.3	5.6	9.9	10.8	1.7	12.5	2.4	5.4	7.1
	Pastoral system(s)	0	4	1.5	1.5	0	0	0	0	0	2.7	0	1.8	0	0	0	4.9	1	0.7
	Customary Institutions	0	2	0.6	0.8	0.3	0.4	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2.5	0	1	0.3
	Autonomous adaptation	0	0	1.3	0.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.6	0	2.5	0	1.5	0.2
	Resilience	0.7	0	3.4	1.1	0.6	2	0.6	21.3	0.1	0.3	16.7	6.4	34.8	16.2	15	22	14.7	7.4
	Adaptive capacity	0	0	3	6.7	0	12.9	0	0.7	0	0.3	0	1	0.2	0	2.5	0	6.9	1.8
	Rights	0	0	0	1.9	0.3	0	0.4	0.7	3.4	1.3	0	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0.9
	Indigenous	0	0	2.5	4.2	0.3	1.6	0.6	0.4	0.7	9.7	0	4.6	0	0	0	0	0.5	1.9
	Pastoral Governance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Key resources	0	2	1.3	0.8	0	0.8	0	0	0	0	0	0.1	0	0	2.5	4.9	0	0.3
		25.3	**29.3**	**40.7**	**45.3**	**3.3**	**32.4**	**2.5**	**39.7**	**5.1**	**19.5**	**22.2**	**37.6**	**61.2**	**34.7**	**37.5**	**39**	**36.8**	**28.3**
'Transforming Pastoralism and Drylands'	Climate risk	4.4	1	4.2	1.9	0	4.3	0	4.6	0.4	0	4.2	2.6	3.2	8.6	2.5	9.8	5.8	2.6
	Vulnerable	18.1	4	14.6	7.6	8.4	25.8	0.4	8.5	2.2	0	15.3	25	8.9	7.3	7.5	7.3	9.8	10.2
	Degradation	14.3	7.1	10	15.2	7.5	12.5	9.6	6	1	1	5.6	6.4	1.1	1	0	4.9	3.4	6.4
	Conflict	0	12.1	5.3	8.2	0.6	3.5	0.6	0	0.4	1	0	0.5	0.2	1	0	2.4	0.5	1.9
	Insecurity	0.3	6.1	4.4	2.9	3.3	0.4	0.2	14.5	0.7	0.3	1.4	4.1	0.6	0	0	0	0.5	2.4
	Coping strategy	3.8	0	2.5	2.9	0.3	2	0	0.4	0.1	0	0	1.1	0.2	0	0	0	1	0.9
	Transform	0	3	0.4	0.2	1.2	0	2.3	0.7	25.3	0	2.8	0.4	1.1	2.3	0	4.9	0.5	4.8
	Sedentarise	0.3	4	0.4	1.3	0	0	0	0	0.4	0.7	0	0.7	0.6	0	0	0	0.5	0.5
	Irrigation	16	14.1	7.2	6.7	12	7	19.5	3.5	4.9	0.7	2.8	11.8	1.5	18.5	0	0	1.5	8.4
	Integration	0.7	3	0.4	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.4	2.5	5.9	1.3	6.9	0.7	1.1	4.6	12.5	2.4	14.1	2.4
	Commercial	6.1	6.1	1.1	0.4	29	2	4.4	0	18.7	39.6	1.4	1.6	1.1	4.6	10	17.1	2.5	8.5
	Productivity	4.1	4	4	3.4	21	4.3	9	8.9	25.2	20.5	5.6	0.7	4.8	5	10	0	4.4	9.6
	Value chain	0	0	0.6	0.2	10.2	0	3.1	0	0.4	12.4	0	0.8	1.3	0	7.5	0	1.5	1.9
	Climate resilient	0	0	0	0	0	0.4	0	4.6	3	0.3	8.3	1	5.6	3.3	10	2.4	3.9	1.9
	Renewable Energy	1.4	0	0.4	0.2	0	1.6	4.4	0	1.9	0	5.6	0.3	0	2.6	0	0	3.9	1.2
	Planned adaptation	0	0	0	0.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.5	0	0.5	0.1
		69.6	**64.6**	**55.3**	**51.8**	**94**	**64.1**	**54**	**54.3**	**90.6**	**77.9**	**59.7**	**57.6**	**31.2**	**58.7**	**62.5**	**51.2**	**54.3**	**63.7**
'Modern, Mobile and Green'	Pastoralist entrepreneurs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Diversification	1.4	5.1	3.4	2.5	2.4	2.3	1.7	1.4	0	1	1.4	3	1.7	0	0	2.4	1	1.7
	Green economy	0	0	0	0	0	0.8	34.3	3.9	4	0.3	15.3	1.5	4.5	5.9	0	2.4	3.9	4.9
	Sustainable adaptation	0	0	0.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Carbon sequestration	3.8	0	0	0	0.3	0.4	7.3	0.4	0	0	1.4	0.1	0	0.3	0	0	0.5	0.9
	Payment for Environmental Service	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.4	0.3	0	0	0.5	0.1
	Climate Smart Agriculture	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.1	0	0	0	0	1	0
	Policy harmonisation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0
	Cross border	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.2	0	0	0.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Social Protection	0	0	0.4	0.4	0	0	0	0.4	0.2	0	0	0	0.9	0	0	2.4	1.5	0.3
	Public Goods	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.1	0.7	0	0	0.2	0	0	0	0	0.06
		5.1	**6.1**	**4**	**2.9**	**2.7**	**3.5**	**43.5**	**6**	**4.3**	**2.7**	**18.1**	**4.8**	**7.6**	**6.6**	**0**	**7.3**	**8.9**	**8**



Figure 5.1 Aggregate percentage for each discourse in Ethiopian policy documents

5.2.1.1 'Transforming pastoralism and drylands'

What is most evident from Figure 5.1 is that there is no clear pattern or noticeable change of dominance of a particular discourse over time in the documents analysed here (which, as has been noted earlier, vary considerably in length). The breakdown of words in Table 5.1 shows that 'transforming pastoralism' is clearly the most prominent discourse across almost all Ethiopian policy documents analysed – the only exception being the FDRE-MECC *Agriculture and Forestry Climate Resilience Strategy* from 2015.

The aggregate percentage value for the 'transforming pastoralism' discourse ranges from 69.6% in 2007 through counts as high as 94%, 90.6% and 62.5% in 2010, 2014 and 2016, respectively. It is evident that, despite the 'new thinking' on rangeland ecology and models of pastoralist development that has informed most drylands-related research since the 1990s and the emergence of narratives that see pastoralists as playing an important role in the 'green economy' (see Chapter 2), the use of terminology more associated with 'old narratives' of unproductive, fragile and conflict-ridden drylands and vulnerable communities in the face of climate change remains high. Table 5.1 shows, for example, that the word 'vulnerable' has the highest frequency of any keyword across all documents (10.2% overall) and, in two documents, has a count of >25%.

What is noticeable from Table 5.1 is the contrast of discourses and terminology across policy documents, reflecting the particular focus of certain policies and strategies, as well as perhaps the positions of whatever ministries or agencies are responsible for their production and implementation. Not surprisingly, the terms 'commercialisation', 'productivity' and 'value chain(s)' have the highest counts in the 2010 FDRE-MOA *Agriculture Sector Policy and*

Investment Framework (PIF), the 2015 *Livestock Master Plan* (LMP), as well as the second *Growth and Transformation Plan* (GTP-II) from 2014. These three documents also have the highest aggregate word counts associated with the 'transforming' discourse (94%, 77.9% and 90.6%, respectively). The term 'transform', or its synonyms, also features most strongly in the *GTP-II*, with a percentage value of 25.3%, as is be expected from a document that sets out Ethiopia's intentions to become a 'middle-income country' by 2025. In a similar vein, the term 'climate-resilient' becomes much more apparent in documents from 2013 on – the year Ethiopia released its vision for a *Climate Resilient Green Economy* (CRGE).

We have already seen in Chapter 2 that plans for extensive irrigation in lowlands areas, and for water development in general, are at the heart of Ethiopia's development strategies, and this is borne out by the CA. The keyword 'irrigation' has a high percentage value across all Ethiopian policy documents (8.4% overall). Unsurprisingly, its highest counts are in the 2011 *Green Economy Strategy* (GES) (19.5%) and the 2015 '*Water and Energy Climate Resilience Strategy*' (18.5%).

5.2.1.2 'Pure pastoralism'

When examining the extent to which terms associated with a 'pure pastoralism' discourse feature in the Ethiopian sample, Table 5.1 shows that the adaptation plans produced by the two Regional States, Afar (FDRE 2010) and Somali (FDRE 2011a), both have high aggregate percentages: 37.7% and 38.5%, respectively. Given that both Regional States are characterised by arid and semi-arid lands with pastoralism as the dominant production system, this is to be expected. It may also reflect the extent to which a broader range of local actors were involved in the drafting of these documents[70]. Hence, we can observe in both documents a high count of terms such as 'variability', 'mobility' and 'livelihoods', while terms such as 'pastoral systems', 'customary institutions', 'autonomous adaptation' and 'key resources' also feature.

Table 5.1 reveals that, in the only policy document specifically addressed to pastoral areas – the 2008 FDRE '*Pastoral Areas Policy'* – while having a relatively high count of the terms 'mobility' (8.1%) and 'livelihoods' (13.1%), certain other keywords associated with a 'pure pastoralism' discourse, such as 'resilience', 'rights' and 'indigenous', do not feature at all. As Table 5.1 also shows, in documents such as the 2013 FDRE/WB document or the 2015 EPCC report, the high percentage of just a few keywords, such as 'variability', 'livelihoods', and especially 'resilience', has a somewhat distorting effect on overall aggregate scores (see Fig. 5.1). Similarly, the high aggregate count of the 'pure pastoralism' discourse is apparent for the 2011 *Ethiopian Programme of Adaptation to Climate Change* (EPACC) document (at 32.4%), but this is a reflection of the high score (12.9%) of another single term – 'adaptive capacity'. While for the purposes of this CA, I

[70] See also Chapter 6.

have located these keywords in the 'pure pastoralism' category, it is evident that such words are used by numerous and often quite different policy actors, across multiple policies. Just as with the term 'sustainable development', they have to some extent lost clarity of definition through frequent expression and are context dependent. Table 5.1 reveals that the word 'resilience', for example, has high percentage values in several cases (21.3% for the 2013 FDRE/WB *Coping with Change* document, 34.8% for the 2015 FDRE-MECC *Agriculture and Forestry Climate Resilience Strategy*). While this supports the view that resilience is a convenient "all-embracing mobilising metaphor" (Pain and Levine, 2012: 21) for governmental and non-governmental actors alike, it does not necessarily imply that a narrative constructed around 'the inherent resilience of pastoralist mobility' has suddenly been endorsed by Ethiopian policymakers.

Interestingly, Table 5.1 shows that the keyword 'pastoral governance', or its synonyms, do not appear at all in any of the Ethiopian policy documents reviewed, while terms such as 'autonomous adaptation', 'rights' and 'key resources' barely feature. The absence of 'rights' may be a reflection of the 2009 *Charities and Civil Society Proclamation,* which severally restricted CSOs from engaging in advocacy or 'rights-based' work for almost a decade (see Chapter 6). This pattern contrasts sharply with the strong emphasis placed on pastoral, land and other forms of 'rights' in the Kenyan sample analysed below.

5.2.1.3 'Modern, mobile and green'

Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 show that terms associated with the 'modern, mobile and green' discourse remain low across the Ethiopian sample. While there are high counts for 'green economy' and 'renewable energy' in the 2011 *GES* or the 2015 *Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (EINDC)* document, there is clearly little room for mobile pastoralism in Ethiopia's vision for a modern and 'climate-resilient green economy'. As Table 5.1 reveals, the keywords 'pastoralist entrepreneurs', 'sustainable adaptation' and 'payments for environmental services' – popular in recent international agency reports and academic studies on the drylands – barely feature.

The metaphor 'climate-smart agriculture' – somewhat surprisingly given its prominence in contemporary global food security discourse – appears in only two of the documents analysed – EPCC 2014 and FDRE 2017. Similarly, Table 5.1 reveals infrequent use of the term 'cross-border' (or its synonyms), which appears in only three documents, pointing to the apparent low priority given to transboundary pastoralist movement and trade. This is consistent with the thesis of Anbessa (2015) that indifference or hostility by Ethiopian policymakers towards informal trade by lowland pastoralists is a result of historic and systematic bias in favour of the predominantly crop-farming highlands (see Chapter 2).

While the aggregate percentage score for the 'modern, mobile and green' discourse is noticeably high at 43.5% for the FDRE 2011 *GES*, this is a result of the high count (34.3%) of a single keyword – 'green economy'.

In the two consortium documents reviewed (Farm Africa, 2016; USAID, 2016), where one might expect a higher showing of terminology associated with the 'modern, mobile and green' discourse, words associated with the 'transforming' discourse are still predominant, with high percentage values for keywords such as 'vulnerable', 'integration', 'commercial' and 'climate resilient'.

In sum, on the basis of this CA, we can infer that, despite an increase in the use of certain keywords such as resilience, there is no noticeable pattern of change over time regarding discourses on pastoralism found within Ethiopian policies related to climate change and drylands from 2007 to 2017. 'Transforming pastoralism' is clearly the most dominant discourse across almost all documents analysed. While a 'pure pastoralism' discourse does show some quite high aggregate scores for certain documents, this is generally a reflection of the high percentage values of a handful of keywords I have associated with that discourse but which could equally apply in the other discourses depending on how they are framed, or in what context they are used. Meanwhile, a 'modern, mobile and green' discourse, favoured by certain donors and international agencies, does not feature in the CA as prominently as might have been expected.

5.2.2 Discourse analysis of Ethiopian documents

DA of these same Ethiopian policy documents supports the findings of the CA – that 'transforming pastoralism and drylands' is the most dominant discourse across almost all documents analysed, with little change over time, despite some inroads made by emerging climate-resilience and green-economy narratives. Nevertheless, from the DA, we can begin to gain a deeper understanding of the kinds of assumptions, ideologies and narrative structures underpinning each discourse – as well as the policy prescriptions emanating from these. Of the 17 documents examined, I have organised these around a particular theme or focus in common, rather than in chronological order. The first set of documents analysed are policies that have climate adaptation as their primary focus, although included here is also the *Pastoral Areas Policy* (2008), which touches on the impacts of climate change on pastoralism. The second group are policies that specifically address the agricultural sector, including livestock production, in the context of climatic and other uncertainties. The third set of policies examined comprises those associated with Ethiopia's drive for a '*Climate Resilient Green Economy*' (CRGE).

5.2.2.1 Climate-change adaptation

Looking at Ethiopia's policies, from the first *National Adaptation Programme of Action* (NAPA) of 2007 to the most recent *National Adaptation Plan* (NAP-ETH) (2017), it is evident that – although there is a great deal of consensus on the climate vulnerability of drylands and pastoralists – the planned policy responses differ on the importance of supporting pastoralist adaptation or on the role pastoralist mobility.

Ethiopia's first NAPA was prepared as part of Ethiopia's commitment to the UNFCCC and as a precursor to accessing adaptation funds (FDRE-NMA, 2007). Land degradation and poverty are framed in the same deterministic manner as Malthusian narratives of overpopulation (of people and livestock), poverty and climate hazards leading to environmental degradation and food insecurity that have been a feature of drylands planning in the HoA for many decades (Chapter 2). According to the NAPA:

> drought and famine, flood, malaria, land degradation, livestock disease, insect pests and earthquakes have been the main sources of risk and vulnerability in most parts of the country…. While the causes of most disasters are climate related, the deterioration of the natural environment due to unchecked human activities and poverty has further exacerbated the situation (FDRE-NMA, 2007: 16).

Recurrent drought is "the single most important climate related natural hazard impacting the country" (ibid.: 25), with arid and semi-arid areas most affected. "Rain-fed farmers and pastoralists", who are engaged in "coping mechanisms" as they deal with climate extremes, are identified as "the most vulnerable" (ibid.: 5). There is an assumption that existing systems are inefficient and unproductive, and some kind of (state-led) intervention needs to take place, in line with the 'transforming pastoralism' discourse identified earlier. According to NAPA, there is a need for "greater awareness about natural resource management amongst livestock keepers" and for more "rational use" of resources (FDRE-NMA, 2007: 33). Adaptation measures proposed include: 'improved/productive animal breeds to reduce herd size and its pressure on the land', 'promotion of grazing management', 'de-stocking of livestock on a regular basis', 'promotion of irrigation for agricultural development' and the introduction of 'mixed farming systems, where appropriate' (ibid.: 40). On page 44, there is a call for the "reorganisation of drought-affected community". These (predominantly technocratic) framings resonate with the arguments of Krätli and Enson (2013: 15) that, in the case of "crisis-scenarios with anthropogenic roots" – such as land degradation – blame has to go somewhere. As none of the key players – government ministries, scientists, international agencies – involved in policy formulation want it, "blame drifts towards the margins", typically reaching groups that are considered 'uneconomic' or 'unproductive', such as pastoralists or small-scale farmers.

Sedentarisation emerges as a theme in the *Pastoral Areas Policy* from 2008 – a document that presents a somewhat conflicting picture of how sustainable development is to be achieved in pastoral areas. While this policy predates government concerns about climate change, it refers to pastoral areas being characterised by "unpredictable and unstable climate conditions as well as ecologically fragile environments" (FDRE, 2008: 6). At the same time, there is acknowledgment that "pastoralism constitutes a unique and important way of life for a large part of Ethiopia" (FDRE, 2008: 5). There is also a commitment to "continue supporting pastoral livelihoods" (ibid.: 7), and to "developing participatory land-use and ownership policy based on traditional communal land-use system" (ibid.: 10).

Nonetheless, in the longer term, the government envisions:

> …gradual and voluntary transition towards permanent settlement especially along the perennial riverbanks….In order for this vision to be realized, there is need to: encourage and support voluntary settlement of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists and support the expansion of irrigation development to diversify and sustain the livelihoods of pastoralists (ibid.: 2).

This vision is clearly influenced by the belief that traditional pastoralism cannot survive in its current form in the face of climatic shocks – what Krätli and Enson (2013) refer to as a 'doomed-by-climate-change' narrative. In this storyline, pastoralists are amongst the groups most 'at risk' from external constraints that are regarded as unstoppable, ultimately making it difficult for them to resist dispossession of their resources: "one cannot be dispossessed of something that is already lost" (Krätli and Enson, 2012:15).

In 2011 the NAPA was replaced by the EPACC. It sets out climate-related risks as well as adaptation strategies and options across a number of sectors, including those relevant to pastoral areas. There is evidence of strong intertextuality in this (and later) climate-related policy, in that ideas are repeated and built upon from earlier documents. Ethiopia is identified in the EPACC as a country "most vulnerable to climate change because of its low adaptive capacity…The country's smallholder farmers and pastoralists are those with livelihoods most vulnerable to changes in climate" (FDE-EPA, 2011: vi). Pressure on resources often leads to "increased mobility and the probability of conflict" (ibid.: 10). The adaptive measures proposed in the EPACC nevertheless show some recognition of the positive role that mobility and the heterogeneity of drylands play in animal production. There are calls to "rehabilitate and manage dry-season rangelands through customary institutions" (ibid: 38) and for "promotion of cross-border livestock trade" (ibid.: 39) as well as "dissemination of indigenous knowledge" (ibid.: 40).

It is in the two Regional State plans for adaptation, the *Afar Plan* and the *Somali Plan*, where elements of a 'pure pastoralism' discourse and a more nuanced understanding of the causes of vulnerability can be found. While both documents paint a familiar picture of communities that are

"exposed to drought and chronic food shortages, risks of flooding hazards, and conflict over increasingly scarce and fragile resources" (FDRE, 2010: 13), there is also recognition that "climate stressors and shocks are not new in these contexts of pastoral and agro-pastoral systems" (FDRE, 2010: iii). Pastoralists are engaged in "opportunistic management" (ibid.: 26) and "endogenous adaptation strategies" (ibid.: 58). Nevertheless, the case for intervention is reiterated. Traditional systems need to be:

> …supplemented and supported by modern adaptation approaches and external (institutional) interventions with a view to strengthening local adaptation strategies, empowering vulnerable groups and building resilience and resistance to climate change impacts (ibid.: 58).

Unlike the naturalistic framings of vulnerability and change that are a characteristic of several other policy documents reviewed here, the *Afar Plan* observes that "the vulnerability of pastoral communities to climate risks and shocks is thus more a consequence of their marginalization than climate change per se" (FDRE, 2010: 3). Similarly, the *Somali Plan* maintains that "for a long time, a poor understanding of herding systems resulted in inappropriate policies that undermined pastoral development — such as by constraining herd mobility, leading pastoralists to become sedentary" (FDRE, 2011a: 82). The same plan asserts that "climate alone is rarely the reason people fall into poverty; instead, it interacts with existing problems and makes them worse" (ibid.: 8). Both plans are careful nonetheless to steer away from any overtly political statements. While the expansion of irrigated commercial agriculture is highlighted, the resulting loss of access to dry-season resources as a contributor to pastoralist vulnerability (see Eriksen and Marin, 2015) is not mentioned. Instead, pastoralists have been hindered by "the lack of pastoral friendly market systems and structures" (FDRE, 2010: 28), "weak extension services" (ibid.: 29) and a "decline in rangeland productivity…due to recurrent drought caused by climate variability" (ibid.: 30).

In the language of CDA, the Afar and Somali texts can be read as "sites of discursive struggle" (Hajer, 2006: 73), in that they reveal traces of different discourses (in this case, both 'transforming pastoralism' and 'pure pastoralism') and ideologies struggling for dominance. Such 'interdiscursivity' (Fairclough, 1995) can, nevertheless, be a positive sign of creative discursive and socio-cultural change.

Ethiopia's 2017 *National Adaptation Plan* (NAP-ETH) builds on the earlier NAPA and EPACC documents and is designed, according to its authors, to address the perception that climate change adaptation initiatives have been overly "sector-specific, and regionally focused" (FDRE, 2017: 3). "Short term coping mechanisms" in the predominantly pastoral regions of Afar, Somali and Oromo are deemed no longer sufficient in the face of climate change so there is a need instead for "building resilience and adaptive capacity for vulnerable communities" (ibid.: 12). Unlike the Regional State plans reviewed above, there is no reference at all to non-climatic drivers of vulnerability, or to pastoralists' own agency and innovation. Within NAP-ETH, technical solutions

– "improved (livestock) breeding and feeding systems and improved pasture/grazing management" (ibid.: 18), "improving the resilience of value chains and marketing systems for livestock" (ibid.: 20), "improved early warning systems" (ibid.: 20) and "strengthening crop and livestock insurance" (ibid.: 20), along with adaptation options that include "livelihood diversification and voluntary resettlement" (ibid.: 19) – are once again to the fore. Clearly, the discourse in Ethiopia's latest NAP, as with its predecessors, is predominantly a transforming one, drawing on narratives of pastoralist vulnerability, resource scarcity and the need for integration of pastoral production into the national economy. And where largely technocratic solutions are being privileged over the kinds of pastoral governance or resource rights concerns found within the 'pure pastoralism' and 'modern and mobile' discourses.

5.2.2.2 Agricultural intensification and commercialisation

A number of policies address the agriculture sector in the context of a changing climate. All of these documents contain a strong narrative thread of the need to intensify and commercialise agricultural – including pastoral production – in order to meet the twin imperative of tackling climate change and food insecurity, while also driving economic growth. Central to this transformation is the extension of commercial agriculture into 'under-utilised' lowland areas (FDRE-MOA, 2010: 6). According to the *Agriculture Sector PIF 2010-2020:*

> Vulnerability to droughts is greatest in the pastoral areas of the lowlands and the densely populated, food-insecure districts of the highlands. Drought-induced famines are further exacerbated by limited coping mechanisms and inadequate contingency planning for drought mitigation and the threat of climate change (ibid.: 4).

The authors argue that the PIF will lead to "improving the adaptability of the agricultural sector to climate change and achieving national carbon neutrality by 2020" (ibid.: 28). There is no mention of mobile pastoralism as a viable production strategy. Instead:

> …rangeland degradation threatens the livelihoods of pastoral communities in large areas of the lowlands, calling for alternative forms of income generation to reduce grazing pressure, and better rangeland management including the use of exclusion areas, forage development and drought preparedness (ibid.: 20).

In the *GTP II,* 'modernisation of agriculture' remains central to Ethiopia's vision for a *CRGE* (FDRE, 2014: 2). The target set for irrigation schemes is 4.1 million hectares by 2020, while the ambitious target for national forest coverage is 20% by end of GTP II (ibid.: 95). As afforestation means less land is available for crop cultivation or livestock grazing, there are implications for the pastoral lowlands. There is an assumption that the problems of climate change and food insecurity are best solved by applying 'irrigation-centred sedentary agriculture" (ibid.: 27) and technical solutions (FDRE, 2014). *GTP II* states that the livestock sub-sector is "still at the lowest state of development, being still dependent on backward production methods…efforts will be made

transform the sub-sector" (ibid.: 122). The term 'pastoral development' is used only once in GTP II, and in conjunction with crop farming (FDRE, 2014: 121).

Ethiopia's *LMP* (2015)[71] sets out similar investment interventions to improve productivity in the livestock sub-sector, albeit with only a small section devoted to pastoralism. While the *LMP* is still within a broader frame of 'transformation', there are a number of specific policy constraints and proposed actions for pastoral areas identified that are not articulated in earlier agricultural policies. These echo the kind of calls for greater affirmative action by the state in support of 'pastoral governance' that are more typical of the 'pure pastoralism' and 'modern, mobile and green' discourses (see Chapter 3). The plan argues for: "stronger policy, legal and institutional frameworks to support sustainable pastoral and agro-pastoral production" (FDRE-MoA 2015: 110).

Similar counternarratives to the dominant transforming discourse can be found in the EPCC Assessment Report (2015), which focuses on agriculture and food security. This report provides an insight into what messages are coming from the Ethiopian scientific community. While the EPCC document typically portrays a bleak outlook on future climate impacts on agriculture, there are mixed messages. On the one hand, the authors reproduce Malthusian narratives of resource scarcity and pastoralist vulnerability:

> The combination of weather events, a doubling of pastoral populations, the loss of prime dry season grazing, reduced mobility and a substantial increase in the number of poor and very poor pastoral households, are resulting in levels of resilience to drought being much reduced…some pastoralists are trapped in a permanent livelihood crisis (EPCC, 2015: 180).

Pastoralism is, nonetheless, acknowledged as: "a proven, adaptive livelihood system that supports human populations to inhabit one of the most remote and inhospitable regions of the world, including in remote areas that cannot access rivers and therefore benefit from irrigation" (ibid.: 185). Investing in pastoralism, the authors argue, can "help secure livelihoods, conserve ecosystem services, promote wildlife conservation and strengthen cultural values and traditions" (ibid.: 209).

The report also offers a less naturalistic framing of vulnerability and highlights instead the fact that:

> ....poorly formulated pastoral area policy, has exacerbated pastoral vulnerability...the general development trend has been to promote sedentary agriculture as an alternative to mobile livestock keeping…the result of these policies has included huge investment in water resource development and the dislocation of former tried and tested rangeland management systems (ibid.: 190).

In sum, national policy frameworks that focus on agricultural growth clearly reveal a narrative thread that calls for the expansion of irrigation and sedentary agriculture in the 'under-utilised' lowlands, legitimised by the twin challenges of climate change and food security – in line with the

[71] The LMP was written with the support and input of the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), whose head office is in Addis (see Chapter 6).

'transforming pastoralism and drylands' discourse. The two (science-led) documents, the *LMP* and the *EPCC Assessment Report*, in contrast, show somewhat higher levels of interdiscursivity: also emphasising the need for a commercially orientated livestock sector, while simultaneously acknowledging the multiple forms of vulnerability and policy constraints facing pastoralists.

5.2.2.3 A Climate Resilient Green Economy

Several of the documents reviewed come under the umbrella of Ethiopia's vision for a '*Climate Resilient Green Economy'* (CRGE), which in turn is closely linked to its drive to achieve 'middle-income status' by 2025 (FDRE, 2014). The 2011 *GES* is the first of these. Its objective is "to identify green economy opportunities that can help Ethiopia reach its economic growth targets while keeping GHG emissions low" (FDRE, 2011b: iii). Agriculture and forestry are seen as offering the greatest "GHG abatement potential" (ibid.: 28). The *GES* explicitly refers to the "creation of new agricultural land in arid areas through irrigation…new agricultural land could be created from un-cultivated non-forest areas, thereby reducing emissions from the expansion of total cropland" (ibid.: 138). Elsewhere, there are plans to increase the production of biofuels "on marginal lands" (ibid.: 172). There is no reference to the potential social and environmental consequences of such changes in land use in the name of GHG abatement.

The emphasis on agriculture-led growth, irrigation and transforming production systems remains central to the *GES*. However, in line with earlier policies, some slight differences in thinking can be observed. There is no explicit mention of 'voluntary settlement' of pastoralists. Nonetheless, the assumption that traditional pastoral systems are no longer tenable is still strong. With more emphasis on mitigation rather than adaptation, policy prescriptions include: "reducing herd size and switching to more efficient livestock systems", "improving (rangelands) to enhance their carbon sequestration potential" and encouraging "a partial shift towards lower emitting sources of protein, e.g. poultry" (ibid.: 24) – all of which offer the "combined benefit of supporting economic growth, increasing farmers/pastoralists income and limiting emissions" (ibid.: 24). There is a sense here that state policies are making available – through, for example, carbon-sequestration schemes – assets such as land and forests for what had been described as "the new green economy of repair" (Fairhead *et al*., 2012: 251), while the role of international development partners is to provide finance, advice and support.

The theme of 'climate resilience' is central to two CRGE strategies produced in 2015. The first of these sets out challenges faced in the agriculture (including livestock) and forestry sectors related to current and future climate change (FDRE/MECC, 2015a). A number of alternative future scenarios are documented based on different climate model projections. There is an acknowledgment that "there is a high degree of uncertainty in projections of how global climate change will affect temperature and rainfall patterns in Ethiopia" (ibid.: 6). Nevertheless, "the future

impacts and costs of climate change on agriculture and forestry are potentially very significant, which could put our ambition of reaching middle-income status by 2025 at risk" (ibid.: 6). Drylands are identified as "highly vulnerable" (ibid.: 21). Under future scenarios of higher average temperature, there are generally "large impacts on livestock production and net revenues, with some studies reporting a decline of approximately 50% or more in livestock revenues by 2050" (ibid.: 38). Interestingly, the same document stresses "the need for resilience responses that are grounded in the local context" (ibid.: 17). Despite revealing a broader understanding of resilience, the document contains little that has not been stated elsewhere, or that moves beyond a narrow focus on technocratic solutions. Adaptation options for the livestock subsector and pastoral areas typically include: "value-chain improvements", "herd diversification", "breeding of climate resistant livestock", "fodder and feed improvement" and "rangeland rehabilitation and management" (ibid.: 46). There is a strong emphasis on an "increasing role for the private sector in delivering a resilient agriculture" to make up anticipated shortfalls in public-sector and international climate funding (ibid.: 54).

The second resilience strategy focuses on water and energy (FDRE/MECC, 2015b). While there is no direct reference to pastoralism, it is relevant in that it sets out Ethiopia's plans to expand irrigation and energy in peripheral areas, including the predominantly pastoralist Afar and Somali Regions. Once again, the emphasis is on technocratic solutions. To avoid any "unintended negative impacts on local communities", "Social and Environmental Impact Assessment" is encouraged as a necessary first step (ibid.: 30). In the case of renewable energy, however, the need for such assessment is not mentioned. The emphasis instead is on "diversifying the energy mix" (ibid.: 36), and "securing energy access for all…including enabling non-grid access for remoter communities" (ibid.: 40). Plans to expand forest cover, exploit renewable energy potential (notably the construction of large dams) and reduce emissions from livestock are also at the heart of Ethiopia's INDC commitments from 2015 (FDRE, 2015). I will examine the consequences of these green-economy plans for pastoral areas in Chapter 7.

Two documents that are outside of official state policymaking but nonetheless provide some insight into how donors and INGOs are thinking are the Farm Africa (2016) and USAID (2016) papers describing donor-funded resilience programmes underway in pastoral areas. Here, we might expect a 'modern, mobile and green' discourse to feature more prominently. However again, there are mixed messages about the sustainability of the pastoral way of life and its contribution to adaptation in the drylands. While the importance of 'customary institutions' is recognised and certain keywords such as 'resilience', 'adaptive management' and even 'green technologies' are used, the (by now familiar) Malthusian narrative that traditional pastoralism is no longer viable in the face of climate change, population growth and other uncertainties is still predominant. Such change is leading to "increasing competition for land and resulting in more frequent and intense

conflict between neighboring communities" (Farm Africa, 2016: 2). Pastoralists "lack climate information and adaptation strategies, as well as the ability to effectively manage natural resources" (USAID, 2016: 2). There is an assumption that "market-based approaches" and "diversification of livelihoods" can improve the "resilience of vulnerable pastoralists" (ibid.: 2). We gain little sense of pastoralists' own agency being acknowledged – how pastoralists are already innovating and taking advantage of market opportunities (Catley, 2017). Nor are any suggestions made as to how mobility – pastoralists' primary means of dealing with climate and dryland variability – can be protected. Instead, the message from these documents is that 'resilience', and 'pastoral development', are processes that only the state, donors or INGOs can facilitate. Arguably, certain forms of knowledge and management solutions – namely those offered by the state, donors and INGOs – are being privileged here over local / indigenous forms of knowledge and practice – a form of 'discursive power' in the Foucauldian sense (Chapter 4).

We can conclude from this DA that there are mixed, and sometimes contradictory, messages on pastoralism emanating from Ethiopian climate-change and related policies. These emanate from a predominant discourse that, for the main part, believes in state-mediated commercialisation and 'transformation' of the Ethiopian pastoral lowlands. Across all three categories of documents reviewed, the impact of climate change and the drive for rapid economic growth and food security are clearly guiding narratives for greater sedentarisation of pastoral communities and for 'transforming' production systems – just as similar narratives of desertification and tragedy of the commons shaped drylands planning in the past (discussed in Chapter 2). For the main part, the adaptation plans and resilience strategies reviewed here – the Afar and Somali plans and the EPCC Assessment being exceptions – frame vulnerability and change in the drylands in terms of naturally occurring hazards. Although mobile pastoralism is acknowledged as a proven adaptive livelihood strategy in some documents, any positive direct references to pastoralism are lost in the overall negative representations. In sum, the Ethiopian findings provide firm evidence to support what has been suggested elsewhere (Yirgu *et al*., 2013; Kratli, 2019): that, while the language may have evolved, some of the assumptions driving current climate change and other policies are not necessarily 'new', but are instead rooted in the same historical narratives around 'unproductive' pastoral lowlands, pastoralists as victims of environmental change, and the need for modernisation.

5.3 Analysis of Kenyan policy documents

This section draws from a CA and DA of Kenyan policy documents spanning the period 2008–2016, a list of which can be found, along with rationale for their selection, in Chapter 4 (Table 4.3).

5.3.1 Content analysis of Kenyan policy documents

This section sets out the results of CA applied to Kenyan policy documents and strategies that have relevance directly, or indirectly, to pastoralist livelihoods. The same discourses and keywords (see Table 3.1) that were used for the analysis of Ethiopian documents apply again here.

As the documents vary in length from 7–230 pages, Table 5.2 shows a percentage value for each key-word count that can be contrasted across documents and within documents. For the full word count of Kenyan policy documents, see Table 8, Appendix F. The final column in Table 5.2 shows the percentage value of that keyword across all the documents in the sample. Figure 5.2 is a bar chart visualising the aggregate percentage value breakdown for each discourse and for each document, allowing a comparison across time.

Table 5.2 Breakdown of keywords in Kenyan policy documents as percentage values.

Table 5.2 Breakdown of keywords used in Kenyan policy documents as percentage values

		GoK-MLD 2008	GoK-MALF 2010	GoK 2010	GoK-MDNKOAL 2012	GoK-MDP 2013	GoK 2013a	GoK 2013b	GoK-MALF 2014	GoK-NDMA 2014	GoK-MENR 2014	GoK-MENR 2015a	GoK-MENR 2015b	GoK 2015	GoK-MENR 2016	GoK-MLPP 2016	GoK-ICG 2016	totals %
'Pure Pastoralism'	Variability	0.0	0.3	4.1	2.9	0.0	2.9	1.2	0.4	1.3	4.3	2.0	0.8	3.3	3.4	1.0	5.8	2.1
	Mobility	0.8	0.0	0.0	11.9	0.0	0.1	6.4	2.0	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.6	1.7
	Livelihood(s)	4.6	3.8	5.8	6.6	3.6	5.3	12.0	30.9	3.2	0.8	2.0	2.7	3.0	4.7	6.4	3.9	5.9
	Pastoral System	1.5	0.5	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.5	1.2	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	8.3	0.7
	Customary Institutions	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	1.2	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.1	0.8
	Autonomous adaptation	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.1
	Resilience	0.0	0.0	1.2	1.2	1.3	8.2	10.2	6.4	11.0	18.4	16.3	8.5	6.9	15.3	0.0	3.9	6.1
	Adaptive capacity	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.8	0.0	2.3	0.3	0.4	0.0	12.9	6.1	0.0	1.5	4.0	0.0	0.3	1.5
	Rights	0.8	0.7	0.0	3.7	7.4	0.4	2.9	2.4	1.3	0.8	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.3	5.9	1.9	2.0
	Indigenous	10.0	0.5	1.0	1.6	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.3	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.3	1.3	4.4	1.4	1.2
	Pastoral governance	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.9	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.8	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	3.3	0.6
	Key resources	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.2	0.6
		19.2	**5.8**	**12.6**	**36.5**	**13.2**	**20.6**	**37.7**	**47.0**	**20.0**	**38.7**	**26.5**	**12.8**	**15.1**	**29.8**	**19.1**	**54.7**	**23.3**
'Transforming Pastoralism and Drylands'	Climate risk	0.0	0.7	4.6	1.2	0.2	5.5	4.4	4.4	28.1	2.7	4.1	0.8	6.6	8.2	1.0	2.5	4.7
	Vulnerable	3.8	1.2	15.0	3.7	8.7	10.7	15.5	4.4	8.1	15.6	8.2	5.8	3.9	19.0	1.0	1.9	8.4
	Degradation	3.8	7.6	9.0	1.6	1.3	7.3	1.5	3.2	0.0	5.1	0.0	1.6	5.7	1.1	21.1	3.6	4.8
	Conflict	6.2	2.5	1.9	4.9	3.5	1.2	9.4	6.0	0.6	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.5	14.7	1.1	2.9
	Insecurity	5.4	2.3	0.5	3.7	1.4	0.8	2.9	3.6	1.0	0.8	0.0	1.6	1.8	0.3	2.0	0.6	1.6
	Coping strategy	0.0	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.4	0.6	1.6	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.4
	Transform	3.1	6.0	1.9	0.8	15.1	0.9	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.0	2.3	2.1	1.1	1.5	0.6	3.3
	Sedentarise	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	1.0	0.3	0.2
	Irrigation	0.0	18.0	3.9	4.5	4.9	3.0	2.3	7.6	0.0	0.0	2.0	1.2	9.4	1.3	3.9	0.8	4.8
	Integration	0.0	3.3	5.3	4.9	23.0	7.0	5.0	4.0	10.3	13.3	18.4	8.9	3.6	9.8	6.9	3.9	8.2
	Commercial	19.2	24.3	18.6	15.6	8.8	9.0	4.4	8.0	7.1	7.8	12.2	9.7	15.1	12.4	1.0	2.5	11.3
	Productivity	16.2	17.7	2.9	4.1	8.0	1.6	2.6	1.2	0.6	0.8	0.0	0.8	11.2	2.4	16.7	7.2	6.1
	Value chain(s)	20.0	7.4	1.2	2.0	1.7	0.3	1.8	4.0	0.0	0.0	4.1	0.0	12.1	1.6	0.5	7.5	3.4
	Climate resilient	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	11.3	0.3	0.0	0.3	7.4	8.2	0.0	1.2	6.1	0.0	0.3	2.6
	Renewable Energy	0.0	0.5	9.4	3.3	3.0	7.7	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.8	10.2	6.2	0.9	0.8	1.0	1.7	3.1
	Planned adaptation	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.1
		77.7	**91.9**	**75.8**	**50.4**	**80.3**	**66.8**	**52.3**	**47.8**	**57.7**	**57.0**	**67.3**	**38.8**	**75.5**	**65.2**	**72.1**	**34.8**	**65.9**
"Modern, Mobile and Green'	Pastoralist entrepreneurs	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0
	Diversification	0.0	1.2	1.7	2.9	0.0	0.8	0.6	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.9	1.1	0.5	2.8	1.0
	Green economy	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.1	0.9	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.0	44.2	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.3	2.3
	Sustainable adaptation	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Climate smart	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.2	1.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	6.1	0.0	6.9	3.4	0.5	0.6	1.0
	Carbon sequestration	0.0	0.3	9.2	2.9	0.8	10.3	0.3	1.2	0.0	2.3	0.0	0.8	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.6	2.7
	Payments for Environmental Ser	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.8	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.1
	Policy harmonisation	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.1
	Cross-border	1.5	0.8	0.5	3.7	0.8	0.3	4.4	0.0	1.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	6.4	4.1	1.3
	Social Protection	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.9	4.3	0.1	2.9	1.2	17.7	0.0	0.0	2.7	0.6	0.3	0.0	0.3	2.1
	Public good(s)	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.4	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.3	0.2
		3.1	**2.3**	**11.6**	**13.1**	**6.5**	**12.6**	**9.9**	**5.2**	**22.3**	**4.3**	**6.1**	**48.4**	**9.4**	**5.0**	**8.8**	**10.5**	**10.8**

Figure 5.2 Aggregate percentage for each discourse in Kenyan policy documents



5.3.1.1 'Transforming pastoralism and drylands'

Just as with the Ethiopian policy documents, the CA reveals that a 'transforming pastoralism and drylands' remains the more dominant discourse category across 14 of the 16 analysed Kenyan policies.[72] Figure 5.2 shows, furthermore, that there is no clearly identifiable pattern over time. While certain years may show a higher frequency of keywords associated with a 'pure pastoralism' or 'modern, mobile and green' discourse, this – as we shall discover – is a reflection of particular policies and their attendant institutional provenance, rather than any significant pattern of change from one discourse to another over time.

Of the 16 documents analysed, the aggregate percentage value of the 'transforming' discourse remains greater than 50% in all but three cases. In 2010, the aggregate percentage value of the 'transforming' discourse is as high as 91.9% for the 2010 GoK-MALF *Agricultural Strategy* and – with a couple of notable exceptions – high counts of this particular discourse persist throughout the period reviewed. The *National Climate Change Response Strategy* (NCCRS*)* of 2010 has an aggregate percentage value of 75.8%. The 2013 GoK-MDP *Vision 2030 MTP2* has an aggregate percentage value of 80.3% – as is to be expected, in view of its focus on economic transformation. While the 2014 GoK-MALF *Ending Drought Emergency (EDE) Framework for Sustainable Livelihoods* has a lower aggregate value for the 'transforming pastoralism' discourse (47.8%,),

[72] Acknowledging again here that such results are a function of how keywords were categorised under each discourse – a limitation of CA discussed in Chapter 4 (4.4.5).

from 2015 the aggregate counts are high again – the only exception being the GoK-Isiolo County Government (GoK-ICG) *Livestock Strategy,* where keywords associated with a 'pure pastoralism' discourse are more dominant. In the cases of the 2015 GoK *Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) Framework*, the 2016 *National Adaptation Plan* (NAP) and the 2016 GoK-MLPP *National Land Use Plan* (NLUP), we can observe aggregate values of 75.5%, 65.2% and 72.01%, respectively. In the most recent national policy in the Kenyan sample, the 2016 GoK-MLPP *NLUP*, Table 5.2 shows that several keywords associated with a 'transforming' discourse, namely 'degraded', 'conflict' and 'productivity', have high word counts of 21.1%, 14.7% and 16.7% respectively. The term 'vulnerable' appears in every document in the sample, with a percentage value as high as 19% in one case. This would appear to support the findings of Odhiambo (2014), discussed in Chapter 2, that deeply held narratives depicting the ASAL as 'degraded', 'unproductive' and 'prone to endemic conflict' persist in Kenyan policy.

In almost all cases, there is use of the word 'integration' (or its synonym 'mainstream'), with word counts as high as 23% for the GoK-MDP 2013 *Vision 2030 MTP2*, 13.3% for the GoK-MENR 2014 *National Climate Change Framework Policy* (NCCFP) and 18.4% in the GoK-MENR 2015a *INDC* document. This is consistent with what has been highlighted by a number of scholars (Abbink *et al*., 2014; Elliot 2016; Odhiambo, 2014; Mosley and Watson, 2016) that the ASAL are no longer perceived by the Kenyan state and other actors as 'no-go' peripheral areas, but instead offer a 'new frontier' for capital accumulation and resource extraction.

What is clearly noticeable from Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2 is the strong contrast of discourses and terminology across policy documents, reflecting the particular focus of certain policies and strategies, as well as the positions of whatever ministries or agencies are responsible for their production and implementation (explored further in Chapter 6). This would suggest that there is no significant 'unifying position', or single discourse, around pastoralism across Kenyan ministries and associated government agencies, but rather a high level of interdiscursivity. This becomes even more apparent in the findings of the DA (see 5.3.2).

Terms such as 'commercial', 'productivity' and 'value chains' are used consistently in policies specific to the agricultural and/or livestock sector, for example. 'Commercial' (or its synonyms), the most frequently used keyword across all Kenyan documents (11.3%), appears in GoK-MLD *National Livestock Policy* (NLP) from 2008, the GoK-MALF *Agriculture Sector Development Strategy* (ASDS) of 2010 and the GoK 2015 *CSA Framework,* with counts of 19.2%, 24.3% and 15.1%, respectively. This points to the strong emphasis being put on market liberalisation and the integration of dryland agriculture into both the national and the global economy.

In turn, terms such as 'climate risk', 'vulnerable' and 'renewable energy' feature prominently in policies that are focused on climate-change mitigation and adaptation. While 'vulnerable' is a

keyword that appears in all 16 documents, its highest word counts are in the GoK 2010 *NCCRS*, the GoK 2013 *NCCAP*, the GoK 2013 *EDE MTP*, the GoK 2014 *NCCFP* and the GoK-MENR 2016 *NAP*. The term 'climate-resilient', meanwhile, appears less frequently than was the case in the Ethiopian sample, with low percentage value counts – with the exception of the GoK 2013 *NCCAP* (11.3%).

5.3.1.2 'Pure pastoralism'

What Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2 also show is that, although dominant in only one policy document (the 2016 GoK-ICG *Livestock Strategy*), keywords associated with the 'pure pastoralism' discourse have a strong presence within many of the Kenyan documents analysed. In this discourse, the inherent adaptability and resilience of pastoral systems are considered as part of the solution to climate-change challenges, rather than being part of the problem.

This is in part a reflection of the noticeable prominence of a single keyword, 'resilience', particularly from 2013 onwards. In the GoK-MENR 2014 *NCCFP*, for example, 'resilience' has a score of 18.4%, contributing (along with 'adaptive capacity') to a high aggregate score of 29.8%. In the GoK-MENR 2016 *NAP*, 'resilience' has a percentage value count of 15.3%, influencing the overall aggregate value of 25.9%. However, these high aggregate scores – derived from a single term or two – do not necessarily reflect that strong support for mobile pastoral systems or 'pastoral governance' can be found in these particular policies and constituencies.

Nevertheless, there are several documents where we can observe a wider range of terminology associated with the 'pure pastoralism' discourse. These provide a clearer picture of where 'counternarratives' concerning pastoralists have gained currency among – or are being produced by – certain policymakers, and suggests - as Odhiambo (2014) and others have observed (see 2.4.3) - that a substantive shift in thinking occurred in light of the changing policy context resulting from Constitutional reform of 2010, the process of devolution that followed, and in particular, the establishment of a dedicated MDNKOAL (Elmi and Birch, 2013), a theme explored further in Chapter 6. In the 2012 GoK–MDNKOAL '*ASAL policy'*, for example, a wider range of terms, including 'variability' (2.9%), 'mobile' (11.9%), 'livelihoods' (6.6%), 'customary institutions' (2.0%), 'rights' (3.7%), 'indigenous' (1.6%) and 'pastoral governance' (4.9%), are used. However, it is within the one county level document analysed - the 2016 GoK-ICG *Livestock Strategy* - where the highest aggregate score for 'pure pastoralism' can be found (54.7%). Here again, there is evidence of a wider range of terms associated with the 'pure pastoralism' discourse, with the keywords 'pastoral systems', 'customary institutions' and 'key resources' scoring higher counts that in any other document reviewed (8.3%, 9.1% and 8.2%, respectively). This is unsurprising, in that – as the policy itself acknowledges – pastoralism is the "dominant livestock production system

in Isiolo" (GoK-ICG, 2016: 12).[73] Interestingly, the term 'rights', in contrast to its low count in the Ethiopian policy documents, appears in 12 of the 16 documents reviewed (and with a count of 7.4% in the case of the 2013 GoK-MDP *MTP*), reflecting perhaps the higher value paid to minorities, land and other forms of rights found in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution (GoK, 2010).

