



**HEIDEGGER, HÖLDERLIN, HITLER: EVALUATING THE
PROXIMITY OF HEIDEGGER’S PHILOSOPHY TO
NATIONAL SOCIALISM THROUGH THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF POETRY FOR HIS CONCEPT OF TRUTH, 1927-1937**

Gregory David Jackson

A major thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy

Maynooth University
Department of Philosophy

April 2019

Head of Department: Prof. Philipp W. Rosemann

Supervisor: Dr Susan Gottlöber

Internal Examiner: Prof. William Desmond

External Examiner: Prof. Thomas Sheehan

TABLE OF CONTENT

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	I
ABSTRACT	IV
ABBREVIATIONS	V
INTRODUCTION.....	1
Methodology	11
Literature Review	13
CHAPTER 1	
A NEW TRAJECTORY AFTER THE FAILURE OF <i>BEING AND TIME</i>	24
1.1 Truth in <i>Being and Time</i>	25
1.2 The Problem of ‘Reality’ and Heidegger’s Appropriation of the Transcendental Reduction	38
1.3 The Significance of Art Before 1930	48
1.4 A Response to the Problem of Nihilism in National Socialism	50
CHAPTER 2	
A CATASTROPHIC HISTORY: HEIDEGGER’S CONFRONTATION WITH PLATO	65
2.1 On Heidegger’s Interpretations in General, and of Plato Specifically	67
2.2 Overview of the Lecture Series	76
2.3 Truth as <i>Aletheia</i> in the Allegory of the Cave.....	80
2.4 Heidegger’s Phenomenological and Hermeneutical Interpretation of the Platonic Ideas	85
2.5 The Significance of the Elites in Heidegger’s Concept of Truth	89
2.5.1 Clarifying the Essence of <i>Dasein</i> : Grounds for a Development	89
2.5.2 Heidegger’s Interpretation of Liberated <i>Dasein</i> as Legislative <i>Dasein</i>	92
2.6 Introduction of the Significance of Art	108
2.7 Transition: From Truth to Untruth	112
2.7.1 Detour Through Sense Experience.....	113
2.7.2 Clarification of the <i>Pseudo Doxa</i>	116
2.7.3 Untruth	119
2.7.4 A Development in the Concept of Nature and Hearing the Call of Blood and Soil.....	122
CHAPTER 3	
THE PROPHETIC POET: HEIDEGGER’S ENCOUNTER WITH HÖLDERLIN	129
3.1 Overview of the Lecture Series.....	133
3.2 Heidegger’s Interpretation of Hölderlin through Thinking in Decision	137
3.2.1 The Destiny of Hölderlin’s Poetry in Context: A Critique of Aesthetics	137
3.2.2 Why Hölderlin?	141
3.2.3 Thinking Through Decision	147

3.2.4	Consequences	156
3.3	Three Creative Forces for German <i>Dasein</i> : Heidegger, Hölderlin, Hitler	159
3.4	Understanding the Significance of Hölderlin's Poetry Through Fundamental Attunement	167
3.5	The Two Meanings of Heidegger's Concept of Earth	173
3.5.1	The First Meaning: Earth as Mystery.....	175
3.5.2	The Second Meaning: Earth as Holy and as Homeland.....	184
3.6	The Ambiguity of the Myth of the Homeland	189
CHAPTER 4		
FOUNDATIONS FOR A NEW BEGINNING: HEIDEGGER'S		
CONFRONTATION WITH NIETZSCHE		
202		
4.1	How Heidegger Interprets Nietzsche and His Retrospective Re-Evaluation of the Significance of the <i>Nietzsche</i> Lectures.....	204
4.2	Overview of the Lecture Course	210
4.3	The Will to Power is the Grounds of Destiny	214
4.4	The Significance of Art in the Question of Truth	218
4.4.1	Corporeal Attunements and Rapture	219
4.4.2	Is There a Good Beyond (my) Being? Will <i>Contra</i> Beauty.....	222
4.4.3	The Grand Style	229
4.5	Clarification of the Essence of Truth	234
4.5.1	A Return to Platonism in Context of the Confrontation with Nietzsche: Establishing Distance Between Art and Truth	235
4.5.2	Nietzsche's Inversion of Platonism: A Path Cleared Toward Retrieving the Identity of Art and Truth	245
4.6	Truth as Art and Art as Truth: A New Interpretation of the Sensuous and the Significance of the 'Turn' (<i>Kehre</i>).....	247
CONCLUSION.....		257
BIBLIOGRAPHY		273

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am very grateful to have received the Maynooth University Hume Scholarship, which enabled me to pursue this study. For that, I have Prof. Michael Dunne to thank, as well as all of the wonderful and kind individuals that breathe life into the Maynooth Philosophy Department. Especially, thanks to Dr Susan Gottlöber who supervised this project with great attention and care and provided me both intellectual and existential support. I have her the most to thank for constantly inviting me to clarify and reclarify my meanings. Without her, this project may easily have been lost to the obtuse. Thanks also to Prof. Philipp Rosemann who kindly provided feedback on an earlier draft of this study. The Philosophy Department at Maynooth University is sure to thrive with him at its helm. Thanks to Dr Cyril McDonnell, whose intellectual labour stemming far before my time continues to render Heidegger's work intelligible and laid ripe ground for me to critically engage with Heidegger's work in a way that would have not been possible otherwise. He is, the reader may note, all over this project. As is the work of Prof. Thomas Sheehan. Prof. Sheehan's work provided me entry into Heidegger's thought in the early years of this project and I still find myself consulting and re-consulting his work. I had the luck of meeting Prof. Sheehan only one time thus far. As I took my leave at a conference, I boldly drew his attention for a moment to thank him for his illuminating talk. Expecting only a formal and brief response, Prof. Sheehan took me aside and engaged me about my project for far longer than I could have dreamed was necessary. Acts of such kindness, and of genuine interest in those of us who have barely begun our academic pursuits, is pedagogy at its finest. When I think of the teacher I would one day like to become it is this moment that comes to mind. I must also thank Prof. Sheehan for agreeing to examine this thesis. Likewise, Prof. William Desmond, who I am truly honoured to have agreed to examine this thesis and consider its adequacy, who took interest in me and my work despite its flaws and immaturity, who took time from his busy schedule to meet me for a number of coffees and helped direct my attention toward more fruitful critique, without being disparaging, only being encouraging. I am also indebted to Tony Cunningham and Daniel Watson, both of whom come from entirely different perspectives, from each other, from Heidegger. Both of whom undoubtedly set the correct 'course' and 'impetus' to this work. Tony also read large

parts of this thesis and provided invaluable feedback, proof reading, and heart-breaking critical engagements without which this project would not be what it is. Tony, I understand your reasons for leaving the university, but your students did not lose a lecturer, they lost a teacher. On that note, thanks to my students! *Without them, all this is for nothing.* Thanks also to Zachary Davis who read and provided feedback for an earlier draft of this thesis. My parents, to whom I dedicate this work. My father, for I never would have had the courage to embark on this journey without his belief and encouragement. My mother, who instilled in me an early desire for grasping at that which lies beyond our understanding. Thanks also to my brother, whose brief flirtation with madness thought me the importance of self-care and community, and that there is life beyond academia, a life that may be enriched by philosophy but in the end must always be the impetus for philosophy. Chris, who taught me that the tortoise always wins the race. My sister, who evidences daily that the hare can get there too. My colleague Daniel Murphy, who I engaged with in extended dialogue through which I learned many things, and whose scholarly persistence is a constant source of inspiration. May we continue our ascent out of this cave together! Páraic, who shows daily that one can be ‘fabulous’ and resist structures of power at the same time, and Brenda, who ‘mammied’ the both of us when we needed it. Jim, a personal shaman of sorts, who invested in keeping me healthy with herbs and remedies from distant places. Jack, who I am lucky enough to work for. Long may Brewery Coffee thrive, with its wonderful community of customers and friends. Working there gave me much needed break from the difficult work of philosophy. Jack, it is bosses like you that evidence that capitalism need not ruin every good person. There are many others who I am unable to thank in the detail they deserve, and so to all of you, all those who supported me throughout and believed in me when I could not. Thank you! It turns out the hardest thing about a project of this nature is perseverance and endurance. Without the community around me, this feat would never have been possible.

‘Those who speak of it, do not know. Those who know if it, do not speak’.

- *Dao De Ching*, Verse 56

‘Then I knew not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners and soothsayers who also say many things, but do not understand the meaning of them’.

- Socrates, Plato’s *Apology*, 22c

‘We all know that art is not truth. Art is a lie that makes us realize truth, at least the truth that is given [to] us to understand’.

- Pablo Picasso

ABSTRACT

This thesis evaluates the proximity of Heidegger's philosophy to National Socialism by exploring the significance of his thesis on the work of art in the developments of his concept of truth throughout the 1930s. During this time, two major developments emerged in Heidegger's concept of truth. First, he emphasises the significance of 'concealment'. He gives this the name both 'untruth' and 'earth' and believes that it is the 'essence' of truth. Then, he argues that the work of art has a crucial role in the disclosure of truth, for the work of art discloses the concealed 'as' concealed. From at least 1931, Heidegger was also a supporter of the growing National Socialist movement in Germany. This study argues that Heidegger's support of the National Socialists has its roots within his philosophy and particularly in his understanding of the essence of truth. This connection is deepened as the National Socialist movement takes control of the state and Heidegger's project gains increased focus on the problem of nihilism and the destiny of the German nation. Further, this study argues that although Heidegger's introduction of the work of art attempts to address the limitations that he saw in the movement, the significance of art attempts to achieve what he had hoped the National Socialist revolution would, namely an overcoming of nihilism and transition to the 'other beginning' of Western thought. Regardless, the philosophical problems at the roots of his support survive its migration to his reflections on art. By exploring the significance of the work of art in the development of his concept of truth in the context of his support of the movement, this thesis illuminates certain limitations of Heidegger's thought that left his thinking open to something like National Socialism.

ABBREVIATIONS

The following is cited texts from Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe*, listing the abbreviation first, then the full title and publishing information. Texts are in order of the *Gesamtausgabe* editions.

SZ *Sein und Zeit, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 2, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann, 2nd edn. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2018)

UK *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*, in *Holzwege, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 5, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), pp. 1-74

WD *Wozu Dichter*, in *Holzwege, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 5, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), pp. 269-320

BH *Brief über den Humanismus*, in *Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 9, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), pp. 313-364

WM *Was ist Metaphysik?*, in *Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 9, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), pp. 103-122

WW *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, in *Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 9, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), pp. 177-202

DK *Die Kehre*, in *Identität und Differenz, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 11, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006), pp. 113-124

GS *Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache (1953/54): Zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden*, in *Unterwegs zur Sprache, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 12, ed. by

Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1959), pp. 79-146

ZS *Zeit und Sein*, in *Zur Sache des Denken*, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 14, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1969), pp. 3-115

AP *Der Anfang der Abendländischen Philosophie: Auslegung des Anaximander und Parmenides*, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 35, ed. by Peter Trawny (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2012)

WWP *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet*, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 34, ed. by Hermann Mörchen (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1988)

SW *Sein und Wahrheit: 1. Die Grundfrage der Philosophie 2. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 36/37, ed. by Hartmut Tietjen (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2001)

HH *Hölderlin's Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein"*, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 39, ed. by Susanne Ziegler (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1980)

EM *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 40, ed. by Petra Jaeger (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983)

NK *Nietzsche: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst*, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 43, ed. by Bernd Heimbüchel (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985)

NM *Nietzsches metaphysischs Grundstellung im abendländischen Denken: Die Ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen*, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 44, ed. by Marion Heinz (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1986)

BP *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 65, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989)

UII-VI *Überlegungen II-VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931-1938), Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 94, ed. by Peter Trawny (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2014)

Cited English texts and their respective abbreviations, listed in alphabetical order

BT *Being and Time* rev. edn by Dennis J Schmidt, trans. by Joan Stambaugh, SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy, ed. by Dennis J. Schmidt (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010)

BaT *Being and Truth*, trans. by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, Studies in Continental Thought, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010)

BF *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: Insight Into That Which Is and Basic Principles of Thinking*, trans. by Andrew J. Mitchell, Studies in Continental Thought, ed. by John Sallis (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2012)

BPP *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. by Albert Hofstadter, rev. edn (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1982; repr. 1988)

BWP *The Beginning of Western Philosophy: Interpretations of Anaximander and Parmenides*, trans. by Richard Rojcewicz, Studies in Continental Thought, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2015)

CP *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, trans. by Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu, Studies in Continental Thought, ed. by John Sallis (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2012)

ET *The Essence of Truth: On Plato's Cave Allegory and the Theaetetus*, trans. by Ted Sadler, Athlone Contemporary European Thinkers (London: Continuum, 2002)

FM *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, trans. by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, *Studies in Continental Thought*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995)

HE 'Hölderlin's Earth and Heaven', in *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*, trans. by Keith Hollier, *Contemporary Studies in Philosophy and the Human Sciences*, ed. by Hugh J. Silverman and Graeme Nicholson (New York: Humanity Books, 2000), pp. 175-208

HHGR *Hölderlin's Hymns "Germania" and "The Rhine"*, trans. by William McNeill and Julia Ireland, *Studies in Continental Thought*, ed. by John Sallis (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2014)

HP *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, *Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy*, ed. by James M. Edie (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988; repr. 1994)

IM *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, 2nd rev. edn (London: Yale University Press, 2014)

IP *Introduction to Philosophy: Thinking and Poetizing*, trans. Phillip Jacques Braunstein, *Studies in Continental Thought*, ed. by John Sallis (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2011)

LL *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*, trans. By Wanda Torres Gregory and Yvonne Unna (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009)

LT *Logic: The Question of Truth*, trans. by Thomas Sheehan, *Studies in Continental Thought*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010)

NI *Nietzsche Volume I: The Will to Power as Art*, trans. by David Farrell-Krell (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979; repr. 1991)

NII *Nietzsche Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, trans. by David Farrell-Krell (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984; repr. 1991)

NHS *Nature, History, State: 1933-1934*, trans. by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (London: Bloomsbury, 2015)

OF *Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, trans. by John Van Buren, *Studies in Continental Thought*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999)

OA *The Origin of the Work of Art*, trans. by Albert Hofstadter, in *Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964)*, ed. by David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1978; repr. Routledge Classics, 2011), pp. 83-140

PII-VI *Ponderings II-VI: Black Notebooks 1931-38*, trans. by Richard Rojcewicz, *Studies in Continental Thought*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2016)

PM *Parmenides*, trans. by André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz, *Studies in Continental Thought*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992)

TE *The Event*, trans. by Richard Rojcewicz, *Studies in Continental Thought*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2013)

WT *What Calls for Thinking*, trans. by Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray, in *Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964)*, ed. by David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1978; repr. Routledge Classics, 2011), pp. 261-277

WM *What is Metaphysics?*, trans. by David Farrell Krell, in *Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964)*, ed. by David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1978; repr. Routledge Classics, 2011), pp. 41-57

WP *What are Poets For?* in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. by Albert Hofstadter
(New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1971), pp. 87-14

INTRODUCTION

In the decade preceding *Being and Time*, Martin Heidegger published ‘absolutely nothing’.¹ His reputation may have placed him ahead of his peers for consideration for the chair of philosophy in Marburg in 1925 but, with few publications to his name, he was rejected.² Seeking to satisfy the requirements for consideration, Heidegger rushed to print the first two (of a planned three) divisions of *the first part* of *Being and Time*. As it turned out, being hasty led to disappointment,³ and the remainder of this work never saw the light of day.⁴ In fact, Heidegger is said to have set the third division of the first part to flame.⁵ In a letter to Richardson in 1962 Heidegger presents his thought as if it were a unified whole.⁶ On the contrary, Heidegger’s ‘path’ of thought is rife with such meanders, hesitations, and re-evaluations.

In the years between 1927 and 1937 there are two such re-evaluations in his thought. In *Being and Time* (1927) Heidegger thinks of truth as a process of the ‘disclosing’ (*Erscholssenschaft*) or ‘unconcealing’ (*Unverborgenheit*) of things through the being of the human being, what he calls *Dasein*.⁷ Throughout the 1930s the question of the essence of truth became a central concern in his project, and he refocussed his efforts on the significance of ‘concealment’ (*Verbergung*).⁸ Consequently, Heidegger’s project is framed anew, where the task of raising the question of the meaning of being became an attempt to think (and ‘ground’) the truth

¹Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time* (London: University of California Press, 1993; repr. 1995), p. 1

²*Ibid.*, pp. 479-481.

³*GS*, p. 89. ‘Vielleicht ist es der Grundmangel des Buches “Sein und Zeit”, daß ich mich zu früh zu weit vorgewagt habe.’ ‘It is perhaps the basic flaw of the book “Being and Time” that I ventured too far too soon.’ See also, *UII-VI*, p. 20.

⁴Rüdiger Safranski, *Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil*, trans. by Ewals Osers (London: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 171. Safranski informs us that Heidegger continued to work on what was to comprise the latter parts of this work. For example, his 1927 class *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology* was a ‘draft version’ of Division III of the first part of *Being and Time*.

⁵Daniel O. Dahlstrom, ‘Transcendental Truth and the Truth That Prevails’, in *Transcendental Heidegger*, ed. by Steven Crowell and Jeff Malpas (California: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 63-73 (p. 67).

⁶See, Martin Heidegger, ‘Preface’, in William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 4th edn (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), pp. viii-xxii (pp. xiv-xxii).

⁷*SZ*, pp. 282-305.

⁸Heidegger’s first public attempt to re-engage with the significance of concealment after *Being and Time* was in 1930, in a lecture titled ‘On the Essence of Truth’. *WW*, esp. pp. 193-196.

of being.⁹ Secondly, in 1935 Heidegger lectured on *The Origin of the Work of Art*, where he began to stress the significance of the work of art in the disclosure of truth. During this time, Heidegger also became a member of the National Socialist Party.

In an attempt to get to grips with what is at stake in these developments, this study investigates the role of art in the development of Heidegger's reflections on the essence of truth. In due course, we will see how Heidegger's notion of truth, and the importance of concealment and the nothing (*das Nichts*) therein, become understood as 'untruth' (*Unwahrheit*), a notion which comes to its fruition in the concept of 'earth' (*Erde*). The concept of earth gets substantial treatment in his 1934/35 lecture series on Hölderlin, as well as his 1935/35 lecture *The Origin of the Work of Art*. Heidegger understands earth as 'self-concealing' (*Sichverschließende*), and he believes that it can be 'revealed' through the work of art.¹⁰ He turns to poetry, and particularly the poetry of Hölderlin, to reveal the significance of the concealed earth.¹¹ But there is a certain tension inherent in bringing the self-concealing to view, for how do we reveal what is 'hidden' and 'self-closing'?

The *Black Notebooks* reveal that Heidegger saw a potential parallel in his philosophy and the burgeoning National Socialist movement, and especially in his reflections on the essence of truth.¹² By investigating the role of art in the essence of truth in context of his support, the connections between his thought and his involvement with the National Socialists come under sharper focus and scrutiny. We can already suggest this connection. The earth comes to language through poetry, and the poet Hölderlin is understood to name this earth both 'holy' (*Heiliges*) and 'homeland' (*Heimat*).¹³ Talk of the homeland is not incidental. In a 1933/34 lecture series, Heidegger claims that the 'tremendous moment into which National Socialism is being driven today is the coming to be of a new spirit of the entire earth'.¹⁴ This is

⁹Heidegger discusses the difference between these two (closely related) projects in his *Contributions to Philosophy*, where he presents this change as a clarification that attempts to resist the various misinterpretations of *Being and Time*. *BP*, pp. 259-260. However, there is more at stake in this change than what Heidegger claims here, which a sufficient understanding of the developments within Heidegger's thinking help identify. I suggest one of these differences (between the meaning of being/truth of being) below. This receives a more substantial treatment in chapter three, see Section 3.6 of this study.

¹⁰*UK*, p. 42.

¹¹*HH*, esp. p. 250. *HHGR*, esp. pp. 226-227. See also, André Schuwer, 'Nature and the Holy: On Heidegger's Interpretation of Hölderlin's Hymn "Wie wenn am Feiertage"', *Research in Phenomenology*, 7, 1 (1977), 225-237.

¹²See, for example, *UII-VI*, p. 6, p. 111, and pp. 134-135.

¹³*HH*, pp. 78-104.

¹⁴His emphasis. *SW*, p. 148. *BaT*, p. 116. 'Dieser ungeheure Augenblick, in den der Nationalsozialismus heute gedrängt ist, ist das Werden eines neuen Geistes der Erde überhaupt'.

one resolution of the tension of revealing the self-concealed, a process he ties to the National Socialist movement. His concept of earth, then, first gets treatment in light of the significance he sees in the National Socialist movement, before its poetic and philosophical treatment in his lecture series on Hölderlin and in his *The Origin of the Work of Art*. To evaluate the intersection of Heidegger's involvement with the National Socialist Party and his philosophy, one must clarify the role of art in his understanding of the essence of truth.

It is this sort of connection between Heidegger's philosophy and his support of the Party that give Rockmore cause to claim that 'Heidegger's philosophical thought and his Nazism are interdependent and cannot be separated', and that he 'turned to National Socialism on the basis of his philosophy'.¹⁵ On the other hand, Engelland argues that there is no relation here, for Heidegger's philosophy, transcendental in nature, is concerned only with 'our experience of our experience'.¹⁶ There is a middle way available. O'Brien approximates this way when he discusses Heidegger's attempt to 'exploit the central concepts of his own thought in the service of a noxious political vision'.¹⁷ However, this evades the philosophical issues at play when he pledges his support, for O'Brien implicitly suggests that his turn to the National Socialists results from a distortion to his philosophy. There is certainly truth to this. But it was Heidegger, after all, who firmly believed that his support of the National Socialist regime 'lay in the essence of his philosophy'.¹⁸ In this light, Thomson offers a poignant remark when he contends that 'what remains [both] dangerous and promising in Heidegger cannot be entirely separated but, instead, need to be thought in relation to one another'.¹⁹ With this sentiment in mind, I am not so sure we can sanitise Heidegger's thought from its problematic elements, problems that remain coherent with his support of the National Socialist regime and inseparable from his philosophical project, certainly at the time of this study at least (1927-1937). Even if we also maintain that there is something of profound importance occurring with Heidegger with which we must engage, if we are to 'do' philosophy after him.

¹⁵Tom Rockmore, *On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy* (Oxford: University of California Press, 1992), p. 5.

¹⁶Chad Engelland, *Heidegger's Shadow: Kant, Husserl and the Transcendental Turn* (London: Routledge, 2017), pp. 232-233.

¹⁷Mahon O'Brien, *Heidegger, History and the Holocaust* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), p. 4.

¹⁸Karl Löwith, 'My Last Meeting with Heidegger in Rome, 1936', *New German Critique*, 45, special issue on Bloch and Heidegger (1988), 115-116 (p. 115).

¹⁹Iain D. Thomson, *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 5.

Heidegger's support of the National Socialist Party has its roots in his philosophy, and especially his understanding of the essence of truth.²⁰ This conviction is deepened as he begins to explore the importance of the role of 'destiny' (*Geschick*) and the elite in national transformation, wrapped in the rubric of other beginnings.²¹ As it turns out, neither is it the case that his flight into the significance of art is a means for him to move away from what drew his support to the National Socialists, as some commentators contend.²² Although this focus on the work of art may have been an admission, of sorts, of the inadequacy of the National Socialist movement in achieving the 'leap' (*Sprung*) into the other beginning of Western thought, it seems to me that it is precisely this 'hope' that should come into question when raising the problem of Heidegger's involvement with the National Socialists. His hope in other beginnings has its dangers, most readily evident in his initial support of the Party and, although this support wavers, it is precisely in light of this vision that the significance of art becomes a central focus in his thought.²³

Further questions guide this project, questions that remain largely implicit but are worthwhile drawing the reader's attention to. Given the depth of Heidegger's thought, and its far-ranging influence and impact on the field of philosophy and beyond, the Heidegger controversy seems to me to be a crucial case study in the question of the role and responsibility of the philosopher in society. *What* is the role of the thinker in society? *How* does his or her thought bare an effect on the direction that society takes? Is the philosopher responsible for how their ideas are received by

²⁰As the *Black Notebooks* reveal, Heidegger also believed that this was the case. I explore the intersection Heidegger saw between his philosophy and the National Socialist movement in the early 1930s in chapter one.

²¹These come under critical review in chapter two and three of this study.

²²Cf., for example, Janae Scholtz, *The Invention of a People: Heidegger and Deleuze on Art and the Political* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), p. 197. She claims, '[o]ne can read Heidegger's introduction of this discussion on art as a clear denial of the politics of the day and as favouring the attempt to address the overcoming of metaphysics and the transformation of human *Dasein* philosophically or by other means'.

²³Cf., however, John D. Caputo, 'Demythologizing Heidegger: *Aletheia* and the History of Being', *Review of Metaphysics*, 41, 3 (1988), 519-546 (p. 519). 'Heidegger's best insights [on *aletheia*] are obscured by his penchant for heroic tales and privileged epochs, for first dawns and new beginnings'. This implicitly concedes, however, that Heidegger's 'best insights' can be rendered without this obscuration. This is an important question to raise, but I am not so sure that this is possible. Or at least, that this will be enough to escape some of the problems in Heidegger's thought. This is not to suggest, however, that there is a lack of significant philosophical weight behind these insights, and that we cannot learn from Heidegger because his thinking leads *him* to Nazism. Due to this interdependence, it makes our task more difficult, but, in my view, this also makes engaging with Heidegger both more important and more rewarding, for perhaps it is precisely this interdependence that makes his thinking so crucial to engage with if we are to learn something about the possible dangers of philosophical thought itself. If the Heidegger controversy teaches us anything, it is that profundity does not *de facto* lead us toward the good. I reflect on this further in the conclusion to this thesis.

the community of people that they are introduced to? Can philosophy penetrate and articulate the deeper problems that give rise to the instability of our world? And, perhaps most importantly, what role does philosophy play in safeguarding the world from the dangers that thought can uncover? Given his own involvement with the National Socialist regime was one which endeavoured to shape the movement,²⁴ and given that his work after 1950 is largely a sustained confrontation with the modern ‘technological’ meaning of being with the goal of transcending the grasp of technology on contemporary society,²⁵ it seems to me that Heidegger’s clear and impassioned support of the early stages of the National Socialist movement was motivated by precisely these concerns. Retrospectively we can see that he got it wrong, but in the early 1930s the issue was not so clear cut. There were some who saw this danger. How did Heidegger, an admittedly brilliant thinker, miss what seemed inevitable to others?

I am getting ahead of myself. By investigating a development in Heidegger’s thought I am already situating this study against those that would argue for a unity thesis in his thought.²⁶ It is one thing to say that Heidegger’s thought had a singular focus—what he misleadingly abbreviates as the question of being (*Seinsfrage*)²⁷—it is entirely another to say that his approach to this singular focus did not change. A change of focus that often renders substantially different insights and conclusions. As Heidegger made sure to remind us: ‘[w]ays, not works’.²⁸

A shift in approach to his focus on ‘being’ occurs in the 1930s. This is perhaps most evident when the ‘meaning of being’ is instead rendered by him as the ‘truth of being’.²⁹ The shift from meaning to truth is an example of a seemingly

²⁴*UII-VI*, pp. 134-135. *PII-VI*, pp. 98-99. See also, *UII-VI*, pp. 133-134, where Heidegger claims that the distinction between theory and praxis is derivative of a more primordial unity.

²⁵Thomson explores this further in his *Heidegger, Art and Postmodernity*. See, esp. pp. 25-32 and pp. 192-212. However, the focus on the technological meaning of being does not come into explicit focus until after the time period of interest to this thesis.

²⁶See, for example, Carol J. White, *Time and Death: Heidegger’s Analysis of Finitude* (England: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), esp. p. ii: ‘There is no distinct ‘early’ and ‘late’ Heidegger, in my view, only earlier and later ways of saying the same thing’. I also raise this problem in my Literature Review, below.

²⁷See Chapter 1, n. 63.

²⁸On this, see, Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Heidegger’s Ways*, trans. by John W. Stanley (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 10-11.

²⁹As far as I can ascertain, Heidegger does not provide a clear reason as to why he decides, in or around 1934, to render being (*Sein*) with the archaic spelling being (*Seyn*). At this time, he will often use being and being interchangeably, sometimes suggestive of an important distinction but sometimes not. For example, in *BP*, pp. 72-73, ‘the question of being’ (*die Frage nach dem Seyn*) and the ‘being question’ (*Seinsfrage*) are used to discuss the same thing, whereas on pp. 259-260 he draws a distinction between the ‘truth of being’ (*die Wahrheit des Seyns*) and the ‘understanding of being’ (*Seinsverständnis*). It is likely that he begins to use the archaic spelling due to his engagement with

inconsequential claim,³⁰ where on closer examination it turns out that something more sinister lurks underneath. The rubric of the truth of *beyng* has important connections with his involvement with the National Socialists, where the disruption to social norms inherent in raising a question about the source of meaningful intelligibility becomes instead the importance of grounding certain meanings over others by the hands of an elite.³¹ There are important nuances to his thesis on the elite, and likewise often times some of the more overt connections with National Socialist doctrine resist being integrated into its base forms. I am thinking of his call to ‘blood’ and ‘soil’,³² and his desire to reclaim the German homeland.³³ In this light, when examining Heidegger’s commitment to National Socialism, the nature of the development that took place in his thought, especially in and around the 1930s, requires great care and clarity.

The development in question gives Heidegger the means to find a greater coherence between his own thinking and the National Socialist movement.³⁴ But is there a dimension of his thought that resists his attempt to be the thinker of his

Hölderlin, who also used this spelling. However, this is not a choice on Hölderlin’s part, but instead simply the way it was still spelt in the 18th Century. Because Heidegger believed that Hölderlin’s poetry speaks from beyond the metaphysical tradition, understood by Heidegger as the framework of thought that has defined Western thinking since Plato, then the spelling ‘*beyng*’ (*Seyn*) seems to provide for Heidegger a sense of being beyond its ‘forgottenness’ in this tradition. Regardless of whether we follow Heidegger here or not, in line with his attempt to move beyond metaphysics, ‘*beyng*’, for him, seems to emphasise his focus on the concealment of truth, whereas ‘being’ comes to represent to way being has been represented (and ‘forgotten’) throughout metaphysics. This is the view of McNeill and Ireland, who point out as much in their ‘Translators’ Forward’ to *HHGR*, p. xiv. However, as Susanne Ziegler, the editor of the 1934/35 lecture series on Hölderlin, points out, Heidegger is not consistent in this distinction. See the ‘Editors Epilogue’ in *HH*, pp. 295-296. *HHGR*, pp. 268-269. For sake of consistency in this thesis, I use ‘*beyng*’ when quoting Heidegger and other commentators when they also utilise this spelling, and also when emphasising Heidegger’s specific emphasis on the fact that *beyng* conceals itself. I use ‘being’, then, when referring to ‘being’ understood as a kind of meaningful intelligibility that is disclosed in, and through, the *concealed* understanding of the meaning of being of *Dasein*. For more on this usage of being, See my discussion in Chapter 1, n. 63. When the specific meaning is somewhat equivocal, referring to either senses, or both, I opt to use ‘being’ rather than ‘*beyng*’. The equivocity of this term is perhaps necessary. This is because, as the reader may have noticed, the former (one might say, more primordial) sense of being as concealed *beyng* is (despite certain complications to this notion that occur through the development of this concept and are fleshed out further as this study progresses) the implicit meaning of being sustained within the facticity of *Dasein*, and is, thus, the origin of the irruption of meaningful intelligibility (i.e., ‘being’),

³⁰In a 1932 lecture series Heidegger claims that these are both the same question: ‘the question of the essence of truth [...] is the question of Being! Understanding of Being’. *AP*, p. 112. *BP*, p. 86. As I go on to show, however, there are important differences in both renderings of what is arguably a singular project.

³¹I explore this further in chapter three.

³²*SW*, pp 263-264.

³³*HH*, pp. 104-105.

³⁴I explore this further in chapter one.

time?³⁵ Is there something within his thinking that transcends *his* understanding of its significance?³⁶ To reduce Heidegger's philosophy to Nazi ideology ignores a depth in his thinking that resists this charge.³⁷ But to reduce *his own belief* in the coherence between his philosophy and the movement to an act of self-deception at the same moment seems to charge Heidegger with an ignorance that undermines our desire to preserve the value of his thinking in the first place.³⁸ This raises the distinction between the man and his thought, a distinction that obscures more than it clarifies, for the purposes of this study at least. Instead, we must keep in mind that Heidegger found a home for his thinking within the National Socialist state, at least for a while, and this thesis sets out to discover on what grounds he managed to do so. This is not to suggest that this is the only home for Heidegger's thought. But until we are clear about what lies within his thought that sought expression through the National Socialist movement then we cannot find fruitful ground for his thought that resists this darker potential. The goal of this thesis is not to dismiss neither the man 'Heidegger' or his philosophy. Rather, by evaluating the proximity between his thought and his support of National Socialism this study seeks to go some way to discover the means in which to lead this thinking beyond its inherent dangers.

This thesis focuses on the years between 1930 and 1937, which includes the years of his most vocal support for the regime.³⁹ One unavoidable part of the

³⁵See, for example, O'Brien, *Heidegger, History, Holocaust*, p. 78 and p. 126.

³⁶Felix Ó Murchadha, *The Time of Revolution: Kairos and Chronos in Heidegger* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013; repr. 2014), p. 2 and pp. 174-184.

³⁷Cf., for example, Emmanuel Faye, 'Nazi Foundations in Heidegger's Work', trans. by Alexis Watson and Richard J. Golsan, *South Central Review*, 23, 1 (2006), 55-66 (p. 56). He claims, 'it is absolutely impossible to separate [National Socialist] ideology from philosophy in Heidegger's work'.

³⁸Ó Murchadha approximates a defence like this when he justifies Heidegger's appointment as rector of Freiburg University by claiming that Heidegger, in accepting this position, failed to take into account his 'own transformation of the concept of possibility in *Being and Time*'. In other words, Heidegger was not sufficiently Heideggerian. Ó Murchadha, *The Time of Revolution*, p. 2.

³⁹Some of the most troubling documentation from Heidegger's support at this time come from his time as rector of Freiburg University, which comprised of an academic year beginning in May of 1933. However, Heidegger discusses the significance of the Nazi's much earlier, beginning in a letter to his brother in 1931. Martin Heidegger, 'Martin und Fritz Heidegger: Briefe', in *Heidegger und der Antisemitismus: Positionen im Widerstreit, Mit Briefen von Martin und Fritz Heidegger* (Freiburg: Herder, 2016), pp. 15-142 (p. 22). In 1936, he still maintained to a friend that his support of the National Socialist party lay in the 'essence of his philosophy'. Löwith, 'My Last Meeting with Heidegger in Rome', p. 115. However, it is during his time as rector of Freiburg University where the most controversial of passages are to be found. See, for example, his address in 1934 to the 600 or so recently employed peoples of Freiburg. Martin Heidegger, 'Follow the Führer! (1934)', trans. by D. D. Runes, in *Martin Heidegger: Philosophical and Political Writings*, ed. by Manfred Stassen (London: Continuum, 2003), pp. 12-15. As Heidegger concludes (p. 15), '[f]or in what that resolve demands, we are but following the glorious will of our Führer. To become one of his loyal following means to desire wholeheartedly and undeviatingly that the German people may once more find its growing unity, its true worth and true power, and may procure thereby its endurance and greatness as a work State. *To the man of this unprecedented resolve, our Führer Adolf Hitler, let us give a threefold "Heil!"*'.

development in his thinking in the 1930s is the introduction of the significance of the work of art in his thought. Most famously argued for in his 1935/36 lecture on *The Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger comes to believe that the work of art, and especially poetry, has a crucial role in the disclosure of truth to a people. That truth is now thought of in relation to the *Dasein* of the nation, as opposed to the individual in *Being and Time*, already evidences some of the developments in his concept of truth. However, in *Being and Time* Heidegger labours to safeguard his understanding of *Dasein* from the notion of subjectivity, and so this development has its roots in that text, as do many of the developments brought under scrutiny in this thesis.

As a result, I begin this thesis with a contextual chapter that examines Heidegger's notion of truth in *Being and Time* (1927), as well as highlighting certain tensions within that text that he tries to surpass throughout the 1930s. One such example is his conviction that although beings 'are' independent of *Dasein*, because being only *is* through the understanding of being of *Dasein* then what 'is' *is* only that which is disclosed *through Dasein's* understanding.⁴⁰ This position leaves his concept of nature (*Natur*) in tension. Nature is understood by him as that which is always reduced to the understanding of the meaning of being available to *Dasein*,⁴¹ and yet in other moments, he speaks of it with a sense of what overpowers *Dasein*.⁴² Understood as overpowering, Heidegger suggests that nature resists being reduced to the meaningful world into which *Dasein* has been thrown.

Chapter two focusses on his 1931/32 lecture series *On the Essence of Truth: On Plato's Allegory of the Cave and the Theaetetus*. I begin with his lecture series on Plato because what is at stake in Heidegger's reflections on the essence of truth is to establish the possibility of moving from the 'first' to the 'other' beginning of Western thinking, and he believes that it is the work of Plato which guides the first history of

emphasis. A further study would be needed to see in what way his thinking develops after this time, and what these later developments suggests for his support of the movement. For there are substantial developments in his thinking beyond 1937 also, such as his critique of the will, especially as he interprets it in the philosophy of Nietzsche.

⁴⁰SZ, p. 244. BT, p. 178. 'Seiendes ist unabhängig von Erfahrung, Kenntnis und Erfassen, wodurch es erschlossen, entdeckt und bestimmt wird. Sein aber "ist" nur im Verstehen des Seienden, zu dessen Sein so etwas wie Seinsverständnis gehört'. This passage professes Heidegger's adherence to the transcendental reduction, in accordance with his support of the method of phenomenology. Heidegger, however, departs from his mentor in phenomenology, Husserl, to establish his own approach in phenomenology. I unpack this further in Section 1.2.

⁴¹SZ, p. 85. BT, p. 63.

⁴²SZ, pp. 201-202. BT, p. 147

Western thinking.⁴³ The task of establishing the other beginning comes with great urgency, for he argues that the history of the first beginning culminates in an age of sweeping nihilism that risks emptying the West of all meaningful existence.⁴⁴ By beginning with this lecture series, I establish the first major development in Heidegger's understanding of the essence of truth since *Being and Time*, where the concept of 'untruth' receives substantial attention through his interpretation of the figure that for him represents the origin of the first beginning of Western thinking. The concept of nature makes a striking return in this lecture series also. He now explicitly considers it the 'overpowering' (*Übermacht*),⁴⁵ suggesting that Heidegger is beginning to depart from certain positions he held in *Being and Time*. The significance of art enters into the picture also, and Heidegger argues that the great poets play a crucial role in revealing nature to a historical people.⁴⁶ However he does not, at this stage at least, have a fully developed thesis on the significance of the work of art.

Chapter three builds on these themes, focussing attention on the poet Hölderlin who Heidegger contends names nature (now understood as 'earth') the 'holy' and the 'homeland'. Hölderlin is a poet that affords great privilege in Heidegger's thought, and his understanding of the significance of the work of art seems to entirely rest on this poet. As Heidegger claims in his 1934/35 lecture series *Hölderlin's Hymns: "Germania" and "The Rhine"*—the focus of this chapter—to discover the essence of art requires an encounter with 'solely and precisely Hölderlin's poetry'.⁴⁷ As it turns out, Heidegger believes that Hölderlin's poetry is 'of' or 'from' the other beginning that he endeavoured to establish.⁴⁸ Wishing to avoid a philosophical 'assault' on his poetry, Heidegger implores us to stand in the 'domain in which [Hölderlin's] poetry

⁴³See, *BP*, p. 216. *CP*, p. 169, when he informs us that the 'issue in these considerations [...] is solely the history of the ways of dealing with the guiding question [the question of the truth of being] under the essential dominance of Platonism, with the task of playing over from the first to the other beginning'.

⁴⁴*NM*, p. 166. *III*, p. 159. 'Der Nihilismus ist das Ereignis des Schwindens aller Gewichte aus allen Dingen, die Tatsache des Fehlens des Schwergewichts'. 'Nihilism is the event of the disappearance of all weight from all things, the fact of the absence of an emphatic weight'. Trans. mod. The German word *Schwergewichts* is generally used as a term for 'heavyweight', as in the category of boxing. It can also mean stress, or emphasis. Here I have rendered it as emphatic weight, as the idea is that when the uppermost values get devalued, such as in the death of God, reality loses its meaningful centre and thus becomes permeated by nihilism. In a similar vein of thought, Farrell-Krell has rendered the term 'centre of gravity'.

⁴⁵*WWP*, p. 237. *ET*, pp. 169-170.

⁴⁶*WWP*, pp. 60-64.

⁴⁷*HH*, 22. *HHGR*, p. 23

⁴⁸*BP*, p. 204. See also, *HH*, p. 1.

unfolds its power'.⁴⁹ There are important questions to be raised in this encounter between Heidegger and Hölderlin. Heidegger utilised this encounter to establish the significance of the 'homeland', but is this homeland a straightforward appeal to founding the National Socialist state? Or is there something more nuanced happening in his discussion of it? Heidegger's growing distance with the Party would certainly make it seem so, and yet connotations of 'blood' and 'soil' are difficult to forget, despite his attempt to bring a philosophical depth to these categories.⁵⁰ And what of this privileging of Hölderlin? Why must it be through him that the earth gets its name? And why as homeland?

Plato may get the history of metaphysics started but, by proclaiming the death of God and attempting to 'invert' Platonism, Nietzsche is understood to bring this history to an end.⁵¹ Having surveyed Heidegger's hope for what lies beyond the history of metaphysics through his encounter with Hölderlin, the fourth chapter deals with his first lecture series on Nietzsche, *The Will to Power as Art*. This is a thinker Heidegger sought to bring to a 'full unfolding' because he believed that there was resource in his thought for transitioning to the 'other beginning' of which Hölderlin is understood to have founded.⁵² In this chapter, the various themes of the thesis coalesce, as Heidegger tries to utilise resources in Nietzsche's thought to develop a conception of truth *as* appearance with a renewed focus on the importance of sensuous reality. To establish this, he draws on his concept of earth. Due to this focus, the importance of the work of art takes centre stage, as it is through its capacity to disclose beauty through appearances that truth is revealed. I take this opportunity to explore further certain limitations of Heidegger's thought. In *Being and Time*, the givenness of meaning is reduced to its disclosure through *Dasein*. Subsequent years see him try to move beyond this reduction, yet there is great difficulty in providing the gift of givenness an adequate voice. Heidegger comes to understand this gift as a primordial 'silence'.⁵³ But in his search for a spoken silence he often leaves us short-changed.

⁴⁹Emphasis removed. *HH*, p. 19. *HHGR*, p. 21.

⁵⁰*SW*, pp. 263-264. *BaT*, p. 201.

⁵¹*NK*, p. 13. *NI*, p. 10.

⁵²*EM*, p. 39. *IM*, p. 40. As he claims in his *Contributions*, '[t]he last one who asked the question of "truth", and asked about it most passionately, is Nietzsche'. *BP*, p. 361. *CP*, p. 285. See also, *BP*, p. 359. *CP*, pp. 283-284, where Heidegger draws our attention to his 1931/32 lecture series on Plato, and his 1936/37 lecture course on Nietzsche for his pursuit of the essence of truth. Both texts are central in this study.

⁵³*BP*, p. 510. *CP*, p. 401.

The conclusion to this thesis considers the place of nihilism and destiny, the category of the people, and the importance of other beginnings, in his thought throughout the 1930's. A further study would be needed to evaluate whether these problems remain after the time period under investigation, or whether Heidegger successfully transcends them. I make some suggestions to the contrary, as one major theme that I critically evaluate—the notion of place or *topos*—remains an intrinsic and necessary part of Heidegger's philosophical vision. Accordingly, I reflect on the shortfalls of his philosophical project, and wonder what might be achieved by an ethics that precedes Heidegger's fundamental ontology.

Methodology

This project focusses on Heidegger's interpretation of these individuals because Heidegger understands these thinkers to be significant in his understanding of the history of metaphysics. The significance of these thinkers and poets *to him* is what is of significance to this project. Therefore, I take Heidegger on his word that his various confrontations with the philosophical giants of the Western tradition are of central importance in his attempts to approach the question of the meaning and truth of being.⁵⁴

Secondly, this project is not concerned with whether Heidegger interprets these figures 'correctly', 'justifiably', 'violently' etc., and given the extensive scholarship that testifies to this, it is assumed that he probably does not.⁵⁵ Regardless, whether Heidegger's Plato, or Heidegger's Nietzsche, or otherwise, is a fair interpretation of the thinker in question is outside the scope of this project. What is relevant for this project is how Heidegger understood and developed his interpretations of these thinkers for the subject matter of this thesis, namely the significance of the role of art in the development of Heidegger's reflections on the essence of truth.

This study is primarily a hermeneutic investigation. In order to adequately understand the context of the development in Heidegger's thought, the investigation

⁵⁴In *Being and Time*, this is understood as the destruction (*Destruction*) of the Western philosophical tradition, see, *SZ*, pp. 27-36, which was to be complete in the unpublished second part of *Being and Time*. This sentiment continues after plans for the remainder of *Being and Time* were dropped, and with it the rubric of destruction. See, for example, *BP*, p. 216. *CP*, p. 169.

⁵⁵Wrathall, for example, claims that Heidegger was a 'notoriously violent reader of other philosophers'. Mark Wrathall, 'Heidegger on Plato, Truth and Unconcealment: The 1931-32 Lecture on the Essence of Truth', *Inquiry*, 47, 5 (2004), 443-463 (p. 445). I discuss some reasons for this, in light of Heidegger specific hermeneutical approach to reading a text, see Section 2.1.

begins by way of a brief exposition and analysis of Heidegger's position on a number of themes in *Being and Time* relevant to the research question of this thesis, the role of art in Heidegger's reflection on truth in the decade between 1927-1937. I proceed chronologically, following the relevant threads of this research question from *Being and Time* through his 1931/32 lecture series on Plato, his 1934/35 lecture series on Hölderlin, and his 1936/37 lecture series on Nietzsche, moving between exposition and commentary of the lecture series, and then analysis in relation to the thesis question.

This study does not pursue the development of Heidegger's thought after 1937. Every study has its limitations. I focus my attention on this decade for two primary reasons. First, this decade marks a development in Heidegger's thought that reaches fruition in what scholarship has deemed the 'turn' (*Kehre*). Many interpretations of the significance of this development exist within scholarship, and throughout this study I engage with these interpretations and develop an understanding of what is at stake with this term. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, this decade comprises the particular years in which Heidegger is a supporter of the National Socialist movement. Thus, it has special interest for those concerned with his support and its relation to his philosophy. A further study would have to deal with what emerges after this thought, and so besides a brief comment here and there I neglect a detailed analysis of what is at stake in further developments of his thought, such as his critique of the will and his concept of *Gelassenheit*.

There is also an historico-critical dimension to this work. Heidegger's philosophical developments at this time come from his desire to address the limitations he sees in his approach in *Being and Time*, but also as a means to address the decadence he sees in his contemporary environment, 'exhorting' the nations *Dasein*.⁵⁶ The consequence of this latter focus of his thought at this time gives Heidegger cause for faith in the National Socialist Party under the leadership of Adolf Hitler. As he claims in his *Black Notebooks*, '[t]he great experience and fortune that the Führer has awakened a new actuality, giving our thinking the correct course and impetus. Otherwise, despite all the thoroughness, it would have remained lost in itself and would only with difficulty have found its way to effectiveness'.⁵⁷ Hence, the connection between the specific developments in Heidegger's understanding of truth

⁵⁶*UII-VI*, pp. 14-15. *PII-VI*, p. 12.

⁵⁷My emphasis. *UII-VI*, p. 111, *PII-VI*, p. 81.

under the guidance of the significance that he saw in his contemporary era is brought under review. This study traces the ‘course’ and ‘impetus’ that Heidegger believed Hitler (and the National Socialist movement in general) to have provided his thought at a moment when he also lost faith in his own philosophical project. This new emphasis gives rise to the necessity of overcoming the nihilism he witnessed in his contemporary era, by entering into dialogue with the poet Hölderlin in order to establish a people and a nation, thus transitioning to the other beginning of Western thought. In this critical juncture between Heidegger and Hitler, then, the significance of the poet Hölderlin makes a stark and central entrance into his thought. As such, understanding the development of Heidegger’s concept of truth and the role of the work of art therein in relation to how he viewed and related to his contemporary world, is a fruitful approach to an inquiry that seeks to shed light on the intersection between Heidegger’s philosophy and his support of the National Socialist movement.

However, although I situate this in context of his involvement with the National Socialists, and thus reflect on the philosophical precedent in his thought for his support of the movement, I do not pursue a historically contextualised investigation of the National Socialist regime in general, one where, for example, the significance of the ‘homeland’ for Heidegger would be evaluated in relation to other intellectuals of the Nazi regime. Such work has been done elsewhere.⁵⁸ Because the focus of this study is to discover the precedent in Heidegger’s thought for support of the National Socialist movement, in view of furthering critical reflection on the limitations of *his* philosophical project in light of this support, a study which also sought to situate this in the other thinkers of this time is beyond the scope of this project.

Literature Review

Heidegger’s investigation into the nature of art is central to the development of his philosophy. Mitchell examines how, through reflection on the work of art in his *The Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger rethinks the lack of priority of space in *Being and Time*.⁵⁹ In a similar vein, Malpas sees the theme of place arise through the work of art,⁶⁰ a theme he finds inadequately explored in *Being and Time*.⁶¹ Magrini

⁵⁸See, for example, O’Brien, *Heidegger, History, Holocaust*, pp. 48-76.

⁵⁹Andrew J. Mitchell, *Heidegger Among the Sculptors: Body, Space and the Art of Dwelling* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), p. 9.

⁶⁰Jeff Malpas, *Heidegger’s Topology: Being, Place, World* (London: The MIT Press, 2006), pp. 196-197.

emphasises the importance of *The Origin* in rethinking the notion of *Dasein*,⁶² which Bresnahan claims is in order to surpass the ‘problem of anthropocentrism in *Being and Time*’.⁶³

With a similar emphasis to Bresnahan, Richardson claims that *The Origin of the Work of Art* ‘reached a level that is attainable only by Heidegger II [i.e., the later Heidegger]’.⁶⁴ This is because in this work Heidegger thinks the ‘primacy of Being [over *Dasein*] in the coming to pass of truth’.⁶⁵ This reading relies on his argument that Heidegger’s thought develops from a focus on *Dasein* to ‘being itself’ (*Sein selbst*),⁶⁶ an argument that has come under critical evaluation in recent years, most notably by Sheehan. He calls Richardson’s thesis the ‘classic paradigm’ of Heideggerian scholarship.⁶⁷ Sheehan instead argues that Heidegger’s project as it developed remained committed to the ‘phenomenological reduction’, which he understands to be the reduction of the category of being to the specific focus of the meaning of being available to *Dasein*.⁶⁸ His stress on the reduction of being to meaning proves useful, clarifying the significance of Heidegger’s later focus on ‘being itself’, or the ‘clearing’, without substantialising being beyond the human being. For Sheehan, *Dasein* and being ‘itself’ are the same phenomena from two ‘viewpoints’,⁶⁹ where the latter focus serves to emphasise the condition of possibility for the sustaining of the meaningfulness of things in the ‘open’ space that *Dasein*

⁶¹Ibid., pp. 65-146.

⁶²Magrini also discusses Heidegger’s attempts to ‘de-center’ *Dasein* through his work on art and poetry. James Magrini, ‘The Work of Art and Truth of Being as “Historical”: Reading Being and Time, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” and the “Turn” in Heidegger’s Philosophy of the 1930s’, *Philosophy Today*, 54, 4 (2009), 346-363.

⁶³Aili Brenahan, ‘The Dynamic Phenomenon of Art in Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art”’, *European Journal of Philosophy*, 25, 2 (2017), 294-311 (p. 298).

⁶⁴William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 4th edn (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), p. 417.

⁶⁵Richardson, *Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 409. Guignon has a similar emphasis. See, Charles Guignon, ‘Truth as Disclosure: Art, Language, History’, in *Heidegger Reexamined Volume 3: Art Poetry, Technology*, ed. by Hubert Mark Wrathall (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 47-62 (p. 53). See also, Joseph J. Kockelmans, *On The Truth of Being: Reflections on Heidegger’s Later Philosophy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 155-162.

⁶⁶Richardson, *Through Phenomenology to Thought*, pp. 621-625. See also, William H. Bossart, ‘Heidegger’s Theory of Art’, *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 27, 1 (1968), 57-66.

⁶⁷Thomas Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift* (London: Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd, 2015), p. xii and pp. 3-28. See also, Thomas Sheehan, ‘A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research’, *Continental Philosophy Review*, 34, 2 (2001), 1-20.

⁶⁸Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger*, p. 10. See also, Richard Polt, Interview with *Ereignis*, <<http://www.beyng.com/RichardPoltInterview.html>> [last accessed 24/06/16] where he says, ‘I agree with Thomas Sheehan, who has repeatedly argued that what Heidegger is asking about is the basis of intelligibility’. Magrini is also sympathetic toward Sheehan’s view. See his, ‘The Work of Art and Truth’, pp. 346-348. Cf., however, Babette Babiche, ‘The ‘New’ Heidegger’, in *Heidegger in the 21st Century*, ed. by Tziovannis Georgakis and Paul Ennis (Frankfurt a.M.: Springer, 2015), pp. 167-187. Babiche asks us to stop looking for the ‘new’ Heidegger and instead to ‘start thinking’.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 194.

sustains as a thrown-open project.⁷⁰ He thus argues that the trajectory of Heidegger's thought is unified because this prior condition is always understood to be *Dasein*, but is separate in that in 1930 Heidegger realised that this prior condition is intrinsically hidden and concealed.⁷¹ While he does not discuss the work of art in his study, Sheehan's approach provides an opening in which to view the unity between the earlier and later work of Heidegger's thought without reducing the genuine philosophical concerns of the later thought to the 'mystical' or 'poetic'.⁷²

However, there does seem to be a significant development at play with the introduction of the work of art. For example, Heidegger's later thought is marked by a distinctively poetic style. For this and other reasons, Sheehan's approach is contested. Capobianco, for example, defends a version of the classical paradigm. He argues that Heidegger's thought takes a 'turn' (*Kehre*) in or around 1940 which moves away from *Da-Sein* and to 'being itself' (*Sein selbst*). Here, being itself is understood as the 'temporal-spatial, finite and negative, presencing itself'.⁷³ He thus understands Heidegger's later work to critique the anthropocentrism of the earlier works, instead taking *Dasein* to be co-responsive to this being process the fruits of which result in meaningful intelligibility.⁷⁴ The language of being 'itself' would seem to lend itself to this reading, but Capobianco risks substantialising being in a way that would seem contrary to Heidegger's critique of the metaphysics of presence, where being is taken as *a* being. On the other hand, although Sheehan acknowledges that a shift in emphasis occurs in the 1930s, one which abandons the transcendental approach of *Being and Time* and develops an approach he considers 'being-historical' (*seinsgeschichtlich*), one still wonders why this latter approach demands of Heidegger a more poetic style than his earlier, philosophically rigorous, approach in works such as *Being and Time*.⁷⁵ As Capobianco argues, his 'saying of [being itself] may be

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 222 and p. 241.

⁷¹Ibid., pp. 223-229.

⁷²Following the work of Capobianco, Claxton view's Heidegger's later thought with this mystical focus. Susanne Claxton, *Heidegger's Gods: An Ecofeminist Perspective* (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), esp., pp. 7-42.

⁷³Richard Capobianco, *Engaging Heidegger* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) p. 7. Capobianco believes this reflection on 'being itself' to originate in the 1930s, see his, *Heidegger's Way of Being* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), pp. 57-62.

⁷⁴Capobianco, *Engaging Heidegger*, p. 4.

⁷⁵Sheehan does recognise that Heidegger's changes from a transcendental approach to a being-historical (*seinsgeschichtlich*) approach to thinking, which is an attempt to elucidate how *Dasein* makes possible the various configurations of meaningful intelligibility throughout the history of metaphysics. Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger*, p. 27. However, although this gives us some sense for the different phenomenon Heidegger is trying to articulate, it does not tell us *why* he feels the need to articulate this in the poetic style of the later texts.

cryptic [...] [but] this very poetic and enigmatic manner of expression may be said to be the true genius of Heidegger's way of thinking'.⁷⁶

Vallega-Neu explores this change in rhetoric, arguing that the later more poetic style of thinking attempts to let being 'eventuate in language'.⁷⁷ Heidegger's later style is therefore 'performative' in nature,⁷⁸ which demands a style of writing that moves beyond strictly descriptive, philosophical prose. This argument does not conflict with the reduction of being to its meaning to *Dasein*, for we can make sense of this by claiming that it is in the act of articulation through language—a distinctively human phenomenon—that establishes a meaning of being. This would cohere with the premise of Heidegger's reading of philosophical texts, where the meaning of being is implicitly deposited in the texts of other thinkers as 'unthought', awaiting hermeneutic retrieval by the interpreter.⁷⁹ This would also suggest that Heidegger leans more heavily on the hermeneutic influences in his thinking as his thought progresses, influences that informed his project in *Being and Time*.⁸⁰ There is therefore genuine credence to understanding the development in Heidegger's thought as rooted in *Being and Time*. Capobianco's interpretation instead demands that we see the later work as a divergence from this text.

Scholars such as White and Ridling defend such a unity thesis in Heidegger's thought.⁸¹ Emad is slightly more nuanced. He argues that there is a constant 'back and forth' between the transcendental-horizonal approach and the being-historical approach to thinking. This still leaves him defending a unity thesis, arguing that there

⁷⁶Capobianco, *Heidegger's Way of Being*, p. 78. Although a claim like this requires more substance. We can hardly let a thinker off the hook for a penchant for the obtuse in the name of 'genius'. It is precisely this enigmatic manner of thought, we might say to Capobianco, that allows for the very confusion he and Sheehan are seeking to clarify, both of which take ample evidence from Heidegger's texts to make completely opposing claims.

⁷⁷Daniela Vallega-Neu, 'Poietic Saying', in *Companion to Heidegger's Contribution's to Philosophy*, ed. by Charles E. Scott, Susan M. Schoenbohm, Daniela Vallega-Neu, and Alejandro Vallega (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001), pp. 66-80. See also, Samuel Ijsseling, 'Mimesis and Translation', in *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 348-351 (p. 350) and Francois Dastur, 'Language and Ereignis', in *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 355-369 (esp. pp. 362-365).

⁷⁸Vallega-Neu, 'Poietic Saying', p. 66 and pp. 74-77.

⁷⁹See Section 2.1 of this study.

⁸⁰This is explored in great detail by Cyril McDonnell, *Heidegger's Way Through Phenomenology To the Question of the Meaning of Being: A Study of Heidegger's Philosophical Path of Thinking from 1909 to 1927* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2015), especially pp. 72-163.

⁸¹White, *Time and Death*, esp. p. Ii: '[t]here is no distinct 'early' and 'late' Heidegger, in my view, only earlier and later ways of saying the same thing'. This is also the intention of Zaine Ridling, *The Witness of Being: The Unity of Heidegger's Later Thought* (Missouri: Access Foundation, 2001).

is no real ‘break’ in his thought.⁸² Certainly, Heidegger wished for us to evaluate his thought as such,⁸³ but there are very definite developments. For example, the introduction of the work of art in 1935 is completely distinct from his thought as it stood in *Being and Time*.⁸⁴ Thomson thus concludes that a strict unity thesis of Heidegger’s thought lacks ‘sensitivity to the very real breaks, ruptures and discontinuities through which his work passed as it went through its fascinating evolution’.⁸⁵

The ‘new paradigm’ is a compelling development in contemporary scholarship. Nonetheless, Sheehan’s argument that Heidegger’s project reached its fruition through the discovery of the significance of concealment in the 1930 lecture series *On the Essence of Truth* is worth re-evaluating,⁸⁶ particularly in light of the fact that the significance of the work of art does not become fully apparent to Heidegger until 1934. It is certainly the case that the work of art is explored in relation to the new emphasis of concealment,⁸⁷ and so due to the significance Sheehan accords this discovery his work provides fruitful ground for pursuing this investigation. However, because some scholars contend that Heidegger’s reflections on the work of art is evidence of the change of focus from *Dasein* to being itself, a thesis that Sheehan and others now rejects, by exploring Heidegger’s concept of truth in relation to the significance of the work of art we are offered opportunity to develop and critically engage with the insights of Sheehan’s project.

The introduction of the work of art in Heidegger’s thought offers a re-evaluation of his concept of truth. Dreyfus’ reading focuses on this aspect. For him, Heidegger offers a promethean account of the work of art, where the work of art reconfigures a meaningful world anew.⁸⁸ Thompson develops this sentiment, but

⁸²Parvis Emad, *On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy* (London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), p. 200.

⁸³Heidegger, ‘Preface’, pp. xiv-xxii.

⁸⁴See Section 1.3 of this study.

⁸⁵Iain Thomson, ‘On the Advantages and Disadvantages of Reading Heidegger Backwards: White’s *Time and Death*’, *Inquiry*, 50, 1 (2007), 103-120, (p. 111).

⁸⁶Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger*, pp. 223-229. See also, Richard Polt, ‘Meaning, Excess, Event’, *Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual*, 1, 2011, 26-53, where he critically engages with, and develops, Sheehan’s position, accounting for some of its inadequacies, which I also explore throughout this thesis. I agree with Sheehan, that Heidegger’s ‘insight into *intrinsic hiddenness* of the appropriated clearing’ is the essential insight of the later work. Nonetheless, I show in what way Heidegger utilises this insight toward unsavoury ends throughout the period of the 1930s.

⁸⁷*HH*, p. 250. See also, Schuwer, ‘Nature and the Holy’, 225-237.

⁸⁸Hubert Dreyfus, ‘Heidegger on the Connection between Nihilism, Art, Technology, Politics’, in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 289-316 (esp. pp. 297-301). Young sees credence to this view, but he argues that in the final draft of *The Origin of the Work of Art* Heidegger had largely distanced himself from this promethean sentiment. Cf. Julian

highlights that for Heidegger the work of art is essential in transcending the nihilist age.⁸⁹ He explores how the work of art is key in propelling us toward a post-modern world where the truth of being (understood as the inherent polysemy within the meaning of things) is grasped by a people, thus allowing them to disclose new and inchoate meanings within things.⁹⁰ It is this insight he sees at work in Heidegger's description of Van Gogh's pair of peasant shoes.⁹¹ Dill responds that both Thomson and Dreyfus fail to recognise the very specific kind of art Heidegger has in mind, which is to say, not art works in general but 'primal poesy'. He understands this as a

Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp 29-34. He instead thinks that Heidegger's work on art is about thematizing a world, as opposed creating a new one. See also, Jacques Taminiaux, 'The Origin of "The Origin of the Work of Art"', in *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 392-404 (esp. pp. 401-404). Taminiaux explores the various drafts of this lecture series, exploring the 'change of tone' of the earlier drafts of this lecture in 1935, to the later one in 1936. As he concludes, the latter series is 'in no way Promethean'. *Ibid.*, p. 404.

⁸⁹Thomson, *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, p 2. Phillips also points this out. James Phillips, *Heidegger's Volk: Between National Socialism and Poetry* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 156.

⁹⁰He develops this in conjunction with the lyrics of a song by U2, pp. 121-140. See also Mark A. Wrathall, *Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press. 2011), p. 238. Although the emphasis of Young's work is different, he echoes this when he argues that Heidegger's work on art should be seen as ethical rather than ontological, in the sense of the Greek *ethos*, meaning that it 'constitutes, for us, the proper way to live'. Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art*, p. 24. See also, Barbara Bolt, *Heidegger Reframed*, Interpreting Key Thinkers for the Arts (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2011), pp. 135-136. Vattimo also explores this role of the encounter between art and truth in the age of the 'moment of the final dissolution of metaphysics'. Gianni Vattimo, 'Aesthetics at the End of Epistemology', in *Heidegger Reexamined, Volume 3: Art, Poetry, Philosophy*, ed. by Hubert Dreyfus, Mark Wrathall (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 1-8 (pp. 4-5).

⁹¹Thomson, *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, pp. 106-120. Heidegger's interpretation of this painting has caused controversy in scholarship after an article by Schapiro appeared in 1968 where he argues that Heidegger mistook these shoes for a peasant woman and thereby his account of the peasant woman's world available in the shoes is a 'projection' on his part. Meyer Schapiro, 'The Still Life as a Personal Object—a Note on Heidegger and Van Gogh', in *Theory and Philosophy of Art: Style, Artist and Society* (New York: George Braziller, 1998), pp. 135-151. Thomson counters that who the shoes belong to is irrelevant, as Heidegger is drawing our attention to the background of the painting that resists intelligibility and that the world of the peasant woman is available in the various *gestalt* figures in the painting's background. Thomson, *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, pp. 112-115. Derrida deals with this controversy by exploiting Heidegger's own claim that it is uncertain to whom the shoes belong. Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, trans. by Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), esp. pp. 257-382. See also, Michael Payne, 'Derrida, Heidegger, and Van Gogh's 'Old Shoes'', *Textual Practises*, 6, 1 (1992), 87-100. In a similar fashion, Young claims that the painting itself is irrelevant to the theory being proposed. Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art*, p. 22. Likewise, Babette Babiche raises the problem of the differences between philosophy and art history in 'From Van Gogh's Museum to the Temple at Bassae: Heidegger's Truth of Art and Schapiro's Art History', *Culture, Theory and Critique*, 44, 2 (2003), 151-169. Whether or not the shoes actually belonged to the 'peasant woman', Sassen questions the National Socialist ideology that is present in Heidegger's account of the peasant woman. Brigitte Sassen, 'Heidegger on Van Gogh's *Old Shoes*: The Use/Abuse of a Painting', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 32, 2 (2001), 160-173. As a result, she argues that it is not the painting that initiates the truth, but instead a 'truth' (or ideology) is imposed by Heidegger onto the painting (pp. 169-173).

kind of art that originates and grounds our history.⁹² However, Thomson also delineates between different works of art with different functions, where only a few have a world disclosing function.⁹³

These discussions focus on the philosophical content of Heidegger's work on the role of art in truth, thus avoiding potentially problematic implications in the context of Heidegger's support of the National Socialist regime.⁹⁴ To avoid this dimension is to assume that these are two separate issues that can be extracted from one another. Others would dispute this. But there are vast discrepancies within scholarship on how to view Heidegger's understanding of the work of art in the context of his political engagement.

Wolin draws our attention to the importance of the elite vanguard in Heidegger's thought, an elite that is endowed with the task of legislating the meaning of being.⁹⁵ Therefore, his work on truth is 'tied to the emergence of a new political order',⁹⁶ and the state becomes a 'giant work of art'.⁹⁷ Young counters that Wolin inadequately accounts for Heidegger's emphasis on the creative individuals' receptivity to being.⁹⁸ In Young's view, Heidegger's elite, and the 'homeland' they create, lack the implications of totalitarianism that Wolin interprets it to have.⁹⁹ The assumptions of the classical paradigm linger in the background here, for if being is

⁹²Matt Dill, 'Heidegger, Art and the Overcoming of Metaphysics', *European Journal of Philosophy*, 25, 2 (2017), 294-311 (esp. pp. 297-303).

⁹³Thomson, *Heidegger, Art and Postmodernity*, pp. 44-45 and pp. 65-72. Bruin also defends this position. John Bruin, 'Heidegger and Two Kinds of Art', *The Journal of Aesthetic and Art Criticism*, 52, 4 (1994), 447-457. However, Brenahan claims that because Bruin understands the Van Gogh painting as 'representational art', he mistakes Heidegger's focus on art as such, as opposed the work of art. Cf. Brenahan, 'The Dynamic Phenomenon of Art', p. 294.

⁹⁴For example, Kockelmans notes that Heidegger's understands of the work of art as 'the essential function in the destiny of a people', but does not critically engage with the notion of a destiny of a people, a notion that was utilised by the National Socialist Party. Joseph J. Kockelmans, *Heidegger on Art and Artworks* (Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), p. 210. Likewise, Vallega-Neu makes mention of the importance of the 'few thinkers' in Heidegger's understanding of truth but does not discuss or evaluate the elitism this suggests. Vallega-Neu, 'Poietic Saying', pp. 76-77. See also, Brenahan, 'The Dynamic Phenomenon of Art', pp. 294-311. It is my view, as I explore in chapter two, that Heidegger's thesis on the significance of the elites does establish a connection between his philosophy and support of the National Socialist movement. See Section 2.5 of this study.

⁹⁵Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 126. See also, Robert J. Dostel, 'The Public and the People: Heidegger's Illiberal Politics', *The Review of Metaphysics*, 47, 3 (1994), 517-555 (esp. p. 553).

⁹⁶Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, p. 112.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 111-118 (esp. p. 117).

⁹⁸Julian Young, *Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 119. The importance of the sense of receptivity in Heidegger's understanding of the work of art is also explored by Ruta Marija Vabalaitė, 'Activity and Passivity in the Creation of Art: Heidegger and Later Philosophers', *Filosofija Sociologija*, 28, 1 (2017), 3-10.

⁹⁹Cf., however, Long's exploration of the political implications of Heidegger's work on art. Christopher P. Long, 'Art's Fateful Hour: Benjamin, Heidegger, Art and Politics', *New German Critique*, 83, Special Issue on Walter Benjamin (2001), 89-115.

reduced to the meaningful space constituted by the human being, how can one really be receptive to it? What is the 'it' to which one is receptive? Young's point invites important clarifications, which I explore in chapter two. Nonetheless, the role of the elite raises important questions for the significance of the development of Heidegger's reflections on the essence of truth and the relation between his philosophy and support of the National Socialist movement overall.¹⁰⁰

McNeill claims that 'the importance of Heidegger's Hölderlin's lectures (and especially of the first lecture course [in 1934/35]) for understanding [...] his subsequent thought, can hardly be overstated'.¹⁰¹ However, there is great difficulty in establishing precisely the significance of Hölderlin for Heidegger's thought. Janicaud and Grossman develop this, reflecting on the significance of Hölderlin's poetry in Heidegger's attempts to overcome metaphysics (and hence nihilism) through the founding of the other beginning available in his poetry.¹⁰² Emad explores Heidegger's suggestion in the *Contributions* that Hölderlin's poetry preserves a history of being, a history that is not dependent on the will in the manner of the first beginning.¹⁰³ However, Gethmann-Siefert argues that Heidegger's use of Hölderlin is an attempt to justify his 'abortive political commitment'.¹⁰⁴ As a result, what was supposed to appear as 'only philosophical [...] reflects political errors and practical misdirection'.¹⁰⁵ Grossman admits that Heidegger's Hölderlin 'is not free of political innocence'.¹⁰⁶ Likewise, Lacoue-Labarthe suggests that Heidegger uses Hölderlin 'to step beyond [strict] philosophical questioning', and that his 'Hölderlinian preaching is the continuation and prolongation of the philosophico-political discourse of 1933'.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁰See Section 2.5 of this study.

¹⁰¹William McNeill, 'Heidegger's Hölderlin Lectures', in *The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger*, ed. by François Raffoul and Eric S. Nelson (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 223-236 (p. 224).

¹⁰²Dominique Janicaud, 'The "Overcoming" of Metaphysics in the Hölderlin Lectures', in *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indian University Press, 1993), pp. 383-391 and Andreas Grossman, 'The Myth of Poetry: On Heidegger's Hölderlin', trans. by Donald F. Goodwin, *The Comparatist*, 28, 2004, 29-38. See also, Babette E. Babiche, *Words in Blood, Like Flowers: Philosophy and Poetry, Music, Eros in Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Heidegger* (State University of New York: State University of New York Press, 2006), p. 249, who mentions the role of both Nietzsche and Hölderlin in this overcoming.

¹⁰³Parvis Emad, 'Heidegger's Stance on Hölderlin in the *Beiträge*', *Studia Phaenomenologica*, 12, 2012, 359-381.

¹⁰⁴Annmarie Gethmann-Siefert, 'Heidegger and Hölderlin: The Over-Usage of Poets in an Impoverished Time', trans. by Richard Taft, *Research in Phenomenology*, 19, 1 (1989), 59-88 (p. 59). Cf., Jeff Malpas, *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place: Explorations in the Topology of Being* (London: The MIT Press, 2012), pp. 143-144.

¹⁰⁵Gethmann-Siefert, 'Heidegger and Hölderlin', p. 59. See also, Grossman, 'The Myth of Poetry: On Heidegger's Hölderlin', p. 30.

¹⁰⁶Grossman, 'The Myth of Poetry: On Heidegger's Hölderlin', p. 38.

¹⁰⁷Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction of the Political*, trans. by Chris Turner (Paris: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1990), p. 12.

In a similar vein, Farias calls Hölderlin Heidegger's 'spiritual Führer'.¹⁰⁸ It is certainly evident that Hölderlin is extremely significant for Heidegger, but the implications of this significance and its importance for Heidegger's support for the National Socialist Party is still under debate, a debate I address in Chapter three.¹⁰⁹

Gethmann-Siefert claims that in the Hölderlin lecture the concept being-in-the-world is 'concretized as being-on-the-earth'.¹¹⁰ Pöggeler remarks that the concept of earth 'conceals within it the decisive step which Heidegger took along his way of thinking when he thought about art'.¹¹¹ Harries agrees.¹¹² Likewise, Bernasconi asserts that by introducing the concept of earth Heidegger acknowledges that *Being and Time* 'needed modification',¹¹³ and Wood hints at this when he points out that Heidegger's '*Sinn des Seins* is found exemplary in the work of art where sensory presence and meaning are fused'.¹¹⁴ However, this concept has been the subject of critical scrutiny. Bernasconi points out that Heidegger utilises a sense of earth as 'native ground',¹¹⁵ problematic in light of Heidegger's involvement with the National Socialist regime. Likewise, Bambach develops the connection between his notion of concealment and earth, arguing that Heidegger is here utilising the 'ontological implications of art to put forward his own *völkish*-political reading of truth'.¹¹⁶ Scholtz, on the other hand, claims that the connection between Heidegger's 'earth' and the blood and soil ideology is 'assumed' rather than critically established.¹¹⁷ She argues that because the people are understood to arise from poetic attunement it lacks

¹⁰⁸Victor Farias, *Heidegger and Nazism*, trans. by Paul Burrell, Dominic Di Bernardi and Gabriel R. Ricci (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), p. 239.

¹⁰⁹See esp., Section 3.2 of this study.

¹¹⁰Gethmann-Siefert, 'Heidegger and Hölderlin', p. 76.

¹¹¹Otto Pöggeler, *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, trans. by Daniel Magurshak and Sigmund Barber (United States of America: Humanities Press, 1978; repr. 1990), p. 167.

¹¹²Karsten Harries, *Art Matters: A Critical Commentary on Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art"*, Contributions to Phenomenology, vol. 57, ed. by Nicolas de Warren and Dermot Moran (Netherlands: Springer, 2009), p. 44.

¹¹³Robert Bernasconi, 'Race and Earth in Heidegger's Thinking During the Late 1930s', *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 48, 1 (2010), 49-66 (p. 51).

¹¹⁴Robert E. Wood, 'The Heart in Heidegger's Thought', *Continental Philosophy Review*, 48, 4 (2015), 445-462 (p. 447).

¹¹⁵Bernasconi, 'Race and Earth in Heidegger's Thinking', p. 62.

¹¹⁶Charles Bambach, *Heidegger's Roots: Nietzsche, National Socialism, and the Greeks* (London: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 292-294 (p. 292). As he explores, Heidegger's word for 'concealment' (*Verborgenheit*) plays on the verb '*bergen*', meaning 'to shelter' and 'to hide', and the noun '*Berg*', meaning 'mountain'. He claims that Heidegger draws 'on the elemental power of the *Berg* as something essential to the life and will of the *Volk*', and so, as he concludes, '[t]he language of *Berg* and *bergen* would thus become linked not only rhetorically but also ontologically and politically'. *Ibid.*, p. 293.

¹¹⁷Scholtz, *The Invention of a People*, p. 194.

the political ‘fervour’ assumed by his detractors.¹¹⁸ O’Brien’s work could be seen as a middle ground here. He notes the autochthonous element of Heidegger’s understanding of earth, but he attempts to salvage this notion by exploring its potential to be understood as a universal earth that unites our provincial struggles.¹¹⁹ In this way, O’Brien is willing to engage with the problematic political dimension of Heidegger’s philosophy but argues that there are resources in his own thought that resist this.¹²⁰ It should be noted, however, that in the case of earth, O’Brien draws from the poetry of Heaney and Kavanagh in order to develop this; resources that are thus outside the confines of Heidegger’s thought.¹²¹

This overview of scholarship reveals a number of important concerns for this thesis. This could be listed as the following. (1) Heidegger’s thinking undergoes a development around the time that the work of art becomes pivotal in his thought. (2) Scholarship is at odds about how to understand and frame this development. (3) The work of art has an important role in Heidegger’s understanding of the essence of truth, as evidence in his essay *The Origin of the Work of Art*. (4) An important concern for him at this time is the overcoming of nihilism. (5) The poet Hölderlin is significant for him in the regard. (6) There is nonetheless widespread disagreement regarding the significance of his commitment to National Socialism and the role of the work of art therein. (7) If there are problems to be found within his thought, there is a question of whether the resources within this thought are sufficient to lead beyond its limitations.

This thesis addresses these questions. By evaluating the significance of the work of art within the development of his concept of truth an opportunity arises to reflect further on the nature of the development that takes place in Heidegger’s thought, and whether or not he remains committed to the phenomenological reduction of being to the meaning of things for the human being given that it is often the case that scholars consider the introduction of the work of art as evidence of Heidegger’s

¹¹⁸Ibid., p. 199. Bernasconi also develops his reading in this direction. Bernasconi, ‘Race and Earth in Heidegger’s Thinking’, pp. 62-64.

¹¹⁹O’Brien, *Heidegger, History, and the Holocaust*, pp. 105-114, esp. p. 109: ‘[t]he local is the gateway to the Universal and in looking out for what is beyond the regional, the provincial – we end up discovering it in the way the local obtains for others who are like us and yet different in specifically regional ways’.

¹²⁰Ibid., p. 78 and p. 126.

¹²¹Ibid., pp. 105-109. Cf., David Nowell Smith, *Sounding/Silence: Martin Heidegger at the Limits of Poetics* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), pp. 178-196. He argues that to move beyond Heidegger one must draw from resources beyond his own thought, as Heidegger’s thought lacks sufficient resources to mitigate the problems inherent within his thought.

thought moving from a focus on *Dasein* to being itself. Further, by contextualising this development in relation to the significance that he saw in the National Socialist movement we are given the means to bring into sharper focus the relation between his philosophy and his political engagement. These elements bring to the fore the problem of nihilism for him at this time, as it is both the National Socialist revolution and the work of art that are supposed to address this. In turn, the significance of the poet Hölderlin can be evaluated in light of Heidegger's support of the National Socialist Party. Hence, we discover the extent to which his thesis on the work of art is embedded in this support. By doing so, certain limitations in Heidegger's thought are evaluated, and I establish the necessity of drawing from beyond his own thought in order to address the specific problems brought under review.

CHAPTER 1

A NEW TRAJECTORY AFTER THE FAILURE OF *BEING AND TIME*

Being and Time sought to raise the question of the meaning of being *as* a question for the first time in the history of Western philosophy. More specifically, *Being and Time* attempted to evaluate the significance of our implicit awareness of what being (or ‘to be’) (*Sein*) means, to trace this awareness back to its ground in the facticity of *Dasein*, and from here discover the way in which the fundamental question he sought might be raised. However, Heidegger believed that *Being and Time* fell short of this intended goal.¹ In an attempt to address the limitations of this text, less than a decade later Heidegger introduced the significance of the work of art into his thought. To establish why this development into the significance of art for the question of the meaning of being occurs, this chapter looks at a number of key themes for this study as they stood in *Being and Time*. Firstly, his conception of the essence of truth in this work is unpacked. Then, a tension inherent in his understanding of ‘reality’ (*Realität*) and the role of nature (*Natur*) therein is explored. This turns out to be crucial in understanding the development of Heidegger’s concept of truth as he attempts to address this tension through his understanding of ‘concealment’ and ‘earth’, which requires him to re-evaluate his appropriation of the transcendental reduction in Husserl’s thought. Thirdly, the role of the work of art in Heidegger’s thought and its significance for his project as it stood before 1930 is examined.

The Black Notebooks reveal that Heidegger saw a proximity between his own thinking and the rise of the National Socialist movement as it emerged in Germany in 1930. Initially, Heidegger believed that the National Socialist Party would be key in transcending the nihilism of his time, and the problem of nihilism is a theme that comes up throughout each lecture series under investigation in this thesis.² By 1934, the work of art became Heidegger’s primary hope in addressing the nihilism of the West. By introducing the theme of nihilism, a final section of this chapter explores the proximity he saw in his thought and the Party in the early 1930s, establishing

¹*BH*, pp. 327-328.

²On this, see his letter to his friend Elisabeth Blochmann. Martin Heidegger, ‘Selected Letters from the Heidegger-Blochmann Correspondence’, trans. by Frank W.H Edler, *Heidegger and the Political*, special issue, *Graduate Faculty of Philosophy Journal* 14, 2-15, 1 (1991), 557-77 (p. 570). I explore this further, below.

some connections between the significance of his reflections on truth in this period and his initial enthusiasm for the National Socialist movement. This chapter thus establishes the appropriate context for pursuing the thesis question: What is the significance of art in the developments of Heidegger's reflections of truth throughout the rise of the National Socialist State?

1.1 Truth in *Being and Time*

If the question of the meaning of being (*die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein*) is to be posed in an adequate way, Heidegger believed that it must first take into account the being that can ask about the meaning of being, that is, the human being.³ This is because for him, the human being is distinguished from other beings in that it always-already has some sense for the meaning of being, albeit a vague, unintelligible, but implicit sense, unthematically considered.⁴ The first two divisions of *Being and Time* thus endeavour to inquire into this way of being of the human being. He calls this way of being *Dasein*. Characterised by 'always-being-my-own' (*Jemeinigkeit*),⁵ *Dasein* is the specific way in which the human being is implicated in the world. Heidegger argues that it is in virtue of this beings concern for itself that allows for the opening of a temporal horizon in which things in the world can be rendered meaningful, and hence *be* the beings that they are.⁶ Reflecting this, Heidegger tells us that "[t]ruth "is given" so long and so far as *Dasein* is".⁷

So, although it is not until section 44 of the first division of *Being and Time* that Heidegger explicitly deals with the question of truth, it is no surprise when he claims that truth has a 'primordial connection' with the meaning of being.⁸ He repeats this claim in his 1932 study on Anaximander and Parmenides claiming, 'the question of

³See my discussion of this below, n. 63.

⁴*SZ*, p. 6. *BT*, p. 3. "Being" is the self-evident concept. "Being" is used in all knowing and predicating, in every relation to beings and in every relation to oneself, and the expression is understandable "without further ado." Everybody understands: "the sky *is* blue," "I *am* happy," and similar statements. But this average comprehensibility only demonstrates the incomprehensibility. [...] The fact that we live already in an understanding of being and that the meaning of being is at the same time shrouded in darkness proves the fundamental necessity of retrieving the question of the meaning of "being". See also, *SZ*, pp. 15-18.

⁵Trans mod. *SZ*, p. 53. *BT*, p. 42.

⁶Heidegger explores this in, *SZ*, pp. 254-261. See also, *ibid.*, pp. 463-489.

⁷Emphasis removed. My translation. *SZ*, p. 299. 'Wahreheit "gibt es" nur, sofern und solange *Dasein* ist'.

⁸Thus, he tells us that this 'phenomenon [must] have been encountered already within [the] preparatory fundamental analysis, the analytic of *Dasein*'. *SZ*, p. 283. *BT*, p. 205.

the essence of truth [...] is the question of Being! Understanding of Being'.⁹ Thus, for Heidegger, truth is always in the 'orbit' (*Umkreis*) of the problematic of fundamental ontology¹⁰—i.e., the task of raising the question of the meaning of being. The importance of this section on truth, especially in light of the developments of Heidegger's philosophical project, one where the question of truth (or '*aletheia*') becomes increasingly pertinent, should not be overlooked.

In Heidegger's estimation, it not only has been implicitly encountered in *Being and Time*. Instead, the ground covered by the preceding part of the first division 'pertains to nothing less than the most primordial phenomenon of truth'.¹¹ Heidegger's account of truth is developed in opposition against what he believes to have been a fundamental misunderstanding of the essence of truth throughout the history of metaphysics. Incorrectly seen in terms of a relation between a subject and object,¹² his intention is to re-orientate us toward an appropriate and more fundamental understanding of truth. Instead, he argues that the ontological act of *Dasein* 'discovering' (*entdecken*) is the primary meaning of what truth is.¹³ This discovering is understood to be 'grounded' in the 'disclosedness' (*Erschlossenheit*) of world.¹⁴

By the world being 'disclosed', Heidegger is emphasising that the world and the ontological meanings that sustain things within the world are given to *Dasein* to be made sense of in some way. As I noted, *Dasein* is distinguished in that it already has a sense for the world albeit implicit and unconsidered. *Dasein* is always-already 'thrown' (*Geworfen*) into a world that is disclosed to it meaningfully.¹⁵ Although truth may be 'there' already, in some sense at least, Heidegger wants to capture the specific conditions of *Dasein* that allow it 'access' this world and make sense of it in

⁹*AP*, p. 112. *BWP*, p. 86. See also, Walter Biemel, *Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study by Walter Biemel*, trans. by J. L. Mehta (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), p. 25, who argues that Heidegger's thought is 'twofold' in that it is an inquiry into being and 'at the same time' an inquiry into truth. Similarly, Versényi, claims that 'Being and Truth are inseparable and, in the end, interchangeable terms in [Heidegger's] philosophy. Laszlo Versényi, *Heidegger, Being, and Truth* (London: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 1. This certainly may have been the case as his project stood in *Being and Time*. But throughout this thesis I show in what way there are important differences in the question of the 'meaning of being' and the question of 'truth of being' in Heidegger's thought. These differences, however, should not be thought of as contrary, but more so as a development from his project as stood in *Being and Time*.

¹⁰*SZ*, p. 283. *BT*, p. 205. As a note inserted beside this by Heidegger at a later date reads – 'Not only [in the orbit], but into the *middle*'. His emphasis.

¹¹*SZ*, p. 292. *BT*, p. 212.

¹²*SZ*, pp. 284-288

¹³*SZ*, p. 292. *BT*, p. 211.

¹⁴*SZ*, p. 292. *BT*, p. 212.

¹⁵*SZ*, p. 180. *BT*, pp. 131-132.

some way. He tells us that ‘disclosedness’ is determined by attunement (*Befindlichkeit*), understanding (*Verstehen*) and discourse (*Rede*).¹⁶ The (meaningful) world *Dasein* is thrown into it either blindly accepts as what it is, or else it appropriates the world in relation to its own potentiality-for-being.¹⁷ Hence, *Dasein* does not just receive the meaning that it is thrown into but ‘projects’ (*Entwerfen*) meanings also. This occurs through understanding (*Verstehen*), by which Heidegger means that *Dasein* projects itself upon possibilities of its being, understanding itself in terms of its world and likewise making sense of the world in relation to itself.¹⁸

Chapter three develops more concretely the concept of attunement in Heidegger’s thought. For now, it should be stated that Heidegger does not mean attunement (or mood (*Stimmung*)) in the sense of an irrational appendage to an otherwise rational being, thus obscuring our access to the world as it really is ‘in itself’.¹⁹ Instead, attunements, as Heidegger understands them, make manifest and bring one before the ‘there’ (*Da*) of ‘*Dasein*’ (literally, ‘there/here-being’), that is, attunements determine “‘how one is’ and thus bring ‘being to its “there.””²⁰ As such, an attunement will ‘assail’ us, but not from ‘without’ or ‘within’, but as a ‘mode’ of being-in-the-world.²¹ *Dasein*, then, is always and necessarily *moody*, or as he puts it,

¹⁶Ibid. Cf., however, Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger*, pp. 297-299.

¹⁷This latter process occurs, according to Heidegger, through the experience of anxiety-over-ones-own-death via the fundamental attunement of angst, allowing *Dasein* to become ‘properly’ or ‘genuinely’ itself. This is the process of what is generally (and poorly) translated as ‘authentic’ (*Eigentlichkeit*). *SZ*, pp. 244-253. *BT*, pp. 178-184. I explore this translation in the following chapter, n. 235. See also, Daniel O. Dahlstrom, *Heidegger’s Concept of Truth*, *Modern European Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 311-315.

¹⁸*SZ*, pp. 197-204. Heidegger’s conception of understanding is elaborated in much greater detail in the second chapter of this thesis, where I explore his return to this notion in relation to Plato’s concept of the Ideas.

¹⁹Heidegger argues that it is only through mood that anything can be encountered at all. As such, the understanding of moods as colouring objective reality gets at the issue in the wrong way because it is in virtue of moods that we have any meaningful access to the world. *SZ*, p. 183. *BT*, p. 134: “[i]ndeed, we must *ontologically* in principle leave the primary discovery of the world to “mere mood.”” His emphasis. Here, I am equating ‘*Befindlichkeit*’ (how-one-finds-oneself) with the closely related ‘*Stimmung*’ (mood). This is because, as chapter three explores, by 1934 Heidegger drops ‘*Befindlichkeit*’ from his vocabulary and instead only uses ‘*Stimmung*’, and an array of other related terms, such as ‘*Grundstimmung*’, ‘*bestimmt*’, etc. The significance of this is explored in chapter three. Because the sense here does not obscure the meaning too much, I leave this in place, as it keeps the developments more coherent and avoids having to develop the difference between ‘*Stimmung*’ and ‘*Befindlichkeit*’, a distinction which is not necessary for the topic of this thesis. For more on this distinction, see, Andreas Elpidorou and Lauren Freeman, ‘Affectivity in Heidegger I: Moods and Emotions in *Being and Time*’, *Philosophy Compass*, 10, 10 (2015), 661-671 (esp. pp. 662-664). There, they explore how moods are the ontic manifestation of the ontological structure of ‘*Befindlichkeit*’.

²⁰*SZ*, p. 179. *BT*, p. 131.

²¹*SZ*, p. 182. *BT*, p. 133.

‘[m]ood [or, attunement] has always already disclosed being-in-the-world as a whole and first makes possible directing oneself toward something’.²²

The meanings of the world thus disclosed, through understanding and attunement, are sustained by discourse. Discourse points to the necessity of meanings being shared in the public realm, but this conviction is founded on the central importance Heidegger affords language. Heidegger claims that a statement is rooted in the disclosedness of understanding.²³ Words do not just ‘point’ to the thing in a sign-signified relationship but, instead, the statement gathers both the thing *and* the uncovering and disclosure of world by *Dasein* along with it. Indeed, perhaps even the distinction here is problematic. Rather: through the discovery of the thing by *Dasein*, and thereby articulated and named in language, the thing becomes what it is. More than a decade after *Being and Time*, Heidegger claimed that ‘[w]hen we go to the well, when we go through the woods, we are always already going through the word “well”, through the word “woods”, even if we do not speak the words and do not think of anything relating to language’.²⁴ Language, in this view, is not an expression of the ‘inside’ or ‘psychical life’ of *Dasein*. Rather, language is the articulation of its being the ‘there’ (*Da*) of being (*Sein*).²⁵ In this sense, language is *testament* to our being-in-the-world,²⁶ through which things are secured into some kind of meaningful intelligibility. This articulation then, does not point *to* the thing but instead it is *through* the articulation that the thing becomes what it is. I understand this thing *as* a table, and so by understanding it *as* such, and giving it its name, I ‘free’ it to be what it is.²⁷ Hence, ‘language is the [...] house of being’.²⁸

²²Ibid.

²³SZ, pp. 295-296.

²⁴WD, p. 310. WP, p. 129. ‘Wenn wir zum Brunnen, wenn wir durch den Wald gehen, gehen wir schon immer durch das Wort “Brunnen”, durch das Wort “Wald” hindurch, auch wenn wir diese Worte nicht aussprechen und nicht an Sprachliches denken’.

²⁵McDonnell explores in what way Heidegger’s views on language are primarily appropriated from the hermeneutic tradition, especially from Dilthey. McDonnell, *Heidegger’s Way Through Phenomenology*, especially pp. 157-163.

²⁶This is why McDonnell is correct in emphasising the Diltheyan-hermeneutic focus of Heidegger’s reflections, as philosophy begins with ‘reflections [...] on the expressions of the significances of everyday, mundane ‘factic life-experience’ as documented and recorded through our literature and art’. See his, *Heidegger’s Way Through Phenomenology*, p. 73. However as I go on to explore, Heidegger does *not* emphasise the role of art in this process until *after Being and Time*, and this development has significant implications for Heidegger’s project as whole. Cf. also, Dahlstrom, *Heidegger’s Concept of Truth*, pp. 175-222. Although Dahlstrom recognises this hermeneutic influence, he attributes this influence to Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle. As does Sheehan, see his, *Making Sense of Heidegger*, pp. 31-107.

²⁷On the relationship between the existential-hermeneutical ‘as’ of the understanding, and the apophantic ‘as’ of language. See, SZ, pp. 204-213.

²⁸WD, p. 310. WP, p. 129. ‘Die Sprache ist [...] das Haus des Seins’.

These three factors result in the disclosedness of world, thus grounding the process of truth as an act of discovery on behalf of *Dasein*. As we have seen disclosedness is sustained by *Dasein* as a ‘thrown project’ (*geworfener Entwurf*), what Heidegger understands to be the ‘constituent of the structure of concern’.²⁹ Concern (*Sorge*) expresses the being of *Dasein*, for it is this beings concern about itself that first allows for the emergence of a temporal horizon in which the world becomes meaningful.³⁰ This is not to say, however, that truth is a subjective projection by *Dasein*. Heidegger emphasises that *Dasein* is always implicated in both truth *and* untruth.³¹ Things are revealed ‘through’ *Dasein* (truth),³² but things are at the same time cast in some sort of darkness (untruth). *Dasein* is caught in this relationship of what is revealed (*Entdecken*) to/through it and concealed (*Verbergen*) from it.³³

Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology in *Being and Time* reflects and is sustained by his insight into the nature of truth at this time.³⁴ In *Being and Time* Heidegger formally defines the method of phenomenology as a kind of research that ‘let[s] what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself’.³⁵ Phenomenology is a compound word, comprised of the Ancient Greek ‘*phainómenon*’ and ‘*logos*’. A phenomenon is an appearance, i.e., ‘what is manifest’.³⁶ Phenomena are ‘self-showing’, what ‘lies in the light of day’.³⁷ The connection with light is important. We might say that truth as a kind of discovery

²⁹SZ, p. 295. *BT*, p. 214.

³⁰Heidegger explores this in *SZ*, pp. 254-261. See also, *ibid.*, pp. 463-489.

³¹SZ, p. 294. *BT*, pp. 213-214.

³²I use the word ‘through’ here in reference to Heidegger’s own usage of it in his *Black Notebooks. UII-VI*, p. 10. *PII-VI*, p. 9. ‘Das Seiende einlassen – durchlassen “durch” das Da-sein. Die Zweideutigkeit des “Durch”’. ‘To let in beings—let them through “through” Da-sein’. Ambiguity of the “Through”’. Trans. mod.

³³SZ, p. 294.

³⁴The question of method is not raised here incidentally. Through following the developments of Heidegger’s thought on the nature of truth, and the role of art therein, this thesis explores the way in which Heidegger’s method of thinking evolves to meet these insights. By doing so, this thesis contextualises Heidegger’s change of approach from the earlier hermeneutical-phenomenological approach to the question of the meaning of being, to the poetic approach of the later texts. See Section 2.1 and 3.2. Richardson’s *Through Phenomenology to Thought* was the first work in the Anglo-American world to deal with this transition. However, as my Literature Review explored, this reading has come under some contestation in recent scholarship. Particularly by Sheehan in his *Making Sense of Heidegger*, who lays out the critical framework in which to understand Heidegger’s overall project and the relation between the earlier and the later work. Sheehan argues that Heidegger never moves beyond the claim that being depends on *Dasein* to manifest. Heidegger thus always remains broadly phenomenological.

³⁵SZ, p. 46. *BT*, p. 32. ‘Das was sich zeigt, so wie es sich von ihm selbst her zeigt, von ihm selbst her sehen lassen’.

³⁶SZ, p. 38. *BT*, p. 27.

