THE RELEVANCE OF SIZE: A COMPARISON OF 'SMALL' EUROPEAN NAVIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD, 1990 - 2017

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Dedication.

Dedicated to those who preserve life,

fair winds and following seas.

Acknowledgements.

Abbreviations.

A.F.M.	Armed Forces Malta
A.M.C.C.N.	Allied Maritime Component Command Northwood
BALTDEFCOL	Baltic Defence College
BALTRON	Baltic Naval Squadron
C.F.S.P.	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CINCEASTLANT	Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic
Co.	County
COMMARAIR	Maritime Air Command
COMSUBNATO	NATO Submarine Command
Dept.	Department
DG MARE	Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs
D.H.A.	Department of Humanitarian affairs
D.P.K.O.	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
D.Z.P.	De Zeven Provinciën (The Seven Province) class
E.A.D.R.C.C.	Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre
E.B.F.	External Border Fund
E.C.H.O.	European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department
E.E.A.S.	European External Action Service
E.P.V.	Extended Patrol Vessel

E.R.C.	Emergency Relief Coordinator
E.S.S.	European Security Strategy
E.U.G.S.	European Union Global Strategy
E.U.M.S.S.	European Maritime Security Strategy
E.U.T.M.	European Training Mission
EUNAVFORMED.	European Naval Force Mediterranean
EUROSUR	European Border Surveillance System
FINABEL	European Army Interoperability Centre
F.N.	Fridtjof Nansen
G.D.P.	Gross Domestic Product
HNLMS	His/Her Netherlands Majesty's Ship
HODOPS	Historical Ordnance Disposal Operations
I.A.S.C.	Inter Agency Standing Committee
I.E.D.	Improvised Explosive Device
IMERC	Irish Maritime and Energy Resource Cluster
I.M.E.T.	International Military Education and Training programme
I.M.O.	International Maritime Organisation
I.N.S.	Irish Naval Service
I.R.A.	Irish Republican Army
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
I.T.	Information Technology
K.D.	Karel Doorman

KNM	*K*ongelig *N*orske *M*arine (Norwegian Navy Ship)
LÉ	Long Éireannach (Irish Ship)
MAOC-N	Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre Narcotics
MARCOM	Allied Maritime Command
MARSUR	Maritime Surveillance
MCAST	Malta College of Arts, Science and Technology
M.O.U.	Memorandum of Understanding
M.T.B.	Motor Torpedo Boat
M.C.S.	Marine and Coast Watching Service
M.R.C.C.	Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
N.G.O.	Non Governmental Organisation
N.J.O.D.	Norwegian Joint Operational Doctrine
N.M.C.I.	National Maritime College Ireland
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Op.	Operation
O.P.V.	Offshore Patrol Vessel
PASSEX	Passing Exercise
P.F.P.	Partnership for Peace
P.S.O.	Peace Support Operations
R.D.T.	Rapid Deployment Team
RHIB	Rigid Hulled Inflatable Boat
R.M.A.	Royal Malta Artillery

R.N.N.	Royal Norwegian Navy
R.Nd.N.	Royal Netherlands Navy
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies
SAR	Search and Rescue
S.D.R.	Strategic Defence Review
S.L.A.	Service Level Agreements
SNMCMG1	Standing Naval Mine Counter Measure Group One
SQ.EX.	Squadron Exercises
S.U.A.	Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
U.K./N.L. A.F.	United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force
U.K./N.L. E.U.B.G.	United Kingdom/Netherlands Battle Group
UNCLOS I	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
U.N.H.C.R.	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
U.S.C.G.	United States coast guard
U.S.N.	United States Navy
V.P.D.	Vessel Protection Detachment
W.E.U.	Western European Union
W.M.D	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Summary

This thesis examines the development of 'small' European navies in the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union until the present day. Its aims are to document the development of such navies in a period a significant change in global maritime affairs. It also investigates the utility of the term 'small navy', firstly, to establish whether size has a reliable impact on a navies behaviour and development, and secondly, to investigate if there is evidence to support the claim that small navies are possessed of distinct characteristics compared to their larger peers. This thesis examines these ideas through a series of case studies, including two major case studies: The Irish Naval Service and the Maltese Maritime Squadron. The development of these navies is examined in the period by investigating the development of their policy, assets and operational activities. This thesis also includes a number of secondary case studies of similar navies including the Royal Norwegian Navy, the Royal Netherlands Navy, the Croatian Navy, and the navies of the Baltic States. It also includes an analysis of the maritime frameworks of three major international organisations: The U.N., the E.U., and NATO. With the emphasis on multilateralism during this period in maritime affairs, it is relevant to explore the relationships the case studies have had with these bodies and the impact of them on their development. This thesis major findings are that while the term 'small', in relation to navies carries some utility in broadly estimating a navy's displacement and capability for traditional naval operations; each navy represents a unique attempt at answering the nuanced requirements of its nation state. Furthermore, in relation to their larger peers, this thesis finds that the differences between the classes are best described as those of 'scale' rather than of qualitative 'type'.

Chapter 1:
Introduction.

This work focuses on the development of small European navies in the period following the end of the Cold War. In particular it is concerned with their composition and evolution. It also examines them as organisations within rapidly changing strategic, political, and economic environments. It explores these topics particularly in relation to case studies of 'small' navies in the period. Furthermore, it accounts for the development of the major international frameworks in the period and their impact on the environments these navies have existed within. These topics raise a number of key questions such as: the utility of size based metrics in classifying a navy's effectiveness? Can the term 'small' effectively describe a distinct class of navy beyond physical size? How have these navies conceptualised their own identities in this period? And how have they been influenced by the relationships with each other and their larger peers?

This thesis considers the navies of a selection of European states throughout this period, in light of their often expanded roles as public bodies in the maritime domain. It also investigates their place within the international frameworks in which they operate both individually and through institutions such as the E.U, NATO and the U.N. It also provides an investigation into the accuracy of the traditional dominant frameworks in maritime strategy. It does so by examining the utility of conceptualising 'small navies' as possessing homogenous characteristics based on that classification. Additionally, it addresses the question that any such characteristics differ fundamentally, beyond scope, from their larger equivalents. Thus this research is related to topics ranging from naval affairs and maritime theory, to international legal development, organisational learning, the economics of small organisations particularly in times of economic stress, and their transitions through times of rapid change.

In the almost three decades since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the states of Europe have witnessed tremendous social, political, and economic change across the continent. Some have transitioned from satellites of a dominant world power to independence. From there many have expanded their engagement into voluntary international efforts through the E.U., NATO, and the U.N. Others have experienced both economic growth and decline, and recovery thereafter. Additionally, they have all been impacted by the massive changes in the distribution of global power since the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. In the maritime domain they have witnessed a significant shift in affairs as following the collapse of the only naval force to truly rival the United States Navy (U.S.N.) in terms of power projection and war-fighting capability. With the dissolution of the Soviet Navy a new trend emerged in the period that followed, one that expanded naval affairs focus beyond the scope of 'naval' concerns towards broader 'maritime' activities. This trend was particularly notable amongst the publications of the dominant U.S.N. and it direct allies, but as will be illustrated, this trend influenced navies of all 'ranks' throughout the period.[1] Additionally, throughout the period the general trend towards greater levels of political and defence integration in Europe through bodies such as the E.U., NATO, and the U.N. necessitate their inclusion in any study of the development of these navies. The impact of these organisations on the character of the challenges faced by these navies can be found in examples such as: the relationship between the E.U.'s border arrangements and sea based migration in the Mediterranean, and NATOs collective defence arrangements on the regional security tensions between Russia and its neighbours including the Nordic and Baltic States.

Within maritime strategy the topic of small navies has often been sidelined. Since the late nineteenth century there has existed a tendency to view such affairs through a small selection of dominant models or frameworks. Specifically, those were the Anglo-American frameworks that were pioneered in such seminal texts as Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* and Corbett's

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[1] Geoffery Till, 'European naval power after the Cold War' in Gert de Nooy (ed.), *The role of European naval forces after the Cold War* (London, 1996), pp 23-54. at p. 53.

Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.[2] These works laid the foundation of the conception of naval power as the capacity for the manifestation of the will the state through the leverage of force. Indeed, contemporary histories of naval power are still being framed in terms coined over a century ago.[3] These frameworks have been the basis of the evolution of many of the most notable naval forces in the world, throughout the twentieth century. Mahan's concepts on the nature of seapower, and Corbett's moderating influence that emphasis must be placed in its relationship to the effect it has on land can be found in naval doctrine in the early twenty first century.[4]Additionally, they still serve as influencers of the contemporary theory. These theories often conflate terms such as size and capability as synonymous with overall relevance. These more recent theories have often sorted navies into homogenous size based categories such as small, medium or large. Even where works have sought to create a more nuanced understanding of naval compositions, such as Eric Grove's 14 point categorisation, such work often still carries with it a prioritisation of the top tiers of its scale over 'token' navies that sit at the bottom and was structured around topics such as power projection.[5] Considering more recent notable publications on maritime strategy, there remains a trend towards minimal consideration of such navies in larger texts on the subject. Speller's *Understanding Naval Warfare* makes little reference to the topic beyond mentions of the potential for technologically enabled asymmetric threats to larger powers in terms of naval access.[6] Geoffrey Tills text on *Seapower* made reference to the question about how best to rank order navies, and alluded to the importance of factors such as function but did not significantly engage with the question beyond this.[7] Recent histories on the topic such as Richard Harding's, *Modern Naval History* have

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[2] Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The influence of sea power upon history 1660-1783* (Boston, 1890); Julian Corbett, *Some principles of Maritime Strategy* (Annapolis, 1911).

[3] Richard Harding, *The emergence of Britain's global naval supremacy: the war of 1739-1748* (Woodbridge, 2010).

[4] Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: a guide for the twenty-first century* (4th ed., London, 2018), p. 66.

[5] Eric Grove, *The future of seapower* (London, 1990).

[6] Ian Speller, *Understanding naval warfare* (3rd ed., London, 2018), p 189.

[7] Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: a guide for the twenty-first century* (4th ed., London, 2018), p. 115.

likewise remained traditionally focused on the activities of large navies in the period in relation to sea power.[8]

This is not to say that there are not valid reasons why such frameworks have gained prominence. On one hand they rightly espoused the importance of navies, and the maritime environment to societies in both a military and civil sense. This is especially due to its historical importance for resources, trade, communication and national security outside the domain of warfare. It is however necessary to note that they have often carried an inherent bias, that has traditionally discouraged focus on the smaller navies within the spectrum.

However, in recent years there have been some developments and smaller publications that have begun to reassess these frameworks. With notable theorists such as Geoffrey Till making some efforts to deal with the apparent difficulties of grouping navies by size, particularly 'small navies'.[9] Meanwhile others such as Jacob Borresen have looked at specific facets of smaller navies.[10] Borresen's work has examined the separation between the larger 'blue water' navies focused on traditional power projection and 'coastal' navies that are modelled around their environment and the deterrence of larger forces.[11] This has contributed an element of differentiation but not one that strays far from concepts expressed in the period of Mahan.[12] Speller too has addressed the topic with a paper to the International Studies Association arguing for the consideration of small navies to move beyond the question of size and scope.[13]

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[8] Richard Harding, *modern naval history* (London, 2016), p. 9.

[9] Geoffrey Till, 'Can small navies stay afloat?' in *Jane's Navy International*, mxxiv, no.6 (2003).

[10] Jacob Borresen, 'Coastal power: The sea power of the coastal state and the management of maritime resources' in Rolf Hobson & Tom Kristiansen (eds), *Navies in northern waters* (London, 2004), pp 249-275.

[11] Jacob Borresen 'The seapower of the coastal state', in *Journal Of Strategic Studies*, xvii,no.1, (1994), pp 148-175.

[12] Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: a guide for the twenty-first century* (4th ed., London, 2018), p. 71.

[13] Ian Speller, Maritime strategy and policy for smaller navies (San Diego, 2012), p. 18.

This trend has begun to accelerate with publication of the book 'Small Navies' by Mulqueen, Sanders, and Speller.[14] This collection of papers was a product of an international conference on the topic of small navies held in Maynooth University, Ireland in 2012. It brings together a selection of papers on theory and case studies of practices of small navies and includes 19 case studies by naval analysts, historians and senior naval personnel. These papers highlight growth in the interest in small navies. They feature topics such as the examination of the ranking, the nature of small navies and the utility of hierarchies by commentators such as Till, Borresen and Grove and insights into global naval development from Ireland to Romania to Asian navies such as Singapore and Korea. Additionally, papers such as Christopher Tuck's on the Confederate Navy and Jon Robb-Webb's on the considering the British Fleet in Asia in 1944 as a small navy demonstrate that the questions on the nature of what a small navy is are entering the historical discourse.

What this conference demonstrated was that the questions around the nature of small navies had simultaneous importance to contributors of diverse backgrounds and indeed the navies themselves. It was succeeded by a subsequent conference in 2018 held in King's College London. Also of note in relation to the discourse on small navies is the recently published *Maritime Power in the Black Sea* by Deborah Sanders. This text examined six littoral states in the region ranging in size from Russia and Turkey to Romania and Bulgaria. It did so to provide a framework for assessing the efficacy of a given states 'maritime power' in light of the trend of broadening the concept of a state's relationship with the sea beyond 'naval' topics. This framework is particularly relevant to the discourse as it evolved beyond a traditional quantitative analysis and blended an assessment of the qualitative factors such as morale and professionalisation within a navy with the regional and international political context it finds itself operating within. This included direct reference to the impact of bodies such as the E.U. and NATO and their relationship with the

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[14] Michael Mulqueen, Deborah Sanders, and Ian Speller,(eds), *Small navies strategy and policy for small navies in war and peace* (London, 2014).

navies in the region.[15] This work was built in part from earlier efforts examining regional security issues, namely how domestic political factors play a significant role in regional security realities.[16]

The aim of this thesis will be to examine western European navies in the post Cold War period, particularly those that would be defined as traditionally 'small'. For the purposes of selection of case studies this thesis, the term 'small' is used to describe a number of navies that have either been traditionally ranked as 'small' across the broad spectrum of the various frameworks outlined, or have themselves self-identified as 'small' in their own publications. Examples of the former include the Irish Naval Service and the Maltese Maritime Squadron, while the Royal Norwegian Navy and the Royal Netherlands Navy serve as examples of the latter. In this work the commentary on the issues with the meaning of this term will be analysed. Recently in the discourse the question has been raised as to what criteria should qualify the term 'small' in relation to navies. At the start of the period many established ordering systems for the ranking of navies were formulated around concepts such as power projection, fleet variety and sheer size.[17] However, since then and with the shift away from Cold War era naval theory centred around traditional conceptions of sea power in relation to conflict, the question has been raised as the effect of such classifications. As Germond notes, the creation of such structures creates implicit hierarchies and they in turn colour perceptions about the service being inferior, when its size may not inherently be defective.[18] Likewise, Till has noted that the term small may in fact be better understood as a means of classifying a distinct set of typical activities navies concern themselves with.[19] Indeed, he argues that small navies are best considered as big navies in miniature and do

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[15] Deborah Sanders, *Maritime power in the Black Sea* (London, 2014), p. 2.

[16] Deborah Sanders, *Security cooperation between Russia and Ukraine in the post-soviet era (New York, 2001).*

[17] Eric Grove, *The future of seapower* (London, 1990).

[18] Basil Germond, 'Small navies in perspective: deconstructing the hierarchy of naval forces' in Mulqueen, Michael, Sanders, Deborah and Speller, Ian (eds), *Small navies strategy and policy for small navies in war and peace* (London, 2014), pp 34-50 at p. 49.

[19] Geoffrey Till, 'Are small navies different' in Mulqueen et. al. (eds), *Small navies strategy and policy for small navies in war and peace* (London, 2014), pp 21-33. at p. 31.

not possess distinct characteristics without analogue to their larger counterparts.[20] This thesis will engage with these debates and provide an analysis that seeks to assess their validity and the nature of the term 'small navy'. This will be achieved by taking a broad-spectrum approach to such institutions in light of a variety of topics beyond the traditionally military or strategic. For the purposes of this research examples have been chosen that represent a variety of navies with different traditions and compositions, who have been categorised as 'small' in the period.

It will firstly examine the composition of these navies and specific strategic and operational issues they faced and how they were dealt with. Secondly it will examine how the political and legal environments, national and supranational, that these navies exist in have had an effect upon them. It will examine both the distinct tasks they fulfil and the complex and demanding roles they operate within. This will be carried out in light of contemporary developments globally in the period since the end of the Cold War and in the greater context of how smaller institutions react to rapidly changing economic and political environments

The central questions in all of these topics will be how these navies have adapted to change in this period? To what extent can they be grouped together? And if they can be, how does this differ from other comparative groups i.e. large navies. This secondary point has recently received some attention by scholars, and this work will seek to appraise their efforts further.[21]

In order to investigate these questions this work will be structured on two major case studies of distinct navies. The Irish Naval Service represents a small, neutral force that concerns itself mainly with constabulary activities and has been overlooked historically in comparison to the other branches of the military. The Irish focus on defence affairs has traditionally been dominated nationally and

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[20] Geoffrey Till, 'Are small navies different' in Mulqueen et. al. (eds), *Small navies strategy and policy for small navies in war and peace* (London, 2014), pp 21-33. at p.31
[21] Michael Mulqueen, Deborah Sanders, and Ian Speller (eds), *Small navies strategy and policy for small navies in war and peace* (London, 2014).

internationally by the land-based forces. However, the period of focus seems to have represented a departure from this trend. Additionally, of note is that its area of responsibility drastically expanded in the period of study. The Irish Naval Service provides this study with an example of a constabulary, Atlantic navy that has experienced significant environmental change, notably a vastly expanded area of operations as a result of several international agreements.[22]

The Maltese Maritime squadron is an example of a Mediterranean small navy that operates right on the forefront of migration issues, and other consequences of contemporary political upheaval. What is additionally interesting about the Maritime Squadron is that for an organisation of its size, it has not let conventional notions of efficacy deter it from performing in a host of different roles and capacities. It has injected itself seemingly at every opportunity into international, particularly European task forces. Notably they played and have continued to play an important role in the E.U. Naval Force counter piracy operation ATALANTA, in the Gulf of Aden; as well as maintaining long held relationships with the British Armed Forces, particularly the Royal Navy. Simultaneously it has also been fostering new ones with forces such as the Irish Naval Service and the Royal Netherlands Navy. They also are an interesting case study as they exist right on the forefront of the European border with North Africa, dealing with issues of illegal migration and smuggling on a near constant basis and especially in the wake of the so-called 'Arab Spring'. Furthermore, they have recently been involved with stability and capacity building exercises with forces in the region especially the Libyan elements. It is certainly worthwhile investigating the Maritime Squadron when examining conventions about the efficacy of small naval forces.

As major case studies both the Naval Service and the Maritime Squadron present interesting examples of different small navies operating within the same geopolitical environment and roughly similar constraints. However, it would

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[22] United Nations Commission on the limits of the Continental Shelf, statement by the chairman of the Commission on the limits of the Continental Shelf on the progress of work in the Commission (New York, 2007) p. 8.

indeed be difficult to draw definitive conclusions about small navies as a group, with such a narrow focus. Therefore, it is necessary to supplement the major case studies with a series of secondary studies. This will provide a broader appreciation of the different organisations in Europe, which occupy this group. Furthermore, these examples will better allow this study to illustrate the different attributes of small navies across Europe while simultaneously serving as acid tests for conclusions drawn by this study or by other commentators on the subject.

The Royal Netherlands' Navy is a small navy that has a history of being much larger and presently operates as a member of NATO in a wide variety of roles. These have ranged from search and rescue operations, in aid to the civil power to minesweeping and counter terrorism duties. The Royal Netherlands Navy offers an interesting variant on the theme of small navies, as uniquely at one stage it consisted of five separate admiralties in the Netherlands, and around the world. However, it fell into decline in the period leading up to the twentieth century, and especially leading into the Second World War. It saw a rebirth of sorts in the later part of the twentieth century, mostly due to the renewed emphasis on the formation of effective navies within the NATO countries. As a result the Royal Netherlands Navy now operates as a highly technologically adept, modern naval force that has put a large amount of emphasis upon overcoming its disadvantages in raw size with innovative technology and integrated multilateral partnerships. This has been achieved with an emphasis on emergent technologies and expansion along these lines. It provides this study with an interesting example of a small navy, though some elements within the service might debate that title that has a cultural history of being far larger. Operationally it is involved in broadly similar tasks to the Irish Naval Service but has also engaged in some multilateral cooperative ventures such as the combined United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force.[23] Additionally,

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[23] Ministry of Defence, *Netherlands ready for rapid deployment*, available at defensive.nl, (https://www.defensie.nl/actueel/nieuws/2009/12/03/nederland-paraat-voor-snelle-inzet) (13 Dec 2016).

through its status as a member of NATO means it also contributed to some more globally significant maritime operations. Recently of note, it has been a contributor to ATALANTA alongside the Maltese. Furthermore, it has recently completed the introduction of its new fleet plan, consisting of ten large ocean going ships, as well as a significant amphibious squadron, putting it in a prime position for research as it realises its current goals and begins to adapt and plan for subsequent realities.

The Royal Norwegian Navy is somewhat similar, as like the R.Nd.Navy it too was once a larger force. In the aftermath of the Second World War it saw major restructuring including a reduction of size, and a general re-tasking of its force. With its close proximity to the U.S.S.R., the R.N.N. set about optimising itself for coastal defence, and sea-denial based operations. This was done in an effort to ensure that in case of the outbreak of open hostilities with the U.S.S.R. they would be able to delay the Soviet Navy, until assistance from the other NATO forces arrived. This was achieved in part through funding from other NATO states particularly the U.S. Unsurprisingly with the collapse of the U.S.S.R., the R.N.N. began to revaluate its role in the post-Cold War period. The R.N.N. has seen its role change drastically with the end of the cold war, and the disappearance of the Soviet threat in northern waters. In the period of focus it has spent a considerable amount of time and effort exploring new roles, in a joint maritime environment to the current day. Having spent the best part of the century planning to deter and delay Soviet aggression in expectation of NATO support the R.N.N. was likely the most effected out of the case studies by the collapse of U.S.S.R. Ostensibly the legacy of the cold war is still apparent as the Navy still defines it broad task as 'preserving Norwegian freedom against military and other pressures and to ensure free access to our waters and ports.'.[24] However, the justification now finds its roots increasingly in Norway's substantial maritime revenue, both in terms of trade and exploitation of natural

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[24] Royal Norwegian Navy, 'Organisation,'available at: Norwegian Armed Forces, (http://forsvaret.no/om-forsvaret/organisasjon/sjoforsvaret/Sider/sjoforsvaret.aspx) (2 Jan. 2017).

resources. However there has been substantial change in terms of fleet composition to reflect a more constabulary role, and naval procurement in the period has featured a move towards a smaller fleet overall while maintaining effectiveness generally. However given recent trends of renewed Russian expansionism in Crimea and military build-up in Northern waters the R.N.N. has seen a significant return to the familiar patterns of the last century.

The Croatian Navy is an interesting example of a naval force that was established in the period, as an indirect result of the collapse of the U.S.S.R. The Croatian Navy emerged in 1991, as a part of the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia and the outbreak of conflict between independent Croatia and Serbian loyalists. Throughout that conflict it had to cope with the added pressure of an ongoing conflict, while trying to establish a functioning organisation. In the aftermath of the war the Croatian Navy was tasked with establishing a fully functioning and effective modern naval service particularly 'The development and maintenance of appropriate skills for both traditional and non-traditional tasks and to achieve the required level of interoperability with NATO'.[25] It further defined its specific roles as being traditional anti-ship, submarine and mine activities, as well as limited counter terrorist capacities. Furthermore, it has taken a growing interest in the safety of the Adriatic, and the maintenance of good order at sea. In an international sense the Croatian Navy has placed a heavy emphasis on international operations, within the NATO framework. Notably until it joined NATO it was heavily involved in their 'Partnership for Peace' program in the Mediterranean. Currently in terms of organisation the Croatian Navy has undergone a series of upgrades to its existing hardware, as well as plans to purchase new inshore patrol vessels. With regards to research there has, like many other navies of its scale, been very little identifiable research carried out on the Croatian Navy, certainly not in the English language. The Croatian Navy represents a distinctly unique example of a small navy in Europe, that has within the period studied not only emerged, but spent a protracted period of that time

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[25] Croatian Navy, '*Flotilla troops*', available at armed forces of Croatia, (http://www.osrh.hr/) (2 January 2014).

in conflict. Also, of note is that unlike the other examples given thus far, it has emerged from the former Soviet Union. To what extent this has influenced its evolution in the period will be investigated.

The final minor study of this research will deal with what are collectively known as the Baltic States, comprised of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Like Croatia they too emerged as independent organisations after the breakup of the Eastern Bloc. However, they are distinct in that they represent a Baltic rather than an Atlantic, Adriatic, or Mediterranean example of small post-Soviet navies in Europe. In general, all of the Baltic navies shared a focus on international co-operation in the period. This was expressed locally via the established BALTRON initiative between them, which saw them contributing to a collective local task force, or through the auspices of their NATO membership. Furthermore counter-mine tasking was a role that all three have specialisations within. This was due to the historically large number of sea mines in the Baltic Sea. Estonia represents perhaps the least developed of the three navies as it has suffered throughout the period from a lack of clear doctrinal direction and somewhat of a lack of attention in general. There have been indications in period that this would change, as in recent years there have been talk of modernisation.

Latvia has meanwhile devoted a great deal of attention towards achieving a NATO standard level of operational capacity, especially with regards to education, through the English language. Furthermore, it has successfully participated in numerous NATO led operations. Recently its major focus has been on building its capacity through co-operative efforts such as BALTRON and especially with regards to sea surveillance. Lithuania has distinguished itself from the others by recently completing part of an ongoing modernisation process. This saw the purchase and integration of several multi role patrol vessels into the fleet. With this interesting approach to unified regional capacity the Baltic States present an example of integrated naval organisations seeking to maximise their economy of effort. The Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Navies combined have developed interestingly unique traits, despite their similarities, and interconnectivity. They have variously pursued different forms of

specialisation, while demonstrating a shared interest in the importance of collective defence which has come into prominence again in the region. They also represent an example of what effects small navies in intensive cooperation can achieve.

By utilising these navies as minor studies, this project will be better able to reflect the broad nature of these forces throughout Europe. These minor studies will also provide a useful test for observations made of the major studies. With the topic of the scope of this research dealt with it, it is necessary to identify the sources being utilised both in general and with specific regards to the individual case studies. Furthermore, it is necessary to examine the methodologies proposed for analysing them.

With regards to published material on the case studies, such material is relatively scarce. This is primarily a result of existing restrictions of the release of potentially sensitive government materiel relevant to the period under such standards as the '30-year rule' in Ireland. Considering this it is necessary to consult other, related sources, such as governmental communiqués, speeches by political and military figures, press releases by the armed forces and their governments, white papers on defence, debate proceedings, annual reports, legislation, journal articles and other published writings by those involved in policy and decision making within the relevant forces. In order to fill the gap in the sources, interviews with relevant personnel were of paramount importance as a large majority of other traditional sources such as archival records have not been released for the period. In parallel it is necessary to examine the works of naval commentators, as outlined previously many of them have not broached the topic of smaller navies. Therefore, it is of significance itself to attempt to understand how, and if, this is reflected in how navies have structured themselves. It is also necessary to examine how internal policies have been disseminated throughout the naval organisation.

It should also be noted that given the recent focus of this topic that the line of distinction between primary and secondary sources is more fluid than usual.

Much of the commentary on this period that would traditionally fall in the latter category can be considered the former owing to its contemporaneous publication to the events it describes.

With regards to organisational composition and change a wide variety of factors outside of simply military are considered. These will generally include but are not limited to the impact of changing socio-political environments, the diversification of such organisations with regards to personnel, assets, and the increased move towards international integration of European politics and economics. Furthermore, as a natural part of this strategic appraisal of the navies their approaches, compositions, and operating cultures will be analysed in the broader strategic context. Thus, this thesis will provide an insight into the merits of their operational procedures, strategic, economic or otherwise. This is especially with regards to the joint context of their international activities, and to test assertions of homogeny.

The historical analysis of this work is vital in understanding the development of the navies in question during the twentieth and twenty first century. The focus, as stated, will mainly be on the post-Cold War period as an initially transitional phase. This was between two different periods of the macro understanding of global power distribution, in the wake of the collapse of the U.S.S.R. From a world divided firmly between democratic West and communist East into the much more economically integrated, globalised society that exists presently.

The final major research methodology is that of legal analysis. In order to understand how small navies impact and are impacted by the development of maritime laws in Europe it is necessary to analyse these legal frameworks. This involves researching the various supra-national organizations involved in this law making, as well as the individual nations themselves. In the example of the U.N. this has meant mostly analysing the various conventions on the laws of the sea; while for the E.U. this involves a thorough examination of the directives passed by the Commission and Parliament, as well as the various international military task forces and bodies that exist within such superstructures. This aspect of the

research is again designed to examine whether there are indeed any unique traits of small navies.

As mentioned previously there exists little in terms of published works on the topic of small navies in relative terms. Mulqueen, Sanders and Speller's *Small Navies Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace* is the most focused work to date.[26] Other relevant texts on naval affairs from the period such as Till's *Seapower,* Grove's *The Future of Seapower,* Gray's *The Leverage of Seapower* and Black's *Naval Power* serve more to highlight the absence of discussion of such navies roles and development in the period as they do not engage on the topic save perhaps for Till's contribution on the composition of navies which restates some of the established ranking systems but is more focused on the topic of technological development in the period.[27] Therefore, they serve mainly to contextualise this research. There are better prospects in regards to works that help outline the technical aspects of such navies throughout the twentieth century. Chant's *Small Craft Navies*, Fontenoy's text on *Submarines,* and Gardiner's *All the Worlds Warships 1947-82* for example, at least make the establishment of the composition of such fleets across their history accessible.[28] Perhaps of greater relevance than general maritime theory, the topic of maritime security has intersected with many of the small navies examined within this study. There has been in recent years a swell in interest in the topic. With texts such as Talley's *Maritime Safety, Security and Piracy* and Berube and Cullen (eds.), *Maritime Private Security: Market Responses to Piracy, Terrorism and Waterborne Security Risks in the 21st Century*. These have examined the topic from the perspective of the shipping industry with Talley outlining the emergence of contemporary vessel and port security trends

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[26] Michael Mulqueen, Deborah Sanders, and Ian Speller,(eds), *Small navies strategy and policy for small navies in war and peace* (London, 2014).
[27] Geoffrey Till, Seapower: a guide for the twenty-first century (3rd ed., London, 2013); Eric Grove, The future of seapower (London, 1990); Colin Gray, The leverage of seapower: the strategic advantage of navies in war (New York, 1992); Jeremy Black, Naval power, (Basingstoke, 2009).
[28] Christopher Chant, *Small craft navies* (London, 1992); Paul E. Fontenoy, *Submarines* (California, 2007); R. Gardiner, *All the worlds warships 1947-82.Pt 1. Western powers* (London, 1983).

influenced by the rise of the non-state security threats such as piracy. Berube and Cullen meanwhile have examined the growth of private maritime security, illustrating that while the private sector has begun to provide direct individual security solutions that the core of the maintenance of good order at sea still relies on navies, and increasingly those operating in conjunction with each other. Others, such as Robert McCabe, have examined and advocated the role of multilateralism as part of the effective response to piracy globally.[29] These are relevant to the topic of small navies as it will be illustrated that such cooperative undertakings in the period served as a proving ground for the realisation of many of the trends towards multilateralism, amongst navies across the spectrum of size. While these works have focused on the impact navies have had on these issues this thesis will invert that perspective and examine how these trends have impacted on the development of the navies themselves, notably as the focus in the period has drifted from piracy towards migration. These works, as well as the other general texts mentioned above aid in providing a comprehensive analysis of the developments on the topic. [30]

Journals have provided similar contributions in that many have addressed topics on security and naval affairs that have helped contextualise this research. These have come in the form of traditional strategic journals such as *The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies* (RUSI) and *The Journal of Strategic Studies* and more focused geographical examples such as the *Journal of Slavic Military Studies.* Indeed, some commentators such as Sanders have written significantly on Eastern European navies as well as the Ukraine in the period.[31]However, while such works are not directly connected to the case studies there is relevance in that they provide valuable comparisons on the topic

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[29] Robert McCabe, 'The palingenesis of maritime piracy and the evolution of contemporary counter-piracy' (PhD thesis, Maynooth University, 2015); Robert McCabe, *Modern maritime piracy: genesis, evolution and responses* (London, 2017).
[30] Wayne Talley, *Maritime safety, security and piracy* (London, 2008); Claude Berube, Claude Cullen (eds), Maritime private security: market responses to piracy, terrorism and waterborne security risks in the 21st century (London, 2012).
[31] See for example; D. Sanders, 'Rebuilding the Ukranian navy' in *US Naval War College Review*, lxx, no. 4 (2017), pp 61-78; D. Sanders, 'The Bulgarian navy after the Cold War', in *US Naval War College Review,* lxviii, no.2 (2015), pp 69-84.

of small navies. For example, Sanders work on Romania, Bulgaria and the Ukraine has illustrated both that small developing navies in the period tend to utilise guiding principles from larger established organisations such as NATO, and that size, economics, and the strategic environment play a major defining factor in the challenges faced by a given navy.[32] Other journal sources include the *Military Balance* which provided a vital assistance in collating the various spending such militaries have engaged in the period to illustrate their budgetary development.[33] Additionally, there have been some general attempts to address the issue of the European navies in the period following the end of the Cold War. De Noy's collection of essays on *The Role of European Naval Forces after the Cold War* published in 1996 saw commentators forwarding predications of increased multilateralism across all navies in the region due to the rising cost of naval technology and the unpredictable security environment they faced.[34] More recently Stohs's *Into the Abyss?: European Naval Power in the Post-Cold War Era* has illustrated that over the course of the period these trends were maintained particularly as financial difficulties impacted even the largest of European forces such as the Royal Navy. Thus, he argues that traditional defence capacity has atrophied and even previously second rank Cold War forces have become increasingly reliant on allied support from international partners particularly the U.S.N.[35]

Moving towards the case studies, the first of the major studies is that of the Irish Naval Service. In general, there is a dearth of studies on the topic of the Irish

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[32] Deborah Sanders, 'Small navies in the Black Sea: a case study of Romania's maritime power' in Michael Mulqueen, Deborah Sanders, and Ian Speller (eds), *Small navies strategy and policy for small navies in war and peace* (London, 2014), pp 151-167, at p. 166; Deborah Sanders, 'The Bulgarian Navy after the Cold War', in *US Naval War College Review,* lxviii, no.2 (2015), pp 69-84; Deborah Sanders, 'Maritime security in the Black Sea: can regional solutions work?' in *European Security*, xviii, (2009), pp 101-125; Deborah Sanders, *Ukraine after the Orange Revolution: can it complete military transformation and join the US-led war on terrorism?* (Pennsylvania, 2006).
[33] See for example International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 2016, Europe*, (London 2016), available at: tandfonline.com, (http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597222.2016.1127564) (6 Dec 2016)
[34] Geoffery Till, 'European naval power after the Cold War' in Gert de Nooy (ed.), *The role of European naval forces after the Cold War* (London, 1996), pp 23-54. at p. 54.
[35] Jeremy Stohs, 'Into the abyss?: European naval power in the post-Cold War era' in *U.S. Naval War College Review*, lxxi, no. 3 (2018), pp 1-26. at p.23.

Naval Service. Indeed during this research, the recent, second White Paper on Defence was the first policy published that had seen the focus of the Naval Service moved away from solely fisheries protection.[36] In an academic sense, there are two focused piece of research on the Irish Naval service. First is Pádrhraic Ó Confhaola's *The Naval Forces of the Irish State, 1922-1977* which offers an appraisal of the Irish Naval Services initial history.[37] This has provided a useful narrative of the traditions of the Irish Naval Service and illustrated the inconsistent history of its development. The second is the research of John Treacy into procurement in the period 1946-1980 particularly the history of the corvette class.[38] Treacy's work has posited that the selection and purchase of the vessels, in addition to the costly repairs that followed, followed by a swift decline in interest in the maritime domain set the stage for three decades of decline for the Service.[39] Other works such as Daire Brunicardi's *Haulbowline* have dealt with the specific history of installations in a narrative sense, documenting the development of the Naval Base in Cork across the centuries.[40] Eunan O'Halpin's *Defending Ireland* is also notable as it does not make serious mention of the role of the Naval Service.[41] Instead the focus of the most comprehensive academic treatise on the strategic defence of the island of Ireland is predominantly focused on land and air concepts. There are again other works on the Naval Service such as Aidan McIvor's *A history of the Irish Naval Service* again this is a rather brief history of the service lacking in significant depth of research, especially in the period of focus.[42] Similarly, Tom McGinty's *The Irish Navy: A story of courage and tenacity*, presents similar issues.[43] Ultimately these are by and large of little academic use, as they rely on a very narrow set of sources, do not contain sufficient depth of analysis, and in

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[36] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2015).
[37] Pádrhraic Ó Confhaola, 'The naval forces of the Irish State, 1922-1977' (PhD thesis, Maynooth University, 2010).
[38] John Treacy, 'Caveat emptor - building Ireland's small navy 1945-49' in Col. D Dignam, Prof. E. O'Halpin, Dr. I. Speller (eds), *Defence Forces Review 2016* (2016), pp 141-54.
[39] Ibid. p. 154
[40] Daire Brunicardi, *Haulbowline* (Dublin, 2012).
[41] Eunan O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland* (Dublin, 1999).
[42] Aidan McIvor, *A history of the Irish Naval Service* (Dublin, 1994).
[43] Tom McGinty, *The Irish Navy: a story of courage and tenacity* (Tralee, 1995).

some cases seem to be heavily biased in terms of their desire to present the Irish Naval Service in favourable terms. [44]

The other major case study in this research is that of the Armed Forces Malta, specifically its Maritime Squadron. Similar to the Irish Naval service the Maritime Squadron suffers from a lack of studies concerning its evolution and attributes. Potentially this is due to its perception as somewhat diminutive. It has only operated as a distinct unit within the Armed Forces Malta for just over a decade, and as has been stated before prevailing and long held beliefs about the proportional effectiveness and relevance of small navies have only recently been challenged in any co-ordinated way. It should be noted that while there has not yet been significant consideration of the island's naval affairs. There has been some more recent interest in Malta in the security context of the maritime domain. Examples include De Battista's paper on Malta's changing security climate. This paper examined the impact that the increasingly blurred line between naval affairs and maritime security, especially given the increased interest of large powers and defence initiatives such as NATO in such affairs, has had on the traditional conceptions of neutrality for states such as Malta.[45]

With regards to the international bodies this thesis will address, there is relevance contained within the general strategic texts. Additionally, there have been some works that examine elements of their role in the period directly such as Zolotukhina's *The Evolution of NATO: the 2010 Strategic Concept and Beyond* and articles such as Poe's *Rules Of Engagement: Complexities of Coalition Interaction in Military Operations Other Than War*.[46] These have examined the developing complexities of increased multilateralism and specifically in examples such as Poe's work the added considerations that must be addressed when

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[44] Tom McGinty, *The Irish Navy: a story of courage and tenacity* (Tralee, 1995).
[45] André P. DeBattista, 'A small-island state within a changing security climate: the case of Malta' in *Symposia Melitensia*, no.12 (2016), pp 69-86. At p. 85.
[46] Elizabeth, Zolotukhina, The evolution of NATO: the 2010 strategic concept and beyond (Washington D.C., 2010); Stacy, Poe, Rules of engagement: complexities of coalition interaction in military operations other than war (Newport, 1995) available at dtic.mil, (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA293881) (18 June 2016)

military assets are deployed in non-traditional roles. However, the majority of the commentary in the period crosses the line between the two types of sources mentioned and will be addressed subsequently.

The secondary case studies present a mixed affair of material as while it is relatively absent for examples such as Croatia, with some small exceptions such as shorter articles like Reljanović's *Croatian Navy in Defense of the Adriatic*, However this work is typical in that it amounts to narrative documentation rather than critical appraisal.[47] Others such as Norway and the Netherlands have produced far greater volumes of work particularly as it relates to strategic studies. Examples include the essays collected in Hobson and Kristiansen (eds.) *Navies in Northern Waters* and Cold War historical pieces like Gullow's *The War Plans of the Land Forces during the Cold War.*[48] *Navies in Northern waters* serves to highlight the historical tradition of 'secondary' navies that found themselves located between the competing interests of larger world powers, most notably in the Cold War and how this has influenced strategic thinking on matters such as defence with examples such as Norway's' 'coastal state' approach. Gullow's work compliments this by placing it in the greater context of the rest of the armed forces and illustrating that small fleets are not by definition ignored or irrelevant in traditional defence planning. Other works in the period such as Lindley-French and van Straten's *Exploiting the Value of Small Navies: The experience of the Royal Netherlands Navy* have presented a form of civil-military cooperative partnerships based on the Royal Navy's 'ships taken up from trade' concept that would provide more economic access to assets with less militaristic primary purposes such as construction.[49]

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[47] Mary Reljanović, Croatian Navy in defense of the Adriatic (Dubrovnik, 2013).

[48] Jacob Borresen, 'Coastal power: the sea power of the coastal state and the management of maritime resources' in Rolf Hobson & Tom Kristiansen (eds), *Navies in Northern* Waters (London, 2004), pp 249-275.; Gjeseth Gullow, *Landforsvarets krigsplaner under den kalde krigen* [The War Plans of the Land Forces during the Cold War] (Bergen, 2011).

[49] Julian Lindley-French & Wouter van Straten, 'Exploiting the value of small navies: the experience of the Royal Netherlands Navy' in *The RUSI Journal*, cliii, no. 6 (2008), pp 66-69. at p. 67.

Moving beyond the commentary on the period, there is very little available archival material that applies to the period following the end of the Cold War. Once again this is due to the various periods that must expire before such documents are released. As such the majority of evidence will come from the other kinds of sources outlined earlier. Given the relative youth of much of this material it has not yet been compiled and examined as a related body of work which is in part what this thesis will provide.

The interviews consist of a serious of testimonies of former and serving senior officers in the Irish and Maltese navies conducted in Ireland and Malta over two years. These officers have held senior staff positions and include several former heads of the services. They have been chosen as they were key to directing the development of their respective organisations. In particular several were heavily involved in areas such as formalisation operating procedures as well as the development of significant changes in the educational frameworks of their particular navy. The interview format was semi structured. Specific areas of interest and questions were related to three strands of development in the period namely: policy, assets, and operational development. These were further subdivided into topics such as the role of the organisations in shaping policy, the impact of international policy and frameworks, the importance of educational development within the service, and the impact of international operations on the service's development to name but a few. This gave the participants the ability to communicate their perceptions of the impact of developments and their individual emphasis on the importance of these topics.

With regards to the printed material on the primary case studies, while many traditional sources such as archives were unavailable for the period in focus. The advantage of such a contemporary topic is that an increasing amount of public engagement and dissemination of information has occurred in the period. From annual reports to progress reviews the Irish Naval Service has produced a body of primary source material in the period. Government sources too have been made more accessible through improvements in distribution technology. The publication of the first two White Papers and increased levels of Department of

Defence publications were also noted, these included a series of strategy statements as well as traditional press releases and reports on ministerial speeches. The period also saw an increased traditional media presence in newspapers and online publications, in addition to significant new departures such as documentary film making.

With the exception of the significantly increased media engagement, similar sources can be found for the Maltese in the same period, and access has also been improved through better distribution channels. Annual governmental reports chart the development of the Maritime Squadron, its goals, and active engagements in the period. Sources for these reports range from the Squadron itself to the relevant governmental departments over the period. This was complemented by an increased series of press release communiqués documenting activities and developmental progress in areas such as infrastructure development and asset procurement.

The secondary studies present some variety in source material. Within each all of the above-mentioned sources have their equivalent. Additionally, all have produced and disseminated doctrine in various formats over the period, from the defence and operational doctrine published by the Dutch and Norwegians, to the Croatian Strategic Defence Review, and the various publications to have emerged from the joint defence college operated by the Baltic States.[50] However, there are some marked differences in the volume of theory produced around the forces, given the relative youth of the Croatian and Baltic services compared to the Norwegian and Dutch navies this is not surprising.

Finally, with regards to the various supranational frameworks there is a vast array of primary source materials relating to all three. Much of this stems from publications made by the various organisations and their sub ordinate bodies. In a defence and security context these would be represented by groups such as

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[50] See for example; Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, *Strategic defence review 2005* (Zagreb, 2005); Gareth Evans, *Norway's joint submarine plan* (London, 2016); Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Capable force, strategic concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces* (Oslo, 2009).

the U.N. Security Council, the various E.U. Naval forces, Frontex, The European Defence Agency and NATO's various strategic elements to name some of the major examples. Other associate organisations that are relevant to maritime affairs include the International Maritime Organisation, the European Commission for Human Rights, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and the statistic bureaus such as Eurostat. Between all these stakeholders and their publications relating to maritime affairs in Europe in the period, it is possible to assemble a comprehensive representation of their activities in the period.

In relation to the structure of this thesis, chapter two will examine the major supra national frameworks that are of relevance to this thesis, the U.N., NATO, and the European Union. Chapter three will examine the Irish Naval Services historical development from a brief examination of its history in the 20th century until the period of focus. Chapter four will continue with the Naval Service in the period in question, particularly its development in terms of policy, assets, and its operational activities at home and internationally. Chapters five and six will shift focus onto the Maltese Maritime Squadron and provided the complementary chapters to that case study. Chapter seven will comprise of an examination of the named secondary studies, to provide greater depth to the thesis.

In conclusion, this introduction has outlined the format this project shall take and also the relevance of its chosen case studies and methodologies. Additionally, it has outlined the state of contemporary research on the topic of small navies, their attributes and challenges in this period.

Chapter 2:
Maritime frameworks of Western Europe: the E.U., NATO, and the U.N.

When considering small navies in the wider European context, it is of vital importance that the international bodies and frameworks they operate within, or alongside, be examined. In a highly globalised world, maritime affairs have retained their historical place at the forefront of co-operation, and interaction between nations. The waters and coastal regions encompassing Western Europe have historically been the focus of a great deal of national and international attention. This is due to their strategic importance in European and international affairs including politics, economics, security and defence. Therefore there is a necessity to understand the development of the various frameworks involved. In relation to the development of small navies in Western Europe, the aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the relevant frameworks. This will allow them to be juxtaposed with the case studies, to better gauge their impact on the individual navies. Furthermore this chapter is relevant as the period of focus is dominated by the topic of multilateralism. As this chapter will illustrate this is true within the context of traditional maritime frameworks such as NATO, but also evident in the growth of maritime interest witnessed within others such as the E.U and the U.N.

This chapter will also serve to provide a background analysis of the ongoing maritime crisis occurring in the Mediterranean. This is in line with the overall goal to provide an insight into the development of European small navies. Furthermore, this event is a relevant litmus test of the theoretical becoming the practical. Additionally, it represents a crisis that involves a wide variety of factors relevant to maritime and European affairs. Significantly these factors include

defence policy, security, migration and border control, humanitarian relief. From a naval perspective, the event represents a blending of several roles of navies. These roles include search and rescue, maritime patrol, humanitarian relief, nuclear, biological and chemical containment. These events have placed great demands on the navies involved in terms of assets, interoperability, and endurance. In later chapters the development and composition of the case studies will be judged in light of their involvement.

The primary purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the frameworks, additionally this chapter will illustrate how the various international frameworks interact and differ from each other. It will also serve to highlight how a large amount of naval theory tends to segregate naval activities into distinct categories such as the three outlined below.

In order to achieve these aims, this chapter will be structured to ensure that the most important frameworks of each body are detailed to provide a focused narrative for each, and to aid in the comparative study.

Within each of the organisations, three key frameworks will be addressed. This will be achieved by analysing the primary doctrine as well as any supporting information. General naval, maritime, and military frameworks will be dealt with firstly. This is due to their obvious import for such organisations as navies. Secondly, the frameworks surrounding general maritime security shall be examined, in order to gain a better appreciation of the dynamic environments involved in maritime affairs within Europe. Finally with regards to the Mediterranean topic mentioned above, it will be necessary to detail the frameworks devised around humanitarian aid, as it will be vital to understand these developments to accurately assess the crisis in the Mediterranean.

This chapter will work chronologically and begin with the oldest and largest relevant institution, the United Nations (U.N.). The U.N. has stood as the largest international diplomatic institution for much of the preceding century. It continues to be at the forefront of international relations and global affairs. While its direct intervention in the maritime affairs, of Western Europe can be

difficult to measure, it has been instrumental in providing the basis for the global understanding of the political concept of the maritime domain. Furthermore it has also been heavily involved in the holistic development of contemporary peacekeeping theory.

Following on from the U.N. the next organisation examined will be the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). NATO was primarily formed as a defence pact between western nations to counter Soviet hostility. However with the collapse of the rival Warsaw pact, in the wake of Soviet dissolution in the early 1990s, NATO has continued to find relevance in the post-Soviet world. While neither of the major case studies have ever been members of the organisation, they have been notably influenced by NATO lead theory and practice. Consequently, they have had a long history of interaction and co-operation with NATO forces both operationally and developmentally.

The final institution in this chapter is the European Union (E.U.). The E.U. represents the most politically integrated of the organisations listed in this chapter. It also has the most direct involvement of any organisation listed in this chapter on the case studies and in European maritime affairs in general. While in terms of policy, politics and economics its members are quite directly linked, defence policy represents a more traditional, ad hoc affair. There is far more discretion on the parts of member states as to their involvement. Therefore the E.U. will be a key body of interest in understanding development throughout Western Europe. This is true beyond simply maritime affairs.

Finally this chapter will conclude with a summary of the major developments that led to the current crisis in the Mediterranean. This will include a history of both the causes, and the international responses to the crisis.

As stated above the first organisation that will be analysed is the United Nations. The United Nations was founded in October 1945. At its fundamental level a collection of institutions such as specialised agencies, programmes, funds, and a centralised assembly based in New York. Its members represent the various world states and its stated goal is to provide a more peaceful global community,

by engaging its member states in efforts to determine the balance between the various competing rights shared by them and their citizens. In particular, the U.N. views its major responsibilities to include the maintenance of global peace and security, the promotion of international cooperation particularly in efforts to address international problems, and the promotion of human rights particularly in developing nations and conflict regions. With regards to this thesis, the relevance is that the institutions created as a result of these aims, have produced a great deal of relevant policy and theory in relation to the major maritime topics addressed in this chapter. Before tackling the individual frameworks, it is necessary to briefly highlight the major groups involved in their creation. These exist at a principal and subsidiary level.

The General Assembly represents the 'parliament of nations' within the U.N. It is the primary, universalist, organ through which members can interact with the shaping of the organisation. At a subsidiary level the General Assembly has been involved in the naval/general military framework of the U.N. through the Peace Building Commission, in regards to humanitarian aid through the High Commissioner for Refugees (U.N.H.C.R.), and the strategy for disaster reduction. The Security Council has been the most directly involved organ of the U.N. in military and security affairs. Made up of fifteen members (five permanent) it has overseen the U.N.'s attempts at the resolution of conflict. It was by definition significantly involved in developing the U.N.'s security framework and also its military theory. The Economic and Social Council has coordinated the U.N. systems that attempt to tackle such issues internationally. It has been involved with the General assembly on the topic of refugees and has overseen the International Maritime Organisation, the principle agency for U.N. maritime affairs, notably maritime security. The Secretariat has been primarily concerned with the substantive and administrative work of the U.N. In this context it has been responsible for the bureaucratic management of the various departments and offices that oversee the U.N.s activities. Of relevance to this work are the Department of Peace Keeping operations, the Department of Safety and Security and the Office for the coordination of Humanitarian affairs.