5.3.1.3 'Modern, mobile and green'

As in the case of Ethiopia, Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2 show that keywords associated with the 'modern, mobile and green' discourse appear less prominently in the sample analysed. Nevertheless, there are some interesting results. 'Climate-smart agriculture' (CSA) is referred to in nine of the documents reviewed, particularly in those from 2015 onwards, with word counts of 6.1% and 6.9% in two cases. One of these documents – the *Kenya CSA Framework 2015–2030* – is dedicated to promoting CSA as a response to climatic challenges. There is also reference to the 'carbon sequestration' potential of rangelands in 11 out of the 16 documents. The emphasis here on CSA and carbon markets would appear to support the claim that national climate-change policies are driven in part by the desire to capitalise on new sources of donor support for climate adaptation and mitigation (Lockwood, 2013; Maina *et al*., 2014).

In contrast to its almost total absence from the Ethiopian policies reviewed above, the keyword 'cross-border' (or one of its synonyms) is used in 12 Kenyan policy documents. For one document, the 2016 GoK-MLPP *NLUP*, it scores a percentage value as high as 6.4%. This would suggest the possibility that regional (HoA) initiatives on the drylands[74] have influenced how Kenyan policymakers view the need for greater regional policy harmonisation around such issues as drought management, cross-border livestock trade and animal disease control.

Table 5.2 also shows that other keywords in this discourse, such as 'diversification', 'green economy', 'climate smart', 'payments for environmental services' and 'social protection' – terms considered by some as deliberately apolitical in how they are framed (Symons, 2014) – appear across a number of the documents reviewed here. They generally do so, however, with lower percentage values than might be expected from the relevant literature.

Finally, while the aggregate percentage score for the 'modern, mobile and green' discourse is noticeably high at 48.4% for the 2015 GoK-MENR *Green Economy Strategy* (GESIP), this is a result of the high percentage value (44.2%) of a single term – 'green economy'. Similarly, the high

[73] Should the sample of Kenyan documents have included additional County level documents it is possible that the overall results of the CA for Kenya presented here would have been different – showing greater content in line with a the 'pure pastoralism' and 'modern and mobile; discourses for example. A limitation of CA acknowledged in the Methods chapter (4.4.1).

[74] See, for example, IGAD's Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRISI) from 2013. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is a regional organisation, comprising eight member states in the HoA.

aggregate count of this same discourse is apparent for the 2014 GoK-NDMA *EDE Framework for Drought Risk Management* (at 22.3%), but this is largely a reflection of the high score (17.7%) of another keyword – 'social protection'. Clearly the word counts in these cases do not reveal the context in which such keywords are used.

In sum, the CA of sampled Kenyan documents suggests that – just as in the Ethiopian case – there is no clearly identifiable pattern in discursive emphasis over time, but rather discursive emphasis is a reflection more of particular policies and their attendant institutional provenance. The 'transforming pastoralism and drylands' discourse remains the more dominant one across 14 of the 16 analysed Kenyan policy documents. Within this discourse, the high count of keywords such as 'integration', 'commercial' and 'productive' reveal the strong desire on behalf of the state for greater integration of the ASALs into national development. Nevertheless, keywords associated with the 'pure pastoralism' discourse also have a strong presence within many of the Kenyan documents analysed, with the caveat that this is, in part, a reflection of the prominence of a single keyword, 'resilience', particularly from 2013 onwards. As with the Ethiopian documents reviewed earlier, keywords associated with a 'modern, mobile and green' discourse appear less prominently in the sample analysed, with the exception of one document, the 2015 GoK-MENR *GESIP*.

5.3.2 Discourse analysis of Kenyan documents

The DA of Kenyan policy documents supports the findings of the CA: that there are mixed – and sometimes conflicting – messages about the sustainability of the pastoral way of life and its contribution to adaptation in the drylands. While 'crises narratives' (Roe, 1991) of 'pastoralist vulnerability', 'conflict over resources' and 'food insecurity' are still to the fore, the analysis suggests that other (counter) narratives – associated with the 'pure pastoralism' and 'modern, mobile and green' discourses – have influenced the thinking of certain policymakers. As the CA above also reveals, this appears to be a reflection of the positions and ideologies of whatever ministries or agencies are responsible for the production and implementation of specific policies, rather than of any common understanding across Kenyan policymaking circles.

As in the case of the Ethiopian policies above, I have chosen to structure my analysis by grouping together documents that share some common thematic focus, rather than examine each policy in strict chronological order. The first set of documents analysed are policies that address either climate change directly, as in various national climate mitigation and adaptation plans and strategies, or are focused on agriculture but make reference to pastoralism in the context of a changing climate. The section that follows looks at two specific policies of relevance: firstly, the 2012 *National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands* (referred to as the '*ASAL Policy*'), where pastoralist rights emerge as a strong theme, and, secondly, a County government livestock strategy that strongly endorses pastoral production. The third set of

policies examined, are those built around Kenya's '*Ending Drought Emergencies'* (EDE) initiative, where changes affecting the drylands and pastoralism in the context of climatic and other uncertainties is a priority focus. For convenience, I include the *National Land Use Policy* (NLUP) from 2016 in this last group.

5.3.2.1 Climate change and pastoralism

The 2008 GoK-MLD *NLP* and the 2010 GoK-MALF *ASDS* were written before climate change emerged as a central issue of Kenyan policy. Nonetheless, these are relevant documents. There is a strong narrative that declining range resources, climate-induced droughts and demographic change are making nomadic pastoral systems untenable. A related narrative points to pastoralist practices as contributing to land degradation. According to the *NLP*: "The range environment is fragile and, due to its inappropriate use, degradation of the range has been observed in some areas. This situation reduces the capacity of the land to support enough livestock in the rangelands" (GoK-MLD, 2008: 21). Likewise, in the *ASDS* – designed to guide the development of a commercially oriented and modern agriculture sector – ASALs are described as:

> …fragile ecosystems with scarce and erratic rainfall patterns. Despite the enormous livestock potential, development in these areas has been low compared with the rest of the country…pastoral systems are changing with increasing sedentarization due to changing lifestyles and land tenure, and adoption of crop production in marginal lands (GoK-MALF, 2010: 40).

The *ASDS* continues:

> …the frequency and severity of drought has increased in recent years… coupled with overstocking and the degraded environment, this has had a devastating effect on pasture regeneration and on the livelihoods of pastoral communities .... livestock migration has resulted in conflicts over use of pastures and water sources, and in environmental degradation (ibid.: 40).

Clearly, pastoralist mobility is perceived here as part of 'the problem', rather than as a strategic response to climatic and resource variability. In turn, policy prescriptions are generally framed in 'technical fix' and managerial-orientated terms, typically focusing on the need for improved livestock inputs and livestock health, marketing and value addition, disaster preparedness, rangeland management and livelihood diversification (GoK-MLD, 2008; GoK-MALF, 2010).

The *ASDS* essentially sets out a vision for agricultural modernisation in the ASAL that includes:

> …exploiting the 9.2 million-ha irrigation potential; developing water resources for livestock, domestic and irrigation use; constructing roads; managing natural resources; facilitating sustainable exploitation of renewable sources of energy to support agricultural development; exploring the possibility of providing a livestock insurance scheme for producers in arid areas; and improving technical capacity of communities in arid lands (GoK-MALF, 2010: 64).

The challenges of drought and conflict over resources are also highlighted in the second MTP of *Vision 2030*, Kenya's national development plan:

> Competition between communities over natural resources increases insecurity within Kenya and across its borders. Insecurity in turn increases vulnerability to drought, by impeding migration, curtailing access to services and resources, destroying assets, and damaging inter-communal relations (GoK-MDP, 2013: 41).

Under "emerging issues and challenges", "pastoral transformation" (ibid.: 42) is highlighted. While pastoralism is recognised for its importance to the economy and livelihoods, it is understood in this document that transformation is inevitable. In the same section, however, reference is made to barriers to pastoral mobility: "Pastoralism is affected by the disruption of seasonal transhumance patterns, the expansion of community conservancies, the unchecked influx of people and livestock, and the spread of invasive species" (ibid.: 42). There is also a caveat about the potential "environmental challenges" brought about by new investments in the ASAL – such as oil and mineral extraction (ibid.: 42).

Two documents in which climate concerns are central are the 2010 *NCCRS* and the 2013 *NCCAP*. These documents largely exclude any analysis of the broader socio-economic and political changes underway in Kenya' drylands, preferring instead to promulgate a narrative of environmental crises, not dissimilar to that found in the agriculture policies discussed above. According to the *NCCRS*: "Climate change is already happening and at an alarming rate" (GoK, 2010: 30). Kenya's ASAL are: "subject to recurring droughts, which when coupled with overexploitation of resources, result in high vulnerability to land degradation and desertification. This not only increases levels of GHG emissions, but simultaneously threatens livelihoods" (ibid.: 17). Drought inevitably leads to "massive livestock and wildlife deaths and an increase in human-human and wildlife-human conflicts" (ibid.: 32). The *NCCRS* and *NCCAP* frame the challenge of climate change for food security in the drylands in ways that are consistent with (predominantly depoliticised) global narratives on climate change and agriculture – namely that climate change is an externally imposed problem that has profound implications for food and livelihood security, particularly for small-scale farmers and pastoralists. According to the *NCCAP*:

> Pastoral and marginal agricultural areas are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Extended periods of drought erode livelihood opportunities and community resilience in these areas; leading to undesirable coping strategies that damage the environment and impair household nutritional status, further undermining long-term food-security (GoK, 2013a: 4).

Nonetheless, in line with the 'modern, mobile and green pastoralism' discourse identified earlier, climate change is also presented as "an opportunity for the country to develop appropriate response strategies and activities required to making communities safer and resilient" (ibid.: 4). The assertion is made that: "Building climate resilience, or increasing the ability to adapt to climate

change, in as low-carbon a way as possible, will help Kenya achieve sustainable development and Vision 2030 goals…" (GoK, 2013a: 26). Similar to the Ethiopian case, technocratic policy solutions are reiterated. A greater role for renewable energy, including biofuels, is envisaged (GoK, 2010; GoK, 2013a) – the implications for pastoralists of which are explored in later chapters.

When it comes to reducing livestock emissions, there are some caveats. Whilst agriculture:

> ...is a large and growing GHG emitter, responsible for about 30 per cent of Kenya's emissions in 2010, with about 90 per cent of these emissions generated by the livestock sector…actions to respond to these increasing emissions will be considered and prioritised based on the country's unique social, cultural, environmental and economic factors (GoK, 2013: 31).

According to the *NCCRS*: "improved livestock management has the scope to contribute to the ASAL's strategy by improving the livelihoods of pastoralists and achieving climate resilience benefits through healthier livestock and reduced degradation of rangeland" (ibid.: 149).

In a later document (GoK, 2015), 'climate-smart agriculture' (CSA) is promoted as a means to provide: "solutions towards increased agriculture sector productivity while addressing effects of changing climate and weather patterns" (ibid.: vi). Extended periods of drought have, according to the authors, eroded "livelihood opportunities and community resilience" in pastoral areas, "leading to undesirable coping strategies that damage the environment and impair household nutritional status" (ibid.: 9). CSA fits conveniently with a vision of agricultural modernisation, flagged as offering: "an excellent opportunity for agricultural growth" (ibid.: 22), as well as "leveraging climate finance" (ibid.: 24). The issue of unequal access to and fragmentation of critical rangeland resources resulting from changes in land use is clearly absent from CSA policy. Nor is there any suggestion as to whether socio-economic factors or political interests in the newly devolved ASAL counties might impede the implementation of CSA programmes.

Subsequent climate policies – such as the 2014 *NCCFP*, Kenya's *INDC* from 2015[75], the 2015 *Green Economy Strategy* (GESIP) and the 2016 *National Adaptation Plan* (NAP) – share this (apolitical) vision of 'green growth' and include plans for the rollout of renewable energy, green technologies and REDD-type carbon sequestration initiatives (GoK-MENR, 2015a; GoK-MENR, 2015b; GoK-MENR, 2016). The INDC sets out an ambitious target to reduce Kenya's GHG emissions by 30% by 2030, including reiterating the aim of reducing emissions from the livestock sector (GoK-MENR, 2015a). Although a full picture of the role of, and consequences for, pastoralism within this new green economy cannot be determined from analysis of policy documents alone, it is evident that loss of pastoral mobility and the transition to mixed-farming or non-pastoralist-based activities are regarded by some policymakers as unavoidable in the face of

[75] INDCs were subsequently renamed as *Nationally Determined Contributions* (NDC) following COP21.

climate change or the kind of transformation being advocated, a theme explored further in Chapters 6 and 7.

5.3.2.2. Pastoralist rights

As the CA revealed, one document where strong elements of the 'pure pastoralism' and 'mobile, modern and green' discourses can be found is the 2012 '*ASAL Policy'*. As we saw in Chapter 2, this policy marked a significant departure from historical narratives that viewed the Kenyan drylands as either 'unproductive and conflict ridden'. The policy offers instead an alternative storyline, one that recognises the ASAL as part of Kenya, but with unique constraints and attributes. Policy and practice should take into account the ASAL – and pastoralists' – unique characteristics, without compromising principles of good governance (GoK-MDNKOAL, 2012).

The *ASAL Policy* draws on the 2010 Constitution, which attests to the common citizenship of all Kenyans but requires the state to recognise diversity. It is also an attempt to harmonise with the African Union (AU) *Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa* (AU, 2010), notable for its rights-based approach to pastoral development (Odhiambo, 2017). Unlike the largely technocratic, and mostly depoliticised, focus of the national climate policies analysed so far, the policy is upfront in its endorsement of pastoralism, its critique of the historical neglect of ASAL and – notably – its emphasis on the problems of restrictions to mobility:

> A policy focus on pastoralism is justified for two main reasons. First, pastoralists are among the groups most marginalised from socio-economic services and infrastructure…The second reason is that, until recently, most governments' viewed pastoral areas as net consumers of national wealth that offered poor prospects of return on investment. Pastoralism was therefore less valued than other forms of land-use and less well-supported…Governments now recognise the strengths of pastoralism and have formed ministries or other authorities to enhance the contribution of pastoralism to food security, environmental stewardship, and economic growth (GoK-MDNKOAL, 2012: 5).

The document continues: "Pastoralists have successfully managed climate variability for centuries. Their skills and indigenous knowledge will become more valuable as the impact of global climate change becomes more pressing" (ibid.: 12). Nonetheless, climate change is not underestimated:

> Climate change will exacerbate the challenges already facing the region. Chronic poverty and vulnerability in the ASAL mean that adaptive capacity is generally low. Traditional mechanisms for managing climate variability, such as mobility and the use of drought-reserve areas, are being closed off… (ibid.: 12).

It is within the *Isiolo County Government's Livestock Strategy and Action Plan 2016–2020*, where a 'pure pastoralism' discourse is most pronounced. The strategy refers to the fact that "changes in land-use, such as the establishment of conservancies, the mushrooming of new settlements…and the spread of farming along the Ewaso-Nyiro River, are already driving fragmentation of rangeland…leading to localised degradation" (GoK-ICG, 2016: 14). Pastoralists are increasingly

"deprived of access…to critical grazing or water resources", which has "undermined seasonally productivity and pastoralists' resilience to extreme events" (ibid.: 23). "Poor understanding by government planners and livestock officers of the rationale underpinning pastoral livestock mobility and the maintenance of the rangelands under common-property regimes" (ibid. 24) has not helped. Reiterating a narrative found within the *ASAL Policy*: pastoralism – "if properly supported" – remains "the most appropriate land-use and livelihood in the ASAL" (ibid.: 15). While acknowledging that some youth are opting out of herding, it stresses that others are taking advantage of "new opportunities", while "improvements in mobile communication and marketing systems have enabled a small degree of livelihood diversification, such as small businesses run by women" (ibid.: 14). Along with the emphasis on "drought preparedness" (ibid.: 60), "building the capacity of county veterinary services" (ibid.: 62), "infrastructure development" (ibid.: 65*)* and "more efficient livestock marketing systems" (ibid.: 36) – all set out in detail – policy prescriptions include the commitment to "legally protect rangelands and pastoral resources from alienation, encroachment and fragmentation" (ibid.: 58), as well as "legislate in favour of livestock mobility" (ibid.: 60), both fundamental to the idea of enhanced governance of pastoral areas, as promulgated within both the 'pure pastoralism' and 'modern, mobile and green' discourses. The strong alignment towards both these discourses found within the *Isiolo County Government's Livestock Strategy* suggests the inclusion of more County-level documents in the sample for Kenya may have resulted in a different set of findings.

5.3.2.3 Ending drought emergencies

There is a particular focus in Kenyan policies on drought, as is to be expected given the recent history of recurring drought. One institution set up under the MDNKOAL was the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA), subsequently mandated with coordinating the *Common Programme Framework in Ending Drought Emergencies (EDE) in Kenya*. The focus of the '*EDE: Second MTP 2013–2017'* is on building resilience to a wider set of shocks and stresses, not just climate risk (GoK-NDMA, 2014). Pastoral mobility is seen as a key drought-management strategy. Parallels can be drawn with the 2012 '*ASAL Policy'* and the 2016 *ICG Livestock Strategy*, in that all three documents offer the kind of holistic analysis of challenges facing dryland communities that is lacking in the climate-specific policy documents reviewed earlier. According to the authors:

> The EDE reflects two significant changes in our understanding of drought emergencies in Kenya. The first is that they have their roots in poverty and vulnerability, and in the fact that Kenya's drought-prone areas are also among those which have benefited least from investment in the past. The second is that drought emergencies are complex challenges, which can only be managed by strong and competent institutions, able to draw on new streams of finance as well as the skills and resources of all actors (GoK-NDMA, 2014: 9).

While the plan acknowledges that "pastoralism remains the dominant production system in the ASAL and underpins its regional economy" (ibid.: 23), it reproduces the notion that some level of

"pastoral transformation" (ibid.: 22) is inevitable in light of climatic and other changes taking places in the drylands. Echoing concerns around land-alienation processes that have been discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the EDE Plan refers to how:

> Processes of commercialisation and individualisation are widening the gap between wealthier and poorer households…pastoralism is also changing as a result of processes affecting the rangelands, including the disruption of traditional seasonal transhumance patterns, the expansion of community conservancies, the unchecked influx of people and livestock, and the spread of invasive species…new investment is beginning to drive an expansion of private-sector activity in the region (ibid.: 22).

While greater investment is advocated, the EDE Plan draws attention to the fact that:

> The EDE initiative is being introduced in Kenya at a time of significant change in governance and in the institutional arrangements for its delivery. Implementation of devolved governance will be lengthy and complex, particularly in arid and pastoral counties where institutional capacity is comparatively low and where the operating environment is more challenging (ibid.: 42)

A similar analysis of the complexities and uncertainties facing dryland inhabitants can be found in two follow-up documents – *the EDE Common Programme Framework for Sustainable Livelihoods* (GoK-MALF, 2014) and the *EDE Common Programme Framework for Drought Risk Management* (GoK-NDMA, 2014). Unlike the focus on 'technical-fix' type solutions that are characteristic of earlier climate-specific policies, greater emphasis is put on such areas as 'improved governance of land tenure'; 'development of community by-laws and reciprocal agreements between communities to manage access to land and water resources'; 'programmes promoting the payment of environmental services'; and greater provision of 'public goods and services' – including 'social protection for the most vulnerable' (GoK-NDMA, 2014; GoK-MALF, 2014). Devolution, meanwhile, "presents significant opportunities for drought-risk management, for example in strengthening local voices in the design and implementation of national policies and in ensuring faster and more appropriate responses" (GoK-NDMA, 2014: 25).

As with many of the Kenyan policies, there are conflicting messages on pastoralism to be found in the last of the documents analysed here: the *National Land Use Policy (NLUP)* (GoK-MLPP, 2016). On the one hand, familiar environmental-crises narratives are reproduced: the ASAL are described as: "threatened by land fragmentation, resource conflicts, reduced productivity, desertification and sedentarisation, resulting in loss of livestock during droughts" (ibid.: 23). Conflict over access to resources around pastoral communities has "affected the utilization of land for food production in large areas raising the spectre of widespread hunger and food insecurity" (ibid.: 26). At the same time, the *NLUP* calls on the government to "recognize pastoralism as a legitimate land-use and production system by establishing suitable methods of defining and registering land-rights in pastoral areas while allowing pastoralists to maintain their unique land systems and livelihoods" (ibid.: 44). Significantly, the *NLUP* is also the only policy document in

the sample that acknowledges the socio-cultural aspects of land and the relationship between indigenous people and their environment. The *NLUP* makes a number of positive recommendations for pastoral areas, including several that would fit within the 'pure pastoralism' and 'modern, mobile and green' discourses described earlier.[76]

In sum, the DA of Kenyan documents supports the findings of the CA: that there are mixed – and sometimes conflicting – messages about the sustainability of the pastoral way of life in the context of climatic and other changes. While crises narratives of 'pastoralist vulnerability', 'resource conflict' and 'food insecurity' are still central, and a 'transforming pastoralism and pastoral areas' discourse is still predominant overall, the analysis suggests that counternarratives, such as the need to protect pastoralist rights to critical resources, have begun to inform the policies and strategies of certain actors, notably those institutions whose mandates include pastoral area development and drought resilience. The higher levels of 'interdiscursivity' found within Kenyan policy documents – compared to their Ethiopian counterparts – is indicative perhaps of the more open and participatory nature of Kenyan policymaking in general (see Chapters 2 and 6), and the fact that a conducive policy space for pastoralists is considered to have opened up around the time of the 2012 *ASAL Policy* (Elmi and Birch, 2013; Odhiambo, 2014). Higher interdiscursivity, as we have seen (Chapter 4), hints at the potential for great discursive and therefore positive socio-cultural change in the future (Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002).

5.4 Conclusion

The results of this analysis are broadly congruent with my hypothesis on selecting the two cases (see Section 4.3): that a 'transforming pastoralism and drylands' policy discourse would feature more strongly in Ethiopian policies and strategies than they do in Kenya. While there is clearly evidence of 'new thinking' around the inherent resilience and adaptive nature of pastoralism in both cases, the CA and DA confirm that a 'transforming' discourse remains dominant, if slightly less so in Kenya. Within this discourse, often simplistic and depoliticised crises narratives of 'unproductive and conflict-ridden' drylands and 'climate-induced pastoralist vulnerability' remain to the fore. As others have noted (Scott, 1998; Roe, 1991; Krätli, 2013; Scoones. 2015), such simplifications are convenient for policymakers in that they help generate consensus and make action possible in the face of uncertainty. They also amplify the perception that some kind of 'intervention' needs to take place, so opening up space for the state, or other actors, to claim stewardship over resources previously managed under customary institutions. If drylands are perceived – or deliberately framed – as somehow 'empty' or 'unproductive', then it follows that

[76] The 2016 *Community Land Act* (see Chapter 2*)*, which provides for a classification of land known as community land, is also significant in that it enshrines in law a number of the principles and recommendations found in the *NLUP*, and includes important articles on 'rights and entitlements in communal areas', 'benefit-sharing from natural resource management' and 'dispute resolution mechanisms' (GOK-NLC, 2016). See also: Alden Wily (2018).

conversion to other forms of land use – such as irrigated cropping, resource extraction or wildlife conservation – is justifiable.

In both cases, it is apparent that the desire to 'transform', 'commercialise' and 'integrate' dryland resources and production – including the pastoralist economy – within a broader framework of national development, is being driven by an ideology of market-based economic growth and modernisation, notwithstanding a strong mediation role for the central state (especially in Ethiopia). The imperative of climate change, meanwhile, has provided a new language to policymakers to reframe growth as an opportunity to build a 'green economy' and to redefine the role of the state, as argued by Death (2016). By defining pastoralists as 'vulnerable' social groups whose 'resilience' needs to be enhanced – as many of the policies define them – pastoralists' own agency and knowledge in how they respond to climatic and other change is somehow denied.

From the textual analysis alone, it is not possible to determine the full extent to which discursive structures in Kenyan and Ethiopian policymaking "enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of power and dominance in society" (van Dijk, 2001: 353). Nevertheless, the analysis of certain policy documents reveals that there are indications that long-standing narratives of 'fragile drylands' and 'pastoral vulnerability' are being challenged (at least within certain state departments and agencies in Kenya), and that counternarratives built around the idea of 'pastoralist resilience' and 'pastoralist rights' are influencing the ways in which pastoralists are understood and portrayed. How long this will last, in light of the kind of rapid economic, political and demographic change underway in the drylands (see Chapters 2, 6 and 7), as well as recurrence of severe droughts affecting parts of Ethiopia and Kenya (EU/ECHO, 2017; Anyadike, 2019), remains to be seen.

To what extent dominant discourses in the Kenyan and Ethiopian cases have contributed to positive pastoral outcomes, or whose interests and power has been served, cannot be determined from this textual analysis alone. Policies do not cause outcomes in a linear fashion. They interact with numerous other factors (Robinson and Crane, 2015; Scoones, 2015). There is a need therefore to look beyond the written texts analysed here, firstly to identify how different actor or interest groups form and affect policy outcomes through negotiation, bargaining and political competition (Keeley and Scoones, 2003) and, secondly, to look at the implications and consequences of policy outcomes for pastoralists themselves. This is the task of Chapters 6 and 7 that follow.

Chapter 6: Ethiopian and Kenyan Policy Actors and their Interests

6.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter, I argued that a 'transforming pastoralism' discourse remains dominant in both Ethiopian and Kenyan policy, although less pronounced in Kenya. Despite greater recognition of the inherent resilience and adaptive nature of pastoralism, crises narratives of 'unproductive and conflict-ridden drylands' and 'climate-induced pastoralist vulnerability' remain deeply embedded. These amplify the perception that some kind of intervention is necessary, or open up space for the state and other actors to claim stewardship over land and resources previously managed under customary institutions. The purpose of this chapter is to uncover which actors, actor networks and institutions are driving these, or different, policy discourses and narratives, and why they hold the positions they do. This is done through an analysis of the different discourses and narratives as expressed by interviewees, employing NVivo software.[77]

I begin this chapter with an overview of the importance of different framings and narratives across different actors, before going on to examine these in more detail for each case. Table 6.1 provides a summary of the number of references (sentences or paragraphs coded from the interview transcripts) for each actor type that explicitly matches an assumption or narrative in line with one of the three discourses on pastoralism identified in Chapter 3 (an additional layer of coding to the open and axial coding described in Chapter 4), so providing a basis for analysis of actors and their narratives. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 display the same data in a separate set of bar charts for each country, giving a clearer sense of the overall pattern. While the NVivo coding by actor type is limited, in that it misses important contextual background, and the results would have undoubtedly been different should additional informants have been interviewed (more local-government officials in both cases, for example) it is useful nonetheless in providing an overview of the relative importance of different framings and narratives across the different categories of informants who participated in this research. Of the original nine categories of actor identified earlier (Table 4.4), several are grouped together here as they share similar characteristics and, as we shall discover, broadly similar standpoints: INGOs and international researchers, including UN agency staff, for example.

[77] A list of all the organisations and agencies from which interviewees are drawn can be found in Appendix B.

Table 6.1 Summary of informants' discourses on pastoralism and climate change

	Number of informants	**Number of references in NVivo Axial coding that match each discourse**			
		'Pure pastoralism'	***'Transforming pastoralism'***	***'Modern, mobile and green pastoralism'***	Total refs.
ETHIOPIA					
State actors	(7)	**5** *(13%)*	**22** *(56%)*	**12** *(31%)*	39
Donors	(4)	**3** *(16%)*	**8** *(42%)*	**8** *(42%)*	19
INGOs and international researchers	(13)	**47** *(51%)*	**11** *(12%)*	**35** *(37%)*	93
Local researchers	(6)	**9** *(43%)*	**4** *(19%)*	**8** *(38%)*	21
Pastoralist organisations	(2)	**16** *(73%)*	**4** *(18%)*	**2** *(9%)*	22
totals	(32)	80	49	65	194
KENYA					
State actors	(7)	**7** *(20%)*	**11** *(31%)*	**17** *(49%)*	35
Donors	0	0	0	0	0
INGOs and international researchers	(16)	**24** *(32%)*	**9** (12%)	**41** *(56%)*	74
Local researchers	(6)	**15** *(42%)*	**12** *(33%)*	**9** *(25%)*	36
Pastoralist organisations and local CSOs	(7)	**19** *(79%)*	**2** *(8%)*	**3** *(13%)*	24
Totals	(36)	65	34	70	169

Figure 6.1: Breakdown of each actor categories' discourses (Ethiopia)



Figure 6.2: Breakdown of each actor categories' discourses (Kenya)



The interview findings reveal that there is a marked difference in how the state actors interviewed in Ethiopia and Kenya frame contemporary challenges facing pastoralists and what responses are needed. In Ethiopia, as Figure 6.1 illustrates, it is evident that a 'transforming pastoralism and drylands' discourse is predominant among state actors interviewed (56% of references for this category), matching the dominant discourse found in the CA and DA of Ethiopian policy documents in Chapter 5. In the discussion that follows, we learn that predominantly apolitical

narratives of vulnerability and the causes of conflict, along with technocratic and managerial solutions, are at the fore among this group. This finding notwithstanding, Ethiopian state actors have clearly absorbed – or co-opted – many of the metaphors and narratives associated with a 'modern, mobile and green' discourse (31% of references for this category), as they seek to mobilise resources around common goals of climate resilience and economic growth. Interestingly, the dominant narratives among state actors interviewed in Kenya (Figure 6.2) are those closer to a 'modern, mobile and green' discourse (49% of references), while still retaining significant perspectives matching a 'transforming pastoralism' discourse (31%). While this finding stands out in contrast to the findings of the CA of Kenyan policies (Chapter 5) – where a 'transforming pastoralism' was more dominant – it does match the higher levels of interdiscursivity (compared to Ethiopia) uncovered from the DA of Kenyan policies. It is also explained by the fact that government officials in Kenya who did agree to be interviewed are likely to be more favourably disposed towards pastoralist development.

While there are some differences, non-state actors across both cases – particularly INGOs, researchers and pastoralist representatives – share many similar framings. Table 6.1 illustrates that, amongst these actors, the 'pure pastoralist' and 'modern and mobile and green' discourses are prominent: accounting, in the case of Ethiopia, for 51% and 37% respectively of the INGO and international researcher category references, and as high as 73% of references matching the 'pure pastoralist' discourse in the pastoralist organisation (PO) category. For the Kenyan INGO and international researcher category, as high as 56% of references match a 'modern, mobile and green' discourse, with a further 32% matching the 'pure pastoralism' discourse. Unsurprisingly, 79% of Kenyan PO and local CSO references match a 'pure pastoralism' discourse. Meanwhile, donor officials interviewed in Ethiopia hold some views that are closer to a government position – stressing the need for a more commercially orientated form of pastoralism, for example – matching the 'transforming pastoralism' discourse (accounting for 42% of references for this category), while at the same time recognising the value of mobility and calling for improved governance in pastoral areas, reflective of the 'pure pastoralism' and 'modern, mobile and green' discourses (16% and 42% respectively).

It is important, nonetheless, to acknowledge gaps in the data. In Kenya, I was unable to interview anyone from a donor or bilateral aid agency, despite these agencies' importance as policy actors. Hence we do not get a sense of what discourses and narratives are being promulgated by donors in Kenya, other than what other actors have to say about them. It also proved difficult to secure interviews with officials from certain relevant government departments in Kenya, such as those responsible for irrigation or renewable energy, who may have offered a different perspective. Responses were likely to have been different should more regional and sub-regional (Ethiopia) and county level (Kenya) government officials have been interviewed in both cases.

On the strength of these findings, I argue that the state is clearly the dominant actor driving national policy narratives on pastoralism and climate change in Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the influence of donors, of UN agencies and – to a lesser extent – a select group of INGOs and individual researchers on shaping current narratives and bringing certain elements of the 'modern, mobile and green' discourse to debates on pastoralism, is also evident. In Kenya, in contrast, the findings are less clearcut: while a 'transforming pastoralism' discourse is dominant in most Kenyan policy documents analysed, the findings of interviews reveal that interaction between state and non-state actors has made a deeper impression than in Ethiopia. Local and international researchers, donors, certain CSOs and even certain individuals within government form a 'discursive coalition' (Hajer, 2005) of like-minded actors who have evidently brought about a more substantive change in understandings of pastoralism (compared to Ethiopia), at least within some policy circles. This shift is reflected in the standpoints of those Kenyan government officials interviewed for this research (as Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2 illustrate), if not necessarily in all areas of written policy (as Chapter 5 reveals) or in all areas of policy implementation (as we shall discover in Chapter 7). The findings support the assertion that narratives shift to suit the needs of actors as new opportunities and contexts arise (Otto-Naess *et al*., 2015; Whitfield, 2016) – the process of devolution and the rapid development of Kenya's ASAL counties or the promotion of a 'climate resilient green economy' in Ethiopia being cases in point.

I further argue, reiterating what has been observed in Chapter 5, that – while the language of 'resilience', 'the green economy' and 'climate smart' may have moved centre stage – the 'transformation' and integration of what were once peripheral areas into the national economy, and by default, the transformation of pastoral production towards a more commercial and diversified orientation, remains the primary interest of policymakers in both countries, despite differences in the policy and political landscapes.

Here, as in the previous chapter, the cases of Ethiopia and Kenya are taken separately, examining the principle state and non-state actors, and their associated discourses, narratives and interests, in each case respectively. A final concluding section summarises key issues while comparing and contrasting the discourses and agency of actors across the two countries.

6.2 Policy actors in Ethiopia

This section examines the principle actors driving policy processes around climate change and pastoral area development in Ethiopia, and their associated discourses, narratives and interests. Each actor category (Table 6.1) is taken separately. The findings reveal that the state is the dominant actor driving national policy narratives on pastoralism and climate change in Ethiopia, with a very clear policy agenda in mind – the transformation of Ethiopia's drylands for the purposes of national development. Nonetheless, the influence of donors, UN agencies and – to a

lesser extent – a select group of INGOs and individual researchers on state actors' current narratives, bringing elements of the 'modern, mobile and green' discourse into debates on the future of pastoralism, is also evident.

6.2.1 Ethiopian state actor discourses, narratives and interests

As Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 illustrate, a 'transforming pastoralism and drylands' discourse is predominant among government officials interviewed (56% of references for this category), matching the dominant discourse found in the CA and DA of Ethiopian policy documents in Chapter 5. It is important to clarify that the 'state' in Ethiopia includes multiple ministries and agencies with different mandates and activities. There is often duplication in terms of concerns and priorities – especially with regard to pastoral development (FDRE-MoFPDA, 2018). Relevant ministries include: the Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change (MoEFCC), which acts as the national focal point for the UNFCCC and which coordinate the CRGE,[78] the *National Adaptation Plan* (NAP) and other climate policies; the Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation (MoFEC), which hosts the national CRGE *Climate Finance Facility*[79]; the Ministry for Water, Irrigation and Electricity (MWIE), which holds the remit for water development and energy; the Ministry of Federal and Pastoralist Development Affairs (MoFPDA),[80] which is the coordinator of development activities in the predominantly pastoral Regional States of Afar, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella, and which was given the mandate to develop a new *Pastoral Development Policy and Strategy;* and the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), responsible for agricultural and livestock development and the lead national agency for the IGAD *EDE* programme in Ethiopia. As we saw in earlier chapters, policymaking in Ethiopia has, for the main part, been highly centralised, a view endorsed by several (non-state) interviewees.[81] The situation is made more complex by the Regional States' administrative structure that nominally devolves a certain amount of power and decision-making to the regional and sub-regional (*Woreda*) levels. While the regions are obliged to abide and follow national policy, they also have the power to formulate their own policies and legislation.[82]

For the purposes of this research, six interviews were conducted with federal government officials in Ethiopia: three from the MoEFCC, two from the MoA and one from the MoFPDA. In addition,

[78] Climate Resilient Green Economy (see Chapter 5).
[79] The MoFEC has recently sought accreditation with the global *Green Climate Fund* (GCF) and will be the conduit for channelling international climate finance into national climate investments.
[80] In late 2018, the MoFPDA was renamed the 'Ministry for Peace', reflective perhaps of a shift away from the special attention given by the GoE to pastoral areas since 2015 (when the Ministry had its mandate extended to 'Pastoral Development') towards greater focus on security at a time of political instability.
[81] Skype interviews with: international researcher 1, 18/04/208; international researcher 2, 11/05/2018; Interviews with: INGO staff 4, 17/05/2018; Ethiopian PO representative 2, 29/05/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 2, 24/05/2018; donor official 3, 30/05/2018.
[82] Interview with international researcher 3, 14/03/2018.

one interview was held with an official from the Oromia Pastoralist Area Development Commission, a Regional State institution.

Reflective of the kinds of naturalistic and largely depoliticised framings of resource conflict that were a characteristic of most Ethiopian policies analysed in Chapter 5, state officials highlighted the effects of climate change,[83] degradation and declining productivity of rangeland resources[84], inter-community conflict[85] and pastoralists' cultural resistance to modernisation[86] as barriers to pastoral development. Pastoralist mobility is essentially seen as a fixed 'coping strategy' that is no longer sufficient for dealing with the uncertainties brought about by climate change and shrinking rangelands,[87] with pastoralists becoming *"dependent on government interventions"*,[88] or exiting pastoralism altogether. Competition for natural resources such as water and pasture, within a context of growing numbers of people and livestock, is deemed a primary driver of conflict in pastoral areas,[89] echoing the kinds of Malthusian narratives of population and poverty that have informed attitudes towards Africa's drylands in the past (see Chapter 2). According to one official:

> *Because of climate change, pastoralism is not working. It's not working because there are also conflicts. The Ilemi Triangle[90] is a conflict-prone area, and the conflict comes from the dwindling resources. Climate change is aggravating this. This restricts pastoralists' movement.*[91]

Another spoke of the pressure put on frontier areas' pasture and water by an influx of people from neighbouring countries displaced by climate change and conflict.[92] Arguably, such naturalistic framings of the causes of conflict obscure the many and complex factors that are behind an upsurge in inter-group clashes in Ethiopia in 2018 and 2019 (Burke, 2017; Lefort and Tronval, 2019).[93]

As we have seen in earlier chapters, 'environmental-crises' and 'resource-scarcity' narratives (Krätli and Enson, 2013; Scoones *et al*., 2019) are frequently evoked to amplify the perception that some kind of intervention or 'solution' is necessary. There was consensus amongst officials

[83] Interviews with: Ethiopian government official 1, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018; Ethiopian local government official 1, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 5, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 6, 22/05/2018.
[84] Interview with Ethiopian government official 2, 22/05/2018.
[85] Interviews with: Ethiopian government official 1, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018.
[86] Interviews with: Ethiopian local government official 1, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018.
[87] Interviews with: Government official 2, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018; Ethiopian local government official 1, 25/05/2018.
[88] Interview with Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018.
[89] Interviews with: Ethiopian government official 1, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018; donor official 4, 29/05/2018.
[90] The Ilemi Triangle is a predominantly pastoralist and agropastoralists territory of about 14,000 square km in the southeast of Ethiopia whose ownership is disputed by the neighbouring countries of Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda.
[91] Interview with Ethiopian government official 4, 29/05/2018.
[92] Interview with Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018
[93] Despite PM Abiy Ahmed's reform process underway since 2018, ethnic-based conflicts persist in several parts of Ethiopia, most notably along the border between Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz regions, and across Ethiopia's Oromia and Somali Regions, with large numbers displaced. See: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45724440 (Accessed, 07/07/2020).

interviewed that there is a need to "*build the resilience"* of pastoralists in the face of drought and other 'shocks'.[94] Their respective Ministries, they asserted, were working hard to provide key infrastructure and social services, water development, improved rangeland management and improved marketing of livestock.[95] For these informants, such interventions are not only a means to develop the hitherto untapped potential of Ethiopia's lowlands, but also a precursor to the creation of *"climate-resilient livelihoods*".[96] 'Resilience', according to one official, provides an integrative conceptual framework that allows the different sectors in Ethiopia to work towards a common goal.[97] Referring to the new *Pastoral Development Policy*, one official asserted that: *"The whole idea of the* (new) *policy framework and strategic thinking is to create resilient pastoralism…resilience in terms of diversified livelihoods."*[98]

As was evident from the CA and DA of Ethiopian policies (Chapter 5), and reaffirmed by several officials interviewed, climate-adaptation policy puts the same discursive emphasis on natural hazards like drought, and the need to build 'climate resilience' as a means of mobilising consensus and the support of development partners. The assumption that pastoralist and small-farmer 'autonomous adaptation' is no longer sufficient to deal with the enormity of climate change implies that there is a need instead for deliberate policy decisions and planned actions on the part of state agencies. The objectives of the latest *Adaptation Plan* are, according to one official: *"building resilience and adaptive capacity, and integrating the adaptations into existing policies, government policies, strategies, as well as projects and programmes."*[99]

The view that settlement in one place means formerly marginalised pastoralists could avail of better services, and avoid the worst affects of climate-induced drought (matching a similar narrative identified within policies analysed) was expressed by most officials[100] – suggesting that 'transforming pastoralists' into agropastoralists still remains the predominant discourse at the heart of Ethiopian government policy towards pastoral areas. While this discourse predates concerns about climate change, the 'climate-resilience' and climate-adaptation interventions described thus far have clearly been absorbed by the transforming discourse. This supports the thesis that narratives shift to suit the needs of actors as new opportunities arise and new contexts unfold (Otto-Naess *et al*., 2015; Whitfield, 2016).

[94] Interviews with: Ethiopian government official 1, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 5, 30/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 6, 30/05/2018.
[95] Interviews with: Ethiopian government official 1, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 5, 30/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 6, 30/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 1, 22/05/2018.
[96] Interviews with: Ethiopian government official 1, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 5, 30/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 6, 30/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 1, 22/05/2018.
[97] Interview with Ethiopian government official 2, 22/05/2018.
[98] Interview with Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018.
[99] Interview with Ethiopian government official 6, 30/05/2018.
[100] Interviews with: Regional (AU) official 7/03/2018; Ethiopian government official 1, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government officith al 3, 25/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 5, 30/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 6, 30/05/2018; Ethiopian local government official 1, 25/05/2018.

The argument that pastoralists need to adopt 'market-based approaches', develop livestock 'value chains' and/or start to 'diversify livelihoods' was made by several officials[101] – again matching the dominant 'transforming pastoralism' discourse. According to one:

> *There is a huge potential of surface and ground water there that can be used to irrigate drylands. Not only for diversification, but highly commercialised pastoralism…they can increase the production and productivity of their livestock for market, even for the international market.*[102]

As highlighted by several officials,[103] the argument to reduce livestock numbers, and so reduce GHG emissions, is given further impetus by the strong commitment of Ethiopia to meet its Paris Agreement targets[104] – an example of where global narratives around livestock's contribution to global warming (Gerber *et al*., 2013; Willet *et al*., 2019) are being translated into policymaking at the national level. As we have seen in earlier chapters (Chapters 2 and 3) the new (post COP 21 Paris Agreement) global political consensus to tackle climate change offers potential to attract international climate finance for 'resilience building' (Joseph, 2014), carbon sequestration (FAO 2013; McGahey *et al*., 2014; Dabasso *et al*., 2014), 'climate smart agriculture' (FAO, 2013), biodiversity protection and 'green economic growth'. Amongst African nations, Ethiopia has been a front-runner in embracing – and to some extent shaping - this new green agenda (Death, 2016; Redda and Roland, 2016). The consequences of these policy narratives for pastoralism are explored in Chapter 7.

Despite the persistence of the 'transforming pastoralism' discourse amongst officials interviewed, there was evidence of a shift in rhetoric. A senior official made the case:

> *Ten or twenty years ago, in terms of pastoralism, the thinking was you assumed those pastoralist areas as a sort of a burden for the nation...whenever you talk about pastoral areas you think in terms of conflict, in terms of vulnerability, in terms of drought. Now we are at a point where the paradigm has changed...So let's start from the potential, not from the problem of vulnerability.*[105]

For prominent state actors, such as the MoFPDA, partnership with other Ministries, with donors, with drylands 'experts', as well as with pastoralist leaders and CSOs like the Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia (through such fora as the *Ethiopian Pastoralist Day*) adds a layer of credibility to their policy initiatives. It is likely, furthermore, that the potential to attract substantive World Bank funding was a contributory factor when developing the new *Pastoral Development Policy*.[106]

[101] Interviews with: Ethiopian local government official 1, 25/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 2, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018.
[102] Interview with Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018.
[103] Interviews with: Ethiopian local government official 1, 25/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 5, 30/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 6, 30/05/2018; donor official 3, 30/05/2018.
[104] Ethiopia has pledged a net GHG emissions reduction of 64% from 'business as usual' by 2030, as set out its NDCs and GES – both reviewed in Chapter 5.
[105] Interview with Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018.
[106] In 2019, the World Bank approved $350 million in the form of concessional credit and grants for a major '*Lowlands Livelihood Resilience Project*. These funds are to be channeled through the Ministry for Peace (formerly the

Stakeholder consultations satisfy the concerns of international donors, even if rarely – according to several non-state informants – they reach out beyond a select group.[107] Policy priorities would also appear to be informed by what donors are keen on funding at this point in time – namely: anything that 'builds resilience'. Nonetheless, for one official, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) is not overly influenced by external actor priorities, even if they appear to adopt those actors' narratives:

> *Actually our government is not influenced by that one…They will take what they believe fits their vision…The intention is really more administrative, is it about governing the people in the pastoralist areas…areas bordering other countries and prone to conflict…And what they consider available land happens to be in the pastoral areas. The big rivers that cross the pastoralist areas are seen as offering irrigation potential...the government's desire is to develop those areas.*[108]

For one non-state interviewee, while the policy rhetoric may talk of 'resilience' and 'climate smart', the motivations and interests of powerful actors (the state and private investors) in terms of accessing new funds and knowledge around the green economy remain the same.[109] The pastoral lowlands of Ethiopia are being targeted – not for what they can bring to pastoralists, but rather as a 'new frontier' for investment and as means of extending state control and security to border areas.[110] Similarly, one INGO informant asserted that the government regards pastoral areas as: "*potentially untapped resources. They are really looking at how they can accelerate development of those areas…but not necessarily with the pastoralist communities at the centre of that thinking."*[111]

In sum, while pastoralism may no longer be considered by state actors as 'backward', or the antithesis to the modern state, to the extent it was in the past (see Chapter 2), and the language of 'resilience' has clearly been adopted as a means to rationalise government-mediated development interventions – this research finds that 'transforming pastoralism and the drylands' for the purposes of economic growth remains the dominant discourse amongst GoE officials interviewed. This would suggest that state actors are the prominent force shaping the kinds of discourse and narratives found in Ethiopian national policies analysed. Dovetailing with the interests of donors and other development actors, 'building resilience' is a convenient means of mobilising support for such a vision.

MoFPDA). See: http://www.mofed.gov.et/hi/web/guest/-/ethiopia-signs-financing-agreement-with-the-world-bank (Accessed, 07/07/2020).

[107] Interviews with: Ethiopian PO representative 2, 29/05/2018; INGO staff member 3, 17/05/2018; Skype interview with international researcher 2, 11/05/2018.

[108] Interview with Ethiopian government official 2, 22/05/2018

[109] Skype Interview with international researcher 2, 11/05/2018.

[110] Skype Interviews with: international researcher 1, 18/04/2018; international researcher 2, 11/05/2018.

[111] Interview with INGO staff 6, 23/05/2018.

6.2.2 Donors' discourses, narratives and interests (Ethiopia)

As Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 illustrate, donor officials interviewed in Ethiopia hold some views that are closer to a government position – arguing, for example, for more commercially orientated pastoralism – matching the 'transforming pastoralism' discourse (42% of references for this category), while at the same time recognising the value of mobility and calling for security of land tenure in pastoral areas – reflective of the 'modern, mobile and green' and 'pure pastoralism' discourses (16% and 42% respectively).

Multiple multilateral and bilateral donors have invested heavily in pastoral development, climate resilience and agricultural programmes and projects in Ethiopia's lowlands (Gebremeskel *et al*., 2019). Appendix G provides an indicative list of recent and/or current donor programmes and initiatives in Ethiopia that have a strong resilience focus. Funding is channelled through federal government ministries, or through various state-INGO partnerships and consortiums, such as PRIME[112] or BRACED[113], which in turn implement projects in collaboration with local government.[114] Funding is also sourced from multilateral climate-finance mechanisms such as the UNFCCC AF, the GCF or through regional (IGAD) 'drought resilience' type initiatives. As part of the fieldwork, interviews were conducted with four donor and/or bilateral aid organisation staff in Ethiopia, one from USAID, one from GIZ and two from the World Bank.