³⁷SZ, pp. 38-39. *BT*, p. 27.

consists of *Dasein*'s ability to shed light on things through its understanding, attunement, and language. However, beings can show themselves in a way that they are not. Heidegger calls this 'seeming' (*Scheinen*) and 'semblance' (*Schein*).³⁸ Phenomena understood as both light and seeming are 'structurally connected'.³⁹ This connection is because a phenomenon 'seeming' as something depends more originally on it showing up 'as' something period. Hence, in *Being and Time* Heidegger takes the positive notion of phenomena as 'what is manifest' (*das Offenbare*) and semblance its privative modification.⁴⁰ This is the relationship between truth and untruth, respectively, as it stands in *Being and Time* at least.⁴¹

Heidegger understands *logos* as he understands language, which we saw to make 'manifest "what is being talked about"'.⁴² The *logos* makes manifest, which lets something be seen *as* something *for* someone.⁴³ It thus has the function of allowing the thing be seen *as* it is in the public realm.⁴⁴ It is in this sense that *logos* translates as language, but also, reason, judgment, concept, definition, etc.⁴⁵ For him then, the goal of phenomenology is to thematically bring to light the meaningful content that accompanies the phenomenon, i.e., its being. This meaning is not something 'behind' the phenomenon but is instead the implicit and concealed significance of the phenomenon which can thematically be brought to light.⁴⁶ By rendering this implicit content explicit, phenomenology guards the truth of things against semblant untruth. Hence, we see the way in which his conception of truth is enmeshed with his understanding of the method of phenomenology, for as a making manifest the *logos* allows the phenomena be discovered from its concealment in untruth.⁴⁷ When the meaning of a specific or particular being (*Seiend*) is discovered *thematically* (for by being thrown into a meaningful world with some implicit understanding of the meaning of being this is *always* occurring unthematically) then phenomenology is

³⁸Emphasis removed on seeming. Ibid.

³⁹SZ, p. 39. *BT*, p. 27. This structural connection becomes crucial as Heidegger's reflection on the importance of concealment in the nature of truth develop.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹As we will see below, and explored in greater detail throughout the remainder of this study, untruth takes on a centrality and importance that it did not have in *Being and Time*.

⁴²Ibid. ' [...] offenbar machen das, wovon in der Rede "die Rede" ist'.

⁴³SZ, p. 43.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 44. *BT*, p. 31. See also, Brandon Absher, 'Speaking of Being: Language, Speech and Silence in *Being and Time*', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, 30, 2 (2016), 204-231 (p. 208).

⁴⁵SZ, p. 43. *BT*, p. 30.

⁴⁶SZ, pp. 48-49. *BT*, p. 34.

⁴⁷SZ, p. 44. *BT*, pp. 31-32.

taking place.⁴⁸

Because Heidegger's project in *Being and Time* is the attempt to raise the question of the meaning of being, he utilises the phenomenological method to elucidate the nature of the being that has some understanding of the meaning of being in general. Hence, the necessity of the preparation for investigation of the meaning of being through the existential-analytic of *Dasein*.⁴⁹ Through this starting point, he endeavours to safeguard our understanding of the human being from the various semblances it suffers, i.e. human understood as subject, spirit, soul, rational being, etc.⁵⁰ In sum, clarification of the 'who' of the human being must begin from the basis that the human being (as *Dasein*) already has some implicit understanding of the meaning of being (*Sein*) and is thus a place (*Da*) where beings are freed into meaning.⁵¹

Just as his understanding of *Dasein* will shift and develop in the years under review in this study, his understanding of untruth as semblance is an important distinction between the later and earlier notions of truth also. Heidegger informs us in the *Contributions to Philosophy* that untruth in *Being and Time* was experienced as 'some sort of falsehood' rather than concealment.⁵² The attentive reader may have noticed two distinct (but related) notions of concealment operative in the passage above, although Heidegger does not explicitly distinguish between them in *Being and Time*. First, concealment in the sense of untruth, which is understood as the covering over into semblance of an original discovery of truth by *Dasein*. Second, there is

⁴⁸SZ, pp. 47-48. *BT*, p. 33.

⁴⁹SZ, p. 50. *BT*, p. 35. It is because of this specific focus in Heidegger's project that I *do not* capitalise his use of the term 'being' in this study—which would only be capitalised in German as a result of its use as a noun—for this has the implication of substantialising being to the English reader, reading in a similar way that capital G 'God' does. In this way, this refusal to capitalise being offers a covert resistance to (what Sheehan has called) the 'classical paradigm' of Anglo-American Heideggerian research, which I discussed in my literature review. For more on this, see n. 63, below. 'Being' is therefore capitalised only when quoting from translations of Heidegger's texts and other scholars who capitalise this term.

⁵⁰SZ, pp. 63-67. *BT*, pp. 47-49.

⁵¹SZ, p. 15-20. This fundamental connection between place and truth is crucial in the developments that occur in his thinking of truth after this time.

⁵²*BP*, p. 352. *CP*, p. 278. As this study documents, Heidegger's understanding of untruth and concealment undergoes a number of developments throughout the 1930s, beginning with his 1930 lecture *The Essence of Truth* and continued in his study of *doxa* in Plato's *Theaetetus* (1931/32). This is one of the topics of the next chapter. See also, Natalija Bonic, 'Obviousness and Semblant Truth with Heidegger', *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie*, 67, 1 (2005), 61-93 (esp. p. 61). Bonic explores the concept of untruth in *Being and Time*, which she claims is the 'various misconceptions and pseudo-problems, which, if undetected, can lead philosophical inquiry seriously astray'. As we will see, Heidegger comes to believe that untruth is the 'essence' of truth, culminating in his lecture series on Nietzsche which endeavours to understand being as both 'semblance' and 'shining' (*Schein*). This is the topic of the fourth chapter of this thesis.

concealment in the sense of the meaningful being of the phenomenon implicit in its disclosure, of which the method of phenomenology endeavours to make thematically available. These notions are related, and although a section below on nihilism goes some way in bringing clarity, the remaining chapters of this thesis explore this in greater detail.⁵³ Regardless, in *Being and Time* it is understood that *Dasein* discovers the concealed being (or meaning) of the thing and renders it truthful, only for the being to be covered over into semblance through time. This is concealment in the first sense, which Heidegger self-critically claims later is akin to thinking of it as a sort of ‘falsehood’. However, because this meaning is initially unthematically (or, only implicitly) considered, its meaningful content remains concealed to *Dasein*, awaiting phenomenology to make available for thematic consideration this concealed meaning.⁵⁴ This is concealment in the second sense. The first and second senses of concealment are not meant here in any kind of hierarchy, for in *Being and Time* both meanings are only implicitly distinct. Here, I draw attention to this distinction only for sake of clarity.

It is important to stress that Heidegger rejects the notion of eternal truths.⁵⁵ Because discovery is grounded in attunement, understanding, and language, *Dasein* never discovers something that eternally *is*. To assume that there is such a thing to be discovered would be, in Heidegger’s view at least, a misunderstanding of the fact that discovery is grounded in the historical disclosedness of the world to a *finite* human being running-forward-into-death (*Vorlaufen Zum Tode*). The world so disclosed is thus finite, vulnerable, and admits of change.

Heidegger highlights this difference through critique of the traditional distinction between ‘*intellectus*’ and ‘*res*’. Traditionally, so he tells us, truth is conceived as the adequate agreement between the intellect and the thing, caught up in

⁵³This is because the significance of concealment is not fully developed by Heidegger until the emergence of the concept of earth in his 1934/35 study on Hölderlin, even though it first comes under thematic investigation (through the notions of nature and untruth) in his 1931/32 study on Plato. Therefore, this concept cannot get the elucidation it requires until this thesis, chronological in nature, gets properly underway through analysis of the lecture series in question.

⁵⁴SZ, p. 47. *BT*, p. 33.

⁵⁵SZ, p. 300. *BT*, p. 217. To be accurate, Heidegger argues that “‘eternal truths’ will not be adequately proven until it is successfully demonstrated that *Dasein* has been and will be for all eternity’. What Heidegger means by this, however, is that if the way in which the human being is, i.e., *Dasein*, has always occurred and will always occur (a proof that one assumes would be impossible to make), then it could be said that *Dasein*, as the pre-condition of truthfulness, *is* eternal. That is, if *Dasein is* eternally then this condition of truthfulness would be eternally true, even if what *is* in truth would change throughout history. As he goes on to say, ‘all truth is relative to the being of *Dasein*’. Emphasis removed. See, also, Versényi, *Heidegger, Being, and Truth*, p. 40.

the locus of the statement.⁵⁶ He considers this to be emblematic of the distinction between subject (*intellectus*) and object (*res*).⁵⁷ This view would say that if there is a table and I say, ‘there is a table’, the agreement between my statement and the table means that a truthful statement has occurred. Alternatively, if I said, ‘there is an orange’, but still referred to the table, I would be incorrect, and perhaps even delusional. He understands this view to be inadequate because the thing ‘table’ is understood as an eternally present thing (*res*) that my mind (*intellectus*) has adequately perceived as what it is. Heidegger obscures this view by reminding us that mind and thing are entirely different ‘species’.⁵⁸ Assumably, they agree through the locus of the statement but, if they are distinct in the way that they are supposed, this agreement is inadequate. The species ‘mind’ can never be the same as the species ‘thing’, and on what basis does the statement provide a medium in which these species can coalesce? This problem of their equation is therefore ignored.⁵⁹

Heidegger instead tries to provide an understanding of truth that avoids such inadequacy, and his approach problematises the divide between subject and object.⁶⁰ The hermeneutic understanding of language that Heidegger assumes helps secure this, for language in this view does not bridge a subject and object.⁶¹ Instead, it is as if the thing is spoken into being what it ‘is’ through *Dasein*’s unique capacity for discovery. Being, here, understood in the *specifically Heideggerian way* of the *meaningful significance* of something to *Dasein*.⁶² This is not to say then, that truth is a subjective

⁵⁶SZ, p. 284. BT, p. 206.

⁵⁷SZ, p. 286. BT, p. 208.

⁵⁸SZ, p. 286. BT, p. 207.

⁵⁹SZ, p. 286. BT, pp. 207-208.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Versényi claims, with Heidegger, that Heidegger’s critique of the subject/object divide and insistence on *Dasein* as a being that discloses beings (through language, I would clarify) is not a ‘break with tradition but the appropriation of the earlier tradition of Western thought’. Versényi, *Heidegger, Being, and Truth*, p. 36. He has in mind, here, the Greek word *aletheia*. In the following chapter, I explore the significance of this term for Heidegger for his understanding of truth. However, I would be slow to take Heidegger at his word on the affinity he sees between his understanding of truth and that of the Ancient Greeks. Indeed, it may well be the case that Heidegger saw an affinity here, but the affinity he sees comes from the specific post-Kantian, hermeneutic, existential, emphasis to his thinking, which he applies to his method in phenomenology. See also, McDonnell, *Heidegger’s Way Through Phenomenology*, p. 228. As McDonnell points out, ‘[t]he meaning that Heidegger gives to the term ‘*Dasein*’ in his philosophy, nevertheless, has nothing to do at all, by any stretch of the etymological imagination, with the normative power of etymological method *per se* of the word ‘*Dasein*’. Heidegger can only see the meaning in the word ‘*Dasein*’ as expressing one’s own understanding of the ‘there of Being’, and in which I find myself implicated as that-which-is as a being who harbours some ‘understanding of being’ after he has appropriated Dilthey’s [hermeneutic] triad of *Erlebnis-Verstehen-Ausdruck* in the *existentialistic* fashion. Here what Heidegger finds in the term is what he gives to the term’. His emphasis.

⁶²Hence, Sheehan claims being is understood by Heidegger as meaningful intelligibility, which Sheehan also takes him to understand through the ‘phenomenological reduction’. According to him,

projection on the part of a human being. Instead, *Dasein* is understood to be a being

this reduction occurs when things are understood to be real in so far as they are ‘meaningfully present’ to the human being. Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger*, pp. 9-10. Sheehan identifies how Heidegger is indebted to the phenomenological tradition for this understanding of being and the following section of this chapter briefly explores this intersection between Heidegger’s project in phenomenology, and Husserl’s. However, some commentators have emphasised in what way Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology differs to that of Husserl’s. For example, Sheehan shows in what way Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology owes a huge debt to Aristotle, over Husserl. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-107. See also, Jacques Taminiaux, *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*, trans. by Michael Gendre (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), esp. pp. 111-137. See also, Kisiel, *Genesis*, pp. 227-308. Van Buren notes that in the few years preceding *Being and Time*, Heidegger took a renewed interest in the philosophy of Kant and his understanding of transcendental philosophy along with it. John van Buren, *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 366-367. Likewise, Dahlstrom refer to the period when *Being and Time* was written as the ‘Kantian Turn’. Daniel O. Dahlstrom, ‘Transcendental Truth and the Truth That Prevails’, p. 63. See also, Kisiel, *Genesis*, p. 451. Engelland goes as far as to say that the Heidegger of *Being and Time* viewed Kant as a ‘collaborator’ in Heidegger’s topic in Phenomenology, perhaps more so than Husserl. Chad Engelland, ‘The Phenomenological Kant: Heidegger’s Interest in Transcendental Philosophy’, *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 41, 2 (2010), 150-169 (p. 150). See also, Frank Shalow, *The Renewal of the Heidegger Kant Dialogue: Action, Thought and Responsibility* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), pp. 150-169. Cf. also, McDonnell, *Heidegger’s Way Through Phenomenology*, pp. 8-71. He emphasises in what way Heidegger’s manner of doing phenomenology is *contrary* that of Husserl’s. McDonnell’s focus on the hermeneutical and existential lens through which Heidegger develops his method in phenomenology is particularly influential in my reading here, which he argues Heidegger appropriates primarily from Dilthey and Kierkegaard. *Ibid.*, esp. pp. 72-223. Which is to say, although Heidegger may think *through* and *after* the transcendental reduction as Husserl understands it, he finds a different matter for thought than the clarification of the significance of ‘being-as-thing’ and ‘being-as-consciousness’, *pace* Husserl. Hence, his project is one that searches for the meaning of being, which he contends goes unthought in the transcendental reduction. McDonnell argues that this different project in phenomenology requires Heidegger to appropriate central tenants from the philosophy of both Dilthey and Kierkegaard in order to address *his* topic in phenomenology, in the process rejecting central tenants of Husserl’s phenomenology. I make somewhat in addressing the differences between Heidegger and Husserl’s project(s) in phenomenology in the following section, however a thorough investigation of these influences on Heidegger’s specific method of phenomenology is beyond the scope of this thesis. Regardless, it is because Heidegger has a very specific understanding of both ‘being’ and the method of elucidating its meaning (through phenomenology) that allows him to argue that the question of being has been neglected by the tradition that preceded him. This is because for him, the being-question (*Seinsfrage*) refers to the implicit understanding of the meaning of being deposited into the ‘there’ of ‘being’ (*Dasein*) with the possibility of a hermeneutic retrieval of its meaning (in the form of the ‘unthought’) subsequently rendering the meaning of being throughout history thematically available to thought, providing the means for us to raise this question *as* a question again ‘today’ (*heute*). Otherwise, his claim that being has been ‘forgotten’ by the history of metaphysics would be ludicrous, given the extensive study and exposition of the nature of being throughout the history of philosophy. This is what is presupposed in Heidegger’s critique of Aristotle and Aquinas. *SZ*, pp. 18-20. *BT*, pp. 12-13. Because, in his view, the question of being is ‘nothing else than the radicalisation of an essential tendency of being that belongs to *Dasein* itself, namely, of the pre-ontological understanding of being’, (which is his appropriation of the Diltheyan hermeneutic stress on the implicit significance of lived experience in the human being and the possibility of this significance to be hermeneutically retrieved in order to be raised from lived experience to understanding through articulation), then the investigations of Aquinas and Aristotle into being remain ‘ontologically [un]clarified’. This is because they do not understand his, *very specific*, understanding of what being is (the implicit understanding of the meaning of being available in *Dasein*) and *how this understanding of being* should be investigated. Therefore, Heidegger’s claim that the question of being has been forgotten by the history of metaphysics relies on us, as readers, to first of all accept his claim that any investigation into being is implicitly an investigation of *Dasein* as a being with some implicit understanding of the meaning of being, and the subsequent equating of meaning (*Sinn*) and being (*Sein*) that this implies. To contract the attempt to raise the question of the meaning of being for *Dasein* to simply the ‘being-question’ (*Seinsfrage*), is therefore misleading to its intended reader.

that transcends beings to their meaning (or being), albeit a meaning that is always cast in a mixture of light and darkness in virtue of its finitude.⁶³

This tells us that although Heidegger rejects eternal truths, an understanding of transcendence is operative, albeit one which understands that transcendence is indebted to the finitude of *Dasein*. Heidegger believes that *Dasein* is thrown into a world that it makes sense of (a past), is a being-toward-death (*Sein-zum-Tode*) and a being that *anticipates* this death (future). Accordingly, it ‘comes back [from the temporal ‘horizon’] to the beings encountered in the there’ (present).⁶⁴ Hence, with the notion of *Dasein*, Heidegger is attempting to articulate the *whence* of meaningful intelligibility from the particular experience of finitude itself and without recourse to an infinite.⁶⁵ With this emphasis in place, *Dasein*, as Richardson puts it, ‘is essentially not a thing but a happening, and this happening *is* transcendence (better: transcending)’.⁶⁶ Consequentially, disclosedness is factual (*faktisch*),⁶⁷ which is to say that *Dasein* is thrown into a particular, historical world and therefore has its own concrete *lived* experience of this world;⁶⁸ a lived experience that it expresses through its use of language, tools, etc., in virtue of its implicit awareness of itself as the ‘there’ of ‘being’; a lived experience that is constantly threatened—whether one is

⁶³Hence, Heidegger tells us that the ‘ontic distinction of *Dasein* lies in the fact that it *is* ontological’. *SZ*, p. 16. *BT*, p. 11.

⁶⁴*SZ*, pp. 481-485, esp. p. 484. *BT*, pp. 347-349, esp. p. 348. For a close study of the ‘ecstasies’ of time in *Being and Time*, see, David Farrell Krell, *Ecstasy, Catastrophe: Heidegger from Being and Time to the Black Notebooks* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015), esp. pp. 1-105.

⁶⁵For further discussion of this see, McDonnell, *Heidegger’s Way Through Phenomenology*, pp. 320-324 and Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger*, pp. 9-10. See Section 4.6 of this study, where I explore in what way Heidegger’s thought achieves this attempt through the significance of the ‘turn’ (*Kehre*).

⁶⁶Richardson, *Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 36. See also, Heidegger’s discussion of transcendence in *BP*, p. 217, *CP*, p. 170. At this stage (1936-38) Heidegger has become sceptical of the notion of transcendence, as he sees its roots in Platonism and thus the history of metaphysics. Heidegger grows increasingly critical of Plato throughout the 1930s, beginning with his 1931/32 lecture series on Plato. Thus, “[t]ranscendence” always involves departing from known and familiar “beings” and going out in some way beyond them. From the perspective of the basic question of the truth of being, that amounts to a remaining mired in the mode of inquiry of the guiding question, i.e., in *metaphysics*’. His emphasis. Rosen also notices this implicit Platonism in Heidegger’s thought as it stood in *Being and Time*, which he sees in the idea of care. In Rosen’s view, care (*Sorge*) as understood in *Being and Time*, is a continuation of the concept of *Eros* in Platonic philosophy. Stanley Rosen, ‘Remarks on Heidegger’s Plato’ in *Heidegger and Plato: Toward Dialogue*, ed. by Catalin Partenie and Tom Rockmore, (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2005), pp. 178-191 (p. 181). The critique of his notion of transcendence become evident through the development of his concept of earth, and his interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought, explored in chapter three and four of this study, respectively. Cf., however, Philipp Rossman, ‘Heidegger’s Transcendental History’, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 40, 4 (2002), 501-523

⁶⁷*SZ*, p. 293. *BT*, p. 212.

⁶⁸Richardson, *Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 53. Heidegger’s adherence to a transcendental starting point is brought into sharper focus, below.

thematically aware or not—by a foreclosure through the inevitable prospect of its death.⁶⁹

The divide between subject and object is a derivative of this more primordial, existential, disclosure of the truth of things through *Dasein*'s discovery. However, Heidegger claims that there are still two senses of truthfulness operative here.⁷⁰ That is to say, primarily, or in the first sense, truth is the basic phenomenon that arises through being *Dasein*, as *Dasein* renders things meaningful and encounterable by being a finite and historical situated being with some understanding of what it means to be. *Dasein* 'frees' the entity to show itself.⁷¹ This process of discovering (*entdeckend-sein*) is the primordial experience of truth, and so it is both existential and ontological in nature.⁷² Existential in that it concerns a concrete lived experience of the world, and ontological in that it is involved in the disclosure of what things mean. This primary sense of truth is the basis for the secondary sense, namely that this thing is true *as* table in virtue of having been discovered as such by *Dasein*. This is the things 'being-discovered' (*endeckt-sein*). It is in this secondary sense that the understanding of truth as the adequate relationship between subject and object becomes conceived, albeit inadequately so.

Because things are first of all covered over in semblance, truth is understood by him as a kind of 'robbery' (*Raub*). *Dasein* has 'snatched' (*abgerungen*) the truth from its concealment in untruth.⁷³ Again, this is not to suggest that truth is subjective and arbitrary.⁷⁴ *Dasein* is in the first place thrown into an already disclosed world, and so thrown into an operative, meaningful, whole. But due to its capacity to understand, in the hermeneutic sense that Heidegger emphasises, it discovers and grounds truth also, i.e., it projects the meaning of things from out of its own lived experience and subsequent understanding of itself.⁷⁵ This accounts for why truths develop and change throughout history, and he thus believes that truths are embedded in an historical context as a part of a meaningful whole. But as his understanding of the method in phenomenology nonetheless suggests, the '*logos*' also depends on the 'self-showing' of phenomena. There is a tension here, between the self-showing itself

⁶⁹SZ, pp. 318-321.

⁷⁰SZ, p. 291. *BT*, p. 211.

⁷¹On the use of 'freed' (*freigegeben*) here, see, *SZ*, pp. 111-120.

⁷²SZ, p. 291. *BT*, p. 211.

⁷³SZ, p. 294. *BT*, p. 213. Stambaugh renders *abgerungen* as 'wrested'. The term 'snatch' however, keeps the sense here coherent with the understanding of truth as 'robbery' (*Raub*).

⁷⁴SZ, p. 290. *BT*, p. 210.

⁷⁵SZ, p. 50. *BT*, p. 35. Heidegger uses the Ancient Greek *hermēneúein* here. See also, *SZ*, pp. 190-204.

and the discovery of this self-showing of the phenomenon. Regardless, in *Being and Time* this self-showing must first of all be discovered, and so truth entirely depends on *Dasein*. Hence (and he emphasises) “‘Truth “is given” so long and so far as *Dasein* is’.”⁷⁶

In anticipation of the developments to come, the use of the term *es gibt* (literally, ‘it gives’, but has the same function as the English ‘there is’) should not be understated. *Dasein* may be the condition of possibility of truth, but truth is nonetheless ‘given’.⁷⁷ By placing the *es gibt* in inverted commas, Heidegger both highlights this givenness but simultaneously emphasises his own conviction of the reduction of this giving to *Dasein*’s capacity to disclose things into truth/meaning. However, as a clarificatory (or critical) note Heidegger later writes in this section suggests, that the world is disclosed to (and subsequently discovered by) *Dasein* presupposes that the ‘essence of truth places us in the “prior” of what is spoken to us’.⁷⁸ When this prior ‘spokenness’ comes to be understood as a more primordial ‘silence’,⁷⁹ then we begin to approach the difficulty in articulating the significance he sees in concealment throughout the 1930s. *For how do we say what is silence?*⁸⁰

Further, the notion that the initial discovering of truth, ‘housed’ in language, gets over time covered over into semblance suggest the project of fundamental ontology moving away from its analytic of *Dasein* and into its attempts to uncover the primordial experience of words, such as Heidegger’s attempt in the decade of 1930 (and beyond) with the Greek *aletheia*.⁸¹ When Heidegger develops his first explicit study on this word in the 1931/32 lecture series *The Essence of Truth: On*

⁷⁶SZ, p. 299. His emphasis. ‘Wahreheit “gibt es” nur, sofern und solange *Dasein* ist’. Stambaugh renders, “‘There is” truth only insofar as *Dasein* is and as long as it is”. However, as I unpack in what follow, although Heidegger reduces the ‘giving’ to the disclosing of *Dasein*, Heidegger emphasises this giving for an important reason.

⁷⁷Heidegger points out the significance of the ‘*es gibt*’ in *Being and Time*, even if in the *Letter on Humanism* he claims that it was not properly understood there, See, *BH*, pp. 334-337. A marginal note Heidegger later makes in his own copy of *Being and Time* further testifies to this, when he is discussing *Dasein* as being-in and thus ‘having’ a world: “‘Having’ corresponds to this ‘giving’. *Dasein* never ‘has’ world’. *SZ*, p. 78. *BT*, p. 58.

⁷⁸SZ, p. 301. *BT*, p. 218.

⁷⁹*BP*, p. 510.

⁸⁰On this, see, *BP*, pp. 78-80.

⁸¹Heidegger nonetheless acknowledges the importance of this in *Being and Time*: ‘we must guard against uninhibited word mysticism. Nevertheless, in the end, it is the business of philosophy to preserve the *power of the most elemental words* in which *Dasein* expresses itself and to protect them from being flattened by the common understanding go the point of unintelligibility, which in its turn functions as a source of illusory problems’. *SZ*, p. 291. *BT*, p. 211. Braver points out that this claim remains ‘undeveloped’ until Heidegger’s later work on the work of art. Lee Braver, *Groundless Grounds: A Study of Heidegger and Wittgenstein* (London: The MIT Press, 2012), p. 263, n. 195. Cf., Caputo, ‘Demythologizing Heidegger: *Aletheia* and the History of Being’, esp. pp. 529-233.

Plato's Allegory of the Cave and the Theaetetus, he emphasises its privative character: *a-letheia*, un-concealment. This results in a further development. As he argues, concealment, or untruth, 'belongs to the essence of truth'.⁸² This is the subject of the next chapter in this study.

1.2 The Problem of 'Reality' and Heidegger's Appropriation of the Transcendental Reduction

McDonnell claims that in *Being and Time* it is both a 'central contention' and 'fundamental limit' of Heidegger's thought that there is a 'back-behind' the question of the meaning of being which cannot be addressed in the raising of that question.⁸³ To establish this, McDonnell explores how Heidegger cannot address what lies 'behind' this question because of the limits of meaningful discourse that he applies to philosophy through *his* understanding of phenomenology as fundamental ontology in *Being and Time*.⁸⁴ This is in part because it is only through *Dasein* (as a being that has some implicit understanding of the meaning of being) that things come-to-be in any meaningful sense. However, in this study I argue that the significance of concealment as his thought develops places this thesis into question. Through his understanding of earth, and the role of the work of art therein, this thesis shows how Heidegger attempts to address the 'back behind' the meaning of being in a way that his thinking could not as it stood in *Being and Time*.⁸⁵

The limitation of phenomenological discourse that Heidegger embraces in his method of phenomenology creates this tension in his thought. In this section, I frame this tension through exploration of his reflection on 'reality', not only because Heidegger spends some time in *Being and Time* dealing with the 'ontological

⁸²His emphasis. *WWP*, p. 92. *ET*, p. 67.

⁸³Cyril McDonnell, 'Understanding and Assessing Heidegger's Topic in Phenomenology in Light of His Appropriation of Dilthey's Hermeneutic Manner of Thinking', *Maynooth Philosophical Papers*, 4, 2007, 31-54 (p. 41).

⁸⁴Ibid. See also, his seminal study *Heidegger's Way Through Phenomenology*, esp. pp. 343-347.

⁸⁵As McDonnell puts it, Heidegger's projects in *Being and Time* 'leaves untouched but *thought*, however implicitly, [...] the significance of *the existence* of that which lies beyond the comprehension of the innermost finitude of one's own being-in-the-world'. His emphasis. McDonnell, *Heidegger's Way Through Phenomenology*, p. 346. McDonnell contends that this remains unthought throughout Heidegger's entire *oeuvre*. Although I conclude that the resources in Heidegger's thought are unable to sufficiently address this region of being, I nonetheless explore Heidegger's endeavour to do so. Therefore, the inadequacies of Heidegger's account in *Being and Time* that McDonnell draws our attention to does become thought by Heidegger, albeit inadequately so. See also, Polt, 'Meaning, Excess, Event', esp. pp. 32-38.

problem' of reality,⁸⁶ but also because this thesis is brought to a close through discussion of Heidegger's attempts to return to the problem of the appropriate grounding position for an adequate comprehension of reality through his interpretation of Nietzsche.⁸⁷ A reflection on his concept of nature (*Natur*), a concept which goes through re-evaluation as his thinking progresses throughout the 1930s, establishes the significance of this tension.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger argues the following:

Beings *are* independently of the experience, cognition, and comprehension through which they are disclosed [*erschlossen*], discovered [*entdeckt*] and determined [*bestimmt*]. But being "is" only in the understanding of that being to whose being something like an understanding of being belongs [i.e. *Dasein*].⁸⁸

This develops what has been said previously. The central contention of *Being and Time* is that the question of the meaning of being has remained implicit but fundamentally unasked and forgotten throughout the history of metaphysics. *Dasein* is the being that has this sense for the meaning of being. Hence, the disclosure of the truth (meaning) of things depends on the ontological nature of *Dasein* (as a transcendent, finite being, anticipating its own death). Hence, being only *is* in the understanding of *Dasein*, which allows for the disclosure of beings. Yet a question remains, a naïve one, and one that admittedly misunderstands the starting point of *Being and Time*. The question would go something like, 'what is there *beyond Dasein*?' The question is naïve because the answer, for Heidegger at least, is a simple one. *Dasein* is the 'there' of 'being', and so the very reference to a 'there-beyond-the-there' depends more primordially on the disclosure of things to *Dasein*.⁸⁹

Yet, in this passage Heidegger acknowledges the existence of an 'external world' beyond *Dasein* ('[b]eings *are* independently'). In the same moment, he discards any need for proof of its existence and circumvents any need to discuss it. As he alludes, this is because although beings 'are' independently of the understanding of the meaning of being of *Dasein*, being only *is* in and through this understanding.⁹⁰

⁸⁶SZ, pp. 266-281.

⁸⁷As I have discussed in this chapter, in *Being and Time* this grounding position is sought through the transcendental-analytic of *Dasein*. By 1936, when Heidegger is giving his lectures on Nietzsche, this grounding position has altered considerably. The work of art and its role on the essence of truth is the central contributing factor to this change in standpoint, which I document throughout this thesis. See, Section 4.6 of this study.

⁸⁸SZ, p. 244. *BT*, p. 178. 'Seindes ist unabhängig von Erfahrung, Kenntnis und Erfassen, wodurch es erschlossen, entdeckt und bestimmt wird. Sein aber "ist" nur im Verstehen des Seindedn, zu dessen Sein so etwas wie Seinsverständnis gehört'.

⁸⁹SZ, p. 483. *BT*, p. 348. 'If no *Dasein* exists, no world is "there" either'.

⁹⁰SZ, p. 275.

The preceding discussion of truth confirms why this is the case for him, as it is only through *Dasein* discovering something *as* something that anything can be said, *in any meaningful sense at least*, to ‘be’. As McDonnell clarifies, with this emphasis Heidegger is accepting, contrary to Husserl’s estimation, the legitimacy of the transcendental reduction.⁹¹ In this passage then, the beings that ‘are’ beyond disclosure are the beings taken for granted in what Husserl calls the ‘natural attitude’, an ontological category that is to be dispensed within phenomenological research.⁹²

In *Ideas I*, Husserl advances his argument for the illegitimacy of the ‘natural attitude’ for phenomenological research. The natural attitude is the mode of consciousness in everyday experience. In this view, one takes the existence of things for granted, as lying there available beyond the experience of things to consciousness whether one is intentionally directed toward them or not and, therefore, one assumes that things beyond consciousness have an independent meaning other than our perception of them.⁹³ By comparing the outer perception of a thing to the inner experience of that thing, Husserl concludes that the perception of a thing is always incomplete and depends on the ‘harmony’ (*Zusammenhang*) of one’s intentional consciousness to complete it.⁹⁴ Husserl thus calls on us to undergo the transcendental reduction to a state of pure consciousness. This occurs when one realises that the experience of outer sense perception depends pre-conditionally on the existence of consciousness. Hence, once this reduction to pure consciousness is complete, one understands that ‘reality is not in itself something absolute which becomes tied secondarily to something else; rather, in the absolute sense, it is nothing at all; it has no “absolute essence” whatever; it has the essentiality of something which, of necessity, is *only* intentional, *only* an object of consciousness, something presented in

⁹¹McDonnell, *Heidegger’s Way Through Phenomenology*, p. 50 and pp. 302-316. Cf., however, *ibid.*, p. 327, as it would seem that this is the only part of phenomenological research to which Heidegger follows Husserl. ‘Heidegger never denied the legitimacy of Husserl’s argument in the transcendental reduction for a formal conception of phenomenology as the study of pure intentional consciousness and its objectivities. What Heidegger does object to, following Dilthey’s critique, is that the experience of consciousness that is gained in and through the ability of consciousness to reflect upon its own operations is a theoretical, abstract (ahistorical) view of the way ‘consciousness’ is lived and actually experienced by human beings’. I explore the significance of this for Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology, below.

⁹²Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book, General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. by F. Kersten (Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), pp. 81-83 and pp. 109-114.

⁹³*Ibid.*, pp. 81-83.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 89-94 and pp. 105-107. Cf. also McDonnell, *Heidegger’s Way Through Phenomenology*, pp. 47-62.

the manner peculiar to consciousness, something apparent'.⁹⁵ For Husserl, talk of what lies beyond consciousness 'in itself' is thus absurd, precisely because the pre-condition for the 'in itself' is the intentional processes of a perceiving consciousness.

Although Heidegger rejects the category of 'consciousness', he accepts the implications of the reduction. In the passage above, Heidegger is arguing that any discussion of what *is* before this initial phenomenological starting point is adequately incorporated into one's analysis extends beyond the limitations of meaningful philosophical discourse, as it lacks adequate ontological comprehension of the significance of *Dasein* and its relationship to reality. Reality is thus understood by him as the *significance* and *meaning* of things to *Dasein*.⁹⁶ Despite accepting the legitimacy of the reduction, this emphasis also marks an important break with Husserl. For Husserl, once the transcendental reduction to pure consciousness is complete, what remains available for thought is the analysis and clarification of essential and universal features of intentional consciousness and its objectivities. This is his project in phenomenology.⁹⁷ For Heidegger, what remains is *Dasein*, a being that has some implicit understanding of the meaning of being which it expresses through concrete engagement with a particular, historical world, and particular things within that world, most famously articulated in his analysis of tools as primarily 'in "handiness"' (*zuhandenheit*),⁹⁸ but also as deposited 'unthought' in the texts of thinkers throughout the philosophical canon, and later he emphasises the significance of this in relation to the work of art. With this hermeneutic and existential focus in his approach to phenomenology successfully integrated into his version of the transcendental reduction, Heidegger's project ventures the attempt to raise the question of the meaning of being for us 'today'.⁹⁹ Thus, Heidegger follows Husserl's

⁹⁵His emphasis. Husserl, *Ideas I*, p. 113.

⁹⁶As Sheehan puts it, 'the only entrance into Heidegger's works is through the phenomenological reduction. Over the door to his [Heidegger's] academy is engraved [...] "No phenomenological reduction? Don't even *try* to get in."' Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger*, p. 10. It is because Heidegger thinks that both Dilthey and Scheler inadequately adhere to the reduction in their thought, that he charges them with an 'ontological indefiniteness' in their work. *SZ*, pp. 277-280.

⁹⁷Husserl, *Ideas I*, pp. 131-143, and p. 147. 'If we heed the norms prescribed by the phenomenological reduction, if, as they demand, we exclude all transcendencies, and if, therefore, we take mental processes purely as they are with respect to their own essence, then, according to all that has been said, a field of eidetic cognitions is opened up to us'.

⁹⁸*SZ*, pp. 136-147. *BT*, pp. 99-107.

⁹⁹As Dahlstrom puts it, 'Heidegger clearly transforms, but by no means simply rejects the phenomenological reduction'. Dahlstrom, *Heidegger's Concept of Truth*, p. 113. On the significance of this project as one which address us 'today' see, McDonnell, *Heidegger's Way Through Phenomenology*, pp. 224-253. See also, *SZ*, p. 3. *BT*, p. 1. 'Die genannte Frage ist *heute* in Vergessenheit gekommen'. 'This question [the question of the meaning of being] has *today* been forgotten'. My emphasis. I explore this briefly, below. As I go on to argue in further chapters, this

critique of the natural attitude, but his position maintains his own particular emphasis on the concrete, engagement with the particular world in which *Dasein* is immersed.

This starting point does not reject that the ‘in itself’ exists. Which is to say, neither Heidegger nor Husserl argue for a kind of idealism.¹⁰⁰ *Dasein* may disclose the wall *as* wall, but if you want to see if the wall is ‘really’ there, then (they might retort): ‘run into it!’ Reality is not a projection of the ‘mind’. For Heidegger, because *Dasein* is defined by its being-in-the-world it ‘defies such proofs [for the existence of external world], because it always already *is* in its being [that is, being-in-the-world] what the [...] proofs first deem necessary to demonstrate for it’.¹⁰¹ This is not to simply take the existence of the world on faith, which, on the contrary, is precisely what is done within the natural attitude. Rather, he argues that although his starting point incorporates the insights of idealism by clarifying the transcendental dimension of experience, he is more of a realist than philosophical realism allows for he is clarifying the necessary preconditions for the world around us to be disclosed meaningful to us.¹⁰² Because the phenomenon of ‘world’ relies on *Dasein* being a being-in-the-world with some implicit understanding of what it means to be, then whether ‘that’ table really ‘exists’ or not misunderstands the significance of the human being as *Dasein* because, as McDonnell succinctly puts it, ‘such indication [i.e., to the ‘there’] presupposes *the facticity of some understanding of Being already there for Dasein*’.¹⁰³ The problem of the ‘external world’ is thus a false problem,¹⁰⁴ for the *significance* of things within the world pre-conditionally depend on their disclosure through a being such as *Dasein*. What Heidegger is clarifying then, is that

significance in Heidegger’s project is crucial for understanding the development of his question from one of the ‘meaning of being’ to the ‘truth of being’.

¹⁰⁰Heidegger leaves the meaning of both realism and idealism in these passages rather vague, given that both of these terms refer to a large history of diverse positions within the philosophical canon. He defines realism as when it is understood that ‘the external world is objectively present in a real way’. This means that realism takes the existence of the external world for granted, and that the world shows itself to the human being as it is ‘in itself’ (within certain limitations, assumingly). Idealism, on the other hand, claims that reality is only what is within the parameters of an individuals’ consciousness. *SZ*, pp. 274-275. *BT*, p. 199.

¹⁰¹His emphasis. *SZ*, p. 272. *BT*, p. 197.

¹⁰²This is because for him realism lacks an ontological comprehension of what is real, thus positing the need to prove the existence of an external world. *Ibid.* See also, *SZ*, p. 45. *BT*, p. 32. ‘Realism and Idealism alike thoroughly miss the meaning of the Greek concept of truth from which alone the possibility of something like a “theory of Ideas” can be understood as philosophical knowledge’. Heidegger will offer his own analysis of the theory of Ideas in Plato, in context of his understanding of the Greek *aletheia*, in the 1931/32 lecture series *On Plato’s Allegory of the Cave and the Theaetetus*. This is the subject of the next chapter of this thesis.

¹⁰³His emphasis. McDonnell, ‘Understanding and Assessing Heidegger’s Topic in Phenomenology’, p. 41.

¹⁰⁴*SZ*, pp. 268-276, esp. p. 272. *BT*, pp. 194-200, esp. p. 197.

discussion of the ‘in itself’ beyond the human being is unavailable to properly grounded phenomenological discourse, and for good reason. Alternatively, properly grounded phenomenological discourse allows us to discuss the ‘in itself’ precisely because it clarifies what is at stake in any pursuit of the ‘in itself’; namely, the recovering the source of meaning/truth within the concealed but implicit awareness of being within the facticity of the human being: *Dasein*.

It is because of this fact that the beings that ‘are’ beyond the disclosure of the meaning of beings are ‘unmeaningful’ (*Unsinnige*).¹⁰⁵ As Heidegger clarifies, to say beings are unmeaningful is not a value statement, but an ‘ontological determination’. Beings unlike *Dasein* are ‘bare of meaning as such’.¹⁰⁶ Again, this is not to say that they are *not*—i.e., that ‘beings in themselves’ do not really ‘exist’—but that they are not in any *meaningful sense* until *Dasein* has disclosed them *as* such and such.¹⁰⁷

Accepting the implications of the transcendental reduction beyond the natural attitude, Heidegger acknowledges the existence of things beyond *Dasein*’s comprehension and at the same time denies this beyond any meaningful ontological status.¹⁰⁸ And yet, on a closer reading we witness him struggle with the limitations of

¹⁰⁵*SZ*, p. 202. *BT*, p. 147.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷Accordingly, in *Being and Time* Heidegger distinguishes between different senses of the term ‘world’. *SZ*, p. 87-88. *BT*, pp. 64-66. For example, world could be used to refer to ‘objective’ reality, understood as ‘the totality of beings which can be objectively present within the world’. This would be the understanding of world in the natural attitude. He clarifies that this is *not* the sense he is interested in. Instead, in his sense world refers to the network of significances that *Dasein* ‘lives’ in. *SZ*, p. 88. *BT*, p. 65. What is relevant for our purposes here, however, is that by distinguishing these senses of world Heidegger recognises that there is a legitimacy to discussing world in these other senses. However, not in his project of fundamental ontology as it stood in *Being and Time*.

¹⁰⁸In virtue of the preceding discussion, we can clarify that Heidegger acknowledges three separate ontological categories of being in this passage. First, there are the beings that ‘are’, assumed within the natural attitude. The implications of the transcendental reduction requires that the phenomenologist must bracket these beings from consideration. We might call this the ‘being’ of the being of beings, which would perhaps be rendered clearer as the ‘actuality’ of the being beyond its significance to *Dasein*. Then, there is the disclosure of these beings to *Dasein*. This is what Heidegger calls the ‘being’ of beings (*Sein des Seienden*). This is the particular way a being is meaningful. Finally, there is the ‘is’ of the ‘to be’ in *Dasein*, which is *not* a being. This is what Heidegger is referring to when he discuss ‘being’, or ‘being itself’. The distinction between the second (the being of beings) and third (being) is what Heidegger would call the ontological difference, which although is not the explicit subject of this passage is implicitly assumed within it. Thus, when Heidegger talks about ‘beings’ (*seiendes*), he is referring to the being of beings, i.e., the disclosure of beings to *Dasein*. He is *not*, then, and ever, discussing the ‘being’ of the being of beings, as these are the beings assumed within the natural attitude. After the transcendental reduction has taken place in thought, any talk of the beings beyond their disclosure is to be dispensed with. However, I argue in this thesis that as Heidegger’s thought develops, he becomes dissatisfied with the limitations of this distinction, and attempts to think all *three* distinctions in one through his understanding of truth as the ‘strife’ between earth and world. I explore this further in chapter three and four of this study. See esp., Section 4.6.

the transcendental position that the reduction forces him to adopt.¹⁰⁹ Although his struggle with this tension becomes increasingly evident as his thought progresses, there are a few instances in *Being and Time* where he seems to implicitly acknowledge these limitations and the tension it creates. For example, Heidegger tells us that what is ‘unmeaningful’ can be experienced as ‘absurd’ (*widersinnig*).¹¹⁰ But by suggesting that the ‘unmeaningful’ can be experienced, he cannot only have the implications of the transcendental reduction in mind precisely because the ‘unmeaningful’ beings beyond disclosure are dispensed through the transcendental reduction, and this reduction is the condition of possibility for experience. Thus, to say that beings beyond their disclosure can be experienced, albeit as ‘absurd’, Heidegger is more likely to have an existential concern around the significance of our relationship with that which lies beyond the confines of our capacity to understand. The problem of the external world thus haunts his transcendental discourse. The influence of Nietzsche’s thought shapes this concern, as it is him who drew our attention to the fundamental meaninglessness of things beyond the value ascribed to them by the human being.¹¹¹ Besides terms like ‘unmeaningful’ or ‘absurd’ to point to that-which-is beyond the comprehension of the meaning of being in *Dasein*, Heidegger will sometimes use the term ‘nature’.¹¹²

He clarifies a few different meanings of the term ‘nature’. Physics, for example, seeks to understand ‘nature’ as an ‘objectively present’ ‘matter’.¹¹³ This would be ‘world’ understood as such in the natural attitude. Heidegger counters that this ‘objectifying’ ‘thematization’ of beings ‘presupposes being-in-the-world as the fundamental constitution of *Dasein*’.¹¹⁴ This is because nature ‘is itself a being which

¹⁰⁹In the 1936/38 *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger explicitly wishes to remove all sense of the transcendental gap from his thinking. *BP*, pp. 322-323. I explore this further in this thesis, see esp. Section 4.6.

¹¹⁰*SZ*, p. 202. *BT*, p. 147.

¹¹¹Sheehan draws our attention to the significance of Nietzsche’s thought in his *Making Sense of Heidegger*, p. 133. Farrell-Krell also strongly emphasises this Nietzschean influence in Heidegger’s thought. Cf. David Farrell-Krell, *Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger’s Thinking of Being* (London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986), esp. pp. 126-137. Kisiel explores evidence that this influence has its roots from as early as 1915. Theodore Kisiel, ‘Measuring the Greatness of the Great Men of Grand Politics: How Nietzsche’s “Dynamite” Rendered Heidegger “kaputt”’, in *Heidegger & Nietzsche*, ed. by Babette Babiche, Alfred Denker, and Holger Zabrowski (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2012), pp. 195-222 (p. 196).

¹¹²See, for example, *SZ*, p. 88, p. 150, p. 192, p. 203. Polt also explores this sense of nature in *Being and Time*. See his, ‘Meaning, Excess, Event’, esp. pp. 36-37. In the second chapter, I document the significance of the term ‘nature’ for his support for the National Socialist regime. I also show that his understanding of this term becomes one influence in the development of his concept of earth.

¹¹³*SZ*, pp. 479-480. *BT*, pp. 345-346.

¹¹⁴*SZ*, p. 481. *BT* p. 346.

is encountered within the world',¹¹⁵ world understood here as the meaningful world available to *Dasein's* disclosure, the sense that he *is* interested in post the transcendental reduction. Thus, in *Being and Time* Heidegger generally thinks of nature as the 'site' of one's 'place' encountered through the understanding. This sense of nature is always historical and particular to one's world, it is 'historical as a countryside, as areas that have been inhabited or exploited, as battlefield and cultic sites'.¹¹⁶ Heidegger's connects here the significance of the transcendental reduction with his hermeneutic emphasis on the factic, lived-experience of *Dasein*. His point is that, for example, when I go for a walk in the woods, I don't encounter 'the woods' or 'nature' as some abstract entity. Instead, what I encounter is the specific woods I am walking in, the woods by Castletown house in Celbridge, where the town of Celbridge first grew from as the workers for the estate settled down nearby and, more specifically, where my mother brought me for walks when I was a kid, where I later had my first kiss, etc.¹¹⁷

This emphasis gives rise to another sense of nature, a sense which the limitations on thought that the transcendental reduction demands leave him unable to sufficiently articulate. We see this when, in certain moments, Heidegger admits a sense of nature as something more than its reduction to significance, where nature seems to be that which eludes our grasp. On discussing nature discovered in its 'objective presence' (i.e., as the natural sciences would) he says '[b]ut in this kind of discovery of nature, nature as what "stirs and strives," what overcomes us, entrances us as landscape, remains hidden. [...] [T]he river's "source" ascertained by the geographer is not the "source in the ground."'"¹¹⁸ This characterisation of nature as what 'overcomes' and 'entrances us' resists and brings into tension his presentation of nature as reduced to the meaning of the world of *Dasein*. We might call this the 'superior' sense of nature. His reference to the source of the river points to his 1934/35 study on Hölderlin's poem *The Rhine*, where it is solely through the accompaniment of the poetry of Hölderlin that the nature of source and origin can be

¹¹⁵SZ, p. 85. BT, p. 63.

¹¹⁶SZ, p. 513. BT, p. 370.

¹¹⁷As Heidegger elegantly puts it in an earlier lecture series, when I encounter a table I do not encounter some abstract, objective, table, but the table that 'my wife sits in the evening when she wants to stay up and read, there at the table we had such and such a discussion that time. [...] That is *the* table as such it is there in the temporality of everydayness'. *OF*, p. 69. See also, Malpas, 'Heidegger's Topology of Being', in *Transcendental Heidegger*, ed. by Steven Crowell and Jeff Malpas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 119-134 (pp. 121-122).

¹¹⁸SZ, p. 95. BT, p. 70.

encountered.¹¹⁹ At another point, he claims that ‘nature is a limit case of the being of possible innerworldly beings. Dasein can discover beings as nature in this sense only in a definite mode of its being-in-the-world’.¹²⁰ Here, he acknowledges the superior sense of nature (as a ‘limit case’ (*Grenzfall*)) but argues that because *Dasein* is a being that discovers its world it can never reach beyond this discovery.

However, if we think of nature as the ‘limit case’ that, in certain moments, ‘overcomes’ and ‘entrances us’, we can understand the following passage, and we see the possible implications of nature understood in the superior sense: ‘Objectively Present things encountered in Dasein can, so to speak, assault its being [*Sein*]; for example, events of nature which break in on us and destroy us’.¹²¹ With this example, Heidegger is thinking of a moment when an event of nature, a natural disaster for instance, irrupts the nature that we have ‘neared’ (*nähern*) through our meaningful world.¹²² This event is so beyond the world available to us from our everyday discovery that it can ‘break in on us and destroy us’. It is *this* sort of existential experience that turns the ‘unmeaning’ of that-which-is beyond their disclosure to *Dasein* into the experience of ‘absurdity’, drawing our attention to Heidegger’s resistance to understand the significance of the transcendental reduction purely in relation to the clarification of the significance of being-as-thing for consciousness *pace* Husserl, precisely because such an understanding of consciousness and its relation to world cannot account for what lies beyond the grasp of this consciousness. In this sense, although our meaningful worlds represent the totality-of-what-is *for Dasein*, in certain moments nature can unleash its superiority and collapse the worlds of meaning that we inhabit.¹²³ It is no coincidence that this idea of nature as ‘breaking

¹¹⁹*HH*, esp. pp. 155-294. *HHGR*, esp. pp. 148-167. This is not to suggest that Heidegger is pointing our attention in *Being and Time* toward this lecture series, as this lecture series is composed seven years after the publication of *Being and Time*, and the significance of poetry had not become evident to him when composing *Being and Time*. Nonetheless, it is telling that Heidegger feels compelled to reflect on the nature of source and origin through the way that it is unfolded in a poem about the river Rhine, and not solely through philosophical reflection.

¹²⁰*SZ*, p. 88. *BT*, p. 65. ‘Natur ist [...] ein Grenzfall des Seins von möglichem innerweltlichen Seienden. Das Seinde als Natur kann das Dasein nur in einem bestimmten Modus seines In-der-Welt-seins entdecken’.

¹²¹*SZ*, p. 202. *BT*, p. 147. ‘Vorhandenes kann als im Dasein Begegnendes gegen dessen Sein gleichsam anlaufen, zum Beispiel hereinbrechende und zerstörende Naturereignisse’.

¹²²On the significance of ‘nearness’ and the related ontological activity of *Dasein* ‘de-distancing’ see, *SZ*, pp. 140-147. See, esp. pp. 142-143. *BT*, p. 104.

¹²³Phillips draws on this passage from *Being and Time* to show argue that the Heidegger of *Being and Time* has the same conception of nature that he does in *The Origin of the Work of Art*, as that which can ‘rupture’ our meaningful worlds. Phillips, *Heidegger’s Volk*, p. 156. What I show here, however, is that although this conception of nature is present in certain moments of *Being and Time*, it is the exception to the rule in that text. This understanding of nature becomes the dominant understanding of nature by the time of *The Origin of the Work of Art*, as I develop throughout this thesis.

in’ to—and so breaking down—our meaningful worlds is also the function of ‘the nothing’ (*das Nichts*) in his 1929 *What is Metaphysics?*¹²⁴ The specific ‘limit case’ that Heidegger chooses to explore in detail in *Being and Time*, is death, which discloses to us the nothing that sustains our being.¹²⁵ Hence, Heidegger takes a specific hermeneutical and existential emphasis to his thinking *after* the reduction is successfully incorporated into his thought, a reduction that thus brings him to the significance of a specific, lived, experience of the world that is threatened by the limitations of its finitude.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger acknowledges a sense of concealment as ‘outright concealment’ but claims discovery can only occur through phenomenon in the mode of semblance.¹²⁶ Therefore truth understood as discovery is not concerned with complete darkness. Instead *Dasein* ‘robs’ (*raubt*) truth from a distorted light.¹²⁷ Through his concept of earth and subsequent engagement with Nietzsche, Heidegger develops an understanding of concealment that attempts to affirm its outright darkness, understood by him as what we might call an ‘excess’ to the understanding of the meaning of being.¹²⁸ In *Being and Time*, this role of the excess to the understanding of the meaning of being is barely recognised, as it transcends the limitations of meaningful philosophical discourse available to phenomenology and specifically post the transcendental reduction. Regardless, although Heidegger adheres to a version of the transcendental reduction in *Being and Time*, subsequently reducing the significance of nature to the world that it is discovered through, there is nonetheless a tension at play that acknowledges that *Dasein*’s understanding of the meaning of being is haunted by the unmeaningful absurdity that lies beyond the realm of phenomenological disclosure. Because this ‘unmeaning’ is undiscovered, it is

¹²⁴*WM*, esp. pp. 113-122.

¹²⁵In his discussion of death, Heidegger draws our attention to the significance of Jaspers’ exploration of death as a ‘limit situation’ (*Grenzsituation*). *SZ*, p. 331, n. 2. *BT*, p. 239, n. 6. He does not, however, use this term himself for *his* exploration of death in *Being and Time*. As the next chapter explores, in the 1930s Heidegger connects his understanding of ‘nothing’ and ‘concealment’ with his concept of nature, bringing together his adherence to the transcendental reduction alongside his post-Nietzschean concern regarding nihilism. As we will see in the final chapter of this thesis, this endeavour culminates in his attempt to think together the beings that ‘are’ beyond disclosure and the being of beings within disclosure, leading the way to ‘leap’ over both transcendence and the ontological difference. On this, see, *BP*, pp. 250-251.

¹²⁶*SZ*, p. 293. Elsewhere, he is slightly more ambiguous, claiming that a phenomenon can be ‘covered up in the sense that it is still completely *undiscovered*. There is neither knowledge nor lack of knowledge about it’. He distinguishes this from a ‘*submerged*’ phenomenon, which is the sense that he means when discussing semblance. His emphasis. *SZ*, p. 48. *BT*, p. 34.

¹²⁷*SZ*, p. 294.

¹²⁸I develop this further in chapter three and four of this study. See also, Polt, ‘Meaning, Excess, Event’, esp. p. 34.

concealed. As Heidegger further explores the significance of ‘concealment’, he utilises the work of art to address what his understanding of the limits of meaningful philosophical discourse does not allow, namely, a retrieval of the ‘nothing’ within beings without reducing this ‘concealment’ to something ‘revealed’ through the process of disclosure of *Dasein*’s understanding.¹²⁹ By 1934, it is the task of the poets to bring a people into a fundamental connection with the primordial concealment.

1.3 The Significance of Art Before 1930

In *Being and Time*, the work of art has minor, if any, significance. This is certainly noteworthy, given the prominent role of poetry and the work of art in the 1935/36 lecture on *The Origin of the Work of Art*, and given the central place *poesis* has in his thought throughout the 1940s and beyond. In *Being and Time* there is passing allusion in a footnote to Tolstoy’s exploration of inauthentic demise in *The Death of Ivan Ilyich*.¹³⁰ Perhaps more notably, there is the expression of *Dasein* as concern (*Sorge*) through the fable of Hyginus.¹³¹ Heidegger uses this fable as the most profound evidence of the ‘well grounded’ ‘ontological ‘construction’ of his determination of the being of *Dasein* as concern.¹³² However, we are told that the demonstrative power of this fable is not in its poetic quality but in the pre-ontological, self-interpretation of *Dasein* it evidences.¹³³ Although, arguably, the poetic dimension of the myth is the

¹²⁹See Section 3. 5 and Section 4.6. See also, Mitchell, *Heidegger Among the Sculptures*, esp. pp. 9-13.

¹³⁰*SZ*, p. 337, n. 4. For an exploration of the significance of this footnote, see, Robert Bernasconi, ‘Literary Attestation in Philosophy. Heidegger’s Footnote on Tolstoy’s ‘The Death of Ivan Ilyich’’, in *Philosopher Poets*, ed. by David Wood (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 7-36.

¹³¹*SZ*, pp. 261-265. *BT*, pp. 189-193.

¹³²*SZ*, pp. 261-262. *BT*, pp. 190-191.

¹³³*SZ*, p. 261. *BT*, p. 190. From a Husserlian Phenomenological standpoint, one which encourages us to dispense with texts and focus on our own capacity to ‘bracket’ the natural attitude and think after the transcendental reduction is complete in ones thought, the use of the fable could offer no ‘confirmation’ of *Dasein* as a being of care, as it is a pre-phenomenological text. It is perhaps telling that in Husserl’s own marginal notes to *Being and Time*, he skips entirely the section in question. Edmund Husserl, *Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology and The Confrontation with Heidegger (1927-1930)*, trans. and ed by Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 1997), p. 350. The use of the fable, then, is likely to come from Heidegger’s attempts to reform Husserlian phenomenology toward Dilthey’s hermeneutic method of inquiry. On this, see, McDonnell, *Heidegger’s Way Through Phenomenology*, pp. 72-163. See especially, pp. 116-118 and pp. 130-135. Regardless, even if it can be said that Dilthey’s concerns with poetry lie latent within Heidegger’s discussion of the fable, Heidegger does not mention or engage with them here. Presumably because, as I discuss further below, *poesis* was understood as an inauthentic form of articulating the meaning of being. Taminiaux, *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*, pp. 117-122. For more on Heidegger’s use of this myth, see, Drew A. Hyland, ‘Caring for Myth: Heidegger, Plato and the Myth of Cura’, *Research in Phenomenology*, 27, 1 (1997), pp. 90-102, esp. pp.92-94. Here, Hyland draws attention to the constant ‘qualifications and re-qualifications of qualifications’ Heidegger makes in introducing this myth, almost as if its use is an embarrassment.

pre-ontological expression of this self-interpretation through the fable (as a form of ‘*poesis*’, as Heidegger will come to understand it by 1935), the significance of this lies entirely omitted from the discussion.

This is not a surprise if we consider Heidegger’s understanding of poetry at this time. In *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (1927), Heidegger admits that the poet can grasp and express the coming-to-be of the world in its meaningful worldliness. That is, ‘poetry, creative literature, is nothing but the elementary emergence into words, the becoming uncovered, of existence as being-in-the-world’.¹³⁴ This echoes a similar claim in *Being and Time*. ‘The communication of the existential possibilities of how-one-finds-oneself-situated [*Befindlichkeit*], that is, the opening up of existence, can become the true aim of “poetic” speech’.¹³⁵ Thus, the poet can draw attention to our meaningful worlds, as Rilke does in the passage from his *The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge*, but in a dismissive tone Heidegger claims that this ‘elementary emergence into words’ is ‘unconsidered’ and ‘not at all theoretically discovered’.¹³⁶ So, although the fable of Hyginus is seen as significant in its pre-ontological clarification of the importance of *Dasein*’s concern, it is nonetheless marked by the ‘naïveté of an ‘accidental, “immediate” and ‘unreflective “beholding”’.¹³⁷ It would be another matter altogether to allow the meaning of *Dasein* to ‘be brought *thematically* to self-showing’, in the manner in which his conception of fundamental ontology as presented in *Being and Time* endeavours.¹³⁸ So as Taminiaux correctly points out, for Heidegger at this time, ‘the poet cannot be on an equal footing with the thinker’.¹³⁹

This is starkly opposed to the Heidegger of 1935, where the artwork becomes the site of truth through the disclosive power of *poiesis*. In 1942 he argues that the

Later (p. 100) Hyland criticizes the Heidegger of *Being and Time* on account of his allegiance to ‘scientific phenomenology’, causing him to insufficiently grasp, at this time, the significance of myth for ontological analysis. Hyland points out, however, that the poetic thought that emerges later embraces this. A brief look at the 1942 lecture series *Parmenides* would confirm this, where Heidegger asserts that the use of myth in Plato is the preservation of ‘primordial thinking’. *PM*, pp. 99-100.

¹³⁴*BPP*, pp. 172-173.

¹³⁵Trans. mod. *SZ*, p. 216. *BT*, p. 157. ‘Die Mitteilung der existenzialen Möglichkeiten der Befindlichkeit, das heißt das Erschließen von Existenz, kann eigenes Ziel der “dichtenden” Rede Werden’.

¹³⁶*BPP*, p. 173. Likewise, Taminiaux explores how Heidegger’s understanding of inauthentic existence in *Being and Time* is shaped by his reading of *poiesis* in Aristotle. Taminiaux, *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*, pp. 117-122.

¹³⁷*SZ*, p. 49. *BT*, p. 34.

¹³⁸My emphasis. *SZ*, pp. 36-52, esp. p. 42. *BT*, pp. 26-37, esp. p. 30.

¹³⁹Taminiaux, ‘The Origin of “The Origin of the Work of Art”’, p. 395.

poets '[beckon] to the holy' and '[draw] the gods near'.¹⁴⁰ By 1951, the question of the relationship between thinking and poetry becomes, for him, inescapable.¹⁴¹ What realisation allows for such a stark development in his thought? As we will see, this development hinges on his discovery of the significant of concealment. This discovery gains a central focus through the problem he comes to see in nihilism.

1.4 A Response to the Problem of Nihilism in National Socialism

As we saw, Heidegger believes that concealment was inadequately grasped as a kind of 'falsehood' in *Being and Time*. By the time of writing the *Contributions*, concealment is instead explored in the two-fold sense of the 'abandonment' (*Seinsverlassenheit*) and 'forgottenness' (*Seinsvergessenheit*) of being.¹⁴² Throughout the 1930s, the problem of nihilism is a focal concern for Heidegger,¹⁴³ and he argues that nihilism has its 'deepest ground (*innerster Grund*)' in the essence of being understood in this two-fold sense of both 'abandoning' and 'forgotten'.¹⁴⁴ It is in virtue of this development that the work of art is a means in which this nihilism can be effectively countered.¹⁴⁵ The National Socialist 'revolution' was another means by which he believed this nihilism could be effectively countered.¹⁴⁶ This section begins to address this tenuous terrain, and a brief overview of scholarship at the end of this section on Heidegger's involvement with the National Socialist regime helps shape the discussion of the significance of his involvement throughout the rest of the thesis.

Ehrmantraut argues that 'in the two decades following [Heidegger's rectoral Address] [...] [Heidegger develops] an ever deepening reflection on the problem of 'nihilism' in modernity and the roots of nihilism in what he considers the inception of the history of the West'.¹⁴⁷ His reference is to Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche's statement 'God is Dead', which he takes as evidence of the need of the German

¹⁴⁰WD, p. 319. WP, p. 138. See also his 1966 interview with *Der Spiegel*, Martin Heidegger, 'Only a God Can Save Us: *Der Spiegel's* Interview With Martin Heidegger', in *Martin Heidegger: Philosophical and Political Writings*, ed. by Manfred Stassen (London: Continuum, 2003), pp. 24-48 (p. 36), where he infamously claims that 'only a God can save us'.

¹⁴¹WT, p. 271.

¹⁴²BP, pp. 113-116.

¹⁴³As I go on to explore, this theme arises in each of the lecture series under investigation in this thesis.

¹⁴⁴BP, p. 116.

¹⁴⁵This is what is at stake in his engagement with the poet Hölderlin, as I explore in chapter three.

¹⁴⁶SW, p. 148, BaT, p. 116.

¹⁴⁷Michael Ehrmantraut, 'Nihilism and Education in Heidegger's Essay: "Nietzsche's Word: "God is Dead"'"', *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 48, 8 (2016), 764-784 (p. 764). Pöggeler also points to this. Otto Pöggeler, *Philosophie und Politik bei Heidegger* (Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber GmbH, 1972), esp. pp. 71-72.

people to ‘face up to the forsakenness of modern man in the midst of what is’.¹⁴⁸ The ‘forsakenness’ of ‘what is’ reflects the bleak understanding Heidegger had of the state of his contemporary world. In his 1929/30 lecture series *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger voices these grievances. ‘[E]verywhere there are disruptions, crises, catastrophes, needs: the contemporary social misery, political confusion, the powerlessness of science, the erosion of art, the groundlessness of philosophy, the impotence of religion’.¹⁴⁹ However, the ‘groups, associations, circles, classes, parties’ which would meet these needs of the time have failed.¹⁵⁰ Kisiel documents how Heidegger’s thinking here has its roots almost two decades before. In 1915, the ‘young’ Heidegger ‘reports for a local newspaper’.¹⁵¹ His report opens with the following quotation from Nietzsche’s *The Will to Power*: ‘For some time now, our entire European culture has been in motion as if toward a catastrophe, with a tortuous tension that increases with each decade, restlessly, violently, precipitously, like a river that wants to end in a torrent, that no longer deliberates, that is afraid to pause and take thought, to meditate on the sense of this precipitous movement’.¹⁵²

The connection with Nietzsche is not incidental. As Chapter four of this study looks at closely, Heidegger believed that Nietzsche offered the most profound philosophical reflection on the significance of nihilism in the course of the history of Western metaphysics,¹⁵³ superseded only by Hölderlin in offering us the means to effectively counter its all-pervasive grasp. He describes nihilism as ‘the event [*Ereignis*] of the disappearance of all weight from all things, the fact of the absence of

¹⁴⁸Martin Heidegger, ‘The Self Assertion of the German University (1933)’ trans. by Karsten Harries in *Heidegger: Philosophical and Political Writings*, ed. by Manfred Stassen (London: Continuum, 2003), pp. 2-11 (p. 5). See also, Harries, *Art Matters*, p. 43. ‘Heidegger accepts the truth of Nietzsche’s pronouncement [of the death of God]. Such acceptance is a presupposition of all his subsequent work. See also, Pöggeler, *Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking*, p. 83.

¹⁴⁹*FM*, p. 163. See also, Safranski, *Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil*, p. 228. According to Safranski, Heidegger retrospectively used this as a justification for his involvement, for ‘the hardships of the period [...] called for resolute political action’.

¹⁵⁰*FM*, p. 163. As Heidegger says in his 1933 Rectoral Address, ‘[d]o we know about this spiritual mission? Whether we do or do not, the question must be inevitably face: *are* we, teachers and students of this “high” school, truly and commonly rooted in the essence of the German university? Does this essence have genuine strength to shape our existence [*Dasein*]?’ Only if we fundamentally *will* this essence’. The German destiny, he says later, is in ‘the most extreme distress’. Martin Heidegger, ‘The Self-Assertion of the German University’, trans. by Karsten Harries, in *Martin Heidegger: Political and Philosophical Writings*, ed. by Manfred Stassen (London: Continuum, 2003), pp. 2-11.

¹⁵¹Kisiel, ‘Measuring the Greatness of the Great Men of Grand Politics’, p. 196. Pöggeler points this out also, however he claims that Nietzsche only became ‘decisive’ for Heidegger following *Being and Time*. Cf. his *Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking*, p. 83.

¹⁵²As quoted by Kisiel in, ‘Measuring the Greatness of the Great Men of Grand Politics’, p. 196.

¹⁵³*BP*, pp. 119-120.

an emphatic weight [*Schwergewicht*].¹⁵⁴ The idea here is that when the intrinsic values of a world lose their capacity to sustain a meaningful bind on *Dasein*, such as through the death of God in the West, the meaningful world that *Dasein* sustains gets emptied of its meaningful content.¹⁵⁵ Although Heidegger is drawing heavily on Nietzsche, it is coherent with what has already been explored of his thought. *Dasein* transcends beings to their meaning, a meaning that is sustained by its being-in-the-world. This meaningful world I am ‘thrown’ into. However, if the meanings that sustain that world lose their grip on *Dasein*, then our world, and the beings that are made sense of *as* something through it, begin to denature. The ‘absurd’ or ‘unmeaning’ that these entities ‘are’ beyond the disclosure of their meaning to *Dasein* thus begin to protrude into the meaningful world. Here, we see the transcendental reduction with Heidegger’s existentialist emphasis coalesce. Hence, the beings meaningfully disclosed progressively decay into nothing and insignificance. In this sense, Sheehan frames Heidegger’s project (one which asks about the source of meaningful intelligibility) as ‘very much a post-Nietzschean inquiry’.¹⁵⁶

However, according to Heidegger the framework of *Being and Time* was unable to adequately articulate the significance of concealment, what he by that point understands to be the grounds of nihilism. In his 1947 text *Letter on Humanism* Heidegger explains that the project of *Being and Time* failed because it could not express the dimension of its experience, which is to say, ‘the fundamental experience of the forgottenness of being’.¹⁵⁷ In his 1936/38 *Contributions to Philosophy*, he informs us that nihilism arises from the ‘abandonment’ and ‘forgottenness’ of being.¹⁵⁸ Despite the sensational name, Heidegger is here pointing to one of his fundamental insights in *Being and Time*, that being both discloses beings and withdraws from beings in their disclosure, and so being (*Sein*) is *not a* being (*ein Seiendes*). This is what he calls the ontological difference, the irreducible gap between the meaning of beings and their source of meaning in *Dasein*.¹⁵⁹ However, due to his increasing concerns regarding the significance of nihilism, this insight comes to gain a particular significance it does not have in *Being and Time*. In the

¹⁵⁴NM, p. 166. ‘Der Nihilismus ist das Ereignis des Schwindens aller Gewichte aus allen Dingen, die Tatsache des Fehlens des Schwergewichts’. ‘Nihilism is the *Ereignis* of the disappearance of all weight from all things, the fact of the absence of an emphatic weight’.

¹⁵⁵Hence, for Heidegger in the 1930s *Dasein* becomes that which we must ‘leap’ into. BP, pp. 31-32.

¹⁵⁶Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger*, p. 133.

¹⁵⁷BH, p. 328. ‘[...] der Grunderfahrung des Seinsvergessenheit’.

¹⁵⁸BP, pp. 115-119. CP, pp. 91-94.

¹⁵⁹SZ, pp. 5-6. In *What is Metaphysics?* Heidegger points out that this source is ‘no-thing’. WM, p. 115.

Contributions he argues that the ‘innermost ground of historical uprootedness [or, nihilism] is an essential ground, grounding in the essence of beyng: the fact that beyng is withdrawing from beings and yet lets them appear as what “is” and even as what “is more eminently.”¹⁶⁰ That being withdraws is another way of saying being is concealed, and that it is ‘nothing’, or, not a thing. By the mid-1930s, this concealment is understood to be the grounds of nihilism.¹⁶¹ Hence, although he affirms Nietzsche’s recognition of the problem of nihilism, he believes that Nietzsche failed to recognise its source in the concealment of beyng to which Heidegger seeks to draw our attention.¹⁶² This is because throughout the history of metaphysics, being becomes forgotten in virtue of its nature as concealed. Because being conceals itself (*Seinsverlassenheit*) it remains forgotten (*Seinsvergessenheit*). This is another way of saying that its significance as a concealed phenomenon remains unarticulated throughout the history of Western thought. This argument boils down to the conviction that the source of nihilism in the West is because the ontological difference had thus far not been discovered throughout that history, as far as Heidegger contends at least, revealing the major historical significance that he sees in his own philosophical project.

Heidegger expresses this through a story. Soon after the meaning of being becomes questionable, documented through the fragments that remain of the pre-Socratic philosophers, the fact that being conceals itself means that its significance as *not* a being (or nothing) becomes missed. This is because as a concealed phenomenon it is unavailable to representational thought.¹⁶³ In fact, it is concealed precisely in virtue of the fact that it relies on *Dasein*’s unique nature as a thrown being that project understanding through its concern about itself, thus opening up a temporal horizon that allows beings to come to be in some meaningful way.¹⁶⁴ As a result of inadequately articulating the significance of this ‘no-thing’, the philosophy of Plato makes the first move in reducing being to *a* being, i.e., re-presenting it *as* Idea, and later Christianity takes this up by understanding being as God.¹⁶⁵ This is the history of

¹⁶⁰*BP*, pp. 116-117. *CP*, p. 92. ‘Der innerste Grund der geschichtlichen Entwurzelung ist ein wesenhafter, im Wesen des Seyns gründender: daß das Seyn sich dem Seienden entzieht und es dabei doch als “seined” und sogar “seiender” erscheinen läßt’.

¹⁶¹*BP*, pp. 138-141.

¹⁶²*Ibid.* See also, *ibid.*, p. 115.

¹⁶³Claxton, *Heidegger’s Gods*, pp. 11-12.

¹⁶⁴Meaning understood as a pre-thematic ‘non’ understanding of being, available to *Dasein* as a result of its implicit understanding of what it means to be in virtue of its concern over itself as a being in being.

¹⁶⁵*BP*, pp. 116-119.

metaphysics, understood by him as a history of the forgottenness of being where being is understood as presence as opposed a more original absence. This history Heidegger wishes to rectify through his project of raising anew the question of the meaning of being. Once a sufficient starting point had been reached through the analytic of *Dasein* in the first two divisions of *Being and Time*, this was to occur through the ‘destruction’ (*Destruktion*) of the history of metaphysics.¹⁶⁶

However, the passage from his *Letter on Humanism* shows that in Heidegger’s estimation his attempt to achieve what he had set out to do in *Being and Time* ultimately failed.¹⁶⁷ Evidence from the *Black Notebook* displays how Heidegger was not satisfied with his philosophical output for a number of years after *Being and Time*. In March of 1932 Heidegger writes to himself, ‘I am in all clarity at a place from which my entire previous literate output (*Being and Time*, “What is Metaphysics?,” Kantbook, and “On the Essence of Ground I and II”) has become alien to me. Alien like a path brought to an impasse, a path overgrown with grass and vegetation’.¹⁶⁸ Another note suggests how Heidegger believed he overcame this ‘impasse’. Namely, through ‘[t]he great experience and fortune that the Führer has awakened a new actuality, *giving our thinking the correct course and impetus*. Otherwise, despite all the thoroughness, it would have remained lost in itself and would only with difficulty have found its way to effectiveness’.¹⁶⁹

This is a troubling admission for the question of the intersection between Heidegger’s support of the movement and his philosophy. This passage elucidates that, as far as Heidegger believed at least, the developments in his thinking at this time come from the significance he saw in Hitler as the *Führer* of Germany. Likewise, Safranski explores how Heidegger sought to develop a philosophy that was ‘in control’ of its time,¹⁷⁰ and he shows how Heidegger took steps to appropriate the mood of the time as the starting point for his philosophical reflections.¹⁷¹ However, he claims that Heidegger was ‘bewitched’ by Hitler.¹⁷² This seems to evade the

¹⁶⁶The prospect of this destruction is discussed in *SZ*, pp. 27-36. However, the third division of the first part of *Being and Time*, where this was to occur, was never published.

¹⁶⁷*BH*, pp. 327-328.

¹⁶⁸*UII-VI*, p. 20. *PII-VI*, p. 15.

¹⁶⁹My emphasis. *UII-VI*, p. 111, *PII-VI*, p. 81.

¹⁷⁰Safranski, *Between Good and Evil*, p. 226.

¹⁷¹*Ibid.*, p. 234.

¹⁷²*Ibid.*, p. 232. It is important to remember that Heidegger was certainly not on his own in this ill-conceived conviction, as support for the National Socialist Party in Germany boomed in 1929, at the height of the Great Depression. As Collins notes, this enthusiasm for the National Socialists continued to rise in the years that followed, with a 2.6 percent share in 1928, into a 43.9 percent share in 1933. Jeff Collins, *Heidegger and the Nazis*, Postmodern Encounters (Cambridge: Cox & Wyman Ltd, 2000)

problem of this intersection, for the attempt to raise the question of the meaning of being is to do so in its significance as it stands for a people ‘today’ (*heute*).¹⁷³ As we know, it is in the 1930s that the National Socialist Party rose to major significance within Germany. With this emphasis on the significance of being ‘today’, the rise of the National Socialist Party might easily cohere with his philosophical search for a meaning of being for a people. To suggest that there is a ‘bewitchment’ occurring misses the significance of this historical event for the aims of Heidegger’s philosophical project. Instead, the National Socialist revolution is an ‘awakening’ of a new ‘actuality’, one which gives a renewed ‘impetus’ to his thought. Passages from the *Black Notebooks* testify to this. For example, when Heidegger says that the current ‘stirring’ of the youth (i.e., the contemporary excitement of the rise of the National Socialist Party) is ‘not a fleeting tickle—instead, the emergence of an agility in the appropriation of beings—the enduring of an early hardness, the approaching of a free cultivation—awakening bond with that which afflicts. Work—people—cultivation—state—| opening up of the world’.¹⁷⁴

The statement ‘opening up of the world’ is how Heidegger understands the occurrence of truth. In the 1931/32 lecture series on Plato, the subject of the next chapter of this thesis, Heidegger draws attention to the fact that ‘this change of the essence of truth [his project in this lecture series] is the revolution [*Umwälzung*] of the whole human being, at the beginning of which we stand’.¹⁷⁵ Mirroring this, in a public appeal for the withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations, Heidegger claims ‘The National Socialist Revolution is bringing about the total transformation of our German Dasein’.¹⁷⁶ We begin to see then, the historical significance Heidegger saw in the National Socialist movement and the relation he believed it to have with his own philosophy.

We have to be careful here. The importance Heidegger saw in the Party serves only to show us the significance that Heidegger saw in his own philosophy and its

pp. 12-13. See also, Howard Eiland, ‘Heidegger’s Political Engagement’, *Salmagundi*, 70/71, Intellectuals (1986), 267-284 (p. 267). Safranski also documents the mood of the time and the enthusiasm for the ‘National Socialist revolution’ in *Between Good and Evil*, pp. 229-230.

¹⁷³SZ, p. 3. BT, p. 1. ‘Die genannte Frage ist *heute* in Vergessenheit gekommen’. ‘This question [the question of the meaning of being] has *today* been forgotten’. My emphasis. The significance of Heidegger’s project to raise anew the question of being today—and the relation this emphasis has in context of the influence of biblical hermeneutics in his thought—is explored by McDonnell in his *Heidegger’s Way Through Phenomenology*, pp. 224-253.

¹⁷⁴UII-VI, p. 6. PII-VI, pp. 46-47.

¹⁷⁵WWP, p. 324.

¹⁷⁶Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, p. 3.

relation to the National Socialist movement in Germany, in the early 1930s at least. This does not suggest that Heidegger's philosophy necessarily leads to Nazism. Moreover, to judge Heidegger for supporting the movement in the early 1930s on account of the actions of the Nazi party by 1946 is to be historically myopic. There were, indeed, troubling warning signs of what was to come, even in 1930. But Heidegger saw hope in a movement that he wished to shape, and the *Black Notebooks* show us that he became dissatisfied with how this movement actualised itself.¹⁷⁷ To examine this intersection thus requires careful evaluation.

The theme of nihilism is crucial for evaluating this intersection. As this study explores, the development in his understanding of the essence of truth draws Heidegger's attention to the significance of concealment, which is thought by him in this two-fold way of the abandonment/forgottenness of being. Because it has been forgotten, the concealment of being becomes responsible for the onset of nihilism, as it cannot sufficiently grasp the nature of disclosure in being as 'nothing'. Thus, it is only through a renewed reflection on the essence of truth and the significance of concealment therein that we develop an adequate response to this nihilism. In this way, the change of the essence of truth is a 'revolution'.¹⁷⁸ As, too, was the rise of the National Socialist Party, or so Heidegger believed. Reflecting this, in a letter to his brother in 1931, Heidegger suggests that the National Socialist Party was a response to nihilism. He claims that the rise of the Nazis is beyond 'mere party politics' but instead 'about the salvation (*Rettung*) or sinking (*Untergang*) of Europe and Western Civilisation'.¹⁷⁹ In March of 1933, one year after the entry in the *Black Notebooks* regarding the 'impasse' of his previous output, he continues this sentiment to his brother in a letter to his friend, and German-Jewish scholar, Elisabeth Blochmann:

The current events have for me—precisely because so much remains obscure and uncontrolled—an extraordinary concentrative power. It intensified the will and the confidence to work in the service of a grand mission and to cooperate in the building of a world grounded in the people. For some time now, I have given up on the empty, thus nihilistic talk of mere "culture" and so-called "values" and have sought this new ground in *Da-sein*. We will find this ground and at the same time the calling of the German people in the history of the West only if we expose ourselves to being itself in a new way and new appropriation. I thereby experience the current events wholly out of the future. Only in this way can we develop a genuine involvement out of the *in-*

¹⁷⁷I explore this further in chapter three.

¹⁷⁸*WWP*, p. 324.

¹⁷⁹Heidegger, '*Martin und Fritz Heidegger: Briefe*', p. 22. In the break of the 1931-32 lecture series on Plato, Hermann Mörchen visited Heidegger at his hut in Todtnauberg. Afterward, he reflects, 'the talk was not about philosophy, but mainly about National Socialism'. As quoted by Safranski in *Between Good and Evil*, pp. 226–227.

stantiation [*Inständigkeit*] in our history which is in fact the precondition for any effective action.¹⁸⁰

As he also claims in his *Black Notebooks*: ‘We do not desire to underpin National Socialism “theoretically,” not even supposedly so as to make it in that way for the first time durable and enduring. But we do want to provide the movement and its proper power possibilities of world-configuration and of development’.¹⁸¹ Nonetheless, Heidegger felt that this potential power of the movement would not be actualised without an ‘attunement growing into the ground’.¹⁸² The connection between truth and ground is important. In a subsequently deleted passage from his 1930 lecture *On The Essence of Truth*, Heidegger claims ‘the connection with the land [*Bodenständigkeit*] is the foundation of all truth’.¹⁸³ The connections Heidegger is making here between truth, land, and National Socialism give evidence for Lacoue-Labarthe’s estimation that Heidegger investment in the National Socialist Party was not *only* in the economic, political, and social disarray of Germany at the time, but ‘also, and perhaps even principally the anxiety and even the dread arising from the acknowledged exhaustion of the modern project in which the catastrophic Being of that project stands revealed’.¹⁸⁴ What this connection between truth, concealment, nihilism, and the Nazis show, is that these are not two differing ‘investments’ in Heidegger’s thought but seem to be both essentially related for him in the grounds of his own philosophy. Therefore, the ‘impetus’ set on his thought through the new ‘actuality’ of the National Socialist revolution is not something *new* to add to his thinking. Instead, Heidegger sees the significance of his own philosophy, with its attempts to get to foundations of Western metaphysics and confront the problem of nihilism, as having an inner coherence with the ‘revolution’ he witnessed in his own time through the rise of the National Socialists. The problem of nihilism and the important philosophical connection it has with Heidegger’s insight of the concealment of being, thus offers us a fruitful ‘prism’ in which to investigate the intersection between Heidegger’s philosophy and his support of the National Socialist

¹⁸⁰Heidegger, ‘Selected Letters from the Heidegger-Blochmann Correspondence’, p. 570.

¹⁸¹*UII-VI*, pp. 134-135. *PII-VI*, pp. 98-99.

¹⁸²*UII-VI*, p. 62. *PII-VI*, 47.

¹⁸³Farias, *Heidegger and Nazism*, p. 72. Farias discovers this from both an account given by Heinrich Berl and corroborating his account with the one given by the *Karlsruher Tagblatt*, July 16, 1930. O’Brien also explores this connection between land and truth, with specific reference to Heidegger’s use of the term ‘rootedness’ (*Bodenständigkeit*), in *Heidegger, History and the Holocaust*, pp.71-76 and pp. 105-114.

¹⁸⁴Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, p. 20.

Party. In due course, we will also see that the role of art in the essence of truth are intimately bound up for him with the problem of nihilism.

Many attempts have been made in scholarship to both condemn and redeem Heidegger in face of his commitments to National Socialism. Began by Heidegger's former student Karl Löwith in 1940,¹⁸⁵ the link between Heidegger's thought and his involvement with the National Socialist Party has received widespread discussion. Commentators such as Farias, Wolin, Faye, Rockmore and, most recently, Trawny, explore how Heidegger's support of the National Socialist Party exerts significant problematic implications for his philosophy.¹⁸⁶ Farias' work is arguably the most extreme, making a case that Heidegger's support of National Socialism is the result of a sustained commitment to various forms of conservative and fascist thinking traceable since the beginning of his philosophical thought.¹⁸⁷ His charge is that Heidegger's philosophy seems to directly lead one to support of the National Socialists. Many have explored the limitations and biases that inform Farias' work.¹⁸⁸ However, Faye agrees with Farias' thesis, and argues that Heidegger is a committed anti-Semite, and given his allegiance to the National Socialist Party 'it is absolutely impossible to separate [National Socialist] ideology from philosophy in Heidegger's work'.¹⁸⁹ Sheehan counters by documenting the many errors in scholarship and misrepresentations of Heidegger's thought in Faye's work.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁵Karl Löwith, 'The Political Implications of Heidegger's Existentialism', in *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*, ed. by Richard Wolin (London: The MIT Press, 1993; repr. 1998), pp. 167-187.

¹⁸⁶Farias, *Heidegger and Nazism*. See also, Richard Wolin, 'Introduction' in *The Heidegger Controversy*, ed. by Richard Wolin (London: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 25-28, Emmanuel Faye, *Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy in Light of the Unpublished Seminars of 1933-1935*, trans. by Michael B. Smith (United States of America: Yale University Press, 2009) and, Peter Trawny, *Heidegger and the Myth of a Jewish World Conspiracy*, trans. by Andrew J. Mitchell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015). For example, Wolin argues that the link between Heidegger's politics and his philosophy are undeniable. See his, *The Politics of Being*, p. 2. For a defence of Wolin's reading see, Josef Chytrý, 'The Timeliness of Martin Heidegger's National Socialism', *New German Critique*, 58, 1993, 86-96 (esp. pp. 88-93). This is not to suggest that these scholars exhaust the list of those that would oppose Heidegger's philosophy on account of his politics. For a critical engagement with the criticisms raised by others, such as Adorno, Bourdieu, and Habermas, see, O'Brien, *Heidegger, History and the Holocaust*, pp. 43-76 That Heidegger's philosophy and his support of the movement are fundamentally intertwined is also the central contention of Rockmore's *On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy*.

¹⁸⁷Farias, *Heidegger and Nazism*, p.4.

¹⁸⁸Young explores these in *Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism*, pp. 38-40. Most notably, he quotes the historian Hugo Ott as remarking that 'Farias' methodology while possibly acceptable in literary criticism is quite unacceptable in historical research', *ibid.*, p. 39. See also, O'Brien, *Heidegger, History and the Holocaust*, pp. 134-135, n. 14, Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, pp. 123-136, and W. J. Korab Karpowicz, 'Heidegger's Hidden Path: From Philosophy to Politics', *The Review of Metaphysics*, 61, 2 (2007), 295-315 (p. 296).

¹⁸⁹Faye, 'Nazi Foundations in Heidegger's Work', p. 56. See also, Christopher Rickey, *Revolutionary Saints: Heidegger, National Socialism, and Antinomian Politics* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania

However, it is one thing to say that Heidegger philosophy directly leads to Nazism and another to recognise the significance he saw in his philosophy in relation to his historical time. This more nuanced approach is embodied in the work of both Ott and Bambach. They show in what way the National Socialist movement was conceived by Heidegger as an event of the disclosure of truth and being.¹⁹¹ Ott is more neutral in his analysis. But by emphasising the significance of rootedness (*Bodenständigkeit*) in his thought, Bambach explores the philosophical coherence of Heidegger's understanding of truth and his support of the National Socialist movement.¹⁹² Therefore, to explore in what way Heidegger's philosophy was embedded in its time is not to excuse his involvement. In this light, Trawny raises the problem of a potential 'contamination', where 'contamination takes hold at the margins of thinking, dissolving them, blurring them'.¹⁹³

On the opposing side there are those that would see Heidegger's engagement with National Socialism as purely opportunism, or a personal error.¹⁹⁴ This view would claim that his involvement bears no relation to his philosophy, and often that his philosophy contradicts his support of the regime.¹⁹⁵ On the issue of his anti-Semitism for example, a recent commentator goes as far as to say that because Heidegger is a philosopher who accepts the transcendental critique, which is to say, his project is one that focusses purely on 'our experience of our experience', his anti-

State University Press, 2002), p. 183. Adorno also finds evidence of this. Theodor Adorno, *The Jargon of Authenticity*, trans. by Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will (London: Routledge Classics, 2003), p. 84 and p. 108.

¹⁹⁰Thomas Sheehan, 'Emmanuel Faye: The Introduction of Fraud into Philosophy?', *Philosophy Today*, 59, 3 (2015), 367-400. Sheehan does find Heidegger's involvement with Nazism problematic, however. See, Thomas Sheehan, 'Heidegger and the Nazi's', *The New York Review of Books*, 16 June 1988. Available at <<https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1988/06/16/heidegger-and-the-nazis/>> [accessed 15 Sep 2018]. At the end of the article, Sheehan argues that Heidegger's increasing focus on nihilism and its relevance in his myth of the history of being is in large part responsible for this flight into Nazism. He thus calls on us to 'demythologize' Heidegger's thought, if we are to separate what is useful from what is not. Caputo also attempts this in his 'Demythologizing Heidegger: *Aletheia* and the History of Being'. However, in this thesis I claim that this task becomes increasingly difficult when dealing with his concept of untruth/earth and the significance of art. I deal with this further in the conclusion to this thesis.

¹⁹¹Hugo Ott, *Martin Heidegger: A Political Life*, trans. by Allan Blunden (London: Fontana Press, 1993), p. 374. See also, Bambach, *Heidegger's Roots*, pp. 60-63.

¹⁹²Bambach, *Heidegger's Roots*, pp. 114-115.

¹⁹³Trawny, *The Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy*, p. 3.

¹⁹⁴This is the defence of Heidegger's Jewish friend, Petzet. Heinrich Wiegand Petzet, *Encounters and Dialogues with Martin Heidegger: 1929-1976*, trans. by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (London: Chicago University Press, 1993), esp. pp. 30-35. See also, Phillips, *Heidegger's Volk*, pp. 95-132. Cf. also Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, pp. 19-22.

¹⁹⁵On this, see, Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, esp. pp. 9-29, Ó Murchadha, *The Time of Revolution*, p. 2, and O'Brien, *Heidegger, History and the Holocaust*, p. 126.

Semitism bears as little relevance on his thought as it would a mathematician.¹⁹⁶ Arguably, Heidegger's anti-Semitism and his engagement with the National Socialist Party could be treated as two separate issues. However, given the anti-Semitism of the Party, and the revelations in the *Black Notebooks* that Heidegger harbours anti-Semitic convictions, Heidegger's commitment to the National Socialist Party and his anti-Semitism are linked.¹⁹⁷ Likewise, although Trawny pays particular attention to the problem of his anti-Semitism, the problem of 'contamination' equally applies to his support of National Socialism in general.

If one is to condemn Heidegger's philosophy on the grounds of his involvement with the Nazis, then one must do so by showing that his support of the regime gains its precedent from his philosophy, and that this philosophy holds genuine proximity to National Socialist ideology.¹⁹⁸ We saw that the attempts to do so by both Farias and Fay have been brought into dispute by scholarship, and even alongside the material garnered in the *Black Notebooks*, without further critique and evaluation of his philosophy the status of his philosophy as National Socialist ideology is questionable.

Schürmann, for example, would argue that Heidegger's thinking is intrinsically anarchic in principle, and it therefore resists any attempt toward establishing a totalitarian or authoritarian political order.¹⁹⁹ However, the strength of his position is maintained by reminding us that 'Heidegger refrained from developing his political thinking beyond a few hints here and there in his work'.²⁰⁰ There are limitations to this approach. As Wolin discusses, Schürmann's strategy is to read Heidegger

¹⁹⁶Engelland, *Heidegger's Shadow*, pp. 232-233.

¹⁹⁷In this light, Trawny finds the grounds of Heidegger's anti-Semitism within his narrative of the history of being. Trawny, *The Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy*, pp. 8-17. Recognising this same link, Thomson defends Heidegger's political commitments on the grounds that his later works on the essence of technology offers a sustained critique of the holocaust. Iain Thomson, *Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 118. However, I do not discuss in this thesis the anti-Semitic remarks in Heidegger's *Black Notebooks*. This is because they do not emerge in any substantial way until 1938 and beyond. They are therefore beyond the timeline of concern to this thesis. Nonetheless, reflections on the significance of a 'people' and the 'destiny' of the German nation provide some consideration for a further study that would reflect on his anti-Semitism.

¹⁹⁸It should be noted, however, that it is beyond the scope of this study to clarify the positive relationship between Heidegger's philosophy and National Socialist ideology. Rather, I confine myself to investigating the proximity Heidegger saw between his thought and what he understood to be National Socialist thought.

¹⁹⁹Reiner Schürmann, 'Political Thinking in Heidegger', *Social Research*, 45, 1 (1978), 191-221.

²⁰⁰Reiner Schürmann, 'The Ontological Difference and Political Philosophy', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 40, 1 (1979), 99-122 (p. 100).

backwards, thus beginning his analysis with the later works.²⁰¹ Wolin critiques this, reminding us that Schürmann largely, and conveniently, bypasses Heidegger's work from the 1930s. The question of the philosophical basis of his support for the regime in 1933 thus remains largely unquestioned.²⁰² Lacoue-Labarthe would seem to largely agree with Schürmann, however he does not avoid the works from 1930. Instead, he argues that the problematic claims Heidegger makes in these works are incoherent with the philosophical principles developed in *Being and Time*.²⁰³ Likewise, O'Brien recognises Heidegger's attempts to reconcile his philosophy with his political engagement, but argues that there are resources in Heidegger's thought that resist his striving for a synthesis of his political support for the National Socialist and his philosophy.²⁰⁴ Focussing on the later works, Thomson, Derrida, and Pöggeler, explore how Heidegger's later philosophy developed as an engagement with the problems of Nazism and the limitations of his philosophy that led him to support.²⁰⁵ Therefore, these commentators all believe that if there is a problem in his philosophy, there are other possibilities available within this thought, possibilities that Heidegger either moves away from in the 1930s resulting in his support, or develops in the 1950s as an attempt to critically engage with his own support.

Heidegger was dissatisfied with *Being and Time*. Evidence from the *Black Notebooks* testify to the fact that the subsequent developments this disappointment

²⁰¹Reiner Schürmann, *Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy*, trans. by Christine Marie-Gross and Reiner Schürmann (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), pp. 13-14.

²⁰²Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, p. 181, 93n.

²⁰³Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, esp. pp. 9-29.

²⁰⁴O'Brien, *Heidegger, History and the Holocaust*, p. 126. Ó Murchadha approaches this also, when he justifies Heidegger's appointment as rector of Freiburg University by claiming that Heidegger failed to take into account his 'own transformation of the concept of possibility in *Being and Time*'. Had he done so, so Ó Murchadha contends, then he would have understood that revolutions are never actual, but occur only as possibility. Revolutions are not actualised but instead 'make possible'. Ó Murchadha, *The Time of Revolution*, p. 2 and pp. 174-184. As Ó Murchadha clarifies however (p. 2), his goal is neither to defend nor exonerate Heidegger, but instead to understand what philosophical basis informs his political engagement. Although such an effort is indeed a worthwhile scholarly pursuit, one wonders whether there is a responsibility to critically engage and reflect on the implications of this 'political philosophy'. Without this critical dimension, an exposition and explanation of the political philosophy at play can end up functioning as a justification, whether or not this is the authors intent. Which is to say, sometimes at least, an appeal to neutrality effectively conceals one's own implicit partisan agenda.

²⁰⁵Thomson, *Heidegger on Ontotheology*, p. 118. See also, Jacques Derrida, *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*, trans. by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (London: University of Chicago Press, 1989), esp. pp. 5-6, p. 101. Pöggeler engages with the problematic *völkish* element of Heidegger's earlier work, but sees an anti-totalitarian tendency in the later focus on the topology of being. This is because his later focus on the topology of being must bring the truth of being into focus, explicitly distinguishing itself from other 'equally original and competitive means of disclosure' (*gleichursprunglichen und konkurrierenden Bezugweisen*), such as poetry and politics, or so Pöggeler contends, at least. Pöggeler, *Philosophie und Politik bei Heidegger*, p. 102. Cf., however, Rockmore, *On Heidegger's Nazism and his Philosophy*, pp. 244-281, esp. pp. 274-275.

necessitated drew their impetus from the significance he saw in the movement,²⁰⁶ and he believed his philosophy had an important role to play in the realisation of the potential of this movement.²⁰⁷ In this thesis I investigate the role of art in Heidegger's developing understanding of the essence of truth in the 1930s. Because the focus of this thesis is on Heidegger's understanding of truth and art, the extensive issue of Heidegger's affiliation with the Nazis cannot be exhausted within the scope of this investigation. Nonetheless, due to the time period in question the issue cannot be ignored, and the developments in his concept of truth and the role of art therein are explored in conjunction with his support for the National Socialist Party, so long as they are relevant to the role of art in truth. In doing so, we open up the possibility of assessing the significance of his involvement with the Party and evaluating his philosophy in light of this support. It is the role of the work of art in the essence of truth that gives Heidegger the means to develop what he considers to be an adequate response to the history of the forgottenness of being and the ensuing nihilism he believes to stem from this history. In the process, the promise he saw in the National Socialist movement—albeit a promise that for him they fail to actualise²⁰⁸—remains tied to his reflections on the work of art and its role in the essence of truth. This is not to suggest that Heidegger's philosophy inevitably leads to National Socialism. Regardless, we must proceed in the investigation acknowledging that his philosophy was *open* to something like it. It is in this way we should understand Thomson's decree that 'what remains [both] dangerous and promising in Heidegger cannot be

²⁰⁶*UII-VI*, p. 111, *PII-VI*, p. 81.