Continuing with the next relevant framework, The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or NATO is a transatlantic political and military alliance between the United States and 28 other European nations.[1] It was formed primarily around the concept of collective defence, in that any attack perpetrated against a singular member would be considered an attack on all members in line with Article 51 of the U.N. charter.[2] There was also a movement towards preventing the revival of militant nationalism, and fostering European integration, enshrined in the treaty as secondary concerns.[3] Since its inception NATO has evolved alongside the development of politics and military affairs, through the twentieth century to the present day. NATO, like the U.N., was born in the wake of the Second World War. However, while the U.N. was principally an attempt to foster better communications between the states of the world, NATO was envisioned as a direct counter to perceived Soviet expansionism in the wake of the war. Alongside direct aid the United States enshrined its political commitment to Europe in the NATO treaty of 1949.[4]

Beyond its initial role as a defence organisation, the 1960s NATO saw the emergence of its other major role for much of the twentieth century, as one of maintaining détente.[5] For three decades this format characterised NATO, until the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in the late 1980s. Entering the final decade of the twentieth century and a rapidly changing political dynamic throughout Europe, NATO saw a restructuring of its primary role. It was now supporting the democratisation and security of a newly expanded Europe. This decade also saw an increased role in assisting with peace support operations and directly guaranteeing the safety of various ethnic groups,

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[1] NATO, *Montenegro joins NATO as 29th ally* (Washington. D.C., 2017) available at nato.int/news, (https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/news_144647.htm) (27 Sept. 2018).
[2] The UN, *UN Charter* (San Francisco, 1945) available at UN.org, (http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/index.html) (15 Mar 2016).
[3] NATO, *History of NATO* (Brussels, 2016) available at NATO.int, (http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html) (3 Apr. 2017).
[4] NATO, *The North Atlantic Treaty – 4 April 1949* (Washington D.C., 1949), available at nato.int/official texts, (https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm) (14 Sep 2018).
[5] Philip Windsor, 'NATO and European Détente', in *Royal institute of International Affairs – The World Today*, xxiii, no.9 (1967), pp 361-369 at p. 362.

through its involvement in Yugoslavia and Kosovo. These conflicts marked a turning point for NATO, that saw it becoming a more dynamic and responsive organisation. Entering the new millennium this would continue to hold true as the outbreak of the War on terror and the focus on sub state groups such as Al-Qaeda expanded NATO's involvement beyond Europe.

In Afghanistan, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO allies have found that military power is no longer enough to secure any tangible victory. Peacekeeping had become at least as difficult as peace-making. During the Cold War years, allied security had entailed the defence of the North Atlantic allies. Now the definition of 'security' has radically expanded to include the individual's freedom from the violent extremism bred by instability and nation-state failure.[6] The culmination of this development is the strategic concept that was adopted by the allies in 2010.[7] Now almost a decade later, the first attempts at implementing this newly codified concept had begun. Reflecting its dual political-military nature NATO has been structured bi-laterally with the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee representing the major interests of each, between the two, sits the Secretary General, and the various administrators that facilitate both groups, including their relevant subordinates. In relation to doctrine the most relevant of these is Allied Command transformation.

Of the three major organisations examined in this chapter, the European Union represents the most complex. For the purposes of this work the scale of examination will be limited to the major facets and agencies that are most applicable to the topic. The E.U. has developed monumentally from its inception as a customs union, between the original six member states, into the most complicated and varied transnational union of states in the history of the world, so far. It now encompasses 28 member states spanning the length and breadth

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[6] NATO, *history of NATO* (Brussels, 2016) available at NATO.int,
(http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html) (3 Apr. 2017).
[7] Elizabeth Zolotukhina, The evolution of NATO: the 2010 strategic concept and beyond
(Washington D.C., 2010) p. 2.

of Europe and accounts for seven percent of world population.[8] In economic terms it represents twenty two percent of global G.D.P.[9] E.U. involvement has grown organically too, from trade and economics to a variety of topics covering, politics, law, social issues, humanitarian concerns, and, of course, defence. When approaching the topic of defence, ultimate responsibility rests on the European Council. It has held a remit over common security and defence policies. The council has also overseen a series of subordinate bodies and agencies. Significantly relevant to the topic of defence is the European External Action Service (E.E.A.S.), a product of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, the E.E.A.S. served to facilitate the achievement of the common security goals. In the context of security there has been some crossover, as the E.E.A.S. has been involved in the topic of general and maritime security. In addition the European commission, the distinct executive branch of the E.U., has some remit in this area. The Commission's Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs, is involved in the development of policy including that of security in the maritime domain.[10] Finally, on the topic of Humanitarian aid, while there is undoubtedly some cross over with the institutions mentioned thus far, distinct responsibility for practice falls on the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (E.C.H.O.). The E.C.H.O. overseas the implementation of strategy handed down from the commission in accordance with its establishment under Article. 214 of the consolidated treaty.[11]

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[8] European Institute of Statistics, *European Union reaches 500 million through combination of accessions, migration and natural growth* (Vienna , 2010) available at oeaw.ac.at, (http://www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/datasheet/EU_reaches_500_Mill.shtml) (28 Mar. 2016).
[9] International Monetary Fund, *Report for selected country groups and subjects* (Washington D.C. 2016) available at imf.org, (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=58&pr.y=19&sy=2015&ey=2015&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=001%2C998&s=NGDPD&grp=1&a=1) (30 Mar. 2016).
[10] EEAS, *The challenges of securing maritime areas for the European Union* (Brussels, 2018) available at: eeas.europa.eu, (https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_nn/41690/The%20challenges%20of%20securing%20maritime%20areas%20for%20the%20European%20Union) (10 Sept. 2018).
[11] European Union, *Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union* (Brussels, 2012), available at eur-lex.europa.eu, (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=en) (19 Apr. 2016).

Proceeding to the development of policy, the U.N. is immediately distinct from the other two organisations in that its interest in military policy has been nearly entirely focused on the land domain. In the last century, the U.N. was synonymous with the evolution of peacekeeping and peace support operations. United Nations Peacekeeping began in 1948, shortly following the foundation of the U.N., when the Security Council authorized the deployment of U.N. military observers to the Middle East. The mission's role was to monitor the armistice agreement between the new Israel and the surrounding nations. This mission was titled the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).[12] For the rest of the century, until the end of the Cold War, U.N. peacekeeping would reflect this style of operation. Typically those missions consisted of unarmed military observers, and lightly armed troops with primarily monitoring, reporting and confidence-building roles.[13] In the 1990s there was a series of reforms and expansions undertaken, designed to reflect the recognition the P.S.O.s were becoming far more complicated in scope and nature. Additionally, this was to account for their expansion into issues beyond the purely military. In 1992 the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (D.P.K.O.) was created to oversee P.S.O.s. However, the issues faced in operations in the Balkans and Rwanda, led to an independent enquiry into the failures in these regions.[14] These inquiries led to the Brahimi report. The report highlighted that P.S.O.s would need increased funding and clearer mandates to achieve effectiveness.[15] Later in 2006 there was a major overhaul of the D.P.K.O., with Peace Operations 2010.[16] This split the D.P.K.O., creating the Department of Field Support. Following Peace

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[12] Resolution of 11 August 1949, [S/1376, II], 1

[13] United Nations, *The early years* (Brussels, 2016), available at UN.org, (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/early.shtml) (10 Apr. 2016).

[14] United Nations Security Council, Letter *dated 15 December 1999 from the Secretary-General* (New York 1999), available at UN.org, (http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1999/1257) (8 Apr. 2016).

[15] United Nations Security Council, *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects* (New York, 2000), available at un.org,) (http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/55/305) (13 Apr. 2016).

[16] United Nations Secretary General, *Peace operations 2010 reform strategy* (New York, 2006), available at un.org, (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/po2010.pdf) (13 Apr. 2016).

Ops. 2010s realisation, the most recent development of U.N. peacekeeping has been the 2014 panel on Peace Operations.[17] The Secretary General's response to which, had not been delivered after two years of its publication. In a maritime context, the U.N.'s focus has traditionally remained on land-based matters, yet there have been those that impact on the maritime domain.

U.N. operations at sea take three major forms: authorization of states actions, designation of maritime actions by states, and finally the integration of naval assets into the U.N. operations themselves. Of those three options the latter primarily concerns this work, as it involves the assets being under actual U.N. command rather than that of their flag nations. These operations have mostly revolved around the supply of transport and lift capabilities.[18] It may seem unusual that such a globally minded organisation as the U.N. has placed little attention upon naval affairs. However as will be examined in the next section, the U.N. has been proportionally far more active in maritime security affairs. It should also be noted, that as people live on land, that peacekeeping and P.S.O.s in general will generally be focused there, with the exception of coastal regions, naval assets will most likely continue to find the most use in a support role towards ground forces. Finally, the far more expensive nature of deploying naval assets (especially those leased, as the U.N. does), compared to their ground assets, serves to disincentivise organisations, such as the U.N., that operate on constrained budgets.[19] However it must be noted that Articles 41 and 42 of the U.N. Charter to provide a basis for the imposition of naval blockades as a means of restoring international peace.[20] Reviewing the U.N.'s strategic framework for maritime assets, it is clear that there is an awareness of the maritime domain

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[17] United Nations Security Council, Identical letters dated 17 June 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, (New York, 2015), available at UN.org, (http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/95) (14 Apr.2016).

[18] Adam Siegel, 'An examination of maritime peace support operations' in James J Wirtz & Jeffrey A. Larsen (eds), *Naval peacekeeping and humanitarian operations* (London, 2008), pp 97-110, at p. 100.

[19] Ibid., p 105.

[20] The UN, *UN Charter* (San Francisco, 1945) available at UN.org, (http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/index.html) (15 Mar 2016).

and of the potential of naval assets in more traditional definitions but in practice this has not been an area of focus.

Maritime security is a rather flexible term used to describe a wide variety of interests and actions designed to create safer seas for many types of shipping and other maritime industries/activities. Within the framework of the U.N., responsibility for the topic of maritime security falls to the International Maritime Organisation. The I.M.O. is one of the longest running institutions of the U.N. Founded in 1948 as the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, it would be renamed the I.M.O. in 1982. [21] Its goal was primarily to promote safety at sea through the establishment of standardised, international regulations. In 1958 the I.M.O. convention was formally adopted

> to provide machinery for cooperation among Governments in the field of governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade; to encourage and facilitate the general adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution from ships.[22]

The expansion of the I.M.O. interests into Maritime security came in the 2000s. In 2005 most notably, the I.M.O. adopted amendments to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (S.U.A.) against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988, and its related Protocol (the 2005 S.U.A. Protocols).[23] These amendments notably introduced the rights for states to board and investigate other flag states vessels, if there is a reasonable suspicion that the vessel has or

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[21] United Nations, *Convention of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, March 6, 1948* (Geneva, 1948), available at law.Yale.edu, (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decad056.asp) (4 Mar. 2016).
[22] I.M.O., *Convention on the International Maritime Organization (I.M.O.)* (Geneva 1948), available at jus.uio.no, (http://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/14/14-01/imo_consolidated.xml) (5 Mar. 2016).
[23] I.M.O., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of fixed platforms located on the Continental Shelf (New York, 1988), available at imo.org, (http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/SUA-Treaties.aspx) (8 Mar. 2016).

will be engaged in the commission of an offence under the convention. Since 2005, the I.M.O. has seen its role in maritime security become two faceted. It defines its roles as developing appropriate regulations and guidance, through its Maritime Safety Committee, and engaging in capacity-building work. [24] There have been, to date, three major topics of interest in this regard for the I.M.O.: piracy, terrorism and mixed migration by sea. Piracy has received the lion's share of this attention. Since the 1990s the I.M.O. has been involved in the global suppression of piracy, but since 2005 it has mainly focused on Africa. At a guidance level, this has led to the publication of a series of documents, directed at advising governments of best practices in dealing with piracy. The most notable of these was the 2015 Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships circular.[25] Within its capacity building role, in 2009 it published the Djibouti code of conduct.[26] Subsequently, the codes trust fund has funded several projects, to promote capacity building in the region. A similar code was published in 2013 concerned with similar issues in West and Central Africa.[27] In regards to terrorism, the S.U.A. was amended in 2005, to include the use of maritime actions to 'to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from any act: '.[28] Furthermore it added a raft of actions related to biological, chemical, and nuclear material. The I.M.O. is also involved in both the U.N. Security Council Counter Terrorism

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[24] I.M.O., *Maritime security* (London, 2016), available at IMO.org, (http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/piracy/Pages/default.aspx) (9 Mar. 2016).

[25] I.M.O., *Piracy and armed robbery against ships* (London, 2015), available at imo.org, (http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/Documents/MSC.1-Circ.1333-Rev.1.pdf) (9 Mar. 2016).

[26] I.M.O., *Djibouti code of conduct* (London, 2014), available at imo.org, (http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PIU/Documents/DCoC%20Newsletter%20(2015).pdf) (9 Mar. 2016).

[27] I.M.O., The code of conduct concerning the repression of piracy, armed robbery against ships, and illicit maritime activity in West and Central Africa - June 2013 (London, 2013), available at IMO.org, (http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Documents/code_of_conduct%20signe d%20from%20ECOWAS%20site.pdf) (9 Mar 2016).

[28] I.M.O., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of fixed platforms located on the Continental Shelf (New York, 1988), available at imo.org, (http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/SUA-Treaties.aspx) (8 Mar. 2016).

Committee's Executive Directorate and the U.N. General Assembly's Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force.[29]

With regards to migration, recent events have turned attentions towards the issue globally. Alongside the U.N.H.C.R. the I.M.O. has published a guide to principles and practices relating to maritime rescue.[30] At a capacity building level, it has been involved in creating opportunities for various U.N. agencies, to cooperate and exchange information and ideas on tackling the issue of unsafe mixed migration.[31] Examining these various aspects of the I.M.O.'s activities in the maritime security domain, the organisations structure and activities are broadly in line with the general role of the U.N. as a coordinator and facilitator of interstate interactions and policy creation. Unlike the E.U., and NATO it plays a far less directly involved part in these issues but instead chooses to focus on the creation, facilitation, and dissemination of best practice in regards to maritime security.

The evolution of the current U.N. framework for humanitarian aid dovetails particularly well with this works period of focus. With the adoption of Resolution 46/182 in 1991 The U.N. defined its overall approach to humanitarian operations.[32] Among the reforms brought about in the resolution was the establishment of the Emergency Relief Coordinator (E.R.C.).[33] This new officer in the U.N. was envisioned as a role to combine and surpass the functions carried out by a devolved group of representatives up until that point. It also brought

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[29] I.M.O., *Maritime security* (London, 2016), available at IMO.org, (http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/piracy/Pages/default.aspx) (9 Mar. 2016).
[30] UNHCR, *Rescue at sea* (New York, 2016), available at imo.org, (http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/seamigration/Documents/UNHCR-Rescue_at_Sea-Guide-ENG-screen.pdf) (10 Mar. 2016).
[31] I.M.O., *High-level meeting to address unsafe mixed migration by sea (4-5 March 2015)* (London, 2015), (http://www.imo.org/en/About/Events/Pages/High-Level-Meeting-to-Address-Unsafe-Mixed-Migration-by-Sea-(March-2015).aspx) (11 Mar. 2016).
[32] United Nations General Assembly, *Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations* (New York, 1991), available at un.org, (http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r182.htm) (18 Mar 2016).
[33] Ibid.

into the fold the natural disaster functions of the U.N. Disaster relief organisation. 46/182 also created the Inter Agency Standing Committee (I.A.S.C.), the Consolidated Appeals Process and the Central Emergency Revolving Fund.[34] These were to be the mechanisms by which the E.R.C. operated.

Not long after this, the Department of Humanitarian affairs (D.H.A.) which was founded to support the E.R.C. in 1992 was renamed.[35] This move was part of the Secretary-General's programme of reform. The D.H.A. was subsequently became the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). OCHA was given an expanded mandate to include the coordination of humanitarian response, policy development and humanitarian advocacy. Since 1998 OCHA has remained the major player in U.N. humanitarian affairs, it has promoted coordination through the IASC and operated with a wide variety of partners in humanitarian efforts. Its common activities included 'needs assessments, consolidated appeals, field coordination arrangements and the development of humanitarian policies.'[36] In regards to its policy development OCHA places a strong emphasis on what it refers to as 'an evidence-based and forward-looking humanitarian policy agenda'.[37] With an additional focus on lessons learned from its deployments. For example, in a military context, it states that its experiences in Afghanistan and Somalia have highlighted the importance of ensuring clear policy guidelines, dictating the role of military forces, in humanitarian provision and support roles. The former in particular, highlighted that without these 'clear' guidelines that the 'blur of local perceptions of their work and motives' can impede the operations of all.[38] However the latter serves to highlight the

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[34] United Nations General Assembly, *strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian E emergency assistance of the United Nations* (New York, 1991), available at un.org, (http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r182.htm) (18 Mar 2016).
[35] UN OCHA, *History of OCHA* (New York, 2016), available at unocha.org, (http://www.unocha.org/about-us/who-we-are/history) (22 Mar. 2016)
[36] Ibid.
[37] UN OCHA, Policy (New York, 2016), available at UNOCHA.org, (http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/policy/overview) (23 Mar. 2016)
[38] Ibid.

importance of protecting civilians in conflict regions as it is vital to ensuring their access to humanitarian aid.[39] The most recent policy development for OCHA has been the publication of its Strategic plan for 2014-17.[40] This plan highlights two major goals for OCHA. Goal one: field effectiveness, seeks to promote efficiency, response times, leadership expertise, situational awareness, and coordination. Goal two: 'Fit for the future', places an emphasis on increased diversity, and interoperability of actors involved in OCHA's work, as well as the innovation of solutions to the various problems surrounding Humanitarian efforts.[41] So far OCHA claims to have experienced success in these goals according to recent reports.[42] In summary, the U.N. has created what appears to be an adaptive instrument for humanitarian aid, through OCHA, as will be illustrated in later sections there has been international recognition of this through the policies of the other organisations referring or directly deferring to OCHA.

As a natural evolution of its status as a primarily military-political alliance, NATO has a recognisable maritime component. Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) is based in Northwood, London. It is responsible for overseeing all NATO maritime forces and serves as their primary command headquarters. The roots of MARCOM lie in the formation of NATO. In 1953 the Commander in Chief of the Royal Navy's Home Fleet was designated Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic (CINCEASTLANT), this underwent a change recently when the post was re-designated as Commander, Allied Maritime Component Command Northwood ('CC-Mar' or A.M.C.C.N.). In 2010 the command was renamed Allied

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[39] UN OCHA, Policy (New York, 2016), available at UNOCHA.org, (http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/policy/overview) (23 Mar. 2016)
[40] UN OCHA, *OCHA Strategic plan 2014-2017* (New York, 2013), available at docs.unocha.org, (https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OCHA%20SF%202014-2017%20Strategic%20Plan.pdf) (25 Mar. 2016).
[41] UN OCHA, *OCHA Strategic plan 2014-2017* (New York, 2013), available at docs.unocha.org, (https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OCHA%20SF%202014-2017%20Strategic%20Plan.pdf) (25 Mar. 2016).
[42] UN OCHA, *OCHA in 2014 & 2015: plan and budget* (New York 2015), available at docs.unocha.org, (https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OCHA%20in%202014-15%20vF%2072%20dpi%20single%20WEB.pdf) (26 Mar. 2016).

Maritime Command Northwood.[43] The year 2010 coincides with the NATO Summit in Lisbon that saw the adoption of NATO's latest Strategic Concept. This outlined the current consensus around the core tasks of the alliance notably these include collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.[44] In response to the framework laid out in the 2010 strategic concept, NATO adopted the new Alliance Maritime Strategy in January 2011.[45]

The Maritime Strategy set out to address the three core tasks of the 2010 publication, and how NATO's maritime assets could contribute to their success. In terms of deterrence the strategy stressed the importance of the flexibility of NATO forces as key to deterring all forms of aggression. In terms of crisis management, the strategy defined the important roles naval assets can play in roles such as enforcing arms embargos, maritime interdiction and providing immediate humanitarian assistance. As for cooperative security, the Strategy asserted that through operations with partner nations and organisations, such as the U.N. and the E.U., NATO's maritime forces are helping to build regional security and stability. The 2011 strategy also identified maritime security as another key benefit offered by the NATO naval forces and this shall be dealt with subsequently. Following on from these developments in the naval framework of NATO, there was another major restructuring carried out on the organisation of its maritime forces.

In December of 2012 MARCOM was officially launched as a new streamlined command service, to facilitate efficient realisation of the assets at NATO's disposal. What had been a bifurcated command, in both the UK and Naples, Italy

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[43] Dr. Gregory W. Pedlow, *The evolution of NATO's command structure, 1951-2009* (Brussels, 2010), available at shape.nato.int, (http://www.shape.nato.int/resources/21/evolution%20of%20nato%20cmd%20structure%2019 51-2009.pdf) (20 Mar. 2016).

[44] NATO, *Strategic concept for the defence and security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (Lisbon, 2010) available at nato.int, (http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf) (19 Mar. 2016).

[45] NATO, *Alliance maritime strategy* (Brussels, 2011), available at nato.int, (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm) (19 Mar. 2016).

was merged into a centralised command in the UK.[46] MARCOM also operated two subordinate commands – Submarine Command (COMSUBNATO) and Maritime Air Command (COMMARAIR).[47] In terms of current composition, MARCOM has lead four standing NATO maritime groups, these consist of two frigate groups and two mine countermeasures groups.[48] The final point worth referencing in this regard is that there has been heavy emphasis throughout NATO's literature on the importance of interoperability of its forces.[49] NATO has by all accounts, been at the forefront of this push in the military domain, with its standardisation campaigns. NATO itself identified that there are two major elements to successful interoperability: components and mechanisms.[50] The former being that the equipment used need not necessarily be common but compatible with other allies. The latter, that interoperability is a product of effective interactions with all parties involved, from training and co-operating with allies, partner states, and organisations, to strengthening relations with defence and security industry organisations. Analysing the development of the current framework within NATO in a naval and military context there has been a trend towards the streamlining of goals and efforts of the allies to promote efficiency in the complex joint endeavour the alliance represents.

Within NATOs strategic framework for maritime activities, it was previously mentioned, that in the 2011 Maritime Strategy, NATOs maritime command had identified that maritime security was a key area of interest. Indeed, the strategy put the topic of maritime security on par with the three major core tasks identified in Lisbon in 2010. In the strategy NATO argues that

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[46] MARCOM, Allied maritime command mission, (London 2012), available at mc.nato.int, (http://www.mc.nato.int/about/Pages/Mission.aspx) (20 Mar. 2016)
[47] NATO, NATO's maritime activities, (London, 2015), available at nato.int, (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_70759.htm?selectedLocale=en) (20 Mar. 2016)
[48] Ibid.
[49] NATO, *Alliance maritime strategy,* (Brussels, 2011), available at nato.int, (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm) (19 Mar. 2016)
[50] NATO, Interoperability: connecting NATO forces (Brussels 2012) , available at nato.int, (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84112.htm) (21 Mar. 2016)

> Existing national and international legislation is sufficient to allow Allies to undertake a range of maritime security operations; however, there may be scope for further enhancing mutual awareness and, where possible, operational harmonisation, among national legal authorities and practices.[51]

Furthermore, in Article 15 the strategy identifies the distinct activities that NATO forces can engage in to promote Maritime Security. Specifically, these are surveillance and patrolling, carried out in conjunction with scheduled NATO activities or in expanded roles, the protection of energy security, including critical infrastructure and lines of communication, and maintaining the ability of all NATO forces to undertake maritime interdiction missions, such as those in support of law enforcement goals, or to prevent the proliferation of arms and weapons of mass destruction.

In relation to recent practices within MARCOM around maritime security, NATO has been recently active in two major endeavours: Operation Ocean Shield and Operation Active Endeavour. Operation Ocean Shield was the alliance's ongoing counter piracy mission in the region of the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean. Ocean Shield evolved from a request in 2008 by the U.N., for assistance ensuring the safe passage of U.N. World Food Programme vessels in the region.[52] Operation Allied Provider resulted and was succeeded by Op. Allied Protector in 2009, and in August of that year Ocean Shield was launched.[53] Ocean Shield concluded in 2016. In keeping with NATO themes, Op. Ocean Shield was built around providing an ongoing deterrence to pirate activities, through installing a competent capable force in the region, and by specifically targeting the pirates' logistics and support structures. Additionally, this was

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[51] NATO, *Alliance maritime strategy* (Brussels, 2011), available at nato.int, (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm) (19 Mar. 2016).
[52] NATO, *Counter piracy operations* (Brussels, 2015), available at. Nato.int, (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48815.htm?selectedLocale=en) (22 Mar. 2016).
[53] NATO, *NATO Defence Ministers decide to extend NATO's counter-piracy mission until 2016* (Brussels, 2014), available at nato.int, (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_110867.htm) (16 Mar. 2016).

carried out while also promoting capacity building in the area.[54] Furthermore, there has been an integration of efforts, with similar actions taken by the E.U. in the region such as OP. ATALANTA.[55]

The other major endeavour recently undertaken by NATO is in relation to combating terrorism at sea. Terrorism has been a major point of focus for NATO especially since the 2001 attacks on the U.S. Operation Active Endeavour was NATOs sole counter terrorism operation in the period.[56] Active Endeavours' aim was to detect, deter and protect against terrorist activity in the Mediterranean. This was to be achieved through monitoring, patrolling, escorting and compliant boarding. To date it has interacted with over 100,000 vessels in the Mediterranean Sea.[57] Throughout its 15 year life span, Op. Active Endeavour underwent several evolutions in scope, most notably in 2009, when its revised concept of operations highlighted the importance of information sharing with partners in the region, to ensure operational success.[58] This was followed in 2010 by another update, to bring the operations mandate in line with the 2011 Maritime strategy.[59] Later in 2013, as part of the 2011 reforms, the operational command was transferred to MARCOM. A final point of interest concerning Active Endeavour was that in 2010 the General Rapporteur, Lord Joppling, published a report on E.U. and NATO maritime security operations, and their co-ordination. In the report he stressed the importance of such coordination, remarking that while both organisations had been stressing the importance of co-operation, 'It is striking for instance that NATO and the E.U. both operate in

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[54] NATO, *Counter piracy operations* (Brussels, 2015), available at. Nato.int, (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48815.htm?selectedLocale=en) (22 Mar. 2016).
[55] MARCOM, *Counter-piracy operations*, available at. mc.nato.int, (http://www.mc.nato.int/about/Pages/NATO%20and%20Maritime%20Piracy.aspx) (24 Mar. 2016).
[56] MARCOM, *Countering terrorism* (London, 2012), available at mc.nato.int, (http://www.mc.nato.int/about/Pages/NATO%20and%20Terrorism%20at%20sea.aspx) (20 Mar. 2016)
[57] MARCOM, *Operation Active Endeavour* (London, 2015), available at mc.nato.int, (http://www.mc.nato.int/ops/Pages/OAE.aspx) (20 Mar. 2016)
[58] NATO, *Operation Active Endeavour* (Brussels, 2015), available at nato.int, (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm) (18 Mar. 2016)
[59] Ibid.

the Mediterranean – with Frontex and Active Endeavour –; yet, these efforts are barely co-ordinated.'[60] While such co-operation may seem natural given the significant overlap of both organisations memberships and would be achieved later in the period, it has historically been the case that NATOs significant military aspect has created difficulties for E.U. members in relation to cooperative operations especially for neutral states. An example in the region would be Ireland.[61] Active endeavour was succeeded by Op. Ocean Shield in 2017. In summing up NATO's maritime security efforts, it is clear that they have integrated quite easily in NATO's existing defence framework, due to their perception as extensions of NATOs deterrent function. While this approach has merits, and NATO has acknowledged both the complexity of modern crises, and that deterrence has gone beyond the mere concept of the threat of force, asset tasking is still structured along traditional lines

Compared to the two other organisations of interest in this chapter, NATO is perhaps the least well known for its focus on humanitarian aid. However as flexibility of focus has become common to NATO, it is unsurprising to discover that it has assimilated this role into its remit. The general term 'crisis' appears many times in NATOs policy. At a strategic level, 'the management of crises affecting the security of its members' had been enshrined in its 1991 Strategic Concept. [62] This was again reiterated in 1999. In the 2010 Strategic concept the concept was broadened greatly: 'NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilise post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.' [63] This was representative of a broader recognition of the expansion of NATO roles beyond the strictly military, the

[60] Lord Joppling, *Maritime security: NATO and E.U. roles and co-ordination* (London, 2010), available at nato-pa.int, (http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=2087) (26 Mar. 2016).
[61] Lorna Siggins, *Department of Defence denies Naval Service involvement in NATO exercise* (Dublin, 2018), available at Irishtimes.com, (https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/department-of-defence-denies-naval-service-involvement-in-nato-exercise-1.3622047) (10 Sept. 2018).
[62] NATO, *Crisis management* (Brussels, 2015) available at nato.int, (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49192.htm?selectedLocale=en) (14 Mar. 2016).
[63] Ibid.

ensuing necessity to enhance civil-military planning and interaction, and to promote a greater interoperability between NATO and friendly forces. However, at an operational level, there had been already several examples of NATO led humanitarian efforts for five decades previously.

NATO itself attributed its early humanitarian projects to the necessity of developing civil protection measures in the event of a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union and its allies.[64] From this came the first attempts of codifying assistance between NATO members in 1958.[65] These were eventually expanded to partner countries in 1995. Not long after in 1998, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre (E.A.D.R.C.C.) and its ad hoc agent the E.A.D.R. Unit were established to co-ordinate relief efforts on NATOs behalf.[66] From its own perspective NATO identified its particular role in humanitarian relief as providing the kind of immediate response that is necessary in crisis zones. Military assets, it argued, bring forth the kind of flexible, immediately deployable relief that is necessary in first response situations.[67] The particularly rugged nature of military assets allows them to operate effectively, particularly in terms of supply to inaccessible areas.[68] Interestingly the E.A.D.R.C.C. has been very closely linked to the U.N.'s OCHA which

> Retains the primary role in the coordination of international disaster relief operations. The Centre is designed as a regional coordination mechanism, supporting and complementing the U.N. efforts. Furthermore, its principal function is coordination rather than direction[69]

What has separated the E.A.D.R.C.C. from similar institutions, is that as a co-ordinate entity it devolves the decision making, as to whether aid should be

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[64] NATO, *Crisis management* (Brussels, 2015) available at nato.int, (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49192.htm?selectedLocale=en) (14 Mar. 2016).
[65] Ibid.
[66] NATO, *Standing operating procedures for the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit* (EADRU) (Brussels 2007) available at Nato.int, (http://www.nato.int/eadrcc/sop/sop.htm) (17 Mar. 2016)
[67] NATO, NATO's growing humanitarian role (Brussels 2006), available at nato.int, (http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/art4.html) (12 Mar. 2016).
[68] Ibid.
[69] NATO, *Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre* (Brussels, 2016), available at NATO.int, (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52057.htm?#) (18 Mar. 2016).

rendered, to the individual ally states. Since its inception the E.A.D.R.C.C. has seen its mandate widen dramatically, in 2004 it was mandated to respond to requests from the new Afghan government, in relation to natural disasters, and this was further extended in 2007 to all areas where NATO is active militarily.[70] In the time following its inception the E.A.D.R.C.C. has operated across the globe, in support of NATO activities such as those in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Bosnia. It has also operated within the traditional NATO common defence context, the first occurring in 2001, following the September eleventh attacks on the US. In summary what is most interesting about NATOs approach to humanitarian aid, is that adopts a far less prescriptive role in its execution, instead leaving it to the U.N. and individual allies to direct their efforts

Turning towards the European Union, each of the three organisations agrees that the respect of their member's sovereignty is important. However, it is notable that the E.U. possesses the most direct political influence over its members. While primarily a trade union, from the beginning including its predecessors the EEC, and the Coal and Steel Community, E.U. integration has grown significantly. Likewise, it is important to note that, the original goal of the E.U. lies in the search for creation and maintenance of peaceful, prosperous and, importantly, politically integrated Europe. Once more, this was born in the wake of the conflicts that engulfed the region in the earlier twentieth century. With this in mind, it is unsurprising that the E.U. had a long historical interest in defence planning.

The first organised attempt at common security was the failed European Defence Community in the 1950s, despite its collapse, the 1954 modification of the treaty of Brussels brought about the formation of the Western European Union (W.E.U). The W.E.U. was founded in the style of NATOs mutual defence goals.[71] This would remain stable until the end of the Cold War, and following

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[70] NATO, *Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre* (Brussels, 2016), available at NATO.int, (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52057.htm?#) (18 Mar. 2016)
[71] EEAS, *The Western European Union* (Brussels, 2016), available at eeas.europa.eu, (http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/weu/index_en.htm) (2 Apr. 2016).

the subsequent Balkans conflicts, the E.U. began to pursue a more active role in conflict prevention. To this end the W.E.U. council adopted the 'Petersburg Tasks' in 1992, which outlined the three major purposes that E.U. military forces could be deployed: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.[72] The 1993 Maastricht Treaty laid the grounds for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and in 1999 the Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated both into a unified framework.[73] It also created the post of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (C.F.S.P.), and indicated the possibility of the creation of a common defence policy under the C.F.S.P. That same year the Berlin plus agreements gave the E.U. access to NATO assets in certain environments and improved information sharing between the two organisations, these agreements were made permanent in 2003.[74] Alongside this came the publication of the European Security Strategy (E.S.S), that laid the framework for the C.F.S.P. and subsequently, the Common Security and Defence policy.[75]The E.S.S. was designed to enhance cohesion surrounding the security threats that faced Europe namely

- Terrorism
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (W.M.D.)
- Regional conflicts
- State failure
- Organised crime.[76]

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[72] Western European Union, *Petersberg Declaration* (Bonn, 1992) available at weu.int, (http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf) (3 Apr. 2016).
[73] European Union, *Treaty of Amsterdam* (Amsterdam 1997), available at eur-lex.europa.eu, (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1463144545671&uri=CELEX:11997D/TXT) (2 Apr. 2016).
[74] European Union, *E.U.-NATO: The framework for permanent relations and Berlin plus* (Berlin, 2003), available at consilium.europa.eu, (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf) (15 Apr. 2016).
[75] Javier Solana, *A secure Europe in a better world – European security strategy* (Brussels, 2003), available at consilium.europa.eu, (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf) (17 Apr. 2016).
[76] Ibid.

Concurrent with these developments, the 1999 Helsinki Conference had set goals that by 2003 the E.U. would have developed a rapid reaction force 'capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty'.[77] This force was to encompass the breadth of domains from air, to sea, to land. Following this in 2003, there was a switch to a more qualitative approach. From these developments the 'Battle Group' concept was born. Battle groups were to consist of '1,500 personnel that can be deployed within ten days after an E.U. decision to launch an operation and that can be sustained for up to thirty days (extendible to 120 days with rotation)'.[78] The concept saw rapid realisation and by the end of 2007, the first battle groups reached operational capacity, three years ahead of schedule.[79]

In 2004 the Council of ministers ratified the European Defence Agency

> To develop defence capabilities; promote defence research and technology (R&T); foster armaments co-operation; and to create a competitive European Defence Equipment Market as well as to strengthen the European Defence, Technological and Industrial Base.[80]

2009 saw the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon. Lisbon incorporated the C.S.D.P. and introduced solidarity and mutual assistance clauses.[81] The former reinforced the commitment of the E.U. to act in solidarity, in the event of a terrorist attack on a member state; while the latter creates an obligation of member states to render aid to others that are the targets of armed aggression. Interestingly 'This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States'.[82] While

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[77] EEAS, *Military headline goals* (Brussels, 2016), available at eeas.europa.eu, (http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/military_headline_goals/index_en.htm) (7 Apr. 2016)

[78] Ibid.

[79] Ibid.

[80] EEAS, *European Defence Agency* (Brussels, 2016), available at eeas.europa.eu, (http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/eda/index_en.htm) (19 Apr. 2016).

[81] European Union, Treaty of Lisbon (Lisbon, 2007) available at. lex.europa.eu, (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL&from=EN) (20 Apr.2016).

[82] Ibid.

> Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.[83]

Lisbon also expanded the Petersberg tasks to include

> joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.[84]

As mentioned previously, Lisbon also established the E.E.A.S. to coordinate assets in this regard. In essence these changes seem to be heavily influenced by NATOs frameworks, while seeking to preserve the relevance of NATO in the European context, and the autonomy of European member states in matters of defence. Since Lisbon, the military framework of the E.U. has remained relatively stable. In 2016 the E.U. adopted the European Union Global Strategy (E.U.G.S.) as a replacement for the 2003 E.S.S. The E.U.G.S. identified three major areas of focus for the future of E.U. defence development: firstly 'responding to external conflicts and crises when they arise', secondly 'building the capacities of partners', and thirdly 'protecting the European Union and its citizens through external action'.[85] The shift towards a more externally focused development model is apparent given the experiences the E.U. faced as a result of external conflicts in the period it is somewhat unsurprising. Another significant development from the E.U.G.S. is that it was accompanied by a significant commitment between both the E.U. and NATO towards a greater level of active cooperation.[86] Having made direct reference to emergent concerns to security

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[83] European Union, Treaty of Lisbon (Lisbon, 2007) available at. lex.europa.eu, (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL&from=EN) (20 Apr.2016).

[84] EEAS, The Treaty of Lisbon (Brussels, 2015), available at eeas.europa.eu, (http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/lisbon/index_en.htm) (24 Apr. 2016).

[85] E.U., *Implementation plan on security and defence* (Brussels, 2016) , available at europa.eu, (https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/pages/files/2016-12_-_factsheet_-_implementation_plan_on_security_and_defence.pdf) (8 sept. 2018).

[86] E.U., NATO, Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

from the East and the South, the declaration pledged that the focus of such increased cooperation would be on the topics of

- countering hybrid threats
- operational cooperation including at sea and on migration
- cyber security and defence
- defence capabilities
- defence industry and research
- exercises
- supporting Eastern and Southern partners' capacity-building efforts.[87]

The second and final topics contain a natural connection the maritime domain and indeed supplemental literature published by the partners distinctly referenced the maritime operations in the Mediterranean as examples of areas suitable for increased cooperation.[88]

In a naval context the first active operation, ATALANTA was launched in 2008, and has seen success combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden, more recently Operation Sophia was launched in 2015, and will be dealt with in more detail in the later portion of this chapter. In conclusion the E.U. has undergone a period of rapid strategic development surrounding defence in the period of focus, however it must be noted that while the framework has been rapidly adapting there has been very few operational deployments of forces, particularly in the maritime domain to benchmark the progress against.

In the context of Europe, maritime security was the domain of the E.U. Commission, specifically the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs (DG MARE). The directorate encompassed a broad range of maritime interests under two main policy headings, those of fisheries policy and the Integrated Maritime Policy, the latter of which contained maritime security. While fisheries have

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(Warsaw 2018) available at consilium.europa.eu,
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf) (20 Sept. 2018).
[87] European Union, *EU-NATO cooperation* (Brussels, 2016) p. 2.
[88] Ibid.

been a mainstay of E.U. maritime affairs, the Integrated Maritime Policy was a far more recent development. Published in 2007 the policy set forth the goals of the union to secure the maritime future of Europe.[89] While making no direct inferences to naval affairs, the policy did recognise the need to establish an integrated maritime surveillance network.[90] In 2014 the DG MARE published the Maritime Security Strategy (E.U.M.S.S.), in its own words, the main goals of an E.U. Maritime Security Strategy were:

> 1) to identify and articulate the main strategic maritime interests of the E.U.;
>
> 2) to identify and articulate the maritime threats, challenges and risks to the strategic maritime interests of the E.U.; and
>
> 3) to organise the response, i.e. provide the common policy objectives, common principles and areas of common support as the backbone of the joint strategic framework in order to create coherence for the diverse and wide array of sector specific maritime policies and strategies.[91]

Among the interests, and threats, identified were the protection of the E.U.'s security and economic interests, the upholding of maritime law, protection of trade routes, peaceful and sustainable exploitation of maritime assets, the security of E.U. borders against criminal activities, and the creation of an integrated understanding among E.U. In particular cross border criminal enterprises, encompassing a wide range of activities from smuggling and piracy, to threatening trade routes and terrorism, were identified as threats to E.U. security. In order to combat these myriad threats, the strategy placed a great deal of importance on ensuring the effective cooperation of the assets each member state could contribute to the endeavour. In order to strengthen the

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[89] European Commission, *An integrated maritime policy for the European Union* (Brussels, 2007) available at eur-lex.europa.eu, (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0575:FIN:EN:PDF) (20 Apr. 2016)
[90] Ibid.
[91] Directorate General Maritime Affairs*, Maritime security strategy* (Brussels, 2014), available at ec.Europa.eu, (http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/maritime-security/index_en.htm) (21 Apr. 2016).

E.U.'s maritime security, the strategy identified five major 'areas of implementation'.[92]

Firstly, it asserted that

> The strength of the E.U. lies in the range of instruments at its disposal, including political dialogue with international, regional and bilateral partners ... support for regional maritime capacity building and civilian and military C.S.D.P. actions.[93]

It also stressed that:

> Several factors, such as illegal activities of non-state actors, cross-border crime, international terrorism or piracy, exploit the weaknesses of fragmented local, regional and global maritime governance systems.[94]

The next two identified points centred on promoting surveillance and capability building. Once again, the focus was on promoting development that would harmonise E.U. efforts to increase security through concepts of interoperability of military hard assets, and also operational and strategic theory and practice.

Point four was in relation to risk management and crisis. In civil terms it discussed the benefits of promoting higher standards of safety and sea, worthiness in vessels and once more promoted general cross sector integration of all assets, civil and military. This was aimed towards facilitating and streamlining common understandings, leading to enhanced response capabilities.

The final point on 'Maritime security research and innovation, education and training' again stressed the critical nature of harmonising concepts, across the variety of stakeholders involved in maritime security. This was to be achieved through integrated exercises and programs that aided in common understanding of maritime affairs for all actors. Following the publication of the E.U.M.S.S., the council published an action plan in 2014, to highlight how it planned to achieve

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[92] Directorate General Maritime Affairs, *Maritime security strategy* (Brussels, 2014), available at ec.Europa.eu, (http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/maritime-security/index_en.htm) (21 Apr. 2016).
[93] Ibid.
[94] Ibid.

the vision of the E.U.M.S.S.[95] Of particular interest within this action plan were some of the ways the council foresees achieving each of the five major areas of the E.U.M.S.S. The first 'workstrand' was to be tackled through increased integration with E.U. and NATO, as well as engaging third party states in capacity building arrangements, to reduce the burden on E.U. assets. It is also notable that section 1.5 outlined the need to reassess the E.U.s ability to rapidly react to crises.

The second strand was to be achieved by promoting inter agency and cross border information sharing. Section 2.2 highlights that there should be a particular use made of Frontex's surveillance network EUROSUR.[96] In addition, the same emphasis was given to utilising its maritime equivalent MARSUR.[97] Strand three, capability would be addressed through the exploration and promotion of standardisation of vessel requirements, the exploration of dual use technologies such as satellite surveillance, and the development of best practice sharing habits and mechanisms, amongst all actors.

Similarly strand four, risk management, would primarily be addressed through the creation of a common risk assessment model, across sectors, and the promotion of integrated shared training and exercises. Finally strand five, innovation and training, would be tackled through the encouragement of collation of and innovation within the current available data and practices. Once more innovation and cooperation between actors would be highly encouraged. In summary the contemporary security developments in relation to maritime affairs in Europe have centred primarily on creating an integrated framework

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[95] E.U. Council, *European Union Maritime Security Strategy (E.U.M.S.S.) - Action Plan* (Brussels, 2014), available at ec. Europa.eu, (http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/maritime-security/doc/20141216-action-plan_en.pdf) (22 Apr. 2016).
[96] E.U. Parliament and Council, *Establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur)* (Brussels, 2013), available at eur-lex.europa.eu, (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052&from=EN) (23 Apr. 2016).
[97] European Defence Agency, *Maritime Sureveillance (MARSUR)* (Brussels, 2012), available at eda.europa.eu, (https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/eda-factsheets/marsur-factsheet-v2_09102012_cs5_bleu) (20 Apr. 2016).

that can be disseminated and realised by the plethora of organisations involved in maritime affairs.

As mentioned previously, when assessing the humanitarian frameworks of the E.U., the primary agency with responsibility is the E.C.H.O. Within the period of focus for this thesis, the E.C.H.O. has dominated the topic of humanitarian aid, particularly in relation to the interaction between such endeavours and military action. Founded in 1992 as the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office, E.C.H.O. was responsible for distributing E.U. level funding throughout a host of partner Non-Governmental Organisations (N.G.O.s). However, a concise, E.U. level strategy, for the humanitarian goals and projects of the E.U., would not emerge until fifteen years later in 2007. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, it was not until the Lisbon treaty was ratified, that humanitarian aid was given distinct status as a topic in the E.U. treaty. In 2007 the European Consensus on Humanitarian aid was signed by the Council, European Parliament, and European Commission. The Consensus aims were based on improving the

> ...coherence, effectiveness and quality of the E.U.'s humanitarian response. Preserving life, preventing and alleviating suffering and helping to maintain human dignity in the face of natural and man-made disasters.[98]

Central to the Consensus are the guiding principles of the 1949 Geneva Convention, the four principals being: neutrality (that aid is not predicated towards sides of conflicts), humanity, independence (that aid is given free from other political or military goals), and impartiality (that aid is solely provide on the basis of need). [99]

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[98] European Union, *Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union* (Brussels, 2012), available at eur-lex.europa.eu, (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=en) (19 Apr. 2016).
[99] E.C.H.O., *Humanitarian principles* (Brussels, 2016), available at ec.europa.eu, (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/who/humanitarian-aid-and-civil-protection/humanitarian-principles_en) (13 Apr. 2016).

The Consensus was updated in 2012 to better improve performance and accountability to stakeholders.[100] In relation to the interaction between humanitarian efforts and Military assets, Articles 61 through 65 of the consensus addressed the framework of these interactions.[101] Of these articles, the most salient aspects are that Article 61 placed a strong emphasis that the use of military assets, in the humanitarian context, should be at all times an option of 'last resort'.[102] Article 62 centred on ensuring that where military assets are deployed in humanitarian roles, that the host nations authority is respected. Article 63 meanwhile made it clear, that while the assets in question shall remain under direct command of their home nation that overall control remains in the hands of the relevant civilian agencies notably the O.C.H.A. The final Articles 64 and 65 respectively, stressed the importance of dialogue and communication between military and civilian organisations in providing humanitarian aid, and Article 65 guarantees that the costs incurred from such deployments will burden neither the provider nor the recipient nations.

It is also interesting to note that, according to the E.U. Commission, the principles governing the use of military assets in humanitarian roles and in support of humanitarian endeavours have been directly influenced by similar guidelines, developed by the U.N. O.C.H.A.[103] Since the publication of the Consensus an action plan was initiated in 2008, to gauge the effectiveness of the new Consensus. The plan ran until 2013 and based on the evaluation of its

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[100] E.C.H.O., *Annual report on the implementation of the European consensus on humanitarian aid 2012* (Brussels, 2012), available at ec. Europa.eu, (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/consensus/2012_Consensus_Annual_Report.pdf) (15 Apr. 2016).
[101] E.U. Parliament/Council/ Commission, *The European consensus on humanitarian aid* (Brussels, 2008), available at eur-lex.europa.eu, (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1431445468547&uri=CELEX:42008X0130(01)) (19 Apr. 2016).
[102] Ibid.
[103] European commission, *Civil-military relationships in humanitarian crises* (Brussels, 2016), available at ec.euroap.eu, (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/civil-military-relations_en) (11 Apr. 2016).

results, a new implementation plan was drafted in 2015.[104] The plan placed emphasis on three main common priorities:

- Upholding humanitarian principles and International Humanitarian Law.
- A stronger needs-based approach.
- Enhancing coordination and coherence.[105]

In regards to the third topic on coordination there was no reference to military forces. In summary, the current framework for E.U. humanitarian aid in relation to military forces is that of recognition of the role they can play in disaster relief; but also, one of cautious approach to realising these assets. Understandably as much humanitarian aid is deployed to regions experiencing upheaval and conflict, it is reasonable to be concerned about inflaming tensions further by injecting external military forces into the situation, in any context as the risk of misapprehension is quite high.

As stated previously this thesis intends to use the Mediterranean migrant crisis as a case event to appraise development in Western European navies. It is now therefore of relevance to provide some general information on the state of the crisis at the point where both case studies became formally involved. This will enable each of the case studies the space to develop the topic further as it was experienced by each service. In December of 2015 the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees published its midyear report for the calendar months of January to June for that year. The report noted that '2015 is likely to exceed all previous records for global forced displacement'.[106] Specifically, it predicted that the figure of forcibly displaced person was on track to exceed 60 million people, the highest rates seen since the end of the Second

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[104] European Commission, *Implementation plan of the European consensus on humanitarian aid* (Brussels, 2015), available at ec.europa.eu (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/2015_Consensus_Implementation_Plan_en.pdf) (14 Apr. 2016).
[105] Ibid.
[106] Office of the UNHCR, *2015 likely to break records for forced displacement – study* (France, 2015), available at unhcr.org, (http://www.unhcr.org/5672c2576.html) (4 April 2016).

World War.[107] Of these displaced peoples, the report further detailed that over one million will have attempted to cross the Mediterranean Sea in search of asylum in 2015. This represented a massive increase in migration in the region as the equivalent figures for 2014 were approximately five times less than the following year at 219,000 asylum seekers.[108] Furthermore the International Organisation of Migration stated that the Mediterranean Sea was the source of almost all migration into Europe, with a mere three percent of the total of migrants arriving in Europe coming via land.[109] Of the one million migrants at sea at that time it is relevant to note their distribution, in terms of both their origin and their intended destinations. With regards to intended destination the lion's share of the migrants chose the Islands of Greece, approximately 844,000 people, with Italy following behind with approximately 150,000. Spain was the next highest destination with approx. 3,592, Cyprus reported 269, and Malta received 150. As for the origins of the peoples themselves, almost half of the total numbers claimed to hail from Syria at 43 percent. The next largest nationality was Afghanis at 23 percent and 14 percent claimed to be from Iraq.[110] The remainder of the migrants originated from a collection of states such as Nigeria, Pakistan, Iran, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Gambia, and Guinea.[111]

Beyond these statistics, it is also necessary to provide some context as to the origins of the crisis. With 80 percent of the migrants originating in active war zones, in the Middle East, these areas will be focused on. Syria had for the eight years leading up to 2015 seen itself rapidly decline into a protracted civil conflict. Initially this was a result of spreading unrest across the Middle East in the wake of the 'Arab Spring' in 2011. What initially began as protest against the Assad government in Syria escalated to all out civil war in the wake of the Army's

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[107] Office of the UNHCR, *likely to break records for forced displacement – study* (France, 2015), available at unhcr.org, (http://www.unhcr.org/5672c2576.html) (4 April 2016).
[108] *ABC News Australia*, 30 Dec. 2015.
[109] *ABC News Australia*, 22 Dec. 2015.
[110] Office of the UNHCR, *Regional migrant data,* (France, 2015), available at unhcr.org, (http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php) (4 April 2016).
[111] Ibid.

intervention.[112] From that point Syria saw itself divided into a maelstrom of shifting territories, and groups, as the forces of the Assad government, the various rebel groups, ethnic collectives, Islamic extremists and foreign participants such as Russia have been constantly struggling to establish control of the state.[113] The net result is that, according to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs there were 4.8 million Syrians outside of Syria in need of assistance in 2015. Those were the figures that fled Syria since March of 2012.[114] Having left these regions, as has been evidenced above, many of them have sought to find refuge in Europe via the Mediterranean.