Asked about the kinds of challenges facing pastoralism, donor informants generally shared the same kinds of basic assumptions about cause and effect relationships as government officials. According to one donor staff: "*the more the resources are shrinking, the more people will get into conflict because of resource scarcity."*[115] Pastoralists' "*coping capacity was diminishing"* in the face of climate change.[116] Apportioning some share of blame for pastoralist vulnerability to pastoralists themselves, one donor official asserted that rangeland resources are under pressure, not only because of drought, but because: "*People do not really give attention to resource management or take care of resources such as water and pastures."*[117]

There were, nonetheless, some differences in how issues were framed. Donor representatives were more likely than government officials to acknowledge gaps in policy coherence and policy implementation. Several drew attention to the increased trend of privatisation, and subsequent fragmentation of formerly communal lands, and the lack of clear land-use policies, either at federal

[112] PRIME (Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion), a USAID-funded, $US70 million, five-year project led by Mercy Corps and Care Ethiopia. See: https://www.prime-ethiopia.org/ (Accessed, 07/07/2020).
[113] BRACED (Building Resilience to Climate Extremes and Disasters). See: http://www.braced.org/news/i/in-ethiopia-climate-change-leads-herders-to-retrain-as-farmers/ (Accessed, 07/07/2020).
[114] Interviews with: donor official 1, 29/05/2018; INGO staff 3, 17/05/2018.
[115] Interview with donor official 2, 23/05/2018.
[116] Interview with donor official 2, 23/05/2018.
[117] Interview with donor official 1, 29/05/2018.

or regional level.[118] Reflective of the kind of narratives found in the 'pure pastoralism', and 'modern, mobile and green' discourses that emphasise restrictions on mobility as a key constraint, and improved governance of pastoral rangelands as a solution, one official asserted:

> (X: name of agency withheld) *aims to influence government to understand the importance of mobile pastoralism – for many years considered unproductive and backward…the Government needs to recognise the importance of mobility and customary institutions and move away from any enforced villagisation. Local land-use plans would help, as would an overarching land-use policy.*[119]

The challenge was how to make '*mega-projects'* (dams and irrigation schemes) *"more pastoralist friendly*."[120] According to one official, pastoralists could benefit from irrigated land "*set aside for growing pasture"* and from "*out-grower schemes*."[121] There is an assumption – shared with government officials – that incorporating pastoralists into the market economy and generating cash income were necessary for pastoralists to adapt to climate change:

> *Transformation is not just changing pastoralists to agrarians. But improving their production system…The two* (mobility and commercialisation*) are actually compatible. Those people who stay in the system are going to benefit from the market, from the demand for livestock. So the system will continue to grow, but with commercialisation."*[122]

Donors interviewed see their role as an enabling one, building capacity and facilitating progressive policy change, primarily working through various inter-governmental and inter-agency working groups and technical committees.[123] According to one donor official:

> *Building resilience is our primary goal – creating more self-sufficiency in pastoral areas, economic empowerment, equitable development, gender equality.*[124]

While not claiming to have any direct input to state policy, the influence of donors on shaping the current resilience narrative, and bringing elements of a 'modern, mobile and green' discourse to debates on the future of pastoralism in Ethiopia, is significant. From interviews with donor officials, it is evident that they, in turn, have been informed by the work of research organisations and drylands scholars. The myriad of resilience-building initiatives and programmes currently being rolled out in Ethiopia (Appendix G) suggests something of a paradigm shift in terms of the thinking around pastoralism amongst donors and their allies (within and outside government) – away from an earlier narrative (see Chapter 2) that views pastoralists 'as part of the problem' to one instead that regards pastoralism, and pastoral areas, as 'part of the solution'.

[118] Interviews with: donor official 1, 29/05/2018; donor official 4, 26/05/2018; donor official 3, 30/05/2018.
[119] Interview with donor official 1, 29/05/2018.
[120] Interview with donor official 2, 23/05/2018.
[121] Interview with donor official 2, 23/05/2018.
[122] Interview with donor official 2, 23/05/2018.
[123] Interview with donor official 1, 29/05/2018.
[124] Interview with donor official 1, 29/05/2018.

> *Basically, the biggest policy agenda that's being pushed by almost all development partners is the issue of accepting pastoralism as a livelihood strategy. To exploit the potential in the drylands.*[125]

It was noted that the World Bank and USAID have been strong supporters of the *Pastoral Development Policy and Strategy* and in bringing different stakeholders together.[126] Arguably, by exerting their authority, financial leverage and influence over government policies in subtle ways – through, for example, various 'working groups' and 'technical committees' - absolves them from any responsibility for interventions in pastoral areas that do not work out as planned.

In sum, we find mixed messages emanating from donors. While making calls for smaller herd size, further commercialisation and adoption of 'climate-smart' solutions, there is also recognition of pastoralism as a proven adaptive strategy suited to dryland areas, and of the need to protect mobility and improve rangeland governance. Undoubtedly, as keen advocates of resilience frameworks and market-led approaches, and with the kind of power and influence that substantial resources can bring, it is reasonable to infer that donors are a significant actor shaping Ethiopian policy narratives. Alongside the desire for greater market liberalisation and climate resilience, donors' interests in Ethiopia would appear to be primarily one of promoting 'good governance' – in terms of not only land-use policy and the administration of development assistance, as we have seen above, but also greater accountability of the Ethiopian political system more generally. This is done primarily through providing funding and expertise through various public–private partnerships and consortia, capacity building and technical support – all forms of 'soft power' or 'governmentality at a distance' (Joseph, 2014: 287).

6.2.3 INGOs' and international researchers' discourses, narratives and interests (Ethiopia)

As there was a great deal of discursive commonality within the views of INGO staff and international researchers interviewed, I have grouped them together as one actor category here. A number of prominent INGOs are working on pastoralist development projects and programmes in Ethiopia – usually in partnership with government agencies, or through consortiums such as PRIME or BRACED. There are also several international multilateral agencies focused on agriculture who have strong presence in Ethiopia, including the International Fund for African Development (IFAD), the FAO and the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI).

Table 6.1 reveals that INGO staff and international researchers interviewed in Ethiopia – accounting for the highest number of references coded for any category – generally held views that are best interpreted as matching the 'pure pastoralism' and 'modern, mobile and green' discourses (51%, and 37% respectively). When compared to the 'transforming pastoralism' discourse that is

[125] Interview with donor official 2, 23/05/2018.
[126] Interviews with: donor official 1, 29/05/2018; donor official 2, 23/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 2, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018; INGO staff 3, 7/05/2018; INGO staff 7, 26/05/2018.

dominant in the written policy (Chapter 5), this would appear to indicate that INGOs and international researchers, while having some input, have nowhere near the level of influence the state, or even donors, do in shaping policy narratives. This is no surprise when we consider that, for many years, INGOs and CSOs were severely restricted from engaging in rights-based or advocacy work under the *Charities and Civil Society Proclamation*[127] and, as a consequence, have been reluctant to challenge mainstream narratives (around, for example, villagisation) for fear of government reprobation.[128] INGO and CSOs that support pastoralists, have nonetheless sought to influence policy discourse by other means – by cultivating contacts with key individuals within government ministries and state agencies,[129] by using their wider contacts to influence policy at regional (HoA and the AU) level[130] or as members of international pastoralist advocacy networks such as CELEP.

For the purposes of this research, interviews were conducted with seven INGO staff: two from Mercy Corps and one from each of: Care Ethiopia, SOS Sahel, Danish Church Aid, Misereor and Christian Aid. In addition, interviews were held with six international researchers whose work is closely focused on pastoral area development: one working with ILRI, one with Tufts University, one with the AU, one currently freelance and two with the FAO-UN.

INGO staff and international researchers interviewed were cognisant of the hardships caused by recurrent drought, but several felt there is still too much uncertainty around how rainfall patterns are changing to reach definitive conclusions about future impacts.[131] While climate change brings another layer of uncertainty, there are equally pressing challenges facing the drylands, notably inappropriate government policy and poor governance of pastoral areas.[132] State institutions were portrayed as 'lacking capacity'[133] or as facilitating land-grabs and 'mega projects' that restrict mobility and access to seasonal resources,[134] while pastoralists' adaptive capacity and way of life is being steadily undermined[135] – narratives generally not found within the official policy documents analysed in Chapter 5, but prominent in the relevant academic literature (Chapter 2). In line with the kind of critical perspectives of government policy found in a 'pure pastoralism' discourse,

[127] As part of the political reform process under PM Abiy Ahmed, this legislation was replaced in late 2018 under a new Civil Society Proclamation. See: https://freedomhouse.org/article/ethiopia-civil-society-proclamation-advances-essential-freedoms (Accessed, 07/07/2020).
[128] Interviews with: INGO staff 6, 23/05/2018; PO representative 1, 17/05/2018;
[129] Interviews with: INGO staff member 1, 15/05/2018; INGO staff 8, 31/05/2018; international researcher 3, 14/05/2018; Skype interview with international researcher 1, 18/04/2018.
[130] Interview with INGO staff 5, 21/05/2018.
[131] Interviews with: international researcher 1, 18/04/2018; international researcher 2, 11/05/2018; international researcher 3, 14/05/2018.
[132] Interviews with: international researcher 1, 1/04/2018; international researcher 3, 14/05/2018; INGO staff 4, 17/05/2018.
[133] Interviews with: INGO staff, 1, 15/05/2018; UN agency official 1, 16/05/2018.
[134] Interview with INGO staff 3, 17/05/2018.
[135] Interviews with: international researcher 1, 18/04/2018; International researcher 2, 11/05/2018; INGO staff 1, 15/05/2018; INGO staff 7, 31/05/2018; international researcher 3, 14/05/2018; UN agency official 2, 16/05/2018; Ethiopian PO representative 1, 17/05/2018; Ethiopian PO representative 2, 29/05/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 24/05/2018.

described in earlier chapters, one INGO staff member asserted that, within policymaking, there was little "*understanding of how pastoralist area dryland systems and ecologies work."*[136] In contrast, one international researcher felt that the development of the new *Pastoral Development Policy* had opened up a space for the GoE to "*think more positively, more rationally, about pastoralism and development."*[137]

According to these informants, pastoralists have shown that they are capable of adapting and innovating in the face of change. Pastoralists are taking advantage of new market opportunities and technologies, such as the use of mobile phones, mobile money and trucks to transport livestock.[138] Instead of calling for reduced livestock emissions, these actors advocate instead for recognition of the critical role pastoral systems play in maintaining rangeland ecosystems, meeting food security needs and offering an adaptive land-use system in the face of climate uncertainty.[139] A number of INGO informants and researchers believe responses to climate change offer the potential for pastoralists and pastoral areas to benefit from 'carbon sequestration' and 'payment for ecosystem services' (PES) type schemes[140] and 'climate-smart' livestock production[141], a similar narrative thread to that promulgated by several donor informants.

In sum, there is a great deal of discursive commonality amongst INGO staff and international researchers interviewed: rejecting apolitical 'environmental-crises' framings and recognising instead the broader context of change in pastoral areas. They are calling for stronger resource rights and less restrictions on mobility, and highlighting that pastoralists are already innovating and engaged in markets – all narratives closer to the 'pure pastoralism' and 'modern, mobile and green' discourses, identified earlier. The extent, however, to which these actors' narratives have informed actual policy still remains limited, as Chapter 5 has revealed. The reasons for this evidently lie in the top-down nature or Ethiopian policymaking in general, and the aforementioned *Charities and Civil Society Proclamation.* According to one INGO interviewee: "…*it's ok to talk about delivering services in pastoral areas, but not rights*."[142] For another:

> *I would say we are rarely invited to give our view. It is more a matter of…trying to facilitate…point out something that you could assist them with. And then trying to work it out from that angle…These are very sensitive topics. These are not freely discussed areas….land-use, especially.*[143]

[136] Interview with INGO staff 3, 17/05/2018.
[137] Interview with international researcher 3, 14/05/2018.
[138] Interviews with: international researcher 2, 11/05/2018; UN agency official 2, 16/05/2018; INGO staff 6, 23/05/2018.
[139] Interviews with: international researcher 2, 11/05/2018; international researcher 3, 14/05/2018; Ethiopian PO representative 1, 7/05/2018; Ethiopian PO representative 2, 29/05/2018; INGO staff 4, 17/05/2018; INGO staff 6, 23/05/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 5, 30/05/2018.
[140] Interviews with: INGO staff 1, 15/05/2018; INGO staff 6, 23/05/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 5, 30/05/2018.
[141] Interviews with: UN agency official 1, 16/05/2018; INGO staff 5, 21/05/2018.
[142] Interviews with: INGO staff 6, 23/05/2018
[143] Interview with INGO staff 1, 15/05/2018.

Regarding INGO and international researchers' interests in Ethiopia, interviewees were reticent about their own organisations' agendas, beyond stating that they were motivated by the desire to improve the status and livelihoods of the pastoralist communities with whom they work, and to bring about greater recognition of pastoralism as a legitimate land-use system.[144] Several INGO respondents expressed enthusiasm to be included in donor-funded partnerships and consortia, such as the aforementioned PRIME and BRACED programmes.[145] This appears to offer them the necessary legitimacy to operate within the constraints set by the *Charities and Civil Society Proclamation,* and perhaps to have some influence over policy discourse through non-adversarial means, as well as to secure necessary funds for their programmes. Speaking about his organisation's involvement with BRACED, one INGO interviewee stressed: "*what we are doing as a strategy is to engage positively with government sectors so that government sectors themselves can really understand the benefit of what we are saying, and then they make it their own agenda."*[146] For another: *"relationships between government and NGOs are under quite a lot of strain at the moment, but ultimately, as an INGO, we are here to support the government's vision."*[147]

6.2.4 Ethiopian local researchers' discourses, narratives and interests

The perspectives of local researchers interviewed in Ethiopia were similar to those of INGO and international researchers above, indicating that – along with several pastoralist organisations – there exists a loose (and fluid) coalition of like-minded actors in Ethiopia, who endeavour to bring 'new thinking' on pastoralism into policymaking processes. Yet, as Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 illustrate, where a high percentage of references for this actor category are coded as matching either the 'pure pastoralism' (43%) or 'modern, mobile and green' (38%) discourses, it is evident that local researchers are among those actors with only limited influence over the kinds of discourses and narratives that appear in written policy – where the 'transforming pastoralism' discourse is dominant – or in turn, the kinds of interventions being prioritised by the state.

It is beyond the scope of this study to document the full spectrum of individuals and institutions producing research on climate change, drylands agriculture, livestock and/or pastoral development issues in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning research institutions such as the Institute of Pastoral and Agropastoral Studies, Haramaya University (HU), and the College of Drylands Agriculture, Mekelle University (MU), both of which have close links with key government ministries such as the MoFPDA and the MoA, as well as international research partnerships. Another prominent institution is the Drylands Research Directorate within the Ethiopian Institute

[144] Interviews with: INGO staff 1, 15/05/2018; INGO staff 3, 17/05/2018; INGO staff 4, 17/05/2018; INGO staff 5, 21/05/2018; INGO staff 6, 23/05/2018; INGO staff, 7, 31/05/2018.
[145] Interviews with: INGO staff 1, 15/05/2018; INGO staff, 6, 23/05/2018; INGO staff 7, 31/05/2018.
[146] Interview with INGO staff 7, 31/05/2018.
[147] Interview with INGO staff 3, 17/05/2018.

for Agricultural Research (EIAR). For the purposes of this research, six local researchers and/or consultants with expertise in drylands development and/or pastoralism were interviewed. Of these: one worked for the EIAR, one for the International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE)[148], one for Tufts University, one for ILRI and two who are freelance.

Local researchers highlighted similar challenges facing pastoral areas to their international researcher colleagues above: Pastoral resources are being lost, they asserted, as former rangelands are converted to other forms of land use.[149] There is growing disparity between rich and poor livestock owners.[150] As natural hazards become more frequent, pastoralists have little time to recover and face destitution as a result[151]. Those who 'drop out' were *"contributing in some ways to the destruction of the ecology, because they have to produce charcoal, firewood, whatever, in order to make a living."*[152] For some, the scale of change taking place was such that it is questionable whether a 'traditional form of pastoralism' would remain viable in the future.[153] For several local researchers, pastoralists' customary resource management systems have been eroded by the government's strict administrative delineation of pastoral areas, based on the *Woreda* and *Kebele* type of division.[154] Local researchers – like their international counterparts – were also critical of sedentarisation and infrastructure development in critical agroecological zones:

> *…settlement, those big projects, they are taking away the prime grazing and watering sources…if you take away that key resource, there is no way you can utilise the marginal resource efficiently...*[155]

Contradicting the government view that livestock emissions are a problem, one researcher asserted that: "*Recent research indicates that extensive livestock keeping on rangelands is good for helping to store carbon emissions into the soil."*[156] By assuming cattle are responsible for degradation and GHG emissions, the CRGE, according to another, failed to take account of the "*food-security contribution of livestock…poultry may not be an appropriate for everybody, especially in the arid areas. Camels, smaller livestock, such as sheep and goats are more suitable for dry areas."*[157]

Ethiopian researchers' standpoints are likely to be shaped not only by their personal research interests and the particular focus of their institutions, but also by their exposure to other research from local and international sources, and from the collaborative nature of their work (often with international partners). Such collaborations are likely to add status and legitimacy to their research,

[148] The ICIPE is a member of the Association of International Research and Developent Centres in Africa (AIRCA).
[149] Interviews with: Ethiopian local researcher 2, 24/05/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 5, 30/05/2018; Ethiopian Local Researcher 4, 30/05/2018.
[150] Interviews with: Ethiopian local researcher 5, 30/05/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 3, 24/05/2018;.
[151] Interview with Ethiopian local researcher 5, 30/05/2018.
[152] Interview with Ethiopian local researcher 3, 24/05/2018.
[153] Interviews with: Ethiopian local researcher 2, 24/05/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 3, 24/05/2018.
[154] Interviews with: Ethiopian local researcher 1, 17/05/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 2, 24/05/2018.
[155] Interview with Ethiopian local researcher 5, 30/05/2018.
[156] Interview with Ethiopian local researcher 3, 24/05/2018.
[157] Interview with Ethiopian local researcher 5, 30/05/2018.

as well as offer an important source of funding. Several university departments, as we saw above, have close links with the MoFPDA and the MoA, in which case, certain research projects are likely to be driven by those Ministries' interests and priorities. Like their CSO colleagues, Ethiopian local researchers are also likely to have been circumspect in what they write or say in recent years, fearing state censure and/or loss of state support. One international researcher, nonetheless, felt that certain:

> *…senior, experienced, Ethiopian individuals, who may be academics, may be private consultants, who are consulted by governments to advise them on what the policies and strategies should be… are more influential in shifting policy than the kind of international presence in Ethiopia, particularly that of NGOs and donors.*[158]

In sum, we can detect some level of interdiscursivity within the findings of interviews with local researchers in Ethiopia: sharing many of the concerns around the longer-term viability of nomadic pastoralism, but also highlighting the broader context for pastoralists' predicaments and the government's failure to recognise and protect pastoral systems. It would appear from the findings, however, (and as Table 6.1 illustrates) that, while the influence of local researchers on shaping mainstream policy discourse should not be discounted, it is not as strong as that of the state or even donors.

6.2.5 Ethiopian pastoralist organisations' discourses, narratives and interests

It would be presumptive to make inferences on the strength of interviews with just two Ethiopian pastoralist organisations (POs). Nonetheless, these interviews do provide some insight into the kinds of discourses and narratives being promulgated by actors who represent pastoralists' interests, and the level of influence these organisations have on wider debates around pastoral development in Ethiopia. As Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 illustrate – not surprisingly – references matching the 'pure pastoralist' discourses account for 73% of all coded references under this actor category, indicating that POs' positioning remains marginal within the predominant discourses found within policy itself.

POs in Ethiopia are by no means as numerous or institutionally strong as their counterparts in Kenya. Nor, as we saw, has the same 'democratic space' existed for local CSOs in Ethiopia to voice opposition to large development investments damaging to pastoralists' interests, as in Kenya. The most prominent national organisation in recent years is the Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia (PFE), a network of more than 20 different organisations. The PFE provides training to local pastoralist groups and local and regional government officials on relevant policy processes, with the aim of enabling pastoralists to "*decide and speak for themselves."*[159] PFE collaborates with the MoFPDA

[158] Skype interview with international researcher 2, 11/04/2018.
[159] Interview with PO representative 1, 17/05/2018.

in organising an annual *Ethiopian Pastoralist Day* (EPD) – a 'pastoral gathering' (Morton, 2010) that (in theory) allows pastoralist groups from different regions to feed their own narratives and perspectives into government discourse. POs also exist at regional level, such as the Oromia Pastoralist Association (OPA). For the purposes of this research, interviews were held with representatives from each of these POs – the PFE and the OPA.

A Pastoral Affairs Standing Committee (PASC), composed largely of Members of Parliament (MPs) from pastoral areas, whose role is to review and revise policies and legislation pertinent to pastoral areas before putting such legislation to Parliament for ratification,[160] also exists in Ethiopia. However, as I was unable to meet any members, the extent of its influence on policy narratives is unknown.

PO informants shared many similar concerns and understandings to other actors above, especially INGO informants and researchers both local and international. Climate change for them was a reality, "*because pastoral livelihoods are heavily dependent on climate…this is heavily related with grazing land, natural resource."*[161] Another challenge was *"conflict between the different pastoral groups…such as between pastoralists in Oromia and in Somali region."*[162] Reflecting thinking in line with the 'pure pastoralism' discourse, pastoralist mobility was viewed by these informants as central to the pastoralist livelihood system and the best way to make use of harsh and variable environments.[163] Such mobility is, however, increasingly restricted,[164] and pastoralists are *"forced to keep their animals for a long period of time in a very limited area. When you do that, it directly affects the natural environment, degradation of the natural environment, soil erosion."*[165]

PO representatives were eager to counter the perception that pastoralists were culturally resistant to change or reluctant to sell livestock before a drought. For one informant, pastoralists have good reason for maintaining large herds:

> *If drought is there, then how else are we going to reduce that risk? It is compensating by numbers. And you know the number of animals, and the composition of livestock in a herd…they have purpose in terms of rangeland management…*[166]

For another PO informant: "*traditional local markets, run by pastoralists themselves…you don't see any initiative from the government to support that."*[167]

[160] Interview with Ethiopian local government official, 25/05/2018.
[161] Interview with Ethiopian PO representative 2, 29/05/2018
[162] Interview with Ethiopian PO representative 2, 29/05/2018
[163] Interviews with: Ethiopian PO representative 1, 17/05/2018; Ethiopian PO representative 2, 29/05/2018.
[164] Interviews with: Ethiopian PO representative 1, 17/05/2018; Ethiopian PO representative 2, 29/05/2018;
[165] Interview with Ethiopian PO representative 2, 29/05/2018.
[166] Interview with Ethiopian PO representative 1, 17/05/2018.
[167] Interview with Ethiopian PO representative 2, 29/05/2018.

One PO informant had doubts as to what the 'green economy' could bring to pastoralism: "*The CRGE, to me, it's more of a political, rather than, you know, an on-the-ground policy, with not much to offer pastoralists. It is like Ethiopia attaching with the global movement…what is important, if you are working on the green economy, is not to harm livelihoods."*[168] The value of rangelands, he continued, is not recognised for its carbon-sequestration potential, "…*in the way forests are."* Pastoralists need to be "*made aware of climate change"*, but "*they may not understand the climate science we are talking about."* Instead, there is a need to "*link it to their traditional climate forecasting…"*[169] This is indicative of the kinds of 'pure pastoralism' discourse that rejects top-down technocratic solutions and places value instead on indigenous knowledge and customary institutions.

Both interviewees stressed that the primary role of their respective organisations is to serve the interests and promote the welfare of the communities and constituencies they represent.[170] This is, in effect, where they draw their legitimacy as political actors. They also draw strength from their connections and networks at local, national, and even international level.[171] Although the data would suggest otherwise (see Table 6.1 – where the majority of references for this actor clearly match a discourse that is less prominent in most written policy), several informants from other categories were of the view that POs have worked hard to cultivate close relationships with key ministries and individuals in government and with other actors (donors, researchers, INGOs), thus allowing them some agency, albeit a limited one, within policymaking.[172] According to one informant, the PFE chooses to "*work within the government processes, rather from outside, as that's where these decisions are made."*[173] Nonetheless – as the CA and DA in Chapter 5 reveal – the kinds of 'pure pastoralism' narratives associated with POs, as identified above, are rarely reflected in the predominant discourses found within government policies and strategies. This suggests that POs are at the margins in terms of shaping mainstream policy narratives in Ethiopia.

6.2.6 Ethiopian policy actors: conclusions

In sum, what emerges from the findings is that the state remains the dominant actor driving national policy narratives and priorities around pastoralism and climate change in Ethiopia, and that its primary interest is the 'transformation' and accelerated development – and greater control – of what were once considered 'unproductive' and peripheral pastoral areas. While pastoralism may no longer be considered by state officials as 'backward' or the antithesis to the modern state to the

[168] Interview with Ethiopian PO representative 1, 17/05/2018.
[169] Interview with Ethiopian PO representative 1, 17/05/2018.
[170] Interviews with: Ethiopian PO representative 1, 17/05/2018; Ethiopian PO representative 2, 29/05/2018.
[171] The PFE, for example, is a partner organisation of CELEP and is in other regional and international pastoralist networks.
[172] Skype interview international researcher 2, 11/05/2018; Interviews with: international researcher 3, 14/05/2018; Ethiopian PO representative 1, 17/05/2018; Ethiopian PO representative 2, 29/05/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 5, 30/05/2018.
[173] Interview with international researcher 3, 14/05/2018.

extent it was in the past (see Chapter 2), and the language of 'resilience' has evidently been absorbed by the state as a means to rationalise government-mediated development interventions (another form of governmentality, in a Foucauldian sense), the findings show that 'transforming pastoralism and the drylands' remains the dominant discourse around pastoralist development among government officials interviewed, matching what appeared in the analysis of policies. There is also a sense that the state is using concerns over climate change to legitimise the re-emergence, or continuation, of past unpopular policies and programmes – sedentarisation, large infrastructure development, and the associated displacement of pastoralists from key resources, all of which may actually exacerbate vulnerability of some groups (see Chapter 7). The influence of donors (who clearly have the financial resources, knowledge base and close links to government departments to be able to influence some policies, especially those focused on 'resilience building' and rangeland management), of UN agencies – and to a lesser extent – a select group of INGOs and individual drylands researchers on shaping current narratives and bringing elements of the 'modern, mobile and green' discourse to policy discussions and debates on the future of pastoralism is, nonetheless, gaining some momentum, notably, around the formulation of a new *Pastoral Development Policy.* Whether these new understandings are bringing any corresponding change in the kinds of interventions and programming taking place in the pastoral lowlands, is debatable, as Chapter 7 investigates. It is possible, nonetheless, that a more consensus-based policy environment (such as that found in Kenya) may eventually emerge out of the current political reform process in Ethiopia. The dominant interest of the state (and, to some extent, donors) – transforming pastoral areas for the benefit of the national economy – would appear at first glance to compete with the interests of other actors (INGOs, researchers and POs), who are anxious to defend pastoralist mobility and customary institutions. However, there is evidently also some discursive commonality across all actors in that they all express the desire to strengthen livelihoods and 'build resilience' of pastoralists in the face of climate change and other uncertainties. Some differences remain, nonetheless, in allocating causality for pastoralist predicaments and in the kinds of responses being advocated for.

6.3 Kenyan policy actors

This section examines the state and non-state actors driving policy processes around climate change and pastoral area development in Kenya, and their associated discourses, narratives and interests. Each actor category (see Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2) is taken in turn. While a 'transforming pastoralism' discourse was found to be dominant in the CA and DA of Kenyan policy documents, the findings of interviews reveal that alternative discourses are prominent across all actor groups in this case. Local and international researchers, donors, certain CSOs and even certain individuals within government form a discursive coalition of like-minded actors who have brought about a more significant change in attitudes towards pastoralism (at least within some policy circles) than

is the case in Ethiopia. This shift is reflected in the language of those Kenyan government officials interviewed, if not necessarily in all areas of written policy (as Chapter 5 reveals), or in what kinds of programmes and interventions are being implemented.

6.3.1 Kenyan state actors' discourses, narratives and interests

As is evident from Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2, the dominant narratives among state actors interviewed in Kenya are those closer to a 'modern, mobile and green' discourse (49% of state actors' references), while still retaining significant perspectives matching a 'transforming pastoralism' discourse (31%). While this finding stands out in contrast to the findings of the CA of Kenyan policies (Chapter 5), where a 'transforming pastoralism' was more dominant (an anomaly explained by the fact that those government officials who agreed to be interviewed were more likely to be more favourably disposed towards pastoralist development than colleagues elsewhere), it does match the higher levels of interdiscursivity (compared to Ethiopia) uncovered from the DA of Kenyan policies.

Before examining state actors' narratives and interests, it is worth distinguishing between the multiple ministries and other state bodies that are relevant to this study. The Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MEF)[174] is the lead institution with regard to climate-change planning and policy, although all government ministries, departments and institutions have an obligation under the 2016 *Climate Change Act* (the legislative and institutional framework for climate policy implementation) to mainstream climate change across their functions (Kiboi, 2017). A Climate Change Steering Group, chaired by the MEF, brings together government officials, donors, UN agencies and other stakeholders.[175] The Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (MALF)[176] is (among other things) responsible for implementing the IGAD *Regional Pastoral Livelihood Resilience Project* (RPLRP) and was instrumental in developing the *Ending Drought Emergencies* (EDE) initiative (see Chapter 5).[177] At the time of fieldwork (June 2018), MALF was preparing a new *Rangelands and Pastoralism Strategy*.[178] This Ministry is also working with various development partners, including the private sector, to implement a new *Climate Smart Agriculture Strategy* (GoK-MALF, 2017).

Reiterating what has been highlighted elsewhere (see Chapters 2 and 5), informants acknowledged the creation of the Ministry for the Development of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands

[174] In 2018, the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MENR) changed its name to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MEF).
[175] Interview with Kenyan local researcher 3, 09/06/2018.
[176] In 2018, MALF was renamed the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Irrigation (MALFI).
[177] Interview with Kenyan government official 4, 21/06/2018.
[178] According to one informant, the Rangelands Strategy has been sidelined as the Ministry has moved to embrace the current government's '*Big Four*' agenda, a four-point strategy launched by President Uhuru Kenyatta outlining what he will be focusing on in his last presidential term: food security, manufacturing, and affordable healthcare and housing for all (GoK, 2018).

(MDNKOAL) in 2008 (and the subsequent '*ASAL Policy'* 2012) as opening a discursive space for alternative perspectives towards pastoralism to counter more entrenched views.[179] Decommissioned in 2013, the MDNKOAL's brief was subsumed temporarily by the ASAL Secretariat and subsequently, in 2018, by a State Department for ASAL located within a new Ministry for Devolution and ASAL. A cross-section of informants stressed that this State Department no longer had the same authority and agency as it did when a designated Ministry.[180] The MDNKOAL, nonetheless, left behind a number of important legacy institutions, notably the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA), praised as an effective state agency by informants across all actor groups.[181] Another influential (state-affiliated) actor is the *ASAL Stakeholder Forum (*ASF), a multi-stakeholder platform set up in 2012.[182] The ASF works closely with the Pastoralist Parliamentary Group (PPG), an important cross-party caucus of ASAL elected representatives formed in 1998.

Following on from the 2010 Constitution and the 2012 *County Governments Act*, government administration and resources, including finance for climate adaptation, are in the process of being devolved to the county level.*[183]* A number of ASAL counties are developing their own county-level Climate Adaptation Plans, with technical support from the *Adaptation Consortium* (ADA) – a partnership of state agencies (such as the NDMA), and several INGOs that work with local partners in five ASAL counties.[184] The implications and consequences of devolved climate policies are explored further in Chapter 7. For this research, interviews were held with officials from: the Ministry of Planning (one), the MEF (one), MALF (one) and NDMA (one). In addition, interviews were held with one county government official, a representative from the ASF and one pastoralist MP.

'Environmental-crises' narratives – that link climate disasters and environmental change to resource scarcity and conflict – were identifiable from interviews with Kenyan government informants, usually qualified with the caveat that climate change is just one of a number of uncertainties facing pastoral areas. Increased frequency and intensity of droughts and flooding was held up as evidence of climate change.[185] Higher temperatures and heavy rainfall were leading to

[179] Skype interviews with: international researcher 4, 12,04/2018; international researcher 5, 08/05/2018; INGO staff 12, 18/06/2018. Interviews with: Kenyan local researcher 1, 05/03/2018; Kenyan government official 5, 20/06/2018.
[180] Skype interview with international researcher 5, 08/05/2018; Interviews with: Kenyan PO representative 2, 09/06/2018; international researcher 10, 14/06/2018; UN agency official 3, 12/06/2018; INGO staff 9, 04/06/2018.
[181] Skype interviews with: international researcher 4, 12,04/2018; Kenyan local NGO staff 2, 07/06/2018; INGO staff 12, 18/06/2018. Interviews with: Kenyan government official 1, 11/06/2018; Kenyan government official 5, 20/06/2018; Kenyan local researcher 5, 21/06/2018; Kenyan consortium staff 1, 20/06/208; INGO staff 9, 04/06/2018.
[182] Interview with Kenyan government official 1, 11/06/2018.
[183] A recently formed Frontier Counties Development Council (FCDC), linking nine Northern counties and led by County Governors, provides another platform for the ASAL counties to promote their interests.
[184] Skype interviews with: international researcher 4, 12/04/2018; international researcher 5, 08/05/18; Interview with Kenyan consortium member 1, 20/06/2018.
[185] Interviews with: Kenyan local government official 1, 08/03/2018; Kenyan government official 1, 11/06/2018; Kenyan government official 2, 11/06/2018; Kenyan government official 3, 21/06/2018; Kenyan government official 4, 21/06/2018; Kenyan government official 5, 20/06/2018; Kenyan pastoralist MP 1, 21/06/2018.

outbreaks of livestock diseases, such as Rift Valley Fever in 2018.[186] For several informants, what they perceive as traditional pastoralist 'coping strategies' were no longer effective.[187] Population growth and the spread of unplanned settlements were restricting mobility and resulting in degradation of rangelands.[188] For one official – resonating more with the 'pure pastoralism' and 'modern and mobile' discourses highlighted in earlier chapters – pastoralist vulnerability was compounded by *"competition between pastoralists and other land users…with the bigger ranches, irrigation schemes, conservancies, wildlife parks…"*[189] These encroach into important grazing areas and migratory routes used by pastoralists, allowing for less options during periods of drought.[190]

One official defended irrigation: asserting it as a means of moving beyond providing emergency relief to drought-affected communities:

> *A lot of our agencies are moving from giving handouts to 'how can we build resilience?'. You will find a very good project in Turkana where the Red Cross has supported a community to come up with irrigation for their livelihoods and also for fodder. Not only during those periods of drought, but also pushing the communities to have to strengthen livelihoods in advance of such drought… so it's not necessarily that irrigation is competing with other forms of land use.*[191]

While less pronounced than in Ethiopia, Kenyan state actors interviewed generally focused on predominantly technocratic responses to climate change, rather than addressing the socio-political causes of pastoralist vulnerability. Typically:

> *First of all we are trying to develop key feed storage facilities as a strategy, livestock feed has been a key thing… And then we are also trying to enhance the germplasm in the rangelands. Much of the rangelands are actually degraded or of low-value. The other thing is appropriate water harvesting…so to be able to maintain the health of the rangelands.*[192]

For another official, Kenya is committed to reducing its GHG emissions, as well as to ensuring greater food security. Its mitigation targets under the current NCCAP are "*based on efficiency. Not creating more change of land use, but using the land more efficiently...in energy, in land-use management, in agriculture, livestock, transport …"*[193] There was potential, furthermore, for pastoral areas to benefit from land-based carbon-credit and 'payments for environmental services' (PES) schemes[194] – resonating with what has been argued in the literature on pastoralism and the green economy (see McGahey *et al*., 2014).

[186] Interview with Kenyan government official 2, 11/06/2018.
[187] Interviews with: Kenyan government official 3, 21/06/2018; Kenyan government official 4, 21/06/2018.
[188] Interview with Kenyan government official 5, 20/06/2018.
[189] Interview with Kenyan government official 4, 21/06/2018.
[190] Interview with Kenyan government official 4, 21/06/2018.
[191] Interview with Kenyan government official 2, 11/06/2018.
[192] Interview with Kenyan government official 3, 13/06/2018.
[193] Interview with Kenyan government official 2, 11/06/2018.
[194] Interview with Kenyan government official 3, 13/06/2018.

Despite the challenges, one official stressed that pastoralism remains the most appropriate form of land use for the more arid ASAL counties:

> *There is nothing else you can do in the arid lands…let the national policy talk about agriculture, crop production, but in Wajir, which is 80% pastoralist, you focus on livestock.*[195]

A pastoralist MP reiterated a similar narrative:

> *Pastoralists are made vulnerable by the virtue of just living in the ASAL... But that's part of their life…and they are adapted to it over years. They have built resilience in very many ways. You can see in the type of livestock they keep. They keep camels, which can sustain in severe weather conditions, even a drought. And the same time they keep small livestock, you know goats and sheep, because they can easily slaughter them…*[196]

For these state actors, the argument that ASAL counties were somehow at a disadvantage in national development processes was no longer tenable. Echoing the kind of 'new frontier' thinking that was identified as driving policy change towards northern Kenyan counties since 2010 (see Chapter 2), the same MP asserted *"that new outlook of investment in ASAL is because of devolution…Unlike in the past where they planned everything for us from Nairobi, now they are forced to plan with us."* ASAL counties are, furthermore, now assured of core funds and can apply for additional funds through the *Equalization Fund,*[197] designed for climate sensitive (and predominantly pastoralist) counties considered *"marginalised in the past."*[198]

While not explicit in the interviews with these officials, it appears – from the extensive literature, from national policy documents analysed in Chapter 5 (notably *Vision 2030,* and associated *Medium Term Plans*) and from interviews with other non-state actors – that the dominant interest of the Kenyan Government (as with its Ethiopian counterpart) is the desire to transform and integrate dryland resources and production within a broader vision of national economic development. There was a strong sense from many non-state actors that the recent push to establish irrigation, to construct pipelines, roads, airports, wind farms, abattoirs – even turn Isiolo town into a 'resort city' under LAPSSET (see Chapter 2) – are part of the state's ambitions to 'open up' the so-called 'frontier counties'.[199] All part of what Lind (2018: 1) refers to as "a new spatial politics than binds pastoral margins ever closer to state power and global capital." According to a cross-section of informants, the work and policies of all Ministries now need to be aligned with President

[195] Interview with Kenyan government official 1, 11/06/2018.
[196] Interview with Kenyan pastoralist MP 1, 21/06/2018.
[197] The *Equalization Fund* was established under Article 204 of the Kenyan Constitution and is designed to address the low level of infrastructure and basic services in ASAL counties of Northern Kenya and other regions. See: http://www.dlci-hoa.org/documents/briefs/ (Accessed 13/02/2018)
[198] Interview with Kenyan government official 2, 11/06/2018.
[199] Skype interviews with INGO staff member 12, 18/06/2018; international researcher 4, 12/04/2018; Interviews with: Kenyan local researcher 1, 05/03/2018; INGO staff member 11, 08/06/2018; INGO staff member 9, 04/06/2018; Kenyan Consortium staff member 1, 20/06/2018; international researcher 10, 14/06/2018.

Kenyatta's 'Big Four agenda'.[200] However: *"If you look at the food security in the Big Four, there's nothing there whatsoever about pastoralism."*[201] Notwithstanding this primary aim of transform and integrate Kenya's dryland resources and production into the national economy, recent policies and legislation, notably the 2016 *NLUP* (Chapter 5), and the passing of the 2016 *Community Land Act* (see Chapter and 5), suggests that state actors and policy makers are cogniscant of the need for a legislative framework that protects the land rights of communities in those areas Kenya classified as 'community lands' (GoK-NLC, 2016) (see Chapter 2). The extent to which this rhetoric has been translated into practice is discussed in Chapter 7 (7.3.3).

In sum, just as with the narratives that emerged from the CA and DA of Kenyan policy documents (Chapter 5), a high level of interdiscursivity can be identified in the positions of Kenyan state actors interviewed. These actors show genuine concern for pastoralist predicaments in the face of climatic and other challenges. They also recognise the role of pastoral production, combined with a strong belief in the positive benefits that devolution, 'green growth' and new investments can bring to ASAL counties. Ultimately, the Kenyan Government's primary interest lies in its desire to transform and integrate Kenya's drylands resources and production within a broader vision of national economic development, as set out in *Vision 2030* and subsequent MTPs (see Chapter 5). While no longer reliant on external sources of funding (see 6.3.2. below), leveraging new sources of finance from donor funding, private capital and multilateral climate funds to pursue such ambitions is an added incentive.[202] It is reasonable to infer that the state is a significant actor driving the kinds of national policy narratives identified in Chapter 5.

6.3.2 Donors' discourses, narratives and interests (Kenya)

Numerous multilateral and bilateral donors have invested heavily in 'climate resilience', 'green energy' and pastoral development projects and initiatives in Kenya in recent years. An indicative list of some of these projects is included in Appendix G. Kenya also receives substantive international climate finance through the Green Climate Fund (GCF).[203]

It was not possible to interview any donor representatives during fieldwork in Kenya. Hence I am unable to make any direct inferences on the kinds of discourses and narratives on climate change and pastoralism being promoted by donors, or the full extent to which donors are shaping the kinds of national policy narratives identified in Chapter 5, other than drawing on analysis of what these donors project reports and briefings say, or from what others actors say about donors. Among these other informants, there were differences of opinion as to how influential, or otherwise, donors

[200] Interviews with: INGO staff member 13, 19/06/2018; INGO staff member 9, 04/06/2018; Kenyan PO representative 1, 06/06/2018; Kenyan government official 3, 13/06/2018.
[201] Interview with INGO staff 9, 04/06/2018.
[202] Interview with Kenyan local researcher 1, 05/03/2018.
[203] https://www.greenclimate.fund/countries/kenya (Accessed, 07/07/2020).

were. According to one INGO informant, donors have *"a lot of influence behind the scenes. They influence the thinking of the government…in terms of the programmes that they design, that directly support the government, or support civil society*."[204] Donors, in turn, were influenced by:

> *…the corporate sector in their own countries…who have their own interests…particularly where it's more about commercialisation, privatisation… When you look at the current emphasis around competitiveness, the value chain approach, in agriculture and in the livestock sector, these are all coming from over there.*[205]

Others observed that Kenya no longer relies on donor support to the extent it had in the past. ODA as a proportion of government spending has fallen considerably.[206] Kenya is increasingly looking to China as a source of foreign investment.[207] Some traditional donors, furthermore, are *"shying away from directly to be seen to be influencing policy. They are happy to support climate-change adaptation but they're not really going into the depths of using their clout to push for certain positions, as it was before."*[208]

6.3.3 INGOs', UN agencies' and international researchers' discourses, narratives and interests (Kenya)

As for Ethiopia, I have grouped the responses of INGO staff, UN agency staff and international researchers as one actor category. As Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2 display, 56% of references for this category match a 'modern, mobile and green' discourse, with a further 32% matching the 'pure pastoralism' discourse. When compared to the 'transforming pastoralism' discourse that is dominant in (the majority of) Kenyan policy documents analysed (Chapter 5), this would appear to show that INGOs and international researchers have less agency in shaping policy narratives in Kenya than the state or even donors. Nonetheless, what is significant – as is evident from Figure 6.2 – is the fact that both this actor category and state actors share very similar percentages of references matching a 'modern, mobile and green' discourse (49% of all references for state actors, 56% for INGOs), suggesting that INGOs – as one part of a like-minded network (along with local researchers, CSOs and possibly donors) – have clearly brought 'new thinking' around pastoralism to the heart of certain policymaking circles in Kenya.

Interviews were held with Kenyan personnel from the following agencies: Trócaire (two), Action Aid (one), Cordaid (one), Christensen Fund (one) and the Adaptation Consortium (one).[209] In

[204] Interview with INGO staff 13, 19/06/2018.
[205] Interview with INGO staff 13, 19/06/2018.
[206] Skype interview with interntional consultant 5, 08/05/2018; Interviews with Kenyan local government official 1, 08/03/2018; Kenyan PO representative 2, 09/06/2018; Kenyan government official 5, 20/06/2018.
[207] Interviews with: Kenyan local government official 1, 08/03/2018; Kenyan PO representative 2, 09/06/2018
[208] Interview with Kenyan PO representative 2, 09/06/2018.
[209] The Adaptation Consortium (ADA) is not an INGO, but rather a consortium comprised of NGOs (such as Christian Aid), research organisations (such as IIED) and a semi-state body (the NDMA) with its own staff and budget, working on climate adaptation in partnership with several county governments. It is included in this category for convenience.

addition, interviews were conducted with an international researcher working for IIED, one from the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS) East Africa, one from the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), two from ILRI and two freelance researchers (one a former advisor to the MDNKOAL). Three dryland experts working with FAO in Nairobi were also interviewed.

INGO informants and international researchers interviewed generally share similar understandings of pastoralism, reflecting the kind of 'pure pastoralism' and 'modern, mobile and green' discourses identified earlier. According to a UN agency official:

> *To me pastoralism has adapted and evolved...And is adapting to those variabilities of climate, and it is probably one of the more climate resilient livelihoods if it's allowed to operate as it evolved originally. But everything that we are doing at the moment is hamstringing those extensive areas.*[210]

Matching the kind of holistic analysis found in several of the more 'ASAL-specific' Kenyan policy documents examined in Chapter 5 (notably, the 2012 *ASAL Policy*, the two *EDE strategies* and the *ICG Livestock Strategy*), a common refrain was that localised climate impacts need to be considered within a broader context. As one informant explained:

> *…what affects pastoral production a lot more than biophysical factors are policies and decisions that affect their flexibility, their movement…Climate change impacts will be felt, not only because of the change in rainfall patterns, but because of other factors…including ability to move flexibly across space and time...*[211]

Similarly, for one international researcher: "*climate change is an exacerbator. I don't see it as the main driver. Climate variability has always been there."*[212]

Reflective of a 'pure pastoralist' discourse that places culpability for pastoralist predicaments on the state and their supporters (such as private investors) who do not understand pastoral systems, rather than on pastoralists themselves, one INGO informant asserted that the current government's plans to establish "*land banks to ensure future food security"* were likely to be located in *"…ecotone zones that are conducive for adaptation. It will take away water and pasture from the pastoralists."*[213] Corroborating recent research (Schilling *et al*. 2015; 2016), several informants highlighted that pastoralists' access to critical resources in drought-affected Turkana County has been restricted by the discovery and extraction of oil.[214] Elsewhere, large dam projects in northern counties, driven by Kenya's ambitions to meet its *Vision 2030* and NDC targets, are costing:

[210] Interview with UN agency staff 3, 12/06/2018.
[211] Skype interview with INGO staff 12, 8/06/2018.
[212] Skype interview with international researcher 4, 12/04/2018.
[213] Interview with INGO staff 13, 19/08/2018.
[214] Skype interviews with: international researcher 04, 12/04/2018. Interviews with: INGO staff 9. 04/06/2018; INGO staff 11, 08/06/2018.

"*billions of shillings"* and "*benefit only the investors, not the local people."*[215] Similarly, Lake Turkana Wind Power (LTWP) was mentioned by as an example of a 'green-energy' project where "*communities were not consulted*"[216] and where benefits are not being shared equitably[217] (see also Chapter 7).

Resonating with the 'modern, mobile and green' discourse (and matching narratives found in later-period Kenyan policies), these informants were keen to highlight pastoralist innovation. Pastoralists are taking advantage of new technologies and 'niche markets' – such as the growing urban demand for *nyama choma* (roast meat) and camel milk.[218] Some "*educated pastoralists*" were "*trying to modernise, trying to engage more in markets, make use of technologies, do some things differently, while still maintaining some aspect of extensive livestock keeping."*[219] Pastoralist households typically 'spread risk' by sending some children to school in the hope of gaining from livelihood diversification and/or remittances in the future, while others remain to look after livestock.[220] For these actors, pastoralism was an inherently "*low-external-input"* and "*natural*" form of production, but has yet to be fully appeciated as such.[221]

Echoing a narrative uncovered in several of the EDE-specific strategies analysed in Chapter 5, most informants believe Kenya's climate-change policies, in the context of devolution, offered potential for pastoralists. According to one: "*with devolved government the view that pastoralism is backward is changing."*[222] The work of the ADA Consortium was held up as an effective programme that could be replicated in other ASAL counties.[223] One informant also welcomed the 2016 *Community Land Act* (CLA) as legislation that had the potential to bring benefits to pastoralist communities and a good example of how "*the narratives around pastoralism had evolved"* in Kenya.[224]

INGO and UN agency officials in Kenya stated that their primary interest is not only "*supporting livelihoods"*[225] in pastoral areas, but playing a facilitative and advocacy role to bring about change for the better through, for example, building the capacity of local government and local

[215] Interview with INGO staff 9, 04/06/2018.
[216] Interview with INGO staff 9, 04/06/2018.
[217] Skype interview with international researcher 04, 2/04/2018. Interviews with: INGO staff 9, 04/06/2018; Kenyan local researcher 1, 05/03/2018.
[218] Skype interviews with: international researcher 4, 12/04/2018; international researcher 5, 09/05/2018; international researcher 9, 14/06/2018; UN agency official 5, 16/07/2018; Interview with local Kenyan local researcher 2, 06/06/2018.
[219] Skype interview with international researcher 9, 14/06/2018.
[220] Skype interview with international researcher 5, 09/05/2018.
[221] Interviews with: INGO staff member 12, 18/06/2018; international researcher 6, 05/06/2018.
[222] Interview with INGO staff member 10, 08/06/2018.
[223] Skype interview with international researcher 4, 12/04/2018. Interviews with: Kenyan government official 1, 11/06/18, Kenyan consortium staff member 1, 20/06/2018; Kenyan PO representative 2, 09/06/2018; Kenyan local researcher 5, 21/06/2018.
[224] Interview with INGO staff 12, 18/06/2018.
[225] Interview with INGO staff 9, 04/06/2018.

communities to engage in policymaking processes.[226] Collaboration and networking with others is clearly important for these actors to achieve these interests: "*Your networks…good relationship with the members of County assemblies, or with their leader"* can make a difference, according to one informant.[227] Several INGOs also support local communities to mobilise to defend their land rights in the face of new investments, such as the proposed dam on the Ewaso-Ngiro River and oil extraction in Turkana.[228] Securing and maintaining the support of various constituencies (the state, donors, host communities and County governments, supporters in home countries), which enables them to continue their work in Kenya, is undoubtedly an important additional motivating factor.