²⁰⁷As Gessmann puts it, '[i]t is necessary to admit [in light of the *Black Notebooks*]—contrary to all attempts at a charitable reading—that Heidegger himself viewed his philosophy in a different light than that in which many scholars had long perceived it. It is necessary to admit that he himself did not wish to uphold the distance between thinking and dictatorial politics during the 1930s'. Martin Gessman, 'Heidegger and National Socialism: He Meant What he Said', in *Heidegger's Black Notebooks: Responses to Anti-Semitism*, ed. by Andrew J. Mitchell and Peter Trawny (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), pp. 114-129 (p. 145).

²⁰⁸By March 1933 Heidegger is already waiting for a 'second awakening' of the National Socialist movement. Safranski, *Between Good and Evil*, p. 236. Here, Safranski is quoting from a letter Heidegger wrote to Elisabeth Blochmann. We see these doubts echoed throughout his *UII-VI* also, pp. 114, 118-121, 130-134. On p. 142 he speaks about a '*vulgar National Socialism*' ("*vulgärnationalsozialismus*"). His emphasis. This echoes his controversial remark in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, '[a]ll this calls itself philosophy. In particular, what is peddled about nowadays as the philosophy of National Socialism, but which has not the least to do with the inner truth and greatness of this movement'. *EM*, p. 208. *IM*, p. 222. Heidegger's interpolation added at a later date clarifies that the sentence means the 'encounter between global technology and modern humanity'. This is dubious, or at least misleading, especially in light of the very clear tension displayed in his *Black Notebooks* between praise and doubt of the movement itself. This is explored by Lacoue-Labarthe, in *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, pp. 17-18. Cf., however, Julia Ireland, 'Naming Physis and the "Inner Truth of National Socialism": A New Archival Discovery', *Research in Phenomenology*, 44, 2014, 315-346.

entirely separated but, instead, need to be thought in relation to one another'.²⁰⁹ Through this contextual approach, the limitations of his philosophy can be brought to light.

Having explored a number of key themes in Heidegger's thought for the purposes of this thesis, we are in a position to get underway. To briefly recapitulate: in *Being and Time*, in virtue of its ontological capacity to 'discover', and hence disclose the meaning of beings, truth is understood to be entirely dependent on *Dasein*. This position relies on Heidegger having accepted the transcendental reduction, which leads him to conceive of *Dasein* as a being that transcends beings to their meaning and, moreover, rejecting any talk of what lies beyond this transcendental gap as outside his project of phenomenology. For this would be to relapse into the natural attitude, the critique of which Heidegger accepts.

Furthermore, post this reduction, Heidegger does not find pure consciousness, *pace* Husserl. Instead, he discovers *Dasein*, a concrete, hermeneutic being who is engaged with the world. Hence, Heidegger finds another possibility within phenomenological research, to raise the question of the meaning of being through investigation of the implicit meaning of being within *Dasein*. Heidegger's post-Nietzschean emphasis to this question results in an inherent tension in his thought where the beings beyond their disclosure to *Dasein* are conceived as 'absurd', in certain moments making themselves known to *Dasein*, thus drawing attention to the limitations and finitude of the meaningful world. In this sense, nature can 'break in' on us and 'destroy' our worlds.

In the 1930s, Heidegger argues that the lack of awareness of his insight of the ontological difference throughout the history of the West has resulted in an onset of nihilism in that tradition for the necessity of the withdrawing of being for the disclosure of beings has meant that the source of meaningful intelligibility (*Dasein*) remains unaccounted for by that tradition. For a world plummeting into nihilism, the 'absurd' and 'unmeaningful' beings become known only in their unmeaning, for what was conceived as insuring the stability of beings (God) no longer maintains its bind within the implicit meaning of being in Western civilisation as a whole. Hence, Heidegger accepts Nietzsche's thesis on the death of God, albeit with his own particular hermeneutic and existential emphasis. This emphasis gives him scope to see hope in the rise of the National Socialist Party to counteract this inevitable

²⁰⁹Thomson, *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, p. 5.

development of nihilism, with its roots in the beginning of the philosophical tradition in Ancient Greece. The question that remains, however, is whether the link Heidegger finds between Nazism and his own philosophy is the necessary fruition of his ideas, or a subsidiary opportunism that would thus leave the integrity of his thought uncontaminated.

The following chapter develops these themes further, where we see Heidegger return to his account of truth and the inadequacies he comes to see therein through reflection on the significance of concealment. This reflection occurs at a time when Heidegger was increasingly enthusiastic about the rise of the National Socialist Party, and believes that his attempt to raise the question of the meaning of being for us 'today' has received appropriate direction from the *Führer*. Therefore, there are two primary concerns for Heidegger in this development. Firstly, he seeks to address certain inadequacies and tensions that he sees in the presentation of the essence of truth in *Being and Time*. Secondly, he wishes to develop this understanding in relation to the particular social and political developments within Germany. The theme of nihilism binds these two concerns together, for both Heidegger's project and the National Socialist Party are attempts to address the problem of nihilism, or so he believes at least. Although the work of art maintains a derivative status in his project as fundamental ontology, it takes a striking centrality to this project once the significance of concealment and its relation to nihilism becomes central in his thought. As we will see, the 1931/32 lecture series *The Essence of Truth: On Plato's Cave Allegory and Theaetetus* makes the first steps toward this realisation.

CHAPTER 2

A CATASTROPHIC HISTORY: HEIDEGGER'S CONFRONTATION WITH PLATO

In September of 1930 the National Socialist Party was elected the second largest Party in Germany's Weimar Republic. Evidence, in the form of a letter to his brother, and privately spoken words to friends at his cabin, displays Heidegger's enthusiasm for the prospects of this rising political movement.¹ His enthusiasm continued, and in 1933—now rector of Freiburg University—Heidegger tells his audience that the 'Führer alone *is* the present and future German reality and its law'.² Concurrently, Heidegger expressed dissatisfaction with his previous literary output, subsequently claiming that the *Führer* set the correct 'course' and 'impetus' for his work.³ To consider Heidegger's support as distinct from his philosophy is thus in dispute, for Heidegger himself finds the means for his support in the foundations of his own philosophy. However, Heidegger may misunderstand the significance of his work. Thus, the philosophical precedent for his support requires evaluation, a task that is begun in this chapter.

In the winter semester of 1931, and again in 1933, Heidegger lectured on parts of Plato's *The Republic*. Reflecting Heidegger's contemporary political climate, *The Republic* argues that an ideal state would be run by an unelected philosopher king, alongside a few carefully chosen, elite, guardians. However, his interest in *The Republic* is not its support for totalitarianism, directly at least.⁴ Rather, his

¹Safranski documents Hermann Mörchen's 'impression in his diary' after his visit to Heidegger at his cabin in Todtnauberg: '[a]dmittedly the talk was not about philosophy, but mainly about National Socialism'. Safranski, *Between Good and Evil*, p. 226. See also, Heidegger, 'Martin und Fritz Heidegger: Briefe', p. 22.

²His emphasis. From an address he gave his students, November 3, 1933. See, Martin Heidegger, 'Political Texts, 1933-34', in *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*, ed. by Richard Wolin (London: The MIT Press, 1993; repr. 1998), pp. 40-60, esp. pp. 46-47. See also, Heidegger, 'Follow the Führer!', p. 15, '[f]or in what that resolve demands, we are but following the glorious will of our Führer. To become one of his loyal following means to desire wholeheartedly and undeviatingly that the German people may once more find its growing unity, its true worth and true power, and may procure thereby its endurance and greatness as a work State. *To the man of this unprecedented resolve, our Führer Adolf Hitler, let us give a threefold "Heil!"*'. His emphasis. This was not just a public appeal either. Around the same time as this public declaration, in a letter to his brother, dated May, 1933, Heidegger continued to encourage him to join the Party, despite his brothers' reservations. See, Heidegger, 'Martin und Fritz Heidegger: Briefe', p. 36.

³III-VI, p. 111, PII-VI, p. 81.

⁴Cf., however, Section 2.5 of this study. Fifty years later, on Heidegger's 80th birthday, Arendt reflects on what occurs in the move from the absent 'abode' of thinking to the present 'realm of human affairs', a move that turned both of these philosophical giants to 'tyrants and Führers'. Although she

engagement with *The Republic* is in its depiction of the allegory of the cave, the topic of which is truth.⁵

His 1931/32 study of Plato further establishes the philosophical framework for his support of the National Socialist Party. Primarily, this is rooted in a development of his understanding of *Dasein*, which he now understands as both the nation's *Dasein*, and certain individual, 'liberated' *Daseins*. The liberator is the one who has broken out of the cave and, now free from the tyranny of the many, can legislate the meaning of being for those trapped in the cave. There is a certain urgency in this task, for the problem of nihilism has become a focus in his thinking where the history of philosophy is seen as a history of nihilism, and its origin in the Platonic doctrine of the Ideas.⁶ The liberator has a significant role in rooting (*Bodenständigkeit*) the people (*Volk*) to nature (*Natur*), thus offering a response to the problem of nihilism. Nature is a concept which also goes through significant re-evaluation in this lecture series. It is now affirmed in its 'overarching power'. It is 'concealed' (*Verschlossenheit*), but it nonetheless 'tunes' (*stimmt*) the people, allowing for the possibility of the greatness of the people to be realised.⁷ Heidegger suggests that poetry and art have a significant role in discovering the significance of nature, although this claim is not given much substance at this time.⁸

The repeat course of this lecture series (*Being and Truth*, from 1933/34) presents these philosophical developments in an explicit framework of support for the National Socialist Party.⁹ Here, Heidegger introduces his concept of 'earth' (*Erde*).

does not develop it further, she seems to suggest that this is a constant seduction and danger inherent within the movement of thinking itself. Kant, she tells us, was the 'great exception'. Hannah Arendt, 'Martin Heidegger at Eighty', in *Heidegger & Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays*, ed. by Michael Murray (London: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 293-303 (esp. pp. 300-303). Wolin draws our attention to Heidegger's distrust of democracy, seemingly prevalent throughout his *oeuvre*. Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, p. 117. See also, Heidegger, 'Only a God can Save us', p. 36, where he remains committed to his conviction that democracy is an inadequate form of government. See also, Safranski, *Between Good and Evil*, p. 225. Rockmore points out that the Rectoral Address in 1933 'uncritically took a Platonic approach in grounding politics in philosophy'. Rockmore, *On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy*, p. 132. See also, Bambach, *Heidegger's Roots*, pp. 200-208. Cf., however, Theodore Kisiel, 'On the Purported Platonism of Heidegger's Rectoral Address', in *Heidegger and Plato: Toward Dialogue*, ed. by Catalin Partenie and Tom Rockmore (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2005) pp. 3-21.

⁵Or at least, understood as a 'hint' (*Wink*). *WWP*, p. 21. *ET*, p. 17. However, in a similar lecture course three years later, this allegory is considered 'the single centre of Platonic philosophizing'. His emphasis, *SW*, p. 124. *BaT*, p. 97. See also, Francisco J. Gonzalez, *Plato and Heidegger: A Question of Dialogue* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009), p. 101.

⁶*WWP*, pp. 8-19.

⁷*WWP*, pp. 237-238.

⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 60-64.

⁹See, Gonzalez, *Plato and Heidegger*, pp. 107-136, where he discusses some of the minor philosophical differences between the lecture course of 1931/32 and 1933/34. This is not the same,

Earth is a development of his concept of both nature and untruth (*Unwahrheit*), but it is not until the 1934/35 lecture series on Hölderlin that he develops the notion of earth into a concept of philosophical weight. In 1933/34, he ties it to the significance of the National Socialists, for the ‘tremendous moment’ of this movement ‘is the coming to be of a new spirit of the entire earth’.¹⁰

After some remarks on Heidegger’s hermeneutic method and the specific intentions of his ‘confrontation’ (*Auseinandersetzung*) with Plato, I provide an overview of the lecture series. I then move on to explore key elements of his interpretation of Plato, such as his understanding of truth, his interpretation of the ‘Ideas’, and I explore the introduction of the significance of art. In the second half of the lecture series, Heidegger develops his concept of ‘untruth’, through reflection on the significance of the use of the Greek word *doxa* (meaning ‘look’ in the two-fold sense of ‘view’ and ‘opinion’) in Plato’s *Theaetetus*.¹¹ His notion of untruth and nature are shown to come together through his concept of earth and are connected to a rhetoric of ‘blood’ (*Blut*) and ‘soil’ (*Boden*), which are situated within the context of the significance of the National Socialist movement.

2.1 On Heidegger’s Interpretations in General, and of Plato Specifically

The problems with Heidegger’s interpretations of other philosophers have been well documented in scholarship. Wrathall claims that Heidegger was a ‘notoriously violent reader of other philosophers’.¹² On the Plato lectures specifically, Gonzalez argues that the Plato they present are a ‘complete fabrication’,¹³ and Inwood further

however, for Heidegger’s revision of his interpretation in 1940. See *ibid.*, p. 102. Although the philosophical differences between 1931/32 and 1933/34 are few and far between, in the repeat course Heidegger at times presents his philosophical views in relation to the importance of the National Socialist movement.

¹⁰His emphasis. *SW*, p. 148. *BaT*, p. 116. ‘Dieser ungeheure Augenblick, in den der Nationalsozialismus heute gedrängt ist, ist das Werden eines neuen Geistes der Erde überhaupt’.

¹¹*WWP*, esp. pp. 251-257.

¹²Wrathall, ‘Heidegger on Plato, Truth and Unconcealment’, p. 445. In this same vein, Thomson notes the ‘undeniable hermeneutical violence’ of Heidegger’s *Nietzsche* lectures. Thomson, *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, p. 14, 12n. Safranski more favourable writes that ‘Heidegger has to read Plato against the grain’. See his, *Between Good and Evil*, p. 217.

¹³Gonzalez, *Plato and Heidegger*, p. 154. On this Gonzalez is speaking specifically of Heidegger’s thesis in 1940 that Plato subjugates *aletheia* to the light of the Ideas. As he points out (p. 123), however, this reading begins in 1931. Likewise, Gonzalez states ‘what will prove to determine Heidegger’s later reading of Plato are not the insights, but rather the serious errors and reductive simplifications that, rather than being corrected, will become only more entrenched and more liberated from the text they distort’. *Ibid.*, p. 135. However, Gonzalez argues that the 1931 lecture course is, as far as Heidegger’s interpretations go, one of Heidegger’s better presentations of Plato’s philosophy. It is still not without its (at times, major) problems. See *ibid.*, esp. pp. 113-136. With this in mind,

documents the many discrepancies between Heidegger's presentation of the Platonic dialogues, and the dialogues themselves.¹⁴

This was a character of criticism with which Heidegger was familiar. In a 1932 lecture series *The Beginning of Western Philosophy*, Heidegger addresses the 'fashionable' tendency to 'refute [his] interpretation of earlier philosophers by saying: "That is Heidegger, but not Hegel," or "Heidegger, but not Kant," etc'. 'Certainly', he responds, '[b]ut does it follow ipso facto that the interpretation is false?'¹⁵ As the previous chapter explored, Heidegger argues that the essence of truth understood as either 'correct' or 'incorrect' is a misunderstanding. Likewise, the 'correct' understanding of these thinkers is attributed by him to the authority of the masses (*das Man*). The masses may be many, but they are essentially 'no one'.¹⁶

Is Heidegger offering us a cheap justification for irresponsible hermeneutics? He is, after all, placing into question the need for an accurate account of what a text is explicitly arguing. But there is something more than a violent bending of a text to his will occurring here. Heidegger claims that the re-interpretation of a text is a historical necessity for any 'great' idea and its 'historical endurance' testament to the continued 'unfolding of its essence'.¹⁷ That is, if there was a way to simply *get* Plato, then we would have dispensed with him since Aristotle. Instead, that an idea endures historically means that it is being taken up in new ways by the various traditions and thinkers that receive the text through time.

In the first volume of his lectures on Nietzsche, Heidegger distinguishes between a 'guiding question' (*Leitfrage*) and 'grounding question' (*Grundfrage*).¹⁸ The grounding question is the question of the meaning of being. He argues that this question is the implicit, 'unthought' (*ungedacht*) dimension within the text, which shapes and guides what is rendered explicit in the text itself. The 'explicit' part of the text also contains 'guiding questions', for example, Nietzsche's understanding of the

Safranski puts it rather mildly when he says, 'Heidegger has to read Plato against the grain'. Safranski, *Between Good and Evil*, p. 217. Rosen attributes this to Heidegger's tendency to 'Aristotelianize' Plato. See, Rosen, 'Remarks on Heidegger's Plato', p. 184. Similarly, Gadamer claims that Heidegger rejects Plato's theory of forms, and especially the Idea of a universal good, on account of his reading of Aristotle. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Heidegger's Ways*, trans. by John W. Stanley (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 83. I do not discuss his interpretation of Plato's understanding of the good until the fourth chapter of this study. See Section 4.4.2.

¹⁴Michael Inwood, 'Truth and Untruth in Plato and Heidegger', in *Heidegger and Plato: Toward Dialogue*, ed. by Catalin Partenie and Tom Rockmore (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2005), pp. 72-95.

¹⁵His emphasis. *AP*, p. 105. *BWP*, p. 80.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 80. See also, *SZ*, pp. 168-173.

¹⁷*HH*, pp. 144-146. *HHGM*, pp. 127-128.

¹⁸*NK*, pp. 3-5. *NI*, pp. 3-6.

being of beings as will to power, or at least, as far as Heidegger understands Nietzsche's take on the being of beings.¹⁹ With Heidegger's hermeneutic emphasis in place, namely, that the meaning of being is the implicit significance of the world to *Dasein*, the explicit guiding questions are understood to draw our attention to the grounding question. With this in mind, Heidegger is suggesting that the philosophers' engagement with the explicit 'guiding' questions provides the means to experience that which implicitly conditions what a thinker has thought through a hermeneutical retrieval of the unthought in the text. In turn, this allows them to discover inchoate and unexpressed possibilities of that thought that the thinker in question failed to pursue, possibilities that he believes to guide the meaning of being throughout history.²⁰ Thus, in response to these critics he tells us that what matters instead is the 'necessity and originality of the guiding questioning under which the interpretation stands'.²¹ It is only through a critical engagement between our own sense of being and the expression of the meaning of being in the theses of other thinkers that we are properly free to penetrate deeper into our pursuit of the question of the meaning of being.²²

Heidegger offers us an example of what he means by this in his *Contributions to Philosophy* (written 1936-38) when discussing his 1929 study *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. He admits that his exposition of the transcendental imagination is historically inaccurate, and that there is a difference between what Kant means by the transcendental imagination and what he claims Kant to mean in that lecture series. Thus, there is a conscious 'distortion' (*Verzeichnung*) of Kant's position in this text.²³ To justify this, he draws on a distinction between two different senses of history, in German rendered with two different words: '*Historie*' and

¹⁹NK, p. 4. NI, p. 4.

²⁰NK, p. 6. NI, p. 5.

²¹AP, p. 105. BWP, p. 80.

²²In *Being and Time*, this would be an expression of getting into the hermeneutic circle 'in the right way'. SZ, p. 203. This is because, as McDonnell points out, the goal of Heidegger's method in phenomenology is not, contrary Husserl, to begin from a 'presuppositionless' starting point, but instead, 'on determining which pre-suppositions *need to be expelled* and which ones *need to be accepted*, before a *proper interpretation* of [...] the question of the meaning of Being, is to be laid out'. McDonnell, *Heidegger's Way Through Phenomenology*, p. 238. See also, *WWP*, p. 78 and p. 286. *ET*, p. 57 and p. 203, where Heidegger chastises the phenomenological movement for thinking that it could see through an 'unprejudiced looking'. It is because philosophy cannot be 'standpointless' that the phenomena must always give way through 'attack' from a human standpoint. This is not to say that Heidegger's phenomenology is a kind of relativism. One must still find the right 'access' into the phenomenon that is showing itself. SZ, pp. 49-50. *BT*, p. 35. See also, Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, *Heidegger, Hölderlin and the Subject of Poetic Language: Toward a New Poetics of Dasein* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), pp. 28-30.

²³BP, pp. 252-254, esp. p. 253. CP, pp. 199-200.

‘*Geschichte*’. The first meaning of history (*Historie*) is understood to be concerned with facts and occurrences that arise within the passing of the ‘vulgar’ sense of time.²⁴ A historical study in this sense would try to offer an accurate account of what Kant said, and perhaps contextualise his philosophy within the specific philosophical, economic or political interests of Germany in the early 19th Century. Heidegger claims that this approach cannot ‘touch what is essential’ (*Wesentliches*).²⁵ Against this, history in the second sense (*Geschichte*) concerns the historical developments and changes in what the meaning of being ‘is’, as deposited in the form of the ‘unsaid’ in the texts of various philosophical thinkers.²⁶ Heidegger connects ‘*Geschichte*’ with the German ‘*Geschick*’, meaning destiny, or fate.²⁷ ‘*Geschick*’ is etymologically connected to the word ‘*schicken*’, meaning ‘to send’. This more primary sense of history, then, is not only concerned with the past texts through history but also a possible future history—sent to us from a past—toward which it in the same moment moves.²⁸ Therefore, a ‘historical confrontation’ (*geschichtliche Auseinandersetzung*) in Heidegger’s sense is not only something that should reveal what remains implicit and unsaid by the author, guiding ‘history’ in his sense of the unarticulated meaning of being housed within the language of the people and the philosophical texts belonging to a given tradition, but at the same time attempts to dislodge the authors implicit commitments to their historical horizon in order to pave the way for a new beginning of Western thinking.²⁹ Hence, Heidegger claims that ‘by

²⁴Which is to say, time as a series of ‘now’ points. I discuss Heidegger’s understanding of time further in the next chapter. See Section 3.2.

²⁵*BP*, p. 253.

²⁶*Ibid.*

²⁷This connection is explored by David Wood, ‘Reiterating the Temporal: Toward a Rethinking of Heidegger on Time’ in *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 136-159 (esp. pp. 150-157). See also, Jacques Derrida, ‘Heidegger’s Ear: Philopolemology (*Geschlecht* IV), trans. by John P. Leavey, Jr., in *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 163-218 (p. 177).

²⁸Here, I try to capture an aspect of Heidegger’s understanding of time as ‘ecstatic’, which problematises the sense of time as a succession of ‘now’ moments in the present, and instead argues that time is comprised of a past, present, and future. For more on this, see, *SZ*, pp. 428-438.

²⁹*BP*, p. 253. *CP*, p. 199. ‘Geschichtliche Auseinandersetzung [...] ist eben ein Vorgehen, das gleichsehr die frühere Geschichte in ihre verborgene Größe zurückstellt und zugleich und nur so das andere Fragen, nicht zum Vergleich, gegenüberstellt, sondern als Fügbarkeit gegenüber jener Größe und ihren Notwendigkeiten zum Vollzug bringt’. ‘Historical confrontation [...] is precisely a procedure that just as much places the earlier history back into its hidden greatness and to the same extent, but only to that extent, counterposes the *other questioning*—not for the sake of comparison but in order to carry it out as compliance to that greatness and to its necessities’. In *Being and Time* this concern is acknowledged, but the sense of a new beginning is missing. See, *SZ*, pp. 28-29. *BT*, p. 20. This is largely because his understanding of history as a history of nihilism has not yet been developed, and therefore the necessity of another beginning has not become pertinent to his thought. Nonetheless, this theme is nonetheless present when he claims that the ‘tradition that hereby gains dominance makes

doing violence to Kant’, he was developing the conditions of possibility of bringing the ‘relation between Da-sein and beyng closer to [his] contemporaries by referring to the previous view *in spite of all the essential differences*’.³⁰ This is an ‘incorrect’ study, in a strict, historically accurate, sense (*Historie*). Instead, it concerns the destiny of a people’s history (*Geschichte*): ‘related to the preparation for future thinking’.³¹ In such fashion, Heidegger’s brief response to his detractors in 1932 ends by asking us to ‘pay attention primarily not to the means and paths of [his] interpretation, but what these means and paths will set before you’.³²

Heidegger’s approach, understood as ‘confrontation’, first demands of us that we accept his own thesis in the originality of *his* guiding question, the question of the meaning of being. There is good reason to do so. His claim that the question of the meaning of being remains unarticulated and implicit in the ‘there’ of ‘being’ (that I am) seems a unique and powerful starting point for examining the significance of being for the human being throughout history, evidenced by the lasting impact *Being and Time* has had in both philosophy and fields beyond. That this starting point is given a hermeneutic emphasis provides Heidegger with scope to illuminate that the meaning of being remains ‘unthought’ but available for hermeneutic retrieval through the theses of the great thinkers throughout Western history seems to be a fruitful approach for discovering possibilities within a text that remain unexplored, assumptions on behalf of the thinker in question that hindered more unique and creative possibilities within their thought can thus be exploited, and the interpreter may also garner insights about the historical time in which the texts were written.³³ In doing so, it seems reasonable that we open horizons for potential future thinking that remain unexploited as the text currently stands, and within the Western tradition of philosophy in general.³⁴

However, it seems to me that the issue at stake is whether the significance of Kant’s discussion of the transcendental imagination, unthought or not, genuinely

what it “transmits” so little accessible that initially and for the most part it covers it over instead. What has been handed down [...] bars access to those original “wellsprings” out of which the traditional categories and concepts were in part genuinely drawn’. See also, Wrathall, ‘Heidegger on Plato, Truth and Unconcealment’, p. 445.

³⁰His emphasis. *BP*, 253. *CP*, p. 199.

³¹Ibid.

³²*AP*, p. 106. *BWP*, p. 81.

³³Ó Murchadha endeavours to approach interpreting Heidegger in a similar fashion. See his, *The Time of Revolution*, pp. 7-8.

³⁴This does not mean that Heidegger’s narrative of the development from the first to the other beginning of thought is beyond criticism. I raise this problem in the conclusion to the thesis. On this, see, Caputo, ‘Demythologizing Heidegger: *Aletheia* and the History of Being’, p. 519.

teaches Heidegger something about the relationship between *Dasein* and being, or whether he simply uses Kant's discussion of the transcendental imagination as a 'cloaking device' for his own conception of this relationship. This would seem to be the difference between abusing a text for one's own ends or treating the text as a companion in an attempt to address the question of the meaning of being. When one speaks about the 'violence' of Heidegger's interpretations, then, the crucial question is whether Heidegger is willing to *learn* from the thinkers he engages, or whether these thinkers become purely reduced to his own sense for being.

Such a question can be answered with evidence from the text itself. For example, Gonzalez explores how Heidegger's presentation of the *implicit* 'unthought' in Plato often contradicts what is *explicitly* 'thought' by Plato.³⁵ If it is a case that Heidegger is willing to maintain that the explicit part of the text will at times contradict what he believes to be its implicit significance, then Heidegger must commit to the principle that he can understand the thinker better than they understand themselves.³⁶ Nonetheless, it would seem to me to be a hermeneutic responsibility to explain why this thought dimension of the text contradicts the unthought that he allegedly presents. The Nietzsche lectures show evidence that Heidegger is willing to go through pains to do this.³⁷ With the examples that Gonzalez supplies however, Heidegger reneged this responsibility.³⁸

Nonetheless, he does seem to believe that there is some kind of important relationship between the interpreted and the interpreter. When he discusses 'confrontation' in the 1936 *Nietzsche* lecture series, he talks about it as tracing a thought in its 'strongest strength' in order to 'free' *us* to pursue the question of the

³⁵Gonzalez, *Plato and Heidegger*, p. 138.

³⁶There are reasonable grounds to assume that he would, given the influence of the hermeneutic tradition on his thought. On the influence of the Hermeneutic tradition in Heidegger's thought. See, for example, Charles R. Bambach, *Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crises of Historicism* (London: Cornell University Press, 1995), esp. pp. 238-243. According to Gadamer, Schleiermacher, argued that understanding the thinker better than they understand themselves is precisely the goal of hermeneutical exegesis. For more on this, see, Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd rev edn. (New York: Continuum, 1999), pp. 184-197 (esp. p. 192). For the significance of the influence of Schleiermacher's biblical hermeneutics for Heidegger's manner of doing Phenomenology, see, McDonnell, *Heidegger's Way Through Phenomenology*, pp. 224-253.

³⁷For example, although Nietzsche understands the significance of the human being in terms of biology, Heidegger argues that it 'only seems that way'. Nietzsche is instead offering a 'transformed interpretation of the biological on the basis of Being, grasped in a superior way'. Even though Heidegger must concede (given the extensive textual evidence that Nietzsche held fast to an interpretation of the human being as primarily a biological being) that this is 'not fully mastered' by Nietzsche. *NK*, p. 273. *NI*, p. 219.

³⁸Gonzalez, *Plato and Heidegger*, pp. 136-142.

meaning of being.³⁹ This tells us that Heidegger believes there is a companionship at play between the strength of one thinker and another meeting each other in the conflict of a confrontation, which reveals the unthought of one and in turn frees the thought of the interpreter towards more original reflection. Nonetheless, one wonders whether this encounter is truly enough to learn from a thinker, or if this focus on *our* pursuit of the meaning of being places too much emphasis on the text as being in service to one's own interest.

In this study, I am interested in Heidegger's philosophical development through his interpretation of the thinkers in question, and so the issue of Heidegger's fidelity to these thinkers is beyond the scope of this investigation. As we have just seen, Heidegger is not interested in strict philosophical fidelity anyway,⁴⁰ at least with regard to what is explicitly written in the text. Instead, his interest is in a kind of engagement he calls historical confrontation where it is understood that the unthought of the thinker in question becomes a 'force' (or 'strength') (*Stärke*) in one's own pursuit of the question of the meaning of being. Heidegger believes that in pursuing an interpretation in this sense, our thinking is reoriented from an accurate account of what a thinker said, and instead gains a particular, historical, force, toward the unfolding of what 'is' throughout history. It is with this method in place that Heidegger argues, regarding his interpretation of Plato, that '[a]t issue in these considerations is not a history of Platonism in the sense of a series of doctrinal views as variations on Platonic theory. At issue is solely the history of the ways of dealing with the guiding question under the essential dominance of Platonism, with the task of playing over from the first to the other beginning'.⁴¹ Instead of asking, then, does Heidegger correctly interpret Plato, we should ask what he is trying to *achieve* with his interpretation of Plato. What is the 'force' of Plato's thinking that Heidegger wishes to confront?

Heidegger alludes to this at the beginning of the lecture course. He tells us that the history of philosophy has largely failed to understand the essence of truth.⁴² Translated into German with '*Unverborgenheit*' (unhiddenness/unconcealedness), the Ancient Greek word '*aletheia*' captures the original experience of truth within the

³⁹NK, p. 6. NI, p. 5.

⁴⁰Philosophical fidelity was not the only kind of fidelity with which Heidegger struggled. See, Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger, *Briefe 1925-1975* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1998).

⁴¹BP, p. 216. CP, p. 169. See also, Catherine Zuckert, *Postmodern Platos: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Gadamer, Strauss, Derrida* (London: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 33

⁴²WPP, pp. 7-19.

Ancient Greek world. Heidegger believes that the philosophical tradition has since covered over and forgotten this original experience of truth, and Plato's reflections represent the moment in which a decisive change in the essence of truth occurs.⁴³ Through engagement with Plato's allegory of the cave, Heidegger returns to the moment of this change. In this allegory, he finds evidence of the experience of truth as '*aletheia*', what he takes to mean the unhiddenness of beings and, more fundamentally, the role that *Dasein* plays in this unhiddenness. At the same time, he argues that through the course of the allegory this experience of truth gives way to another, where truth is understood as the correct correspondence between statement and thing.⁴⁴ We saw that this version of truth is understood to be derivative of the more primordial, existential and ontological *lived* truth of *Dasein*. Founded in the allegory of the cave, he calls the development of the derivative understanding of truth the beginning of the 'catastrophic course' (*verhängnisvoller Gang*) of Western philosophy.⁴⁵ This suggests a connection between nihilism and the essence of truth, an essence of truth he understands to shape the development of the history of the West.

The connection between Plato and nihilism is also suggested in an appendix to this lecture series, when Heidegger asks himself about the meaning of Plato's Ideas.⁴⁶ He claims that 'with this question we touch on the foundation and fundamental constitution of Western spiritual *Dasein*' (*abendländisches geistiges Dasein*).⁴⁷ As it turns out, Heidegger's biggest concern with this question is not *what* Idea means but instead *that* the Platonic concept of the Idea is pervasive throughout the history of Western thought. He suggests that it is through the Platonic conception of the Idea that the understanding of the Christian God (and its 'governing' of beings) is drawn.⁴⁸

⁴³Heidegger later revises this thesis, arguing that '*aletheia*' was always experienced as '*orthotes*', or correctness. Gadamer, *Heidegger's Ways*, p. 87. This is discussed further by Gonzalez, *Plato and Heidegger*, pp. 162-167. Because this revision does not occur until 1964, it is beyond the scope of this investigation. Cf., however, Caputo, 'Demythologizing Heidegger: *Aletheia* and the History of Being', esp. pp. 529-233.

⁴⁴*WWP*, p. 17. Because the primordial sense of truth is said to be retained by the pre-Socratic philosophers, they are 'undeniably superior'. See, *ibid.*, p. 16.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁴⁶Throughout this study, I capitalise Idea when referring to Plato's doctrine of the Ideas.

⁴⁷*WWP*, p. 324. *ET*, p. 230.

⁴⁸Heidegger here echoing Nietzsche's claim that Christianity is 'Platonism for the "the people"'. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, in *Basic Writings*, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 2000), p. 193. Heidegger is thinking this, however, in terms of his thesis of the onto-theo-logical understanding of being, where being is grasped both ontologically and theologically, or as Thomson puts it, from the 'inside-out' and 'outside-in'. Iain Thomson, 'Ontotheology? Understanding Heidegger's *Destruktion* of Metaphysics', *International Journal of Philosophical*

The story does not end here, for the ‘doctrine of [I]deas’ remain with Western humanity throughout German Classicism and Romanticism and up until Nietzsche. Offering an early expression of what became his understanding of the history of being, Heidegger underscores that since the doctrine of the Ideas ‘there has [...] been no clear, no primordial, no decisive, and no creative, spiritual, historical standpoint and stance of man’.⁴⁹ Hence, he now conceives of the history of the concept of truth as a history of ‘decline’ (*Rückgang*).⁵⁰

This ‘decline’ concerns far more than simply our understanding of the essence of truth, for the decline in the concept of truth is precisely the decline into nihilism. In the *Black Notebooks*, about the time that this lecture course is being delivered, Heidegger claims that the ‘essence of truth must first be transformed and must be transposed into a new sharpness and hardness so that beings may find admittance’.⁵¹ Likewise, in another appendix to this lecture series Heidegger discusses how the ‘essence of truth will change, and our questioning must bring this change into motion and give it the power of penetration’.⁵² He tells us that this ‘struggle for truth’ results in an instability which will result in a ‘comprehensive transformation of man’s being in whose initial phase we now stand’.⁵³ However, it is only through a ‘[g]enuine historical decline’, that the ‘decisive beginning of proper *futurity*’ occurs.⁵⁴ There is hope here, but one that relies on this historical confrontation with Plato. He maintains the essential connection between *Dasein* and the essence of truth, and so by connecting the concept of truth with the problem of nihilism, then this problem threatens our *Dasein*.⁵⁵ Thus, to re-awaken the question of truth by returning to the

Studies, 8, 3 (2000), 297-327 (esp. pp. 299-306). Although this is a thesis that does not fully arise until the mid to late 1930s, Heidegger has already developed an early version of it by 1930. See, *HP*, p. 126.

⁴⁹*WWP*, p. 325. *ET*, p. 230. This is very similar to Zuckert’s understanding of Nietzsche’s position on Plato. Zuckert holds that Nietzsche’s biggest criticism of Plato is not about Plato’s philosophy as such but instead that he hid the true meaning of philosophy, namely that it is a stance one takes on one’s own existence and not a doctrine of ideas reflecting reality, or the Ideas in Plato’s case, (or otherwise). In this sense, Plato was a ‘legislator’, creating philosophical ideals for primarily political reasons and convincing those who followed him that these were actually reflective of *the* truth and not *his* (Plato’s) truth. See, Zuckert, *Postmodern Platos*, pp. 10-32.

⁵⁰*WWP*, pp. 8-19.

⁵¹*UII-VI*, p. 10. Throughout the *Black Notebooks* it is unclear when a lot of the passages have been written. This passage is located in the second book, beginning October 1931, and is located before a dated passage in March 1932. Therefore, this passage is likely to be written during the time of this lecture course, which began in the winter semester of 1931.

⁵²*WWP*, p. 323. *ET*, p. 229

⁵³*WWP*, p. 324. *ET*, p. 229. Safranski echoes this sentiment when he claims that Heidegger saw himself as ‘the philosophical leader whose mission it is to set a new truth happening into motion for a whole community and to create a new truth relationship’. See his, *Between Good and Evil*, p. 221.

⁵⁴*WWP*, p. 10.

⁵⁵*WWP*, pp. 119-122.

source of this decline and its origins in the history of the West becomes a question for him around the fate of humanity. Luckily, Heidegger's reflections on the essence of truth have an existential emphasis. The essence of truth, when fully enacted, makes beings become 'more' beingful for *Dasein*.⁵⁶

A story emerges from all this. Heidegger understands the history of metaphysics to have been a history of various forms of Platonism, resulting in the modern nihilistic world where there is no longer a 'decisive', 'historical' standpoint for man. This history of decline comprises the 'first beginning' of Western metaphysics and culminates in an age where the nature of the human being as the 'there' of being is under threat. Delusions of grandeur afloat, Heidegger believes that through a 'historical confrontation' with Plato, he can change the course of history and aid the transition into the other beginning of Western thought.⁵⁷ Therefore, Heidegger tells us, '[f]or us, it is not a matter of introducing the techniques and mastering the methods for interpreting Platonic dialogues; rather, it is a matter of *revival [Erweckung] and implementation [Durchsetzung] of the question of the essence of truth*'.⁵⁸ Heidegger's confrontation with Plato is about the utilisation of a decisive historical moment for the occurrence of this new founding of truth.⁵⁹ As the *Black Notebooks* reveal to us, this decisive moment was also evident for Heidegger in the rising of the National Socialist Party to prominence within Germany.⁶⁰ Conceiving his own philosophical project in relation to the political situation of Germany, Heidegger set out to be the philosopher of his time.

2.2 Overview of the Lecture Series

The allegory of the cave is primarily a story that offers a 'hint' of the essence of truth as *aletheia*.⁶¹ Heidegger believes that the Greek word '*aletheia*' should be understood as an *alpha privatum*, *a-letheia*, or *un-concealment*. For him, this clarification captures the essence of truth more originally,⁶² but because this means that untruth '*belongs to the essence of truth*' the second half of the lecture series deals with the

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 33-34.

⁵⁷Safranski, *Between Good and Evil*, pp. 214-216.

⁵⁸Trans. mod. His emphasis. *SW*, p. 125. *BaT*, p. 98.

⁵⁹In the next chapter, I develop how Heidegger thinks this can occur, through his notion of decision (*Ent-scheidung*).

⁶⁰As noted in the previous chapter. See also, Heidegger, 'Political Texts, 1933-34', p. 46. 'The National Socialist revolution is bringing about a total transformation of our German *Dasein*'.

⁶¹*WWP*, p. 18.

⁶²Ibid., pp. 91-92.

topic of untruth, or concealment/hiddenness as explored in Plato's dialogue *Theaetetus*.⁶³ There is also a thesis being advanced that this dialogue exhibits an historical shift where the understanding of the essence of truth begins to change from its original Greek experience of *aletheia*, and instead into the derivative concept of the 'correct'.⁶⁴

The allegory of the cave tells a story of a group of prisoners chained in a cave, with a fire behind them projecting images at a wall. The prisoners stare at the wall, assuming the shadows to be the real beings. The allegory then follows what happens when a prisoner is freed from their shackles and ascends up the cave, finally able to glimpse the beings themselves and eventually, the Ideas. Now freed, the liberated prisoner returns to the cave and frees the other prisoners. Heidegger splits the allegory into four separate moments, but we are implored to pay attention to the '*whole path* consisting of these transitions'.⁶⁵

By thinking about the allegory as a unified whole, Heidegger is trying to resolve an issue with how the Ideas are presented there. On the one hand, Heidegger believes that Plato's allegory of the cave maintains the fundamental sense of *aletheia* as a kind of unconcealment to *Dasein*. He takes Plato to acknowledge that whether we are within or beyond the confines of the cave we are still immersed in some kind of *aletheia*. On the other hand, because the Ideas are presented as being beyond the confines of the cave, he argues that Plato's doctrine of the Ideas leads the way for seeing the Ideas as objects for (and separate too) the subject.⁶⁶ By understanding them

⁶³His emphasis. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁶⁴For him, an expression of the 'decline' within the concept of truth is evident in the dominant experience of truth in terms of correctness, which he critiques in *Being and Time*. That is, truth understood as being revealed through the proper accordance between a proposition (subject) and thing (object). Heidegger sketches out this critique in relation to his developing historical narrative early on in the lecture series, *ibid.*, pp. 8-18. It should be noted however, that Heidegger is not arguing that propositional truth is not a form of truth, but instead that it is grounded in a more fundamental kind of truth that since Plato has been lost to the philosophical tradition.

⁶⁵His emphasis. *WWP*, p. 21.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 70-72. Heidegger thinks that the discussion of the Idea's is ambiguous, and it is because of this ambiguity that they become seen as the being of the object for the subject. By pp. 103-104, however, Heidegger argues that through his analysis of the good as the 'highest Idea', Plato secures the future interpretation of the Idea's as Idea's for a subject. This is the basis of Wrathall interpretation, that Heidegger's critique of the allegory is primarily about its favouring of disclosure as a kind of cognition. Wrathall, 'Heidegger on Plato, Truth and Unconcealment', p. 453. Although this is partially correct, his reading ignores the political undertones of the lecture series. It would seem that as far as Wrathall is concerned at least, *Dasein* is synonymous with 'man' and for Plato truth is the cognitive understanding of re-presentative truth whereas for Heidegger truth is *also* about mood, body, etc. This is a positivistic and reductive understanding of what is at stake, for Heidegger is focussed on the '*Da*' in which man is implicated. This, what is at issue now, and in light of the problem of nihilism, is the various ways and degrees in which this *Da* can be 'lit up'. This misunderstanding causes Wrathall to

as outside the cave, Plato creates a false division between two different orders of truth where the most fundamental one is conceived of as beyond this world.⁶⁷ Heidegger attempts to resolve this problem through his notion of authentic *Dasein*. For him, the first stage of the allegory teaches us that *aletheia* and beings are equivalent to each other, but the return of the liberated prisoner in the fourth stage teaches us that we must come to see these beings from the ‘fundamental stance’ (*Grundstellung*) of authentic *Dasein*.⁶⁸ For Heidegger, seeing the allegory of the cave this way allows us to make sense of what is ‘more’ true despite there being no transcendent source—outside of *Dasein*’s own groundless transcendence—that guarantees the stability of this truth. Truth is not the permanent Ideas *out there*. Instead, truth is ‘enacted’ by coming to stand ‘in the ground of his [authentic *Dasein*’s] essence’.⁶⁹

To establish the emphasis on the significance of authenticity, Heidegger places a central import on the last stage of the allegory, when the prisoner returns to the cave.⁷⁰ He claims that ‘the cave allegory is all about [...] the liberation and awakening of the innermost power of the essence of man’.⁷¹ The return, then, is not a return from truth to semblance but the ‘occurrence’ when *Dasein* becomes properly itself, liberated from the tyranny of the many and so free to enact the ‘ultimate decision and law-giving’.⁷² This introduces a significant alteration to the allegory. It is no longer the case that the liberated one distinguishes the shadows from the beings. To think of it this way would be, for Heidegger, to think through the inadequate distinction between the Ideas and the beings. Instead, it is through the struggle of the

entirely ignore the significance of the ‘liberator’ in Heidegger’s analysis, and its implications for his thesis on truth. I discuss the significance of the liberator, below.

⁶⁷*WWP*, pp. 111-112. Heidegger suggests that the grounds for this division lies in Plato’s conception of the good beyond being, even if he emphasises that a proper understanding of this concept resists the divide between subject and object. Heidegger’s interpretation of this concept is brought under critical evaluation in the final chapter of this thesis. See Section 4.4.2. See also, *ibid.*, pp. 318-320 and pp. 8-19. See also, *SW*, pp. 220-224.

⁶⁸*WWP*, p. 120. Heidegger emphasises the ‘stance’ (*stellung*). As I elaborate on, below, Heidegger believes Plato to have failed to see this point, instead taking the Ideas as something true beyond the stance of *Dasein*.

⁶⁹*WWP*, p. 37. *ET*, p. 28. As explained in the previous chapter, the ground of our essence is, for Heidegger, *Dasein*’s transcendence, stemming from *Dasein* being a ‘being which understands [the meaning of] being and exists on the basis of this understanding’. His emphasis. *Ibid.*, p. 77 and p. 56, respectively. However, as I go on to explore, this position undertakes a subtle but consequential shift when Heidegger introduces his notion of the liberator.

⁷⁰Even though, as Heidegger admits, the final stage of the allegory does not speak about *aletheia*. *WWP*, p. 87. This requires Heidegger to do some philosophical gymnastics to argue that the final stage is the most important part. For him, it is the *essential* part, allowing him to develop his important notion of the legislator *Dasein*. See Section 2.5, below.

⁷¹*WWP*, p. 112. *ET*, p. 82.

⁷²*WWP*, p. 82. *ET*, p. 60. ‘[...] wer von Grund auf weiß, worauf es ankommt, und eine letzte Entscheidung und Gesetzgebung vollzieht’.

liberated that being is brought to beings,⁷³ making beings ‘more’ beingful, in turn changing the beings themselves.⁷⁴ The liberator does not return to liberate others. Rather, he legislates the being of beings for the cave dwellers.⁷⁵ As I explore below, the significance of the one who escapes the cave is a development in Heidegger’s understanding of truth that requires careful and critical evaluation.

There are other important developments brewing in Heidegger’s concept of truth. We see this most readily when he moves to the second part of his lecture series on Plato’s *Theaetetus*. The *Theaetetus*, a text which deals in part with the relationship between error and knowledge, offers Heidegger a chance to reflect on the nature of ‘untruth’, and especially the historical change where untruth is experienced as error or falsehood, the very mistake he later charges himself with in *Being and Time*.⁷⁶ In this fashion, a large part of Heidegger’s discussion is focussed around the significance of the Ancient Greek word (and understanding of) ‘*doxa*’, ‘look’, which can mean both ‘opinion’ or ‘view’. In an attempt to pursue this further, his specific focus is Plato’s reflections on the ‘*pseudo doxa*’, translated as the ‘distorted view’. However, in Heidegger’s view, untruth should be understood as the essence of truth,⁷⁷ and he claims that the proper understanding of *doxa* ‘is indifferent in respect of truth and falsity’.⁷⁸ His reflection on the *pseudo doxa*, then, is used to penetrate further the nature of untruth as concealment. In the end, Heidegger concludes that Plato does not grasp the significance of this, and the ‘seat’ of truth throughout the philosophical tradition becomes the proposition, and un-truth, in turn, ‘the failure of the intended predicate’.⁷⁹ That is, framed through the ‘distorted view’, the significance of *doxa* becomes understood as the incorrect view of the observer.

This nonetheless gives Heidegger some room to go ‘beyond Plato’.⁸⁰ At this point in the lecture series, Heidegger is developing the fruits of his ‘historical confrontation’ with Plato by going back to the beginning of the philosophical

⁷³*SW*, p. 117. *BaT*, p. 92.

⁷⁴*WWP*, pp. 33-34. See also, *ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

⁷⁵*WWP*, p. 88-90.

⁷⁶*BP*, pp. 351-352.

⁷⁷*WWP*, p. 92.

⁷⁸*WWP*, p. 258. *ET*, p. 184.

⁷⁹*WWP*, p. 319. *ET*, p. 226.

⁸⁰Unfolding his own thesis on truth is primarily what occurs between p. 208-228. Heidegger uses the term ‘going beyond Plato’ (*hinausgehend über Platon*) specifically in *WWP*, p. 312. Arguably, Heidegger had been going beyond Plato in some sense (and for better or worse) throughout the whole lecture series. However, it is not until the time spent at the end of this lecture series expanding on his own views on truth, that Heidegger returns to Plato, on pp. 318-322, to secure his thesis of what Plato failed to understand sufficiently.

tradition in order to reclaim the significance of untruth. By critically evaluating Plato's thought in context of Heidegger's understanding of truth as un-concealment, he develops what he sees as the unthought in Plato's reflections on *doxa* to tease toward an adequate understanding of untruth, which he takes to be the 'concealment' of 'un-concealment'. Heidegger uses this to develop his understanding of nature, where the sense of nature in *Being and Time* as the powerful excess to our understanding of the meaning of being takes precedence over his reduction of nature to the understanding.⁸¹ This marks an important development in Heidegger's thought, where that which lies beyond the understanding of being becomes increasingly pertinent to address. The struggle to do so forces him to return to the significance of sense perception and provides him with an emphasis on corporeality that was lacking in *Being and Time*.⁸² The lecture series ends by re-securing his thesis that the loss of the experience of truth as *aletheia* occurs through various interpretative decisions Plato makes on the essence of truth and untruth in these dialogues.⁸³

2.3 Truth as *Aletheia* in the Allegory of the Cave

Heidegger understands the first and second stages of the allegory to be emblematic of the usual situation of the person as inauthentic *Dasein*. Here, the prisoners are chained to the ground and a fire behind them projects shadows onto the wall. The prisoners, unaware of their situation, take the shadows as the things themselves.⁸⁴ That the prisoners are unable to even speak about their situation shows that they are unable to question their surroundings. They take things as they are and so they have no relationship to themselves.⁸⁵ However, as Heidegger points out there is still a kind of unconcealment in the cave, that is, there is an unavoidable dynamic between what is unconcealed in front of them, even *as* shadows, and what lies concealed and hidden behind them.⁸⁶ *Dasein*, even in its fallen state, is *always* immersed in truth. What is important is that the prisoners have no sense of the unhidden *as* unhidden,

⁸¹ *WWP*, p. 237.

⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 236-237.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 318-322.

⁸⁴ 'Now if they were able to talk with one another about what they see', Socrates asks Glaucon, 'would they not take this for real beings?', 'Of course, by Zeus!' replies Glaucon. As quoted by Heidegger, *WWP*, p. 24. *ET*, p. 19.

⁸⁵ *WWP*, pp. 26-27.

⁸⁶ *WWP*, p. 26. It is in this sense that the allegory is primarily about being and *not* truth as a form of assertion. Gonzalez, *Plato and Heidegger*, pp. 107-108. In Heidegger's understanding, there is not only a 'relation' but an 'identity' (*Gleichsetzung*) between being and truth. *WWP*, p. 143.

that is, they *unquestioningly* take what is shown to them, the shadows, as being the beings that they are.⁸⁷ Therefore, they do not have the means to judge between correctness, correspondence or resemblance.⁸⁸ This is because what we take as beings and the unconcealed belong together and, for the prisoners at this stage, they are *rightly* experienced as one and the same.⁸⁹ Regardless, the lack of the prisoners' relationship with themselves tells us something crucial. Namely, that the concealment of beings is not, in the most fundamental sense, a concealed 'aspect' of the being. Rather, concealment is the implicit understanding of the meaning of being that allows beings be meaningful. Otherwise, once the 'concealed' part of the being becomes meaningful it, too, would also remain a mere shadow.

In the second stage, the prisoner is freed from his shackles. Liberated and able to ascend the cave, he cannot find the will to do so. This is because although he now 'sees more *correctly*',⁹⁰ he is more familiar with the shadows. The attempted liberation thus fails, and he flees back to the safety of the shackles.⁹¹ This tells Heidegger a number of things. First, there are 'degrees' of truth.⁹² That is, the prisoners in the first stage had no sense that the shadows could be 'more' beingful.⁹³ Second, this nonetheless confirms for Heidegger that correctness of seeing is dependent on, and derivative of, unconcealment. But, third, that correctness is grounded primarily in 'the *way* in which beings are in each case unhidden'.⁹⁴ These last two points are worth dwelling on. Notice that although this is technically a 'higher' stage, the derivative of truth, correctness, now enters the picture. This is because it is only now that the prisoner gains some insight into his situation. In turn, a separation occurs between shadows and things. The prisoner thus has some manner of judging between things and can see that the beings now revealed as the cause of the shadows are more correct,⁹⁵ but can only see this in relation to where he stands in the

⁸⁷ *WWP*, p. 27.

⁸⁸ *WWP*, p. 30. *ET*, p. 23.

⁸⁹ *WWP*, pp. 33-34.

⁹⁰ His emphasis. *WWP*, p. 34. *ET*, p. 26.

⁹¹ *WWP*, pp. 35-37.

⁹² *WWP*, p. 33. *ET*, p. 25

⁹³ *WWP*, p. 33. *ET*, p. 25. 'Das Seiende hat ebenfalls *Grade!*' Heidegger emphasises the word 'degrees' (*Grade*) here, indicating its importance. He wants to maintain this sense of truth, whilst losing the sense that there is a highest degree, i.e., that there is a limit by which one could judge the 'most' true. For him, this would result in a situation where the highest degree of truth could be most adequately represented, and hence reduce truth to correctness. Therefore, he focuses on the existential lived truth of the human being, which can admit of higher degrees, which could suggest that nihilism is a lower form of existential truth that can be overcome.

⁹⁴ His emphasis. *WWP*, p. 34. *ET*, p. 26.

⁹⁵ *WWP*, pp. 34-35. *ET*, pp. 26-27.

cave.⁹⁶ Heidegger is drawing our attention to the fact that correctness is a judgment we make grounded first of all in the existential truth we embody and, although this is a ‘higher’ stage, the prisoners does not have the existential truth to proceed deeper into his liberation. Heidegger argues that when we know ourselves authentically as the ‘there’ of being (*Da- Sein*), we can stand before the ‘unhidden *as* unhidden’, which suggests having an understanding of the essence of truth as such.⁹⁷ It is this more fundamental sense of concealment that is suggested above. Not yet for the prisoner. When we begin to experience a mode of being outside the familiar everything becomes confusion and we flee (from ourselves) back to the shackles of our cave.⁹⁸

The ‘genuine’ (*eigentliche*) liberation occurs in the third stage.⁹⁹ Although the prisoner does not gain the courage to leave the cave, he is ‘forcibly dragged up the steep and rugged ascent [...] into the sunlight’.¹⁰⁰ Echoing his own views of being ‘assailed’ by the mood of angst, Heidegger emphasises the violence of this stage.¹⁰¹ If there is courage to be seen here, it is one solely of endurance and persistence in face of the violent onslaught of the light.¹⁰² That is, the prisoner has now found himself in the realm of the Ideas and amongst their illuminating view, but it takes him a while to properly see them. One slowly adapts to this illumination before eventually glimpsing the sun. Plato calls the sun the ‘good’, the highest Idea of all. It is what ‘gives the light, as what gives *time*, as what *rules over* everything, and which is the ground even of what is seen in the *cave*, of the shadows and the light and the fire’.¹⁰³ Having done so, the ‘fundamental stance’ (*Grundstellung*) is secured,¹⁰⁴ one in which genuine insight into the nature of *aletheia* is embodied by the former prisoner.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁶*WWP*, p. 43. Nonetheless, moments like this exemplify the importance of the derivative of truth in the hopes Heidegger has for its superlative. That is, one can only make a judgment on beings as *aletheia* (crucial for Heidegger’s hopes in the revolution of truth), if one has a sense that beings can be *more* or *less* truthful.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 41.

¹⁰⁰*WWP*, p. 39. *ET*, p. 30.

¹⁰¹Gordon and Gordon also point out this connection. Haim Gordon and Rivca Gordon, *Heidegger on Truth and Myth: A Rejection of Postmodernism* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 2006; repr. 2007), p. 66.

¹⁰²*WWP*, p. 43.

¹⁰³His emphasis. *WWP*, p. 43.

¹⁰⁴Emphasis removed. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

¹⁰⁵That is, knowing one’s role as *Dasein* in the disclosure of truth and thus seeing the ‘unhidden *as* unhidden’. *WWP*, p. 37 and p. 120. As we see below, however, Heidegger introduces a significant alteration to Plato’s Idea of the good. For a discussion of Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato’s understanding of the good beyond being, see Section 4.4.3.

The prisoner has now been freed from the cave. If it is the case, however, that the prisoner was only liberated when he was *forced* up the cave—unable to leave the cave in a sole act of will—then who did the forcing? Heidegger’s answer is ambiguous. Certainly, the one already liberated plays some role. However, the liberator is not one who can tell the shadows *from* the beings, thus offering the prisoners an opportunity to escape. Instead, he brings being *to* the shadows.¹⁰⁶ For Heidegger, there is no beyond the cave. Instead, through taking a decisive *stance* on their illumination of beings for the cave dwellers, the liberator make the beings ‘more’ beingful.¹⁰⁷ Because he rejects the notion that the thing approximates its eternal truth in the forms, this becoming ‘more’ is not to say that the being becomes more itself but, on the contrary, ‘[c]loseness and distance to beings changes the beings themselves’.¹⁰⁸ Hence, the fourth stage is the most important, for it is here that the liberated prisoner returns to the cave and grounds the truth of being for the cave dwellers.¹⁰⁹ Now, the ‘unity’ of the allegory is complete, for truth only occurs within the cave, albeit still the case that truth can reach *greater* or *higher* levels of disclosure.

The alteration to the final stage of the allegory draws on Heidegger’s adherence to the transcendental reduction, alongside his particular hermeneutical and existential emphasis. If he contended that the beings become more themselves then he would affirm the truth of the natural attitude: that beings have substantial independence and meaning beyond their disclosure through *Dasein*. However, with the thesis of the natural attitude dispensed, the beings do not become ‘more’ themselves but are

¹⁰⁶It is in this sense that Heidegger reads the significance of the superlative of *aletheia*, i.e., the Ideas as the ‘most’ unhidden. They are the most beingful, but not as two beings to be compared (shadows, less being, Ideas, more being). Instead, the shadows become ‘more’ beingful too he who perceives the Ideas. Heidegger, *WWP*, pp. 70-71. This is the crux of the misreading provided by Gordon and Gordon in *Heidegger on Truth and Myth*. They compare Heidegger’s reading to, for example, the discoveries about the world made by Galileo or Spinoza. These figures revealed something about the world that had been concealed and were then persecuted for their discoveries. These examples provided by Gordon and Gordon do share elements of both the allegory of the cave and Heidegger’s particular reading of it. However, Heidegger is very clear that he is not talking about the discovery of new beings, as this would simply be more shadows. For him, the emphasis is on the *way* in which one relates to the beings themselves, as there are only shadows. The shadows become beings through the relating of *Dasein*, which is why he must read the allegory as a process of becoming authentic *Dasein*. Cf., Gordon and Gordon, *Heidegger on Truth and Myth*, p.66 and *WWP*, p. 48. A proper understanding of untruth would also make their misreading clear, a concept I will explore, below. Conveniently for Gordon and Gordon, they opt to ‘skip’ the issue of untruth in their account of Heidegger’s understanding of truth. *Ibid.*, p. 131. Their account is therefore grossly inadequate.

¹⁰⁷As Wrathall puts it, ‘[o]nly with the return do the ideas play their proper role – namely, they give us that intelligibility on the basis of which beings can appear as what they are’. Wrathall, ‘Heidegger on Plato, Truth and Unconcealment’, p. 453. See also, Gonzalez, *Plato and Heidegger*, p. 110.

¹⁰⁸*WWP*, p. 34. *ET*, p. 26. ‘Nähe und Ferne zum Seienden verändert das Seiende selbst’.

¹⁰⁹*WWP*, pp. 79-86.

instead recreated with greater levels of existential disclosure, thus becoming *richer* in meaning. This is the significance of standing before the unhidden *as* unhidden, and how Heidegger attempts to resolve the tension inherent in conceiving the Ideas as both a source of truth and a temporal and historical category. Glimpsing the Ideas beyond their existence as a shadow requires the liberated Dasein, as it is through taking a stance on who he is and what he takes to be that allow the shadows to light up anew.¹¹⁰ By his own admission, Heidegger is now going ‘beyond Plato’,¹¹¹ and it requires an elaboration on his interpretation of the Ideas and the significance of the liberator to explain this fully. The following, however, offers a hint of the direction Heidegger takes this.

In the allegory of the cave, Plato describes how, once freed, if the prisoner was to return to the cave to tell the others of the world outside he would be mocked, and possibly even murdered, if he tried to lead them up to the light of the Ideas beyond their cave.¹¹² Exposed to the constant possibility of death,¹¹³ or coming to grips with one’s finitude, the liberated prisoner ‘has a surer footing in the ground of human-historical Dasein. Only then does he gain the power for the violence he must employ in liberation’.¹¹⁴ This violence, however, is not physical violence, but the violence of the philosopher, the violence of one ‘who enacts an ultimate decision and law-giving’.¹¹⁵ Before we can adequately explore what this violence entails, however, we must take a closer look at how Heidegger interprets the Ideas.

¹¹⁰WHP, pp. 75-78. This is what Heidegger understands to be care (*Sorge*). Ibid., p. 73. See also, Safranski, *Between Good and Evil*, p. 246.

¹¹¹WHP, pp. 71.

¹¹²WHP, p. 80.

¹¹³Heidegger is not talking about the possibility of physical death, even if that is its ontic roots, but instead an ontological death, what Heidegger describes here as ‘the forfeiture and rendering powerless of one’s own essence’. WHP, p. 84. ET, p. 61.

¹¹⁴WHP, p. 81. ET, p. 60.

¹¹⁵WHP, p. 82. ET, p. 60. Although a different kind of violence, the connection it has with the physical violence is not clear. By which I mean, there is a distinction between these differing kinds of violence, but a distinction nonetheless suggests a connection. I distinguish between oranges and apples, for example, but only because they are both fruit. Heidegger does distinguish his understanding of violence from ‘blind caprice’ and does not at this time discuss the prospect of war or physical murder. One wonders if this would even matter to him, as war is an ontic affair within the history of being. As he claims in his lecture series in Hölderlin, the first ‘World War began with skirmishes at the outposts. The beginning is immediately left behind; it vanishes as an event proceeds. The commencement—the origin—by contrast, first appears and comes to the fore in the course of an event and is fully there only as its end’. HH, p. 3. HHGR, p. 3. It is likely that Žižek has the sort of violence that Heidegger tries to affirm when he claimed that ‘Hitler was not violent enough’. He uses this to criticize Heidegger on this point, arguing that the violence of the Nazis was an ‘impotent acting-out which, ultimately, remained in the service of the very order it despised’. In this sense, contrary to its intended aims Nazism enabled the ‘decadent’ bourgeois order to survive. Slavoj Žižek, *Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism* (London: Verso, 2012; repr. 2013) pp. 901-902. Hence, for him, a more radical kind of violence is one which would have found a way of cutting ties to the bourgeois order

2.4 Heidegger's Phenomenological and Hermeneutical Interpretation of the Platonic Ideas

Heidegger claims that the Ideas are the 'look (*Anblick*) of something *as* something'.¹¹⁶ This is a signpost back to his own analysis in *Being and Time* where he develops the 'as' structure of *Dasein*'s understanding. For him, 'understanding' is the 'being' of *Dasein*'s 'potentiality-for-being' (*Seinkönnen*). It is responsible for freeing beings in the world to their possibilities, i.e., something is understood in terms of its 'serviceability, usability, detrimentality'.¹¹⁷ By 'potentiality-for-being' Heidegger means our own pre-ontological (or unthematic and unconsidered) sense of the significance of our 'being-in-the-world'. This potentiality-for-being is the 'for the sake of which' I am and, as such, it is the underlying basis for allowing things to be relevant to me *as* what they are.¹¹⁸

In this way, 'understanding' in Heidegger's view is not understood in the way we might usually think, for example, I understand what Heidegger means by 'understanding' (or do not understand, as the case may well be). Instead, beginning with the thesis that I always have some understanding of the meaning of being, albeit implicit and vague, things already make sense to me in some way. Understanding is then said to become 'itself' in interpretation.¹¹⁹ He calls this the 'existential-hermeneutical "as"',¹²⁰ occurring through the 'development of possibilities projected in understanding' where I come to take something *as* something.¹²¹ For example, I interpret Heidegger's views on understanding *as* meaning such and such.

This shift from understanding to interpretation applies equally to things in the world around me. I take this thing *as* a table, or *as* a chair. Heidegger's point is that I am not just 'seeing' the table, in the sense of perceiving it with my eyes, and then after the fact 'cloaking' it with some sort of meaning, but instead that I am in the first-place understanding what I see *as* a table, a table that I then interpret in relation to its contextually specific 'what-it's-for' (*Wozu*) (eat dinner, for example), laid out for me

through a radical re-structuring of society and norms, circumventing any need for a (physically) violent response.

¹¹⁶His emphasis, *WWP*, p. 51. *ET*, p. 38.

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 140.

¹¹⁸*SZ*, p. 115 and pp. 197-204.

¹¹⁹*SZ*, p. 197. *BT*, p. 144.

¹²⁰His emphasis. *SZ*, p. 210.

¹²¹*SZ*, pp. 197-198. *BT*, p. 144.

in the world that I am thrown into.¹²² It is only because of this primary understanding, immersed within a meaningful world, that the table is revealed to me as significant in some way. That I can ‘see’ the table with my eyes is derivative of the more primary sense of truth that Heidegger draws to our attention.

Although Plato misses the mark slightly, Heidegger argues that it is this ‘*more primordial*’ sense of sight that Plato explores with his understanding of the Ideas.¹²³ However, contrary to Plato’s Ideas, Heidegger’s analysis in *Being and Time* argues that this ‘look’ recedes from view. That is, in our everyday dealings with things, the ‘as’ of the thing generally remains operative but absent in our engagements and use of the thing. As Heidegger explores in his 1925 lecture course *Logic: The Question of Truth*, ‘[e]very act of having things before our eyes, every act of perceiving them, is held within this [prior] disclosure of those things, a disclosure that things get from a primary making-sense-of-things in terms of their what-they’re-for’.¹²⁴ Heidegger calls this a kind of ‘knowing-our-way-around’, leading him to describe the as-structure as primarily a non-explicit, non-thematic, pre-predicative kind of knowing,¹²⁵ such as a craftsman using a hammer as if it were an extension of their body. The less they have the hammer present before them as an object, the more it is free to be what it is

¹²²The following thought experiment might bring clarity to the idea. Imagine a group of travellers shipwrecked on an island with no access to the rest of the world via technology, etc. A lot was lost in the shipwreck, but a number of tables remain. As the group settle into their new surroundings, and begin to create a life for themselves there, they find little use for the tables, as the ground of the island is uneven, and they lack knives, forks, plates, etc. However, one of the survivors makes the discovery that these specific tables float on the water relatively well and the group begin to use the tables to raft out onto the water, placing them upside down, and hooking nets around the base of the inverted legs to catch fish. For the first generation of the survivors, they are likely to understand this object *as* a table being used incorrectly as a raft or fishing boat. Perhaps this understanding in some way survives to the second generation and so on. Eventually, however, this same object simply becomes taken *as* fishing boat. If I was to then arrive on to the island and take this object (now *as* raft) and place it on land, and use it as a table, I would appear to the now established islanders as outlandish, insane even. Nonetheless, we are both, ‘objectively’ speaking, perceiving the same object with our eyes. The understanding that underlies our senses, or makes *sense* of our senses, is worlds apart. As Heidegger claims in *Being and Time*: ‘Any simple pre-predicative seeing of what is at hand is in itself already understanding and interpretive [...] It contains in itself the explicitness of referential relations (of the what-they’re-for) which belong to the totality of relevance in terms of which what is simply encountered is understood’. Trans. mod. *SZ*, pp. 198-199. *BT*, pp. 144-145. I use the object *for* eating. They, in order to fish. As such, the same ‘object’ is entirely different. It is this sort of distinction that causes Heidegger to reject the subject/object distinction as derivative, and instead emphasises the primordial ‘sight’ of the understanding of *Dasein*.

¹²³His emphasis, *WWP*, p. 50. *ET*, p. 38. Hence, the Ideas are the ‘look [*Anblick*] of something *as* something’. His emphasis, *WWP*, p. 51. *ET*, p. 38. On the back of this, Wrathall claims that Heidegger interprets Plato phenomenologically. Wrathall, ‘Heidegger on Plato, Truth and Unconcealment’, p. 463, n. 10. He concludes that it is through this phenomenological reading that Heidegger is more charitable to Plato than in later interpretations. Wrathall misses the significance of the hermeneutic approach that Heidegger develops in his method of phenomenology. I point to this, below, and explore the significance of it in relation to Heidegger’s understanding of the liberator.

¹²⁴*LT*, p. 121. See also, Wrathall, ‘Heidegger on Plato, Truth and Unconcealment’, p. 460.

¹²⁵*LT*, pp. 122-123.

through my engagement with it in relation to its ‘what-it’s-for’. Hence, if I want to know what a hammer is, I pick it up and I use it.

However, in Heidegger’s view, Plato, and Ancient Greek thought in general, thinks being is presence, *ousia*, and so Plato takes the Ideas to be the stable ‘truthfulness’ of the being.¹²⁶ That is, that thing *is* (always *as*) hammer, secured in place by the Idea of hammer. The more I reflect on what the hammer *is*, the more it can be what it is. For Plato, then, it is this Idea that reveals to me the objects ‘for-what’. The Ideas are a kind of light, ‘letting-through’ (*Durchlassens*) the being for a seeing, which Plato takes as a source of making the thing present.¹²⁷ Instead, Heidegger argues that there is an essential ‘unity’ (*Einheit*) between person and Idea.¹²⁸

Zwart claims there are two Platos at work in Heidegger’s interpretation, ‘one with whom he shares deep sympathies even as he is harshly critical of the other’,¹²⁹ and it is moments like these where this ambivalence is most operative. On the one hand, Heidegger claims that Plato’s understanding of the Ideas grasps the reciprocal relationship between the seeing of the Idea and what is seen, the Parmenidean ‘*noêin*’,¹³⁰ which points beyond the problematic divide between subject and object¹³¹ and into an analysis that focusses on the more fundamental understanding of a ‘manifestness’ (*Offenbarkeit*) to the understanding of being.¹³² Heidegger reads it this way because for him, the allegory of the cave contains within itself an implicit articulation of the significance of *aletheia* as the de-concealing essence of *Dasein*. On the other, because this sense is implicit it is unthought, and Plato is taken to inadequately grasp the significance of this and instead interpret the Ideas as the presence of objects in the world.¹³³ By raising his pre-thematic understanding of the

¹²⁶ *WWP*, p. 51. Gonzalez claims that this is a major reduction of Plato’s thinking. Gonzalez, *Plato and Heidegger*, pp. 111-113.

¹²⁷ *WWP*, p. 56.

¹²⁸ His emphasis. *WWP*, p. 71.

¹²⁹ Megan Halteman Zwart, ‘What Simple Descriptions ... Cannot Grasp: Heidegger and the Plato of Myth’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Graduate Program in Philosophy, Norte Dame, Indiana, 2009), p. i.

¹³⁰ *WWP*, p. 52.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 70-72.

¹³² *Ibid.*, pp. 111-112.

¹³³ Plato is therefore understood to miss the significance of the movement from inauthentic to authentic *Dasein* that Heidegger believes to be the fundamental issue at stake in his allegory of the cave. *Ibid.*, p. 120. Cf., however, Heidegger’s discussion later on where he argues that it would be wrong to reduce Plato to the ‘theory of [I]deas’. Instead, ‘with this word [Idea] Plato means something which relates to his innermost philosophical questioning, something which opens up and guides this questioning, and something which for the entirety of Plato’s career *remains* a question’. His emphasis. *Ibid.*, pp. 173-

reciprocity between the Ideas and person to an explicit interpretation that distinguishes them, Plato instigates a split between the essence of something as the eternal and permanent truthful stability to be *seen* by the prisoner who has escaped the cave, and the shadowed material thing that exists in our physical world of the cave.¹³⁴ For Heidegger, it is this interpretive move that secures the ‘catastrophic course’ of Western thought,¹³⁵ for it loses sight of the fundamental role *Dasein* plays in revealing beings.

Heidegger argues that because the Idea is always founded through an historical understanding of being, bound essentially up with the look that catches sight of them, they should properly be considered to be in the domain of interpretation.¹³⁶ That is, they are the being of beings disclosed through the transcendent home of the historical understanding of the meaning of being, namely *Dasein*.¹³⁷ Reflecting his sense of the absent look, his emphasis on the Ideas as a hermeneutic category gives Heidegger cause to reflect on them as tone and sound, rather than sight. As he claims, the word ‘*Helle*’ (brightness) originally stems from ‘*hallen*’ (‘reverberate’ or ‘echo’).¹³⁸ This original significance of hearing over sight indicates for him ‘an early power and wisdom of language’,¹³⁹ emphasising a passive and hermeneutic sense of the disclosure of beings. This suggests that a proper understanding of the Ideas would not think of them as a transcendent source beyond this world, thus presencing the objects before us in order to catch *sight* of them. Instead, one *hears* them, they echo and penetrate, and so are sustained by *us* in our pre-predicative sense for what *is*, the groundless ground of our meaningful, historically changing worlds.

173. *ET*, p. 125. Here we see the ambivalence assert itself again, where even Heidegger seems uncomfortable with his tendency to reduce Plato to the source of Western nihilism.

¹³⁴In this sense Wrathall is incorrect to claim that Heidegger prime disagreement with Plato is him ‘basing his argument on an assumption about the primacy of ideas and cognition over other practices or kinds of familiarity with the world’. Wrathall, ‘Heidegger on Plato, Truth and Unconcealment’, p. 453. Instead, Heidegger’s point is that the *as* is not ‘more’ beingful than the being, it is simply its condition of possibility of givenness. Instead, Heidegger’s claim is beings become more beingful through authentic *Dasein*, understanding oneself as the ‘there’ of ‘being’, and hence capable of disclosing inchoate possibilities of being into being/s. This would, to Wrathall’s credit, require a kind of embodying of truth that extends beyond cognitive disclosure. As we will see, below, Heidegger’s prime disagreement with Plato focusses far more on the significant of untruth, than it does his hermeneutical-phenomenological re-interpretation of the Ideas.

¹³⁵*WWP*, p. 17.

¹³⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 70-72. See also, Gonzalez, *Plato and Heidegger*, p. 116.

¹³⁷*WWP*, pp. 72-79. On this, see, Gonzalez, *Plato and Heidegger*, pp. 120-123. Gonzalez argues that because Heidegger assigns the Ideas as the ‘glass’ through which ‘sensible objects can be seen as they are’, and not, as they are in Plato, ‘the light that enables this glass to be transparent’, his critique of Plato for subjugating *aletheia* to the Ideas is absurd and ironic, for it is *Heidegger* that makes this mistake, not Plato.

¹³⁸*WWP*, pp. 54-55. *ET*, pp. 40-41.

¹³⁹*WWP*, p. 54. *ET*, p. 41.

2.5 The Significance of the Elites in Heidegger's Concept of Truth

Interpreting the Ideas in this way means that Heidegger establishes a monopoly on truth for certain individuals. As the allegory depicts, most of us are trapped within the cave, and we are told the story of a philosopher's slow and arduous ascent from a world he has taken for granted up to the true beings *as they really are* in the Ideas. Having reflected on these eternal forms, they return to the cave and teach the truth of beings to everyday people. For Heidegger however, the Ideas are a creative and interpretive category. There is no 'beyond' the cave and so the liberator cannot liberate others to interpret the truth of beings. To do so, would be to reduce truth to subjective anarchy precisely because the Ideas are bound up with the individual who catches sight of them. In virtue of this phenomenological and hermeneutical philosophical commitments, the liberator instead becomes the *legislator*, instituting *their* understanding of the meaning of the being on the shadows through an act of ontological 'violence'.¹⁴⁰ There are only some who can sight the Ideas and establish their meaning. This marks a subtle but significant development in Heidegger's understanding of the essence of truth. To come to grips with why this figure becomes important in his understanding of truth, it will be helpful to evaluate his understanding of *Dasein* and discuss some reasons for the development of this notion after *Being and Time*.

2.5.1 Clarifying the Essence of *Dasein*: Grounds for a Development

By the time Heidegger was preparing this lecture series, he was dissatisfied with his notion of *Dasein* as presented in *Being and Time*. Primarily this is because he believed it had been 'misinterpreted and misused as an anthropology or a "philosophy of existence."'”¹⁴¹ This misunderstanding was because *Dasein* was interpreted to mean the same as man, or so he contends at least.¹⁴² On the contrary, he tells us that the

¹⁴⁰This is the kind of violence that Heidegger's points to when he talks about an 'ultimate decision and law-giving'. *WWP*, p. 82. *ET*, p. 60. In what follows, I unpack what is meant by this.

¹⁴¹*UII-VI*, p. 21. *PII-VI*, p. 16.

¹⁴²See, *BP*, pp. 87-88, where Heidegger talks of the anthropological misinterpretation of *Being and Time*. In his *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger charges Sartre with this misinterpretation. However, in that text he also claims that *Being and Time* failed in expressing adequately the relation between *Dasein* and *Sein* (the *Kehre*) because of its reliance on the language of metaphysics. See, *BH*, pp. 328-

expression of an individuality within *Dasein* was only a ‘contingent passageway to the alone-ness of Da-sein, wherein the all-oneness of being happens’.¹⁴³ He also concedes, however, that *Being and Time* was an ‘imperfect’ attempt to elucidate the nature of *Dasein*.¹⁴⁴ Therefore, this misinterpretation was not simply the fault of his readers but also lay in the grounds of his exposition of this concept in *Being and Time*.¹⁴⁵

His 1929 lecture *What is Metaphysics?* attempts to elucidate the nature of *Dasein* more clearly. There, he unfolds a metaphysical inquiry by calling the nature of the human being into question.¹⁴⁶ In pursuit of this nature, he arrives at ‘nothing’ (*das Nichts*).¹⁴⁷ It is claimed that this nothing is encountered through the fundamental mood of angst (*Angst*), through which it is revealed that *Dasein* is the ground of meaning, but this ground is a groundless one, an abyss.¹⁴⁸ This is another way of pointing to *Dasein* as the transcendent source for meaning where, in virtue of its finitude (experienced through the ‘bright night of nothingness’), the ‘primordial openness of beings as such emerges’.¹⁴⁹ Being *Dasein* means ‘being-held-into nothing’.¹⁵⁰

Contrary to those that took *Dasein* to refer to the human being, *Dasein* is *not* an ‘I’. In *Being and Time*, it is characterised as ‘always-being-my-own-being’ (*Jemeinigkeit*),¹⁵¹ but *Dasein* is the ‘there’ of being, and so not an ‘I-pole’. Rather, it is the prior condition for the appearing of a meaningful world to which the ‘I’ subsequently identifies. This identification means that initially *Dasein* is inauthentic,¹⁵² which means it exists with a lack of understanding of the significance

329. Therefore, Heidegger also had doubts about whether this was only a problem of interpretation, or whether it was a failure within the treatise itself.

¹⁴³ *UII-VI*, p. 21. *PII-VI*, p. 17.

¹⁴⁴ *UII-VI*, p. 9. *PII-VI*, p. 8.

¹⁴⁵ On this, see, *BP*, p. 69. *CP*, p. 55. ‘The temptation is strong to believe that the entire meditation in the first [published] half of *Being and Time* is limited to the sphere of an anthropology, one that merely takes a peculiar direction’. He claims this also in *ibid.*, p. 88. *CP*, p. 70, but clarifies that the misinterpretation was ‘chiefly kept in check [...] by adhering from the start to the basic question of the “meaning of being” as *the* one and only question’. His emphasis. His doubts about the presentation of *Dasein* in *Being and Time* are expressed even stronger in his 1941 treatise *The Event*, when he laments that in *Being and Time* *Dasein* was ‘exclusively presented in terms of the human being, although projected out of being’. *TE*, p. 245

¹⁴⁶ *WM*, p. 103.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 112. ‘Die Angst offenbart das Nichts’.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 114. ‘In der hellen Nacht des Nichts der Angst erstet erst die ursprüngliche Offenheit des Seienden als eines solchen’.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 115. ‘Da-sein heißt: Hineingehaltenheit in das Nichts.’

¹⁵¹ *SZ*, p. 57. *BT*, p. 42.

¹⁵² *SZ*, pp. 169-173.

of being the ‘there’ of being, and so it does not understand the grounds of itself as the source of the openness of a meaningful world. Lacking this, *Dasein* is characterised as being ‘fallen’ into its world, which means that it identifies itself purely in relation to the world into which it is thrown. Heidegger thinks that without this more fundamental awareness of the nothing that sustains my being, *Dasein*’s sense of ‘I’ is inadequate: ‘Without original manifestation of nothing, no selfhood and no freedom’.¹⁵³ Through anxiety-over-my-own-death, my finitude, or my ‘being held out into nothing’, is revealed to me. This allows me to become *who* I am, as I discover that the source of the possibilities that I can seize in my lived experience is within my own being. This ‘source’ is ‘no-thing’, and experiencing this I am free to pursue other means, or other than the means that have been handed to me by the many (*Das Man*), of disclosing my own being in the world around me. A notion of individuality is thus retained by Heidegger in *Being and Time*, albeit one where my usual self as a ‘they-self’ becomes dispensed through the revelation of myself as the source of the openness of world.¹⁵⁴ I am therefore no longer exclusively bound to the possibilities this world has to offer and I can begin to disclose new possibilities of my own being and the beings around me through a more fundamental relationship with my potentiality-for-being.

However, I also share being *Dasein* with others, expressed in what Heidegger calls ‘Dasein-with’ (*Mitdasein*).¹⁵⁵ This notion is to suggest that I am always related to others in my daily interaction with the world I am immersed in.¹⁵⁶ Being-in-the-world is always a ‘being-with’ (*Mitsein*) others, a being-with I grasp through *Dasein*-with¹⁵⁷. There is thus no distinction between *Dasein* and the others.¹⁵⁸ Complicating matters further, in the same discussion Heidegger also says, ‘but the expression “*Dasein*” clearly shows that this being is “first of all” [*zunächst*] unrelated [*Unbezogenheit*] to others’.¹⁵⁹

Heidegger worried about the anthropocentric misunderstanding of *Dasein*, as it might mean thinking of *Dasein* as a kind of subject or reducing it to the human being. As Heidegger proceeds to clarify the nature of *Dasein*, which shifts the focus of his

¹⁵³ *WM*, p. 115. ‘Ohne ursprüngliche Offenbarkeit des Nichts kein Selbstsein und keine Freiheit.’

¹⁵⁴ *SZ*, pp. 249-253.

¹⁵⁵ *SZ*, p. 159.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 160-161.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 158-159.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 152-156.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 160. My translation. ‘Aber der Ausdruck “*Dasein*” zeigt doch deutlich, dass dieses Seiende “*zunächst*” ist in der Unbezogenheit auf Andere’. O’Brien also explores this tension in his *Heidegger, History and the Holocaust*, pp. 78-94.

analysis, some commentators contend that his investigation moves from its anthropocentric focus in *Being and Time* and into a focus on ‘being itself’.¹⁶⁰ Correcting this anthropocentric misunderstanding, however, does not mean claiming that being exists independently of *Dasein*. His interpretation of the Ideas made this clear, as they are enmeshed with the gaze of the liberator. Rather, *Dasein* should not be perceived as an individual as it is through *Dasein* that the world is rendered manifest, open, and available for meaningful interaction. *Dasein*, thought more primordially, is the emptiness and absence that holds the meaning of things open and available, a ‘place’ through which I subsequently identify with as ‘my own’. But because this is a ‘place’ that I share with others it is neither ‘myself’ nor a ‘collective’, but something that precedes this very division. Either way, the presentation of *Dasein* in *Being and Time* is in some kind of tension between an individual and a collective, and he sought to correct the tension inherent within the notion in the proceeding years.

2.5.2 Heidegger’s Interpretation of Liberated *Dasein* as Legislative *Dasein*

This tension brings him into trouble. Lacoue-Labarthe argues that the analytic of *Dasein* (as presented in *Being and Time*) harbours the ‘possibility of a commitment to fascism’ due to the ambiguity of the significance of ‘being-with’ and ‘always-being-my-own’.¹⁶¹ By this, he means that because the self-hood of *Dasein* is caught between the individual and the many, it was possible for Heidegger to commit himself ‘to a movement that was national and popular’.¹⁶² Echoing this, by 1931 Heidegger no longer speaks of a *Dasein* characterised by ‘always-being-my-own’, but instead ‘our’ *Dasein*, ‘today’s *Dasein*’, etc.¹⁶³ Later, he speaks more specifically about

¹⁶⁰Cf., for example, Capobianco, *Heidegger’s Way of Being*, pp. 40-42.

¹⁶¹Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, pp. 108-110.

¹⁶²Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, p. 108.

¹⁶³*Ibid.*, p. 108. See, also, *WWP*, p. 12, p. 16, p. 45, p. 63, p. 116, p. 120, p. 209, p. 216, pp 221-222 and p. 322, where all instances of *Dasein* are either human *Dasein* (*menschlichen Daseins*), our (*unser*) *Dasein*, today’s *Dasein* (*heutigen Daseins*), etc., p. 84, p. 130, p. 156, p. 215, p. 217, p. 238, pp. 246-247, are all instances where Heidegger uses ‘his *Dasein*’ or ‘this *Dasein*’ instead of ‘our’ or ‘human’. However, cf. the discussion on p. 75, where although Heidegger largely repeats his discussion of truth as it is in *Being and Time* (i.e., *Dasein* is ‘in’ the truth), he now emphasises that this means being within and a part of history. Hence, he now claims that ‘[t]ruth is greater than man’.

the people (*Volk*).¹⁶⁴ Hence, in the tension of *Dasein* as either an individual or a collective, it would seem that the collective has won out.

Such a conclusion proves too hasty. Heidegger does try to resolve this tension in this lecture series but, if anything, he doubles down on the centrality of the individual. The framework of the allegory aids Heidegger in this analysis, as it is the difficult ascent of the individual up the cave that results in one's freedom. Therefore, when Heidegger understands the Ideas to be bound up with she who catches sight of them, then the sense of the individual has not been lost to his emphasis on a people but has instead become reified in the escaped individual. This freed individual does not return to free others, as the rubric of a 'liberator' would suggest. Instead, the liberator 'decide[s] from the start what sort of reality it is that the cave dwellers take as what *is*'.¹⁶⁵ To call him simply liberated, or liberator, is therefore misleading. The liberated one does not liberate, *but legislates the truth of being for a people*. If we are to find a precedent to support fascism in his thought, here is one place we should look.

The legitimate philosophical basis for this position makes the task more difficult. Heidegger thinks that the Ideas should be understood as reciprocally related to the sight that catches sight of them, a 'binding' of person and meaning that frees the thing into being.¹⁶⁶ Which is to say, there is a necessary 'unity' between what is perceived and the act of perceiving.¹⁶⁷ As he claims, '[t]his pre-modeling perceiving of beings, of essence [i.e. the Ideas], is already *bound* to what is projected in such a projection'.¹⁶⁸ For him, even this 'binding' needs to be thought of as a 'taking into one's possession'.¹⁶⁹ This is because when one is authentic one 'does not strive in order to have and possess'.¹⁷⁰ Instead, because 'beings are referred to him and in his *Dasein*, and he is referred to them' it is only through him that 'beings come to be and

¹⁶⁴In the 1931/32 lecture course (*WWP*) on Plato Heidegger uses the term '*Volk*', twice. Once, on p. 145, to claim that the history of being occurs as the history of the *Volk*. On p. 146, he claims that the question of untruth is the source of determination of the Western spirit (*Geist*) and its people (*Völker*). In the 1933/34 repeat of this lecture course (*SW*) Heidegger uses the term *Volk* eighty four times. Now he does not talk about 'Western spirit' but instead the 'German' *Volk* (p. 3). Displaying the way in which Heidegger drew heavily from contemporary discourse, p. 3 uses the term *Volk* eleven times.

¹⁶⁵His emphasis. *SW*, pp 183-184. *BaT*, p. 141. 'Er kann von vornherein entscheiden, was für eine Wirklichkeit das ist, was die Höhlenbewohner für das Seiende halten'.

¹⁶⁶*WWP*, p. 59.

¹⁶⁷His emphasis. *WWP*, p. 71.

¹⁶⁸His emphasis. *WWP*, p. 71. *ET*, p. 52.

¹⁶⁹*WWP*, pp. 59-60.

¹⁷⁰*WWP*, p. 217. *ET*, p. 156.

not to be'.¹⁷¹ This conviction that the Ideas are bound up with the person who catches sight of them means that truth depends on *Dasein*, as we already noted was the case in *Being and Time*. However, Heidegger is still concerned that this risks the possibility of collapsing truth into some kind of arbitrariness and subjectivity. In *Being and Truth*, Heidegger raises precisely this concern.¹⁷² By ascribing the ontological act of de-concealment to specific individuals who then establish and transmit this truth to the people, who then sustain this truth as a collective, he tries to avoid understanding truth as relying entirely on an individual subjectivity. The attempt proves dubious and has certain implications that could draw our concern when evaluating this development in light of his involvement with the National Socialist regime. For example, Wolin warns us that these *Daseins* are a 'dominating caste of leader-types'.¹⁷³

Although there certainly is an elitism at play here, we should be specific about what kind of elitism Heidegger is advocating. Reminding us that 'the call for leadership' was 'commonplace in Weimar Germany', Young argues that '[t]o suppose [...] [that] elitism must, of necessity, be fascist or antidemocratic is to be historically myopic'.¹⁷⁴ Certainly, there are certain kinds of elitism that are not necessarily problematic. When I go to the doctor, for example, I assume that they have a vast pool of knowledge and experience to know what the best thing to do is about my illness, without necessarily knowing the ins and outs of this myself. In this sense, the elite are the best of a group and, although there is an important question around privilege that could be raised here,¹⁷⁵ for the sake of brevity and focus on the issue at hand it is reasonable to suggest that there are certain people whose authority, stemming from hard work and dedication to their particular craft, should be taken seriously.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷¹Ibid.

¹⁷²*SW*, pp. 172-173.

¹⁷³Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, p. 124.

¹⁷⁴Young, *Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism*, p. 122.

¹⁷⁵The authority one gives certain experts often relies on the privilege of those in authority, a privilege that allows them to rise the ranks of society with greater ease. A child of a doctor born into the middle-class has far more chance of becoming a doctor than an equally capable working-class child born in an impoverished neighbourhood. This holds true for doctors just as much as lawyers, judges, politicians, etc. Often time, the authority that we see in such figures is dependent on the class privilege within our society.

¹⁷⁶At least within the reasonable confines of their knowledge on that craft at least, as Socrates thought us. Plato, *Apology*, 21a-23e, in *Plato: Symposium and the Death of Socrates*, trans. by Tom Griffith (London: Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, 1997), pp. 89-92.

Heidegger's emphasis is different. For him, it is not solely the case that the liberation from the cave is hard work, the fruits of which—if the experience is properly faced and embodied—endow one with an authority to which is worth listening. Instead, not everyone 'has the same *right* and the same *strength* for every truth'.¹⁷⁷ This suggests that Heidegger does not see the authority of the legislator in terms of sedulousness. Not all of us have the same 'right' and 'strength' to truth, and so there is a notion of privilege at play that informs the rights of the liberator. However, Heidegger does not provide us with adequate means of justify this privilege. Which is to say, *who* is liberated, and *on what grounds*? How do we conceive of the basis for their 'right' and 'strength'? There is also a second question to unravel, one which is perhaps more important for understanding the mechanism of Heidegger's concept of truth. What do the liberators *do*? What is their significance for Heidegger's concept of truth?

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger develops a concept of destiny (*Geschick*), in the context of a discussion of the relationship between authentic *Dasein* and the tradition into which it is thrown. Destiny is understood as the tradition of the community which guides the possibilities available for the community.¹⁷⁸ Through the process of being assailed by the mood of angst, and coming to grips with one's finitude, these possibilities can be seized upon and realised by authentic *Dasein*. Authentic *Dasein*, then, is confined to its fate (*Schicksal*). This means that authentic *Dasein* discovers itself in relation to its tradition, in turn providing that tradition the means to continue to realise itself.¹⁷⁹

Wolin jumps in here, problematizing the reliance of the community on authentic *Dasein*. He claims, the '*de facto* separation of human natures into authentic and inauthentic is radically undemocratic. [...] By celebrating the division between human types and their capacities, Heidegger in effect merely codified in ontological form a time-honored commonplace of German authoritarian political thought'.¹⁸⁰ I

¹⁷⁷My emphasis. *WWP*, p. 32.

¹⁷⁸*SZ*, pp. 507-509.

¹⁷⁹*Ibid.*, p. 510. There are nonetheless problems with this thesis, however. As Harries argues, '[o]nce we recognise that authenticity demands subordination of the individual to a common destiny, it becomes impossible to see the *Rektoratsrede* as diametrically opposed to *Being and Time*'. Karsten Harries, 'Heidegger as a Political Thinker', *The Review of Metaphysics*, 29, 4 (1976), 642-669 (p. 651). This raises the question of the significance of the people (*Volk*) in Heidegger's thinking, which I explore in greater detail in the following chapter. Harries point of qualification also reminds us that the developments in question here follow from the precedent set in *Being and Time*, a precedent Heidegger developed further to problematic ends in context of the 'course' and 'impetus' set into his work under the influence of Hitler.

¹⁸⁰Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, p. 56.

am not so sure this is applicable to the dominant thrust in *Being and Time*. In that text, one becomes authentic through being ‘assailed’ by the mood of angst, as long as one manages to successfully face the prospect of death that this mood acquiesces.¹⁸¹ Even then, one is not always authentic but is capable of discovering, in certain moments, the means to disclose new possibilities into the meaning of being.¹⁸² Although an important question remains regarding *who* becomes authentic (one would need to determine whether being ‘assailed’ by angst suggests a chance event, an event occasioned through hard work and dedication, or whether it is more applicable to privilege), as it stands, authenticity is, theoretically at least, available as a possibility to anyone and (in certain moments) can be realised by the person who has embraced their finitude. Accepting this, that Heidegger then argues that these *Dasein* gain an influence within society that implicitly, and perhaps sometimes explicitly, shape that society, does not in and of itself suggest a necessary totalitarianism. Nor, does it suggest a division in class or human nature, as Wolin argues. Instead, it is a descriptive thesis which claims that certain people in certain moments have the capacity to exert a greater influence on the shaping of society because they have found a means to embrace the ground of their existence in a manner that others have not—as *yet*—had the opportunity to do so.

However, the 1931/32 lecture course goes further than this. Now, he stresses that the leap to authentic *Dasein* is not ‘granted’ to every ‘arbitrary human being’.¹⁸³ ‘[E]very existence [*Existenz*]’, or so he tells us, ‘has its own law [*Gesetz*] and rank [*Rang*]’.¹⁸⁴ By framing authenticity this way, Heidegger begins to crystallize a divide

¹⁸¹The verb Heidegger uses to describe the experience of moods is ‘*überfallen*’, which translates as ‘attack’, ‘invade’, or ‘to pounce upon’. Stambaugh’s ‘assail’ is a good translation, but the sense that it is beyond our control, that it comes upon us, should be drawn attention to. *SZ*, p. 182. *BT*, p. 133. For the importance of angst in experiencing the prospect of death, see, *ibid.*, pp. 404-411. *BT*, pp. 292-297.

¹⁸²*SZ*, pp. 249-253, esp. p. 253. *BT*, p. 184. ‘Allein in der Angst liegt die Möglichkeit eines ausgezeichneten Erschließens, weil sie vereinzelt. Diese Vereinzelung holt das Dasein aus seinem Verfallen zurück und macht ihm Eigentlichkeit und Uneigentlichkeit als Möglichkeiten seines Seins offenbar. Diese Grundmöglichkeiten des Daseins, das je meines ist, zeigen sich in der Angst wie an ihnen selbst, unverstellt durch innerweltliches Seiendes, daran sich das Dasein zunächst und zumeist klammert’. ‘However, in anxiety there lies the possibility of a distinctive disclosure, since anxiety individualises. This individuality fetches Dasein back from its falling pretty and reveals to it authenticity and inauthenticity as possibilities of its being. The fundamental possibilities of Dasein, which are always my own, show themselves in anxiety as they are, undisguised, by innerworldly beings to which Dasein, initially and for the most part, clings’.

¹⁸³*WWP*, p. 238. ‘Aber dieser Einsatz des eigenen Wesens und die daraus entspringende Haltung sind gar nicht jedem beliebigen Menschen ohne weiteres beschieden und nicht jedem in gleicher Weise’. ‘But this risk of one’s own being, and the stance that arises therefrom, is not granted to every arbitrary human being, nor to all in the same way’. My translation.