Meanwhile Afghanistan provided a sizeable measure of the migrants in the period. Since the U.S. led invasion in 2001 Afghanistan had known little, relative, stability, after the winding down of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) involvement in the later part of 2015, the Taliban led insurgency had seen renewed success in fighting the Afghan Army.[115] This renewed conflict and seemingly perpetual political instability helped maintain the steady flow of asylum seekers fleeing Afghanistan in the period.

Iraq too saw a resurgence in asylum seekers fleeing for Europe. According to Eurostat, there was a nine fold increase in the number of asylum applications by Iraqi citizens to Europe between 2014 and 2015.[116] Similar to the other examples Iraq's situation was a product of both external invasion and internal conflicts. Following the War in Iraq (2003-2011) and the exit of coalition troops, Iraq saw a resurgence of sectarian violence initially from Sunni groups, but later in the period from the group calling itself the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.[117]

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[112] *BBC News*, 10 May 2011.
[113] *BBC News*, 30 Sept. 2015.
[114] UN OCHA, *Syrian Arab Republic* (Belgium, 2016), available at unocha.org, (http://www.unocha.org/syria) (5 Apr. 2016).
[115] *New York Times*, 29 Apr. 2015.
[116] Eurostat, *Asylum Quarterly Report* (Luxembourg, 2016) available at ec.europa.eu, (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_quarterly_report#Where_do_they_come_from.3F) (9 Apr 2016)
[117] The Guardian, *Iraq crisis: Isis gains strength near Baghdad as Kurdish forces seize Kirkuk* (London, 2014), available at TheGuardian.com,

In response to what was referred to as the migrant crisis, the major European states engaged in several attempts to mitigate the flow of migrants and the issues they created. The Mediterranean states were the first to act in this regard, as migration has long been an issue of relevance in their national awareness. Operation Mare Nostrum was launched by the Italian Navy in October 2013. Designed as a response to the high rates of migration and deaths associated with the attempts to cross the sea in unworthy vessels, Mare Nostrum operated for one year at a cost to the Italian government of 114 million Euros and rescued a reported 150,000 persons from the Mediterranean waters.[118] Mare Nostrum is further notable as it served as the inspiration for its successor Operations Triton. Triton was launched by Frontex, the E.U.'s border security agency. However it came under immediate criticism for two major reasons. Firstly it initially composed a far smaller commitment of both assets and funds despite being internationally funded.[119] Secondly, unlike Mare Nostrum, it operated a smaller search and rescue capability. Furthermore as opposed to its predecessor, Operation Triton it focused on border protection rather than search and rescue, and operated closer to the Italian coast.[120] Criticism came to a head in April of 2015 following a series of extremely lethal shipwrecks in the Mediterranean, notably on 19 April 2015, which saw nearly 800 migrants drown in one instance.[121]

(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/12/crisis-in-iraq-insurgents-take-major-cities-live-blog) (8 Mar. 2016).

[118] Ella Ide, *Italy ignores pleas, ends boat migrant rescue operation* (Rome, 2014), available at Yahoo.com (https://www.yahoo.com/news/italy-confirms-end-boat-migrant-rescue-op-mare-142437512.html?ref=gs) (8 Apr 2016).

[119] Julian Borger, *E.U. under pressure over migrant rescue operations in the Mediterranean* (London, 2015), available at theguardian.com,
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/15/eu-states-migrant-rescue-operations-mediterranean) (10 Apr. 2016).

[120] Ibid.

[121] Antonio Denti, *Hundreds drown off Libya, E.U. leaders forced to reconsider migrant crisis* (Palermo, 2015) available at reuters.com, (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-idUSKBN0NA07020150419) (15 Apr. 2016).

This led to emergency talks which saw the commitment to a new ten-point plan to increase the effectiveness of operations tackling the crisis. of particular note the first two points committed to:

> Reinforce the Joint Operations in the Mediterranean, namely Triton and Poseidon, by increasing the financial resources and the number of assets. We will also extend their operational area, allowing us to intervene further, within the mandate of Frontex.[122]

And,

> A systematic effort to capture and destroy vessels used by the smugglers. The positive results obtained with the Atalanta operation should inspire us to similar operations against smugglers in the Mediterranean.[123]

This was also followed by a commitment days later to triple the funding of Triton with aims to bring it in line with Mare Nostrum's.[124]

In addition to the border patrol and SAR operations carried out, the focus then shifted towards the interdiction and dismantling of the organisations involved in smuggling migrants. In June 2015 the E.U. launched E.U. Naval force Mediterranean EUNAVFOR MED.[125] It was structured to operate in three distinct phases, the first of which focused 'on surveillance and assessment of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean'.[126] This was considered completed by October of 2015 it then subsequently transitioned into its second, phase, which provided 'for the search and, if necessary, diversion of suspicious vessels'.[127] This second phase was also

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[122] European Commission, *Joint Foreign and Home Affairs Council: ten point action plan on migration* (Luxembourg, 2015) available at europa.eu, (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4813_en.htm) (10 Apr 2015).
[123] Ibid.
[124] Sridharan Vasudevan, *E.U. to triple funding for 'Operation Triton' to tackle Mediterranean migrant crisis* (London, 2015), available at ibtimes.co.uk, (http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/eu-triple-funding-operation-triton-tackle-mediterranean-migrant-crisis-1498100) (11 Apr. 2017).
[125] European Union Naval Force, *European Union Naval Force – Mediterranean Operation Sophia* (Rome, 2016) available at eeas.eu, (http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-med/pdf/factsheet_eunavfor_med_en.pdf) (16 Apr. 2016).
[126] Ibid.
[127] Union Naval Force, *European Union Naval Force – Mediterranean Operation Sophia* (Rome, 2016) available at eeas.eu, (http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-med/pdf/factsheet_eunavfor_med_en.pdf) (16 Apr. 2016).

renamed as 'Operation Sophia'. By April 2016 the operation had reported some success, with 13,000 migrants rescued and 69 alleged traffickers arrested.[128] However as will be examined in later chapters it had already by that point been criticised over its lack of a fully realised plan on how it would successfully transition to its third phase. This third phase was to deal with the apprehension of smugglers and the disposal of their vessels, and it particularly aimed to do so before they could be utilised.[129] However the obvious implication that this would entail the possibility of operations within the territories of the points of departure had not been addressed.

In relation to this chapter, what has become apparent with regards to the European response to the migrant crisis is that much of the initial responses in the period were focused on individual elements that comprised the event. Each of the operations detailed has been structured around a different primary focus (SAR, Border Patrol, Smuggling interdiction etc.), with secondary concern given to the other facets of the crisis. While the response times to the arising issues were improving as the crisis progressed, there seems to be no holistic approach to the issue. How this has affected the various naval organisations involved with the operations will be examined in the coming chapters.

It should be noted that since this period the situation in the region has changed, while 2015 was a landmark year in terms of the flow of people figures have since fluctuated in the region, indeed this was not a new departure as will be demonstrated in the later chapter detailing Malta's involvement in crisis. Factors such as the military defeat of ISIS in the North of Iraq have also likely had a significant impact on the nature of the flow of people out of those regions.[130]

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[128]Daniel, Pelz, *On the Mediterranean refugee patrol with the Bundeswehr* (Med Sea, 2016) available at dw.com, (http://www.dw.com/en/on-the-mediterranean-refugee-patrol-with-the-bundeswehr/a-19209234) (26 Apr. 2016).

[129] European Union Naval Force, *European Union Naval Force – Mediterranean Operation Sophia* (Rome, 2016) available at eeas.eu, (http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-med/pdf/factsheet_eunavfor_med_en.pdf) (16 Apr. 2016).

[130] Terri Cronk, *Evidence of normal life returns to Iraq, Syria, after 'Caliphate' defeat, official says* (Washington, 2018) available at dod.defense.gov,

Likewise the more recent issues with the increasing disagreements between the various nations involved in the responses to the crisis, such as the Italian Government's decision to close ports to N.G.O. led vessels, have created new issues in the region.[131]

Reviewing this chapter, there have been some notable differences in approach, towards the activities discussed by the three supra-national bodies. These are mostly accounted for through the fundamental character of the organisations. NATO's focus on defence, the E.U.'s on national integration and the U.N.s more universalist diplomatic role. Simultaneously it is also the case, that there are some general similarities that can be drawn about the frameworks within each organisation. Particularly those that have impacted on navies in Europe. The primary similarity is that despite a growing trend towards the acknowledgement of the diversity of roles that naval assets can perform, through a wide variety of operations, the strategic frameworks of these roles are still being outsourced to traditional parties. This is true of military, peacekeeping, and humanitarian efforts most of all. By comparison there has been more integration in the area of maritime security, though this is most likely due to the fluid nature of that term in many organisations.

This chapter presents a range of questions to be answered about these framework's efficacy. These relate to their impact on Navies engaging in development and operational activities in the period. Some of these questions include: How do such navies understand their identities in the myriad of environments which they now operate within? Given the increased emphasis that the use of military forces should be done in a particularly 'demilitarised' context. How do navies in their development account for the increasing flexibility being demanded of them by such organisations as the U.N., NATO, and the E.U.? Now that these frameworks have been illustrated it remains to examine how the case study naval services have interacted with them.

(https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1502396/evidence-of-normal-life-returns-to-iraq-syria-after-caliphate-defeat-official-s/) (17 Sept. 2018).
[131] *The BBC*, 30 June 2018.

Chapter 3:
The Irish Naval Service:
Historical development.

The Irish Naval Service (Naval Service) is the branch of the Irish Defence Forces with responsibility for maritime affairs. Currently the service defines itself in these terms:

> The Naval Service is the State's principal seagoing agency maintaining a constant presence twenty four hours a day, three hundred and sixty five days a year throughout Ireland's enormous and rich maritime jurisdiction, upholding Ireland's sovereign rights.[1]

For the purposes of this thesis, it will represent a major case study. It offers a distinct example of a small constabulary navy, operating in the European context. As outlined previously, it has been chosen for its stature, its relative youth, and its status as a traditionally constabulary navy. As a major case study within this thesis, it will therefore be examined over two chapters, each taking a distinct approach to examining this organisation.

This first chapter will examine the Naval Service primarily in terms of its historical development, leading up to the period of focus post 1990. This will provide a necessary contextual foundation for the examination of the service in the second chapter. To best serve the goals of this chapter it will principally take a historical narrative approach.

The first section will discuss the initial history of the Naval Service. It will begin in the period following the foundation of the Irish State but before the establishment of the Marine Service in 1939. It will then progress through to the period until 1946, when the foundations for what would become the Naval

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[1] Irish Naval Service, *Roles of the Naval Service*, available at: www.military.ie (http://www.military.ie/naval-service/organisation/roles-of-the-naval-service/) (5 Feb. 2017).

Service were laid, alongside the establishment of operations on Haulbowline and the initial organisational development. The next period focused on will be the establishment of the current Naval Service, in the aftermath of the Second World War, and its development throughout the decades before accession into the now European Union. This period highlights the initial attempts at growth and the setbacks faced. Furthermore it illustrates the efforts made towards the establishment of a stable framework for future sustainability within the Naval Service. The final part of this initial section will deal with the initial effects of EU accession on the Naval Service up to the end of the 1970s.

Section two will comprise the remainder of the chapter. With the necessary background detailed in section one; it will examine the direct preceding years to the period at the focus of this thesis. This section will begin by outlining of the continuing period, of significant overhaul of the Naval Service, in the early 1980s. It will then conclude at the end of the decade leading up to the collapse of the U.S.S.R.

This will provide the necessary context for the following chapter. This chapter will continue into the period following the end of the Cold War, through the first decade of the millennium, and the global economic crisis. It will examine the adaptation of the Naval Service to these periods of re-organisation in global strategic affairs.

Within all of the periods outlined above, the development of the Naval Service will be examined under three main headings. These will be: areas of responsibility in the affairs of the state, approaches to these responsibilities, and the changing composition of the Naval Service in terms of personnel and vessels.

The Irish Defence Forces encompass all of the armed military forces of the Republic of Ireland, notably the Naval Service, Army and Air Corps. Nominally this force traces its origins to before the foundation of the Irish State.[2] It should

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[2] Irish Naval Service, *History*, available at: www.military.ie (http://www.military.ie/naval-service/history/) (5 Feb. 2017)

be noted though, that until the formation of the Marine and Coast Watching Service in 1939, the only maritime military force had been the Coastal and Marine Service. This had lasted no more than eleven months between April 1923 and March 1924.[3] Its brevity and the lack of a replacement can be attributed primarily to aggressive budgetary reductions carried out in the wake of the civil war to reign in unsustainable military spending.[4] This is reinforced by the rejection of a proposed reduced and more cost-effective force.[5] Also cited were the provisions of Article Six of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, which held that:

> Until an arrangement has been made between the British and Irish Governments whereby the Irish Free State undertakes her own coastal defence, the defence by sea of Great Britain and Ireland shall be undertaken by His Majesty's Imperial Forces, but this shall not prevent the construction or maintenance by the Government of the Irish Free State of such vessels as are necessary for the protection of the Revenue or the Fisheries.   The foregoing provisions of this article shall be reviewed at a conference of Representatives of the British and Irish governments, to be held at the expiration of five years from the date hereof with a view to the undertaking by Ireland of a share in her own coastal defence[6]

The effect of this was that for the remainder of this period the only state-owned vessel operating in any capacity was the LÉ *Mhuirchu*, a steam powered patrol ship, operating as part of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries. To state that this was less than effective for the tasks facing the authorities, is somewhat of an understatement. *Mhuirchu* lacked a crew with any real authority to perform the tasks necessary for basic coastal or harbour patrol, and went without armament for most of this period. This would eventually begin to change when she received a single gun in 1923.[7]

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[3] Thomas McKenna, 'Thank god we're surrounded by water' in *An Cósantoir*, (Apr., 1973), p. 105.
[4] Pádrhraic Ó Confhaola, 'The Naval Forces of the Irish State, 1922-1977' (PhD thesis, Maynooth University, 2010), p. 44.
[5] Tom McGinty, The Irish Navy: a story of courage and tenacity (Tralee, 1995), p. 111.
[6] Text of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, 1921 (N.A.I., DE 2/301/1).
[7] Thomas McKenna, 'Thank god we're surrounded by water' in *An Cósantoir*, (Apr., 1973), p. 107.

The primary task facing the *Muirchu* was that of fisheries protection. Given the characteristics of the vessel this proved quite difficult. This was not simply due to the problems of being a solitary vessel, and the lack of capability to enforce any orders given to ships. These physical issues were compounded as prior to the 1933 Fisheries act it had no remit to conduct searches. Fundamentally the fact that its crew were civil servants and not police officers meant that they, in theory, were legally unable to exercise any powers of seizure, search, or arrest.[8] This was an inconvenient contradiction of powers. A similar issue arose with the task of preventing residual arms smuggling, as well as subversive activities ongoing from the period of conflict in the early 1920s. These activities threatened not only the security of the state, but also diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom, which were still very much in their infancy. Such was the amount of lingering suspicion from the Anglo-Irish war that proposals to grant Royal Navy vessels powers to conduct the type of searches denied to the *Mhuirchu,* as a temporary solution, met with significant resistance.[9] In the remainder of this period, it should be noted that some efforts were made to plan future forces, by the government. Initially the focus was on the reacquisition of the three 'treaty ports' of Cóbh, Loughswilly and Berehaven, as these were foreseen as the keys to any successful force.[10] These ports had remained under the control of the United Kingdom, as part of the 1921 agreement, due to their strategic importance in the case of another U-boat campaign in the Atlantic.[11] Additionally, there was some occasional speculation of the type of force to come, including the, short lived, possibility of a submarine based force.[12] Such initiatives were unrealistic, ab intio, from both a budgetary and infrastructure standpoint however they do indicate that from the outset there was acknowledgement of the depth of assets that would be necessary for

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[8]Pádrhraic Ó Confhaola, 'The Naval Forces of the Irish State, 1922-1977' (PhD thesis, Maynooth University, 2010), p. 49.
[9] Ibid., p. 50.
[10] *Memorandum on coast defence, 1926* (N.A.I., S4978).
[11] *Text of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, 1921* (N.A.I., DE 2/301/1).
[12] *Memorandum coast defence* (sea) (N.A.I., DFA 205/122), p. 1

a comprehensive naval security solution for an area as challenging as the Irish territorial waters.

The next major milestone occurred in 1938, shortly before the outbreak of hostilities in Europe. In July of that year, the Royal Navy had relinquished control of the three 'treaty ports' leaving them open for reoccupation.[13] Furthermore, with the enactment of the new constitution, Bunreacht na hÉireann, in December of that year, the coastal waters of the island were claimed by the Irish government:

> ...with nothing but a 1908 vintage fishery protector armed with a 3pdr. and solid shot, to look after five thousand one hundred and twenty seven square miles of the then territorial sea...and a coastline of one thousand nine hundred and seventy miles.[14]

At this time there were discussions already taking place, within the Army, about the need to establish some form of navy, and suggestions for a force of six patrol vessels supplemented by three dozen motor torpedo boats (M.T.B.) and supplementary trawlers were made by the general staff.[15] However the initial purchase in 1939 consisted of just two M.T.B.s from Thornycroft.[16] The outbreak of World War II did spur on a further expansion of the naval forces of the state. Between September and December 1939 there was a sudden rush to establish a 'Marine and Coast Watching Service' and provide the necessities for its operation. Firstly, the *Muirchu* and another vessel the *Fort Rannoch* were appropriated from the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, and the order of M.T.B.s was increased to six (though it would be 1942 before the final vessel of that order had arrived). Furthermore, the base on Haulbowline Island was inspected and judged suitable for the establishment of a naval base. In 1940 this was followed by the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) (No.2) Act 1940 which separated the M.C.S. ranks and ratings from the existing army structure.

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[13] Robert Fisk, *In time of war: Ireland, Ulster and the price of neutrality* (London, 1983), p. 26.
[14] Thomas McKenna, 'Thank god we're surrounded by water' in *An Cósantoir*, (Apr., 1973), p. 108.
[15] Daire Brunicardi, *Haulbowline* (Dublin, 2012), p. 177.
[16] Ibid., p. 178.

Haulbowline Island was occupied in July, and in October a mine laying vessel the *Shark* was purchased and commissioned. This rapid drive towards the establishment of a navy was spurred by the necessities of international law, specifically, Ireland's declaration of neutrality. In order to vouchsafe the declaration, it was necessary to satisfy the conditions laid down in the thirteenth schedule to the 1907 Hague convention concerning the 'Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War. As such the duties of the M.C.S. (later, from 1942, the Marine Service) were extended to:

> (1) Entry to, and conduct and control of, belligerent warships in territorial waters and ports.
> (2) The conduct and regulation of Merchant ships in territorial waters and Ports.
> (3) Mine laying, minesweeping, mine destruction and notification of mines.
> (4) Escort duties.
> (5) Protection of navigation aids.
> (6) Fisheries protection duties.
> (7) Rescue duties.[17]

The first major challenge facing the service was reorganising Haulbowline Island into a working naval base. This was being attempted after a period of neglect to the base that had seen the installation slip into a significant state of disrepair. This was successful, though facilities were never quite appropriate for the necessities of the upkeep of the vessels at hand.[18] However the majority of the issues were overcome to some degree, rendering the base operational.[19] The issue of suitability arose once more, as it quickly became apparent that the small M.T.B.s were unable to conduct the type of long-range patrols envisioned. As a result of these shortcomings they were relegated to defensive duties in and around Cork harbour.[20] The other major activity that seemed to occupy the M.C.S. time was that of mine sweeping. This was as a result of the frequent

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[17] Thomas McKenna, 'Thank god we're surrounded by water' in *An Cósantoir* (Apr., 1973), p. 111.
[18] Daire Brunicardi, *The Seahound* (Cork, 2011), pp 127-128.
[19] Daire Brunicardi, *Haulbowline* (Dublin, 2012), p. 189.
[20] Ibid, p. 189.

occurrence of British sea mines off the south coast, breaking free and drifting in Irish waters. By all accounts this was a common task with over nine hundred mines in total destroyed by the naval forces and the Ordinance Corps of the Army between 1939 and 1945.[21] This was to typify the role of the M.C.S. throughout the Second World War, that of coastal observation and clearing of ordinance. Occasionally the M.C.S. dealt with fisheries protection duties and infrequent rescue events related to the war.[22] However by the end of hostilities, it had not seen any conventional military engagements.

The M.C.S. in this format came to an end alongside the war in Europe. In conjunction with the perceived lack of requirement due to the war's end, there existed grave concerns about the utility, efficiency and even discipline within the force. Officially it was noted that 'A general looseness of control and lack of responsibility among the officers, and in particular among the senior officers, has resulted in the whole service being unreliable'.[23] By March 1946 all aspects of the M.C.S. had been disbanded. However, the experience had led to recognition that a standing naval force was required in future.[24] To this end the Naval Service was made a permanent part of the Defence Forces that same March.

With the foundation of the Naval Service, the tasks facing its organisation were threefold. The first task was one of definition of its roles in war and peace. In broad terms theses task were: in wartime, the main goals were to patrol Irish waters preventing their exploitation by belligerents, particularly with regards to minesweeping activities. In peacetime fisheries protection was once again the primary task, with hydrographical survey and transport services for the rest of the defence forces as secondary tasks.[25]

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[21] Thomas McKenna, 'Thank god we're surrounded by water' in *An Cósantoir* (Apr., 1973), p. 110
[22] Daire Brunicardi, *Haulbowline* (Dublin, 2012), p. 197.
[23] General report on the Defence Forces, 1944-45 (I.M.A.), p. 35
[24] Pádrhraic Ó Confhaola, 'The Naval Forces of the Irish State, 1922-1977' (PhD thesis, Maynooth University, 2010), p. 93.
[25] Memorandum on Defence Forces, addendum 2, 1945(I.M.A.), p.1.

The second task was the re-organisation of the rank structure to place the Naval Service, particularly its command structure, on par with that of the Army's to ensure the separation of the forces.[26] This was achieved through the 1947 Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act and subsequent reorganisation efforts in 1948.[27]

The third and final major task was to outfit the service with suitable vessels. The corvette class was settled on as the most economical solution to the roles envisioned for the new service. Over the winter of 1946-47 three such vessels were purchased from the Royal Navy, the *Macha*, *Maev* and *Cliona*. These vessels were to make up the bulk of the fleet until the last of them was retired in 1971.

From the outset these vessels seemed ill suited to the tasks at hand, be they patrol work in the harsh Atlantic conditions or the requirements of mine sweeping post war. Additionally, they were in such a poor state of repair that they were almost immediately occupied with a costly set of repair works to render them suitable for service.[28] Having completed this restructuring, the bulk of the post war period was spent engaging in peacetime security duties. In addition to the now ubiquitous fisheries protection role, the Naval Service, in conjunction with the customs department, began to take a more active role in the prevention of smuggling operations affecting the state.[29] Also of note, in this period was the Naval Service' first international mission when the LÉ *Cliona* was dispatched to Nice, France in September of 1948. The purpose was to escort the remains of W. B. Yeats back to Ireland for burial. The publicity element of this role for the Naval Service was noted and similar efforts would be seen again throughout its history.[30]

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[26] *General report on the Defence Forces, 1947-48* (I.M.A.), p.15
[27] *Annual report on the Defence Forces, 1948-49* (I.M.A.), p.1.
[28] John Treacy, *Caveat emptor – building Ireland's small navy 1945-49* in Col. D Dignam Prof. E. O'Halpin, Dr. I. Speller (eds), *Defence Forces Review 2016*, (Kildare, 2016) pp. 141-153, at p.152
[29] General Report on the Defence Forces, 1947-48 (I.M.A.), p. 72.
[30] Pádrhraic Ó Confhaola, 'The Naval Forces of the Irish State, 1922-1977' (PhD thesis, Maynooth University, 2010), p. 110.

In contrast to the sudden expansion in the aftermath of the Second World War, the 1950s would be a period of stagnation for the Naval Service. Despite plans in the 1940s for a fleet that was more than twice the size of what was purchased; a series of setbacks would see the service's growth severely hampered. The first of these occurred in 1950, with a revising of Irish defence policy in the event of war in Europe. With the expectation that any invasion of the state would be principally by air, the emphasis for Ireland's defence was shifted to the Air Corps.[31] The next major issue facing the Naval Service in this period was a significant shortfall in personnel, some two hundred and eight in total at the beginning of the decade.[32] This trend would persist throughout the rest of the 1950s. The situation became of such concern that in 1956 the Minister of Defence, Sean McEoin, was forced to make a public appeal for volunteers.[33] Numbers throughout this period were so low, as to not allow the full manning of the three corvettes in operation.

The corvettes themselves, the core of the fleet, were also rapidly becoming unsuitable, once again, for operational duties. As financial constraints precluded any hope of replacement, a series of overhauls were carried out on the *Macha* and *Cliona* in 1957 and 1958 respectively. These works were hoped to extend the lifespan of the vessels for the next decade.[34] Despite these issues, there was some positive progress made with regards to the establishment of training facilities. By the end of the decade, the Naval Service possessed not only the capability to produce lower grade specialists in-house, but it was also making progress towards the ability to provide officer training in line with the rest of the Defence Forces.[35]

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[31] Annual report on the Defence Forces, 1950 (I.M.A.), p. 1.
[32] Pádrhraic Ó Confhaola, 'The Naval Forces of the Irish State, 1922-1977' (PhD thesis, Maynooth University, 2010), p. 115.
[33] Sean MacEoin address, 1956 (I.M.A., 3/24479).
[34] *Memorandum on the Naval Service, 1967* (N.A. I., S/615), p. 9.
[35] Pádrhraic Ó Confhaola, 'The Naval Forces of the Irish State, 1922-1977' (PhD thesis, Maynooth University, 2010), p. 127.

If the 1950s could be described as a period of stagnation for the Naval Service, then the 1960s were to be a period of renewed decline. In retrospect, it is accurate to say that the service was never in a more precarious position than it was by the end of the decade. The key, once more, to this state of affairs was financing. The Irish government was reluctant to countenance the spending of anything more than was absolutely necessary to maintain the force.[36] In an effort to boost available funding, the Naval Service sought to find areas of responsibility it could expand towards.

The most notable of these endeavours was the foundation of the short-lived Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in 1960. Traditionally the role of the Department of Transport and Power, operational control of marine rescue coordination was formally transferred to the Department of Defence in April 1960. Shortly thereafter the M.R.C.C. was established in Haulbowline, it consisted of three officers, operating on a 24-hour basis. Unfortunately this seemingly small strain on manpower proved too great, and control was handed back to the Department of Transport soon thereafter, who would set up a civilian replacement for the service based in Shannon, Co. Clare.[37]

Another problem for the Naval Service was the rapid degradation of their fleet. By 1961 the three corvettes, all had their life expectancies extended to 1967 through re-fittings. However in reality despite some efforts at upkeep the service was only ever able to guarantee the function of one at a time in this period.[38] Several attempts were made to search for suitable replacements, as far abroad as the U.S.A., but none proved cost effective for the government.[39] These problems were further compounded with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) in 1964, which saw the territory of the Irish

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[36] Pádrhraic Ó Confhaola, 'The Naval Forces of the Irish State, 1922-1977' (PhD thesis, Maynooth University, 2010), p.129.
[37] Ibid, p. 135
[38] *Memorandum on the Naval Service, 1967* (N.A. I., S/615), p. 2.
[39] *Memorandum for Government re: vessels of naval service, 1969* (N.A.I., TAOIS 2000/6/216)

Sea extended to a 12-mile limit.[40] In effect the result was that the area of responsibility for the Naval Service increased four hundred percent under UNCLOS I.[41] By the end of the decade the still young service saw itself facing a massively increased area of responsibility, while continually undermanned and relying on vessels far beyond their capabilities and lifespan.

In contrast to the gradual stagnation and decline witnessed in previous decades, the 1970s would be the period of drastic reversals of fortune for the Naval Service. The Service went from facing the reality of an extinction, of the state's third formal maritime service, to a period of new, relative prosperity. It had been suggested that the demands of E.E.C. accession, and the prospect of vastly increased territorial waters (particularly the proposed 200-mile European common fisheries area), are what finally convinced the powers that be to take interest in the Naval Service.[42]

By 1970 the Naval Service had been reduced to a single serviceable ship the LÉ *Maev*., However following her breakdown that same year, she was finally decommissioned in January 1971. [43] With this the last of the corvettes were out of service, and they were swiftly replaced with three *Coniston* class minesweepers that same February and March. The vessels were purchased second hand from the Admiralty following inspections to determine their sea worthiness in Gibraltar and Hythe.[44] Shortly thereafter the first Irish built ship the LÉ *Deirdre* was commissioned in May 1972. Based on the Norwegian *NORNEN* class patrol vessel, and intended to fulfil Ireland's offshore patrol needs, she was to spearhead the new P21 class. [45] The first purpose built patrol

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[40] United Nations, *United Nations convention on the law of the sea* (New York, 1982) available at (http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf) (6 Nov. 2017).

[41] J.J. Kavanagh, 'The NS fishery protection role' in *An Cosantóir*, (Feb., 1986), p. 6.

[42] Pádrhraic Ó Confhaola, 'The Naval Forces of the Irish State, 1922-1977' (PhD thesis, Maynooth University, 2010), p. 144.

[43] *Irish Times*, 18 Feb. 1970.

[44] Pádrhraic Ó Confhaola, 'The Naval Forces of the Irish State, 1922-1977' (PhD thesis, Maynooth University, 2010), p. 145

[45] Frank Troy, 'Engineering in the Naval Service' in *Journal of the institution of Engineers of Ireland,* (May 1986), p. 32.

craft in the history of the Naval Service, she was followed later in the decade by the LÉ *Emer*, in 1977, the *Aoife* in late 1979, and finally by the *Aisling* in May 1980. These acquisitions were supplemented by the purchase of two temporary vessels for shorter patrols and training, the LÉ *Setanta* and LÉ *Ferdia*. However, these vessels would not have a long service life as they were purchased in 1976 and disposed of less than a decade later in 1984.[46]

In terms of roles occupied by the Naval Service in this decade, they remained similar to the previous decades but with some notable additions. As was to be expected fisheries protection was the dominant duty of the service. With E.E.C. accession in 1973, the inevitable expansion of Irish waters followed. In 1972 Ireland claimed a 200-mile fishing zone.[47] By 1976 the 200-mile exclusive economic zone had been agreed by the E.E.C. These events can be directly linked to the proportionally rapid expansion of the Naval Service in this period, as they not only drastically increased the responsibility of the service, but that with them, came fifty percent of the funds necessary for the expansions.[48] Furthermore, the prospect of European fishing vessels in the Irish Sea, led to a new focus on maritime interests in government with the imposition of restrictions on foreign trawler size.[49] Alongside this came the appointment of a Minister for Fisheries and the increase of penalties for illegal fishing activities.[50]

This period is also notable for an increase of Soviet activity off the Irish coast. This took the form not only of fishing vessels such as the *Belmoyore*.[51] But also that of intelligence collectors like the *Repiter*.[52] Both of these incidents highlight a policy of commitment to the maintenance and patrol of the 12-mile limit by the Naval Service, while also highlighting their understanding of the ramifications of hard-line approaches towards East-West interactions. At home

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[46] Aidan, McIvor, *A history of the Irish Naval Service* (Dublin, 1994), p. 145.
[47] *Irish Times*, 31 Dec. 1971.
[48] Ibid, 18 Oct. 1977.
[49] Ibid, 11 Apr. 1977.
[50] Ibid, 13 Apr. 1977.
[51] Ibid, 15 Oct. 1976.
[52] Tom McGinty, The *Irish Navy: a story of courage and tenacity* (Tralee, 1995), p. 177.

the escalation of violence in Northern Ireland, with the re-emergence of paramilitary actors, was also a cause for concern. With the escalating conflict it was feared that the various groups would take advantage of Ireland's wide coastline to smuggle the arms necessary for the conflict into the states. Notably the Naval Service was involved with efforts to prevent arms smuggling by the Provisional I.R.A. from Libya. In March 1973 the *Fola, Grainne* and *Deirdre* took part in a landmark operation to capture the *MV Claudia* which was found to be carrying in excess of five tonnes of arms and explosives in the form of Semtex. While undoubtedly a massive success it should be noted that such interdictions occurred infrequently. Additionally, one of the potential constraints on these operations was that they took place independent of Royal Navy efforts to prevent the same kind of activity. Neither force, similar to their respective governments, appeared to be willing to co-operate due to lasting suspicions from the previous decades.[53]

By the end of the 1970s the Naval Service was beginning to take shape into a suitable maritime patrol service that had prospects of actually fulfilling its remit. With political attentions turning towards the sea, the vast increase to territorial waters and the successful experience of indigenous built ships the Naval Service was poised for another period of expansion in the following decade.

At the outset of the 1980s the Naval Service seemed prepared to continue with the progression and expansion of the previous decade. There was initial progress with vessel procurement. In 1984 the largest service vessel to date the LÉ *Eithne* was commissioned. Designed for offshore patrols, she was twice the displacement of her older siblings, faster and carried the facilities to launch and recover helicopters from her deck. The latter was part of an initiative designed to leverage air assets, to make up for the massive areas of responsibility for a given Irish patrol vessel. She was planned to be followed by two sister ships of similar specification. Unfortunately for the Naval Service, the dockyard and

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[53] Pádrhraic Ó Confhaola, 'The Naval Forces of the Irish State, 1922-1977' (PhD thesis, Maynooth University, 2010), p. 150.

shipwrights at Verolme, despite heavy government subsidies, was forced to close down that same year.[54] This was linked with industrial unrest and a global low demand for ships, making the venture unsustainable. With the loss of this facility the prospect of home-grown ships built in Cork was lost, meaning that the *Eithne* was destined to be a once off project rather than the lead vessel of a new class. That same year the now venerable minesweepers came to the end of their service life. Subsequently they were disposed of by 1987. This left the Naval Service with no inshore capability, as its remaining ships lacked the manoeuvrability for such work. It appears that the unprecedented period of expansion had come to an end.

Uncharacteristically this absence in the fleet was short lived, as two inshore patrol vessels were purchased the following year from the Royal Navy, the LÉ *Ciara* and *Orla* respectively. These vessels had served previously as patrol vessels in the waters surrounding Hong Kong. However the waters in that region comprised a significantly less difficult environment than they faced fulfilling the task of inshore patrol off the Atlantic coast. In one respect this unusually rapid replacement of a gap in the fleet, could be evidence of a commitment to the maintenance of a functional service. This is reinforced by the growth of drug interdiction, as a common inshore activity. It is however more likely the result of the very reasonable cost attached to the deal.[55]

In terms of operational ability, with the loss of the minesweepers, the expertise attached to their mine clearing was lost in addition. What had been a mainstay of the service since its inception, minesweeping and clearing, had been discarded. This left a gap in capability and also resulted in specialists in that field being made conceptually redundant as a result. The impact on morale, while difficult to measure would not have been positive. Shortly thereafter the Army Air Corps discovered its Dauphin model helicopters were unsuited for maritime rescue operations due to poor lift capacity and unsuitable redundancy

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[54] *Irish Times*, 28 Sep. 1984.
[55] Daire Brunicardi, *Haulbowline* (Dublin, 2012), p. 227.

characteristics[56]. As a direct result the *Eithne* lost it's on board helicopter capabilities.

Despite these setbacks the service continued to consolidate its position as an important state agency. 1984 saw another large shipment of arms, bound for the conflict in Northern Ireland intercepted. Initially carried from the USA aboard the *Valhalla*, they were transferred to the trawler *Marita Ann* and she was intercepted of the coast of Co. Kerry, carrying seven tonnes of arms and other military equipment.[57] By 1990 the Naval Service had settled into what would remain its essential configuration in terms of composition, for the next two decades. However, while the situation facing the Naval Service had improved on many fronts, the service still remained proportionately undermanned and underequipped for its extremely large area of responsibility. Moving towards the end of the century the focus was beginning to shift towards consolidation of the service. In particular, the structures on Haulbowline and organisational matters were to be addressed. Consistency it seems was finally becoming a characteristic within the service.

What this brief history of the development of the modern naval service illustrates is that from the end of the Second World War, to the collapse of the U.S.S.R. there was no stable long-term vision for naval development in the Irish state. For the first twenty years the service underwent a slow decline in terms of fleet assets until finally achieving redundancy with the complete loss of operational capacity in 1971. With the undoubtedly vital aid of financing due to E.E.C. accession this was corrected to a significant degree. However, as was evidenced by the downsizing in the decade following, this development was not indicative of a new long term focus on maritime affairs in the period. Simultaneously, it must be noted that while interest in Irish naval development has hardly been consistent, that there was overall progress made in developing the capacity of the service; most obviously in attempts towards increasing self-

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[56] *Irish Times*, 24 Jan. 2000.
[57] Daire Brunicardi, *Haulbowline* (Dublin, 2012), p. 226.

reliance in terms of training capabilities. Notwithstanding the loss of minesweeping as a specialisation, the Naval Service did gradually expand its portfolio of taskings and capabilities over the period. Additionally, this was achieved while constantly dealing with the issue of low levels of recruitment and retention. This was a trend that was set to continue into the following period.

Chapter 4:
The Irish Naval Service in the post-Cold War period: Development and change.

The period of focus for this chapter is that immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union to the present day. It represented a period of rapid change in global affairs. This change can be evidenced across several relevant topics from the political to the military. For the Irish Naval Service it marks the culmination of decades of uncertainty and the quest for a sense of stability in the organisation. Stability, in this context, is defined both in terms of tasking and matters such as composition and identity.

This chapter will provide the first account of this period, across these topics. It will demonstrate that the period can rightly be considered the culmination of a process to solidify the Naval Service's identity, within the Defence Forces. It will also examine efforts to provide a functionally stable service in terms of its composition, from infrastructure and assets, to personnel. This is noteworthy in the context of the previous chapter's illustration that historically commitments to maintain the Naval Service had rarely been followed, with periods of short-term growth and inevitable decline having been the norm.

Contemporary naval theory has begun to consider that 'small navies' may well have possessed a series of characteristics that had generally gone unrecognised. The debate around these characteristics, and indeed the question of the descriptive value of the collective term 'small navies' is of interest to this thesis. This chapter will utilise the Naval Service in this period to examine certain questions related to the debate. Particularly it will focus on interactions at a policy and doctrinal level between the Naval Service and other bodies, domestic and international. It will do this by tracing the development of practices in the

period. Furthermore it will examine how strategic policy has filtered through the various agencies, be they civilian or military, to the practices of the Naval Service.

This chapter will also be of significance as the Naval Service has only recently begun to take its first steps onto the international stage with regards to combined operations with other naval actors. At a period when contemporary maritime theory has moved in the direction of large integrated maritime operations between nations it will be of note to mark the experiences of a rather new entrant into this arena.

This chapter will provide the first authoritative account of developments in the naval service and naval affairs in Ireland for this period. It will do so under three main headlines.

Firstly, it will examine the development of policy in relation to the Naval Service. This chapter will examine the various bodies that have had an impact on the development of the Naval Service. This section will begin with a focus on domestic policy sources. Key institutions examined will include the various political interests such as the Department of Defence and the Department of Finance. Within the political institutions a variety of sources beyond traditional policy, such as the two white papers of the era, will be included. These encompass funding allocations, debates and committee reports. Naturally, this examination will continue with the policy derived by the Defence Forces themselves at a strategic level.

As the primary contact point where policy from the political level is integrated into the organisation; in-house Defence Forces policy and specific Naval Service policy illustrates how strategic level goals are translated through the organisations to operational outcomes. To illustrate this both the implementation of strategic goals and general organisational development will be analysed. Organisational development, in this context, will focus on the behaviours and practices the naval service has implemented to achieve strategic goals. This includes areas such as recruitment and training, cooperation with

external bodies and a variety of other soft assets. Throughout the first section there will be a comparison made between these developments and relevant examples from the major organisations of the first chapter.

Secondly this chapter will assess the development of the various physical assets of the Naval Service. The development of the fleet will naturally be the major focus. Alongside this the development of other assets such as the naval base at Haulbowline will be examined.

The Third section will focus on how operational practices have developed over the period for the Naval Service. Approaching them initially from a domestic context, the role of the Naval Service in traditional defence orientations will be analysed first. Next the other aspects of the Naval Service's function will be examined, from its mainstay constabulary duties to its other maritime security activities. This section will cover such topics as its role in smuggling interdiction and other aid to the civil power tasks. Finally this section will analyse the various international contributions that the Naval Service has made in the period. Special focus will be paid to its contribution towards the European response to the recent migrant crisis via Op. PONTUS.

To begin the first section, and the examination of the development of naval policy, in this period, it is appropriate to begin with the most fundamental areas of development. While not strictly limited to the development of policy, the financial situation of the Defence Forces are key to understanding a vital context in which development in the period takes place. In particular, as defence spending is often critically tied to the fortunes of the state, it provides an interesting opportunity to understand the perception of the Naval Service within the state. The period of focus also represents one of the most dramatic periods in the economic history of the state. The rise of the 'Celtic Tiger' economy in the middle of the 1990s and the rapid expansion of the Irish economy brought unprecedented prosperity to the nation through the early years of the millennium. The subsequent global recession, and the associated banking and property crises that manifested from 2008 onwards, represented a dramatic

about face in the state's fortunes. With the period of austerity and gradual recovery, post 2014, that followed, the two decades since the fall of the Soviet Union have been eventful in economic terms for Ireland. But how has this impacted the Naval Service?

Firstly it is necessary to assess overall defence spending at a national level. At the beginning of the period of focus through to the early years of the Celtic Tiger in 1996–7 defence spending as a whole remained at around 1.1 percent, broadly keeping in line with growth in G.D.P. for the same period.[1] However this would begin to diverge at around the turn of the century, while G.D.P. continued to grow at a steady rate, in this period, defence spending did not keep pace. Spending on defence fell to sub one percent by the millennium[2]. This fall would continue, with further decreased allocations until eventually defence spending settled at approximately 0.5 percent of G.D.P. [3] There it would remain for the period until the economic crash in 2008.[4]

Following the 2008 crash, despite the rapid contraction of the economy that followed, defence spending would decrease, in line with the economy, but remain stable at approximately 0.6 percent for the years immediately following the crisis.[5] From 2011 onwards the major effects of the recession began to impact the Defence Forces, as a series of budget cuts would see spending on the

[1] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 1997, Europe* (London, 1997), available at: tandfonline.com,
(http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597229708460105) (6 Dec 2016) p. 86.
[2] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 2001, Europe* (London, 2001), available at: tandfonline.com,
(http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597220108460153) (6 Dec 2016) p. 91.
[3] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 2006, Europe* (London, 2006), available at: tandfonline.com,
(http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597220600782820) (6 Dec 2016) p. 127.
[4] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 2009, Europe* (London, 2009), available at: tandfonline.com,
(http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597220802709878) (6 Dec 2016) p. 178.
[5] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 2011, Europe* (London, 2011), available at: tandfonline.com,
(http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597222.2011.559835) (6 Dec 2016) p. 118.

forces fall significantly to 0.4 percent of G.D.P. through 2012.[6] These cuts would continue throughout the next several years. However from 2013 onwards, the budget had re stabilised at 0.5 percent of G.D.P.[7] This figure stayed at around 900 million Euros for the three years leading up to 2016.[8] It would continue to slowly grow in raw terms to a height of 1.03 billion in 2017 but would not track with G.D.P. growth in the same period falling back to 0.3 percent in the same year.[9]

While overall defence spending is an important factor to consider, the total budget of the Defence Forces accounts for spending by the organisation from all outgoings. In light of this fundamental context, it is relevant to consider the internal allocation of funds for maritime assets. This is necessary to distinguish the weighting of naval allocations. While outgoings such as pay and structural maintenance are drawn from communal funds shared between the branches, the yearly financial reports in the Defence Forces Annual Report does make a distinction for the 'Naval Service: Equipment, Fuel, Maintenance etc.'.[10] These concerns are the primary focus of most discreet naval spending.

Charting this spending the early years of the current century were quite stable in terms of this spending. For the first four years spending remained at approximately 11 million Euros and approximately 1.5 percent of total

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[6] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 2013, Europe* (London, 2013), available at: tandfonline.com, (http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597222.2013.756999) (6 Dec 2016) p. 145

[7] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 2015, Europe* (London, 2015), available at: tandfonline.com, (http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597222.2015.996348) (6 Dec 2016) p.105

[8] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 2016, Europe* (London, 2016), available at: tandfonline.com, (http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597222.2016.1127564) (6 Dec 2016) p. 109

[9] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 2018, Europe* (London, 2018), available at: tandfonline.com, (https://www-tandfonline-com /doi/abs/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416980) (5 June 2018) p. 502

[10] Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces annual report to the Minister For Defence 2006, (Dublin, 2006) p. 86.

spending.[11] Following this the trend, spending would gradually increase, for those concerns over the remainder of the decade. In terms of overall spending, this resulted in spending staying at approximately 1.8 percent of the budgets from 2006 onwards. However in real terms this often meant variations of actual allocation by several million Euros. From 2007 through 2009, for example budget fluctuations led to an allocation of 13 million Euros in 2006.[12] This increased to 16 Million Euros in 2007.[13] It then fell back to 14 million Euros in 2008. [14] It must however be noted, that the internal consistency in the wake of a serious economic crash is in itself potentially positive.

In contrast to a decade of rather muted growth in the assets budget for the Naval Service, 2010 saw a dramatic increase in such spending with the budget rising to 37 million Euros, five percent of the overall Defence Forces budget for the year.[15] Despite a dip the following year of six million Euros, spending would remain at five percent for the next several years. [16] Recently there has been another, large invigoration of spending in this area.[17] The year 2014 saw the budget for maritime assets almost double once more. The allocation, for maritime assets, increased to 71 million Euros, accounting for 10.5 percent of the total budget that year.[18] A slight slip has followed this most recent expenditure, as in 2015 the allocation was 65 million Euros or 9.7 percent of the

[11] Defence Forces Ireland, *Defence Forces annual report 2002* (Dublin, 2002) p. 52, Defence Forces Ireland, *Defence Forces Annual Report 2003* (Dublin, 2003) p.37, Defence Forces Ireland, *Defence Forces Annual Report 2004* (Dublin, 2004) p. 49.

[12] Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces annual report To The Minister For Defence 2007, (Dublin, 2007) p. 72.

[13] Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces annual report 2008, (Dublin, 2008) p. 61.

[14] Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces annual report 2009, (Dublin, 2009) p. 63.

[15] Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces annual report 2010, (Dublin, 2010) p. 53.

[16] Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces annual report 2011, (Dublin, 2011) p. 49.

[17] Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces annual report 2012, (Dublin, 2012) p.48, Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces annual report 2013, (Dublin, 2013) p. 55.

[18] Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces annual report 2014, (Dublin 2014) p. 51.

budget.[19] This was almost identical the following year with 64 million and 9.4 percent of the budget allocated in 2016.[20] While it is clear that overall defence spending in the period has increased very marginally and at times even decreased there has been a series of dramatic infusions of assets into the Naval Service, certainly within the last decade. Notably the recent surges in funding dove tail with contemporaneous vessel purchases. This would likely indicate short term injections rather than evidence of a sustained long-term investment.

By itself, the raw data on defence spending in this period is not conclusive proof of change in any particular direction, at least without the context the policy examination provides. However analysis of it provides a powerful metric for assessing policy developments in the period. In essence, it enables a benchmarking of concepts such as commitment to development. Furthermore, it provides vital context for any other behavioural patterns that emerge in development as there is not an aspect of these affairs that does not first need to consider funding in its execution.

When examining the development of naval policy in Ireland for the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is important to note that at a political level, military affairs in the absence of clear and present security threats tend to be de-prioritised. This difference is usually a reflection on the broader cultural and political notions about the importance of defence and benefits gained from such investments. Ireland's deliberate neutrality and relatively small economy have traditionally had a strong impact on defence spending. As has been illustrated in previous chapters, defence spending has rarely been a priority outside of moments of necessity, for example the requirements of enforcing neutrality in the 1940s or the impact of expanded zones of economic exploitation in the 1970s.

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[19] Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces annual report 2015, (Dublin, 2015) p. 53.
[20] Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces annual report 2016, (Dublin, 2016) p. 63.

Focusing on the development of policy relating to the Naval Service, particularly in the last decade of the twentieth century, it is readily apparent that much of the discourse was conducted in very broad terms. This is particularly evident at governmental level. That is to say it was focused on the defence forces as a singular entity, without distinction to the various branches. This was especially clearly seen in the series of reviews that took place over the decade. Before the publication of the White Paper in 2000, much of the focus of government initiatives was on the establishment of a cohesive understanding of the Defence Forces as a whole, and redefining the nature of the Defence forces in general.

Of relevance to this thesis, the earliest indication in this shift of thinking in the period came in 1993. In September of that year the government approved an update of the roles of the Defence forces to now include

> (1) to defend the State against armed aggression; this being a contingency, preparations for its implementation will depend on ongoing Government assessment of threats;
>
> (2) To aid the civil power, meaning in practice to assist when requested, the Garda Síochána, who have primary responsibility for law and order, including the protection of the internal security of the State;
>
> (3) To participate in international missions in the cause of peace;
>
> (4) To provide a fishery protection service in accordance with the State's obligations as a member of the European Union; and,
>
> (5) to carry out such other duties as may be assigned to them from time to time, for example, search and rescue, air ambulance service, ministerial air transport service, assistance on the occasion of natural disasters, assistance in connection with the maintenance of essential services.[21]

This shift in definition was carried out to recognise formally the role of the Defence Forces in Irish society outside of the traditional military role. It was in essence recognition that the day to day responsibilities of the Defence Forces were not reflected by existing policy.[22] Alongside this redefinition, came a series

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[21] Minister for Defence (Barrett, S.), *Written answers, Defence Forces role*, Dáil Éireann Debate *Vol. 462 No. 6, p. 37.*
[22] Ibid. p. 37.

of restructuring programs. These were designed to help optimise the Defence Forces, to better achieve its mandate effectively, and above all efficiently.[23] It should be noted there were commitments given that the new roles for the Defence Forces were not to be seen as a fundamental replacement of the originals.[24]

With regards to the Naval Service specifically, while much of the reorganisation of the Defence Forces was viewed at a combined administrative and command level, part of the established Efficiency Audit Group, included a review of both it and the Air Corps.[25] This was carried out by external auditors Price Waterhouse in 1996. Owing to its proximity to the drafting process of the White Paper the impacts of this review will be detailed in the next section on the paper itself.

In conjunction with these governmental efforts, the Department of the Taoiseach published its *Action Programme for the Millennium* in 1998.[26] The document is relevant as not only did it promise to end what it describes as 'reactive ad hoc planning that has characterised the management of our Defence Forces'.[27]. Furthermore, it made specific reference to fisheries protection and drug interdiction (roles chiefly dominated by the Naval Service), as vital roles for the Defence Forces at home. The plan made several commitments, notably for the Naval Service, it commits to the publication of a White Paper on defence, the delegation of admin tasks for day to day activities to the services themselves and to 'Redefine and enhance the role of the...Naval

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[23] Minister for Defence (Barrett, S.), *Written answers, Defence Forces role*, Dáil Éireann Debate *Vol. 462 No. 6, p. 37.*
[24] Minister for Defence (Barrett, S.), Questions oral answers, Defence Forces role, Dáil Éireann Debate.
Vol. 462 No. 6, p. 15.
[25] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2000), p. 48.
[26] Department of Taoiseach, *Action programme for the Millennium*, (Dublin, 1998), available at Taoiseach.gov.ie,
(http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Publications/Publications_Archive/Publications_for_1998/actionmillennium1.pdf) (17 Dec 2016).
[27] Ibid., p.21.