In sum, the predominantly 'modern, mobile and green' discourse that emerges from interviews with these actors (see Table 6.1) matches a similar discourse uncovered in several 'ASAL-focused' Kenyan policy documents analysed in Chapter 5. Thus we can infer that INGOs, UN officials and international researchers are part of a 'discursive coalition' of like-minded actors, who have (to some extent) brought about something of a paradigm shift in thinking around pastoralism – a shift that is partially reflected in the language of Kenyan policymaking, if not necessarily in all areas of policy implementation, as we discover in Chapter 7. These actors are motivated, furthermore, by what they claim is a desire to improve the welfare and rights of the communities with whom they work, so giving them legitimacy as political actors.

6.3.4 Kenyan local researchers' discourses, narratives and interests

Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2 reveal that there were high levels of interdiscursivity among Kenyan local researchers interviewed, with 42% of references for this category matching a 'pure pastoralism' discourse, 33% matching a 'transforming' discourse and 25% closer to a 'modern, mobile and green' discourse. As local researchers, along with their international counterparts, are continually producing new research on the drylands and pastoralism (a great deal of which provides arguments about the value of pastoral systems – see Chapter 2), it is reasonable to infer that these actors have – as part of the same discursive coalition referred to above – also brought new kinds of thinking around pastoralism into mainstream policymaking in Kenya.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to document the many Kenyan individuals and institutions engaged in research on climate change, livestock and/or pastoral development issues in Kenya. Interviews were, nonetheless, held with six local researchers from a range of relevant research organisations, namely: the Kenyan Agricultural and Livestock Research Organisation (KALRO) (one); the Department of Land and Natural Resources, University of Nairobi (one); the Center for

[226] Skype interview with INGO staff 12, 18/06/2018. Interviews with: INGO staff 9, 04/06/2018; INGO staff 10, 08/06/2018; INGO staff 11, 08/06/2018.
[227] Interview with INGO staff 9, 04/06/2018.
[228] Interviews with: INGO staff 9, 04/06/2018; INGO staff 11, 08/06/2018.

Sustainable Dryland Ecosystems and Societies, University of Nairobi (one); LTS Africa[229] (one) and two freelance consultants.

There were mixed messages emanating from local researchers: reiterating the kinds of environmental-crises narratives expressed elsewhere, that traditional nomadic pastoralism was being overwhelmed by the extent of climatic and other changes, while simultaneously pointing to restrictions on mobility and inappropriate policies and investments. For one local researcher: "*the scale of climate change of what we have today exceeds the capacity of traditional systems that used to cope with what we call climate change in the past."*[230]

For these researchers, the growing numbers of people and settlements in ASAL counties was putting pressure on resources and driving social and economic change. Unplanned settlements and "*competing land uses"* were restricting pastoralist mobility and resulting in degradation of rangelands.[231] For another researcher: *"the formerly dry-season grazing areas become increasingly contested. And the winners of that contest are usually people who are armed..."*[232] Population was increasing, not only amongst pastoralists themselves, *"but also amongst competing land users... people who are not pastoralists move into land that is seen as 'empty land.'"*[233] Several informants highlighted urban expansion in the southern counties of Kajaido and Narok as a threat to once extensive community grazing lands.[234]

Consistent with what has been documented in the literature (Little, 2013; Catley, 2017; Lind *et al*., 2016), all of these informants reiterated that there is a trend of growing inequality in pastoral areas. While wealthier livestock owners were taking advantage of new market opportunities, others were being forced by circumstances, or opting, out of pastoralism altogether. For one local researcher, current trends will ultimately "*favour the big players who will take advantage of county resources…the key players will be the bigger commercial interests."* [235]

Local researchers, as with most INGO and PO informants, also questioned the predominant national food security narrative, which places little value on the contribution of livestock to food and nutrition security. Critical dry-season grazing reserves are being allocated for large-scale irrigated crop farming at the expense of livestock production.[236] Ambitious plans to transform Kenya into a 'green economy', according to one informant, are part of an agenda to "*transform the*

[229] LTS Africa (Kenya) is a private-sector consultancy specialising in environmental policy. LTS has assisted the GoK in writing a number of Kenyan climate change strategies and policies.
[230] Interview with Kenyan local researcher 1, 05/03/2018.
[231] Interview with Kenyan local researcher 1, 05/03/2018
[232] Interview with Kenyan local researcher 4, 18/06/208.
[233] Interview with Kenyan local researcher 1, 05/03/2018.
[234] Interviews with: Kenyan local researcher 2, 06/06/2018; Kenyan local researcher 3, 09/06/2018; Kenyan local researcher 5, 21/06/2018.
[235] Interview with Kenyan local researcher 3, 09/06/2018.
[236] Interviews with: Kenyan local researcher 1, 05/03/2018; Kenyan local researcher 3, 09/06/2018; Kenyan local researcher 5, 21/06/2018.

drylands...all driven because there is a lot of land in pastoralist areas…but there is no conversation about what happens to pastoralist livelihoods."[237] Nonetheless, local researchers generally welcome the possibilities for pastoralists opened by the process of devolution and the 2016 CLA.[238]

In sum, just as in Kenyan policy documents reviewed, there were mixed and often overlapping narratives being iterated by local researchers. On the one hand, their insights match the kind of neo-Malthusian 'overpopulation' and 'environmental-crises' narratives found, for example, in the 2008 GoK NLP,[239] the 2010 ASDS[240] and in several national climate-adaptation strategies. At the same time, a parallel discursive emphasis – one that recognises the broader and often-politicised context of pastoralist vulnerability, and is closer to the 'pure pastoralism' and 'modern, mobile and green' discourses, prominent in later-period Kenyan policy documents, is also apparent. Just as in Ethiopia, local researchers and consultants derive their legitimacy from their status as researchers working with academic or other institutions and from their national and international networks. Nonetheless, for one local researcher, whose organisation was dependent on state funding, the research agenda is carefully monitored: *"We have to get approval* (from NACOSTI)[241] *for a particular research to see if it fits government priorities…if something comes up that is different from the government agenda, they may not take it."*[242]

While certain academics and researchers will invariably be invited to share their views when a new policy is being developed,[243] and consultants are frequently recruited to assist in the writing of certain policies,[244] the interests of, and the extent to which local researchers have informed the kinds of Kenyan policy narratives uncovered in Chapter 5, remains unclear. But undoubtedly, they too form part of that broader discursive coalition of like-minded actors, who – as we have seen – are in some way pushing for greater value to be placed on pastoralism as a viable livelihood and production strategy. The state, in turn, relies on these researchers and other non-state actors (INGOs, UN agencies and donors) to add legitimacy to their policy prescriptions (Weisser *at al*., 2014).

6.3.5 Kenyan pastoralist organisations' and local CSOs' discourses, narratives and interests

As Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2 illustrate – not surprisingly – references matching the 'pure pastoralist' discourses account for as high as 79% of all coded references under this actor category, indicating

[237] Interview with Kenyan local researcher 1, 05/03/2018.
[238] Interviews with: Kenyan local researcher 1, 05/03/2018; Kenyan local researcher 3, 09/06/2018; Kenyan local producer 5, 21/06/2018; private-sector consultant 1, 14/06/2018.
[239] National Livestock Plan.
[240] Agriculture Sector Development Strategy.
[241] National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation.
[242] Interview with Kenyan local researcher 2, 06/6/2018.
[243] Interviews with: Kenyan local researcher 4, 18/06/2018; Kenyan local researcher 5, 21/06/2018.
[244] Interview with private-sector consultant 1, 14/06/2018.

that POs' positioning remains largely marginal within the predominant discourses and narratives found within most policies reviewed in Chapter 5 (excluding some notable exceptions, such as the 2012 *ASAL Policy* or the *KoG-ICG Livestock Strategy*). Nonetheless, these organisations must also be considered as part of the same discursive coalition referred to above – in terms of influencing debates around and informing attitudes towards pastoralism in Kenya.

Unlike Ethiopia, Kenya is considered to have an active and well-connected civil society. Dedicated Kenyan CSOs – such as DLCI[245] and RECONCILE – have been at the forefront of providing research and advocating on behalf of pastoralism for many years. In 2012, CSOs were invited by the MDNKOAL to engage in the *ASAL Policy* process (Birch and Elmi, 2013). Many small locally based POs and community-based organisations are also working at community and county levels on pastoralist-related issues and/or to defend pastoralist land rights, even in formerly remote areas.[246] For one informant, these local POs remain, nonetheless, on the "*margins of national policy processes."*[247] At national level, several pastoralist advocacy platforms exist, notably the Pastoralist Development Network of Kenya (PDNK) and the Centre for Minority Rights Development (CEMIRIDE). These networks continue to research, lobby and engage in civic education on pastoral-related policies, such as the 2016 CLA.[248] PDNK and CEMIRIDE have been active in organising an annual '*Kenya Pastoralist Week'* (KPW). CEMIRIDE has worked with several ASAL county governments to organise fora related to climate policy.[249] It is worth noting that pastoralist gatherings, such as *Kenya Pastoralist Week* or *Ethiopian Pastoralist Day* (see above), can also be considered a 'technology of rule' in the Foucauldian sense – ways in which pastoralists across ethnic and county/regional boundaries (usually facilitated by INGOs, but also, increasingly, with the support and 'buy-in' of government and MPs) are given space to present and discuss their concerns and issues. This, in theory, produces a discourse about what pastoralists want (labelled by NGOs and advocates as 'the voice of pastoralists'), that can be fed back to policymakers (Morton, 2010).

For the purposes of this research, interviews were held with representative from the following organisations: DLCI (two), RECONCILE (one), PDNK (one), CEMIRIDE (one), IMPACT (one) and Friends of Lake Turkana (one).

While also concerned about climate change and increased inter-community conflicts, the primary discursive focus of PO and local CSO informants was on the state's culpability for pastoralists' problems, a narrative in line with the 'pure pastoralism' discourse that looks to allocate blame for

[245] Drylands Learning and Capacity Building Initiative for Improved Policy and Practice in the HoA (DLCI).
[246] Skype interview with Kenyan PO representative 3, 11/06/2018; Interviews with: Kenyan PO representative 2, 09/06/2018; INGO staff 9, 04/06/2018; INGO staff 11, 08/06/2018.
[247] Interview with Kenyan local NGO staff 1, 07/03/2018.
[248] Skype interviews with: Kenyan PO representative 3, 11/06/2018; Kenyan local NGO staff 2, 07/06/2018; Interviews with: Kenyan PO representative 1, 06/06/2018; Kenyan PO representative 2, 09/06/2018.
[249] Interview with Kenyan PO representative 2, 09/06/2018.

pastoralists' predicaments on external factors. For these actors, government policy is facilitating changes in land use:

> *Because of demand for land space…huge national mega projects – roads, electricity, railway lines, oil pipeline, airports – all these are competing for land and sometimes they even obstruct traditional routes to rangeland resources like water.*[250]

The government's primary motive for being interested in the ASALs, according to another informant, is that they consider them to be "*available land…in terms of space, size, unoccupied"* and thus suitable for irrigation and other investments.[251] Another PO representative elaborated:

> *Food security in Kenya is crop production…even at the county level we see the same thing. The County Governor talks always of irrigation…I have always said pastoralism is neglected by the national government, and so perhaps with devolution we will see a change. But with devolution it's not any different.* [252]

PO representatives[253] also raised concerns about the 'community conservancies' model of wildlife conservation.[254] For one informant, the government views wildlife conservation "*as the alternative to pastoralism in northern Kenya, despite the fact that pastoralism is the main livelihood. For them, conservation is not something that can complement pastoralism."*[255]

For these organisations, the needs of pastoralists are not adequately addressed in national development frameworks, such as *Vision 2030* and the second MTP, despite the fact these policies do now recognise "*the different dynamics and opportunities that the ASALs bring."*[256] Ultimately, pastoralism as a livelihood system has been "*misunderstood…and for that reason, not really supported in terms of development."*[257]

While POs are also part of a discursive coalition of like-minded actors that has undoubtedly helped shape pastoralist discourse and narratives in Kenya, pastoralist 'voice' in policymaking remains, according to one PO representative, peripheral: *"In terms of climate change, the green economy, my thinking is...that we have yet to reach to where we want to be, as indigenous peoples and pastoralists."*[258]

[250] Interview with Kenyan local NGO staff 1, 07/03/2018.
[251] Skype interview with Kenyan local NGO staff, 3, 18/06/2018.
[252] Skype interview with Kenyan PO representative 3, 11/06/2018.
[253] Skype interviews with: Kenyan PO representative 3, 11/06/2018; Kenyan PO representative 4, 17/07/2018; Interviews with: Kenyan PO representative 1, 06/06/2018; Kenyan PO representative 2, 09/06/2018.
[254] Most community conservancies are members of the Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT), a Kenyan non-governmental umbrella organisation set up in 2004 by a coalition of conservation interests, politicians and local leaders. NRT conservancies are reported to cover as much as 44,000 square kilometers of land – roughly 8% of Kenya's land mass (Mbaria, 2017).
[255] Skype interview with PO representative 4, 17/07/2018.
[256] Skype interview with Kenyan local NGO staff 3, 18/06/2018;
[257] Interview with Kenyan PO representative 2, 09/06/2018.
[258] Interview with Kenyan PO representative 2, 09/06/2018

Like their colleagues in Ethiopia, but clearly operating in a more open political space, Kenyan CSOs and POs claim to serve the interests of the pastoralist communities and constituencies they represent. From this, they derive their legitimacy, as well as from their connections and networks, and the growing body of research that generally substantiates their claims (see Chapters 2 and 7). CSOs and POs continue to work closely with multiple partners, both within and outside of government, as new opportunities arise and funding becomes available. Several individuals from within these CSOs, along with members of the PPG, were influential in the formulation of the 2012 *ASAL Policy*[259] and cultivated close relationships within the MDNKOAL, at a critical time for pastoralist policy. This provides evidence that, in 'non-linear policy processes', the boundaries between different 'actor categories' are often blurred (Keely and Scoones, 2003) and disproves the conventional wisdom that pastoralists lack the ability to organise themselves or exert political leverage to bring about policy change (Pavenello, 2010). Nevertheless, Kenyan POs and CSOs rely on financial support from a relatively small pool of INGOs, and long-term funding is increasingly difficult to secure.[260] For one informant, national CSO or PO public engagement with the Kenyan Government is less visible now than it was in the past. Instead:

> *What you see are a lot of very effective, more localised, NGOs working at county level... They have much more legitimacy because they are from those communities and they are voters as well. People's focus has shifted, rightly so, to the counties.*[261]

According to another informant, under the current administration, the private sector has in effect "*replaced civil society…because of the interest in trade and investment, and away from issues that used to drive policy before."*[262]

6.3.6 Kenyan policy actors: conclusions

In Kenya, as is evident from Table 6.1, and from the above discussion, we find considerable discursive commonality within the responses of informants. While there is consensus that climate change is just one of a number of stressors currently driving pastoralist vulnerability, there are nonetheless some differences in where causality for these challenges lies, and the extent to which pastoralists are either taking advantage of, or being pushed aside by, the changes taking place (see Chapter 7). Here too, government officials have clearly absorbed – but not necessarily diluted, as their Ethiopian counterparts appear to have done – the kind of narratives associated with a 'modern, mobile and green' discourse, while also retaining certain perspectives in line with the 'transforming' discourse, that was to the fore in most policies analysed. Ultimately, the Kenyan

[259] Interview with Kenyan local researcher 1, 05/03/2018; Skype interview with international researcher 5, 08/05/2018.
[260] Skype interviews with: international researcher 5, 08/05/2018 Kenyan local NGO staff 2, 07/06/2018; Kenyan local NGO staff 3, 18/06/2018; Personal interviews with: Kenyan PO representative 1, 06/06/2018; Kenyan PO representative 2, 09/06/2018; Kenyan local government official 1, 08/03/2018; Kenyan local researcher 1, 05/03/2018; international researcher 6, 05/06/2018; INGO staff 9, 04/06/2018, INGO staff 11, 08/06/2018.
[261] Skype interview with international researcher 5, 08/05/2018.
[262] Interview with Kenyan local researcher 1, 05/03/2018.

Government is motivated by the desire to transform and integrate Kenya's dryland resources and production within a broader vision of national economic development. This includes, as we have seen above, ambitious plans for infrastructure development (including renewable energy), resource extraction and commercialisation of agriculture (including the livestock sector) – the consequences if which are explored in Chapter 7. It is reasonable to infer that, while the state is the dominant actor driving the kinds of national policy narratives identified in Chapter 5, it is by no means the only actor with influence. INGOs, researchers, UN agencies, certain CSOs (and even individuals within government), all form part of a discursive coalition of like-minded actors who have brought about a noticeable paradigm shift in thinking around pastoralism – a shift that is beginning to be reflected in the language of some Kenyan policymaking (as revealed in Chapter 5) and some state actors (this chapter), if not necessarily in all areas of policy implementation.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the agency and interests of different state and non-state actors within Ethiopian and Kenyan policy. It has done so by identifying and analysing their differing discourses and narratives around pastoralism and climate change. The findings reveal that there is a marked difference in how state actors in Ethiopia and Kenya frame contemporary challenges facing pastoralists and what responses are needed. In Ethiopia, as Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 illustrate, it is evident that a 'transforming pastoralism and drylands' discourse is predominant among state actors interviewed (accounting for 56% of references for this category), broadly matching the dominant discourse found in the CA and DA of Ethiopian policy documents in Chapter 5. This finding notwithstanding, Ethiopian state actors have clearly co-opted – and possibly diluted – many of the narratives associated with a 'modern, mobile and green' discourse (31% of references) as they seek to mobilise resources around common goals of climate resilience, food security and economic growth. The extent to which these new understandings are actually manifest in the way development is taking place in pastoral areas of Ethiopia, or whether similar modernising and 'technocratic' solutions that were characteristic of drylands development in the past (see Chapter 2), are still prevalent, is debatable, as Chapter 7 explores further. Either way, the state is clearly the dominant actor driving policy narratives on pastoralism and climate change in Ethiopia, as it seeks to maximise opportunities for resource exploitation in dryland areas long considered peripheral.

In Kenya, in contrast, the findings are less clearcut – while a 'transforming pastoralism' discourse is dominant in the CA and DA of policy documents, the findings of interviews reveal that interaction between state and non-state actors has made a deeper impression. Interestingly, the dominant narratives among state actors interviewed in Kenya are those closer to a 'modern, mobile and green' discourse (49% of references for this category in Table 6.1), while still retaining perspectives matching a 'transforming pastoralism' discourse (31%). The evidence suggests that

local and international researchers, donors, key CSOs and even certain individuals within government form a discursive coalition of like-minded actors who have brought about a more substantive change in attitudes towards pastoralism (at least within some policy circles) – a shift that is reflected in the standpoints of those Kenyan government officials interviewed for this research (as Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2 illustrate), if not necessarily in all areas of written policy (as Chapter 5 reveals) or in all policy interventions (Chapter 7). Just as with its Ethiopian counterparts, the Kenyan Government is, nonetheless, primarily driven by an ambition to transform and integrate Kenya's drylands resources and production within a broader vision of national economic development.

The findings support the assertion that narratives shift to suit the needs of actors as new opportunities and contexts arise (Otto-Naess *et al*., 2015 Death, 2016; Whitfield, 2016) – the process of devolution and the rapid development of Kenya's ASAL counties or the promotion of a 'climate-resilient green economy' in Ethiopia being cases in point. Policy processes that allow alternative perspectives to mainstream discourse to be heard and/or enable pastoralists to engage as citizens in decision-making that affects them, have thus far been contingent on certain political 'policy spaces' opening up at particular times, most notably in Kenya during the period of the MDNKOAL between 2009 and 2013. In Kenya, such an opportunity has arisen again in the context of political devolution, and in light of the recognition of community land-rights clearly framed within the 2016 *Community Land Act*. As we have seen, where systems of political governance are open and inclusive (a theme explored further in Chapter 8), policy-windows can be used by particular actors in a policy sub-system - CSOs at the county level in Kenya for example - in order to advance the engagement of issues they care about (Beland & Howlett, 2016). The extent to which the new *Pastoral Development Policy* and tentative moves towards developing a national *Land Use Policy* open up a similar policy space for pastoralist engagement in Ethiopia, however, remains to be seen, and ultimately depends on the outcomes of the broader political reform process initiated under PM Abiy Ahmed.

Finally, this chapter argues that, while the language of 'resilience', 'the green economy' and 'climate-smart' innovations may have become more prominent in discourse around pastoral development, ultimately the 'transformation' and accelerated development of what were once considered 'unproductive' and peripheral pastoral areas and, by default, the modernisation of pastoral production towards a more commercialised and diversified orientation, remains the primary interest of the state and its supporters in both Ethiopia and Kenya. Who exactly is benefitting and who loses out, and whose interests are being privileged over others in this process needs to be examined further. This is the purpose of Chapter 7 that follows.

Chapter 7: The Consequences of Policy Narratives for Pastoralism

7.1 Introduction

As this thesis has argued thus far, despite evidence of new discourses and narratives around the inherent resilience and adaptive nature of pastoralism, environmental-crises narratives of 'resource scarcity', 'conflict-ridden drylands', and 'pastoral vulnerability' remain deeply embedded in Ethiopian and Kenyan policymaking. There are, however, some differences between the two cases in where the discursive emphasis lies (Chapters 5 and 6). Such narratives amplify the perception that some kind of 'intervention' needs to take place, so opening up space for the state, and other powerful actors (private investors, local elites, conservation organisations), to claim stewardship over resources previously managed under customary institutions. While the language of 'resilience', 'the green economy', and 'climate-smart' innovations may have moved centre stage – driven by climate-change arguments – the economic 'transformation' and modernisation of areas long neglected by the state and private capital and, by default, the transformation of pastoral production towards a more market-led and diversified orientation remain the primary ambitions of national policymakers in both countries, despite differences in their policy and political landscapes.

Policies, nonetheless, do not cause outcomes in a linear fashion. They interact with other factors. The kinds of changes underway in pastoral drylands are driven as much by demographic growth, changes in market supply and demand, and regional security concerns, as they are by policymaking and political processes. The growth of small towns, infrastructure projects, oil and mineral extraction – even wildlife conservancies – are increasingly linked in a modernist vision of economic and social transformation (Mosley and Watson, 2016; Lind, 2018; Cormack and Kurewa, 2018; Lind *et al*., 2020). The uncertainty brought about by climate change is another variable. Combined, these policies and factors have far-reaching implications for pastoralist livelihoods, as this chapter uncovers.

Drawing on findings from interviews with the same sample of informants (Appendix A), as well as the literature reviewed earlier, this chapter examines the consequences of national climate-change and drylands-development policy narratives for pastoralist livelihoods. In doing so, I address the fourth element of my analytical framework (see Chapter 3), which is interested in uncovering the political economy of 'winners and losers' from policy processes (Adger *et al*., 2001; Robbins, 2012) that might otherwise be obscured by the kinds of depoliticised policy narratives that are prevalent in many policies examined.

The findings reveal that some differences exist between the two countries – notably more political space for pastoralist communities and CSOs to engage in decision-making processes and/or to resist unwelcome forms of development in Kenya, in contrast to Ethiopia. In both cases, nonetheless, actions to address climate change or build 'climate resilience' and 'green growth' in pastoral areas are, in themselves, creating new social disparities and differentiated patterns of climate risk, as well as accentuating existing ones. I argue that different actors and interests (the state, private investors, wealthier herders / 'pastoralist elites') are seeking to take advantage of the kinds of investment opportunities and political/policy spaces that have emerged, particularly as they relate to critical issues of land and other resources. This poses challenges for pastoral area governance, and the future of pastoralism more generally.

As in previous chapters, the cases of Ethiopia and Kenya are presented separately, before providing a synthesis of key findings in a concluding section. While the interview data relevant to policy outcomes and consequences were initially coded under the following themes: 'Rhetoric or Reality?'; 'Winners and Losers'; 'Adaptive Capacity'; Future of Pastoralism'; and 'Pastoralist Governance' (see Appendix E), I have chosen – for reasons of brevity and argument – to present my interpretation of the coded data under three sub-headings, which are applied in each case. Firstly: 'Strategies, Plans and Programmes' – so allowing a brief recap of the key climate-change and pastoral-area-development policies and strategies for that country. Secondly: 'Winners and Losers from policy narratives', enabling me to apply (as I have done throughout) a political ecology lens to my analysis of policy narratives. Finally, for each case, I examine: 'What future for pastoralism?', mapping possible future pastoralist development pathways, as well as drawing some tentative policy lessons for pastoral area governance – conclusions that are elaborated on in Chapter 8. Throughout this chapter, I continue to highlight – and analyse – similarities and differences between the two cases, as I have done in earlier chapters

7.2. Consequences of policy narratives and solutions for pastoralism in Ethiopia

While Ethiopian government officials (and donor staff) interviewed were keen – as we shall see – to stress the benefits of policies and (donor-supported) programmes and investments designed to strengthen resilience in the face of climate change (especially those purported to provide a new level of public-service delivery and social protection to pastoralists in dryland areas that was not there before), other (non-state) informants expressed concern that many of these same policies and investments were giving rise to complex and unpredictable effects at the local level – including the appropriation of key pastoral resources. This ultimately serves to undermine pastoralists' ability to respond to climatic and other uncertainties. More broadly, the findings point to the fact that development planning and policy prescriptions that flow from dominant narratives surrounding climate change, the green economy and the development of pastoral areas more generally are

predominantly serving the interests of those who have most to gain from greater commercialisation and the privatisation of formerly customarily managed resources. Not least the state itself, but also a growing elite within pastoralism, notably those with the ability to take advantage of new markets and business opportunities.

7.2.1 Strategies, plans and programmes: Ethiopia

It is useful here to briefly distinguish between what is meant by a policy, a strategy, a plan and a programme. A policy outlines the issues of concern, and the principles and goals required to guide decision-making around that issue. A strategy in turn sets out how those goals will be achieved and what actions and measures are required. Short- and mid-term plans and programmes are used for more detailed planning of the goals and objectives defined in the strategy. While a plan sets out a course of action, a programme is a longer-term portfolio of (usually) multiple projects designed to produce specific outcomes (Aragrande and Argenti, 2001). Throughout this thesis, I use the term 'policy documents' as an umbrella term to describe all government-formulated policies, strategies and plans. Programmes refer to specific time-bound development initiatives to meet the goals of those plans or strategies (although some INGO programmes may be independent of national policies and strategies). In most cases, these are funded by bilateral or multilateral donors and are undertaken by a partnership, or consortium, of agencies – a specific Ministry or Regional State authority together with one or more research institutes and/or NGOs. PRIME in Ethiopia, is one example (see Chapter 6).

Ethiopia is in the process of implementing a number of climate-change and pastoral-area-development policies and strategies – driven primarily by national development priorities, but also, as I have outlined in Chapters 2 and 6, incentivised by the availability of international climate finance and donor funding. All policies are designed to align with broader national development policy frameworks such as the 2015–2020 *Growth and Transformation Plan* (GTP II) and the 2011 *Climate Resilient Green Economy* (CRGE) Strategy. More recently, Ethiopia has set out its mitigation targets in its *Nationally Determined Contributions* (NDCs), has prepared a new (2017) *National Adaptation Plan*, alongside working on the *Ending Drought Emergencies* (EDE) and other sector-specific resilience strategies (all linked to the CRGE). Ethiopia's flagship *Productive Safety Net Programme* (PSNP) – and its offshoot, the *Household Asset Building Programme* (HABP) – have been extended to pastoral regions, such as Afar, and reframed by policymakers as a central component of Ethiopia's climate-change adaptation efforts (FDRE/WB, 2013 – see Chapter 5). The MoFPDA, meanwhile, set out a new *Pastoral Development Policy and Strategy* in 2019, designed to guide the future development of pastoral areas. The discourses and narratives found within these, and associated, policy documents have been analysed in Chapter 5, as have the actors and actor networks shaping policy processes (Chapter 6). As we have seen, while the influence of

donors, UN agencies and – to a lesser extent – a select group of INGOs, POs and individual researchers on shaping narratives and understandings of pastoralism is significant, amongst government officials interviewed (with some exceptions) a 'transforming pastoralism and the drylands' discourse remains dominant. These officials have nonetheless adopted many of the narratives associated with a 'modern, mobile and green' discourse, as they endeavour to mobilise support around a common set of goals – economic growth, food security and resilience to drought. Even if these policies may not all be (or are poorly) implemented – as a number of non-state actors interviewed report (Chapter 6) – the prescriptions and plans that flow from them still have the potential to influence the lived spaces, livelihoods and climate responses of pastoralist communities (Goldman *et al*., 2018), particularly when they inform decision-making around changes in land use and rights of access to critical resources.

7.2.2 'Winners and losers' from Ethiopian policy narratives

As outlined in Chapter 2, successive regimes in Ethiopia have undertaken policy actions in favour of non-pastoralist forms of land use, irrigated agriculture in particular (Dyer *et al*., 2008; Lavers 2012; Behnke & Kerven, 2013; Yimer 2015; Regassa *et al*., 2019). There is a long history of attempts to transform the pastoralist way of life into a sedentary one (Catley *et al*., 2013; Gebeye, 2016) with settled pastoralists usually ending up poorer and more marginalised as a result (Little *et al*., 2010; Fratkin, 2014). In recent years, the state had been planning to resettle a further 1.5 million pastoralists from their customary lands, ostensibly intended to improve access to basic services and build resilience to drought, despite the reluctance and often outright opposition of many communities to engage (Flintan, 2011; Fratkin, 2013; Addis 2015, Oakland Institute, 2019).[263] Customary claims to communal grazing land are not officially recognised and the best land is being progressively taken over for irrigated cultivation as the agricultural sector becomes more commercialised (Dyer *et al*., 2008; Headey *et al*., 2014; Yimer, 2015; Rettberg, 2020). Lands that may appear to some as 'empty' or 'underutilised' – or are claimed as such[264] – are targeted for private and state investment, ignoring their function as critical dry-season grazing reserves for pastoralists – along the Awash River in Afar, for example (Lavers, 2016; Galaty, 2013; Mulatu and Bekure, 2013; Abbink *et al*., 2014; Rettberg, 2020) – a view endorsed by many INGO staff, researchers and PO representatives interviewed for this research.[265]

[263] The numbers actually resettled may be considerably less than originally envisaged. It is reported in a World Bank study that, in 2017/18 in Afar State alone, 24,500 pastoralist households were relocated into 154 'commune centres' (Gebremeskal *et al*., 2019).

[264] See for example the 2010 FDRA-MOA, *Agricultural Policy Investment Framework*, reviewed in Chapter 5.

[265] Interviews with: international researcher 1, 18/04/2018; international researcher 2, 11/05/2018; INGO staff 1, 15/05/2018; INGO staff 8, 31/05/2018; international researcher 3, 14/05/2018; UN agency official 2, 16/05/2018; Ethiopian PO representative 1, 17/05/2018; Ethiopian PO representative 2, 29/05/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 24/05/2018; INGO staff 7, 26/05/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 2, 24/05/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 5, 30/05/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 4, 30/05/2018.

As we saw in Chapter 6, there is a strong view among certain officials that commercialisation of agriculture (including pastoral production), settlement, and 'diversified livelihoods' are necessary precursors for resilience and development – narratives central to the 'transforming pastoralism' discourse. Unsurprisingly, the views of government informants interviewed for this research were largely positive about Ethiopia's climate-change, green-economy and broader pastoral-area-development policies and programmes. Without giving specific examples, these officials asserted that new policies, and support towards formerly peripheral pastoral areas in general, are bringing benefits, especially in terms of improved services and infrastructure, and are part of a wider dynamic of economic growth and state-mediated commercialisation.[266] According to one official, pastoral development programmes are now *"linking the pastoralist economy to the agricultural economy…this is a positive engagement, an economic link, rather than pastoralists feeling themselves as marginalised, or as out of the economy."*[267] Similarly, for an official in the MoEFCC, the latest NAP:

> *…brings positive change…there are measures for example, early warning systems will help them* (pastoralists) *to prepare before they are affected by droughts and floods. Irrigation may help them minimise the effect of drought. Infrastructure helps to protect against the impact of floods.*[268]

According to another official, Ethiopia's PSNP has taken on board the kind of integrated drylands development thinking found in such regional (HoA) initiatives as the RPLP[269] and is now: *"very supportive* (of pastoralism)*…now the future is in drought resilience."*[270]

Nevertheless, for one international researcher, while the "*language of resilience and climate change"*[271] is now predominant, little has changed in terms of the kinds of interventions and programming being implemented by government, donors and even INGOs:

> *…they are still doing market development…rangeland development…water development, and probably still doing local institutional development and capacity building…there's been no fundamental shift towards really addressing some of the core issues that pastoralists face, which is really about securing access to rangelands resources and land tenure….*[272]

As we have seen in earlier chapters, 'green-growth' and 'climate-resilience' narratives have been evoked by the state to legitimise a new era of modernisation projects in the agriculture and energy sectors. Many non-state actors interviewed for this research were nonetheless sceptical about the extent pastoralists and pastoral areas were benefitting from strategies such as the *Climate Resilient Green Economy* (CRGE). According to one informant:

---

[266] Interviews with: Ethiopian government official 1, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 2, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018; Ethiopian local government official 1, 25/05/2018.
[267] Interview with Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018.
[268] Interview with Ethiopian government official 5, 30/05/2018.
[269] Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Regional Pastoralist Livelihoods Programme (RPLP).
[270] Interview with Ethiopian government official 1, 22/05/2018.
[271] Skype Interview with international researcher 2, 11/05/2018.
[272] Skype Interview with international researcher 2, 11/05/2018.

> *The green economy is more concerned with taking primary resources from pastoral areas, such as livestock, while processing or value addition is at the highlands, or at the market centres, where they have good infrastructure, to export or to distribute for the potential demand side…Maybe if we can see that the contribution livestock makes to GDP is high, there will be more support.*[273]

Consistent with what has been reported elsewhere (Jones and Carabine, 2013; Wondemagegnehu, 2016), several informants felt that the CRGE in its initial phase was overly focused on mitigation, at the expense of adaptation, despite what they perceived as compelling evidence for Ethiopia to concentrate on adaptation.[274] As Chapter 5 reveals, plans to expand forest cover, exploit renewable energy potential and reduce emissions from livestock are at the heart of Ethiopia's NDC targets (FDRE, 2015). While rural electrification is considered a priority for pastoral areas, hydropower schemes – such as the controversial Gibe III dam on the Omo River – have been constructed primarily with agricultural intensification and energy exports in mind.[275] While government and donor officials were reticent about discussing the negative consequences of infrastructure development (and associated 'villagisation' schemes) – several non-state informants spoke of how 'mega-projects' have led to the human-rights violations among indigenous agropastoralists in the Lower Omo Valley.[276] Thousands have been displaced by the conversion of former grazing land to irrigated sugar plantations and by associated resettlement,[277] affirming what has been documented in the literature (Abbink *et al*., 2014; Fratkin, 2014; Kefale and Gebresenet, 2014; Hodbod *et al*., 2018; Mosely and Watson, 2016; Oakland Institute, 2019; Regassa *et al*., 2019) and media reports.[278] Only recently, has such displacement been acknowledged by senior officials in government.[279] Interviews with a cross-section of non-state actors reveal, furthermore, that national or regional climate policies that drive large-scale transformative change – the development of hydropower, for example, or the conversion of pastoral lowlands into other forms of land use, as described above – are effectively giving rise to complex and unpredictable effects at the local level, such as the dispossession of pastoralists' key resources – ultimately undermining pastoralists' means of responding to climatic and resource variability.[280] One INGO informant explained:

[273] Interview with INGO staff 2, 15/05/2018.
[274] Interviews with: INGO staff 8, 31/05/2018; local researcher 3, 24/05/2018; donor official 3, 30/05/2018.
[275] Skype interview with international researcher 2, 11/05/2018; Interviews with: INGO staff 3, 17/05/2018; INGO staff 7, 26/05/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 5, 30/05/2018.
[276] Skype interview with international researcher 2, 11/05/2018; Interviews with: PO representative 1, 17/05/2018; PO representative 2, 29/05/2018. INGO staff 3, 17/05/2018; INGO staff 7, 26/05/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 5, 30/05/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 3, 24/05/2018.
[277] Out of 360,00 hectares allocated nationally for sugar plantation projects, under the management of the state-owned Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, 245,000 are within pastoral and agro-pastoral areas; the largest is at Kuraz, Omo River basin, SNNPR, with an area of 175,000 hectares (Kefale and Gebresenet, 2014).
[278] In 2019, there were reports of ongoing human-rights abuses by the Ethiopian military against Bodi and Mursi agropastoralists in Lower Omo. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/oct/21/the-nobel-peace-prize-can-inspire-abiy-ahmed-to-new-heights-in-ethiopia (Accessed 07/07/2020).
[279] At a seminar in April 2019, Government Minister Seyoum Mesfin stated that the new government recognised that certain "development interventions in the pastoralist areas…came with a cost" https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/jun/13/state-projects-leave-tens-of-thousands-of-lives-in-the-balance-in-ethiopia-study (Accessed 07/07/2020).
[280] Interviews with: INGO staff 8, 31/05/2018; INGO staff 6, 23/05/2018; Ethiopian PO representative 1, 17/05/2018.

> *Pastoralism exists by exploiting temporal and spatial variation…It's all about mobility. The moment the pastoral lands are fragmented because of conversion into other forms of land use, it restricts their mobility between wet- and dry-season grazing reserves. That exposes their vulnerability and undermines their entire livelihood system.*[281]

There is a risk that technocratic policy prescriptions in the name of climate mitigation or adaptation (irrigation, satellite-based early-warning systems, as examples) that are not cognisant of customary institutions and strategies (such as mobility) will repeat the development mistakes of earlier drylands interventions in the 1980s and 1990s (see Chapter 2), such as concentrating people and livestock around boreholes. Water development projects – for many years a core element of Ethiopia's sedentarisation programme (Chapter 5) and also central to the CRGE Strategy, which targets the "creation of new agricultural land in arid areas through irrigation" (FDRE, 2011b: 138) – were highlighted as particularly problematic by several non-state informants.[282] This confirms a pattern that has been documented extensively in the literature (Behnke *et al*., 2013; Galaty, 2013; Yirgu *et al.*, 2013; Yimer, 2015; Krätli, 2019). In the words of one informant, water provision can be:

> *…devastating to these lowland areas, particularly when they are putting in water in the wet-season grazing areas…And of course, they couch it in terms of helping with climate change…So you end up having sacrifice zones…because these are areas that normally do not hold animals, unless it's the rainy season'.*[283]

An international researcher elaborated further:

> *Traditional coping strategies have changed. And one of the reasons why they have changed is because government has allowed water to be developed everywhere without reference to grazing, they have allowed towns to be built anywhere without reference to grazing, the core production system. They've allowed people to privatise some of the best bits….*[284]

Reflecting on the role of pastoralism in the 'green economy', another researcher observed:

> *One of the patterns that we see is that, as central governments and individuals start to recognise that there's an economic value in pastoral areas, whether it's livestock or whether it's a green-economy-related activity, the chances are that they will try and capture that benefit for themselves…*[285]

While many pastoralists are clearly feeling the negative effects of the kinds of transformation and shift to a more commercially orientated economy, as described above, and with traditional support systems for poorer households to deal with risks and variability no longer as strong as in the past,[286] others are taking advantage of new opportunities such as the growth in cross-border and

[281] Interview with INGO staff 6, 23/05/2018.
[282] Skype interviews with international researcher 1, 18/04/2018; international researcher 2, 11/05/2018; Interviews with: INGO staff 1, 15/05/2018; UN agency official 1, 16/05/2018; INGO staff 6, 23/05/2018; INGO staff 7, 26/05/2018; Ethiopian PO representative 2, 29/05/2018.
[283] Interview with INGO staff 1, 15/05/2018.
[284] Skype Interview with international researcher 1, 18/04/2018.
[285] Skype interview with International researcher 2, 11/05/2018.
[286] Skype interview with international researcher 2, 11/05/2018.

international livestock markets[287] or growing demand for high-value fodder crops. There was a view amongst government officials, donors and some researchers that those who were able to grow their herds, have access to markets and diversify were better placed to avail of these opportunities,[288] in line with the kinds of 'transforming pastoralism' and 'modern, mobile and green' discourses I have identified as associated with these actors (Chapter 6). Nonetheless, livestock ownership is increasingly "*concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of people."* This new class of livestock owners *"start to appropriate land and water. You get this privatisation of rangeland, which makes it more and more difficult for the poor guys to stay in the system."*[289] These are views consistent with what has been argued elsewhere: that commercialisation of the livestock sector is increasingly redistributing livestock from the poor to the rich (Krätli, 2019); that there has been a shift towards more individualistic behaviour as pastoralists compete for access to and control over productive resources – among the Borana in southern Oromia, for example (Tache, 2013), or by an Afar pastoralist elite who have benefited from political connections and certain land deals (Rettberg, 2020); and that land appropriation (in Somali Region) is co-produced through political claims to territory and capital investment by wealthy indigenous (pastoralist, Somali) traders and politicians (Korf *et al*., 2015).

The suggestion that many people will opt, or be forced, to move out of pastoralism was reiterated by a number of informants.[290] For one local researcher: *"you see more and more pastoralists registering their children in schools because they see it as a way out of the pastoral mode of practice."*[291] Several INGO staff and international researchers emphasised the challenge of finding 'alternative livelihoods'[292] for the: "*huge proportions of people who are unlikely to return to pastoralism."*[293] For another informant, a key question was: *"how do you invest in alternatives in a way that doesn't pull the carpet from under the pastoralists?"*[294]

In sum, although wealth disparity is not a new phenomenon among pastoralists (Catley *et al*., 2013; Krätli, 2019), it is evident that there are growing social inequities, with some groups emerging as 'winners' from the transformation of Ethiopia's predominantly pastoral lowlands, and others 'losing' out in the process. The winners include the state itself – in terms of a rapidly growing national economy and increased agricultural export earnings (see Chapters 2 and 4), as well as its

[287] Ethiopia is the biggest supplier of live animals to countries in the Middle East (Gebremeskal *et al*, 2019). These animals are predominantly raised under pastoral systems (Kratli, 2019).
[288] Interviews with: donor official 1, 29/05/2018; donor official 2, 23/05/2018, Ethiopian local government official 1, 25/05/208; Ethiopian local researcher 5, 30/05/2018; Skype interview with international researcher 2, 11/05/2018.
[289] Skype interview with international researcher 2, 11/05/2018.
[290] Skype interviews with international researcher 2, 11/05/2018; international researcher 1, 18/04/2018. Interviews with: donor official 1, 29/05/2018; INGO staff 3, 17/05/2018; INGO staff 4, 17/05/2018; INGO staff 6, 23/05/2018; INGO staff 7, 26/06/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 5, 30/05/2018.
[291] Interview with Ethiopian local researcher 3, 24/05/2018.
[292] Skype interviews with international researcher 2, 11/05/2018; international researcher 1, 18/04/2018. Interviews with: INGO staff 1, 15/05/2018; INGO staff 6, 23/05/2018; INGO staff 7, 26/05/2018.
[293] Skype interview with international researcher 2, 11/05/2018.
[294] Skype interview with international researcher 1, 18/04/2018.

claim to have achieved greater national energy and food security (USAID, 2018). Other 'winners' are investors who have moved into the fertile riparian areas of the lowlands to take advantage of changes in land use (the Ethiopian Sugar Corperation is just one example),[295] as well as a new commercial class of wealthier pastoralists who – as described above – have profited from a lucrative regional[296] and international market for livestock, and/or who can afford to diversify their interests. While government policies and (donor-supported) programmes and investments designed to strengthen resilience in the face of climate change are – according to a cross-section of informants – providing some degree of social protection for certain poorer and/or drought-affected pastoralists that was not there before – determining how many, and who exactly is benefiting, is beyond the scope of this research. While Ethiopia has undoubtedly made impressive advances in terms of economic development and food security, reduced aid dependency and falling levels of poverty[297] over the last 15 years (USAID, 2018: World Bank, 2020a, 2020c), the extent to which that growth has been translated into redistribution of resources, improved services delivery and enhanced adaptive capacity in pastoral lowlands remains unclear and requires further research.

Poorer pastoralists, meanwhile, who make up the majority of pastoralists in Ethiopia (Krätli, 2019; World Bank, 2020d), and whose mobility and access to critical seasonal rangeland resources is increasingly restricted by changes in land use and infrastructure development, are clearly the 'losers' from the kinds of changes underway. It is these groups who have found it hard to rebuild their herds after successive droughts, many falling into destitution as a result (Gebremeskal *et al*., 2019). The extension of large-scale social-protection programmes to pastoral areas of Ethiopia is symptomatic of this trend (Tsegay, 2017). Others have opted to migrate in search of livelihood options (Catley, 2017). Although beyond the scope of this research, pastoralist women are likely to face additional disadvantages because of gender inequality (Balehey *et al*., 2018; Krätli, 2019). Also facing particular challenges, as we saw above, are minority indigenous agropastoralist ethnic groups, such as those inhabiting the Lower Omo Valley, who have been displaced from their traditional lands to make way for industrial sugarcane cultivation, as well as pastoralist communities along the interface between Somali Regional State and Oromia displaced by growing ethnic and political tensions during 2017/2018.[298]

[295] Since regime change in 1991, millions of hectares of Ethiopia's pastoral lowlands have been offered to investors (Lavers, 2016; Regassa *et al*., 2018).

[296] Ethiopian pastoralists in southern Oromia, for example, have long benefited from livestock price differentials through formal and informal (illicit) cross-border trade with northern Kenya (World Bank, 2020d).

[297] According to the World Bank (2020c), the share of the population living below the national poverty line in Ethiopia decreased from 30% in 2011 to 24% in 2016, although rural areas lag behind urban areas in poverty reduction.

[298] Tens of thousands of ethnic Oromo are reported to have been evicted from Somali region during 2017 and 2018, with similar numbers of Somali displaced from Oromia in retaliation. Pastoralism is practiced widely in both regions. See: https://qz.com/africa/1411519/ethiopias-ethnic-violence-history-with-oromos-amharas-somalis-tigray/ (Accessed 06/07/2020)

7.2.3 What future for pastoralism in Ethiopia?

Policy outcomes also have consequences for the future of pastoralism and thus deserve consideration. While pastoralists are not the homogeneous group as they are sometimes depicted, the extent to which pastoral systems in Ethiopia, and elsewhere in the HoA, will remain 'viable' in the future has exercised the minds of scholars and policymakers for some time (Little 2013; Abera and Abdullahi, 2015; Catley, 2017; Lind *et al*., 2016; Krätli, 2019; Gebremeskal *et al*., 2019). Alternative visions of the future are central to these debates (Lind *et al*., 2020). Pessimists (reflective of both the 'pure pastoralism' and 'transforming pastoralism' discourses identified earlier) will point to the ongoing marginalisation of pastoralism and question the long-term viability of a livelihood system in the face of increasing climatic, and other, challenges. Optimists, in contrast – in line with the 'modern, mobile and green' discourse – point to new understandings of rangeland ecology, the growth in pastoralist entrepreneurship, as well as the potential for pastoralists to be recognised as having a role in the green economy (Chapter 2).

The findings outlined in this chapter fall somewhere in the middle ground. Most Ethiopian informants felt that pastoralism will continue, but some pastoralists will do better than others.[299] Pastoralism, according to a donor official:

> *…will still provide a livelihood opportunity for a significant number of people…The question is: will it support the same number of people, or even more people? The answer is no. It's mostly the better-off pastoralists who will survive in the system…* (others) *will continue to drop out and need support to diversify.*[300]

Ultimately, *"there will be 'fewer people practising mobile pastoralism".*[301] In contrast – reflective more of the kind of 'modern, mobile and green' discourse identified earlier – one local researcher argued that "*mobility will still be key, even in the modern kind of pastoralism…and you'll find a lot of migration, moving out of the pastoral areas, positively and negatively."*[302] The argument was made that there are still vast areas of land in Ethiopia where alternative land-use options were just not viable or appropriate.[303] For one international researcher: *"Even if it is the case that all the higher-quality productive areas are taken out of the system. I think there will still be people who can somehow manage to survive on the rest".*[304]

What emerges from these findings (and the Kenya findings that follow) is that there is a need for improved, and more inclusive, governance of pastoral rangelands – in line with the kinds of 'pure

[299] Skype interview with international researcher 2, 11/05/2018. Interviews with: international researcher 3, 14/05/2018; donor official 1, 29/05/2018; INGO staff 4, 17/05/2018; INGO staff 6, 23/05/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 5, 30/05/2018.
[300] Interview with donor official 1, 29/05/2018.
[301] Interview with donor official 1, 29/05/2018.
[302] Interview with Ethiopian local researcher 5, 30/05/2019.
[303] Interviews with: international researcher 3, 14/05/2018; PO representative 1, 17/05/2018; PO representative 2, 29/05/2018; INGO staff 4, 17/05/2018; INGO staff 3, 17/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 2, 22/05/2018.
[304] Interview with international researcher 3, 14/05/2018.

pastoralism' and 'modern, mobile and green' discourses identified in earlier chapters. At the core of such governance is land-tenure[305] security: the need to facilitate, rather than impede, mobility (including, critically, movement across borders), pastoralists' key strategic means of managing variability, as well as to safeguard pastoralist lands and other resources from the kinds of appropriation outlined above. Davies *et al*. (2016) remind us, nonetheless, that 'good governance' in pastoral rangelands must be set within an overarching commitment to respect pastoralist human rights – clearly lacking in the cases of enforced villagisation and displacement in areas such as South Omo, described earlier. In Chapter 8, I bring my key findings together to elaborate further on what a more inclusive form of pastoral area governance would entail.