¹⁸⁴*Ibid.* In the *Contributions*, he claims that ‘[i]t is always only a few who arrive at the leap [into *Dasein*]’. *BP*, p. 236. *CP*, p. 186.

between inauthentic and authentic *Dasein* that Wolin seems to prematurely ascribe to *Being and Time*. Because it is not available to any ‘arbitrary’ human being, he suggests that there is a basis for those that become authentic and those that do not. In other words, some people are destined for this greatness.

There are moments that resist this emphasis. For example, Heidegger claims that becoming authentic occurs through ‘great difficulty’ (*Mühe*) and ‘time’ (*Zeit*).¹⁸⁵ However, through the rubric of the ‘demigods’ (*Halbgötter*), Heidegger provides us with a clearer understanding of the providence of the elite in his 1934/35 lecture series on Hölderlin. He names these demigods the ‘overhumans’ (*Übermenschen*) and ‘undergods’ (*Untergötter*).¹⁸⁶ Echoing his claim that the *Führer* set the correct ‘course’ for his work, he tells us that the ‘one’, ‘true’, *Führer* ‘points’ into the realm of the demigods.¹⁸⁷ It is not likely that he means Hitler handpicks these elite. Instead, coupled with the emphasis on ‘time’, Heidegger is suggesting that it is in the historical moment when the *Führer* comes to power that the elite are awoken into action.¹⁸⁸ Alongside what was said in the previous chapter on the intersection between the problem of nihilism and the rise of the National Socialist Party, we see a sense that the rise of the National Socialist regime is an important moment within the history of being to which the German people must now grab onto with haste.¹⁸⁹ In the anxiety that this ‘moment’ creates,¹⁹⁰ Heidegger calls on a few individuals to guide the truth of being for the German people.¹⁹¹

But is this really a concern? Do I risk suggesting prematurely a connection between a descriptive philosophical thesis on the role of certain people in the establishment of the significance of things within the world, and a fascist order that demanded cohesion and unity of a people for a greater good that the state sought to realise? A greater good that we now know, with the gift of hindsight, to have been catastrophic. Regardless, something subtle in his thesis on truth seems to have shifted

¹⁸⁵ *WWP*, p. 238.

¹⁸⁶ *HH*, p. 166.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 210. ‘Der wahre und je einzige Führer weist in seinem Seyn allerdings in den Bereich der Halbgötter’.

¹⁸⁸ There is further precedent for this reading in the lecture series on Hölderlin. See Section 3.3 of this study. See also, *HH*, pp. 49-53.

¹⁸⁹ As Safranski writes, ‘[t]o Heidegger the National Socialist seizure of power was a revolution. It was far more than politics; it was a new act of the history of Being, the beginning of a new epoch. Hitler, to him, meant a new era’. Safranski, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 228.

¹⁹⁰ For a thorough discussion of the significance of the ‘moment’ (*Augenblick*) in Heidegger’s understanding of temporality, see, Ó Murchadha, *The Time of Revolution*, pp. 25-60. See also, Safranski, *Beyond Good and Evil*, pp. 226-228.

¹⁹¹ *HH*, pp. 51-53.

and there is now a suggestion that there is some basis that distinguishes the inauthentic and authentic. Heidegger does not seem to provide us with enough to analyze the significance of this sufficiently. So far, at least. In the next chapter, I take a case study to critically evaluate this further by examining the privilege Heidegger affords Hölderlin as the ‘destiny’ of Germany and the significance he sees in a dialogue between the poet, the philosopher, and the state-creator.¹⁹² For now, let us examine the significance of these elites for Heidegger’s understanding of the essence of truth, for this subtle shift in the essence of truth has some troubling consequences.

In the *Nietzsche* lecture series (1936), the overman (*Übermensch*), understood by Heidegger as the philosopher as artist, is the one who ‘grounds Being anew’.¹⁹³ He is distinguished from the ‘last man’, who has been determined by the history of Platonism.¹⁹⁴ As we saw at the start of the chapter, Heidegger thinks the history of the West is the history of Platonism, which is for him a history of nihilism. As a result, most of us are ‘last men’ for Heidegger because we are ‘thrown’ into a history of nihilism, and so we have lost all meaningful relation with what is essential. *Dasein* is the pre-condition for meaning, and nihilism its antithesis. When nihilism takes root, *Dasein*, or the disclosure of things to *Dasein* in a way that is rich in meaning, is slowly lost. Hence, we are ‘uprooted’ (*Entwurzelung*),¹⁹⁵ and so Heidegger believes that *Dasein* must be ‘grounded’ (*ge-gründet*).¹⁹⁶ We are no longer *Dasein apriori*, but it is that into which we must ‘leap’ (*Sprung*).¹⁹⁷ However, there is no ‘ready-made standpoint’ from which to do this.¹⁹⁸ Truth is disclosed through time and history. Therefore, it is the ‘few’ that ‘newly put the essence of truth up for decision’,¹⁹⁹ and so they provide the ‘revolution’ of the ‘whole human being’.²⁰⁰ As a result, the liberator is understood as the philosopher who, by illuminating ‘history and reality for the people’, will ‘bring *Dasein* into them’.²⁰¹

¹⁹²See section 3.2 and 3.3, below.

¹⁹³*NK*, p. 274. *NI*, p. 220. “‘Der Übermensch’ ist der Mensch, der das Sein neu gründet, in der Strenge des Wissens und der Härte des Schaffens.’

¹⁹⁴*NK*, pp. 258-259. *NI*, p. 208.

¹⁹⁵*BP*, pp. 116-117.

¹⁹⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 23-27 (esp. pp. 26-27).

¹⁹⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 68-69.

¹⁹⁸*BP*, p. 14. *CP*, p. 14. ‘Der Sprung in das Zwischen erspringt erst das Da-sein und besetzt nicht einen bereitstehenden Standplatz’ ‘The leap into the “between” is what first reaches and opens Da-sein and does not occupy a ready-made standpoint’.

¹⁹⁹*BP*, p. 11. *CP*, p. 11.

²⁰⁰*WWP*, p. 324.

²⁰¹*SW*, p. 185. *BaT*, p. 142.

This still does not to guarantee authenticity for the rest of us. For Heidegger, all humans are ‘thrown’ beings that ‘project’, and so to say that *Dasein* must be grounded is not to say that we are no longer *Dasein*. The term *Dasein* thus becomes reserved for the few, authentic *Daseins*. Hence, he now claims that sometimes the ‘trajectory of the throw of our thrownness opens itself up [...] as mission or mandate’.²⁰² With their mandate at hand they can withstand the ‘suffering’ (*Leiden*) of being, which in turn gives way to ‘passion’ (*Leiden-schaft*). As passionate, they are the only ones who can truly create.²⁰³

As the ones who can create, they are ‘without city and state’, ‘*apolis*’.²⁰⁴ This is because as creators they are above the establishment of the state, thought of in the Greek sense of the *polis*. They ground being, and so they create the pre-conditional fabric of meaningful intelligibility from which the *polis* arises. In this sense, Wolin argues that Heidegger’s elites are ‘self-justifying “laws unto themselves”’.²⁰⁵ Young counters that, because the ‘state’ is thought of in the sense of the Greek *polis*, this does not mean that they are ‘above the law’. Instead, the state is first established through a creative speaking.²⁰⁶ However, although Young is correct to stress the more ontological nuance that Heidegger establishes through a reflection on the Greek *polis*, this creative speaking into being of the state is nonetheless founded through the *voice* of the liberator, as he is the one who has escaped the cave and sighted the Ideas.²⁰⁷ This ‘voice’ is the ‘essence’ of a people,²⁰⁸ and so when the liberator returns to the cave it is only ‘he [who] can decide whether something is shadow or real thing’,²⁰⁹ and because Heidegger understands the Ideas as bound up with whoever catches sight of them, then the liberator distinguishes the shadows and the real things from the ‘standpoint of *his view* of essence’.²¹⁰ Therefore, when the legislator gains ‘a surer footing in the ground of human-historical *Dasein*’,²¹¹ this is not simply to understand oneself as the ‘there’ of being, as per *Being and Time*. Instead, the realisation of understanding oneself as this ‘there’ also means that one gains the capacity to exert

²⁰² *HH*, p. 175. *HHGR*, p. 160.

²⁰³ *HH*, pp. 175-176. *HHGR*, p. 160.

²⁰⁴ *EM*, pp. 161-162. *IM*, p. 170

²⁰⁵ Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, p. 126.

²⁰⁶ Young, *Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism*, p. 115.

²⁰⁷ *BP*, p. 319. *CP*, p. 252. ‘The *voice* [*Stimme*] of a people seldom speaks and speaks only in a few individuals’. His emphasis.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁹ *WWP*, p. 89. *ET*, p. 65

²¹⁰ *WWP*, p. 89. *ET*, p. 65

²¹¹ *WWP*, p. 81, *ET*, p. 60.

one's will on the unconcealment of beings because who I am—and it is only the liberator who is in this view an ‘I’ in any meaningful sense²¹²—determines what it is that he, and subsequently those in the cave, take to be. The significant difference here is that when one becomes the liberator, one is free to bind oneself to the Ideas, and so one’s task is not to free others to become liberators, but to establish the being of beings for the cave dwellers.

This invites an important clarification. Heidegger warns us that we cannot know who the elite are, and, in the *Nietzsche* lectures, he specifies that the elite are *not* the current, bourgeois elite of Germany.²¹³ Instead, his elites receive ‘no publicity’.²¹⁴ It is this misunderstanding that Young could be seen to correct, if we take them being ‘above the law’ in the sense that they can do whatever they wish within the state. Nonetheless, in the *Contributions to Philosophy* Heidegger advocates a necessary control of the masses, in order to provide an important stepping stone to establish the work of the liberated class:

Control [*Herrschaft*] over the free (that is, groundless and selfish) masses must be established and sustained with the shackles of “organization”. In this way can what is thereby “organized” grow back in its original ground, so that what is of the masses is not simply contained [*eindämmen*] but *transformed* [*verwandeln*] [...] Yet would that guarantee the transformation of the uprootedness [*Entwurzelung*] into a rootedness [*Verwurzelung*], and above all would the means necessary for such an action guarantee this transformation?

Still another control is needed here, one that is concealed and restrained and that for a long time will be sparse and quiet. Here, the future ones to come [*die Zukünftigen*] must be prepared, those who create in being itself new locations out of which a constancy in the strife of earth and world will eventuate again.

Both forms of rule-and-control [*Herrschaftsformen*], though fundamentally different, must be willed and *simultaneously* affirmed by those who know. Here at the same time is a truth in which the essence of being is surmised [*erahnt*]: in being there essentially occurs a fissure into the highest uniqueness and flattest commonality.²¹⁵

It is true that here there is talk of transformation rather than control. However, it is *first of all and necessarily* a control that leads to transformation. This control is

²¹²BP, pp. 319-321.

²¹³NK, pp. 145-146.

²¹⁴BP, pp. 400. CP, p. 317.

²¹⁵Trans. mod. BP, pp. 61-62. CP, pp. 49-50. ‘Die Herrschaft über die frei (d. i. bodenlos und eigensüchtig) gewordenen Massen muß mit den Fesseln der “Organisation” errichtet und gehalten werden. Kann auf diesem Wege das so “Organisierte” in seine ursprünglichen Gründe zurückwachsen, das Massenhafte nicht nur eindämmen, sondern verwandeln? [...] Aber verbürgt es und vor allem verbürgen die solchem Handeln gerade notwendigen Mittel auch die Verwandlung der Entwurzelung in eine Verwurzelung? Hier bedarf es einer anderen Herrschaft noch, einer verborgenen und verhaltenen, langhin vereinzelt und stillen. Hier müssen die Zukünftigen bereitet werden, die neue Standorte im Sein selbst schaffen, aus denen wieder eine Beständigkeit im Streit von Erde und Welt sich ereignet. Beide Herrschaftsformen - grundverschieden — müssen von den Wissenden gewollt und zugleich bejaht werden. Hier ist zugleich eine Wahrheit, in der das Wesen des Seyns erahnt wird: die im Seyn wesende Zerklüftung in die höchste Einzigkeit und die flachste Vergemeinerung’.

realised through organizational ‘shackles’. Heidegger knows that this is insufficient, and there is a sense in this passage that it is only this kind of control that Heidegger sees at work in Nazi Germany.²¹⁶ This control must nonetheless be willed ‘by those who know’ (*von den Wissenden gewollt*).²¹⁷ It must be willed alongside another kind of control, however. His elite, ‘the future ones to come’, fulfill this role, for as opposed to the societal control of the organisations, they control in the ontological sense of establishing the truth of what ‘is’ as described in his analysis of the fourth stage of the allegory of the cave.

To escape the cave is to become authentic, a process unavailable to any ‘arbitrary’ human being. In Heidegger’s view then, the masses never escape the cave. Instead, their *polis* (or cave) is established by those who are *apolis*. This is not to simply say that the elites are above the law and able to do whatever they wish. Instead, this is another way of saying that the precondition for all meaningful things (from which result all subsidiary things, such as what we conceive as right or wrong, just and unjust, etc., the basis from which we create law within the state) is established by these elites. The argument, however, effectively circumvents the need to awaken others into authenticity and instead demands the cohesion and subordination of the masses to the elite, legislative *Daseins*.²¹⁸ Heidegger thus believes that to create the necessary cohesion within the masses for the work of the elites to be a success, an authoritarian form of governance is necessary.

Kisiel attempts to obfuscate by claiming that the reliance of the ruler on the creative class implicitly resists the ‘totalitarian direction that National Socialism in fact took’.²¹⁹ If Kisiel means totalitarianism as ruling under a single ruler, then perhaps his position has credence. However, totalitarianism is equally the central control by an elite group, and so not necessarily that of one ruler. As the passage from the *Contribution* elucidates, Heidegger affirms *this* kind of totalitarianism, albeit one

²¹⁶See Section 3.3 of this study.

²¹⁷Hence, his own imploration to the student body that the *Führer* is the present and future law of Germany.

²¹⁸Hersey misses this. It is true that in *Being and Truth* Heidegger claims that the liberator does ‘seize this or that person whom he thinks he has recognised and lead him up the steep path’. However, Heidegger has in mind the freeing of the particular ‘future ones’, as he talks about in the passage from the *Contributions* (above). Hence, he frees the one he ‘has recognised’, and certainly not any ‘arbitrary individual’. *SW*, p. 183. *BaT*, p. 141. Hersey claims that the liberator frees through his commitment to ‘light and to being’. However, as the discussion here shows, this ‘light’ is always in the *light of* the legislator. John M. Hersey, ‘The Question of Ground and the Truth of Being: Heidegger’s WS 1931/2 Lecture Course *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet*’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Catholic University of America, 2008), pp. 181-185.

²¹⁹Kisiel, ‘Measuring the Greatness of the Great Men of Grand Politics’, p. 202.

that utilises an ‘ontic’ totalitarianism (or societal control) toward an ontological one where the basis for the essence of beings is designated by a few individuals. For Heidegger, this is necessary if the masses are not just to be controlled but transformed, and nihilism successfully countered. Heidegger thus no longer believes that we can await the experience of being assailed by the mood of angst. The masses cannot be trusted to face the reality of their finitude. The sentiment is still to free them, but it is to free them through their subordination to the will of a few individuals. In this light, Harries is on the mark when he wonders if Heidegger’s attempt to establish a *polis* for the German people must ‘tend toward totalitarianism’.²²⁰ It should be noted that even if his thesis of the importance of the elites lends itself toward totalitarianism, this does not tell us that he came to adhere and support the specific way in which the totalitarian state of Nazi Germany realised itself. In the next chapter, I examine evidence that shows that Heidegger became dissatisfied with the direction the state took. However, was this dissatisfaction enough for Heidegger to lose faith in his thesis on the importance of the subordination of the masses to authoritarian control? Not by the time he finished writing the *Contributions to Philosophy* in 1938, at least.

As his views on elitism remain prominent throughout this time, and open to misinterpretation, clarity of key terms is necessary. When I say Heidegger’s ‘elitism’, I point to his philosophical thesis that by grasping the essence of truth as an interpretive act between person and world, certain individuals establish and mold the meaning of things within their own view, which the collective implicitly take for granted. They are therefore responsible for establishing the background, implicit, meaningful fabric of intelligibility that sustains our capacity to take beings *as* what they are. In *Being and Truth* Heidegger tell us that ‘there is no truth in itself; rather, truth is *decision* and *fate* for human beings’.²²¹ But when he worries that this risks a collapse into subjectivism he asks ‘where can we find a human being who can definitively say what truth is?’, and his answer is clear.²²² As he goes on to tell us, truth is a ‘happening’,²²³ and this happening *happens* through the one who has

²²⁰Harries, ‘Heidegger as Political Thinker’, p. 669.

²²¹*SW*, p. 172. *BaT*, pp. 133-134. Trans. mod. As we will see, decision refers to the interpretive act of the legislative *Dasein* who responds to the fate and destiny of the nation as established by the poet. See Chapter 3, esp. 3.2.

²²²*SW*, p. 173. *BaT*, p. 134. Trans. mod.

²²³*SW*, p. 179. *BaT*, p. 138.

escaped the cave.²²⁴ It is the liberator, then, who tells us what is truth and what is not. His thesis on the elites thus affirms a kind of ontological totalitarianism, where it is them who establish the truth of things. This leads Heidegger to argue for an ontic authoritarianism also, by which he means that there is a necessity to limit the everyday freedom of individuals, in the form of organisational ‘shackles’, in order to allow for the important work of these few, elite, individuals. I do not use totalitarian for this latter political view as I feel that the description he provides us in the *Contributions* is insufficiently clear to charge him with holding an outright totalitarian political philosophy. His stress on the ‘shackles’ of an ‘organisation’ nonetheless tell us that suppression of the masses and increased control was a necessary if the totalitarian work of the philosophical elite could get underway. This development brings Heidegger’s philosophical thought and his support of the National Socialist movement into greater proximity.

There is important ambiguity to which we should draw attention. Responding to Wolin, Young claims that his reading of the legislator misunderstands the reticence with which Heidegger characterises them.²²⁵ Heidegger is very clear that the understanding of being is never simply subjectively conjured up by an individual, liberated or not. He is careful to say that freedom is not a freedom *from* the cave.²²⁶ Instead, freedom is freedom *for* the illuminating view (*Lichtblick*) of the Ideas.²²⁷ Hence, one must let ‘*being* give the lead’.²²⁸ For him, it is only once being (*Sein*) is given lead, that one is then freed to bind with the Ideas. But remember, freedom may be the ability to bond to the illuminating light of the Ideas,²²⁹ but this is always in the light of one’s understanding. Hence, this binding with the Idea is the ‘means to become free for what makes-free, to which I comport myself’.²³⁰ Freedom may be the capacity to see the Ideas,²³¹ but this requires the liberator to ‘allow, in advance, a light to come on’.²³² The liberator maintains the monopoly on the Ideas.

²²⁴*SW*, p. 179-185. *BaT*, p. 142.

²²⁵Young, *Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism*, pp. 119-121.

²²⁶*WWP*, p. 58.

²²⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.

²²⁸The full sentence, articulating the circular nature of this process that Heidegger tries to convey, goes ‘[t]o be deconcealing is the innermost accomplishment of liberation. It is *care* [*Sorge*] itself: becoming-free as binding oneself to the [I]deas, as letting *being* give the lead. [*dem Sein die Führung überlassen*]’ His emphasis. *WWP*, p. 73. *ET*, p. 54.

²²⁹*WWP*, p. 58. Gonzalez is therefore correct to claim that the ascent of the cave is really about obtaining greater degrees of freedom. Gonzalez, *Plato and Heidegger*, p. 109.

²³⁰*WWP*, p. 59. *ET*, p. 44.

²³¹*WWP*, p. 59. *ET*, p. 44: a ‘power’ by which I can ‘[bind] myself to what lets-through’.²³¹

²³²*WWP*, p. 60. *ET*, p. 45.

The implications of what Heidegger is saying is as follows. First, that freedom is a particular way of being which renders one capable of bringing being to beings. Therefore, it is only the liberator who is free in any meaningful sense. Heidegger explicitly characterises the interrelation between ‘light’ and ‘freedom’ as a ‘taking into one’s possession’ of the light of the Ideas through a binding with them.²³³ Secondly, as freed the liberator is tasked with a certain kind of responsibility, in the dual sense of responding *to* and being responsible *for*. When Heidegger talks about giving being the lead, he has in mind that being ‘makes a claim’ on man.²³⁴ *Dasein* is always already thrown into truth and so it is claimed by the world into which it is thrown. Put another way, *Dasein* never arises in a vacuum. The ‘freedom’ that Heidegger speaks of, then, emphasises that the liberator does not arbitrarily destroy the old world and build anew. Instead, freedom means to become the ‘there’ of being more properly, a-*propr*-ietly heralding the ‘echo’ (*hallen*) of this call of being through the beings around him to greater levels of penetration into the meaningful world we are immersed in.²³⁵

²³³ *WWP*, pp. 59-60.

²³⁴ *WWP*, p. 246. *ET*, p. 176.

²³⁵ My use of the term ‘a-*propr*-ietly’ draws from Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. The translation of ‘*Eigentlichkeit*’ as ‘authenticity’ is misleading. Heidegger does not use the German word ‘*Authentisch*’ because, as he clarifies in a passage in the *Contributions*, there is no ‘existentiell-moral’ significance to his understanding of *Eigentlichkeit*. As he claims, being *Dasein* ‘properly’ is not to be understood in a *moral-existentiell* sense but, rather, in terms of fundamental ontology as a character of *that* *Da-sein* which *endures* the “there” by sheltering the truth in some fashion or other (such as thoughtfully or poetically, or by building, leading, sacrificing, suffering, rejoicing)’. Trans. mod. His emphasis. *BP*, p. 302. *CP*, p. 238. By this, he means that being ‘*Uneigentlichkeit*’ (or, inauthentic) has nothing to do with, for example, pretending to like U2 to try to impress a beautiful woman, nor does it have anything to do with ‘doing the right thing’, etc. Instead, *Dasein* is the means by which the world shows up in some meaningful way to the human being, and an authentic *Dasein* preserves and discloses this truth of being (i.e., the way in which things show up) in a manner that inauthentic *Dasein* is unable. Instead, inauthentic *Dasein*, at best, sustains the truth of the world it is thrown into, and, at worst, is responsible for these truths being levelled down to less meaningful versions of themselves. As this thesis explores, in the 1930s Heidegger comes to see us all, besides from a few, elite, individuals, as inauthentic (*uneigentliches*) *Dasein*. Which is to say, we are still beings that sustain the meaningfulness of the world, and so we are still *Dasein*. But we are not *properly*, or authentically, *Dasein*. This is because Heidegger thinks that mankind is lost to the event of nihilism resulting in *Dasein* being unable to sufficiently sustain its being. If these few individuals are to be successful, i.e., through poetry (or ‘sacrificing, suffering, rejoicing, etc.) there is hope in the ap-propriative event (*Ereignis*) that will propel Western metaphysics into the ‘other beginning’. In this light, a suitable translating for *Eigentlichkeit* might be ‘proper’, avoiding the usual connotations of authenticity, which Heidegger wishes to avoid. This is a suggestion that is also made by David Farrell-Krell in his *The Purest of Bastards: Works of Mourning, Art, and Affirmation in the Thought of Jacques Derrida* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), p. 118. He suggests the English ‘proper’ and ‘inappropriate’ for *Eigentlichkeit* and *Uneigentlichkeit*, respectively. This translation would also mirror the etymological connection between ‘*Eigentlichkeit*’ and ‘*Ereignis*’, thus rendered in the English as ‘proper’ and ‘ap-*propr*-iation’, respectively. We then also avoid the unsuitable translation of *Ereignis* as ‘event’. On this, see, *ZS*, pp. 25-26: ‘Wir können das mit dem Namen “das Ereignis” Genannte nicht mehr am Leitfaden der geläufigen Wortbedeutung vorstellen; denn sie versteht “Ereignis” im Sinne von Vorkommnis und Geschehnis’, ‘we can no longer present this with

The emphasis on the reticent response to the call of being does seem in tension with his conviction that the gaze of the legislator always binds with the Ideas. Hence, scholars such as Richardson jump on this rhetorical shift to argue that Heidegger's thinking is moving from *Dasein* to *Sein*.²³⁶ On the contrary, as opposed to suggesting a being process I am subservient too, this rhetorical shift seems more likely to be characterising a disposition of thinking of the legislator, and as Heidegger makes clear in *Being and Time*, moods always arise from beyond the realm of cognitive disclosure.²³⁷ Reflecting this, Heidegger characterises the liberator as marked by a meditative mood of careful reticence as he must be responsive to the needs and demands of his historical situation. Thus:

The philosopher must remain solitary, because this is what he *is* according to his nature. His solitude is not to be *admired*. Isolation is nothing to be wished for as such. Just for this reason must the philosopher, always in decisive moments, *be there* [*da sein*] and not give way. He will not misunderstand solitude in external fashion, as withdrawal and letting things go their own way.²³⁸

Being and Truth clarifies that being solitary is necessary because of the liberator's privileged position within the world. He is solitary because there is no 'retreat' in the cave. He is constantly misunderstood, 'he [therefore] speaks with the

the name "the event" as we all know it in the manner of common word meanings; this understands "Ereignis" as an event and a happening'. My translation. See also, Sheehan's exploration of this in *Making Sense of Heidegger*, pp. 232-236, who emphasises the important connection between *Ereignis* and *Auge* in Heidegger's usage. See also, *DK*, p. 121: 'Ereignis ist eignende Eräugnis'. This is a difficult passage to faithfully translate, but we might approximate the meaning by translating: 'The appropriation is properly a bringing-into-view'. Regardless, the translation of 'authenticity' with 'properly' at the very least avoids a misunderstanding of his term *Eigentlichkeit* and keeps the English translation of Heidegger's *Ereignis* consistent with his related use of *Eigentlichkeit*. However, because 'proper' often reads awkwardly, which is an important consideration for every translation, I generally opt to translate this term with the less awkward, but more problematic, authentic. I follow this same logic with the translation of *Ereignis*, which I generally render as event. With this translation of *Ereignis* I follow Vallega-Neu and Rojcewicz, whose 'aim in translating was to capture in English the effect the original would have on a native speaker of German. Therefore, we did not attempt to resolve the grammatical peculiarities, nor have we imposed on Heidegger's terminology the extraordinary sense which the ordinary words do eventually assume'. *CP*, p. xv. There are problems with this approach, certainly, but I will leave it to the experts to explore new ways of disclosing Heidegger's specific meanings into the English language, and humbly hope that clarificatory footnotes is enough to draw the reader's attention to some of these meanings that Heidegger brings to these words.

²³⁶Richardson, *Through Phenomenology to Thought*, pp. 211-212. See also, Kockelmans, *On The Truth of Being*, p. 5. Cf., Habermas' critique of Heidegger relies on a similar understanding of this development as Richardson and Kockelmans. Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, trans. by Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987; repr. 1998), pp. 131-160 (esp. pp. 148-160).

²³⁷*SZ*, pp. 178-179.

²³⁸My emphasis on 'be there'. *WWP*, 86. *ET*, p. 63. 'Der Philosoph muß einsam bleiben, weil er es seinem Wesen nach *ist*. Seine Einsamkeit ist nicht zu *bereden*. Vereinzelung ist nichts, was zu wollen wäre. Gerade deshalb muß er immer wieder in entscheidenden Augenblicken *da sein* und nicht weich en. Er wird Einsamkeit nicht äußerlich mißverstehen als ein Sich-Zurückziehen und Gehen-lassen der Dinge'.

danger that what he says might suddenly turn into its opposite'.²³⁹ Hence, solitude is not 'withdrawal', but being *his* 'there' and 'not [giving] way'.²⁴⁰ The withdrawal and reticence, therefore, is not just because legislating truths require a careful and nuanced thinking. Instead, it is because there are only few who are capable of this kind of thinking. This clarifies the role of freeing others from their blind adherence to the many, and shows us the significance alteration Heidegger's interpretation makes to the allegory of the cave. When the liberator returns to the cave, he does not do so to debate with the cave dwellers. Instead, it is to seize one or two others that 'he has recognised'.²⁴¹ Which is to say, one of the other elite liberators, that, in turn, legislate the Ideas in their own light to the cave dwellers. Most of us remain without possibility of ever escaping our shackles.

Bringing together the significance of the legislator and his belonging to being in solitude, the 'overman' cannot be his own contemporary for he does not belong to himself. Instead, he belongs only to the 'becoming in being'.²⁴² This serves only to emphasise the absolute power that Heidegger gives the liberator, for it is only through him and his standpoint that truth is grounded. In fact, he first loses the many, then even himself, for he is herald only to the truth of being.²⁴³ Ó Murchadha claims that 'philosophy [in Heidegger's view] is not something other than the movement of history, but rather that very movement in its most accentuated form', but he fails to draw our attention to the fact that this is not any philosopher, or philosophy as such.²⁴⁴ Instead, it is only the liberator who is at one with this movement of history; the becoming in being. Here, we are provided with a philosophical basis to understand Heidegger's exchange with Jaspers, where Heidegger claimed that there is only need for 'two or three' professors of philosophy in Germany: '[w]hen Jaspers asked which ones, Heidegger remained meaningfully silent'.²⁴⁵

The problem of Heidegger's elitism is thus the following one. If the significance of the liberator was simply to liberate, then his or her task would be to

²³⁹*SW*, p. 183. *BaT*, p. 141.

²⁴⁰*WWP*, 86. *ET*, p. 63.

²⁴¹*SW*, p. 183. *BaT*, p. 141.

²⁴²*NK*, p. 274. 'Er zuerst muß aufhören, sein eigener Zeitgenosse zu sein, weil er am wenigsten sich selbst gehört, sondern dem Werden des Seins'.

²⁴³In the next chapter, I explore Heidegger's philosophical justification of this through his notion of thinking through decision. See Section 3.2. See also, Section 4. 3, for Heidegger clarification and expansion on this position through exploration of Nietzsche's concept of the will to power and eternal recurrence of the same.

²⁴⁴Ó Murchadha, *The Time of Revolution*, p. 120.

²⁴⁵Safranski, *Between Good and Evil*, p. 231.

free those within the cave to sight the Ideas through the discovery of the essence of truth, to pursue, *in their own manner*, the question of the meaning of being. For Heidegger, this would be a catastrophe. To do so would be to reduce the meaning of being to pure subjectivism and create an anarchic order where the Ideas are bound up with each liberated individual within the cave. If Heidegger was to maintain this, then the significant thrust of Plato's allegory, to understand the grounds of truth as something above and beyond the individual, would be entirely lost, and he would be forced to radically contradict his own position that truth is both dependant on *Dasein* but not a philosophical solipsism. Therefore, the liberator may drag some into the light, but even then it is a light that already 'fills and binds [the liberator's] own view'.²⁴⁶ As a result, for him the liberator must not liberate, but legislate, in order to enact the 'ultimate decision and law-giving',²⁴⁷ thus establishing the being of beings for those within the cave.

Heidegger affirms the Ideas as the 'primordially unhidden' (i.e., as the superlative),²⁴⁸ but they are so not because they are the 'truest' in some ahistorical sense, rather they become established as the measure of the highest truth *through* the liberator. If truth is not an 'arbitrary property of man but the ground of his existence',²⁴⁹ and if, as we saw, it is only *some* who have the capacity to enact this ground of their existence, then there is a monopoly on truth belonging entirely to certain, individual, people. For Heidegger, this is not only a prescriptive plea for the importance of the elite within society, although it is this also. Moreover, it is a descriptive thesis on the disclosure of truth and the importance of certain individuals in this disclosure. However, this descriptive thesis subsequently gives him cause to affirm an authoritarian order where the masses are saved from nihilism through the work of the totalitarian elite. In the process, the collective *Dasein* lose any sense of meaningful agency.²⁵⁰ We begin to see, then, the precedent in Heidegger's thought for support of a political order that demanded cohesion of the people, with no say in the direction that their society took.

²⁴⁶ *WWP*, p. 81. *ET*, p. 60.

²⁴⁷ *WWP*, p. 82. *ET*, p. 60.

²⁴⁸ *WWP*, p. 70.

²⁴⁹ *WWP*, p. 118. *ET*, p. 85.

²⁵⁰ Hence, Heidegger writes to his academic staff, as Nazi rector of Freiburg University, that the 'individual, whatever his place, counts for nothing. The destiny of our nation within the state counts for everything'. Safranski, *Beyond Good and Evil*, pp. 270-271. What Heidegger fails to inform his staff here, however, is that the individual does nonetheless have a *crucial* place in the realisation of this collective destiny. Albeit only a few, particular, individuals. Indeed, as far as the masses should be concerned, it is *their* individuality that 'counts for nothing'.

2.6 Introduction of the Significance of Art

Heidegger has claimed that the Ideas rely on the gaze of the liberator to be what they are. As we have seen, it is the liberator, as legislator, who decides the ‘objectivity of objects’,²⁵¹ and shapes the meaningful world for the people. However, Heidegger still wants to save the liberator from being conceived as a pure, wilful, subject. We have seen him introduce this sense of freedom and responsibility as a responding *to* being, giving being the ‘lead’. However, if the Ideas are not anything until they are discovered by the liberator, then is there a means by which we can conceive of this response *to* being? Which is to say, to what is the disposition of ‘restraint’ or ‘reticence’ meant to allow one respond? The demands of one’s historical moment, for sure. But the introduction of the notion of art provides something more here. The significance of art is understood in relation to nature, introducing a further development to this notion also. To establish this, Heidegger discusses what he calls the ‘pre-modelling projection of being [*Seinsentwurf*] [that] first allows us to come closer to beings’.²⁵²

To clarify what this means, Heidegger draws our attention to two different versions of the pre-modelling projection: science, and art. He points out that the modern sciences do not, as is commonly assumed, take their departure and make their discoveries through experimentation. Of course, in some sense they do. But Heidegger argues that this is merely a consequence of an initial decision that was made regarding what ‘nature’ is: ‘a spatio-temporally determined totality of movement of masspoints’.²⁵³ From this primary experience of nature, modern science developed the scientific method and so the discoveries it makes through the works of Galileo, Kepler, Newton, et. all, were available for discovery.²⁵⁴ Likewise, and before the time of the sciences, reality is discovered (or, perhaps dis-covered emphasises here its initial concealment) through the projective and grounding power of art or,

²⁵¹ *WWP*, p. 210. *ET*, p. 151. Heidegger does not use the phrase ‘objectivity of objects’ (*Objektivität der Objekte*) explicitly in connection with the liberators, however that he has them in mind is evident when he claims that ‘It is only the groundstance [*Grundverhältnis*] and force of the Dasein of man that can decide [this] meaning’. This draws from his discussion, earlier, where it is through the ‘positionedness’ of the legislator through their ‘stance’ (*Haltung*) that truth is empowered. *Ibid.*, pp. 114-115.

²⁵² *WWP*, pp. 61. *ET*, p. 45.

²⁵³ *WWP*, p. 61. *ET*, p. 46.

²⁵⁴ *WWP*, p. 61.

more specifically, through ‘great poetry and its projections’.²⁵⁵ That is to say, the poetry of Homer, Dante, and Goethe, provide a people with a basic sense of what it means to be, by projecting a meaningful space in which interpretations of what *is* (the Ideas) can occur.²⁵⁶

Heidegger feels very differently toward these two grounding enterprises. In his view, the modern sciences do precisely the opposite of what the liberation from the cave is supposed to achieve, namely to make beings more beingful. On the contrary, through the sciences ‘the relationship to beings is crushed, the instinct for the essence of nature driven out, and the instinct for the essence of man suffocated’.²⁵⁷ The modern sciences ‘de-‘natures’ nature’.²⁵⁸ We see here the crucial notion of nature re-enter the picture, and our relationship to it has an intrinsic connection with the onset of nihilism. Poetry, on the other hand, ‘makes beings more beingful’.²⁵⁹

The *Black Notebooks* contain an array of early entries which reflect the importance poetry comes to take in his wider philosophical project. Written at the time of this lecture series, these passages document what seems to be a moment of rich inspiration for this development, marking, with an enthusiastic tone, the beginnings of the fundamental role that art takes in his reflections on the essence of truth:

30

The philosophy to come must be an *exhortation* [*Zuspruch*]—exhortation to the being of the “there.”

31

The great difficult of the new beginning: to let the voice [*Stimme*] exhort and to awaken attunement [*Stimmung*]; but at the same time for the creators [*Schaffende*]—to

²⁵⁵ *WWP*, pp. 63-64. *ET*, p. 47.

²⁵⁶ *WWP*, p. 64. One can thus again identify two senses of concealment operative here. The most fundamental sense of concealment remains the implicit and unarticulated awareness of oneself as the ‘there’ of being which Heidegger now believes to be provided orientation from a sense one has of ‘nature’, as established by either the poets or the science, and conceivably—although not identified by Heidegger here—other grounding enterprises such as philosophy, artworks in general, or technological developments. This more fundamental concealment allows us then reveal beings in a new way, providing the means to reveal the being in a manner in which it was concealed in a different historical time. Given the central place Hölderlin has in Heidegger’s writings, he is notably absent from the list of poets Heidegger mentions. Perhaps, this is because for Heidegger the truth of Hölderlin’s poetry is one that will come in the future, and this list refers to the past. See, *HH*, p. 1.

²⁵⁷ *WWP*, p. 62. *ET*, p. 46. Heidegger does not at this point qualify this statement. See, however, *SW*, p. 162. *BaT*, pp. 126-127, where Heidegger talks about ‘technology’ (as well as science) as blocking our relationship with nature.

²⁵⁸ *HH*, p. 76.

²⁵⁹ *WWP*, p. 64. *ET*, p. 47. Given that the ‘occurrence’ of *aletheia* as expressed in the allegory of the cave is to make beings ‘more’ beingful, the connection with art is especially significant.

think all this in advance with clarity and to bring it into a creating concept [*schaffender Begriff*].

The exhortation exhorts humanity to its higher affiliation and deeper rootedness [*Verwurzelung*].

32

This exhortation—of philosophy—is the *poetry of being* [*Dichtung des Seins*]. The poetry of being earlier than beings (for us) and yet only in order to propound beings as older. The eruption [*Ausbruch*] of being in the packings of its poetry. “Poets”—They poetize “only” beings in each case! And yet in that way also *being!*

33

Or must not philosophy a fortiori poetize beings? Yes, and even beings *as such*—as a whole.

34

Which poetizing? If yet no creating—poetizing for Da-sein—only there does *being* in general occur. Being becomes poem; therefore finite! Not the converse—to poetize beings and *thus* first empower them; i.e., to make Dasein at the same time mature for power and in the service of power!

35

The poetizing exhortation leads before something cor-responding [*Ent-sprechendes*]—what cor-responds to the poetized—this “responding” manifests itself thus for the first time.²⁶⁰

This entry is written in a moment of creative inspiration, and Heidegger will not develop these ideas in any systematic way until the 1934/35 lecture series on Hölderlin. Regardless, these passages evidence the central role that art, and especially poetry, takes in his understanding of being and truth. Remaining only suggestive at this stage, the following is a hint at the direction in which his thinking is taking.

Entry 30 and 31 both focus on the role of philosophy in the future. For Heidegger, philosophy is to think through the ‘creating concept’, and in doing so ‘exhort’ *Dasein*. The call to exhortation draws on the existentialist emphasises in Heidegger’s thought. The German word ‘*Zusprach*’ (here translated as exhortation) literally breaks down as ‘to-saying’, i.e., philosophy must speak directly to *Dasein*, in the process ‘rooting’ it. Entry 32 onward informs us of what it is that philosophy to think (‘in advance’), i.e., the ‘poetry of being’. He seems to think of the irruption of beings into existence as a kind of poetic sovereignty; a path laid down by the poets of previous times. In *Being and Truth*, Heidegger claims that the difference between the sciences and the artists is in that art does not ‘picture’ reality like the sciences attempt

²⁶⁰Trans. mod. His emphasis. *UII-VI*, pp. 14-15. *PII-VI*, p. 12.

to, i.e., by ‘reaching ahead into actuality’,²⁶¹ framing in advance what nature is, but instead ‘the innermost sense of all artistic formation is to reveal the *possible*, that is, the *free, creative projection*, of what is *possible for the Being of humanity*’.²⁶² It seems that for him the arts possess a power that addresses the existential awakening of truth within the human being. Indeed, the suggestion is even richer—being only ‘occurs’ through a poetizing for *Dasein*. This trajectory means a dialogue between poetry and philosophy becomes immanent in his thought: ‘[p]hilosophy merely the retuned reverberation of great poetry. Re-tuning into the concept—i.e., retuning of being’.²⁶³ Philosophy does not ‘[reach] ahead into actuality’ like the sciences, but instead prepares the place for the coming-to-be of what has been made possible for the essence of the human being by the great artists and poets of our historical tradition.²⁶⁴ Here, Heidegger introduces a central connection between poetry and rootedness (here, as ‘*Verwurzelung*’, later ‘*Bodenständigkeit*’). For Heidegger, it is great poetry and the art that lay the foundation for this more primordial proximity, to make beings ‘more’ beingful through some kind of ‘rooting’.

But to what are we ‘rooted’? Heidegger claims that the ‘more primordial the binding, the greater proximity to beings’.²⁶⁵ We have already seen that the sense here is on the existentialist transformation of beings, on the grounds of the liberators capacity to legislate. For Heidegger, this recreates the being, as the being of beings is housed within the understanding of *Dasein*. Yet, there is something more to this. Now, the term nature in Heidegger’s thought takes a striking primacy. Heidegger says that the modern sciences ‘block’ our relationship with nature.²⁶⁶ Poetry, on the other hand, discovers nature.²⁶⁷ Nature is now referred to as the ‘supreme’ or ‘overarching power’ (*Übermacht*), ‘concealed’ (*Verschlossenheit*) but primordially related to the human being through fundamental attunement.²⁶⁸ Heidegger now suggests that it is through the arts that we connect to this sense of nature. Through an investigation into

²⁶¹His emphasis. *SW*, p. 162. *BaT*, p. 126.

²⁶²His emphasis. *SW*, p. 164. *BaT*, p. 127.

²⁶³His emphasis. *UII-VI*, p. 22. *UII-VI*, p. 18. Note the connotations of sound and music with which Heidegger expresses this. Playing also, off of his manipulation of the German word ‘*stimmt*’, such as *Stimmung* (attunement) or *be-stimmt* (determined).

²⁶⁴See also, *BP*, p. 19. *CP*, p. 17. ‘The poet [...] veils the truth in images and presents it that way to the gaze for preservation’.

²⁶⁵*WWP*, p. 60. ET, p. 45.

²⁶⁶*SW*, p. 162. *BaT*, pp. 126-127.

²⁶⁷*WWP*, pp. 61-64.

²⁶⁸*Ibid.*, p. 237.

untruth, he develops what he means by this sense of nature, and in what way man is rooted in it, thus allowing for this greater primordial binding to beings.

2.7 Transition: From Truth to Untruth

Heidegger interprets *aletheia* to mean a manifestation of a being to an understanding of being, and so not a proposition about a being. Although Plato may go wrong in his analysis, by equating truth with the appearance of what *is* Heidegger believes that the allegory of the cave explores this original experience of truth. However, he adds his own twist to this, where only certain individuals grasp this essence of truth. Understanding truth to be a historically contingent process of revealing the nature of things through creative interpretation, they are freed from taking the shadows as the beings themselves and can bind themselves to the Ideas, thereby legislating the meaning of beings in their own view to the people. Truth is therefore a ‘fundamental occurrence’ in man and accordingly, Heidegger takes the allegory to be primarily about deconcealment (*Entbergung*) where (certain) *Daseins* have the capacity to make sense of things and find a use for them.

To set up the topic for the second half of the lecture course, he points out that, in the question of unhiddenness, we ‘must run up against’ hiddenness?’²⁶⁹ For example, false gold *is* false gold because it *conceals* what it is presenting itself to be.²⁷⁰ In this sense, false gold is *manifest* (or unhidden) *as* what it is *not*. This recalls the relationship between phenomena and semblance. In *Being and Time*, semblance was connected with manifestation but considered to be derivative of it.²⁷¹ His exploration of hiddenness in this lecture series reconsiders this analysis.

His focus for his study of untruth is on the Greek word ‘*doxa*’, which means ‘look’, but has the ambiguous significance of both a ‘view’ and ‘opinion’.²⁷² For Heidegger, Plato does not explore the proper significance of *doxa* and the experience of truth that he wishes to remind us of is already disappearing in Plato’s work. Plato thus investigates *doxa* in the *Theaetetus* by pursuing an understanding of the ‘*pseudo doxa*’, or the *distorted* view. Heidegger still feels that there is room for manoeuvre in this investigation. Plato may miss its proper significance, but Heidegger claims that if

²⁶⁹ *WWP*, p. 124. *ET*, p. 89.

²⁷⁰ *WWP*, p. 118.

²⁷¹ *SZ*, p. 39. *BT*, p. 27.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 251-257.

aletheia is the appearing that reveals then the *pseudo doxa* is an appearing that conceals.²⁷³ Either way, they both tell us something important about the essence of truth as an appearing phenomenon. A reflection on the *Theaetetus* provides an important clue. The proper counter-concept to *a-letheia* is not simply *letheia*—a word which did not exist in Ancient Greece—but *pseudo*.²⁷⁴ With this, the question of the essence of truth changes to the question of the essence of untruth,²⁷⁵ the ‘more primordial’ direction to the question of truth.²⁷⁶

2.7.1 Detour Through Sense Experience

The *Theaetetus* is a dialogue that reflects on the nature of ‘*episteme*’ or knowledge (*Wissen*).²⁷⁷ Concurrent with his view on the original experience of *aletheia*, Heidegger believes knowledge to be understood by the Greeks as a kind of ‘domineering-self-knowledge-in-something’ (*beherrschende Sich-auskennen in etwas*).²⁷⁸ This reading maintains the unity between the knower and the known that Heidegger has endeavored to draw out in the previous discussion of truth,²⁷⁹ and his use of ‘*beherrschen*’ (meaning to rule, command, or dominate) emphasises the significance he sees in the liberator. With the unity between knower and known established, it is no surprise to Heidegger when the first answer to the question of the nature of knowledge in the *Theaetetus* is that it is a kind of sense perception, an answer ultimately found to be lacking.²⁸⁰ This pushes Heidegger into an analysis of

²⁷³This inspires Heidegger to reflect on the nature of a pseudonym, which is not a false, or incorrect, name, but a distortion, i.e., a name that conceals the name of the actual author that lies behind it. *Ibid.*, pp. 134-135.

²⁷⁴Heidegger stresses this as a counter concept because, as he points out, one would expect that if his thesis was correct than the counter concept to ‘*a-letheia*’ would be a word that did not exist, namely ‘*letheia*’. He saves himself from this criticism by pointing out that the Ancient Greek’s had an array of words that suggest this connection, such as ‘*lêthē*’, forgetfulness, or ‘*lanthanō*’, to escape notice, or be hidden. *WWP*, pp. 138-139.

²⁷⁵In *Being and Truth* Heidegger calls the essence of truth the ‘struggle’ (*Kampf*) with untruth, ‘where untruth is posited with the enabling of the essence of truth’. Emphasis removed. *SW*, p. 363. *BaT*, p. 200.

²⁷⁶*WWP*, p. 147. *ET*, p. 106.

²⁷⁷*WWP*, p. 150. *ET*, p. 110.

²⁷⁸*WWP*, p. 153. *ET*, p. 112. Sadler has ‘commanding knowing-one’s-way-around in something’, which softens the significance between truth and legislative *Dasein* that Heidegger has made in the previous discussion. See also, *ibid.*, pp. 121-122. Cf. Wrathall, ‘Heidegger on Plato, Truth and Unconcealment’, p. 457.

²⁷⁹See also, *SW*, p. 243.

²⁸⁰Heidegger thinks this perception in the transcendental sense, as the ‘per-ception (*Wahrnehmen*) in which perceivedness occurs’. His emphasis. *WWP*, p. 164. *ET*, p. 120. Heidegger explicitly connects this with Kant. In German ‘*nehmen*’ means to take, this thus maintains the sense of a taking-up-of-the-thing by the one who perceives. Perception, then, is not just a blind seeing, but an interpreting and

the significance of sense perception, *'aisthánomai'*. As we saw earlier, Heidegger subordinates sense perception to the 'as' structure, which first makes sense of the thing perceived.²⁸¹ Similarly, in a lecture course on Hegel in 1930, he points out that sense perception is the immediate perceiving of the thing, requiring language (naming the thing) to *mediate* it into something knowable.²⁸² This makes him note that the object of perception is really two, where only one—the 'object-for-us'—can be said to be in truth.²⁸³ His emphasis here still leaves room to see that the second part of this object, the 'object-for-it', is important.²⁸⁴ However, as we saw in the previous chapter, Heidegger's phenomenological and hermeneutical commitments leave him stuck in a sort of 'correlate loop' between human and world, where the significance of things that exceed their disclosure to *Dasein* remains acknowledged but unavailable to thought.²⁸⁵ Through reflection on the significance of sense perception he returns to this problem, and he begins to break free of the limitations of the transcendental reduction.

As Heidegger interprets it, Plato believes sense perception to converge into a unity located in the 'soul'.²⁸⁶ This is the '*single* sighted nature' in which the perception of the various aspects of things 'converge'.²⁸⁷ There is thus a different

understanding of the thing perceived. Although Heidegger believes the Greek understanding maintains this sense, it is still nonetheless sense perception that is at issue in Theaetetus' first answer to the question of the essence of knowledge, even if this sense perception is understood in a way that connects it fundamentally with the perceiver.

²⁸¹*SZ*, pp. 190-197. As we explored in the previous chapter, this is in virtue of Heidegger's commitments to transcendental philosophy, as a means of escaping the 'natural attitude'.

²⁸²*HP*, pp. 63-69.

²⁸³*Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

²⁸⁴*HP*, pp. 48-49.

²⁸⁵In *After Finitude* Meillassoux recognises this problem, and argues that philosophy after Kant—with the distinction between the 'noumenal' and 'phenomenal' world—is forced to maintain some version of this correlative circle. On Heidegger's position specifically, he claims it is an instance of 'strong correlationism', where it is 'unthinkable that the unthinkable be impossible'. Emphasis removed. By this, he means that what lies beyond the correlation between man and world, the 'unthinkable', is both assumed but deemed impossible to address. According to Meillassoux, this is the implication of the concept of facticity. Quentin Meillassoux, *After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency*, (London: Continuum, 2011), pp. 40-42. Although I agree that this adequately encapsulates Heidegger's position in *Being and Time*—see Section 1.2, above, where I address this tension, although without specific reference to Meillassoux or his concept of the 'correlationism'—as the thesis progresses I show that Heidegger makes some headway in dealing with the inadequacy of this account. However, a discussion of the potential contribution that this development in Heidegger's thought could make to Meillassoux's 'speculative realism' is beyond the scope of this project.

²⁸⁶*WWP*, pp. 171-173. The argument for the 'unity' of the 'soul' runs something like, if the thing was only perceived in sense perception then the thing would be located 'in' parts of the body, and then dispersed throughout the body. That is, we would see the thing 'in' our eyes, and then hear it 'in' our ears. The phenomenological reality, however, is that the thing is perceived as *one* thing. *WWP*, p. 171. The child crying on the bus, for example, is *one* thing, even if in some sense I am seeing the child with my eyes and hearing the crying with my ears.

²⁸⁷His emphasis. *WWP*, pp. 171-178.

kind of perception, ‘*dianoéomai*’ or the perception of the soul, that he first focusses on.²⁸⁸ He clarifies that it is in the soul that the Idea is sighted.²⁸⁹ The soul is the ‘passage-way’ through which sense perception must go,²⁹⁰ ‘what holds up this *one* region of perceivability, as one with this region itself [...] the region-opening and holding-open relationship to the perceivable’.²⁹¹ Like the metaphorical image of what lies ‘beyond’ the cave, Heidegger understands Plato’s concept of the soul to be pointing to the transcendent grounds for the emergence of reality, i.e., the essential part of who we are that frees thing to be meaningful ‘as’ something.²⁹² This maintains his position in *Being and Time* and *What is Metaphysics?* that it is in virtue of the transcendence of *Dasein*, as being-held-out-into-nothing, that something like nature or corporeality can be encountered. Without it, this corporeality could not be experienced meaningfully, and all that would remain would be the absurdity that Heidegger takes things to be beyond their disclosure through *Dasein*.²⁹³ However, Heidegger now stresses that the body, and corporeality as such, is in some sort of significant relationship with this ‘perceiving’; ‘a relationship within which the historical human being *is*’.²⁹⁴ The emphasis on corporeality begins to make room in his analysis for the retrieval of the significance of the materiality of things beyond their disclosure to the understanding of *Dasein*.

Heidegger follows this path toward an analysis of sense perception, where a particular problem that Plato explores in the *Theaetetus* provides inspiration. The problem is as follows: Theaetetus is ‘snub-nosed’ and ‘goggle-eyed’, much like Socrates. If one was to approach Theaetetus in the distance, they might easily mistake him for Socrates. When doing so, they take something to be known, namely, before them in the distance is Socrates. Yet, on closer examination, it turns out to be

²⁸⁸‘*Dianoéomai*’ is usually translated as to think, but in distinction from the usual ‘*noesis*’. Containing the preposition ‘*dia*’ meaning ‘through’, this is generally taken to be representative of the sequential thinking in human thought, and thus for Plato it tends to mean something like discursive thinking. Heidegger discusses none of this here, instead just providing his translation as the perception of the soul. That beings are freed *through* (*dia*) *Dasein*, however, could have been Heidegger source of inspiration for reading this as the perception of the soul.

²⁸⁹*WWP*, p. 173.

²⁹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 176.

²⁹¹*WWP*, p. 175. *ET*, p. 127.

²⁹²As such, the soul should not be thought of as something that is ‘breathed into’ a body. *WWP*, p. 177. Instead, as that which ‘holds up this *one* region of perceivability, as one with this region itself’, Heidegger’s understanding of Plato’s concept of the soul bares a stark similarity with his understanding of *Dasein*. *WWP*, p. 174. *ET*, p. 128.

²⁹³*WWP*, pp. 194-196.

²⁹⁴His emphasis. *WWP*, p. 178. *ET*, p. 129.

Theaetetus.²⁹⁵ What, then, is known, when the observer takes what is known to be otherwise than what it turns out to be? Which is to say, what is the ‘thing’ that is *not* what it is disclosed *as* by the soul. By taking this path toward the significance of the *pseudo doxa* (or, distorted view), Heidegger retrieves the problem of untruth and concealment. Through this confrontation he hopes to be freed to pursue deeper his pursuit of the question of the essence of truth.

2.7.2 Clarification of the *Pseudo Doxa*

As Heidegger presents it, in the *Theaetetus* Plato tries to understand the essence of knowledge as a ‘view’ (*doxa*) of something, but by way of clarifying in what way a distorted (*pseudo*) view can occur.²⁹⁶ *Doxa* means ‘view’ (*Ansicht*), but this view has the sense of either an ‘opinion’ (*Meinung*) or the ‘look’ (*Anblick*) of something.²⁹⁷ Heidegger is re-approaching the problem of conceiving of truth as appearance and manifestation. As both ‘opinion’ and a ‘look’, *doxa* obtains its meaning from the way I understand something *and* from the ‘object’ I am trying to understand.²⁹⁸ This ‘view’, however, can be distorted. A reflection on *doxa* thus suggests that semblance (*Schein*) be conceived as an intrinsic part of the essence of the appearance of phenomena, as opposed the derivation of truth as per his analysis in *Being and Time*.²⁹⁹ Heidegger finds the suggestion compelling.

The *pseudo doxa* occurs when I see someone in the distance and I take them to be Socrates, but it turns out to be Theaetetus. Somehow what I thought I saw I did not see, and yet I saw it all the same. Although the relation between *doxa* and *pseudo* is evocative, Heidegger believes that the inclusion of ‘*pseudo*’ already runs the risk of wavering in the region of correctness and incorrectness.³⁰⁰ For him, the two meanings of *doxa* have themselves ‘two faces’. The first ‘face’ is a look that can present itself as what it is *or* as what it is not.³⁰¹ The example of false gold exhibits this, where what is not gold shows up *as* gold, or what *is* gold is taken as *not* gold. The second ‘face’ is that the view of what is revealed can be correct *or* incorrect,³⁰² which is to

²⁹⁵ *WWP*, pp. 265-266. *ET*, p. 189.

²⁹⁶ *WWP*, p. 258. *ET*, p. 184.

²⁹⁷ *WWP*, pp. 251-261.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

²⁹⁹ *SZ*, p. 39. *BT*, p. 27.

³⁰⁰ *WWP*, pp. 258-259.

³⁰¹ *WWP*, p. 258.

³⁰² *Ibid.*

say, if I am lucky the jeweller will take the false gold I am trying to sell him to be true gold. Heidegger's plan is to follow Plato's investigation of *doxa* as *pseudo* in order that that we might stumble onto the 'authentic rootedness [*Verwurzelung*] of the problem of untruth (distortion)',³⁰³ which for Heidegger wavers somewhere in the region of the first face. This still does not quite get to the root. For Heidegger, *doxa* is the 'ambiguous' (*Zweideutigkeit*) 'view' of the thing, that can only then, and subsequently, be taken as *this* or *that*.³⁰⁴ To properly get to this experience however, we must follow Heidegger in his interpretation of Plato's discussion.

Heidegger argues that there are three paths Plato takes in the dialogue of understanding the nature of a distorted view, the first two of which turn out to be inadequate, but that nonetheless say something significant. The final one satisfies Plato, but Heidegger finds it to be inadequate. For sake of brevity, I only briefly touch on these, leaving a more thorough discussion for Heidegger's own subsequent discussion of *doxa*.

The first inadequate solution given is that the *pseudo doxa* is a knowing that at the same time is a not knowing. That is, I know in the sense of viewing a being before me, a being I take to be Socrates, but it is actually Theaetetus. Therefore, what I thought I knew to be Socrates I actually did not know. One and the same thing, however, cannot be both known and not known.³⁰⁵ Likewise, the second solution, where the *pseudo doxa* is located somewhere between 'being' and 'non-being', fails to sufficiently get to the matter. Here, the idea is that *pseudo* occurs through a kind of directedness toward a *doxa* that is actually nothing, i.e., because I see Socrates, but it is actually Theaetetus, my view is a view of nothing.³⁰⁶ Yet, how can one have a view of nothing? The 'view', although not correct, was still a view of Theaetetus, and therefore not of nothing.³⁰⁷ Although Heidegger likes that 'nothing' has come into question, he claims that in Ancient Greek thought there is no distinction between non-existence and nothing.³⁰⁸ Regardless, the painstaking trouble Plato takes to explore the significance of nothing displays for Heidegger that there is an interesting recognition occurring in the *Theaetetus* of something 'between' knowing and not knowing, or being and being-nothing. That is, that the 'non-existing and the nothing

³⁰³His emphasis. *WWP*, p. 261. *ET*, p. 186.

³⁰⁴*WWP*, pp. 254-255. See also, pp. 310-311.

³⁰⁵*WWP*, pp. 265-271.

³⁰⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 271-277.

³⁰⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 272-273.

³⁰⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 272-274.

[...] are *not* the same, is, until Plato, not at all self-evident'.³⁰⁹ However, this analysis (rather, Heidegger's analysis of the significance of the nothing) is unavailable to Plato, and so both of his solutions fail to bring the significance of the distorted view into focus. These two attempts may make some headway into the matter, but they are both inadequate.

Plato solves this by considering the *pseudo doxa* as a substitution instead of a confusion. That is, both Theaetetus and Socrates are intended in the distorted view, but one simply substitutes Theaetetus (who it really is) for Socrates (who it is not).³¹⁰ The view thus relates to both beings but distorts itself in substituting something other than what the being is. As such, the nature of *pseudo* is 'that which is intended is missed'.³¹¹ Although Heidegger thinks something profound is occurring in this reflection, it is precisely at this moment that he thinks that Plato goes wrong. For him, Plato considers the *pseudo doxa* as a false view, where the moment of distortion is interpreted as a mistake on behalf of the observer. That is, Plato thinks of this mistaking as an incorrect assertion of the observing subject, and so the *pseudo* loses its sense of a 'distortion' and instead becomes the 'incorrect'. Because of this, Heidegger again charges Plato with setting up the grounds for the divisions of subject and object, strengthening the loss of truth as unconcealment.³¹² Nonetheless, Plato sees the essence of the *pseudo doxa* as being a case where 'one is posited *instead* of the other'.³¹³ Although Plato wrongly interprets this 'interchanging' as a kind of

³⁰⁹Ibid., p. 274. This claim shows again the ambiguity between praise and condemnation of Plato.

³¹⁰WWP, pp. 278-283. ET, p. 198-201.

³¹¹His emphasis. WWP, p. 278. ET, p. 198.

³¹²WWP, p. 317.

³¹³His emphasis. WWP, pp. 282-283. ET, p. 201. It is this sort of philosophical move—where Plato is understood to recognise something profound, and yet misunderstand the significance of this recognition—that motivates Heidegger to use the *Theaetetus* as both a source of witness to the onset of the divide between subject and object *as well as* opening up the possibility for a refined grasp of untruth. Wrathall simplifies when he frames the primary concern of Heidegger's argument as being a critique of cognitive orientated philosophical models in favour of what is more properly involved in being-in-the-world. This is because Wrathall believes that Heidegger prime disagreement with Plato is him 'basing his argument on an assumption about the primacy of ideas and cognition over other practices or kinds of familiarity with the world'. Wrathall, 'Heidegger on Plato, Truth and Unconcealment', p. 453. There is truth to this. Heidegger's hermeneutical-phenomenological focus certainly does emphasise the 'inadequacies of cognitive orientated philosophical models', but this is a subsidiary part of his investigation and is more apt to describing an aspect of the first part of this lecture course, in his interpretation of the Ideas. Heidegger takes this critique and applies it to the attempt to awaken an experience of truth within the German people that will disclose a greater, existential, lived truth for their lives. It is *this* concern that draws Heidegger's attention to untruth, for which the interpretation of the cave was only a preparatory analysis. Cf., *ibid.*, p. 455. For Heidegger, this greater truth can only occur through an authentic 'rootedness' in one's 'soil', as I discuss further below. This crucial dimension, which I discuss further below, is missing from Wrathall's analysis, perhaps because of the uncomfortable resonances Heidegger's argument has with his political time.

confusion on behalf of the observer, Heidegger believes it suggests something fundamental about the nature of untruth.

2.7.3 Untruth

What then is *doxa*? Heidegger thinks Plato discovers that the *one* object of *doxa*, the thing that is showing itself and that I also have a view of, is more properly two objects. For Plato, one object is posited instead of the other, but Heidegger takes a different approach. His underlying concern is something like the following: what is first ‘given’ (*doxa*), so that something can be subsequently taken ‘as’ (*aletheia*)? Already, this pushes the limitations of the transcendental reduction. Because the ‘given’ depends on the ‘as’, to ask what comes before this is, for Husserl at least, to think in the natural attitude. Thus, the transcendental reduction dismisses the significance of what precedes the ‘as’. More specifically, the transcendental reduction turns the problem back around on itself. If something is to be ‘given’, then it conditionally depends on being taken *as* something by the human being.

Heidegger is aware of this. His first step is to re-establish that, because we always see in light of the Ideas, we never view a phenomenon directly.³¹⁴ This is another way of formulating his position that we always view an object ‘as’ something in virtue of an understanding of the meaning of being.³¹⁵ But Heidegger thinks that Plato’s notion of ‘interchanging’ in the *pseudo doxa* suggests that the thing stands in relationship to *both* the perception of the soul (or what is taken ‘as’) *and* what exceeds the soul in sense perception (or, what is ‘given’ to be taken ‘as’). That is, ‘the two *go together* in a new way’.³¹⁶ He thus begins to notice an inadequacy in the transcendental reduction for adequately describing the pre-conditions of the emergence of beings.

The investigation into *doxa* proves ripe for this critique. Heidegger argues that the ‘difference’ between the things reception in sense and soul perception, which he takes to be in virtue of an essential ‘ambiguity’ within the thing, means that the thing

³¹⁴*WWP*, pp. 285-286.

³¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 286.

³¹⁶His emphasis. *WWP*, p. 309. *ET*, p. 219. This claim is made off the back of a thorough discussion of different ways in which the human being can make things present to itself. This is in order to clarify the temporal aspect of *Dasein*, as well as drawing attention to its immersion in things in the world via a number of similes of the soul. A thorough discussion of this however, is outside the scope of this thesis. See, *WWP*, pp. 292-309.

is always ‘forked in itself’ (*in sich gegabelt*).³¹⁷ As ‘forked’, it is *both* what it is taken ‘as’, but preceding this, it is (in some sense) ‘there’ to be taken ‘as’ something. His lectures on Hegel uncovered this also. When I view an object there is really two, only one of which is an object-for-us. But the ‘object-for-it’ still ‘belongs’ to the ‘object-for-us’, as they are fundamentally ‘one object twice’.³¹⁸ The transcendental reduction thus fails to get to the ‘thing itself’ precisely because it cannot take into sufficient account the fact that the thing is first ‘there’ to be taken *as* something. This preceding dimension of sense perception may be an absurd reality that is always made sense of through an understanding of being, but Heidegger now emphasises that ‘the hard and the coloured are somehow *there*, and accordingly [themselves] demand a comportment which takes them in as such’.³¹⁹ *Doxa* thus concerns the corporeal nature of things, and this corporeal nature, even before it gets taken in by the understanding, is not nothing.³²⁰ The nothing (as in, the thing that is *not* within the confines of the understanding of being) is thus not necessarily non-existent.³²¹ Heidegger’s analysis of the significance of the nothing thus moves away from a focus on what is disclosed through our anxiety toward our own death and instead encounters the nothing within the beings themselves.

This is not to say that the corporeal can be retrieved in and of itself. It requires a soul for the corporeal to become present.³²² The ‘ambiguity’ that *doxa* suggests, as both the look of something and an opinion of the looker, gives him opportunity to push his analysis of truth toward this direction.³²³ Because *doxa* is a ‘double claim’, requiring us to think both a relationship to being and how ‘these beings can and do show themselves *from themselves*’,³²⁴ Heidegger is forced to reconsider the role of what *precedes*, and thus exceeds, the understanding of being in the constitution of that understanding. It is the *difference* between the corporeal thing and the thing *as* it is understood in virtue of the understanding of being that creates a ‘sphere of play’

³¹⁷ *WWP*, p. 312.

³¹⁸ *HP*, pp. 48-49.

³¹⁹ *WWP*, pp. 229-230. *ET*, p. 164.

³²⁰ *WWP*, p. 299. *ET*, p. 213.

³²¹ *WWP*, pp. 275-276.

³²² *WWP*, p. 299. *ET*, p. 213.

³²³ This is why the results of the investigation into sense experience must always be kept in the ‘background’, even as this investigation is seen in the dialogue to be fruitless and require a new path of investigation. *WWP*, p. 252.

³²⁴ His emphasis. *WWP*, p. 253. *ET*, p. 181. Heidegger clarifies that sense perception alone cannot do this. However, contrary to *Being and Time* where it is *only* in virtue of the understanding of the meaning of being that things show themselves from themselves, Heidegger now emphasises the relevance of sense perception.

(*Spielraum*) where things can emerge into being and change historically.³²⁵ By attempting to think these two objects as one in a way that pushes his analysis of truth deeper into the significance of corporeality, he finds a way of explaining how the beings ‘themselves’ can change through history. The big lesson of the cave, after all, was that beings and the unconcealed are one and the same.³²⁶

Heidegger characterises the perception of the soul as ‘*logos*’, which he understands as a kind of speech where the soul tells itself what it takes to be. That is, by offering its opinion on what is, there is a constant ‘saying’ of being by the soul.³²⁷ This saying of the *logos* is understood to be a pre-linguistic ‘silent’ saying, what Heidegger calls a ‘gathering’, one which appropriates the objects around me in relation to who I am.³²⁸ What the example of the *pseudo doxa* reveals however, is that the object of sense perception the soul ‘gathers’ is itself inherently and essentially ‘ambiguous’, being possibly Socrates, Theaetetus, or otherwise.³²⁹ By describing it as an ‘ambiguous’ object, he is *not* claiming that the ‘object-for-it’ can be somehow viewed ‘in-itself’. There is abyss between the object’s being ‘there’ for us, i.e., what we have come to understand the object ‘as’, and ‘that’ the object exists. The latter is always and necessarily *hidden* and *concealed*, and so will always exceed the former. It is untruth.

In *Being and Time* this gap convinces Heidegger to limit the confines of his study to what is available to thought through the transcendental reduction. What exceeds this ‘there’ remains both acknowledged but unthinkable. *Doxa* means to be directed toward an ‘absurd’ and ‘unmeaningful’ object *and at the same time* an object of meaning, its being.³³⁰ Hence, the object is always one of ambiguity. This creates a ‘forking’ that results in a ‘free play’ from which things emerge meaningfully through the *logos* of the soul. We are thus directed toward both truth and untruth. This development provides Heidegger the means to retrieve the significance of nature that

³²⁵Emphasis removed. *WWP*, p. 318. *ET*, p. 225.

³²⁶*WWP*, pp. 33-34.

³²⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 280-281.

³²⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 279-281. The clarification of the perception of soul as a ‘silence’ is telling of what is to come. At this stage, Heidegger is still focussed on the significance of the meaning of being for *Dasein*, but when ‘earth’ comes to be conceived as the primordial silence, we see where this trajectory takes him, for the ‘nothing’ becomes understood to within corporeal reality. I explore this in greater depth in chapter 3 and 4. However, given that *What is Metaphysics* already understood the nothing to be *Dasein* as being ‘held-out-into-nothing’, this move is already implicitly available there, reaching fruition in Heidegger’s concept of earth. *WM*, p. 115: ‘Da-sein heißt: Hineingehaltenheit in das Nichts’.

³²⁹*WWP*, pp. 310-312.

³³⁰*WWP*, pp. 311-312.

the transcendental dimension of *Being and Time* left him unable to sufficiently evaluate.

2.7.4 A Development in the Concept of Nature and Hearing the Call of Blood and Soil

Contrary *Being and Time*, Heidegger suggests that nature—in the sense in which he wishes to understand it now—is no longer limited by our understanding of the meaning of being. Rather, nature is the ‘overarching power’ that ‘reveals itself when man tests his own power and fails’.³³¹ He argues that man ‘corporeally [participates] as nature within the totality of nature’.³³² We are ‘fundamentally attuned’ (*Grundstimmung*) to nature, but only because we are ‘tuned’ (*stimmt*) to it first.³³³ Thus, it may be in virtue of our implicit understanding of the meaning of being that we make sense of things, but Heidegger now informs us that nature addresses us in return. In this lecture series then, Heidegger allows himself revel in the power of nature.

Nature addresses us through its essence as untruth and concealment. Heidegger understands Heraclitus to suggest this when he says that ‘nature loves to hide’.³³⁴ However, nature is only present when there is also an understanding of being. As he says, nature ‘as such, only *holds sway* where being is understood’.³³⁵ By conceiving it as a concealed phenomenon within an understanding, nature is not taken to have ‘substance’ beyond the understanding of the meaning of being. To do so would be to return to the natural attitude, where a concept is developed without sufficient grasp of the significance of the human being as a being that already has some pre-ontological

³³¹*WWP*, p. 237. *ET*, p. 169. ‘Die Übermacht der Natur in einem mehrfältigen Sinne und damit diese selbst offenbart sich erst, wenn der Mensch seine eigene Macht versucht und in ihr scheitert’. Early on Heidegger introduces the word nature as meaning what the Greeks meant by *aletheia*. *Ibid.*, p. 13. This is because there is an equation in the Greek world between beings and truth. Hence, ‘the more the unhidden is unhidden, the closer do we come to beings’. *Ibid.*, p. 33. *ET*, 26. The proper understanding Heidegger wants to give of nature is the Greek *ousia*, which he understands as the ‘holding sway of beings’, their coming from and returning to hiddenness. *WWP*, p. 13. Hence, there is an importance emphasis here on hiddenness, which Heidegger exploits.

³³²His emphasis. *WWP*, p. 237. *ET*, p. 169. ‘Sobald der Mensch (d. h. indem er leiblich) existiert, ist er durch den Leib von Empfindbarem und Empfundnem umdrängt; was eben zugleich sagt, daß er leiblich als Natur im Ganzen der Natur, obzwar in seiner Weise, mitschwingt’.

³³³*WWP*, p. 238.

³³⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

³³⁵His emphasis. *WWP*, pp. 237-238. *ET*, p. 170.

understanding of the meaning of being.³³⁶ Nature and the understanding of the meaning of being co-belong to man. This ‘co-belonging is *rooted* in the primordial unity of the Dasein of man, how both elements are *there* in and with this Dasein, [...] this unity itself requires a specifically split mode of being of the human being’.³³⁷ This is still quite a step from his claim in *Being and Time* that nature is reduced to the particular world one is immersed in. Instead, through a ‘fundamental attunement’ (*Grundstimmungen*) the ‘all-powerful nature “determines” (*bestimmt*) man, i.e., tunes (*stimmt*) his primordial attunedness as such and such’.³³⁸

There is a double claim here. First, Heidegger maintains that we always make sense of nature, which is to say, things are given *through* the understanding, and so it is only in virtue of this understanding that nature is ‘there’ in the first place. Secondly, it is nonetheless a givenness that is beyond the understanding, it precedes the understanding, ‘tuning’ it. This means that to think of the significance of nature requires something beyond the reduction to an *as something* that the understanding simultaneously demands. Thus, it must be understood as concealed, for if it were revealed it would be revealed *as something* thus reducing it to less than the ‘all-powerful’ that it reveals itself *as*. His reflection on the significance of the *pseudo doxa* brings to our attention the problem of how appearances can appear as what they are not. If in Plato’s view the *pseudo doxa* is an appearing that conceals, Heidegger reverses this and instead wants us to think of it as a concealment that appears. He then uses this insight to articulate the significance he sees in nature as the ‘overpowering’. By experiencing it as concealed, we come face to face with its overpowering. As he argues in the *Contributions*, ‘to leave being in concealment is radically different from experiencing being as self-concealing’.³³⁹ Hence, the object of ‘ambiguity’, the *doxa*, is concealed in-and-of-itself, and Heidegger wishes us to experience it as such. To do so, is to experience nature as the overpowering.

The problem as it presents itself is to figure out how we encounter this nature without reducing it through the understanding, and also without returning to the natural attitude. Remember, it is the necessity of the transcendental reduction that leaves this sense of nature largely implicit and unexplored in *Being and Time*. Now,

³³⁶This is the charge that Heidegger levels against both Aristotle and Aquinas in *Being and Time*, who attempt to elucidate that nature of man through ‘soul’, or the nature of being as ‘*transcendens*’, without sufficient clarity of the ontological priority of *Dasein*. *SZ*, pp. 18-20.

³³⁷*WWP*, p. 235. *ET*, p. 168.

³³⁸*WWP*, p. 238. *ET*, p. 170.

³³⁹*BP*, pp. 255-257. ‘Seyn in der Verborgenheit lassen und das Seyn als das Sichverbergende erfahren ist grundverschieden’.

however, Heidegger claims that there is an access to this concealed appearing of nature through our corporeal existence. Man is always exposed to the ‘sensations received through his body’, and so nature is ‘primordially present in attunedness’.³⁴⁰

This creates a rather novel solution to the tension in Heidegger’s understanding of nature, and the limitation of the transcendental reduction. He now holds that ‘[w]hat unhiddenness is can only be shown from *hiddenness*’.³⁴¹ The transcendental reduction begins with unhiddenness but, although the problem of untruth (or hiddenness) draws our attention to the inadequacy of this starting point, Heidegger still agrees with the crux of the argument against the natural attitude. To substantialise nature beyond the experience of nature in *Dasein* is to repeat the metaphysics of presence, for this would be to take nature ‘as’ something lying there ‘present-at-hand’ alongside the human being. However, to reduce nature to its experience of the human being seems to do an injustice to the experience of it as ‘greater’ than our own ‘power’ or capacity to comprehend it. Nature ‘surprises’ us, whether it be through new discoveries about it, scientific or otherwise, or, an example Heidegger would be more comfortable with, when a natural disaster destroys our particular locale. To do justice to this experience of nature, without thinking of it as something meaningful beyond the understanding of the meaning of being, one must experience it as ‘concealed’ and ‘hidden’ from view. If we experience it ‘as’ its ‘unhiddenness’ or its ‘unavailability’, then it ‘shows up’ to us in its ‘overarching power’. This solution opens up a tear within the fabric of the transcendental reduction whilst still satisfying the critique of the natural attitude, a tear that draws his attention to the significance of corporeality, for it is within our own nature as corporeal that nature ‘tunes’ us. Heidegger spends the next four years exploiting this, which eventually gives way to the significance of earth and the work of art.

In his 1933/34 seminar series *Nature, History, State*, Heidegger recalls the Greek sense of nature as ‘*physis*’, like the ‘tenderness’ of a flower blossoming, this is nature that is ‘Being-from-itself; coming-forth-from-itself, streams around human beings, gives them rest or unrest, calms or threatens them’.³⁴² Nature ‘works on the

³⁴⁰ *WWP*, p. 237. *ET*, p. 169.

³⁴¹ His emphasis. *WWP*, p. 327. *ET*, p. 232.

³⁴² *NHS*, p. 24. In the 1931/32 lecture series on Plato, Heidegger mainly uses the Greek ‘*ousia*’ to talk about nature. *WWP*, p. 13. However, in the *Nature, History, State* seminars he claims that both of these words have a common meaning, ‘growing, coming up, taking form’. Heidegger therefore uses these terms synonymously. *NHS*, p. 27.

human being, [and] roots him in the soil [*Bodenständigkeit*].³⁴³ There is a reciprocal relationship here, for we are only ‘rooted’ when ‘nature belongs as an environment’.³⁴⁴ The ‘more primordially the understanding of being arises from the depth of *Dasein*, the more grounded is the right to the *concept* of being. i.e., the necessity of philosophy to bring being to conceptual expression’.³⁴⁵ The liberator plays an important role here, who brings being back to the shadows after their atrophy through the history of nihilism. Heidegger translates the Greek ‘*paideia*’ (education) with the German ‘*Gehaltenheit*’. For him *paideia* is not about educating, but about taking a stance (*Haltung*), choosing one’s ‘footing’ (*Halt*). ‘*Gehaltenheit*’ might therefore be translated as ‘positionedness’.³⁴⁶ This is because for him to glimpse the Ideas is to bind with them. One does not ‘teach’ the Ideas, then, but embodies them. To escape the cave is to ask, ‘what itself empowers unhiddenness’.³⁴⁷ By bringing being to the shadows the legislator lights up the unhidden, but this process is empowered by nature, concealment, the essence of truth. Thus, it is only through being rooted in the soil that the liberator can legislate the ‘objectivity of objects’.³⁴⁸ Heidegger’s liberator is the one who is rooted. Being rooted means being able to make a home and turn desolation and waste into ‘fruitful and cultivated land’.³⁴⁹ Hence, autochthonous roots provide the promise of a resistance to nihilism. This rootedness in nature means a greater level of existential disclosure to the understanding of the meaning of being to *Dasein*, now thought of as the *Da-Sein* of the nation, the ‘*Volk*’.

³⁴³*NHS*, p. 55. Bambach presents evidence of the importance of autochthonic roots in (Heidegger’s understanding of) the essence of truth as far back as 1924. Bambach, *Heidegger’s Roots*, p. 114. See also, O’Brien, *Heidegger, History, Holocaust*, pp. 71-76, who discusses this notion in Heidegger’s thought as it used in 1950. Even at this later date, O’Brien notes problematic traps within this notion that remain present from his thought as it stood in 1930.

³⁴⁴*NHS*, p. 55

³⁴⁵*WWP*, p. 210. *ET*, p. 151.

³⁴⁶This is the translation given by Sadler. *ET*, p. 83. The German verb ‘*halten*’ means ‘to hold’, and the suffix ‘*-heit*’ turns the verb into a noun, a suffix that functions similarly to the English ‘-ness’. So, a more literally translation might be ‘holdedness’, or if we took the prefix ‘ge-’ to indicate a past tense, then we might say ‘heldness’, both of which reads even more awkwardly than the unfortunate ‘positionedness’. With this translation (from Greek to German), Heidegger is emphasising the particular way in which for him the liberator takes a hold on to reality in a manner that determines the ‘objectivity of objects’ for the people. Therefore, it is the liberator’s particular ‘take’ or ‘position’ on the nature of what *is*, that determines what things are. This is Heidegger’s interpretation of the what is at stake in Plato’s exploration of ‘*paideia*’ (education), which for Plato occurs through the encounter with the good beyond being. Heidegger’s particular reading of it thus requires him to take substantial liberties with his interpretation of the concept of the good beyond being also, a reading that receives critical evaluation in Section 4.4.2 of this study.

³⁴⁷*WWP*, pp. 114-115. *ET*, p. 83.

³⁴⁸*WWP*, p. 210. *ET*, p. 151.

³⁴⁹*NHS*, p. 55.

Although only briefly developed at this stage, poetry and art are significant in providing this attunement to nature.³⁵⁰ The National Socialist Party also play a role. Heidegger claims that the ‘tremendous moment into which National Socialism is being driven today is the coming to be of *a new spirit of the entire earth*’.³⁵¹ There is thus a darker side to all of this. On the back of these developments Heidegger affirms the National Socialist call to ‘blood and soil’ as ‘powerful and necessary’ (*mächtig und notwendig*), even if, on their own, they are not a ‘sufficient condition for the *Dasein* of a *Volk*’.³⁵² Discussing the opposition between ‘blood and soil’ on the one hand, and ‘knowledge and spirit’ on the other, he claims:

Knowledge first brings a direction and path to the blood’s flow, first brings to the soil the fecundity of what it can bring to term. Knowledge lets the nobility of the soil yield what the soil can bring to term.

The decision lies in whether we are capable of taking on all this with adequate originality and strength—whether we are capable of giving our *Dasein* a real weight and a real gravity; only if we succeed in this shall we create the possibility of greatness for ourselves.³⁵³

Through an understanding of being (knowledge/spirit), our attunement to nature (blood/soil) is given direction. But this nature is ‘noble’ and our capacity to comprehend it, by being more primordially rooted in it, allows this nobility to reap its fruit. The claim is not that blood and soil on its own can establish the superiority of a people. Heidegger later critiques the National Socialist focus on the reduction of the human being to its biology in order to establish this.³⁵⁴ The suggestion is instead that the greatness of the people allow the blood and soil to be richer. Equally, however, rootedness within the ‘overpowering nature’ leads to the people’s health and the

³⁵⁰As I explored above. See Section 2.6.

³⁵¹His emphasis. *SW*, p. 148. *BaT*, p. 116. ‘Dieser ungeheure Augenblick, in den der Nationalsozialismus heute gedrängt ist, ist das Werden *eines neuen Geistes der Erde überhaupt*’.

³⁵²Trans mod. *SW*, p. 263. *BaT*, p. 201.

³⁵³*SW*, pp 263-264. *BaT*, p. 201.

³⁵⁴In a letter to the Denazification Committee, Heidegger argues that Hitler ‘had brought me in 1933/34 to a no man’s land where I affirmed the social and national (not in the national-socialist manner) and denied the intellectual and metaphysical foundation in the biologism of the Party doctrine, because the social and national, as I saw it, was not essentially tied to the biological-racist Weltanschauung theory’. As quoted by Rickey in *Revolutionary Saints*, p. 188. See also, Robert Bernasconi, ‘Heidegger, Rickert, Nietzsche, and the Critique of Biologism’, in *Heidegger & Nietzsche*, ed. by Babette Babiche, Alfred Denker, Holger Zabrowski (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2012) pp. 159-179, Safranski, *Between Good and Evil*, pp. 301-302 and Young, *Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism*, pp. 36-37, who defend Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism in light of this critique. Cf., however, Bambach, *Heidegger’s Roots*, p. 285, who points out that although Heidegger may have rejected biology as an adequate basis for the exclusion of one people from another, he nonetheless maintains the superiority of the German people and the exclusion of others from this community through his notion of autochthony. See also, Section 3.5 and 3.6 of this study.

production of the state.³⁵⁵ Being rooted in one's soil, coupled with a 'will to expansion', there is the promise of a homeland.³⁵⁶ To suggest that the soil is inherently superior and substantial would be to return to the natural attitude, but Heidegger is being bold here, perhaps too much so, for this soil is 'noble' and the understanding is heightened through its rootedness in this soil. Does this not provide the soil with an ontological status it fails to warrant? Regardless, Heidegger finds a resonance in his own thought with the direction of the German state under the leadership of Hitler and the National Socialist Party.

The emphasis on rootedness finds its justification in Heidegger's understanding of the history of metaphysics. Platonic metaphysics tells us that truth lies beyond the world, uprooting us from the grounds of the reality that appears to us. Plato is taken to have genuine insight and so he recognises that corporeal reality must be 'gathered' by the soul. But corporeal reality precedes our capacity to make sense of it. Heidegger calls for certain, elite, philosophers to 'root' themselves in the supremacy of nature and 'gather' a new truth for those who remain unable to escape the throes of a nihilism that has developed through Platonism. Hence, the encounter with untruth means that 'the entire foundation of previous philosophy becomes unstable',³⁵⁷ and 'the connection with the land [*Bodenständigkeit*] is the foundation of all truth'.³⁵⁸

By the 1933/34 repeat of the lecture series on Plato Heidegger speaks of 'earth' instead of nature. He develops a philosophical understanding of earth in his 1934/35 lecture series on Hölderlin, and perhaps most notably in his 1935/36 lecture *The Origin of the Work of Art*. In 1933/34, however, this concept is used to express the promise of a rootedness that is to be found in National Socialism. Heidegger calls for the German people, through being 'rooted' in their 'heritage' and 'vocation', to 'transform the spirit of the earth'.³⁵⁹ Hence, they would once again be rooted in the

³⁵⁵NHS, p. 55. See also, Andrew J. Mitchell, 'Heidegger's Breakdown: Health and Healing Under the Care of Dr. V.E. von Gebattel', *Research in Phenomenology*, 46, 2016, 70-97 (esp. pp. 72-76).

³⁵⁶NHS, p. 55.

³⁵⁷WWP, p.287. ET, p. 204. Bambach thus points out the important connection between Heidegger's method of 'confrontation' and his notion of rootedness. Bambach, *Heidegger's Roots*, pp. 258-261.

³⁵⁸Farias, *Heidegger and Nazism*, p. 72. Farias discovers that this was an explicit claim made by Heidegger in his 1930 lectures *On the Essence of Truth* but was subsequently deleted in the 1942 printed version. Farias discovers this from an account given by Heinrich Berl and corroborating his account with the one given by the *Karlsruher Tagblatt*, July 16, 1930. O'Brien also explores this connection, with specific reference to Heidegger's use of the term '*Bodenständigkeit*', in *Heidegger, History and the Holocaust*, pp.71-76 and pp. 105-114.

³⁵⁹His emphasis. SW, p. 86 and p. 148. BaT, p. 70 and p. 116. 'Dieser ungeheure Augenblick, in den der Nationalsozialismus heute gedrängt ist, ist das Werden eines neuen Geistes der Erde überhaupt'.

earth, the ‘great moment’ that drives National Socialism.³⁶⁰ For him, to encounter the significance of untruth is to aid the people and the state in this goal. Heidegger’s ‘moment’, then, is one that, driven by the National Socialists, resists the dominion of Plato’s doctrine of Ideas, ‘roots’ the liberated to nature, and transforms ‘from the bottom up the German world—and, as we believe, the European world too’.³⁶¹

By thinking the significance of concealment as the ‘blood’ and ‘soil’ of the nation, Heidegger is drawing from certain elements of his own philosophy to develop a further coherence between his own work and the work of the National Socialist movement. Is he merely offering us an obscure framing of his project in context of a politically turbulent time? I am not so sure. To overcome Plato is to retrieve the significance of corporeal, sensuous reality, circumvented by his doctrine of the Ideas. By calling for a return to ‘blood’ and ‘soil’, the National Socialist Party were preparing the people for precisely this overcoming. Heidegger’s task, then, was to simply direct to greater ‘knowledge’ this ‘tremendous moment’.³⁶² Poetry and art will also play a significant role in this. Will his turn to works of art draw his attention to the inadequacy of the National Socialist Party? The next chapter follows this up. Through analysis of Heidegger’s 1934/35 lecture series on Hölderlin, we look at the significance of poetry for the realisation of the German homeland.

³⁶⁰*SW*, p. 148. *BaT*, p. 116.

³⁶¹*SW*, p. 225. *BaT*, p. 172.

³⁶² *SW*, p. 148. *BaT*, p. 116.

CHAPTER 3

THE PROPHETIC POET: HEIDEGGER'S ENCOUNTER WITH HÖLDERLIN

The years of 1933-37 were crucial for the solidification of Nazi control within Germany. After the seizure of power in 1933, the '*Gleichschaltung*', laws designed to increase the Nazification of state and society, were being implemented throughout Germany.¹ Heidegger's predecessor as rector of Freiburg University, von Möllendorf, was unwilling to implement these measures and resigned in May of 1933.² Heidegger swiftly took his place.³ As the first '*Führer*-rector' of Freiburg, the circle that surrounded Heidegger hoped that he would solidify Nazi control within the university.⁴

However, passages from the *Black Notebooks* demonstrate that Heidegger was hesitant to assume office.⁵ This confirms what Heidegger had claimed in his 1945 'apologia' *Facts and Thoughts*, a document that has otherwise shown to be largely

¹Including increased discrimination against Jewish staff at universities. One such member of staff was Heidegger's former mentor, Edmund Husserl. Ott claims, however, that the rumors that Heidegger banned Husserl from using the library, due to being Jewish, are 'without foundation'. Ott, *A Political Life*, pp. 173-174. However, despite Heidegger's assertion in a letter to the Denazification committee, that he was 'deeply shocked' by the increased persecution of the Jews, Löwith testifies that even as late as 1936—a year *after* the Nuremberg laws were enacted—Heidegger 'did not remove the Party insignia from his lapel' whilst with him, lamenting 'it had obviously not occurred to him that the swastika was out of place while spending the day with me'. Löwith, 'My Last Meeting with Heidegger in Rome, 1936', p. 115. With the publication of the *Black Notebooks*, the question around Heidegger's anti-Semitism has received discussion in recent scholarship. However, because the most troubling passages from his notebooks regarding the Jewish people are not until 1938 and beyond, the question of Heidegger's anti-Semitism is beyond the scope of this thesis.

²Ott, *A Political Life*, pp. 140-141.

³Safranski, *Between Good and Evil*, pp. 239-241.

⁴Ott, *A Political Life*, p. 147, and Safranski, *Between Good and Evil*, pp. 239-242. This was certainly Heidegger's intention also. See, *UII-VI*, p. 117. *PII-VI*, p. 86: 'the leader of the various Party organizations must be built out and all schooling aligned to a *Reichs-university*; the latter not as a separate academy—yet indeed under the highest political and spiritual demands and impulses of the people and of the configuration of the state'.

⁵*UII-VI*, p. 110. *PII-VI*, p. 81. 'Pressed to assume the rectorship, I am acting for the first time against my innermost voice. In this office, at most I might possibly be able to prevent one thing or another. For building up—assuming such is still possible—the personnel are lacking'. Safranski also claims that Heidegger was hesitant even 'on the morning of election day'. See his, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 240 and p. 278. Cf., however, *ibid.* p. 240-241. As Safranski points out, '[c]onsidering his alleged hesitation before, Heidegger displayed a remarkable burst of activity immediately after his election'. It is evident then, that Heidegger was very much in two minds about his explicit involvement in this way, and so although it has been shown to be a largely inaccurate account, it is likely that Heidegger largely believed (aspects, at least) the version of events he tells in his 1945 text *Facts and Thoughts*. Martin Heidegger, 'The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts', trans. by Lisa Harries, in *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers*, ed. by Gunther Neske and Emil Ketterings (New York: Paragon House, 1990), pp. 15-32.

inaccurate.⁶ For example, Ott explores how Heidegger's appointment as rector was not a 'series of chance events' but instead an 'internal conspiracy, plotted behind the scenes by a small clique of Nazi sympathisers'.⁷ Regardless of the factual discrepancies between Heidegger's 'official' account and the corrections by Ott and others, these accounts offer a glimpse into the internal power struggles of an emerging political order. With his appointment as rector of Freiburg University, Heidegger was in a position to realise his vision of achieving a 're-[organisation]' of the university by bringing 'philosophy to bear in the right place and help it do its work'.⁸ Faced with the reality of this task, Heidegger evidently experienced trepidation. His hesitation proved insightful, as it would seem that his attempt to aid the Party did not succeed, at least as Heidegger believed. In a letter to Jaspers, he evaluates that his time as rector was a 'failure'.⁹ Heidegger resigned nine months after he was instated, and his appointment came to an end at the end of the term, on the 23 April 1934, one year after he assumed office.¹⁰

Subsequently, his first lecture series was *Hölderlin's Hymns: Germania and the Rhine*.¹¹ Safranski argues that Heidegger's turn toward 'works of art' was because he 'was better able to read [these] than the political reality'.¹² Likewise, Bernasconi claims that this lecture series marks Heidegger's attempt to re-approach his primary

⁶*Facts and Thoughts* was a document written in 1945 to the Denazification committee in Freiburg, who were reviewing Heidegger's case after the war. See, Rockmore, *On Heidegger's Nazism and his Philosophy*, pp. 73-116, esp. p. 80. Rockmore argues that this text was designed to 'influence the immediate situation in which he found himself, at a time in which he was obliged to answer for his actions before the military authorities immediately after the end of the Second World War'. It is therefore the first statement of the 'official view' of Heidegger's Nazism.

⁷Ott documents in what way Heidegger's version of events is doubtful, as he claims that he was forced, largely against his will, to assume office as rector of Freiburg. On the contrary, 'Heidegger's entrance as rector-to-be had been prepared well in advance'. Ott, *A Political Life*, pp. 140-148 (p. 146). Cf., Heidegger, 'The Rectorate 1933/34', pp. 15-16.

⁸As he wrote in a letter to Karl Jaspers on April 3rd, 1933. See, Ott, *A Political Life*, pp. 141-142.

⁹Heidegger calls it a 'failure' in a letter to Jaspers in 1935. See, Safranski, *Between Good and Evil*, p. 282 and Ott, *A Political Life*, p. 135. Ott explores one such example of this failure, namely Heidegger's 'academic summer camp'. The purpose of the summer camp was to facilitate the forging of 'a real bond between the university and the working life of the nation, growing out of a close collaboration between the students in their respective disciplines and members of the working population'. Ott is correct in connecting this with the vision Heidegger set out in his Rectoral Address, where the unity of labour service, military service and the service of knowledge is established. Ott, *Martin Heidegger: A Political Life*, pp. 224-234 (p. 224-226). Due to tensions that emerged between the various factions of the camps, Heidegger almost brings it to an early close. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

¹⁰Ott, *A Political Life*, p. 139. Heidegger resigns in the Winter Semester of 1933, 9 months after his successful election into office. See, Michael Murray, 'Heidegger's Hermeneutic Reading of Hölderlin: The Signs of Time', *The Eighteenth Century*, 21, 1 (1980), 41-66 (p. 65). See also, Ott, *A Political Life*, p. 240.

¹¹Murray, 'Heidegger's Hermeneutic Reading of Hölderlin', p. 65.

¹²Safranski, *Between Good and Evil*, p. 263.

topic, the question of the truth of being.¹³ This could suggest that after the failure of his rectorate Heidegger retreated into the practise of philosophy with a renewed appreciation for works of art and poetic disclosure.¹⁴ However, Heidegger was not re-evaluating the significance that he had seen in his philosophy before the rectorate, as some commentators contend.¹⁵ As Gethmann-Siefert argues, Heidegger's turn toward Hölderlin was a 'justification for an abortive political commitment'.¹⁶ In this chapter I explore in what way the relationship between art, truth and Heidegger's support of the movement remain conjoined and coherent on philosophical grounds.¹⁷

Heidegger argues that the dialogue between the poets and the philosophers is secured through the figure of the 'creator of the state' (*Staatsschöpfer*). The state creator plays an important role in awakening the attunement of the people (*Volk*) to the earth,¹⁸ as he also argued in the 1933/34 lecture series *Being and Truth*.¹⁹ The issue proves ambiguous, as his faith in the proficiency of Hitler as *Führer* is now wavering.²⁰ By bringing this tension under review we glimpse the many layers of ambiguity in coming to grips with the Heidegger controversy. I suggest that part of

¹³Robert Bernasconi, 'Poets as Prophets and as Painters: Heidegger's Turn to Language and the Hölderlin Turn in Context', in *Heidegger and Language*, ed. by Jeffrey Powell, Studies in Continental Thought, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2013), pp. 146-162 (p. 146). Likewise, McNeill claims that 'the importance of Heidegger's Hölderlin's lectures (and especially of the first lecture course [of 1934/35]) for understanding [...] his subsequent thought, can hardly be overstated'. McNeill, 'Heidegger's Hölderlin Lectures', p. 224.