Service'.[28] However, as will be illustrated, the suceeding White Paper would not live up to this pledge in terms of policy.

The plan also set out a commitment to introduce continuous recruitment schemes and an overall commitment towards an expanded role for the Defence Forces in peacekeeping. However this would remain primarily an Army dominion. It must also be noted however that there was serious consideration given in the same period to the outright disbandment of the Naval Service as a branch of the military and its replacement with an unarmed civilian coast guard. This was due to perceptions of a lack of military necessity for such a force within the Department of Defence.[29]

Within the service itself, initial recognition was officially somewhat cautiously optimistic. In an interview given shortly after the report, the then Flag Officer, Commodore John Kavanagh stated in regards to policy that a proposal to move the HQ. to Cork and to not opt to privatise fisheries protection (which had been favoured by the Department of the Marine) were welcome. He also recommended that going forward the White Paper should look to the U.S. Coast Guard as an example for Irish maritime development.[30] However this would not seem to have been the case as evidenced below. In the same interview he also stressed the issue of personnel shortages; this will be addressed in the relevant section later.

In the period leading up to the millennium there were several efforts made to reorganise defence in the Irish context. Most of these efforts were generalised and focused around reflecting the realities of the Defence Forces actual activities. The primary motivation for the various governments seemed to lie in efficiency and streamlining rather than in innovation. For the Naval Service,

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[28] Department of Taoiseach, *Action programme for the Millennium*, (Dublin, 1998), available at Taoiseach.gov.ie,
(http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Publications/Publications_Archive/Publications_for_1998/actionmillennium1.pdf) (17 Dec 2016) p.21.
[29] *Irish Independent*, 10 Aug. 1999.
[30] *Irish Times*, 6 Aug. 1998.

while it can be argued that there was recognition of its ongoing role in fulfilling vital economic functions. However this would not be readily apparent in the products of this initial restructuring.

In terms of the development of defence policy in the Irish context, the period following the Millennium has seen the publication of the two most important policy documents on defence in the modern history of the state. These are namely the two white papers published by the Department of Defence in the year 2000 and its more recent successor published in 2015. These papers represented the first of their kind, a concerted effort on behalf of the Government and Department of Defence to engage in development planning for the Defence Forces over a period of time. The papers are separated by a decade and a half of development. However, for the Naval Service and maritime doctrine in the period, they represent the clearest definition of strategic level policy.

With the approach of the new millennium, and in line with a self-professed renewed interest in Defence matters, the Department of Defence was tasked with the creation of the first White Paper on defence in the history of the state.[31] The goal of which was to set out the medium-term strategies the government identified as suitable for achieving policy goals.[32] With regards to general maritime defence, there was very little attention paid to this concern in the 2000 White Paper. The security and environment assessment within the paper dismissed concerns about territorial defence and in particular stressed that,

> The naval component of defence has necessarily had a lower priority than land-based defence. ... There is no case for a significant shift in defence provision towards an enhanced naval contribution. [33]

Furthermore it stressed 'Ireland does not face a maritime-based threat for which the provision of a full naval capability is necessary or for which the huge costs of

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[31] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2000), p. 7.
[32] Ibid., p. 8.
[33] Ibid., p. 46.

warships could be justified'.[34] In the White Paper, emphasis was put on the role of the Naval Service in fisheries protection duties as they account for 90 per cent of its activities.[35] Indeed the overall tone of the White Paper was that the Naval Service should remain focused towards its current primary tasking of protecting the state's assets at sea principally fishing rights. Furthermore, it identified maintenance of the service in its current format and a focus on efficiency of existing assets material and personnel as major goals for the service in the medium term. In terms of the flotilla, it asserted that maintenance rather than expansion should be the focus.[36] Turning to operations, as fisheries protection was identified as the primary goal, efficiency was defined as a combination of searches conducted and days on patrol. These should be maximised and were situated as performance markers for the success of any initiative. Furthermore, the White Paper set out a clear commitment that the Naval Service's position as sole maritime agency of the state must be maintained. This was principally owed to the limitations of available resources and the risk of overlapping services.[37] Finally, with regards to development there was an acceptance of several of the recommendations made by the external auditors brought in to assess the Naval Service. Notably there is a commitment to improving infrastructure at the naval base in Cork, enhancement of existing I.T. services to bring them in line with E.U. standards, and a commitment to develop the relationship between the Naval College and Cork Institute of Technology.[38] The report also acknowledged that the efforts to relocate the Headquarters of the Naval Service to Cork had been completed.[39]

While the first White Paper can be rightly described as a landmark moment in the development of Defence policy for both the Naval Service and the Defence Forces as a whole; little of the policy in relation to naval affairs was particularly

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[34] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2000) p. 46.
[35] Ibid., p. 45.
[36] Ibid., p. 46.
[37] Ibid., p. 47.
[38] Ibid., p. 48.
[39] Ibid., p. 48.

surprising. There was a confirmed lack of concern for maritime affairs outside of fisheries duties. Furthermore at all points there was a settled expectation on the continuation of budgetary constraints hampering expansion of the Naval Service. This is typical of issues faced by such smaller navies, as has been noted previously, the economies of scale larger navies benefit from are keenly absent for such organisations. Indeed the decision of the White Paper was that there is no need for a substantial change in resource allocation.[40] Finally, in the realm of international security there was an endorsement of the concept of an increasingly interdependent security and defence structure within the bounds of the E.U., despite the absence of any kind of formalised defence guarantee.[41]

In the period between the publication of the first and second white papers on defence, a number of additional policy documents emerged. These came in the form of annual reports and strategy statements produced by both the Department of Defence and the Defence Forces. From the Department of Defence's strategic statements, there was not a major focus on naval affairs. However in some areas there are reflections of the beginnings of developments that would be reflected in the second White Paper. In the 2003-2005 Statement the expanding nature of the Naval Service, in interacting with various other state bodies, was reflected in the target of creating Service Level Agreements (S.L.A.) with a variety of state bodies.[42] In the 2008-2010 statement the department expanded its focus on maritime affairs to stress the importance of integration of assets to affect the domain.[43] Furthermore it highlighted the importance of the ongoing replacement programme, as key in creating a more integrated,

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[40] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2000), p. 9.
[41] Ibid., p. 14.
[42] Department of Defence, *Strategy statement 2003-2005* (Dublin, 2002), available at defence.ie, (http://www.defence.ie/WebSite.nsf/72804bb4760386f380256c610055a16b/58d00b906ab895c080256c5400543440/$FILE/StrategyStatement2003-2005.pdf) (28 Dec. 2016) p. 15.
[43] Department of Defence, *Strategy statement 2008-2010* (Dublin, 2007), available at defence.ie, (http://www.defence.ie/WebSite.nsf/72804bb4760386f380256c610055a16b/a221c63d3721aa2f802573f400554af9/$FILE/Statement%20of%20Strategy%202008-2010.pdf) (28 Dec. 2016) p. 21.

interoperable Defence Forces.[44] It was also in this document where the first mention of the upcoming second White Paper (planned to span 2011-2020) including a reference to an expansion of naval assets.[45] Finally it was also the first strategic document to include a direct reference to naval affairs under the NATO Partnership for Peace (P.F.P.) program. In this case 'Cooperation in maritime matters' was identified as a 'priority area of interest'.[46] By contrast the next strategy statement for the period 2011-2014, was lacking any commitment to developing maritime assets specifically. This strategy statement had returned to the standard emphasis on increasing opportunities for joint integration of naval assets within the Defence Forces.[47] Finally the most recent Department of Defence strategic statement for the period 2015-2017 was essentially identical, in its maritime aspect, as the previous, however in light of the imminent publication of the White Paper at the time, and not wishing to pre-empt its contents, it is likely this is a product of timing.

In conjunction with the strategic statements, the Department of Defence published a report on the implementation of the first White Paper in 2005. In relation to the Naval Service the report coincided with the completion of a five-year implementation plan targeted at the Naval Service. From the report the areas of focus that were addressed centred around the creation of more efficient systems of organisation, of operations and a drive to address recruitment as a concern.[48] This report is noteworthy as it provides the clearest example of the Department's understanding of the focus and impacts of efforts to implement its strategic vision for the Naval Service.

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[44] Department of Defence, *Strategy statement 2008-2010* (Dublin, 2007), available at defence.ie, (http://www.defence.ie/WebSite.nsf/72804bb4760386f380256c610055a16b/a221c63d3721aa2f802573f400554af9/$FILE/Statement%20of%20Strategy%202008-2010.pdf) (28 Dec. 2016) p. 20.
[45] Ibid., p.33
[46] Ibid., p. 15.
[47] Department of Defence, *Strategy statement 2011-2015* (Dublin, 2010), available at defence.ie, (http://www.defence.ie/WebSite.nsf/72804bb4760386f380256c610055a16b/1820c82ff2b38b4c802579e30032ec2a/$FILE/Statement%20of%20Strategy%202011-2014.pdf) (28 Dec. 2016) p. 20
[48] Department of Defence, *The White paper on defence: Review of Implementation* (Dublin 2005), available at defence.ie, (http://www.defence.ie/WebSite.nsf/72804bb4760386f380256c610055a16b/e1cd6e42fd36ebbf802572b4003b7368/$FILE/WPReview.pdf) (29 Dec 2016) p. 30.

In the context of policy, the annual reports tend to be lacking in content. This was primarily a reflection of their nature as progress reports, however towards the later part of the last decade they illustrate an interesting shift in Department of Defence analysis. Beginning in 2006 there was a significant change in the content of the reports. There was a much larger emphasis, from that year, placed on the presentation of analytical data, particularly of activity of the various branches of the Defence Forces. This shift was tied directly to a desire to provide a more comprehensive overview of both the Department of Defence and the Defence Forces.[49] While primarily quantitative in nature, a regard was shown to qualitative aspects in part. Beyond data on activities such as naval operations, aid to the civil power missions, and raw personnel numbers, there were sections that dealt with attempts to quantify the knowledge base of the Defence Forces.[50] This shift in the annual reports in this period suggests a move towards a more outcome-based assessment, in terms of activities, of strategic planning and implementation.

In addition to the Department of Defence publications on strategy and the annual reports the Defence Forces themselves published equivalents to both. In general terms there was less divergence of focus in terms of the strategic statements as the period progressed. Indeed even before this convergence began, the differences were more of focus and presentation than of substance. Examining the strategy statements, after the publication of the first White Paper in 2000, the commentary on naval affairs implied simple endorsements of both it and the contemporaneous implementation plans.[51] Interestingly, where it departed from the Department of Defence statement from the same period was it focused more on identifying outputs in terms of operational activities.[52] This

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[49] Department of Defence, *Annual report 2006* (Dublin, 2006), available at defence.ie, (http://www.defence.ie/WebSite.nsf/72804bb4760386f380256c610055a16b/4d8cca1da933177
c8025731c0054d170/$FILE/AR2006.pdf) (2 Jan 2017) p. 2.
[50] Ibid., p. 34.
[51] Defence Forces Ireland, *Strategy statement 2001-2004* (Dublin, 2000), available at military.ie, (http://www.military.ie/fileadmin/user_upload/images/Info_Centre/Docs2/strategy_01-04.pdf) (3 Jan. 2017) p. 11.
[52] Ibid., p. 20.

seems to have been an attempt to directly connect strategic planning to operational outputs at a higher level than the service itself. Given that these reports are directed for external review, the reason for this difference in approach is likely owing to the Defence Forces connection to the tasks. With the next statement for 2003-2005 there is a greater focus away from strictly Defence Force matters, strategic policy in this statement, is structured around four major goals. The first of these was state defence.[53]. The second was human resources, in keeping with trends towards increased focus on asset optimisation.[54] Peace support operations (P.S.O.) were the third, given the swell of such operations in the period. [55] Finally government support services were reflective of the increasing familiarity the organisation was gaining in such roles.[56] In addition Interdepartmental relations are given more emphasis than previously.[57]

From a maritime perspective, this statement in addition to re-endorsing the implementation plan set out the desire for full integration of the Naval Service into the proposed National Maritime College (N.M.C.I.) scheme.[58] Furthermore in recognition of its potential role in assisting P.S.O.s directed it to investigate the possibility of an enhanced sea lift capability.[59] The four strategic headings became the major focus of the next strategic statement, 2005-2007. They were expanded on in greater detail for much of the document. It is at this point that the convergence of the Defence Forces and Department of Defence strategy statements can be clearly seen, as naval policy is all but absent beyond cursory explanations of the nature of the Naval Service, and restatement of the progress of White Paper goals. One exception to this being recognition of the role of the Naval Service in overseas activities, again in a logistical support role to land

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[53] Defence Forces Ireland, *Strategy statement* 2003-2005 (Dublin, 2003), available at military.ie, (http://www.military.ie/fileadmin/user_upload/images/Info_Centre/Docs2/strategy_03-05.pdf) (3 Jan. 2017) p. 9.
[54] Ibid., p. 12.
[55] Ibid., p. 14.
[56] Ibid., p. 16.
[57] Ibid., p. 17.
[58] Ibid., p. 4.
[59] Ibid., p. 4.

elements.[60] The 2008-2010 statement is nearly identical in its stance on naval policy as the Department of Defence equivalent with the most emphasis being given to joint operations development and mention of the upcoming vessel replacement program.[61] This would be repeated in subsequent statements such as the 2015-2017 publication.[62] However it is again of note that the publication of the 2015 statement was done in light of the upcoming White Paper on defence. Much like the equivalent document from the Department of Defence it is unsurprising it did not pre-empt the upcoming overarching paper.

With regards to the annual reports published by the Defence Forces in the period, they contain significant overlap with their Department of Defence counterparts. As has been mentioned there is a relative lack of relevance to policy in the naval context due to the nature of the documents. The same trend of convergence in terms of composition between these and their Department of Defence counterparts is also present throughout the period. What is particularly noteworthy is that, again, there was a noticeable shift in Department of Defence reports towards a greater emphasis on raw metrics after 2006. Defence Forces reporting was nearly entirely centred on this kind of data before 2004.[63] By 2005 the annual reports had begun to more closely mirror the strategic statements, as they were now structured in line with the four major goals discussed previously.[64] From 2006 onwards there was a reshuffle once more, and the reports begin to structure themselves around areas of engagement from

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[60] Defence Forces Ireland, *Strategy statement 2005-2007* (Dublin, 2004), available at military.ie, (http://www.military.ie/fileadmin/user_upload/images/Info_Centre/Docs2/strategy-en-05-07.pdf) (3 Jan. 2017) p. 18.

[61] Defence Forces Ireland, *Strategy statement 2008-2010* (Dublin 2007), available at military.ie, (http://www.military.ie/fileadmin/user_upload/images/Info_Centre/Docs2/Strateg_08-10en.pdf) (3 Jan. 2017) p. 19.

[62] Defence Forces Ireland, *Strategy statement 2015-2017* (Dublin, 2014), available at military.ie,(http://www.military.ie/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/Strategy_Statements/Department_of _Defence_and_Defence_Forces_Strategy_Statement_2015-2017_English_Version.pdf) (3 Jan. 2017) p.20

[63] Defence Forces Ireland, *Annual report 2002* (Dublin, 2003), available at military.ie, (http://www.military.ie/fileadmin/user_upload/images/Info_Centre/documents/Annual_Report s/ar_2002_en.pdf) (4 Jan. 2017).

[64] Defence Forces Ireland, *Annual report 2005* (Dublin, 2006), available at military.ie (http://www.military.ie/fileadmin/user_upload/images/Info_Centre/documents/Annual_Report s/ar_2005_en.pdf) (4 Jan. 2017) p. 10.

traditional military development to domestic and international security and organisational policy.[65] This lasted until a further reorganisation in 2012.[66] This simplified the focus to defence policy, capacity to deliver and operational outputs. While analysis of these documents appears to reinforce the assertion, that there has been a convergence of approaches to reporting policy outcomes, there is little of relevance to understanding naval policy development, except to perhaps confirm that there was not a large focus at the broad Defence Forces level on such development

From an internal Naval Service perspective it is important to also highlight the 2001 Naval Service Implementation plan. The plan was designed as a formal guide as to how the Naval Service would implement the various recommendations that had accrued and those that had been reflected in the White Paper. Of particular import in this plan in relation to policy was the formal embracing of a 'Service Delivery Ethos' within the Naval Service.[67] This was an ethos that would frame the Naval Service's role within the state as one of a service provider to the other public bodies it provided assistance or service to. These would now be viewed, in a sense, as customers in parallel to a more business focused approach to the non military aspects of the Naval Service's remit. In conjunction with this more customer focused approach a Kaplan-Norton style Balanced Scorecard system was introduced. With the increased formal emphasis on metric performance indicators, this was utilised as a means to assess the progress of Naval Service plans and projects. Furthermore it was a means of establishing direction for such developments to promote unity

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[65] Defence Forces Ireland, *Annual report 2006* (Dublin, 2007), available at military.ie (http://www.military.ie/fileadmin/user_upload/images/Info_Centre/documents/Annual_Reports/ar_2006_en.pdf) (4 Jan. 2017) p. 5.
[66] Defence Forces Ireland, *Annual report 2012* (Dublin, 2013), available at military.ie (http://www.military.ie/fileadmin/user_upload/images/Info_Centre/documents/Annual_Reports/an_report_2012_en.pdf) (4 Jan. 2017) p. 7.
[67] Interview with Commodore (Ret.) Frank Lynch of Cork, Ireland (22 Oct. 2017) p. 7.

between sectional interests to ensure elements were not working to the detriment of the Naval Service's goals.[68]

Other notable elements addressed in the plan included an emphasis on acknowledging the impact of 'Operational Swing' on the Naval Service. 'Operational Swing' refers to the frequency that, owing to the breadth of the Service's tasking and the relative small size of the fleet, vessels often had to rapidly switch between their defence tasking and patrol duties, to operations involving their various aid to the civil power functions.[69] This challenge faced by the Naval Service was evidenced as compounding the need for an emphasis on adaptability and multi-skilling amongst personnel. Finally to help ensure the integration of new strategies, and that Commanding officers were not allowing daily tasking to eclipse strategic planning, emphasis was placed on officers to undertake responsibility to remain abreast of such matters. This was practiced through activities such as delivering reports to the Flag Officer in the presence of subordinates to ensure unity of purpose throughout the command structures.[70] The major elements of the 2001 paper would be carried forward subsequently into various strategy statements.[71]

Returning to the concept of 'Operational Swing', it is worth noting that in the period when this was being formalised within the Naval Service, it is strikingly similar to concepts arising from the doctrine published by the Royal Navy at the turn of the century. Specifically, 'Swing' as a concept was detailed within the Future Navy Operational Concept as:

> ...the ability to configure a force, formation or unit to permit it to operate successfully, and cost effectively, across a range of mission types and roles. Swing is not merely an equipment characteristic; it is a force characteristic...[72]

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[68] Interview with Commodore (Ret.) Frank Lynch of Cork, Ireland (22 Oct. 2017) p. 10.
[69] Ibid., p. 7.
[70] Ibid., p. 9.
[71] Naval Service, *Strategy statement* (Dublin, 2003) p. 5.
[72] Royal Navy, *Future navy operational concept* (London, 2001), p. 3.

Furthermore, the importance of flexible naval assets was heavily emphasised during the launch of the revised British Maritime Doctrine BR1806, by the then First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Michael Boyce.[73] Notable examples of such adaptive behaviour pre-dating the development of the doctrine included the response by the Royal Navy to the operations in Kosovo, and the pivoting of assets to the tasks required.[74]

Having examined the three branches of the Irish public service that deal with strategic defence policy, the impression that emerges of strategic policymaking in this period is one of convergence and at times redundancy. Innovation in strategic policy making, certainly above the service branch level, is relatively absent. Instead it seems to be reactionary and descriptive of organic developments in naval policy, which emerged in the periods before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The overall strategic framework has certainly been consolidated and developed but it does not reflect major innovation. Activities at a policy level, particularly those higher than the Naval Service itself, have remained familiar to tasks carried out in decades before, indeed the development in this period has been of a form of codification and consolidation even recognition.

However this is not to dismiss the period as lacking in innovations and new departures, which shall be examined in due course. Examples include Ireland's Maritime and Energy Resource Cluster (IMERC), the various cross organisational groups such as the Joint Task Force in relation to narcotics interdiction; as well as an increased formalisation of relationships between such bodies and the Naval Service. These departures emerged in the form of the numerous Service Level Agreements, Memorandums of Understanding (M.O.U.) and general defence legislation. They added a much needed structure to such activities and can be viewed as organic, bottom up, policy making as will be evidenced in the operational thread of this chapter. Even the trend towards duplication of efforts

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[73] Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, 'Naval capabilities: the launch of the British maritime doctrine' in *The RUSI Journal*, cxliv, no. 44 (1999), pp 65-71. at p. 65.
[74] Ibid., p. 66.

and redundancy in publications has at times proved elucidating of the differences in focus of the various bodies involved in policy making.

While consolidation of such efforts obviously contributes towards efficiency and clarity of intent, it has been stated across the period that the innovative and adaptive characteristics of the Naval Service have been key strengths that the organisation has relied upon. With the notable increase in all efficiency markers, particularly in operational tempo in relation to patrol tasking which is the primary activity of the Naval Service, the effect of this 'strength' is certain. The pressing concern for the future of the Service, indeed the Defence Forces proper, was how to balance the risk of stifling such flexibility in a bid to improve clarity and reduce redundancy. The question of the nature of such adaptability, whether it stems from design or is a by-product of incidental environmental factors, has thus far been evidenced at a policy level, as stemming from the diverse responsibilities placed upon the Naval Service as the primary sea going agency of the state. Later sections on operational development will highlight how this has manifested.

In regards to policy making the question of how to balance the varying perspectives of the organisations involved and effected by defence policy will prove interesting. The increasing emphasis on cooperative efforts and improved communications between the various bodies has been repeatedly stressed, indeed the preeminent policy documents, the White Papers display a broadened input base between the first and the second. The internal restructuring within the Naval Service has demonstrated a new departure in the terms in which it views itself and its role as a service provider to the state. The period has been one of consolidation and formalisation for the Naval Service.

In the 16 years since the first White Paper on Defence much has changed in the security landscape of Europe and the wider world. From the global War on Terror to regional instability around Europe's borders, to fractious political developments from within Europe and without, global economic crashes and recoveries, there has been much unforeseen change. The most recent White

Paper was published in 2015 and comes as recognition that it is time to reassess the concept of defence in the Irish context.

The most recent White Paper was, in terms of policy, far broader than the original. It appears to have taken a more holistic approach to the topic of defence. This can be seen as an evolution on some of the topics acknowledged in the previous paper. Initially it departed from the first White Paper with its drafting process. Whereas the original White Paper was drafted solely by the Department of Defence following submissions, this time there was a greater emphasis put on fostering open debate. One notable example of this was the decision to publish a preliminary green paper in 2013.[75] Another notable example was that this time around the security assessment was carried out by

> An inter-departmental group comprising representatives from the Department of the Taoiseach, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of Defence, the Department of Justice and Equality and An Garda Síochána.[76]

From the outset, the second White Paper made it clear that its predictions of an increased interdependence, particularly in the European context, were accurate.[77] The adoption of a formal European Security Strategy in 2003 was referenced as indicative of that fact. There are several more examples of a broadening of the nature of defence and security to be found in the paper's construction. The integration of the Department of the Taoiseach's national risk assessment demonstrates further how security had moved beyond the traditional concepts from the start of the period, and now encompassed diverse topics including 'economic risks, environmental risks, geo-political risks, social risks, and technological risks'.[78]

In its stated aims, the second White Paper's focus was expanded from its predecessor's. While it remained a medium term plan that managed topics such

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[75] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2015), p. 6.
[76] Ibid., p. 6.
[77] Ibid., p. 2.
[78] Ibid., p. 4.

as development of the Defence Forces and their tasks. It provided a clear acknowledgement that defence in the Irish context was directly tied to engagement with international bodies.[79] Furthermore there was a clear aim 'To ensure defence policy contributes in a congruent way with wider social and economic policy'.[80] This was a reinforcement of the previous recognition that the Defence Forces relevance in reality has often been connected into its roles beyond the traditionally military. Finally one of the new key objectives was based around ensuring that the defence forces as an organisation was one in which its members can take pride within serving, this can be seen a direct reference to longstanding issues of morale and personnel retention and a commitment to tackle them.[81]

In a maritime context, the paper broadened the scope of what constitutes defence at sea. Unlike the previous paper that dealt with maritime issues directly under the heading of the Naval Service, the second White Paper took a more organic, task orientated approach. In terms of the security environment the paper, identified key topics of concern as the protection of fisheries, but also of the prospects of the exploitation of other natural resources, such as gas and oil, as well as the maintenance and stewardship of offshore renewable energy interests.[82]

Another notable new departure was the involvement of the Naval Service in the Irish Maritime and Energy Resource Cluster (IMERC), a group dedicated to assisting increase Irelands returns from the sea in terms of G.D.P.[83] IMERC was focused particularly on the areas of maritime operations and technology and the Naval Service's experience with both domains gave it an opportunity to contribute meaningfully to these efforts. Collaborations between the two bodies ranged in format from public private partnerships involving the

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[79] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2015), p. 5.
[80] Ibid.
[81] *Irish Times*, 30 Sep. 2016.
[82] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2015) p. 19.
[83] Ibid., p. 55.

development and trialling of new technologies to the fostering of increased entrepreneurial activities revolving around the maritime domain.[84] While seemingly initially successful in the period, IMERC was disbanded in 2017 following the unilateral decision of University College Cork and Cork institute of technology to withdraw from the project. This decision was taken whilst citing a 2016 report describing IMERC as 'not fit for purpose' due to 'poor public procurement, poor public relations, and poor financial management'.[85] Within the Naval Service, the Department of Defence and amongst private partners of the venture the decision to collapse the project was sharply criticised.[86] The report that the decision was based on in particular was described in internal Naval Service documents as containing 'inaccuracies and unsubstantiated assertions'.[87] This example serves to highlight that once more while such partnerships can produce net benefits for their participants, they are dependent on a unified vision between stakeholders for stability.

Where the paper considers the national security element of policy, in terms of national defence from armed aggression, there was not specific mention of any particular element of the Defence Forces.[88]Overall the second White Paper departs from its predecessor, most notably, where it tackles the topic of defence and security in terms of discreet areas of interest rather than along the lines of military services.

Security threats, for example, range far beyond the traditional state defence and encompass topics from espionage to transnational organised crime and espionage.[89] There was a more outward focused gaze on defence as a whole, what could be referred to as a 'global citizen' approach to the issue, as the focus

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[84] Comdt. Seán Ó Fátharta, *Naval Service operations 2015* (Cork, 2015) available at: military.ie, (http://www.military.ie/ie/an-tseirbhis-chabhlaigh/nuacht-agus-imeachtai/single-view/article/sunday-27th-december-2015-naval-service-operations-2015/?cHash=d536ba16e6a42d86c5dea2079407206a) (12 Sept. 2018).
[85] *Irish Examiner*, 14 Aug. 2017.
[86] Ibid., 21 Aug. 2017.
[87] Ibid., 18 Dec. 2017.
[88] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2015) p. 2.3
[89] Ibid., pp 14-15.

is directed at mutual benefit from a kind of economy of scale in security terms. One notable example was that domestic terrorist threats are for the first time de-prioritised in relation to larger international terrorist activities.[90] This was integrated in the case of the Naval Service through its renewed dedication to counter mine operations as will be discussed later. With direct relation to the Naval Service far more of the paper was concerned with 'Domestic Security Supports'.[91] There was a notable expansion in scope of espoused roles for the Naval Service in this regard. Aid to the civil power roles in assisting An Garda Síochána were mentioned, both in terms of the assistance the Naval Diving Unit could lend and, at greater length, its role in drug interdiction operations.[92]

In relation to drug interdiction there was a commitment to continue Naval Service involvement, particularly as 'the authorities with direct responsibilities in this area (An Garda Síochána and Revenue) do not have the operational capabilities for the kind of maritime interventions that the Defence Forces can provide'.[93] Furthermore, there are commitments given to foster and develop greater synergy, in terms of integration between the Naval Service and other maritime bodies such as the Coast Guard.[94]

Within the Defence Forces themselves, the joint nature of the maritime patrol operations carried out by the Air Corps was given recognition as vital to majority of operations carried out by the Naval Service.[95] However, in light of the newly broadened approach to maritime security, there was a reaffirmation of the primacy of patrol duties, particularly as fisheries monitoring was projected to remain the mainstay activity of the Defence Forces.[96] The indication was that while an expanded set of tasks is desirable the Naval Service should remain rooted in ensuring it can provide for its primary tasking.

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[90] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2015) p. 19.
[91] Ibid., p. 35.
[92] Ibid., p. 35.
[93] Ibid., p. 37.
[94] Ibid., p. 40.
[95] Ibid., p. 39.
[96] Ibid., p. 38.

The effect of this acknowledgement of the status quo can be reflected in development plans for the Naval Service. There was a firm commitment that the current disposition of the Naval Service be maintained at no less than eight vessels.[97] Of the vessels mentioned specifically, all were designed primarily around patrol duties. However, there was evidence of the increased recognition of the flexible nature of the Naval Service. The envisioned replacement for the LÉ *Eithne* in particular, was described as a Multi Role Vessel, designed to suit adaptive tasking.[98]

The envisioned replacements for the LÉ *Orla* and LÉ *Ciara* were to have dedicated Mine sweeping and counter I.E.D. capabilities, reviving an activity that disappeared largely with the disposal of the *Conniston* class vessels.[99] Infrastructure outside of the flotilla was characterised in more general terms with allusions made to necessary developments, notably described as outside the current funding scope, including major refurbishments of Haulbowline base.[100] This was somewhat at odds with the commitment to continue modernising the service, as onshore assets often play a significant role in ensuring a Navy is capable of reaching peak efficiency in relation to supporting maintaining, even berthing the fleet. This was especially relevant given that such a large amount of ocean monitoring in the Irish domain has been carried out onshore, through the various digital infrastructures such as the Fisheries Monitoring Centre.

Finally, the second White Paper is further of relevance as it served as a clear example of the influence that international policy has been translated into national military doctrine. As mentioned, there was a direct acknowledgement, from the beginning, that the E.S.S. had served as the inspiration for the broadening concept of defence. Notably in a Maritime context this also included

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[97] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2015) p. 67.
[98] Ibid., p. 67.
[99] Ibid., p. 68.
[100] Ibid., p. 70.

reference to the E.U. Maritime Security Strategy.[101] In endorsing this strategy the White Paper made reference to the importance of Ireland's geographical position, and pledged 'to support the internal as well as the external dimension of maritime security and will continue to stress the importance of the global aspect of the Action Plan'.[102] While the White Paper is somewhat vague in the particulars of Ireland's relationship with the E.U.M.S.S. later publications indicate that the Naval Service's initiatives relating to integrated maritime intelligence, through innovative sensors systems and in assimilating data from meteorological partners, was representative of the type of integrated maritime frameworks envisioned in the E.U.M.S.S.[103] This illustrates a convergence of the vision of both actors in this domain.

In the NATO context, there was a reaffirmation of the benefits of Ireland's adoption of the Partnership for Peace program. There was also an acknowledgment of the need to remain proactive to ensure Ireland's ability to meet emerging challenges, with little indication beyond a statement of intent.[104] However in relation to Partnership for Peace it was only mentioned in reference to the Army's peacekeeping operations and work in the E.U. battle groups directly.[105] This would seem to indicate that though there was an increased international outlook, the focus yet remained on preparing the traditional means of Irish international military involvement. However while the format of the Naval Service appeared to be remaining unchanged, in that it still reflected a force designed primarily to deal with 'internal' Irish concerns, there were two notable examples of it expanding its operations internationally. The first was in its participation, as a founding member, in the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre – Narcotics (MAOC-N) since 2007, and secondly in its assertion that the

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[101] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2015), p. 3.
[102] Ibid., p.28
[103] European Commission, *Second report on the implementation of the EU maritime security strategy action plan* (Brussels 2017), available ec.europa.eu, (https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/sites/maritimeaffairs/files/swd-2017-238_en.pdf) (5 May 2017)
[104] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2015), p. 30.
[105] Ibid., p. 65.

Naval Service in conjunction with the Air Corp's Maritime patrols can have a significant role in contributing to the 'Recognised Maritime Picture'.[106] In general there does seem to have been a trend towards an increasingly international outlook in policy as evidenced in the second White Paper. However there was little evidence to suggest that this would be more than an exploration of the boundaries of traditional tasking, furthermore there was no evidence to suggest a radical reshuffling of the nature of the Naval Service in these affairs.

With the first section on policy completed, the next section will be focused on another major area of development, that of the physical assets available to the Naval Service in the period of focus. As stated this section will examine both the seagoing assets and general fleet composition in the period. Furthermore it will describe the development of infrastructure at the naval base in Haulbowline to investigate if it reinforces the stated aims of the policy.

Beginning with the shore-based infrastructure of the naval base at Haulbowline, Co. Cork; the period since the end of the twentieth century has seen a number of projects to upgrade the base and its surrounding environs. These projects have been mainly centred on refurbishing infrastructure that had in some cases, remained untouched for nearly a century.[107] With the confirmation of the move of the Naval Service HQ. to the island officially in 1999, came the first major refurbishment programs. Initially these were initiated under the auspices of the first White Paper, which allocated an amount equating to approximately five million Dollars for development of the naval base.[108] From later reports and publications, it is clear that the majority of this funding was diverted to necessary refitting of critical basic assets, such as the provision of dining facilities in 2003.[109] Similarly the same trend can be witnessed in the major

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[106] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2015), p. 62.
[107] Daire Brunicardi, *Haulbowline* (Dublin, 2012), p. 229.
[108] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2000), p. 92.
[109] Defence Forces Ireland, *Defence forces annual report 2002* (Dublin, 2002), p. 36.

refurbishment of accommodation on the island that took place between 2003 and 2005.[110]

The impression gathered from these projects is of a race to create and maintain viable basic facilities. However, by the publication of the mid-life review of the first White Paper, the first major new development, of a combined operations and support building had been enacted.[111] Further refurbishments surrounding accommodation took place in 2006.[112] This was in addition to another unique departure previously mentioned, the jointly developed framework between the Naval Service and the N.M.C.I.

This development came in 2006 and saw the completion of the N.M.C.I. building, located adjacent to the naval base, as part of the first Public Private Partnership involving a third level institution in the history of the state.[113] In the period the N.M.C.I. was one of the largest new ventures in terms of infrastructure for the Naval Service. The following year saw the construction of a new headquarters for the Naval Reserves.[114] From that point there would be an absence of notable infrastructural developments for several years. This was somewhat unsurprising given the economic climate had turned rather inhospitable following the crash of 2008. This would change in 2014 when the Naval Service, in conjunction with partners in Cork City Council, began to take submissions for a 'master plan' for both the naval base, and the rest of the land on the island of Haulbowline.[115] It was also at this time that a number of properties 'surplus to military

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[110] Defence Forces Ireland, *Defence forces annual report 2004* (Dublin, 2004), p. 21.
[111] Department of Defence, *The White paper on defence: review of implementation* (Dublin 2005), available at defence.ie, (http://www.defence.ie/WebSite.nsf/72804bb4760386f380256c610055a16b/e1cd6e42fd36ebbf 802572b4003b7368/$FILE/WPReview.pdf) (29 Dec 2016), p. 30.
[112] Defence Forces Ireland, *Defence forces annual report 2006* (Dublin, 2006), p. 18.
[113] National Maritime College of Ireland, *Minister Mary Hanafin opens National Maritime College of Ireland in Ringaskiddy, Co. Cork* (Cork, 2006), Available at nmci.ie, (https://www.nmci.ie/index.cfm/page/newsarchive/id/6) (6 Jan 2017).
[114] Defence Forces Ireland, Department of Defence and Defence Forces *annual report* to the Minister for Defence 2007 (Dublin, 2007) p. 10.
[115] Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces annual report 2014 (Dublin, 2014) p. 24.

requirements'; mainly consisting of reserve facilities were disposed of. [116] The master plan was finalised in 2015 and focused on

> The necessity to continue to operate a fully functioning Naval Base and Naval Dockyard, and also to realise the considerable potential surrounding the use of the former Irish Steel foundry site including the Naval Service requirement for the utilisation of the west wall berthage facility to facilitate the larger P60 class Offshore Patrol Vessels.[117]

Finally the most recent White Paper offered insight into the rationale, and proposed benefits of this new cross sector approach to development. The paper stressed that while such developments (be they modernisation attempts or outright new constructions), were needed throughout the Defence Forces, that existing capital streams would be insufficient to achieve their realisation.[118]Furthermore the second White Paper highlighted the proposed developments for Haulbowline included 'commercial, educational and tourism development. This will be leveraged to maximise the benefit to the Naval Service and development of the Base'.[119] This was indicative of the development, in general, of naval thinking in the Irish context. The broadened scope of naval interests and duties was being utilised to maximise revenue streams that directly benefited the service. Certainly, while development in the period has mostly been infrequent, and focused around meeting baseline standards for critical logistics; the transition to broader areas of interest mirrored the general theme of widening the outlook of the Defence Forces. This outlook has led to initiatives designed to identify new areas of contribution to the state beyond the traditionally military. What was notable additionally was that within the most recent strategic policy, this has been identified as a critical action and not merely desirable in terms of general efficiency or utility.

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[116] Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces annual report 2015 (Dublin, 2015) p. 28.
[117]Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces annual report 2015 (Dublin, 2015) p. 28.
[118] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2015) p. 69.
[119] Ibid., p. 117.

While the infrastructure that supports any navy is vital for its existence and success, there are no physical assets more important in characterising and defining a navy, than its fleet assets. As has been discussed previously, the nature of Irish fleet procurement has historically been a series of critical purchases, typified more by convenience and economic thrift than of foresight. Even in the decade before this period, economic realities had played a key role in dictating naval procurement, as evidenced in the cancelling of the LÉ *Eithne*'s sister ships and the emergency nature of the purchase of the LÉ *Orla* and LÉ *Ciara*.

In the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Naval Service has engaged in two major purchases of vessels; those of the two *Róisín* class Coastal Patrol Vessels at the turn of the century, and more recently the procurement of the *Samuel Beckett* class of Offshore Patrol Vessels.

The first of the *Róisín* class vessels, the eponymous LÉ *Róisín* was contracted in 1997. The first vessel since the *Eithne* to be purpose built for patrol duties in Irish waters. She was manufactured in the U.K. by Appledore ship builders, Devon, and designed to emphasise its ability to with stand the rough sea conditions off the coast of Ireland with a minimal crew compliment.[120]The *Róisín* entered service in 1999. The following year the White Paper laid out the government's position on naval procurement for the rest of the period, the commitment was to a minimum of an eight-ship flotilla, centred on patrol activities, and rapid deployment, with a contingent military capacity.[121] It was also within the White Paper that the government elected to purchase the sister ship of the *Róisín* the LÉ *Niamh*. This vessel was envisioned as the replacement to the aging LÉ *Deirdre* and was delivered in 2001 to coincide with the decommissioning of its predecessor. [122] In relation to acquisition in this period it

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[120] Nava technology.com, *Roisin Class* (New York, 2017) available at Naval-technology.com, (http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/roisin/) (10 Jan 2017).
[121] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2000) p. 46.
[122] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2000),p. 47.

is also notable that the first White Paper emphasises the role of E.U. funding in these projects.[123]

With the completion of the replacement program to compensate for the loss of the *Deirdre*, the largest replacement program of the period was undertaken. Within the mid-term review of the White Paper in 2005 this program was explained as a means of replacing the *Emer* class vessels, as they reached the end of their functional service life.[124] The vessels that would replace the *Emer* class were classified as offshore patrol vessels. Their purpose was to provide flexible patrol assets within the Irish area of responsibility and beyond. The tender process for the vessels was launched in 2006, as a joint civil and military venture.[125] Publication of the program followed in the official journal of the European Union the subsequent year. At this stage the proposal sought accommodation of two O.P.V.s and one Extended Patrol vessel, with an option for two additional vessels.[126] In 2008 finalisation of the purchase began, and by 2010 a formal contract was awarded to Babcock Marine for two new O.P.V.s, with the first to be delivered by 2014.[127] The vessels were announced to be expansions on the existing *Róisín* platform. The modifications to the original designs saw that the new vessels would benefit from increased resilience in inclement weather and be the first vessels in Irish history to support the usage of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.[128] Confirmation of the second vessel, scheduled

[123] Ibid., p. 45.

[124] Department of Defence, *The White paper on defence: review of implementation* (Dublin, 2005), available at defence.ie, (http://www.defence.ie/WebSite.nsf/72804bb4760386f380256c610055a16b/e1cd6e42fd36ebbf802572b4003b7368/$FILE/WPReview.pdf) (29 Dec 2016) p. 30.

[125] Defence Forces Ireland, *Defence Forces annual report 2006* (Dublin, 2006) p. 16.

[126] Defence Forces Ireland, Department of Defence and Defence Forces *annual report* to the Minister for Defence 2007 (Dublin, 2007) p. 9.

[127] Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces annual report 2010 (Dublin 2010) p. 14.

[128] Department of Defence Ireland, The Minister for Justice, Equality & Defence, Mr. Alan Shatter, T.D., announces that the build of new naval service ship is well underway (Dublin, 2010). available at: defence.ie, (http://www.defence.ie/WebSite.nsf/Release+ID/24D094FA0CCF107A80257A02004D22CD?OpenDocument) (8 Jan 2017).

for completion in 2015 followed the next year in 2011.[129] The vessels were named in 2013, as the *Samuel Beckett* class, with the second vessel titled the LÉ *James Joyce* (a notable departure from the tradition of naming vessels after female characters of Irish legend).[130] Both entered service on time with the *Samuel Beckett* commencing duty in 2014, and the *James Joyce* following in 2015. The option for the third vessel the LÉ *William Butler Yeats* was taken in this period and it was scheduled for completion and commission by the second quarter of 2016[131], thus completing the initial O.P.V. purchase. However it was further extended with the procurement of a fourth vessel, the LÉ *George Bernard Shaw*.[132] The vessel successfully completed initial trials in early 2018 and was undergoing more extensive trials as of September 2018.[133] Given the historical tradition of procurement plans being consistently downsized for the Naval Service, this is likely an indication of the successful reception of the class.

Finally the most recent White Paper has revived the E.P.V. project to an extent by formalising the plan to replace the LÉ *Eithne* with a new Multi Role Vessel. It was envisioned that the M.R.V. 'will provide a flexible and adaptive capability for a wide range of maritime tasks, both at home and overseas.'[134] However beyond this general statement of intent the exact nature of the vessel has yet to be finalised. In 2017 a delegation was sent to New Zealand to inspect the *HMNZS Canterbury* as a possible model for the project. During this process a number of potential features including, capacity for a company sized unit, landing craft functionality, helicopter capability, and the provision of a mini ship hospital.[135] However, as of the most recent official statements from the Department of Defence, the project has still yet to be announced for the public

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[129] Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces annual report 2011 (Dublin, 2011) p. 14.
[130] Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces annual report 2013 (Dublin, 2013) p. 27.
[131] Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces annual report 2015 (Dublin 2015) p. 26.
[132] *Irish Times*, 10 Oct. 2017.
[133] *Irish Examiner,* 14 Mar. 2018.
[134] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2015)*.*
[135] *Irish Examiner*, 12 Oct. 2017.

tendering process that would finalise the scope of the vessel.[136] Given the issues faced historically with the inability of the Naval Service and the Air Corps to reach an agreement around ship based helicopter assets on *Eithne;* it is highly unlikely that such a vessel would be helicopter focused.

In addition to purchases made in this period a number of vessels were decommissioned as they reached the end of their service lives. The LÉ *Deirdre,* the first custom built craft of the Naval Service was sold in 2001 at public auction following 28 years of service.[137] This sale was to make way for the new *Róisín* class vessels. This was followed in 2013, with the disposal of the first of *Emer* class patrol vessels. The LÉ *Emer* herself was sold to a private bidder.[138] She was transported to Nigeria and subsequently she was seized by the national authorities and absorbed into the Nigerian military as a training vessel, the NNS *Prosperity.[139]* Her sister ship the LÉ *Aoife* was decommissioned in 2015 and, unlike the *Emer*, the *Aoife* was not sold. She was instead gifted to the Maltese Maritime Squadron. She has since been integrated into the Maritime Squadron and been deployed as part of the ongoing migrant crisis in the Mediterranean.[140] The following year 2016, the final vessel of the *Emer* class the LÉ *Aisling* was decommissioned. Initially it was unclear what would become of the vessel, with some consideration being given to converting her into a museum feature.[141] However she was eventually sold at auction to a Dutch based broker, resold thereafter, and was unveiled as the flagship of the 'Libyan National Army' in May of 2018.[142]

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[136] Minister for Defence (Kehoe, P.), *Written answers, naval services vessels*, Dáil Éireann Debate *Vol. 967 No. 4.*
[137] *Irish Times*, 15 June 2001.
[138] Ibid., 23 Oct. 2013.
[139] Pan African News agency, *Nigeria: President Jonathan commissions 4 new naval ships*, (Lagos, 2015) available at: panapress.com, (http://www.panapress.com/Nigeria--President-Jonathan-commissions-4-new-Naval-ships--3-630424675-0-lang2-index.html) (9 Jan. 2017).
[140] *Times of Malta*, 28 June 2015.
[141] *Connacht tribune*, 4 Dec. 2016.
[142] Jeremy Binnie, 'Libyan National Army takes delivery of ex-Irish OPV', *Jane's Defence weekly* (May, 2018) available at janes.com, (https://www.janes.com/article/80200/libyan-national-army-takes-delivery-of-ex-irish-opv) (6 June 2018).

Considering the decommissioned vessels of the period of focus, the most interesting trend is that the period marks the first in Irish naval history of co-ordinated vessel replacement. Historically the replacement of vessels has often been carried out as a result of crisis moments of unavoidable decommissioning of their predecessors. This period marks a more coordinated and sustainable approach to vessel procurement functionally achieving the aims of programs launched in the 1980s.

Looking at vessel procurement in the period the experiences of the Naval Service seem quite typical of the general issues faced by small navies. Particularly that the service had to provide for a vast scope of maritime duties. However due to limitations of scale in terms of both finances and personnel, it had to prioritise adaptability and crew efficiency; while also accounting for year wide operational activities in some of the roughest waters in Western Europe. The Naval Services purchasing decisions reinforce its pragmatic attitude of focusing on daily regular tasking, with an eye towards rapid adaptability in terms of operational swing. Furthermore, while there are claims of efforts by the Department of Defence to push towards a more single natured element to ship procurement, this was ultimately contested by the Naval Service. That 'given the small fleet in place there was no means of having the right ship in the right place at the right time with this notion'.[143] This argument clearly demonstrates a deep connection to to the concept of 'Operational Swing'. This was ultimately successful as procurement commitments can be clearly evidenced as having developed along the lines of increased flexibility.

The third major asset available to the Naval Service is that of personnel. As has been illustrated, the history of the service has often been marked by issues surrounding recruitment and retention. With the publication of the White Papers, the state outlined its projections for the period following the millennium. The first White Paper targeted a reduction in overall Defence Forces membership by 1000 members, over its life time, from 11,500 to 10,500, while

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[143] Interview with Commodore (Ret.) Frank Lynch of Cork, Ireland *(22 Oct. 2017)* p. 12.

simultaneously maintaining ongoing recruitment.[144] By the middle term of this paper's life span the Department of Defence had noted that this had been difficult to balance, with steadily dropping recruitment levels and an increasing imbalance in regards to specialist roles within the Defence Forces.[145] The second White Paper further cut recommended standings to 9,500 personnel but established a definitive goal of 1,094 members within the Naval Service. Since 2015 the Service has maintained a standing around this number but recent years have been marked with a number of high-profile departures of proportionally large numbers of experienced personnel.[146]

By the end of this period a series of research papers into satisfaction within the Defence Forces, highlighted a growing issue within the Defence Forces as a whole. Climate surveys published between 2008 and 2015 noted a marked decrease in satisfaction, particularly amongst the enlisted ranks and non-commissioned officers.[147] These findings received national attention and were linked into larger discourses on the rates of pay cuts that typified the public sector following the 2008 crisis.[148] Most recently a qualitative study, commissioned to follow these reports found that dissatisfaction was most keenly felt in relation to rates of pay, lack of career guidance and opportunities, eroded camaraderie through competitive promotional practices and that senior officers had become out of touch with the issues and concerns of their subordinates.[149] In the wake of this report it seems these trends have continued and as of August 2018, the Defence Forces has been reported to have continually failed to meet its targeted personnel targets as despite high levels of

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[144] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2000) p. 27.
[145] Department of Defence, The white paper on defence: Review of Implementation (Dublin, 2007), available at defence.ie,(http://www.defence.ie/WebSite.nsf/72804bb4760386f380256c610055a16b/e1cd6e42fd36ebbf802572b4003b7368/$FILE/WPReview.pdf) (22 Jan 2018) p. 18.
[146] *Irish Times*, 8 Aug. 2017.
[147] Defence Forces Ireland, *Wellbeing in the Defence Forces: report on the Defence Forces 'your say' climate survey 2015* (Dublin, 2016) p. 21.
[148] *Irish Times*, 20 Sept. 2016.
[149] Dr Juliet Mac Mahon, Dr Sarah Mac Curtain, and Claire Harnett, *Workplace climate in the Defence Forces phase 2: results of the focus group research* (Limerick, 2017) p. 5.

recruitment comparatively, retention issues have resulted in no significant net gain.[150]

Internally the Naval Service's approach in this period towards personnel retention and recruitment has been characterised by efforts to standardise the accreditations it awards. This has been achieved through greater integration of its awards through the national framework, and by efforts to integrate itself with civil bodies i.e. through the N.M.C.I. Another goal has been the creation of more efficient, symbiotic relationships with its partners in maritime education. The rationale for these practices was in a large part reflective of the realities of the high turnover rate of personnel, as previously the lack of accreditation for the training received by personnel had created situations where former naval personnel were, upon their exit from the service, considered formally unskilled by private industry. Indeed it has been remarked by senior officers that this was present historically by design to prevent the exit of personnel into the private sector.[151] Within this period there existed a shift in thinking within the Naval Service, through accreditation it was hoped that personnel would be more motivated to stay for longer terms. Failing this, the Naval Service argued, that there was a general societal benefit in ensuring that exiting personnel were equipped to re-enter civilian employment, thus benefitting the state as a whole.[152] Towards the end of the period, the Naval Service heavily pursued attempts to provide personnel with the opportunities to engage in overseas missions. This aspect will be dealt with in greater detail in the third section of this chapter in regards to Operation PONTUS.

In addition the Naval Service in this period engaged a wide variety of partners, including international military partners and national and international civil organisations.[153] From the military perspective, partners engaged in the period

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[150] *Irish Examiner*, 8 Aug. 2018.
[151] Interview with Commodore Hugh Tully of Cork, Ireland *(10 Apr. 2017)*, p. 10.
[152] Ibid.
[153] Interview with Commander Steve Walsh of Cork, Ireland *(10 April 2017)*, p. 4.

include the U.S., Canadian, U.K. and Maltese navies.[154] Additionally civil partners were engaged through educational organisations such as the European Maritime academies forum.[155] Nationally the focus was placed on other public bodies through a series of service level agreements, which shall be addressed in greater detail in later sections of this chapter. Beyond other public service bodies, the Naval Service also engaged private sector partners, particularly technology based companies in joint public-private research ventures to aid technological development. These ventures could also include other public sector partners such as the Joint venture between Dell-EMC, the Naval Service and Cork University Hospital to test wearable vital statistic monitors in practical environments.[156] Like many other navies the small or otherwise these links were fostered in attempts to increase efficiency, variety and reduce costs through mutually beneficial exchanges.