While Chapters 5 and 6 reveal that discourse in Ethiopia has tentatively shifted towards supporting improved governance, there is still a notable disconnect between formal policy that recognises pastoral production and the realities on the ground. Article 40 of the 1995 Constitution broadly recognises the right of pastoralists to have grazing land (FDRE, 1995), and several Regional State Proclamations (for example, Afar, Somali) "guarantee the land-use rights of pastoralists" (IGAD, 2016: 23). Nonetheless, as we have seen, weak land governance has enabled greater private acquisition and individualisation of rangeland and water by wealthier herders and non-pastoralist interests (including the state itself), generally to the detriment of poorer pastoralists' welfare and adaptive capacity. At the time of writing (2020), it appears that there are some signs for optimism. The MoA, with the support of USAID, is reported to be developing a comprehensive national Land Use Policy: '*The aim is to provide more clarity around land use in pastoral areas, which will then prove helpful for the Regional governments to interpret to meet their particular needs….* '[306] Local land-use plans would, in turn, offer:

> *A type of protection against further fragmentation, and beyond that, by improving this rangeland, by reseeding or removing invasive species, etc… you are showing that you're using the land productively and you're investing in rangelands. That's also a form of security.*[307]

It is beyond the scope of this research to examine the extent to which the rhetoric of land-use policy reform has been translated into beneficial livelihood outcomes at the local level. Nonetheless, several donor and other informants, cited the USAID-supported LAND[308] project in Borana

[305] Land tenure is understood here as the relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among people, as individuals or groups, with respect to land and other natural resources such as water and forest (FAO, 2002).
[306] Interview with donor official 1, 29/05/2018.
[307] Interview with international researcher 3, 14/05/2018.
[308] The USAID funded Land Administration to Nurture Development (LAND) programme implemented in Ethiopia's Oromia Region in the Guji and Borana pastoral zones between 2013-2017, is considered to have taken an innovative approach to working with regional governments and pastoral communities and their customary governance institutions. It's aim was to strengthen land tenure security among pastoralists through a pilot formalization process that allows communal land rights to be demarcated, recognized, and certified (McPeak, *et al*., 2015; Bekure, 2018) The project is also designed to legally recognize customary communal land governance institutions, such as the traditional *Gada* and *dheeda* systems, and to strengthen pastoral communities' capacity for inclusive land-use planning, management, and investment negotiations (Ibid). Challenges around reconciling traditional customary instutions with formal government administrative systems are dicusssed in Chapter 8 (8.3).

(Oromia) as an example of where a customary land-tenure system with traditional grazing area units (*dheeda*) has been formally recognised, and which offers potential to be replicated elsewhere.[309] This is one example of where discourses of 'modern, mobile and green' and even 'pure pastoralism' – both of which place value on strategic mobility as a means of managing the variability of dryland ecologies and climate and which highlight the role of customary institutions – have begun to inform local government decision-making and planning.

The extent to which pastoralist representatives and pastoralist civil society in Ethiopia will play a role in asserting pastoralist identity, and bring a stronger 'voice' to policymaking processes in the future, would appear to be weak. As Chapter 6 reveals, pastoralist political representation and advocacy on behalf of pastoralism remain far behind the levels found in Kenya. CSOs have been constrained until now from questioning state-led interventions or from resisting projects that are deemed 'in the national interest' (Roberts, 2019; Mosley and Watson, 2016). There are signs that a new 'policy space' is beginning to open up, in light of political reforms initiated by PM Abiy Ahmed in 2018 – although not without a cost. New freedom of political expression has energised power struggles over territory between dominant ethnic groups who stand to benefit or lose from the reform process in Ethiopia (MRI, 2019).

While the challenges facing pastoralists in Ethiopia are considerable, the pathways they follow will remain diverse, with some taking advantage of new opportunities, and others forced, or choosing, to transition out of pastoralism altogether. Clearly there is a need for more inclusive and accountable forms of pastoral area governance: that protect mobility and safeguard pastoralists' access to key resources, their strategic means of managing variability, and that enable pastoralists to have greater agency in decision-making that affects them. Unless state interests genuinely match the rhetoric of the new *Pastoral Development Policy* (see Chapter 6) and work at the same time towards introducing a national Land Use Policy that makes provision for communal land-tenure and pastoralist concerns (as in the case of the *Community Land Act* in Kenya, discussed below), such broader forms of governance seem unlikely.

7.3 The consequences of policy narratives for pastoralism in Kenya

For Kenya, the findings reveal that climate-change and drylands-focused policies cannot be separated from the broader context of political devolution and rapid economic transformation underway in ASAL counties. Such policies and programming that have been devolved to the county level are generally perceived by key informants (across all actor groups) as beginning to bring some benefits, especially in term of pastoralists' preparedness and recovery in the face of

[309] Interviews with: Ethiopian government official 1, 22/05/2018; donor official 1, 29/05/2018; donor official 2, 23/05/2018; donor official 3, 30/05/2018; international researcher 3, 14/05/2018; Ethiopian PO representative 2, 29/05/2018; INGO staff 6, 23/05/2019.

drought and greater community input into decision-making processes.[310] New economic opportunities are also being created as towns and populations expand along with a corresponding growth in demand for livestock products.[311] Yet, as in Ethiopia, such benefits are hardly widely felt enough to offset what, for many – as we shall discover below – are the negative consequences of the kinds of rapid demographic, social and economic transformation that are underway in ASAL counties, as Kenya strives to achieve its ambitious *Vision 2030* and 'Big Four' development targets. These developments create space, as we shall see, for 'elite capture' among newly elected officials, wealthier pastoralists and dominant ethnic groups. Meanwhile, other (poorer, less politically connected and/or minority ethnic) pastoralists find their autonomous adaptive capacity increasingly undermined as access to and control over critical resources are diminished. The perceptions of informants in this research are consistent with a growing body of research that focuses on the outcomes associated with Kenya's ambitions to achieve middle-income status through low-carbon strategies and new infrastructure investments in dryland areas (Maina *et al*., 2013; Symons, 2014; King-Okumu, 2015; Letai and Tiampati, 2015; Otto-Naess *et al*., 2015; Mosley and Watson, 2016; Cormack and Kurewa, 2018; Johnson and Ogeya, 2018). What this research adds – and what I found surprising – is the extent to which indigenous capital – including local pastoralist elites – and local political interests play such a prominent role in driving economic and social transformation in formerly peripheral ASAL counties, reconfiguring pastoralist livelihoods in the process.

7.3.1 Strategies, plans and programmes: Kenya

The establishment of the MDNKOAL in 2008 (see Chapters 2 & 6), the '*ASAL Policy'* (2012), along with the second *Medium Term Plan* (MTP) of *Vision 2030*, Kenya's overarching national development framework, have been welcomed by commentators (see Chapter 2) and a cross-section of informants (Chapter 6) as constituting a notable shift in discourse on Kenya's drylands: away from their being seen as 'problem areas' that need to be treated separately to, instead, a perspective that regarded them as an integral part of the national economy (Elmi and Birch, 2013; Odhiambo, 2014). As the analysis of policy documents in Chapter 5 confirms, there is an underlying narrative within the second MTP and associated sector-specific strategies (water, energy and agriculture especially) that views what were once considered as peripheral areas to offer instead a 'new frontier' for capital accumulation, resource extraction and infrastructure development, as well as a site for 'green growth'. More recently, this narrative has been extended through the current government's 'Big Four' agenda – a four-point strategy launched by President

[310] Skype interviews with: international researcher 4, 12/04/2018; international researcher 5, 08/05/18. Interviews with; Kenyan local government official 1, 08/03/2018; Kenyan government official 1, 11/06/2018; Kenyan government official 2, 11/06/2018; Kenyan government official 4, 21/06/2018; Kenyan government official 5, 20/06/2018; Kenyan consortium member 1, 20/06/2018; Kenyan local researcher 5, 21/06/2018.

[311] Skype interview with INGO staff 12, 18/06/2018; Interviews with: Kenyan private-sector consultant 1, 14/06/2018; INGO staff 13, 19/06/2018.

Kenyatta in 2018. Meanwhile, the process of political devolution has become the primary means by which the state is seeking to extend its intentions to economically transform ASAL counties, as well as deliver various climate-change policies and strategies (see 7.3.2) – in effect, affording a great deal of new power and legitimacy to county officials (Abdi and Lind, 2018; Manzano, 2018; World Bank, 2020d). Despite growing acceptance (and endorsement) of pastoralism as a legitimate land-use system amongst Kenyan policymakers (at least among those interviewed – see Chapter 6), the extent to which there is still space for pastoralist mobility within what is essentially a modernist and market-led vision of economic and social transformation of ASAL counties, and who are the 'winners and losers' from the kinds of policy prescriptions that flow from policy narratives, depends on whose perspectives and voices are being heard. Invariably, those who have greater access to resources and capital in its various forms are able to use these to secure further benefits (King-Okumu, 2015; Symons, 2014), as we discover below.

7.3.2 'Winners and losers' from Kenyan policy narratives

Devolution is the main context in which a great deal of political and economic change in Kenya is taking place. All policies must now be channelled through devolution. These include climate-change adaptation policies, as set out in the *National Adaptation Plan* (NAP), the *National Climate Change Action Plan* (NCCAP) and associated *Ending Drought Emergencies* (EDE) initiatives (see Chapter 5). The *Climate Change Act* of 2016 requires county governments to integrate and mainstream climate actions into County Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs). ASAL counties are in the process of developing their own county-level Climate Adaptation Plans and disaster-risk-reduction strategies.[312] Several counties are piloting a devolved County Climate Change Funding (CCCF) mechanism – deemed by a cross-section of informants as an effective process that allows for decision-making at the county and community (ward) level.[313] CCCFs must be aligned with national priorities, as set out in the NAP, but county governments have jurisdiction over sectors such as climate information services, agriculture and natural resource governance (Murphy and Orindi, 2017).[314] Many adaptation investments under this fund target the livestock sector and – notably – focus on strengthening customary rangeland institutions,[315] reflective of the growing

[312] Skype interviews with: international researcher 4, 12/04/2018; international researcher 5, 08/05/18. Interview with Kenyan consortium member 1, 20/06/2018.

[313] Skype interviews with: international researcher 4, 12/04/2018; international researcher 5, 08/05/18. Interviews with: Kenyan local government official 1, 08/03/2018; Kenyan government official 1, 11/06/2018; Kenyan government official 2, 11/06/2018; Kenyan government official 4, 21/06/2018; Kenyan consortium member 1, 20/06/2018; Kenyan local researcher 5, 21/06/2018.

[314] Under this mechanism 82 different climate adaptation investments prioritised by 'local communities' were implemented across the five counties in the period 2015–2017 (Murphy & Orindi, 2017).

[315] Interviews with: Kenyan consortium member 1, 20/06/2018; international researcher 10, 14/06/2018; Kenyan local researcher 5, 21/06/2018; Kenyan Pastoralist MP 1, 21/05/2018.

influence of the 'modern, mobile and green' and even the 'pure pastoralism' discourses identified earlier.[316] For one PO representative involved in this process:

> *We had a very good pilot of climate adaptation plans with Isiolo County. The communities decided what they wanted to do, the communities were given the capacity to procure services, were trained and given capacity to supervise the implementation of all these activities…In Isiolo today, conflicts over resources, over grazing lands, over water points, have drastically reduced.*[317]

In line with the various *EDE* Strategies (Chapter 5), where the discursive emphasis is on 'building resilience' to a wider set of shocks and stresses, not just climate risk, there has been an attempt, according to one INGO informant, *"to move from emergencies to resilience thinking…With the NDMA now, the focus is on disaster risk management and there are some positives. Especially if they follow it up, and use it at the County level…*"[318] One government official asserted that, while "*droughts are more devastating"*, now with devolution: *"there is more support for pastoralists. At least I can say for Wajir...the early-warning system works much better than it used to. The institutional structures are now there, so the response is better."*[319]

According to several interviewees,[320] pastoralists in ASAL counties are now benefitting from the roll out of the *Kenya Livestock Insurance programme (KLIP)*, so cushioning the worst effects of livestock losses during severe droughts and floods. From its inception in 2014 up until 2018, KLIP reportedly paid out KSh700m, benefitting 32,000 pastoralists.[321]

Nonetheless, devolution has brought its own challenges. For some informants, county resources are frequently channelled into providing 'showpiece' infrastructure, such as boreholes, livestock markets and slaughterhouses[322] with: "*little joined-up thinking…they want to show something concrete so that people could see that this government had brought us an abattoir."*[323] As more money makes its way to the counties, corruption and the 'elite capture' of benefits are a consequence.[324] Informants mentioned that minority pastoralist ethnic groups were fearful of being disadvantaged in counties where a majority pastoralist ethnic group dominate political and

[316] See also the analysis of the *Isiolo County Livestock Strategy and Implementation Plan* 2016, in Chapter 5, where these discourses are predominant.
[317] Interview with Kenyan PO representative 2, 09/06/2018.
[318] Skype interview with INGO staff 12, 18/06/2018.
[319] Interview with Kenyan government official 5, 20/06/2018.
[320] Skype interview with international researcher 9, 14/06/2018; Interviews with international researcher 7, 07/06/2018; Kenyan government official 4, 21/06/2018.
[321] http://www.kilimo.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Nairobi_KLIP-Executive-Semiars-Final-Report_IM.pdf (Accessed 06/07/2020)
[322] Skype interview with Kenyan local NGO staff 2, 07/06/2018. Interviews with: international researcher 7, 07/06/2018; Kenyan local researcher 3, 09/06/2018.
[323] Skype interview with Kenyan local NGO staff 2, 07/06/2018.
[324] Skype interview with international researcher 5, 08/05/2018: Interviews with: Kenyan local researcher 1, 05/03/2018; Kenyan local researcher 2, 06/06/2018; Kenyan government official 5, 20/06/2018; Kenyan local government official 1, 08/03/2018; INGO staff 9, 04/06/2018; UN official 3, 12/06/2018; international researcher 6, 05/06/2018; international researcher 10, 14/06/2018.

economic power[325] – corroborating claims made in the literature (Greiner, 2016: Scott-Villiers, 2017; Manzano, 2018; Mkutu, 2019).[326] Several different informants asserted that local political elites often have a vested interest in maintaining ethnic divisions, as they seek to consolidate political power and personal gain.[327] The situation is made more complex by inter-county boundary disputes over pasture and water (Mkutu, 2019, World Bank, 2020d). According to a local NGO interviewee, such "*politicisation of ethnicity is not helpful in terms of moving forward, or protecting communal resources as a whole."*[328] For one local researcher:

> *Pastoralists are very homogeneous when you pit them against others. But when they are amongst themselves they are extremely heterogeneous…with devolution, that heterogenuity is playing itself out. In so much as devolution is a huge opportunity, it is now being undermined by inter- and intra-community tensions*.[329]

As earlier chapters reveal, such contestations over power and resources are rarely mentioned within the kinds of dominant (and largely de-politicised) policy narratives and representations that tend to frame 'pastoralist vulnerability' in terms of climate change or 'resource scarcity'. It is worth reiterating here that the term 'pastoral elite' is frequently used in discussions on pastoralism in Kenya, as it was by interviewees in this research. This refers to a growing class of wealthy, and usually politically well-connected, herd owners (often absentee, some of whom may now be MPs or members of county assemblies) or former pastoralists, who have made money accumulating livestock from enclosing land (such as the 'Group Ranches' in the southern Kenyan rangelands) and /or from investments in other businesses. It also includes those who have taken advantage of rent-seeking opportunities resulting from policy change or political appointment (Catley *et al*., 2013; Catley 2017; Manzano, 2018; World Bank, 2020d). The perception that all pastoralists are 'poor' or 'powerless' is clearly not accurate.

Predominantly pastoralist counties in Northern Kenya are, as we have seen, undergoing rapid transformation, as population grows and the development of infrastructure and energy projects, new roads, pipelines and irrigation schemes continues apace. The GoK is set on developing the LAPSSET Corridor project, linking oil production in Turkana with a new port and refinery at Lamu, and encouraging multiple investments along its route, including plans to construct a large dam on the Ewaso-Ng'iro River (LCDA, 2016). LAPSSET has been framed within GoK policy as "essential for growth and investment" (LCDA 2016:16). While LAPSSET remains, for now, "more on paper than on the ground" (Scoones, 2018: 2), the prospect of further discoveries of oil, gas and mineral reserves in the region is likely to add to its momentum. Various studies (Enns, 2017, Letai

[325] Interviews with: Kenyan local researcher 4, 18/06/2018; international researcher 6, 05/06/2018.
[326] Minority Rendille and Gaba communities in Marsabit County, for example, where the majority Borana dominate local politics (Mkutu, 2019).
[327] Skype interview with international researcher 5, 08/05/2018. Interviews with; Kenyan local government official 1, 08/03/2018; international researcher 10, 14/06/2018; Kenyan local researcher 4, 18/06/2018; INGO staff 9, 04/06/2018.
[328] Skype interview with Kenyan local NGO staff 2, 07/06/3018.
[329] Interview with Kenyan local researcher 1, 05/03/2018.

and Tiampati, 2015; Loduk *et al*., 2016; Schilling *et al*., 2016; Kochore, 2016; Greiner, 2020) have highlighted that, while such 'mega-infrastructure projects' may bring employment and business opportunities for some, they place restrictions on mobility of others, fuel resentment and frequently aggravate conflicts over land and other resources where different ethnic groups meet. Patterns of economic differentiation, furthermore, are likely to disrupt the kinds of traditional social networks and reciprocal arrangements that characterise pastoral systems and that play a critical role in their ability to respond to climate change (see Chapter 2).

As Elliot (2016), Greiner (2016) and Mosley and Watson (2016) have all argued, the enclosure of land in northern counties is connected to new forms of territoralisation, driven by powerful individuals and local elites, as much as it is by external investors or the state. The prospect of new investments, such as those described above, and accompanying rise in land prices has given rise to an 'economy of anticipation' (Mosley and Watson, 2016: 453), as much as it raises fear of dispossession. For one INGO interviewee, new investments such as oil are largely benefitting *"the elite"* in northern counties "*while the community members who are not educated, who are actually the land-users, may not be feeling the benefits directly."*[330] The same informant added:

> *Communities we interact with* (in Turkana East) *have been asking us to help them to intervene. They feel the effects of oil and gas will be the same as the effects of the geothermal at Olkaria…the investors just came in, have their discussions with the national government and they will be given their license …the communities feel that they're not involved. Yet it's taking part of their livelihoods…*[331]

Another trend has been the rapid growth of unplanned settlements around towns and waterpoints and along new roads. A single borehole or fixed waterpoint can, according to one researcher, quickly become: "*the epicenter of a rangeland degradation nightmare.* '[332]

Just like Ethiopia, Kenya clearly has a strong growth-orientated vision of a 'green economy' – as set out in NDC mitigation targets and the 2015 *Green Economy Strategy Implementation Plan* (GESIP). Keen to leverage funds newly available through the Green Climate Fund (GCF), REDD+[333] and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), investment in sectors such as renewable energy and 'climate-smart agriculture' are seen as paths to development and job creation (Death, 2016; GoK-MENR, 2015b; Maina *et al*., 2013). Rangelands are increasingly being targeted for the potential to generate solar, geothermal and wind energy projects. The 3rd MTP envisages a four-fold expansion of geothermal energy output alone (GoK, 2018). Displacement of local Maasai communities and loss of grazing land to make way for the Olkaria geothermal scheme and

[330] Interview with INGO staff 11, 08/06/2018.
[331] Interview with INGO staff 11, 08/06/2018.
[332] Interview with international researcher 10, 14/06/2018.
[333] Under REDD – a tool of the UNFCCC – countries with extensive forest and/or grasslands will be compensated if they agree to manage these lands in ways that reduce GHG emissions and enhance carbon storage (FAO, 2009).

associated infrastructure development in Kenya's Rift Valley[334] was mentioned by several non-state actors interviewed,[335] endorsing what has been reported elsewhere (Sena, 2015; Johnson and Ogeya, 2018; Renkens, 2019).[336] For a PO representative, the focus of investment to date has been on *"large energy projects rather than on decentralised smaller-scale energy projects…that could bring real benefit to local communities.*"[337] For these, and other, non-state actors, the case of Lake Turkana Wind Power (LTWP) is another example of where contestations between Kenya's green-economy ambitions and the customary rights and aspirations of local pastoralist communities are being played out. Sited in 150,000 acres of rangeland on the border of Samburu and Marsabit counties, and inhabited by a mix of interacting Samburu, Turkana, and minority El Molo and Rendille pastoralist groups (Voller *et al*., 2016; Drew, 2020), LTWP is currently the largest wind-power project in Africa, and one of a number of 'flagship' infrastructure investments designed to 'transform' northern ASAL counties (another is LAPSSET). As such, the government were very keen to involve private investors and donors from the start.[338] The development of LTWP has been accompanied by accusations of 'land grabbing', and concerns over infringements of customary land rights of local pastoralists, resulting in a legal case brought by some members of local indigenous community groups against LTWP and the county government (Mutiga, 2015: Voller *et al*., 2016). Cormack and Kurewa (2018: 89) suggest that LTWP has produced "a variety of contradictory effects", as local communities seek to gain access to information, and benefits such as employment or compensation, while simultaneously experiencing "new forms of exclusion". Vulnerable minority groups like the El Molo are particularly affected by the decrease of negotiated use and access to land (Renkens, 2019). Tensions between - and within - communities close to LTWP have also been used and inflamed by incumbant politicians in the newly devolved county governments, or by aspiring politicians for political gain (Drew, 2020: 76). Informants in this research shared similar concerns about the poor community consultation process, the inadequate compensation for land taken from community members and the fact that LTWP has encroached into an important dry-season grazing reserve.[339] For several informants, the issue of whether the development of renewable energy would bring benefits or not was closely tied to the question of land rights:

[334] Olkaria IV geothermal plant is the biggest single-site geothermal facility in the world. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/26/the-joys-of-springs-how-kenya-could-steam-beyond-fossil-fuel (Accessed 06/07/2020).

[335] Skype interview with Kenyan PO representative 3, 11/06/2018; Interviews with INGO staff 9, 04/06/2018; with PO representative 2, 09/06/2018.

[336] Drawing on over a decade of research in East Pokot, Baringo County, Greiner (2020) reports that Kenya's 'new geothermal frontier' is being shaped and defined by 'internal processes and differentiation', as much as it is by the interests of the state and global capital. Planned investment and infrastructure development (such as new roads) around new and proposed geothermal projects has led to the increased appropriation and privatisation of former community lands by local elites, as well as - in some instances - a renewal of ethnic tensions between Turkana and Pokot communities.

[337] Skype interview with Kenyan PO representative 3, 11/06/2018.

[338] Interview with Kenyan private-sector consultant 1, 14/06/2018.

[339] Skype interviews with: Kenyan PO representative 3, 11/06/2018; local NGO staff 3, 18/06/2018; INGO staff 12, 18/06/2018. Interviews with: Kenyan local NGO staff 1, 07/03/2018; Kenyan local government official 1, 08/03/2018; INGO staff 9, 04/06/2018; international researcher 10, 14/06/2018.

> *There are pastoralists around Lake Turkana who've been fighting because their land has been taken away to put up a wind farm. If they had secure tenure, they would be daft not to put up a wind farm there, because they could make a killing on it. It's having the rights to lease a little bit of your land to generate energy and then I think pastoralists have got a huge opportunity.*[340]

This underlines the need, as stated in the case of Ethiopia above, for more inclusive forms of land governance in pastoral areas that offer security of tenure for user groups of communal rangelands.

Another domain where the prescriptions that flow from climate policy narratives have implications for pastoralist livelihoods is 'climate-smart agriculture' (CSA). Following on from its *CSA Framework programme* launched in 2015 (analysed in Chapter 5), the GoK has subsequently developed a *Kenya CSA Strategy* 2017–2026, in line with its climate-change commitments. Various donors, meanwhile, are providing substantive funding to programmes in Kenya that include a CSA component.[341] For its proponents, CSA offers 'a triple win' in the face of climate change: *"enhancing resilience and food security, and where possible, trying to mitigate climate change."*[342] As with narratives of 'climate resilience' and the 'green economy', the global momentum around CSA proves an attractive 'fit' for the Kenyan (and Ethiopian) states' ambitions to tackle the twin challenge of climate change and food security without constraining economic growth. Emphasis on technological and market-based solutions adds further impetus to the push for CSA, as revealed by the discourse analysis in Chapter 5. CSA can be seen as another example where powerful actors – in this case, the Kenyan state, the World Bank and UN bodies (such as the FAO), along with private-sector interests (agri-businesses) – are adopting and promoting a global green narrative around what is essentially a long-standing idea – the modernisation of agriculture (Bergius and Buseth, 2019). Arguably, just as with agri-modernisation endeavours in the past, CSA policies and strategies will sideline the kinds of socio-political processes – such as displacement from critical resources or 'elite capture' of newly devolved funding – that continue to marginalise those pastoralists with the least assets or connections to political power at county level. A cross-section of non-state actors expressed reservations about what CSA has to offer.[343] One local researcher commented:

> *First of all, it's agriculture. They don't think about pastoralism. They are thinking about converting Turkana into something else. They are thinking about irrigation. They look at a green dry-season grazing areas and see it as having potential for doing agriculture.*[344]

Nonetheless, for an international livestock researcher:

[340] Interview with international researcher 10, 14/06/2018.
[341] See for example: http://projects.worldbank.org/P154784?lang=en (Accessed, 07/07/2020)
[342] Interview with UN agency official 4, 12/06/2018.
[343] Skype interview with INGO staff 12, 18/06/2018; Interviews with: local Kenyan NGO staff 1, 07/03/2018; Kenyan local researcher 1, 05/03/2018; Kenyan PO representative 1, 06/06/2018; UN agency official 4, 12/06/2018.
[344] Interview with Kenyan local researcher 1, 05/03/2018.

> *Climate-smart agriculture policies do prioritise adaptation and they talk about pastoral production systems...but a lot of these narratives are just about productivity…for example, one of the biggest CSA projects…funded by the World Bank…It does highlight livestock, yet it's not terribly sophisticated in its understanding of the dynamics of pastoralism.*[345]

The predominant national food security narrative, which, as we have seen, frequently uses climate change as a reason to justify the expansion of irrigated cropping, and which places little value on pastoral production – was also highlighted by interviewees as a cause for concern. For one CSO informant: *"The belief that 'in order for you to be food secure, then you must grow crops' is still there."*[346] Lands traditionally used as pastoralist dry-season reserves are being targeted for irrigation schemes, effectively undermining pastoralists' ability to respond to climatic and other uncertainties.[347] Once these resources are *"removed from the system"*, pastoralists are forced to *"go elsewhere when there is a drought."*[348] As a consequence: "*you will see more and more invasions of national parks, the forests, privatised land…".*[349] Sizable new 'land banks' as a means to ensure future food security are also being proposed in ASAL counties, where land is still considered plentiful.[350] Several interviewees[351] gave the example of the (one million acre) Galanna Kulalu irrigation and food security scheme in Tana River County, which has dispossessed lands previously used by minority agropastoralists (such as the Orma) and which has largely proved to be an expensive failure according to media reports.[352] In a similar vein, PO informants felt that the recent expansion of community wildlife conservancies in northern Kenya (see Chapter 6) – which are backed by international donors and the Kenyan political elite alike (Bersaglio and Cleaver, 2018) – represents another form of expropriation of critical dry-season resources, bringing benefits to some (such as new sources of income), but disadvantaging others.[353] While conservancies usually allow a certain amount of grazing rights, Mosley and Watson (2016) write that those who are not considered to be 'members of the community' (pastoralist groups from elsewhere who make seasonal use of pasture, for example) are likely to be excluded.

In sum, there are clearly 'winners and losers' from Kenyan policy processes and the prescriptions that flow from policy narratives. The 'winners' are those pastoralists in ASAL counties with closer proximity to administrative centres who are in a position to take advantage of improved services (health and education and, for those who qualify, new social-protection measures such as the

[345] Interview with international researcher 7, 07/06/2018.
[346] Skype interview with Kenyan local NGO staff 3, 18/06/2018.
[347] Interviews with: Kenyan local researcher 1, 05/03/2018; Kenyan local researcher 3, 09/06/2018; Kenyan local researcher 5, 21/06/2018; INGO staff member 13, 19/06/2018; Kenyan PO representative 2. 09/06/2018.
[348] Interview with UN agency official 3, 12/06/2018.
[349] Interview with UN agency official 3, 12/06/2018.
[350] Interview with INGO staff 13, 19/06/2018.
[351] Skype interviews with: INGO staff 12, 18/06/2018; Kenyan PO representative 3, 11/06/2018. Interviews with: Kenyan PO representative 2, 09/06/2018; INGO staff member 10, 08/06/2018; Kenyan local researcher 3, 09/06/2018; Kenyan local researcher 5, 21/06/2018.
[352] https://nib.or.ke/projects/flagship-projects/galana (Accessed, 07/07/2020).
[353] Skype interviews with: Kenyan PO representative 3, 11/06/2018; Kenyan PO representative 4, 17/07/2018. Interviews with: Kenyan PO representative 1, 06/06/2018; Kenyan PO representative 2, 09/06/2018. INGO staff 12, 18/06/18; INGO staff 13, 19/06/2018.

Kenyan Livestock Insurance Programme), infrastructure (the building of roads and abattoirs), alongside newly devolved drought-preparedness strategies and county climate adaptation. Other 'winners' are those pastoralists (generally wealthier and/or with larger herds in the first place) profiting from the growing urban demand for meat and dairy, or who have been able to use their political allegiances to capture the benefits of devolved power and resources to the county level. The 'losers' in this scenario are those groups with the least assets (smaller herds, for example, which makes it harder to recover after a drought), or who are not well connected politically and economically, and whose traditional livestock routes, mobility and access to critical seasonal resources have been restricted by the growing privatisation of formerly communally managed rangelands. In tandem are those who have been displaced as pastoral resources are converted to other types of land use – irrigated cropping (Galanna Kulalu, for example), renewable energy schemes (the expansion of geothermal and wind power, described above), oil extraction (Turkana) or wildlife tourism. Ultimately, the livelihoods and adaptive capacity of these groups are being compromised.

7.3.3 What future for pastoralism in Kenya?

In light of the challenges described thus far, the future of pastoralism in Kenya – just as in Ethiopia – is uncertain. The ability to which pastoralists, as households and as communities, can respond to climatic and other 'shocks and stresses', and can adapt to and anticipate change – in other words, to be 'resilient' – depends on multiple factors, not least their ability to maintain mobility. Facing increasing restrictions in access to key resources, and at the same time showing a desire to access education, or with new livelihood opportunities opening up, the trend of some 'moving out' (Lind *et al*., 2016) of pastoralism is likely to continue.[354] A cross-section of informants stressed, nonetheless, that pastoralists have always adapted to change, and will continue to innovate[355] – reflective of the 'modern, mobile and green' discourse identified in earlier chapters. According to a private-sector consultant: *"You have a more educated, more aware, more connected with the outside world, group, so they can actually enhance livestock development, using modern methods…which tells us that some people will do ok."*[356] Similarly, one international researcher reflected that:

> *A lot of pastoralist communities are trying to develop, trying to modernise, trying to engage more in markets, make use of technologies…do some things differently, while still being*

[354] Skype interview UN agency official 5, 16/07/2019. Interviews with: Kenyan local researcher 1, 05/03/2018; Kenyan local government official 1, 08/03/2018; Kenyan local researcher 3, 09/06/2018; Kenyan government official 3, 13/06/2018; UN agency official 3, 12/06/2018.

[355] Skype interviews with: international researcher 4, 12/04/2018; international researcher 5, 09/05/2018; UN agency official 5, 16/07/2019; INGO staff 12, 18/06/2018. Interviews with: Kenyan private-sector consultant 1, 14/06/2018; Kenyan pastoralist MP 1, 21/06/2018; Kenyan government official 5, 20/06/2018; Kenyan local researcher 5, 21/06/2018.

[356] Interview with Kenyan private-sector consultant 1, 14/06/2018.

pastoralists. And in some cases, still maintaining some aspect of the extensive nature of livestock keeping'.[357]

Several INGO informants maintained that pastoralists in some areas who had previously 'exited' pastoralism were now returning, as the market for livestock products continues to grow.[358] Echoing sentiments expressed by their Ethiopian counterparts, a cross-section of informants asserted that pastoralism is likely to remain the best land-use option in the most arid areas, despite climate change.[359] There was a belief that some pastoralists will do better than others. According to one informant:

The big players will take advantage of county resources, of the county infrastructure that is developing, to fatten their animals for the market. They might buy from the poorer livestock keepers, who might get some trickle down. But mostly the key players will be the bigger commercial interests.[360]

Unsurprisingly perhaps – as their interest is to mobilise support for pastoralist concerns (see Chapter 6) – PO representatives generally held a pessimistic outlook. Typically:

If we keep going the way we're going now, there'll be some serious change. Unless our government understands pastoralism, and protects pastoralism…Even in that climate-smart policy, there's nothing about pastoralism. In that 'Big 4' agenda, there's nothing about pastoralism...[361]

For another:

With all of these things combined, we're almost heading towards the extinction of pastoralism in Kenya, if we're not careful…In spite of there being rhetoric about recognising pastoralism.[362]

As in Ethiopia, climate adaptation and pastoralist development policies and interventions in Kenya need to be considered within the context of pastoral land governance. Without security of tenure and agreements around land use, these policy interventions – however well intentioned – are likely to result in failure, or will be insufficient to mitigate against the negative consequences of the kinds of inappropriate developments described above. For one researcher, ensuring the longer-term sustainability of pastoral areas was less about "*technical solutions…It is getting governance sorted first. It includes agreements about who can go where, and when*."[363]

Given that customary forms of pastoral governance have usually worked best when they are far from state control (Behnke, 2018), the challenge remains as to how to maintain these systems in

[357] Skype interview with international researcher 9, 14/06/2018.
[358] Skype interview with INGO staff 12, 18/06/2018. Interview with INGO staff 13, 19/06/2018.
[359] Skype interview with international researcher 22, 14/06/2019; Interviews with: Kenyan local NGO staff 1, 07/03/2018; INGO staff 9, 04/06/2018; Kenyan government official 1, 11/06/2018; international researcher 10, 14/06/2018; Kenyan pastoralist MP 1, 21/06/2018; Kenyan consortium staff 1, 20/06/2018.
[360] Interview with Kenyan local researcher 3, 09/06/2018.
[361] Interview with Kenyan PO representative 1, 06/06/2018.
[362] Interview with Kenyan PO representative 2, 09/06/2018.
[363] Interview with international researcher 7, 07/06/2018.

light of the new forms of devolved political governance in Kenya (Manzano, 2018) – where, as we have seen, 'elite capture' is a real possibility. Isiolo County Government's attempt to revive and protect 'customary institutions', as emphasised in their *County Livestock Strategy and Plan* (2016) (see Chapter 5), would appear to be one effort to overcome such as challenge. The risk, however, is that a 'hybrid' form of governance in pastoral areas emerges, diluting effectiveness (World Bank, 2020d). Nonetheless, in light of the centrality of mobility to pastoralist systems the case for more flexible property relations has become stronger. As we have seen, ideal patterns of common property mangagement rarely exist in the increasingly fragmented pastoral drylands (see Chapter 2). Drawing on the work of Moritz (2016), Scoones (2020: 26) suggests that the emergence of 'open property regimes' – hybrid constructions of private, communal and open-access – in pastoral areas emphasises how production, accumulation and longer term sustainability can be achieved outside a standardised, regulated tenure form. Policy makers in Kenya could also learn from the experience of the LAND project in Borana, Ethiopia, described earlier (7.2.3), where attempts have been made to reconcile traditional customary instutions with formal government administrative systems as well as promote participatory rangeland management type planning.

Several informants volunteered suggestions on ways in which the governance of pastoral lands and secure access to resources could be strengthened. According to an INGO interviewee: *"if we help communities to have security of tenure for the land that they are traditionally practising grazing on, then they would be able to make decisions on other forms of investment…"*[364] For one researcher, in areas where land use is increasingly contested, legally demarcated 'livestock corridors' will reduce conflict and can prove beneficial to wildlife.[365] As in Ethiopia, there were calls for a clear national land-use policy and local land-use plans that recognise pastoralism as a land-use system and protect pastoral land from further encroachment.[366] It was observed, nonetheless, that 'vested interests' often work against well-intentioned local community resource management agreements – so undermining the kinds of collective risk management arrangements that are fundamental to dealing with climate and ecosystem variability. Wealthy livestock owners, from a pastoralist background, but who don't "*necessarily live a pastoralist life themselves anymore…who now live in Nairobi or a county capital",*[367] can afford to hire other herders, and have the ability, connections and resources to move large numbers of animals to where pasture is good, and so have little interest in seeing local communities impose their own by-laws restricting grazing.[368]

[364] Skype interview with INGO staff 12, 18/06/2018.
[365] Interview with international researcher 6, 05/06/2018.
[366] Skype interviews with: international researcher 4, 12/04/2018; international researcher 9, 14/06/2018. Interviews with: international researcher 7, 07/06/2018; Kenyan PO representative 2, 09/06/2018.
[367] Skype interview with international researcher 9, 14/06/2018.
[368] Skype interview with international researcher 9, 14/06/2018.

Legislation alone does not solve the problem of weak pastoral tenure but it does provide the legal basis for action (Hannam, 2018: 1). The *Community Land Act* (CLA) 2016 (see Chapter 6) – an outcome of the Kenyan Constitutional reform process and legislation and conceivably influenced by the 'pure pastoralism' and 'modern, mobile and green' discourses that recognise the importance of pastoralism to drylands – has been welcomed by many in Kenya as providing a legal tool for securing community land (Manzano, 2018; Mokku and Alden-Wily, 2017) – a view endorsed by almost all interviewees in this study. Nonetheless, concerns about the CLA consistent with those found in the literature (Alden-Wily, 2018; Manzano, 2018) remain. These include the lack of institutional capacity and political will to see it implemented, and whether loopholes in the CLA will be used by pastoral elites to 'grab land' and dispossess communities, as happened with former 'Trust Lands' in the post-independence period.[369] A number of informants shared the view that those groups with greater assets and information, and with closer links to decision-making processes are, likely to benefit more than others from the current land-reform process unless safeguards are put in place and greater awareness raised.[370] While gaps between policy-making and policy implementation are apparent in the case of the CLA, undoubtedly the more open policy space that has been generated in Kenya (compared to what we have seen in Ethiopia) – including efforts to integrate national climate adaptation actions into County Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs), as well as ensure coherence between climate adaptation, DRR and other county level programmmes - described earlier (7.3.2), is a potentially positive indication for implementation effectiveness.

7.4 Conclusion

Drawing on the findings of interviews with a cross-section of relevant policy actors in Ethiopia and Kenya, this chapter has examined how climate-change and broader national policy narratives are manifesting themselves through development planning and programming in the drylands of the HoA and, in turn, the consequences of policy 'solutions' for pastoralist livelihoods and for future pastoralist pathways. In doing so (and addressing the fourth element of my analytical framework), the insights of this chapter go some way towards uncovering the political economy of winners and losers from policy processes, that might otherwise be obscured within the kinds of depoliticised policy narratives that are so prevalent in many of the policies reviewed (Chapter 5).

The findings of this research provide further evidence to support what a number of scholars have argued elsewhere: that the kinds of economic, social and political transformations that are

[369] Skype interview with Kenyan local NGO staff 2, 07/06/2018. Interviews with: Kenyan local researcher 1, 05/03/2019; Kenyan local NGO staff 1, 07/03/2018; INGO staff 11, 08/06/2018; Kenyan government official 3, 13/6/2018; Kenyan government official 5, 20/06/2018.

[370] Skype interview with Kenyan local NGO staff 2, 07/06/2018. Interviews with: Kenyan local researcher 1, 05/03/2019; Kenyan local NGO staff 1, 07/03/2018; Kenyan PO representative 1, 06/06/2018; Kenyan pastoralist MP 1, 21/06/2019; Kenyan government official 5, 20/06/2018.

underway in the pastoral drylands of Ethiopia and Kenya, while benefiting some, are resulting in negative processes for others. Notable are: the appropriation of pastoral resources (see for example: Galaty, 2013; Mulatu and Bekere, 2013; Abbink *et al*., 2014; Mosley and Watson, 2016; Regassa *et al*., 2019); involuntary sedentarisation (Yimer, 2015; Hodbod *et al*., 2018; Regassa *et al*., 2018); the replacement of pastoralism with irrigated agriculture (Behnke and Kerven, 2013; Lavers, 2016); the exacerbation of local resource conflicts and ethnic divisions (Schilling *et al*., 2016; Mkutu, 2019; Manzano, 2018); alongside growing social inequity within pastoral areas (Greiner, 2016, 2017; Catley, 2017; Kochore, 2016; Cormack and Kurewa, 2018; Krätli, 2019). What this research adds – and what is only beginning to be explored elsewhere (Regassa *et al*., 2019; Lind *et al*., 2020) – is an insight into the extent to which local capital – including local pastoralist elites and local political interests – play a prominent role in driving those transformations. In other words, it shows where the interests of the state, external private investors and local capital have merged to gain control of, and profit from, formerly communally managed lands and resources – reconfiguring pastoralist livelihoods in the process. This is another example of where governmentality in the Foucauldian sense (Chapter 4) is playing out in the pastoral drylands, whereby certain local actors (political elites and pastoralist entrepreneurs, for example) have come to internalise the responsibilities, norms and discourses (in this case, a 'transforming pastoralism' discourse) of the state, often at the expense of the wider community.

In Ethiopia, it is argued, the kinds of policy prescriptions and planning that flow from dominant narratives surrounding climate change, the 'green economy' and the development of pastoral areas more generally primarily serve the interests of those who have most to gain from greater commercialisation, changes in land use and the privatisation of formerly customarily managed resources. These include the state itself (in terms of a rapidly growing national economy and increased agricultural export earnings – the benefits of which, according to government officials, are beginning to be reinvested in pastoral area development) but also external investors (state and private agri-businesses, investors in infrastructure and extractives) as well as a growing commercial class within pastoralism. Poorer pastoralists, meanwhile, whose mobility and access to critical seasonal rangeland resources is increasingly restricted by changes in land use and infrastructure development, are undoubtedly the 'losers' from the kinds of changes underway. Facing particular challenges are minority agropastoralist ethnic groups, such as those inhabiting the Lower Omo Valley – dispossessed of their traditional lands to make way for industrial sugarcane cultivation and facing enforced villagisation as a consequence. The findings further reveal that technocratic solutions – programmes of sedentarisation, fixed waterpoints and conversion of dry-season pastoral reserves to crop cultivation – are still being prioritised by policymakers, despite a long history of similar ill-conceived interventions (Dyer *et al*., 2008; Lavers, 2012; Catley *et al*., 2013; Regassa *et al*, 2019; Krätli, 2019).

Similarly, narratives of 'green growth', 'food security' and 'climate resilience' are, as we saw in Chapters 5 and 6, being evoked by policymakers in Kenya as a means of legitimising new infrastructure projects and private investments. As the interviews reveal, infrastructure development, the rapid growth in towns in northern counties, investments in extractives, 'green' energy, irrigated cropping – even wildlife conservancies – are evidently bringing employment and business opportunities for some. Notably they are those with greater resources of land, livestock, education, social and political capital – or who belong to a dominant ethnic group in a devolved county. Yet such developments place restrictions on the mobility of others: poorer, less asset-rich and/or minority pastoralist groups, who may have been displaced and marginalised historically,[371] and who now face new forms of exclusion in the name of 'green growth' or conservation, or as political boundaries are redrawn. With the loss of access to key resources, local conflicts over land and resources are accentuated. Without sufficient assets or political capital to be able to stake their own claims or resist the power of the state and private capital, these poorer groups risk increasing marginalisation and are less equipped to deal with climatic and other 'shocks' as a consequence. This ultimately pushes many into destitution and food-aid dependency.

More specifically, the consequences of climate-change policies for pastoralists are mixed. Although levels of implementation are arguably at a more advanced stage in Kenya, some dryland communities in both countries are – according to a cross-section of informants – beginning to see the benefits of various climate-adaptation and disaster-risk-reduction policies and (donor-supported) resilience programmes in terms of greater preparedness in the face of drought and other hazards, along with improved provision of state services and the extension of social-protection measures to formerly peripheral pastoral areas. The effects of severe regional drought in the period 2015–17, for example, are perceived (in both cases) as being less devastating for dryland communities than the drought of 2011/12 was. Nonetheless, the interviews also reveal that national climate policies that drive large-scale transformative change - the development of hydropower, for example, or the conversion of pastoral lowlands into other forms of land use - are effectively giving rise to complex and unpredictable effects at the local level. This ultimately undermines pastoralists' primary means of responding to climatic and resource variability – mobility.

There are some important differences between the two countries, nonetheless. In the case of Kenya, the findings reveal that there is a stronger effort amongst government ministries to integrate and ensure coherence between various climate-adaptation and drought-management strategies. Under the 2016 *Climate Change Act,* all such policies and plans must be channelled and mainstreamed through devolved government. Public participation is a social and political right of all citizens of Kenya, protected by the Constitution. This opens up more space for community engagement in

[371] The Maasai from Kenya's Rift valley, for example, displaced by white settlers and game reserves during colonial times (Letai and Lind, 2013) and subsequently, under pressure again from the establishment of wildlife conservancies, and renewable energy projects.

decision-making. In Ethiopia, in contrast, as Chapter 6 reveals, different powerful ministries are more likely to work separately on different policies, with some competition for resources and donor support. At the time of writing (2020), there is a risk that policies for developing pastoral areas as set out in a new draft *Pastoral Development Policy and Strategy* may be given less attention, as the government endeavours to contain emergent power struggles between dominant ethnic groups who stand to benefit or lose from the current political reform process (MRI, 2019). In Kenya, while many pastoralists face disadvantages, or suffer the consequences of increasing rangeland fragmentation, they are not subject to enforced sedentarisation (as in Ethiopia), nor would they tolerate it, given their greater political power.[372] In Kenya, local communities have the space to resist unwelcome forms of development, in a way that has not been permitted in Ethiopia until very recently. In Kenya, the *Community Land Act* is generally perceived as offering a progressive means by which communal land holdings can be legally recognised and pastoralist tenure protected. No such comparable legislation exists in Ethiopia. These findings thus add further weight to the growing call by various institutions for strengthened land rights and governance in pastoral areas, and for the need to bring pastoralists into the centre of policy debates (Haddis *et al*., 2017; FAO, 2018; Gebremeskel *et al*., 2019).

In sum, this chapter argues that, while some important differences exist between the two countries, actions to address climate change or build 'climate resilience' and 'green growth' in pastoral areas are creating new social disparities and differentiated patterns of vulnerability, as well as consolidating existing ones, in both cases. Different actors and interests (the state, private investors, wealthier herders / 'pastoralist elites') are seeking to take advantage of the kinds of investment opportunities and political / policy spaces that are opening up, particularly as they relate to critical issues of access to, and control over, land and other resources. Invariably, those groups that have greater access to resources and capital in its various forms are able to use these to secure further benefits. In Chapter 8, I provide concluding arguments in support of my thesis that more responsive and inclusive forms of governance in pastoral areas are necessary, as well as identifying openings for further research.

[372] Pastoralist MPs form a sizable caucus in the Kenyan Parliament, and Kenyan CSOs operate with far greater freedom than has been the case in Ethiopia (see Chapter 6).