¹⁴This is the position Scholtz in her *The Invention of a People*. See esp., p 197, where she claims that one 'can read Heidegger's introduction of this discussion on art as a clear denial of the politics of the day and as favouring the attempt to address the overcoming of metaphysics and the transformation of human Dasein philosophically or by other means'. However, Bernasconi charges Heidegger with 'self-deception' over his attempt to characterise himself as resisting the movement through being 'active as a philosopher'. Here, Heidegger is arguing that because the act of philosophizing is itself a disruptive act, and so regardless of his specific views he was inherently challenging the possibility of a stable ideological basis for the National Socialist movement. Bernasconi concludes, '[o]ne can hardly count as an act of resistance an activity that one concedes is completely irrelevant to those one is allegedly resisting'. Robert Bernasconi, 'Who Belongs? Heidegger's Philosophy of the *Volk* in 1933-4', in *NHS*, pp. 109-126 (p. 113). Although we should be aware what Heidegger means by his alleged 'resistance', Bernasconi is not off the mark to identify this claim as self-deception, for it effectively refuses to take responsibility for the part he played in legitimising the regime. On this, see Section 3.3, below. This must nonetheless be distinguished from the claim that Heidegger's philosophy and National Socialist Ideology are one and the same, although the intersection between these still proves ripe for critical evaluation, Cf., however, Rickey, *Revolutionary Saints*, p. 183, and, Faye, 'Nazi Foundations in Heidegger's Work', p. 56.

¹⁵As Scholtz argues. See, Scholtz, *The Invention of a People*, p. 197.

¹⁶Gethmann-Siefert, 'Heidegger and Hölderlin', p. 59.

¹⁷Therefore, we must reject Malpas' conclusion, as he separates Heidegger's philosophy from his involvement by framing his support as a personal failure. Malpas, *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place*, pp. 143-144.

¹⁸*HH*, p. 144.

¹⁹*SW*, p. 148. *BaT*, p. 116.

²⁰As his *Black Notebooks* elucidate, discussed further below. Safranski is nonetheless correct in his estimation that 'Heidegger's faith in Hitler and in the need for revolution was unbroken', even if he does 'gradually [loosen] his ties to politics'. Safranski, *Between Good and Evil*, p. 281.

the problem in his philosophy relies on such ambiguity. Nonetheless, Heidegger's dissociation from the Party was not due to a rediscovery of democratic values but because the movement had not been 'radical' enough.²¹ Hence, Heidegger turns to the poetic works of Hölderlin to help National Socialism become the force he hoped it would.²²

In a lecture series immediately following Heidegger's resignation as rector of Freiberg, and directly preceding his lecture series on Hölderlin, his final words are 'the original language is the language of poetry',²³ and 'true poetry is the language of being [*Sein*] that was forespoken to us a long time ago already and that we have yet to catch up with'.²⁴ Heidegger draws our attention to poetry in 1931/32, but he had not yet developed the significance of art and poetry beyond suggestion. McNeill thus identifies the first half of this lecture series as 'especially important' because Heidegger unpacks his understanding of the significance of poetry.²⁵ By focussing on the mechanism behind the power of poetry, as well as discussing Hölderlin's *Germania*, Heidegger develops further his concept of earth. Because this 'self-concealed' region must find its way to language then we cannot reveal it as *something*. To do so, would be to repeat the metaphysics of presence where being is understood *as* a being. Instead, we must allow this concealed earth to be revealed *as* the concealed.²⁶

Art holds the key to this, and through interpretation of Hölderlin's *Germania* Heidegger names the concealed earth 'holy' (*Heilige*) and 'homeland' (*Heimat*). This move largely relies on the exaltation of the poet Hölderlin to a prophet like figure in his thinking. Although it proves a great struggle to discover the philosophical grounds for this exaltation, I clarify Heidegger's approach to the poet by exploring a kind of thinking he calls thinking in 'decision' (*Ent-scheidung*). The adequacy of this is brought into question, but this development in methodology is seen to be a coherent step in Heidegger's approach to phenomenology. I argue that his concept of earth has

²¹Grossman, 'The Myth of Poetry: On Heidegger's Hölderlin', p. 30. This is not to suggest that the legitimacy of democratic forms of government is beyond question. However, because one pertinent question of this thesis is whether or not certain aspects of Heidegger's philosophy lend itself to support of fascist or autocratic political regimes then his distrust of democracy is certainly worthy of note.

²²His *Black Notebooks* testify to this. In one passage he claims that National Socialism is a 'genuine' but 'nascent' power, that must 'recede in favor of the future'. *UII-VI*, pp. 114-115. *PII-V*, p. 84. See also, *UII-VI*, p. 150. *PII-VI*, p. 110, where he truly 'believes' that National Socialism harbours the 'guarantee of greatness', but only if it is a 'prelude to a great future of the people'.

²³*LL*, p. 141.

²⁴Trans mod. *Ibid.*, pp. 141-142.

²⁵McNeill, 'Heidegger's Hölderlin Lectures', p. 226.

²⁶*HH*, p. 250. *HHGR*, pp. 226-227. See also, *UK*, p. 32. *OA*, pp. 109-110.

two meanings, one that is philosophically profound and another that is problematic in light of his support of the National Socialist movement. This ambiguity asserts itself elsewhere. Through reflection on the significance of the earth as ‘homeland’, I explore the importance in Heidegger’s thought of disrupting the everyday, common presumptions of the meaning of being through philosophical questioning, which suggests a resistance to an authoritarian order.²⁷ However, because the homeland relies on the elite ‘demigods’, his understanding of the homeland vacillates between the importance of ‘disruption’ and the problematic authoritarianism to which an aspect of his philosophy lends itself. It is suggested that the ambiguities that stem from this ambiguity results in an irreconcilable tension within Heidegger’s thought. Through this reflection we encounter an important domain for evaluating the intersection between his philosophy and his support of the movement. For, perhaps it is within this very ambiguity that his thought could so easily find a home for itself in National Socialist Germany.

3.1 Overview of the Lecture Series

As the title of the poem suggests, Hölderlin’s *Germania* highlights the significance of the homeland (*Heimat*). Couched in divine imagery of gods, a priestess, and the holy earth, *Germania* speaks of a holy mourning in face of the fleeing gods.²⁸ Heidegger seeks to avoid a philosophical ‘assault’ on Hölderlin’s poetry in an attempt to stand ‘within the domain in which poetry unfolds its power’,²⁹ and so he is careful not to ‘explain [away]’ these terms as ‘metaphor’.³⁰ To do so would think of poetry as a sort of ‘psychic lived experience’ where the ‘mind of the poet [is] compared with the material circumstances outside in nature’.³¹ For Heidegger, poetry is instead

²⁷*HH*, pp. 206-209. See also, Phillips, *Heidegger’s Volk*, p. 180.

²⁸After a preliminary remark and a brief introduction that outline the significance Heidegger sees in Hölderlin, as well as warning us not to ‘launch [a philosophical] assault upon a poetic work’, Heidegger demands that we first ‘read and listen’ the poem. Thus, it is printed in full near the beginning of the course. *HH*, pp. 10-13. *HHGR*, pp. 14-16. See also, *HH*, pp. 1-8 and pp. 40-42 where Heidegger makes an appeal to his audience to re-read ‘and indeed frequently’ the poem *Germania*. This is because there is a gap between ‘saying and saying’, that is, being able to recite the poem, or being able to ‘follow poetically the telling of the poetry’. *HH*, pp. 40-42. *HHGR*, pp. 41-41.

²⁹Emphasis removed. *HH*, p. 19. *HHGR*, p. 21.

³⁰*HH*, pp. 4-6.

³¹*HH*, p. 254. *HHGR*, p. 230. It is this poetic kind of thinking that Malpas has in mind when he insists that ‘understood as “mythical” Heidegger’s thinking does not lose itself in the telling of impossible and fantastic stories [...] but instead turns back to the original experience of being and of truth, aiming to articulate that experience, to unfold the “story” that belongs to it in a way that allows it to be disclosed in its own terms’. Malpas, *Heidegger’s Topology*, p. 207.

understood as a kind of ‘telling’ (*sagen*) where something is made ‘manifest [...] but by way of a specific pointing’.³² He endorses Hölderlin’s claims in the *Hyperion*, that poetry ‘is the beginning and end’ of philosophy,³³ and so for Heidegger, ‘[t]he poet is the grounder of beyng’.³⁴ Because poetry grounds our sense of being, then ‘the Dasein of the peoples in each case springs from poetry’, a poetry that ‘prevails even at their decline, if their decline is to be a great one and not a mere disintegration’.³⁵ As such, Heidegger holds that there is an essential relationship between poetry and ourselves, and suggests a unique temporality at work that privileges the future.³⁶ To work through the poem is always a working with ourselves. He hopes that this ‘struggle’ will ‘thrust us out of our everydayness’ where the true power of poetry is to be found.³⁷ If Heidegger’s ontological revolution in the nature of truth is to get underway he believes that this engagement with poetry (and ‘not just any poetry, but solely and precisely Hölderlin’s poetry’) is necessary.³⁸ With Nietzsche’s Zarathustra at the back of his mind, Heidegger endeavors to give the German people the ‘ears to hear’ Hölderlin³⁹ in order to realise their unique destiny.⁴⁰

He argues that the power of the poem *Germania* lies in its fundamental attunement of a holy mourning in a readied distress.⁴¹ For Heidegger, this means that Hölderlin’s poetry articulates the experience of the death of God, connecting the significance Heidegger sees in Hölderlin with that of Nietzsche. However, to speak of the death of gods is to renounce them by preserving their divinity.⁴² Hence, he claims in the Rectoral Address that Nietzsche’s pronouncement of the death of God is evidence only of his ‘passionate [seeking] of God’.⁴³ It is these liberated ‘few’ who are the ones capable of ‘bringing near’ (*die Nähe zum*) the ‘final god’ (*letzten Gott*).⁴⁴

³²HH, pp. 29-31. HHGR, p. 29.

³³HH, p. 21. HHGR, p. 23.

³⁴HH, p. 33. ‘Der Dichter ist der Begründer des Seyns.’

³⁵HH, p. 20. HHGR, p. 22.

³⁶HH, p. 104-113. This privileging of the future within his discussion of temporality is established in *Being and Time*, even if the ‘unity’ of the *ecstasies* suggests an equal originality. See Farrell Krell’s discussion of this in *Ecstasy, Catastrophe*, pp. 11-36, esp. pp. 22-30. See also, *UII-VI*, p. 114. *PII-VI*, p. 84: ‘National Socialism not a ready-made eternal truth come down from heaven [...] it must itself, as a formation, recede in favour of the future’. His emphasis.

³⁷HH, pp. 22-24.

³⁸HH, p. 22. HHGR, p. 23.

³⁹HH, pp. 136-137.

⁴⁰This is the central concern of the second part of the lecture series, on Hölderlin’s *The Rhine*. See, for example, HH, pp. 171-180.

⁴¹HH, p. 107.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 93-97.

⁴³Heidegger, ‘The Self-Assertion of the German University’, p.5. See also, HH, p. 95. Heidegger explores this renunciation as a kind of seeking in explicit relation to Hölderlin also. Ibid., pp. 81-83.

⁴⁴BP, pp. 11-13.

Given that Heidegger disparages the possibility of a fruitful encounter between philosophy and religion,⁴⁵ his approach to the gods—one that refuses doctrine and awaits for their appearing through poetic reflection and philosophical exegesis—makes sense of Heidegger’s willingness to embrace Hölderlin’s discussion of the divinities throughout this lecture course and beyond.

In his *To Mother Earth*, Hölderlin’s writes:

The pillars of the temple stand
Abandoned in days of need
The north storm’s echo rings indeed
- - deep within the chambers,
And the rain makes them pure,
And moss grows and the swallows return,
In days of spring, yet nameless is
The God within them, and the cup of thanks
And vessel of sacrifice and all holy shrines
Abandoned to the foe in Earth’s silent seclusion⁴⁶

Heidegger utilises this stanza to connect the nihilism he witnessed in his contemporary society with the flight of the gods. As he goes on to claim, ‘[c]ustom and tradition are found only where temple and image, as the historical existence [*Dasein*] of the gods, tower over and are binding for our everyday activity and living’.⁴⁷ As such, when he thinks of the flight of the gods he is not thinking of a loss of one’s personal religious conviction. Instead, what is in mind here is the loss of meaningful significance for the people who belong to a historical world, and who no longer understand themselves as having a place within a larger whole. When Hölderlin tells us that the temples are ‘abandoned’ to the earth’s ‘silent seclusion’, Heidegger believes he speak to this not being at home. However, due to Heidegger’s emphasis on the ‘German’ *Dasein*, the significance of ‘place’ (or the ‘there’ (*Da*)) in Heidegger’s reflections on the essence of truth take on an increased nationalistic

⁴⁵Ott explores in great detail Heidegger’s early commitments to Catholic philosophy, his subsequent conversion to Protestantism, and his eventual turn away from Christianity altogether. As he quotes (p. 121), Heidegger describes ‘the faith of [his] birth’ as ‘a thorn in the flesh’. Ott, *A Political Life*, pp. 41-131, esp. pp. 106-121. A look at some of the references to Christianity in the *Contributions* attests to the profound change of heart that occurred in a man who once pledged his thought ‘in the service of Christian-scholastic philosophy and Catholic ideology’. Ibid., p. 78. Comparatively, Heidegger claims that the ‘abandonment of being’—by which he means the beginning of the onset of nihilism—is established through the Christian appeal to a creator God. *BP*, p. 111. Hence, the epigraph to the VII section of his *Contributions to Philosophy* reads ‘The Last God: The god wholly other than past ones and especially other than the Christian one’. *BP*, p. 403. *CP*, p. 319. In the *Introduction to Metaphysics* Heidegger claims that a “‘Christian Philosophy’” is a round square and a misunderstanding’. *EM*, p. 9. *IM*, p. 8. See also, *UII-VI*, p. 118. However, a discussion of the significance of Heidegger’s relationship with Christianity is beyond the scope of this investigation.

⁴⁶As quoted by Heidegger in, *HH*, p. 98. *HHGR*, p. 89.

⁴⁷Trans. mod. *HH*, pp. 98-99. *HHGR*, p. 89.

emphasis.⁴⁸ As such, he draws on Hölderlin's *Germania* to develop his concept of earth, and Hölderlin is taken to name the earth both 'holy' and 'homeland'. Although *Germania* may suggest this homeland, it is in *The Rhine* that Heidegger believes this vision to be established.⁴⁹

That the homeland is an event of the future, and by implication *not* his contemporary political environment,⁵⁰ has been used as a means of defence for Heidegger's discussion of the homeland.⁵¹ Likewise, he claims that the 'fatherland' (*Vaterland*) is 'beyng itself' (*Seyn selbst*),⁵² which introduces an ambiguity and fluidity in his understanding of this homeland that makes it difficult to associate with an ethnic or national fascism. If the fatherland is 'beyng itself' then it is not the physical place of Germany. There is a legitimate question to be raised here of whether Heidegger is offering a subtle critique of the Nazi regime. Certainly, Heidegger's faith in the National Socialist regime is wavering, and this seems to increase his concern for the significance of nihilism. Will they simply be one more victim to the grasp of nihilism? He turns to Hölderlin's *The Rhine* because the earth has been 'pathless' (*weglos*) since the flight of the gods,⁵³ and the river Rhine is the water that shapes the land.⁵⁴ He takes this to suggest that what is at stake in *The Rhine* is the possibility of the overcoming of nihilism through the grounding of the truth of beyng. In this light, *The Rhine* is understood as a 'destiny' (*Schicksal*).⁵⁵ Through reflection on the 'origin', heard only by the demigods,⁵⁶ this part of the lecture series utilises Hölderlin's *The Rhine* to explore the possibility of grounding the 'enigma' (*Rätzel*) of what has 'purely arisen' (*Reinentsprungene*),⁵⁷ understood through the rubric of the 'homeland'.

⁴⁸Cf., however, Malpas, *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place*, pp. 143-144.

⁴⁹*HH*, pp. 222-225.

⁵⁰*HH*, p. 88.

⁵¹Phillips, *Heidegger's Volk*, pp. 169-217. See also, Malpas, *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place*, p. 64. Cf. Catherine H. Zuckert, 'Martin Heidegger: His Philosophy and His Politics', *Political Theory*, 18, 1 (1990), 51-79 (esp. pp. 58-59), and Bernasconi, 'Race and Earth in Heidegger's Thinking', pp. 59-60.

⁵²*HH*, p. 121.

⁵³*HH*, p. 93.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, p. 224.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, p. 206.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 199-203.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, p. 234.

3.2 Heidegger's Interpretation of Hölderlin through Thinking in Decision

Heidegger opens the lecture series with the claim that Hölderlin's poetry has a unique and privileged relationship with the future of the German people.⁵⁸ He has 'grounded the origin of another history',⁵⁹ and his work is the 'destiny' of the German people.⁶⁰ However, there is no consensus in scholarship on how best to make sense of the privilege Heidegger affords Hölderlin. Here, I pursue this. The significance of Hölderlin's poetry for Heidegger proves difficult to make sense of given that his critique of aesthetics implies that we cannot understand the status of Hölderlin as a choice on Heidegger's part.⁶¹ After evaluating the limitations of previous approaches to understanding the status of Hölderlin's poetry in Heidegger's work, I unpack a methodology of thinking that he develops in the *Contributions* called 'inceptual thinking', thinking in 'de-cision', or 'the inventive thinking of beyng' (*Das Erdenken des Seyn*). This provides the means for understanding the legitimacy of the prophet-like status of Hölderlin in his thought. This methodology is secured through his specific understanding of temporality, which privileges the future. Hence, Heidegger conceives of Hölderlin as a 'destiny' (*Geschick*) that is 'to come' (*künftig*).⁶² Nonetheless, there are questions to be raised around the privileging of Hölderlin's poetry in Heidegger's thought. Heidegger may justify this through his understanding of thinking through decision but, as we will see, some of the claims that he relies on the status of this poetry to establish are often without sufficient philosophical weight to be convincing. Worse, he utilises Hölderlin's work to establish the superiority of the German nation.

3.2.1 The Destiny of Hölderlin's Poetry in Context: A Critique of Aesthetics

The following declaration opens the lecture series:

A silence must be maintained around him for a long time to come, especially now, when 'interest' in him is thriving and 'literary history' is seeking new 'themes'. People write now about 'Hölderlin and his gods'. That is surely the most extreme

⁵⁸*HH*, p. 1. *HHGR*, p. 1.

⁵⁹Trans. mod. *Ibid*.

⁶⁰*HH*, p. 6. *HHGR*, p. 6.

⁶¹See, for example, *HH*, pp. 213-214. *HHGR*, p. 194. Heidegger claims '[t]his choice [of Hölderlin] is not some arbitrary selection made from among available poets. This choice is a historical decision'. I explore his critique of aesthetics, below.

⁶²*HH*, p. 1. *HHGR*, p. 1. See also, Janicaud, 'The "Overcoming" of Metaphysics in the Hölderlin Lectures', p. 388.

misinterpretation whereby this poet, who still lies ahead of the Germans, is conclusively stifled and made ineffectual under the illusion of now finally doing 'justice' to him. As if his work needed such a thing, especially on the part of the bad judges running around today. One treats Hölderlin 'historiographically' and fails to recognize the singular, essential point that his work, still without time or space, has already surpassed our historiographical rummagings and has grounded the origin of another history: that history that starts with the struggle over the decision concerning the arrival or flight of the God.⁶³

Heidegger believes that the significance of Hölderlin's poetry has so far eluded the German interpreters, despite the contemporary surge of excitement in his work. This implies that Heidegger sets out to address this state of affairs. Vadén argues that for Heidegger 'hearing the word of the poet means risking a change, of being swept away so that all safety is lost. Only from this vulnerable experience may truth grow'.⁶⁴ Following from this sentiment, Heidegger suggests that he does not intend to establish a definitive interpretation of his work but instead wishes to engage in Hölderlin's poetry in a way that leads the German people into the 'origin' that his poetry has 'already' established for the German people.⁶⁵ This already tells us that there is more at stake here than simply a 'historical confrontation'. A confrontation pursues the hidden meaning of being that conditions what a thinker has explicitly stated, preparing the possibility for a future history. Hölderlin, on the other hand, speaks to us from this other history. That Hölderlin is the 'most futural' (*zukünftigster*) of German poets is a conviction Heidegger maintains throughout this lecture series and beyond.⁶⁶ However, he clarifies that this is a future that should be thought of as an 'origin' (*Anfang*) that is still 'to come' (*künftig*). Hence, Hölderlin's poetry is still without 'time' and 'space'.

Heidegger's specific approach to interpreting this poet needs to be contextualised within his critique of aesthetics. If Hölderlin is a destiny, then Heidegger's privileging of Hölderlin should not be understood as an arbitrary

⁶³Trans. mod. *HH*, p. 1. *HHGR*, p. 1. 'Noch muß er lange Zeit verschwiegen werden, zumal jetzt, da das "Interesse" für ihn sich regt und die "Literaturhistorie" neue "Themen" sucht. Man schreibt jetzt über "Hölderlin und seine Götter". Das ist wohl die äußerste Mißdeutung, durch die man diesen den Deutschen erst noch bevorstehenden Dichter endgültig in die Wirkungslosigkeit abdrängt unter dem Schein, ihm nun endlich "gerecht" zu werden. Als ob sein Werk dieses nötig hätte, zumal von seiten der schlechten Richter, die heute umgehen. Man nimmt Hölderlin "historisch" und verkennt jenes einzig Wesentliche, daß sein noch zeit-raum-loses Werk unser historisches Getue schon überwunden und den Anfang einer anderen Geschichte gegründet hat, jener Geschichte, die anhebt mit dem Kampf um die Entscheidung über Ankunft oder Flucht des Gottes'.

⁶⁴Tera Vadén, *Heidegger, Žižek on Revolution* (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2014), p. 5.

⁶⁵*HH*, pp. 3-4. *HHGR*, pp. 3-4. Heidegger here distinguishes 'origin' (*Anfang*) from 'beginning' (*Beginn*). For example, the First World War began with certain skirmishes, but it had its origin 'centuries ago in the political and spiritual history of the Western world'.

⁶⁶*HH*, p. 6 and p. 146. See also, *BP*, p. 204.

aesthetical choice, where he prefers his work over, say, Goethe or Novalis.⁶⁷ Heidegger's choice of Hölderlin must transcend the region of the subject for the justification of the claim that a specific poet is a 'destiny' for a people would come from beyond one's personal tastes.⁶⁸ Instead, Hölderlin is unique in that he 'finds' a sense of being that approaches the German people through the poetic telling in the poem.⁶⁹ Heidegger's task in this lecture is to awaken the German people to this calling. He thus hopes the German people will come to 'stand in the domain in which poetry unfolds its power',⁷⁰ and so sets out to avoid launching a 'philosophical assault' on the poem.⁷¹ How and why this *must* be Hölderlin's poetry, however, is unclear, and his arguments to support this claim often leave a lot to be desired.⁷²

In the 1931/32 lectures on Plato, Heidegger asserts that if we are to understand in what way poetry makes 'beings more beingful', 'the philosopher must first cease to think of the problem of art in aesthetic terms'.⁷³ The significance of art thus does not lie in the domain of personal tastes. As he specifies, the essence of poetry should not be understood as the expression of lived experience in the sense of the poet's inner psychic life symbolised through metaphor.⁷⁴ He critiques Spengler, telling us that poetry is the expression of the soul of a group of people in the exact same way that bicycles and automobiles are. This approach thus fails to distinguish between poetry and other forms of the expression of a people. Likewise, Kolbenheyer argues that poetry is the biological necessity of the people, but as Heidegger points out: so is digestion!⁷⁵ This critique is reminiscent of his critique of truth understood as correctness. It is not wrong to say that the psychic life of the poet becomes expressed

⁶⁷HH, p. 220. Heidegger certainly liked these poets also. For example, when Heidegger discusses poetry (briefly) in the Plato lectures of 1931/32 Heidegger says Goethe, Shakespeare and Homer are examples of great poetry, whereas Hölderlin is not mentioned. *WWP*, p. 64. Nonetheless, although these poets do 'ground being', they do not get the very unique and specific treatment that Hölderlin receives in Heidegger's thought, as having a privileged place in relation to the destiny of the German people. It is likely that Heidegger does not mention Hölderlin in this list because he is still a destiny of the future, whereas the other poets are understood by him to have grounded being in the past.

⁶⁸See, for example, *HH*, pp. 19-20, pp. 25-42, and pp. 213-214. See also, *HH*, pp. 149-150. *HHGR* p. 131. Heidegger says, 'what calls upon us to concern ourselves with precisely this poetizing' is not 'some particular orientation of aesthetic taste'.

⁶⁹*HH*, pp. 31-33.

⁷⁰*HH*, p. 19. *HHGR*, p. 21. '[I]m Machtbereich der Dichtung stehen'.

⁷¹*HH*, p. 5.

⁷²For example, Heidegger argues that Hölderlin is the poet of the poets because he projected the German being the farthest. *HH*, p. 220. This simply begs the question. Instead of providing an argument for this claim Heidegger is substantiating his first claim with another. With little help from the primary sources we are left attempting to construct what reasoning underpins this.

⁷³*WWP*, p. 64.

⁷⁴*HH*, pp. 25-29. Heidegger expands this to include not just 'individual' expression but 'collective' expression also, in the sense of Spengler or Rosenberg.

⁷⁵*HH*, pp. 26-27.

in the poem, it is just inessential and derivative.⁷⁶ It would seem that the aesthetic approach attempts to save poetry from this critique by claiming that the poetic condensation of lived experience into poetic form results in a manifestation of beauty, the fruits of which are available to the perceiver to grasp through their subjective encounter.⁷⁷ However, because this relies on the notion of the subject, Heidegger concludes that these approaches fail to adequately grasp the essence of poetry and art.⁷⁸ The distinction between subject and object stems from an inadequate grasp of the nature of *aletheia*, which in Heidegger's view is responsible for the onset of nihilism.⁷⁹

On the contrary, Heidegger argues that poetry makes 'manifest' by way of a specific 'pointing' for a given historical people.⁸⁰ Utilizing Hölderlin's writing, Heidegger claims that this can occur because poetry is 'the beckoning [of the gods]

⁷⁶It is in this sense that Thomson rightly asserts that Heidegger is not anti-aesthetics, even if to consider a Heideggerian aesthetics would be 'oxymoronic'. Thomson, *Heidegger, Art and Postmodernity*, p. 41.

⁷⁷As he claims in his 1936 lectures on Nietzsche, aesthetics is the 'consideration of man's state of feeling in relation to the beautiful'. *NK*, p. 90. *NI*, p. 78. Therefore, Thomson contextualises Heidegger's critique within his critique of subjectivity. Thomson, *Heidegger, Art and Postmodernity*, p. 49. Heidegger explicitly argues this in his Nietzsche lectures. *NK*, pp. 89-92. This is the supposition of his claim in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* that art now 'belongs in the domain of the pastry chef'. *EM*, p. 140. *IM*, p. 146. (We might update this example and claim that for us today art belongs in the realm of the barista).

⁷⁸*HH*, pp. 28-29. See also, Thomson, *Heidegger, Art and Postmodernity*, pp. 47-49. Thomson reminds us that the term aesthetics comes from the Greek word '*aesthesis*', meaning feeling and sensation. By focusing on sensation, this is opposed to '*nöema*', or things that refer to the thought and the mind. In this way, an approach through aesthetics assumes from the outset that there is some significant divide between the art object (a product of mind) and the human subject (understood as a vehicle for physical sensation). Therefore, Thomson concludes that the underlying assumption of the aesthetical approach is that 'the modern subject must supposedly first get outside the immanent sphere of its own subjectivity so as to encounter this 'external' object, and then return back to its subjective sphere bearing the fruits of this encounter'.

⁷⁹Thus, Allen argues that the overcoming of aesthetics is part and parcel with Heidegger's attempt to overcome metaphysics. William S. Allen, *Ellipses: Of Poetry and the Experience of Language after Heidegger, Hölderlin, and Blanchot* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2007), p. 61. Developing this further, Thomson explores in what way aesthetics not only results from the inaccurate divide between subject and object but, in Heidegger's view, 'somersaults beyond itself' into late modern 'enframing'. Thomson, *Heidegger, Art and Postmodernity*, pp. 57-62. Heidegger also claims that aesthetics has its ground in contemporary 'liberal' humanity. *HH*, p. 28. It is unclear in what way Heidegger means 'liberalism' in this statement. Around this time, he uses this term more as a pejorative statement of dismissal rather than anything of philosophical content. He equates it with a kind of thinking that is concerned with 'opinions', which is to say, it considers truth to be housed within the opinion of the subject. It is likely that what he means is that both nihilism and aesthetic are grounded in the loss of the essence of *aletheia* that begins with Plato, as he argues in his lecture on Nietzsche. See, *NK*, pp. 89-108, for a brief sketch on his conception of the history of the development of the concept of aesthetics from the Ancient Greek world to the present day. In the *Nietzsche* lecture series, Heidegger's claims that just as the essence of truth begins to wane, so too does aesthetics begin. *NK*, p. 93. See also, Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art*, p. 9. Which is why in the *Origin of the Work of Art* he argues that the aesthetic approach to art relies on the problematic divide between 'matter' and 'form'. *UK*, p. 11. Heidegger repeats this claim in his lectures on Nietzsche, although there with reference to the Platonic '*eidos*' and 'Idea'. *NK*, pp. 93-94.

⁸⁰*HH*, pp. 30-31.

shrouded in word'.⁸¹ Hence, the essence of poetry could not be the further away from the expression of the poets lived experience. Instead, it is a 'founding'.⁸² The last line of Hölderlin's *Remembrance* testifies to this: '[y]et what remains, the poet found'.⁸³ What 'remains' are the beings we encounter in our everyday life, which show up in light of the historical meaning of being founded by the poet.⁸⁴ Heidegger's understanding of temporality is at play in the significance of this phrase. As the beings that remain (present) are founded (past) by a sense of being that approaches us (future). Hence, his task is not to make sense of Hölderlin by bringing him 'in line with the times' but instead to bring the German people under the power of his poetry.⁸⁵ In the case of Hölderlin at least, the poetic 'pointing' of the poem allows for the transition from the first to the other beginning for the German people.

3.2.2 Why Hölderlin?

Poetry is a 'power' that 'points' to a future. With this significance in mind, we can see why Heidegger sought to frame Hölderlin's poetry in terms of a destiny for a people, and not in terms of his own personal tastes. But why is Hölderlin the poet to realise this destiny? de Man raises this problem, pointing out that there is a significant difference for Heidegger between Hölderlin and other poets.⁸⁶ On what grounds can Heidegger claim that Hölderlin is not simply *his* favored poet, and not only the poet of poets, but he even goes as far as to suggest that Hölderlin's poetry must become the central encounter for all future philosophy.⁸⁷ His criticism of aesthetics is not strong enough to sustain this claim for it only tells us that the essence of art cannot be conceived in relation to its significance to a subject. Instead, great poetry is

⁸¹HH, p. 32. The specific passage Heidegger invokes here is from the poem *Rousseau*, where Hölderlin says '...and beckoning's are/ From time immemorial the language of the gods'.

⁸²HH, p. 33. 'Dichtung ist Stiftung'. See also, pp. 42-43, where Heidegger discusses who is 'speaking' in the poem. He admits that in a certain obvious sense, Hölderlin is the one who speaks. However, with an example from Hölderlin's *Bread and Wine*, '[t]he town is peaceful round about; the lane, lit up, falls silent,' Heidegger points out that it is the poetry that is speaking here, and not Hölderlin (as a subject). In this way, it is the town that is being brought to its truth through the poem.

⁸³HH, p. 33. 'Was bleibt aber, stiften die Dichter'.

⁸⁴HH, pp. 214-215.

⁸⁵HH, p. 4.

⁸⁶Paul de Man, *Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism*, 2nd rev. ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), pp. 252-255. In his 1946 text *What are Poets for?*, Heidegger claims that both Rilke and Hölderlin question the essence of poetry, but Hölderlin is nonetheless of higher rank. See, *WD*, p. 319 and p. 276.

⁸⁷BP, pp. 421-424. CP, pp. 333-335. 'The historical destiny of philosophy culminates in knowledge of the necessity to create a hearing for the words of Hölderlin'.

understood to be a prophetic ‘pointing’. However, his critique of aesthetics does not provide us with the means to evaluate which poets achieve this ‘pointing’, and on what basis they can be distinguished from other poets. Scholarship is thus divided on how exactly to understand this.

Some offer engaging explorations of the significance of this privileged place Hölderlin takes in Heidegger’s thought, but fail to adequately critically evaluate Heidegger’s choice of *this* poet amongst others.⁸⁸ As such, they simply take Heidegger at his word.⁸⁹ Others are not so favorable but, although this latter group

⁸⁸One exception to this is James Magrini, ‘Speaking the Language of Destiny: *Heidegger’s Conversations with Hölderlin*’, in *Philosophical Writings*, 42, 1 (2014), 34-52. However, Magrini commits many similar errors of other scholars that I survey below, effectively evading the problem of the philosophical means at Heidegger’s disposal to claim, with any authority, that Hölderlin is the destiny of authentic German being. For example, on p. 36, Magrini argues that Hölderlin poetizes the primal event of language thus leading the way to the ‘*Ereignis*’ (understood as the moment in which the gods re-enter into relation with *Dasein*). Magrini argues that the *Ereignis* is, for Heidegger, a poetic moment. With this established, he claims that this ‘indicates’ for Heidegger that Hölderlin’s poetry is the thinking and poetizing of *Dasein*’s destiny. Here, the question of how it is Hölderlin’s poetry that achieves this, and how this can be known by Heidegger, is evaded. He repeats this mistake on p. 45 in relation to Heidegger’s concept of earth, where it is claimed that ‘for Heidegger’, entering into relation to the earth happens through Hölderlin’s poetry. Yet the question still remains, why Hölderlin? Magrini attempts to soften this potential retort by claiming, on p. 47, that all poetry *like* Hölderlin’s poetry is born of the ‘festival’, (i.e., the encounter between gods and men). However, for Heidegger it is *only* Hölderlin who is this destiny, not those ‘like’ him. This manoeuvre is attempted again at the conclusion of the article, where he reminds us that the re-orientation toward the earth is crucial for Heidegger in the overcoming of nihilism and so, because Hölderlin attempts to re-awaken a relationship with the holy and orientate us to the earth, the Germans need a poet ‘like’ Hölderlin. He then concludes, ‘[t]hus, it is Hölderlin’s poetry that holds within it the fate of Germany and the West’ (p. 50). This is the clearest example of the fallacy of illicit transference at play throughout this attempt to elucidate Heidegger’s exaltation of Hölderlin, for Magrini moves from a particular law about poetry in general (i.e., some poets have the potential, in virtue of the power of poetry, to re-awaken us to the holy earth) to then ascribing one such poet, following Heidegger, as the sole possibility for this realisation. Although Magrini’s article very helpfully elucidates some of the philosophical concerns at play in Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin, and the particular temporal metaphysics that help rationalise the power Heidegger sees in poetry, the problem facing us when attempting to understand the authority Heidegger ascribes Hölderlin as a particular and special example of this potential within poetic reflection is evaded. As the discussion throughout this section elucidates, Magrini is in no way alone in avoiding this problem.

⁸⁹See, for example, Emad, ‘Heidegger’s Stance on Hölderlin in *Beiträge*’, pp. 359-381. In this article, Emad fails to critically evaluate Heidegger’s choice of Hölderlin as the poet of the future of philosophy. For example, on pp. 367-268, he accepts unequivocally that ‘the entire span of the first onset has been under the sway of the all-pervading Will’, and equally accepts without question that Hölderlin’s poetry ‘*is the “place” that shelters another appearing of be-ing and that this poetry resides straightaway in the other onset*’. His emphasis. As such, he boldly concludes (pp. 368-369) that ‘*this work [the Contributions]*’, ‘establishes’ a central ‘connection’ between Hölderlin and philosophy. His emphasis. All that is left for Emad to do, then, is discuss in the rest of the article the relationship between philosophy and poetry that makes the dialogue between the two possible. However, Heidegger does not establish this, *pace* Emad’s claim. Rather, he asserts that this is the case without sufficient qualification. See also, Janicaud, ‘The “Overcoming” of Metaphysics in the Hölderlin Lectures’, pp. 390-391. Although Janicaud does concede that Heidegger’s claim regarding Hölderlin is ‘daring’, in the end he follows the same tact as Emad. For example, he raises a critique of Heidegger’s position by Kommerell, but dismisses it without discussion as he is ‘not concerned with all the questions raised by a literary critic’. Kommerell thus assumes such questions (by a literary critique or otherwise) are invalid. But on what grounds? One would surely assume that one’s particular discipline does not exclude one from asking valid questions. Likewise, the significance of Hölderlin

might disparage what he does through his appropriation of Hölderlin's poetry, the question of the legitimacy of the choice of Hölderlin remains neglected.⁹⁰ Even Kommerell, largely critical of Heidegger's reading,⁹¹ and who 'was better placed than anyone to understand what Heidegger was attempting in his reading of Hölderlin' concedes that Hölderlin was a destiny.⁹² However, it is not that Hölderlin is *a* destiny but *the* destiny. Heidegger is clear on this. He is not the poet of the Germans as a 'genitivus subiectivus', like Rilke, Goethe, and Schiller, but as a 'genitivus obiectivus:

goes entirely unchallenged in Schuwer, 'Nature and the Holy', pp. 225-237. Similarly, for Zuckert, who argues '[p]eople had not understood the significance of Hölderlin's work [...] because they retained the "subjective", "liberal" understanding of poetry [...]. A true appreciate of the meaning of Hölderlin's poetry required the critique of the metaphysical tradition that Heidegger provided many years later'. Zuckert, 'Martin Heidegger: His Philosophy and His Politics', p. 59.

⁹⁰See, for example, Gethmann-Siefert, 'Heidegger and Hölderlin', pp. 59-88. Gethmann-Siefert is largely dismissive of how Heidegger uses Hölderlin to reduce action to interpretation, as she criticizes on p. 80. However, she fails to discuss this significance of Heidegger interpreting Hölderlin to secure this reduction. See, for example, pp. 66-67, where she explores a passage where Heidegger calls Hölderlin a destiny but continues as if Heidegger is talking about poetry in general. The question of why that it is solely and precisely Hölderlin that is the destiny is not raised at all. Grossman commits this same error also. Grossman, 'The Myth of Poetry: On Heidegger's Hölderlin', pp. 30-33. He also claims that Heidegger believes his philosophy is 'splendidly expressed' (p. 35) in Hölderlin's poetry, however Heidegger's critique of aesthetics means that, for Heidegger at least, we cannot understand the exaltation of Hölderlin in his thought this way. To do so would be to understand the significance of poetry as the expression of an individual's mind. Cf., however, Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art*, p. 73, n. 7. Although the reasons for Young's discomfort with Heidegger's use of Hölderlin fail to account for some of the ambiguities in Heidegger's understanding of time, he does to his credit find this exaltation of Hölderlin problematic. This is confined to a footnote however, and does not receive the critical evaluation it deserves. Rohkrämer takes note of the fact that Hölderlin is essential in Heidegger's vision for National Socialism but does not develop the philosophical grounds that allow him to make him 'the poet'. His emphasis. Thomas Rohkrämer, 'Heidegger and National Socialism: Great Hopes, Despair and Resilience', in *Reading Heidegger's Black Notebooks: 1931-41*, ed. by Ingo Farin and Jeff Malpas (London: The MIT Press, 2016), pp. 239-252 (p. 244). Farrell-Krell also argues that Heidegger's "'fatherlandly turn," is utterly foreign to the Hölderlin who is devoted to the dramatist Sophocles and to the polis'. Farrell-Krell, *Ecstasy, Catastrophe*, p. 40. As I will show below, Heidegger utilises Hölderlin in order to establish the 'fatherlandly turn' that Farrell-Krell mentions. Whether or not, however, this emphasis on the fatherland is within Hölderlin's work, this turn toward the fatherland is certainly a latent possibility present in Heidegger's thought, the basis for which is identifiable even in *Being and Time*. See the Conclusion to this study. Lacoue-Labarthe does offer us a critical analysis, calling Heidegger's engagement with Hölderlin a 'failure' for its attempt to step beyond the confines of meaningful philosophical discourse. Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, p. 12. Nonetheless, this dismissal fails to explore further what philosophical grounds sustain this exaltation. In this section, I pursue this. In doing so, I discover *pace* Lacoue-Labarthe, that there is sufficient philosophical resource within Heidegger's thought to sustain this position on the prophet status of Hölderlin, albeit one he utilises for, at times, disastrous ends.

⁹¹Farrel-Krell, *Ecstasy, Catastrophe*, p. 40. Janicaud also documents this. Janicaud, 'The "Overcoming" of Metaphysics in the Hölderlin Lectures', pp. 390-391.

⁹²Bernasconi, 'Poets as Prophets and as Painters', p. 150. However, in a letter to Heidegger, Kommerell asks him to distinguish between prophets in a religious sense, and prophets in a different sense. According to Bernasconi, Heidegger does as much in his lecture course on Hölderlin's *Andenken*, where he claims that poets are prophets in the Greek sense of 'foretelling'. Because the lecture course on Hölderlin's *Andenken* is beyond the confines of the time period of this investigation, however, a discussion of the development in Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin after the 1930s is beyond the scope of this project. Either way, we are still left wondering how Heidegger 'knows' that Hölderlin 'foretells' the destiny of the German people.

the poet who first poetizes the Germans'.⁹³ This seems too strong a claim for any meaningful philosophical discourse to have the resources to make.⁹⁴ Beyond subjective assertion, or personal vindication, from what source has Heidegger drawn this immense insight? This is not to argue against Heidegger's claim that poetry founds a people. Regardless of this claim, I am asking *why* it is *Hölderlin* who is understood by him to 'found' the German people and on what philosophical basis can this specific claim be made? If Hölderlin maintains this authority in his thought, and Heidegger draws on this authority to make philosophical claims about the nature of poetry, the relationship between philosophy and poetry, and the future of Germany and the West, then it is important to determine on what grounds this authority rests.

In an attempt to make sense of this, we can take an approach that looks at the issues where Heidegger and Hölderlin seem closely aligned in their thinking. There are clear resonances between Heidegger's own thought and what he sees occurring in Hölderlin's poetry. For example, Hölderlin's work often critiques the notion of subjectivity.⁹⁵ This is connected to Hölderlin's thoughts on language, where the human being is thought of as a kind of dialogue.⁹⁶ Heidegger agrees.⁹⁷ Another point of contact is the significance of the flight of the gods, an adequate encounter of which Heidegger understands to allow for a successful confrontation with nihilism.⁹⁸

Poetry can be a useful accompaniment and resource for philosophical reflection, and Heidegger found a likely companion in the poetry of Hölderlin. However, his claim relies on more than this. Hölderlin is said to be the poet of all poets and the destiny of the German people. This stretches what would be a legitimate companionship between a poet and a thinker to the status of a universality for *all* philosophy that seems hard to substantiate. Put another way, the status of Hölderlin in Heidegger's thought cannot be justified by drawing attention to influence of Hölderlin on Heidegger's thought because Hölderlin is understood by him to be

⁹³*HH*, p. 220. *HHGR*, p. 201. '[D]er Dichter, der die Deutzchen erst dichtet'.

⁹⁴Heidegger nonetheless insists that his use of Hölderlin as the destiny of Germany is *not* an arbitrary selection on his behalf. *HH*, pp. 213-214.

⁹⁵As I explored in the previous section, Heidegger's critique of subjectivity is essential for his understanding of the essence of truth. This critique is also a central part of his reading of Hölderlin's understanding of the 'holy'. *HH*, pp. 83-87. For an in dept discussion of the critique of subjectivity in both Hölderlin and Heidegger, see, Gosetti-Forencei, *Heidegger, Hölderlin and the Subject of Poetic Language*, esp. pp. 27-60.

⁹⁶Heidegger develops this by drawing on a fragment from an untitled poem: 'Much have humans experienced./ Named many of the heavenly./ Since we are a dialogue/ And can hear from one another'. *HH*, pp. 68-72. *HHGR*, pp. 62-65.

⁹⁷*HH*, pp. 76-77.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 81-83. See also, *BP*, pp. 27-29.

influence to the German nation as a whole. The way Heidegger presents it at least, his thesis on the significance of this poet draws attention to an influence that is occurring beyond his philosophical reflection.

Heidegger's fundamental concern in the 1930s is the transition from the first to the other beginning of Western thought through grounding of the truth of being.⁹⁹ Perhaps Emad provides a clue to understanding the relationship between Heidegger and Hölderlin's poetry when he explains how 'another appearing of being [...] one not referentially dependent upon the "Will"—is sheltered and preserved in Hölderlin's "poetizing"'.¹⁰⁰ That Heidegger's later notion of 'releasement' (*Gelassenheit*) draws influence from Hölderlin, and that Heidegger saw this notion as critical in the transcendence of metaphysics, is perhaps influential in his exaltation in Heidegger's thinking. Against this, the term 'releasement' does not gain significant ground in his thinking until mid-way through his Nietzsche lecture series, in 1937-40,¹⁰¹ which precedes his claim in this lecture series that he is the 'poet of the poet'¹⁰² and the future of the German people.¹⁰³ Moreover, Emad's explanation still leaves us having to accept that the critique of the 'will' is the central tenant of the overcoming of metaphysics and that the possibility of this is foretold and has the potential to be realised solely through engagement with Hölderlin's work. Further, this again draws on the influence of Hölderlin on Heidegger's thought, and so does not succeed in establishing the legitimacy of the claim that Hölderlin is the founder of the German people and the future hope for Western thought.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹*BP*, p. 78. As Brencio points out, after the failure of *Being and Time* (due to its reliance on the language of metaphysics), Hölderlin becomes an 'instrument' for Heidegger in 're-signifying mankind's linguistically'. This is certainly a use Heidegger makes of the poet. However, because this conceives of Hölderlin as an instrument *for Heidegger*, it undermines his claim that Hölderlin is a 'destiny' for the German people beyond Heidegger's own philosophical views. Francesca Brencio, 'Foundation and Poetry: Heidegger as a Reader of Hölderlin', *Studia Philosophiae Christianae*, 49, 4 (2013), 181-200 (p. 194).

¹⁰⁰Emad, 'Heidegger's Stance on Hölderlin in *Beiträge*', p. 359.

¹⁰¹In fact, in this lecture series the 'will' maintains a central importance in Heidegger's thinking. See, for example, *HH*, p. 144. *HHGR*, p. 126, where he claims, that the 'truth of a people is that manifestness of being out of which the people knows what it wills historically in willing *itself*, in willing to be itself'. His emphasis. See also, Section 4.3 of this study.

¹⁰²His emphasis. *HH*, p. 30. 'Dichter des Dichters'.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, p. 255.

¹⁰⁴Another reason Heidegger gives for this claim is that Hölderlin poetizes *about* poetry, i.e., the essence of poetry is poetized in his poetry. *HH*, pp. 30-40. A number of commentators explore the significance of the performative and poetic language throughout Heidegger's development at this time, and because the meaning of being occurs through the language that articulates it, Heidegger could have seen Hölderlin as key in articulating this new way of speaking the truth of being. Vallega-Nua, 'Poietic Saying', p. 66, and Magrini, 'Speaking the Language of Destiny', p. 35. See also, *BP*, p. 78. However, this reasoning falters, for it is difficult to believe that Hölderlin is the only German poet available and known to Heidegger who reflected on the essence of poetry. In fact, in his 1946 text

Bernasconi instead contextualises the promise of Hölderlin's poetry in the political time, reminding us that there was a surge of excitement for Hölderlin's poetry in Nazi Germany.¹⁰⁵ Although Heidegger does not justify his encounter with Hölderlin in this way, his 'Preliminary Remarks' to this lecture series acknowledge Hölderlin's growing popularity. However, this explains Heidegger's exaltation of Hölderlin as a historical contingency and Heidegger makes it clear that the poet does not 'bring the psychic import of our time into poetic form'.¹⁰⁶ Therefore, if we accept Bernasconi's argument then we must reject Heidegger's own understanding of the significance of Hölderlin because, although 'interest' in him is 'thriving', his position is that Hölderlin has not yet become the political and philosophical force he is destined to be.¹⁰⁷ Bernasconi illuminates a necessary dimension here, but we must remember that, in Heidegger's view at least, he is privy to a certain insight that is precisely *not* reflected by the contemporary time. Thus, it is his engagement with Hölderlin that aids in the transition to the other beginning.

The most convincing justification Heidegger provides for the status of Hölderlin is somewhat along these lines. Heidegger demands a dialogue between thinking and art, but this is not to equate them. Instead, thinking and art are inextricably "'near" to each other'. When the thinker reflects on this 'nearness', 'the poet becomes a destiny'.¹⁰⁸ Perhaps reflecting on this 'nearness', he tells us that for the 'builders building a new world', i.e., the legislators, Hölderlin is understood to be a force that directs this world.¹⁰⁹ Heidegger tells us that we cannot know who the legislators are, although it would seem that he is exempt from this claim.¹¹⁰ It is only those like him—the 'world-builders'—who have the capacity to understand the significance of this poet and recognise the legitimacy of his claim. He thus dismisses

What are Poets for?, he claims that both Rilke and Hölderlin question the essence of poetry, but Hölderlin is nonetheless of higher rank. See, *WD*, p. 319 and p. 276, respectively. Again, we are left wondering on what grounds this highest rank can be established? Fundamentally, would it not be a more reasonable position for Heidegger to claim that he agrees with what Hölderlin takes to be the significance of poetry? Or is *influenced* by his understanding? It is another speculative jump to argue that this holds for all poetry. It would seem that his belief in the prophet-like nature of Hölderlin's work affords him this jump. These claims thus mutually support each other, but neither have adequate philosophical ground to support them. In this light, the argument remains unconvincing.

¹⁰⁵Bernasconi, 'Poets as Prophets and as Painters', pp. 147-148 and p. 156.

¹⁰⁶*HH*, p. 251. *HHGR*, p. 227.

¹⁰⁷*HH*, p. 195.

¹⁰⁸Trans. mod. *TE*, p. 282.

¹⁰⁹*HH*, p. 221. *HHGR*, p. 202. 'Hölderlin ist Kündler und Rufer für die, die es angeht, die selbst in eine Berufung als Bauleute am neuen Bau der Welt gestellt sind'.

¹¹⁰*HH*, p. 251. *HHGR*, p. 228. 'Man kann daher auch nie unmittelbar aus dem jeweils Heutigen her sagen, ob einer ein Schaffender ist; man kann höchstens sagen, daß er es nicht ist'. 'For this reason too, one can never directly say, on the basis of whatever is in each case contemporary, whether someone is a creator. At most, one can say that he is not'.

the need to qualify the prophet-like status he attributes Hölderlin as it is ‘superfluous to provide lengthy assurances [on] [...] what calls on us [i.e., Heidegger] to concern ourselves with precisely this poetizing’.¹¹¹ Understanding Heidegger’s methodology of thinking through ‘decision’ provides the philosophical weight behind this claim.

3.2.3 Thinking Through Decision

Heidegger informs us that ‘[t]his choice [of Hölderlin] is not some arbitrary selection made from among available poets. This choice is a historical decision’.¹¹² This claim evokes an understanding of thinking that he develops in the *Contributions* called ‘inceptual thinking’ (*Das anfängliche Denken*), through which one is able to think through ‘decision’ (*Ent-scheidung*).¹¹³ A proper understanding of what this means sheds light on Heidegger’s approach to Hölderlin’s poetry and clarifies why he is not in a position to justify the status of Hölderlin through anything more than assertion. He contrasts inceptual thinking with the ‘ordinary determination’ of thinking, which he conceives of as a form of Platonism. This is when thinking is understood as (some form of) the representation of the Idea as the most ‘common’ or ‘general’ aspects of the thing, a form of thinking that has governed the history of philosophy.¹¹⁴ Inceptual thinking, on the other hand, is a kind of ‘projection’ where ‘rank’ (*rangsetzung*) and ‘decision’ can be established by the few who are capable of achieving it.¹¹⁵ As a projection which establishes ‘rank’ by way of ‘decision’ by the ‘few’, Heidegger’s understanding of the significance of the liberator informs this kind of thinking. He then names three ‘essential grounds’ for this decision: 1. Hölderlin is the poet of poets and poetizing, 2. He is the poet of the Germans, 3. He has not yet become the force in the history of the German people.¹¹⁶ Appearing more as evasion and distraction, these claims again fail to establish the grounds of the decision for the status of Hölderlin as the poet of the Germans and instead only clarify what Heidegger sees at work in Hölderlin’s work. Through reflection on inceptual thinking, or thinking through decision, I reconstruct what philosophical precedent might underpin this ‘historical decision’.

¹¹¹ *HH*, p. 149. *HHGR*, p. 131.

¹¹² *HH*, pp. 213-214. *HHGR*, p. 194.

¹¹³ *BP*, p. 66. *CP*, p. 53.

¹¹⁴ *BP*, p. 63. *CP*, p. 51.

¹¹⁵ *BP*, p. 66 and p. 96. *CP*, p. 53 and p. 76.

¹¹⁶ *HH*, pp. 213-214. *HHGR*, pp. 194-195.

In the *Contributions* Heidegger distinguishes his use of ‘decision’ from ‘choice’ (*Wahl*). He elaborates that if choice is a selection of one thing over the other ‘decision refers to the surrendering itself [of thinking]’ that ‘separates’ (*scheidet*), and so let’s ‘come into play’, the ‘undecided’ ‘open realm’, ‘belonging to [...] the human being as the one who grounds being’.¹¹⁷ This draws on his sense of the reciprocity of being-open to a sending of being, where it is through an openness toward being (responding to its ‘call’) that the meaning of being can be constituted and grounded. We encountered this in the previous chapter also, where the Ideas are established by the legislator through his or her being free *for* the Ideas. I suggested that this was best conceived as a disposition or mood through which the liberator thought. He calls this mood ‘restraint’ (*Verhaltenheit*), and with ‘inceptual thinking’ he is developing a kind of thought that can emerge when one properly succumbs to this mood.¹¹⁸

Although in the previous chapter I focussed on Heidegger’s methodology of ‘confrontation’, his understanding of the significance of decision remained in the background. In the *Contributions*, Heidegger claims that with Plato and Aristotle thinking was still ‘creative’,¹¹⁹ by which he means that Plato was (implicitly at least) thinking in ‘decision’ (in Heidegger’s sense). Necessarily so. Without this creativity at play, the ‘domain’ that defines the modern nihilistic world, where beings ‘abandonment’ is ‘forgotten’, would not have been sufficiently grounded, or so Heidegger contends.¹²⁰ In so far as this is the case, all thinking has been ‘*subsequent*, in the sense that it merely provides to the things that have [already] been interpreted their most general features’.¹²¹ Hence, the previous chapter explored a ‘decision’ for the essence of truth by Plato, where through a confrontation with this decision the meaning of the essence of truth was to be opened up again for decision by Heidegger.¹²² Therefore, Heidegger re-claims (or, re-defines and establishes) the

¹¹⁷Emphasis removed. *BP*, p. 88. *CP*, p. 70.

¹¹⁸*BP*, p. 65. *CP*, p. 52.

¹¹⁹*BP*, p. 64.

¹²⁰*Ibid.*

¹²¹His emphasis. *Ibid.*, p. 63. Emad claims that it is only in this sense of decision that Descartes’s ‘*cogito*’, Hegel’s ‘absolute spirit’, Nietzsche’s ‘overman’, etc., was determined and thus could establish the meaning of being throughout history. Emad, *On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy*, pp. 88-108, esp. p. 99. However, Heidegger might reply that they could not achieve the heights that Plato did. Hence, the history of the meaning of being in the West is for him determined by Platonism, and not, as Emad suggests, Descartes and Hegel. The issue of Nietzsche is slightly more complex, and Heidegger does argue that Nietzsche achieves the height of decision. Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche is the subject of the next chapter of this study. See esp., Section 4.1.

¹²²Hence, Vallega-Neu unpacks the sense in which Heidegger wishes to give the German word ‘*Entscheidungen*’ as ‘occurrences that contain a break or a cut’ articulating both ‘a closure and an opening’. ‘To be in decision’, she explains, ‘means to be in this unbridgeable difference, exposed to it,

essence of truth as *aletheia* and for the first time (in his view) attempts to articulate the significance of untruth and concealment thus propelling us to the other beginning. The sense here is that thinking through decision is the unthought foundation of all essential thinking throughout the history of being.¹²³ It is the basic, and generally implicit, standpoint of a thinker that through its articulation in the text unfolds the meaning of being through history. By establishing this kind of thinking as a mode of thought that the liberators must utilise, they can ‘confront’ the philosophical foundations that have led to the modern nihilistic world and ground a new sense of being for their people.¹²⁴

This connection with creativity and art is important. In *The Will to Power as Art* Heidegger argues that thinking through decision is reflected in what Nietzsche calls the ‘grand style’ (*der große Stil*). Art is understood to be the greatest stimulant to life because it ‘conducts one into the sphere of command of the grand style’.¹²⁵ This is because ‘art places the whole of Dasein in decision and keeps it there’,¹²⁶ and so the grand style is the epitome of ‘artistic actuality’ (*Kunstwirklichkeit*).¹²⁷ So, if an historical confrontation is the attempt to engage with the implicit and unthought meaning of being in the thesis of another thinking (an activity of thought), then this is only to propel the legislator into a space in which they can ground a new truth (an activity of art).¹²⁸ It might be useful to recall the early flash of insight from the *Black Notebooks* that I drew on in the previous chapter, where being is thought of as a kind of poetry.¹²⁹ Being is the ‘poetic’ ‘uniqueness’ that establishes a people. Decisional thinking is a poetic response to being as it establishes what Heidegger calls the ‘turning’ of being toward *Dasein*.¹³⁰ Decision is thus unavailable to representational thought. This is because representational thought only re-presents the meaning of being and so it cannot think the unique and intimate relationship being has with *Dasein*, as this lies in the grounds of concealment and so is hidden from re-

and called to take a stance on it’. Daniella Vallega-Neu, ‘Thinking in Decision’, *Research in Phenomenology*, 33, 1 (2003), 247-263 (p. 248).

¹²³Here, I mean ‘essential’ in Heidegger’s sense of ‘*Wesung*’. See, *BP*, p. 66. ‘[A]lles Wesen ist Wesung’. ‘[A]ll essence is essencing’.

¹²⁴*BP*, pp. 56-60.

¹²⁵*NK*, p. 153. *NI*, p. 130. ‘Stimulans, das heißt: in den Befehlsbereich des großen Stils zwingen’.

¹²⁶*NK*, p. 147. *NI*, p. 125. ‘Kunst stellt das ganze Dasein in die Entscheidung, hält es darin’.

¹²⁷*NK*, p. 145. *NI*, p. 124.

¹²⁸Hence, the seeing of the Ideas is necessarily an interpretive and creative act for Heidegger. Although this is not to say that the essence of art and the essence of this style of thinking is equal, Heidegger explicitly uses art as an example of the kind of style at work in this kind of thinking. *BP*, p. 69.

¹²⁹*UII-VI*, pp. 14-15. *PII-VI*, p. 12.

¹³⁰*BP*, pp 63-65. See also, Section 4.6 of this study.

presentation. Hence, in the *Contributions* inceptual thinking is not the attempt to grasp a ‘concept’ (*Begriff*). Instead it is the ‘epitome’ (*inbegriff*) that is accompanied by a ‘comprehensive grasp’ (*Zusammengriff*) of the relationship between *Dasein* and being, i.e., the turn (*Kehre*).¹³¹ Originally, thinking did not comprehend what ‘was’. Rather, by establishing the relationship between *Dasein* and the meaning of being thinking grounded what *is*. Being is thus thought and determined in response to the thinking that thinks it.¹³² For Heidegger, this must occur through the rooting to nature (or, concealment) that is afforded through a *poetic* response.¹³³ Thus, the future of philosophy demands a confrontation with poetry.¹³⁴

Although ‘decision’ is a human act, occurring through a particular individual legislative projection, it should be still thought of as the essence of being itself.¹³⁵ This is because when being reaches words, through the projection of the legislator, what occurs is the event (*Ereignis*).¹³⁶ The following passage reflects the significance of this for thinking through decision:

The inventive thinking of the truth of being is essentially projection. By its very essence, such a projection, in being carried out and unfolded, must place itself back into that which it opens. This might make it seem that where the projection reigns, there is arbitrariness and a wandering about in what is ungrounded. Yet the projection places itself precisely on the ground and in that way first transforms itself into the necessity to which it is related from the ground up, although in a still hidden way prior to its enactment.¹³⁷

Here, Heidegger concedes that it may seem there is a certain arbitrariness in thinking through decision, where through a projection (or fundamental stance) the legislator establishes and grounds the significance of things. But it is not so clear-cut, and he rejects that it should be understood as an arbitrary process. Does the legislator simply ground what he or she sees fit? Or do they ground something specific, namely the truth of being as concealed? Heidegger discourages the first possibility. The

¹³¹Ibid. As I unpack in the conclusion to the next chapter however, this incorrectly suggests that the ‘turn’ (*Kehre*) is a reciprocal relationship between *Dasein* and being, whereas instead, it is the ‘togetherness’ of these ‘two’ thought as ‘one’. Sheehan, ‘*Kehre* and *Ereignis*’, pp. 3-16. See also, Section 4.6 of this study.

¹³²Vallega-Neu, ‘Poietic Saying’, pp. 66-80.

¹³³See, *HH*, p. 257. *HHGR*, p. 233 and, *HH*, p. 258. *HHGR*, p. 234. See also, Section 3.5, below.

¹³⁴*HH*, pp. 184-185. This is also what Heidegger is exploring in his 1944 *Introduction to Philosophy: Thinking and Poietizing*, the last (and unfinished) lecture course he gave before the end of the Second World War.

¹³⁵*BP*, pp. 83-84.

¹³⁶*BP*, p. 80. As Vallega-Neu argues, thinking through decision is a kind of thinking that ‘finds itself in this decision and at the same time occurs as this decision’. Vallega-Neu, ‘Thinking in Decision’, p. 248. See also, *BP*, p. 95. *CP*, p. 75, being occurs ‘in the ap-proprietion [Er-eignung] of de-cision’, which should be understood as the appropriation of being that occurs through decision.

¹³⁷*BP*, p. 56. *CP*, p. 45.

projection places itself into the ‘ground’, which echoes the significance of being ‘rooted’ into nature. By placing itself into this ground, the projection is transformed into the ‘necessity’ to which it relates, namely grounding the truth of being as a concealed phenomenon. In so far as this truth is in its concealment then it cannot be the establishment of some *thing*. Hence, what is arbitrary is *not* that the legislators can ground whatever they want. Instead, it is that they must decide *who* is the one to speak the truth of being. This still boils down to a choice on Heidegger’s part, and so the projection is arbitrary because Heidegger could have found another poet in whose words he could ground this concealment had he wished to do so. Regardless, Heidegger’s answer is clear, it is Hölderlin who will ‘point’ the German people to this concealment.¹³⁸ However, a reflection on temporality shows us why Heidegger would not have understood this as an arbitrary choice on his behalf.

The claim that Hölderlin is a ‘future’ that is ‘to come’ brings temporality to the fore. For Heidegger, temporality is the ‘prevailing forward of that which has been into the future—which, directed backward, opens up that which earlier already readied itself as such—there prevails the approach of a coming (*das Zu-kommen*) and a still-presencing (future and having-been) in one: originary time’.¹³⁹ He distinguishes this from ‘vulgar’ time, which is clock time or time as a series of ‘now’ points. Instead, Heidegger is interested in ‘originary time’. As a vessel for the truth of being poetry is grounded in this sense of time.¹⁴⁰ Hölderlin calls this the ‘time that tears’ and Heidegger says that this is because it is the ‘oscillation that tears us into the future and casts us back into having-been’.¹⁴¹ ‘Originary time’ is therefore a ‘power’ through which we can re-establish a relationship with ourselves and the world.¹⁴²

¹³⁸Heidegger tells us in his *The Event* that ‘[i]n truth, Hölderlin serves for the interpretation of an attempt to think the inceptuality of the beginning’. *TE*, p. 291. By which, Heidegger means that his poetry arises out of ‘being itself’, i.e., concealment. *Ibid.*, p. 292. But to claim this relies on an ‘interpretation’, which Heidegger distinguishes from ‘commentary. A commentary is an ‘appendage’ to a poem, whereas an interpretation must bring the poets ‘utterance of the enduring’, i.e. concealment, to ‘language’. *Ibid.*, p. 293. The focus here, then, is still on Heidegger’s work as a philosopher to establish the significance that he sees in this particular poetry.

¹³⁹*HH*, p. 109. *HHGR*, p. 99.

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*

¹⁴¹*Ibid.*

¹⁴²*HH*, pp. 140-141. This is the temporal mechanism behind the ‘event’ (*Ereignis*). *Ibid.*, pp. 55-57. *HHGR*, pp. 53-54. Heidegger argues that, ‘the time of the peaks is long, because on the peaks reigns a persistent waiting for and awaiting the event [*Ereignis*]’. Heidegger calls this a long time because it is a ‘making ready for the true that shall once come to pass [*sich ereignen*]’. Again, note here that this ‘making ready for the true’ will ‘once’ come to pass. This ‘once’ is the ‘moment’ (*Augenblick*). *HH*, pp. 110-113. As Magrini points out, this exceeds the possibility of ‘resolute anticipation’ in *Being and Time*, for it is not simply the realisation of my finitude through anxiety-toward-my-own-death but, instead, this ‘foretells and announces the proximate arrival of Dasein’s destiny in the event of the *Ereignis*’. Magrini, ‘Speaking the Language of Destiny’, p. 37.

When Heidegger says that Hölderlin is the destiny that ‘approaches’, he means it in this sense of the future. Thus, the contemporary excitement for Hölderlin’s work *could* have been read by Heidegger as the awakening within the people of the ‘anticipation’ of the power within Hölderlin’s work, of which his job, as a legislative philosopher, is to aid them in experiencing, realising, and interpreting in the light that he sees fit. The passage from the *Contributions* nonetheless reveals that there is a certain arbitrariness at work here, despite Heidegger’s claim otherwise.

This is because as a future which is ‘to come’, Hölderlin is not the ‘actual’ future of Germany waiting to be realised (in the sense of time as a series of now points), but a *possible* coming ap-propriative event that required seizing and establishing via a projection through philosophical interpretation. To select Hölderlin as the destiny of Germany is at base an arbitrary choice, by which I mean that another poet could have been picked by Heidegger had he wished to do so. As a ‘historical decision’ however, it cannot be presented as such. As the passage from the *Contributions* clarifies, ‘[i]f [successfully] unfolded, the projection loses every semblance of self-aggrandizement [...] What is opened by it has persistence only in the grounding that shapes history. What is projected in the projection overpowers the projection itself and justifies it’.¹⁴³ Which is to say, if Heidegger’s philosophical project had been a success, Hölderlin would be, and would be seen to have always been, the destiny of the German people. *But only retrospectively so*, which is to say, he would have been seen as such from the point of view of the people of *that* time, in the ‘vulgar’ or ‘derivative’ sense of the future.¹⁴⁴ Until such time, and whilst it is still

¹⁴³*BP*, 56. *CP*, p. 45. In the *Black Notebooks*, he has a similar defence of National Socialism, where only *if* it leads to a ‘great future of the people’ will it be its ‘greatness’, which Heidegger, also in the same passage, claims that it already is. *UII-VI*, p. 150. *PII-VI*, p. 110. Notice here, then, that it within the future that its present greatness is secured.

¹⁴⁴Richardson calls this ‘re-col-lective’ thought (*Andenken*), where Heidegger conceives that the tri-dimensional structure of time allows the ‘Being process’ to ‘[come] ("future") to the thinker in and through what already has-been ("past") and is rendered manifest ("present") by the words that the thinker himself formulates’. Richardson, *Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 21. Young also recognises the importance of recollective thinking for Heidegger, but attributes this ‘kind’ of thinking as a poetic thinking, in contrast to both meditative thinking and representational thinking. Young, *Heidegger’s Later Thinking*, p. 18. Young argues that fundamental thought requires both meditative thinking (*Denken*) and recollective thinking (*Andenken*). Like Vallega-Neu, Young connects recollective thinking specifically to poetic thinking. Vallega-Neu, ‘Poetic Sayings’, pp. 66-80. Young claims that Heidegger’s later thought is a mixture of poetic thinking and recollective thinking. Kockelmans agrees that there is a distinction between these two, and holds that poetic thinking belongs to the poets and recollective thinking to the thinkers. Kockelman, *Heidegger on Art and Artworks*, p. 77 and p. 197. However, Kockelman also points out that Heidegger himself seemed unsure of the specifics of this distinction, and that essential thinking is neither of these things, although Heidegger characterises the difference only negatively as an ‘abyss of difference’. *Ibid.*, pp. 195-197. Heidegger’s ‘thinking in decision’ effectively combines both of these kinds of poetic and philosophical thinking through the figure of the legislator. We see this exemplified in his 1944/45 lecture series *Introduction*

the time of the creators, Hölderlin can only be articulated by them (which is to say, chosen) as if he were, unfolding this projection for the good of the people. Put another way, once the ‘power’ of Hölderlin’s poetry has been successfully ‘grounded’ through the projection of the legislators (i.e., Heidegger), it is only *then* that this projection is not arbitrary, for by then Heidegger’s interpretation of Hölderlin’s poetry has successfully ‘opened’ the ‘truth of beyng’, ‘transforming’ itself into the truth that Heidegger claims that is already is at the time of the lecture series. Therefore, Heidegger cannot ground this assertion in any meaningful philosophical basis but instead must do so performatively and poetically (or ‘self-aggrandizingly’ through ‘projection’, as he puts it above), claiming it as if it already is to prepare the ground for it to be so.¹⁴⁵

However, to conceive of the framework of Hölderlin’s significance in this way misunderstands the mechanisms behind Heidegger’s concept of temporality, precisely because the ‘future’ is ‘now’ through its anticipation, which in this instance is the ‘power’ of the poetry that Heidegger seeks to unfold to his audience. Utilising this kind of time is thus reserved for the ‘creators’, who legislate with a time of ‘their own tide’ (*eigenes Fluten*) and ‘law’ (*Gesetz*),¹⁴⁶ separated from the time of the people by an ‘abyss’ (*Abgrund*).¹⁴⁷ Once the projection has grounded history it subsequently justifies the groundlessness of this choice for it is only *through* the projection of the legislator that reality is grounded in the first place.¹⁴⁸ By utilising a poet that he sees

to Philosophy, when he says Nietzsche ‘as a thinker is a poet’, and Hölderlin who ‘as a poet is a thinker’. *IP*, p. 6. As he later claims (p. 13), ‘In Nietzsche and Hölderlin’s thinking and poetizing, poetizing and thinking are interwoven with one another in a single and wondrous way, if not completely joined together’.

¹⁴⁵For more on this, see, Vallega-Nua, ‘Poietic Saying’, p. 66, and Magrini, ‘Speaking the Language of Destiny’, p. 35. See also, *BP*, p. 78.

¹⁴⁶*HH*, p. 52. Heidegger utilises Hölderlin to make this claim, when Hölderlin writes that ‘the times of the creator are/ Like a mountain range billowing high/ From sea to sea/ That draws across the Earth’. *Ibid. HHGR*, pp. 50-51.

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸On this see also, *BP*, pp. 368-370. *CP*, pp. 291-292. In this passage Heidegger distinguishes between the belief of the legislators and the belief of the masses. The latter is understood as derivative, as it is a taking as true without sufficient ground. The belief of the legislators, on the other hand, is understood as authentic knowledge, for the legislators are understood by him to be ‘abiding in the essence of truth’. Emphasis removed. Therefore, he concludes that ‘questioners of this kind are the original and proper believers [...] this belief is persistence in the extreme decision [of the essence of truth]. Only such belief can bring our history to a grounded one once again’. Hence, de Mann is correct to assert in his *Blindness and Insight* that for Heidegger, Hölderlin is the ‘witness’ to being, but when he asks (p. 254) ‘why [this witness] must [...] be Hölderlin’ he is unable to provide a satisfactory answer. As he rightly obfuscates, (p. 252) ‘Heidegger is the thinker who has shoved aside all available authorities [...] why would he spare Hölderlin in particular? It is not because Hölderlin is a poet, for we know from the Rilke study that poets are just as capable of "error" as metaphysicians’. De Mann’s reply to this (pp. 254-264) is unsatisfactory, however, because it relies on the affinity Heidegger sees between Hölderlin’s thoughts on the essence of poetry and his own. I have already shown this answer to be

promise in, Heidegger sees himself as directly preparing this event 'to come', 'configuring' and 'grounding' the truth of being for a people 'today'.¹⁴⁹ In this light, he is being most honest when he claims that 'in our [Heidegger's] thoughtful and philosophical endeavour to empower the essence of poetry, we [Heidegger] have chosen Hölderlin'.¹⁵⁰

Lacoue-Labarthe argues that Heidegger uses Hölderlin to transgress the 'limit of philosophy'.¹⁵¹ For him, this limit is established by the project of fundamental ontology and its commitment to not producing a 'new thesis on Being',¹⁵² instead serving only to describe the pre-conditions in which these theses can be produced. Although thinking in decision could be seen to be precisely this, i.e., a description of the pre-conditions for which a thesis of being is produced, we also see that Heidegger utilises this insight to ground his own truth of being, namely the truth of being as concealed and as foretold in Hölderlin's poetry. Likewise, Lacoue-Labarthe claims that Heidegger 'indulged' and transgressed this limit on two occasions: his political commitment as rector in 1933/34, and his use of Hölderlin, both of which allowed him to 'step beyond strict questioning' and instead seek to 'herald' a new beginning of thought.¹⁵³ Perhaps the problem he points to can be illustrated with greater ease through Koch, who explores the significance of the difference between prescriptive and descriptive philosophical practises for evaluating Heidegger's support of National Socialism.¹⁵⁴ There are differences between these two commentators. For Lacoue-

inadequate. Instead, Hölderlin does not risk error simply because Heidegger decides that he does not. Heidegger does require a witness to being, and he 'believes' that it is Hölderlin, in the sense of 'belief' described in this passage from the *Contributions*.

¹⁴⁹Cf., however, *BP*, p. 422. *CP*, p. 334, where Heidegger claims that 'a preparation of thought must occur in order to interpret Hölderlin. To "interpret" does of course not mean here to make "understandable"; instead, it means to ground the projection of the truth of his poetry in the meditation and disposition wherein future Da-sein oscillates'. One could thus counter that there is a dialogue happening between the poet and the thinker, a poet who has indeed been to the 'other beginning' of Western philosophy, 'transported' out of his time, as Heidegger tells us in *HH*, p. 1. Even if this were true (and the notion of temporality that this would require us to think seems dubious and a stretch too far), it still requires Heidegger to 'ground' this projection. It seems to me much more straightforward to see the emphasis of this claim on Heidegger's act of 'grounding' rather than the semi-mystical way he in certain moments portrays the act of 'poetizing'. Indeed, I think in light of Heidegger's understanding of thinking in decision, the mystical conception of a poetry poetizing from other beginnings is preceded by the inceptual thinking that determines that this is the case and unfolds it as such.

¹⁵⁰My emphasis. *HH*, p. 222. *HHGR*, p. 202. The statement reads, 'Das bisher Gesagte mag genügen, um zu verdeutlichen, weshalb wir in der denkerisch-philosophischen Bemühung um die Ermächtigung der Macht des Wesens der Dichtung Hölderlin gewählt haben'.

¹⁵¹Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, pp. 3-4 and p. 12.

¹⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁵³*Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹⁵⁴William Koch, 'Phenomenology as Social Critique', in *Horizons of Authenticity in Phenomenology, Existentialism, and Moral Psychology: Essays in Honor of Charles Guignon*, ed. by Hans Pederson

Labarthe, Heidegger betrays his own claim to be evaluating the history of philosophy, which searches for the means to articulate the non-historical experiences that inform this history.¹⁵⁵ Koch instead distinguishes the difference between, on the hand, describing what something is and, on the other, imposing one's own sense on what it should or *could* be.¹⁵⁶ Either way, the sentiment is the same. Heidegger's use of Hölderlin betrays his own commitments to a strictly descriptive practice, where one does not impose one's sense on things and instead reveals them for what they are.¹⁵⁷

Yet there is solid foundation within Heidegger's philosophy to make the move toward a prescriptive phenomenology. De Beistegui reminds us that Heidegger's project in phenomenology, with its emphasis on concrete, factual, life, was always to resist the descriptive nature of his phenomenological compatriots.¹⁵⁸ Whereas for Husserl, the transcendental reduction produces the conditions in which the meaning of being-as-thing and being-as-consciousness can be adequately described, Heidegger's transcendental reduction instead leaves him with *Dasein*, a being with an implicit understanding of what it means to be and who is concretely *engaged* with a world of meaning.¹⁵⁹ Hence, *Dasein's* expression of its own factic life-experience endows it with the possibility of opening up new worlds of meaning, altering its own existential experience of the world and, by extension, the world that its fellow *Dasein* inhabit.

Heidegger's project, with its hermeneutic and existential emphasis, is concerned with the implicit way that the meaning of being has shaped history. In doing so, there is the possibility of a new beginning of thought. There is a development here. With the significance of nihilism in focus, and a re-framing of his project from meaning to truth, the necessity of an existential awakening of truth in order to make beings

and Megan Altman, *Contributions to Phenomenology*, vol. 74, ed. by Nicholas de Warren and Dermot Moran (London: Springer, 2015), pp. 311-328 (esp. p. 313 and p. 326). As he argues (p. 316), 'the thought of the early 1930s [...] demonstrates a failure to apply the phenomenological method as it was developed early in Heidegger's career'.

¹⁵⁵Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, p. 11. Cf. Ó Murchadha, *The Time of Revolution*, pp. 120-121. As he points out, this non-historical ground was the 'temporality of *Dasein* and the temporality of being'.

¹⁵⁶Koch, 'Phenomenology as Social Critique', p. 316.

¹⁵⁷See Heidegger's own discussion of this in, *SZ*, pp. 46-47. *BT*, pp. 32-33.

¹⁵⁸Miguel de Beistegui, *The New Heidegger*, *Continuum Studies in Continental Philosophy* (London: Continuum, 2005), p. 164.

¹⁵⁹Heidegger might even go one step further here, for it is Husserl's focus on intentional consciousness that is implicitly shaped by the meaning of being, a meaning that has its historical precedent in the modern era of philosophy and its focus on a conscious, experiencing, subject. Hence, Heidegger's matter for thought remains unthought in Husserl's understanding and method of phenomenology. McDonnell, *Heidegger's Way Through Phenomenology*, pp. 258-263, esp. pp. 262-263.

'more' beingful for a people takes on a centrality it did not have in *Being and Time*. But this is not, *pace* Lacoue-Labarthe and Koch, to contradict his earlier philosophy, but a development of one of its central motivating factors, namely a hermeneutic retrieval of the significance of the meaning of being for a people 'today'.¹⁶⁰ With this development in place, Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology inevitably gives way to an increased focus on historicity which does not just describe the means in which the history of philosophy could be produced but, instead, a need to subject this history to a repetition that results in its own transformation.¹⁶¹ By thinking in 'decision', Heidegger utilises Hölderlin to begin this historical transformation.¹⁶²

3.2.4 Consequences

Every decision has consequence. This holds true in in the usual sense of the word just as much as it holds true for Heidegger's particular usage of it. With the authority of Hölderlin established, as arbitrary as this particular choice might be, Heidegger is free to make further arguments that rely on this established authority, arguments that help him demonstrate the significance that he sees in the National Socialist movement. To elucidate the possible consequences of this kind of thinking for the purpose of this discussion, the following explores one such example.

Heidegger claims that Hölderlin's poem *The Rhine* establishes an intrinsic relationship between Greece and Germany. In *The Rhine*, Hölderlin writes about how 'impatiently/ To Asia [the river Rhine] was driven'. Heidegger uses this to argue that the rivers 'will' is 'thrust' toward Asia, but then breaks off toward Ionia, and then Greece.¹⁶³ This is because although the river 'wished to wander', 'uncomprehending is/ Wishing in the face of destiny'.¹⁶⁴ It is worthwhile mentioning that this claim is geographically incorrect. The (actual river) Rhine begins in Switzerland, goes through Germany, and enters into the North Sea. However, because for Heidegger the poem

¹⁶⁰This is also the view of McDonnell, who situates this argument in contexts of Heidegger's involvement with the National Socialist Party in general. See his, *Heidegger's Way Through Phenomenology*, pp. 251-253.

¹⁶¹Ó Murchadha, *The Time of Revolution*, pp. 120-121.

¹⁶²Heidegger clarifies in *Being and Time*, that a 'descriptive phenomenology' must take its departure from 'the way phenomena are encountered'. *SZ*, pp. 46-47. *BT*, pp. 32-33. Therefore, because Heidegger comes to believe that phenomena are encountered through great poetry (that comes from the 'future'), and gains a particular focus on raising the revealed truth of beings to greater levels of existential disclosure, then phenomenology becomes—precisely as a result of his thesis on *how* phenomena are encountered—the attempt to establish a myth for a nation through the interpretation of certain, great, poets, as *decided* by the legislative philosophers.

¹⁶³*HH*, p. 204. *HHGR*, p. 186.

¹⁶⁴*HH*, pp. 203-204. *HHGR*, p. 186. 'Doch unverständig ist / Das Wünschen vor dem Schicksaal'.

cannot be understood as a metaphor, but instead a prophetic ‘pointing’ to the truth of being, then the poem *The Rhine* precedes the geographical reality of the river Rhine.¹⁶⁵ He stretches this logic to its extreme when he claims that, because ‘the poets are not directed toward nature as an object, [...] [but instead] “nature” as being finds itself in saying’, ‘the saying of the poets as the self-saying of nature is of the same essence as the latter’.¹⁶⁶ Therefore, the ‘river is a founder and poet, *not just metaphorically, but as itself*’.¹⁶⁷ Thus, Heidegger disputes an allegorical significance between the river Rhine and the poem *The Rhine*. The river Rhine is *as* poetized in the poem. Following this logic through, he clarifies that what ‘stands in [the Rhine’s] originary will here is not the East as East, but as that being that the river in its origin alone had to regard as appropriate to its own kingly character, as that which alone could grant him the fulfilment of his essence’.¹⁶⁸ Drawing on the significance that is seen in the poem over the river itself, Hölderlin is not understood to be referring to the East as a geographical location, where we would assume he might have in mind east Asia, but instead that place in which the Rhine (the river *as* poem) would fulfil its destiny, namely Greece. This line of reasoning, functioning as an evasive manoeuvre to avoid criticism for gross geographical inaccuracies, further attempts to substantiate his claim that the German nation is a superior one, for the Rhine was unable to fulfil its destiny when travelling toward Asia (which, for some reason, means Greece for Heidegger), and instead breaks toward Germany to reclaim its destiny.

Heidegger then moves to concretise the superiority of the German nation but in doing so takes substantial liberties with Hölderlin’s own words, even if we just stick to the extracts from Hölderlin’s work that Heidegger himself cites.¹⁶⁹ He argues that

¹⁶⁵The basis for this was established in Section 1.2 of this study, as the disclosure of beings relies on the meaning of being deposited in the understanding of *Dasein*, and the beings beyond this (i.e., a geographer or scientist studying the location of the Rhine) are irrelevant. At this point, poetry is understood to be the means by which this disclosure occurs. However, as we saw in the previous chapter, Heidegger begun to see an increased significance in corporeal reality, and the emphasis here seems to place a lot of weight on the river itself. Likewise, Heidegger does have some kind of geographical accuracy in mind. See *HH*, p. 204. *HHGR*, p. 186. ‘The direction, in its commencement pointing toward the East, suddenly breaks off at the present-day locale of Chur and proceeds toward the German land in the North’.

¹⁶⁶*HH*, p. 258. *HHGR*, p. 233.

¹⁶⁷My emphasis. *HH*, p. 264. *HHGR*, p. 239. As we will see below, however, Heidegger takes this to suggest that nature comes to ‘speak’ in poetry. Thus, poetry becomes the ‘clang of arms of nature herself’. *HH*, p. 257. *HHGR*, p. 233.

¹⁶⁸*HH*, p. 204. *HHGR*, p. 186.

¹⁶⁹Farrell Krell claims that the ‘fatherlandly turn’ of Heidegger’s is entirely foreign to the work of Hölderlin. Farrell Krell, *Ecstasy, Catastrophe*, p. 40

for Hölderlin Germany always had its foundation in Greece.¹⁷⁰ In *The Journey* the poet writes:

I, however, am bound for the Caucasus!
[...] back in ancient time
Our parents, the German race,
Carried off silently on waves of the Donau,
Arrived there with children of the sun
On a summer's day, when they
Sought shade together
Down by the Black Sea.¹⁷¹

Except, in this passage Hölderlin nowhere claims that the German people were a part of Greece. Instead, he claims that the German people travelled through the Danube down to the Black Sea, which does have some historical relation to Greece, but it is also bordered by many other European and Asian countries. Heidegger tries to avoid this retort through a throwaway line, when he says the Greeks are of a 'related lineage' (he does not make clear to whom), and then emphasises how without the Greeks 'Western history cannot be thought'.¹⁷² After refocussing our attention to the importance that *Heidegger* sees in the Greeks, his claim that Hölderlin takes the Rhine to move from Greece to Germany provides an illusion of a secure interpretation, ostensibly establishing the superiority of the German people. The Rhine (as poetized in the poem *The Rhine*) must turn from Greece to Germany for the fulfilment of its destiny. Nevertheless, this security comes from nowhere but the arbitrary leaps Heidegger is allowing of himself.¹⁷³ What Hölderlin actually says is that he is 'bound for the Caucasus', which is a region that separates Asia and Europe. It therefore does not relate specifically to Greece at all. Perhaps Heidegger is drawing on Greek myth, for it is on the Caucasus that Zeus chains up Prometheus for bringing fire to human beings. However, he does not argue this, and so his claims about what Hölderlin is suggesting in this poem remain entirely unsubstantiated. Further, the thrust of this argument relies on the authority of Hölderlin, and in this instance we witness Heidegger take substantial liberties with Hölderlin's work in order to establish his own thesis around the superiority of the German nation. It is in moments like these that we can understand the sentiments in Rohkrämer's discussion of the

¹⁷⁰HH, pp. 205-206. HHGR, pp. 187-188.

¹⁷¹HH, p. 205. HHGR, p. 187. 'Ich aber will dem Kaukasos zu! [...] Es seien vor alter Zeit / Die Eltern einst, das deutsche Geschlecht, / Still fortgezogen von Wellen der Donau, Dort mit der Sonne Kindern / Am Sommertage, da diese / Sich Schatten suchten zusammen / Am schwarzen Meere gekommen'.

¹⁷²HH, p. 205. HHGR, pp. 187.

¹⁷³This is an example of what Gethmann-Siefert calls 'practical misdirection' on behalf of Heidegger, through his (ab)use of Hölderlin. Gethmann-Siefert, 'Heidegger and Hölderlin', p. 59. See also, Grossman, 'The Myth of Poetry: On Heidegger's Hölderlin', p. 30.

‘far-fetched [fantasy]’ of Heidegger’s use of Hölderlin.¹⁷⁴

Regardless of the weaknesses of these arguments, they allow Heidegger to establish the importance of the National Socialist movement, for they are to re-awaken our call to this earth, it is them that aid the German people reclaim their destiny,¹⁷⁵ and was it not them, after all, that oversaw the re-awakening of the greatness of Hölderlin’s work for the German people?¹⁷⁶ The National Socialist call to the earth is understood to resonate in the poetry of Hölderlin, and Heidegger’s work, as a liberated philosopher, is to help unfold this call so that the German people may gain the ‘ears’ to hear it.¹⁷⁷ Heidegger believes that when the poet, the philosopher, and the creator of the state combine their creative forces in this way, a historical people emerge.

3.3 Three Creative Forces for German *Dasein*: Heidegger, Hölderlin, Hitler

Heidegger develops a tripartite structure of ‘creative forces’ that account for the emergence of an historical people. These are the poet, the thinker, and the creator of the state.¹⁷⁸ The poet is the one who ‘harnesses the lightning flashes of the God, compelling them into the word’.¹⁷⁹ These ‘lightning-charged’ words are then placed into the ‘language of his people’.¹⁸⁰ Because *Dasein* is now said to be a ‘dialogue’, which is to say that language ‘determines our being’,¹⁸¹ we see what Heidegger means when he asserted that ‘[t]rue poetry is the language of [...] being’.¹⁸² It is the thinker, however, who must ‘comprehend’, ‘configure’ and thus ‘open’ (*eröffnen*) the foundation laid by poetry.¹⁸³

Hölderlin is this poet and Heidegger the thinker. It is not a stretch to hear Hitler as a final ‘H’, here called the ‘creator of the state’ (*Staatsschöpfer*).¹⁸⁴ Heidegger claims, ‘the being that has been comprehended in this way [by the thinker] is set into

¹⁷⁴Rohkrämer, ‘Heidegger and National Socialism: Great Hopes, Despair and Resilience’, p. 245.

¹⁷⁵*SW*, p. 86 and p. 148.

¹⁷⁶Bernasconi, ‘Poets as Prophets and as Painters’, pp. 147-148 and p. 156.

¹⁷⁷*HH*, pp. 136-137.

¹⁷⁸*HH*, pp. 143-144.

¹⁷⁹*HH*, p. 30. *HHGR*, p. 30.

¹⁸⁰*Ibid.*

¹⁸¹*HH*, p. 68. *HHGR*, p. 63.

¹⁸²*LL*, p. 141. Elements of this are expressed in the early passages from the *Black Notebooks* on the significance of art, explored in the previous chapter. *UII-VI*, pp. 14-15. *PII-VI*, p. 12.

¹⁸³*HH*, p. 144. *HHGR*, p. 126. The German verb ‘*Eröffnen*’ comes also with the sense of to inaugurate, reveal, and disclose.

¹⁸⁴Desmond also draws attention to this ‘trinity’. William Desmond, *Art, Origins, Otherness: Between Philosophy and Art* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), p. 219.

the ultimate and preeminent gravity of beings—that is into an *integrated* [*be-stimmte*] historical truth—by the people being brought to itself as a people. This occurs through the creating of the state accorded the people in its essence—a creating accomplished by the creator of the state'.¹⁸⁵ One wonders if this tripartite vision is what Heidegger has in mind when he says in his *Black Notebooks* that philosophy must end to make way for 'metapolitics [...] *metaphysics as metapolitics*'.¹⁸⁶ Note however, that in this conception Hitler is one part of three. His role is essential, but nonetheless marginal. That is to say, it is the poet and the thinker that 'found' and 'open' the truth of being. By establishing the state, the state-creator 'accomplishes' the awakening of the people to the possibility of this historical endowment. This is therefore an essential role, for without Hitler playing this part the entire revolutionary enterprise Heidegger hoped for in the 1930s could not begin. This crucial role is reflected elsewhere: '[t]he great experience and fortune that the Führer has awakened a new actuality, giving our thinking the correct course and impetus. Otherwise, despite all the thoroughness, it would have remained lost in itself and would only with difficulty have found its way to effectiveness'.¹⁸⁷ Nonetheless, his role is meaningless unless the poet has already founded this possibility, and the thinker has the capacity to 'open' its truth.

After a close reading of what is said about the *Führer*, and especially Hitler as *Führer* in the *Black Notebooks*, the crucial role the state-creator plays requires critical evaluation. The *Black Notebooks* reveal that as the reality of the movement and failure of his rectorship becomes apparent to Heidegger, his hope for the National Socialist Party are unsettled. In a passage dated December 1933, concurrent with the time that Heidegger officially resigns, he writes that the rector is 'supposed to ensure a leadership of the school. But the rector is becoming simply an intercessor for those organizations [the ministries]'.¹⁸⁸ In the same passage he claims that whether the rectorship is held by a National Socialist is only of 'relative' importance, but this is only because if one was not a Nazi one would be more likely—out of either 'prudence' or 'anxiety'—to carry through the necessary tasks. Is Heidegger one of these Nazis? Officially declaring himself as aligned with an ideology from which he is personally and philosophically distancing himself? We are also left wondering

¹⁸⁵Trans mod. His emphasis. *HH*, p. 144. *HHGR*, p. 126.

¹⁸⁶His emphasis. *UII-VI*, p. 115. *PII-VI*, p. 85.

¹⁸⁷*UII-VI*, p. 111. *PII-VI*, p. 81.

¹⁸⁸*UII-VI*, pp. 130-131. *PII-VI*, pp. 95-96.

what are the ‘necessary tasks’ Heidegger has in mind, but a passage from the time as rector testifies to his desires to have ‘all schooling aligned to a *Reichs-university*’.¹⁸⁹ The stark reality of the *Gleichschaltung* echoes uncomfortably in the background, even if at other moments Heidegger seems disparaged by their ineffectuality.¹⁹⁰ He begins to stress that ‘the will of the leader can be shared by others’?¹⁹¹ In the context of the role of the elite legislative-philosophers this is not a surprise, but it is a rather different emphasis than the *Führer* as sole ‘law’ of Germany.¹⁹² A few passages later, we see him frustrated by the ‘popular remark’ that National Socialism was developed by praxis, marginalising the importance of theory. Heidegger problematises this distinction as a misunderstanding of theory, for ‘all basic attunements are rooted [theoretically], and out of them the historical world must be created’.¹⁹³ Hölderlin perhaps provides him a theoretical rooting for praxis. He then clarifies:

We do not desire to underpin National Socialism “theoretically,” [...] But we do want to provide the movement and its proper power possibilities of world-configuration and of development, whereby we know that these projects as such—i.e., falsified into “ideas”—do not possess any effectuality; but indeed they do if they are language and interrogative attitudes, ones thrown in the power of the movement | and arisen in the field of that power and persisting therein.¹⁹⁴

We see here the extent to which Heidegger believes his project is *fundamental* for the potential of National Socialism to realise itself.¹⁹⁵ Note, the importance of ‘language’ and ‘interrogative attitudes’ to be ‘thrown’ into the ‘power of the movement’. Hölderlin provides this power for the movement, whereby through Heidegger’s interpretive work the ‘beckoning of the gods’ ‘shrouded’ in his poetry will ‘permeate’ the ‘ground and soil’ of the German homeland, in turn strengthening the movement.¹⁹⁶

In the previous chapter we also documented Heidegger’s excitement in a letter to his brother upon reading *Mein Kampf*, but in a passage around this time—four years after the letter—Heidegger talks about the ‘brainless appeal of Hitler’s *Mein*

¹⁸⁹His emphasis. *UII-VI*, p. 117. *PII-VI*, p. 86.

¹⁹⁰*UII-VI*, p. 131. *PII-VI*, p. 96. In this lecture course too, *HH*, p. 221. *HHGR*, p. 202.

¹⁹¹*UII-VI*, p. 126. *PII-VI*, p. 92.

¹⁹²Heidegger, ‘Political Texts, 1933-34’, p. 47.

¹⁹³*UII-VI*, pp. 133-134. *PII-VI*, p. 98.

¹⁹⁴*UII-VI*, pp. 134-135. *PII-VI*, pp. 98-99.

¹⁹⁵After reflecting on the importance that the will of the leader be ‘shared’ by others, Heidegger talks of the ‘official “superiors” and of the alleged power holder’. *UII-VI*, p. 126. *PII-VI*, p. 92. This is because it is Heidegger’s elite who have the true power in his vision, as it is them who establish the *polis*.

¹⁹⁶*HH*, pp. 79-80. *HHGR*, p. 73

Kampf.¹⁹⁷ Here, he is discussing the doctrines of the ‘vulgar’ National Socialist and so this is not an attack directly on the book but instead more likely to be an attack on the way in which this book has been read and understood. But in a later passage, he writes that when ‘a man with a diploma in engineering becomes Führer, there the creation of great possibilities is done for’.¹⁹⁸ This *is* a direct attack on the proficiency of Hitler as *Führer*. Is it this same failure of leadership that he laments when he decides that one must ‘assume the leadership for oneself, stepping out from the crowd and reconfiguring it in struggle, and in silence prepare for what is coming in its approach, stepping out from small domains’?¹⁹⁹ Here, the significance of the liberators again come in to play, for although they knowingly ‘will’ the control of the masses by the National Socialists, they do so in order to establish the truth of being in ‘silence’.²⁰⁰ For him, and although the former must be willed by the elite, it is only the latter that would ‘transform’ them.²⁰¹ With a developing lack of faith in both the regime and the *Führer* Heidegger appeals to the ‘inner truth and greatness’ of the National Socialist movement.²⁰²

However, a later discussion in the lecture series on Hölderlin clarifies matters. Heidegger claims that ‘[t]o be a Führer—a leader—is a destiny’.²⁰³ He tells us that there is only ‘one’ or ‘sole’ *Führer*, and it is the him who points to the realm of the demigods.²⁰⁴ Therefore, even if the ‘real’ revolution occurs in the background through the liberators, the role of the *Führer* is essential. We could understand this as two separate and contradictory accounts, where publicly Heidegger continued to profess his allegiance to regime and privately began to hold severe reservations. A much more straightforward reading is possible. Once Hitler successfully set the right ‘course’ for Heidegger’s thought, and once he had successfully created a sense of unity within the masses, Hitler’s important work was done. Heidegger thus gets straight to the task as he sees it after the failure of his rectorship. Through his work on

¹⁹⁷ *UII-VI*, p. 142. *PII-VI*, p. 104.