Another example of educational development in the period was the joint venture launched by the Defence Forces in conjunction with the Cork institute of Technology as part of the N.M.C.I. framework to formalise the accreditation of the college under the national framework. This produced the degree in leadership, management and naval studies, BA L.M.N.S., with the first successful class of non-commissioned officers graduating in 2010.[157] Alongside this program several others were launched targeting young officers but also merchant maritime interests. The Bsc in Nautical Science and the two BEngs in Marine Engineering and Marine Electrotechnology were launched to provide an answer to the non-military requirements of the Naval Service. They further illustrate the leverage achieved by the service through its partnerships with

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[154] Comdt. Seán Ó Fátharta, *Naval Service operations 2015* (Cork, 2015) available at: military.ie, (http://www.military.ie/ie/an-tseirbhis-chabhlaigh/nuacht-agus-imeachtai/single-view/article/sunday-27th-december-2015-naval-service-operations-2015/?cHash=d536ba16e6a42d86c5dea2079407206a) (12 Sept. 2018).
[155] Interview with Commander Steve Walsh of Cork, Ireland *(10 April 2017)* p. 2.
[156] Interview with Commodore Hugh Tully of Cork, Ireland *(10 Apr. 2017)* p. 13.
[157] *Irish Examiner*, 18 June. 2010

other public bodies and the trend towards formalisation, collaboration and professionalization in the period.[158]

There were other similar programs undertaken by the rest of the Defence Forces in the period, such as the partnership with Maynooth University and its Centre for Military History and Strategic Studies. This had lead to a series of annual courses directed at cadets in training and also to senior officers. The former has produced a series of short specialist courses given to naval cadets as part of the 'Cadet Course and Naval Watchkeepers Course'. These courses provided instruction on the topics of defence studies, maritime strategy and naval policy to first and second year cadets in the Naval Service.[159] The latter has also developed into a fully accredited Masters program for Staff officers, the Master's Degree in Leadership Management and Defence Studies.[160] However this program was a development of the Command and Staff school and was established without direct involvement of the Naval Service.

In conclusion, the trends surrounding the procurement of assets have illustrated that naval procurement in the period was nationally focused. Across the procurement initiatives of the period, the fulfilment of domestic duties was pursued above all else. While there has been a general expansion of the Naval Services interests, in the period, they have consistently been focused internally. In terms of the development of structural assets, the necessity to meet basic standards for operational function has dominated the development in the period, yet projects such as the N.M.C.I. point to a focus on co-operation and collaboration as a means of overcoming obstacles to desired expansion. In terms of the procurement of sea going assets, the projects undertaken in the period corroborate stated commitments to maintaining the fleet strength, and the nature of the vessels themselves illustrate a desire to maintain flexibility for

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[158] *Irish Examiner*, 18 June. 2010

[159] Centre for Military History and Strategic Studies, *CMHSS* (Kildare 2013) available at Maynoothuniversity.ie,(https://www.maynoothuniversity.ie/sites/default/files/assets/document/CMHSS%20web%20page%202013.pdf) (7 July 2018).

[160] Defence Forces Ireland, *The command and staff school* (Kildare, 2018).

unforeseen developments and a wide variety of tasking. This was carried out while recognising the primacy of fisheries patrols in the reality of the Naval Services routine.

Overall while the stated policy desire is to ensure the Naval Service remains focused on its national duties a recognition of the gradual expansion of those duties, due to the status of the service as the sole maritime expression of the state, is evident. With regards to personnel, the trends in the period seem focused on leveraging assets, obtainable through an open and innovative approach towards building partnerships beyond established military customs.

In particular, the goal of ensuring personnel morale and retention through an investment in an ethos, that aims to promote a sense of personal investment within the service, has enabled the Naval Service to reframe its approach to personnel as providing a net positive to the state, through its contribution to the pool of skilled, accredited labour. This is despite the period being marked by increased defence forces cuts and some notable large departures of personnel from the Naval Service. This reframing is in keeping with the overall trend it has displayed in the period to embrace its role as a public body beyond traditional conceptions of a navy.

The final section documents significant operational changes within the Naval Service. This section will group these developments by tasking in its analysis. Defence, fisheries, and other aid to civil power roles will be examined, as well as the first sole international operation by the Naval Service in Operation PONTUS.

As has been repeatedly stated, this period included a great deal of formalisation within the Naval Service. In operational terms this is most clear in the trend towards the development of formal Memorandums of Understanding and Service Level Agreements between the Defence Forces as a whole and elements such as the Naval Service and other bodies. Much of these developments were built from the first White Paper's recognition that the doubling up of service

provision was to be avoided at all costs to encourage efficiency, particularly in the Maritime context.[161] While the terms M.O.U. and S.L.A. can be sometimes difficult to discern, in the Defence Forces the standard seems to have been a distinction drawn as M.O.U.s were carried as department level agreements whereas S.L.A.s were used to define service arrangements.[162] The first of these S.L.A.s was achieved in 2002 between the Naval Service, Dep. of Defence and Department of Communications, Marine, and Natural Resources. Unsurprisingly it dealt with the provision of fisheries service duties and across the remainder of the decade, so that by 2015 the Naval Service had six dedicated S.L.A.s. these dealt with topics from SAR and the Coast Guard, Medical training, work alongside the Marine Institute in relation to training, meteorological data sharing with Met Eireann and the provision of port security.[163] The model's success saw its integration into the rest of the Defence Forces as by 2017 there were 20 separate S.L.A.s providing for practices from the Air Corps provision of air ambulance services and transport for the policing oversight body to the Army's role in assisting in disaster relief with the Office of Public Works.[164]

The benefit to the Naval Service in these agreements was twofold: firstly, they formalised the operational legitimacy of the Naval Service in providing these services, as well as defining the nature of what was to be provided and a process for access and protocols for application. Secondly it legitimised the case for the provision of assets for these taskings, as they were now formally acknowledged across the public service. The issue of funding allocation was decided, so that to avoid the situation of public bodies billing each other that they would be costed into budgetary allocations instead, much to the Naval Services satisfaction.[165] It would be important to note that beyond formalisation for the sake of efficiency in the performance of these duties there is an interesting dimension in how the

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[161] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2000) p. 47.
[162] Interview with Commodore (Ret.) Frank Lynch of Cork, Ireland (22 Oct. 2017), p. 7.
[163] Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces annual report 2015 (Dublin, 2015) p. 56.
[164] Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces annual report 2016 (Dublin, 2016), p. 66.
[165] Interview with Commodore (Ret.) Frank Lynch of Cork, Ireland *(22 Oct. 2017)* p. 20.

application of the service based ethos and its 'children' the S.L.A.s/M.O.U.s has defined the modern Naval Service within the recent debates on global maritime development. These included notions of increased scope of naval affairs, and an expansion beyond traditional maritime focuses were centred in discourse. The Naval Service represents an interesting example of a navy that has had the majority of its focus placed on less traditional taskings. Instead it has opted to define itself as distinctly a military organisation that provides services additional to that identity, rather than centring its identity in those services.

As was referenced earlier at a national level in regards to defence the issue of the naval defence of the state was not envisioned as particularly relevant to the immediate goals of the Defence Forces or Irish Defence in general. The first White Paper unambiguously stated

> The naval component of defence has necessarily had a lower priority than land-based defence. Having regard to the defence and security environment assessment, the Government consider that there is no case for a significant shift in defence provision towards an enhanced naval contribution. [166]

However there was an acknowledgement that there was a responsibility that the Naval Service had to meet contingent and actual maritime defence requirements. Furthermore it acknowledged that the meaning and scope of this was to be handled in-house. The resultant naval response appears to have concluded that, with the indication that additional naval defence development was not to be a budgetary priority, its traditional behaviour of focusing on the efficient utilisation of standing assets was to be a focus. From 2002 a series of multi disciplinary studies were initiated including topics such as Naval Warfare, and weapons and sensors development, of those commissioned some eventually developed into standing advisory boards including the two mentioned above.[167] The goal of these boards was to advise on the issues of expertise and to ensure that in the case of naval defence in particular, that the

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[166] Department of Defence Ireland, *White Paper on defence* (Dublin, 2000) p. 46.
[167] Interview with Commodore (Ret.) Frank Lynch of Cork, Ireland *(22 Oct. 2017)* p. 11.

Naval Service developed two necessary strands of competence. The first was to ensure that maritime defence initiatives undertaken were the most appropriate given the limited resource envelope. Secondly it was decided that while the scope of the direct kinetic contribution of the Naval Service would not be likely to expand, the role of the Naval Service was to include being able to provide the most accurate and informed advice in relation to maritime defence in the contemporary context. This would be evidenced by a commitment to identify areas of weakness, in terms of specialised naval knowledge, and to utilise existing international relationships to access premier training courses for naval personnel. It was then planned to incorporate that expertise back into the Naval Service. This led to a series of naval personnel attending courses internationally on topics from armed boarding to specialist navigation, to principal naval warfare.[168]

Nationally focused but globally minded the Naval Service was, like many small navies, attempting to access the fruits of large economies of scale than itself. It was also alongside these developments that the service embraced its now formal identity as a 'Constabulary Navy' set out by the White Paper. The Naval Service chose to highlight this as an indication that its national defence focus should be upon the surveillance and patrol of territorial waters and economic zones. This allowed the framing of daily patrol activities, regardless of mission tasking, as contributory to national defence readiness.[169]It should be noted that this outlook was carried into other activities. Examples of this trend include port security and asymmetric threats, which will be detailed in the relevant section of this chapter. Furthermore, the impact of these initial implementation measures has continued to the present day within the service. Indeed, at the strategic level they continue to serve as the basis for ongoing development[170]

In summary, the topic of defence operational development, serves to highlight four important elements. Firstly it highlights how the Naval Service was

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[168] Interview with Commodore (Ret.) Frank Lynch of Cork, Ireland *(22 Oct. 2017)*, p. 11.
[169] Irish Naval Service, *Strategy statement* (Dublin, 2003) p. 7.
[170] Interview with Commodore Hugh Tully of Cork, Ireland (10 Apr. 2017) p. 5.

dedicated to retaining a military identity in relation to its status as a public body, and in relation to its global outlook. Secondly it demonstrates a formal recognition of the complexities of its status as a military organisation, while also framed as the principle sea-going agency of the state. Thirdly it demonstrates how that complexity translated to the interwoven nature of its various taskings. Fourthly it serves to highlight how one small constabulary navy balanced its identity as primarily a defence body with the recognition of its myriad traditional, non military missions, by identifying opportunities for simultaneous discharge of its duties through reframing the concept of their contribution to defence.

In regards to fisheries protection/patrol duties, their operational development in the period in focus illustrates keenly how scaling issues can often disproportionately affect smaller Navies. As with other topics the first White Paper set the tone for the major developments in fisheries patrol duties across the period. The increased patrol requirements in terms of days at sea envisioned for each of the vessels were coupled with an adoption of the Price Waterhouse recommendation that a model of a 2:2 deployment ratio.[171] This deployment ratio envisioned that for every two years at sea a member of the service was expected to spend two years ashore. These years would be spent fulfilling other duties in relation to infrastructure, training, support duties etc. Envisioned as a means of personnel retention, this created a situation where satisfaction of such requirements could only be achieved through a 'three card trick' mechanism that constantly rotated personnel (with two thousand movements averaged per year) ashore. While some did complete dedicated two year deployments the reality was that 700 personnel a year were deployed at sea for thirty or more days.[172] Coupled with inconsistent recruitment over the period, this provided a distinct issue in providing trained personnel where they were needed, as meeting tasking performance indicators was prioritised. What is also notable is that while the Price Waterhouse recommendation was adopted for an

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[171] Department of Defence Ireland, *White Paper on defence* (Dublin, 2000) p. 48.
[172] Interview with Commodore (Ret.) Frank Lynch of Cork, Ireland *(22 Oct. 2017)* p. 10.

establishment of 1,144, it was not taken into account that it was for a flotilla of seven vessels instead of eight.[173] In reality actual average strength in the period was 1,050 personnel with a ten percent turnover yearly.[174] What this aspect of operational development serves to highlight is that there is a certain critical mass of personnel for operating a naval service at a level beyond a token effort, where there is an expectation of standards being met. In these circumstances smaller scale organisations are disproportionately impacted by the effects of numerically minor variations. Furthermore it highlighted that performance indicators must be carefully co-varianced to ensure that the impacts of success in one sector do not come at the cost of others.

Of the other various aid to the civil power functions of the Naval Service in this period, its operational development of port security and narcotics interdiction have distinct relevance in understanding the developments in the period. While the effects of the 'principle sea going agency' endorsement of the White Paper, and the adoption of the service ethos and agreements system, have been discussed previously. Port security represents another example of how such traditionally non-military roles, were incorporated into the expanded definition for defence practiced by the naval service. Port security was guaranteed, under an S.L.A. agreed with the Marine Survey Office.[175] Shortly after the first White Paper, the Naval Service began to place emphasis on readiness for potential evolutions of the nature of state security, in relation to the potential for asymmetric threats.[176] The reasoning indicated was that while direct armed aggression was highly unlikely, with the increase in focus on the maritime interest of the state, that disruptions caused by potential threats to the realisation of maritime assets, in terms of trade and natural resources, were therefore increasingly a threat to state interests.[177] This argument seems to

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[173] Interview with Commodore (Ret.) Frank Lynch of Cork, Ireland *(22 Oct. 2017),* p. 6.
[174] Ibid., p. 10.
[175] Defence Forces Ireland, Department Of Defence and Defence Forces annual report 2015 (Dublin, 2015) p. 56.
[176] Naval Service, *Strategy statement* (Dublin, 2003) p. 7.
[177] Naval Service, *Strategy statement* (Dublin, 2003) p.10

have contributed to the renewal of the interest in the development of minesweeping and ordnance disposal at a strategic level for the Department of Defence. This was evidenced by its direct indication within the second White Paper, in relation to the envisioned replacement vessels for the Coastal Patrol Vessels.[178] The indications at the end of the period were that this would manifest as a combination of an emphasis on building the skill set of underwater ordinance disposal within the Naval Diving Unit, in conjunction with plug and play modules compatible with recently acquired vessels, utilising robotics and specialised small craft.[179] This is likely as it offers the best compromise between maintaining the flexibility of the fleet by avoiding singularly specialised craft and ensuring assets are fit to task.

The development of narcotics interdiction is interesting in this period as it serves to highlight a prototype of the arrangements that were formalised into the S.L.A. and M.O.U. framework. In 1993 the Joint Task Force on Drug interdiction was established between the Naval Service, Revenue and An Garda Síochána. The following year in 1994 the Naval Service was included in list of parties empowered by law to engage in such interdiction operations under section 35 of the Criminal Justice Act 1994.[180] This was necessary due to the nature of drugs interdiction being a matter for discreet national and international attention, owing to its distinction by Article 108 of UNCLOS from piracy and slavery which are recognised under Article 110 as universal crimes.[181] Drugs interdiction in this sense represented the first formalisation of a situation where the requirements of services made available by the Naval Service, were outside the capacity for another state agency, (in this case an Garda Síochána and Revenue). Further developments in the period of focus in this area relate to the expansion of asset sharing, and the foundation Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre –

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[178] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2015) p. 68.
[179] Interview with Commodore Hugh Tully of Cork, Ireland *(10 Apr. 2017)*, p. 5.
[180] Criminal Justice Act 1994.
[181] United Nations, *United Nations convention on the law of the sea* (New York, 1982) available at (http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf) (6/11/2017) p. 59.

Narcotics (MAOC-N) in 2007, alongside the U.K., France, Spain, Portugal, The Netherlands and Italy. This has given the State unprecedented access to intelligence on international narcotic smuggling, as well as access to other agencies such as INTERPOL and the American Drug Enforcement Agency.

In addition to direct benefits in relation to prosecution of interdiction operations, these developments were dovetailed with parallel efforts to create a unified 'recognised maritime picture' and folded into general intelligence and monitoring developments in the period.[182] Once more the activities were framed within a broader definition of national interest as a core defence objective. Furthermore by using maritime awareness as a touchstone concept in framing operational development, the Naval Service was able to distil an often labyrinthine aspect of maritime security, and integrate it into its primary tasking.

In relation to international operations, the first solo international naval operation for the Naval Service took place in 2015. In response to the growing humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean, resulting from unprecedented rates of mass migration, a commitment was made that Irish naval assets would become involved in the SAR efforts in the region. To this end the Irish Government agreed a bilateral 'note verbale' with the Italian government.[183] This would allow Irish naval assets to operate from Italian waters, thereby satisfying the conditions of both UNCLOS, in relation to the operation of warships in foreign waters engaged in humanitarian aid, and the national legal restrictions on Defence Forces personnel engaging in border enforcement operations under the Defence (Amendment) Act 2006.[184]

Operation PONTUS was conducted as a series of three-month deployments of single vessels. It was envisioned to run alongside the ongoing EUNAVFORMED OP Sophia, which was engaged in further measures to combat trafficking in the region beyond merely the rendering of humanitarian aid. This would create

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[182] Interview with Commodore Hugh Tully of Cork, Ireland *(10 Apr. 2017)*, p. 6
[183] Interview with Commodore Hugh Tully of Cork, Ireland *(10 Apr. 2017)*, p. 2.
[184] Cdr. Pat Burke, 'Troubled waters,' in Col. D Dignam Prof. E. O'Halpin, Dr. I. Speller (eds), *Defence Forces Review 2016* (Kildare, 2016), pp 177-189.

challenges with regards to information sharing between the Naval Service and SOPHIA elements in the operational space.[185] From a Naval Service perspective Op. PONTUS was envisioned as an opportunity for the Service to engage internationally in a meaningful way towards national interests, in conjunction with international partners. It was also envisioned that it would be a suitable tasking for a service that operated flexible craft with crews suited towards operational swing and high tempo daily operations.[186] Challenges identified included fuel costing, which was justified as being marginally costed, as vessels involved would have been scheduled with patrol duties at home in any case; and that with the tight personnel limits of the service the loss of a ship for daily duties in national waters would stretch the already tight margins for error. [187]

It was also discovered after the initial deployments that the unprecedented scope of the rescue efforts and the subsequent operational tempo was taking a toll in terms of cost to both finances and stress amongst crews. The Fleet Operations Readiness training section elements observing the operation noted that the sheer numbers of persons requiring aid and provision on board, the impact of the need to protect personnel from the potential for infectious disease, the harsh weather conditions, and the frequent issues with operating on the territorial limits of Libyan waters were creating an environment that was pushing crew and assets beyond expectations.[188] These findings led to a series of ad hoc initiatives to better prepare vessels and crews for subsequent deployments. While these measures were ad hoc by the expeditionary nature of the deployment, and in the case of the *Beckett* class vessels the novelty of the assets, they were expected and codified by existing practices of operational review within the service.[189]

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[185] *Irish Times* 10 Jul. 2017
[186] Interview with Commodore Hugh Tully of Cork, Ireland (10 Apr. 2017) p. 2.
[187] Interview with Commodore Hugh Tully of Cork, Ireland (10 Apr. 2017), p. 3.
[188] Ibid.,p. 4.
[189] Interview with Lieutenant Commander Tony Geraghty of Cork, Ireland (29 Mar. 2018) p. 9.

While it is not surprising that such a new departure would lead to unforeseen challenges for any service. Op. PONTUS served to highlight, that even taking into account the adaptable structures in place to account for operational swing and on the job learning, that had been formalised in the Naval Service, the thin margins such navies operate within are truly difficult to fully account for.

Within the Naval Service itself, PONTUS was viewed as an important opportunity in several other regards. At the highest level in the Naval Service, it was considered an opportunity to demonstrate the outcomes of over two decades of audits and restructuring. That these efforts had resulted in a service capable of engaging in the kind of independent overseas operations, that the land-based forces had been engaging in since the 1960s. Indeed, comparisons have been made to the operation as the Naval Service's 'Congo', in reference to the Army's first overseas peacekeeping mission in the 1960s.[190] In this regard the verdict from the legislature seemed to have been positive. In July of 2017 the Government approved a motion that the Defence Forces would join EU NAVFORMED Operation SOPHIA.[191] SOPHIA had by comparison, to PONTUS expanded mission parameters, beyond Search and Rescue, and into more active attempts to dismantle people smuggling operations in the region. It would appear that the results of Op. PONTUS had convinced the government that increased Naval Service commitment to the security operations in the Mediterranean were both practicable and desirable. For its own part, the service had achieved a notable progression in its involvement overseas, and achieved a goal that had clearly been targeted as an evolution to the previous PONTUS involvement. This can most clearly be evidenced by the engagement in and formalisation of intelligence gathering activities, concerning the operational habits of smugglers operating in the region during PONTUS.[192] Furthermore, senior members of the Service had expressed convictions that greater

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[190] Interview with Lieutenant Commander Tony Geraghty of Cork, Ireland (29 Mar. 2018), p. 9.
[191] *The Irish Times*, 13 Jul. 2017.
[192] Interview with Lieutenant Commander Tony Geraghty of Cork, Ireland (29 Mar. 2018) p. 8.

integration into the combined response, to the issue of security in the Mediterranean, was the correct path during Op. PONTUS.[193]

Beyond the strategic level, PONTUS was also seen as important in that it provided an opportunity to offer service members the ability to engage in the kinds of overseas operations that previously had been the sole remit of the Army. As has been referenced repeatedly, retention of personnel has been a familiar issue faced by the Naval Service across its history. With the unprecedented expansion of the fleet in the period leading up to the second White Paper and beyond, Op. PONTUS and subsequent operations were envisioned as being of great potential for retention. They could provide personnel the opportunity to realise the skills they have been developing in a fresh environment, and facing a novel set of challenges.[194] Additionally, The Naval Service identified opportunities to gather leadership experience and development for personnel as part of Op. PONTUS. This was achieved at both at a command and tactical level. Unlike the majority of established naval operations carried out by the Naval Service, the lengthy deployments and dynamic nature of Op. PONTUS involvement were a new departure for the service, and exposed crews to relatively novel tempos of decision making.[195]

Finally it is of note that the Naval Service has benefitted in terms of public awareness as a result of Op. Pontus. This has stemmed from an active public information campaign coordinated through social media accounts as well as traditional media sources; most notably the Naval Service assisted in the creation of a long form documentary of the L.É. *Samuel Beckett*'s deployment.[196] The result of these efforts has been a significant increase in the visibility of the Service in the public eye. This can be evidenced by a series of accolades the

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[193] Interview with Commodore Hugh Tully of Cork, Ireland (10 Apr. 2017), p. 2.
[194] Interview with Commodore Hugh Tully of Cork, Ireland (10 Apr. 2017), p. 11.
[195] Interview with Lieutenant Commander Tony Geraghty of Cork, Ireland (29 Mar. 2018) p. 11.
[196] *Irish Times*, 13 Dec. 2018.

Service has received as a result of its humanitarian efforts.[197] This publicity has impacted further across to the rest of the Defence Forces. The Naval Service contribution has been cited as a key component to a number of national and international accolades awarded to the organisation.[198] This seems to demonstrate the success of the Naval Service in stepping into the public sphere through efforts such as PONTUS.

In conclusion to this examination of the Naval Service in the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is necessary to reflect on two key questions. What has typified the Naval Services experiences of the period and what does this illustrate about 'small navies' in general in the European context?

 A large proportion of the Naval Services activities in this period have centred on formalisation. This was reflected at a strategic level, both with regards to operational practices and procurement, by the various audits and reports leading up to the two white papers on defence, and the various midterm implementation plans and strategy statements. Internally this manifested with the introduction of tools and strategies from the business sector, particularly as they apply to public bodies. These tools primarily served to homogenise the vision and implementation of internal reforms. Educational practices were formalised through the partnerships leading to the N.M.C.I. and the greater integration of them within the national framework. While the roles of the Naval Service with regards to other public institutions were formalised through the implementation of the S.L.A. and M.O.U. models.

Another overall theme in the period was of expansion. While assets in terms of the fleet have expanded moderately, the most notable change has been witnessed in the efforts to expand the formal recognition of the Naval Service as a public body. These efforts have focused on demonstrating the contributions and interests of the Naval Service in a wide variety of areas beyond its

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[197] Jehan Ashmore, *'Freedom of Entry' award to Naval Service* (Dublin, 2017), available at: Afloat.ie, (https://afloat.ie/port-news/navy/item/35377-freedom-of-entry-award-to-naval-service-plus-tours-of-le-eithne-in-dun-laoghaire-harbour) (20 Sep. 2018)
[198] *Irish Times*, 12 Dec. 2016.

traditional tasking. The Naval Service in the period appears to have emphasised the importance of awareness for the assets it provides to the state, and the importance of public awareness. For an organisation that is relatively small and has existed in a context of traditional 'sea blindness', both political and public; the Naval Service has achieved, most recently through its high-profile involvement in the Mediterranean, a recognition nationally and internationally. This was unprecedented compared to previous periods.

It should however be noted that the nature of this expansion is not universal, as has been illustrated personnel growth has remained stagnant and budgets have not trended upwards in general terms and the issues created by the impact of the financial crisis of 2008 onwards including the above and additional recruitment freezes have created challenges for the Naval Service.

In relation to the second aspect of this conclusion, the Naval Service seems to have produced a form of stability, in addition to formalisation, and a developing level of political and public interest in the period. While it is arguable that the impacts of minor changes, in terms of resources and utilisation, such awareness can bring, disproportionately affect small navies given their reduced scale. It is not apparent that either the issues or the solutions present in the Naval Service in this period represent anything particularly unique to the case of Ireland, or small navies in general. Formalisation is a process all navies must deal with, and its effects are not necessarily different beyond simply scope in larger organisations. Likewise, awareness, educational efficiency, standardisation, and the issues in relation to retention as a result of lack of opportunity for personnel engagement, are not exclusive to navies of any scale. Furthermore, the opportunities to mitigate these issues that the service has engaged in such as greater integration with public private partnerships, or the participation in overseas deployments, do not necessarily constitute activities of type tied to size. As the publications and interviews this chapter draws on have illustrated, the Naval Services challenges and opportunities are a mix of familiar and unique but that it appears that differentiation is tied to the resolution of the model of investigation. It is not self-evident that this differs significantly between any

class of navy to suggest that small and large are more than differences of scale rather than substance. It would seem that the lower that resolution is the less uniquely 'small' the issues their impacts and solutions appear.

Chapter 5:
The Maltese Maritime Squadron:
Historical development.

The Maritime Squadron of the Armed Forces of Malta (A.F.M.) is the sole naval component of the Maltese military. The Maritime Squadron has responsibility for the security of Maltese territorial waters, maritime surveillance and law enforcement, as well as search and rescue.

The Squadron has most recently defined its roles as:

- Protection of Malta's maritime claims such as territorial seas and Fisheries Conservation and Management Zone
- Surveillance and protection of Malta's maritime borders
- Suppression of illegal activities at sea such as smuggling and trafficking
- General maritime law enforcement
- Maritime Safety missions including Search and Rescue (SAR), general boating safety and provision of safety and security information to commercial shipping
- Port security and protection of sensitive vessels and infrastructure
- Fisheries protection
- Support to other Government Agencies
- Support marine conservation research projects[1]

As an island nation situated in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, Malta has historically been highly involved with growing levels of maritime traffic. With the outbreak of war in the region, the importance of such a strategic point was that securing the island was almost required in order to control the Mediterranean

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[1] Maritime Squadron, *Maritime operations*, available at: www.afm.gov.mt
(http://www.afm.gov.mt/marops?l=1) (5 March 2018).

itself.[2] Outside of times of conflict the same geographical importance of Malta, has heavily influenced the use of the island as an organisational nexus and staging ground for search and rescue operations. These operations have spanned the Mediterranean, often in conjunction with neighbouring nations such as Italy, Greece, and Spain. In addition to this, Malta has emerged as both a notable tourist destination, due to its favourable climate, and also it has become a major cargo hub for the logistics in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Throughout the period of focus it has emerged as the sixth largest flag state in the world.[3] Furthermore, and notably in recent years, Malta's location has put it on the forefront of the issue of irregular migration into Europe from across the Mediterranean. Factors such as the destabilisation of the region, due to events such as the 'Arab Spring', and the various civil conflicts that have emerged in the aftermath have contributed to an unprecedented rate of migration from the region towards Southern Europe. This near constant increase in traffic both in maritime trade and passenger arrivals by air and sea, as well as growth of recreational boating amongst the population, have all resulted in increased activity in the airspace and sea-lanes around the Maltese islands.[4]

In the modern period, particularly the latter twentieth and early twenty first centuries, these trends have required the development of a substantial search and rescue capabilities within the Maritime Squadron. While the physical size of the Maltese islands places them among the smallest landmasses in Mediterranean theatre, indeed globally, the Maltese search and rescue region is vast in comparison. At its outermost limits in surrounds an area of responsibility covering in excess of 250,000 square kilometres.[5]

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[2] Daniel Fiott, 'Being small, acting tall? Malta and European defence,' in D. Fiott (ed.), *The common security and defence policy: national perspectives* (Gent, 2015), pp 93-96, at p. 93.
[3] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 June. 2018) p. 10.
[4] John Pike, *Malta maritime squadron*, available at Globalsecurity.org,(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/mt-afm-martitime.htm) (4 April 2017).
[5] *Times of Malta*, 14 June 2018.

In this area the Maritime Squadron has had to develop and maintain the capability to respond to an increasing variety of emergencies. These range from assisting troubled vessels, medical evacuations, to the previously mentioned security issues of sea based migration, including people smuggling and asylum seeking.

With regards to the organisation of all operations within this search and rescue region, the responsibility lies entirely with the Armed Forces., particularly the Maritime Squadron as has been evidenced in their operational definitions. To this end the Armed Forces operate the Malta Rescue Co-ordination Centre, which is the SAR point of contact in Malta for all international interactions. On a practical level the Maritime Squadron also utilises its maritime and air assets on a daily basis, to respond to a variety of missions and requests. Notably similar to the Irish example, there is a lack of available resources compared to the sheer size of the area of responsibility. This has resulted in the Maritime Squadron having to become proficient in liaising with other similar services in the region, and also in engaging in multi-national operations. The upshot of this necessity for integration has been that the Rescue Co-ordination Centre Malta has developed continued working relations with neighbouring Co-ordination centres, other maritime organisations. These included the Italian Navy, Coastguard, other navies in the Mediterranean, and beyond. For the purposes of this chapter the other notable examples are the Royal Navy, the U.S. Navy and Coastguard, and the Irish Naval Service.

For this thesis, the Maritime Squadron represents the second major case study, in addition to the Irish Naval Service. It offers another distinct example of a small navy operating in the European context. As outlined previously, it has been chosen for a variety of factors. These include its stature, its relative youth, and its relationships with international issues such as migration and maritime security, in the Mediterranean and further afield. As a major case study within this thesis, it will therefore be allotted a more detailed examination than others. In parallel with the Irish Naval Service, this will translate into two chapters, each

taking a distinct approach to examining this organisation within the context of this study.

This first chapter will examine the Maritime Squadron mainly in terms of its historical development. The topics of its doctrinal development, assets procurement and operational development in the period of focus will be dealt with in the second chapter. To best serve the goals of this chapter, it will mostly take a historical narrative approach. It will divide the history of this organisations development into a series of discreet periods of interest. These will then be grouped into three larger sections. These sections will cover the early history of the Maritime Squadron, the time leading up to the period of focus, and finally, the topics that fit best outside of the historical narrative, such as emergent developments.

The first section will discuss the initial history of the Maritime Squadron. To do so it will begin with a brief overview of the development of the A.F.M. with regards to the maritime environment in the period leading up to Maltese independence from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the foundation of the Republic in 1974. The immediate period following the foundation of the Republic will then be examined leading up until the end of the 1970s.

Section two will comprise the remainder of this chapter. With the necessary background detailed in section one, it will delve into the period most relevant to this thesis. This section will begin by outlining the continuing development of the Maritime Squadron, in the early 1980s. It will then progress to the years of the collapse of the U.S.S.R. setting the stage for the continuation of the next chapter. As with the Irish example, its effects on the Maritime Squadron may well shed light on the nature of small navies in the European context.

Within all of the periods predating the specific period of focus, the development of the Maritime Squadron will be examined under three main headings. These headings will consist of: the areas of responsibility and roles in the security of the state, organisational changes and the changing composition of the Maritime Squadron in terms of personnel and service craft.

In historical terms the naval tradition in Malta can be traced back to the sixteenth century and the colonisation of the Island by the Knights of the Order of Saint John in 1530. While under Hospitalier control, ships based from Malta took part in notable campaigns against the Ottoman Empire including the battle of Lepanto in 1571, and the Battle of the Dardanelles in 1656. In the eighteenth century with the arrival of the French Navy under Napoleon in 1798 Malta underwent its first transition in ownership. It was then captured by the British forces two years later in 1800.[6]

Owing to its strategic importance Malta was kept for use as a naval base and subsequently made a part of the British Empire in 1814. It remained a shipping station and the location of the Headquarters of the Mediterranean fleet until shortly before the Second World War, as its vulnerability to air attack from mainland Italy forced relocation of the fleet to Alexandria in Egypt.[7] In the aftermath of the Second World War and until the completion of Malta's gradual transition to independence from British rule, Malta remained an important base in the Mediterranean fleet's possession, up and until it was disbanded in 1967. This came as the escalation of tensions between West and East made the North Atlantic a far more important focus for British Naval attention.[8] In this same period of decline for the Mediterranean Fleet, Malta as a nation was well on the way towards establishing an independent state. 1964 saw it become an independent, sovereign commonwealth realm, with Queen Elizabeth II as its Head of State. Over the following six years until 1970 numerous institutions were founded to provide for this new independence. 1968 for example, saw the foundation of the Central Bank of Malta. 1970 saw Malta register an association agreement with the European Economic Community. Finally in 1970, following the passage of the 'Malta Armed Forces Act' act by parliament; the Royal Malta

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[6] William Laird Clowes, *The Royal Navy, a history from the earliest times to 1900* (4 vols, London, 1997), ii, p. 423.

[7] *The Fleet at Alexandria.* Dir. Unknown. Digital. Prod. British Pathé, 1940. Available at British Pathé, (http://www.britishpathe.com/video/the-fleet-at-alexandria) (16 Feb 2017).

[8] Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval policy since World War II (London, 1987) p. 297.

Artillery, which was the most recent incarnation of the British Army's presence in Malta, became the Malta Land Force.[9]

The act sets out the general orders of the Armed Forces and its organisation as a body called by the President and their ministers. While providing no dedicated department of defence, the duties of governmental oversight generally fell upon the office of the Prime Minister initially, though this would shift to the Minister for Home Affairs and National Security in more recent years.[10] While not explicitly a part of the act, in the same year as the Armed Forces were founded, the Maritime Troop of the Malta Land Force was established as a sub unit in November. Two officers and 25 men were selected to undergo basic training, prior to the arrival of patrol craft. An elementary navigation course was organised at the Government Nautical School, Floriana, whilst instruction on marine engines was run by the government chief engineer.[11] In January 1971 two *Swift* Class patrol boats were donated by the United States Coast Guard and designated C-23 and C-24. In addition a team of U.S. Navy instructors accompanied the craft, to train the crews on their operation. In July 1971 the force was renamed 1st (Maritime) Battery of the Malta Land Force and was based in Senglea. The initial duties of the maritime battery were not dissimilar to those currently in place, broadly speaking they encompassed coastguard, customs and policing duties. SAR had yet to make much of an appearance by this point; as such duties were still the responsibility of British Forces.[12] In 1972 three more *Equity* class boats came online, due to a donation by West Germany. The vessels: C-27, C-28 and C-29 were former customs launches. Therefore they were ideally suited to inshore patrol duties. 1973 saw further change to the youthful armed forces as on 19 April 1973, the title Malta Land Force was legally

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[9] Malta Armed Forces Act, 1970 ([CAP. 220]) available at Justiceservices.gov.mt, (http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid=8725) (8 Apr. 2017).

[10] Ministry of Home Affairs and Security, *Portfolio*, available at Ministry for Home Affairs, (http://homeaffairs.gov.mt/en/The-Ministry/The-Minister/Pages/Portfolio.aspx) (4 May 2018).

[11] Steno Webs, *Maritime Squadron- Armed Forces of Malta,* (Malta 2010), available at steno.webs.com, (http://steno.webs.com/112/afm/maritime.htm) (2 Feb. 2017).

[12] Ibid.

changed to Armed Forces of Malta (A.F.M.). This was not merely a change of designation: it was meant to reflect the increased responsibilities and expansion of its manpower strength to some 4,000, organized into four major units (namely 1st Regiment RMA and three battalions of the Pioneer Corps).[13]

Additionally the first purpose built craft was obtained by the Maritime Battery, now officially the '1st (Maritime) Battery of the Armed Forces of Malta'. The vessel(C-21) had been commissioned originally for the Customs Service, but had been reassigned to the Battery subsequently. While not increasing the overall scope of the Maritime Battery's operative capacity, like the swift boats it was only suitable for inshore patrol work, the vessel did represent a significant milestone in the Maritime Squadrons development nonetheless.

1974 was another landmark year in the development of political and military affairs for Malta. On the 31st of December Malta officially became a republic with the transfer of position of head of state from the monarch of England, as represented by the executive role of the Governor-General, to the President. With the declaration of the republic came a new constitution which confirmed Malta's place as a sovereign state within the commonwealth.[14] With this new constitution, Malta's system of governance took on a recognisable form to the present day. In the military context, predicting that a sole focus on artillery would no longer be viable in the future, the 1st Regiment of the Royal Malta Artillery (R.M.A.) was renamed the 1st Regiment, Armed Forces Malta. While specialisation in that field continued for the remainder of the decade, there had been recognition of the coming expansion of duties. The sole remaining directly British controlled aspect of Maltese autonomy was the pre-existing 'base

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[13] Armed Forces Malta, *A.F.M. history,* available at The Armed Forces of Malta, (http://www.afm.gov.mt/afmhistory?l=1) (3 Mar. 2017).
[14] Constitution of Malta, Article 124.(1).3, available at Justice services.gov.mt, (http://justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid=8566) (6 May 2018)

agreement'. This had been extended officially in 1972 to provide for the garrisoning of British forces on the Island until 1979.[15]

When considering the history of military development in Malta, in the period predating the formation of the republic the strategic importance of the Islands cannot be overlooked. Since the arrival of the Knights of the Order of Saint John and through subsequent occupations by both the British and French forces there has been consistent acknowledgement of Malta's importance for maritime operations within the Mediterranean. Indeed it took a drastic reshaping of global strategic paradigms, the Cold War, for this importance to wane. What is most relevant to this period in terms of the evolution of the current Maritime Squadron is that this history of fortification of the islands, has directly contributed to an awareness of the strategic importance of such a small landmass. This has impacted on historical maritime affairs throughout the Mediterranean. While expansion in this period seems minimal, what is perhaps more notable is the immediate recognition of the nature of the duties to be performed by the maritime element of the Armed Forces.

Following the establishment of the Republic in 1974, the remainder of the decade can be characterised as a period of transition from the previous form of governance to the new. While indeed it can be said that this had begun nearly a decade earlier, with the first step towards sovereignty taken in the 1960s; the final years of direct British presence on the islands accelerated the pace of transition.

Not long after the establishment of the republic, the fleet continued its expansion. This time it was in the form of two more customs style patrol vessels. Originally built in Yugoslavia for the Libyan customs department, the vessels, *C-25* and *C-26* were donated by the Libyan government in 1975. From an administrative perspective the first major development after the formation of the Republic came in October 1977, when the Battery transferred its

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[15] Armed Forces Malta, *A.F.M. history,* available at The Armed Forces of Malta, (http://www.afm.gov.mt/afmhistory?l=1) (3 Mar. 2017)

Headquarters to Hay Wharf, Floriana, which remained its current location to the present day. This was a major step towards the establishment of the Battery as a more independent element of the Armed Forces. The next major organisational change would occur towards the beginning of the next decade, when in 1980, The Armed Forces were divided into two separate units, known as the Armed Forces of Malta and the Task Force.

Another issue relevant to this period is that by the close of decade, there had not been a single intake of officer-cadets to the entirety of the A.F.M.[16] Indeed low officer numbers remains a distinct characteristic of the Maritime Squadron. While under normal circumstance the lack of any new officer cadets over a decade would be very unusual and problematic for most services, in the Maltese example it is understandable. The issue of a lack of training programs had to be tackled as previously officer-cadets had completed their training in the United Kingdom at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. However due to the rapidly changing nature and structure of the organisation in this period, it is unsurprising that the stability necessary to organise and field such a program was not present.

These issues were compounded in the period when, in 1979 seven members of the police force were promoted by the then government and 'placed in the military ranks, above all military officers, which caused an exodus of military officers'.[17] This resulted in a situation where major operational command duties were falling onto the shoulders of NCOs, with no immediate relief forthcoming.

Operationally this period is important as it represented the establishment of the now traditional duties of what was to become the Maritime Squadron. Initial limitations due to the availability of vessels were a key feature in Maltese Maritime development. The initial vessels were adapted for general inshore patrol work. As a result of this operations throughout the latter part of the

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[16] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta, Malta (30 August 2018) p.2
[17] Ibid.

decade continued to revolve around issues such as customs, harbour policing, contraband detection and interception, and the enforcement of laws relating to fishing and hunting. The most significant change in the roles of the Maritime Battery in this period came in 1978. With the aforementioned 'base agreement' between the Maltese and British government set to expire in 1979, and the last of the British forces to leave the Island as a result.[18] The Royal Navy officially handed over the responsibility for SAR operations in Maltese waters to the Maritime Battery in October 1978.[19]

Alongside this new official responsibility came the further donation of two more vessels. The two vessels, *C-68* and *C-71* were of the *RAF2700* series and had been utilised by the Royal Air Force for SAR operations making them generally suited for Maltese needs.[20] With the acquisition of SAR responsibilities, the Maritime Battery had rounded out its operational duties into their now traditional form. In conjunction with the major changes taking place throughout the Armed Forces in this period the format for the services was starting to emerge by the end of the 1970s.[21] With the dawn of what was to be a dynamic decade, in the context of global political structures and strategic development the Armed Forces would have to continue to adapt to evolving requirements.

With the beginning of a new decade came yet another large scale restructuring of the Armed Forces. This had two major effects on the Maritime Battery. Firstly it began with another renaming of the unit. The 1st (Maritime) Battery of the Armed Forces of Malta officially became the Maritime Squadron of the Armed Forces of Malta, in line with its current designation. However despite this, it had yet to achieve full independence from land based command. As has been mentioned the Armed Forces were split into two major organisations the Armed Forces Malta and the Task Force. This was the first major attempt to separate

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[18] *New York Times*, 30 Dec. 1971.
[19] *TVM*, 10 July 2018.
[20] Royal Air Force Museum, *RTTL 2757*, (London 2012), available at: rafmuseum.org, (https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/research/collections/rttl-2757/) (20 Sept. 2018)

the conventional land forces from the more esoteric elements of the Armed Forces. On 1 April 1980 what had previously been the 1st Regiment Armed Forces Malta was separated from the rest of the A.F.M. and placed under an autonomous command.[22]

 The newly formed 'Task Force' was designed to encapsulate the units that served unconventional roles in relation to the other land forces. This was a recognition of the elements of the Armed Forces that undertook non-traditional military duties, especially those which served in a primarily 'Aid to the Civil Power' facility. The Task Force was initially comprised of an infantry company, the Maritime Squadron, and the Helicopter Flight, with combined personnel of about five hundred personnel between its elements. In addition to this, a number of Law Enforcement Officers were also recruited into this new organisation. This was designed to augment its strength, and to enable the task force to fulfil the role for which it was envisioned. The recognition that the skills required from such a task forces had expanded beyond the traditionally military is evidenced by the decision to blend in law enforcement officers.

The Task Force would continue to develop along the lines of a widely skilled organisation throughout the decade as other military sections, such as the Ammunition Depot, the Explosives Ordinance Disposal, and the Airport Company were later absorbed into the new command, further augmenting its utility.[23] With regards to the fleet itself, there were some more expansions in this period, though they were admittedly minor in scope. In 1982, talks were held in Malta between then Prime Minister Dom Mintoff and the Yugoslav President Sergei Kraigher. Among the topics discussed was increased co-operation in the maritime environment and as a result of these talks Yugoslavia donated two *Kalnik* class patrol boats, as a symbol of good faith. The Maritime Squadron took charge of these vessels in a ceremony held in Dockyard Creek on the 31st March

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[22] Vassalo History, *The Armed Force of Malta: a history*, (Valetta, 2013) available at: vassalohistory.com,
(https://vassallohistory.wordpress.com/armed-forces/) (19 Sept. 2018)
[23] Captain Chris Xuereb, '35 years of service' in *On Parade (*Oct., 2005) p. 6.

1982, coinciding with Malta's Freedom Day.[24] The vessels, *C-38* and *C-39*, had been used as patrol boats in the Yugoslav Navy, and continued the trend of donated inshore vessels that compromised the bulk of the Maritime Squadron's assets.

In terms of operational capacity not much in this period changed as requirements and equipment remained familiar. The most notable event that impacted disposition in this period was also the single greatest loss of life in peacetime to the Maritime Squadron.

On the 7 September 1984 the *Swift*-class patrol boat *C-23* was in the process of a routine disposal mission near the village of Qala, off the coast of Gozo. The cargo it was to jettison was a consignment of illegally manufactured fireworks that had been seized by the Maltese police. Not long after the vessel had left port the cargo detonated for unknown reasons, though it is speculated that a spark could have occurred from various origins on board. The explosion killed seven on board; five were members of the Armed Forces as well as two police officers that were overseeing the assignment. Of the crew and passengers, the only person to survive the explosion was a Private, Emmanuel Montesin. While severely injured in the detonation he was able to beach the severely damaged patrol boat subsequently. The following day, a state funeral was held for the victims and a day of national mourning was declared.[25] This led to a change in how such operations were carried out with all dangerous material carried on towed barges as a result. Through the first half of the 1980s despite another major rearrangement of the Armed Forces and another re-designation the Maritime Squadron found its operational environment mostly unchanged.

Yet again the period at the end of the 1980s saw more reorganisation throughout the Armed Forces. Principally the Task Force was dissolved in May of 1988, and the various sub units that comprised it were re-amalgamated into the

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[24] Steno Webs, *Maritime squadron- Armed Forces of Malta* (Malta 2010), available at steno.webs.com, (http://steno.webs.com/112/afm/maritime.htm) (2 Feb 2017).
[25] *Times of Malta*, 7 Sept. 2009.

Armed Forces.[26] This was done in an effort to bring the Armed Forces in line with similar organisations throughout Europe. The newly reformed Armed Forces were placed under the command of the newly formed rank of Brigadier. The various units of the Task Force were re-amalgamated with units from 2 Regiment of the Armed Forces and the Armed Forces Depot in May 1988. Shortly thereafter in June of the same year the Colours of the regiments and service were replaced.[27] Another notable organisational development in this period occurred in 1987 with the first class of officer cadets passing out in April of that year. The following year's class was similarly notable with two of its members being dedicated Naval Officers.[28] They held the distinction of being the first class of cadets to be trained independent of the British Armed Forces. However they did spend a period of five months of their training in Italy at the Italian Army's Infantry and Cavalry school located in Cesano, Rome. Meanwhile the naval officers were sent to the Federal Republic of West Germany for specialised training.[29] This hallmark of fostering close working relationships with other militaries in Europe can be witnessed throughout the history of the Maritime Squadron in programs such as these.

Despite the continuing rapidly changing nature of the organisation of the A.F.M., procurement, especially of new vessels remained highly limited for the remainder of the 1980s. For the remainder of the decade the only new vessels added to the Maltese fleet were two more rescue launches donated by the British. *C-20* was a *RAF 1600* series launch and *C-21* a *RAF 1300* model. Both vessels were very similar in design to the earlier C-68 and *C-71* craft that had also been donated in the 1970s.[30] It was also in this period that the German customs launches *C-27*, *C-28* and *C-29* came to the end of their lifespan

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[26] Captain Chris Xuereb,' 35 years of service' in *On Parade (*Oct., 2005) p. 7.

[27] Armed Forces Malta, *A.F.M. colours,* available at The Armed Forces of Malta, (https://afm.gov.mt/en/info/colours/Pages/AFM-Colours.aspx) (30 Aug. 2018).

[28] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta, Malta (30 Aug. 2018) p. 2.

[29] Ibid., p. 1.

[30] David Rose, *History of the RSL Fleet and 1654* (Valletta, 2012), available at: rsl1654.weebly.com, (rsl1654.weebly.com/history-of-rsl1654.html) (20 Sept. 2018)

alongside one of the Libyan Launches, also *C-29* in 1989. By this point the Maritime Squadron had been operational for nearly two decades, and had managed that entire time solely on donations of vessels from friendly navies and coast guards, with exception of *C-21* which was initially built for the customs department. While the Maritime Squadron was now facing a large majority of these vessels becoming unserviceable in the near future there did not yet appear to be any efforts made to address this issue proactively.

The final notable event that occurred in Malta in this decade came towards the end of 1989, Malta played host to one of the most symbolically important summits if the twentieth Century. For two days in early December, the U.S. President George Bush met with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, in a series of informal talks designed to discuss the rapidly changing events across Europe.[31] It was at this event that Gorbachev declared an end to the 'Cold War' and both leaders pledged their commitment to a new era of increased openness and communication between East and West.[32] While no agreements were signed the event can be viewed as a formal acknowledgement of already drastically altered state of global affairs. Reviewing the decade as a whole the Maritime Battery/Squadron seems to have managed to maintain a degree of consistency despite another series of widespread organisational changes, and a dearth of procurement.

Since the arrival of the very first *Swift* class patrol boats in 1971 the maritime elements of Malta's armed forces have scarcely seen a period where their duties and workload have decreased. While the global strategic importance of the Mediterranean has waxed and waned since the 1970s the Maritime Squadron in all of its incarnations have always remained on the forefront of southern European maritime affairs. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the focus was placed on developing the Armed Forces into a flexible professional task force.

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[31] *Los Angeles Times*, 2 Dec. 1989.
[32] *Washington Post*, 4 Dec. 1989.

Looking forward to the next chapter, while the focus of global strategy was elsewhere in northern waters, the Maritime Squadron laid the foundation for a competent, task oriented organisation. While the rest of the world began to realise the most significant changes in global strategic and political affairs, following the collapse of the Soviet Union; the Maltese would use this opportunity to begin the process of modernisation of their services. Furthermore the prospect of the most peaceful era in world history created opportunity for small states, such as Malta to become involved to a greater extent in international affairs, such as in the European Union. Moving into the first decade of the twenty first century the importance of peripheral states in Europe would grow in importance, with the emergence of a new influx of irregular immigrants, particularly on the southern borders of the Mediterranean. While facing the largest expansion in the scope of their duties, the Maritime Squadrons task oriented focus, coupled with increased funding opportunities greatly influenced both development and performance of the Squadron. Now with the necessary understanding of the history of the Maritime Service, the next chapter will progress towards the period of focus.

Chapter 6:
The Maltese Maritime Squadron in the post-Cold War period: Development and change.