Chapter 8: Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

In Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis, it was revealed that – while there is a growing body of knowledge on how climatic and other forms of dynamic change are impacting on pastoralism in the HoA – less is known about how recent policy responses and development interventions in the name of climate change or drylands development are shaped by certain discourses and narratives and by political interests, and what the consequences of these narratives are. This study sets out to address that gap. Drawing on a systematic content and discourse analysis of national policies across multiple government institutions and across a distinct period of time (2007–2017), as well as from an analysis of interview data from 68 key informants in the two case-study countries, this study argues that – while concerns around climate change and calls for strengthening resilience of dryland communities have given a new impetus to pastoral development in the HoA – old narratives that depict pastoral systems and pastoral areas as unproductive and in need of modernisation remain embedded in policymaking. Combined with climate-change arguments, these narratives are opening up space for the state and other actors – private investors, local elites, conservation organisations – to extend control over natural resources previously managed under customary institutions. Climate policy 'solutions' and dryland investments are, in turn, leading to new patterns of social differentiation and vulnerability among pastoralists. Meanwhile, local pastoralist elites and local political interests are playing an increasingly prominent role in driving economic and social change in formerly peripheral pastoral drylands of Kenya and Ethiopia. It follows that predominantly apolitical and technocratic climate-adaptation and resilience-building interventions on their own – while providing some degree of climate-risk preparedness – are insufficient to meet the needs of pastoralist communities. The extent and nature of dynamic change in the drylands of the HoA calls for political responses that address social inequities and power imbalances, that safeguard pastoralists' resource rights and that allow for more inclusive forms of governance**.**

The first part of this chapter synthesises the results of this research and outlines my central arguments in support of my thesis. The second part offers practical contributions with regard to what improved governance in pastoral areas might entail. The third part highlights the contribution of this study to the existing body of research. In the final part, I identify some possible openings for future research in this area**.**

8.2 Beyond climate change: The politics of pastoralist transformations

The first argument of this thesis – and the answer to my first research question – is that, *despite a growing body of research and evidence pointing to the ecological, economic and social value of pastoral systems, a 'transforming pastoralism and pastoral areas' discourse remains at the heart of both Ethiopian and Kenyan policy*. As has been discussed, the governments of Ethiopia and Kenya have – with donor support – ambitions to integrate formerly peripheral dryland areas into the national economy and to design development strategies and policies that ostensibly seek to strengthen the 'resilience' of pastoralists to climate change. What is evident, nonetheless – from both the policy document analysis and the interview data – is that, within this vision, pastoralists are still frequently perceived as ill-adapted to 'modern' contingencies and 'in need of transformation'. If not always explicit, old narratives of fragile and conflict-ridden drylands and of pastoral systems as 'unproductive' remain deeply embedded within policy discourse. By defining pastoralists as 'vulnerable' social groups whose 'resilience' needs to be enhanced, as many national policies clearly do, pastoralists' own agency and knowledge in how they respond to climatic and other change is denied.

The depth and persistence of such narratives is, in part, both a cause and consequence of these narratives' power to influence policy and planning processes (Robbins, 2012), ultimately contributing, as we have seen, to limiting the power and resource rights of local people – in this case, poorer pastoralists. Just as narratives of 'overgrazing', 'desertification' and 'tragedy of the commons' shaped drylands planning in the past (Chapter 2), so the threat of climate change – combined with the drive for modernisation and 'green growth' – provides justification for powerful actors today (state institutions, rent-seeking government officials, private investors, conservation organisations) to claim stewardship over communal rangelands and convert them to other forms of land use. In Ethiopia, the desire to build 'climate resilience', combined with the push for rapid economic growth, are clearly guiding narratives for the drive to sedentarise pastoralist communities and for transforming pastoral production systems towards a more commercialised orientation. In Kenya, while counternarratives built around the ideas of 'pastoralist resilience' and 'pastoralist rights' are influencing the ways in which pastoralists are understood and portrayed by policy actors – and are more prominent within certain policies[373] – long-standing crises narratives of 'pastoralist vulnerability', 'conflict over resources' and 'food insecurity' still persist. Narratives, furthermore, not only convey storylines of cause and effect; they usually have embedded the advocacy of particular policy 'solutions'. In Ethiopia and Kenya, it is no different. Technocratic policy prescriptions – 'rangeland management', 'disaster-risk reduction', 'early warning systems', 'commercialisation of the livestock sector', 'index-based livestock insurance', 'water development' – are, for the most part, privileged over measures that would strengthen pastoralist land rights – or,

[373] Notably the 2012 '*ASAL policy',* the various *Ending Drought Emergency* strategies, and the *Isiolo County Livestock Strategy* (see Chapter 5).

critically, protect mobility, pastoralists' key strategy for managing climatic and ecological variability.

The second core argument of this study – and the answer to my second research question – is that *the transformation of pastoral production towards a more commercial and diversified orientation remains the primary interest of policymakers (the state and donors) in both cases, despite differences in their political landscapes.*

In Ethiopia, the state (key ministries such as the MoFPDA, the MoEFCC and the MoA especially) is clearly the dominant actor driving national policy narratives on pastoralism and climate change. Nonetheless, the influence of certain donors (the World Bank and USAID), UN agencies and – to a lesser extent – a select group of INGOs and respected individual researchers and research institutes on shaping the current narratives, and bringing certain elements of the 'modern, mobile and green' discourse to debates on the future of pastoralism, is also evident (see Chapter 6). Ethiopian state actors have in turn clearly adopted many of the metaphors and narratives associated with a 'modern, mobile and green' discourse on pastoralism, as they seek to mobilise resources around common goals of climate resilience, food security and economic growth. Yet the extent to which new understandings of pastoralism are manifested in development planning in pastoral areas, or existing structures of power are challenged, remains open to question.

In Kenya, in contrast, the findings are less clearcut – while a 'transforming pastoralism' discourse is, as we saw, dominant in most policy documents analysed (Chapter 5), the findings of interviews reveal that interaction between state and non-state actors have had a deeper and more lasting impression. Local and international researchers, CSOs and even certain individuals within key government ministries (notably the former MDNKOAL) and institutions (the NDMA, in particular) – along with 'pro-pastoralist' local county government officials and members of the Pastoralist Parliamentary Group (PPG) – form a 'discursive coalition' of like-minded actors, who have evidently brought about a more substantive shift in thinking around pastoralism. This shift is discernable in the perspectives and assumptions of those Kenyan government officials interviewed for this research (see Table 6.1) – if not necessarily in all areas of written policy (as Chapter 5 reveals) or in all areas of policy implementation (Chapter 7).

POs, meanwhile, although an important contributor to new understandings of pastoralism, remain (in both cases) at the margins in terms of their influence over policy processes and outcomes and find themselves increasingly restricted by the challenge of securing long-term financial support (Ethiopia and Kenya), as well as by what they can, or cannot, say on certain matters deemed in the national interest (Ethiopia).

My third argument, and the answer to my third research question, is that, *while some differences exist between the two cases, actions to address climate change or build 'climate resilience' and 'green growth' in pastoral areas are leading to new social inequities and differentiated patterns of vulnerability, as well as accentuating existing ones.* In Ethiopia, the findings point to the fact that the kinds of policy prescriptions and planning that flow from dominant narratives surrounding climate change, the 'green economy' and the development of pastoral areas more generally primarily serve the interests of those who have most to gain from greater commercialisation, changes in land use and the privatisation of formerly communally managed resources, especially in the fertile riverine areas of Ethiopia's lowlands. This includes the state itself, in terms of higher economic growth (the benefits of which are arguably being reinvested in rural development and improved services) but also private investors and a growing commercial, and politically well connected, class within pastoralism itself. Meanwhile, technocratic solutions and control-orientated measures – programmes of sedentarisation, fixed waterpoints and conversion of dry-season pastoral reserves to crop cultivation – continue to be prioritised by the state, despite a long history of similarly ill-fated interventions in pastoral rangelands. As Chapter 7 reveals, these programmes have led to undesirable consequences for poorer pastoralist households, who find themselves displaced from critical resources. As a result, communities along the Awash River (Afar) or minority indigenous agropastoralist groups, such as in the Lower Omo Valley, whose traditional lands have been converted to industrial sugarcane cultivation, face enforced villagisation and subsequently find themselves more vulnerable or even destitute.

Similarly, narratives of 'green growth', 'food security' and 'climate resilience' are being evoked by policymakers in Kenya as a means of legitimising new infrastructure projects and private investments in ASAL counties. While infrastructure development corridors (such as LAPSSET), the rapid growth in towns, investments in extractives, 'green'-energy projects, irrigated cropping – even wildlife conservancies – bring gains for some, others 'lose out' as a consequence. As in Ethiopia, an emergent local elite in pastoral areas (including wealthy livestock owners and ex-pastoralists) has been able to use their political connections (at both national and county level) to capture the benefits of devolved power and resources, or has managed to profit from compensatory payments for infrastructure development and changes in land tenure. At risk of falling into destitution are those less asset-rich households (with smaller herds) and/or minority pastoralist groups that face new forms of displacement in the name of green economic growth or conservation, or as political boundaries are redrawn along ethnic lines. Such groups are less equipped to deal with climatic and other 'shocks' when they do occur.

There are, nonetheless, some important differences between the two cases. For Kenya, the findings reveal that there is a stronger coherence between various climate-adaptation and drought-management strategies. Under the 2016 *Climate Change Act*, all such policies and plans must be

channelled and mainstreamed through devolved government, so – in theory – opening up more space for community engagement in decision-making. In Ethiopia, in contrast, as Chapter 6 reveals, different ministries are more likely to work separately on different policies, with some element of competition for resources and donor support. In Kenya, while many pastoralists undoubtedly suffer the consequences of rangeland fragmentation and inappropriate development, they are not subject to any official programmme of sedentarisation (as in Ethiopia) – nor would they accept such an imposition, given their stronger political power. In Kenya, local communities and POs have shown they have the power to resist unwelcome forms of development, in a way that has not been permitted in Ethiopia until very recently. In Kenya, the 2016 *Community Land Act* (CLA) is generally perceived as offering a progressive means by which communal land holding can be legally recognised and pastoralist tenure protected. No such comparable legislation exists in Ethiopia.

8.3 Policy lessons and ways forward

The findings of this research demonstrate that policies and interventions for climate-change adaptation and pastoralist development need to be considered within the context of political interests and governance in pastoral areas. Climate-adaptation and resilience-building types of policies and programming on their own, whether well-intentioned or – as we have seen (Chapters 6 and 7) – designed with other interests and priorities in mind, are clearly insufficient to address the nature of dynamic change underway and the multiple challenges faced by pastoralists in the HoA. 'Governance' opens up a broader political agenda that addresses the multiple political processes and relationships through which state and non-state actors interact, allowing policymaking in the HoA to move beyond the kinds of depoliticised 'environmental-crises' narratives that are a feature of so much of the 'transforming pastoralism' discourse described thus far.

It is evident that clearer overarching national land-use policies that integrate principles of 'pastoral governance' (see Chapter 3), and that put measures in place to prevent the loss of further key pastoral resources would make a difference in terms of enhancing pastoralists' rights and livelihoods. At the heart of such governance is the need to facilitate, rather than impede, mobility – nomadic pastoralists' key means of managing the variability of drylands, including movement across borders (national and inter-county or regional-state), where forms of governance are often at their weakest (Sempleci and Nori, 2020). As reiterated throughout this thesis, there is a need, furthermore, to safeguard strategic resources (for example, dry-season grazing reserves) from the kinds of inappropriate investments and forms of capital accumulation described in earlier chapters – investments frequently driven by the very policies that purport to transform pastoral areas in the name of 'green growth' or 'climate resilience'. Such resources, as we saw, are central to pastoral

systems, in that they provide a critical 'fallback' in times of need, such as during a drought, livestock disease outbreak or armed conflict.

The extent to which poorer pastoralists especially will be able to adapt to environmental, economic and political change, and take advantage of policy initiatives and economic opportunities – in a manner that is both equitable and sustainable – depends on how willing the state is (with or without the support of 'development partners'), at both national and local government levels, to create an enabling space for responsive and inclusive governance in pastoral rangelands. Such intentions are certainly reflected in the 2012 *ASAL Policy* in Kenya (see Chapter 5) –which, as we saw, emerged at a particular time when a (discursive) coalition of state and non-state actors, including progressive minds within the MDNKOAL, came together to push for recognition of pastoralism as a legitimate land-use system and for the development of ASAL counties. The MDNKOAL has since been disbanded and its successor institutions are perceived as lacking the same political will to see the *ASAL Policy* implemented (Chapter 6) – at a time when the Kenyan Government's 'Big Four' agenda dominates national development interests (GoK, 2018). In turn, there is general agreement that the process of devolution and growing pastoralist political representation at both national and county levels, have created a significant political space for pastoralism in Kenya. But this is not without the accompanying challenges of elite capture, growing social differentiation and new forms of territoralisation along ethnic lines, as Chapter 7 reveals. The extent to which the new *Pastoral Development Policy* (Chapter 6) has opened up a similar policy space for pastoralist engagement in Ethiopia remains to be seen, and ultimately depends on the outcomes of the broader political reform process initiated under PM Abiy Ahmed.

Rather than invest solely in top-down and technical 'solutions' to climate change and rangeland management – as is the case in a great many of the policies analysed – there is a need to invest instead in pastoralists' capacity to claim their rights to the strategic resources on which they depend and to empower them to participate in relevant decision-making processes, as they are entitled to do under both countries' respective constitutions (Chapter 2). Clearly, fairer and more inclusive power structures – at all levels – are required to ensure that institutions, both formal and customary, are transparent and accountable to those pastoralist communities they purport to govern. There is a need, furthermore - as we heard from a cross-section of interviewees (Chapter 6) - for the state and donors to ensure long-term support to those CSOs and other non-state actors who are providing pastoralist communities with essential information regarding legislation, policies and investments that have implications for them – the 2016 *Community Land Act* (CLA) or *County Spatial Plans* (see below) in Kenya, for example. Such support remains uncertain at present (Chapter 6).

As has also been highlighted in this study, greater emphasis needs to be put on local pastoralists' knowledge, innovation and adaptation as entry points for climate-change and livestock-related interventions. This involves understanding how pastoralists are already innovating in response to

change in the drylands, as well as awareness of the current constraints to innovation – notably restrictions on mobility and growing inequities in asset ownership and levels of power (Chapters 6 and 7). While existing adaptation policies and measures may reduce risk in the short term, they do not necessarily address the development needs and rights of pastoralists that enable them to adapt to climatic and other forms of change in the longer term. Mainstream climate policy discourse, as was evident from the policy analysis (Chapter 5), is rarely shaped by indigenous understandings and practices, and is contingent instead on the inputs of institutionalised science and so-called 'experts' – another form of power in the Foucauldian sense (Chapter 4). Following a constructivist perspective that informs this research, 'inclusive' or participatory governance necessarily implies opening up pastoral area governance to alternative and 'non-expert' framings of problems and solutions (Hajer, 1995), particularly in relation to complex challenges that have social implications, such as climate change. Although not a focus of this study, the active role of women in pastoralist systems also needs to be more widely recognised and supported through enabling policy frameworks. Resource loss, climate shocks, conflicts, and adverse policies affect all pastoralists, but their impact is felt more severely by pastoralist women who have been historically marginalised.

Challenges remain nonetheless, especially in terms of how 'communities' are to be defined and delineated and at what scale communal territories are to be recognised in land-tenure legislation (Sande *et al*., 2020). Formal land-certification frameworks (such as in Ethiopia) have generally been developed with small-scale farmers in mind and offer no guidance on how large communal rangeland territories should be (Sande *et al*., 2020). The USAID-supported LAND project in Borana Ethiopia (see Chapter 7) offers an example, nonetheless, of where attempts have been made to harmonise flexible and traditional customary governance institutions (the *Gada* and *dheeda*) with formal government administration, and where a 'participatory rangeland management' (Roba and Davies, 2018) type of planning has worked to overcome these challenges. There is potential for such good practice to be replicated and scaled-up elsewhere in Ethiopia. In the Kenyan case, meanwhile, wealthy and/or absentee livestock owners – who have the ability, connections and resources to move large numbers of animals to where pasture is good – will often work in pursuit of their own interests, undermining community-based resource-management agreements (see Chapter 7). The weakening of customary institutions and the kinds of misguided development interventions described thus far have not helped, especially in a pastoral land-tenure context where – to borrow the words of Behnke – "everything is now up for grabs" (2018: 716).

At a regional level, 2020 has seen moves towards adoption of an important protocol on cross-border transhumance amongst IGAD member states[374] – a key tool in realising the AU *Policy Framework for Pastoralism* (see Chapters 2 and 5). This transhumance agreement has been

[374] https://icpald.org/coa-transhumance-protocol-meeting/

influenced by two important documents: the FAO's *Voluntary Guidelines for the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security* (FAO, 2012) and the *VGGT Technical Guide on improving governance in pastoral lands* (Davies *et al*., 2016), both of which offer valuable pointers for governance reform. In Kenya, work is being done by the Kenyan National Land Commission to develop *County Spatial Planning Guidelines*, designed to assist counties in mapping and managing pastoral lands (GoK-MLPP, 2018). Significantly, the 2016 *Community Land Act* in Kenya offers, as we have seen, a potentially progressive legal tool for securing community land, although concerns have been raised around whether the institutional capacity and political will is there to see it implemented, and whether loopholes will be used by local pastoral elites to 'grab land' and dispossess communities (Chapter 7). Allowing communities to themselves lease lands to investors or to national and local governments – as suggested by several interviewees (Chapter 7) – may ensure that communities are properly compensated from new investments, such as a wind farm or a mining concession. At the same time, there is a need to confront vested interests and political power in such contexts, where there is a high risk that benefits will accrue to some groups more so than others (Chapter 7). 'Good governance' calls for equitable benefit-sharing agreements between investors and other stakeholders, as well as within communities. Pastoralist communities are entitled to be protected by the UN principle of 'free, prior and informed consent' which pertains to indigenous peoples, so allowing them to give or withhold consent from a project that affects them or their territories (Davies *et al*., 2016) – a principle evidently not observed in the case of Lake Turkana Wind Power (LTWP) (Chapter 7). Davies *et al*. (2016) observes that 'good governance' in pastoral rangelands must be set within an overarching commitment to respect pastoralist human rights – clearly also lacking in the enforced villagisation and displacement of pastoralists in certain regions of Ethiopia described earlier.

Ultimately, the challenge for initiatives such as the LAND project (Ethiopia) or the *CLA* and *County Spatial Plans* (Kenya) lies in their implementation – and the extent to which CSOs, including local pastoralist groups and organisations, are given a real 'voice' in policy- and decision-making processes that affect them. This would ensure that alternative discourse and narratives countering common misconceptions around pastoralism and climate change are heard. Nonetheless, as Godfrey-Wood and Otto-Naess (2016: 56) remind us: "ensuring that vulnerable people have a 'voice' cannot necessarily be equated with transformative outcomes, and may have little effect unless they are accompanied by changes in structures for representation and power." To date, this would seem to have been realised to a far greater extent in Kenya than in Ethiopia, where the space for pastoralist engagement in decision-making and governance is much narrower.

8.3 Contribution to the literature

This thesis makes a contribution to the pastoralist studies literature in a number of ways. These are as follows:

Firstly, as we saw in Chapters 1 and 2, several scholars have suggested that, while the language may have evolved, some of the narratives driving current climate-change and pastoralist-development policies in Ethiopia and Kenya are not necessarily 'new', but are instead rooted in 'old' (historical) discourses around 'unproductive' drylands, the poor as agents and victims of environmental degradation, and the need for modernisation. Eriksen and Marin (2015), for example, argue that seemingly apolitical narratives of environmental change found in Ethiopian climate-change policies are likely to serve the interests of certain constituencies or obscure policy impacts at the local level. Elsewhere, Krätli (2019) asserts that the Ethiopian state is using climate-change arguments, combined with the drive for modernisation, to validate the re-emergence or continuation of past unpopular policies such as sedentarisation or the displacement of pastoralists from key resources. In the case of Kenya, Odhiambo (2014) argues that deeply held negative narratives depicting the ASAL as degraded and unproductive, and pastoral systems as backward, remain remarkably persistent, despite the gains made by 'new policy frameworks'. Climate change has, if anything, "fed these age-old narratives" (ibid.: 17). What this study adds to this literature is a systematic analysis of Ethiopian and Kenyan national policies over a specific time period (supplemented by interviews with key informants), the results of which clearly verify the claims above – allowing for some nuances and differences between the two cases. The CA and DA of national policy documents (Chapter 5), which identified a 'transforming pastoralism and pastoral areas' discourse to be to the fore in both cases, provides strong empirical evidence to support the argument that climate change and future food-security imperatives are being evoked by powerful actors as a means to legitimise appropriation of pastoral resources, just as narratives of 'overgrazing', 'desertification' and 'tragedy of the commons' were used to do so in the past (Chapter 2). Similarly, the interviews with policy actors reveal that state officials in Ethiopia are inclined to frame commercialisation of the livestock sector, livelihood diversification and even sedentarisation as necessary precursors for 'climate-resilient livelihoods' (Chapter 6).

Secondly, this research adds further empirical evidence to support what has been observed elsewhere: that narratives shift to suit the needs of actors as new opportunities and contexts arise (Maina *et al.*, 2014; Otto-Naess *et al*., 2015; Whitfield, 2016) – the process of devolution and the accelerated economic development of northern Kenya's ASAL counties or the promotion of a 'green economy' in Ethiopia being cases in point. And that 'dominant narratives' have the ability to absorb the language and concepts of 'counternarratives' (Toulmin and Brock, 2016) – where a discourse of 'modern, mobile and green pastoralism' has now become more central to how policymakers in both Ethiopia and Kenya increasingly envision a pastoral sector that is both

'climate-resilient' and 'modern'. What this study reveals, which has perhaps been underexplored to date, is the extent to which interactions between state and non-state actors have had a deeper and more lasting impression on how pastoralism is understood within certain policymaking circles in Kenya compared to Ethiopia. Local and international researchers, CSOs, even individuals within key government ministries (notably the former MDNKOAL) and institutions (the NDMA) – along with 'pro-pastoralist' local county government officials and members of the Pastoralist Parliamentary Group (PPG) – form a 'discursive coalition' of like-minded actors, who have evidently brought about a more substantive shift in thinking around pastoralism than has been the case (until very recently) in Ethiopia. This shift is discernable at least in the perspectives and assumptions of those Kenyan government officials interviewed for this research (see Table 6.1) – if not necessarily manifested in all areas of written policy or in all areas of policy implementation. This is an anomaly explained by the fact that there is likely to be greater support for pastoralism within certain government Ministries and state institutions – those responsible for livestock development, pastoralist affairs and/or drought management, for example – than there is among their colleagues responsible for national economic planning, renewable energy or irrigation – all domains where important policy decisions are made that have implications for the livelihoods of pastoralists.

Thirdly, this research builds on what a number of scholars have highlighted elsewhere – that the kinds of economic, social and political transformations and processes that are underway in the pastoral drylands of Ethiopia and Kenya, while benefiting some, are resulting in negative outcomes for others. Such processes include: the appropriation of pastoral resources (see for example: Galaty, 2013; Mulatu and Bekere, 2013; Abbink *et al*., 2014; Mosley and Watson, 2016); involuntary sedentarisation (Yimer, 2015; Hodbod *et al*., 2018; Regassa *et al.*, 2019); the replacement of pastoralism with irrigated agriculture (Behnke and Kerven, 2013; Lavers, 2016); the exacerbation of local resource conflicts and ethnic divisions (Schilling *et al*., 2016; Mkutu, 2019; Manzano, 2018); alongside growing social inequity within pastoral areas (Greiner, 2016; Catley, 2017; Kochore, 2016; Cormack and Kurewa, 2018; Krätli, 2019). What this research adds – and what is only beginning to be explored elsewhere (Regassa *et al,* 2019; Lind *et al.*, 2020) – is a clear exposé of the extent to which local capital in both Kenya and Ethiopia – including local pastoralist elites and political interests – are playing a prominent role in driving that transformation (see Chapters 6 and 7). The findings reveal that capital accumulation and resource appropriation in the pastoral areas cannot be understood simply as a case of 'the state and/or global capital *versus* local communities' – as might suit a populist narrative – but rather is a multidimensional process whereby the interests of the state, external investors and local capital frequently converge with similar intentions in mind: gaining control of, and profiting from, formerly communally managed lands and resources - reconfiguring pastoralist livelihoods in the process. Local capital and local politicians' readiness in Turkana County, Kenya, to facilitate and invest in land deals that convert

former communally held rangeland into irrigated crop cultivation, oil extraction or wildlife tourism, is just one such case. In some instances, this could be a matter of local pastoralists 'enclosing' formerly communal lands, before they are taken by others, with a view to profiting from future land value (Chapters 6 and 7). This trend is another example of where governmentality, in the Foucauldian sense (see Chapter 4), is playing out in the pastoral drylands – whereby certain local actors have come to internalise the responsibilities, norms and discourses (in this case, a 'transforming pastoralism' discourse) of the state, often at the expense of the wider community.

There is a need, nonetheless, to move beyond a simple dichotomy of 'winners and losers'. The challenge for policy makers is to enable pathways the allow the development imperatives of the state – such as food security, resilience in the face of climate change, and sustainable economic growth – to be met in a way that does not undermine the rights of pastoralists to land and other resources. And which, as argued above, affords more agency and voice to pastoralists in policymaking processes that affect them. In others words, an inclusive and 'rights-based' form of governance of pastoral drylands as this chapter has called for. 'Climate resilience' discourse does not have to be 'modernisation in disguise', confined to kind of top-down technocratic programmes and 'mega' infrastructure projects that are such a strong feature of much contemporary green development in Ethiopa and Kenya's drylands – large scale hydro-power or the replacement of mobile livestock production with irrigated agriculture, for example. The consequences of which are leading to new forms of vulnerability for many. Such discourse needs to be steered instead towards emphasising the adaptive capacity and agency of pastoralists towards progressive ends. As those whose standpoint is closer to a 'modern, mobile and green' discourse have argued (Chapter 3), climate change offers an opportunity for the state and their development partners to move beyond simply recognising the role of extensive livestock systems in drylands management and food security and to translate that new understanding into climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies that are appropriate to local and diverse contexts. And that do not lead to maladaptive outcomes. The need for a 'greener' form of development also offers space for pastoralists capitalise on the growth in new 'niche markets' for high-value livestock products, and to be compensated for the environmental services they provide. This thesis support such a view, with the premise that such a green development paradigm recognises the broader context of vulnerability in pastoral drylands, which prevents the interests of some groups being promoted at the expense of others, and which allows room for multiple perspectives and forms of knowledge in policy-making processes.

8.4 Limitations, and avenues of further research

This thesis has systematically examined the ways in which discourse and narratives around pastoralism and pastoral development are promulgated within national policies focused on climate

change and drylands development in Ethiopia and Kenya, the agency and interests of different actors shaping these policies, and the consequences of these policy narratives for pastoralist livelihoods. The findings reveal that climate-change narratives – combined with the drive for modernisation – are being used by the state and other actors as tools in contestations over land and other resources in the drylands of Ethiopia and Kenya, the outcomes of which are creating new social inequities and patterns of vulnerability among pastoralists, as well as accentuating existing ones. Finally, it has argued for more inclusive forms of governance in pastoral lands: that protect and safeguard pastoralists' rights to the resources necessary for sustaining mobile livestock production, and that afford more agency and voice to pastoralists in policymaking processes.

A limitation of this research is the fact that no local case studies of contested forms of climate adaptation or mitigation – while frequently cited (LTWP in Kenya for example) – are examined in depth. Nor is space given to the voices and perspectives of local pastoralist community members (for reasons given in Chapter 4), despite pastoralism being at the heart of this study. The fact that womens voices or perspectives are not explicitly considered in this study is acknowledged as a further limitation. It is quite possible that different perspectives would have emerged should womens' voices have been more the fore.

Evidently, more local, case-specific, research is needed – typically focusing on, for example, cases where interventions in the name of climate adaptation, the 'green economy' (such as a renewable-energy or carbon-sequestration project), 'climate-smart agriculture' or 'climate resilience' are being implemented in predominantly pastoral areas of Ethiopia or Kenya. The kinds of questions that need to be asked here include: What climate-change arguments and other narratives are driving these interventions and what and whose knowledge is being taken into account? What are the political and structural drivers that produce vulnerability in these local contexts? Are such projects 'building resilience', as their proponents claim, or are they instead exacerbating existing, or creating new, inequities and differentiated exposure to climate change and other uncertainties? In light of growing social differentiation within pastoral areas, as have seen above, there is clearly also a need also to interrogate the concept of a 'pastoralist community' more closely in any such localised case-specific research.

Such research necessitates critical, politicised and context-specific analysis of both the nature of local vulnerabilities and multiple stressors, as well as kinds of solutions being proposed. By placing local and regional environmental problems in a broader historical, and political economy, context, and by examining the distribution of costs and benefits from environmental change (a change in land use from pastoralism to irrigated cropping or from pastoralism to a wildlife conservancy, as examples), this research could benefit from the insights of political ecology, which seeks to understand the ways in which social relations, institutions and power produce particular types of environments and patterns of resource use at the local level. Such research could build on recent

studies by (among others): Kronenburg-Garcia (2018) on forms of governmentality and pastoralism in Kenya's southern drylands; Pas Schrijver (2019) on shifting roles of access and control of grazing resources in northern Kenya; Greiner (2020) on the consequences of geothermal investments in Baringo county, Kenya; Cormack and Kurewa (2018) and Drew (2020) on the politics of inclusion in the case of LTWP; Rettburg (2020) on the politics of state-driven investments in the Awash Valley, Ethiopia. More research on the consequences of devolution for pastoralism in Kenya would also be of value, building on the work of Scott-Villiers (2017), Abdi and Lind (2018) and Manzano (2018), who have pointed to the 'territorial nature' of devolution in pastoral areas as posing a significant challenge for minority ethnic groups where a majority group dominates – a trend reported by informants in this study (Chapter 7). A question for further research is how pastoralist mobility, in the context of climatic and other forms of change in the dryland, constitutes a challenge to such territorialisation as a form of governmentality in the Foucauldian sense (see Chapter 4).

At the same time, there is a need for climate-change research that engages critically and reflexively with local pastoralist communities, and action-research that aligns with the ways pastoralists talk about their own dynamics of vulnerability / resilience – in other words, that engages with pastoralists' own perspectives, knowledge and worldviews. Pastoralist communities, after all, have been living with a fluctuating climate and other forms of change for millennia. They continue to adapt and innovate, and create new forms of mobility, despite the many challenges. For 'solutions' we need to look more to the local level rather than rely on the kinds of top-down technocratic fixes and knowledge of experts that, for the main part, form the mainstay of the kinds of policies analysed in this study. This calls, perhaps, for collaborative forms of research, using ethnographic approaches over a longer period of time, logistically not possible for this study.

8.5 Conclusion

From the findings of this research, a clearer picture has emerged of how seemingly apolitical narratives of climate change and pastoralist vulnerability are likely to serve the political and economic interests of certain constituencies, as well as mask the impacts of national policy and politics at the local level, including politicised claims to land and other resources. In tandem, actions to address climate change or build 'climate resilience' in pastoral areas are consolidating, as well as creating new, inequities and patterns of differentiated exposure to climate risk. Clearly, climate-adaptation and resilience-building interventions on their own are insufficient to meet the needs of pastoralist communities. The extent and nature of change in the drylands of the HoA call for political responses that address social inequities and power imbalances, that safeguard pastoralists' resource rights, and that allow for more inclusive forms of governance**.** Through the use of different methods – content analysis, discourse analysis and interviews with key informants

– this research has made an empirical contribution to the growing literature on the pastoralist–climate change nexus and related discourses and narratives. This research is important in its own right. It is also valuable as a basis on which to build further research.

Bibliography

Abbink, J., Askey, K., Dori, D.F., Fratkin, E., Gabbert, E.C., Galaty, J., LaToskey, S., Lydall, J., Mahmoud, H., Markakis, J., Shlee, G., Strecker, I., and D. Turton (2014) 'Lands of the Future: Transforming Pastoral Lands and Livelihoods in Eastern Africa', *Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Papers*. Halle Salle, Germany*:* Max Planck Institute.

Abdi A. and Lind, J. (2018) 'The changing face of local peace-building in Kenya's North-eastern borderlands'. *Accord Insight 4*. [Online] Available at: http://www.politicalsettlements.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Accord-Insight-4-Borderlands-WEB.pdf <Accessed: 23/06/2020>

Abera, Y. and Abdulahi, M. (eds) (2015) *The Intricate Road to Development: Government Development Strategies in the Pastoral Areas of the Horn of Africa*. Addis Ababa: IPSS, Addis Ababa University.

Adams, W.M. (2009) *Green Development* (3rd edition). London: Routledge.

Addis, E. (2015) 'Implementation of Government Development Strategies on Afar Pastoralists in Ethiopia', in: Abera, Y. and Abdulahi, M. (eds) *The Intricate Road to Development: Government Development Strategies in the Pastoral Areas of the Horn of Africa.* Addis Ababa: IPSS, Addis Ababa University.

Adger, W.N., Nenjaminsen, T.A., Browne, K. and Svarstad, H. (2001) 'Advancing a Political Ecology of Environmental Discourses', *Development and Change,* 32(4): 681–715.

Adger, W.N., Eakin, H. and Winkels, A. (2009) 'Nested and teleconnected vulnerabilities to environmental change', *Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment,* 7(3): 150–157.

Adriansen, H.K., and Nielsen, T.T. (2002) 'Going where the grass is greener: On the study of pastoral mobility in Ferlo, Senegal', *Human Ecology,* 30(2): 215–226.

African Union (AU) (2010) *Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa: Securing, Protecting and Improving the Lives, Livelihoods and Rights of Pastoralist Communities*. Addis Ababa: Dept. of Rural Economy and Agriculture, African Union.

Alden-Wily, L. (2018) 'The Community Land Act in Kenya: Opportunities and challenges for communities', *Land* 7(12).

Anderson, S., Hesse, C., and Nassef, M. (2009) *Pastoralism and Climate Change: Enabling Adaptive Capacity*. London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

Anbessa, M.D. (2015) 'Ethiopian pastoralist policy at a crossroads: further marginalisation or revitalisation?' In: Abera, Y. and Abdulahi, M. (eds) *The Intricate Road to Development: Government Development Strategies in the Pastoral Areas of the Horn of Africa,* IPSS, Addis Ababa University.

Aragrande, M. and Argenti, O. (2001) *Studying Food Supply and Distribution Systems to Cities in Developing Countries and Countries in Transition – Methodological and Operational Guide*. Rome: FAO. [Online] Available at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-x6996e.pdf <Accessed 16/06/2020>

Anyadike, O. (2019) 'Drought in Africa leaves 45 million in need across 14 countries', *The New Humanitarian,* 10 June 2019. [Online] Available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2019/06/10/drought-africa-2019-45-million-in-need <Accessed 16/01/2020>

Avery, S. (2014) 'The Turkana Aquifer discoveries and development proposals', *DLCI Discussion Brief*. Nairobi: Drylands Learning and Capacity Building Initiative for Improved Policy and Practice in the Horn of Africa. [Online] Available at: https://www.dlci-hoa.org/tag/livelihood-diversification-2/ <Accessed 12/04/2017>

Baker, S.E. and Edwards, R. (2012) 'How many qualitative interviews is enough', *National Centre for Research Methods Review Paper,* NCRM, Middlesex University. [Online] Available at: http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/2273/4/how_many_interviews.pdf <Accessed: 09/01/2018>

Bahadur, A.V., Ibrahim, M. and Tanner, T. (2010) 'The Resilience Renaissance? Unpacking of resilience for tackling climate change and disasters', *CRS Discussion Paper 1*. Brighton: IDS, University of Sussex.

Bahadur A.V., Peters, K., Wilkinson, E., Pichon, F., Gray, K. and Tanner. T. (2015) 'The three As: Tracking resilience across BRACED', *ODI Working Paper*. London. ODI.

Balehey, S., Tesfay, G. and Balehegn, M. (2018) 'Traditional gender inequalities limit pastoral women's opportunities for adaptation to climate change: Evidence from the Afar pastoralists of Ethiopia', *Pastoralism* 8(23).

Barrero, L.R. and Lind, J. (2014) 'Into the fold: what pastoral responses to crisis tell us about the future of pastoralism in the Horn', *Future Agricultures Working Paper 091*. Brighton: IDS, University of Sussex.

Bartlett, L., and Vavrus, F. (2017) 'Comparative case studies: An innovative approach', *Nordic Journal of Comparative and International Education (NJCIE),* 1(1): 5–17.

Bass, S., Wang, S., Ferede, T. and Fikreyesus, D. (2013) 'Making growth green and inclusive: The case of Ethiopia', *OECD Green Growth Papers*, 2013-07. Paris: OECD Publishing.

Bedelian, C. and Ogutu, J.O (2017) 'Trade-offs for climate-resilient pastoral livelihoods in wildlife conservancies in the Mara ecosystem, Kenya', *Pastoralism* 7(10).

Behnke R. and Mortimore, M. (2016) (eds) *The End of Desertification? Disputing Environmental Change in the Drylands*. Berlin: Springer.

Behnke, R.H., Scoones, I. and Kerven, C (eds) (1993) *Range Ecology at Disequilibrium: New Models of Natural Variability and Pastoral Adaptation in African Savannas*. London: ODI.

Behnke, R.H., Scoones, I. and Kerven, C. (2013) 'Counting the costs: replacing pastoralism with irrigated agriculture in the Awash Valley', in: Catley, A., J. Lind, and Scoones, I. (eds) *Pastoralism and Development in Africa: Dynamic Change at the Margins*. London Routledge, pp.57–70.

Behnke, R. (2018) 'Open Access and the sovereign commons: A political ecology of pastoral land tenure', *Land Use Policy*, 76(1): 708–718.

Bekure, S. (2018) Formally recognising pastoral communithy land rights in Ethiopia. *Land-Links.* USAID. [Online]. Available at: https://www.land-links.org/2018/03/formally-recognizing-pastoral-community-land-rights-in-ethiopia/ <Accessed: 08/02/2021>

Balehey, S., Tesfay, G. and Belahegn, M. (2018) 'Traditonal gender inequalities limit pastoral women's opportunties for adaptation to climate change: Evidence from the Afar pastoralists of Ethiopua. *Pastoralism*. 8(1)

Béland, D. and Howlett, M. (2016) 'The role and impact of multiple-streams approach in comparative policy analysis', *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis* 18(3)

Béné, C., Newsham, A., Davies, M., Ulrichs, and Godfrey-Wood, R. (2014) 'Resilience, poverty and development', *International Development,* 26(5): 598–623.

Bergius M. and Buseth, J.T. (2019) 'Towards a green modernisation development discourse: the new green revolution in Africa', *Journal of Political Ecology*, 26: 57–83.

Berkes, F., Colding, J. and Folke, C. (2003) *Navigating Social-Ecological Systems: Building Resilience for Complexity and Change.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bersaglio, B. and Cleaver, F. (2018) 'Green grab by bricolage: The institutional workings of community conservancies in Kenya', *Conservation and Society* 16: 467–480.

Bersaglio, B., Devlin, J. and Yap, N. (2015) 'Contextualising emergency responses to famine among Turkana pastoralists in Kenya', *Development in Practice,* 25(5): 688–702.

Beymer-Farris, B., Bassett, T.J. and Bryceson, I. (2012) 'Promises and pitfalls of adaptive management in resilience thinking: the lens of political ecology', in: T. Plieninger and Bieling, C. (eds) *Resilience and the cultural landscape: understanding and managing change in human-shaped environments.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 283–299.

Billig, M. (1988) 'Methodology and Scholarship in Understanding Ideological Explanation', in: C. Antaki (ed.) *Analysing Everyday Explanation: A Casebook of Methods.* London: Sage.

Blackwell, P. (2010) 'East Africa's pastoralist emergency: Is climate change the straw that breaks the camel's back?', *Third World Quarterly*, 31(8): 1321–1338.

Blaikie, P. and Brookfield, H. (1987) *Land Degradation and Society*. London: Methuan.

Boles, O.J.C., Shoemaker, A., and Courtney Mustaphi, C.J. (2019) 'Historical ecologies of pastoralist overgrazing in Kenya: Long-term perspectives on cause and effect', *Human Ecology*, 47: 419–434.

Bollig, M. and Österle, M. (2008) 'Changing communal land tenure in an East Afircan pastoral system: Institutions and socio-economic transformation among the Pokot of North West Kenya', *Zeitschrift fur Ethnologie,* 133: 301–22.

Bowen, G. (2008) 'Naturalistic inquiry and the saturation concept: a research note', *Qualitative Research,* 8(1): 137–152.

Bromley, D.W and Cernea, M.C. (1989) 'The management of common property natural resources: Some conceptual and operational fallacies*', World Bank Discussion paper 57.* Washington DC: World Bank.

Bryant, R.L and Bailey, S. (1997) *Third World Political Ecology*. London, Routledge.

Burke, J (2017) 'It's life and death: how the growth of Addis Ababa has sparked ethnic tensions', *The Guardian*, 13 March 2017. [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/mar/13/life-death-growth-addis-ababa-racial-tensions <Accessed: 09/01/2018>

Campbell, B.M., Thornton, P., Zougmore, R., van Asten, P., and Lipper, L (2014) 'Sustainable Intensification: what is its role in climate smart agriculture?', *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability*, 8: 39–43.

Cannon, T. and Muller-Mahn, D. (2010) 'Vulnerability, resilience and development discourses in context of climate change', *Natural Hazards*, 55(3): 621–635.

Carabine, E.A (2014) *Resilience in the Rangelands? Responses to change in the Amboseli Social-Ecological System of Kenya*. Unpublished PhD Thesis. Dept of Geography, University of Sheffield. [Online] Available at: http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/7568/2/eThesis_Carabine.pdf <Accessed: 15/06/2016>

Carswell, G. and Jones, J. (eds) (2004) *The Earthscan Reader in Environment, Development and Rural Livelihoods.* London: Earthscan.

Catley, A and Aklilu, Y. (2013) 'Moving up, or moving out? Commercialisation, growth and destitution in pastoralist areas', in: Catley, A., Lind, J. and Scoones, I. (eds) *Pastoralism and Development in Africa; Dynamic Change at the Margins*. London: Routledge, pp. 85–97.

Catley, A., Lind, J. and Scoones, I. (2013) 'Development at the Margins: Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa', in: Catley, A., Lind, J. and Scoones, I (eds) *Pastoralism and Development in Africa; Dynamic Change at the Margins*. London: Routledge, pp. 1–26.

Catley, A. (2017) *Pathways to Resilience in Pastoralist Areas: A Synthesis of Research in the Horn of Africa.* Boston: Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University.

Cervigni, R. and Morris, M. (2016) *Confronting Drought in Africa's Drylands: Opportunities for Enhancing Resilience.* Washington, DC: World Bank.

Ciriacy-Wanthrup, S.V., Bishop, R.C. (1975) 'Common property as a concept in natural resource policy.' Natural Resources Journal 15: 713-727

Clapham, C. (2004) 'Ethiopia and the challenge of diversity', *African Insight*, 34(1): 50–55.

Conway, D. and Schipper, E.L.F. (2011) 'Adaptation to climate change in Africa: Challenges and opportunities identified from Ethiopia', *Global Environmental Change,* 21(1): 227–237.

Corbin, J., and Strauss, A. (2008) *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory (3rd edition).* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Cormack, Z. and Kurewa, A. (2018) 'The changing value of land in Northern Kenya: The case of Lake Turkana Wind Power', *Critical African Studies,* 10(1); 89–107.

Creswell, J. (2014) *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches (4th Edition).* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Dabasso, D.H., Tadesse, Z. and Hoag, D (2014) 'Carbon Stocks in semi-arid pastoral eco-systems of northern Kenya', *Pastoralism* 4(5).

Daily Nation (2015) 'Kenya ranked sixth on extreme poverty lists'. [Online] Available at: http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Poverty-Africa-Index-Kenya-Inequality/-/1056/2628224/-/ltoepc/-/index.html <Accessed 26/07/2016>

Davies, J. (2007) *The Total Economic Valuation of Kenyan Pastoralism.* Nairobi: World Initiative of Sustainable Pastoralism (WISP) IUCN / UNDP. [Online] Available at: http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/kenya_tev.pdf <Accessed 14/12/2015>

Davies, J., Herrera, P., Ruiz-Mirazo, J., Mohamed-Katerere, J., Hannan, I. and Nuesri, E. (2016) 'Improving governance of pastoral lands: Implementing the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security', *FAO Governance of Tenure Technical Guide 6*. Rome: FAO.

Davis, D.K. (2016) *Arid Lands: History, Power, Knowledge*. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

Dean, M. (1999) *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*. London: Sage.

Death, C. (2015) 'Four discourses of the green economy in the global South', *Third World Quarterly* 36(12): 2207–2224.

Death, C. (2016) 'Green states in Africa: beyond the usual suspects', *Environmental Politics,* 25(1): 116–135.

Delgado, C., Rosegrant, M., Steinfeld, H., Ehui, S. and Courbois, C. (1999) 'The coming livestock revolution', *Choices, (Fourth Quarter):* 40–44.

Denscombe, M. (2014) *The Good Research Guide for small-scale social research projects (5th Edition)*. New York: Open University Press.

de Jode, H & Flintan, F. (2020) *How to do; Gender and Pastoralism*. IFAD/CGIAR. [Online]. Available from: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/FINAL2_HTDN_genderpastoralism_2020_08_07.pdf <Accessed: 10/02/2021>

de Wit, S. (2015) 'Changing patterns of rain or power? How an idea of adaptation to climate change travels up and down to a village in Simanjiro, Maasailand, Northern Tanzania', *Working Papers of the Priority Programme 1488 of the German Research Foundation Adaptation and Creativity in Africa – Technologies and significations in the making of order and disorder.* University of Halle. [Online] Available at: https://lost-research-group.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/SPP1448_WP11_de_Wit.pdf <Accessed 13/12/2019>

Devereaux, S. and Tibbo, K. (2013). 'Social protection for pastoralists', in: Catley, A., Lind, J. and Scoones, I. (eds) *Pastoralism and Development in Africa; Dynamic Change at the Margins*, London: Routledge, pp. 215–230.

Drew, J. (2020) 'Meanings of place and struggles for inclusion in the Lake Turkana Wind Power Project', in: Lind, J., Okenwa, D. and Scoones, I. (eds) *Land Investment and Politics: Reconfiguring Eastern Africa's Pastoral Drylands.* Suffolk, UK: James Currey, pp. 66-77.

Dryzek, J. (2013) *The Politics of the Earth; Environmental Discourses (3rd Edition)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dyer, N., Omondi, S. and Wantsusi, M. (2008). *Securing Pastoralism in East and West Africa: Protecting and Promoting Livestock Mobility.* London, IIED. [Online]: Available at: http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/G03457.pdf <Accessed 25/05/2016>.

Dyer, K.W. (2012) 'Pastoralists in the Horn of Africa; Diverse livelihood pathways', *CAADP Policy Brief 06*. Brighton: Future Agricultures Consortium, IDS, University of Sussex.

Edge, J., and Richards, K. (1998) 'May I see your warrant please? Justifying outcomes in qualitative research', *Applied Linguistics*, 19(3): 334–356.

Ellis, J. and Swift, D.M. (1988) 'Stability of African pastoral ecosystems', *Journal of Range Management*, 41: 450–459.

Elliot, H. (2016) 'Planning, property and plots at the gateway to Kenya's 'new frontier'', *Journal of East African Studies*, 10(3): 511–529.

Elmi, M. and Birch, I (2013) 'Creating policy space for pastoralism in Kenya', *Future Agricultures Working Paper* 068. Brighton: IDS, University of Sussex.

Enns, C. (2017) 'Infrastructure projects and rural politics in northern Kenya: the use of divergent expertise to negotiate the terms of land deals for transport infrastructure', *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 46(2): 358–376.

Ericksen P., de Leeuw, J., Thornton, P., Herrero, M. and Notenbaert, A. (2013) 'Climate change in Sub-Saharan Africa: what consequences for Pastoralism?', in: Catley, A., Lind, J. and Scoones, I. (eds) *Pastoralism and Development in Africa: Dynamic Change at the Margins*, London: Routledge, pp. 71–81.

Eriksen, S. and Lind, J. (2009) 'Adaptation as a political process: Adjusting to drought and conflict in Kenya's Drylands', *Environmental Management*, 43: 817–835.

Eriksen, S. and Marin, S. (2011) *Pastoral pathways: Climate change adaptation lessons from Ethiopia.'* Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric Norwegian University of Life Sciences.

Eriksen, S. and Marin, S. (2015) 'Sustainable adaptation under adverse development: Lessons from Ethiopia', in: Inderberg, Y.H., Eriksen, S., O'Brien, K. and Sygna, L. (eds) *Climate Change Adaptation and Development: Transforming Paradigms and Practices*. London: Routledge.

Eriksen, S., Nightingale, A.J, and Eakin, H. (2015) 'Reframing adaptation: the political nature of climate change adaptation', *Global Environmental Change*, 35: 522–533.

EU/ECHO (2017) *ECHO Factsheet – Horn of Africa, March 2017*. [Online]. Available at: http://eu/ECHO%20(2017)%20ECHO%20Factsheet%20%E2%80%93%20Horn%20of%20Africa,%20March%202017 <Accessed 26/01/2018>

Faguet, J.P., Fox, A.M. and Pöschl, C. (2015) 'Decentralizing for a deeper, more supple democracy', *Journal of Democracy* 26(4): 60–74.

Fairclough N. (1992) *Discourse and Social Change*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Fairclough, N. (2001) 'Critical Discourse Analysis as a method in social scientific research', in: Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (eds) *Methods in Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: SAGE. pp. 121–138.

Fairclough N. and Wodak, R. (1997) 'Critical Discourse Analysis', in: T. A. van Dijk (ed.) *Discourse Studies. A multidisciplinary Introduction Vol 2: Discourse as Social Interaction*. London: SAGE. pp. 258–284.

Fairhead J., Leach, M. and Scoones, I. (2012) ''Green grabbing': A new appropriation of nature?', *Journal of Peasant Studies* 39(2): 237–261.

FAO (2002) 'Land Tenure and Rural Development', *FAO Land Tenure Studies 3*, Rome: FAO. [Online] Available from: http://www.fao.org/3/y4307e/y4307e00.htm <Accessed: 13/07/2020>

FAO (2009). *Review of Evidence on Drylands Pastoral Systems and Climate Change*. Rome: FAO. [Online] Available from: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i1135e.pdf <Accessed 23/04/2015 >

FAO (2010) *Climate Smart Agriculture: Policies, Practices, and Financing for Food Security, Adaptation and Mitigation.* Rome: Food and Agricultural Organisation.