¹⁹⁸ *UII-VI*, p. 146. *PII-VI*, p. 107. This is quite different to what he said to Jaspers not one year earlier, in June of 1933, when he questioned the capacity for an uneducated man such as Hitler to govern. Heidegger replied that education ‘is quite irrelevant ... just look at his wonderful hands!’ Safranski, *Between Good and Evil*, p. 232. The time of this quote from the *Black Notebooks* is difficult to pin point exactly, but it seems to come from after December 1933 and before the end of the rectorship, judging from the passages that refer to these times in, *UII-VII*, p. 130 and p. 154.

¹⁹⁹ *UII-VI*, p. 132. *PII-VI*, p. 97.

²⁰⁰ *BP*, pp. 61-62.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

²⁰² *EM*, p. 208. *IM*, p. 222.

²⁰³ *HH*, p. 210. *HHGR*, p. 192. See also, Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, p. 126.

²⁰⁴ *HH*, p. 210.

Hölderlin Heidegger tries to save the movement from increased vulgarity and misunderstanding of its essence. Therefore, although it is correct to note the distance Heidegger found his own thought from the developments of a movement he once saw such promise in he nonetheless maintains within his thought a crucial importance for what had occurred and was continuing to occur in National Socialist Germany.²⁰⁵ Mainly, to establish and maintain an authoritarian order that demanded cohesion and subordination of the general public so that the *real* work could be done behind the scenes by Heidegger.

Heidegger wished to provide the ‘language’ and ‘interrogative attitudes’ of the movement the capacity and ‘power’ for ‘world-configuration’.²⁰⁶ Likewise, Zimmerman points out that Heidegger utilized all the important terms of the time—degeneration, rootedness, *Volksgeist*, decision—and debated with many of the other key intellectuals of the Nazi regime, such as Spengler and Klages.²⁰⁷ Nonetheless, Phillips argues that it misconstrues Heidegger’s involvement with the regime to claim that he provides the language of National Socialism with an ontological gloss, for he often disagrees with the way in which these terms were being utilized by his contemporaries.²⁰⁸ However, O’Brien concedes that Heidegger is ‘playing a dangerous game here’.²⁰⁹ Heidegger was an extremely popular figure in Germany and the language he wished to deepen and clarify is the same language that was used in order to rationalise the systemic genocide of the Jewish people. The intellectual class that sustained this discourse both implicitly and explicitly fed into the framework in which this rationalization could occur, whether they agreed with the base ways in which this language was used or not. Of course, Heidegger could not have known with any certainty that this was the direction the State would take. Moreover, scholars like O’Brien and Thomson explain how Heidegger’s thinking would oppose the Final Solution,²¹⁰ and Heidegger himself testifies to this when he claims in 1949 (quite controversially) that ‘the production of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination

²⁰⁵Grossman, ‘The Myth of Poetry: On Heidegger’s Hölderlin’, p. 30

²⁰⁶*UII-VI*, pp. 134-135. *PII-VI*, pp. 98-99.

²⁰⁷Michael E. Zimmerman, *Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 4. Bernasconi discusses some of these debates, and the impact they had on Heidegger’s philosophy at this time, in Bernasconi, ‘Race and Earth in Heidegger’s Thinking’, 49-66.

²⁰⁸Phillips, *Heidegger’s Volk*, p. 179.

²⁰⁹O’Brien, *Heidegger, History, and the Holocaust*, p. 62.

²¹⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 23-41 and Thomson, *Heidegger on Ontotheology*, p. 83.

camps' is a result of the modern technological meaning of being.²¹¹ There is thus genuine distance between Heidegger's thought and the official ideology of National Socialist Germany, and good sense in carefully examining the differences between the thinking of Heidegger and the thinking of his contemporary Nazi ideologues.²¹²

However, Bernasconi points out that there were many 'varieties of racial thinking in Nazi Germany', and so it is a false distinction to place Heidegger in one category and all other thinkers that supported the movement in another, and then to examine the various ways Heidegger was intellectually distant from the official and base form that this thinking took.²¹³ Such a move seems dishonest, in that it serves to distance Heidegger from a movement that emerged from various intellectual voices, many of whom did not agree with each other. More importantly, and regardless of the discrepancies between Heidegger and some of these other thinkers, a necessary question emerges around the role and responsibility of the intellectual class in sustaining the violence of authoritarian regimes, and indeed systems of abuses of power in all its forms, despite all of their varying disagreements and discrepancies with official Party doctrine. This is the 'dangerous game' that O'Brien justifiably worries about, and it is disappointing that Heidegger did not have the foresight to see it. As Wolin puts it: '[f]rom a contemporary political standpoint, Heidegger's acceptance of the rectorship in May 1933 was a far from innocent affair. It provided a tacit semblance of cultural respectability for the fledgling Nazi dictatorship [...] his appointment was widely perceived as an instance of political *Gleichschaltung*'.²¹⁴

²¹¹BF, p. 27. O'Brien discusses the controversy of the passage in his *Heidegger, History, Holocaust*, pp. 23-41 (esp. pp. 23-35). This is not to suggest that Heidegger's claim here is adequate. In this passage, he effectively diminishes the suffering and grief of the Jewish people by reducing the holocaust to one of many atrocities that occur due to the modern technological meaning of being. What this passage does serve to show, however, is that Heidegger would not have found the holocaust a sufficient response to the threat that the National Socialist regime believed the Jewish people were. Heidegger did believe that this threat was real, as some of the later instalments of the *Black Notebooks* reveal. Because the notebooks that contain the anti-Semitic passages occur after the time frame under investigation in this thesis, to address the problem of Heidegger's anti-Semitism is beyond the scope of this project.

²¹²O'Brien, *Heidegger, History, and the Holocaust*, pp. 43-76. Such a task is beyond the scope of this study, as I am concerned with establishing the proximity between Heidegger's thought and his support of the National Socialist regime.

²¹³Bernasconi, 'Race and Earth in Heidegger's Thinking', p. 50. See also, Frank H.W. Edler, 'The Significance of Hölderlin for Heidegger's Political Involvement with Nazism', (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Toronto, 1992), pp. 94-97.

²¹⁴Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, p. 85. As Rohkrämer points out, '[t]he often-noted fascination with his lectures indicates that from early in his career, he was more than just a philosopher, but spoke to the heart of more general concerns of the times. Heidegger had a tendency to interpret his own personal development in more general historical terms, and he found resonance with this—among students and within wider debates about the situation of the times'. Rohkrämer, 'Heidegger and National Socialism: Great Hopes, Despair and Resilience', p. 240.

Reflecting Wolin's concerns, the Nazi newspaper of Freiburg *Der Alemanne* printed the following in relation to Heidegger officially joining the Nazi party:

On the day of German Labor, on the day of the Community of the People, the Rector of Freiburg University, Dr. Martin Heidegger, made his official entry into the National Socialist Party. We Freiburg Nazis see in this act more than a superficial acknowledgment of the revolution that has been accomplished and of the powers that be. We know that Martin Heidegger, in his high sense of responsibility, *in his concern for the destiny and future of the German people*, stands in the midst of our glorious movement. We know, too, that he has never made any secret of his German character, that for years he has supported the party of Adolf Hitler in its difficult struggle for existence and power to the utmost of his strength, that he was always ready to bring a sacrifice to Germany's holy altar, and that no National Socialist ever knocked in vain at his door.

We Freiburg people are proud that this profound thinker works at our University, and that he has, in refusing an honorable call, made it clear that he wishes to remain bound to our beautiful home town, which is also his. As National Socialists we find endless satisfaction in the knowledge that this great man stands in our ranks, in Adolf Hitler's ranks. Like our Leader, the philosopher Martin Heidegger sprang, by will power and strength of spirit, from the restricted circles of an insignificant country town to a shining position in the learned world. [...]

The effect of Heidegger's philosophy is powerful today. Every serious researcher must, whether he rejects it or agrees with it, start from the assumption that it represents the core of modern philosophical thought, and that its creator, Martin Heidegger, is the spiritual leader of contemporary thinking. We are proud of Martin Heidegger; we greet him with all honor. As once Fichte did not deny his spiritual power and authority over the uprising of 1813, so Heidegger has recognized and fulfilled the greatness of our era.²¹⁵

The same newspaper had the following to say on his becoming rector:

The Alma Mater of Freiburg had its great day today. In the presence of the Minister for Culture, Education and Justice Dr. Wacker, Minister of the Interior Pflaumer, the rectors of the Heidelberg and Karlsruhe colleges, the Mayor, Dr. Kerber, and many guests of honor, the rectorate was formally transferred to the new Rector, Professor of Philosophy Dr. Martin Heidegger. *For the first time the storm troops of Adolf Hitler could appear freely, and the brown ceremonial uniform gave new luster to the impressive scene.*²¹⁶

These extracts from an official newspaper of the National Socialist state are obviously partial toward the Party, and they should not be taken as the authority on how Heidegger was perceived by all the people of Germany in 1933. It nonetheless demonstrates the way in which Heidegger's politico-philosophical vision played into the widespread National Socialist propaganda. For example, the first extract

²¹⁵My emphasis. *Der Alemanne*, May 3, 1933 'The Philosopher Heidegger Enters the Nazi Party', trans. by Dagobert D. Runes, in *German Existentialism: Martin Heidegger* (New York: The Wisdom Library, 1965), pp. 13-15.

²¹⁶Emphasis in original. *Der Alemaane*, May 28, 1933 'Inauguration of New Rector', trans. by Dagobert D. Runes, in *German Existentialism: Martin Heidegger* (New York: The Wisdom Library, 1965) pp. 16-17.

highlights Heidegger's philosophical concern with the 'destiny' and the 'future' of the German people. It utilizes his intellectual stature to provide further legitimacy to the movement and, by framing him as a thinker of modernity, the movement could appear as an inevitable, historical development. The second extract also documents that with Heidegger's appointment as rector 'for the first time the storm troops of Adolf Hitler could appear freely'. Hence, although Jaspers clearly holds the depth of Heidegger's philosophy in high regard, he rightly reminds the denazification committee of Freiburg that Heidegger 'helped place National Socialism in the saddle'.²¹⁷

O'Brien carefully excavates the differences between the anti-modernist tendencies of Spengler and Heidegger, but these extracts show us that, in context of the time, it is unreasonable of us to assume that Heidegger's students were able to distinguish the intellectual discrepancies between them.²¹⁸ Not to speak of the homeland, and his calls to 'blood' and 'soil'. There is something crucial missing in the attempt of O'Brien and others to show to the differences between Heidegger and the other thinkers of his time, namely the concrete effects that theory can have on praxis and the human lives that can be lost in the migration from one to the other. As scholars it is important we reckon with the philosophical differences between Heidegger and other Nazi ideologists, but we must also recognise that these philosophical nuances were easily lost on the students who sat into his lecture halls and left with a renewed sense of praise and support for a regime that subsequently became responsible for over six million Jewish deaths in extermination camps, not to mention other marginalized groups such as the queer community and peoples with disabilities.²¹⁹ It is through this line of questioning that the true 'failure' of his

²¹⁷Karl Jaspers, 'Letter to the Freiburg University Denazification Committee (December 22, 1945)', in *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*, ed. by Richard Wolin (London: The MIT Press, 1998), pp. 144-151 (p. 149).

²¹⁸Zimmerman reflects on the extent to which Heidegger was influenced by Spengler in his *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity*, pp. 27-29. O'Brien responds to this discussion in his *Heidegger, History, Holocaust*, pp. 51-54, arguing that Zimmerman is 'inclined to paper over substantial cracks of incompatibility between Heidegger and his putative intellectual forbears' (p. 51). Although O'Brien is correct to see the differences between the two thinkers, the fact that this debate exists at all shows that it was not for granted that the two differed, significantly at least, requiring careful hermeneutic excavation for these differences to become apparent.

²¹⁹Another example of this is Heidegger use of the '*Rassenkunde*' (racial sciences) in the 1933/34 lectures on Plato. See, Phillips, *Heidegger's Volk*, p. 171. Phillips argues that Heidegger's thinking does not lend itself to the biologicistic racism this term invokes, but Heidegger does not clarify this to the people listening nor in the published version of this manuscript. Although Phillips is likely to be correct, this is one example of the irresponsibility on behalf of Heidegger to not differentiate sufficiently *his* meaning of these terms from their contemporary meaning. Was it not the teaching of the racial sciences that normalised and justified the widespread anti-Semitism and subsequent genocide

rectorship becomes apparent. Whether or not Heidegger's philosophical views differed from the official doctrine of the Party, and they often do differ significantly, his support nonetheless strengthened the Nazi regime.

Because I am pursuing the role of art in his thinking on truth, and the extent to which this bares a relation to his political involvement, this line of questioning brings us beyond the confines of this thesis. But although it is evident that there is a crucial distinction to be made between Heidegger's philosophy and the National Socialist regime as it unfolded, the specifics of his philosophy, and why he believed that his support for the regime lay in its 'very essence', still requires close attention.²²⁰ There are deep-rooted philosophical concerns of the nature of truth and art that compel him to support of the National Socialist Party, and so although his views differed from the Party, his philosophy is still not easily separable from his support. To this end, I now look at his understanding of fundamental attunements, and the specific fundamental attunement Heidegger believes at work in Hölderlin's poetry, for it is through standing in the 'power' of the attunement of his poetry that Heidegger believes that the German people can realise their destiny.

3.4 Understanding the Significance of Hölderlin's Poetry Through Fundamental Attunement

Heidegger splits his discussion of fundamental attunement (*Grundstimmung*) into two categories, fundamental attunement in general and the significance of poetry in their constitution, and the specific fundamental attunement that Heidegger sees at work in Hölderlin's poetry. Before evaluating the fundamental attunement operative in Hölderlin's poetry, I first take a look at fundamental attunement in general.

In the first chapter we saw how *Dasein* is understood to always be 'disposed' toward the world or, as he puts it, attunements 'always already disclosed being-in-the-world as a whole and first makes possible directing oneself toward something'.²²¹ An attunement is not only responsible for the way in which beings show up but *that* they

that ensued? Bernasconi raises a similar point when he claims '[t]hat Heidegger would use the word "metaphysically necessary" [in the context of race] in a lecture course was irresponsible, as there is no reason to suppose that most or even any of his students would understand it in the special meaning he gave it'. Bernasconi, 'Race and Earth in Heidegger's Thinking', p. 58. However, Bernasconi thinks that this does not mean that he was 'legitimizing racial breeding'. On the contrary, even if Heidegger was not arguing for this, that he was likely to be perceived as such effectively functioned as support.

²²⁰Löwith, 'My Last Meeting with Heidegger in Rome, 1936', p. 115.

²²¹Emphasis removed. *SZ*, p. 182. *BT*, p. 133.

show up at all. Heidegger still adheres to this thesis in 1934, claiming that an ‘attunement [...] first *opens up* that realm within which something can first be specifically set before us or represented’.²²² However, now Heidegger is focused on historical attunements and, most importantly, the fundamental attunements of great poetry through which a people come to understand itself and its world.

In one passage, Heidegger plays off of the root word ‘*stimm-*’ to develop an array of poetic resonances that seek to elucidate the nature of an attunement. The ‘telling’ of the poem is conceived as a ‘voice’ (*Stimme*), which speaks from an attunement (*Stimmung*) that must be attuned (*gestimmt*) through philosophy, integrating (*be-stimmt*) the ‘ground’ and ‘soil’ for the people.²²³ Through certain instances of great poetry, like Hölderlin’s ‘late’ poetry, there are fundamental attunements (*die Grundstimmungen*) at work.²²⁴ This follows a similar distinction in *Being and Time*, except in that text a fundamental attunement is something like anxiety-toward-my-own-death, which discloses my finitude and provides the possibility to become an individual. Instead, Heidegger understands fundamental attunements as what attunes (and is attuned by) the ‘ground and soil’ (i.e., nature) that permeates (*durchstimmt*) (we could poetically translate, sing-through)²²⁵ the meaningful space that is founded by the poet.²²⁶

²²²HH, p. 140. HHGR, p. 124. ‘[...] sondern die Stimmung als entrückend-einrückende eröffnet den Bezirk, innerhalb dessen erst etwas eigens vor-gestellt werden kann’.

²²³HH, pp. 79-80. HHGR, p. 73. The German word ‘*bestimmt*’ translates as ‘certain’ or ‘definite’, and so Heidegger splits the prefix from the stem to give a sense of taking a stance through the attunement, thus maintaining a ‘definite’ or ‘certain’ position to what is. As we saw in the previous chapter, Heidegger understands this as a binding together the Idea with the legislator. Keeping this sense in mind, I translate ‘*bestimmt*’ with ‘integrate’. McNeill and Ireland have here simply ‘at-tune’, and in other instances ‘determinate, attuned’. See, for example, HHGR, p. 126.

²²⁴Another important move Heidegger makes in this lecture series is to establish a distinction between Hölderlin’s later poetry, written the last few years before he fell into some form of mental illness, and the poetry that came before this time. HH, pp. 36-37 and p. 222. This allows him to limit the extent to which he must reconcile Hölderlin’s commitments to Christianity, more evidently present in his earlier works, with Heidegger’s own views about the coming of the final God. However, Heidegger emphasises that these works came at a time when Hölderlin had a nervous breakdown, and he does seem to see something special about mental illness, claiming (p. 37) that mental illness in ‘certain’ people is not necessarily an illness. He does not unpack this suggestion further in this lecture series, however in his *Contributions to Philosophy* he does draw our attention to the fact that Hölderlin, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche all suffered from nervous breakdowns, and he claims that this is because they ‘suffered most deeply the uprootedness to which Western history is driven and who at the same time surmised their gods most intimately’. BP, p. 204. CP, p. 160. As Grossman points out, this suggests that for Heidegger, Hölderlin sacrificed himself, ‘tragically setting free a new world’. Grossman, ‘The Myth of Poetry: On Heidegger’s “Hölderlin”’, p. 32. For an account of Heidegger’s own struggle with mental illness, see, Mitchell, ‘Heidegger’s Breakdown’.

²²⁵The play on the root ‘*stimm-*’ provides this whole passage with a musical quality that is intriguing given that Heidegger has nothing to say on the significance of music.

²²⁶HH, pp. 79-80. HHGR, p. 73

Reflecting this change, Heidegger has dropped ‘how-one-finds-oneself-situated’ (*Befindlichkeit*) from the discussion of the nature of attunements. In *Being and Time*, how-one-finds-oneself-situated and attunement (*Stimmung*) are closely related, where how-one-finds-oneself-situated seems to be the ontological designation of an attunement.²²⁷ He does not draw attention to this distinction, presumably because of the focus on the individual the notion of how-one-finds-oneself-situated suggests. He instead speaks of the German ‘vocation’ (*die Bestimmung*),²²⁸ because of his continued philosophical efforts to think of *Dasein* beyond the divide of subject and object. As such, a fundamental attunement provides the possibility for a nation to take up its vocation.²²⁹ In this light, how-one-finds-oneself-situated through a given disposition is not as relevant as the way in which a nation is attuned to its tradition and destiny. Thus, by standing within the ‘power’ of a fundamental attunement within certain poetry the nation is transformed into a people (*Volk*).

Heidegger almost slips back into the distinction between subject and object when he conceives of an attunement as having two sides. First, there is what attunes, which would be the poem. Second, there is what is attuned in the attunement, the people. Through an authentic engagement with the poem, we are, ‘together with beings’, ‘*trans-posed*’ (*ver-setzt*) into the attunement.²³⁰ Thus, Heidegger emphasises that what is primary is the attunement itself, which give rise to both of these sides.²³¹ As such, the fundamental attunement provides the possibility for the reciprocity of the people and the poem,²³² which in turn strengthens the attunement. Eventually, a people is transported ‘out into [the limits of] beings as a whole’ instigating an opening up of being.²³³ Through this process, *Dasein* and its world can go about a ‘transformation [...] that amounts to a complete recreating of its exposure to beings, and thereby to a recoinning [*Umprägung*] of being’.²³⁴ In this sense, Hölderlin’s poetry contains the counter-attunement for a world succumbed to nihilism.²³⁵

In the lecture series on Plato, Heidegger claimed that nature ‘tunes’ us. He clarifies that this must occur through a fundamental attunement for this is what

²²⁷Elpidorou and Freeman, ‘Affectivity in Heidegger I’, esp. p. 663.

²²⁸*HH*, pp. 134-136.

²²⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 143-144.

²³⁰His emphasis. *HH*, p. 89. *HHGR*, p. 81.

²³¹*Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.

²³²*HH*, p. 82-83.

²³³*HH*, p. 181 and p. 223. *HHGR*, p. 165 and p. 203.

²³⁴*HH*, p. 142. *HHGR*, p. 125.

²³⁵See also, Magrini, ‘Speaking the Language of Destiny’, p. 37.

‘permeates’ the ‘ground and soil’.²³⁶ There is still reciprocity between nature and its disclosure to us at play, but Heidegger maintains the precedence of the former. As a stanza in Hölderlin’s *Germania* suggests, it is the earth that is first readied for us: ‘[a]lready nurtured for them, the field indeed grows verdant/ Prelude to a harsher time, the gift is readied’.²³⁷ So, Heidegger claims that the ‘readied Earth is the condition for man’s being able to look and wanting to look’.²³⁸ The fundamental attunement does not *just* attune nature, although it does that too. Instead, the poets respond to the call of the earth.²³⁹ In this way, poetry is understood to be the ‘clang of arms of nature herself’²⁴⁰, bringing the ‘mystery’ of being to the understanding, ‘unveiling’ what can be ‘accomplished only in song’.²⁴¹ When one is ‘transported into the Earth’ one is brought into relationship with the gods, thus establishing the homeland and transcending nihilism.²⁴² Such is the poetic mandate.²⁴³ Following this logic, Heidegger believes that it is in the poetry of Hölderlin that the earth names itself.

For Heidegger, a fundamental attunement, by responding to the call of the earth through great poetry, provides a people a chance to become greater, bringing them, and the beings of their everyday lives, to greater heights by awakening their vocation and realising their destiny. A further move to historicize *Dasein* lies here. Although ‘concern’ (*Sorge*) is still the ‘fundamental trait’ of *Dasein*, its mode of concern depends on its ‘origin’, that is, the fundamental attunement that attunes it.²⁴⁴ Which is to say, concern is still the ‘essence’ of *Dasein*, but the emphasis is not, as in *Being and Time*, that *Dasein* is always-already concerned for itself and its world through its anticipation of its own death, but instead *how* it concerns. Concern becomes a historical category, a way of being that can be lost and undermined, as in the modern nihilistic world where meaning has atrophied. If concern depends on its origin, and the origin is, for Heidegger, the ‘telling’ of the poem to the German people, then concern is both a historical and a national category. Heidegger calls on the German

²³⁶HH, pp. 79-80. HHGR, p. 73.

²³⁷HH, p. 103. HHGR, p. 94. ‘Schon grünet ja, im Vorspiel rauherer Zeit / Für sie erzogen das Feld, bereitet ist die Gaabe’.

²³⁸HH, p. 104. HHGR, p. 95.

²³⁹HH, pp. 87-89.

²⁴⁰HH, p. 257. HHGR, p. 233.

²⁴¹HH, pp. 249-250. HHGR, pp. 226-227.

²⁴²HH, p. 181 and p. 223. HHGR, p. 165 and p. 203.

²⁴³HH, pp. 249-250.

²⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 140-143. As I will explore below, the question of the ‘origin’ is what is at stake in his interpretation of Hölderlin’s *The Rhine*. See Section 3.6.

people to respond to the call of the earth as articulated in Hölderlin's poetry to unfold their origin and establish their way of being.

He argues that the fundamental attunement at work in Hölderlin's *Germania* is a 'holy mourning in a readied distress'.²⁴⁵ Heidegger takes 'the holy mourning' (das *Heiligtrauernde*) directly from the first stanza of *Germania*. The sense of distress is also apparent in this stanza. *Germania* begins:

Not those, the blessed ones who once appeared,
Divine images in the land of old,
Those, indeed, I may call no longer, yet if
You waters of the homeland! now with you
The heart's love has plaint, what else does it want,
The holy mourning one? For full of expectation lies
The land, and as in sultry days
Bowed down, a heaven casts today
You longing ones! its shadows full of intimation round about us.²⁴⁶

Heidegger stresses the significance of the opening words '[n]ot those', arguing that this is a 'necessary renunciation' of the gods of old.²⁴⁷ As *Germania* later continues: '[g]ods who have fled! You too, you present ones, once/ More truthful, you had your times!' Heidegger takes this to be not only announcing but placing us 'before the fleeing, the remaining absent, and the arriving gods'.²⁴⁸ This distress is 'holy' because it turns us toward the fleeing gods,²⁴⁹ and 'readied' because it is an 'awaiting of that which is to come'.²⁵⁰ As a renunciation (of the past) that awaits (the future), Heidegger believes that this poem points to his understanding of original temporality,²⁵¹ which will prepare the way for the gods to come in the 'moment'.²⁵² As a renunciation that prepares, the attunement of mourning gains increased power through its oscillation with the counter attunement of joy (*Freude*).²⁵³ It is the power of such conflict that will allow 'the truth of the Earth and of the homeland' to be

²⁴⁵HH, p. 107. HHGR, p. 97.

²⁴⁶See, HH, pp. 10-13. HHGR, pp. 14-16, for the full printed text of *Germania*. All future citations of the poem refer to these pages. Otherwise, I am citing where Heidegger is discussing separate sections of the poem.

²⁴⁷HH, p. 81. HHGR, p. 74.

²⁴⁸HH, p. 140. HHGR, p. 123. Heidegger thinks that Nietzsche's understanding of the death of God is also a preserving in this sense. HH, p. 95. HHGR, p. 86.

²⁴⁹HH, p. 223. HHGR, p. 204.

²⁵⁰HH, p. 108.

²⁵¹HH, p. 117. HHGR, p. 106.

²⁵²HH, pp. 56-57 and pp. 110-113.

²⁵³HH, p. 148. HHGR, p. 130. Heidegger takes this from when Hölderlin writes, in an epigram entitled 'Sophocles', 'Viele versuchten umsonst, das Freudigste freudig zu sagen, / Hier spricht endlich es mir, hier in der Trauer sich aus'. 'Many tried in vain to joyfully say the most joyful, / Here finally it speaks to me, here within mourning'.

realised within the people.²⁵⁴ Hence, an ‘I’ does not speak in the poem, but a ‘we’, and for Heidegger this ‘we’ is the future of the German people, their destiny, realizing itself through the fundamental attunement of the poetry.²⁵⁵

The theme of the destiny of the people links *Germania* and *The Rhine*. Earlier I drew on a verse of *Germania* that spoke about how the ‘gift’ of the earth is ‘readied’. That stanza (stanza III) continues:

For the sacrificial meal and valley and rivers lie
Open wide around prophetic mountains.
So that into the Orient may look
The man and from there be moved by many transformation

Heidegger reads the significance of the ‘man’ and his ‘transformation’, looking into the ‘Orient’, as emblematic of the necessity of the philosophical confrontation between Greece and Germany. This is what is at stake in *The Rhine*.²⁵⁶ *The Rhine* is said to ‘intensify’ and ‘enrich’ the fundamental attunement at work in *Germania*,²⁵⁷ where ‘beings as a whole—gods, humans, earth—are to open themselves up anew’.²⁵⁸ As such, its fundamental attunement is still the same, but it is not just ‘superficially carrying [it] over’.²⁵⁹ Instead, by ‘thinking the demigods’ it enriches the fundamental attunement because it poetizes the singular destiny of the German being as the homeland.²⁶⁰

It is through the confrontation between Greece and Germany, what Heidegger calls the repeat and retrieve (*Wiederholung*) of the philosophical inception in Ancient Greece, that the other beginning will eventuate. This is not to become Greek but to surpass them.²⁶¹ It is this process that Heidegger began through his confrontation with Plato, where the question of the essence of truth hangs in the balance, and in the final chapter of this study we will see how instrumental Nietzsche is for him in this regard. Through this pursuit, which leads Heidegger to the fundamental attunement of Hölderlin’s poetry, the homeland will be established.

Heidegger’s philosophical project, as it emerges in the 1930s, attempts to

²⁵⁴HH, p. 223. HHGR, p. 204.

²⁵⁵HH, pp. 104-113, esp. p. 107.

²⁵⁶HH, p. 224. This ‘man’ is the poet. Ibid., pp. 287-288. However, this is not the poet as the individual Hölderlin but is instead understood as the ‘we’ as foretold through the attunement available through the poem. This is because the poet does not express his lived experience, but instead founds the German people.

²⁵⁷HH, p. 149. HHGR, p. 131.

²⁵⁸HH, p. 183. HHGR, p. 167.

²⁵⁹HH, p. 227. HHGR, p. 207.

²⁶⁰HH, pp. 227-228.

²⁶¹HH, pp. 290-294, esp. p. 293: ‘Echte Wiederholung entspringt aus ursprünglicher Verwandlung’. ‘Genuine repeat and retrieve arises out of primordial transformation’. My translation.

address the nihilism he believed to define his contemporary era, arguing that being has ‘abandoned’ us and has been ‘forgotten’ throughout the history of metaphysics. The abandonment of being is its concealment, and his philosophical project of grounding the ‘truth of beyng’ is a direct response to this abandonment for to ground the truth of being is to articulate the significance of concealment.²⁶² Knowledge of concealment may draw the fleeing gods toward us,²⁶³ but because the significance of concealment is ‘forgotten’ it is also understood to be the source of nihilism.²⁶⁴

Hölderlin speaks of a ‘pathless Earth’ that results from the flight of the gods.²⁶⁵ Heidegger sees this as evidence that Hölderlin foresaw the problem of nihilism. Hence, *The Rhine* speaks of the rivers that shape the pathless earth into a homeland.²⁶⁶ However, for him Hölderlin not only recognises this but, because poetry is understood as ‘telling’ that ‘points’, his poetry leads the way for the possibility of the overcoming of nihilism. It is the experience of the flight of the gods that ‘transported’ Hölderlin out of his historical time so that his poetry could found the other beginning.²⁶⁷ To establish the other beginning is to renounce the gods of old and await their return, who arise from the earth. As the final stanza of *Germania* proclaims

O name you daughter of the holy Earth!
Once the Mother. On the rock the waters rush
And storms in the woods, and in her name too
From ancient times echoes the divinity of old once more.

Heidegger thinks that this fundamental attunement of *Germania* and *The Rhine* is primarily an opportunity to awaken the call to the earth. In what follows, I explore the significance of his concept of earth.

3.5 The Two Meanings of Heidegger’s Concept of Earth

In the previous chapter I explored Heidegger’s focus on the truth disclosing capacities of *Dasein*, developed in *Being and Time* through the concept of truth as unconcealment (*Entbergen*), and in what way his focus shifted to a ‘region’ or

²⁶²*BP*, pp. 23-24.

²⁶³*Ibid.*

²⁶⁴*BP*, p. 116.

²⁶⁵*HH*, p. 93.

²⁶⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 90-93.

²⁶⁷*HH*, p. 1 and p. 50.

‘dimension’ of being that precedes this.²⁶⁸ Heidegger called this ‘untruth’. Untruth is said to be the ‘immediate’, ‘concealed’, dimension of truth that precedes the ‘mediated’ truth of being through language. However, in so far as Heidegger holds to his phenomenological and hermeneutical commitment that the meaning of being is always *understood*, a problem with this thesis remained. For, if this concealed dimension of being precedes the unconcealed truth, then it also precedes language.²⁶⁹ To discuss this foundational truth is thus oxymoronic, and to figure out a means of revealing this concealed truth to a people even harder. In the lectures on Plato, he wonders whether sense perception and affectivity are possible modes of access to this dimension, and he believed that the National Socialist revolution was providing the means in which to orientate the people to it. He calls this concealed nature ‘earth’, a name that serves to further emphasise its corporeal element. Affectivity is indeed the means of access to this dimension, but he argues that it is poetry and art, and especially the poetry of Hölderlin, that provides the fundamental attunement in which to experience it.²⁷⁰

This tension, and his solution in the power of poetry, gives rise to two meanings within this concept. First, there is the phenomenological descriptive version of earth that we see in essays such as *The Origin of the Work of Art*. His discussion of it there largely tries to draw our attention to its unknowability. In the lecture series on Hölderlin for example, he calls it the ‘mystery’.²⁷¹ Then, there is the poetic naming of earth *for a people* which Heidegger believes to occur through Hölderlin’s *Germania*

²⁶⁸Heidegger now calls this region ‘earth’. However, although Heidegger says earth is different from world, he nonetheless specifies that it is never separated from world. *UK*, p. 35. *OA*, p. 111. As such, to call the earth a ‘dimension’ or ‘region’ is misleading, as it could be taken to suggest that it is a separable part of a greater whole, made up of both earth and world. I take ‘dimension’ here for the translation given by McNeill and Ireland, in *HH*, p. 106. *HHGR*, p. 96. The line reads ‘[t]his Earthly dimension of the Earth is unattainable even for the heavenly’. However, the German reads ‘[s]elbst den Himmlischen bleibt dieses Irdisch der Erde unerreichbar’, which might be more faithfully translated as ‘[e]ven for the heavenly, the earthliness of the earth remains unreachable’. For ease of translation, McNeill and Ireland have done a good job, but I suspect Heidegger avoided the German *Dimension* or *Bezirk* for a reason. Cf. however, *BP*, p. 145, where Heidegger speaks of the ‘concealed region of truth’ ‘verborgenen [...] Bezirkes einer Wahrheit’. However, this is not simply a translation problem but a philosophical problem when poised with attempting to elucidate a phenomenon that precedes language. As such, I take it that the reader is familiar with this difficulty, and continue to use these terms and others as a form of formal indication.

²⁶⁹*HH*, p. 75. ‘Der ursprüngliche Ursprung der Sprache als des Wesensgrundes des menschlichen Daseins bleibt aber ein Geheimnis’. ‘The original origin of language as the essential ground of human *Dasein*, however, remains a mystery’. My translation.

²⁷⁰Heidegger re-affirms this lack in the ability of philosophy (as regards the necessary task in the confrontation with nihilism) in his interview with *Der Spiegel*. There, he claims philosophy can only prepare the ‘readiness, of keeping oneself open for the arrival of or the absence of the god’. Philosophy, therefore, must be a dialogue with Hölderlin, who points toward these gods. Heidegger, ‘Only a God Can Save Us’, p. 39 and p. 43.

²⁷¹*HH*, pp. 248-250.

and *The Rhine*,²⁷² and Heidegger takes Hölderlin to name earth ‘holy’ and ‘homeland’. For this section, I will first of all explore earth as a phenomenological concept, drawing primarily from his discussion of it in *The Origin of the Work of Art*. Then, I will develop this idea as it is named and thought in Heidegger’s interpretation of Hölderlin’s works in this lecture series.

3.5.1 The First Meaning: Earth as Mystery

In *The Origin of the Work of Art* Heidegger describes earth as ‘continually self-secluding and to that extent sheltering and concealing’.²⁷³ Because earth is ‘concealed’, he is building on his concept of untruth. The concealed is what precedes unconcealment, and Heidegger believes that the work of art plays a crucial role in its disclosure.²⁷⁴ In the lecture series on Plato, the work of art disclosed nature.²⁷⁵ The concept of earth is thus the fruition of his concept of nature and untruth. Regardless, some commentators have struggled to discern the significance of earth.

For example, Fell argues that earth is ‘intended concretely [...] Here the philosophical term “ground” ceases to be metaphorical; its original literal, root meaning is recalled’.²⁷⁶ Wrathall offers a similar line of interpretation as Fell in discussion of Heidegger’s concept of the ‘fourfold’.²⁷⁷ Except, Heidegger is careful to associate his concept of earth with this meaning. Recalling the Greek ‘*physis*’, he claims that earth is ‘not to be associated with the idea of matter deposited somewhere, or with the merely astronomical idea of a planet’.²⁷⁸ Certainly, he reminds us of a ‘clod of earth’ (*Erdscholl*) and ‘stone’, but he disputes the literal meaning that Fell and Wrathall offer: the ‘clod’ of earth and ‘stone’ are already things.²⁷⁹ On the contrary, the concept of earth tries to elucidate what precedes the formation of a thing. This is why earth is not to be found in the ‘heaviness’ of the stone as, although earth is present within its heaviness, the earth in the stone is something that ‘denies

²⁷²HH, p. 250. HHGR, pp. 226-227.

²⁷³UK, p. 35. OA, p. 111. ‘Die Erde ist das zu nichts gedrängte Hervorkommen des ständig Sichverschließenden und dergestalt Bergenden’.

²⁷⁴UK, p. 32. OA, pp. 109-110.

²⁷⁵WWP, pp. 63-64. ET, p. 47.

²⁷⁶Joseph Fell, *Heidegger and Sartre: An Essay on Being and Place* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 197.

²⁷⁷Wrathall, *Heidegger and Unconcealment*, pp.195-211, esp. p. 205.

²⁷⁸UK, p. 28. OA, p. 107.

²⁷⁹Trans. mod. UK, p. 5. OA, p. 92.

penetration'.²⁸⁰ Earth is thus unavailable to the methods of the modern sciences because they attempt to penetrate the stone and break it open, in the sense of understanding the being of the stone on the basis of what can be quantised and verified as correct through repeated experimentation. For Heidegger, this still means that the 'stone has instantly withdrawn again into the [...] bulk of its fragments'.²⁸¹

In the lecture series on Plato, Heidegger's understanding of 'nothing' shifted focus from *Dasein* as standing-into-nothing to the concealed nature of corporeal 'stuff', or the 'ambiguous' 'look' of beings. This ambiguity means that it is a great struggle to elucidate this concept through philosophical discourse. Heidegger provides a concrete example of this difficulty when reflecting on various philosophical responses to the 'thingness' of the 'thing'. Unable to discover what this 'thingness' is, he concludes that the 'self-refusal of the mere thing, this self-contained, irreducible spontaneity, belongs precisely to the essence of the thing. [...] [as such,] we should not force our way to its thingly character'.²⁸² Heidegger believes that the significance of concealment has eluded the history of philosophy, but his reflection on the things 'thingness' suggests that this is a necessity of the nature of concealment. Philosophy cannot 'penetrate' its essence. However, there is an even richer suggestion here. The 'thingness' of the thing is always in a state of 'excess' to our understanding, for it by nature refuses disclosure.²⁸³

Following this sentiment, Harries calls earth a 'material transcendence'.²⁸⁴ However, by attempting to clarify a phenomenon that lies beyond the transcendental horizon of *Dasein*, Heidegger draws into question the emphasis on the transcendental approach in *Being and Time*.²⁸⁵ Recognising this, Harries clarifies that by material transcendence he means to 'refer to that aspect of things that makes them incapable of being adequately expressed in some clear and distinct discourse'.²⁸⁶ Which is to say, as opposed to *Dasein* transcending the thing to its meaning (or being), it is understood

²⁸⁰UK, p. 33. OA, p. 110.

²⁸¹UK, p. 33. OA, p. 110.

²⁸²'Oder sollte dieses Sichzurückhalten des bloßen Dinges, sollte dieses in sich beruhende Zunichtsgedrängtsein gerade zum Wesen des Dinges gehören? Muß dann jenes Befremdende und Verschllossene im Wesen des Dinges nicht für ein Denken, das versucht, das Ding zu denken, das Vertraute werden? Steht es so, dann dürfen wir den Weg zum Dinghaften des Dinges nicht erzwingen'. UK, p. 17. OA, p. 99.

²⁸³See, Polt, *Meaning, Excess, Event*.

²⁸⁴Harries, *Art Matters*, p. 117.

²⁸⁵Bernasconi thus argues that 'by introducing the notion of earth, [Heidegger acknowledges] that *Being and Time* needed modification'. Bernasconi, 'Race and Earth in Heidegger's Thinking', p. 51. Cf. Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World, p. 197.

²⁸⁶Harries, *Art Matters*, p. 117.

that in virtue of this earthly element the thing always transcends *Dasein*'s capacity to grasp it. Following in kind, Polt points out that our 'understanding always grows from and rests on an opacity that continues to resist our interpretation'.²⁸⁷ The 'thing' is thus both its meaning and its excess, it is two-objects-in-one.²⁸⁸

This serves to remind us that earth should not be understood as something that *is*, and so it misrepresents the implications of this concept to think that *Dasein* only has a partial glimpse of a totality.²⁸⁹ If this was so, then we would have to concede that earth 'is', but that this 'is' is concealed from view. Instead, earth *precedes* view. It is 'self-closing'. Earth is the material, corporeal, 'abyss', 'unattainable even for the heavenly'.²⁹⁰ Hence, earth is 'essentially undisclosable, that which shrinks from every disclosure and constantly keeps itself closed up'.²⁹¹ Earth is the 'nothing' within the material reality around us, which he understands to be the site of the emergence of the fleeing gods.²⁹² Reflecting this, he calls the earth the 'mystery' or 'secret' (*Geheimnis*) of being.²⁹³ Language springs from this mystery.²⁹⁴ In so far as the

²⁸⁷Richard Polt, *The Emergency of Being: On Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy* (London: Cornell University Press, 2006), p. 145. Likewise, Thomson points out that earth is the 'inherently dynamic dimension of intelligibility that simultaneously offers itself to and resists being brought fully into the light of our "worlds" of meaning and permanently stabilized therein'. Thomson, *Heidegger, Art and Postmodernity*, p. 89. See also, *UK*, p. 34. *OA*, p. 110: 'Das Sichverschließen der Erde aber ist kein einförmiges, starres Verhangenbleiben, sondern es entfaltet sich in eine unerschöpfliche Fülle einfacher Weisen und Gestalten'. 'The self-seclusion of earth, however, is not a uniform inflexible staying under cover, but unfolds itself in an inexhaustible variety of simple modes and shapes'. Trans. mod.

²⁸⁸Polt argues that this 'paradox' in his thinking results because of the realisation that 'part of [the meaning of "is"] [...] is precisely that what is cannot be exhausted by any meaning, but exceeds it'. He concludes that the question of the truth of being 'should then involve both meaning and excess'. Polt, 'Meaning, Excess, Event', p. 34. Polt criticizes Sheehan for failing to properly articulate this aspect of Heidegger's work. However, we must think of this excess not as another meaning to be 'discovered', but what has remained unacknowledged in the meaning itself, understood as its abyss. It is because of this tension that Heidegger argues in *The Origin* that 'Welt und Erde sind wesentlich voneinander verschieden und doch niemals getrennt'. 'World and earth are essentially different from one another and yet are never separated'. *UK*, p. 35. *OA*, p. 111.

²⁸⁹If we were to conceive of it as such, it would succumb to the same problem Heidegger has with the transcendental approach of *Being and Time*, which presupposed a 'below and a hither side'. Emphasis removed. *BP*, p. 322. *CP*, p. 255.

²⁹⁰*HH*, p. 106. *HHGR*, p. 96. Heidegger believes that this impossible attempt to glimpse a totality inspires Hölderlin to charge Oedipus with 'an/ Eye to many'. *HH*, pp. 65-66. *HHGR*, p. 60.

²⁹¹'Offen gelichtet als sie selbst erscheint die Erde nur, wo sie als die wesentlich Unerschließbare gewahrt und bewahrt wird, die vor jeder Erschließung zurückweicht und d. h. ständig sich verschlossen hält'. *UK*, p. 33. *OA*, p. 110.

²⁹²*BP*, pp. 26-27. *CP*, p. 23. 'The truth of being, however, as the openness of the self-concealing, is at the same time transposition into the decision regarding the remoteness and nearness of the gods and so is preparedness for the passing by of the last god'. See also, *HH*, pp. 98-99, where Heidegger discusses Hölderlin's claim that the gods arise from the 'silent seclusion' of the earth.

²⁹³*HH*, pp. 248-250. See, also, *BH*, pp. 318-319. 'Die Sprache verweigert uns noch ihr Wesen [...] Zu diesen gehört auch, die Versicherung, etwas sei unerklärlich. Mit solchen Aussagen meinen wir vor dem Geheimnis zu stehen. Als ob es denn so ausgemacht sei, daß die Wahrheit des Seins sich überhaupt auf Ursachen und Erklärungsgründe oder, was dasselbe ist, auf deren Unfaßlichkeit stellen lasse'. 'Language still denies us its essence [...] [even] the assurance that it is inexplicable. By such

source of language is a mysterious one, this source always eludes the possibility of dialogue, for it is this very mystery that endows us with our capacity to speak. Language, then, protects us from the ‘blinding abyss’ from which the gods emerge. To call to these gods by revealing the earth is to begin to overcome nihilism, but as his reflection on the thingness of the thing illuminated, this concealment cannot be grasped through philosophical discourse.

With this sense in mind, in *The Origin* he rephrases the tension within the ‘one-objects-twice’²⁹⁵ to the ‘strife’ (*Streit*, literally ‘quarrel’) between earth and world. The focus here has shifted. Now, by ‘setting up a world and setting forth the earth’ the work of art accomplishes the ‘strife’ between earth and world,²⁹⁶ as opposed the *logos* of the soul. This may seem like he is moving away from the centrality of *Dasein*, but it is nonetheless the artists who establish our world through the primordial projection of great poetry, and the people of the work sustain and preserve its meaning.²⁹⁷ The focus is indeed on ‘art itself’, but to remove the artist and the community that receive this work from the picture would be a gross misreading. Regardless, it is the work of art thus produced that reveals the earth *as* the earth.²⁹⁸ In this sense, the artists and the people are indeed subsidiary to the work itself.

In *The Origin* he claims:

That into which the [art]work sets itself back and which it causes to come forth in this setting back of itself we called the earth. Earth is that which comes forth and shelters. Earth, irreducibly spontaneous, is effortless and untiring. Upon the earth and in it, historical man grounds his dwelling in the world. In setting up a world, the [art]work sets forth the earth. This setting forth must be thought here in the strict sense of the word. The [art]work moves the earth itself into the open region of a world and keeps it there. *The [art]work lets the Earth be an Earth.*²⁹⁹

The need to let the earth be the earth relies on his understanding of the limits of

statements, we believe that we confront the mystery. As if it were so arranged, that the truth of being itself is based on causes and causes of explanations or, what is the same, its incomprehensibility’. My translation.

²⁹⁴ *HH*, p. 75.

²⁹⁵ *HP*, pp. 48-49.

²⁹⁶ ‘Indem das Werk eine Welt aufstellt und die Erde herstellt, ist es eine Anstiftung dieses Streites’. *UK*, p. 36. *OA*, p. 112.

²⁹⁷ *UK*, pp. 54-60.

²⁹⁸ *UK*, p. 32. *OA*, pp. 109-110.

²⁹⁹ His emphasis. ‘Wohin das Werk sich zurückstellt und was es in diesem Sich Zurückstellen hervorkommen läßt, nannten wir die Erde. Sie ist das Hervorkommend-Bergende. Die Erde ist das zu nichts gedrängte Mühelose-Unermüdliche. Auf die Erde und in sie gründet der geschichtliche Mensch sein Wohnen in der Welt. Indem das Werk eine Welt aufstellt, stellt es die Erde her. Das Herstellen ist hier im strengen Sinne des Wortes zu denkend Das Werk rückt und hält die Erde selbst in das Offene einer Welt. *Das Werk läßt die Erde eine Erde sein*’. *UK*, p. 32. *OA*, pp. 109-110

meaningful philosophical discourse.³⁰⁰ Although the concept of the earth breaks beyond the transcendental project he utilizes in *Being and Time*, Heidegger has not dismissed the hermeneutical and phenomenological commitments to the investigation of a world that appears to a being who already understands the meaning of being, with the limits of meaningful philosophical discourse this implies, for any meaningful philosophical discourse must begin by clarifying the significance of the understanding of the meaning of being for the being that asks about being.³⁰¹ As I explored in the first chapter, there was still a tension here for, through his discussion of nature, Heidegger recognised that such limitation left an ‘unknown’ that exceeded the limitations of this discourse. Hence, there was a development of his concept of nature into the ‘overpowering’, and he argued that we needed to find a way to reveal nature as nature.³⁰² The problem that faces Heidegger here is that what the thing *is*, is not really anything until it is disclosed in language through *Dasein*, which means that once we make sense of nature we reduce it to our meaningful worlds. It would thus no longer be ‘overpowering’, and instead just ‘there’. This is why Heidegger talks about earth as ‘concealed’ and ‘silent’, for he remains committed to the limits of philosophical discussion from within the meaning of being as available to *Dasein*. Hence, the earth, as the ‘self-secluding’ must be allowed remain as such, even if it is to come to the ‘open region’ of our worlds.

Yet he still wishes to bring the ‘mystery’ of the earth to language. He clarifies this in the *Contributions*, when he critically evaluates previous work, explaining that having an understanding of being (understood as a thrown projection) means being thrown into an ‘open’ that is itself first rooted into the earth, ‘protruding up into a [meaningful] world’.³⁰³ As he claims in the same passage, this marks the difference between the attempt to raise the question of the meaning of being in *Being and Time* and the attempt to ground the truth of being in this period. This is because one’s understanding is not just an implicit sense of being, but a ‘taking over’ where what is ‘self-secluding’ ‘opens itself as maintaining and binding’.³⁰⁴ This is another way of

³⁰⁰This position is implicitly in the background in a discussion on language in this lecture series. *HH*, pp. 59-77. See esp., pp. 75-76. *HHGR*, pp. 68-69, where Heidegger claims, ‘[w]e shall first approach our questioning here if we ponder fundamentally how poetizing as the fundamental event of the historical *Dasein* of human beings relates [...] to *nature*, prior to all natural science’. His emphasis. Hence, although Heidegger continues to commit to the thesis that nature is only discovered through language, he nonetheless maintains his conviction that we relate to a nature beyond language also.

³⁰¹*SZ*, pp. 273-276.

³⁰²*NHS*, p. 55. Nature must come to belong as an ‘environment’.

³⁰³*BP*, p. 259. *CP*, p. 204.

³⁰⁴*BP*, p. 260. *CP*, p. 204.

claiming that nature ‘tunes’ our understanding of being.³⁰⁵ By adhering to this call of the earth that attunes us through Hölderlin’s poetry, the German people can ‘leap’ back into *Dasein* and ground the truth of being.³⁰⁶ The task at hand is thus to bring the self-secluding earth into the open, orientating the people to the earth in a way that reveals the earth as self-concealed. This allows the earth *be* earth, ‘protruding’ into our worlds in order to raise the disclosure of truth to greater existential heights and make beings ‘more’ beingful.

Thus, it is when his concept of nature, that which overpowers and shapes our understanding of the meaning of being, and untruth, that which precedes meaningful intelligibility, develop into his concept of earth that the full significance of the work of art comes into view for Heidegger. If we are to allow this ‘self-closing’ earth be brought into the ‘open region’ of our worlds, then a different strategy is required than philosophical discourse. Heidegger takes Hölderlin to point at this when Hölderlin speaks of ‘intimacy’. As Heidegger argues:

Intimacy is that originary unity of the enmity of the powers of what has purely sprung forth. It is the mystery belonging to such being. What has purely sprung forth is never simply inexplicable in some respect, in one particular level of its being; it remains enigma through and through. Intimacy has the nature of a mystery, not because others fail to penetrate it; rather, in itself it prevails in essence as mystery. There is mystery only where intimacy holds sway. When, however, this mystery is named and told of as such, then it thereby becomes manifest. Yet the unveiling of its manifestness is precisely a not wanting to explain, but rather understanding it as self-concealing concealment. Bringing the mystery to understanding is indeed an unveiling, but it is that unveiling that may be accomplished only in song, in the poetizing.³⁰⁷

If for Heidegger, raising the question of the meaning of being in *Being and Time* is a hermeneutic project that endeavours to listen to the deposited meaning of being within the various texts throughout philosophical history, then grounding the truth of

³⁰⁵ *WWP*, pp. 236-237. *ET*, p. 169.

³⁰⁶ *BP*, pp. 421-422. *CP*, p. 332: ‘philosophy is now in the first place preparation for philosophy by way of the construction of the most proximate foyers in whose spatial structure the words of Hölderlin can be heard, be answered by Da-sein, and in this answer be grounded for the language of the future human being. Only thus does the human being set foot on the next protracted passageway to being’. See also, *BP*, p. 280. *CP*, p. 220: ‘Da-sein, [...] if able to leap in creative grounding, is grounded abyssally in the event’. As we have seen, this ‘abyss’ is the silent call of the earth.

³⁰⁷ *HH*, p. 250. *HHGR*, pp. 226-227. ‘Die Innigkeit ist jene ursprüngliche Einheit der Feindseligkeit der Mächte des Reinentsprungenen. Sie ist das zu diesem Seyn gehörige Geheimnis. Reinentsprungenes ist nie nur unerklärbar in irgendeiner Hinsicht, in irgend tiner Schicht seines Seyns, es bleibt Rätsel durch und durch. Die Innigkeit hat nicht die Beschaffenheit eines Geheimnisses, weil andere sie nicht durchdringen, sondern in sich west sie als Geheimnis. Geheimnis ist nur, wo Innigkeit waltet. Wenn jedoch dieses Geheimnis als ein solches genannt und gesagt wird, dann ist es damit offenbar, aber die Enthüllung seiner Offenbarkeit ist gerade das Nicht-erklären-wollen, vielmehr das Verstehen seiner als der sich verbergenden Verborgenheit. Das Zum-Verstehen-bringen des Geheimnisses ist zwar ein Enthüllen, aber jenes, das gerade noch vollbracht werden darf im Gesang, in der Dichtung’. Schuwer also discusses this crucial role the poets have in Heidegger’s thought for addressing this mystery. Schuwer, ‘Nature and the Holy’, pp. 225-237.

beyng is instead, hearing the call of the earth as deposited in the texts of Hölderlin through which our world is raised to a higher level of existential disclosure. As such, the mystery of earth requires a name so that it can be experienced through the understanding. Philosophy, or so it would seem, is simply incapable of doing justice to revealing this ‘self-concealing concealment’. Instead, this can occur through a poetic sensitivity called ‘intimacy’. Heidegger believes that poetry arises as the means in which nature articulates itself.³⁰⁸ In the violent strife between earth and world, intimacy is the ‘restraint’ of the poet, who carefully crafts this name into language, thus laying the foundation for the possibility of an historical people.³⁰⁹

The discussion on Heidegger’s use of Hölderlin has already elucidated the dangers of this position.³¹⁰ On the one hand, that poetry has the capacity to tell us something about our origins and disclose to us meanings and sentiments that are unavailable to philosophy is a powerful appraisal for the significance of poetry and the arts for both philosophical discourse and humanity at large. On the other, one must wonder who has the authority to name the specific poets or poetic texts that contain these insights. And by what means do we evaluate the status of these insights? Do the poets simply give us something to reflect on, that we must also maintain a crucial philosophical distance? Or are these unalloyed truths that must be followed? We have already seen Heidegger’s answer to this question. He is the one to point to Hölderlin. For it is Hölderlin’s poetry, and his alone, that the earth gains its name. Moreover, as the one who seems to have the monopoly on the interpretation of these insights, is it not in the end *Heidegger* who tells us precisely how the mysterious earth comes to language as the ‘holy’ and the ‘homeland’, and as he evaluates the significance of these in his interpretation of *Germania* and *The Rhine*? The absolute authority he provides the poets then, becomes for him a vehicle in which to instill his philosophy an authority it often times fails to warrant.³¹¹

³⁰⁸HH, p. 258. HHGR, p. 234. ‘Im Wesen des Seyns selbst, verstanden als “Natur” (Innigkeit), gründet die Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit der Dichtung’. ‘In the essence of beyng itself, understood as “nature” (intimacy), is grounded the possibility and necessity of poetry’.

³⁰⁹HH, p. 275.

³¹⁰See Section 3.2.4, above.

³¹¹I am reminded of the role of the Oracle at Delphi. In Plato’s *Apology*, it is not in question that the Oracle speaks for the gods, as she is the mouthpiece of divine truth. However, the onus is on Socrates to discover what she means when she claims that he is the wisest person in Athens. Which is to say, the truth of the Oracle must be *interpreted*. This places significant responsibility on Socrates to successfully discover the meaning of this truth. Heidegger treats Hölderlin similarly, and it is his responsibility to interpret the meaning. An important difference, however, lies in that for Socrates, the successful interpretation of the meaning of the Oracle lay in his attempt to find the truth through dialogue with *others*. On the contrary, as we saw above, and will continue to explore in what follows,

Through the tension between the recognition that our understanding of the world is pervaded by mystery, and that this mystery must nonetheless come to both word and world through poetry, two concepts of earth emerge in Heidegger's thought. The first meaning is a phenomenological descriptive thesis that points to an inchoate, material, region that precedes meaningful intelligibility, protruding into the meaningful world of the human being. This, he more appropriately calls 'mystery'.³¹² The second is the hermeneutic retrieval of the meaning of this region for a people through the power of poetry, and for Heidegger this is only in Hölderlin's poetry. This is necessary, for the tension between earth and world is maintained by the strife instigated by the artwork, and truth is the existential disclosure of a place *for* a people. Heidegger's interest in the work of art is not about the essence of art, but instead to ground a future German being *through* the work of art.³¹³ To create the environment for a new disclosure of truth is also the motivation behind his discussion of truth in the lectures on Plato, and the fundamental motivating factor behind his support for the National Socialist movement. Here we see the central themes of the present investigation collide. If Heidegger is to reconcile his philosophy with his support for National Socialism, he is forced to provide the work of art an essential role in developing his understanding of the essence of truth, for it is only through the work of arts capacity to disclose the 'silence' of 'concealment' that the revolutionary

Heidegger's use of Hölderlin functions to justify the legitimacy of the National Socialist regime despite his growing grievances with how the regime is unfolding itself. For Heidegger then, the prophet status of Hölderlin functioning to effectively strengthen Heidegger's own views with an authority they fail to warrant.

³¹²It is this first meaning that Mitchell has in mind, when he claims that earth is the 'key to radiance, for it is the Earth that comes to "shine" in the artwork, and "world" now facilitating that shining'. Mitchell, *Heidegger Among the Sculptors*, p. 10. Although his claim holds for artworks in general, and especially sculpturing (as his study is primarily interested in), in the sense that artworks have a capacity to reveal the materiality of the world in a way that equipment cannot (where earth is 'used up', as Heidegger claims in the *Origin*), what Mitchell misses is that Heidegger's real concern is bringing the earth to language in a way that is only achieved in certain great poetry, such as Hölderlin's. This would instigate the transportation to a 're-coining' of being, establishing the other beginning through an encounter with the last god. This occurs through the fundamental attunement in the poem. *HH*, pp. 139-141, p. 181 and p. 223.

³¹³*UK*, p. 63. *OA*, p. 130. 'Der dichtende Entwurf der Wahrheit, der sich ins Werk stellt als Gestalt, wird auch nie ins Leere und Unbestimmte hinein vollzogen. Die Wahrheit wird im Werk vielmehr den kommenden Bewahrenden, d. h. einem geschichtlichen Menschentum zugeworfen. Das Zugeworfene ist jedoch niemals ein willkürlich Zugemutetes. Der wahrhaft dichtende Entwurf ist die Eröffnung von Jenem, worin das Dasein als geschichtliches schon geworfen ist. Dies ist die Erde und für ein geschichtliches Volk seine Erde, der sich verschließende Grund, dem es aufrucht mit all dem, was es, sich selbst noch verborgen, schon ist'. 'The poetic projection of truth that sets itself into work as figure is also never carried out in the direction of an indeterminate void. Rather, in the work, truth is thrown toward the coming preservers, that is, toward a historical group of human beings. Truly poetic projection is the opening up of that into which human being as historical is already case. This is the earth and, for a historical people, its earth, the self-secluding ground on which it rests together with everything that it already is, though still hidden from itself'.

capacity that he saw inherent in National Socialism can be fulfilled. Thus, after the failure of his rectorship, Heidegger utilises a specific work of art to justify his involvement in the regime for, if he can find a way to get the German people to stand in the ‘domain’ of ‘power’ of Hölderlin’s poetry, the work of art might *eventuate* its world disclosing function thus re-orientating the movement toward its ‘inner greatness’. As his *Origin of the Work of Art* powerfully claims, ‘[w]henever art happens [...] a thrust enters history; history either begins or starts over again’.³¹⁴

Here, one wonders about the problem of ‘contamination’ when evaluating the relationship between his philosophy and support of the movement. *The Origin* is focussed on the first meaning of earth, and yet he believes that the history that art ‘begins’ is ‘the transporting of a people into its appointed task as entry into that people’s endowment’.³¹⁵ It seems that it is not so easy to separate Heidegger’s philosophical understanding of earth from his poetic one. For him, the earth can only be understood and experienced in its mystery, if it comes to language *for* a people *through* a given poet. It is through this that a people become a historical people.³¹⁶ Likewise, this intimacy is available only when the poet feels a true ‘belonging to the being of his own people’.³¹⁷ For Trawny, contamination occurs when a thinking that first of all seemed ‘neutral’, ‘now appears in a different light’.³¹⁸ We have already seen an example of this, when Heidegger establishes the superiority of the German people through the significance he accords Hölderlin’s poetry.

Can this talk of an historical people then, and the importance of certain poets therein, be easily separated from the ways in which Heidegger utilised this argument? More specifically, can his conviction that we belong to our earth be so easily separated from the often unfavourable distinction between one historical people and the other that it implies? I would like to avoid the temptation of answering this problem with the claim that we are *all* people of this earth. Who I am is so in relation to who I am not, and there is surely something to be said for the desire for rootedness, a feeling of belonging to a place. Which is to say, there is a tempting romance in Heidegger’s provincialism, a sentiment I am not entirely sure should be immediately

³¹⁴UK, p. 65. OA, p. 131. ‘Immer wenn Kunst geschieht, d. h. wenn ein Anfang ist, kommt in die Geschichte ein Stoß, fängt Geschichte erst oder wieder an’.

³¹⁵Ibid. ‘Geschichte ist die Entrückung eines Volkes in sein Aufgegebenes als Einrückung in sein Mitgegebenes’.

³¹⁶It is important to recall here the crucial connection between earth and place. I evaluate this further, below.

³¹⁷HH, p. 135. HHGR, p. 120.

³¹⁸Trawny, *The Myth of a Jewish World Conspiracy*, p. 3.

shunned. Yet when Heidegger points to this distinction, that is, the distinction between one people and another, he does speak of certain origins as more ‘pure’.³¹⁹ As we saw, concern has become for him an historical category, and there are different ways that this ontological category realises itself and embeds itself in a people. Does this distinction not point to a *chosen* people, to a ‘destiny’ that separates *us* from *them*? To shed some light on these questions, the remainder of this chapter explores the meanings of earth that Heidegger ‘hears’ within Hölderlin’s poetry: the ‘holy’ and ‘homeland’.

3.5.2 The Second Meaning: Earth as Holy and as Homeland

In *Germania*, the final stanza speaks about a ‘holy’ earth once called the ‘mother’. Hölderlin writes this ‘Mother [...] of all’ is the one who ‘bears the abyss’.³²⁰ Heidegger takes this to be pointing to his philosophical understanding of earth. Likewise, he takes Hölderlin’s descriptions of waters rushing on rocks to evoke the first stanza, which talks about the ‘waters of the homeland’.³²¹ This is the second meaning of earth in Heidegger’s thought, earth named ‘holy’ and ‘homeland’ as foretold through Hölderlin’s *Germania*.³²² We have seen that the fundamental attunement at work in the poem is understood to be a holy mourning at the flight of the gods.³²³ Heidegger draws on some of Hölderlin’s own writings to argue that by ‘holy’ Hölderlin is clarifying and elaborating on the fundamental attunement of the poem.³²⁴ Hölderlin calls this holy a ‘disinterestedness’ (*Uneigennützigkeit*) and through a reading of Hölderlin *On the Operations of the Poetic Spirit*, Heidegger says this disinterestedness is not a lack of interest but a relinquishing of ‘utility’

³¹⁹HH, pp. 243-244.

³²⁰HH, p. 242. Line 76 and 77 of *Germania* read ‘Die Mutter ist von allem, / und den Abgrund trägt Die Verborgene sonst genannt von Menschen’.

³²¹Ibid., pp. 90-93 and p. 137.

³²²Haar finds four meanings of Earth in Heidegger; Earth as concealing and hence impenetrable, Earth as a re-thinking of nature, Earth as the materiality of the work of art and, finally, Earth as native ground. Michael Haar, *The Song of the Earth*, trans. by Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 57-63. Cf. Bernasconi, ‘Race and Earth in Heidegger’s Thinking’, p. 62, who argues that ‘Haar has no warrant for saying that the earth as native ground should be taken in a less original sense’. Likewise, the two meanings I give earth include all four distinctions made by Haar, as the first (concealment) and third (materiality) meaning are mutually exclusive, as are the second (nature) and fourth (native ground). To separate them in the manner Haar does obscures the political resonances Heidegger’s discussion of earth is necessarily enmeshed with.

³²³HH, p. 82. HHGR, p. 75. ‘[T]he entire fundamental attunement is holy’.

³²⁴HH, pp. 83-87.

(*Nutzen*).³²⁵ It is clear that Hölderlin is concerned with the limitations of the divide between subject and object. He claims that the holy is a recognition of himself as a ‘unity contained within the divine’,³²⁶ an experience available through a ‘sentiment’. Heidegger equates ‘sentiment’ with his understanding of a fundamental attunement.³²⁷

However, Heidegger is not drawing on Hölderlin to argue for the literal existence of the gods. As I already pointed out, the fundamental attunement of a holy mourning in a readied distress is a renunciation of the gods of old and an awaiting for the future ones. For him, ‘Earthly’ does not mean created by a creator-god, but rather an uncreated abyss within which all emergent happening tremble and remain held’.³²⁸ In *The Origin*, Heidegger explores the Ancient Greek ‘temple’ as a kind of work of art, where it is ‘by means of the temple’ that ‘the god is present’.³²⁹ Heidegger emphasises that because the temple ‘encloses’ and thus conceals the figure of the god, i.e., its earthly element, the god is let ‘stand out into the holy precinct through the open portico’.³³⁰ It is through the ‘silent seclusion’ of the earth that the gods arise, as Hölderlin writes in *Germania*. In this passage, Heidegger is not arguing for the existence of the Greek gods either, but he is claiming that it is only through the concealing power of the work of art that the gods for a people are established, which in turn sustains a meaningful world.³³¹ Heidegger uses this concept to insert a contingency and historicity into the concept of the divine, averting the limitations he sees in atheism whilst simultaneously rejecting any form of theism or pantheism.³³² Which is to say, it is not that the earth is holy, but through a proper orientation to the

³²⁵ *HH*, p. 84.

³²⁶ As quoted by Heidegger in *HH*, pp. 85-86. *HHGR*, p. 78.

³²⁷ *HH*, p. 84.

³²⁸ Trans. mod. *HH*, p. 107. *HHGR*, p. 97. ‘Irdisch heißt nicht, von einem Schöpfergott geschaffen, sondern ungeschaffener Abgrund, in dem alles heraufkommende Geschehen erzittert und gehalten bleibt’.

³²⁹ *UK*, p. 27. *OA*, p. 106.

³³⁰ *UK*, p. 27. *OA*, p. 106.

³³¹ As the passage from *The Origin* continues, ‘Das Tempel werk fügt erst und sammelt zugleich die Einheit jener Bahnen und Bezüge um sich, in denen Geburt und Tod, Unheil und Segen, Sieg und Schmach, Ausharren und Verfall — dem Menschenwesen die Gestalt seines Geschickes gewinnen. Die waltende Weite dieser offenen Bezüge ist die Welt dieses geschichtlichen Volkes. Aus ihr und in ihr kommt es erst auf sich selbst zum Vollbringen seiner Bestimmung zurück’. ‘It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being. The all-governing expanse of this open relational context is the world of this historical people. Only from and in this expanse does the nation first return to itself for the fulfillment of its vocation’. *UK*, pp. 27-28. *OA*, p. 106. See also, *HH*, pp. 98-99. For a discussion of the importance of the experience of divine after the death of God, for Heidegger, see, Wrathall, *Heidegger and Unconcealment*, pp. 195-211.

³³² *HH*, pp. 150-151. See also, *BP*, pp. 409-417, esp. p. 411.

earth as ‘abyss’ our sense of the holy arises. This also allows him de-anthropocentrise his notion of *Dasein* as, although the meaning of being is always ‘housed’ through *Dasein*, *Dasein* is a correlated factor that does not simply ‘project’ its world but must do so through a poetic responsivity to what arises as mystery. This mystery is *not* what exceeds its grasp but what is mystery in and of itself, namely the earth and the gods.³³³ Accordingly, Heidegger is stressing the finitude of *Dasein* whilst simultaneously avoiding the claim that meaning exists beyond it. Except, instead of focusing on the source of this finitude within *Dasein* he articulates how finitude is experienced in our concrete engagement with the world. Not, then, in anxiety-toward-our-own-death, or not *only* there, but out ‘there’ in the world; a *place* that we sustain through being finite beings running-forward-into-death.³³⁴ By nurturing our earth as a holy abyss, we provide the space for the arrival of the last god. It is in virtue of this ‘nurturing’ of the earth for the arrival of the god that the homeland will be established.³³⁵ Naming earth as holy, then, is a means to call out to the fleeing gods through which we can reclaim a sense of ourselves as part of a greater whole.

The above consideration reminds us of the importance of place in Heidegger’s thought. Although temporal in being, as the ‘there’ of being *Dasein* is the *place* where meaning shows up.³³⁶ As such, Malpas argues that Heidegger’s turn toward the earth is founded in the failure of *Being and Time* because his emphasis on temporality in

³³³I discuss the significance of the ‘mystery’ in-and-of-itself further in the next chapter. See, *HH*, p. 250. ‘Reinentsprungenes ist nie nur unerklärbar in irgendeiner Hinsicht, in irgend einer Schicht seines Seyns, es bleibt Rätsel durch und durch. [...] sondern in sich west sie als Geheimnis’. ‘Sheer arisenness is not simply inexplicable in some respect, in *one* layer of its beyng, it remains in riddles through and through. [...] it is in its essence *as* mystery’. My emphasis on ‘as’. For a discussion of the significance of this concept within scholarship of environmental philosophy and eco-phenomenology, see, Trish Glazerbrook, ‘Heidegger and Environmental Philosophy’, in *The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger*, ed. by François Raffoul and Eric S. Nelson (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 433-440. See also, Kate Rigby, ‘Earth, World, Text: On the (Im)Possibility of Ecopoiesis’, *New Literary History*, 35, 3 (2004), 427-442. See also, Magdalena Holy-Luczaj, ‘Heidegger’s Support for a Deep Ecology Reexamined Once: Ontological Egalitarianism or Farwell to the Great Chain of Being’, *Ethics and the Environment*, 20, 1 (2015), 45-66. Holy-Luczaj argues that it is Heidegger’s critique of the two-world theory—what she calls the ‘great chain of being’—makes his thought useful for the development of an ecopoetics, or ‘deep ecology’. Bate also draws from Heidegger’s understanding of earth, as well as many other thinkers and artists, to develop a concept of ecopoiesis. Jonathan Bate, *The Song of the Earth* (London: Picador, 2000).

³³⁴As he argues in the *Contributions to Philosophy*. *BP*, pp. 208-210. What I call ‘two-world’ here Heidegger thinks of as the difference between being and beings, where being becomes forgotten and so the question of beings as such becomes an onto-theological question. What Heidegger is doing here, on the contrary, is providing a framework for conceiving of the divinities that does not forgot the necessity of a creative grounding of the truth of beyng through *Da-Sein*. On this last point, see, *ibid.*, pp. 398-401.

³³⁵*HH*, pp. 104-105.

³³⁶On this see, *SZ*, pp. 135-151.

that text ignores the necessary spatiality of being that he at the same time suggests.³³⁷ This tension turns Heidegger toward the topology of being. Due to the genuine philosophical precedent that underpins this claim, coupled with the uncomfortable connotations it gains in context of Nazi Germany, the problem the ‘homeland’ poses in his thought is not straightforward.

For example, Heidegger stresses that the homeland is not ‘a mere birth place, nor [...] a landscape familiar to us, but *as the power of the Earth* upon which the human beings “dwells poetically”’.³³⁸ One might say that it is through experiencing the earth as holy and so calling forth the gods that the homeland is established. Pointing out that the ‘*topos*’ this would establish is not a geographical one, Malpas argues that Heidegger’s concept of the homeland is not exclusionary.³³⁹ Except, the poet is concerned with *his* people,³⁴⁰ and the *Contributions* distinguishes a people on the basis of a ‘common historical (earthly-worldly) origin’.³⁴¹ Accordingly, Heidegger argues that fundamental attunements are ‘exceptional’ and ‘exclusive’, a necessary conclusion given the ‘way in which being is opened up, and the grounding of being, can be configured differently’.³⁴² Which is to say, Heidegger’s concern is with fundamental attunements exclusive to the Germans.³⁴³ Young concedes this point, but attempts to defend him on similar grounds to Malpas, arguing that Heidegger’s ‘cultural chauvinism’ is rooted in the superiority he sees in the German language and so, given that others can learn this language, the homeland is available to all.³⁴⁴ Besides the fact that this counter-argument would place a demand on us to learn a language that we must take Heidegger’s word is superior,³⁴⁵ it also misunderstands the significance of a language and the way in which it is understood to belong to a people. For Heidegger, it is not just an issue of language but the custom and tradition the language is rooted in.³⁴⁶ It therefore is a nationalistic category, *pace*

³³⁷Malpas, *Heidegger’s Topology*, pp. 65-146.

³³⁸His emphasis. *HH*, p. 88. *HHGR*, p. 80.

³³⁹Malpas, *Heidegger’s Topology*, pp. 143-157.

³⁴⁰*HH*, p. 30.

³⁴¹*BP*, p. 96. *CP*, p. 76. See also, *UK*, p. 63.

³⁴²*HH*, p. 182. *HHGR*, p. 166.

³⁴³Bernasconi also realises this in his, ‘Race and Earth in Heidegger’s Thinking’, pp. 61-63.

³⁴⁴Young, *Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism*, p. 137.

³⁴⁵Martin Heidegger, ‘Only a God Can Save Us’, p. 44. *Der Spiegel* ask: ‘Do you believe the Germans have a special qualification for this reversal?’ Heidegger responds: ‘I have in mind especially the inner relationship of the German language with the language of the Greeks and with their thought. This has been confirmed for me today again by the French. When they begin to think, they speak German, being sure that they could not make it with their own language’.

³⁴⁶Which in turn requires the people to experience their gods. *HH*, pp. 99-100.

Phillips' claims otherwise.³⁴⁷

The homeland may not be exclusionary on biological or geographical grounds, but in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* Heidegger informs his students that in Russia and America everything is 'the same hopeless frenzy of unchained technology and the rootless organization of the average man'.³⁴⁸ In fact, Heidegger claims that in this 'world-historical situation' of nihilism, the realization of the German destiny is the last hope. Caught in the 'pincers' of Russia and America, '[o]ur people, as standing in the center, suffer the most intense pressure—our people, the people richest in neighbors and therefore the most endangered people, and for all that, the most metaphysical people'.³⁴⁹ Although the issue is complex, passages like these make it easy to see the sense of Levinas' claim that '[o]ne's implementation in a landscape, one's attachment to Place, without which the universe would become insignificant and would scarcely exist, is the very splitting of humanity into natives and strangers'.³⁵⁰ Heidegger may not wish to substantiate the category of people or nation on biological grounds but they are nonetheless operative categories in his thought that serve a specific function, namely to assert the superiority of the German homeland, whatever the homeland may be. Levinas clarifies that the development in his concept of nature and concealment sow the seeds for the significance of a people and their destiny, because it is understood by Heidegger that '[n]ature is implanted in that first language which hails us only to found human language. Man must be able to listen and hear and reply. But to hear this language and reply to it consists [...] in living in the place, in being-there. Enrootedness'.³⁵¹ The supremacy of place, and in *one's* place, is foundational in the concept of rootedness and earth.

It is poetry that provides us with the language to name this earth, and thus provide this rootedness. This is because when the mystery 'reaches words', 'what is said is always the event (*Ereignis*)'.³⁵² Which is to say, it is only through giving this mystery a name that a people is founded and a history begin. The significance of the

³⁴⁷Phillips, *Heidegger's Volk*, p. 171.

³⁴⁸*EM*, pp. 40-42. *IM*, p. 41. In this passage, Heidegger is asking the question 'how does it stand with being?', and his examples here are to argue that the nihilism that takes root throughout the West is 'farther along' throughout the rest of Europe. It thus serve to show that Germany is in imminent danger from its geographical surroundings, as their neighbours are farther along in falling into the nihilism that threatens the German people also.

³⁴⁹Trans. mod. *EM*, pp. 40-42. *IM*, p. 42.

³⁵⁰Emmanuel Levinas, 'Heidegger, Gagarin and us', in *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, trans. by Séan Hand (United States of America: Athlone Press, 1990), pp. 231-234, esp. p. 232.

³⁵¹Levinas, 'Heidegger, Gagarin and us', p. 232.

³⁵²*BP*, p. 80. *CP*, p. 64.

work of art in Heidegger's thought is thus introduced to fulfill this crucial role, and thus intimately wrapped in his support and involvement with the National Socialist Party. Perhaps it is because this concealed mystery becomes for Heidegger the homeland that Levinas instead compels us to '[l]et us [only] remain masters of the mystery that the earth breathes'.³⁵³ One indeed would be tempted to affirm Levinas' stance here, but Heidegger resists this possibility. The earth must be named, and it must be named by a poet who *belongs* to a place, and be named *for* a people. As *The Origin of the Work of Art* testifies to, the earth *only* 'emerges as native ground (*heimatliche Grund*)'.³⁵⁴ To call the 'self-concealing' 'mystery' the 'earth' already points to the crucial role that a place has in the disclosure of truth, and when the emphasis is on the possibility of disclosing truth to greater existential significance then the destiny and greatness of a place and a nation seem inevitable.

Heidegger is aware of the complexity at stake of naming this mystery. Intimacy is 'the unveiling of its manifestness [mystery] is precisely a not wanting to explain, but rather understanding it as self-concealing concealment'.³⁵⁵ Regardless, this may well be being as undisclosed and inchoate mystery, but it is nonetheless that from which 'the ground up bears and configures the history of an existing (*daseienden*) people'.³⁵⁶ However we conceive of the category of a people, being concerns the *Germans*. Not the Russians, the Americans, or the Irish. Thus, as we saw in the discussion of nature, the effect of retrieving concealment from its hiddenness and to thus experience it 'as' self-concealed, is to root oneself further into earth, thus making beings 'more' beingful. For Heidegger, the path laid down by *Germania* reaches its culmination in the poem *The Rhine*, which establishes the German homeland by way of a confrontation with the Ancient Greeks. I now turn to this final part of the lecture course to explore further some of the ambiguity and tensions at play.

3.6 The Ambiguity of the Myth of the Homeland

Heidegger claims that within Hölderlin's late poetizing there is a consistent speaking of rivers and waters, and so he gives the 'river' in *Germania* a central importance.³⁵⁷ This is because the 'pathless' earth is shaped by the rivers of the homeland where

³⁵³Levinas, 'Heidegger, Gagarin and us', p. 233.

³⁵⁴*UK*, p. 28. *OA*, p. 107. '[...] die dergestalt selbst erst als der heimatliche Grund herauskommt'.

³⁵⁵*HH*, p. 250. *HHGR*, pp. 226-227

³⁵⁶*HH*, p. 121. *HHGR*, p. 109.

³⁵⁷*HH*, p. 91.

through the experience of intimacy earth becomes holy and leads ‘toward an encounter with the awaited gods’.³⁵⁸ Because *The Rhine* thinks ‘the demigods’, it is understood to enrich the fundamental attunement of Germania. This is because the task of the demigods is to found the other beginning and establish the homeland, a possibility that is thus secured through the poem *The Rhine*.³⁵⁹

By being above humans and below gods, the being of the demigods is that of the singular destiny.³⁶⁰ One such demigod is Hölderlin, who hears the ‘origin’ and thus allows being unfold into language.³⁶¹ This origin is secured and unfolded through the fundamental attunement of the poem, leading to the German destiny. The Rhine is this destiny and so the unfolding of the origin.³⁶² This origin, however, is not only the source of what *is*, but carries alongside it, as it is both the origin *and* what has ‘purely arisen’ from out of this origin.³⁶³

In the fourth stanza Hölderlin writes, ‘Enigma is that which has purely arisen. Even / The song scarcely may unveil it’.³⁶⁴ Heidegger takes this to mean that the mystery of the origin is unfolded through the poetry.³⁶⁵ We therefore notice original temporality—or perhaps the temporality of the origin—when Heidegger claims that there is a ‘growing *necessity* [future] to unveil [present] that which has purely sprung forth [past]’.³⁶⁶ This is another way of saying the end is built into the beginning.³⁶⁷ Except, Heidegger would reject the sense of *telos* that this invokes.³⁶⁸ The end is not certain, and it is not guaranteed. It is mystery and enigma. We can easily see how Heidegger’s two-fold methodology of confrontation and decision compliments this position. For it is precisely this uncertainty that demands the liberators to take a stance on what will be grounded. However, the future already lies in its beginning and so we are required to confront the beginning in order to be free to decide for the

³⁵⁸*HH*, p. 93. *HHGR*, p. 84.

³⁵⁹*HH*, pp. 227-228.

³⁶⁰*HH*, pp. 200-201. *HHGR*, p. 183.

³⁶¹*HH*, p. 202.

³⁶²*Ibid.*, p. 194.

³⁶³*Ibid.*, p. 241. This clarification points to his growing discomfort of the way in which he has previously presented the ontological difference, the critique of which I discuss in the following chapter.

³⁶⁴‘Ein Räthsel ist Reinentprungenes. Auch / Der Gesang kaum darf es enthüllen’. Hölderlin’s *The Rhine* is printed in full in *HH*, pp. 155-161. *HHGR*, pp. 141-146. All citations refer back to these pages, unless I am drawing attention to a specific discussion of Heidegger’s of a portion of the poem elsewhere.

³⁶⁵*HH*, p. 240 and pp. 251-252.

³⁶⁶His emphasis. *HH*, p. 252. *HHGR*, p. 228.

³⁶⁷As Hölderlin writes in stanza IV of *The Rhine*, ‘Wie du anfiengst [*sic*], wirst du bleiben’ ‘As you began, so will you remain’.

³⁶⁸See, *BP*, pp. 268-269. *CP*, p. 211, where Heidegger critiques German Idealism on these grounds.

future.

Because poetry is this origin then poetry is the ‘saying of beyng’.³⁶⁹ The idea here is that because the origin is *as* poetized in the poem, poetry is ‘beyng that brings itself to itself in the word’.³⁷⁰ As Heidegger has suspected in an early flash of insight in the *Black Notebooks*, ‘Being becomes poem; therefore finite!’³⁷¹ It is therefore through the limits on what *is* set out through the demigods as poetized through the poem that beyng is grounded.³⁷² Here, the Rhine is the ultimate destiny as it shapes and limits the abyssal earth. Akin to the temporality at play in Heidegger’s attempt to think through decision, the event of the poem is the retrospective formation of what *is* through the realisation in the people of what is told in the poem.³⁷³ Hölderlin’s late poetry discloses the concealed earth and names it the homeland. Thus, for Heidegger ‘the “fatherland” is beyng itself’.³⁷⁴

Wolin explores how this effectively turns the state into a ‘giant work of art’,³⁷⁵ and Lacoue-Labarthe shows how this is coherent with the National Socialist program of the ‘aestheticization of politics’.³⁷⁶ Which is to say, the state realises itself *through* the telling of the poem that Heidegger deems as the appropriate poetic revealing of truth. Utilising decisional thinking, Heidegger conceives himself as a legislative thinker whose task is to aid the state in the realization of the homeland, a task that resonated with the fascist tendency to view politics as an artform. However, Harries counters that Heidegger *rejects* the modern state, and he emphasises Heidegger’s desire to restore, in his sense of a ‘repeat and retrieve’, the Ancient Greek *polis*.³⁷⁷ Likewise Hölderlin’s *The Rhine* speaks of being ‘driven’ toward ‘Asia’ and yet breaks off to Germany.³⁷⁸ Heidegger is likely to be stretching Hölderlin’s meaning here, as I argued previous.³⁷⁹ Either way, Heidegger’s use of Hölderlin is coherent with the desire to understand politics through art and although the sense he pulls from Hölderlin’s poetry may resist the state as it realised itself, for Heidegger the

³⁶⁹HH, p. 252.

³⁷⁰HH, p. 257. HHGR, p. 233.

³⁷¹UII-VI, pp. 14-15. PII-VI, p. 12

³⁷²HH, pp. 169-170 and pp. 250-252.

³⁷³As he claims, ‘[b]ecause the poets are not directed toward nature as an object, for instance; because, rather, “nature” as beyng founds itself in saying, the saying of the poets as the self-saying of nature is of the same essence as the latter’. HH, p. 258. HHGR, p. 233. This, as Hölderlin claims in *The Rhine*, is ‘[a]ccording to solid law, as in times past’.

³⁷⁴Emphasis removed. HH, p. 121.

³⁷⁵Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, pp. 111-118, esp. p. 117.

³⁷⁶Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art, Politics*, pp. 61-76.

³⁷⁷Harries, ‘Heidegger as Political Thinker’, p. 669.

³⁷⁸HH, pp. 204-206.

³⁷⁹See Section 3.2.4, above.

confrontation between Germany and Greece is crucial in the realization of this homeland.

As it turns out, understanding the homeland and its people through the significance of the work of art proves fruitful for Heidegger. In line with the aesthetisation of politics and the confrontation between Greece and Germany, in the first of the lecture series on Nietzsche he explores Nietzsche's understanding of the distinction between Dionysius and Apollo. Although he admits that Nietzsche tends to emphasise the importance of the Dionysian in artistic states, Heidegger argues that through a more complete reflection Nietzsche realises that the Apollonian (a dream-like philosophical state) and Dionysian (conceived as artistic ecstasy) are equally important.³⁸⁰ Nietzsche is said to recognise that this opposition occurs in 'Greek existence', but it is Hölderlin who conceives of the importance of this opposition in a more 'profound [*tieferen*] and lofty [*edleren*] manner'.³⁸¹ Expressed by him in a letter to his friend Böhlendorff, Hölderlin conceives of this opposition as the Dionysian 'holy pathos' (*heiligen Pathos*) and the Apollonian 'Occidental Junonian sobriety of representational skill' (*abendländisch-junonische Nüchternheit der Darstellungsgabe*) within the essence of the Greeks.³⁸²

He claims that the opposition between Apollo and Dionysius is grasped by Hölderlin as 'endowment' (*Mitgegebenes*) and 'task' (*Aufgegebenes*).³⁸³ In the letter, Hölderlin informs Böhlendorff that the 'holy pathos' is innate to the Greeks.³⁸⁴ Heidegger understands this holy pathos as a 'being struck by the violence of being',³⁸⁵ and so Dionysian consciousness is understood by Heidegger as a proximity to earth. Being 'struck by the violence of being' through earth the Greeks were endowed with the wonder of what is, i.e., through this violent striking the question of the meaning of being became a question. However, because the Greeks were innately tied to this holy pathos, they were 'less masters' of it than they were the 'gift of presentation', thanks to Homer who captured 'Occidental, *Junonian sobriety* for his Apollonian kingdom'.³⁸⁶

If the Greeks were 'endowed' with a Dionysian proximity to being then their 'task' was mastery over the Apollonian gift of presentation. Hölderlin claims in his

³⁸⁰NK, p. 121. NI, p. 102.

³⁸¹NK, p. 122. NI, pp. 103-104.

³⁸²NK, p. 122. NI, pp. 103-104.

³⁸³HH, p. 293. HHGR, p. 266.

³⁸⁴HH, p. 291. HHGR, p. 264.

³⁸⁵HH, p. 292. HHGR, p. 265. '[...] das Betroffenwerden durch die Gewalt des Seyns'.

³⁸⁶His emphasis. As quoted by Heidegger in, HH, p. 291. HHGR, p. 264.

letter that for the Germans this is the opposite. The Germans are instead ‘endowed’ with the mastery of grasping and so it is their ‘task’ to be ‘struck by beyng’.³⁸⁷ It is for this reason that Heidegger sees an essential connection between the Greek and the Germans, for their innate capacities mirror each other. The other beginning and the future of philosophy must be a German event for it is the German people are tied essential to the Greeks. The Greeks disclosed the meaning of being, but by living through its truth they could not conceive its significance as a concealed abandonment.³⁸⁸ The task of the German people is thus to come into an essential proximity with this truth of beyng.

Heidegger also claims that every historical nation is apportioned these dual factors differently and to different extents.³⁸⁹ Kisiel utilises this remark to claim that although Heidegger was concerned exclusively with ‘uniquely German possibilities’ he was nonetheless committed to ‘neighborly interchange’.³⁹⁰ However, we must keep in mind here that for Heidegger Hölderlin ‘experiences beyng as a whole from out of the ground of need’, and in doing so grasps the Germans as the opposite, and so essentially tied, to the Greeks.³⁹¹ There is an elitism at play here, one that favours the Germans over these other nations, despite the possibility of a neighbourly interchange. For him, the philosophical inception was a Greek event and its overcoming and re-grounding an exclusively German one. Hence, responding to the defence of Heidegger’s nationalism on the grounds that he rejected the category of biologism,³⁹² Bambach reminds us that:

when we read the [...] critique of biologism, race, and the metaphysics of blood and consanguinity, we need to remember that Heidegger’s rejection of these principles was grounded in what he deemed a more fundamental form of communal identity—namely, autochthony. Like other National Socialist thinkers, Heidegger too would exclude the Hebrews, the Romans, the Asians, the non-Europeans, though he would do so not on the basis of race or blood, but owing to what he perceived as the issuing autochthonic link to the first Greek beginning. Exclusion for Heidegger thus became a matter of metaphysical rather than biological origin.³⁹³

³⁸⁷HH, p. 292. HHGR, p. 265.

³⁸⁸Claxton, *Heidegger’s Gods*, pp. 11-12.

³⁸⁹HH, pp. 291-292. HHGR, p. 264.

³⁹⁰Kisiel, ‘Measuring the Greatness of the Great Men of Grand Politics’, pp. 197-200.

³⁹¹HH, p. 291. HHGR, p. 264. ‘Der Dichter hat das Auge für diese Wesensbezüge, weil er das Seyn im Ganzen aus dem Grunde der Not erfährt’.

³⁹²Young and Safranski suggests as much. Safranski, *Between Good and Evil*, pp. 301-302 and Young, *Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism*, pp. 36-37.

³⁹³Bambach, *Heidegger’s Roots*, p. 285. In a letter to the Denazification Committee, Heidegger argues that Hitler ‘had brought me in 1933/34 to a no man’s land where I affirmed the social and national (not in the national-socialist manner) and denied the intellectual and metaphysical foundation in the biologism of the Party doctrine, because the social and national, as I saw it, was not essentially tied to the biological-racist Weltanschauung theory’. As quoted by Rickey, *Revolutionary Saints*, p. 188.

Derrida also raises this problem, asking ‘is a metaphysics of race more or less serious than a naturalism or biologism of race?’³⁹⁴ Heidegger’s nationalism draws on the importance of language because the truth of being unfolds through language. As Derrida writes, for Heidegger, German ‘is the only language in which spirit comes to name itself’.³⁹⁵ However, it is not simply a linguistic superiority.³⁹⁶ Extrapolating from this distinction between the Apollonian and Dionysian, Heidegger argues that the superior German language is testament to the gift of the ‘hidden stylistic law’ (*verborgenes Stilgesetz*) that determines the destiny of the German people,³⁹⁷ just like the birth of Western philosophy is a Greek event and not simply a gift to anyone who can speak Ancient Greek. He tells us that the ‘hidden stylistic law’ is in distinction to ‘culture’,³⁹⁸ but he shies away from explicitly articulating what he means in distinction from the cultural. One could at least hypothesise that cultural is understood here as a derivative version of the ontological phenomenon of a ‘hidden stylistic law’ that Heidegger is trying to elucidate. Either way, the grounding of the truth of being can only come to pass through the German nation’s proximity to the Greeks. Hence, Heidegger underscores in his *Nietzsche* series that by ‘recognizing this antagonism Hölderlin and Nietzsche early on placed a question mark after the task of the German people to find their essence historically. Will we understand this cipher? One thing is certain: *history will wreak vengeance on us if we do not*’.³⁹⁹

Noting this line of thinking, Farias evaluates that although Heidegger distances himself from the National Socialist regime as it actualised itself, his philosophy nonetheless retains its basic originating principle, i.e., ‘the claim of the ontologically founded superiority of the “German nationality.”’⁴⁰⁰ This serves to remind us that it is not enough to problematise categories of ‘blood’ and ‘soil’ in an attempt to affirm something of them in ambiguous ways, for Heidegger did not provide us sufficient means to evaluate the significance of one people over another. His glorifying of the

³⁹⁴Derrida, *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*, p. 74.

³⁹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 71.

³⁹⁶Pace Young, *Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism*, p. 137.

³⁹⁷*NK* p. 122. *NI*, p. 104.

³⁹⁸*Ibid.*

³⁹⁹My emphasis. *NK*, pp. 122-123. *NI*, p. 104. ‘Die Geschichte wird sich an uns rächen, wenn wir es nicht verstehen’.

⁴⁰⁰Farias, *Heidegger and Nazism*, p. 256. As Rohkrämer puts it, ‘Heidegger might still have rejected a racism that saw differences in something as material as blood, but even if for him the ethnic differences emerged from different historical developments, the end result was crude national and racial stereotypes’. Rohkrämer, ‘Heidegger and National Socialism: Great Hopes, Despair and Resilience’, p. 247.

German people thus effectively served to strengthen the propaganda of the state, despite the fact that he disagreed with their attempt to establish this superiority on the basis of biology.

Phillips points out that the establishment of Greece as the ‘uncanny homeland’ (*unheimliche Heimat*) of Germany was also a present motif in Nazi Germany.⁴⁰¹ However, he argues that the *polis* this would establish was not the ‘present-at-hand’ National Socialist regime.⁴⁰² Here we are again confronted with this problem of ambiguity. For Heidegger, the *polis* is the site of the ‘clearing of being’ and so Phillip’s argues that the homeland is an ‘orientation within the question of Being’.⁴⁰³ Claiming that this is closer to a ‘disorientation’ than a ‘being-at-home’,⁴⁰⁴ Phillips suggests that the disruption this implies could not be suited to an authoritarian political system. However, he does not clarify whether this ‘question of Being’ is the ‘meaning of being’ or the ‘truth of being’. The distinction would provide clarity. In what follows, I argue that the distinction between meaning and truth, when properly understood, make us again witness to the way in which Heidegger’s thought skirts dangerously close to affirming the importance of authoritarian regimes, only to move away from this in obscure and ambiguous ways. This ambiguity effectively functions as an evasion, as it led people of its time to the conclusion that Heidegger was a philosopher of the National Socialist state, and although there is certainly precedent within his thought for this, there are aspects of his thought that resist this also. The distinction between the meaning and truth of being helps us navigate this tenuous terrain.

The demigods are important because they hear the origin. Unlike the gods, who hear the origin with ‘pity’ and thus abandon it, and the mortals who flee from it, the demigod must suffer it.⁴⁰⁵ As Hölderlin tells us in a fragment:

For everything must,
A demigod grasp or
A human, in accordance with suffering,
In that he hears, alone⁴⁰⁶

This suffering is the hearing of the destiny.⁴⁰⁷ Heidegger claims that it is because of

⁴⁰¹Phillips, *Heidegger’s Volk*, p. 169.

⁴⁰²*Ibid.*, pp. 173-177.

⁴⁰³*Ibid.*, p. 180.

⁴⁰⁴*Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁵*HH*, pp. 200-202.

⁴⁰⁶*Ibid.*, p. 201. ‘Denn alles fassen muss / Ein Halbgott oder / Ein Mensch, dem Leiden nach, / Indem er höret, allein’.

⁴⁰⁷*Ibid.*, p. 201.

this suffering, in the face of the Rhine as destiny, that makes the demigods go blind.⁴⁰⁸ As Hölderlin says in *The Rhine* '[t]he blindest however/ Are sons of gods'. This is not because they do not comprehend, like the humans and gods, but because 'destiny becomes their beyng'.⁴⁰⁹ Heidegger hints at the significance of the blinding when he discusses Hölderlin's interpretation of Oedipus. Because the earth is the material abyss, the desire for grasping the earth in its totality is misinformed. Therefore, 'his desire to know rips through all barriers and demands to know more than he can bear or grasp'.⁴¹⁰ Heidegger is pointing out that the desire to see something in its totality misunderstands the essence of perception, for it is precisely through the limits of the thing that allow it to be what it is. Which is to say, it is the necessary and finite 'lack' of something to compels it to *be*, whether that be in human beings in the sense that I must 'make something' of myself, or a table in the sense that 'tableness' is never distinct from 'chairness', 'dinner', 'homework', and so it cannot be the distinct, eternal, and subsistent entity that Heidegger understands traditional metaphysics, or in this case Oedipus, to assume. However, because the demigods are understood to be existentially aware of this, and so attuned to what precedes the formation of the thing understood as the 'origin', or the earth, they can 'in each case fit itself into a destinal sending and be a destiny'.⁴¹¹ This is their 'lack', which is really a will of excess (*Überwille*) that understands, and thus can withstand, the opening up of beyng as a finite event. Thus empowered, they can question and so disturb.⁴¹²

Here, we approach a theme that was explored in the previous chapter. For Heidegger, to discover the essence of truth is not about understanding it but embodying this understanding also. As he claims in the lecture series on Plato, we must come to see the 'unhidden *as* unhidden', which is to know that 'such a thing as unhiddenness *occurs*'.⁴¹³ This would be akin to understanding that beyng is concealed, and so by recognizing that the source of disclosure is the concealed horizon of our nature as finite beings, we are freed to disclose new truths into being. Thomson

⁴⁰⁸ *HH*, p. 206-207.