To complete the primary comparative element of this thesis; this chapter will examine the Maritime Squadron of the Armed Forces of Malta, in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Similarly to the Irish Naval Service, The Maritime Squadron underwent a series of developments and reorganisations during this period of extensive global strategic change. From a Maltese perspective, the Maritime Squadron experienced a significant, albeit inconsistent evolution. This can be attributed to a variety of factors, from gaining independence as a unit within the A.F.M. to the proportionally rapid expansion of assets and personnel. Like many other organisations the Maritime Squadron underwent significant change in the wake of Malta's accession to the European Union. In light of this, the experience of the Maritime Squadron has been focused on the management of sudden change and expansion. This represents a major departure from the previous chapter's analysis of development, up until this period, as having been gradual and unfocused.

This chapter will also form the first academic account of the development of the Maritime Squadron in the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union. However as with the previous study, its focus will be concentrated on specific areas of interest, weighted by their importance to the Maritime Squadron's development. For example, with regards to the latter part of this period, the issue of border security, particularly in the maritime context has come to dominate European security efforts. Given that this has been a key issue for the Maltese in this period, owing largely to their strategic position, it will be an area

of particular focus. Indeed this chapter will provide the first account of these developments from a Maltese perspective

As with the earlier chapter focused on the Irish Naval Service in the period, this chapter will also seek to examine the development of the Maritime Squadron in light of contemporary naval theory surrounding the term 'small navies'. As before, the focus will be on the integration of policy, and tasking changes over the period of focus. This will contribute towards the goal of illustrating to what degree the Maritime squadron or the character of the responses generated by it, can be compared with other 'small navies'. This will provide the necessary depth for the remaining chapter on conclusions drawn from both case studies. For example, can the experiences of rapid reorganisation in the wake of E.U. accession for the Maltese be compared with the Irish response in the 1970s to E.C. accession? Furthermore was there anything identifiably 'small' about them? To achieve this, these practices and developments will be traced to their root source in the period. Particular attention will once again be paid to the role of various inter and intra state actors beyond the service.

Finally this chapter will be of further significance as it provides a comparative example of another naval service beginning its first forays into international collaborative operations. This is of particular relevance in a European context as these operations were focused around regional maritime security and governance.

In keeping with the approach of chapter four, this examination of the Maritime Squadron will be structured in three sections, each covering a key area of the development of the Squadron in this period. Firstly, it will examine the development of policy that relates to the Maritime Squadron. This section will examine the major organisations that have had an impact on the development of naval policy. It will initially focus on domestic policy sources. Much of the change in the period of focus stems directly from political necessities and governmental bodies. As before with the Naval Service an examination of evidence such as funding allocations, published reports and development plans

provide necessary juxtaposition between policy and effect. This examination will also include analysis of policy as it emerges from the Maritime Squadron in the period.

Such 'in-house' policy is relevant as it illustrates how strategic goals are translated through the organisations to operational outcomes. Again both the direct implementation of strategic goals and general organisational development will be examined where evident. Development will include behaviours and practices implemented to achieve strategic goals. This includes areas such as recruitment and training, cooperation with external bodies and a variety of other soft assets. Finally once more comparisons will be drawn to developments within the relevant supra national bodies as was done in the previous case study.

Secondly this chapter will assess the development of the practical assets of the Maritime Squadron. This will encompass fixed assets such as the on-shore infrastructure and the fleet as well as personnel in the period. The Third section will focus on how operational tasking has evolved for the Maritime Squadron. Firstly this will be examined in the domestic context, this will encompass its nominal role in defence as well as other maritime security affairs such as smuggling interdiction, search and rescue activities (SAR), and migration management. Finally this section will analyse the various contributions of the Maritime Squadron, to international maritime operations in the period.

As with the previous chapter on the Irish Naval Service, this analysis of the Maritime Squadrons development will begin with the trends in resource allocation. Again at a lower level of resolution, budgetary trends can act as a litmus test of the health of a service, and its focus relative to total spending. The period of focus was certainly one of significant European and global financial uncertainty, notably the economic crisis of 2008 and the period of restructuring afterwards. As was witnessed in the previous case study, the trends in global finances were clearly evident in the funding available for military allocation. Given the conventional axiom that smaller navies attract smaller budgets, this

analysis will provide an additional data point as to the consistency of their budgets dovetailing with such trends. Once more budgetary allocations for this period will be juxtaposed with Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P.), as a means of broadly defining trends across the period. Furthermore it is relevant to compare it to G.D.P. as the Maltese budget reports use this as their comparative framework for investment priorities.[1] It should be noted that while statistics are available for total spending, given the traditional status of the Maritime Squadron as a sub unit, as opposed to a distinct branch like the I.N.S.; there are no publicly available statistics on discreet maritime spending. However it is still possible to discern broad spending trends as mentioned.

This case study begins in the period leading up to the Millennium. For the last five years of the decade, spending on military budgets remained stable year on year. In terms of actual spending, budgets consistently approximated 30 million dollars.[2] There was however a general downward trend, with a low of 27 million dollars in the years 1999 and 2000[3]. While small in absolute terms this is a proportionally significant cut of almost ten percent. This is even more significant when it is juxtaposed against the state's G.D.P. at the time. Whereas the previous four years had represented between 0.9 and one percent of total G.D.P., the spending in those two years fell to 0.67 percent of GDP.[4]

However this would see a significant turnaround in the following two years. Through these years spending rose with 64 million dollars allocated in 2001 and

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[1] Ministry of Finance, *Pre budget document 2018, upgrading Malta's infrastructure* (Valetta, 2018) p. 48.
[2] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 1997, Europe* (London, 1997), available at: tandfonline.com,
(http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597229708460105) (5 Apr. 2018) p. 89.
[3] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 2001, Europe* (London, 2001), available at: tandfonline.com,
(http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597220108460153) (6 Apr 2016) p. 301.
[4] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 2001, Europe* (London, 2001), available at: tandfonline.com,
(http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597220108460153) (6 Apr 2016).

74 million in 2002[5]. This also represented the highest level of spending relative to G.D.P. on military allocations in the period of focus of 1.8 and 1.9 percent respectively. Given that accession into the E.U. was looming for the Maltese in 2004, and the state agencies would need to meet common union standards, this may in part explain the sudden increase in spending. As later sections will demonstrate, given the expansion of duties placed on the Maritime Squadron, the cost entailed with meeting the standards set by E.U. accession, and the trends in allocation during the period this seems likely.[6]

For the next five years spending was somewhat relaxed to between 41 million dollars in 2003 and 49 million dollars in 2008.[7] While again this represents a small absolute deduction in monetary terms, it once more is larger in proportional significance. Again this is most readily apparent in terms of G.D.P. While in 2005 the allocated 52 million dollars accounted for one percent of G.D.P., by 2008 the then allocated 49 million dollars had fallen to 0.6 of a percent of G.D.P.[8]

A slight increase was evident in the following years as budgets rose to 59 million and 0.75 percent of GDP, dipping slightly in the years 2011 and 2012 to 0.6 once more.[9] This trend would then continue from 2015 to 2017 with total spending remaining between 56 and 64 million dollars and remaining 0.54 percent of GDP.[10]

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[5] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 2004, Europe* (London, 2004), available at: tandfonline.com, (https://www-tandfonline-com/doi/pdf/10.1080/725292380) (6 Apr 2018) p. 354.

[6] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta, Malta (30 August 2018) p. 7.

[7] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 2010, Europe* (London, 2010), available at: tandfonline.com, (https://www-tandfonline-com/doi/pdf/10.1080/04597220903545882) (3 Apr 2018) p. 465.

[8] Ibid., p. 465.

[9] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 2013, Europe* (London, 2013), available at: tandfonline.com, (http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597222.2013.756999) (7 Apr 2016) p. 145.

[10] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 2017, Europe* (London, 2017), available at: tandfonline.com, (https://www-tandfonline-com /doi/abs/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416987) (9 July 2018) p. 502.

In the period it is clear that while overall spending has increased in line with inflation and increased G.D.P. in the period, it has also been the trend that spending as an overall proportion of the G.D.P. has, in fact, been lowered across the period. While this could possibly the result of less emphasis on security spending, given emergent trends in Maltese security during the period, it may be an artefact of the surge in G.D.P. access to the E.U. markets brought. There have been some exceptional years that seem to represent proportional surges of assets. However from the data on budgets alone, it seems as these were once off injections, later sections of this chapter will seek to contextualise them in light of other developments with the Maritime Squadron. It is for example, unsurprising that the increase in defence spending in 2005 corresponds with the purchase of a new patrol vessel the same year.

When assessing the development of policy in this period for the Maritime Squadron it is clear from the outset that there had been very little specific consideration given towards its development prior to the millennium. This lack of prioritisation can be witnessed in practical terms, as will be discussed in greater detail in the second section of this chapter, by the lack of any significant investment in infrastructure for over two decades by the midpoint of the period.[11] In terms of policy from the government in this period, there arose only two major publications outlining development in the period. The first was the White Paper published in 1996. The paper outlined the development of the Armed Forces as a whole for the proceeding decade. It also introduced a number of measures designed to reform and professionalise the standards amongst officers throughout the A.F.M. These included: The introduction of practical and academic promotions exams, increased oversight on the promotions of senior officers, a mandatory retirement age of 55, annual technical and administrative inspections by third party consultants for all units within the A.F.M., a further commitment to overseas training of cadets and staff officers, and importantly for the Maritime Squadron, the section of the headquarters that dealt with SAR

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[11] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 3.

underwent a modernisation project to improve communications and monitoring capabilities.[12]

While there emerged some rolling development in terms of assets in the period, It is notable that the next major publication in policy outlining development of the Armed Forces came almost two decades later, with the publication of the 'Armed Forces of Malta Strategy Paper 2016-2026' in 2016. This paucity is particularly striking given the major developments that had occurred for the Maritime Squadron alone in that period. Two key examples would be the joining of the European Union in 2004, and the increased requirements and standards it imposed on Malta's maritime component; such as the promotion of the Maritime Squadron to full unit status, as a recognised element within the A.F.M.[13] The latter came about in 2006, as a result of a governmental recognition of the maturity of the Squadron and resulted in the establishment of a dedicated independent command element. However it remained under overall command of the land elements of the A.F.M. due to the absence of naval personnel amongst the Headquarters level.[14]

The 2016 paper was, broadly speaking, a development plan outlining the next decade of Maltese military procurement. While it has a large emphasis placed on development in physical terms, it represented the most definitive outline of the Maltese conception of defence policy. It is notable in this context that while it contained standard reference to traditional defence responsibilities as would be expected of any military, such as the practical defence of Maltese sovereignty; it also emphasised the role of the Armed Forces in intelligence gathering. Furthermore, it recognised the importance of participation in international actions as a key area of interest for Maltese strategic interests.[15] It

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[12] Martin Scicluna, *Labour's approach to the Armed Forces of Malta* (Valetta, 2013)**.**
[13] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta, Malta (30 August 2018) p. 1.
[14] Ibid., p. 3.
[15] Ministry of Home Affairs and National Security, *Strategy paper 2016-2026*, available at: homeaffairs.gov.mt, (https://homeaffairs.gov.mt/en/media/Policies-

should also be noted that across the Armed Forces, specifically at an organisational level, there was a notable focus on restructuring personnel issues such as rank, the use of support services and general benefits for members.[16]

Considering the apparent lack of specific structured policy with regards to military development, unlike the example of the Irish Naval Service, which features duplication of strategic planning at both the political and military level, there seems to be no evidence of strategic planning from a top down perspective. As will be discussed in later sections, towards the end of the period, as the Maritime Squadron became a more prominent tool in maritime policy, the focus from a political level remained restrained from involvement in the military policy.[17] In this way the Maltese maritime policy development seems to be less top down and more organically bottom up.[18]

Turning towards policy generated at a departmental level, again the trend in the period is that there exists little published formal policy. The same can also be said about the Armed Forces and the Maritime Squadron in particular. However there was a series of recently published annual reports, from the middle of the period onwards. These reports described the progress made in achieving short and medium term goals that can offer some illumination as to the direction of development in the absence of policy. These reports were initially a joint publication of the Armed Forces and the Prime Minister's office. However from 2013 onwards, they were transferred to the Ministry of Home Affairs and Security as the Armed Forces had transitioned to reporting to that department. This in itself may suggest a larger recognition of the importance of that

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Documents/Documents/The%20Armed%20Forces%20of%20Malta%20Strategy%20Paper%2020 16-2026.pdf) (29 June 2018).

[16] Ministry of Home Affairs and National Security, *Strategy paper 2016-2026*, available at: homeaffairs.gov.mt, (https://homeaffairs.gov.mt/en/media/Policies-Documents/Documents/The%20Armed%20Forces%20of%20Malta%20Strategy%20Paper%2020 16-2026.pdf) (29 June 2018) p. 5.

[17] Ministry of Home Affairs and National Security, *Strategy paper 2016-2026*, available at: homeaffairs.gov.mt, (https://homeaffairs.gov.mt/en/media/Policies-Documents/Documents/The%20Armed%20Forces%20of%20Malta%20Strategy%20Paper%2020 16-2026.pdf) (29 June 2018) p. 2.

[18] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta, Malta (30 August 2018) p. 10.

department's role in the period with regards to defence matters, though the additional layer between the A.F.M. and access to the highest office in government may have reduced the ability of the organisation to influence policy and development directly.

When assessing this policy this section will examine both the nationally instigated actions and then highlight the potential supranational influences that are of relevance to them.

The first of these reports was published in 2006. This report came shortly after the restructuring of the A.F.M. that saw the promotion of the Maritime Squadron to full unit status. In addition to establishing other new branches such as the legal counsel and audit branch, the majority of the report is focused around the outcomes of these integrations.[19] Of specific relevance to the Maritime Squadron, the report praised ongoing efforts to refit and develop maritime assets as key towards gains in efficiency.[20] The following year of 2007 saw this emphasis on capacity building further reinforced with a series of projects designed to increase maritime surveillance and monitoring occupying the majority share of ongoing efforts for that year.[21] Additionally a renewed emphasis was placed on fostering and formalising training opportunities internationally for the A.F.M.[22] The following year of 2008 was reviewed as being a stable year of consolidation following the more active previous two years, with the major national policy of increased maritime focused evident in the expansion of role of the three year old Search and Rescue centre. Additionally a renewed focus on fostering training relations at home and abroad is apparent in this report.[23] The following year 2009 was similar in that national policies remained stable with some continuing evidence of a focus on promoting monitoring and awareness capabilities through asset development.[24] This

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[19] Government of Malta, *Annual report of government departments 2006* (Valetta, 2006) p. 57.
[20] Ibid. p. 59.
[21] Government of Malta, *Annual report of government departments 2007* (Valetta, 2007) p. 74.
[22] Ibid., p. 75.
[23] Government of Malta, *Annual report of government departments 2008* (Valetta, 2008) p. 54.
[24] Government of Malta, *Annual report of government departments 2009* (Valetta, 2009) p. 63.

emphasis on training refinement and awareness capability continued into the 2010 report, with similar trends in force development.[25]

The year 2011 by contrast, was characterised by the rapid increase of instability in the region attributed to the Libyan crisis. From a policy perspective, notable developments that year included the formalisation of affairs between the Maritime Squadron and the Ministry for Fisheries and most prominently a redrawn policy on SAR operations. This policy was designed to better meet the requirements the massive upswing in operational tempo had created.[26] The following year was less dynamic, though no less busy as policy implementations were once again given space to mature. The policy of rolling renewal of assets continued and, in some ways accelerated due to additional funding resources coming on line as a result of regional issues.[27] Data for the two most recently published years of 2013 and 2014 saw this pattern continue.[28] These years also saw high levels of operational activity dominating the focus as rolling renewal tries to keep pace with demands placed on the service.[29]

As mentioned previously, the development of policy within the Maritime squadron has been described as bottom up in this period. In a broad sense this has manifested in two distinct areas of policy making. The first is of policy in regards to procurement prioritisation and the second is in regards to operational policy with regards to assets and practices.

With regards to procurement policy, it has emerged organically that the squadron would prepare a prioritised schema of developments and that when funding would come online via the government, they would match the availability to an existing need.[30] While not specifically formalised this practice is attributed to two main factors. The first is the lack of dedicated maritime

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[25] Government of Malta, *Annual report of government departments 2010* (Valetta, 2010) p. 48.
[26] Government of Malta, *Annual report of government departments 2011* (Valetta, 2011) p. 50.
[27] Office of the Prime Minister of Malta, *Annual report 2012* (Valetta, 2012) p. 6.
[28] Ministry of Home Affairs and Security, *Annual report 2013* (Valetta, 2013) p. 16.
[29] Ministry of Home Affairs and Security, *Annual report 2014* (Valetta, 2014) p. 46.
[30] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (28 Aug. 2018) p. 1.

personnel at any level beyond the unit HQ.[31] The second factor is that this coupled with the emergence of the first professional maritime officers in the early 1990s, cemented the position of the Maritime Squadron as the repository of all relevant expertise in these affairs.[32] Throughout the remainder of the period this pattern would continue and increase as the Maltese state gained access to relevant E.U. funding, these funds in particular were left at the discretion of the Squadron as to their best utilisation within the boundaries of their allocation.[33]

Secondly in terms of internal operational policy, again this emerged organically, mainly in the period leading up to and following the establishment of unit status and E.U. accession.[34] Again the relative paucity of expertise beyond the Squadron ensured this trend.[35] Given the trend across the period was that officer staff training took place internationally, alongside many different host services, one aspect that typified operational policy was that it was asset based to ensure compatibility.[36] Therefore standard operating procedure type policy was developed for each vessel class as a distinct focus. Additionally, it was in the period between the years 2000-7 that a general operational doctrine was developed at Squadron HQ. level to formalise the practices of the Squadron. This was authored by the then Squadron Flag Officer Lt. Col. Cauchi Inglott, who leaned heavily on the model provided by the United States Coastguard's operational doctrine as his judgement was that the structure of both organisations should be foundationally similar due to the similarity of their duties.[37]

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[31] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta, Malta (30 August 2018) p. 3.
[32] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (28 Aug. 2018) p. 2.
[33] Ibid., p. 3.
[34] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta, Malta (30 August 2018) p. 11.
[35] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (28 Aug. 2018) p.2
[36] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta, Malta (30 August 2018) p.11
[37] Ibid. p.4

Summarising the development of 'in-house' policy in the period; the two major areas of policy examined indicate clear trend towards both a formalisation of policy within the service, and the embodiment of the status of the Squadron as 'the only repository of...maritime knowledge within the armed forces'[38]

In addition to home directed policy, publications in this period also highlight the integration of supranational policy into the Maltese framework. This predominantly progressed through the Armed Forces involvement with various international initiatives in the period. While the Armed Forces have a long tradition of international cooperation, mainly through training initiatives there was a marked increase in involvement in larger initiatives in the latter part of this period. These individual initiatives will be examined in the later section on operations.

2006 marked the establishment of the Maltese branch to handle European Security and Defence Policy.[39] This is relevant as it marks the transition to full commitment in European defence responsibilities, which were falling increasingly on the Armed Forces. Meanwhile in a maritime context, activity in relation to 'irregular migration' was accelerated in this period with the first integration of the Maritime Squadron into Frontex lead initiatives in this case Op. NAUTILUS.[40] This would continue in the following year with an increased integration of Maltese assets into Frontex lead initiatives in the region[41]. 2008 represented a significant surge in international activity as the Maltese reactivated its status as a member of NATO's partnership for peace (P.F.P.) program. Malta had originally been a member of the program since 1994.[42] However a sudden departure from the program came shortly after the unexpected victory of the Labour Party in the 1995 general election. This lead to

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[38] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (28 Aug. 2018) p.2
[39] Government of Malta, *Annual report of government departments 2006* (Valetta, 2006) p. 64.
[40] Government of Malta, *Annual report of government departments 2006* (Valetta, 2006) p. 278.
[41] Government of Malta, *Annual report of government departments 2007* (Valetta, 2007) p. 76.
[42] NATO, *Secretary General's Council welcoming remarks, visit by Maltese Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Professor Guido de Marco, Wednesday, 26 April 1995* (Belgium, 1995), available at: NATO.int, (https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1995/s950426a.htm) (17 Sep. 2018).

a significant refocus on Malta's neutrality, as a means of ensuring regional stability from that government.[43] Apart from reintroduction into P.F.P. that year the A.F.M. began the process of joining FINABEL the European army integration centre. 2008 also saw the Armed Forces reinvigorate their attachment to the 5+5 Defence Initiative. This was the evolution of earlier bilateral exercise with Italy dubbed 'CANALE', in their regional waters.[44] Here again the theme is one of accelerated integration into supranational security systems. This was likely a means of addressing the growing intensity of security in the region.

These patterns would continue for the immediate future. Notably in 2010, with the extended presidency of the 5+5 initiative, Malta once again demonstrated a focus on raising interoperability for regional security forces.[45] This pattern would continue throughout the emergence of the Libyan Crisis, and 2011 saw the continuation of Maltese involvement in these efforts. 2012 saw the beginning of Maltese involvement in the restructuring of the new Libyan security forces through the auspices of the emerging U.N. involvement in the region.[46] Furthermore, independent efforts were made to improve relations with China in the period under the auspices of bilateral military agreements to expand the possibility of equipment procurement.[47] These efforts would remain stable over the next two years, with 2013 being remarkable as the Maritime Squadron took part in the NATO passing training exercise PASSEX 2013, thus reinforcing commitment towards interoperability training with NATO partners.[48] These exercises would continue in an ad-hoc fashion over the period when NATO assets were available in the region, as the Maritime Squadron saw them as opportunities for development and training.[49] In 2015 with the publication of the E.U.M.S.S. the initial Maltese reception to the Strategy and its action plan

[43] *New York Times*, 12 Nov. 1996.
[44] Government of Malta, *Annual report of government departments 2008* (Valetta, 2008) p. 54.
[45] Government of Malta, *Annual report of government departments 2010* (Valetta, 2010) p. 47.
[46] Office of the Prime Minister of Malta, *Annual report 2012* (Valetta, 2012) p. 5.
[47] Ibid., p. 6.
[48] Ministry of Home Affairs and Security, *Annual report 2013* (Valetta, 2013) p. 17.
[49] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Wallace Camilleri of Valleta, Malta (6 Oct. 2018).

was optimistic but cautious.[50] In a speech given by the then Minister for Home Affairs and National Security the importance of cooperative activities, with other E.U. members and 'third members', in the region as a means to provide for common security goals was stressed. This was highlighted particularly in relation to the sharing of intelligence through networks such as the Common Information Sharing Environment project.[51] However, it was also stated that such ventures should be balanced against the individual right to sovereignty of each participant when it came to their legal jurisdictions and the need for confidentiality in relation to national interests, but that overall the E.U.M.S.S. recognition of these factors was welcome.[52] It is of note that the adoption of the cooperative principles of the E.U.M.S.S. influenced the establishment of the cross sectoral government agency 'Malta Marrittima' in 2016.[53] The agency was designed to 'bring industry and government stakeholders together so as to focus and promote the continued and enhanced development of the marine and maritime industries in the Maltese islands.'[54] Within the body the E.U.M.S.S. was referenced in relation to its interest in the development of 'surveillance and security' strategy across the various stakeholders.[55]As of 2018 the Agency has launched its first round of 'seed awards' in conjunction with the University of Malta to fund innovation in the maritime sector.[56] Once more this serves as an example of a small navy state leveraging other partners across the public and private sector to overcome developmental costs.

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[50] Government of Malta, *Press Release PR 141536* (Valetta, 2014), available at: www.gov.mt, (https://www.gov.mt/en/Government/Press%20Releases/Pages/2014/July/08/pr141536.aspx) (8 Mar. 2017).

[51] Minister for Home Affairs and National Security (Mallia, M.), *Towards an effective European maritime integration: the implementation of the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE)* (Valetta, 2014) , available at: www.gov.mt, (https://www.gov.mt/en/Government/Press%20Releases/Documents/pr141536a_speech.pdf) (7 July 2018), p. 2.

[52] Ibid., p. 3.

[53] Joseph Dalli, *New Malta maritime agency to tap into the blue economy and provide Malta a cutting edge approach!* (New York, 2016), available at linkedin.com, (https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/new-malta-marittima-agency-tap-blue-economy-provide-cutting-dalli) (18 Aug. 2018)

[54] *Malta Independent*, 13 April 2016.

[55] Ibid.

[56] *Times of Malta*, 27 May 2018.

In general, it can be summarised that the development of policy in the period was a push towards a series of ongoing renewals. These were likely influenced by the marked increased in operational tempo. What is also particularly evident from contemporary published policy is that a heavy motivating emphasis was placed on integrating Maltese forces into the various supranational frameworks. This was to be achieved through increased co-training and interoperability development. Once again this is an example of a small navy emphasising international cooperation, as a means of achieving outsized effects. Notably compared to the previous case study the Maltese seem to have more rapidly pursued this line of development, likely due to their exigent security concerns in the period, compared to the Irish Naval Service.

Moving on to asset development in the period, shore-based infrastructure had the most delayed start of any of the factors covered in this chapter. Indeed, up until the debut of the major rolling renewal programs in 2002, there had been no significant investment in on shore assets for at least two decades.[57] This would change with the introduction of the renewal schemes. The schemes were mainly a result of the projected renewal of the fleet and the goals of purchasing patrol vessels of greater displacement and length than their predecessors. These purchases would require a commensurate investment in the onshore support assets.[58] Examples of this include the Base at Haywharf being upgraded with an extension placed on the jetty in 2004.[59] More recently, the Maritime Squadron received a brand-new purpose-built base at Haywharf in 2013, which was directly linked to its rising importance over the last decade in relation to Maltese security policy by contemporary heads of government.[60] Developments included a purpose-built HQ bloc, additional hangar facilities, and an ancillary bloc, to accommodate visiting guests to the Maritime Squadron. The latter was repurposed shortly thereafter as a home for the Special Operations Unit of the

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[57] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018), p. 3.
[58] Ibid., p. 3.
[59] *Malta Independant*, 8 July. 2004.
[60] *Malta Independant*, 14 Feb. 2013.

A.F.M.[61] It would seem that upgrading could still not keep pace with the expansion of the Squadron's operations. Shortly thereafter the Maritime Squadron established its first subsidiary base on the second Island of Gozo in 2015, the purposes of which were to cater for the expanded fleet and to provide an increased capacity of coverage for the area.[62]

The early 1990s proved to be a more dynamic period in relation to acquiring new vessels. With the ending of tensions between East and West with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the need for military readiness reduced throughout Europe, many states found themselves with a surplus of equipment that was no longer required. Firstly in February, 1991 the U.S. Ambassador to Malta, Sally Novetzke presented two nineteen-metre *Equity* class craft, which had previously belonged to the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, to the Maritime Squadron, on behalf of the United States government. The ships, P-25 and P-26 were accepted as the last of the Libyan donated launches, mentioned in the previous chapter, were reaching the end of their operational life spans.

The following year the Maritime Squadron received yet more donated vessels. The first of these came in June 1992, when the Maritime Squadron was gifted with 3 *Litoraneo* Class vessels from Italy. These craft P-34, P-36 and P-37 had previously belonged to Italy's 'Guardia di Finanza', the law enforcement agency under Italy's Ministry of Finance that tackles financial crime and smuggling. In that same year, another presentation ceremony took place, this time in November. With the unification of Germany, the state was set to offload much of the newly assimilated former German Democratic Republic materiel. This led to the Maritime Squadron obtaining two *Bremse* Class patrol boats (P-32, P-33) and two *Kondor I* Class (P-30, P-31) minesweepers. In keeping with the Squadron's tradition of working closely with other friendly forces, the initial training on these vessels was carried out in Neustadt in Holstein, Germany

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[61] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta, Malta (30 August 2018), p. 9.
[62] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018), p. 3.

between June and August 1992, with 30 officers and enlisted personnel of the Maritime Squadron attending the course[63]. This culminated with the 52 metre Kondor I Vessels sailing to Malta from Northern Germany, crewed entirely by Maritime Squadron; the voyage of over three thousand nautical miles represented a record for the Maritime Squadron. What is also notable about these vessels is that they represented the first instance of the Maritime squadron actively purchasing vessels rather than receiving donations.[64] This coupled with the increased efforts towards training crews further indicates an increased focus on professionalisation of the Squadron.

Finally of note was that earlier in February of that year, the delivery took place of the first fixed-wing aircraft in the A.F.M.'s history. This took the form of five single-engine Cessna Bird Dog 19-F spotters being purchased from the United States Army. These aircraft were soon put to use mainly for coastal patrol, maritime search operations, as well as pilot training. Such joint operations carried out between the Maritime Squadron and the Air Wing were becoming increasingly commonplace and eventually lead to the Air Wing adopting maritime surveillance, and search and rescue at sea, as two of its major operational duties.[65] With regards to the integration of these assets into maritime patrol operations, a significant amount of 'jointery' was pursued initially at the commands level. This began with commanding officers of the Maritime Squadron operating in conjunction with their Air wing counterparts, but spread further down through the operational level as junior officers responsible for individual operations were encouraged to actively communicate with their counterparts to increase operational effectiveness.[66]

The first half of the last decade of the twentieth century marked the beginning of a much more rapid pace of expansion in Maltese maritime affairs. This can be

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[63] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta, Malta (30 August 2018), p. 2.
[64] Captain Carmelo Mangion, 'Ever broadening horizons' in *On Parade* (Oct., 2010), p. 16.
[65] Air Wing of the Armed Forces of Malta, *Air Wing, A.F.M.*, available at: www.afm.gov.mt (http://www.afm.gov.mt/airwingafm?l=1) (8 Mar. 2017).
[66]Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Wallace Camilleri of Valleta, Malta (6 Oct. 2018).

firstly evidenced by the relatively rapid expansion of the Maltese fleet in the period. Aside from this there were important developments in the political sphere that would heavily influence the expansion of physical assets as E.U. accession was continuing ahead.

Approaching the turn of the century and the new millennium, The Maritime Squadron was beginning to make increasing steps towards the modernisation of itself as a naval organisation. The major overhaul of the entirety of the A.F.M. in the early part of 1992 was officially finalised in 1997. For the Maritime Squadron developments in this period again mainly consisted of increases in the fleet in order to meet the expanding workload faced by the squadron. In terms of vessels there were two notable purchases in this period. The first of these was the addition of another of the *Kondor* class vessels that had initially been purchased in 1992. The earlier vessels had proven to be vital in establishing a successful offshore presence for the Maritime Squadron. The new vessel designated P-29 was to further augment the Maritime Squadrons ability to project assets offshore. Furthermore, in recognition of the increasing importance of search and rescue capabilities within the squadron, the first dedicated SAR vessels were commissioned in 1998. Vittoria Naval Shipyard, Italy was given the task of managing their construction. The *Melita I* and *Melita II* were of the Supervittoria 800 Class, and were similar in design to the SAR launches in service with the Italian Coast Guard. While originally earmarked for the Maltese Civil Protection Department, the vessels were transferred to the Maritime Squadron in May 1999. The decision to re-direct them to the Maritime Squadron was in part due to the recognition that the A.F.M. was the official national SAR agency in Malta.[67] Additionally, the Civil Protection Department also faced significant challenges that it could not overcome in sustaining the vessels operationally.[68] While modest, the vessels were the beginning of a trend

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[67] Armed Forces Malta, *Maritime patrol vessels*, available at: www.afm.gov.mt, (http://www.afm.gov.mt/melitai-melitaii?l=1) (26 Mar. 2018).
[68] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta, Malta (30 August 2018) p. 8.

that would span the next fifteen years. This would see the Maritime Squadron receiving far more modern vessels than had previously been the custom. Indeed with regards to the purchase of equipment the *Melita* vessels represent the beginning of the contemporary format of the Maritime Squadron.

Continuing on from the previous decade the early 2000s would continue to see the Maritime Squadron take major strides towards the modernisation of itself and in recognition of the changing political and strategic environments it was facing. The largest organised modernisation project in the Squadron's history was launched in 2002, titled the 'Fleet Renewal Project'. The project was initiated primarily in recognition of the likely increase of pressure to come on the Maritime Squadron, and secondarily following a series of parliamentary debates where the viability of the Maritime Squadron's assets to meet said challenges was challenged.[69]

The first vessel of the program was commissioned in November of that year as the P-51. The P-51 was the first *Protector* class vessel purchased, it was based on a U.S. Coast Guard design modified from a Hong Kong Police variant of the Dutch *Stan 2600* pattern.[70] The vessel was the first brand new purpose made vessel for the Maritime Squadron. It was intended to provide the Squadron with a modern patrol vessel. Two years after its arrival it was joined by its sister ship the P-52, in the interim period the increasing demands placed on the Maritime Squadron had seen P-51 on a nearly constant deployment schedule[71].

The largest purchase in this period came the following year in 2005 with the commission of the serving flagship of the Maritime squadron the P-61. The design for P61 was based off the Italian Diciotti class and modified to suit Maltese needs. Designed from the ground up for patrol, it possesses a clear rear

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[69] *Times of Malta*, 11 Apr. 2004.
[70] United States Coast Guard, *International acquisition programs* (Washington D.C., 2009) available at webcitation.org, (https://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.uscg.mil%2FACQUISITION%2Finternational%2F&date=2009-12-28) (10 Sept. 2018)
[71] Lt. Col Martin Cauchi Inglott, 'Saving Lives' in *On Parade (Oct., 2007)*.

half, providing sufficient space to land a helicopter and the capacity to launch a Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) patrol boat via a rear launch ramp. This combination of modifications increases its viability for patrolling large areas, and reduces standard crew capacity to 25. The cost of the project was financed entirely from the fifth Italo-Maltese Financial Protocol, in recognition of Malta's increasing responsibilities monitoring the E.U.'s southern borders.[72] This covered the construction of the vessel together with a training and logistic support package. It was also during this time period that the older *Kondor* and *Bremse* vessels were being decommissioned as the newer vessels were coming online.

In terms of equipment in this period, that same year the Maritime Squadron took possession of an *FB Interceptor* type RHIB to augment its rapid deployment team's ability to respond to situations faster than previously. In 2008 The European Union's External Borders Fund (E.B.F.) came online. The fund was designed to augment the capabilities of member states engaged in protecting Europe's borders. This fund presented Malta with an opportunity to finally upgrade its inshore capabilities. In 2010 the venerable *Swift* class boats now P-23 and P-24 were retired after nearly forty years of service. In their stead four brand new *Austral* class patrol boats were commissioned in March.[73] The boats (P-21/22/23/24) were Australian made and had a final price of 9.6 million Euros, of which the E.B.F. contributed 75 percent.[74]. The purchase of these boats remains completely revamped the Maritimes Squadrons inshore capability.

Shortly thereafter a further two million Euro was released by the E.B.F. for the A.F.M. in 2011. For the maritime squadron with border control its primary concern in the period this funding manifested in three additional RHIB boats manufactured to order by Boomeranger of Finland.[75] The boats were outfitted for fast response inshore work and emphasised broadened situational

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[72] *Malta Independant*, 5 Nov. 2005.
[73] Lieutenant Colonel Martin Sammut, 'Thunder from down under' in *On Parade* (Oct., 2010).
[74] Ibid.
[75] Captain Etienne Scicluna, 'Border control, the way ahead' in *On Parade, (Oct., 2012).*

awareness. This was achieved through implementation of thermal imaging and broad-spectrum communications equipment.[76]

Following this the next assets introduced came courtesy of a grants package from the U.S. as part of ongoing force building activities. Alongside other assets such as night vision equipment the Maritime Squadron received two *Defender* class fast response boats along with their supporting material in 2013.[77] Once more the boats were chosen as they were deemed suitable towards increasing the rapid response capability of the service, in relation to border control.

Finally the most recent acquisition in the period came in 2015 with the donation of the decommissioned LÉ *Aoife* from the Irish Naval Service. The donation occurred in the context of building stronger international cooperation between the two states, particularly in the context of 'Security, peace keeping and crisis management'.[78] The vessel was the largest in the fleet at the time of its transfer and was envisioned as temporary stop gap in the Maritime Squadrons long range capabilities, until the envisioned replacement project was finalised.[79] There was however some contention arising in the public sphere as to the suitability of the craft due to its age, crewing requirements, and capabilities for the type of patrol mission the Maritime Squadron envisioned.[80] Nevertheless it entered service as the P-62 in 2015 and was put to work supporting the existing flagship P-61 in offshore patrol duties.

In terms of personnel development in the period it too underwent a series of reforms and expansions particularly in the period following 2002. The first major trend in this period is an unprecedented expansion of the size of the Maritime

[76] Captain Etienne Scicluna, 'Border control, the way ahead' in *On Parade, (Oct., 2012).*
[77] Armed Forces Malta, *Press release PR2797*, available at: www.gov.mt, (https://www.gov.mt/en/Government/Press%20Releases/Pages/2012/December/21/pr2797.aspx) (8 Mar 2015).
[78] Government of Malta, *Press release PR150326*, available at www.gov.mt, (https://www.gov.mt/en/Government/Press%20Releases/Pages/2015/February/19/pr150326.aspx) (10 Mar. 2015).
[79] RTÉ, *'Active discussions' over LÉ Aoife transfer to Malta (Dublin, 2015),* available at: www.rte.ie, (https://www.rte.ie/news/2015/0221/681854-le-aoife/) (12 Mar 2017).
[80] Ibid.

Squadron. In the fifteen years since 2002 the Squadron has more than doubled its personnel from approximately 130 personnel at the turn of the century to close to 400 by the middle of the next decade.[81] The root of this dramatic expansion has been attributed in part the requirements of impending E.U. membership, similar to Ireland's position in the 1970s. Additionally, it can be linked to an increasingly active government policy towards Maltese involvement in the security of the greater region, in terms of issues such as migration, fisheries exploitation and smuggling.[82] In particular the support of office responsible for defence within the office of the Prime Minister for the Maritime Squadrons development was considered vitally important for this development and growth by senior officers.[83]

With regards to the training of personnel, the period represented one of great challenge for the Maritime Squadron. In this period it faced not only the rapid expansion of personnel, but with the unprecedented rate of expansion and overhaul of the fleet in relative terms, the demands placed on existing personnel to up skill and retrain were significant. To quote one former commanding officer 'when you change out all of your assets like that, and bring in a very large chunk of new tech, very quickly, and you're basically jumping two or three generations of boat, the biggest impact is actually on your personnel'.[84] To address this, the maritime squadron adopted a multi layered approach towards training. While much of the basic military training is done in-house, a partnership was entered with the local institution that focuses on training trades, the Malta College of Arts, Science, and Technology (MCAST). This partnership was designed to create a more efficient pathway towards the creation of skilled trade personnel with the Maritime Squadron.[85] Furthermore the character of the training has been

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[81] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 3.
[82] Ibid, p. 4.
[83] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Wallace Camilleri of Valleta, Malta (6 Oct. 2018).
[84] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 3.
[85] Ibid., p. 5.

expanded towards providing access to various other accredited training programmes for seamanship skills.[86]

Meanwhile across the period, officer level naval training, continued to take advantage of international links, with officers in the period receiving training from organisations such as the Royal Navy, Deutsche Marine, and the Irish Naval service.[87] The rationale for maintaining this approach was that the high costs of entry. These were relative to the limited number of cadets Malta produced and drastically outweighed the benefits of standing up such training within the service. It should be noted that the co-operation with MCAST, while similar in tone towards agreements such as the public-private agreement that founded the N.M.C.I. in Ireland is not of the same level of 'jointness' as the latter.[88] Additionally, in order to account for the potential challenges faced by having such diverse institutional backgrounds among its young officers, the Maritime Squadron engaged the U.S. led International Military Education and Training programme (I.M.E.T.) during the period. The programme, which overseas training of allied militaries personnel within U.S. military training institutions, was utilised as both a direct asset to the Maritime Squadron, by enrolling officers in its various programmes, and as a reference guide for best practices in integrating personnel with varying educational backgrounds into a cohesive operational unit.[89] Through this programme the Maritime Squadron was able to have personnel attend a variety of maritime schools including the U.S. Marine Corp.'s officer training school, the U.S.C.G. academy and the U.S. Naval Staff College.[90]

The period also saw significant changes in how naval officer training was conceptualised within the Maritime Squadron and the A.F.M. Whereas previously the practice had been to 'marinise' existing land officers, this period

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[86] Caroline Balzan, 'New courses at the Maritime institute' in *MCAST LINK* , xxix (2009) p. 27.
[87] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 6.
[88] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 6.
[89] Ibid., p. 7.
[90] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta, Malta (30 August 2018) p. 8.

saw the first dedicated cadre of naval officer cadets granted in 2001. Once more this development was motivated by the looming issue of E.U. accession and the increased regulation of standards it would entail.[91]

Aside from vessels the largest change in the composition of the Maritime Squadron towards the end of the millennium was the foundation of the Rapid Deployment Team (R.D.T.) in 1997. As its name suggests the R.D.T. was conceived as a rapid reaction force that would be able to deploy independently, using its own vessels, or in conjunction with other maritime or aerial assets. Specialising in ship boarding and vessel seizure capabilities, its brief was high risk maritime law enforcement duties such as smuggling and counter terrorism operations in maritime environment.[92] These teams would be significant in the latter part of the period as they were among the first assets deployed in international combined maritime operations such as OP ATALANTA as vessel protection details.[93] The success of these deployments would see them expanded within the Maritime Squadron with the establishment of the Special Duty Enhanced Boarding team directly following the initial successful deployments in 2014.

While the growth of the pool of personnel in this period can rightly be characterised as a success for the Maritime Squadron, it has not been without its challenges. Retention remained an issue within the service. The Maritime Squadron, like many navies with relatively small budgets has found it hard to compete with the draw of the private sector. This is especially true for skilled trades people, and other niche maritime skills. The period has in this way witnessed a trend of increasing numbers of personnel opting for earlier retirement options than in previous generations, with the majority of personnel opting to take retirement at the earliest voluntary period of service growing significantly. Furthermore beyond retention with regards to the poaching of personnel, the rapid and sudden surge of personnel at the turn of the century

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[91] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 3.
[92] Captain Carmelo Mangion, 'Ever broadening horizons' in *On Parade, (*Oct., 2010). p. 16.
[93] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Wallace Camilleri of Valleta, Malta (6 Oct. 2018).

has produced a potential generational time bomb.[94] With the accelerated recruiting creating a generation of personnel, that as it nears retirement age will see a rapid exodus of experienced veterans in a short period of time. Such an exodus can have a drastic effect on any service, but the small numbers of the Maritime Squadron likely leaves it bereft of the 'ablative capacity' that a larger service would benefit from. In this sense direct comparison can be drawn to the issues that faced the Irish Naval Service in the 1970s where poor recruitment and retention trends left the service desperately short of experienced personnel during one of its largest transitions.

In summary with regards to asset development, vessel procurement in the period was increased by comparison to the previous period; alongside shore-based infrastructure it reflected a general trend towards professionalising the Squadron. Particularly in vessel procurement the trend seems to have been towards a focus on guaranteeing suitable assets for the mainstay patrol duties of the Squadron. This represents evidence of a settled identity of the Squadron's roles, and coupled with its increasing independence within the A.F.M. this is unsurprising. Personnel development in the period saw the rapid expansion of the service in the first decade of the new millennium. Additionally, it saw increased trends in formalising training practices towards a more recognisable naval standard. Indeed, the increase in international standards applicable to the service placed a demand on this kind of formalisation. It also must be noted that some of the good fortune of the Squadron in this regard, seems to have been due to opportunistic availability of assets. Examples include the availability of appropriate vessels for purchase such as the patrol vessels from Europe and Asia, or in some cases the presence of particularly dynamic foreign defence attachés, as in the example of the various U.S. contributions in the period.[95]

Having completed the comparison of asset development section three of this chapter will turn towards the development of operational behaviour in the

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[94] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 4.
[95] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta, Malta (30 August 2018) p. 2.

period. So far, this chapter has examined the perception of the Maritime Squadron through policy and in terms of its tangible assets. The last area will look at how its operational behaviour has developed across the period. It will examine topics from the Squadron's national responsibilities, to its ongoing international involvement in various security operations at sea.

In the previous case study, it was demonstrated that throughout the period, the Irish Naval Service emphasised the development of a formalised structure for its activities. This was clearly evident in the attempts at codifying its role across the scope of its duties as principle sea going agency of the state, particularly in its formalisation of interactions with other state agencies, such as the police service and customs.

It appears that in this period the Maritime Squadron pursued a broadly similar policy to the Naval Service. Partly this was motivated by an overarching ethos of not duplicating services, owing to limited resource availability across all state actors.[96] Furthermore, and similarly to the Naval Service, the Maritime Squadron has adopted a functional ethos as a service provider in regards to how it conceptualises its role alongside other state agencies.[97] To achieve this conceptual transition to a 'multi-mission agency', the Maritime Squadron has undertaken similar formalisation procedures.[98] For example, in its role as a service provided in aid to the civil power activities such as assisting police and customs officials interdict smuggling operations, it has developed formal Memorandums of Understanding with these actors. Meanwhile with other tasks such as its operation of the coastal radio service, its provision of the state vessel tracking service or its major role in providing search and rescue assets, these roles have been provided for through discreet legislative instruments.[99]

It should be noted that while there are apparent similarities in both services developments in this area, there seems to have been a less formalised focus

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[96] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 7.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid., p. 8.

from the Maltese in this period, and such developments seem more organic in nature. This will become more apparent as this section examines each strand in greater detail. However it does seem that this issue of consolidating the myriad roles that a smaller navy may find itself fulfilling is a particular quirk of smaller navies. This may be a second order effect, stemming from the issue of whether the common status of 'principle sea going agency' of the state, represents a distinct aspect of 'small navies'. Though once more this appears to be issue of 'scale' rather than 'type' as has been highlighted previously. Indeed this seems the product of an overall relative paucity of assets and personnel resources in comparison to the breadth of the duties required.

Given the position of the maritime squadron as primarily a military organisation, it is useful to address the issue of the development of its role in defence. It has become evident from previous sections of this chapter, that development in terms of both policy and assets has been heavily focused on issues other than defence, at least certainly in terms of traditional defence such as securing the territorial assets of Malta from conventional aggression.

From perhaps the most fundamental level the capabilities of the fleet have not expanded beyond offshore patrol type duties. Weapons and other warfare systems have not developed in any significant way towards providing modern deterrents that other small navies, more concerned with maritime defence capabilities have gravitated towards. However it appears that the conception of the Maritime Squadrons contribution to Maltese defence in practice is more esoteric. As has been detailed in earlier sections, the development of the Maritime Squadron particularly in terms of assets has been heavily focused on maritime security capabilities. Whereas their capability to contribute to traditional defensive tasks has not been a priority throughout the period. Again an emphasis on speed, information gathering, and increasingly search and rescue capacity over kinetic warfare capabilities reinforced this.

However it seems that within the period of focus there have been a series of decisions which indicate that the conception of Maltese defence has become

deeply interwoven with the fostering of close working relations with other states in the region. While major developments such as E.U. accession are evident of this development. Indeed it was consciously woven into the decision making processes that lead to increased Maltese participation in regional operations to increase stability and security, throughout the Mediterranean.[100] Returning to the comparative study on the Naval Service in this period, once again certain trends emerge, for example, the redefinition of the wide variety of traditionally security based tasking as contributing towards the national defence.

Additionally, the Maritime Squadron seems to have not been concerned with any issues arising from balancing its status as principle sea going agency of the state, with its military status. In summary, while the topic of defence development in the period contained some of the same characteristics as the other major case study, there does not seem to have been the same issue experienced with the military identity of the Maritime Squadron, conflicting with its other duties conceptually.

Beyond defence, the Maritime Squadron fulfils numerous other roles. In the period of focus, the most prominent is that of border security and its frequent accompaniment, search and rescue at sea. Given the interwoven relation to these activities in the period, they will be dealt with specifically in relation to Malta's ongoing engagements with other regional stakeholders in the latter half of this section.

With regards to the remaining operational duties of the Maritime Squadron in the period this section will examine the roles of smuggling and narcotics interdiction and fisheries protection that the Maritime Squadron fulfilled.

Turning firstly towards fisheries in the period, the published data on fisheries protection does not differentiate it in absolute terms from general patrol activities where cited.[101] Indeed throughout the published military reports in the

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[100] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 4.
[101] Government of Malta, *Annual report of government departments 2006* (Valetta, 2006) p. 59.

period, fisheries protection is documented as a distinct responsibility falling upon the Maritime Squadron. However it is only distinguished as a separate aspect of larger territorial responsibilities from 2012 onwards, with an initial 200 inspections documented for that year.[102] Elsewhere in Strategic fisheries planning in the period, there is little mention of the role of the Maritime Squadron in enforcement duties beyond their nominal role.[103] This is also true at a national, strategic level.[104] However beyond the published doctrine, it has been the case that fisheries protection has increased in relevance in the period. The major factors are principally due to increased expectations placed on Malta, as part of E.U. accession. Again this has been an example of reactive development in light of emergent political necessity, and once more the Maritime Squadron was the only national 'tool' suited to the requirements.[105] The most significant development, beyond the distinction of reporting fisheries protection separately, has been the formalisation of the Maritime Squadron and the Fisheries Control Department's relationship in 2013, with the signing of a formal M.O.U. expanding the activities of the Maritime Squadron in the realm of fisheries protection.[106] This development was in part influenced by the overall push towards increased integration between government departments.[107]

In the period of focus, the evolution of narcotics interdiction operations followed a similar pathway as fisheries protection. Beginning in the first decade of the period, narcotics interdiction was being carried out by the Maritime Squadron with little reference to or conjunction with the national police service

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[102] Office of the Prime Minister of Malta, *Annual report 2012* (Valetta, 2012) p. 2.

[103] Government of Malta, *Malta fisheries operational programme (2007-2013)* (Valetta, 2006) available at Europa.eu, (https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/sites/fisheries/files/docs/body/malta_en.pdf) (20 June 2018) p. 76.

[104] Government of Malta, *Malta's national strategic plan for fisheries 2007-2013*, available at eufunds.gov.mt, (https://eufunds.gov.mt/en/EU%20Funds%20Programmes/Agricultural%20Fisheries%20Fund/Documents/Malta%27s%20national%20strategic%20plan%20for%20fisheries%202007-13.pdf) (20 June 2018) p. 33.

[105] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 2.

[106] Ministry of Home Affairs and Security, *Annual report 2013*, (Valetta, 2013) p. 47.

[107] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 6.

and the customs authority. It should be noted that the Maritime Squadron possessed a level of independent authority in these matters. They had been granted the authority of police and customs officers in 1986.[108] However, despite this the lack of inter-agency co-ordination was perceived as limiting the effectiveness of operations particularly in regards to intelligence sharing and efficacy.[109]

While over the course of the period there has been a greater integration of efforts in this regard with increased cooperation between the various services, there has been no mention of such activities in published reporting on Maritime Squadron operations.[110]This is somewhat notable, as reports from senior serving members of the Maritime Squadron in this period, have highlighted that the domain for smuggling has increased in the period.[111] This can be largely attributed to the general instability in the Southern Mediterranean, as a result of the myriad conflicts emerging from 2010 onwards. While activities continued through the period with regards to smuggling interdiction and the development of assets like the Rapid Deployment teams, it appears that the scale of the migration crisis consumed the vast majority of the attention of the Squadron.[112] This is made more significant as one of the direct impacts of the crisis has been an increase in the level of such activity in the region and also the type of smuggling engaged in.

With the destabilisation of Libya in particular a lucrative opportunity arose for smugglers in the region interested in illegal fuel smuggling.[113] Ultimately it seems that while the development of smuggling interdiction, in the period, seems to have reflected the general trend towards formalisation, it has been eclipsed in the discourse surrounding the security concern posed by other

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[108] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta Malta (30 August 2018).
[109] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 6.
[110] *Malta Independent*, 7 June 2005.
[111] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 12.
[112] *Times of Malta*, 30 May 2008.
[113] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 12.

contemporaneous activities.   Once again this is reflective of the difficulty in matching the breadth of the duties common in small navies.