FAO (2012) *Voluntary Guidelines for the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security.* Rome: Food and Agricultural Organisation.

FAO (2013) *The Climate Smart Agriculture Sourcebook*. Rome: Food and Agricultural Organisation.

FAO (2018) *Pastoralism in Africa's Drylands: Reducing risks, addressing vulnerability and enhancing resilience*. Rome, FAO.

FDRE, (1995) *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia.* [Online] Available at: https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/et/et007en.pdf <Accessed: 18/06/2019>

FDRE Central Statistics Agency (2013) *Population Projection of Ethiopia for all Regions at Woreda Level from 2014-2017*, Addis Ababa: CSA.

FDRE-MoFED (2010) *Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia – Growth and Transformation Plan 1:* 2010/11–2014/15. Addis Ababa. [Online] Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11304.pdf <Accessed: 04/03/2016>

FDRE (2011c) *Ethiopia's Climate Resilient Green Economy: Mission Statement,* (Draft 9). Addis Ababa: Ethiopia.

FDRE (2011d) *Ethiopia's vision for a climate resilient green economy: CRGE: Vision*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. [Online] Available at: https://www.preventionweb.net/publications/view/24317 <Accessed: 25/05/2016>

FDRE-MoFPDA (2018) *A Summary of Context Analysis of Pastoral and Agro-Pastoral Areas to Enrich and Update Draft Policy and Strategy – Pastoral Development Orientation Framework.* Addis Ababa: Ministry of Federal and Pastoral Development Affairs, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

Felli, R. (2016) 'The World Bank's neo-liberal language of resilience', *Research in Political Economy* 31: 267-295.

FEWS-Net/NDMA/WB (2019) Kenya Food Security Outlook Update, August 2019. [Online] Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/KENYA_Food_Security_Outlook_Update_August2019_Final.pdf <Accessed: 10/11/2019>

Flintan, F. (2014) *Plotting Progress: Integrated planning in the rangelands of Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda*. Rome: International Land Coalition. [Online] Available at: http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/Rangelands4_IntegratedPlanning.pdf <Accessed 23/04/2015>

Flintan, F., Ebro, A., Eba, B., Assefa, A., Getahun, Y., Reytar, K., Irwin, B., Yehualashet, H., Abdulahi, M., Gebreyohannes, Z.T., Awgichew, S. and Gudina, D. (2019). *Review of participatory rangeland management (PRM) process and implementation. Rangelands Research Report 2*. Nairobi, Kenya: ILRI. [Online] Available at: https://www.ilri.org/publications/review-participatory-rangeland-management-prm-process-and-implementation <Accessed 08/02/2021>

Flintan, F. (2011) *Broken Lands, Broken Lives? Causes, processes and impacts of land fragmentation on the rangelands of Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda*. Report for the Regional Learning and Advocacy Project (REGLAP), Oxfam, UK. [Online] Available at: http://www.disasterriskreduction.net/east-central-africa/library/detail/en/?dyna_fef%5Bbackuri%5D=%2Feast-central-africa%2Flibrary%2F%3Fcategory%3Dstudies%26reglap%3D1&dyna_fef%5Buid%5D=1084 <Accessed 23/04/2015>

Flintan F. (2008) *Women's Empowerment in Pastoralism*, WISP/IUCN. [Online]. Available from: https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/import/downloads/gender_format.pdf <Accessed: 10/02/2021>

Folk, C. (2006) 'Resilience: The emergence of a perspective for social-ecological systems analyses', *Global Environmental Change* 16: 253–267.

Forsyth, T. (2003) *Critical Political Ecology: The Politics of Environmental Science*. London: Routledge.

Foucault, M. (1991) 'Governmentality', in: Burchell, G., Gordan, C. and Millers, P. (eds) *The Foucault Effect: Studies in governmentality, with two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 87–104.

Foucault M. (1980) 'Truth and power', in: Gordon, C. (ed.) *Power/Knowledge; Selected Interviews and other Writings 1972-1977*. New York: Panthean Books, pp. 109-133.

Foucault, M. (1990) *The history of sexuality, Volume 1: an introduction*. London: Penguin

Fratkin, E., and Smith, K. (1995) 'Women's changing economic roles with pastoral sedentarization: Varying strategies in alternate Rendille communities'. *Human Ecology* 23(4): 433–434.

Fratkin, E. (1997) 'Pastoralism: Governance and development issues', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 26: 235–361.

Fratkin, E. (2004) *Ariaal Pastoralists of Kenya: Studying Pastoralism, Drought, and Development in Africa's Arid Lands*. Boston: Pearson Education.

Fratkin E. (2013) 'Seeking alternative livelihoods in pastoral areas'. In: Catley, A., Lind, J. and Scoones, I. (eds) *Pastoralism and Development in Africa: Dynamic Change at the Margins*, London: Routledge, pp. 197–205

Fratkin E. (2014) 'Ethiopia's pastoralist policies: development, displacement, and resettlement', *Nomadic Peoples* 18(1): 94–114.

Funk, C., Rowland, J., Eilerts, G., Kebebe, E., Biru, N., White, L. and Galu, G. (2012) *A Climate Trend Analysis of Ethiopia, U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2012–3053.* [Online] Available at: https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2012/3053/FS12-3053_ethiopia.pdf <Accessed: 13/07/2020>

Galaty, J.G. and Johnson, D. (1990) *The World of Pastoralism.* New York: Guilford Press.

Galaty, J.G (1992) 'The land is yours: social and economic factors in the privatization and sub-division and sale of Maasai ranches*', Nomadic Peoples* 30: 26–40.

Galaty, J.G. (2012) '*Unused Land' and Unfulfilled Promises: Justifications for Displacing Communities in East Africa*. Paper presented at Global Land Grabbing conference, Cornell University, 12–19 October 2012.

Galaty J.G (2013) 'Land grabbing in the Eastern African Rangelands'. In: Catley, A., Lind, J. and Scoones, I. (eds) *Pastoralism and Development in Africa: Dynamic Change at the Margins*, London: Routledge, pp.143–153.

Galvin, K. (2009) 'Transitions: pastoralists living with change', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 38, 185-198.

Gaventa, J. (2005) 'Reflections of the uses of the 'Power Cube' approach for analysing the spaces, places and dynamics of civil society participation and engagement', *CFP Evaluation Series 2003–2006*, 4. Netherlands: MFP Network [Online] Available at: https://www.participatorymethods.org/sites/participatorymethods.org/files/reflections_on_uses_powercube.pdf <Accessed; 13/11/2016>.

Gebeye, G.A. (2016) 'Unsustain the sustainable: An evaluation of the legal and policy interventions for pastoral development in Ethiopia', *Pastoralism* 6(2).

Gebremeskal, E.N., Desta, S., and Kassa, G.K. (2019) *Pastoral Development in Ethiopia: Trends and the way forward.* Washington DC: World Bank.

Gerber, P.J., Steinfeld, H., Henderson, B., Mottet, A., Opio, C., Dijkman, J., Falcucci, A. & Tempio, G. (2013) *Tackling climate change through livestock – A global assessment of emissions and mitigation opportunities*. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.

GGGI (2016). *Ethiopia Unveils Sectoral Climate Resilience Strategies for Green Economy*, Global Green Growth Institute. [Online] Available at: http://gggi.org/ethiopia-unveils-sectoral-climate-resilience-strategies-for-green-economy/ <Accessed 24/07/2016>

Gilbert, N. (2008) *Researching Social Life* (*3rd Edition)*. London: Sage.

Gillham, B. (2000) *Case Study Research Methods*. London and New York: Continuum.

Given L.M. (2008) *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods*, London: Sage.

GIZ (2017) *The Territorial Approach to Climate Change Adaptation*. [Online] Available at: https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/30615.html <Accessed 8/02/2017>

Godfrey-Wood, R. and Otto-Naess, L. (2016) 'Adaptation to climate change: Transforming development?', *IDS Bulletin* 47(2): 49–62.

GoK (2007) *Vision 2030*. Nairobi: GoK, Ministry of Planning and National Development and the National and Economic and Social Council, Office of the President.

GoK (2018) *Third Medium Term Plan 2018-2022: Transforming Lives: Advancing socio-economic development through the 'Big Four'*. [Online] Available at: http://vision2030.go.ke/inc/uploads/2019/01/THIRD-MEDIUM-TERM-PLAN-2018-2022.pdf <Accessed: 08/07/2020>

GoK-MALF (2017) *Kenya Climate Smart Agriculture Strategy 2017-2026.* Nairobi: Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries. [Online] Available from: https://www.adaptation-undp.org/sites/default/files/resources/kenya_climate_smart_agriculture_strategy.pdf <Accessed: 08/07/2020>

GoK-MLPP (2018) *County Spatial Planning Guidelines 2018.* [Online] Available at: https://www.cog.go.ke/cog-reports/category/93-county-spatial-planning-guidelines-county-spatial-planning-guidelines <Accessed: 08/07/2020>

GoK-NLC (2016) *Community Land Act No.27 of 2016*. [Online] Available at: http://www.landcommission.go.ke/media/erp/upload/communitylandact27of2016.pdf <Accessed: 26/06/2017>

Goldman, M.J., Turner, M.D. and Daly, M. (2018) 'A critical political ecology of human dimensions of climate change: epistemology, ontology and ethics', *WIRESs Climate Change* 9(4) e526.

Goldsmith P. (2013) 'The future of pastoralist conflict in the Horn of Africa', in: Catley, A., Lind, J. and Scoones, I. (eds) *Pastoralism and Development in Africa; Dynamic Change at the Margins*, London: Earthscan, pp. 71–81.

Gomarasca, M. and Nori, M. (2016) 'Better approaches in support of Pastoralism', *Farming Matters*. [Online] Available from: https://www.ileia.org/2016/12/19/better-approaches-support-pastoralism/ <Accessed 8/02/2017>

Grainger, A. (1990) *The Threatening Desert: Controlling Desertification.* London: Earthscan.

Greiner, C. (2016) 'Land-use change, territorial restructuring, and economies of anticipation in dryland Kenya', *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 10: 530–547.

Greiner, C. (2017) 'Pastoralism and land tenure change in Kenya: The failure of customary institutions', *Development and Change* 48(1): 78-97.

Greiner, C. (2020) 'Negotiating access to land and resources at the geothermal frontier in Baringo, Kenya', in: Lind, J., Okenwa, D., and Scoones, I. (2020) *Land Investment and Politics: Reconfiguring Eastern Africa's Pastoral Drylands.* Suffolk, UK: James Currey, pp.101–109.

Grey, D. (2009) *Doing Research in the Real World*, 2nd edition. London: Sage.

Guba, E. and Lincoln, Y. (1994) 'Competing paradigms in qualitative research', in: Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (eds) *The Handbook of Qualitative Research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Haddis, Z., Bekure, S., Dagnew, A., Gebremeskel, T. and Tafere, B. (2017) *Ethiopia's Move to a National Integrated Land Use Policy and Land Use Plan*. Paper presented at the 2017 World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty, The WB, Washington DC, March 20–24 2017. [Online] Available from: https://land-links.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/USAID_Land_Tenure_WB17_Ethiopia_Move_Land_Use_Plan.pdf <Accessed 26/01/2018>

Hagmann, T. and Mulugeta, A. (2008) 'Pastoral conflicts and state-building in the Ethiopian lowlands', *Afrika Spectrum* 43(10): 19–37.

Hajer, M.A. (1995) *The Politics of Environmental Discourse; Ecological Modernisation and the Policy Process*, Oxford, Clarendon.

Hajer, M.A. (2005) 'Coalitions, practices, and meaning in environmental politics: From acid rain to BSE', in: Howarth, D. and Torfing, J. (eds) *Discourse Theory in European Politics*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 297–315.

Hajer, M.A. (2006) 'Doing discourse analysis: coalitions, practices, meaning', in: van den Brink, M. and Metze, T. (eds) *Words matter in policy and planning: discourse theory and method in the social sciences.* Netherlands Geographical Studies 344. Utrecht: KNAG/Nethur, pp. 65–74.

Hakim, C. (2000) *Research Design: Successful designs for social and economic research (2nd Edition).* London: Routledge.

Halderman, M. (2004) 'The political economy of pro-poor livestock policy-making in Ethiopia', *Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative (PPLPI) Working Paper No. 19*. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.

Hannam, I., Dooley, E., Heuser, I.L., Kasimbazi, E., Markus, T. and Tianboa, Q. (2018) 'Governance of pastoral lands', in: Harald Ginzky (ed.) *International Yearbook of Soil Law and Policy 2017*. London: Springer, pp. 101–129.

Hardin, G. (1968) 'The Tragedy of the Commons', *Science 1*62.

Headey, D., Taffesse, A.S., and You, L. (2014) 'Diversification and development in pastoralist Ethiopia', *World Development* 56: 200–213.

Headey, D. and Kennedy, A. (2012) *Enhancing Resilience in the Horn of Africa*. Washington DC: USAID and IFPRI.

Held, D., Roger, C. and Nag, E. (2013) 'Ethiopia's path to a climate resilient green economy', in: Held, D., Roger, C. and Nag, E. (eds) *Climate Governance in the Developing World*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 218–237.

Herrera, P.M., Davies J. and Manzano-Bena, P. (eds) (2014) *The Governance of Rangelands: Collective Action for Sustainable Pastoralism*. London: Routledge.

Herrero, M., Addison, J., Bedalian, C., Carabine. E.A., Havlik, P., Henderson, B., van de Steeg, J. and Thornton, P.K. (2016) 'Climate Change and pastoralism: impacts, consequences and adaptation', *Rev. Sci. Tech. Off. Int. Epiz,* 35(2), 417–433.

Hesse, C. (2011) 'Ecology, equity and economics: reframing dryland policy', *IIED Opinion: Lessons from adaptation in practice.* London: IIED [Online]: Available at: http://pubs.iied.org/17106IIED.html <Accessed; 20/04/2016>

Hesse, C. and Macgregor, J. (2006) 'Pastoralism: drylands' invisible asset? Developing a framework for assessing the value of pastoralism in East Africa', *Drylands Issue Paper* 142 IIED / SOS Sahel.

Hesse, C. and Pattison, J. (2013) 'Ensuring devolution supports adaptation and climate resilient growth in Kenya', *IIED Briefing*. London: IIED. [Online] Available at: http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17161IIED.pdf? <Accessed 14/12/2015>

Hewitt, S. (2009) 'Discourse Analysis and public policy research', *Centre for Rural Economy Discussion Paper Series No. 24*, Newcastle University. [Online] Available from: http://ippra.com/attachments/article/207/dp24Hewitt.pdf <Accessed: 05/01/2018>

Hill, C., Hesse, C., Zwaagstra, H., Harfoot, A., Rowley, T. (2015) *Harnessing Pastoral Knowledge for Climate Change Adaptation in the Drylands*. Paper presented at the 2015 World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty, The World Bank, Washington DC, March 23–27, 2015.

Hoben, A. (1995) 'Paradigms and politics: The cultural construction of environmental policy in Ethiopia', *World Development* 23(6): 1007–1021.

Hodbod, J., Stevenson, E, Akall, G., Akuja, T. Angelei, I., Bedasso, E.A., Buffavand, L., Derbyshire, S. Eulenberger, I., Gownaris, N. Kamski, B., Kurewa, A., Lokuruka, M., Mulugeta, M.F., Okenwa, D., Rodgers, C., Tebbs, E. (2018) 'Social-ecological change in the Omo-Turkana Basin; synthesis of current developments', *Ambio* 48(10): 1099–1115.

Hodgson, D. (Ed) (2000) *Rethinking African Pastiralism: Gender, culture and the myth of the patriarchal pastoralist*. Oxford; James Currey

Homewood, K. and Rodgers, W.A. (1991) *Maasailand Ecology: pastoralist development and wildlife conservation in Ngorogoro, Tanzania*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hsieh, HF. and Shannon, S.E. (2005) 'Three approaches to qualitative Content Analysis', *Qualitative Health Research*, 15(9): 1277–1288.

Huberman A.M. and Miles. M. (2002) *The Qualitative Researcher's Companion*. London: Sage.

Human Rights Watch (2012) *What will happen if hunger comes? Abuses against the indigenous peoples of Ethiopia's Lower Omo Valley*. [Online] Available at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/06/18/what-will-happen-if-hunger-comes-0 <Accessed 24/04/2015>

Human Rights Watch (2017) *Ethiopia*. [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/africa/ethiopia <Accessed 11/01/2018>

IIED and SOS Sahel International (2010) *Modern and Mobile: The future of Livestock Production in Africa's drylands*. London: IIED / SOS Sahel International UK.

IGAD (2013) *IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative: The IDDRSI Initiative*. Djibouti: Intergovernmental Authority on Development. [Online] Available from: http://resilience.igad.int/attachments/article/237/20131020%20IDDRSI%20Strategy%20Revised.pdf <Accessed 11/11/2016>

IGAD (2016) *Policies and Proclamations Relevant to Pastoral Area Land Management for Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Review Report*. Nairobi: IGAD Centre for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development.

IPCC (2012) *Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation. A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Cambridge and New York: IPCC.

IPCC (2013) *Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contributions of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Cambridge and New York: IPCC.

IPCC (2014) *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Cambridge and New York: IPCC.

IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Networks) (2013) *Pastoralism's economic contributions are significant but overlooked.* [Online] Available at: http://www.irinnews.org/report/98052/pastoralism-economic-contributions-are-significant-overlooked.downloaded <Accessed: 05/06/2019>

Jenet, A., N. Buono, S. Di Lello, M., Gomarasca, C., Heine, S., Mason, M., Nori, R., Saavedra, K., Van Troos, K. (2016) *The Path to Greener Pastures: Pastoralism, the backbone of the world's drylands.* Brussels: Vétérinaires Sans Frontièrs International (VSF-I).

Jones, L. and Carabine, E. (2013) 'Exploring political and socio-economic drivers of transformational climate policy: Early insights from the design of Ethiopia's Climate Resilient Green Economy Strategy', *ODI Working Paper October 2013*. London: Overseas Development Institute.

Joseph, J. (2014) 'The EU in the Horn of Africa: Building resilience as a distant form of governance', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 52(2): 285–301.

Johnson, O.W and Ogeya, M (2018) Risky Business: Developing geothermal power in Kenya, *SEI Discussion Brief*. Stockholm: Stockholm Environmental Institute.

Jupp, V. (ed.) (2006) *The SAGE Dictionary of Social Research Methods*. London: Sage.

Keeley, J. and Scoones, I. (1999) 'Understanding environmental policy processes: a review', *IDS Working Papers*. Brighton: IDS Sussex.

Keeley, J and Scoones I. (2000) 'Knowledge, power and politics: the environmental policy making process in Ethiopia', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 38(1): 89–120.

Keeley, J. and Scoones, I. (2003) *Understanding Environmental Policy processes: Cases from Africa.* London: Earthscan.

Kefale, A., and Gebresenbet, F. (2014) 'The Expansion of the Sugar Industry in the Southern Pastoral Lands.' In Rahmato, D., Ayenew, M., Kefale, A, and Haberman, B. (eds.) *Reflections on Development in Ethiopia: New Trends, Sustainability and Challenges*. Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies. [Online] Available from: https://www.fssethiopia.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Reflections-on-Development.pdf <Accessed: 05/02/2021>

Kingdon, J.W. (1984) *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies.* Boston: Little, Brown and Co.

King-Okumu, C., Wasonga, O.V. and Yimer, E. (2015) 'Pastoralism pays: New evidence from the Horn of Africa', *IIED Drylands, Pastoralism and Sustainable Markets Briefing, October 2015*. London: International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).

King-Okumu, C. (2015) *Inclusive green growth in Kenya; Opportunities in the dryland water and rangeland sectors.* IIED / Embassy of Denmark. [Online] Available from: http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10137IIED.pdf <Accessed: 25/05/2016>

Kirimi, L. and Njeru, T. (2016) 'Collective land regimes in pastoralist societies: Lessons from East African countries', *Research Paper Series*. Nairobi: Tegemeo Institute of Agricultural Policy and Development, Egerton University.

Kochore, H.H. (2016) 'The road to Kenya? Vision, expectations and anxieties around new infrastructure development in Northern Kenya', *Journal of East African Studies* 10: 494–510.

Korf, B., Hagmann, T. and Emmenegger, R. (2015) 'Re-spacing African drylands: Territoralisation, sedentarisation and indigenous commodification in the Ethiopian pastoral frontier', *Journal of Peasant Studies,* 42(5): 881-901.

Krätli S. and Enson, J. (2013) *A review of global public policy narratives on the drylands*. London: Climate Change Working Group, IIED.

Krätli, S. (2013) 'Global public policy narratives on the drylands and pastoralism', *IIED Briefing, April 2013,* London: IIED.

Krätli, S. (2015) *Valuing Variability: New Perspectives on Climate Resilient Drylands Development.* London: IIED.

Krätli, S. (2016) 'Discontinuity in pastoral development: Time to update the method', *Revue Scientifique Et Technicque (International Office of Epizootics)* 3(2): 485–497.

Krätli, S. (2019) *Pastoral Development Orientation Framework: Focus on Ethiopia*. Bischöfliches Hilfswerk MISEREOR e.V., Aachen, Germany. [Online] Available from: http://www.celep.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/2019-Misereor-pastoral-development-orientation-framework.pdf <Accessed; 15/03/2020>

Krätli, S. and Swift J. (2014) 'Counting pastoralists in Kenya', *REGLAP Technical Papers*. [Online] Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/295078591_'Counting_Pastoralists'_in_Kenya <Accessed; 23/06/2020>

Kratochwil, F. (2008) 'Constructivism: what it is (not) and how it matters', in: della Porta, D. and Keating, M. (eds) *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kronenburg-García, A. (2018) 'Territorial conflicts, agency and the strategic appropriation of interventions in Kenya's Southern drylands', *Sustainability* 10(11).

Krippendorff, K. (2004) 'Reliability in Content Analysis: Some common misconceptions and recommendations', *Human Communication Research* 30(3): 411–433.

Kumssa, A. and Jones, J.F. (2010) 'Climate change and human security in Africa', *Sustainable Development and World Ecology* 17: 453–461.

Lakoff, G. (2014) *Don't Think of an Elephant: Know your Values and Frame the Debate*. Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing.

Lamprey, H. (1983) 'Pastoralism yesterday and today: the overgrazing problem', in: F. Bourliere (ed.) *Tropical Savannas: Ecosystems of the World*. Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishing.

Lane C. (1998). *Custodians of the Commons: Pastoral Land Tenure in Africa*. London: Taylor and Francis.

Laursen, L. (2017) *How Kenya's herders got their livestock insured*. Stockholm Resilience Centre. [Online] Available from: https://rethink.earth/how-kenyas-herders-got-their-livestock-insured/ <Accessed; 15/03/2020>

Lavers, T. (2012) 'Patterns of agrarian transformation in Ethiopia: State mediated commercialisation and the 'land grab', *Journal of Peasant Studies* 39(3–4): 795–822.

Lavers, T. (2016) 'Agricultural investment in Ethiopia: Undermining national sovereignty or tool for state building?', *Development and Change* 47(5): 1078–1101.

Lefort, R. and Tronval, K. (2019) 'Ethiopian elite lost in electoral maze under Abiy's gaze', *Open Democracy*, 27/02/2019. [Online] Available from: https://www.opendemocracy.net/ren-lefort-kjetil-tronvoll/ethiopian-elite-lost-in-electoral-maze-under-abiys-gaze <Accessed: 15/03/2019>

Letai, J. and Lind, J. (2013) 'Squeezed from all sides: changing resource tenure and pastoralist innovation on the Laikipia Plateau, Kenya'. In: Catley, A., Lind, J. and Scoones, I. (eds) *Pastoralism and Development in Africa: Dynamic Change at the Margins*. London: Routledge, pp. 164–176.

Letai, J. and Tiampati, M. (2014) 'Capturing benefits, whilst safeguarding livelihoods: The debate over LAPSSET', *Resilience in the Horn of Africa – Journal 5*, Nairobi: DLCI/REGLAP.

Levine, S., Ludi, E. and Jones, L (2011) *Rethinking Support for Adaptive Capacity to Climate Change: The Role of Development Interventions*. London: Overseas Development Institute.

Levine, S. (2014) 'Political flag of conceptual umbrella? Why progress on resilience must be freed from the constraints of technical arguments.' *ODI Briefing papers*. London: Overseas Development Institute.

LCDA (2016) *Brief on LAPSSET Corridor Project*. [Online] Available from: http://vision2030.go.ke/inc/uploads/2018/05/LAPSSET-Project-Report-July-2016.pdf <Accessed: 16/09/2018>

Lind, J. (2018) *Designs on the range: corridors, grabs and extractions at the pastoral margins*, PASTRES. [Online) Available from: https://pastres.wordpress.com/2018/09/10/designs-on-the-range-corridors-grabs-and-extractions-at-the-pastoral-margins/ <Accessed: 16/10/2018>

Lind, J., Kohnstamm, S. and Sabates-Wheeler, R. (2016) *Changes in the Drylands of Eastern Africa: Implications for resilience strengthening efforts (Final Report)*. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies (IDS).

Lind, J., Okenwa, D. and Scoones, I. (eds) (2020) *Land Investment and Politics: Reconfiguring Eastern Africa's Pastoral Drylands.* Suffolk: James Currey.

Lind, J. and Birch, I. (2014) 'Social protection in pastoral areas: promoting inclusive growth at the margins', *Future Agricultures Policy Brief No. 70.* Brighton: University of Sussex.

Little, P.D., McPeak, J., Barrett, C.B. and Kristjanson, P. (2008) 'Challenging orthodoxies: understanding poverty in pastoral areas of East Africa', *Development and Change* 39(4): 587–611.

Little, P.D., Behnke, R., McPeak, J. and Gebru, G. (2010) *Retrospective Assessment of Pastoral policies in Ethiopia, 1991–2008: Report Number 1: Pastoral Economic Growth and Development Policy Assessment, Ethiopia*. Addis Abba: FDRE / DFID.

Little, P.D. (2013) 'Reflections on the future of pastoralism in the Horn of Africa?', in: Catley, A., Lind, J. and Scoones, I. (eds) *Pastoralism and Development in Africa: Dynamic Change at the Margins,* London: Routledge, pp. 243–249.

Lockwood, M. (2013) 'What can climate-adaptation policy in Sub-Saharan Africa learn from research on governance and politics?', *Development Policy Review* 31(6): 647–676.

Loduk J.E, Ekai M.N. and Tiampati, M. (2016) 'Turkana County'. In: PDNK, *Kenya's Indigenous Peoples rights in the context of governance: mega infrastructure and extractive projects,* Nairobi: Pastoralist Development Network Kenya.

MacMillan, S. (2017) 'Record payouts being made by Kenyan Government and insurers to protect herders facing historic drought'. In: *ILRI News* February 2017. International Livestock Research Institute. [Online] Available from: https://news.ilri.org/2017/02/21/record-payouts-being-made-by-kenya-government-and-insurers-to-protect-herders-facing-historic-drought/ <Accessed 30/03/2020>

Maina, I., Newsham, A. and Okoto, M. (2013) 'Agriculture and climate change in Kenya: climate chaos, policy dilemmas', *Future Agricultures Working Paper* 70. Brighton: IDS, Sussex University.

Manzano, P. (2017) 'Development interventions in pastoralist areas: a new decision matrix to identify win-win situations and no-go zones', *The Solution Journal*, 8(3).

Manzano, P. (2018) *Traditional pastoralist governance and the national devolution process in Kenya: challenges and opportunities for action – A scoping review for Saferworld* (internal unpublished commissioned report). [Online] Available at: https://sites.google.com/site/pablomanzanobaena/Home/welcome/publications <Accessed; 23/06/2018>

May, T. (2011) *Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process (Fourth Edition)*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Mays, N. and Pope, C. (1995) 'Qualitative research: rigor and qualitative research." *BMJ*. 311(6997), 109-112 [Online] Available from: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2550154/ <Accessed: 03/01/2018>

Mbaria, G (2017) 'The Laikipia crisis and the disenfranchisement of Kenyans in the North', *The Elephant*, May 18th 2017. [Online] Available from: https://www.theelephant.info/features/2017/05/18/the-laikipia-crisis-and-the-disenfranchisement-of-kenyans-in-the-north/ <Accessed: 05/03/2018>

McConnon, E. (2015) *The Security-Development Nexus as Risk Management: A Multiple-Donor Case Study of the Coordination of Security and Development in US, UK and Canadian policy*. Unpublished PhD Thesis, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University

McGahey, D., Davies, J., Hagelberg, N. and Ouedraogo, R. (2014) *Pastoralism and the Green Economy – a natural nexus*? Nairobi: IUCN and UNEP.

McKeon, N. (2015) *Food Security Governance: Empowering Communities, Regulating Corporations*. London: Routledge.

McPeak, J., Little, P.D and Doss, C.R. (2011) *Risk and Social Change in African Rural Economies; Livelihoods in Pastoralist Communities.* London: Taylor and Francis.

McPeak J., Little, P.D., Stickler, M.M., and Huntington, H. (2015) 'Pastoral land tenure at the margins of intensive and extensive land use: Baseline survey results from a USAID customary land rights recognition project in Southern Ethiopia'. Paper presented at the '*2015 World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty*' The World Bank, Washington DC, March 23-27, 2015.

McPeak, J.G., and Little, P.D. (2017) 'Applying the concept of resilience to pastoralist household data', *Pastoralism* 7(14).

Methmann, C. and Oels A. (2014) 'Vulnerability', in: Death, C. (ed.) *Critical Environmental Politics*. London: Routledge, pp 227–286.

Minority Rights Group International (MRGI) (2019) *Ethiopian country profile*. [Online] Available from: https://peoplesunderthreat.org/countries/ethiopia/#background <Accessed: 016/07/2020>

Mkutu, K. (2019) 'Pastoralists, politics and development projects: Understanding the layers of armed conflict in Isiolo County, Kenya', *bicc Working Paper 7*, Nairobi: United States International University.

Mokku, J. and Alden-Wiley, L.A. (2019) *Policy Brief: Critical issues on community land legislation in Kenya*. Nairobi: Drylands Learning and Capacity Building Initiative / Pastoralist Parliamentary Group.

Mosley, J. and Watson, E.E. (2016) 'Frontier transformations: Development visions, spaces and processes in Northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia', *Journal of East African Studies* 10(3): 452–475.

Moritz, M. (2013) 'Review of 'Pastoralism and Development in Africa: Dynamic Change at the Margins' edited by Andy Catley, Jeremy Lind, and Ian Scoones', *Pastoralism* 3(19).

Moritz, M. (2016) 'Open property regimes', *International Journal of the Commons,* 10(2): 688-708.

Morton, J. (2010) 'Why should governmentality matter for the study of pastoral development?', *Nomadic Peoples* 14(1): 6–30.

Morland, A. (2017) 'Drought pushes Kenya's pastoralists to the brink', *The New Humanitarian.* [Online] Available from: http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2017/10/12/drought-pushes-kenya-s-pastoralists-brink <Accessed 06/11/2019>

Morris, J.R. (1998) 'Under 3 flags: The policy environment for pastoralism in Ethiopia and Kenya', *SR/GL-CRSP Pastoral Risk Management Project Technical Report No 04/99*. Utah State University.

Mortimore, M., Anderson, S., Cotula, L. Davies, J., Faccer, K. and Hesse, C. (2009) *Dryland opportunities: A new paradigm for people, ecosystems and development.* London: IIED / Nairobi: UNDP.

Mortimore, M. (1998). *Roots in the African Dust: Sustaining the Drylands*. Cambridge: CUP.

Mulatu, A. and Bekure, S. (2013) 'The need to strengthen land laws in Ethiopia to protect pastoral rights', in: Catley, A., Lind, J. and Scoones, I. (eds) *Pastoralism and Development in Africa: Dynamic Change at the Margins*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 86–194.

Müller B. 2008. International Adaptation Funding. The Need For An Innovative and Strategic Approach. Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. [Online] Available at https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a65b485e-998c-4c57-980f-bc915a114303 <Accessed 17/05/2018>

Murphy, D.M. and Orindi, V. (2017) 'Kenya's County Climate Funds', *NAP Global Network, Country Brief 2B.* [Online] Available from: http://napglobalnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/napgn-en-2017-snapshot-kenya-county-climate-change-funds.pdf <Accessed 06/04/2019>

Mutiga, M. (2015) 'Africa's largest wind-farm set to connect remote Kenya to the grid'. *Guardian newspapers*. [Online] Available from: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/oct/09/africas-largest-windfarm-set-to-connect-remote-kenya-to-the-grid <Accessed: 25/05/2016>

Mwangi, E. and Dohrn, S. (2006) 'Biting the bullet: How to secure access to dryland resources for multiple users', *CAPRi Working Paper 47*, Washington DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

Naimer-Fuller, M. (ed.) (1999) *Managing mobility in African Rangelands: The Legitimization of Transhumance*, London: IT Publications.

Nassef, M., Henderson S. and Hesse, C. (2009) *Pastoralism and climate change: enabling adaptive capacity*. London: Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute.

Nelson D., Adger W.M. and Browne, K. (2007) 'Adaptations to environmental change: Contributions of a resilience framework', *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* 32(1): 395–419.

Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2015) *Climate Change Profile, Kenya*. [Online] Available from: http://api.commissiemer.nl/docs/os/i71/i7152/climate_change_profile_kenya.pdf <Accessed 26/07/2016>

Neville, K. (2015) 'New markets meet old grievances: The fight over bio-fuels in Kenya's Tana River Delta', *New Security Beat.* [Online] Available

at: https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2015/02/markets-meet-grievances-fight-biofuels-kenyas-tana-river-delta/ <Accessed 10 April 2016>

Nicholson, S.E. (2001) 'Climatic and environmental change in Africa during the last two centuries', *Climate Research* 17(2): 123–144.

Njorge, J.M., Ratter, B. and Atieno, L. (2017) 'Climate change policy-making processes in Kenya: deliberative inclusionary processes in play', *International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management*, 9(4): 535-554.

Njoka J.T. (2016) *Kenya: Country Situation Assessment.* PRISE / Centre for Sustainable Dryland Ecosystems and Societies. Nairobi. [Online] Available at: https://www.prise.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Low-Res_Kenya-CSA.pdf <Accessed 20/11/2019>

Notenbaert, A.M., Davies, J. and De Leeuw, J. (2012) 'Policies in support of pastoralism and biodiversity in the heterogeneous drylands of East Africa', *Pastoralism* 2(14).

Nunow, A.A. (2011) *The Dynamics of Land Deals in the Tana Delta, Kenya*. Online. Available at: http://www.future-agricultures.org/papers-and-presentations/conference-papers-2/1163-the-dynamics-of-land-deals-in-the-tana-delta-kenya/file. <Accessed 10 April 2016>

Nunow, A.A. (2013) 'Land deals and the changing political economy of livelihoods in the Tana Delta, Kenya', in: Catley, A., Lind, J. and Scoones, I. (eds) *Pastoralism and Development in Africa: Dynamic Change at the Margins*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 154–163.

Nyariki, D.M. and Amwata, D.A. (2019) 'The value of pastoralism in Kenya: application of the total economic value approach', *Pastoralism* 9(9).

Oakland Institute (2019) *"How they tricked us": Living with Gibe III and sugarcane plantations in Southwest Ethiopia*. [Online] Available at: https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/ethiopia-tricked-gibe-dam-sugarcane-plantations.pdf <Accessed 22/07/2020>

Oba, G. (2013) 'The sustainability of pastoral production in Africa', in: Catley, A., Lind, J. and Scoones, I. (eds) *Pastoralism and Development in Africa: Dynamic Change at the Margins*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 29–36.

Odhiambo, M. (2014) 'The unrelenting persistence of certain narratives: An analysis of changing policy narratives about the ASALs in Kenya', *IIED Country Report*. London, IIED. [Online] Available at: http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10081IIED.pdf <Accessed 10 April 2016>

Odhiambo, M. (2017) *Pastoralism, policy and law in the EAC and IGAD*. Nairobi: Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa (AFSA). [Online] Available at: https://afsafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/pastoralism-policy-and-law-in-the-eac-booklet.pdf <Accessed 13/12/2019>

Ohno, K. (2009) *Ethiopia: Political regime and development policies.* GRIPS Development Forum: Tokyo. [Online] Available at: www.grips.ac.jp/forum/af-growth/support_ethiopia/document/Jun09_DD&ADLI_10E.pdf <Accessed 02/01/2020>

Opiyo, F., Wasonga, O.V., Schilling, J. and Mureithi, S.M. (2012) 'Resource-based conflicts in drought-prone North-Western Kenya: The drivers and mitigation mechanisms', *Wudpecker Journal of Agricultural Research* 1(11): 442–453.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2011) *Towards Green Growth.* Paris: OECD.

Ostrom, E. (1990) *Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action.* Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

Otto Naess, L., Newell, P., Newsham, A, Phillips, J., Quan, J. and Tanner, T. (2015) 'Climate policy meets national development contexts: Insights from Kenyan and Mozambique', *Global Environmental Change* 35: 534–544.

Pain, A. and Levine, S. (2012) 'A conceptual analysis of livelihoods and resilience: addressing the "insecurity of agency"', *ODI-HPG Working Paper November 2012*. London: Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute.

Pas Schrijver, A. (2019*) Pastoralists, Mobility and Conservation: Shifting Rules of Access and Control of Grazing Resources in Kenya's Northern Drylands*. Doctoral Thesis. Department of Human Geography, Stockholm University. [Online] Available at: https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A1262779&dswid=-6286 <Accessed; 23/06/2020>

Pavanello, S. (2010) 'Working across Borders—Harnessing the Potential of Cross-Border Activities to Improve Livelihood Security in the Horn of Africa Drylands', *ODI-HPG Working Paper 2010.* London: Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute.

Peet, R., Robbins, P. and Watts, M. (2011) *Global Political Ecology*, London: Routledge.

Pelling, M. (2011) *Adaptation to climate change: From resilience to transformation.* London: Routledge.

Phillips L. and Jorgensen, M.W (2002). *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, London, Sage.

Practical Action (2016) *Climate Change in Northern Kenya*. [Online] Available at: http://practicalaction.org/posters-climate-change-in-northern-kenya <Accessed 26/07/2016>

Punch, K. (2009) *Introduction to Research Methods in Education*, London: Sage.

Randall, S. (2015) 'Where have all the nomads gone? Fifty years of statistical and demographic invisibilities of African mobile pastoralists', *Pastoralism* 5(1): 22.

Redda, R. and Roland, R. (2016) *Becoming a climate resilient green economy: planning for climate compatible development in Ethiopia*, Climate Development Knowledge Network. [Online] Available at: https://www.africaportal.org/publications/becoming-a-climate-resilient-green-economy-planning-for-climate-compatible-development-in-ethiopia/ <Accessed 18/01/2018>

Regassa, A., Hizekiel, Y. & B. Korf (2019) 'Civilizing the pastoral frontier: land grabbing, dispossession and coercive agrarian development in Ethiopia', *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 46(5): 935–955.

Renkens, I. (2019) 'The impact of renewable energy projects on indigenous communities in Kenya', *IWGIA Report 28*. Denmark: International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs. [Online] Available at: https://www.iwgia.org/en/resources/publications/3535-the-

impact-of-renewable-energy-project-on-indigenous-communities-in-kenya <Accessed; 08/07/2020>

Rettberg, S. (2020) 'Shifting regimes of violence within Ethiopia's Awash investment frontier', in: Lind, J., Okenwa, D. and Scoones, I. (eds) *Land Investment and Politics: Reconfiguring Eastern Africa's Pastoral Drylands,* Suffolk: James Currey, pp. 166–176.

Roba, G. and Davies, J. (2018) *Participatory Rangeland Planning: A Field Guide*. Nairobi: IUCN. [Online] Available at: http://www.celep.info/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/2018-prmp_methodology.pdf <Accessed: 23/06/2020>

Robbins, P. (2012) *Political Ecology* (Second Edition), London, Wiley Blackwell.

Robinson, L.W. and Crane, T.A. (2016) 'Conceptual framework for analyzing science-policy interactions for improved climate policy', *ILRI Project Report*. Nairobi, Kenya: ILRI. Online: Available at: https://cgspace.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10568/78156/PR_science_policy.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y <Accessed: 5/01/2018>

Roberts, T. (2019) 'Closing civic space and inclusive development in Ethiopia', *IDS Working Paper 527*. Brighton: IDS, University of Sussex.

Roe, E.M. (1991). 'Development Narratives, or making the best of blueprint development' *World Development* 19(4): 287–300.

Rowley, J. (2002) 'Using Case Studies in Research', *Management Research News* 25(1): 16–27.

Sandford, S. (1983) *Management of Pastoral Development in the Third World*, Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.

Schilling, J., Akuno, M., Scheffran, J. and Weinzierl, T. (2014) 'On raids and relations: climate change, pastoral conflict and adaptation in north-western Kenya', in: Bob, U. and Bronkhorst, S. (eds) *Conflict-sensitive adaptation to climate change in Africa.* Berlin: Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, pp. 241–268.

Schilling J., Locham, R., Weinzieri, T., Vivekananda, J. and Scheffran, J. (2015) 'The nexus of oil, conflict and climate change vulnerability of pastoral communities in Northwest Kenya', *Earth System Dynamics Journal Discussion Paper* 6: 703–717.

Schilling J., Weinzieri, T., Lokwang, A.E. and Opiyo, F. (2016) 'For better or worse: major developments affecting resource and conflict dynamics in Northwest Kenya', *Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsgeographie* 60(1–2): 57–71.

Schlee, G. (2013) 'Why states still destroy pastoralism and how they can learn that in their own interest they should not', *Nomadic Peoples* 17(2): 6–19.

Scoones, I. (ed.) (1995) *Living with Uncertainty: New Directions in Pastoral Development in Africa*, London: IT Publications.

Scoones, I. (2015) *Sustainable Livelihoods and Rural Development*. Rugby: Practical Action Publishing.

Scoones, I. (2018). *Pastoralism under pressure in northern Kenya*. PASTRES. [Online] Available at: https://pastres.org/2018/11/02/pastoralism-under-pressure-in-northern-kenya/ <Accessed; 02/12/2018>

Scoones, I. (2019) 'What is uncertainty and why does it matter?' *STEPS Working Paper* 105, Brighton, IDS, University of Sussex.

Scoones, I., Smalley, R., Hall, R. and Tsikata, D. (2019) 'Narratives of scarcity: framing the global land rush', *Geoforum* 101: 231–241.

Scoones, I. (2020) 'Pastoralists and peasants: perspectives on agrarian change', *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 48:1: 1-47.

Scott J.C. (1998) *Seeing like a state: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed.* New Haven (CT): Yale University Press.

Scott-Villiers, P. (2017) 'Small wars in Marsabit County: devolution and political violence in Northern Kenya', *Conflict, Security and Development* 17: 247–264.

SDC/WFP (2011) *Building resilience: Bridging food security, climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction: An overview of workshop case studies*. Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) / World Food Programme (WFP). [Online] Available at: http://www.preventionweb.net/files/24163_workshopbuildingresiliencecasestudi.pdf <Accessed: 10 April 2016>

Senda, T.S., Robinson, L.W., Gachene, C.K.K., Kironchi, G. and Doyo, J. (2020) 'An assessment of the implications of alternative scales of communal land tenure formalization in pastoral systems', *Land Use Policy 94*: 104535.

Sena, K. (2015) 'Renewable Energy Projects and the rights of marginalised/indigenous communities in Kenya'. *IWGIA report 21*. Copenhagen. International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs. [Online] Available from: https://www.iwgia.org/en/resources/publications/308-human-rights-reports/3204-renewable-energy-projects-and-the-rights-of-marginalisedindigenous-communities-in-kenya.html <Accessed: 14/11/2016>

Semplici, G. (2019) '"Seeing like the herder": climate change and pastoralists' knowledge – insights from Turkana herders in northern Kenya', in: *Indigenous peoples and climate change: Emerging research on traditional knowledge and livelihoods'*. Geneva: International Labour Organization / Oxford: School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford.

Semplici, G. and Nori, M. (2020) 'Review of "Crossing Boundaries: Legal and policy arrangements for cross-border pastoralism" by Jonathan Davies, Claire Ogali, Lydia Slobodian, Guyo Roba, Razingrim Ouedraogo.' *Pastoralism* 10(11).

Shanahan, M. (2013) 'Media Perceptions and Portrayals of Pastoralism in Kenya, India and China', *Gatekeeper Series*. London: IIED. [Online] Available at: http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/14623IIED.pdf

Sharma V., Orindi, V., Hesse, C., Pattison, J. and Anderson, J (2014) 'Supporting local climate adaptation planning and implementation through local governance and decentralized finance provision', *Development in Practice* 24(4) 579–590.

Shete, M. and Rutten, M. (2015) 'Large scale land acquisitions in Ethiopia', in: Hall, R., Scoones, I. and Tsikata, D. (eds) *Africa's Land Rush: Rural Livelihoods and Agrarian Change*. Sulfolk. James Currey. pp. 65-82.

Shumuye, M.Y. (2015) 'The Role of the Developmental State in Development: The Case of Ethiopia', *International Journal of African and Asian Studies* 14: 96–110.

Sloat, L.L., Gerber, J.S., Sanberg, L.H., Smith, W.K., Herrero, M., Ferrerra, L., Godde, C.M. and West, P.C. (2018) 'Increasing importance of precipitation variability on global livestock grazing lands'. *Nature Climate Change* 8(3): 214–218.

Smit, B. and Pilifosova, O. (2003) 'From adaptation to adaptive capacity and vulnerability reduction', in: Smith J., Klein R.J.T. and Huq, S. (eds) *Climate change, Adaptive Capacity, and Development*. London: Imperial College Press, pp. 9–28

Stabinsky, D. (2014) *Climate Smart Agriculture: myths and problems*. Heinrich Boll Foundation. [Online] Available at: https://br.boell.org/sites/default/files/uploads/2014/09/epaper_climate_smart_eng_boll_brasil18.09.014.pdf <Accessed: 25/11/2016>

Steinfeld, H., Gerber, P., Wassenaar, T., Castel, V., Rosales, M. and de Haan, C., (2006). *Livestock's long shadow: Environmental issues and options.* Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Stemler, S. (2001) 'An overview of Content Analysis', *Practical Assessment, Research and Evaluation* 7 (17).

Stull-Lane, C. & Carabine, E.A. (2015) 'COP21: the climate case for investing in African livestock'. *Guardian Newspapers*. [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/adam-smith-international-partner-zone/2015/dec/11/cop21-the-climate-case-for-investing-in-african-livestock <Accessed: 14/12/2015>

Swift, J. (1996) 'Desertification narratives, winners and losers', in: Leach, M. and Mearns, R. (eds) *The Lie of the Land: Challenging received wisdom on the African environment*. London and Oxford, James Currey.

Symons, K. (2014) 'Anti Politics, Apocalypse and Adaptation in Kenya's National Climate Change Response Strategy', *Scottish Geographical Journal* 130(4): 266–278.

Tache, B. (2013) 'Rangeland enclosure in Southern Oromia, Ethiopia: an innovative response or the erosion of common property resources?', in: Catley, A., Lind, J. and Scoones, I. (eds) *Pastoralism and Development in Africa: Dynamic Change at the Margins*, London: Routledge, pp. 37–46.

Tanner, T. and Horn-Phathanothai, L. (2014) *Climate Change and Development*. London and New York: Routledge.

Tanner, T., Lewis, D., Wrathall, D., Bronen, R., Cradock-Henry, N., Huq, S., Lawless, C., Nawrotzki, R., Prasad, V., Rahman, M. A., Alaniz, R., King, K., McNamara, K., Nadiruzzaman, Md., Henly Shepard, S. and Thomalla, F. (2015) 'Livelihood resilience in the face of climate change', *Nature Climate Change* 5: 23–26.

Taylor, M. (2015) *The Political Ecology of Climate Change Adaptation.* London: Routledge.

Thornton, P., Boone, R., Galvin, K., Burnsilver, S., Waithaka, M., Kuiyah, J., Karanja, S., Gonzalez-Estrada, E. and M. Herrero (2007) 'Coping strategies in livestock-dependent households in East and Southern Africa: a synthesis of four case studies', *Human Ecology* 35: 461–476.

Thornton, P. and Herrero, M. (2010) 'The Inter-Linkages Between Rapid Growth in Livestock Production, Climate Change, and the Impacts on Water Resources, Land Use, and Deforestation, background paper for the 2010 World Development Report', *Policy Research Working Paper 5178*, Washington DC: The World Bank.

Timberlake, L. (1988) *Natural Disasters: Acts of God or Acts of Man?* London, Earthscan.

Toulmin C. and Brock, K. (2016) 'Desertification in the Sahel: Local Practice Meets Global Narrative'. In: Behnke R. and Mortimore M. (eds) *The End of Desertification? Disputing Environmental Change in the Drylands*. Berlin: Springer. pp. 37-63.

Tsegay, B. (2017) 'Critical reflections on safety net policies and practices with respect to social protection among pastoral peoples in Sub-Saharan Africa'. *SPIDA Working Paper Series* [Online] Available at: https://www.penhanetwork.org/sites/default/files/uploads/manual/documents/SPIDA%20Social%20Protection%20in%20SSA%20Final%20BT%202017.pdf <Accessed 16/02/2020>

Turner, M.D. & Schlecht, E. (2019) 'Livestock mobility in sub-Saharan Africa: A critical review', *Pastoralism* 9(13).