⁴⁰⁹ *HH*, p. 207. *HHGR*, p. 189.

⁴¹⁰ *HH*, p. 65. *HHGR*, p. 60.

⁴¹¹ *HH*, p. 207. *HHGR*, p. 189.

⁴¹² *HH*, pp. 208-209. See also, Philips, *Heidegger's Volk*, p. 180. It is this line of reasoning that gives Heidegger cause to consider himself a resistance to the National Socialist regime in virtue of being willing to *do* philosophy. On this, See, Bernasconi, 'Who Belongs? Heidegger's Philosophy of the *Volk* in 1933-4', pp. 109-126 (p. 113). Bernasconi concludes that this is 'self-deception' on Heidegger's part.

⁴¹³ His emphasis. *WWP*, p. 37. *ET*, p. 28.

explores this motif in Heidegger's thought, and discusses what he sees as a 'postmodern polysemy' at work in his thinking.⁴¹⁴ Here, 'postmodernity' is understood as a future that 'arrives [...] [through] the creative efforts of those who would yet "invent" it'.⁴¹⁵ However, because this resists the 'modern assumption' of 'singular meaning'⁴¹⁶, it must be an 'ongoing endeavor' to remain 'genuinely "futural"' and 'open' to other possibilities of the meaning within things.⁴¹⁷ Heidegger suggests as much, claiming that 'answers are more comfortable and therefore true, even if they are answers to questions that merely bear the semblance of being questions'.⁴¹⁸ The questioning of the demigods is instead a 'disturbance [...] and therefore false from the outset'.⁴¹⁹ The questions one asks may appear 'false', but only because they attempt to elucidate what is concealed and hidden from our meaningful worlds. Thomson demonstrates how this sentiment functions in Heidegger's discussion of Van Gogh's painting of a pair of peasant shoes as the 'painting's background continues to suggest other possibilities that nevertheless resist being fully *gestaltet* and so brought into the foreground'.⁴²⁰ If this were the 'question of Being' of the homeland, as Phillips' would portray it, then a resistance to an authoritarian order would be implied precisely because an awareness of the truth of being within the people would be a breeding ground for philosophical critique of one's world, and the people of that world would be free to pursue and disclose new meanings of beings within the world.

We have already seen that there is more at stake than this in the development of Heidegger's thought at this time. His understanding of earth is indeed that which resists intelligibility, but it is the demigods for Heidegger who fashion this resisting earth into a truth, and they ground what *is* through taking their decisional stances. Heidegger discusses this in the *Contributions*, when he claims that the 'future ones' will '[play] out' '[w]orld and earth, in their *strife* [established by the work of art], will raise love and death to their highest level and will integrate them into fidelity to the god and into a capacity to endure the confusion, within a manifold mastery of the

⁴¹⁴Thomson, *Heidegger, Art and Postmodernity*, p. 127.

⁴¹⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 128-129.

⁴¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 122

⁴¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 129. Thomson does not problematise Heidegger's elitism here, instead seeing evidence of these creative elites in bands such as U2. For some reason I have trouble imagining Heidegger seeing eye to eye with him on this example of the elite.

⁴¹⁸*HH*, p. 209. *HHGR*, p. 190.

⁴¹⁹*HH*, p. 209. *HHGR*, p. 190.

⁴²⁰Thomson, *Heidegger, Art and Postmodernity*, p. 112.

truth of beings'.⁴²¹ The creative elites have this mastery over beings because they understand the *truth* (as opposed meaning) of being. Truth understood here as the fact that being withdraws from meaningful intelligibility. The meaning of being then, is the way in which the truth of being becomes instantiated within a particular historical era. This particular instantiation of meaning relies on the decisional stance of the liberated class, as they are the ones who are rooted in the earth.

Thomson 'polysemy' within being is not a misreading, but he misses the crucial caveat that, for Heidegger, it is only the demigods that know the 'way in which being is opened up, and [that] the grounding of being, can be configured differently'.⁴²² Misunderstanding this, Phillips' defence that the *polis* is a disorientation to a totalitarian order goes awry.⁴²³ Heidegger's argument is that it is in virtue of understanding the truth of being that the demigods are free to establish and ground its meaning. They 'suffer' the 'origin'. So, although they disturb the meaning of being, they do so only to establish a new order of meaningful intelligibility for a people.

Although Heidegger's homeland was not intended to have an 'immediate political impact',⁴²⁴ Wolin observes that this attempt to ground the truth of being is 'partially tied to the emergence of a new political order'.⁴²⁵ There is more to be said about this, for the suggestion that the emergence of new political order is in itself problematic seems unconsidered. The question should be whether the new political order was the fascist order of National Socialist Germany. It is undeniable that there was a time when Heidegger thought that this was the case. By 1935 he was no longer so sure. However, whatever the specific political order that he envisioned emerging would be it would indeed be an authoritarian one for the cohesion this implies for the masses is a necessary precondition if the work of his elite is to successfully get underway.⁴²⁶

If Van Gogh's painting of a pair of peasant shoes represent Heidegger's polysemy, then the discussion of the Greek temple in *The Origin* represents his authoritarianism. For it is no longer the experience of anxiety-toward-our-own-death that individuates us, thereby giving us the opportunity to embrace our 'potentiality-for-being'. Instead, it is through the temple as rooted and reflecting our tradition that

⁴²¹His emphasis. *BP*, p. 399. *CP*, p. 316.

⁴²²*HH*, p. 182. *HHGR*, 166.

⁴²³Phillips, *Heidegger's Volk*, p. 180.

⁴²⁴Zuckert, 'Martin Heidegger: His Philosophy and His Politics', p. 58.

⁴²⁵Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, p. 112.

⁴²⁶*BP*, pp. 61-62.

the people learn how to live and die.⁴²⁷ Within this ambiguity lie the tenebrous implications of Heidegger's attempts to ground the truth of *beyng*. Its philosophical motivations as a resistance and response to nihilism through the awareness of *beyng's* withdrawal are both compelling and powerful, but its practical ramifications are troubling. As Heidegger quite clearly argues for his in *Contributions*, an authoritarian order is implied, albeit subsidiary, in his vision of the significance of the elite.⁴²⁸

There is tension here. If the homeland is to be something other than the philosophical inception then the truth of the homeland, and the *ethos* it creates, must maintain some sense of the polysemy of being, its 'mystery'. Heidegger hears this in stanza five of *The Rhine*, where Hölderlin writes '[t]hus a jubilation is his word', and Heidegger takes this jubilation (*Jauchzen*) to mean the 'overflowing breaking loose' of the 'enchanted' earth.⁴²⁹ It is only then, through the 'spirit of the river' (*Stromgeist*), that there is a 'coming to be of the original landscape'.⁴³⁰ The 'enchanted' earth that 'breaks loose' suggests that an understanding of earth as the material abyss is existentially embodied by the people. Heidegger's 'last god', the gods that we await to arise from the earth, is *not* a repeat of the Christian god, in the sense of a belief in a substantial creator god that transcends us. Instead, 'the last god is the other beginning of the immeasurable possibilities of our history'.⁴³¹ The '*ethos*' of the homeland is thus one that gives birth to the polysemy of being that teaches the people how to live more meaningful lives.⁴³²

The ambiguity this creates is irreconcilable. Follow one route and Heidegger is seen to be a liberal teacher of polysemy that Thomson identifies. Take another route and we witness the deeply ingrained nationalistic and elitist tendencies to which Wolin, Bambach, and others draw our attention. This tension is expressed in Heidegger's reading of the thirteenth stanza of *The Rhine* when Hölderlin writes

Then humans and gods the bridal festival celebrate,
All the living celebrate,
And destiny is
Evened out for a while.
And those in flight seek asylum,

⁴²⁷UK, p. 27. OA, p. 106.

⁴²⁸BP, pp. 61-62.

⁴²⁹HH, p. 262. HHGR, p. 237.

⁴³⁰HH, p. 262. HHGR, p. 237.

⁴³¹BP, p. 411. CP, p. 326.

⁴³²On this, see EM, p. 162. IM, p. 170. On discussing the grounding of the *polis* by the elite, Heidegger claims that then 'the poets are only poets, but then are actually poets, the thinkers *only* thinkers, but then are actually thinkers, the priests are *only* priests, but then are actually priests, the rulers are *only* rulers, but then are actually rulers. *Are*—but this says: use violence as violence-doers and become those who rise high in historical Being as creators, as doers'.

And sweet slumber the courageous,
But lovers are
What they always were, they are
At home, [...]
[...] but those unreconciled
Are now turned around and hasten
To extend hands to one another,
Before the friendly light
Goes down and night arrives.

Once the destiny is realised, and the fleeing gods have sought asylum in the established homeland, it is not day but night. This is the ‘necessity of being the between, of catching the ray of lightning and of transforming the dazzling and piercing quality of its light into a gentle and tranquil lucidity, in which humans can accomplish their Dasein’.⁴³³ Which is to say, the truth of the homeland is the ‘fullness of the mystery’, where what *is*, is ‘directed into those possibilities that swirl around it, in which it seeks to save itself time and again from its own frightfulness for a while’.⁴³⁴ Heidegger ends on this ambiguity, reminding us to allow the ‘violence of being [to] [...] become a question again for our ability to grasp’.⁴³⁵

This study is focussed on the role of the work of art in Heidegger’s understanding of truth, and so a continued exploration of the ambiguities the homeland evokes is beyond the scope of this project. It is worth nothing, however, that as a *creative production rooted* within a tradition and its earth the artwork represents the epitome of the ambiguity at work in Heidegger’s thinking at this time. The significance of the polysemic artistic activity is thus seen for its capacity to root one to one’s ‘place’, in order to disclose the *topos* to greater existential heights in the form of realising the destiny of a people. That this ambiguity subsequently asserts itself in his concept of earth is no surprise. This ambiguity arises from the limits of meaningful discourse imposed on the philosophy that requires him to develop an understanding of art that can address what is concealed. Because the National Socialists are also understood to be significant in the appropriation of concealment by a people, then his commitments to the National Socialist regime echo in the background of his reflections on the work of art, leading him to choose Hölderlin as the poet of the Germans through ‘historical decision’. Once this prophetic status of Hölderlin has been asserted, Heidegger utilises Hölderlin’s poetry to establish his

⁴³³HH, p. 283. HHGR, p. 257.

⁴³⁴HH, p. 283. HHGR, p. 257.

⁴³⁵HH, p. 294. HHGR, pp. 266-267. Heidegger concludes the lecture course by quoting Hölderlin, ‘Wir lernen nichts schwerer als das Nationelle frei gebrauchen’. ‘We learn nothing with greater difficulty than the free use of the national’.

vision for the National Socialist movement by naming this concealed earth 'holy' and 'homeland'. The final chapter of this thesis explores Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche in his *The Will to Power as Art*. Nietzsche is not just any thinker however, but the thinker who announces the end of metaphysics and paves the way for the 'leap' to the other beginning that Heidegger believes Hölderlin to have founded. Through a confrontation with his work, Heidegger is given resource to develop further his understanding of the essence of truth, through a focus on the significance of radiant semblance (*Schein*). By doing so, he attempts to lead the way to re-orientate the National Socialist movement toward their authentic destiny, namely, realising the other beginning of Western thought.

CHAPTER 4

FOUNDATIONS FOR A NEW BEGINNING: HEIDEGGER'S CONFRONTATION WITH NIETZSCHE

Heidegger contends that Plato established the dominant truth of being that guides the history of Western metaphysics. This history distinguishes between a truth beyond the cave and mere appearances 'in here', it fails to grasp the significance of concealment, and so by forgetting the role human beings play in the disclosure of meaning, this history culminates in the all-pervasive grasp of nihilism. Heidegger believes he must confront this tradition and retrieve the significance of being as concealed, which would lead the way to the 'other beginning'. This is a task with some urgency, and a new figure now emerges to help in the transition. Plato may be the beginning of this 'catastrophic course' but, as a so-called 'inverted Platonism', Nietzsche's thought offers us the possibility to bring the history of the 'first beginning' to its end.¹ Hope rests on a successful 'confrontation' with Nietzsche's work.

Heidegger interprets Nietzsche's will to power as designating the 'basic character' (*Grundcharakter*) of beings, i.e., their being/truth,² and for Nietzsche art is the 'most perspicuous' form of the will to power.³ As such, what is at stake in Nietzsche's thinking on art is the essence of truth. This requires a certain amount of hermeneutic labour on Heidegger's part for, on the contrary, Nietzsche claims that truth is 'error' and determines that 'art is worth more than truth'.⁴ We are told that this is because Nietzsche did not sufficiently reflect on the nature of truth.⁵ A Platonism 'inverted' remains trapped in the distinction between truth and appearances.⁶ Because Nietzsche remains essentially tied to Platonism his thought

¹NK, p. 15 and p. 23.

²Ibid., pp. 20-21. However, it will not be until the second lecture series on Nietzsche that Heidegger will investigate his idea of the eternal recurrence of the same. For Heidegger, the will to power is understood as the being of beings, or their truth, whereas the eternal return is the attempt to establish the meaning of being. NK, p. 21. Heidegger admits that by thinking of Nietzsche's thought in this way, he is going 'beyond' him. Ibid., p. 34. Blond argues that this means that Nietzsche 'is placed in the path of Heidegger's thinking the overcoming of metaphysics'. Louis P. Blond, *Heidegger and Nietzsche: Overcoming Metaphysics* (London: Continuum, 2010), p. 123.

³NK, p. 82. NI, p. 71. 'Die Kunst ist die durchsichtigste und bekannteste Gestalt des Willens zur Macht'.

⁴NK, pp. 84-88, esp. pp. 87-88.

⁵NK, p. 182. NI, p. 149.

⁶Heidegger draws our attention to one moment in which Nietzsche seems to realise the inadequacy of a reversal through a discussion of a passage from Nietzsche's *Twilight of the Idols*. NK, pp. 249-261. NI,

does not move beyond metaphysics in the same manner as Hölderlin's poetry.⁷ Nonetheless, by inverting Platonism, Nietzsche is understood to bring the history of metaphysics to fruition and so there are resources available to pursue the transition to the other beginning that the poet has founded. By way of a metaphor, we could say that the goal of this confrontation with Nietzsche is to prepare the soil so that the seeds sown by Hölderlin may take root.⁸

Heidegger draws on Nietzsche's insight of the importance of sensuous reality in order to attempt this overcoming (*Überwindung*) of Platonism,⁹ but he must avoid the trap of both positivism and biologism that Heidegger believed Nietzsche's thinking to suffer from.¹⁰ Interpreting Nietzsche this way is to understand him as a nihilist, because if truth is simply physiological responses then there is no room for freedom and decision.¹¹ However, Nietzsche claims that art is the 'countermovement' to nihilism.¹² Heidegger navigates our interpretation of the significance of the sensuous and shows that it is through this emphasis that Nietzsche sees such significance in the work of art. By reflecting on the intimacy between art and truth, Heidegger utilises Nietzsche thought to think the essence of truth from the significance of semblance (*Schein*).¹³ He struggled to find untruth in Plato's discussion of *doxa*. His encounter with Nietzsche is more productive.

Heidegger's story of first beginnings, nihilism, and overcoming, certainly seduces, and Nietzsche becomes an ally in this endeavour. But we have seen

pp. 200-210. However, as we will see, although Nietzsche may 'will' this overturning of Platonism, it is Heidegger that must go on to 'overcome' it.

⁷NK, p. 182. *NI*, p. 149. Assumingly, this has a great deal to do with Hölderlin's status as a poet.

⁸See Zimmerman, *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity*, p. 94, who argues that Heidegger's work on Hölderlin is the 'foil' for his analysis of Nietzsche. The metaphor I use here draws from a very similar metaphor Heidegger uses in his *Introduction to 'What is Metaphysics'*, written twenty years after the original lecture was given in 1929. There, he asks, '[i]n what soil do the roots of the tree of philosophy take hold? Out of what ground do the roots, receive their nourishing juices and strength? What element, concealed in the ground and soil, enters and lives in the roots that support and nourish the tree?' Heidegger, 'Introduction to "What is Metaphysics"', trans Walter Kauffman, in *Pathmarks*, ed. by William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 277-290 (p. 277). However, as I show in this study, exemplified by his method of thinking in 'decision', by 'thinking' the soil Heidegger wishes to provide this soil with certain 'nutrients' that aid the German people in becoming themselves.

⁹NK, p. 261. See also, *ibid.*, pp. 261-274 for Heidegger's development of this.

¹⁰NK, pp. 184-200. See also, *ibid.*, pp. 148-149. *NI*, p. 127, '[i]n order to draw near to the essential will of Nietzsche's thinking, and remain close to it, our thinking must acquire enormous range, plus the ability to see beyond everything that is fatally contemporary in Nietzsche'. His emphasis. Rockmore claims that this is in large part due to frustrations Heidegger had in his failed collaboration with the Nietzsche archives, in preparation for the publication of Nietzsche's *The Will to Power*. Rockmore, *On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy*, pp. 144-145.

¹¹NK, p. 109. *NI*, pp. 92-93.

¹²NK, pp. 86-88. *NI*, pp. 73-75.

¹³NK, p. 262-274.

Heidegger's various responses to the danger of nihilism often leave something to be desired. This is evoked in a tension in Heidegger's thought, between an openness and response *to* being, and the fact that for him being is reduced to its meaning for *Dasein*. Heidegger attempts to move beyond this reduction of being to meaning through his concept of earth, which points at a region that precedes meaningful intelligibility. Yet he holds fast to the fact that truth depends on *Dasein* for its disclosure. Earth *relies* on world, and only emerges as 'native ground'.¹⁴ His affirmation of earth as 'holy' could be one example of a promising suggestion contrary this, but the holy earth becomes the 'homeland'. In the context of his political tumultuous time some of these developments give cause to be concerned. By unpacking his understanding of the relationship between 'will' and 'beauty' in context of his interpretation of Plato's 'good beyond being'—as it stood before 1935 at least¹⁵—I bring this tension in Heidegger's thought into sharper scrutiny. Is there sufficient means in his thought to do justice to the sacral sense of being he sometimes evokes?¹⁶ The discussion raises again the role and power of Heidegger's elite, and a reflection on his interpretation of the 'grand style' reveal further the responsibility and task that Heidegger accords them.

To bring this study to a close, I unpack Heidegger's vision for a new interpretation of reality. In particular, his interpretation of the significance of sensuous reality in Nietzsche's through proves to be ripe ground to do so. This is the climax of the lecture series, and in many ways the fruition of the path of thought Heidegger began in 1930 when he began to emphasise the importance of corporeal reality through reflection on the significance of concealment. To successfully articulate this conception of reality is to grasp the intimate relationship between art and truth, and to take a significant leap toward overcoming nihilism.

4.1 How Heidegger Interprets Nietzsche and His Retrospective Re-Evaluation of the Significance of the *Nietzsche* Lectures

The question of Heidegger's interpretive strategy at this time has been largely exhausted. In the 1930s, Heidegger intends to 'confront' the Western tradition in

¹⁴UK, p. 28. OA, p. 107.

¹⁵As I explore further, below, Heidegger's interpretation of the good beyond being goes through critical revision in his 1936-38 *Contributions to Philosophy*. As we will see however, this is not because he disagrees with the position he developed through his earlier analysis, but that he finds a more adequate means of articulating his interpretation through Nietzsche's 'overman'.

¹⁶NK, pp. 123-133.

order to retrieve its ‘unthought’ roots, with a view to establish the meaning of being that guides this history. He also believes that this leaves the interpreter in a projective space of ‘decision’ whereby, rendering visible the meaning of being, they re-open the questions that guide this history, providing the ‘few’ who are capable of this task the opportunity to propel Western thought to the other beginning by taking their ‘stance’ on the question of the meaning of being. With this established, there are certain things of note worthwhile drawing attention to for his interpretive approach to Nietzsche, and the significance of this lecture series in the context of the developments in Heidegger’s thought at this time.

Heidegger believes that Nietzsche’s thought represents the end of Western metaphysics.¹⁷ Although the allegory of the cave maintains a sense of truth as *aletheia*, Plato makes a ‘decision’ in the allegory that establishes an understanding of truth as a form of correctness. In this lecture series on Nietzsche, Heidegger focusses his critique of Plato’s Ideas on the distinction he makes between a true world over against an appearing one.¹⁸ Nietzsche recognises the inadequacies of this distinction, but Heidegger believes that he remains bound to Platonism and thus maintains the derivative understanding of truth as correctness.¹⁹ Hence, Nietzsche claims that truth is ‘error’, and art is worth more than truth.²⁰

Although this claim might point us in the right direction, Heidegger reminds us that the primordial experience of truth is the appearance of things to *Dasein*.²¹ If this is the case, then truth is not error. For Heidegger, to think the essence of truth as an appearing phenomenon is to prepare the way for the overcoming of metaphysics, as it resists the mistake that took place in allegory of the cave when being is reduced to *a* being, albeit of a ‘higher’ truth in another world.²² He also claims that the overcoming of metaphysics can be achieved through a decisional interpretation of Hölderlin, which allows for a re-orientation to the forgotten and concealed earth. These two themes, the significance of the earth, and the significance of overturning a distinction between a ‘true’ and ‘appearing’ world, are fundamentally intertwined, for earth is the ‘forgotten’ basis for the emergence of appearing things. It is the ‘nothing’ immanent

¹⁷NK, p. 13. *NI*, p. 10.

¹⁸NK, pp. 86-87. *NI*, p. 73.

¹⁹NK, p. 182. *NI*, p. 149.

²⁰NK, pp. 87-88. *NI*, p. 74.

²¹Nonetheless by ‘overturning’ Platonism and highlighting the importance of sensuous reality, Nietzsche points us in the right direction. *NK*, pp. 198-199.

²²This is further explored by David Farrell-Krell, ‘Art and Truth in Raging Discord: Heidegger and Nietzsche on the Will to Power’, *Boundary 2*, 4, 2 (1976), 378-392.

within corporeal reality that ‘gives’ truth *through Dasein*. Hence, Heidegger attempts to penetrate the significance of ‘untruth’ through confrontation with Plato’s understanding of *doxa*, ‘mere’ appearance. He follows this through a decisional interpretation of a poetry that he believes secures a retrieval of the significance of earth.

This path leads him to explore the focus on appearances in the work of Nietzsche, an encounter which Heidegger believes to have been of consequence in the trajectory of his own thought. Heidegger claims that the publication of his lectures on Nietzsche provide ‘a view of the path of thought I [Heidegger] followed from 1930 to the “Letter on Humanism” (1947)’.²³ In his *Letter on Humanism*, he argues that the thinking of the ‘turning’ (*Kehre*) is first hinted at in his 1930 *On the Essence of Truth*.²⁴ Heidegger is thus telling us that the *Nietzsche* lecture series (which continue until 1946) are significant in relation to the development that begun in 1930. He evaluates that this development is rooted in the fact that his thinking ‘turns’ toward the ‘forgottenness of being’,²⁵ i.e., the intricate relationship between concealment and nihilism. This was the ‘dimension’ of the ‘experience’ of *Being and Time*, but it failed to articulate this adequately because it depended too heavily on the language of metaphysics.²⁶

In the preface to Richardson’s book, he says that the ‘turn’ was ‘already at work in my thinking ten years prior to 1947’,²⁷ placing the significance of this realisation in or around 1937, and coinciding with his second lecture series on Nietzsche, *The Will to Power as Knowledge*. However, Heidegger is not likely to be talking about the discovery of concealment, but a development in his thought that could perhaps have its roots in this discovery, namely the critique of the will. Arendt argues that ‘in the second volume of his book about Nietzsche’, Heidegger ‘broke with the whole modern age’s philosophy’.²⁸ Likewise, Wilkerson contends that ‘understanding Heidegger’s *Auseinandersetzung* [confrontation] with Nietzsche is significant for

²³*NI*, p. xl. This invokes a similar claim he made in his preface to Richardson’s *Through Phenomenology to Thought*, when he tells us that the ‘turning’ (*Kehre*) begins a ‘good number of years’ before the Letter on Humanism. Heidegger, ‘Preface’, p. xvi.

²⁴*BH*, pp. 327-328.

²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶*Ibid.* One such example of this inadequacy is the concept of the ontological difference, which maintains the split between being and beings that Heidegger wishes to overcome at this time. *BP*, p. 207. Another is the concept of transcendence. *Ibid.*, pp. 214-222 (esp. p. 217). I explore the significance of this at the end of this chapter.

²⁷Heidegger, ‘Preface’, p. xvi.

²⁸Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, 2 vols (London: Harcourt Inc., 1971; repr. 1978), II, p. 22.

grasping the developments of Heidegger's greater confrontation with the whole of Western metaphysics and its consummation in modernity'.²⁹ Like the peak of a mountain, the lecture series on Nietzsche's *The Will to Power as Art* hinges on these developments, where the seeds sown for the 'turn' in the realisation of the significance of concealment will reach its next major development through his critique of the will.³⁰ This critique is beyond the scope of this study, but recognising the significance of this lecture series for the developments that takes place in Heidegger's thought throughout the 1930s shows us that it is a central text in evaluating the philosophical precedent for Heidegger's support of the National Socialist regime, for it is precisely in this text that the trajectory of his thought before its next major development reaches its fruition.

The focus on the position of Nietzsche in the history of metaphysics, and Heidegger's eventual critique of the will to power, were later used by him to re-define the *Nietzsche* series as focussed solely on matters of 'intra-philosophical discourse'.³¹ However, Heidegger also claimed that these lectures exhibit an implicit criticism of the National Socialism regime, namely through its critique of biologism.³² Either way, Heidegger clearly wished to distance this text from his support of the National Socialist movement. Bambach explores how Heidegger 'eradicates' its political

²⁹Dale Wilkerson, 'Preservation-Enhancement as Value-Positing Metaphysics in Heidegger's Essay "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead'"', in *Heidegger & Nietzsche*, ed. by Babette Babiche, Alfred Denker, Holger Zabrowski (Amsterdam: Rodopi. 2012), pp. 121-143 (p. 123).

³⁰Because in this thesis my focus is no later than 1937, and specifically on the role of art in truth, Heidegger's critique of the will is beyond the scope of this project. This is because the aim of this study was to examine the role of art in Heidegger's developing understanding of the essence of truth in light of the 'course' and 'impetus' set in his thinking by Hitler between the years of 1930 and 1937. Intuitively, it would seem that this 'course' at the very least meanders as a result of his confrontation with the will for, as we will see, the concept of the will plays an important role in Heidegger's understanding of the work and capacities of the legislator. However, a further study would be required to examine the extent to which the critique of the will alters the relationship between Heidegger's philosophy and his support of the National Socialist Party. It may indeed turn out that Heidegger's critique of the will is still not sufficiently adequate to mitigate some of the concerns raised in this thesis. For example, O'Brien explores how Heidegger's later concept of 'releasement' (*Gelassenheit*), a concept that ostensibly attempts to aid us in the resistance to the modern-technological will, remains essentially tied to his notion of autochthony. O'Brien, *Heidegger, History, Holocaust*, pp. 71-76.

³¹Bambach, *Heidegger's Roots*, p. 261.

³²In a letter to the rector of Freiburg in 1945, Heidegger suggests that his critique of the contemporary interpretations of Nietzsche (specifically the emphasis on biologism), 'was a surreptitious way of attacking the biologism associated with National Socialism in general and with Alfred Rosenberg, one of the defendants at Nuremberg, in particular'. This claim is explored by Bernasconi in, 'Heidegger, Rickert, Nietzsche, and the Critique of Biologism', p. 159. As Bernasconi points out, by focussing on figures such as Spengler, Heidegger avoids critiquing the Nazi's directly. By 1936, Spengler was already in disgrace by the Nazi Party. *Ibid.*, pp. 160-163. Heidegger's defence here is therefore tenebrous at best. Likewise, as Rockmore points out, the other prime contemporary opponent in this lecture series is Jaspers who was 'anti-Nazi'. Rockmore, *On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy*, pp. 150-151.

dimension.³³ Drawing our attention to the ‘elisions’ Heidegger made to the text, Bambach counters that Heidegger is using this lecture series to assert his own vision of the perfect National Socialist state.³⁴ Heidegger believes that Nietzsche reverts to the beginning of Greek thought. Bambach explores how this ‘*arche*’ is for Heidegger the ‘axial point for understanding the entire tradition of Western thought’.³⁵ This root in the Greeks is tied to the German people.³⁶ Hence, the ‘German’s affinity with their Greek philosophical ancestors would serve as the foundation for a new rootedness in the Alemannic soil’.³⁷

There is nonetheless a grain of truth in Heidegger’s claim that what is at stake in the *Nietzsche* lecture series is primarily a matter of ‘intra-philosophical discourse’, namely the question of the truth of being, and that this offers a confrontation with National Socialism. However, this is *not* a confrontation in the sense of an act of political resistance, but a confrontation in Heidegger’s sense of the term. The confrontation is exemplified in a (subsequently deleted) passage from his 1936 lecture on Schelling. Heidegger claims:

It is in fact evident that the two men who have initiated countermovements [to nihilism] in Europe for the political formation of their nation as well as their people, each in his own way, that both Hitler and Mussolini are essentially determined by Nietzsche, again in different ways, and this without the authentic metaphysical domain of Nietzschean thought having an immediate impact in the process.³⁸

Kisiel holds that what Heidegger means by this is ‘the Führer was not thinking philosophically enough, and clearly needed philosophical advice to add a dimension of depth to his political decisions [not in Heidegger’s sense of the term] for Germany’.³⁹ Kisiel is correct to note that this is an implicit critique on Heidegger’s part,⁴⁰ but he mischaracterises the nature of the critique. Heidegger is not arguing that the National Socialist movement is failing because Hitler has not taken enough classes in philosophy.⁴¹ As Rockmore puts it, Heidegger ‘signals that both [Hitler and

³³Bambach, *Heidegger’s Roots*, p. 269 and p. 300. See, *ibid.*, pp. 298-299, for a discussion of one of the deleted passages from this lecture course.

³⁴Bambach, *Heidegger’s Roots*, p. 260, and pp. 298-299.

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 252.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 251.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 251. See also, Section 3.6 of this study.

³⁸As quoted and translated by Kisiel in ‘Measuring the Greatness of Great Men of Grand Politics’ in *Nietzsche & Heidegger*, p. 212. See also, Rockmore, *On Heidegger’s Nazism and Philosophy*, pp. 149-150, where he explores the relationship between Nietzsche, Mussolini and Hitler.

³⁹Kisiel, ‘Measuring the Greatness of the Great Men of Grand Politics’, p. 212.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*

⁴¹Heidegger claims, in relation to Plato’s argument that ‘philosophers [should] be the rulers’, that this ‘does not mean that philosophy professors should conduct the affairs of the state’. *NK*, p. 204. *NI*, p. 166.

Mussolini] were determined by what they failed to fully comprehend', i.e., Nietzsche's thought.⁴² Heidegger argues that because Nietzsche's philosophy (as the consummation of Metaphysics) is still not properly understood in a historical (*geschichtlich*) sense, or as 'essential knowledge' (*wesentliches Wissen*),⁴³ the power of Nietzsche's philosophy exists in a derivative state. Thus, its proper force as a countermovement to nihilism cannot be properly grounded within the people. By bringing this implicit force into explicit form through articulation in the text, Heidegger hopes for a hermeneutic retrieval that results in the significance of Nietzsche work to unfold in a historically determinative way, the 'call' of being. The difference may seem pedantic. However, it is representative of the philosophical motivation at play and telling of the extreme historical significance Heidegger sees in the possibility of Nietzsche's thought (and in his own work as a philosopher). It is a confrontation with National Socialism in Heidegger's sense of the term then, because 'the confrontation is mainly limited to Nazism as a form of metaphysics in the age of nihilism'.⁴⁴ However, it should be made clear that this is not intended as an act of political resistance to the National Socialist state. Instead, it is an attempt to aid the state in the discovery and utilisation of the authentic potential that Heidegger still hopes could be realised within the movement.⁴⁵

There is an important relationship between Heidegger's thought and the political context it emerges in. Heidegger sees a genuine proximity between his thinking and the National Socialist movement, albeit that Heidegger now believes this movement may have fallen wayside of its 'inner greatness'. Nonetheless, one must

⁴²Rockmore, *On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy*, p.p. 173-174.

⁴³NK, p. 208. NI, p. 166.

⁴⁴Rockmore, *On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy*, pp. 175-176. See also, Bernasconi, 'Race and Earth in Heidegger's Thinking During the Late 1930s', esp. p. 58.

⁴⁵At this time, Heidegger is still a committed member of the National Socialist Party. In 1936 Heidegger claimed that his support for National Socialism 'lay in the essence of his philosophy'. Löwith, 'My Last Meeting with Heidegger in Rome, 1936', p. 115. Further, Ott informs us that even after the failure of his rectorship, Heidegger nonetheless worked in conjunction with the Gestapo to remove a colleague, Hermann Staudinger, from his teaching position, casting doubt on Heidegger's attempt to characterise his philosophy in this period as a form of covert political resistance. Ott, *A Political Life*, pp. 210-223. Of the four charges Heidegger sustains against Staudinger, the most damaging, that Staudinger had provided information to hostile foreign powers during the first world war, was not upheld, 'even by the Nazi's themselves' (pp. 214-215). Nonetheless, Ott suggests that perhaps this incident should be regarded as personal, rather than politically motivated (pp. 214-215). At the very least, this evidence shows that Harries' is misinformed when he claims that Heidegger resigned from the rectorship because of his 'unwillingness to cooperate with the Nazis'. Harries, 'Heidegger as Political Thinker', p. 643. Cf., Farias, *Heidegger and Nazism*, p. 255, who claims 'Heidegger no longer identified his own thinking with the National Socialist spirit [as it had begun to actualise itself], but now demanded that those who had gone astray reorient themselves to Nietzsche's thought'.

determine what aspect of Heidegger's philosophy lends itself to his support of the movement if this intersection is to be seen as a truly problematic one. Otherwise, it could be the case that Heidegger is simply caught up with his historical time, thus finding a significance within his philosophy that on closer inspection is not there. To that end, for the remainder of this chapter I largely place aside the political dimension of this study and instead focus on the philosophical issues at play. By focussing on the philosophical content, we are given opportunity to explore some of the problems of his thought as they stand within the 'structure' of his thinking. Hence, in this chapter I focus on the significance of the will, and the role of the work of art in the overcoming of metaphysics, which culminates in Heidegger's attempt to rethink the significance of sensuous reality and collapse the divide between the true and appearing world. This provides the means to consider the problems at the roots in Heidegger's thought at this time, and strengthens our capacity to evaluate his philosophy in the light of his support for the National Socialist Party in the conclusion to this thesis.

4.2 Overview of the Lecture Course

The lecture course opens with a discussion of the significance Heidegger sees in Nietzsche's posthumously published *The Will to Power*.⁴⁶ Heidegger reads the *Will to Power* as the planned outline of the 'main structure' (*Hauptbau*) of Nietzsche's thought, for which the poetic *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is the 'vestibule' (*Vorhalle*).⁴⁷ However, he claims that it is a misunderstanding to assume that *The Will to Power* is the attempt to render Nietzsche's philosophy into philosophical prose from its poetic form. Instead, Nietzsche's thought has a robust philosophical structure, and although *The Will to Power* was a work that never saw completion, Heidegger utilises the resources available in its published form to try to render this structure accessible.

First, Heidegger highlights the unity of Nietzsche's concept of the will to power and the eternal recurrence of the same.⁴⁸ For Heidegger, will to power is the 'basic

⁴⁶NK, pp. 9-20.

⁴⁷NK, p. 15. NI, p. 12. If we follow this metaphor to its logical conclusion, then Heidegger is denying that *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is a poetic work. Perhaps this would be because it does not have the 'founding' qualities that the poetry of Hölderlin's is said to, instead leading the reader into the philosophical edifice of Nietzsche's thought. Likewise, although Nietzsche is, in Heidegger's estimation, a philosopher-poet, he is careful to distinguish this from a poet-philosopher. IP, esp. p. 54.

⁴⁸Heidegger claims that Baeumler and Jaspers misunderstood this. NK, pp. 24-27. See also, *ibid.*, pp. 43-46, where Heidegger addresses some of the misunderstandings of Nietzsche's thought. See also,

character of beings’, which is to say beings *are* will to power.⁴⁹ The will to power, however, is *as* the eternal recurrence of the same.⁵⁰ This clarifies that beings *are* will to power, but their being, or ‘meaning’ (*Sinn*), is the eternal recurrence of the same. Thus, although Nietzsche’s rejects the notion of ‘being’, because his thinking reflects on the nature of beings, Heidegger believes that it still addresses the meaning of being.⁵¹ In so far as he will devote his next lecture course entirely to the ‘most difficult thought’ of the eternal return, he does not say much about it in this lecture series. Nonetheless, Heidegger hints that with this complex entanglement between the will to power and the eternal recurrence Nietzsche is attempting to think being as becoming. This is not to say that being only is becoming, but instead that ‘becoming only *is* if it is grounded in Being as Being,’⁵² which he understands to be ‘the thought that pervades the whole of Western philosophy, a thought that remains concealed but is its genuine driving force’.⁵³ The significance Heidegger sees in this is telling. For him, to will ‘becoming’ into ‘being’ means that if the people adequately grasp the truth of being, then they can truly become themselves.⁵⁴ Hence, by articulating the significance of this through the doctrine of eternal return and the will to power, Nietzsche is understood to return the German people to their authentic roots at the beginning of Western philosophy,⁵⁵ aiding them in this transition to the other beginning.⁵⁶ This is the philosophical response, then, to Hölderlin’s *The Rhine*, which moves through Greece to discover its destiny in the German soil.

Farrell-Krell’s analysis of the various interpretive trends of Nietzsche’s thought in Heidegger’s time. *NI*, pp. 238-249.

⁴⁹*NK*, pp. 20-21.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, pp. 78-80. As Heidegger clarifies here, the grounding question of philosophy—the question of the meaning of being—‘remains as foreign to Nietzsche as it does to the history of thought prior to him’. Therefore, Heidegger has to approach Nietzsche’s thought in the manner of a ‘confrontation’ if he is to draw on the unthought dimension of his work that, despite Nietzsche’s claims otherwise, reflects on the meaning of being.

⁵²*NK*, p. 22. *NI*, p. 19. ‘[...] das Werden selbst ist nur, wenn es im Sein als Sein gegründet ist’.

⁵³*NK*, p. 22. *NI*, p. 19

⁵⁴*NM*, pp. 228-229. *NI*, pp. 202-203. See also, Section 4.3, below.

⁵⁵*NK*, pp. 22-23. *NI*, pp. 19-20.

⁵⁶*NK*, pp. 19-20. *NI*, p. 17. ‘Now, if we do not thoughtfully formulate our inquiry in such a way that it is capable of grasping in a unified way the doctrines of the eternal return of the same and will to power, and these two doctrines in their most intrinsic coherence as revaluation, and if we do not go on to comprehend this fundamental formulation as one which is also necessary in the course of Western metaphysics, then we will never grasp Nietzsche’s philosophy. And we will comprehend nothing of the twentieth century and of the centuries to come, nothing of our own metaphysical task’. ‘Wenn wir nun denkerisch nicht eine Fragestellung entwickeln, die imstande ist, die Lehre von der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen, die Lehre vom Willen zur Macht und diese beiden Lehren in ihrem innersten Zusammenhang als Umwertung einheitlich zu begreifen, und wenn wir nicht dazu übergehen, diese Grundfragestellung zugleich zu fassen als eine im Gang der abendländischen Metaphysik notwendige, dann werden wir die Philosophie Nietzsches niemals fassen, d. h. wir

However, because this is a philosophical response to this poetic origin, the task at hand is of a different nature. In the case of Hölderlin, the goal was to stand within the domain of the power of the poetry, heeding its call as the ‘clang’ of nature.⁵⁷ The thinker, on the other hand, must ‘configure’ and ‘open’ the founded truth of the poetry.⁵⁸ As a result, in Heidegger’s estimation, Nietzsche’s thinking forces us to reconsider ‘what is real’, and so through him “‘reality’, is to be defined afresh’.⁵⁹ To reconsider this, is to prepare the way for unfolding and opening the power of Hölderlin’s poetry. Nietzsche reconsiders reality through an overturning of Platonism. This leads him to claim that ‘truth’ is ‘error’,⁶⁰ and that art is the ‘most perspicuous and familiar configuration of will to power’.⁶¹ Therefore, art is more ‘real’ than truth. In this light, Nietzsche interprets the Platonic Ideas as ‘values’, and so the Ideas do not secure the ahistorical truth that they claim.⁶² Overturning the Platonic emphasis on the supersensuous Idea, Nietzsche establishes the ‘sensuous’ as more ‘in being’ than the supersensuous.⁶³ Art is thus understood to be ‘the basic occurrence of all beings’.⁶⁴

Unsurprisingly, Heidegger thoroughly agrees with Nietzsche’s claim that ‘art is the distinctive countermovement to nihilism’.⁶⁵ However, Nietzsche’s emphasis on the sensuous brings this claim into conflict. For Nietzsche, art must be thought in terms of physiology of the artist.⁶⁶ In Heidegger’s estimation, to think of the significance of the artist in terms of physiology reduces art to ‘excitations of the nervous systems’ and ‘bodily conditions’. Heidegger sees this as the epitome of nihilism.⁶⁷ The physiological ‘transactions’ between cells, nerves, etc., are blind, they do not mean anything beyond their purely functional, mechanistic nature. A legislator

begreifen nichts vom 20. Jahrhundert und den künftigen Jahrhunderten, wir begreifen nichts von dem, was unsere metaphysische Aufgabe ist, und wir können das unentwegte Geschreibe und Gerede über Nietzsche lieber heute als morgen ruhig einstellen’.

⁵⁷HH, p. 257. HHGR, p. 233.

⁵⁸HH, p. 144. HHGR, p. 126.

⁵⁹NK, p. 263. NI, p. 211. ‘[...] das Reale oder “die Realität”, neu bestimmt werden soll’.

⁶⁰Nietzsche writes that truth is ‘a kind of error without which a certain kind of living being could not live. The value for life ultimately decides’. ‘[...] die Art von Irrtum, ohne welche eine bestimmte Art von lebendigen Wesen nicht leben könnte. Der Wert für das Leben entscheidet zuletzt’, as quoted by Heidegger in NK, p. 35. As he clarifies here, and the discussion in this chapter elucidates, for Heidegger this does not mean that truth does not exist.

⁶¹NK, p. 82. NI, p. 71.

⁶²NK, pp. 32-36. NI, pp. 28-30.

⁶³NK, pp. 171-172. NI, p. 140.

⁶⁴NK, p. 84. NI, p. 75. ‘Die Kunst ist nach dem erweiterten Begriff des Künstlers das Grundgeschehen alles Seienden; alles Seiende ist, sofern es ist, ein Geschaffenes, Sichschaffendes’.

⁶⁵NK, pp. 86-88. NI, pp. 73-75.

⁶⁶NK, p. 82. NI, p. 71.

⁶⁷NK, p. 109. NI, p. 93.

cannot exercise decision over pre-determined processes of nervous excitation, as these processes are not free in any meaningful sense. But to charge Nietzsche with this sort of nihilism is to straw-man him, for to mix physiology with ‘decisive valuation’ would be akin to mixing ‘fire and water’.⁶⁸

Heidegger’s first move is to argue that for Nietzsche, physiology refers to the ‘corporeal-psychical’ (*leiblich-seelisch*).⁶⁹ He clarifies that ‘bodily’ is not to be understood as purely physical, but as also psychical. ‘We are not first of all “alive,” only then getting an apparatus to sustain our living which we call “the body,” but we are some *body* who is alive (*Wir leben, indem wir leiben*)’.⁷⁰ Hence, when Nietzsche emphasises physiology he already includes the psyche, in Heidegger’s estimation at least. So just as he thinks beyond the distinction between the sensuous and supersensuous, he also thinks beyond the distinction between the soul and the body. Nietzsche ‘always *thinks* one jump more originally than he directly *speaks*’.⁷¹

Likewise, in Heidegger’s view Nietzsche’s understanding of ‘rapture’ (*Rausch*) and ‘the grand style’ (*der große Stil*) points beyond the distinction of truth and appearance, soul and body, etc. For Nietzsche, rapture is the ‘basic’ aesthetic state, interpreted by Heidegger as a kind of attunement that results in ‘enhancement of force and plentitude’.⁷² Heidegger equates the distinction of ‘form’ and ‘content’ with ‘Idea’ and ‘thing’. That a thing has both a formal aspect (that appears) and content (the supersensuous ‘what-being’), is understood to be a mischaracterisation rooted in the dominion of Platonic thinking in the West. To overturn Platonism means to reject this distinction, and Heidegger claims instead that form *is* content.⁷³ Thus, by achieving the grand style through the attunement of rapture, art (and the legislative-artist-cum-overman that embodies it) imposes the form (and so content) on things. In

⁶⁸NK, p. 109. *NI*, p. 93.

⁶⁹NK, pp. 113-114. *NI*, p. 96.

⁷⁰NK, pp. 117-118. *NI*, p. 99. The sense in this passage is difficult to unpack entirely. Farrell-Krell claims that Heidegger is playing with the German phrase ‘wie man liebt und lebt’, ‘the way somebody actually is’. He renders the phrase (p. 118) ‘wir leben, indem wir leiben’ as ‘we are some body that is alive’ to capture the stress on embodiment in this section. In either case, Heidegger is telling us that it is through the body that we are cast out beyond the body, and so to talk of corporeality does *not* restrict the limits of the discourse to the purely ‘physical’, as this is a derivative understanding of the significance of corporeality. It is through attunements, such as love and hate, that our body becomes alive, and likewise it is through the body that attunements are experienced.

⁷¹His emphasis. NK, p. 165. *NI*, p. 134.

⁷²NK, p. 116. *NI*, p. 98.

⁷³NK, p. 139.

this way, art ‘lay[s] the groundwork for [the] establishment of new standards and values’, grounding a new truth that counters nihilism.⁷⁴

However, although Heidegger sees a central concern for the overcoming of nihilism in his own and Nietzsche’s thought, Nietzsche nonetheless remains trapped in the metaphysics he seeks to surpasses. Understood as a process of *mimesis*, Plato is seen to regulate art to a subsidiary level to truth. However, by solely inverting Platonism, Nietzsche risks remaining tied to the very metaphysics he aims to transcend.⁷⁵ Albeit an evocative claim, Nietzsche’s belief that art is worth more than truth is an example of an inversion that remains trapped in the metaphysics it seeks to overcome.⁷⁶ Heidegger’s own project sets up where Nietzsche leaves off, where truth is to be grasped as appearance, and art as the essential ally to this coming-to-be of truth. To expand on this, Heidegger returns to his interpretation of Plato, the beginning of metaphysics, and thinks it in relation to its end, in Nietzsche.⁷⁷ By doing so, Heidegger re-establishes that the overcoming of nihilism is achieved through the grounding of the truth of being in the hands of the creative and artistic ‘overman’.⁷⁸

4.3 The Will to Power is the Grounds of Destiny

For Nietzsche, all beings are will to power and art is its ‘most familiar’ configuration.⁷⁹ Heidegger understands the will as the basic character of beings, and therefore it cannot be simply something pertaining to the psyche.⁸⁰ For Heidegger, will is neither the ‘psyche’ of the individual nor is it the ‘cause’ of something, in the sense of ‘willpower’. Nietzsche argues that this meaning of will is just an illusion.⁸¹ Instead, he describes will as affect, passion and feeling. Heidegger admits that at face value this does not seem to be any different than considering will in terms of the essence of an individual’s psyche.⁸² He takes Nietzsche’s will to power to address the being of beings, for his thought ‘is a matter of the basic modes that constitute Dasein,

⁷⁴NK, p. 147. NI, p. 126.

⁷⁵NK, p. 250. NI, p. 201.

⁷⁶NK, p. 231. NI, p. 188.

⁷⁷This discussion comprises the last third of the lecture series. See, NK, pp. 173-274.

⁷⁸NK, p. 274. NI, p. 220.

⁷⁹NK, p. 169. NI, p. 138.

⁸⁰NK, p. 44. NI, pp. 37-38.

⁸¹As Nietzsche claims in *The Will to Power*: ‘Ich lache eures freien Willens und auch eures unfreien: Wahn ist mir das, was ihr Willen heißt, es gibt keinen Willen’ ‘I laugh at your free will and your unfree one too: what you call will to me is an illusion; there is no will’. As quoted by Heidegger in NK, p. 4. NI, p. 38.

⁸²NK, pp. 44-45. NI, pp. 37-38.

a matter of the ways man confronts the *Da*, the openness and concealment of beings'.⁸³ More specifically then, Nietzsche's will to power is exploring the nature of *Dasein* and specifically as a form of art, and clarifying the structure of the understanding of being.

Heidegger unpacks the terms affect, passion and feeling to try to discover the nature of the will the power, without reducing the will to power to a 'psyche'. He concedes that 'willing' is a directedness toward something, similar to the conception of will as a 'cause', which is to say, the will effects consequence.⁸⁴ However, Heidegger distinguishes between a kind of relation to something that sees us absorbed in the thing, and another that finds us before ourselves with mastery over the thing.⁸⁵ It is this latter kind of willing that Nietzsche must have in mind when he talks about will as a kind of commanding.⁸⁶ 'Willing' as will to power is not a relation to something but, as the *Da* of *Dasein*, a taking the thing *up* through oneself. With this emphasis, Heidegger interprets the will to power as a tautological statement where will means power and power will.⁸⁷ That is, the will to power is not a will that seeks power as its end goal, but a will that *is* power and a power that *is* will.⁸⁸ This means that the will is always a 'willing-out-beyond-itself' (*Über-sich-hinaus-Wollen*).⁸⁹ Like the legislator binding himself to the Idea, the will to power allows one to determining the being of the thing in light of oneself.

The significance of authentic *Dasein* in Heidegger's understanding of *aletheia* thus regulates this interpretation of the will to power.⁹⁰ For will is not quite the 'seizure' of an affect like anger, as in anger we become lost to ourselves. Neither is it quite like a passion that can close the 'ego' off from its surrounding.⁹¹ Heidegger points out, however, that in passions such as hate and love, oneself and one's world is opened up through the passion. A passion, properly speaking, 'is that through which and in which we take hold of ourselves and achieve lucid mastery over the beings

⁸³His emphasis. *NK*, p. 52. *NI*, p. 45. '[...] um die Weise, wie der Mensch das "Da", die Offenheit und Verborgtheit des Seienden, in denen er steht, besteht'.

⁸⁴*NK*, pp. 44-45. *NI*, p. 38.

⁸⁵*NK*, pp. 54-55. *NI*, p. 41. That Heidegger is drawing from his own notion of authenticity here is evident in his description of will as a 'resoluteness' (*Entschlossenheit*).

⁸⁶*NK*, p. 47. See also, *ibid.*, pp. 67-68. This idea of will as command is the most common designation of the will for Nietzsche, according to Heidegger.

⁸⁷*NK*, pp. 69-70.

⁸⁸*Ibid.* See also, *NK*, p. 50. *NI*, p. 42. 'The expression "to power" therefore never means some sort of appendage to will. Rather, it comprises an elucidation of the essence of will itself'.

⁸⁹*NK*, p. 60.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 79.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, p. 56. *NI*, p. 48.

around us and within us'.⁹² Through passion, one becomes 'resolute'.⁹³ They thus gives us a particular access to the world and in doing so provides 'permanence' (*Beständigkeit*) to our existence.⁹⁴

This permanence is nonetheless short lived. For will, as power, is will to more will. Heidegger takes this to imply that 'enhancement [*die Steigerung*] and intensification [*die Erhöhung*]' must be an intrinsic aspect of the will to power.⁹⁵ For given that will to power is the basic character of beings as such, where enhancement and intensification not implied the permanence the will achieves would simply 'sink back' in the face of more will.⁹⁶ As such, will to power is both creative and destructive. This reading echoes Heidegger's anxieties about the need for a greater, or heightened, disclosure of truth in order to resist the increasing decent into nihilism, for it is precisely in virtue of the destructive necessity of the will to power that there must be a simultaneous drive toward greater enhancement and intensification in order to successfully counter its destruction.⁹⁷

His reading also attempts to think past the tension of being and becoming, for if the will were purely destructive it would exist in a state of constant becoming. By emphasising the will as a creative activity, but creativity as a 'taking up and transforming',⁹⁸ Heidegger attempts to ground the notion of becoming within his understanding of the truth of being, which he interprets as what is at stake in Nietzsche's attempt to think the meaning of being as the eternal recurrence.⁹⁹ The link Heidegger has in mind easily imposes itself, as long as we remember the thrust of his philosophical project at this time. To ground the truth of being is to establish the homeland, which is to reveal an existentially heightened form of meaningful disclosure for a people, a 'taking up and transforming'. As Heidegger tells us:

What is this recoinng, in which whatever becomes comes to be being? It is the reconfiguration of what becomes in terms of its supreme possibilities, a reconfiguration in which what becomes is transfigured and attains subsistence in its very dimensions and domains. This recoinng is a creating. To create, in the sense of creation out

⁹²Ibid. '[...] so daß die Leidenschaft jenes ist, wodurch und worin wir in uns selbst Fuß fassen und des Seienden um uns und in uns hellstichtig mächtig werden'.

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴NK, p. 57. NI, p. 49.

⁹⁵NK, p. 70. In the lecture series on Plato, a similar idea is suggested by the understanding that there are 'degrees' of truth. *WWP*, p. 33. *ET*, p. 25

⁹⁶NK, p. 70.

⁹⁷NK, p. 70.

⁹⁸NK, p. 71. NI, p. 61. '[...] das Hinaufbringen und Verwandeln'.

⁹⁹In the second volume of the Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger informs us that it is precisely because Nietzsche conjoins being as becoming and being as permanence, that his 'fundamental metaphysical position is the end of Western philosophy'. *NM*, p. 230. *III*, p. 204.

beyond oneself, is most intrinsically this: to stand in the moment of decision, in which what has prevailed hitherto, our endowment, is directed toward a projected task. When it is so directed, the endowment is preserved. The "momentary" character of creation is the essence of actual, actuating eternity, which achieves its greatest breadth and keenest edge as the moment of eternity in the return of the same. The recoining of what becomes into being—will to power in its supreme configuration—is in its most profound essence something that occurs in the "glance of an eye" as eternal recurrence of the same. The will to power, as constitution of being, is as it is solely on the basis of the way to be which Nietzsche projects for being as a whole: Will to power, in its essence and according to its inner possibility, is eternal recurrence of the same.¹⁰⁰

In the lecture series on Hölderlin, Heidegger drew from the poet to argue that the German 'endowment' is the capacity for lucid presentation, and their task one of being 'struck' by the 'fire' of being.¹⁰¹ By interpreting the significance of the eternal recurrence as the realisation of this 'task' through embracing the will to power, Heidegger establishes Nietzsche's thought as the key for the transition to the other beginning. It is the intellectual articulation of the means through which a people's 'endowment' becomes itself through its task to reclaim its destiny. For Heidegger, this destiny is to understand, and thus 'lucidly present', the truth of being as concealed, or equally to retrieve the forgotten earth. This interpretation of the will to power, then, is a sort of 'metaphysical structure' implicit in the demand of the German nation to reclaim its destiny. The liberator is the one who 'belongs' to this 'becoming in being'.¹⁰² Heidegger thus moves to clarify the meaning of will to power as art, in order to establish the work of the legislative artists.

¹⁰⁰*NM*, pp. 228-229. *NII*, pp. 202-203. 'Und was ist dieses Umprägen, worin Werdendes zu Seiendem wird? Es ist das Hineingestalten des Werdenden in seine höchsten Möglichkeiten, worin als seinen Maßen und Bereichen es sich verklärt und Bestand gewinnt. Dieses Umprägen ist das Schaffen. Schaffen als Übersichhinausschaffen ist aber zuinnerst: im Augenblick der Entscheidung stehen, in welchem Augenblick das Bisherige, Mitgegebene in das vorentworfene Auf gegebene hinausgehoben und so bewahrt wird. Diese Augenblicklichkeit des Schaffens aber ist das Wesen der wirklichen, wirkenden Ewigkeit, die ihre höchste Schärfe und Weite gewinnt als der Augenblick der Ewigkeit der Wiederkunft des Gleichen. Die Umprägung des Werdenden zum Seienden, der Wille zur Macht in seiner höchsten Gestalt, ist in seinem tiefsten Wesen Augenblicklichkeit, d. h. ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen. Der Wille zur Macht als Verfassung des Seienden ist nur, was er ist, auf dem Grunde der Weise zu sein, auf die Nietzsche das Seiende im Ganzen entwirft: Wille zur Macht ist im Wesen und seiner innersten Möglichkeit nach ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen'.

¹⁰¹*HH*, pp. 291-293. *HHGR*, pp. 263-265.

¹⁰²*NK*, p. 274. 'Er zuerst muß aufhören, sein eigener Zeitgenosse zu sein, weil er am wenigsten sich selbst gehört, sondern dem Werden des Seins'.

4.4 The Significance of Art in the Question of Truth

Nietzsche's will to power addresses the guiding question of philosophy, namely what beings 'are'.¹⁰³ Heidegger is thus uncomfortable with the descriptive terms Nietzsche uses for the will to power, for he worries that speaking of will as affect, passion, or feeling reduces the significance of this concept to mere physiology and biologism. Heidegger points out that these are not 'essential definitions' but 'secondary references'.¹⁰⁴ Instead, he argues that Nietzsche's thinking cannot be a matter for psychology and science for the will to power is a 'basic mode' of constituting *Dasein*.¹⁰⁵ The concept of the will is therefore crucial in Heidegger's understanding of *Dasein* at this time, and must subsequently play a central role in Heidegger's understanding of art, for *Dasein* is founded through poetry. Likewise, for Nietzsche, the question of truth plays essentially against the question of art for 'art is worth more than truth'.¹⁰⁶ Heidegger's comments on the will to power at this stage remain preliminary. To get to grips with Nietzsche's understanding of truth and the role of the will therein, one would be prudent to investigate his reflection on art.¹⁰⁷ Heidegger proceeds accordingly.

For Nietzsche, art must be grasped in terms of the artist, and Heidegger reasons that this is because it is only through the artist that something is 'brought forth'. However, it is that which is 'brought forth' that most interests Heidegger. For Nietzsche, the starting point must be 'life' (*Leben*)—a term Heidegger dismisses as 'superficial' elsewhere¹⁰⁸—and life is understood as the will to power, where the artist embodies its most perspicuous form.¹⁰⁹ Hinting at his own efforts in *The Origin*, Heidegger worries that Nietzsche's emphasis on the artist risks failing to interrogate 'the actuality of art as a whole'.¹¹⁰ However, because he reads the will to power as a

¹⁰³NK, pp. 78-79. This is the question of the truth of beings, or, the being of beings. This is in distinction to the grounding question of Western philosophy, the question of the meaning of being. Heidegger will not approach the latter question until the second lecture series on Nietzsche, on the eternal recurrence of the same.

¹⁰⁴NK, p. 119. *NI*, p. 101.

¹⁰⁵NK, p. 52. *NI*, p. 45.

¹⁰⁶NK, p. 88. 'Die Kunst ist mehr wert als "die Wahrheit"'. 'Art is worth more than "truth"'. Heidegger chooses this quote from Nietzsche as the last of his 'Five Statements on Art'. The question of the relation between truth and art will occupy Heidegger for the majority of the rest of the lecture course.

¹⁰⁷NK, p. 89. *NI*, p. 77, 'by means of art and a characterisation of the essence of art, [Nietzsche] wants to show us what will to power is'.

¹⁰⁸*BP*, pp. 221-222.

¹⁰⁹NK, pp. 81-82.

¹¹⁰NK, p. 82. *NI*, p. 70.

notion that clarifies the essence of *Dasein*, it thinks beyond the divide between subject and object. Therefore, Nietzsche's 'aesthetics' 'overturns itself' (*selbst überschlägt*).¹¹¹ Nietzsche is thus understood to implicitly point the reader in the direction of art as such, even though his focus is on the artist. Heidegger expands on this by exploring Nietzsche's view of 'rapture' and the 'grand style'. The following surveys Heidegger's interpretation of these terms, and reflects on the significance of this interpretation for Heidegger's project of grounding the truth of being. In the process, Heidegger's claim that thinking must be a response *to* being (and does he mean *Sein Selbst*? If so, what does *Sein Selbst* even mean?) comes under critical scrutiny.

4.4.1 Corporeal Attunements and Rapture

When Nietzsche claims that art should be the countermovement to nihilism, Heidegger takes this to mean that art should 'prepare and ground standards and laws for historical, intellectual existence'.¹¹² Evoking here the 'stylistic laws' discussed previous, this is what is at stake in Heidegger's exploration of the essence of truth and especially his attempts to elucidate the nature of Hölderlin's poetry. However, if Heidegger is to successfully find the coherence that he believes to exist between his own thinking and that of Nietzsche's, he must guard his own interpretation against the nihilistic misinterpretation he believes possibly through Nietzsche's emphasis on physiology. The physiological emphasis in Nietzsche's thought nonetheless points to the significance of truth as an appearing phenomenon, and Heidegger wishes to establish an understanding of the essence of truth *as* appearance by utilising Nietzsche's insights on the importance of sensuous reality. Therefore, to reconcile the tension between the emphasis on physiology and the countermovement to nihilism, is to be brought to a 'higher concept of the essence of the will to power',¹¹³ precisely because it pursues the essence of truth in appearances.

We saw Heidegger to think of Nietzsche's emphasis on physiology to already include the psychical, but the precedent for this reconciliation lies in the fabric of

¹¹¹NK, p. 90.

¹¹²NK, p. 109. *NI*, p. 92. 'die Ansetzung der neuen höchsten Werte und damit der Maße und Gesetze geschichtlich geistigen Daseins vorbereiten und begründen'.

¹¹³NK, p. 112. *NI*, p. 95.

Heidegger's thought.¹¹⁴ Heidegger understands nihilism in the two-fold sense of the withdrawal of being from beings (its abandonment), and its subsequent being forgotten throughout the history of the West. When Heidegger introduces his notion of earth it also functions in this two-fold way, as earth is the withdrawal or concealment of being understood with a particular emphasis on corporeality. By neglecting, or 'forgetting', the true significance of corporeality as an abyssal concealment, the history of metaphysics culminates in the contemporary era where the earth has become a pure resource for our use. By locating the source of the 'abandonment' of being in earth, Heidegger gains the intellectual artillery to utilise Nietzsche's understanding of the physiology of the artist to solidify the new emphasis on the sensuous in his own thought.

Hence, Heidegger takes Nietzsche's discussion of physiology to mean what is 'bound to nature, which the Greeks of the Golden Age call *'deinon'* and *'deinotaton'*, the frightful'.¹¹⁵ In the *Introduction to Metaphysics* Heidegger understands *deinon* as the 'violent taming of the violent'.¹¹⁶ Likewise, in the lectures on Hölderlin, the earth is the violent abyss, requiring a reciprocal violent taming at the hands of the demigods. Although Nietzsche lacked the means to articulate this adequately,¹¹⁷ Heidegger sees resonance in Nietzsche's physiological aesthetics and the significance he finds in earth. By decreeing that the overman stay true to nature, this would point to Heidegger's project of grounding the truth of being. If the legislators successfully bring the concealed to language, possible only through a dialogue with the work of art, nihilism will be offered a successful countermovement in the history of Western thought. Thus, Heidegger sees his own project as bringing Nietzsche's thought to its proper fruition.¹¹⁸

Heidegger argues that it is through the attunement of 'rapture' that Nietzsche thinks the 'overman' can achieve this. As Nietzsche claims in a passage from *The*

¹¹⁴This is not to say, as Kockelman points out, that Heidegger thinks that Nietzsche's understanding of art does not suffer on behalf of this emphasis on the artist and physiology. Kockelman, *Heidegger on Art and Artworks*, p. 57. Neither am I suggesting that I agree with the coherence Heidegger finds between his own philosophy and that of Nietzsche's. Instead, what I wish to point out in what follows, is that there are certain developments within Heidegger's philosophy that would attract him to Nietzsche's emphases on corporeal and sensuous reality.

¹¹⁵*NK*, pp. 149-150. *NI*, p. 128.

¹¹⁶*EM*, p. 170. *IM*, p. 179.

¹¹⁷In his *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger discusses Nietzsche's dismissal of the term 'being', Heidegger asks (rhetorically): '[d]oes Nietzsche speak the truth? Or is he himself only the final victim of a long-standing errancy and neglect, but as this victim the unrecognized witness to a new necessity?' His emphasis. *EM*, pp. 39-40. *IM*, p. 40.

¹¹⁸As he claims in his *Introduction to Metaphysics*: '[t]he task [...] consists first and foremost in fully unfolding that which was realized through Nietzsche by means of a truly engaged attack on him'. *Ibid.*

Twilight of the Idols, '[i]f there is to be art, if there is to be any aesthetic doing and observing, one physiological precondition is indispensable: *rapture*'.¹¹⁹ He calls rapture a 'special state' in the essence of the corporeal-psychical,¹²⁰ which Heidegger interprets as an 'attunement'.¹²¹ There are certain dispositions within corporeal-physical existence that lend themselves to creative production. Heidegger stresses the psychical aspect of the corporeal. For although an attunement is physical, it is not trapped 'inside' a body. Instead, attunements are the 'basic way we in which we are *outside* ourselves'.¹²²

The body is opaque and concealed, realised only through attunement.¹²³ Because attunement is the way in which I am brought before the world as a whole, 'bodily state involves some way in which the things around us and the people with us lay claim on us or do not so', such as, when our stomach is 'out of sorts'.¹²⁴ Attunements are thus 'woven' (*verwoben*) into embodiment.¹²⁵ As such, we do not have a 'soul' inside a body. Instead, it is being beyond ourselves through the psyche that we are embodied, and equally, it is through the body that we go beyond ourselves out into the world.¹²⁶ This may seem like it clarifies the distinction between soul and body rather than transcending it, but it is an effort to think this distinction as one. In

¹¹⁹His emphasis. As quoted by Heidegger in *NK*, p. 114. *NI*, p. 96. 'Damit es Kunst gibt, damit es irgend ein ästhetisches Tun und Schauen gibt, dazu ist eine physiologische Vorbedingung unumgänglich: *der Rausch*'.

¹²⁰Heidegger believes that Nietzsche's understanding of 'rapture' is one such state. *NK*, p. 114. *NI*, p. 96.

¹²¹*NK*, p. 117. This gives him the opportunity to clarify that an attunement is always corporeal and embodied. *Ibid.*, pp. 117-119. One does wonder how this understanding of attunement is to be understood in the context of an attunement offered a people in a poem, as Hölderlin's *Germania* and *The Rhine* is said to, but his notion of earth (and *Dasein* understood in relation to the nation) is likely to afford him this comparison. Which is to say, an attunement available in a poem is embodied by the *Dasein* of the people, corporeally instantiated through their relationship with the earth. Cf., however, Kockelman, *Heidegger on Art and Artworks*, p. 55. Kockelman claims that Heidegger understands rapture similarly to '*Befindlichkeit*' as understood in *Being and Time*. However, I noted in the previous chapter that Heidegger no longer makes use of this concept when he discusses attunement, as it suggests a notion of individuality that Heidegger is resisting. He follows this precedent in this lecture series on Nietzsche also, using only terms like '*Bestimmung*', '*bestimmt*', '*Grundstimmung*', etc. Nonetheless, Nietzsche's stress on the artist forces Heidegger to at times utilise his notion of attunement in relation to the individual.

¹²²*NK*, p. 117. *NI*, p. 99. 'Die Stimmung ist gerade die Grundart, wie wir außerhalb unserer selbst sind, und das sind wir immer und wesentlich'.

¹²³*NK*, p. 117. *NI*, p. 99. 'Das Gefühl leistet im vorhinein den einhaltenden Einbezug des Leibes in unser Dasein'. In this passage, Heidegger uses the term feeling (*Gefühl*) synonymously with attunement. The term '*Einbezug*' plays with the German verb '*einbeziehen*', meaning 'to include', and the noun '*Bezug*', which means both to 'cover' and 'reference'. This passage would translate as, 'feelings allow in advance the consistent covering inclusivity of the body in our *Dasein*'. Farrell-Krell renders it '[f]eeling achieves from the outset the inherent internalizing tendency of the body in our *Dasein*'.

¹²⁴*NK*, p. 117. *NI*, p. 99.

¹²⁵*NK*, p. 124. *NI*, p. 105.

¹²⁶*NK*, p. 117. *NI*, p. 99.

the process, the distinction between a true (psychical) and appearing (physical) world becomes obscured, an important move for the latter half of the lecture series when Heidegger returns to his confrontation with Platonism.

Rapture is an attunement that allows for the ‘enhancement of force’ (*Kraftsteigerung*) and ‘plenitude’ (*Fülle*).¹²⁷ He interprets the ‘force’ evoked by rapture as equivalent to the being out beyond oneself of an attunement, but in a way that allows ‘beings themselves [be] [...] experienced as [...] more fully in being’.¹²⁸ Here, we again see a significant stress on the opening of a place (the ‘*Da*’) to greater degrees of existential disclosure. By interpreting the significance of ‘enhancement’ as a being ‘borne along by [the] [...] buoyancy’ of the attunement,¹²⁹ the importance of finding a way into Hölderlin’s poetry is reflected. For through the fundamental attunements of his poetry, there is an increase of will, and so an increase in power. It is this ‘enhancement’ then, through which beings are made ‘more’ beingful, that establishes the homeland.

Heidegger has to account for how Nietzsche’s emphasis on the artist can be reconciled with his own emphasis on the essence of art as such, for Heidegger’s concern is for the German people as a whole and not an individual. Heidegger thus pushes the interpretation toward art as such.¹³⁰ The means to do so, however, are already implicit within his interpretation. Art, grasped through the physiology of the artist, is the most perspicuous mode of the will to power. But the will to power is already interpreted as the essence of beings as such. Therefore, as Kockelman argues, this ‘means that all beings that the artist himself does not artistically produce, have a mode of Being that corresponds to the work of art that the artist does produce’.¹³¹ Which is to say, Nietzsche’s understanding of art grasped in terms of the artist already points beyond the artist into the region of beings as a whole.

4.4.2 Is There a Good Beyond (my) Being? Will *Contra* Beauty

This presents a problem. The being of beings corresponds to the mode of being of the artist, and this invariably presents the possibility of arguing for the philosophical solipsism and subjectivism that Heidegger has attempted to safeguard his notion of

¹²⁷NK, p. 118. *NI*, p. 100.

¹²⁸NK, p. 118. *NI*, p. 100.

¹²⁹NK, p. 118. *NI*, p. 100.

¹³⁰See, for example, *NK*, pp. 123-124 and p. 170.

¹³¹Kockelman, *Heidegger on Art and Artworks*, p. 51.

truth against, because it suggests an equivalence between artist and world. His presentation of rapture attempts to clarify this. Rapture is the will to power as a willing beyond oneself, but it is an *engaged* creating.¹³² By presenting rapture as a ‘readiness to tackle’, yet ‘open to everything’,¹³³ Heidegger attempts to counter a misinterpretation of this as a kind of solipsism, for although *Dasein* and world are of same ‘substance’, there is still a reciprocity at play that suggests a distinction. He follows this by turning to Kant’s understanding of beauty in order to sharpen our understanding of the intimate relationship between artist and world.¹³⁴ If this is to be successful, Heidegger must evade the potential collapse into idealism that the intertwinement between artist and world evokes.

Kant describes beauty as ‘disinterestedness’ (*interessellos*), but Heidegger carefully distinguishes this from a lack of interest.¹³⁵ Instead, Heidegger takes disinterestedness to be a comportment where we ‘release what encounters us as such to its way to be; we must allow and grant it what belongs to it and what it brings to us’.¹³⁶ Beauty is a releasing of the ‘thing’ into existence, where the thing shows up ‘in the radiance’ of its coming forward into appearance.¹³⁷ Heidegger has in mind here what Hölderlin calls the ‘holy’, which was a relinquishing of ‘utility’ through which we are brought into contact with the concealed earth.¹³⁸ Such is the experience of the beautiful, when one approaches the thing with a knowing awareness that the thing is given into meaning. Available through the attunement of beauty, Heidegger prescribes this experience of truths being *given* as essential for an understanding of the will to power.

Except, Heidegger wishes to think of this ‘releasement’ toward things alongside the Nietzschean will to power, and the attempt brings him into trouble. He now specifies that rapture is ‘form engendering force’, where the artist ‘anticipates’—but in turn provides—an ‘emphasizing’ of the ‘major features’ of the thing: a ‘seeing

¹³²Nietzsche distinguishes between ‘masculine aesthetics’ (*Mannesästhetik*) and ‘feminine aesthetics’ (*Weibsästhetik*). Nietzsche argues that feminine aesthetics is a receptive kind, which Heidegger takes to mean the understanding of aesthetics described in the previous chapter where aesthetics is understood as the reception of the beautiful in the subject. Masculine aesthetics, on the other hand, is ‘creative’ and ‘productive’, where the artist provides the standard of beauty. *NK*, p. 82.

¹³³*NK*, p. 118. *NI*, p. 100

¹³⁴*NK*, pp. 124-137. *NI*, pp. 107-114.

¹³⁵*NK*, pp. 126-127. *NI*, p. 108.

¹³⁶*NK*, p. 127. *NI*, p. 109. ‘Wir müssen das Begegnende als solches freigeben in dem, was es ist, und müssen ihm das lassen und gönnen, was ihm selbst zugehört und was es uns zubringt’.

¹³⁷*NK*, p. 128. *NI*, p. 110. ‘Es wird nicht gesehen, daß jetzt gerade erst der Gegenstand als reiner Gegenstand zum Vorschein kommt und daß ebendieses In-den-Vorschein-Kommen, das Erscheinen in diesem Schein, wie das Wort “schön” sagt, das Schöne ist’.

¹³⁸*HH*, p. 84.

more simply and strongly'.¹³⁹ This is the attempt to combine 'openness' and the 'will' as a readiness to tackle. One is open to the being that shows itself, as radiant beauty, and in the process, one can see more simply and thus emphasise the major features of the thing through one's will. The attempt to think these together relies on the mechanisms behind the emphasizing of the major features, which Heidegger explores through discussion of the significance of a 'limit'. A limit is the boundary of a thing, that which defines what the thing is. *But it is the artist who imposes this limit.*¹⁴⁰ Can the sentiment of the radiant be done justice alongside the will of the artist? Can we really think, as Heidegger tries to here, 'openness' next to the rapturous, form defining, projection of the legislator artist? Desmond raises a similar problem:

But is there tension between the opening as a giving, and man as a projecting? Does not a significant instability come from mingling these languages: the human as given its being in an opening it does not produce, and the human as projecting itself and its world. The instability is between receiving the gift and projecting one's self and world; between what I would call an ultimate passion of being, an ontological receiving, a being given to be, and a projection of self and its world, neither of which have been unambiguously released beyond their own equivocal being for themselves.¹⁴¹

A closer inspection of this section from Heidegger's *Nietzsche* shows that Desmond's concerns are warranted.

As Heidegger points out, the form of the thing is determined by the 'limit'.¹⁴² Limit is thought of here in the sense of the boundary that defines what the thing is. The limit allows the thing to take a stand and so distinguishes it as something and not something else.¹⁴³ It is what allows the thing to 'form'. Form, distinguished by its limit, is the thing's 'lawfulness', which is not distinguished by the content of the thing but instead *is* the content.¹⁴⁴ Except, as the one who emphasises the 'major features' it is the artist that brings this form to stand.¹⁴⁵ Beauty may bring the thing to bare its radiance, but it is the artist who defines what this thing is. However, form is content, and so the wilful act of the artist inevitable trumps the radiant effects of the beautiful. We are told that the relationship between beauty and will is 'reciprocal' but, in the end, because of the essential role of the 'limit' (or, the 'major features') in

¹³⁹NK, p. 135. Heidegger, *NI*, p. 116. 'Schaffen ist das einfacher und stärker sehende Heraustreiben der Hauptzüge'.

¹⁴⁰NK, pp. 137-139. *NI*, pp. 118-120.

¹⁴¹William Desmond, *Art, Origins, Otherness*, p. 281.

¹⁴²NK, pp. 138-139. *NI*, pp. 119-120.

¹⁴³NK, p. 138. *NI*, p. 119.

¹⁴⁴NK, p. 138. *NI*, p. 120. 'Die echte Form ist der einzige und wahrhafte Inhalt'. 'Genuine form is the only true content'.

¹⁴⁵NK, p. 139. *NI*, p. 119. 'Rausch, das heißt für Nietzsche hellster Sieg der Form.' 'Rapture means the most glorious victory of form.'

the constitution of the thing, the will takes a precedence that seems to eclipse the role of the openness toward beauty. Heidegger is wrestling with this notion of the ‘open’, attempting to bring the eminence it suggests to language. But can his interpretation of beauty allow us to ‘receive’ this ‘open’? Perhaps if reception is thought along the lines of the Latin ‘*capere*’—its etymological root—meaning to take, seize, or capture.

This same problem can be approached another way. When Heidegger clarifies Nietzsche’s claim that art is the most perspicuous form of will to power (because the aesthetic state of rapture is ‘the envisionment through which we constantly see, so that everything here is discernible to us’)¹⁴⁶ he means that our basic psychical/physical states, which are artistic and creative in their most pure form, are the lens through which reality unfolds itself. Further, because reality itself unfolds through this lens, it marks reality, determines reality, *is* reality. As it stands this is rather vague. For the question remains, what is reality? And how can we meaningfully discuss what and how reality *is*? This is a variation of the question of being, in Heidegger’s case its meaning or truth, but by means of a confrontation Heidegger is allowing Nietzsche to guide him in this lecture course toward posing this question anew. At one point, Heidegger claims ‘we can say that the word “truth” for him [Nietzsche] means as much as the truth, and the truth what is known in truth. Knowing is a theoretical-scientific grasp of the actual in the broadest sense’.¹⁴⁷ This begs the question, and Heidegger is certainly aware of this. For, the problem is what *is* this ‘actual’, and how does one ‘grasp’ it, or ‘know’ it, whether scientifically, theoretically, or otherwise. The nature of the ‘real’ thus becomes an open question,¹⁴⁸ and Heidegger understands Nietzsche’s thought to ‘decide’ to pursue this question in the realm of art.¹⁴⁹ However, because for Nietzsche art must be understood in relation to the artist, this creative activity of the artist subsumes any meaningful role ‘the open’ will play. Heidegger does criticise Nietzsche for his reduction of art to the artist, but the discussion on beauty shows us that even Heidegger’s attempts to get beyond this remain soiled by the emphasis on the will.

Heidegger’s attempt to think the good beyond being in Plato’s thought repeats

¹⁴⁶NK, pp. 169-170. *NI*, pp. 138-139.

¹⁴⁷NK, p. 185. *NI*, p. 152. ‘Das Wort Wahrheit bedeutet für ihn soviel wie das Wahre, und dieses heißt: das in Wahrheit Erkannte; und Erkennen ist theoretisch-wissenschaftliches Erfassen des Wirklichen im weitesten Sinne’.

¹⁴⁸NK, p. 263. *NI*, p. 211.

¹⁴⁹NK, p. 84. *NI*, p. 72. ‘Die Kunst ist nach dem erweiterten Begriff des Künstlers das Grundgeschehen alles Seienden’. ‘Art, in accordance with the expanded concept of the artist, is the basic occurrence of all beings’. Trans. mod.

this line of reasoning. In the 1931/32 lecture series, Heidegger points out that the ‘looking eye’ toward the sun (or good beyond being) is *not* the sun. The liberator’s eye may be claimed by the sun, but it is the eye (as the ‘sunniest thing’ (*das Sonnenhafteste*)) that ‘illuminates in its own essence, making-free and giving-free’.¹⁵⁰ Remember, it is the sun that is said to *give* being and time.¹⁵¹ Certainly, we can say that there are some who draw our attention to this gift, but because this sun is ‘yoked’ to the sight that catches sight of it, and is therefore illuminated through the eye, the gift of this good ‘beyond’ is reduced to the eye. Thus, ‘this complete reduction of the ideas to mere “looks” goes hand in hand with a complete reduction of the good to the ideas’.¹⁵² As Heidegger says himself, ‘in its essence, an idea is bonded to perceiving and *is* nothing *outside* this perceiving’.¹⁵³ This interpretation is in tension when thought of alongside the Idea of the good, as it is the highest Idea and empowerment of the Ideas. Hence, the legislator’s eyes cannot be said to be the sun, but they are ‘sunlike’. This is why Heidegger introduces the term ‘positionedness’ (*Gehaltenheit*), his translation for the Greek *paideia*, which he understands as the ‘empowerment’ of the essence of the legislator, which in turn is ‘what itself empowers *aletheia*’.¹⁵⁴ In the 1933/34 repeat of this lecture course, Heidegger claims that the sun ‘must be the enabling power for seeing itself’, but as it turns out it is the legislator’s eye that ‘enables *this yoke as yoke*’.¹⁵⁵ Again, then, although it is admitted that the sun is ‘higher’ than essential knowledge, it is nonetheless enabled to be this beyond through the legislator.¹⁵⁶ This attempt to reconcile meaning with what conditions that meaning fails. Instead, Heidegger simply regulates the grounds of meaning to certain, meaning bestowing individuals. Gonzalez thus points out that Heidegger’s understanding of the concept of the good beyond being in Plato loses all sense of the transcendence that it maintains in Plato’s thinking.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁰ *WWP*, p. 102. *ET*, p. 74. ‘Das Sonnenhafteste ist dasjenige, das am meisten das Vermögen, das es ist, dem Licht verdankt, das Licht in Anspruch nimmt, in seinem Wesen daher selbst lichtend, freimachend und frei-gibend ist’.

¹⁵¹ *WWP*, p. 43. *ET*, p. 33.

¹⁵² Gonzalez, *Plato and Heidegger*, p. 156.

¹⁵³ *WWP*, p. 104. *ET*, p. 75. ‘Die Idee ist dem Erblicken wesensmäßig verhaftet und ist nichts außerhalb dieses Erblickens’.

¹⁵⁴ *WWP*, pp. 114-115.

¹⁵⁵ *SW*, p. 198. *BaT*, pp. 151-152.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ Gonzalez, *Plato and Heidegger*, p. 156. See also, Adriaan T. Peperzak, ‘Heidegger and Plato’s Idea of the Good’, in *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 258-285. For Heidegger, however, it is the finitude of *Dasein* that is the precondition for being and time. He is therefore unable to commit to Plato’s thesis on the good beyond being, and what this tries to teach us about the limits of our finitude.

Does this problem not return us to the tension we noted in his thought in *Being and Time*? The double admission, that entities *are* independent of *Dasein* and yet being *is* only in that being who has an understanding of being, means that there is simultaneously a reduction of meaning to the human being and an admission that this very reduction fails to grasp what precedes it. In an attempt to resolve this tension, he introduces and explores terms such as earth and concealment, and emphasises the primacy of earth over *Dasein*'s capacity to reveal it. But are the resources available in his thought to really speak to this primacy? His attempt to name earth as its self-concealment hinges on this difficulty. Perhaps he gets closest to a solution in *The Origin* when he asks, 'can it be that this self-refusal of the mere thing, this self-contained, irreducible spontaneity, belongs precisely to the essence of the thing?'¹⁵⁸ But Heidegger utilises Hölderlin's poetry to name this self-refusing earth the homeland, in the process ensconcing in his thought the superiority of the German people for the future of Western thought.

His interpretation of the good beyond being as the 'positionedness' of the legislator mirrors his presentation of the 'overman' in this lecture series. Moved through the attunement of rapture, the overman determines the limits of the form of beings, which in turn is understood as its only meaningful content. There are some important differences between this version of the legislator and the one of the 1931/32 lecture series on Plato.¹⁵⁹ Whereas the legislator of 1931/32 is *Dasein*'s transcendence to world, the 1935/36 legislators of the Nietzsche lectures are understood as *Dasein*'s immanence within the world. They are earthly beings, all the more 'rooted' than those of us not attuned to this earthly existence.¹⁶⁰ Earthly here means that they are awoken from their Platonic slumber. Once trapped in the dichotomy between a true and appearing world, and the forgetfulness of being that this entails, they now retrieve the significance of the forgotten earth and free to legislate the truth of beings. To be earthly is to be located in a place, a *topos*, grounding the promise of the Germanic homeland. It seems that Heidegger finds a better way of voicing his interpretation of this concept through Nietzschean metaphysics.

¹⁵⁸UK, p. 17. OA, p. 99.

¹⁵⁹As I explore, below, Heidegger's interpretation of the good beyond being in Plato goes through significant re-evaluation around this time. This is likely to be because Nietzsche provides him the resources to think this concept in the manner he wishes, in the way the resources available in Plato's thought could not.

¹⁶⁰As Farrell-Krell points out. NI, p. 250.

The tensions that the relationship between will and beauty creates are unavoidable. The German phrase ‘*was im Gestimmtsein die Stimmung bestimmt*’ perhaps expresses it best.¹⁶¹ Farrell-Krell translates as ‘what this mood defines in our attunement’. The mood (I translate, attunement) is rapture, attuned to form, attuned by beauty. The sentence would be more faithfully translated as ‘what this attunement [rapture] attunes in our attunement [to beauty]’. Beauty attunes (through form), and so allows for rapture (creating form), which in turn discloses the beautiful.¹⁶² There is a circle here, and Heidegger admits that it is an indeterminate one.¹⁶³ But is it not this very indeterminacy that becomes determined through the will to power as rapture, a creation and destruction, and a willing beyond, where will is power and plentitude?¹⁶⁴ We may think that we are caught between a chicken and an egg, but Heidegger’s answer is in fact quite clear. Although the artist must be responsive to beauty, and thereby experience the thing as being-given, this merely tries to emphasise the ‘reticent’ attunement of the legislator. Regardless of this attunement, in the end it is the legislator who imposes the form on the thing. To save from arbitrariness we cannot say purely subjective, to save from Platonism we cannot say upward toward the good and the forms; instead, Heidegger goes under, to the earth, to bring truth to stand through the legislative will *as* power and to reclaim the concealed earth. Because this concealed earth is not truth but untruth, it demands we take a stand *on* (or decide) what it is. Therefore, in the reciprocal relationship between rapture and beauty ‘we touch upon the character of decision in creation, and what has to do with standards and hierarchy’.¹⁶⁵

By beginning with the artist (as subject) Nietzsche arrives at ‘creation in general’.¹⁶⁶ Heidegger thus thinks that Nietzsche’s discussion of will to power and rapture ‘explode the very subjectivity of the subject’.¹⁶⁷ Heidegger’s discussion certainly distances Nietzsche’s thinking from the conception of the human being as subject, but we have seen that the reliance on the will of certain individuals seems to maintain a notion of subjectivity that overpowers the radiance of beauty. The subject may ‘explode’, but only because the legislator becomes the standard of the world.

¹⁶¹NK, p. 137.

¹⁶²NK, pp. 143-144. *NI*, p. 123.

¹⁶³NK, p. 142. *NI*, p. 122.

¹⁶⁴NK, pp. 142-143. *NI*, pp. 122-123.

¹⁶⁵NK, p. 134. *NI*, p. 116.

¹⁶⁶NK, p. 170. *NI*, p. 139.

¹⁶⁷NK, p. 143. *NI*, p. 123. ‘Der Rausch als Gefühlszustand sprengt gerade die Subjektivität des Subjekts’.

Heidegger thus tells us that '[a]rt belongs to a realm where we find ourselves—we are the very realm'.¹⁶⁸ Flirting dangerously with the solipsistic idealism that Heidegger tries to carefully guard his conception of truth against, he points out that art is the most familiar form of will to power for us—keeping in mind that this is understood as the being of beings—for art is a 'state' (*Zustand*) of our being that originates from man.

With the notion of 'standards and hierarchy' we once again discover the significance of the notion of superiority in Heidegger's understanding of art and truth, and especially the important role that art plays in establishing this hierarchy. For Heidegger, this is undoubtedly to save truth from arbitrariness, for if there is no God to secure the Ideas, all that matters are the 'right' and 'strength' to truth.¹⁶⁹ A reflection on the grand style helps establish what is meant by this.

4.4.3 The Grand Style

The Origin of the Work of Art conceives of truth as the 'strife' between earth and world through the work of art.¹⁷⁰ Likewise, his *Introduction to Metaphysics* speaks of the 'violent taming of the violent'.¹⁷¹ Tension and conflict are thus central to Heidegger's notion of truth, but the 'grand style' brings these tensions into resolution. As Heidegger claims, will to power 'is properly there where power no longer needs the accouterments of battle, [...] its superiority binds all things, in that the will releases all things to their essence and their own bounds'.¹⁷² Will to power as the grand style is when 'abundance' and 'plentitude' are 'restrained' in the simplicity of a decisional stance toward the essence of something.¹⁷³ It is the 'superiority which compels everything strong to be teamed with its strongest antithesis under one yoke'.¹⁷⁴ Thus, the legislator does not just arbitrarily will things into being. If we understood the role of the legislator this way, then Heidegger's thought would be reduced to some kind of subjective-elitist-idealism. It would be pure 'projection'

¹⁶⁸NK, p. 169. *NI*, p. 138.

¹⁶⁹WWP, p. 32. *ET*, p. 25.

¹⁷⁰UK, p. 36. *OA*, p. 112.

¹⁷¹EM, p. 170. *IM*, p. 179.

¹⁷²NK, p. 168. *NI*, p. 137. 'Wille zur Macht ist eigentlich da, wo die Macht das Kämpferische in dem Sinne des bloß Reaktiven nicht mehr nötig hat und aus der Überlegenheit alles bindet, indem er alle Dinge zu ihrem Wesen und ihrer eigenen Grenze freigibt'.

¹⁷³NK, p. 165-168. *NI*, pp. 134-137.

¹⁷⁴NK, p. 164. *NI*, p. 135.

without the necessary reception and listening that Heidegger argues is necessary. Instead, the grand style occurs when the legislator binds together the oppositions that arise from out of our worlds into greater clarity and sharpness, restraining this abundance into simplicity through means of a ‘yoke’ that can sustain the ‘tension of a bow’.¹⁷⁵ Thus, although the emphasis on the will seems to eclipse the role of beauty, Heidegger’s interpretation of truth in the grand style provides some means by which to understand his emphasis on the ‘response’ to being.

Emad reminds us that Heidegger’s thinking becomes increasingly focused on the historicity of meaning post *Being and Time*, and by the 1936 *Contributions to Philosophy* he tells us that Heidegger has thoroughly historicized his thinking.¹⁷⁶ Except, if the truth of a being is entirely dependent on the contextual and historical environment that it emerges in, then is it not the case that there is no significant difference between one truth and the other? For each truth that emerges would simply be an expression of various arbitrary power relations. Heidegger is careful to guard his notion of truth from this sense. As he claims:

Those who posit the uppermost values, the creators, the new philosophers at the forefront, must according to Nietzsche be experimenters; they must tread paths and break trails in the knowledge that they do not have the truth. But from such knowledge it does not at all follow that they have to view their concepts as mere betting chips that can be exchanged at any time for any currency. What does follow is just the opposite: the solidity and binding quality of thought must undergo a grounding in the things themselves in a way that prior philosophy does not know. Only in this way is it possible for a basic position to assert itself over against others, so that the resultant strife will be actual strife and thus the actual origin of truth. The new thinkers must attempt and tempt. That means they must put beings themselves to the test, tempt them with questions concerning their Being and truth.¹⁷⁷

Heidegger is discussing this in the context of Nietzsche’s claim that there is no truth. If there is no truth, then truth itself is arbitrary and everything means anything. Truths would be ‘betting chips’, ‘exchanged at any time for any currency’. Hence, all claims

¹⁷⁵NK, pp. 136-137. *NI*, p. 137.

¹⁷⁶Parvis Emad, “‘Heidegger 1,’ ‘Heidegger II,’ and *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*”, in *From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, Desire: Essays in Honor of William J. Richardson, S.J.*, ed. by Babette E. Babiche, *Phaenomenologica*, vol. 133 (Dordrecht: Springer, 1995), pp. 129-146 (pp. 131-135).

¹⁷⁷NK, p. 32. *NI*, p. 28. ‘Jene, die die obersten Werte setzen, die Schaffenden, voran die neuen Philosophen, müssen nach Nietzsche Versuchende sein. Sie müssen Wege gehen und Bahnen aufbrechen mit dem Wissen, daß es nicht die Wahrheit ist. Aus solchem Wissen folgt aber keineswegs, daß sie ihre Begriffe nur für Spielmarken ansehen und beliebig gegen beliebige andere austauschen dürften. Es folgt das Gegenteil: Die Härte und Verbindlichkeit des Denkens muß eine Gründung in den Sachen selbst erfahren, wie sie die bisherige Philosophie nicht kannte. Denn nur so wird die Möglichkeit geschaffen, daß eine Grundstellung gegen die andere sich behauptet und der Streit ein wirklicher Streit und so der wirkliche Ursprung der Wahrheit wird. Die neuen Denker müssen Versuchende sein, d. h. sie müssen das Seiende selbst hinsichtlich seines Seins und seiner Wahrheit fragend auf die Probe stellen und in die Versuchung bringen’.

of truth would be irrelevant. For Heidegger, this is nihilism.¹⁷⁸ Heidegger argues that the artistic creators understand that the ‘basic position’ of ‘prior philosophy’ has been devalued. In this way, they recognise they are in a period of nihilism: ‘God is dead’. Knowing this, they advance by ‘attempting’ and ‘temptation’, developing a new form of thought that penetrates the ‘things themselves’ in a way heretofore unknown. Nietzsche may say that truth is error, but this does not mean that there is no such thing as truth. Instead, this tells us that the metaphysical framework in which the concept of truth has been understood is wanting.

As Heidegger claims in the *Contributions*, ‘*Decision and question*’, questioning as more originary; placing the essence of truth up for decision. But *truth* itself is already that which is *to be decided per se*.¹⁷⁹ Truth understood as a ‘correctness’ is not wrong, but derivative. Derivative of the essence of truth, an essence that is itself *singular*, ‘one’ and ‘same’ *but not universal*.¹⁸⁰ Heidegger calls truth unconcealment, but the essence of truth is the truth of essence. Truth means ‘the one essence and also the many which satisfy the essence’¹⁸¹ and that the ‘essentiality of essence, its inexhaustibility [...] [is] also its genuine selfhood and selfsameness’.¹⁸² The ambiguity rests on his notion of language. Many words name the same thing but they do not do so univocally.¹⁸³ The differences in the meanings of basic words—words such as truth, beauty, being, art, knowledge, history, freedom—vary through history.¹⁸⁴ Through naming in language we ‘confront’ beings as such and take a stance on them, and in doing so ground the ‘site’ of being.¹⁸⁵ It is thinking in the grand style that raises these variances of meanings into greater heights.

Thus, something becomes what it is through naming, *but this is not because things can be anything*. The meanings of these words vary but they oscillate around ‘principal orbits or routes’, a ‘common ground which we are vaguely aware of but which we do not clearly perceive’.¹⁸⁶ This insight applies most readily to Heidegger’s fundamental project. The meaning of being, the truth of being, *aletheia*, the

¹⁷⁸See, Heidegger’s discussion of ‘liberalism’ in, *HH*, p. 28

¹⁷⁹His emphasis. *BP*, p. 102. *CP*, p. 81.

¹⁸⁰*NK*, pp. 179-181. See also, *ibid.*, pp. 173-179.

¹⁸¹*NK*, p. 178. *NI*, p. 146. ‘Wahrheit nennt sowohl das eine Wesen als auch das Viele, dem Wesen Genügende’.

¹⁸²*NK*, p. 181. *NI*, p. 148. ‘Damit ist die Wesentlichkeit des Wesens, seine Unerschöpflichkeit bejaht und damit seine echte Selbstheit und Selbigkeit’.

¹⁸³*NK*, p. 175. *NI*, p. 144.

¹⁸⁴*NK*, pp. 174-175. *NI*, pp. 143-144.

¹⁸⁵*NK*, p. 175. *NI*, p. 143.

¹⁸⁶*NK*, p. 174. *NI*, pp. 143-144.

homeland, *Da-Sein*, *Ereignis*, and later even its own erasure: ~~being~~, these all emit of certain differences, differences to which scholarly work can help draw our attention, but they all attempt to name the same, enigmatic, withdrawing, groundless ground of meaning that gives itself to be named.¹⁸⁷

For Heidegger, we are inextricably ‘caught up’ in relation to these basic, fundamental, words.¹⁸⁸ Different worlds ‘reign’ throughout the history of language—Heidegger uses the term ‘nature’ as an example—and it is through language that we become rooted to the earth.¹⁸⁹ Language is the house of being, but this house must rest on solid foundation, even if this foundation is foundationless. Which is to say, there is nothing that guarantees this foundation; no stable, eternal presence to hold this foundation in place. Hence, Heidegger believes that the source of language is mystery.¹⁹⁰ One wonders if this is adequate. Is he not here refusing the question of *how* this house was built? This creates ambiguity, an ambiguity that turns him toward the significance of poetry and emboldens him to pick a particular poet in which to found a house of language for the German people, to hold their house in place, at least for a while. But because it is the (liberated) philosopher who ‘opens’ the foundation laid by the poets then is it not Heidegger that takes it upon himself to build this house of language? Sheehan highlights that for Heidegger being relies on the human being as a ‘thrown-open clearing’.¹⁹¹ Thus, the earth comes to language through the poetry of Hölderlin, but as interpreted by the philosopher and held in place by the people. Perhaps it is this anthropocentric focus, despite Heidegger’s best attempts to resist it, that prevents him from adequately encapsulating the gift of this givenness, subsuming beauty to will for example.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁷Sheehan explores in what way these are all variations of the same ‘matter for thought’ in Heidegger’s work. See his, *Making Sense of Heidegger*, esp. pp. 3-9. One wonders, however, if Sheehan makes a mistake when he names this ground the ‘thrown-open’ ‘project’ of *Dasein*, precisely because, as concealed, this (groundless) ground seems to refuse disclosure.