While the majority of supranational operations carried out in the period of focus centred on the home waters of the Mediterranean, it was during this period that the Maritime Squadron took part in the largest and longest running international deployment of maritime assets by the Maltese. Operation ATALANTA, the U.N. mandated response to piracy off the coast of Somalia was launched in December of 2008. From the outset the Maltese committed personnel to the operation. Initially this took the form of ongoing deployments of commissioned personnel to the Headquarters in Northwood, UK. Building on this beginning in 2009 the Maltese commitment was expanded to include the deployment of personnel from the Vessel Protection Detachment (V.P.D.) of the A.F.M.[114] These forces were comprised of integrated assets from the Maritime Squadron's R.D.T. platoon and elements of the C (special duties) Company of the 1 Regiment A.F.M. These elements were combined to provide the depth of personnel needed to ensure that deployment overseas did not leave the interdiction elements of the Maritime Squadron below the strength necessary to fulfil their territorial duties.[115] The land elements were integrated and received training in maritime operations at naval HQ. prior to deployment alongside ATALANTA. Between 2010 and 2011 two detachments of the V.P.D. were deployed to the region to aid in providing security for vessels in the region.[116] These deployments were also notable as the teams were berthed on Dutch vessels that had been deployed to ATALANTA with the teams integrated into the deployment via an M.O.U. between the two states. Initial attempts had been made to reach an agreement with the Italians to host the personnel, in light of the longstanding interoperability training exercises shared by both states. However this proved

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[114] EUNAVFOR, Malta joins EUNAVFOR in fight against pirates, available at: eunavfor.eu
, (http://eunavfor.eu/malta-joins-eu-navfor-in-fight-against-pirates/) (18 Mar. 2018).
[115] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Wallace Camilleri of Valleta, Malta (6 Oct. 2018).
[116] EUNAVFOR, *Malta's first EU NAVFOR operational mission protects World Food Programme (WFP) ship Mustafa-H*, (http://eunavfor.eu/maltas-first-eu-navfor-operational-mission-protects-world-food-programme-wfp-ship-mustafa-h/) (18 Mar 2018).

unsuccessful.[117] Once again this provides an example of small navies in the region leveraging the relationships and integration of friendly forces as a form of force multiplier.[118] While deployed in the region the teams participated in joint operations with the ongoing mission and served as vessel protection for World Food Program aid vessels in the region[119]. This was also an opportunity to engage in integrated training with their Dutch counterparts to continue strengthening relations between the services and integrated operational capacity.[120]

The successes of the initial operations lead to two further deployments of Special Duty Enhanced Boarding teams in 2013 and 2014 respectively.[121] Once more these operations were carried out working closely alongside Dutch naval forces.[122] What these deployments represent for the maritime squadron is a twofold recognition of the importance of an international outlook for Maltese maritime and security interests. Firstly the operations were carried out in conjunction with other efforts in the region by the A.F.M., alongside partners such as the Irish Defence Forces towards enabling the development of security institutions in the region. This was carried out under the auspices of the European Training Mission (E.U.T.M.) Somalia to promote stability in the region. Stability that would hopefully see the risk to shipping in the area greatly reduced. Additionally, the second strand of Maltese interests stem from their

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[117] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta, Malta (30 August 2018) p. 13.

[118] Government of Malta, *Press release PR2398*, available at www.gov.mt, (https://www.gov.mt/en/Government/Press%20Releases/Pages/2011/December/08/pr2398.aspx)(14 Mar. 2018).

[119] EUNAVFOR, *Malta's first EU NAVFOR operational mission protects World Food Programme (WFP) ship Mustafa-H*, (http://eunavfor.eu/maltas-first-eu-navfor-operational-mission-protects-world-food-programme-wfp-ship-mustafa-h/) (18 Mar 2018).

[120] EUNAVFOR, *Maltese boarding team maintain their skills aboard E.U. Naval Force warship HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën*, available at eunavfor.eu,(http://eunavfor.eu/maltese-boarding-team-maintain-their-skills-aboard-eu-naval-force-warship-hnlms-de-zeven-provincien/) (18 Mar 2018).

[121] Government of Malta, *Press release PR1594*, available at www.gov.mt, (https://www.gov.mt/en/Government/Press%20Releases/Pages/2013/July/24/pr1594.aspx) (14 Mar. 2018).

[122] Government of Malta, *Press release PR141023*, available at www.gov.mt, (https://www.gov.mt/en/Government/Press%20Releases/Pages/2014/May/11/pr141023.aspx) (15 Mar 2018).

involvement with shipping in the region. Given Malta's position as sixth largest flag state in the world, it was of political and economic interest to be seen to be actively guaranteeing the security of the flag, while also working towards reducing risk that might affect shipping entering European waters, via the Suez Canal and towards the Mediterranean.[123]

In a broader sense the Maltese engagement with OP ATALANTA again demonstrated the tendency of small navies to leverage friendly relationships towards achieving increased efficiency and effectiveness. Again, it has been the trend that it allows smaller forces to contribute meaningfully towards 'large navy' taskings, such as long term international deployments. Again, this represents another example of how such navies have tried to overcome 'scale' type problems. Furthermore, it serves as another example of the growing recognition across the region of a more globalised outlook of such services. However, it must also be noted that it was not without its criticism within the Armed Forces, notably as elements within the Maritime Squadron have questioned the practice of only sending land based Intelligence officers as representatives to ATALANTA HQ. at Northwood. This has been interpreted by some commentators as illustrative of a lack of due consideration to the importance of naval command within the greater A.F.M. in the period.[124]

One of the areas of international cooperation that the Maritime Squadron engaged frequently in the period was capacity building exercises. Similar to Malta's tendency to utilise friendly states training initiatives, these exercises were seen as vital to maintaining the standard of the Squadrons operational practices. The first and longest running of these engaged in during the period was the bi-lateral training exercise CANALE, carried out initially between Malta and Italy. These were exercises based around maritime interdiction and SAR operations designed to build and maintain the skills necessary for regional co-

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[123] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 10.
[124] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta, Malta (30 August 2018) p. 13.

operation.[125] Additionally, it alternated each year between the two parties with regards to organisation, ensuring each developed the necessary co-operative planning skills.[126]

CANALE began in 1993 in that format but over the course of the period it was gradually expanded and streamlined alongside the developments relating to the 5+5 initiative. This initiative began similarly in the early 1990s initially as an informal dialogue between:

> ...5 member countries of the North side (Spain, France, Italy, Malta and Portugal) and the five member countries of the recently created Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia), in the South side of the Western Mediterranean area.[127]

However shortly after its initial inception, the sanctions placed on Libya following the U.N. Security Council resolution, in relation the involvement of the Gaddafi regime in the Lockerbie bombing incident, all but suspended the initiative until the sanctions were lifted a decade later.[128] Malta by this period had already engaged in some diplomatic efforts using the Maritime Squadron as a representative entity by this point, such as port visits in 1999. [129] Nevertheless this development was seen by the Maltese as a means of promoting greater security within the region and such capacity building exercises, in addition to other security building efforts continued through the period even following the civil war of 2011.[130]

These regional operations would form the basis of the contemporary Maltese approach to such operations. Specifically, they have been cited as fundamental towards developing the skills necessary for the Maltese contributions to

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[125] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Wallace Camilleri of Valleta, Malta (6 Oct. 2018).

[126] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta, Malta (30 August 2018) p. 13.

[127] Miguel Ángel Romeo Núñez, *5+5 Initiative. Mediterranean Security: Shared Security* (Madrid, 2012), available at ieee.es, (http://www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/docs_marco/2012/DIEEEM07-2012_5x5_SegMed_RomeoNunez_ENGLISH.pdf) (10 Sep. 2018) p. 5.

[128] *Irish Times*, 12 Sep. 2003

[129] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta, Malta (30 August 2018) p. 14.

[130] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 12.

operations such as ATALANTA.[131] Additionally, their role in fostering healthy security environments amongst the nations has been repeatedly cited by Maltese policy in the period.[132]

The issue of mass irregular migration has been the dominant maritime security interest in Western Europe in the past decade. This is especially true since the surges of irregular migration, in the wake of the 'Arab Spring'. However while mass migration became a major public interest across Europe, in the period following the 'Arab Spring' in 2010, the Maritime Squadron considers the issue to have been of major importance for over a decade beforehand. Indeed, from the period of 1998 to 2008, the Maritime Squadron had been dealing with migration of an unprecedented scale; attributed to the turmoil in the region encompassing the horn of Africa.[133] Events such as the breakdown of the Somali state and famines effecting Ethiopia and Eritrea had led to a steady stream of migrants travelling overland to attempt to cross into Europe, from Libya. What separated this initial phase of migration was that firstly it was composed of far smaller vessels, containing thirty to forty migrants at a time.[134] Secondly it followed a seasonal pattern with the majority of the activity concentrated on the summer months leaving the winter season in particular as a 'regeneration' period.[135] In the early part of this period responses were mainly focused above an operational level. This was evidenced earlier by the series of investments made in the Maritime Squadron, these were in addition to its promotion to unit status and also the formalisation of its role in Search and Rescue operations in 2002.[136]

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[131] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta, Malta (30 August 2018) p. 13.

[132] Ministry of Home Affairs and Security, *Annual report 2013* (Valetta, 2013) p. 18.

[133] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 8.

[134] Government of Malta, *Annual report of government departments 2008* (Valetta, 2008) p. 5.

[135] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 8.

[136] Major Etienne Scicluna, *ARMED FORCES OF MALTA: Maritime Search-and-Rescue services*,(Valetta,2014) available at slidshare.net, (https://www.slideshare.net/ivanmconsiglio/armed-forces-of-malta-maritime-searchandrescue-services) (4 May 2018) p. 3.

Within the official publications 2007 seems to represent a major watershed in the escalation of activities surrounding the issue of migration. Having successfully participated in the 2006 Frontex led operations NAUTILUS, INDALO and POSEIDON over the previous two years, the Maltese reaffirmed their commitment towards security in the region. This was manifested through pledging further support towards coalition efforts. Further to this they formalised an M.O.U. with the Libyan authorities on Search and Rescue operations in regional waters[137]. However given the limited duration and scope of these operations their effects have been described as more 'political gesture than an operational capability'.[138] The operations spanned the breadth of the region with INDALO focusing on the Western Mediterranean, led by Spain and Portugal, NAUTILUS focused in the central region, while POSEIDON was a Greek led effort in the Eastern Mediterranean supported by Frontex assets.[139]

For Malta engagement in these operations were once more an opportunity to learn best practices and operational policies from its neighbours, while actively engaged in promoting regional security.[140]

2008 continued the trend in increased migration with an 'unprecedented' 2700 migrants landing on Maltese shores.[141] This escalation was met with increased resources being allocated to integration and security exercises carried out that year, such as PHOENIX EXPRESS, CANALE under the 5+5 initiative, and SQUALO in primary conjunction with Italy. All of these exercises share the commonality of improving security and interdiction capabilities as well as SQUALO and CANALE having a distinct SAR component.[142] Meanwhile engagement in Frontex operations was increased as 2008 saw Malta play host to the ongoing Op.

[137] Government of Malta, *Annual report of government departments 2006* (Valetta, 2006) p. 70.
[138] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 9.
[139] European Commission, *E.U. operations In the Mediterranean Sea* (Brussels, 2016), available at: ec.europa.eu, (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/fact-sheets/docs/20161006/eu_operations_in_the_mediterranean_sea_en.pdf) (14 Sep. 2018).
[140] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta, Malta (30 August 2018) p. 14.
[141] Government of Malta, *AnnualrReport of government departments 2008* (Valetta, 2008) p. 52.
[142] Ibid., p. 53.

NAUTILUS.[143] 2009 was considered a quiet year by comparison in terms of migration however all of the previous year's deployments were revisited as well as PHOENIX EXPRESS and CANALE.[144] The year 2010 was notable as Malta took a step back from its involvement in NAUTILUS, which had been renamed CHRONOS, citing the effectiveness of bilateral Italian-Libyan efforts to decrease migrant vessels, the move also came amid concerns that the operating procedures, derived from new E.U. guidelines, were increasing the rates of migrants arriving in Maltese territory.[145]

With the Libyan Crisis in 2011 this lull came to an abrupt end, with a spike in operations in the region in anticipation of mass exodus.[146] This was in addition to continuing involvement in OP. POSEIDON for its fifth consecutive year. [147] The year 2012 saw Malta take the lead in attempts towards security building with the new Libyan authorities. This produced a series of capacity building exercises and culminated in a joint naval operation.[148] 2013 saw the tempo of SAR activities accelerate once more, and it is also notable the numbers of migrants being encountered per vessel had drastically increased, numbering in the hundreds in some instances[149] Frontex involvement in this year expanded again, with the joint maritime air surveillance operation AENEAS 2013.[150] The next two years saw the largest international responses to the crisis with Operations TRITON in 2014 and EUNAVFORMED Op. SOPHIA in 2015. Both operations contain a fundamental SAR and Border Control Element, but as has been discussed previously, Op. SOPHIA had broadened its remit towards interrupting the model of people smuggling in the region. Notably representatives from the Maritime Squadron were involved in the formulation of the phased approach to

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[143] Niels Frenzen, *Malta says Frontex Chronos mission not needed due to success of Italy-Libya push-back agreement*, (Los Angeles, 2010), available at: migrantsatsea.org, (https://migrantsatsea.org/tag/operation-nautilus/) (10 Sep. 2018).
[144] Government of Malta, *Annual report of government departments 2010* (Valetta, 2010) p. 61.
[145] *Times of Malta*, 4 Feb. 2011.
[146] Government of Malta, *Annual report of government departments 2011* (Valetta, 2011) p. 50.
[147] Ibid., p. 51.
[148] Office of the Prime Minister of Malta, *Annual report 2012* (Valetta, 2012) p. 3.
[149] Ministry of Home Affairs and Security, *Annual report 2013* (Valetta, 2013) p. 17.
[150] Ibid.

Op. SOPHIA and have indicated that, similar to previous operations such as NAUTILUS, it was not structured in a way to achieve effective disruption of the models used by smugglers.[151] This has been related to the issues surrounding the operation of such activities within Libyan territory. These concentrated on the prospect of E.U. force deployment within the sovereign territory and the 'perverse incentive' effect created by effective SAR operations in the region. The assertion was that larger numbers of persons were increasingly likely to risk the journey to Europe in expectation of SAR intervention.[152] Indeed, evidence suggests that the practices of smugglers engaged in these trafficking operations became increasingly more hazardous in regards to the seaworthiness of the vessels employed as SAR coverage and efficiency increased.[153] It has also been asserted that the closer proximity to Libyan waters by operations such as the Frontex led initiatives, and those engaged in by N.G.O.s in the region, in response to the aftermath of significant incidents of drowning off the coast of Lamapadusa in 2013, contributed to these trends.[154] What this changed for the Maritime Squadron in particular was that it increased the rate of actual rescue operations that had to be carried out. Previous policy had been that where vessels were encountered, unless there was an overriding concern for the safety of those on board, they would be issued life jackets and provided an escort towards European territorial waters (usually Italian).[155] With the trend towards decreasingly suitable vessels and greater overcrowding witnessed in the period, this led to far more operationally demanding missions for the Squadron.

In summary the dominant trend in operations development in the period of focus for Malta was that the swell of migration drew the majority of attention. Once again the trend was to leverage the availability of supranational resources to achieve outsized effects towards the maritime goals of Malta.

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[151] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 11.
[152] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta, Malta (30 August 2018) p. 5.
[153] Ibid., p. 6.
[154] Ibid.
[155] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 5.

In conclusion, having addressed the three primary strands of policy, assets and operations development in the period, it is clear across all three that while development has been accelerating throughout the period of focus this has been driven by reactionary behaviours. Across the strands it has been demonstrated repeatedly that emerging security concerns and regional crises have guided development for the Maritime Squadron. Unlike the previous case study, for whom the period was one of deliberate formalisation and gradual expansion, the Maritime Squadron's development has been pushed majorly by the necessities of E.U. accession at first, and secondly by the unprecedented levels of irregular migration in the waters surrounding the southern European border.

Throughout this chapter's examination of policy development, the general pattern that emerged was of the growth of prominence of the Maritime Squadron as a means of achieving state interests. Repeatedly it seems that as issues emerged relating to the maritime domain for the various governments of the period, that the Maritime Squadron was the sole tool available to address them. The ad hoc and unstructured nature of policy development seems to illustrate this. While the development of assets has progressed in the period at a similar rate, the trend has been a series of relatively short-term plans. Again, the impact of exigent circumstances is demonstrated in these developments. Whether it was the expansion of personnel, or the various attempts to expand the fleet capacity, the driving force can generally be located in some imminent concern, be they E.U. obligations or emergent security threats. However, it should be noted that the more recent developments such as the ten year strategic plan seem to indicate a more considered medium term approach though it is unclear if planning will expand beyond its scope. Additionally, internally within the Squadron the evidence illustrates that there were consistent attempts to create prioritisation structures for development, even if harmony of purpose was not achieved with other stakeholders within the Armed Forces or the government. Finally, with regards to operational development, there has been a large push in the period towards the maximisation of efficiency and interoperability, particularly in the international context. In a rather short

period of time the Maltese have demonstrated a strong dedication towards regional and international co-operation, in relation to security in the Mediterranean region. As mentioned previously, this is typical of contemporary 'small navy' theory of achieving outsized effects through co-operation. However, it may also be noted that in some cases, the trade-off is that the partners involved bring with them their own interests and motivations that must be accounted for. These factors can have significant impact on such efforts. More so this is the case where popular international attention is drawn to subjects, such as the example of the migrant crisis in Southern Europe.

Chapter 7:
Secondary case studies:
The Netherlands, Norway, Croatia, and The Baltic States.

So far, this thesis has been concerned primarily with the affairs of the two major case studies. While they have been chosen as they provide a relevant insight into the nature of small navies in Europe, it is also necessary to provide a broader insight into the development of other regional navies. This research has been carried out in light of the discourse around the nature of the term 'small' in relation to navies, including the exploration of to what extent it is useful as a collective term. As the previous chapters have demonstrated, sufficient depth of examination of individual organisations highlights that the term is rather unsuitable beyond the coarsest resolution of size. This is the case as the context each navy exists within is as important to understanding it as any descriptive term. In essence the finding so far has been that 'small navies' as a collective term beyond material concerns such as personnel numbers or disposition of assets is unreliable.

This chapter will serve to broaden the sample group. While it has been demonstrated that two 'small navies' can be quite unique, can the term be shown to have a more general meaning, or usefulness, stretched over a broader range of organisations? This chapter will examine the various uses that each of these 'small' navies have demonstrated in their national and international context. The other primary research interest has been the impact of international factors on the development of small navies particularly the roles of larger transnational organisations and coalitions and other navies in shaping the development of small navies in Western Europe. The current and historical

challenges faced by each organisation will also be analysed. Again, to determine whether the term 'small navy' carries utility outside of strictly comparative use.

This chapter will refer to four secondary studies that fit the description of small Western European navies. Namely the Royal Netherlands Navy, the Royal Norwegian Navy, the Croatian Navy and uniquely the navies of the states that made up the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON): Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Each of these represents a distinct organisation broadly with the concept of 'small navy'.

The Royal Netherlands' Navy is a small navy that has one of the longest pedigrees of any naval force in Europe. It presently operates as a member of NATO in a wide variety of roles. The Royal Norwegian Navy is a force that has developed directly in response to the East-West divide that emerged during the Cold War. It too operates within NATO and the period of focus represents a time of great change and redefinition for the organisation. The Croatian Navy is an interesting example of a naval force that was established in the period as a result of the collapse of the U.S.S.R. It was also established in a period of great regional conflict and is unique as it represents a small European Navy with quite recent traditional conflict experience. The Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian Navies combined are northern European navies that have, similarly emerged in the aftermath of the Soviet dissolution. They will be examined under the auspices of the BALTRON organisation. This is interesting as it represents a devolved naval organisation composed entirely of small navies, who also find themselves situated adjacent to a large and antagonistic power.

As these examples will be secondary case studies, the aim of this chapter will be to examine them at a fundamental level, to provide a general appreciation for their attributes and qualities. They represent an acid test of general theories surrounding small navies. This chapter will examine each firstly in terms of its general history. Next each navy's composition will be examined. This will be done in conjunction with an overview of each navy's operational development

and finally with their engagement in international activities and the supranational bodies they have worked within and alongside.

By the end of this chapter, it will be possible to firstly juxtapose the major case studies against allegedly similar organisations, secondly to assess whether the grouping of 'small navies' retains utility in the given contexts, and thirdly to gain an understanding of the diverse nature of European naval traditions and organisations.

The Royal Netherlands Navy (R.Nd.N.) has one of the longest histories of any naval service in the world today. The organisation itself traces its origins a 'statute of admiralty' that was issued by Maximilian I on 8 Jan. 1488.[1] At its peak in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it was the largest naval force in the world, and its five admiralties oversaw naval operations that spanned the globe. However, entering the modern period, the R.Nd.N. experienced a protracted decline in power. The defeat in the fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-84) and the peace treaty of Paris that followed saw the Navy's power neutered substantially. For the next century the R.Nd.N. did make several attempts at modernisation in line with other European powers. The 1860s saw the construction of ironclad warships, such as the *Prins Hendrik der Nederlanden* and *Koning der Nederlanden.* Later, in the 1890s, a series of protected cruisers and coastal defence vessels were constructed. By 1910 the first submarines had been commissioned.[2]

However at the outbreak of the First World War the R.Nd.N. found itself unprepared for the requirements of the conflict. This was a product of unfortunate timing as plans to expand the fleet, to include a contingent of battleships, had been a contentious point of debate between the Dutch military and the government. In 1913, a royal commission, formed to investigate the needs of the Dutch East Indies, had recommended such a purchase. However

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[1] The Royal Netherlands Navy, *History* (The Netherlands, 2016) available at Defensie.nl, (https://www.defensie.nl/organisatie/marine/inhoud/geschiedenis) (6 June 2016).
[2] Paul E. Fontenoy, *Submarines* (California, 2007) p. 158.

ensuing debate saw the introduction of a bill for the purchase of the vessels delayed until August 1914, the outbreak of hostilities the following month saw the bill promptly withdrawn.[3] Due to Dutch neutrality the R.Nd.N. was largely inactive during the war. During the interwar period there was very little development of the navy with plans to purchase battle cruisers scrapped before the outbreak of the Second World War. With the subsequent occupation of the Netherlands, by Nazi Germany in May of 1940, the R.Nd.N. was forced to relocate its base of operations to London. Secondary headquarters were also established in Ceylon and Australia. The Dutch naval campaign was marked with heavy losses particularly in the Asian theatre. The vast majority of these casualties came from the disastrous defeat at the Battle of the Java Sea in February 1942.[4] However it should be noted that the submarine campaign in the Asian theatre achieved some notable successes. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the R.Nd.N. was in a very precarious position. Years of neglect and the rigours of the largest conflict in human history had left the Navy devastated, and lagging behind its peers. However it would still take nearly another decade for the reconstruction and modernisation of the R.Ned.N. to begin in earnest. Immediately following the end of hostilities in the pacific, the remains of the Navy were confronted with the task of attempting to reassert Dutch control over the newly declared Republic of Indonesia. The armed campaign that followed persisted until 1949, when the Netherlands formally recognised the newfound state.[5]

1949 also represents a key moment in the development of the modern Dutch Navy. The formation of NATO under the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 would have the greatest impact on the character of Dutch naval affairs of any event, in the twentieth century. Indeed, the development of the R.Ned.N., both in terms of composition and doctrine, has been predicated on NATO

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[3] Kees, van Dijk, The Netherlands Indies and the Great War, 1914-1918 (Leiden, 2007) p. 123.
[4] Vincent P. O'Hara, *Battle of the Java Sea: 27 February 1942* (Annapolis, 1997) available at microworks.net (http://www.microworks.net/pacific/battles/java_sea.htm) (10 Jun. 2017)
[5] Alaistair, Taylor, Indonesian independence and the United Nations (New York, 1960) p. 186.

development. Initially, within NATO, there was not a large emphasis on naval development, as Soviet doctrine had predominantly been land and air based. Therefore NATO development was generally focused elsewhere than the sea. However, the Dutch involvement in the Korean War, lead to the expansion of the fleet. By the end of the 1950s the fleet consisted of the carrier HNLMS *Karel Doorman* (R81), four *Dolfijn*-class submarines four Holland-class destroyers, two *De Zeven Provinciën*-class cruisers, six *Van Speijk*-class frigates, eight Friesland-class destroyers, and a number of minesweepers. This new force was designed to be flexible to the needs of countering the potential myriad obstacles facing the R.Nd.N. It is also notable that despite the relatively small scale of the force it was still organised along the lines of a 'balanced fleet' similar to larger standing navies. Military developments intensified with the creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955. The 1960s saw a shift in Soviet doctrine to include a greater focus on naval force projection, particularly in relation to submarine warfare and the potential for naval assets to deploy nuclear assets.[6] The waters of the North Atlantic gained a renewed importance in the Cold War as a result. Leading on from this development, in 1965 the R.Nd.N. became a member of the NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic. This was NATO's primary asset tasked with maintaining an ongoing presence in the region. Later in 1973, they joined what would become the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1. The primary goal of both was to ensure the safety of passage, for all allies in the waters of North West Europe.

With the thawing of relations throughout the later part of the twentieth century between East and West, and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Bloc in 1989, NATO underwent dramatic changes to meet the new global situation. The shift in focus from traditional détente standing, to a more active role in the dynamic activities of peace support operations was mirrored by the R.Nd.N. This is reflected in R.Nd.N. doctrine currently, as the support of international law and the aid of humanitarian efforts are given equal prominence to its role in the

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[6] Warren, Magnusson, *Soviet oceans development* (Washington, 1976) p. 7.

defence of Dutch interests.[7] Reflecting this and the general shift in global defence matters towards non-traditional military deployments, since 1990 the R.Nd.N. has been involved in the support of Peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lebanon and the Yugoslavian conflicts.

The contemporary composition of the R.Nd.N. offers an insight into the nature of the organisation. The Dutch fleet was built around a concept of flexibility of tasking and this is heavily apparent in the composition of the fleet itself. The largest vessels in service currently are the two *Karel Doorman* class frigates. The *K.D.* class frigates were constructed in the early 1990s as a multipurpose patrol craft that could deal with air, sea and submarine threats.[8] While eight were originally constructed six have been disposed of through sales to other navies but those that remain have undergone refitting and modernisation programmes throughout their life cycle (carried out alongside their Belgian allies).[9] Alongside the *K.D.* class of frigates are the more recent *De Zeven Provinciën* class frigates. These were constructed as primarily air defence and command vessels with some anti-submarine capabilities. Subsequently, this was expanded to include ballistic missile defence with an ongoing capacity upgrade program.[10] Interestingly, the capabilities of these craft would classify them as destroyers in most other naval forces. *D.Z.P.* class vessels were also notable, by the quality of their electronic warfare suites and sensor arrays. As part of the tests in relation to the ongoing upgrades, their ability to integrate with other NATO vessels information networks was demonstrated.

The final element of the main surface patrol fleet were the four *Holland* class offshore patrol vessels. These were constructed between 2008 and 2011 and are

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[7] The Royal Netherlands Navy, *History* (The Netherlands, 2016) available at Defensie.nl, (https://www.defensie.nl/organisatie/marine/inhoud/geschiedenis) (6 June 2016).
[8] R. Gardiner. All the worlds warships 1947-82. Pt 1. Western Powers (London, 1983) p. 87.
[9] Naval Today.com, *Belgian frigate BNS Louise Marie completes two year modernization program*, available at navaltoday.com, (http://navaltoday.com/2016/04/21/belgian-frigate-bns-louise-marie-completes-two-year-modernization-program/) (12 Dec. 2016).
[10] Nicholas Fiorenza, SMART-L for smart defense? (Washington D.C., 2012), available at aviation week network, (http://aviationweek.com/blog/smart-l-smart-defense) (5 June 2016).

designed to provide air and surface surveillance while also being capable of pursuing light surface targets, such as smugglers and pirates. Alongside the surface craft are the *Walrus* class submarines. Initially constructed during the Cold War due to the high demand for submarines within NATO. The *Walrus* class submarines have been a mainstay of the modern R.Nd.N. In recent years they have found a home in the post-Cold War period as a means of intelligence gathering. In recognition of their continuing utility, they have undergone modernisation upgrades since 2007 and in 2014 the Dutch government announced that they will be replaced by 2025, thus confirming the commitment to maintain submarine capacity within the organisation.[11]

All of the above vessels are supported by two *Rotterdam* class amphibious transport docks and the recently commissioned *Karel Doorman* Joint Support ship. The amphibious vessels also factor into an important role with regards to sea-based land operations as will be discussed later.   The R.Nd.N. also maintained an active mine sweeping service with six Tripartite class mine hunters currently operational in the fleet. Throughout the Dutch fleet it is clear that an emphasis has been placed on versatility and advanced detection and command assets to ensure not only a standalone capability but that alongside first tier navies in NATO the R.Nd.N. is capable of integration. There has also been a noticeable shift towards softer power projection assets with the increased emphasis on amphibious assets and the reduction of the larger traditional defence platforms.

Looking at raw spending while there was a general upward trend in defence allocation in the Netherlands during the period, in terms of simple expenditure, for example between 2002 and 2009 the budget for the armed forces rose from 6.7 billion US Dollars to 12.1 billion at its peak, the overall proportion of military

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[11] Richard, Tomkins *Swedes, Dutch partner for future submarine work* (Washington D.C., 2015), available at UPI.com, (http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2015/01/20/Swedes-Dutch-partner-for-future-submarine-work/2621421769173/) (2 June 2016).

spending by the Netherlands government has not fluctuated greatly. These figures represent 1.6 percent and 1.5 percent of G.D.P. respectively.[12]

What the contemporary make-up illustrates is that the R.Nd.N. fleet has placed an emphasis on flexibility in its vessels capabilities and also on maintaining pace with its NATO allies in terms of integrated communications. While this is not entirely dissimilar from previous examples of 'small navies', the R.Nd.N. seems to have also maintained a greater emphasis on traditional defensive capabilities. This has been particularly true in the context of international joint forces such as NATO.

When evaluating the general outlook of the R.Nd.N. it is useful to highlight the role of its doctrine. In the period there were two major sources of relevant doctrine published in relation to the R.Nd.N. The first was the over-arching Netherlands Defence Doctrine of 2013 which broadly outlined the goals of the Ministry of Defence in relation to developing the armed forces of the Netherlands. The second was the 'Netherlands Maritime Military Doctrine' that specifically deals with the maritime elements of defence.

The R.Nd.N. and the Ministry of Defence stressed the importance of such joint doctrine across the armed forces in order to provide unity of purpose amongst the various organisations.[13] Of note also, was that within the context of its military doctrine, there has been a direct acknowledgment by the Ministry of Defence that NATO doctrine and theory underpins much of the Netherlands doctrine. The distinction is made however, that whereas NATO doctrine represents the consensus of the members of the organisation, the Netherlands

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[12] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 2006, Europe* (London, 2006), available at: tandfonline.com ,
(http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597220600782820) (6 Dec 2016) p. 43.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 2011, Europe* (London, 2011), available at: tandfonline.com ,
(http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597222.2011.559835) (6 Dec 2016) p. 59.
[13] Ministry of Defence, *Defence Doctrine* (Amsterdam, 2016), available at defensie.nl,
(https://www.defensie.nl) (7June 2016).

doctrine is a reflection of the specific needs of and tasks faced by the Netherlands independently of its NATO involvement.[14]

Throughout both sets of doctrine there has been an, expected, emphasis on the importance of doctrine being recognised as a set of guiding principles to inform the practices of commanders. Thus it was asserted that it should not be taken as dogmatic in light of the often mercurial nature of military operations. This was classically NATO in tone. While this could be considered unremarkable as it hardly strayed from expected norms, in this context it was indicative of a 'small navy' framing its doctrine in a similar manner to that of larger navies.

Furthermore in the naval context one of the key advantages of naval assets espoused was that they possess versatility of function. This versatility was also claimed to be as much a result of the crews themselves as it was the vessels.[15] A notable example of the acknowledgement of the versatility of naval assets at a doctrinal level can be seen in the R.Nd.N.'s outlook on amphibious operations. These were initially categorised along traditional military lines into sub groups such as: assaults, the establishment of a land presence, withdrawals, the removal of personnel and equipment to naval vessels, raids, the deployment of short-term physical presences and demonstrations, and the use of such assets to feint an opponent's defences. But it was also immediately revealed that a number of support operations can be considered, planned, and executed, in a very similar fashion. These include amphibious actions against a base of operations for illicit trafficking, and operations to evacuate civilians, or to provide humanitarian assistance, or disaster relief on land.[16]

Another area of importance for Dutch doctrine was that interoperability, at an international level, has been described as 'NATOs silent power'. This was reflected in endeavours such as the previously mentioned joint modernisation

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[14] Ministry of Defence, *Netherlands defence doctrine* (Amsterdam 2013), p.13
[15] Ministry of Defence, *Fundamentals of maritime operations Netherlands maritime military doctrine* (Amsterdam, 2015), p. 92.
[16] Ibid., p. 330.

programmes run with the Belgian Navy. [17] As has been demonstrated previously by the composition of the R.Nd.N. it has emerged as a small navy influenced by an understanding of the importance of an international outlook. Specifically, that it has identified a space for itself on the world stage as part of collective efforts to ensure global peace and stability.

As has been mentioned previously due to its involvement in international organisations such as NATO, the R.Nd.N. has engaged in several international operations of note. For the purposes of this secondary study five distinct operations will be examined. The first of these was the ongoing United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force (U.K./N.L. A.F.). Founded in 1972 as a joint venture between the marine forces of both countries, the U.K./N.L. A.F. has served as a successful example of the benefits in terms of training, and development, that interoperability can provide. In the Dutch context in particular the opportunity to benefit from operations alongside larger partners in the NATO context provides a decided benefit for its amphibious forces. Notably in 2010 the U.K./N.L. A.F. formed the core for the E.U. led U.K./N.L. Battle Group, marking its transition to a trans organisational as well as international joint military venture. As a point of note, the success of U.K./N.L. E.U.B.G. was attributed in part to the history of co-operation fostered by U.K./N.L. A.F.[18] Recently, in 2016 the Dutch have also entered into a significant cooperative alliance with the German Navy to share the use of the *KD* joint support ship, as well as integrating the 800 strong Sea Battalion of the German Navy into the R.NL.N.[19] This joint venture was seen as a means of overcoming operational shortcomings by both parties as the Dutch were experiencing crewing issues relating to the new vessel and the Germans their lack of

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[17] Ministry of Defence, *Fundamentals of maritime operations Netherlands maritime military doctrine* (Amsterdam, 2015), p. 77.

[18] Ministry of Defence, *Netherlands ready for rapid deployment*, available at defensive.nl, (https://www.defensie.nl/actueel/nieuws/2009/12/03/nederland-paraat-voor-snelle-inzet) (13 Dec 2016).

[19] Lars Hoffman, *German Armed Forces to integrate sea battalion into Dutch Navy* (Washington D.C., 2016) available at defensenews.com, (https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2016/02/05/german-armed-forces-to-integrate-sea-battalion-into-dutch-navy/) (15 Sept. 2018).

significant amphibious capabilities.[20] This venture serves as a particularly committed example of the style of combined integrated practices that other small navies have engaged in to overcome such difficulties of scale.

The third operation of note was Operation Sharp Guard.[21] This was a naval blockade of the former Yugoslavia conducted by NATO forces between June 1993 and Oct. 1996. It replaced the previous NATO and E.U. operations: Maritime Guard, and Sharp Fence, seeking to place the efforts to restrict the importation of arms to the Balkan region. As part of their commitment to Standing Naval Force Atlantic and Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, the R.Nd.N. committed several vessels to the operation. In total over 73,000 vessels were challenged by Sharp Guard, and over a dozen were found to be in the process of smuggling arms into the conflict zone.[22] The R.Nd.N. commitment was, by all accounts, capable of sustaining the campaign alongside its larger NATO allies. There was however, an interesting event of note, which demonstrates one of the difficulties of coalition operations. During the challenging of the Maltese tanker *Lido II*, a responding U.S. cruiser was given authorisation to use 'disabling fire' by the British NATO commander, and in turn relayed the order to the Dutch Frigate *Van Kinsberger*. This highlighted the issue, that under the common U.S. understanding of the term 'disabling fire' referred to fire directed to the engineering section of the vessel whereas the Dutch understanding was that it meant to target the bridge of the vessel.[23] While no shots were fired in the end, this incident served to highlight some of the issues that can arise in coalition operations.

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[20] Lars Hoffman, *German Armed Forces to integrate sea battalion into Dutch Navy* (Washington D.C., 2016) available at defensenews.com, (https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2016/02/05/german-armed-forces-to-integrate-sea-battalion-into-dutch-navy/) (15 Sept. 2018).
[21] Jacob Borresen, 'Coastal power: the sea power of the coastal state and the management of maritime resources' in Rolf Hobson & Tom Kristiansen (eds), *Navies in Northern Waters*, (London, 2004), pp 249-275 at p. 273.
[22] *The Independent,* 19 June 1996.
[23] Stacy Poe, *Rules of engagement: complexities of coalition interaction in military operations Other Than War,* (Newport, 1995) available at dtic.mil, (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA293881) (18 June 2016).

Later in the 1990s came the Dutch involvement in Operation Allied Force/Allied Harvest. This was the title given to the NATO campaign in response to the outbreak of conflict, following the failure of the Kosovo verification mission. Here once again, Dutch naval assets assisted in patrolling the waters around the conflict zone and verifying the contents of vessels in the region. In addition submarine elements monitored the activities of the Yugoslav Navy while minesweeping elements ensured that NATO munitions discarded over the sea were rendered safe.[24] As with previous operations, Dutch naval assets settled into increasingly familiar roles of intelligence gathering, and vital support tasking.

The final operation of particular note is that the Dutch have been heavily involved with operation ATALANTA, since 2010. In the period leading up to the present day, they have provided a total of eight vessels to the operation, as well as several support staff, notably a Force Commander E.U. Naval Force, René Luyckx. While ATALANTA has many parallel goals, including safeguarding shipping in the region, the Netherlands has chosen to base the rationale of its involvement firmly in its commitment to aid in the realm of humanitarian efforts in Somalia.[25] As highlighted in the previous chapter, the R.Nd.N. have also used the opportunity of ATALANTA to engage in integrated operations and training with elements of the Maltese Maritime Squadron, by hosting their boarding teams on Dutch naval vessels in theatre. In summary the operations highlighted here demonstrate that the R.Nd.N. is demonstrating a willingness to participate in globally important operations that have had wide scale effects on the world stage.

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[24] Ministry of Defence, *Operation Allied Force* (Amsterdam, 2009), available at defensive.nl, (https://www.google.ie/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&ved=0ahUKEwj21ojJ8tX OAhVoJsAKHSPiAj4QFgg6MAM&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.defensie.nl%2Fbinaries%2Fdefence %2Fdocuments%2Freports%2F2009%2F05%2F01%2Foperation-allied-force%2Foperation-allied-force.pdf&usg=AFQjCNEMP6BPw04OpMbCtyKbS3BZkGU8gg&sig2=cQKxYjWUm9tP70MG1BkuY A&bvm=bv.129759880,d.ZGg&cad=rja) (9 June 2016).

[25] Government of the Netherlands, *The Netherlands to take part in two anti-piracy operations near Somalia* (Amsterdam 2010) available at government.nl (https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2010/04/23/the-netherlands-to-take-part-in-two-anti-piracy-operations-near-somalia) (11 June 2017).

Moving further North in Europe, the Royal Norwegian Navy (R.N.N.) offers an interesting case study. It is one of a navy that went from being on the frontlines of the greatest military build-up in the history of humanity, to having to completely re-orient its nature, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the eventual resurgence of a newly bellicose Russia in more recent years.

Historically speaking the naval tradition of Norway was tied to that of its neighbours Denmark and Sweden. From 1509 to 1814 the history of the R.N.N. was directly tied to the Danish navy as under the union of both states they were a consolidated organisation. The emergence of the modern R.N.N. came with its establishment in 1814, the same year as the union with Sweden. Throughout the union the R.N.N. would maintain its independence. By the turn of the 20th century and the end of the union in 1905, the R.N.N. was essentially a small coastal defence force. Its fleet comprised of two coastal defence vessels and 28 smaller, unarmoured gunboats, with a detachment of motor torpedo boats for support.[26]

Throughout the First World War, Norway like many smaller states would remain neutral. The R.N.N. was mostly therefore concerned with patrol duties, to satisfy the necessities of neutrality. Like many other nations, Norway's merchant fleet suffered under the German U-boat campaigns in the North Sea throughout the war. Despite this, there seem to have been no concerted efforts to modernise the navy during the interwar period. This accounts for the relative ease the German Kriegsmarine had in its campaign to invade Norway in 1940. However it is of note that there was one notable success for the R.N.N. during the German assault. The sinking of the *Blücher* a German heavy cruiser by a combination of land assets from the nearby Oscarsborg fortress significantly delayed the German advance which assisted in evacuation efforts in Oslo.[27]

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[26]J.S., Keltie*, The stateman's year book: statistical and historical annual of the states of the world for the year 1900* (New York, 1900.) p. 1066.
[27] Gordon Williamson, *German heavy cruisers 1939–1945* (Oxford, 2003) p. 33.

With the invasion of Norway, the R.N.N. was forced to relocate to the UK, and operated from there until the end of the War. Following the defeat of Nazi Germany, and the restoration of the Norwegian government, Norwegian defence policy underwent a dramatic change. The experience of World War II had demonstrated that neutrality by declaration was not a certainty. As a result of this a period of unprecedented military expansion was undertaken. NATO access in 1949 brought with it access to a great deal of funding. By 1953 military spending had increased to 30 percent of the state budget.[28] While these funds would decrease over time it was in this period that the R.N.N. was restructured and modernised into a capable force designed around the concept of sea denial in coastal waters. This would characterise the R.N.N. until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Which it will be illustrated created a space for a dramatic overhaul of defence policy for the R.N.N.

For the R.N.N., the period of focus was certainly one of transformation. This can clearly be witnessed in the evolution of its composition. The period has seen a near complete overhaul of the fleet as it currently stands. In relation to its surface vessels the centrepiece of the fleet are the *Fridtjof Nansen*-class frigates, five of which entered service between 2006 and 2011. The *F.N.* class frigates were envisioned to replace the aging *Oslo* class frigates. The *F.N.* class were primarily designed around anti-submarine warfare, in keeping with the traditional sea denial outlook of the R.N.N., however they were augmented with both anti-air and anti-ship based capabilities. The class can therefore operate as a flexible multi role asset. The vessels while comparable to destroyers in other navies were also heavily automated to allow them to operate with a minimal crew complement.[29] Efficiency and flexibility were of paramount importance

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[28] The Norwegian Armed Forces, *History* (Oslo, 2016), available at forsvaret.no, (https://forsvaret.no/en/) (16 June 2016)
[29] Michael Fabey, U.S. studies Norwegians for manning mindset, (Washington D.C. 2014, available at aviationweek.com, (http://aviationweek.com/awin-only/us-studies-norwegians-manning-mindset) (19 June 2016)

during design. The vessels underwent a further augmentation beginning in 2015 to integrate ship borne helicopter support.[30]

In addition to the *F.N.* class of Frigates are the *Skjold* class corvettes. These ultrafast stealth missile craft were originally conceived as Motor Torpedo Boats, but due to their sea worthiness, and lack of torpedoes they were subsequently reclassified. The first vessel the eponymous KNM *Skjold* was commissioned in 1999, with its five sister ships coming nearly a decade later in 2010-2012. The *Skjold* class vessels while primarily tasked with patrol duties are notably traditional in terms of their mindset of fast attack vessels, designed for coastal operations.

Of the surface vessels currently in service with the R.N.N. the *Oksøy* and *Alta* class minehunters/sweepers are the oldest vessels. Commissioned between 1994 and 1997, three of each vessel remain in active service. RNM *Orkla* was destroyed by a fire in 2002 and *Giomma* and *Oksøy* have been decommissioned. The vessels were nearly identical in design and operate in tandem to detect and clear mines respectively. At any given time at least one of these vessels has been assigned to NATOs standing mine clearing force. Owing to a long history of expertise, the maintenance of a counter mine element of the R.N.N. is understandable. Interestingly however the task of mine laying has been absent since 2003 with the sale of the *Vidar* class minelayers to the Latvian and Lithuanian navies.

The currently longest serving vessels in the R.N.N. are the *Ula* class of submarines. These were purchased between 1989 and 1991 in an attempt to modernise the submarine fleet.[31]They were designed around maximising manoeuvrability and difficulty to detect. In keeping with traditional thinking, the presence of a rapidly deployable submarine threat has been of great use in attempting to deny use of the sea to an enemy. Throughout their life cycle there

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[30] Royal Norwegian Navy, *Fridtjof Nansen-class* (Oslo 2016) available at:forsvaret.no, (https://forsvaret.no/en/facts/equipment/fridt jof-nansen-class) (18 June 2016).
[31] Robert Gardiner, Stephen Chumbley, Przemysław Budzbon, (eds) *Conway's All the world's s fighting ships 1947-1995* (Annapolis, 1995) p. 292.

have been several improvements made to the *Ula* class to maintain their relevance. With the announcement of plans to replace the class with a new generation of submarines, commencing in 2020, the R.N.N. has demonstrated a commitment to maintaining a modern submarine fleet.[32]

What can be determined from an analysis of the current R.N.N. fleet is that firstly, the R.N.N. is committed to maintaining a modern active fleet, and secondly, that while a traditional orientation of coastal defence is still evident in the design of much of the fleet flexibility of role is increasingly becoming a focus across the board. Examining defence spending in the Norwegian context in raw figures, it has generally increased since the millennium. However recent trends in increased raw spending have not kept pace with overall G.D.P., as towards the end of the period, it has remained at approximately 1.4 percent.[33] This is a lower proportion of G.D.P. than a decade earlier, when it sat at closer to two percent on average.[34]

With the information gleaned from the current state of the R.N.N. fleet, it is now appropriate to examine the doctrinal developments within the R.N.N. Throughout the modern history of the R.N.N., and the broader history of the Norwegian armed forces, the key components of doctrine have generally remained steadfast. In the rebuilding efforts following the liberation of Norway following the Second World War, Norway found itself on the frontlines of the new Cold War between East and West. As a result, the Norwegian outlook on

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[32] Ministry of Defence, *Request for Information (RFI) regarding submarine capability beyond 2020 has been forwarded to shipyards* (Oslo, 2012), available at www.regjeringen.no, (https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/request-for-information-rfi-regarding-su/id700164/) (19 June 2016).
[33] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 2015, Europe* (London, 2015), available at: tandfonline.com , (http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597222.2015.996348) (6 Dec 2016) p.66
[34] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 2006, Europe*, (London 2006), available at: tandfonline.com , (http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597220600782820) (6 Dec 2016) p 45.

defence since the Second World War has heavily emphasised a defensive stance. This came to be enshrined in the concept of 'Holding Time'. [35]

'Holding Time's core strategy was that Norwegian assets would be suited to delay any form of Soviet aggression long enough for its larger NATO allies to arrive in theatre to repel the threat. 'Holding Time' was designed to ensure that certain key strategic locations were maintained for relief forces to exploit. In a maritime sense, as has been mentioned, the R.N.N. was structured around sea denial to fit this doctrine, with combined sea and land assets working in tandem to achieve this goal. What is perhaps most interesting about Norwegian doctrine in this period is that it was nearly entirely tacit. In lieu of any formalised policy it was communicated directly through training practices and command structure, it was in a sense organically woven through the Armed Forces.[36]

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, this established 'defence invasion' mindset was viewed as no longer relevant to the situation Norway found itself in. Much like the rest of NATO Norway spent much of the 1990s deciding what form it would take to meet the now changed world. This led to the publication of the original Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine (N.J.O.D.) in 2000. In the N.J.O.D. 2000, manoeuvre theory was chosen as the replacement to 'Holding Time'.[37] This was in recognition of the changing nature and more expeditionary approach of NATO in the period. Following the experience of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan and Iraq during the War on terror, a revised N.J.O.D. was published in 2007. N.J.O.D. 2007 added effects-based operations and a network centric approach to warfare.[38] These were directly derived from contemporary U.S. concepts developed from the early experiences of Iraq and

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[35] Thomas Slensvik & Palle Ydstebø ,'The Norwegian joint operational doctrine as a case: heritage, content, process', in Journal of Strategic Studies, xxxix (2016), ii pp 297-314, at p. 299.
[36] Gullow Gjeseth, *Landforsvarets krigsplaner under den kalde krigen* [The war plans of the land forces during the Cold War] (Bergen, 2011) p. 296.
[37] The Defence Staff, Norwegian Armed Forces joint operational doctrine (Oslo, 2000), p 17.
[38] The Defence Staff, Norwegian Armed Forces joint operational doctrine (Oslo, 2007), p 68.

Afghanistan.[39] It is also of note that in the maritime domain traditional defensive operations were still stressed as a primary role of tasking for the R.N.N. and that an integrated approach to coastal defence was promoted in line with traditional thinking.[40]

Three years later in 2010 the process of revising Norwegian doctrine began again as a result of a workshop held in the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College.[41] This was also predicated by a noticeable shift in policy away from expeditionary activities and back towards classic NATO policies of territorial defence.[42] The culmination of this has been the N.J.O.D. 2014. With N.J.O.D. 2014 the Norwegian forces have re-focused their attention on the traditional territorial defence objectives. Gone was the larger emphasis placed on counter insurgency preparedness from 2007, and in its place was a renewed focus on operational level defence planning through joint operations in the domestic environment[43]. It seems that doctrine has come back to a familiar focus in the Norwegian context. One of the key factors attributed to this 'return to defence' has been the increase in focus on the Nordic region, particularly as a result of developments, both political and military, within Russia in the last decade. This is tied in with recognition that the 'High North' has become an area of renewed strategic interest, which goes back almost a decade in Norwegian defence concepts.[44] Even more recently in support of these trends, there have been calls from commentators for a renewed NATO interested in the North Atlantic to

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[39] Torgeir E. Sæverås, 'Effects-based operations: origins, implementation in US military doctrine, and practical usage', in Karl Erik Haug and Ole Jørgen Maaø (eds), *conceptualising modern wa*r (London, 2011), pp 185-205, at p. 190.

[40] The Defence Staff, Norwegian Armed Forces joint operational doctrine (Oslo, 2007) p. 113.

[41] Thomas Slensvik & Palle Ydstebø ,'The Norwegian joint operational doctrine as a case: heritage, content, process', in *Journal of Strategic Studies*, xxxix (2016), ii, pp 297-314, at p. 300.

[42] Thomas Slensvik & Palle Ydstebø ,'The Norwegian joint operational doctrine as a case: heritage, content, process', in *Journal of Strategic Studies*, xxxix (2016), ii, p. 300.

[43] Ibid., p. 301.