Van Dijk, T.A (1993) 'Principles of Discourse Analysis', *Discourse and Society* 4(20) 249–283.

Van Dijk, T.A (2001) 'Critical Discourse Analysis'. In: Schiffrin D., Tannen, D. and Hamilton, H. (eds) *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 352–394.

Vetter, S. (2005) 'Rangelands at equilibrium and non-equilibrium: recent developments in the debate', *Journal of Arid Environments* 62: 321–341.

Voller, L., Christensen, A.B., Kamadi, G. and van de Wiel, H. (2016) *A people in the way of progress; prostitution, alcoholism and a lawsuit on illegal land acquisition in the Lake Turkana Wind Power project.* Danwatch Denmark. [Online] Available at: https://www.danwatch.dk/en/undersogelse/a-people-in-the-way-of-progress/ <Accessed: 25/05/2016>

UNEP (2011) *Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication*. Nairobi: United National Environmental Programme. [Online] Available at: https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/report/towards-green-economy-pathways-sustainable-development-and-poverty-eradication-10 <Accessed: 26/05/2016>

USAID (2014) *Climate Resilient Development; A Framework for understanding and addressing climate change*. [Online] Available at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pbaaa245.pdf <accessed 26/05/2016>

USAID (2018) *Global Food Strategy: Ethiopia Country Plan*. [Online] Available at: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1867/Ethiopia_GFSS_Country_Plan_WS_Edits_9.21.pdf <accessed 04/07/2020>

Walker, B., Holling, C.S., Carpenter, S.R. and Kinzig, A. (2004) 'Resilience, adaptability and transformability in social-ecological systems', *Ecology and Society* 9(2)

Washington, R., New, M., Hawcroft, M., Pearse, H., Rahiz, M. and Karmachurya, J. (2011) 'Climate Change in CCAFS Regions: Recent trends, current projections, crop-climate suitability and prospects for improved climate model information. Part 2: East Africa.' *CAFS project report*. Copenhagen: CGIAR Research Programme on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security.

Weber, R.P. (1990) *Basic Content Analysis*, London: Sage.

Weisser, F., Bollig M., Doevenspeck, M. and Muller-Mahn, D. (2014) 'Translating the 'Adaptation to Climate Change' paradigm: The politics of a travelling idea in Africa', *The Geographical Journal* 180(2): 111–119.

Whitfield, S. (2016) *Adapting to Climate Uncertainty in African Agriculture: Narratives and knowledge politics*. London: Routledge.

Willett, W., Rockström, J., Loken, B. *et al.* (2019) 'Food in the Anthropocene: The EAT–Lancet commission on healthy diets from sustainable food systems', *Lancet* 393: 447–492.

Williams, A.P. and Funk, C. (2011) 'A westward extension of the warm pool leads to a westward extension of the Walker Circulation, drying eastern Africa', *Climate Dynamics* 37: 2417–2435.

Williams, C. (2015) 'Wind powers green growth in Kenya, but for whom?' *Truth-out*, [Online] Available at: http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/29845-wind-powers-green-growth-in-kenya-but-for-whom <Accessed 03/06/2016>

Witsenburg, K. and Roba, A. (2007) 'The use and management of water sources in Kenya's drylands: is there a link between scarcity and violent conflicts?', in: B. Derman, R. Odgaard and E. Sjaastad (eds) *Conflicts Over Land and Water in Africa*. Oxford, James Currey, pp. 215–238.

Wodak, R. (2001) *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, London: Sage.

Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (2009) *Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis*, London: Sage.

Wolmer, W., Keeley, J., Leach, M., Mehta, l. Scoones, I. and Waldman, L. (2006) *Understanding Policy Processes – A Review of IDS research on the environment*, Brighton: Knowledge, Technology and Society Team (KNOTS), Institute of Development Studies, Brighton. [Online] Available at: https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/Policy_Processes06.pdf <Accessed 17/12/2019>

Wondemagegnehu, W. (2016) *The role of discourses, structures and agency in national climate policy formation: The case of Ethiopia*. Nairobi: Consultative Group International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) / International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI). [Online] Available at: https://ccafs.cgiar.org/publications/role-discourses-structures-and-agency-national-climate-policy-formation-case-ethiopia#.Xx2YOpNKirY <Accessed 03/04/2018>

World Bank (2011) '*Climate Smart Agriculture: Increased productivity and Food Security, Enhanced Resilience and Reduced carbon emissions for Sustainable Development, Opportunities and Challenges for a Converging Agenda: Country Examples*'. Washington DC: World Bank [Online] Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/10/17486171/climate-smart-agriculture-

increased-productivity-food-security-enhanced-resilience-reduced-carbon-emissions-sustainable-development <Accessed 03/06/2016>

World Bank (2012) *Inclusive Green Growth; The Pathway to Sustainable Development*. Washington DC: World Bank.

World Bank (2016) *Accelerating Climate Resilient and Low Carbon Development: Progress Report on the Implementation of the Africa Climate Business Plan*. Washington DC: World Bank.

World Bank (2018) *Boosting Prosperity, Improving Equity, in North and North East Kenya*. [Online] Available from: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/05/08/boosting-prosperity-improving-equity-in-north-and-north-eastern-kenya <Accessed 19/08/2020>

World Bank (2019) *This Is What It Is All About: Building Resilience and Adapting to Climate Change in Africa.* Washington, DC: World Bank.

World Bank (2020a) Ethiopia Economic Overview. [Online] Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview <Accessed 3/05/2020>

World Bank (2020b) Kenya Overview. [Online] Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kenya/overview <Accessed 3/05/2020>

World Bank (2020c) *Ethiopia Poverty Assessment – Harnessing Continued Growth for Accelerated Poverty Reduction*. [Online] Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/992661585805283077/Ethiopia-Poverty-Assessment-Harnessing-Continued-Growth-for-Accelerated-Poverty-Reduction <Accessed 3/05/2020>

World Bank. (2020d) *From Isolation to Integration: The Borderlands of the Horn of Africa*. Washington D.C: World Bank.

World Vision (2019) *Kenya Situation Report 1. August 1–August 31, 2019.* [Online] Available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/world-vision-kenya-situation-report-august-1-august-31-2019 <Accessed 16/09/2019>

Yimer, M. (2015) 'Sedentarization and drought resilience: government strategies to support pastoralist livelihoods in Ethiopia', in: Abera, Y. and Abdulahi (eds) *The Intricate Road to Development; Government Development Strategies in the Pastoral Areas of the Horn of Africa*, IPSS, Addis Ababa University.

Yin, R.K. (2003) *Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3rd Edition*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Yin, R.K. (2011) *Applications of Case Study Research*. Thousand Oaks, CA; Sage

Yirgu, L., Nicol, N. and Srinivasan, S. (2013) 'Warming to change? Climate policy and agricultural development in Ethiopia', *Future Agricultures Working Paper 071*, Brighton: IDS, University of Sussex.

Zael, F. and Dietz, T. (2000) 'Of markets, meat, maize and milk: pastoral commoditization in Kenya', in: Anderson, D. (ed.) *The Poor are Not Us: Poverty and Pastoralism in Eastern Africa*. Oxford: James Currey.

Zhang, Q. (2015) '*Pastoralists and the Environmental State: A study of ecological resettlement in Inner Mongolia, China.* Doctoral Thesis. Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Human Geography. [Online]: http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:796513/FULLTEXT01.pdf <Accessed: 18/11/2019>

National policy documents analysed (Chapter 5)

Ethiopia:

Farm Africa Ethiopia (2016) *Market Approaches to Resilience*. [Online] Available from: http://www.farmafrica.org/downloads/resources/braced-market-approaches-to-resilience.pdf <Accessed: 30/06/2017>

FDRE (2007) *National Adaptation Plan of Action*, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia . [Online] Available from: http://www.preventionweb.net/files/8522_eth01.pdf <Accessed: 25/05/2016>

FDRE (2008) *Policy Statement for the Sustainable Development of the Pastoral and Agro-Pastoral Areas of Ethiopia.* [Online] Available from: http://www.pcdp.gov.et/Reports/Ethiopian%20Pastoral%20Policy%20Statement.pdf <Accessed: 30/06/2017>

FDRE (2010) *Afar Regional State Programme of Plan on Adaptation to Climate Change*. [Online] Available from: http://www.academia.edu/18627729/Afar_National_Regional_State_Climate_Change_Adaptation_prog <Accessed: 30/06/2017>

FDRE (2011b) *Climate Resilient Green Economy Strategy*. [Online] Available from: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/ethiopia/docs/Ethiopia%20CRGE.pdf <Accessed: 30/06/2017>

FDRE (2011a) *Somali Regional State Programme of Plan on Adaptation to Climate Change*. [Online] Available from: http://www4.unfccc.int/nap/Documents/Climate%20Change%20Impacts,%20Vulnerabilities%20and%20Adaptation%20Strategies%20in%20Somali%20Region.pdf <Accessed: 30/06/2017>

FDRE (2014) *Growth and Transformation Plan 2 (GTP II) 2015-2020*. [Online] Available from: http://dagethiopia.org/new/images/DAG_DOCS/GTP2_English_Translation_Final_June_21_2016.pdf <Accessed: 30/06/2017>

FDRE (2015) *Intended Nationally Determined Contributions of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (EINDCs)*. [Online] Available from: http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/Ethiopia%20First/INDC-Ethiopia-100615.pdf <Accessed: 30/06/2017>

FDRE (2017) *National Adaptation Plan, Ethiopia's Climate Resilient Green Economy*. Addis Ababa; FDRE.

FDRE-EPA (2011) *Ethiopian Programme of Adaptation to Climate Change*. Addis Ababa; Environmental Protection Agency (*Currently unavailable online*).

FDRE-MECC (2015a) *Climate Resilience Green Economy: Agriculture and Forestry Climate Resilience Strategy*. [Online] Available from: http://gggi.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/CRGE_AgF_FINAL.compressed.pdf <Accessed: 30/06/2017>

FDRE-MECC (2015b) *Climate Resilience Green Economy: Water and Energy Climate Resilience Strategy*. [Online] Available from: http://www.greengrowthknowledge.org/sites/default/files/downloads/resource/Ethiopia_Climate_Resilient_Green_Economy_Water_Energy.pdf <Accessed: 30/06/2017>

FDRE-MoA (2010) *Agricultural Sector Policy and Investment Framework 2010-2020*. [Online] Available from: http://gafspfund.org/sites/gafspfund.org/files/Documents/Ethiopia_5_of_6_CAADP_Post_compact_Investment_Plan_(PIF)_0.pdf <Accessed: 30/06/2017>

FDRE-MoA (2015) *Ethiopian Livestock Master Plan (LMP) 2015-2020: Roadmaps for Growth and Transformation.* [Online] Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283781705_Ethiopia_livestock_master_plan_Roadmaps_for_growth_and_transformation <Accessed: 30/06/2017>

FRDE/WB (2013) *Coping with Change: How Ethiopia's PSNP and HABP are building resilience to climate change.* [Online] Available from: http://www.ltsi.co.uk/images/M_images/PSNP%20Coping%20with%20Change.pdf <Accessed: 30/06/2017>

EPCC (2015) *EPCC Climate Change Working Group First Assessment Report: Impacts, Vulnerability, Adaptation and Mitigation – Agriculture and Food Security.* [Online] Available from: http://www.eas-et.org/new/images/docs//EPCC_Reports/Agricalture%20and%20Food%20Security.pdf <Accessed: 30/06/2017>

USAID / Mercy Corps (2016) *Climate Resilient Development Case Study -Ethiopia: Integrating climate change into market-based Development programmes*. [Online] Available from: https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/Mercy_Corps_CRD_Case_Study_ETHIOPIA.pdf <Accessed: 30/06/2017>

Kenya

GoK (2010) *National Climate Change Response Strategy.* [Online] Available from: https://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/National-Climate-Change-Response-Strategy_April-2010.pdf <Accessed: 26/06/2017>

GoK (2013a) *Kenya National Climate Change Action Plan 2013-2017.* [Online] Available from: https://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Kenya-National-Climate-Change-Action-Plan.pdf <Accessed: 26/06/2017>

GoK (2013b) *Sector Plan for Drought Risk Management and Ending Drought Emergencies: Second Medium Term Plan 2013-2017.* [Online] Available from: http://www.ndma.go.ke/resource-center/ede-reports/category/43-ending-drought-emergencies <Accessed: 26/06/2017>

GoK (2015) *Kenya Climate Smart Agriculture Framework Programme 2015-2030.* [Online] Available from: http://canafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Kenya-CSA-Program-June-24-.pdf <Accessed: 26/06/2017>

GoK – ICG (2016) *Isiolo County Livestock Strategy and Action Plan 2015-2020*. Isiolo; Isiolo County Government.

GoK-MALF (2010) *Agricultural Sector Development Strategy 2010–2020*. [Online] Available from: http://www.gafspfund.org/sites/gafspfund.org/files/Documents/5.%20Kenya_strategy.pdf <Accessed: 26/06/2017>

GoK-MALF (2014) *Ending Drought Emergencies: Common Programme Framework for Sustainable Livelihoods.* [Online] Available from: http://www.ndma.go.ke/resource-center/ede-reports/category/43-ending-drought-emergencies <Accessed: 26/06/2017>

GoK-MENR (2015a) *Kenya's Intended Nationally Determined Contribution.* [Online] Available from: http://www.environment.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Kenya_INDC_20150723.pdf <Accessed: 26/06/2017>

GoK-MENR (2015b) *Green Economy Strategy and Implementation Plan.* [Online] Available from: http://www.environment.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Kenya-Green-Economy-Strategy-and-Implementation-Plan-GESIP-.pdf <Accessed: 26/06/2017>

GoK-MENR (2016) *Kenya National Adaptation Plan 2015-2030.* [Online] Available from: http://www4.unfccc.int/Nap/Documents%20nap/Kenya_Nap_Final.Pdf <Accessed: 26/06/2017>

GoK-MLD (2008) *National Livestock Policy.* [Online] Available from: http://www.agricoop.info.ke/files/downloads/National-Livestock-Policy.pdf <Accessed: 26/06/2017>

GoK-MLPP (2016). *Draft National Land Use Policy.* [Online] Available from: :http://www.ardhi.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Draft-National-Land-Use-Policy-May-2016.pdf <Accessed: 26/06/2017>

GoK-MDNKOAL (2012) *Sessional Paper 8: National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands.* [Online] Available from: http://www.ndma.go.ke/resource-center/policy-documents/category/44-policy-documents <Accessed: 26/06/2017>

GoK-MDP (2013) *Vision 2030: Second Medium Term Plan 2013-2017*. [Online] Available from: http://sdgfunders.org/reports/second-medium-term-plan-2013-2017-kenya-vision-2030/ <Accessed: 26/06/2017>

GoK-MENR (2014) *Sessional Paper 3*: *National Climate Change Framework Policy*. [Online] Available from: www.ke.undp.org/.../kenya/.../Climate-Change-Framework-Policy(31Nov2016).doc <Accessed: 26/06/2017>

GoK-NDMA (2014) *Ending Drought Emergencies: Common Programme Framework for Drought Risk Management.* [Online] Available from: http://www.ndma.go.ke/resource-center/ede-reports/category/43-ending-drought-emergencies <Accessed: 26/06/2017>

Appendices

Appendix A: List of all interviewees

ETHIOPIA			
Referenced Title	**Date of Interview**	**Location**	**Type of interview**
Ethiopian government official 1	22/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
Ethiopian government official 2	22/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
Ethiopian government official 3	25/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
Ethiopian government official 4	29/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
Ethiopian government official 5	30/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
Ethiopian government official 6	30/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
Ethiopian local government official 1	25/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
			Personal
Donor official 1	29/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
Donor official 2	23/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
Donor official 3	30/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
Donor official 4	26/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
Regional (AU) official	07/03/18	Nanyuki, Kenya	Personal
International researcher 1	18/04/18	Dublin	Skype
International researcher 2	11/05/18	Dublin	Skype
International researcher 3	14/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
UN Agency official 1	16/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
UN Agency official 2	16/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
Ethiopian local researcher 1	17/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
Ethiopian local researcher 2	24/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
Ethiopian local researcher 3	24/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
Ethiopian local researcher 4	30/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
Ethiopian local researcher 5	30/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
Ethiopian local researcher 6	31/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
Ethiopian Pastoralist Organisation rep. 1	17/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
Ethiopian Pastoralist Organisation rep. 2	29/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
INGO staff member 1	15/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
INGO staff member 2	15/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
INGO staff member 3	17/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
INGO staff member 4	17/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
INGO staff member 5	21/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
INGO staff member 6	23/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal
INGO staff member 7	31/05/18	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal

KENYA			
Referenced Title	**Date**	**Location**	**Type of Interview**
Keyan government official 1	11/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
Keyan government official 2	11/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
Keyan government official 3	13/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
Keyan government official 4	21/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
Keyan government official 5	20/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
Kenyan local government official 1	08/03/18	Nanyuki, Kenya	Personal
Kenyan Pastoralist MP 1	21/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
Kenyan private sector consultant 1	14/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
Kenyan local researcher 1	05/03/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
Kenyan local researcher 2	06/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
Kenyan local researcher 3	09/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
Kenyan local researcher 4	18/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
Kenyan local researcher 5	21/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
Keyan. consortium staff member 1	20/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
Ken local NGO staff member 1	07/03/18	Nanyuki, Kenya	Personal
Kenyan local NGO staff member 2	07/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	skype
Kenyan Local NGO staff member 3	18/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	skype
Kenyan Pastoralist Organisation rep. 1	06/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
Kenyan Pastoralist Organisation rep. 2	09/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
Kenyan Pastoralist Organisation rep. 3	11/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Skype
Kenyan Pastoralist Organisation rep. 4	17/07/18	Dublin, Ireland	Skype
INGO staff member 9	04/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
INGO staff member 10	08/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
INGO staff member 11	08/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
INGO staff member 12	18/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Skype
INGO staff member 13	19/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
International researcher 4	12/04/18	Dublin, Ireland	Skype
International researcher 5	09/05/18	Dublin, Ireland	Skype
International researcher 6	05/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
International researcher 7	07/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
International researcher 8	11/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
International researcher 9	14/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Skype
International researcher 10	14/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
UN Agency official 3	12/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
UN Agency official 4	12/06/18	Nairobi, Kenya	Personal
UN Agency official 5	16/07/18	Dublin, Ireland	Skype

Appendix B: List of interviewees' organisations

ETHIOPIA	
Name of Organisation	**Type of Organisation**
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)	Bi-lateral Aid agency
US AID	Bi-lateral Aid agency
World Bank	Donor
Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)	UN agency
Ministry for Agriculture and Natural Resources	Federal government ministry
Ministry for Environment, Forests and Climate Change	Federal government ministry
Ministry for Federal and Pastoral Development Affairs	Federal government ministry
Oromia Pastoral Area Development Commission	Regional State government commission
CARE Ethiopia	INGO
Misereor	INGO
Danish Church Aid	INGO
Christian Aid	INGO
Mercy Corps	INGO
SOS Sahel Ethiopia	INGO
Drylands Research Directorate, Ethiopian Institute for Agricultural Research	National research institute
Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University	International research organisation
The International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE)	International research organisation
Climate and Development Knowledge Network (Ethiopia)	Research consortium
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI)	International research institute
Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University	International research institute
Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia	Pastoralist representative organisation
Oromia Pastoralist Association	Pastoralist representative organisation
Agricultural Polcy Unit, African Union	Regional organisation

KENYA	
Name of Organisation	**Type of Organisation**
Adaptation Consortium (ADA)	Agency consortium
Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)	UN agency
Laikipia County Government Department of Environment	Local county government department
National Drought Management Authority (NDMA)	Parastatal agency
Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (MALF)	National government ministry
Ministry of Planning	National government ministry
Ministry for Environment and Forests (MEF)	National government ministry
Arid and Semi Arid Lands Stakeholder Forum (ASF)	Multi stakeholder forum
Pastoralist Parliamentary Group (PPG)	Pastoralist MPs caucus
Trocaire Kenya	INGO
CORDAID	INGO
Christensen Fund	INGO
Action Aid Kenya	INGO
International Union For Conservation of Nature, Global Drylands Project	International research organisation
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI)	International research organisation
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED)	International research organisation
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)	International research organisation
Friends of Lake Turkana	Pastoralist organisation
Centre for Minority Rights and Development (CEMRIDE)	Pastoralist organisation
IMPACT	Pastoralist organisation
Pastoralist Development Network of Kenya (PDNK)	Pastoralist organisation
Drylands Learning and Capacity Building Intiative (DLCI)	National / Local CSO
RECONCILE	National / Local CSO
People, Lands and Rural Development	Local research organisation
Kenyan Agriculture and Livestock Research Org (KALRO)	National research organisation
Department of Land and Natural Resources, University of Nairobi	National research organisation
Centre for Sustainable Drylands, University of Nairobi	National research organisation
LTS Africa	Private sector organisation/ consultancy

Appendix C: Letter of information and Informed Consent Form

1. Tom Campbell, DCU, PhD Research – Letter of Information

Date:

Dear colleague

(Working Title): 'Climate Change Policies and Pastoralist Livelihoods in the Horn of Africa: Insights from Ethiopia and Kenya'

I am writing to invite you to participate in a study of climate policy and pastoralism , which I am conducting as part of my PhD research with the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Ireland (http://www.dcu.ie/law_and_government/index.shtml). The aim of this research is to investigate contemporary climate change and green economy policies in Ethiopia and Kenya and to determine what the implications of these policies are for pastoralist livelihoods.

This research is for purposes of completing a PhD thesis, but the findings may also be used in the writing of subsequent publications such as academic journal articles, conference papers, and similar publications. While your involvement in this research will bring no direct benefits to you or your organisation, you may find the findings and conclusions useful and interesting in terms of informing the work you do.

My preferred approach is to conduct an audio-recorded interview, the content of which will then be transcribed. If you are happy be interviewed and for me to record the discussion, I will ensure that anything that might identify you as an individual is removed from the ensuing transcript. Participation in the research poses no material risk and you may withdraw from the study at any point. Full transcripts of interviews will be stored in confidential electronic files on a personal password protected Google drive until such time as the research is completed, or not longer than 4 years after the interview is conducted (which ever is soonest) with confidentiality of information provided subject to legal limitations. After this period these transcripts will be disposed of. When the research is completed I will send you a link to the final PhD research thesis, as well as to any academic papers published that make use of the data collected. The thesis will also be available through the Dublin City University library. The interview is expected to take approximately one hour long and can be held at a time and location that is convenient for you.

Please complete and sign the attached consent form if you are happy to take part in the study and would like the findings disseminated to you.

With many thanks

Thomas Campbell, PhD Student, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University (DCU)
Thomas.campbell4@mail.dcu.ie

If you have any concerns about this study and wish to contact an independent person, please contact: The Secretary, Dublin City University Research Ethics Committee, c/o Research and Innovation Support, Dublin City University, Dublin 9. Tel 01-7008000, e-mail rec@dcu.ie

Informed Consent Form

Research working title: *Climate Change Policies and Pastoralist Livelihoods in the Horn of Africa: Insights from Ethiopia and Kenya*

Researcher: Thomas Campbell, PhD Student, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University (DCU) – Thomas.campbell4@mail.dcu.ie

Name of Interviewee:

_____

Contact Details (address, email):

_____

_____

- I have read and understood the letter of information about this research on climate change policy and pastoralism in Ethiopia and Kenya.

- I have had the purpose of this research explained to me and have had an opportunity to ask questions about the study.

- I understand I may withdraw from this process at any time, or ask for the recording device to be switched off.

- I agree that my interview can be audio-recorded and transcribed, provided I cannot be identified from the written transcripts.

- I am aware that the information I provide to the researcher can be only be protected within the limitations of the law, i.e. it is possible for the data to subject to subpoena, freedom of information request or mandatory reporting by some professions.

- I understand that the transcript of this interview will be retained for a period of up to 4 years, to be used solely for the purposes of supporting information for the PhD thesis described above, as well as in any related academic publications or conference papers.

- I understand I will not benefit directly from this research.

- I have been given a copy of this consent form.

- Accordingly, I freely and voluntarily consent to take part in this research project

Participants Signature: _____

Name in Block Capitals: _____

Date:

Researcher Signature _____

Appendix D: Interview Schedules

Questions for Ethiopian interviewees:

Policy Context

1. **What do you think have been the main challenges and issues facing the pastoralist / lowland areas of Ethiopia in recent years?**

Supplementary questions (if not mentioned in the answers to Q1 above):

1.1. How significant is climate change for the future of pastoralist areas and pastoralist livelihoods in Ethiopia, and the HoA more generally?

Policy responses and their effectiveness

2. How are these challenges currently being addressed through national policies, including climate change policy?

3. What in your view, does an'effective policy' look like? Is that what current policies are? If not, why not?

Actors and institutions, and their motivations and interests.

4. Who are the principle actors and institutions involved in policymaking in this area?

Supplementary questions (if not mentioned in the answers to Q4 above):

4.1 Are these the same actors who are also involved in shaping agricultural / livestock policy, or developing policies around ending drought emergencies in dryland areas?

4.2. Are there other non-state actors involved in, or concerned with, this policymaking process?

4.3. How are these policies negotiated if there are multiple actors or stakeholders involved and perhaps competing agendas?

5. Does your organisation / ministry have any role in climate change, green economy or dryland / pastoralist development policies – at the formulation or the implementation stage? If so, what is the nature of this involvement and what does your organisation hope to achieve?

Supplementary questions

5.1. If you or your organisation is not directly involved in policymaking do you align yourself with any particular policy position? Why? Why not?

Sources of legitimacy and power

6. Do some actors have more influence than others, when it comes to formulating policy, and if so, why? (from where do they draw their strength?)

Supplementary questions

6.1. Does the availability of new sources of climate finance have any influence in determining what policies are prioritised over others?

6.2. Do the international community – donors or the UN for example – have any say over what policy options and types of interventions are privileged over others?

6.3 Do international consultants, used to design and write policy – around climate change and the green economy for example – have any influence on the way certain policies are designed and communicated?

7. Do any fora, or platforms, exist for pastoralist MPs, pastoralist representative organisations, or other civil society organisations, to input to these policymaking processes?

Supplementary questions

7.1. Are these platforms effective in your view? (Why? Why not?)

7.2. (Ethiopia only) It has been argued that space for civil society engagement in policymaking processes has shrunk as a result of the 2009 Civil Society Proclamation – that restricts local NGOs from using foreign sources of funding for rights advocacy work. Has this any bearing on how pastoralist organisations, for example, might have engaged in recent climate or CRGE policy dialogues?

7.3. (Ethiopia only) Does a Pastoralist Affairs Standing Committee (PASC) still exist in the Ethiopian parliament and if so does it have a role in policymaking?

Climate policy prescriptions and pastoralist outcomes

8. Would you describe the policy options currently being promoted for pastoralist areas as largely 'incremental' in nature, or are they calling for more fundamentally 'transformative' change to take place?

8.1 Do the kinds of approaches and policy solutions favoured by policymakers today differ from dryland policies and programmes in the past?

9. What, in your view are the consequences for pastoralists – both positive, and negative – of the policies we have been discussing so far?

Supplementary questions (if not answered under Q9 above):

9.1. Are these interventions and solutions likely to benefit pastoralists…. in terms of offering new opportunities for pastoral development, or strengthening their capacity to deal with climatic and other uncertainties?

9.2. Do policies take sufficient account of the social and political (non-climatic) factors contributing to pastoralists' vulnerability?

9.4. Are there any cases where donor or government-led 'climate resilience' programmes in pastoral areas may in fact be undesirable, or unachievable, for some pastoralist households?

10. What role, if any, do pastoralists have in the transition to a 'green economy'?

Supplementary questions, (if not answered under Q10 above):

10.1. What are the implications for pastoralist communities in areas where renewable energy infrastructure development – hydro-electric power, geothermal or wind power – is being rolled out?

10.3. Do you know of any REDD+ or other such carbon sequestration schemes in dryland / pastoralist areas, and if so: what are the consequences of these for local pastoralist communities?

11. Does 'climate smart agriculture' have anything to offer to the drylands, or to pastoralist livestock production more specifically?

<u>What future for pastoralism</u> ?

12. How do you see the longer-term future for pastoralism and pastoralists in Ethiopia? …. In 10 years time, what kind of livelihood strategies do you see being pursued?

13. How can rangelands be made more secure for local users such as pastoralists?

Supplementary questions (if not addressed in the answer to Q13 above).

13.1. Are there any vested political interests that may seek to derail – or delay – climate adaptation, drylands development, and other policies that seek to improve governance for pastoralist areas?

13.2. How can the 'voice' of pastoral communities in climate change and other policy formulation be strengthened in the future?

Questions for Kenyan interviewees:

Policy Context

1. **What do you think have been the main challenges and issues facing the pastoralist / dryland areas of Kenya in recent years?**

Supplementary questions (if not mentioned in the answers to Q1 above):

1.1. How significant is climate change for the future of pastoralist areas and pastoralist livelihoods in Kenya, and the HoA more generally?

Policy responses and their effectiveness

2. How are these challenges currently being addressed through national policies, including climate change policy?

3. What in your view does an'effective policy' look like? Is that what current policies are? If not, why not?

Key actors and institutions, and their motivations and interests.

4. Who are the principle actors and institutions involved in policymaking in this area?

Supplementary questions (if not mentioned in the answers to Q4 above):

4.1 Are these the same actors who are also involved in shaping agricultural / livestock policy, or developing policies around ending drought emergencies in dryland areas?

4.2. Are there other non-state actors – CSOs for example, INGOs, donors, or even the private sector – involved in, or concerned with, this policymaking process?

4.3. How are these policies negotiated if there are multiple actors or stakeholders involved? – and perhaps competing agendas?

5. Does your organisation / ministry have any role in climate change, green economy or ASAL / pastoralist development policies – at the formulation or the implementation stage? If so, what is the nature of this involvement and what does your organisation hope to achieve?

5.1. If you or your organisation is not directly involved in policymaking do you align yourself with any particular policy position? Why? Why not?

Sources of legitimacy and power

6. Do some actors have more influence than others, when it comes to formulating policy, and if so, why? (from where do they draw their strength?)

Supplementary questions (if not mentioned in the answers to Q6 above):

6.1. Does the availability of new sources of climate finance have any influence in determining what policies are prioritised over others?

6.2. Do the international community – donors or the UN for example – have any say over what policy options and types of interventions are privileged over others?

6.3 Do international consultants, used to design and write policy – around climate change and the green economy for example – have any influence on the way certain policies are designed and communicated?

7. Do any fora, or platforms, exist for pastoralist MPs, pastoralist representative organisations or other civil society organisations to input to these policymaking processes?

Supplementary questions

7.1. Are these platforms effective in your view? (Why? Why not?)

7.2. (Kenya only) The creation of the MDNKOAL in 2009, the subsequent 'ASAL policy' from 2012, and the process around the new Constitution in 2010, were all seen as opening up significant 'policy space' for pastoralists in Kenya engage in policy processes. Now that the MDNKOAL has been disbanded does that space still exist?

7.3. (Kenya only). What are some of the specific governance challenges faced by ASAL County governments in addressing climate change?

7.4. (Kenya only). To what extent do you think the current devolution or decentralisation process (including the formulation of *County Integrated Development Plans* and the *Equalisation Fund)* impedes, or facilitates, policy implementation that is favourable to pastoralists?

Climate policy prescriptions and pastoralist outcomes

8. Would you describe the policy options currently being promoted for pastoralist areas as largely 'incremental' in nature, or are they calling for more fundamentally 'transformative' change to take place?

Supplementary question

8.1 Do the kinds of approaches and policy solutions favoured by policymakers today differ from dryland policies and programmes in the past?

9. What, in your view are the consequences for pastoralists – both positive, and negative – of the policies we have been discussing so far?

Supplementary questions (if not answered under Q9 above):

9.1. Are these interventions and solutions likely to benefit pastoralists…. in terms of offering new opportunities for pastoral development, or strengthening their capacity to deal with climatic and other uncertainties?

9.2. Do policies take sufficient account of the social and political (non-climatic) factors contributing to pastoralists' vulnerability?

9.3. Are there any cases where donor or government-led 'climate resilience' programmes in pastoral areas may in fact be undesirable, or unachievable, for some pastoralist households?

10. What role, if any, do pastoralists have in the transition to a 'green economy'?

10.1. What are the implications for pastoralist communities in areas where renewable energy infrastructure development – hydro-electric power, geothermal, or wind power – is being rolled out?

10.2. Do you know of any REDD or other such carbon sequestration schemes in dryland / pastoralist areas, and if so: what are the consequences of these for local pastoralist communities?

11. Does 'climate smart agriculture' have anything to offer to the drylands, or to pastoralist livestock production more specifically?

<u>What future for pastoralism</u> ?

12. How do you see the longer-term future for pastoralism and pastoralists in Kenya?

13. How can rangelands be made more secure for local users such as pastoralists?

Supplementary questions if not raised in the answer to Q13 above.

13.1. Are there any vested political interests that may seek to derail – or delay – climate adaptation, drylands development, and other policies that seek to improve governance for pastoralist areas?

13.2. How can the 'voice' of pastoral communities in climate change and other policy formulation be strengthened in the future?

13.3. (Kenya only): Do you think the new *Community Land Act* (2016) will be beneficial for pastoralists? If so, how?

Appendix E: Interview findings Axial codes (Nvivo)

Kenya Interview findings

Nodes\\Phase 2 – Axial Codes

Name	Description	Files	References
Actors and Actor Networks		0	0
Actor networks and discourse coalitions		32	96
Actors' motivations and interests		34	156
Vested interests		25	52
Actors' sources of power and legitimacy		25	42
Contingent nature of policy processes		33	129
Climate policy framework and institutions		12	13
Climate-finance mechanisms		19	25
Devolution, pastoralism and climate change		33	107
Policy coordination and effectiveness		30	79
Policy discourses		0	0
Climate policy prescriptions		28	58
Technical / Apolitical solutions		15	26
Conflicting, competing narratives and Inter-discursivity		12	16
Environmental and climate crisis narratives		35	88
Inappropriate policies and investment		32	80
'Food security without pastoralism'		24	37
'Beyond marginalisation'		23	32
Land tenure		29	49
Restrictions on mobility and access to critical resources		24	38
Understandings and misunderstandings of pastoralism		25	55
'Modern, mobile and green'		21	70
Narrative archetypes		3	4
'Pure pastoralism'		18	65
'Transforming pastoralism and drylands'		26	34
ASALs as the new frontier		10	11
'Moving up or moving out'		19	33

Name	Description	Files	References
'Too many people, too many livestock'		12	20
Policy outcomes and consequences		0	0
Adaptive capacity		17	31
Future of pastoralism		31	45
Pastoralist governance and rights		24	52
Rhetoric or reality?		32	100
Winners and losers		23	54

Ethiopia interview findings

Nodes\\Phase 2 – Axial Codes

Name	Description	Files	References
Actors		0	0
Actors' motivations and interests		27	116
Participation in policy processes		25	81
Policy coherence and effectiveness		25	76
Contingent nature of policy processes		13	18
Sources of power and legitimacy		28	116
Historical context		12	17
New policy spaces		22	46
Technologies of rule		5	6
Discourses and narratives		0	0
Conflicting narratives		15	27
Consensus-building metaphors and narratives		9	18
Dominant discourses		22	46
'Doomed by climate change'		28	59
Climate resilience		28	67
Coping vs adaptive strategies		18	25
'Drylands as the new frontier'		13	22
'Modern, mobile and green'		22	65
'Pure pastoralism'		19	80
'A failure of policy'		29	158
Countervailing power		14	22
Loss of critical resources		20	63
Political and governance solutions		10	14
'Transforming pastoralism and drylands'		28	49
'Too many people, too many animals'		21	47
Technical solutions		9	14
Misunderstanding pastoralism		23	60
Narratives with archetypes		4	10
Policy consequences		0	0
Adaptive capacity		22	37
Future of pastoralism		28	62
Pastoral governance		21	46
Livelihoods		16	18
Rhetoric vs realities		26	71
Winners and losers		20	45

Appendix F: Policy document word counts

Table 7: Keyword count, Ethiopian policy documents

	FDRE-NMA 2007	FDRE 2008	FDRE 2010	FDRE 2011a	FDRE-MoA 2010	FDRE-EPA 2011	FDRE 2011b	FDRE/WB 2013	FDRE 2014	FDRE MoA 2015	FDRE 2015	EPCC 2015	FDRE - MECC 2015a	FDRE - MECC 2015b	USAID / MC 2016	Farm Africa 2016	FDRE 2017	totals
Variability	53	0	44	25	2	10	2	4	0	4	0	88	80	51	0	1	12	**376**
Mobile	0	8	24	33	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	10	0	0	0	1	0	**80**
Livelihood(s)	19	13	75	74	4	25	2	43	8	7	4	73	58	5	5	1	11	**427**
Pastoral system(s)	0	4	8	7	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	13	0	0	0	2	2	**44**
Customary Institutions	0	2	3	4	1	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	**17**
Autonomous adaptation	0	0	7	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	1	0	3	**16**
Resilience	2	0	18	5	2	5	3	60	1	1	12	47	187	49	6	9	30	**437**
Adaptive capacity	0	0	16	32	0	33	0	2	0	1	0	7	1	0	1	0	14	**107**
Rights	0	0	0	9	1	0	2	2	33	4	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	**55**
Indigenous	0	0	13	20	1	4	3	1	7	29	0	34	0	0	0	0	1	**113**
Pastoral Governance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0**
Key resources	0	2	7	4	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	0	**19**
Climate risk	13	1	22	9	0	11	0	13	4	0	3	19	17	26	1	4	12	**155**
Vulnerable	53	4	77	36	28	66	2	24	21	0	11	184	48	22	3	3	20	**602**
Degradation	42	7	53	72	25	32	46	17	10	3	4	47	6	3	0	2	7	**376**
Conflict	0	12	28	39	2	9	3	0	4	3	0	4	1	3	0	1	1	**110**
Insecurity	1	6	23	14	11	1	1	41	7	1	1	30	3	0	0	0	1	**141**
Coping strategy	11	0	13	14	1	5	0	1	1	0	0	8	1	0	0	0	2	**57**
Transform	0	3	2	1	4	0	11	2	242		2	3	6	7	0	2	1	**286**
Sedentarise	1	4	2	6	0	0	0	0	4	2	0	5	3	0	0	0	1	**28**
Irrigation	47	14	38	32	40	18	93	10	47	2	2	87	8	56	0	0	3	**497**
Integration	2	3	2	1	2	1	2	7	56	4	5	5	6	14	5	1	29	**145**
Commercial	18	6	6	2	97	5	21	0	179	118	1	12	6	14	4	7	5	**501**
Productivity	12	4	21	16	70	11	43	25	241	61	4	5	26	15	4	0	9	**567**
Value chain	0	0	3	1	34	0	15	0	4	37	0	6	7	0	3	0	3	**113**
Climate resilient	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	13	29	1	6	7	30	10	4	1	8	**110**
Renewable Energy	4	0	2	1	0	4	21	0	18	0	4	2	0	8	0	0	8	**72**
Adaptive management	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	**4**
Pastoralist entrepreneurs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0**
Diversification	4	5	18	12	8	6	8	4	0	3	1	22	9	0	0	1	2	**103**
Green economy	0	0	0	0	0	2	164	11	38	1	11	11	24	18	0	1	8	**289**
Sustainable adaptation	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	**1**
Carbon sequestration	11	0	0	0	1	1	35	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	**53**
Payment for Environmental Services	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1	**4**
Climate Smart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	**3**
Policy harmonisation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	**1**
Cross border	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**4**
Social Protection	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	5	0	0	1	3	**16**
Public Goods	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	**4**
	293	**99**	**528**	**475**	**334**	**256**	**478**	**282**	**957**	**298**	**72**	**736**	**538**	**303**	**40**	**40**	**204**	**5933**

Table 8: Keyword count of Kenyan policy documents

	GoK-MLD 2008	GoK-MALF 2010	GoK 2010	GoK-MDNKOAL 2012	GoK-MDP 2013	GoK 2013a	GoK 2013b	GoK-MALF 2014	GoK-NDMA 2014	GoK-MENR 2014	GoK-MENR 2015a	GoK-MENR 2015b	GoK 2015	GoK-MENR 2016	GoK-MLPP 2016	GoK-ICG 2016	totals
Variability	0	2	17	7	0	22	4	1	4	11	1	2	11	13	2	21	**118**
Mobile	1	0	0	29	0	1	22	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	31	**94**
Livelihood(s)	6	23	24	16	23	41	41	77	10	2	1	7	10	18	13	14	**326**
Pastoral System	2	3	0	1	0	0	5	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	30	**47**
Customary Institutions	0	0	0	5	0	0	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	33	**43**
Autonomous adaptation	1	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	**8**
Resilience	0	0	5	3	8	63	35	16	34	47	8	22	23	58	0	14	**336**
Adaptive capacity	0	0	2	2	0	18	1	1	0	33	3	0	5	15	0	1	**81**
Rights	1	4	0	9	47	3	10	6	4	2	0	2	0	1	12	7	**108**
Indigenous	13	3	4	4	6	6	3	2	1	4	0	0	1	5	9	5	**66**
Pastoral governance	0	0	0	12	0	0	6	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	12	**34**
Key resources	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	30	**35**
Climate risk	0	4	19	3	1	42	15	11	87	7	2	2	22	31	2	9	**257**
Vulnerable	5	7	62	9	55	82	53	11	25	40	4	15	13	72	2	7	**462**
Degradation	5	46	37	4	8	56	5	8	0	13	0	4	19	4	43	13	**265**
Conflict	8	15	8	12	22	9	32	15	2	2	0	0	1	2	30	4	**162**
Insecurity	7	14	2	9	9	6	10	9	3	2	0	4	6	1	4	2	**88**
Coping strategy	0	1	2	0	0	4	0	1	2	4	0	0	4	2	0	0	**20**
Transform	4	36	8	2	96	7	2	2	2	1	0	6	7	4	3	2	**182**
Sedentarise	0	2	0	0	5	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	1	**12**
Irrigation	0	109	16	11	31	23	8	19	0	0	1	3	31	5	8	3	**268**
Integration	0	20	22	12	146	54	17	10	32	34	9	23	12	37	14	14	**456**
Commercial	25	147	77	38	56	69	15	20	22	20	6	25	50	47	2	9	**628**
Productivity	21	107	12	10	51	12	9	3	2	2	0	2	37	9	34	26	**337**
Value chain(s)	26	45	5	5	11	2	6	10	0	0	2	0	40	6	1	27	**186**
Climate resilient	0	0	3	0	0	87	1	0	1	19	4	0	4	23	0	1	**143**
Renewable Energy	0	3	39	8	19	59	5	0	0	2	5	16	3	3	2	6	**170**
Planned adadptation	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	**4**
Pastoralist entrepreneurs	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	**3**
Diversification	0	7	7	7	0	6	2	3	0	0	0	2	3	4	1	10	**52**
Green economy	0	0	0	0	3	1	3	0	0	4	0	114	1	0	0	1	**127**
Sustainable adaptation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0**
Climate smart	0	0	1	0	1	8	0	1	0	0	3	0	23	13	1	2	**53**
Carbon sequestration	0	2	38	7	5	79	1	3	0	6	0	2	2	0	0	2	**147**
Payments for Environmental Ser	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	**7**
Policy harmonisation	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	**8**
Cross border	2	5	2	9	5	2	15	0	3	1	0	0	0	1	13	15	**73**
Social Protection	0	0	0	7	27	1	10	3	55	0	0	7	2	1	0	1	**114**
Public good(s)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	6	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	**12**
	130	**605**	**413**	**244**	**635**	**767**	**342**	**249**	**310**	**256**	**49**	**258**	**331**	**379**	**204**	**360**	**5532**

Appendix G: Indicative list of current or recent donor-funded pastoralist-resilience programmes and projects in Ethiopia and Kenya[375]

Ethiopia

Principle donor(s)	Programme	Duration	Funding	Institutional Partners	Areas of focus
WB, IFAD	*Pastoralist Community Development Programme'* (PCDP) – Phase III	2014–2019	Phase 3 funding: US$ 210.20 million	Ministry for Pastoralist Development and Federal Affairs (MPDFA), Regional State governments	Service provision, infrastructure development, livelihoods programmes, in 113 pastoral and agropastoral woredas of the Afar, Somali, Oromiya, and SNNP Regional States[376]
WB	*Lowlands Livelihoods Resilience Project*	2019–	($280 million in form of concessional credit, and $70 million in grants),	MPDFAs (as of 2019 the 'Ministry for Peace')	Conflict management, integrated rangeland management, enhanced pastoral and agropastoral production, livelihood diversification and market access, capacity building[377]
USAID	*Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion* (PRIME)	2012–2017	US$70 million	Mercy Corps Ethiopia in partnership with international and local organisations	PRIME focuses on selected districts of Ethiopia's Afar, Oromiya and Somali regions.[378] Livestock productivity and marketing, climate adaptation, livelihood diversification, nutrition
USAID	*Ethiopia Land Administration to Nurture Development (LAND)*	2013–2018	US$10.5 million	LAUD/MoANR: Oromia, Afar, Somali Regional State land admistration bureaus, local organisations	Pastoralist area land rights and governance in Oromia, Afar and Somali[379]
	Resilience Building and	2016–2020	EUR47 million	30 NGOs, FAO	EU-funded project designed to

[375] This list is by no means exhaustive but does include the some prominent donor-funded pastoralist-area-resilience programmes in recent years.
[376] https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P130276?lang=en
[377] http://projects.worldbank.org/P164336?lang=en
[378] https://www.prime-ethiopia.org/
[379] 'https://www.land-links.org/project/land-administration-to-nurture-development-ethiopia/

Principle donor(s)	Programme	Duration	Funding	Institutional Partners	Areas of focus
EU	*Creation of Economic Opportunities in Ethiopia* (RESET II)			and UNICEF	'strengthen the resilience capacity of the most vulnerable communities in Ethiopia' (EU, 2019).[380] Service provision, Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), livelihoods
DFID / UKAID	*Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters*' (BRACED)	2015–2020 2015–2019		Christian Aid, Ethiopia Met. Office, local partners Farm Africa, LTS, Mercy Corps	Climate information services, DRR, in pastoral lowlands of Southern Ethiopia 'Market based approaches to resilience building', in Afar, Somali and SNNPR[381]
WB / IGAD	*Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project*	2014–2021	US$122m		Objectives include 'enhance livelihood resilience of pastoral and agropastoral communities in cross-border drought-prone areas' *382*

[380] https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/projects/resilience-building-and-creation-economic-opportunities-ethiopia-reset-ii_en
[381] https://www.farmafrica.org/ethiopia/braced-in-ethiopia
[382] http://projects.worldbank.org/P129408/regional-pastoral-livelihoods-recovery-resilience-project?lang=en

Kenya

Principle donor(s)	Programme	Duration	Funding	Institutional Partners	Areas of focus
WB	*North and Northeastern Development Initiative* (NEDI)[383]	2018–	$1 billion in grants and loans	GoK, Northern Kenya County administrations	Includes investment in: infrastructure, renewable energy, 'climate-smart agriculture', water and sanitation, Household Safety Net Programme (HSNP), National Agricultural and Rural Inclusive Growth[384] initiative
USAID	*Resilience and Economic Growth in Arid Lands* (REGAL)[385]	2015–2017	$45.5 million	GoK-MALF in 5 ASAL counties; NDMA; Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI); local NGOs	Livestock productivity and marketing, including reduction in livestock emissions, drought resilience
USAID / Swiss Development Corperation (SDC)	*Resilient Arid Lands Partnership for Integrated Development* (Kenya RAPID)	2015–2020	$35.5 million	GoK-MALF in 5 ASAL Counties, local and international NGOs (Care, WV, CRS), private sector organisations	Water supply and NR governance across 5 northern ASAL counties, Supports Kenya's EDE Common programme framework[386]
UKAID/DFID	*'Strengthening Adaptation and Resilience to Climate Change in Kenya Plus'* (StARCK+) [387]	2013–2019	£30 million	UNDP, IIED, AfGRA, IBRD, local partners	Technical support and funding to CSA initiatives, and to the *County Climate Funds (CCF)*
UKAID/DFID	*Arid Lands Support Programme*	2012–2017	£14 million		"improve the coping strategies for over 500,000 of the poorest people in Northern Kenya (to help them to adapt to climate change and improve their livelihoods"[388]
EU	*Supporting Horn of Africa*	2013–	E40 million	GoK, FAO, DANIDA	Drought resilience, food and nutrition

[383] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/05/08/boosting-prosperity-improving-equity-in-north-and-north-eastern-kenya
[384] http://projects.worldbank.org/P153349?lang=en
[385] https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/REGAL_IR.pdf
[386] https://www.usaid.gov/documents/1860/kenya-resilient-arid-lands-partnership-integrated-development
[387] https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-203574
[388] https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-202619

Principle donor(s)	Programme	Duration	Funding	Institutional Partners	Areas of focus
	Resilience in Kenya (SHARE-Kenya)				security, and DRR in ASAL counties[389]
SIDA	*Improved food security and resilience for vulnerable communties in Kenya*	2016–		FAO	Food security, Natural Resource Management, livelihoods, climate change adaptation.

[389] https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/kenya-supporting-horn-africa-resilience-kenya-share%E2%80%93kenya_en