[44] Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Capable force, strategic concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces* (Oslo, 2009) p. 38; Rolf Tamnes, 'The significance of the North Atlantic and the Norwegian contribution', in John Andreas Olson (ed.), *NATO and the North Atlantic: revitalising collective defence*, pp 8-31.

account for the resurgence of Russian activity in the region.[45] Again the format of these recommendations is a return to ensuring that NATO strategy, maritime capabilities and command structures are updated to reflect the changing environment in the region. This it is argued, should not simply be a return to the Cold War strategies but one that would create an integrated response, to ensure that 'maritime partnerships' in the region are prepared to respond to the potential of emergent threats, most notably hybrid warfare combining traditional blue water threats but also the 'low-end threats' typified by attacks on strategic infrastructure, such as communications assets located at or under the sea.[46]

Turning to the international contribution of the Norwegian Navy, it is immediately apparent that it shares many commonalities with other organisations examined thus far. Somewhat predictably the history of international operations for the R.N.N. has been dominated by its important strategic role in defending NATOs northern flank. Throughout the 20th century a number of highly important strategic training scenarios were carried out with a focus on Norway by NATO forces. Notable examples include 'Fallex/Strikeback 1957' and 'Strong Express 1972'. It should be noted that owing to the nature of the 'Cold War' these exercises often served a strategic purpose beyond their training characteristics. They were often as much about cementing deterrence, by demonstrating to the attentive Soviet observers, the organisational capacity and capabilities of NATO.[47] Furthermore these operations were also designed around reassuring ally nations that NATO was capable of fulfilling its promises on defence.

With the change in NATO policies in the 1990s the R.N.N. began to become more involved in active operations globally. Many of these have naturally been

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[45] Rolf Tamnes, 'The significance of the North Atlantic and the Norwegian contribution', in John Andreas Olson (ed.), *NATO and the North Atlantic: revitalising collective defence*, pp 8-31 at p. 8.
[46] John Andreas Olsen, 'Conclusions and recommendations', in John Andreas Olson (ed.), *NATO and the North Atlantic: revitalising collective defence*, pp 102-106 at p. 105.
[47] Geoffrey Till, 'Holding the bridge in troubled times: The Cold War and the navies of Europe', in *Journal Of Strategic Studies*, xxxviii (2005), ii, pp 309-337.

NATO led efforts. Like the Royal Netherlands Navy, it has contributed consistently to Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 (SNMCMG1).[48] Furthermore it operated alongside the R.Nd.N. in operation Sharp Guard, where the incentives of operational experience and being seen to actively contribute to collective defence were present.[49] Since 2001 the R.N.N. has also been involved in activities relating to the War on Terror. Its contribution to Op. Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean, of its *ULA* class submarines, highlighted its ability to contribute in meaningful ways to large scale operations. Indeed, by all accounts, the vessels were shown to be exemplary in their role of clandestine intelligence gathering[50]. Since 2009 the R.N.N. has also contributed vessels and personnel to the efforts to deter piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Naturally this was primarily under the auspices on NATOs Op. Ocean Shield, but notably there was a contribution made as a non E.U. member to ATALANTA.[51] The Frigate, *Fridtjof Nansen was* the vessel involved in both operations. Much like the previously discussed topics Norway's international operations have broadly followed the evolution of NATOs guidelines in the period. However, it must be noted that as those guidelines have trended towards more traditional tasking and dovetail with existing perceptions of the importance of more localised affairs this is somewhat unsurprising.

Finally it is worth noting that recent developments among Norway's contemporaries have mirrored these renewed interests in regional defence. Sweden in particular, a close partner of Norway, has undergone a recent shift in attitudes towards defence matters. Following a period of downsizing it has recently announced plans to begin a reinvigoration of military assets particularly

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[48] Jacob Borresen, 'Coastal power: the sea power of the coastal state and the management of maritime resources' in Rolf Hobson & Tom Kristiansen (eds), *Navies in Northern Waters* (London, 2004), pp 249-275 at p. 272.

[49] Ibid. p. 273

[50] Gareth Evans, *Norway's joint submarine plan* (London, 2016) available at army-technology.com, (http://www.army-technology.com/features/featurenorways-joint-sub-plan-4809508/) (25 June 2016).

[51] *Norway Post*, 1 Mar. 2009.

in relation to national defence.[52] Furthermore, in a specifically naval context, anti submarine assets have been identified as an area of 'special interest'.[53] Additionally there has been strong support recently to accelerate the process of applying for NATO membership moving beyond its already close ties with the organisation.[54] The net result is that there is a growing consensus on the importance of the region once more and the R.N.N. has found itself 'returning to form' as it were to meet the projected demands.

The third secondary study in this thesis is that of the Croatian Navy. There has been a strong maritime tradition in the region that is now contemporary Croatia stretching several centuries. Indeed the modern Croatian navy still celebrates its 'Day of the Navy' on the anniversary of the victory of Duke Branimir against the Venetian fleet on 18 Sept. 887.[55] However for the purposes of this study examination will be restricted to the modern incarnation of the Croatian Navy. That is the organisation that emerged from the breakup of Yugoslavia. Thus it represents not only one of the youngest naval forces in relative terms, but also a unique example of a European Navy born amidst a violent civil conflict.

While still a part of the former Yugoslavia, Croatia was an important territory in the maritime infrastructure of the now dissolved state. Notably the Headquarters of the Yugoslav Navy was located in the now Croatian city of Split. There were also similar notable bases in the Cities of Pula and Šibenik. The Yugoslav navy was analogous in terms of structure to NATO equivalents such as Norway. In essence it was a coastal defence force designed to deter and delay enemy forces. It did so by heavily promoting the use of light missile boats and

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[52] Ministry of Defence (Sweden), *Sweden's defence policy 2016 to 2020* (Stockholm, 2015) available at: government.se, (http://www.government.se/globalassets/government/dokument/forsvarsdepartementet/sweden_defence_policy_2016_to_2020) (3 Jan 2017), p. 3.
[53] Ibid., p. 8.
[54] Gerard O'Dwyer, *Sweden adopts tougher military strategy doctrine* (Stockholm, 2016), available at defensenews.com, (http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/europe/2016/03/17/sweden-defense-military-strategy-doctrine/81908664/) (17 Dec 2016).
[55] Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, *Croatian Navy Day marked* (Zagreb, 2014) available at morh.hr, (https://www.morh.hr/en/news/press-releases/10402-croatian-navy-day-marked-123.html#foto) (15 Dec 2016).

submarine assets in conjunction with coastal defence batteries. It is notable that while Yugoslavia was part of the Soviet sphere of influence, the character of its navy does not seem typically 'soviet' in comparison to other Soviet states in the period. With the outbreak of hostilities following the declaration of Croatian independence in June 1991, there was a rapid push to establish an organised Croatian military force.

During the early fighting in September, Croatian forces were successful in seizing 36 vessels from the former Yugoslav navies, which were being held in the Vela Luka and Velimir Škorpik shipyards.[56] These vessels represented approximately a quarter of the Yugoslav navy and were quickly pressed into action for the Croatian forces. The Navy was formally integrated into Croatian military on 12 Sept. 1991, with the appointment of its first formal commander Sveto Letica.[57] Following the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of the modern state of Croatia in Nov. 1995, the country entered into a period of restructuring and stabilisation, as it adjusted to peacetime. One of the trends that emerged was a marked decrease in military spending as a percentage of GDP, which would continue through the period.[58] The Navy for its part set about restructuring its command and adapting to service in peacetime. Major developments came in the form of modernisation plans, such as those that took place from 2006 to 2015.[59] Additionally, there was the establishment of a dedicated coastguard in Sept. 2007 and successful accession to NATO in April 2009.[60]

From a broad analysis the trends of spending on the Croatian military in the period were similar to both of the previous secondary case studies. While overall

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[56] Mary Reljanović, *Croatian Navy in defence of the Adriatic* (Dubrovnik, 2013), available at web.archive.org, (http://web.archive.org/web/20131203010001/http://www.hrvatski-vojnik.hr/hrvatski-vojnik/772001/hrm.asp) (26 June 2016).
[57] Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, *Croatian Navy marks 25th anniversary* (Zagrebm 2016) available at morh.hr, (https://www.morh.hr/en/news/press-releases/13504-croatian-navy-marks-25h-anniversary-1.html) (15 Dec. 2016).
[58] Central Intelligence Agency, *the world fact book* (Langley, 2016) available at cia.gov, (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/hr.html) (2 July 2016).
[59] Global security.org, *Croatia - navy – modernization* (Washington, 2010) available at globalsecurity.org, (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/hr-navy-modernization.htm) (3 July 2016)
[60] *Reuters*, 28 Mar. 2008

the level of funding being allocated for military spending on a national level has grown steadily it has not been in line with the growth of the economy. Immediately following the turn of the century, Croatia was spending 1.5 percent of G.D.P. on defence in 2004.[61] A decade later this had fallen to 1.3 percent in 2013.[62]

Turning towards the composition of the contemporary Croatian Naval flotilla, what was immediately apparent was that the two decades of budgetary restrictions have had a significant impact on its ability to refit and replace. In essence these restrictions have resulted in little change in the flotilla since the formation of the state. Many of the vessels, with a few exceptions, still date from the period when the Yugoslavian navy operated them.

The core of the flotilla remained the missile boats. Of these the two *Kralj* class vessels the *Kralj Petar Krešimir* IV and *Kralj Dmitar Zvonimir* are the largest. The former was captured while still in production in 1991, while the later was commissioned a decade later in 2002. They are joined by the last of the vessels they were meant to replace. The *Končar* class *Šibenik* is another seized vessel that has been modernised several times to try to extend its life span. Somewhat more recent are the two *Helsinki* class vessels the *Vukovar* and the *Dubrovnik*. The vessels formerly belonged to the Finnish Navy, but were sold to the Croatian government for a token price, as part of an offset deal relating to another purchase of vehicles from the Finnish in 2008.[63] The vessels were similar to their existing counterparts and have assisted in shoring up the flotilla for the time being. In addition to missile boats the Croatian Navy are also operating a small detachment of four *Mirna*-class patrol boats. The *Mirna* class are inshore patrol

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[61] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 2006, Europe* (London 2006), available at: tandfonline.com, (http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597220600782820) (6 Dec. 2016) p. 75.
[62] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The military balance 2015, Europe* (London 2015), available at: tandfonline.com , (http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597222.2015.996348) (6 Dec. 2016) p. 24.
[63] Igor Tabek, *2 Finnish Helsinki class FACs to Croatia (Zagreb, 2008),* available at defenseindustrydaily.com, (http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2-Finnish-Helsinki-Class-FACs-to-Croatia-05017/) (5 July 2016).

boats that date to the early 1980s. Nearing four decades old they were slated to finally be retired and replaced with new inshore patrol vessels under the control of the coast guard.[64] There is also a limited mine hunting component to the Croatian Navy. The *Korčula* class Minesweeper is the sole vessel currently in operation however Croatia was expected to take delivery of two *Kulmbach* class minesweepers from Germany in 2017.[65] These vessels were set to be decommissioned but were instead donated. Finally the flotilla is supported by a small fleet of landing craft and support vessels including diving support launches and a cargo vessel. Looking at the current composition of the Croatian Navy there seems to have been a reluctance to expand or bolster the flotilla outside of life extending upgrades to existing material.

When analysing the outlook in terms of doctrine relating to the Croatian Navy in this period, the prominence of NATO influence is striking. The first attempt at formalising doctrine came with the 2005 Strategic Defence Review (S.D.R.). This was designed as both a first effort at taking stock of the strategic context of Croatia, and to set about a structured development plan for the future. In that regards NATO was used as a benchmark for development and direct consultation was noted[66]. Indeed by this stage Croatia had been a member of NATOs 'Partnership for Peace' program since 2000 and had joined the membership access program in 2002. Following the S.D.R. 2005 was the Croatian Armed Forces Long Term Development Plan 2006-2015. The plan was broadly

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[64] Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, '*"Brodosplit" lays the keel for in-shore patrol vessels'* (Zagreb, 2015), available at morh.hr, (https://www.morh.hr/en/news/press-releases/12102-%E2%80%9Cbrodosplit%E2%80%9C-lays-the-keel-for-in-shore-patrol-vessels.html) (20 June 2016).
[65] Denis Krnic, Split shipyard offers best deal for five ships for the navy, (Split, 2014), available at slobodnadalmacija.hr,
(http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/dalmacija/split/clanak/id/234155/splitski-skver-dao-najbolju-ponudu-za-pet-brodova-hrm-a) (6 July 2016).
[66] Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, *Strategic defence review 2005* (Zagreb, 2005), available at defesa.gov.br,
(http://www.defesa.gov.br/projetosweb/livrobranco/arquivos/pdf/Croacia%202005.pdf) (9 July 2016).

focused on land assets with the navy scheduled to receive only the new patrol vessels, and in fact a downsizing of personnel.[67]

Also, of note was the direction for the establishment of the Coast Guard.[68] In terms of tasking, the Croatian Navy was given the peacetime responsibilities similar to most other navies. These included protection of the state interests at sea beyond national defence, developing capabilities for combined operations both national and in support of international peace support operations and general maintenance of good order in territorial waters i.e. Search and Rescue.[69]

In the wake of successful accession into NATO in 2009 the need for a review of defence strategy came again. The S.D.R. 2013 again broadly set out the goals for the armed services continuing into the future. From a naval perspective an emphasis was placed on developing a balanced set of capabilities to account for both defence needs and general security interests. Notably this included developing an integrated approach to international co operation with allied forces. Significantly there was a commitment that the Coast Guard was to take priority in the acquisition of vessels.[70]As with the previous S.D.R., the 2013 review spawned its own long term development plan, this time to encompass the period 2015-2024. Overall the document stressed the need for 'jointness' amongst the Croatian armed forces especially in light of the requirements for integration alongside other NATO forces. In terms of the Navy, tasking has changed very little since the last development plan with the largest change being the inclusion of a responsibility to participate in allied activities.[71] With regards

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[67] Nathan M. Polak, Ryan C. Henderson, Nathan Garret, 'NATO membership for Albania and Croatia: military modernization, geo-strategic opportunities and force projection', in *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, xxii,no. 4 (2009), pp 502-514, at p. 504.
[68] Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, 'the Croatian Armed Forces long term development plan 2006-2015' (Zagreb, 2006), available at files.ethz.ch, (https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/154936/Croatia_English-2006-2015.pdf) (9July 2016) p. 24.
[69] Ibid., p. 23.
[70] Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, *Strategic defence review 2013* (Zagreb, 2013), available at morh.hr, (https://www.morh.hr/images/stories/morh_2014/pdf/strategic_defence_review_2013.pdf) (9 July 2016) p. 25.

to development, the plan announced the priorities of the Navy to be 'Capability to act against surface targets, Capability for mine and anti-mine operations, Capability for Command and Control, Information-Communication networking, data gathering and sea monitoring'.[72]

A plan for the modernisation of the fleet was also established. It envisioned that by 2020 there will be overhauls of the radar and information systems, particularly to allow integration with NATO systems, a refurbishment of existing missile systems, the launch of the new patrol boats and the acquisition of the new mine hunting vessels[73]. Furthermore there were plans to purchase an Offshore Patrol Vessel second hand by 2024, to bolster the reach of the Navy. Finally there was a timeframe set for the development of integrated doctrine across all branches, with 2017 being the target for individual doctrines for each domain.[74] This would be followed with a joint operations focused sequel in 2020. In conclusion, doctrinally Croatia has been and is currently focused on ensuring the continued relevance of its standing assets for the next decade, as it settles fully into its responsibilities nationally and internationally.

In terms of International maritime operations, since 2009 the Croatian Navy has, like many of the other case studies contributed actively towards Op. ATALANTA. Rather similarly to the example of Malta, the Croatian contribution has taken the form of a series of Vessel Protection Detachments assigned to protect World Food Organisation shipments travelling through the area of operations.[75] Over the course of the period it has successfully deployed several of these teams to

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[71] Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, 'the Croatian Armed Forces long term development plan 2015-2024' (Zagreb, 2015), available at morh.hr, (https://www.morh.hr/images/stories/morh_2015/pdf/dpr/ltdp_en_2015.pdf) (9 July 2016) p. 32.
[72] Ibid., p. 71.
[73] Ibid., pp 72-73.
[74] Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, 'the Croatian Armed Forces long term development plan 2015-2024' (Zagreb, 2015), available at morh.hr, (https://www.morh.hr/images/stories/morh_2015/pdf/dpr/ltdp_en_2015.pdf) (9 July 2016) p. 62.
[75] EUNAVFOR Somalia, *Croatia takes Over E.U. Naval Force World Food Programme vessel protection duties from Serbia,* available at eunavfor.eu (http://eunavfor.eu/croatia-takes-over-eu-naval-force-world-food-programme-vessel-protection-duties-from-serbia/) (15 Sep. 2018).

ATALANTA and has received numerous commendations for their efforts in the operation.[76] It would seem that similar to the other examples of small navies in this period that Croatia has a managed to achieve a significant contribution to a large international maritime partnership despite its relative lack of fixed assets. Outside of ATALANTA there has been no major involvement of the Croatian Navy in other similar operations. There has been some involvement of land forces in a variety of U.N. and NATO operations such as the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara and the NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

With the increased emphasis being put on the Croatian Armed Forces in general, and specific acknowledgement of the need for Croatian naval assets to be made ready for interoperation with other NATO states, it seems plausible that these operations might be more frequent in the future.

The final secondary case study differs somewhat from the previous three as it is not of an individual Navy. While much focus has been placed thus far on large international organisations such as the E.U. and NATO, there are many smaller coalitions, operating within the European maritime context. One of the more obscure of these was the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON). BALTRON was a maritime military co-operation between the three Baltic States Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union the three states were left with the task of establishing an independent military including a maritime component. All three states set about this task rather rapidly and developed similar style naval forces, as will be illustrated.

Alongside these developments came the drive towards international involvement. One of the first major attempts was the formation of BALTRON in 1998. At its core BALTRON was conceived as a means to promote security in the

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[76] EUNAVFOR *Somalia, Croatian maritime protection team awarded E.U. Operation Atalanta Medal for keeping W.F.P. vessel MSM Douro safe from pirates off coast of Somalia*, available at eunavfor.eu (http://eunavfor.eu/croatian-maritime-protection-team-awarded-eu-operation-atalanta-medal-for-keeping-wfp-vessel-msm-douro-safe-from-pirates-off-coast-of-somalia/ (15 Sep. 2018).

Baltic region, prima facia its major concern was the disposal of mines and ordinance in the region, however it was involved in a number of different activities from SAR, to general security at sea, to environmental relief. Furthermore, since the accession of the members into NATO in 2004 it operated as a practice ground for NATO integration.[77] The structure of BALTRON was that each member rotated one to two counter mine vessels per cycle, plus one additional ship for command and control purposes. The staff was similarly rotated to ensure a good distribution amongst the services. There were annual plans drawn up that allocated which vessels and staff would be rotated in, and what activities were to be engaged in. There was also a major secondary emphasis on BALTRON's utility as a small-scale analogy to larger international organisations. As such the planning and conduct of all activities was done in accordance with NATO standards and doctrine.[78] In this way BALTRON developed an evident utility to its member states beyond the scope of its core operational duties. It offered an interesting example of a small naval organisation providing a great benefit to its members beyond the cost in terms of resources allocated.

With regards to the composition of BALTRON, the fleet, as it were, was usually comprised of between four to seven vessels at any given time. These vessels were drawn from the fleets of the respective member states, on rotation, and an examination of their contemporary form is therefore appropriate. The Latvian Navy was the largest of the three contributors. Since 1994 it has developed along a reasonably steady path in terms of procurement. Its two major ship types being mine hunters and patrol vessels. The first decade of its existence saw it develop both aspects, with the purchase of the *Kondor* and *Lindau* class mine hunters/sweepers, and four *Storm* class Norwegian patrol vessels in 2001, and an additional Norwegian *Vidar* class vessel in 2003. Meanwhile it established a dedicated coast guard in 1994, with the acquisition of five coastal patrol boats,

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[77] Estonian Defence Forces, 'BALTRON' (Tallinn, 2015), available at mil.ee, (http://www.mil.ee/en/defence-forces/international-co-operation/BALTRON) (16 July 2016) .
[78] Ibid.

and an additional vessel in 2001. From 2007-14, a major overhaul of vessels was completed and the mine hunting group was replaced with five *tripartite* class minesweepers. These were notably purchased from the Netherlands. More recently the over four-decade old *Storm* class patrol boats have been replaced by the first homebuilt Latvian vessels. These were based on the *Skrunda* class template. An interesting concept, the *Skrunda* was notable for its interchangeable ISO module container, which can be used to accommodate a variety of systems. These range from armaments to equipment for hydro graphic surveys, environmental protection or diving operations.[79] It is more notable thought that the advantage of flexibility of a limited supply of platforms can be evidenced again in this case study.

The Lithuanian Naval Force followed a broadly similar development pattern. Beginning with a pair of the former Soviet *Grisha III* class corvettes, it purchased three *Storm* class patrol boats in 1995 and 2001.[80] This was carried out alongside the procurement of its first *Lindau* class mine warfare vessel in 1999. Since the millennium it has added three Danish *Flyvefisken*-class patrol vessels to its fleet from 2008 to 2010 and an additional one on 2016[81]. In 2006 a *Vidar* class mine layer was added as a command vessel, and most recently two *Hunt* class mine sweepers were purchased from the Royal Navy in 2011.[82] While the rate of development is slightly slower than Latvia the composition of both forces is strikingly similar.

The Estonian Navy differs slightly from its allies, in that it has seen a general reduction in the scope of its naval assets since the foundation of the service.

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[79] Tom Todd, *Skrunda makes it an even SWATH dozen from A & R* (London, 2011), available at maritimejournal.com, (http://www.maritimejournal.com/news101/vessel-build-and-maintenance/vessel-launch/skrunda-makes-it-an-even-swath-dozen-from-a-and-r) (19 July 2016).
[80] Stephen Saunders, *Jane's fighting ships 2008-2009* (London, 2008).
[81] Xavier Vavasseur, *Fourth ex-Danish Navy Flyvefisken-class patrol vessel transferred to Lithuanian Navy* (Brussels, 2016), available at Navy Recognition.com, (http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2016/november-2016-navy-naval-forces-defense-industry-technology-maritime-security-global-news/4611-fourth-ex-danish-navy-flyvefisken-class-patrol-vessel-transferred-to-lithuanian-navy.html) (9 Sept. 2018).
[82] British Embassy Vilnius, *Lithuanian Navy Hunt class commissioning* (Vilnius, 2013).

While it began with seven minesweeping vessels and a mixed assortment of four patrol vessels. The contemporary Estonian Navy has been made far more streamlined. The original minesweepers were replaced by 2009 with three *Sandown* class Minehunters purchased from the Royal Navy.[83] The sole patrol boat in service a Finnish *Rihtniemi* class was converted for use as a training vessel. Finally there was a dedicated Danish *Lindormen* diving support vessel acquired through donation to round out the fleet in 2006.[84] This vessel was subsequently decommissioned and replaced with its sister ship that had been acquired in the same period for the civilian Maritime Academy.[85] Recently the commitment of the Estonian Navy to minesweeping was reinforced with a 30 million Euro investment in upgrading the *Sandown* vessels.[86] What is most interesting to note about the compositions of the fleets is that their similarity suggests an acknowledgement of their connection to and dependence on each other.

In doctrinal terms, BALTRON as an organisation had been mostly focused on the development of tactical naval doctrine and practices. As had been mentioned previously, a large emphasis in terms of strategic doctrine had been placed on assimilating NATO practices where possible. Furthermore, much of the specifically regional practices engaged in by the BALTRON members have been with regards to factors unique to the region. Examples of which include the specific issues surrounding historical ordinance/mine disposal. Again these have been mostly tactical in nature.

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[83] Shipping Times, *HMS Sandown handed over to Estonian Navy* (Scotland, 2007), available at shippingtimes.com, (http://www.shippingtimes.co.uk/item510_SANDOWN.htm) (10 Aug. 2017).
[84] Johnny Balsved, *Two former minelayers sold to Estonia* (Copenhagen, 2006) available at Navalhistory.dk, (http://www.navalhistory.dk/English/NavyNews/2006/0801_MinelayersToEstonia.htm) (4 May 2018).
[85] Baltic News Service, *Estonian navy commissions diver, support vessel Wambola* (Tallinn, 2016), available at leta.lv (http://www.leta.lv/eng/defence_matters_eng/defence_matters_eng/news/0162D14A-E9E6-42A2-B5ED-E8B23E4553DC/) (6 Oct. 2017).
[86] Andrew Whyte, *Estonian Navy to spend €30 million on minehunter modernisation* (Tallinn, 2018), available at Baltic News Service, (https://news.err.ee/844128/estonian-navy-to-spend-30-million-on-minehunter-modernisation) (5 Aug. 2018).

There have however been efforts to promote home-grown doctrine; or at least the recognition that while NATO doctrinal compliance is the overall goal, unique factors need to be addressed to maximise both compliance and the efficacy of the BALTRON member's naval performance. The Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL) was the primary instrument through which international doctrinal development occurred for the Baltic States. It operated since 2000, to provide a venue for educating the forces of the Baltic States, particularly in relation to NATO protocol.[87] BALTDEFCOL was initially developed as part of the push towards NATO accession in the 1990s, but expanded beyond that scope. The college has been observed as a mechanism to ensure that firstly the Baltic militaries are engaged in the act of 'producing' security within NATO and not 'simply receiving it', and secondly that historic 'Soviet attitudes' amongst commanders have been replaced with more contemporary ones.[88] The college operated by bringing together students and instructors from across the NATO membership, to provide a broad-spectrum approach to education and development of security concepts. In relation to BALTRON the colleges impact has primarily been to ensure commanders have developed an interoperable mindset, suited to alliance operations, and that tactical doctrine reinforces this outlook. It should be remarked that once again, a standard format of education and formalisation of practices is seen emerging in a case study in the period.

In the international context, BALTRON engaged in a number of key activities and operations. The longest running exercise was Baltic Fortress (Formerly Amber Sea pre-2008). Baltic Fortress was an annual training exercise that places elements of BALTRON in a simulated scenario designed to test and improve a variety of standard battle procedures at sea.[89] The first iteration was held in 1996 and it therefore predates BALTRON. It was folded into BALTRONs realm of responsibility at its inception. Baltic Fortress has served as the bedrock for the

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[87] Mel Huang, 'Security lynchpin of Baltic cooperation' in G. Heard and Jennifer Moroney (eds), *Security Dynamics in the Former Soviet Bloc* (London, 2013), pp 32-44, at p. 40.
[88] Ibid., p. 40.
[89] The Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, *Baltic naval squadron*, (Vilnius, 2013) p. 24.

successful development of integrated maritime operations for the member states. The other major regional operations were mainly historical ordnance disposal operations (HODOPS) to clear undetonated ordinance, dating from as far back as the First World War. HODOPS has remained a relatively common activity to the present day. Lastly in regional efforts there were the internal squadron exercises (SQ.EX.) these smaller scale operations are usually conducted as a means to gauge readiness and improve the cohesion of the squadron.[90] Additionally, since 2012 these exercises were used to judge the readiness of units assigned to NATOs SNMCMG1 to ensure they were fit for tasking.

In conjunction with the regional focused exercises, there were a number of operations, and exercises, engaged in by BALTRON designed specifically around greater integration into the NATO framework. The longest running of these, was the Baltic Operations (BALTOPS). BALTOPS were yearly exercises designed to promote interoperability and cohesion amongst NATO members. Since 1993 it was extended to former Soviet bloc states, to promote relations between them and NATO. Yearly BALTRON assumed command of a counter mine task unit in the exercises which represented the largest of their kind in the region.[91] In addition there were the 'Mariner' exercises. Mariner combined joint air, sea and land training exercises. These exercises were designed to ensure that the incoming rotation of NATO's quick response 'NATO Response Force' was prepared for activation.   Finally there were the smaller passing exercises (PASSEX). These have been carried out between two or more navies or other entities, to test whether communication protocols are capable of meeting the evolving demands of tasking, and once more to promote cooperation between various maritime actors[92]. Reflecting on the above operations and exercises, the utility of BALTRON seems to have been that it has provided a coherent means of

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[90]The Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, *Baltic naval squadron*, (Vilnius, 2013), p. 34.
[91] Ibid., p. 26.
[92] Ibid. p. 38.

allowing three small navies the ability to perform on a much larger scale. Furthermore its utility as an organisation was that it not only provided effectiveness greater than the sum of its parts, but that it provided these navies with access to vital training exercises, that allowed them to maximise their efficiency.

In 2015, the Estonian navy withdrew its assets from the mine countermeasure squadron of BALTRON. Citing a duplication of roles with the NATO led SNMCMG1, and that such larger operational groups would be its preference for the future of naval cooperation in the region. This was primarily with regards to mine countermeasures.[93] The common issue of lack of depth of resources for smaller navies is evident in this instance. It remains a limiting factor on their ability to spread their commitment which offsets the utility many have identified in joining larger operational groups.

 In summary, each of the navies in question has revealed significant insight into the nature of naval affairs in Europe over the recent decades. With regards to the questions initially posed at the beginning of this chapter, it is without doubt that the first and final ones have been answered. With the relevant factors outlined it is possible to present these organisations as comparisons to the major studies. Similarly it is now clear, that each organisation has a unique set of factors, and traditions, that have underscored its development. The final question was, how useful is the term 'small navies' in grouping together these different organisations. Based on the above analysis in the context of the examples given it would seem that again, utility of the term is contextual based on the resolution of the analysis. Of all the areas detailed however it was notable that the most common similarity found was that defence spending as percentage of G.D.P. remained generally static or in decline. However this can be a product of so many various factors domestic and international, i.e. the

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[93] The Baltic course, *Estonia leaves Baltic minesweeping squadron* (Tallinn, 2015) available at Baltic-course.com, (http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/baltic_news/?doc=14218) (14 Apr. 2018).

global financial crisis of the last decade, that it is quite difficult, at this level of inquiry, to determine how that is related to the question of 'small navies' and their attributes. In terms of history there would be little use of the term found, the backgrounds from the legacy of the Dutch maritime tradition to the contemporary birth of the BALTRON navies are widely varied. In terms of composition, one could rightly argue that the fleets in question are by all accounts small with the convergent issues of operational depth and ablative mass of assets. However the capabilities of the fleets in terms of both diversity of assets and their capabilities within their individual class vary widely across the examples given. In terms of outlook and international involvement on the broad level it would be fair to say that each of these navies has demonstrated an international interest particularly as it seems to offer an efficacy beyond the sum of the member's capabilities. However as can be seen by the nature of assets development, across the examples different organisations have placed varying emphasis on the expectation of international combined operations. This has been manifested in a focus on interoperability of assets and fleet composition around specialisation where resources divert from national interests. Compounding this is that the nature of common defence organisations such as NATO is to promote a shared vision amongst members. However as it is logical that foreign policy is by its nature a tool to achieve national goals, often with domestic effects, each of these organisations interactions have been coloured by these goals. The northern examples have, for instance, been heavily informed in their outlook by their location on the periphery of the contemporary Western world. That geographical factor has inculcated a more defensive outlook than their contemporaries. Ultimately it appears that the context of the inquiry is just as important as the subjects themselves.

Conclusion.

Throughout this thesis the central questions have been: how have small navies in Western Europe developed in the period following the collapse of the U.S.S.R.? How have their individual experiences and the influence of supra national bodies impacted on this development? What degree of utility does the term small navy possess?

The various supra national bodies examined have demonstrated a trend towards increased engagement in maritime affairs in the period. For the U.N. this has manifested in patterns such as the increased interest of its humanitarian agencies in the utility of military assets. Direct examples of this trend include examples such as the I.M.O.'s increased interest in maritime security affairs. This was most keenly reflected in the responses to the issue of piracy off the horn of Africa in the period such as the published policy and updates to the S.U.A.[1] Likewise, maritime security became an area of major interest for the E.U. in the period particularly in relation to the migration crisis it faced on its Southern border as a result of instability across the Middle East and Africa. Throughout the period the E.U. has seen several significant developments in policy relating to defence and security such as the E.U.M.S.S., the E.S.S, its replacement the recent E.U. Global Strategy and its distinct defence elements.[2] Coupled with the development of organisations such as Frontex, to increase its ability to enforce

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[1] I.M.O., *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of fixed platforms Located on the Continental Shelf*, (New York 1988), available at imo.org, (http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/SUA-Treaties.aspx) (8 Mar. 2016); I.M.O., *Maritime security*, (London 2016), available at IMO.org, (http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/piracy/Pages/default.aspx) (9 Mar. 2016); I.M.O., *Piracy and armed robbery against ships*, (London 2015), available at imo.org, (http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/Documents/MSC.1-Circ.1333-Rev.1.pdf) (9 Mar. 2016).
[2] E.U., *Implementation plan on security and defence*, (Brussels, 2016) , available at europa.eu, (https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/pages/files/2016-12_-_factsheet_-_implementation_plan_on_security_and_defence.pdf) (8 Sept. 2018).

its borders, and the creation of military task forces such as the various EUNAVFOR operations; the direct engagement the E.U. has had on the maritime dimension of Western Europe significantly increased through the period. This is evident both in terms of guiding principles and direct action. Given the recent commitments towards greater integration with NATO forces (comprised already of several E.U. member states) this trend is only likely to continue into the future.

NATO also continued to play a significant role in the shaping of European defence. The period witnessed several significant shifts in its conception of European defence, due principally to the end of the traditional Cold War threat of the Eastern bloc, the rise of the non-state actor, the growth of peace support operations in the last decade of the century and the re-emergence of a renewed Russian concern towards the present day. The major focus of NATO policy through the period was in fostering the importance of increased cooperative capacity across its members and allies. This was as larger navies such as the U.S. Navy were promoting integrated, interoperable and global solutions to the question of good order at sea in the period.[3] This can be viewed as maximising the advantages their allies of varying configurations and dispositions could offer. Within these concepts is an acknowledgement that no single Navy even one as large as the U.S.N. could be adapted to all territorial conditions, certainly not simultaneously. Therefore, focus was placed on the role of smaller partners in global security. As such, navies are often specialised around the conditions of their home territories. Though it bears noting that towards the end of this period the focus of many navies had begun to shift back towards traditional maritime force projection as tensions in the North and Asian seas were increasing.[4] Nevertheless, it is clear that each of these organisations has had an increased impact on maritime affairs in the region directly and indirectly.

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[3] U.S. Navy, *A cooperative strategy for 21st century seapower* (Washington D.C., 2007), p. 17
[4] U.S. Navy, *A cooperative strategy for 21st century seapower* (Washington D.C., 2015), p. 4

Recapitulating the case studies themselves it is now pertinent to ask, what have they illustrated about the period? Firstly, it remains to examine what comparisons can be drawn between the major case studies. Once more it is probative to do so under the three major section headings of previous chapters, namely policy, assets, and operational behaviours.

Across the case studies policy development in the period was an area of some general similarities but also some significant and important differences. There are certainly shared characteristics in the major policy documents produced by both of the major case studies. The Irish White Papers and the Maltese equivalents, the 1996 White Paper and the 2016-2026 Strategy Paper, all share a focus on development.[5] While there are examples of blended strategy evident in some instances, there is a distinct lack of emphasis on traditional topics that would be expected in doctrinal publications from other navies. Indeed, by contrast examples in the secondary studies, such as the Norwegian Navy and the Royal Netherlands Navy, they have in the same period of time produced more consistent bodies of traditional doctrine.[6] Other examples in the period of younger services such as the Croatian navy have similarly produced more traditional format doctrine.[7] It is undoubtedly significant that these secondary studies have been influenced by their memberships to common defence organisations such as NATO and in some cases their proximity to the developing tensions between Russia and her neighbours towards the end of the period. However, what is evident is that it is difficult to extract generalised principles about small navies as a class from these examples. Indeed, between the two major case studies it can be noted that the formats of defence policy

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[5] Ministry of Home Affairs and National Security, *Strategy paper 2016-2026*, available at: homeaffairs.gov.mt, (https://homeaffairs.gov.mt/en/media/Policies-Documents/Documents/The%20Armed%20Forces%20of%20Malta%20Strategy%20Paper%202016-2026.pdf) (29 June 2018).

[6] Ministry of Defence, *Netherlands defence doctrine* (Amsterdam 2013); The Defence Staff, Norwegian Armed Forces, *Joint Operational Doctrine*, (Oslo 2007).

[7] Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, *Strategic defence review 2013*, (Zagreb, 2013), available at morh.hr, (https://www.morh.hr/images/stories/morh_2014/pdf/strategic_defence_review_2013.pdf) (9July 2016).

publications are inverted to a large extent in the Irish and Maltese experiences. Firstly, between the two Irish White Papers there was a distinct increase in the acknowledgement of the importance of maritime affairs to the state, and the role of the Naval Service in fulfilling those roles.[8] Additionally, the process in the construction of the second White Paper had expanded to consider a broader variety of input than its predecessor.[9] Meanwhile the Maltese had a conventional public White Paper succeeded by an only semi promulgated 'Strategy Paper' in the same period. The latter was more focused on reforms in the structure of the Armed Forces as an employer than maritime policy.[10] Ultimately there was not significant evidence of a distinctly 'small' type of maritime policy. This was evidenced not only by the variety of policy within the studies, but also as there has not emerged any consideration within these documents that is not also conceivably faced by larger forces. Indeed, as noted above many of these policies have been influenced by larger forces. For example, Norway's 'holding time' while heavily influenced by elements such as their distinct geography and scale, was predicated entirely on the reliance of larger allies' effective participation in multi-lateral defence pacts. Additionally notable was that this was replaced with a focus on counter insurgency operations again tied directly to trends in larger forces development in the period. This was followed towards the end of the period by a more familiar focus of national defence. Additionally, it should also be noted that such patterns were evident in other traditionally larger European navies as a combination of austerity restricted budgets and a lack of compelling threats in the traditional

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[8] Department of Defence Ireland, *White paper on defence* (Dublin, 2015).
[9] Minister for Agriculture, the Marine and Food (Coveney, S.), *White Paper on Defence: Statements*, Dáil Éireann Debate *Vol. 885 No. 1*
[10] Ministry of Home Affairs and National Security, *Strategy paper 2016-2026* (Valetta, 2015). available at: homeaffairs.gov.mt, (https://homeaffairs.gov.mt/en/media/Policies-Documents/Documents/The%20Armed%20Forces%20of%20Malta%20Strategy%20Paper%202020 16-2026.pdf) (29 June 2018).

maritime domain saw the capacity for traditional war-fighting atrophy in such forces.[11]

In terms of assets there was a significant amount of variety amongst the case studies. Over the period of focus both case studies have invested in onshore infrastructure, as both have faced issues created by historical periods of neglect. Additionally, the evidence suggested that the character of most of these infrastructural investments have been a series of overdue projects to bring basic necessities such as accommodation and essential base infrastructure to some kind of functional standard. From this trend there seems to have been a lack of coordinated planning towards the future for both services, beyond a series of 'urgent need' style prioritisations.

Personnel development in the period has demonstrated its own set of unique aspects for both of the major case studies. The Naval Service in the period embarked upon a significant series of reforms and formalisations designed to increase effectiveness and overall professionalisation within the service. The culmination of these efforts manifested in the joint public private venture with the N.M.C.I. Indeed, it seems that the Naval Service continued to strive towards ensuring its capacity to provide its training in-house was maximised. Meanwhile the Maltese continued with their traditional model of maintaining some elements of fundamental training in-house, while co-operating with local institutions to provide specialist technical training, such as their partnership with MCAST. With the practice of outsourcing the 'marinisation' training of their officers to allied services across the world, they too have engaged in formalisation efforts. These have been a result of the necessity of integrating a wide variety of educational standards into their service.[12] The retention of this model of education is somewhat unsurprising given the comparatively tiny number of naval officer recruits and their longstanding tradition of international

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[11] Jeremy Stohs, 'Into the abyss?: European naval power in the post-Cold War era' in *U.S. Naval War College Review*, lxxi, no. 3 (2018), pp 1-26. at p. 22.

[12] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 7.

training. Indeed, they trace this practice to their former status in the commonwealth. While possessing unique formats, both services have engaged in these practices to overcome issues relating to costs and economies of scale. Naval training at any level is costly and highly specialised, and while most navies regardless of size leverage training opportunities with allies; the frequency and dependence on such arrangements appeared more pronounced in the cases of smaller navies like Malta.

Another challenge faced by both cases studies was personnel retention. Malta did experience a relative explosion in personnel numbers at the turn of the century doubling its establishment to 400 members in less than five years. However, over the period decade both navies have experienced issues with retention of personnel, with general increases in the number of personnel opting for early retirement or outright leaving the service before even that milestone.[13] The Naval Service opted to re frame the issue by focusing on maximising return on investment in personnel over the shortened expected period of service.[14] Additionally, the potential for overseas deployment as an incentive to personnel was also realised. The Maltese have moved towards a focus on promised improvement to service conditions most notably in the recent Strategy Paper.[15] By the end of the period neither has shown signs of reversing the trend. This serves to highlight another example of the potential utility in the categorisation of 'small'. While navies around the world must compete with the pulls from private industry, where the specialised skills of sailors are in demand, it seems that the relative impact is most keenly felt by smaller navies as the 'ablative' depth of personnel is absent and the proportional impact of the loss of skilled personnel on budgets are larger.

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[13] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Andrew Mellia of Valleta, Malta (22 Jun. 2018) p. 4.
[14] Interview with Commodore Hugh Tully of Cork, Ireland (10 Apr. 2017).
[15] Ministry of Home Affairs and National Security, *Strategy paper 2016-2026* (Valetta, 2015), available at: homeaffairs.gov.mt, (https://homeaffairs.gov.mt/en/media/Policies-Documents/Documents/The%20Armed%20Forces%20of%20Malta%20Strategy%20Paper%2020 16-2026.pdf) (29 June 2018) p. 3.

As for the fleets, the core studies retain an amount of similarity in that they are both focused around regional patrol operations, though the characteristics of the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea place significantly different demands on the navies that sail them. Both have been restricted at times in their asset procurement to second hand vessels, acquired primarily in line with budgetary constraints, or to donations that may not have been suitable for continued operations, examples such as the *Ciara* and the recent Maltese acquisition of the *Aoife* are illustrative of those trends. However, the Irish Naval Service did see some significant fleet investment over the course of the period. This included the expanded purchase scheme for the *Beckett* class of offshore patrol vessels, notably during a period of significant economic duress. Coupled with the commitment noted in the most recent White Paper to the maintenance of the fleet size, this can be somewhat accounted for by the emergent interest in the Irish governments interest towards the importance of the maritime domain.[16] While it is the case that both navies are composed around territorial patrol duties, the difference in geography alone has significantly impacted on their compositions. Indeed, the potential for variance amongst small navies, despite their perceived common focus on 'home affairs' is further highlighted by the secondary studies. The Netherlands operate a wide variety of modern warships and include a submarine element in their forces, Norway's fleet of rapid response sea denial craft, and the Baltic States tendency towards mine layers and sweepers, all three of which are structured around integration into larger multilateral operations, demonstrate that the 'home affairs' of small navies need not necessarily be restricted to insular territorial maritime order.

It could be argued that the commonality of specialisation might be attached to small navies, as after all it is common that the fleets of states such as Ireland and Malta are comprised of limited types of vessels. However it has been demonstrated that firstly this is not always the case through examples such as the Netherlands more balanced fleet for much of the later twentieth century.

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[16] Inter-Departmental Marine Coordination Group, *Harnessing our ocean wealth* (Dublin, 2012). p. 4.

Secondly there are a host of factors that can explain the particular composition of a fleet beyond a concerted attempt at specialisation. Firstly it has been demonstrated in the major case studies that there have been significant periods of their histories devoid of anything resembling long term development planning. It could be that a small fleet is composed of a distinct character merely due to the availability and affordability of the replacement vessels at a moment where procurement had reached dire necessity as in the examples provide across the naval services life span. The purchase of minesweepers in the 1970s came decades after the busiest period of mine clearing in the services history following the Second World War. Likewise it could be the case that the infrequent purchases and the frequent budgetary restrictions can leave such navies as a 'snapshot' of a particular need at one point in their history. The Croatian fleet, for example, does not face the same strategic climate in its regional environment as it did in the Cold War. Similarly, the Netherlands faced the same prospect in the early 1990s, in contrast to the Baltic and Norwegian navies which never relinquished territorial defence in the same way. It could be more strongly argued that given the frequency that navies of this scale are tasked with the sole responsibility for the maritime affairs of their state, as in the Irish and Maltese examples, that the kind of operational flexibility they have worked towards is itself a form of specialisation. However it does not appear that there is compelling evidence that these demands are demonstrably different to those placed on navies of any scale. It appears instead that the key difference returns to the lack of access to economies of scale and depth of assets enjoyed by other navies.

Operations were the third major topic of analysis for this thesis. It was sub divided into national and international elements. For the Irish Naval Service this was a period of significant formalisation in terms of its national activities. Across the broad spectrum of its role as the principal sea going agency of the state, it sought to codify and harmonise its role with all of the other state actors it engaged with. Examples such as the M.O.U.s with their law enforcement counterparts in relation to narcotics interdiction or the agreements in relation to

fisheries protection with the Department of Agriculture, Food, and the Marine demonstrated this trend. Further recognition of the service can be found in the more frequent references made throughout the second White Paper on Defence to its roles beyond fisheries patrols. Malta meanwhile is harder to analyse in these terms as the line between its national responsibilities and its engagement with international efforts is blurred significantly. This is due to the characteristics of its most pressing interests in the period, namely those relating to migration. Indeed, as mentioned previously many of the secondary studies national concerns would reflect this trend. However, it must be differentiated that the categorisation of a task as of 'national' focus does not preclude its potential for significant international effect. Examples in the period included the record seizure of drugs off the Irish coast in 2007 and 2008 of drugs destined for the rest of Europe.[17]

In relation to international operational developments it has clearly emerged that the foremost trend in maritime strategy in the period was that of multilateralism. This is connected to increased globalisation in the period, most notably in Europe. With the restructuring period that followed the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the subsequent expansions of organisations such as the E.U. and Europe beyond the former iron curtain, the period was certainly dynamic in terms of political and defence development. The initial uncertainty following the dissolution of the old Cold War structures fostered a period of theorisation on the new departures for global security. The rise of the non-state actor, the global 'War on Terror', the increasing instability in the Middle East post 2010, and the resurgent Russian expansionism of the end of the period further galvanised the importance of the western cooperation among the various actors.

For the case studies the impact of the tilt towards multilateralism can be found in their adoption of theoretical concepts that mirror the larger trends. The Irish 'operational swing' concept is strikingly similar to contemporaneous publications by the Royal Navy. The NATO forces in the studies naturally draw guidance from

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[17] *Belfast Telegraph*, 7 Nov. 2008.

the organisations practices which are again driven by their larger members. The Maltese had a well-defined tradition of their operational policy being heavily informed by their experiences training with and working alongside their larger partners. This was most clearly reflected in that their in-house produced operational and procedural theory was directly founded upon the practices of the U.S. Coast Guard.[18] The Dutch similarly took cues from the Royal Navy in structuring their civil-military partnerships in the period. [19]

Actual international operations in the period also demonstrate a general trend towards the perceived utility of international cooperative engagements. The Naval Service saw its first international deployment as part of a distinct maritime operation with Op. PONTUS. For the Naval Service this represented a proving ground for its development within the period. It was perceived as a means to meaningfully contribute to the state's commitment to European integration and as an opportunity to increase the profile of the service. This was also viewed as an opportunity for boosting morale, and obtaining much valued operational experience, for both its crews and vessels.[20] The Maltese in the period saw such operations as vital to promoting regional stability and furthering their national interests. Whether this was working alongside their Mediterranean neighbours in border enforcement operations, such as the numerous Frontex led engagements, working alongside the Libyan Navy before and after the revolution to aid in capacity building in the region, or deploying assets to ATALANTA alongside the Dutch as part of their responsibilities as a large flag state. The Maritime Squadron's contribution to such operations could be directly traced to national interest. Parallels to this could be found in the Norwegian and Baltic examples. Within the period they clearly attributed collective defence as a cornerstone to promoting their national interests and safe guarding their

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[18] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Cauchi Inglott of Valleta, Malta (30 August 2018) p. 4.
[19] Julian Lindley-French & Wouter van Straten, 'Exploiting the value of small navies: the experience of the Royal Netherlands Navy' in *The RUSI Journal*, cliii, no. 6 (2008), pp 66-69. at p.67.
[20] Interview with Lieutenant Commander Tony Geraghty of Cork, Ireland (29 Mar. 2018), p. 2.

territorial stability through their engagement with regional partners and larger international partners through NATO. It must also be noted that while it is common across these navies to attempt to leverage cooperation as a means of achieving greater strategic effect than would be otherwise unavailable to them, that in this period other larger navies such as the Royal Navy and the French Navy were engaging in notably similar practices, up to and including using terms such as 'mutual dependency' to describe their relationship.[21]

On the question of naval identity in this time of maritime multilateralism, across the major case studies the perspective has emerged that these cooperative engagements and the unions involved in them are still considered in terms of national interest. Op. PONTUS for example, was framed by the Irish Naval Service as a positive opportunity for operational experience, personnel development and political relevance. Malta has framed its various engagements in the Mediterranean in similar terms of operational experience. ATALANTA was also framed in terms of the national obligations of Malta to those registered under its flag. Likewise, in the secondary studies the northern navies who are the most clearly structured around integrated multinational operations all frame their practices in terms of the national interest and maintain the importance of their individual identities.

Similarly, with the question on the flexibility requirements placed on the case studies in the period. Both the major case studies appear to not have experienced major difficulty in integrating with these frameworks. In Malta's case the long history of integrated training and the series of cooperative training exercises carried out throughout the period gave it the necessary experience for the kind of cooperative operations it engaged in with its partners. For example, its experience with interoperability training alongside the Italian Navy formed the foundation for its deployment to Op. ATALANTA with the Netherlands Navy. The Irish Naval Service meanwhile found that its experiences with dynamic

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[21] Ben Jones, *Franco-British military cooperation: a new engine for European defence? (Paris, 2011), p. 5.*

patrol operations and culture of tactical flexibility were suited to the tasks it found itself performing in the Mediterranean. It was also fortunate that the Irish Naval Service had only recently purchased a new class of patrol vessel built around these roles. While it is the case that the vessels were, in some ways, not ideally suited for large scale SAR operations embarking hundreds of persons, it was the Irish experience that tactical flexibility allowed them to overcome the operational demands placed on them.

In the introduction to this thesis the questions were raised as to what utility could be found in the term small navy. How could the term be applied, and what was the validity of contemporary commentator's claims around the term? From the case studies presented in this thesis it has been demonstrated that the frameworks based around ranking navies in traditional terms of sea power and force projection are inadequate to describe the effectiveness of a given Navy. Such categorisations are especially insufficient, if effectiveness of the maritime element of a state's armed forces is measured with regards to the full breadth of the state's requirements in the maritime domain, beyond merely defence. This was particularly notable in cases such as the Irish Naval Service where the navy holds the position of 'principle sea going agency'. Indeed, given the idiosyncrasies of individual states relationship with the maritime domain it is hard to conceptualise a fair general criterion of ranking such effectiveness.

With regards to the question of whether small navies represent a fundamental difference in type to large navies, this thesis has demonstrated that the combination of characteristics a given small navy may manifest are significantly varied, indeed at an individual resolution it can be difficult to identify commonalities that might begin to represent a category of small beyond the addressed over simplifications. However, the crux of the matter seems to rest on the notion that the composition and character of navies represent an attempt by their states to address the issues they face in the maritime domain. While it can be rightly argued that small navies are often disproportionately affected by the lack of access to economies of scale and the depth of assets that their larger counterparts possess. It is also the case that, as Till has argued, this does not

represent a difference in type from any other class of navy. Instead it is merely a difference of scale, even if it may produce a certain wariness of character within the services themselves or more frequently their overseeing financial and political bodies.[22] This thesis serves to demonstrate that the behaviours of the case studies in this period, serve as examples of services that conceptualise themselves and their role in terms that would be not be unfamiliar amongst their peers of any scale.

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[22] Geoffrey Till, 'Are small navies different' in Mulqueen et. al. (eds.), *Small navies strategy and policy for small navies in war and peace* (London, 2014), pp 21-33. at p. 31.

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