¹⁸⁸NK, pp. 174-175. *NI*, p. 143.

¹⁸⁹NK, p. 176. *NI*, pp. 144-145.

¹⁹⁰HH, p. 75. ‘Der ursprüngliche Ursprung der Sprache als des Wesensgrundes des menschlichen Daseins bleibt aber ein Geheimnis’. ‘The original origin of language as the essential ground of human *Dasein*, however, remains a mystery’. My translation.

¹⁹¹Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger*, p. xii and p. 11. This point is a central contention throughout this book. Against this, cf. Capobianco, *Heidegger’s Way of Being*, pp. 7- 27. Although Capobianco’s efforts to give voice to the primacy of ‘being itself’ recognises Heidegger wish to articulate, at times, that *Dasein* is not—entirely at least—the source of meaning, the reflection on will and beauty, above, evidences that the resources in Heidegger’s thinking have great difficulty in arguing for this.

¹⁹²On this See. Philip Tonner, ‘Are Animals Poor in World? A Critique of Heidegger’s Anthropocentrism’, in *Anthropocentrism: Humans, Animals, Environment*, ed. by Rob Boddice (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 203-221. As he points out (p. 204), ‘despite being critical of anthropocentrism Heidegger’s thought does not transcend it and his earlier statement of his position in *Being and Time* firmly places *Dasein* at the centre of the ontological universe’. In this thesis I showed

By considering the grand style as the ‘means’ of decision, or decision as the ‘essence’ of the grand style,¹⁹³ Heidegger clarifies for us the responsibility that he sees in the task of the philosophers to ‘open’ the truth of the poet. Heidegger equates the ‘grand’ with the ‘classical’ style. Nietzsche calls the classical style where ‘the *supreme feeling of power* is concentrated’.¹⁹⁴ Classical, however, is not understood here as a particular period in history but instead a ‘basic structure of Dasein’ where chaos and law advance under the same yoke.¹⁹⁵ The opposition of chaos and law evokes the distinction between Apollonian and Dionysian states, and so here Heidegger means the ‘mastery which enables the primal wilderness of chaos [proximity to the meaning of being, Dionysian] and the primordially of law [the Apollonian gift for lucid presentation and philosophical comprehension] to advance under the same yoke, invariably bound to one another with equal necessity’.¹⁹⁶ For Heidegger, Hölderlin’s poetry provides the force in which to realise these hidden artistic and ‘stylistic laws’ of the German nation, stylistic laws that tie the German people to the Greeks. Hence, Hölderlin’s poetry is for him the ‘yoke’ that will allow the German nation to realise itself in founding the homeland, through confrontation with the Greek philosophical inception. By use of the term ‘yoke’ it is hard not to hear echoes of Heidegger’s understanding of the good beyond being, for the sun ‘yokes’ together being and truth through the ‘positionedness’ of the legislator.

The will to power is the poetic ‘will to originality’ where through decision and confrontation our relationship to language and the sameness basic words point to is strengthened, which provides the possibility to free things to be what they are more fully and give ‘shape to Dasein itself’.¹⁹⁷ Which is to say, the will to power as the ‘grand style’ allows us to *become* in *being*, but it is a becoming that is rooted in our relationship with the earth. There is a reciprocity being evoked here that resists the collapse of *Dasein* into world for which Heidegger at the same times argue. *Dasein* is its world, but it’s a world that is grounded on something concrete that *Dasein* tries to articulate in language, to varying degrees of efficiency. The work of the legislator is to establish hierarchy by strengthening our relationship with the ground, the rootedness in the soil, in turn propelling a people’s becoming within being. They do

this to be the case in *Being and Time*, and after examining the developments in Heidegger’s thought that attempt to resist this, I have shown that Heidegger does not transcend this.

¹⁹³NK, p. 164. NI, p. 134.

¹⁹⁴His emphasis. As quoted by Heidegger in NK, p. 146. NI, p. 125.

¹⁹⁵NK, p. 150. NI, p. 128.

¹⁹⁶NK, p. 150. NI, p. 128.

¹⁹⁷NK, p. 176. NI, p. 145.

not then, simply establish things a new from the ground up, arbitrarily willing what they see fit into existence.

Heidegger's 'yoke' or 'measure' for thinking the essence of truth is the poet Hölderlin,¹⁹⁸ who names the earth both holy and homeland. What the preceding discussion tells us is that for Heidegger this is not to impose his own will on the German nation. Instead, it is the attempt to 'enhance' and 'heighten' the disclosure of meaning for the German people through a more encompassing and sufficient articulation of the nature of what is, understood as the 'one' reality that requires *Dasein* to articulate itself. There are echoes here of Heidegger's call to bring direction to the flow of the 'blood' through the enhanced 'spirit' and 'knowledge' of the people.¹⁹⁹ The rise of the National Socialist movement was an awakening of this call to the earth.²⁰⁰ After this call has been awakened, the task at hand is to re-orientate certain individuals to the disclosure of the things themselves as deposited in the language, poetry, and the philosophical treatises that have emerged throughout the Western tradition. Through this, they can overcome the limitations of this tradition and retrieve the truth of being as the concealed origins of intelligibility.

4.5 Clarification of the Essence of Truth

If we were to take Nietzsche at face value, the previous reflection would seem in contradiction to Nietzsche's thinking. Heidegger is aware of this.²⁰¹ In fact, Nietzsche seeks what lies beyond truth, for 'art is worth more than truth'.²⁰² This nonetheless tells us that there is an important relationship in Nietzsche's thinking between art and truth. To discover what is occurring here, Heidegger draws from the following statement by Nietzsche: '[v]ery early in my life I took the question of the relation of *art* to *truth* seriously: and even now I stand in holy dread in the face of this

¹⁹⁸In his *Introduction to Philosophy: Thinking and Poetizing*, Heidegger asks if we can 'freely fantasize an answer' to the question 'what is poetizing?'. To do so, he says, would be to 'fall victim to baseless arbitrariness'. *IP*, p. 55. As a result, a 'measure' is needed, from which the essence of poetizing can be ascertained. In the previous chapter, we saw that this measure was Hölderlin. However, I also showed in that discussion that the choice of this measure is an arbitrary choice on Heidegger's behalf, although he does not conceive of it this way due to his authority as a legislator.

¹⁹⁹*SW*, pp 263-264. *BaT*, p. 201.

²⁰⁰*SW*, p. 86 and p. 148. *BaT*, p. 70 and p. 116.

²⁰¹*NK*, p. 182. *NI*, p. 149. 'Nietzsche says "truth" is error'.

²⁰²*NK*, p. 171. *NI*, p. 140.

discordance'.²⁰³ If the relation of art to truth arouses discord, there must be a conception of truth occurring in Nietzsche that is not simply a rejection that truth exists. Otherwise, there would be no discord between art and truth. Further, if truth does not exist then this would be the epitome of nihilistic discourse. Given that Heidegger has interpreted Nietzsche's will to power to be the *truth* of beings, we can see that Heidegger sees a positive notion of truth operative in Nietzsche's thought. As we will see, when Nietzsche rejects 'truth' he does not reject that truth exists, but he rejects a particular interpretation of truth.

Heidegger believes that a reconciliation of the tension between contradictions and distinctions is the movement of truth as will to power in the grand style, which leads us into higher degrees of existential disclosures of truth. Compelled by the discord between art and truth in Nietzsche's thought, Heidegger thinks that by pursuing the experience that leads to this 'we will be able to see Nietzsche's basic metaphysical position [a position which points beyond the philosophical tradition] in its own light'.²⁰⁴ Hence, it is by reflecting on this tension that we will find the potential for art to be a revolutionary force against nihilism.²⁰⁵ We have already seen hints of where this discussion will go, with Nietzsche's emphasis on the sensuous over the supersensuous. As a so-called 'reversal' of Platonism, Heidegger once again confronts Plato, but this time in the context of Nietzsche's attempts to overturn it.

4.5.1 A Return to Platonism in Context of the Confrontation with Nietzsche: Establishing Distance Between Art and Truth

Heidegger's critique of Plato remains largely consistent with his earlier critique in the 1931/32 lecture course. Plato is still seen as responsible for the consummation of the metaphysics of presence, and therefore the forgetfulness of being. In this sense, his work is largely the source of nihilism in the West. Gonzalez argues that Heidegger's interpretation of Plato becomes increasingly less accurate as a result of his interpretation of Nietzsche.²⁰⁶ It is possible that this is a result of Heidegger's

²⁰³His emphasis. As quoted by Heidegger in *NK*, p. 173. *NI*, p. 142. 'Über das Verhältnis der Kunst zur Wahrheit bin ich am frühesten ernst geworden; und noch jetzt stehe ich mit einem heiligen Entsetzen vor diesem Zwiespalt'.

²⁰⁴*NK*, p. 200. *NI*, p. 163.

²⁰⁵*NK*, p. 172. *NI*, pp. 140-141.

²⁰⁶Gonzalez, *Plato and Heidegger*, p. 138. Gonzalez points out that often times Heidegger will attribute positions to Plato (whether unthought or not) that diverge with what Plato *explicitly* says in the text. For example, On Heidegger's claim that Plato prepares us for the distinction between the

attempts to bring a greater coherence to his understanding of the history of being? For him, Plato and Nietzsche are the beginning and end of this tradition respectively, and so Heidegger has to make Nietzsche's self-proclaimed inverted Platonism cohere with Heidegger's own interpretation of Plato in context of his wider narrative of the history of being. Perhaps aware of the straw man this results in, he encourages us to separate Plato from Platonism.²⁰⁷

If there is a discord between truth and art in Nietzsche's inverted Platonism, then Heidegger reckons there must be evidence of this conflict in Platonism also, albeit of a different kind.²⁰⁸ In an attempt to discover it, he once again returns to the question of the essence of truth for Plato. Heidegger reminds us that for Plato the Idea is the 'what-being', i.e., what a being 'is', a supersensuous truth grasped by the 'eye' of the soul.²⁰⁹ This reading is the same as the 1931/32 understanding of the Ideas. However, Heidegger now wants to focus on Idea as '*eidōs*'. He is unclear if there is a distinction to be made between Idea and *eidōs*, at times suggesting there is, and at other times equating them.²¹⁰ The *eidōs* is the 'outward appearance of something' (*Aussehen von etwas*).²¹¹ If there is a distinction to be made here, it is a superficial one, for the things appears (*eidōs*) as what it is in the light of the truth of the Idea. We might say that the *eidōs* fulfills the Idea in the particular things. They are one and the

subject-object relationship, Gonzalez points out that this relies on Heidegger's account that for Plato the soul and being have to be 'yoked' together. However, Gonzalez argues that if we take the analogy seriously, truth is not 'yoked' but is itself 'the yoke: this means that it is what grounds and makes possibly any relation/distinction between knowing subject and known object, rather than being the product of such a distinction; speaking more strictly, it is what grounds the relation between knower and known in such a way that the dichotomy expressed by our term *subject* and *object* is never allowed to arise'. *Ibid.*, p. 136, and pp. 140-156. See also, William A. Galston, 'Heidegger's Plato: A Critique of Plato's Doctrine of Truth,' *Philosophical Forum*, 13, 4 (1982), 371-383.

²⁰⁷*NK*, p. 184. *NI*, p. 151. 'Wir sagen Platonismus und nicht Platon, weil wir die betreffende Erkenntnisauffassung hier nicht ursprünglich und ausführlich durch Platons Werk belegen, sondern nur einen von hier bestimmten Zug im Groben herausheben'. 'We say "Platonism", and not Plato, because here we are dealing with the conception of knowledge that corresponds to that term, not by way of an original and detailed examination of Plato's works, but only by setting in rough relief one particular aspect of his work'. In his *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger defines Platonism as having 'placed beings as a whole (and in the way they have been considered and been formed during the course of Western history) into a definite condition and has turned definite directions of representation into self-evident ways of "questioning"'. *BP*, p. 219. *CP*, p. 171. Platonism is thus understood as the way in which Plato's texts have come to largely operate and be understood within the Western canon and the course of the history of the West, as opposed the ambiguities and diverging interpretations available within the texts themselves. Nietzsche is also said to have understood this. However, he nonetheless feels compelled to point out that Nietzsche also preserves the difference between Plato and Platonism. See, *NK*, p. 255. *NI*, p. 205. 'Nietzsche [...] consciously sets Plato apart from all Platonism, protecting him from it.

²⁰⁸*NK*, pp. 199-200. *NI*, pp. 162-163.

²⁰⁹*NK*, pp. 184-185. *NI*, pp. 151-152.

²¹⁰See, for example, *NK*, pp. 93-94. Here they seem to be considered one and the same. Cf., *NK*, p. 211, *NI*, p. 172, where he argues that the Idea must be 'brought together with the unity of the *eidōs*'.

²¹¹*NK*, p. 211, *NI*, p. 172

same, where the supersensuous Idea appears through the appearing *eidos*. The change of emphasis to the outward appearing *eidos* over the supersensuous Idea allows Heidegger to stress the material quality of the thing. The Idea is the what-being and Being of beings.²¹² The *eidos* is the ‘outward appearance’ of the Idea in the material thing. Because the *eidos* allows the Idea to become present, and the Idea is the Being of beings, then Heidegger argues that for Plato being is understood as presence.²¹³ The Idea gathers the many things to itself, allowing them to become present as one thing, e.g., the table appearing present before me. This *eidos* is ‘pro-duced’ in the thing by the craftsperson, who has their sight set toward the Idea.²¹⁴

By focusing on the Ideas as present before the craftsperson, Heidegger argues that Plato evades the question of how things come into presence. Thus, Plato must appeal to a ‘creator’ in order to make sense of how the Ideas are singular and available for re-production in the many things.²¹⁵ We can see how Heidegger attempts to avoid this problem by turning the Ideas into a historical, worldly, category, emerging from my implicit understanding of the meaning of being. In tandem with the developments that have occurred since *Being and Time*, Heidegger would want to think this worldliness as earthliness, in accordance with the Greek *physis*.²¹⁶ Plato retains an aspect of this by thinking of the god as ‘*phytourgos*’: planter, gardener.²¹⁷ Nonetheless, this evasion through a creator means that Platonism is unable to sufficiently account for the coming-to-presence of things.²¹⁸

This is a charge he returns to in the *Contributions to Philosophy*. Because Idea is thought of as the ‘unifying one’ for the collective ‘many’, then being is thought of as a being.²¹⁹ Heidegger is more critical in the *Contributions* than he was in 1931/32. Here, although Idea is still meant for a look, for him it has little sense of being bound up with the look as he argued for in the 1931/32 lecture series. He reminds us that the

²¹²NK, p. 184. *NI*, p. 151.

²¹³NK, p. 211. *NI*, p. 172. Here, I capitilise Being to highlight the Platonic sense of the Being of beings as the permanent and stable structure of intelligibility.

²¹⁴NK, pp. 214-216. *NI*, pp. 175-176.

²¹⁵NK, pp. 225-227. *NI*, pp. 182-184.

²¹⁶As such, for him the tool is no longer simply conceived in terms of its ‘serviceability’ to the Idea as in *Being and Time* but its ‘reliability’ (*Verlässlichkeit*) as in *The Origin of the Work of Art*. *UK*, pp. 17-22. As Mitchell puts it, this change of emphasis is to account for ‘the tools ability to negotiate a space that is beyond the control of Dasein’, namely earth. Mitchell, *Heidegger Among the Sculptors*, p. 9.

²¹⁷NK, p. 227. *NI*, p. 184. Heidegger makes passing mention of this, but does not explicitly connect his own analysis of *physis* and earth with Plato’s *phytourgos*.

²¹⁸NK, pp. 226-227. *NI*, p. 184.

²¹⁹*BP*, pp. 208-209. *CP*, pp. 163-164.

Ideas are ‘what offers up a *view* and does so *for* a gaze’.²²⁰ He still wants to differentiate the Idea from being understood as the objective view for a subject, but he believes that the Ideas suggest a permanence and separation from the viewer that he felt was more ambiguous five years previous.²²¹ This is because as the highest beings they can only exist in a community ‘amongst themselves’.²²² So, because Ideas are thought purely on the level of beings and have no sense of the reciprocal relationship they have with those that catch sight of them, they encapsulate for Heidegger the beginning of the forgottenness of beings abandonment. They are simply the principle of unification, and therefore anything that is individual and changeable is non-being. Being thus becomes the ‘most general’.²²³

Likewise, rather than the good beyond being representing *Dasein*’s worldly transcendence, or earthly immanence, the good beyond being by the time of the *Contributions* is understood as the penultimate step in the establishment of the forgottenness of being. This is because, given that the Ideas exist in a community amongst themselves they are now understood to lack any sense of the meaning of being. By asking only about beings, the highest Idea, the good, ‘can never detach itself from beings and strike up against being itself’.²²⁴ The good beyond being still suggests a fundamental relationship with the human being, but for him this is only as what is ‘useful’ to the human being.²²⁵ As a result, the good beyond being as grasped by the legislator does not make possible being and truth, as per his interpretation between 1931-1935.²²⁶ Instead, it is simply the use value of things in the world. Instead of making possible the disclosure of truth—the task of Heidegger’s legislator—he believes that Plato’s Idea of the good is concerned purely with what provides utility to the human being. This reaches its fulfillment in Aristotle’s ‘*eudaimonia*’, which is concerned with human flourishing but with the character of the ‘divine’ and ‘god’. ‘[O]ntology, is thus necessarily *theo-logy*’.²²⁷ For Heidegger, this means that there is a complete reduction of what exceeds the human being to its use *for* the human being. Ironically, we have already seen Heidegger’s thinking suffer

²²⁰His emphasis. *BP*, p. 208. *CP*, p. 163. ‘[...] was die *Aussicht* bietet *für* ein Hinsehen’

²²¹Heidegger at this time argues that by the time of Aristotle’s thinking, the subject-object relationship has become established in Greek thought. *BP*, p. 210.

²²²*BP*, p. 209. *CP*, p. 164.

²²³*BP*, p. 209. *CP*, pp. 163-164.

²²⁴*BP*, p. 210. *CP*, p. 164.

²²⁵*BP*, p. 210. *CP*, p. 164. Gonzalez points out that Heidegger is here reading Nietzsche’s value thinking into Plato’s thought. Gonzalez, *Plato and Heidegger*, p. 147.

²²⁶*WWP*, pp. 99-100. *ET*, p. 72. See also, *SW*, p. 200. *BaT*, p. 153.

²²⁷His emphasis. *BP*, p. 211. *CP*, p. 165.

from precisely this problem except, for him, this reduction in the Greeks misunderstands the reciprocity between being and *Dasein*. Hence, the reduction of the good to utility, in context of the establishing of the divide between subject and object, means that the ‘good’, or ‘being’, becomes understood as an object, albeit the ‘highest’ one. Either way, Heidegger claims that Plato has to appeal to a creator to make sense of the constitution of the Being of beings as Ideas. Heidegger’s interpretation in the *Contributions* thereby crystallises Platonism as the beginning of nihilism and follows Nietzsche in the charge that Christianity is Platonism for the people.²²⁸

With this established, Heidegger argues that for Plato there are different methods by which the Idea can be reproduced. For him, the Greek word ‘*tropos*’ is inaccurately translated as ‘manner’ or ‘way’. Instead, it means ‘how one is turned, in what direction he turns, in what he maintains himself, to what he applies himself, where he turns to and remains tied, and with what intention he does so’.²²⁹ The god is the first producer, producing the Ideas.²³⁰ Moved by unity and singularity, his *tropos* is one of creation of singular essences.²³¹ The craftsperson has a different *tropos*: once removed from the gods, the craftsperson should be properly thought of as the demiurge, who ‘fetches [this] [...] outward appearance of something [as designated by the god] into sensuous visibility’.²³² The demiurge therefore brings the Idea into its fruition in the *eidōs*. This is a job of high responsibility. They are responsible for producing the Idea as set down by the creator within the outward appearance of the manifold things. There is therefore one craftsperson (or demiurge) per Idea, i.e., the table maker produces tables, the shoemaker shoes, ‘[e]ach is proficient to the extent that he limits himself purely to his own field. Else he botches the job’.²³³ The

²²⁸*BP*, p. 211 and p. 218.

²²⁹*NK*, pp. 216-217. *NI*, p. 177. ‘[...] wie einer gewendet ist, wohin er sich wendet, worin er sich aufhält, wofür er sich verwendet, woran er gewendet und gebunden bleibt, worauf er es absieht’. See also, *EM*, p. 113. *IM*, p. 115. In this passage, Heidegger discusses different ways of viewing of sun, that although we now know the contrary, it ‘seems’ to set and rise. ‘This seeming is not nothing. Neither is it untrue. [...] This seeming is historical and it is history, uncovered and grounded in poetry and saga, and thus an essential domain of our world’. Our *tropos*, then, is one that differs to the ‘actual’ way in we orbit the sun.

²³⁰*NK*, p. 224. *NI*, p. 182.

²³¹*NK*, pp. 225-227. *NI*, pp. 182-184. Above, I explored Heidegger’s understanding of essences, and we can see how (his interpretation of) Plato’s account here would be inadequate, for Heidegger at least. For him, essences are historical categories that oscillate around principle ‘orbits’. They thus become singular only through history, but they are also unstable, changing throughout history.

²³²*NK*, pp. 215-216. *NI*, p. 176.

²³³*NK*, p. 216. *NI*, p. 176. ‘Der Tischler blickt auf die Idee des Tisches, der Schuster auf die des Schuhs, und jeder ist um so tüchtiger, je eigentlicher und echter er sich beschränkt; anders ist er ein Pfücher’.

craftsperson picks material that is suited to the Idea they must re-produce in the outward appearance of the thing,²³⁴ and gains careful knowledge and due diligence in executing their task.²³⁵

However, according to Heidegger, Plato argues that there is one demiurge with more power than the craftsperson and he yields this power without the responsibility demanded of the craftsperson. This is the artist. The *tropos* of the artist is one that can produce ‘anything and everything’, and without delay.²³⁶ Like pointing a mirror in all directions, the painter produces the Idea of whatever they paint, and does so three times removed from the gods. Which is to say, first there is the Idea, produced by the God. This Idea is then re-produced by the craftsperson, who through careful diligence allows the Idea to be produced as faithfully as possible in the outward appearance of what they produce. The artist also produces the *eidōs*, but not one particular *eidōs* they are tasked with the responsibility of producing. Instead, they produce as many *eidōi* as they see fit in any moment to produce. Plato says of the artist, ‘you will quickly produce the sun and what it is in the heavens; quickly too the earth; and quickly also you yourself and all other living creatures and implements and plants and everything else’.²³⁷ This is how to properly understand ‘*mimesis*’, which Heidegger says is inadequately understood as ‘copying’ in the sense of a painter copying a landscape. Instead, by thinking *mimesis* in relation to the Greek sense of ‘production’ as a bringing forth the Idea, the painter does not ‘copy’ the *eidōs* as brought forth by the craftsperson, but *produces* it, whether it be table, or sun, or whatever they paint. They do so, however, in a manner that is three steps removed from the truth of the thing, the Idea.²³⁸ It is therefore still an *eidōs*, but a shadowy kind, an ‘*eidolon*’, a ‘residue of the genuine self-showing of beings’.²³⁹ Notice, then, that art functions in the exact opposite way that Heidegger claims it should. For him, art makes beings ‘more’ beingful. For Plato, as he interprets him at least, art reduces beings to shadows.

Heidegger argues that this understanding of Idea and *eidōs* presupposes the Greek understanding of truth as *aletheia*, here described as ‘unchangedness,

²³⁴NK, p. 220. NI, p. 178. ‘[...] der [tropos] ist verschieden. Das eine Mal ist das “Haus” anwesend im Sich-zeigen, erscheinend auf der und durch die Metallfläche des Spiegels; das andere Mal ist das “Haus” anwesend, in Stein und Holz sich zeigend’.

²³⁵NK, p. 216. NI, p. 177.

²³⁶NK, p. 216. NI, p. 177.

²³⁷As quoted by Heidegger in NK, p. 216. NI, p. 177.

²³⁸NK, pp. 228-230. NI, pp. 185-186.

²³⁹NK, p. 229. NI, p. 186.

openness' (*Unverstelltheit, Offenheit*).²⁴⁰ By claiming that the Greeks understood *aletheia* as unchangedness, Heidegger is questioning his earlier analysis of *aletheia* as un-concealment, distancing himself from his view that concealment remained implicit in Plato's account of truth.²⁴¹ The German verb 'verstellen' means change or distortion, and by turning this into a privative noun alongside the suffix '-heit', Heidegger emphasises the Greek understanding of being as presence where truth is that which does not change. If being is understood as presence, as he claims, then they could not have an adequate grasp of concealment, as this is the hidden basis in which what is present comes-to-presence. However, by highlighting the sense of 'openness'—and Heidegger also adds the clarification, 'namely for the self-showing itself' (*nämlich für das Sich-zeigende selbst*)—he recognises how instrumental the Greek understanding of being is for his own attempt to think past the transcendental gap between *Dasein* and world established in his thinking in *Being and Time*. For as we have seen, there is great difficulty in encapsulating the significance of the 'self-showing' when the conditions of possibility within the perceiver are the only means through which the self-showing comes to appear. Regardless, to forget that being *is* within the understanding is to forget being. There may be important resources in Greek thought, but it is through Plato that this forgetfulness takes its course. Hence, Heidegger sought to return to Greek thought but only to overcome it.

Heidegger has not yet discovered the discord between art and truth in Plato's thought. There is distance, as the truth of beings—the Idea—is three steps above the artists re-production of this Idea in the *eidolon*.²⁴² This may be so, but discordance is only between things that relate to each other of equal rank.²⁴³ However, Heidegger's analysis has already been covertly pushing us in this direction, as his understanding of the demiurge as producing the Idea as *eidōs* relies on his understanding of 'production' as 'poiein'.²⁴⁴ Heidegger claims *poiein* is how the Greeks understood production. *Poiein* means 'what is brought forward in a process of bringing-forth', which is one way we understand art today.²⁴⁵ True, his *Origin of the Work of Art*

²⁴⁰Trans. mod. *NK*, p. 225. *NI*, p. 182.

²⁴¹Gonzalez also points this out, showing how Heidegger's account of Plato's understanding of *aletheia* in the *Contributions* loses entirely its a-privative character. Gonzalez, *Plato and Heidegger*, p. 139. Heidegger confirms this in *BP*, pp. 331-332.

²⁴²*NK*, p. 229. *NI*, p. 186.

²⁴³*NK*, pp. 232-234. *NI*, pp. 189-190.

²⁴⁴*NK*, pp. 217-218. *NI*, pp. 177-178.

²⁴⁵*NK*, p. 203. *NI*, p. 165.

attempts to distinguish between different kinds of bringing-forth.²⁴⁶ ‘*Technē*’, for example, is another kind of bringing forth. One where there is action emitting of a ‘masterful know-how’.²⁴⁷ This is perhaps better understood as the work of the craftsperson. In another passage, however, Heidegger says *technē* is an art.²⁴⁸ Coupled with *technē*, Heidegger calls ‘*melete*’, understood as the ‘ability in the sense of an acquired capacity to carry something out’,²⁴⁹ the ‘basic posture of the forward reaching-reaching disclosure of Dasein, which seeks to ground being on its own terms’.²⁵⁰ Heidegger takes *melete* to mean his ‘concern’ (*Sorge*),²⁵¹ and it is not a stretch to see that coupled with *technē* this would mean resolute concern or authenticity. As an act that discloses and grounds beings, this is truth understood as *aletheia* in Heidegger’s sense, which occurs through the legislator artist. For him, *melete*, *technē*, and *poeien* are all forms of art as the Ancient Greek’s understood it.²⁵² Likewise, *The Origin* considers the work of art as a bringing-forth, albeit one that brings forth a being ‘that never was before and will never come to be again’.²⁵³ This is the proper understanding of *poeien* and *poesis*, which for Heidegger comes with the particular significance of staying ‘true to the earth’ (evoking Zarathustra, as Farrell-Krell points out, but as we have seen Heidegger’s own understanding of earth to accompany in the background).²⁵⁴ We can see how Heidegger is playing both Nietzsche’s and Plato’s thought off of each other, for Plato maintains this sense of ‘bringing-forth’ and ‘self-showing’, and Nietzsche emphasises the overman and the earth. Either way, Greek thought, like Nietzsche, understood that art is the basic occurrence of beings, and particularly the human being, and Heidegger would add that the true work of art must articulate the significance of concealment, as in Hölderlin’s disclosure of earth as holy and homeland. Art and truth are understood to be entangled at the beginning of metaphysics through the Greeks, and at its end with the Germans.

By considering art as a kind of *mimesis* in the *Republic*, Plato establishes a

²⁴⁶UK, pp. 44-48.

²⁴⁷NK, p. 202. *NI*, p. 164. ‘[...] *des sich auskennenden und somit beherrschenden Wissens.*’

²⁴⁸NK, p. 236. *NI*, p. 191.

²⁴⁹NK, p. 202. *NI*, p. 164

²⁵⁰NK, p. 202. *NI*, p. 165. ‘[...] bezeichnet [...] die Grundstellung des vorgreifenden Aufbruchs des Daseins zur Gründung des Seienden aus diesem selbst.’

²⁵¹NK, p. 202.

²⁵²NK, pp. 202-203. *NI*, pp. 164-165.

²⁵³UK, p. 50. *OA*, p. 120. ‘Die Einrichtung der Wahrheit ins Werk ist das Hervorbringen eines solchen Seienden, das vordem noch nicht war und nachmals nie mehr werden wird’.

²⁵⁴See Farrell-Krell’s analysis in, *NI*, p. 250. See also, *ibid.*, pp. 144-145.

distance between art and truth. But Heidegger's analysis tries to show us how he implicitly retains this Ancient Greek understanding of *aletheia* and (or, as) art. As Heidegger reminds us, Plato was well aware of an 'ancient quarrel' between philosophy and poetry.²⁵⁵ When we understand this implicit retention of the fundamental relationship that Heidegger sees in Ancient Greek thought between art and truth, we recognise why Heidegger sees discordance emerge in Plato's thought, and how Plato's decision on the essence of truth (as Idea) hinges on this tension.

To argue for this, Heidegger returns to the question of beauty, and specifically Plato's discussion of it in the *Phaedrus*. Heidegger reaffirms his discussion of the soul in his analysis of Plato's *Theaetetus*, where the soul is said to have already glimpsed being.²⁵⁶ For Heidegger, this is because we always-already have some sense of the meaning of being. However, just as he begins to deny the a-privative character of *aletheia* in Greek philosophy, he does the same with Plato's use of *doxa*, now describing it as a 'fleeting appearance'.²⁵⁷ His earlier analysis of *doxa* as untruth nonetheless lingers in the background. This is because *doxa* is understood as that which remains with us because although we have glimpsed being, we lapse into *lêthē*, a 'metaphysical' forgetfulness: *Seinsvergessenheit*.²⁵⁸ Hence, being fleetingly appears through the things in our everyday environment but remains unnoticed—and thus forgotten—in this experience. Perhaps Heidegger no longer discovers the concealment that he wishes to find in *doxa*, as per his analysis in 1931/32, but the concept of *doxa* in Plato implicitly acknowledges the forgottenness that, for Heidegger at least, results from the concealment of being.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁵NK, p. 234. NI, p. 190.

²⁵⁶NK, p. 245. NI, p. 192.

²⁵⁷NK, p. 245. NI, p. 193.

²⁵⁸NK, p. 239. NI, p. 194.

²⁵⁹Accuracy is important here. In the 1931/32 lectures on the *Theaetetus*, Heidegger argues that Plato comes to understand *doxa* as mere appearance, and so Plato misses the opportunity for a proper understanding of concealment and untruth. For Heidegger, concealment and being's oblivion are necessarily intertwined however, for being is forgotten precisely because it conceals itself. Nihilism is therefore a necessity until such a time as the question of the meaning of being becomes raised, and alongside it the significance of understanding *aletheia*, i.e., the process of unconcealment and the intrinsic place of the human being in truths disclosure, is understood, drawing our attention back to this concealed that is forgotten. It is likely that he does not pursue this earlier analysis of *doxa*, however, because his goal at this point is not to utilise Plato's discussion to present an analysis of untruth, but instead to present Plato as having an inadequate grasp of the relation between truth and beauty. In the process, he successfully places Plato (within his own framework, at least) at the forefront of the development of nihilism in the West, for alongside an inadequate account of the coming-to-presence of things the separation of being from beings is established in his thought. In fact, Heidegger's own thought retained this gap, with his establishment of the ontological difference in *Being and Time*, as he claims in *BP*, p. 250. At the end of this lecture series, Heidegger will then develop how we might adequately conceive of this relationship between beauty and truth, leading the way for an adequate grasp of the sensuous, in the process 'leaping' over the ontological difference so being and beings can

Because Heidegger takes Plato to acknowledge that man stands in the forgottenness of being, he claims that Plato must also account for how we move from this forgetfulness to a remembering. For Heidegger, this would be something like seeing ourselves as the concealed source of meaningful intelligibility, although now with the specific emphasis on the earth. In Plato's language, this is to provide an account of how it is that the Ideas are glimpsed from their inadequate presentation in the *doxa* to their proper glimpsing through the *eidos*. Here is where Heidegger sees the trouble begin. Because the Ideas (as *eidoi*) are the outward appearance of things in beings, the movement from beings to the Ideas has to come from the appearing things, i.e., the 'mere' appearing *doxa*. For Plato, this is non-being, so how does one go from non-being to being? Plato claims that this gap is traversed through 'eros', the 'erotic' power elicited by being.²⁶⁰ This still means, however, that being must come to present itself in beings, beings that Plato is understood to have already discarded as a fleeting 'mere appearance', the *doxa*. Therefore, it is beauty that accommodates the retrieval of being in beings.²⁶¹ Although Heidegger had to draw from Kant to do so, his discussion of beauty in the context of Nietzsche's rapture was implicitly setting us up for his analysis of beauty in Plato. He tells us that for Plato, the beautiful preserves being in beings, and by eliciting *eros* man is brought from beings to being. However, this nonetheless implies that truth happens at the 'site' of what Plato considers to be non-being, i.e., the mere appearances.²⁶²

Within this tension lies the discord between art and truth. Plato acknowledges that beauty and truth belong together. But Heidegger points out that beauty is invariably chained to appearances. Plato's understanding of truth as supersensuous is therefore in trouble. Platonic metaphysics—the way Heidegger presents it at least—is stuck in a tension between discarding the appearing phenomena as devoid of being, and a truth of being that depends on these very appearances for its disclosure (through *eros* and beauty).²⁶³ Plato effaces this discord by arguing that sensuous beauty has

be grasped in their essential 'unity'. Ibid. He therefore does not need to explicitly critique at this time the misunderstanding he sees in Plato's exploration of *doxa*.

²⁶⁰NK, p. 240. *NI*, p. 194.

²⁶¹NK, p. 240. *NI*, p. 195.

²⁶²NK, p. 247. *NI*, p. 198.

²⁶³However, it should be noted that this analysis and tension relies on us accepting Heidegger's claim that *doxa* is equivalent to non-being. Heidegger creates this emphasis by interpreting Plato in relation to Nietzsche's division between a true and appearing world. However, in his lecture on Plato in 1931/32, Heidegger points out that although the 'nothing' comes into view in Plato's analysis of *doxa*, *doxa* is not non-being, but ambiguous being, where the *doxa* is (for example) either Socrates or Theaetetus. It seems that the regulation of *doxa* to non-being in the *Nietzsche* lecture series is far too severe. However, because in this thesis I am only interested in Heidegger's interpretations, and not a

‘sheltered its essence in the truth of Being as supersensuous’.²⁶⁴ In Heidegger’s estimation, this simply evades the question of the fundamental role appearances play in the disclosure of truth. This evasion means that Plato creates a distance between art and truth, and by doing so attempts to smooth the edges of the tension. But, if beauty belongs to the appearing things, how can it reconcile the sensuous with the supersensuous? By what means can we conceive this relationship? When Nietzsche inverts Platonism he, in the words of Farrell-Krell, ‘exposes this maneuver and lets the discord reign’.²⁶⁵

4.5.2 Nietzsche’s Inversion of Platonism: A Path Cleared Toward Retrieving the Identity of Art and Truth

Heidegger’s interpretation of *eros* mirrors his presentation of Nietzsche’s rapture, albeit in an inverted way. *Eros* is the erotic power of being, manifested in the beautiful, bringing one from non-being and sensuous appearance to supersensuous truthful being.²⁶⁶ Rapture, on the other hand, discloses the beautiful belonging to appearances, providing the artist with power to legislate truth into this sensuous appearance and impose the form (and content) into beings. Either way, Heidegger understands *eros* and rapture as fundamental attunements that through beauty bring one to truth, and although the interpretations of truth oppose each other, both attunements stem from an encounter with appearing things. Both are in trouble, however. Platonic metaphysics is understood to rely on a supersensuous truth, failing to account for the significance of appearances for the disclosure of truth. But by simply rejecting the category of truth, Nietzsche’s inverted form of Platonism also evades this problem, forever risking a collapse into positivism. By drawing on a section from Nietzsche’s *Twilight of the Idols*, ‘How the “True World” Finally Became a Fable: the History of an Error’, Heidegger argues that the problem in both Platonism and its inverted form in Nietzsche come from the distinction between a true and an appearing world. What is needed, he suggests, is a ‘new interpretation of the sensuous on the basis of a new hierarchy of the sensuous and nonsensuous. [...] A

discussion of this interpretation in light of the texts themselves, then an adequate discussion of this is beyond the scope of this project.

²⁶⁴NK, p. 248. NI, p. 198. ‘[...] das Schöne, als das Scheinende, Sinnliche im voraus doch schon sein Wesen gesichert hat in der Wahrheit des Seins als des Übersinnlichen’.

²⁶⁵Farrell-Krell, ‘Art and Truth in Raging Discord’, p. 383.

²⁶⁶NK, p. 205. NI, p. 167.

new hierarchy and new valuation mean that the ordering *structure* must be changed'.²⁶⁷

Nietzsche hints at what this entails. In the story of the true world as fable, Nietzsche portrays six divisions through Western history beginning with Platonism, where the 'true world' is understood as attainable for certain individuals—Nietzsche says, '[c]ircumlocution for the sentence 'I, Plato, *am* the truth'²⁶⁸—through careful, diligent, philosophical reflection. This creates a split in the world, between the true world of the Ideas, available to the philosopher, and the appearing one of *doxa*, opinion, preserved by the many. Nietzsche then follows the progression of this split, through the Christian claim to truth through the priestly caste, to Kant and the irreducible gap he assumes between the true and appearing world.²⁶⁹ Now that the true world is both posited but necessarily unattainable, the next logical step in the history of this 'error' is to 'abolish' it.²⁷⁰ This gets rid of the supersensuous 'true' world, but if Nietzsche's thinking points beyond positivism, then it is not sufficient to claim that there is just an appearing, sensuous world left.²⁷¹ Heidegger concedes that Nietzsche acknowledges this when he states: '[t]he true world we abolished: which world was left? The apparent one perhaps? ... But no! *along with the true world we have also abolished the apparent one!*'²⁷² Such a claim is representative of the 'final stage' of Nietzsche's philosophy.²⁷³

Because Nietzsche is understood to have remained tied to the traditional interpretation of truth, he was unable to think of a satisfactory account of truth that this abolition demands. This would be a positive notion of truth *as* appearance and

²⁶⁷His emphasis. *NK*, p. 260. *NI*, p. 209.

²⁶⁸*NK*, pp. 253-254. *NI*, pp. 203-204. Nietzsche claims: '[d]ie wahre Welt, erreichbar für den Weisen, den Frommen, den Tugendhaften, — er lebt in ihr, er ist sie. (Älteste Form der Idee, relativ klug, simpel, überzeugend. Umschreibung des Satzes: "ich, Plato, bin die Wahrheit")'. 'The true world, available for the wise, the pious, the virtuous, — it lives in her, it is her. (Oldest form of the idea, relatively clever, simple, convincing. Paraphrasing of the sentence: "I, Plato, am the truth")'. Trans. mod.

²⁶⁹*NK*, pp. 254-256. *NI*, pp. 204-205.

²⁷⁰As quoted by Heidegger in *NK*, p. 257. *NI*, p. 207. Nietzsche claims: '[d]ie "wahre Welt" — eine Idee, die zu Nichts mehr nütz ist, nicht einmal mehr verpflichtend, eine unnütz, eine überflüssig gewordene Idee, folglich eine widerlegte Idee: schaffen wir sie ab!' 'The "true world" — an idea, one no longer useful, no longer obligatory, without use, a superfluous idea, and consequently a refuted idea: let's get rid of it!' Trans. mod.

²⁷¹*NK*, pp. 184-199. *NI*, pp. 151-161.

²⁷²His emphasis. As quoted by Heidegger in *NK*, p. 258. *NI*, p. 207. 'Die wahre Welt haben wir abgeschabt: welche Welt blieb übrig? die scheinbare vielleicht? ... Aber nein! *mit der wahren Welt haben wir auch die scheinbare abgeschafft!*'

²⁷³*NK*, p. 258. *NI*, p. 208.

semblance (*Schein*).²⁷⁴ In *Being and Time*, semblance was seen to be fundamentally related to truth as the disclosure of things to *Dasein*, but it is derivative of a more fundamental openness. Now, semblance is precisely where the essence of truth is to be sought. With the confrontation coming to its fruition by establishing the ‘fundamental experience’ of Nietzsche’s thought, Heidegger returns to the question of the nature of ‘reality’, where what is real, ‘is to be defined afresh’.²⁷⁵

4.6 Truth as Art and Art as Truth: A New Interpretation of the Sensuous and the Significance of the ‘Turn’ (*Kehre*)

Despite Nietzsche’s failure to adequately articulate an understanding of truth as an appearing phenomenon, he provides helpful resources that illuminate the path toward a deepened conception. The starting point is that reality, i.e., the experience of the truthfulness of things, ‘is’ appearances. The German word ‘*Schein*’ means ‘appearance’ and ‘semblance’, but also ‘shining’. Reality is this ‘radiance’; a radiant appearing.²⁷⁶ The emphasis on radiance evokes Heidegger’s discussion on beauty, which suggests that we must have some sense of (and perhaps, for) the origin of appearances. The significance of reality is to be found in the fact that it appears *as* something, it shows itself in some significant way, but it shows itself all the more when we see the appearances with a sense for its coming-to-be in appearances. Heidegger believes that Hölderlin draws our attention to this in what he calls the ‘holy’. The Greek’s called it *physis*; Kant beauty; Nietzsche rapture; Heidegger earth. First, we must overturn Platonism. If we are to look for the source, or origin, of the appearances, we cannot look for something beyond what it already *is*. For this would be to explain appearances by means of another appearance, and an appearance that we arbitrarily take to be ‘more’ true. Although Heidegger argues that Plato is largely responsible for the fact that this becomes forgotten throughout the history of Western thought, Plato has some understanding of this by seeing that it is beauty—an experience that Heidegger reminds us is only available only through an encounter with appearances—that moves us into truth.

Truth is disclosed through the experience of beauty and so it is the work of art

²⁷⁴NK, p. 267. *NI*, p. 215. ‘Nietzsche does not become master of the fate entrenched in that word [*Schein*], which is to say, in the matter’.

²⁷⁵NK, p. 263. *NI*, p. 211.

²⁷⁶NK, p. 268. *NI*, p. 215. See also, *NK*, pp. 198-199. *NI*, p. 161: ‘art creates out of the sensuous. [Therefore, art and truth] [...] meet one another in the single guiding perspective of the rescue and configuration of the sensuous’.

that aids truth in this struggle.²⁷⁷ Heidegger believes that this same insight is available in the thought of the Ancient Greeks before Plato.

For the Greeks, however, what is to be shown, that is, what shines of its own power, is therefore true: beauty. That is why truth needs art, the poetic being of man. Poetically, dwelling man brings all that shines, earth and heaven and the holy, in which every appearance is preserved as permanent and for itself, he brings it, in the form of the work, to a secure stand. “To preserve everything as permanent and for itself”—is called: founding.²⁷⁸

The tension between appearance and truth that Heidegger sees at work in Plato’s thought is evidence of the remainder of this primordial insight, but Plato ‘decides’ to ensconce the concept of truth with a permanence that is contrary to the phenomenon itself. For Heidegger, truth is historical, it is an occurrence, *and it is of this world*. To suggest instead that truth is *something* that secures from beyond this world the truth of the world, a world that is therefore secondary to this proposed permanent world of truth, is a catastrophic error. This move establishes a history of nihilism precisely because it uproots us from the actual grounds of the disclosure of truth, our rootedness in the earth, thereby robbing us of the possibility of the existential transformation that Heidegger sees fundamental in the activity of truth. By returning to the significance of the appearing things for the radiance of truth Nietzsche is understood to reawaken this essential insight of the pre-Socratic Ancient Greeks. Heidegger believes that Nietzsche sees precisely what Heidegger argues is assumed in the thinking of the Ancient Greece *milieu* but he also goes one step further. Art, in the grand style, liberates perspectival reality (or, momentary truths) for ‘expansion’ and ‘transfiguration’, ‘stationing a thing in the clarity of Being’ *and* ‘establishing such clarity as the heightening of life itself’.²⁷⁹

For Heidegger, this move not only re-establishes the significance of art for the disclosure of truth but it also secures the idea that there are ‘degrees’ of truthfulness. This is not, *pace* Plato, a degree of truth that reaches toward the highest degree in the forms. Instead, it is an existential truthfulness, a mode of being (via rapture) that liberates things within the world to be better versions of themselves, modeled in the

²⁷⁷NK, p. 268. NI, p. 216.

²⁷⁸HE, pp. 186-187. See also, UK, p. 69. ‘Die Wahrheit ist die Unverborgenheit des Seienden als des Seienden. Die Wahrheit ist die Wahrheit des Seins. Die Schönheit kommt nicht neben dieser Wahrheit vor. Wenn die Wahrheit sich in das Werk setzt, erscheint sie. Das Erscheinen ist — als dieses Sein der Wahrheit im Werk und als Werk — die Schönheit. So gehört das Schöne in das Sichereignen der Wahrheit’. ‘Truth is the unconcealment of beings as beings. Truth is the truth of being. Beauty does not tarry alongside truth. When truth itself is set to work, it radiates. This radiation is—as the being of truth in the work as work—beauty. So, beauty belongs to the unfolding of truth’. My translation.

²⁷⁹NK, p. 268. NI, p. 216.

vision of the artist who embodies this existential insight. And because, for Heidegger, attunements are primordial of the divide between subject and object then this is not a subjective change to reality. Instead, it is a determination of reality itself. Hence, the liberator legislates the ‘objectivity of objects’ for the cave dwellers.²⁸⁰ Only through a return to the question of art was it possible to ‘bring [this] new reality’ into ‘sharp focus’ (*zusehends in den Blick*).²⁸¹ Through this confrontation with Nietzsche Heidegger retrieves and *transforms* the primordial connection between art and truth that Heidegger believed to be at work in Ancient Greek thought, with a new focus on the significance of earth.

Heidegger thinks that this ‘new reality’ reconciles previous philosophical tensions, namely the dichotomy between being and becoming. One assumes that the arrival of the other beginning suggests as much. As we have seen, for Heidegger all Western thinking has been determined by the Greek beginning and through figures like Heraclitus and Parmenides it is in this beginning that the problem of being and becoming first arose. Plato offers us a solution to this problem. By claiming that the Ideas secure the truth of beings in a world beyond this one he answers the basis of this problem, namely that reality both *is* and yet is *not* at the same time. Reality ‘is’ because it gains its ‘being’ through the Ideas, but reality also changes through the false opinions of us worldly humans, and so it becomes. Reality *is* through the Ideas yet is *not* because of *doxa*. However, the problem of the relationship between these two worlds is, for Heidegger at least, not sufficiently addressed by Plato, nor the tradition that follows him. By establishing the Idea as a ‘being’ ‘beyond’ this world Plato’s solution *forgets* the significance of the concealment of the implicit meaning of being within *Dasein*. By failing to account for this, Platonism is understood to be responsible for the Western traditions decay into an all-encompassing nihilism.

Heidegger counters that being and becoming belong together because they both belong to this *one* reality as a perspectival shining.²⁸² In order for a being to be real it must ‘ensconce’ itself in illusory truth. To remain real, it must stay *true* to the essence of the real as the various emerging ‘perspectives’ (the will to power as art) and simultaneously go beyond itself by ‘advanc[ing] against the [particular ensconced, perspectival, illusory] truth’.²⁸³ Thus, truth and art belong equally to the essence of

²⁸⁰ *WWP*, p. 210. *ET*, p. 151. See also, *WWP*, pp. 114-115.

²⁸¹ *NK*, p. 263. *NI*, p. 211.

²⁸² *NK*, p. 270. *NI*, p. 217.

²⁸³ *NK*, p. 270. *NI*, p. 217.

the real but, at the same time, ‘must diverge from another and go counter to one another’.²⁸⁴ This discord arouses dread after the death of God, because for Nietzsche, according to Heidegger, ‘existence [*Dasein*] can now be endured only in creation’,²⁸⁵ which stands in severance to the necessity of perspectival, ensconced, illusory, truth. Therefore, by reconciling the tension between being and becoming, or finding the means in which to articulate an understanding of being that both resolves this problem and does so without recourse to a world ‘beyond’ this one (alternatively: with recourse only to appearing things), one is already paving the way for a new history. Moreover, by taking one’s cue to return to this origin from the appearing things one avoids the fateful mistake of Plato, thereby solving the problem of nihilism. Hence, Heidegger looks at *doxa* and finds concealment, hiddenness: things *are* because being is *not*.

Heidegger’s distinction between earth and world could be seen as an attempt to think a version of the distinction between becoming and being, but in a way that pushes this tension to some means of reconciliation, in the manner of the ‘grand style’. Earth is an abyss; it is *always becoming* because it resists any means in which to make it intelligible as something. World is meaningful presencing, the illusory sense of truth granted by a given perspective that has stationed itself in truth, *for a time at least*. But it is not earth against world, two separate dimensions that come together to create truth. Instead, they are one. Likewise, being and becoming belong together because they both belong to *one* reality understood as the perspectival shining.²⁸⁶ Heidegger expresses this when he claims that Nietzsche’s perspectivism suggests that the ‘sensuous-corporeal, in itself possess this beyond-itself’.²⁸⁷ The occurrence of being, its origin, is therefore not ‘beyond being’ but its ‘innermost’ (*Innerstes*).²⁸⁸ The *not* at the centre of all things: an earth that gives rise to world.

So, being is *not*. But not just as what cannot be represented to the human being, whereby the implicit assumption remains that being ‘is’, just not as what is representable for the human being. For Heidegger, this would be akin to saying (in German) that ‘*Seyn west*’, being occurs.²⁸⁹ Instead, Heidegger tells us that ‘*Seyn wesung*’ or ‘being is an occurrence’. But it is the occurrence thought of as the

²⁸⁴NK, p. 270. *NI*, p. 217.

²⁸⁵NK, p. 271. *NI*, p. 218.

²⁸⁶NK, p. 270. *NI*, p. 217.

²⁸⁷NK, p. 264. *NI*, p. 212. ‘[...] das Sinnlich-Leibliche, hat in sich dieses ausgerichtete Über-sich-hinaus’.

²⁸⁸BP, pp. 286-287. *CP*, p. 225.

²⁸⁹BP, pp. 286-287.

‘oscillation’ (*Gegenschwung*, literally: counter-swing) between *Dasein* and beyng, not understood as two ‘objectively present poles’ but instead as ‘the pure vibration-of-the-swing itself’ (*die reine Erschwingung selbst*).²⁹⁰ Beyng needs the human being and the human being is dependent on beyng, but this need radically recreates what the human being is, in turn recreating the necessity of the need and the means of the dependence: ‘*This oscillation of needing and belonging* constitutes beyng as the appropriate event (between *Dasein* and *Seyn*), and our thinking is in the first place obliged to raise the movement of this oscillation into the simplicity of knowledge and to ground it in its truth’.²⁹¹

This goes some way to resolve the tension inherent in *Being and Time*, between beings that both ‘are’ and are not, until *Dasein* discloses them *as* something.²⁹² For Heidegger, to think of this nothing in the framework of *Being and Time* would be to assume a relation between *Dasein* and being. When Heidegger develops the significance of the ‘turn’ (*Kehre*) between *Dasein* and beyng, his idea is to ascribe the finitude of *Dasein* into ‘being itself’. We have to be careful here, because to talk of ‘being itself’ is *not*, for Heidegger, to say that *Dasein* is in some sort of relationship with something other than itself. Instead, because the worldhood of the world depends on *Dasein*, then to assume the gap between the ‘is’ in the understanding and the ‘are’ of the independently existing things is a misnomer.²⁹³ It is not that there is something over and beyond *Dasein*, but that this ‘mystery’, the impenetrable finitude of *Dasein*, is an intrinsic part of the beings themselves *precisely because it is only Dasein who experiences something like world*. If one was to describe this accurately however, as Heidegger endeavours, then the mystery is not just the experience of the world for *Dasein* but a property of ‘being itself’, precisely because all that remains, once one has accepted the thesis that being *is* only through the meaning of being, is the meaning of being available to *Dasein*.²⁹⁴ Therefore, there is no longer a

²⁹⁰*BP*, pp. 286-287.

²⁹¹Trans. mod. *BP*, p. 251. *CP*, p. 198. ‘Dieser Gegenschwung des Brauchens und Zugehörens macht das Seyn als Ereignis aus, und die Schwingung dieses Gegenschwunges in die Einfachheit des Wissens zu heben und in seiner Wahrheit zu gründen’. To ‘raise’ this movement into the ‘simplicity of knowledge’ is what Heidegger understands to be thinking in the grand style, which I explored above.

²⁹²*BP*, pp. 286-287. *CP*, p. 225.

²⁹³*BP*, p. 31. *CP*, p. 26. ‘This apparent autonomy of beings in relation to beyng, as if the latter were merely a supplement of “abstract,” representational thought, is no actual priority, however; it is only a sign of the entitlement to a blind decline’.

²⁹⁴*Ibid.* As he clarifies ‘the “actual beings” [i.e., beings beyond their disclosure to *Dasein*], conceived in terms of the truth of beyng [i.e., the way that this distinction appears once the ‘turn’ is complete], are nonbeings under the dominance of the distorted essence of semblance, the origin of which remains veiled’. So, once the significance of this ‘origin’, i.e., concealment, is fully comprehended by

distinction to be made between the beings that ‘are’ beyond disclosure and the beings that are in virtue of this disclosure, for the finite nature of the *is* of *Dasein* subsumes the need for the distinction.²⁹⁵ Instead, one simply looks at the same phenomenon, the disclosure of truth, through different ‘viewpoints’.

It is this insight that pushes Heidegger beyond the transcendental gap between *Dasein* and world as posited in *Being and Time*. *Dasein* is no longer understood as ‘the between’ (*das Zwischen*).²⁹⁶ *Dasein* does not transcend beings to their being, but instead, in virtue of the finitude of *Dasein*, meaningful intelligibility *noths* or *nihilates*, birthing an oscillation where things come-to-presence *as* something. It is in virtue of this no-thing that both *Dasein* and the world it is meaningfully engaged in are constantly re-created. Heidegger first tried to articulate this insight on the nothing in *What is Metaphysics?* in 1929 and strengthened by his investigation of *doxa* in 1931/32. This reflection comes to fruition in his concept of earth in 1934/35. However, the ‘oscillation’ is not between being and *Dasein*. Instead this oscillation is the coming-to-be that being and *Dasein* both already are.²⁹⁷ To understand this ‘oscillation’ is to ‘to let becoming *be* becoming’.²⁹⁸ This process can become known through the work of art, for the work of art allows the earth to *be* the earth, in the light of a world. Through the work of art, the significance of self-concealing earth (*as* a self-concealing earth) is brought to light.²⁹⁹ Thus shining in its radiance, earth receives its first name as the ‘holy’.

Dispensing with his adherence to the transcendental reduction, Heidegger reconsiders the problem of the ontological difference. In *Being and Time*, the ‘nothing’ was understood to be disclosed through the experience of finitude in the

Heidegger, he realises that the truth of being (concealment) must be sheltered in beings. *BP*, pp. 30-31. *CP*, pp. 25-26. It is not that the truth of being *is* beings, but that being *truths* through beings. Hence, earth is holy. ‘Beings are. Being essentially occurs’.

²⁹⁵One may notice that this is a similar gesture to what one might find in German Idealism, where ‘absolute consciousness’ is posited as the ‘in itself’. In the *Contributions*, however, Heidegger claims that it is precisely this inscription of finitude into being that guards his philosophy against ‘every sort of “idealism.”’ For him, the notion of the infinite suggests that being is determinate: ‘a closed *circle*’. His emphasis. Because he claims that being is finite (as a result of needing *Dasein*), then it is open, where the ‘abyssal character is affirmed’. On the contrary, ‘the event stands in its “turning”! (conflictually)’. *BP*, pp. 268-269. *CP*, p. 211. Another study would be required to determine the proximity of Heidegger’s project at this time to German Idealism. It certainly does seem that this latter move brings him closer to some sort of Idealism, than his project stood in *Being and Time*, even if it is certainly *not* the case that *Dasein*, thought as some sort of ‘mind’, ‘projects’ the beings into existence.

²⁹⁶*BP*, p. 335.

²⁹⁷Note that if there is a separation to be found here, it is a distinction that serves to investigate the same process from a different perspective.

²⁹⁸*NK*, p. 271. *NI*, p. 218. ‘Dieser aber als der Grundcharakter des Seienden, das Wesen der Realität, ist in sich dasjenige Sein, das sich selbst will, indem es das Werden sein will’.

²⁹⁹*UK*, p. 33. *OA*, p. 110.

face of my ‘death’. In this view, the ontological difference was the difference between the concealed meaningful significance of the truth of beings, a no-thing, and the beings themselves disclosed in virtue of this no-thing. Thus, experiencing my death reveals the significance of the ontological difference, for it reveals to me that I am the source of the meaningful intelligibility of the world. However, adhering to this distinction is seen as the continuation of the Western tradition’s adherence to Platonism for, although it seeks the ‘unity’ of being and beings, it nonetheless continues to search for the truth of being as *other* than beings. The task, as Heidegger sees it, ‘is not to surpass beings (transcendence) but, instead, to leap over this distinction and consequently over *transcendence* and to question inceptually out of being and truth’.³⁰⁰ But, because ‘being essences as the truth of beings’,³⁰¹ he must refocus his attention to finding being within beings, for, after all, being is not *anything*, and it *certainly* is not some ‘thing’ that stands over and beyond *Dasein*.³⁰² It may indeed be the concealed ‘happening’ that without which nothing would be, but

³⁰⁰His emphasis. *BP*, pp. 250-251. *CP*, p. 197.

³⁰¹*BP*, p. 235. ‘Sein west als die Wahrheit des Seienden’.

³⁰²See, *BP*, p. 217, *CP*, p. 170. “‘Transcendence’ always involves departing from known and familiar “beings” and going out in some way beyond them. From the perspective of the basic question of the truth of being, that amounts to a remaining mired in the mode of inquiry of the guiding question, i.e., in *metaphysics*’. One thing of interest in this rhetorical shift in the way Heidegger tries to articulate the truth of being, is that on the one hand, he is trying to emphasise that being is not available without beings, and being is *only* that which something like an understanding of being in *Dasein* can give rise to. But because this means that he can search for being ‘out there’, which is to say, its significance is within the world in which *Dasein* is immersed (and a world it allows for by being a finite being), then his language makes it seem like being is *not* dependent on *Dasein* and is something beyond *Dasein*: ‘being itself’. This is one of the central misunderstandings that Sheehan’s ‘new paradigm’ tries to address, a misunderstanding most readily available in the work of Capobianco. Cf. his, *Heidegger’s Ways of Being*, esp. p. 7. ‘This “it” (*es*) that “gives” (*gibt*) so richly and so inexhaustibly is Being itself (*Sein selbst*) as the temporal-spatial emerging and shining-forth of beings in their beingness as gathered in the ensemble. Being as “manifestness” or “manifestation” (*Offenbarkeit*), this is the matter itself (*die Sache selbst*) of Heidegger’s thought – which, remarkably enough, is at risk of being “forgotten” all over again’. Contrary to Capobianco’s position here, it is precisely this substantialising of being beyond the human being that is representative of the ‘forgottenness’ of being of which Heidegger is worried about. What he begins to stress in the 1930s, a development this thesis has been tracking, is that because being is ‘concealed’ then this means that it cannot be reduced simply to the meaningful intelligibility of things available to *Dasein* precisely because it precedes what is intelligible. But this is *not* to precede because it is ‘other’ than what is intelligible. Instead, it is the *origins* of intelligibility as primordially dependant on but unrepresentable by the intelligibility to which *Dasein* gives rise. This, then, is simply another way of articulating the significance of the ontological difference, a difference to which that *Dasein* always gives rise. *Alas*, this is a misinterpretation that is easy to make given that Heidegger is not clear on the matter. Further, and I have pointed out throughout this thesis, Heidegger sometimes speak as if being is something over, and beyond, the human being. There is indeed something that Heidegger wishes to voice here. Sometimes, it is simply to stress the absolute finiteness and incompleteness of *Dasein*. In other moments, he seems to conceive of a ‘pushing back’ against *Dasein*’s capacity to disclose, albeit a ‘nothing’ that achieves this. As I have argued, the resources in his thought are unable to argue for this adequately even if it is an insight worthy of consideration. I reflect on this further in the conclusion to this thesis.

without the things that *are* it wouldn't *be* in the first place.³⁰³ Once Heidegger tries to close the gap between being and beings that the ontological difference suggests he finds the 'no-thing' in the inherent finiteness and plurality within the beings themselves, namely earth. Earth is this nothing, a concealed 'nature', the significance of which (for a people, tradition, nation) is brought to language through poetry. Concurrently, transcendence is not just a standing out into nothing, and so beyond beings to their being, which discloses their meaning. Instead, it is the decisional stance I take toward beings based on my understanding of the significance of the 'us' of the truth of beyng. Being, then, is not just the concealed origin of meaningful intelligibility, but a concealed meaning that is bound up with the will to power of certain individuals.³⁰⁴

The overmen are those who embody this knowledge, they who have undergone an existential transformation whereby they have lost their platonic 'baggage'. By experiencing the death of God, the world no longer shows up to them through the distinction between a true and appearing world. This experience re-orientates them to think through 'decision' for they realise the fundamental role human beings have in the grounding of this disclosure of meaning through heralding the call of great poetry, which gives them the means to establish and ground foundational truths for the rest of humanity.³⁰⁵ Their task, as Heidegger prescribes it, is to articulate this 'not' in beyng for their people.³⁰⁶ By grounding the truth of the abandonment of beyng, beyng is remembered. Because it is that the abandonment is forgotten that is the grounds of nihilism, the retrieval of this insight becomes the antidote: '[w]here the danger grows, grows that which saves'. To achieve this would be to satisfy the basic condition of will to power for it establishes the essence of reality as 'shining', i.e. appearances, and its transfiguration and enhancement in the establishment of the significance of the 'not' in beyng.³⁰⁷

For Heidegger, both Hölderlin and Nietzsche were legislative individuals who sought to find a means by which to articulate the abandonment of beyng, forgotten by

³⁰³*BP*, p. 30. *CP*, p. 26. 'Beyng (as event) needs beings so that it might essentially occur. Beings do not need beyng in that way. Beings can still "be" in the abandonment by being; under the domination of this abandonment, the immediate graspability, usability, and serviceability of every sort (e.g., everything must serve the people) obviously constitute what is a being and what is not'.

³⁰⁴*BP*, pp. 100-103.

³⁰⁵*BP*, pp. 6-7. *CP*, p. 8. '[B]eings are brought into their constancy through the downgoing of those who ground the truth of beyng. Beyng itself requires this. It needs those who go down and has already appropriated them, assigned them to itself'.

³⁰⁶*BP*, pp. 31-32.

³⁰⁷*NK*, p. 269. *NI*, pp. 269-270.

Plato. ‘To *stamp* Becoming with the character of Being’³⁰⁸—in the words of Nietzsche—is, for Heidegger, to ‘stand in the moment of decision, in which what has prevailed hitherto, our endowment, is directed toward a projected task’.³⁰⁹ This is how he understands Nietzsche’s ‘eternal recurrence’, which Heidegger takes to be an expression of the meaning of being, and it is to will one’s ‘place’ to heightened levels of existential disclosure by a people embracing their ‘endowment’ and discovering their ‘task’. Thus, one cannot just say that being is not. Rather, one must say how this ‘not’ *is* for a people, and one gains this power by embracing the will to power. Put another way, the concealed horizon of our finitude determines the kind of people we are, and so Heidegger believes that a people need a founding myth in order to relate with it. The destiny of a people thus become intimately bound with this truth of being. Nietzsche tells us that, ‘[w]e need the lie in order to achieve victory over this reality, this ‘truth,’ which is to say, in order to live. [...] That the lie is necessary for life is itself part and parcel of the frightful and questionable character of existence’.³¹⁰ For Heidegger, Hölderlin is a prophesy because he finds the possibility for the embracing of our concealment, creating an eternal recurrence through a poetic projection of the homeland, his ‘lie’ for a ‘frightful’ existence. Nietzsche lays the intellectual foundation for this to be comprehended. In this process, earth receives its second name as the homeland.

The Heidegger of 1927 disregarded poetry in the face of his project of fundamental ontology. The turning (*Kehre*) may attempt to name the oscillating relationship between *Dasein* and being. However, this turn brings the importance of another turn, a turn from philosophy to poetry. For, once one turns to concealment one must find a way to speak of it. Hence, once one is in ‘touch with [the] telling silence’ of the earth, one ‘rises to the rank of the poet’.³¹¹

We begin to see the way in which the developments in Heidegger’s philosophy at this time become bound up with his call to greatness and the destiny of the German people, the same concern that attracted him to the National Socialist movement in the first place. However, this chapter focussed primarily on the philosophical issues at play in the development of Heidegger’s thought. In the conclusion to this thesis, the

³⁰⁸His emphasis. *NM*, pp. 228-229. *NII*, pp. 202-203.

³⁰⁹*Ibid.*

³¹⁰As quote by Heidegger in *NK*, p. 270. *NI*, p. 217. ‘Wir haben Lüge nötig, um über diese Realität, diese “Wahrheit” zum Sieg zu kommen, das heißt um zu leben ... Daß die Lüge nötig ist, um zu leben, das gehört selbst noch mit zu diesem furchtbaren und fragwürdigen Charakter des Daseins’

³¹¹*NM*, p. 233. *NII*, p 208.

insights garnered here are brought together with his support of the Party, in order to clarify what is exactly at stake in this thinking and why it is open to something like National Socialism. Through this clarification, I discuss the limitations and dangers that lie in the root of his thinking and offer some suggestions for how we might move beyond these problems.

CONCLUSION

This study explored the role of the work of art in the development of Heidegger's concept of truth. If we place the significance of his support of the National Socialists aside for a moment, the answer to this question could be seen to be quite straightforward. As Heidegger's thinking develops, he discovers that within the question of truth, which for him means un-concealment or the revealing of things 'through' *Dasein*, there is a hidden, more primordial question, namely, what role does the 'concealing' aspect of un-concealment play in the disclosure of the intelligibility of beings. Concealment, so Heidegger contends, plays a much more fundamental role, for it is the hidden, or groundless, ground of the revealing of things. Heidegger introduces the work of art as a means to address the concealment of truth.

However, to 'address' concealment is not as straightforward as it might seem. By 'addressing' concealment I mean that Heidegger wants to bring concealment into some kind of meaningful intelligibility, or, to make it known for what it is. This is what he means by 'grounding' the truth of being, but it results in a paradox. To bring something into meaningful intelligibility means to be able to speak about it, but if 'untruth' is the source of 'truth', and truth amounts to the disclosing of things by *Dasein* through language, then, how do you bring to language what precedes language?¹

Untruth becomes understood as 'earth', and in 1933 Heidegger believed that the National Socialist Party would orientate the people toward this concealed region of truth.² After Heidegger's disappointment with the direction of the Party, the work of art became the most tenable solution for addressing the problem that revealing this concealment faces us with.³ Are both of these solutions related? Or are they separate? Does his turn toward the work of art dismiss the significance that he once saw in the National Socialist Party? To clarify the role of the work of art in the disclosure of truth helps establish the significance of this intersection. In doing so, one discovers the philosophical motivations at play, and one can evaluate if his philosophy is open to something like National Socialism in the first place.

¹*HH*, p. 75. 'Der ursprüngliche Ursprung der Sprache als des Wesensgrundes des menschlichen Daseins bleibt aber ein Geheimnis'. 'The original origin of language as the essential ground of human *Dasein*, however, remains a mystery'. My translation.

²*SW*, p. 148. *BaT*, p. 116. The 'tremendous moment into which National Socialism is being driven today is the coming to be of a *new spirit of the entire earth*'.

³*UK*, p. 32. *OA*, pp. 109-110. 'The [art]work lets the earth be an earth'. Emphasis removed.

The role of the work of art is to reveal the concealed without reducing it to something revealed, or, as he says in *The Origin*, to allow the ‘earth *be* an earth’.⁴ There is something about art that resists being presented as something stable. Art speaks from a place that seems to draw from an inspiration that exceeds, or precedes, philosophical discourse; it serves to inspire and suggest; its meanings are polysemic.⁵ Heidegger may recognise this, and it may be this insight that leads him to assert the importance of the artwork, but his conclusions do not end there. To reveal the self-concealing means to bear witness to the mystery of earth, and for Heidegger one can only achieve this through the particular place one encounters it in.⁶ To ‘reveal’ concealment is thus to be *rooted* in the ground one is from.⁷ To root in one’s ground, is to make beings ‘more’ beingful and achieve a complete ‘recoining of being’.⁸ Thus, ‘rootedness in the soil [*Bodenständigkeit*] is the foundation of all truth’.⁹ The proximity between the work of art and his support of the National Socialist Party begins to yield its ugly head.

Perhaps we are being too hasty. Let us take a look at the developments within Heidegger’s thought that create this emphasis, for the goal is to understand what precedent lies in his philosophy for this support.

After the disappointment of *Being and Time*, Heidegger discovers that the question of truth is not really about the ‘essence’ of truth. Such a question may have been settled in *Being and Time*, where the answer is that *Dasein*, as the being that discloses a world, is the means by which something like truth comes to pass. But *Dasein* is a being that is *temporal* in nature. Therefore, although *Dasein* is the means by which something *is*, this ‘is’ is *not* a permanent, eternal, category. The concept of ‘essence’ is thus problematised in this text.¹⁰

⁴See, *UK*, p. 32. See, also, *BH*, pp. 318-319. ‘Die Sprache verweigert uns noch ihr Wesen [...] Zu diesen gehört auch, die Versicherung, etwas sei unerklärlich. Mit solchen Aussagen meinen wir vor dem Geheimnis zu stehen. Als ob es denn so ausgemacht sei, daß die Wahrheit des Seins sich überhaupt auf Ursachen und Erklärungsgründe oder, was dasselbe ist, auf deren Unfaßlichkeit stellen lasse.’ ‘Language still denies us its essence [...] To these belong also the assurance that something is inexplicable. By such statements, we believe that we confront the mystery. As if it were so arranged, that the truth of being itself is based on causes and causes of explanations or, what is the same, their incomprehensibility’. My translation.

⁵Thomson, *Heidegger, Art and Postmodernity*, p. 127.

⁶*UK*, p. 28. *OA*, p. 107.

⁷*NHS*, p. 55.

⁸See, *SW*, pp 263-264, and *WWP*, p. 33. *ET*, p. 25, and *HH*, p. 142. *HHGR*, p. 125.

⁹Trans. mod. Farias, *Heidegger and Nazism*, p. 72. Farias discovers that this was an explicit claim made by Heidegger in his 1930 lectures *On the Essence of Truth* but was subsequently deleted in the 1942 printed version.

¹⁰In the *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger reproaches Sartre for misunderstanding precisely this. *BH*, pp. 328-331.

Following in turn, Heidegger realises that the question of the essence of truth is more fundamentally the question of the way in which truth has been ‘*essenced*’ throughout the history of the West. ‘Essenced’ here tries to capture how for Heidegger essences are a historical category, gaining a kind of meaning throughout history, primarily through poetic inspiration, but then implicitly articulated, and so ‘opened’, through the theses of the great thinkers of the West. Under the dominion of Homer, Heidegger believes that it was Plato who established the dominant essence of truth throughout the history of the West.¹¹ But Plato got it wrong. Establishing the source of truth in the Ideas beyond this world, Plato is understood to ‘uproot’ us from the concealed origins of meaningful intelligibility in the earth—the soil—establishing a process that culminates in an age of all-encompassing nihilism.¹² In so far as this is the case, the problem of nihilism and how to overcome it takes centre stage in Heidegger’s thinking at this time, for it threatens the very nature of who we are.

It is in virtue of this nihilism that the masses are understood to have become ‘groundless’ and ‘self-serving’.¹³ It is not their fault, as they are simply victims of a historical process that is beyond their control. Heidegger feels compelled to save, or ‘transform’, these masses.¹⁴ But hope cannot lie, as it does in *Being and Time*, on the possibility of facing one’s finitude through being ‘assailed’ by the mood of angst, awakening *Dasein* from its blind adherence to their historical meaning of being. Indeed, the stakes are now much higher. For one does not have to just awaken from the ‘banality’ of ‘the many’ but must instead surpass a nihilism that uproots one’s very capacity to understand oneself as a meaning bestowing individual. It is worth noting that this seems to genuinely terrify Heidegger, evidenced by the apocalyptic and dark mood that permeates his writing at this time.

If the masses cannot be trusted, then Heidegger believes that the philosophers must rise to meet the urgency of nihilism, which is exemplified in the figure of the ‘liberator’. Heidegger is committed to the thesis that being is the meaningful intelligibility of things available to *Dasein*, and so he interprets the allegory of the cave to mean that the liberator is not liberated from the darkness of the cave and

¹¹ *WWP*, p. 17.

¹² *WWP*, pp. 324-325 and p. 327.

¹³ Trans. mod. *BP*, pp. 61-62. *CP*, pp. 49-50.

¹⁴ Because, by being *Dasein* (that is, a being with some implicit understanding of the meaning of being, and so we exist in a place where things show up *as* something in virtue of that understanding) we are the means by which these essences are secured, then within the question of the essence of truth the fate of the human being hangs in the balance. Hence, with the question of the essence of truth we are faced with a possibility of a ‘revolution’ of the whole human being. *WWP*, p. 324.

learns the truth of things. Rather, he is liberated from his belief that things *are* only whatever they *are*, empowering him to *legislate* new truths within the cave.¹⁵ Even Plato's 'good *beyond* being' is interpreted as the liberator's will to power, through which he legislates by *forming* the *content* of beings in the world.¹⁶ Perhaps the development in the notion of transcendence functions to save him from the worst of this fear. Now, *Dasein* does not just stand-out-into-nothing. Instead, it is in virtue of their immanence within beings that the liberators can form the ambiguous 'look' of things into something determinate, laying the groundwork for the masses to be saved by actively shaping the historical essences that determine who we are.¹⁷

Heidegger is not a reckless tyrant here. His concern is with transformation, he wants to *save* the masses. If this work is to be a success then cohesion of the masses toward a singular destiny becomes a necessity, a cohesion that the National Socialist Party begun to provide within Germany. The 'state-creator' establishes this cohesion, he awakens an attunement within the people to the great poets of their nation, thus aiding the legislators in grounding this more primordial dimension of truth.¹⁸ 'Earth' is Heidegger's name for this primordial dimension, and it within this region that the historical essences are empowered. To orientate a people to this dimension, then, is to confront the nihilist foundations of all previous philosophy.¹⁹ The early stages of National Socialism, with their call for unity, national identity, and evocation of 'blood' and 'soil', seemed to him emblematic of these same concerns. Heidegger's yearning to be the philosopher of his time gave him reason to seize contemporary discourse with a view to complete what he believed to be the unsaid dimension in his own work pre-1930, namely, understanding and confronting the grounds of nihilism in the concealment of being.²⁰ Heidegger rightly concedes that the *Führer* sets the correct 'course' and 'impetus' to his work.²¹

The discovery of the significance of concealment, with its particular emphasis on corporeality, establishes a development that gives him the means to address certain inadequacies in his thought as they stood in *Being and Time*. By 1937, Heidegger no longer adheres to his version of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction. This

¹⁵ *WWP*, pp. 79-86.

¹⁶ *NK*, pp. 116-124.

¹⁷ *BP*, pp. 100-103.

¹⁸ *HH*, pp. 144-145.

¹⁹ *WWP*, p.287.

²⁰ *BH*, p. 328. See also, *BP*, pp. 113-116.

²¹ *UII-VI*, p. 111. Here, Heidegger uses the collective 'our' (*unser*) to refer to his thought, suggestive of the extent to which he identified his philosophy with his nation, and the universality with which he conceived of his philosophical project.

is what scholarship generally refers to as the ‘turn’ (*Kehre*), but there has been much confusion over the significance of this term and its implications for the development of Heidegger’s philosophy.²² For Heidegger, this is when thinking stops inquiring into the significance of that being that has some understanding of the meaning of being (*Dasein*), and instead thinks from the place of meaning that *Dasein* sustains. This does not mean that Heidegger’s thought shifts emphasis from *Dasein* to ‘being itself’. Instead, this development attempts to think from the other side of the same coin, i.e., the pre-condition of meaningful intelligibility. The transcendental reduction, and the ontological difference it gives rise to, distinguishes being from beings. These concepts risk missing that being and beings are unified, and the attempt to separate them becomes reminiscent of the Platonic metaphysics he seeks to overcome.²³ Resisting this, the beings that ‘are’ beyond disclosure to *Dasein* become understood as the ‘not’ that impels what *is* to greater levels of existential disclosure. They are the ambiguous ‘look’ of corporeal ‘stuff’ that compels the liberator to take a stand on the nature of reality. Heidegger no longer needs to think from the vantage point of the ‘is’ of the understanding because the understanding of being extends beyond the realm of an individual. Instead, it is a *place* of meaning, legislated by the elite, and sustained by the community of people that dwell in that place.

It is from the latter ‘viewpoint’ of the turn that the significance of concealment is established.²⁴ The ‘givenness’ of what is meaningful is in-and-of-itself ‘self-closing’ ‘self-concealing’, ‘mystery’. Being’s ‘innermost’ is an abyss which claims *Dasein* and needs *Dasein* to make a claim on it.²⁵ ‘Concealment’ means the concealed horizon of our finitude, but it is also an abyss thought of in terms of corporeality, the soil beneath our feet that we must claim and re-claim as our own. We cannot ignore the political resonances of this, but it is also the case that this move brings to fruition his attempt to think the significance of finitude without recourse to an infinite. Which is to say, Heidegger presents us with the means of thinking the disclosure of truth without recourse to a truth beyond this world. Truth only irrupts when finitude stands within a particular place. It is within the ensuing vulnerable ‘oscillation’ in the strife between unconcealment (or world) and concealment (earth) that truth arises. For Heidegger then, this truth must necessarily be the truth of the homeland.

²²See, Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger*, pp. 231-247

²³*BP*, pp. 250-251

²⁴Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger*, p. 194.

²⁵*BP*, pp. 286-287.

Vulnerable, finite truth demands resolute decision. Truth requires seizing and establishing. This is what Heidegger sees as his task, at a time when the future of Germany was uncertain. *The Origin of the Work of Art* informs us that the work of art accomplishes the 'strife' between earth and world, which would result in the disclosure of truth. But this claim is enmeshed with the significance of the National Socialist Party. A confrontation with Nietzsche may have emboldened Heidegger's desire to reclaim a rootedness in the earth, but the National Socialist movement beat Nietzsche to it. Heidegger believed that *Being and Time* failed to articulate sufficiently the nature of concealment,²⁶ and setting out to retrieve the meaning of this term, Heidegger saw the rhetoric of blood and soil, and the significance of destiny and a people, as resonating with what lay implicit deep within his own project. Although it turned out that the depth of his philosophy could not incorporate the base forms of thinking that were established in the ideology of this movement, he recognised important resonances between his philosophy and this rising political movement, which he took to be the grounds of nihilism in concealment. For Heidegger, to reclaim concealment is not to embrace the mystery of the earth, but to understand the significance of concealment as the material, sensuous, earth rooted *in* a place. Only by recognising the mystery as (our) *earth* does the mystery appear as 'holy', and only then, can it be reclaimed as a 'homeland'. Calls to 'blood' and 'soil', and the will of a people are intimately wrapped in this. Concurrently, his project to raise a question about the meaning of being for us *today* gains an emboldened focus on the disclosure of truth to greater levels of existential significance for a people, where concerns of destiny, a people, and the significance of elite take centre stage.

As the National Socialist movement took control of the state, Heidegger was met with disappointment. For him, the Nazis became one more victim in the history of 'decline', and resigning as rector he was again at a loss for how to overcome the problem of nihilism. The hope that he once had in the National Socialist Party became replaced by the possibilities he saw in the poetry of Hölderlin.²⁷ However, the 'course' and 'impetus' to his thought by the *Führer* had at this stage been well established, and the same problematic categories of 'destiny', 'rootedness', and the privilege of one nation over another encompass his work on this poet also. By establishing what he deemed to be the proper interpretation of Hölderlin's poetry,

²⁶BP, p. 352.

²⁷HH, p. 1.

Heidegger believed that he would achieve the rootedness in the earth that would overcome the problem of nihilism, thus re-orientating the movement to its authentic potential. Heidegger's thesis on the work of art is not about the work of art 'as such', but about *which* poet would achieve the re-rooting into the soil for the German nation. Heidegger chooses the poetry of Hölderlin to establish this truth.

The change from Hitler's politics to Hölderlin's poetry does not save Heidegger's philosophy from its dangerous flirtation with the National Socialist movement.²⁸ If we are to examine the roots within Heidegger's thought of his support of the Party, a key question becomes how one should examine the significance of the intersection between his utilisation of Hölderlin's poetry and his support, precisely because the same problematic categories survive this migration. This is not a merely superficial connection. Heidegger's 'hope' for the other beginnings is the driving force in the necessity to reveal the concealed earth, for only through rootedness will the Germany destiny be realised, and nihilism overturned. The problem that self-closing mystery poses once again asserts itself.

It is important to note that his attempt to found the other beginning by bringing the mystery to language is not only directly related to his support of the National Socialist Party, but is motivated by some of the fundamental commitments of his philosophical project as they stood in *Being and Time* also. For Heidegger, being *is* only through that being who has some understanding of being (*Dasein*) and its expression of the meaning of being in language.²⁹ But Heidegger discovers that the grounds of this expression, the 'innermost' of being, is concealed mystery, and so the move to address the mystery of being through both the 'exhortation' of a people in the grips of a political movement (the National Socialists), or the work of a poet (Hölderlin), is motivated by the demand of this philosophical project, precisely because philosophy can address only that which can be retrieved by the understanding. But this solution, one which places into question the capacity of philosophy to properly articulate this mystery, is inadequate. Whether through philosophy, or poetry, or a political movement, the mystery still gets its name—the homeland—and it gets its name through Heidegger's encounter with this poetry. Poetry may be the 'clang of arms of nature herself',³⁰ but it is Heidegger who must

²⁸Cf. Malpas, *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place*, pp. 142-143, and Scholtz, *The Invention of a People*, esp. p. 197.

²⁹*SZ*, p. 244. *BT*, p. 178

³⁰*HH*, p. 257. *HHGR*, p. 233.

hear this ‘call’ and ‘open’ its truth for the people.³¹ His use of Hölderlin’s poetry, then, is *his* choice, his decision for the German nation, as *the* philosopher of his time. By choosing to name this mystery, Heidegger’s thought cannot do justice to the reverence that he wishes to invoke with talk of it as the ‘mysterious’ and ‘self-closing’.

Heidegger’s interpretation of the will to power encourages this. He takes Nietzsche to think the being of beings as will to power, but he takes the ‘will’ to be a clarification of the understanding of *Dasein*.³² The understanding thus imposes itself on the beings around it, and shape beings in light of itself.³³ Taking their cue from the poets that they believe to express something fundamental about the future of a nation, all beings are moulded in the eyes of the liberator.³⁴ Thus, *Dasein* must come to stand in its ‘self-certainty’, and it is ‘law-giving’.³⁵ There is something uncomfortable in this emphasis. When being is housed only in the understanding it seems to totalise whatever it comes up to face.³⁶ The discussion of will and beauty confirmed this, where the reverence that beauty demands is reduced to the will of the liberator.³⁷ Inevitably, the will becomes a will to will, and more will besides, making beings ‘more’ beingful.³⁸ Heidegger’s thesis on truth, with a creative spin that he incorporates through significance of the work of art, takes on increased emphasis on willing this ‘mystery’ to greater and heightened levels of existential disclosure throughout the 1930s. Perhaps he thinks ‘rootedness’ means one is ‘more’ in touch with this ‘mystery’, but in this very attempt the mystery is eclipsed. Instead, it becomes the homeland.

The mystery becomes the homeland through Hölderlin’s poetry. This attempt might make the homeland more enigmatic, and it does suggest that the National Socialist attempt to establish the homeland was inadequate. But Heidegger maintains the category of the privilege and destiny of a people that was problematic in the identification of his philosophy and the National Socialist movement in the first

³¹*HH*, p. 144. *HHGR*, p. 126.

³²*NK*, pp. 20-21, and p. 52.

³³*Ibid.*, pp. 51-63.

³⁴I am reminded of Jaspers letter to Freiburg University Denazification Committee: ‘Heidegger’s manner of thinking, [...] to me seems in its essence unfree, dictatorial and incapable of communication [...] his manner of speaking and his actions have a certain affinity with National Socialist characteristics which makes his error [in supporting the movement] comprehensible.’ Jaspers, ‘Letter to the Freiburg University Denazification Committee’, pp. 149-150.

³⁵*BP*, p. 69. See, also, his comments on the Greek *melete*. *NK*, pp. 202-203.

³⁶See Section 2.5 of this study.

³⁷*NK*, pp. 123-133. See also, my comments on this in Section 4.4.2.

³⁸*WWP*, pp. 33-34.

place. His belief in the destiny of the German nation eclipses the significance of other groups of people, and his rejection of the significance of biology and culture in favour of the 'stylistic laws' that he interprets from Hölderlin and Nietzsche's work only serves to obfuscate.³⁹ This ambiguity gives him the means to defend himself against the charge of holding the National Socialist doctrine that emphasises biology,⁴⁰ whilst maintaining the basic thrust of the conviction of the privilege of the German nation over other groups of people, whether another nation, or other marginalised groups within Germany, that did not have the right to claim the German soil as their own. On what grounds are the others refused this? Heidegger will not tell us, for the ambiguity he creates around the categories of a nation mean that we are constantly left in suspense.

We should remember that the mystery is conceptualised as 'earth'. The homeland easily resonates with this, for earth is only available through the particular world to which one belongs.⁴¹ This approaches the problem of 'place' in Heidegger's thought, and the importance of place as 'homeland' connects Heidegger's project to the National Socialists. But this connection may be largely superficial, for his critique of biologism tells us that there is distance between the significance he sees in earth and the reality of the Nazi's blood and soil ideology. But he maintains the problems of this category, and he further preserves the connection with the state by arguing that the 'state-creator' awakens this need for a rootedness to nature in the people. Even as a superficial connection, then, the call to blood and soil was for him an important stepping stone to a deeper understanding. 'Knowledge' must direct the path of the 'blood' and 'soil',⁴² and earth is only available through the particular place one encounters it in. This suggests that a far more fruitful point of inquiry might be the significance of the provincial in Heidegger's thought.⁴³ Indeed, it is Hölderlin's poetry, after all, that is to secure this 'homeland' for the German people, and because this is the significance that Heidegger finds in his poetry, then the significance of the work of art gives way to the significance of the *topos* of being in his thought.⁴⁴

The problem that Heidegger's provincialism poses is not an easy one to address. In the first place, there is no reason to suppose that this is an inherently ugly

³⁹NK p. 122, and, *HH*, pp. 290-294.

⁴⁰See Heidegger's Letter to the Denazification Committee in, Rickey, *Revolutionary Saints*, p. 188.

⁴¹*UK*, p. 28. *OA*, p. 107.

⁴²*SW*, pp 263-264. *BaT*, p. 201.

⁴³See, O'Brien, *Heidegger, History and the Holocaust*, pp.71-76

⁴⁴Malpas, *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place*, pp. 142-143

tendency. On the contrary, although at times Heidegger may lean too far on the romantic side of this notion, his desire to belong in a place and be rooted in something greater than his own subjective ‘meanings’ is a sentiment many of us may share. Moreover, it is a response to a real problem. Desolated by the Great Depression, economic prospects in the Weimar Republic were bleak. With a collapsed economy many of pre-1933 Germany left their homes and communities to search for what work was available in industry, a problem with its origins much earlier in the industrial revolution. Being uprooted from one’s home was likely to result in increased alienation, were one felt lost in a world that increasingly seemed distant and apathetic to one’s needs. Nonetheless, I wonder why, for Heidegger, the locale has to become ‘more’ locale, or our particular place a greater ‘particular’. Why does the desire to belong create the need for more intense forms of belonging? It does seem that the anxiety to belong easily creates this reaction, and we see this problem repeat itself today with some of the contemporary reaction toward immigration, where those who need shelter most from collapsing and war-torn worlds are met with rejection and hatred. *They* are not *us*, after all, and *they* threaten *our* way of being. When Heidegger follows this path his conclusions are not comforting. The ‘enemy’ (*Feind*) plays an important role in the disclosure of truth, as he tells us in *The Black Notebooks*.⁴⁵ Why did the ‘destiny’ of the German people have to be a will to a greatness that superseded other groups of people? Why does the desire to belong move us to further alienate those who we consider to not belong?

Lest we forget, Heidegger’s conviction that we only discover the world through the particular place we are thrown into is a convincing philosophical position.⁴⁶ Any identity inevitably distinguishes an ‘us’ from ‘them’, or a ‘what I am’ from a ‘what I am not’. This means that it is unsatisfactory to answer this problem with what amounts to a rather worn out platitude, that we are all people of this earth, for example, and that there is no difference between you and me. It is certainly the case that there is nothing greater about myself in face of the other, nothing which gives me a right that the other should not have, and Heidegger dangerously resists this fact. Instead, he speaks of the ‘destiny’ of the German nation and its people,⁴⁷ a conviction

⁴⁵*UII-VI*, pp. 146-147. *PII-VI*, pp. 107-108.

⁴⁶*SZ*, p. 513. *BT*, p. 370.

⁴⁷As Nazi rector of Freiburg University, Heidegger writes to his academic staff that the ‘individual, whatever his place, counts for nothing. The destiny of our nation within the state counts for everything’. Safranski, *Beyond Good and Evil*, pp. 270-271

that it is only them that will save the West,⁴⁸ and that their language has a right to the Greek beginning that others do not.⁴⁹

On the contrary, the differences of our particularities ought to be reason to rejoice. Unable to grasp this, Heidegger seems stuck in the ‘eternal recurring’ loop of willing his particular place to greater levels of greatness.⁵⁰ Within this eternal recurrence, is there a place to *learn*? Can another ‘particular’ not *teach us* about the limitations of our own? Can these differences, conceived perhaps more on the basis of a friendly scepticism, or a welcoming and warm suspicion, still not bring us the ‘strife’ that Heidegger wished to result from the significance of the ‘enemy’?⁵¹ Or given that it is only through this ‘strife’ and ‘struggle’ (*Erkämpfte*) that there is a ‘guarantee and granting of the highest’⁵², one might perhaps be advised to avoid framing the essence of truth in this way altogether. The unwillingness to learn ‘from’ yields itself in the problem in Heidegger’s approach to interpretation also, where a ‘confrontation’ seems too focussed on one’s own search for the meaning of being.⁵³ And does this concern not gain greater confirmation, when his attempt to ‘confront’ result in the possibility of ‘decision’, *his* decision? His decision was to establish Hölderlin’s poetry as the destiny of the German people. We have seen some of the ways in which this emboldened him to argue for some of the uglier tendencies of his thinking at this time.⁵⁴

Heidegger’s loss of faith in the regime is crucial to consider, for it shows the inadequacy of dismissing Heidegger as a Nazi ideologist.⁵⁵ The depth of his thought easily resists this charge, and we risk circumventing the problems of this thinking if we hastily dismiss it as a result of his support of the movement. But even if this simplifies, it is nonetheless a disappointing failure on Heidegger’s part that his thinking—despite its distance with other Nazi ideologists—fed into the propaganda of the state.⁵⁶ Here, the question of the role and responsibility of the philosopher in society asserts itself, and the failure of Heidegger in this regard is not unique. The

⁴⁸*EM*, pp. 40-42..

⁴⁹*HH*, pp. 290-294.

⁵⁰*NII*, p. 203.

⁵¹*Ibid.*

⁵²*HH*, p. 293. *HHGR*, p. 266.

⁵³See Section 2.1 of this study.

⁵⁴See Section 3.2.4 of this study.

⁵⁵*Pace Faye*, ‘Nazi Foundations in Heidegger’s Work’, p. 56. ‘[I]t is apparent to me that it is absolutely impossible to separate ideology from philosophy in Heidegger’s work’.

⁵⁶*Der Alemanne, May 3, 1933* ‘The Philosopher Heidegger Enters the Nazi Party’, pp. 13-15. See also, Section 3.3 of this study.

Heidegger controversy teaches us the way in which the abstract ‘abode’ of thinking has genuine, practical, consequences, where our thought can be taken up and utilised in ways we may not have intended. His resignation of the rectorship is clear indication that Heidegger realised that this may have been the case, as the many disparaging remarks in the *Black Notebooks* evidence as well,⁵⁷ but there is still genuine proximity between his thinking and the National Socialist Party. Further, the *Black Notebooks* have also revealed that he was a committed anti-Semite. Likewise, the Western tradition is rife with brilliant thinkers who succumbed to racist and other prejudicial notions of their time,⁵⁸ just as there were some who did not.⁵⁹ The Heidegger controversy thus becomes a key case study in an interrogation of the Western tradition of thinking as a whole, providing a framework in which to ask questions about the role of philosophy in society, and how we can safeguard it from simply falling in line with the worst of its historical horizon.

Heidegger’s philosophy is undoubtedly open to something like the National Socialist movement, a dimension of his thought that he drew from and utilised throughout the 1930s in order to be the philosopher of his time. To strengthen this connection, he tells a story about nihilism, other beginnings, and the possibility of the greatness of the German people through the realisation of their destiny, a possibility he sought to realise in the intersection of his philosophical work, the politics of Hitler, and the poetry of Hölderlin.

Might we, with Caputo, save his thought by ‘demythologizing’ it?⁶⁰ Sheehan’s ‘new paradigm’ attempts something like this,⁶¹ sifting through Heidegger’s thought

⁵⁷See, for example, *III-VI*, p. 146.

⁵⁸Can one forget Aristotle’s support of democracy but defence of slavery? Or both Hume’s and Kant’s comments about the inferiority of people of colour? One of course must be sensitive to the historical time these texts are written in. Plato, however, did not believe slavery was necessary, at least in the ideal state. Perhaps Aristotle was being more of a realist. But Aristotle thought that women were inferior to men, another historical assumption that Plato rejected. This is not to judge Aristotle, but the example serves to show that philosophy has the capacity to critique the assumptions of its historical context. At least, one would hope it has the power to do that. If it cannot, then for what reason do we bother? For more on this, see Bernasconi, ‘Race and Earth in Heidegger’s Thinking During the Late 1930s’, esp. p. 66. Bernasconi notes, ‘if the continuing polemic against Heidegger merely serves to distract attention from how widespread the advocacy of racist ideas and policies have been in Western philosophy, then it serves us ill. It must be part of a broader interrogation of the Western philosophical tradition’. See, also, Arendt, ‘Martin Heidegger at Eighty’, esp. pp. 300-303.

⁵⁹One might think here of Plato, who accepted both men and women into his philosophical academy at a time when women were generally considered to be of a lower rationality than man.

⁶⁰Caputo, ‘Demythologizing Heidegger: *Aletheia* and the History of Being’, p. 519.

⁶¹He calls for such an approach to Heidegger’s thought in his ‘Heidegger and the Nazi’s’. See also his, *Making Sense of Heidegger*, p. 293. ‘The project would have been better off without that story [of the history of metaphysics] (and Heidegger’s personal fortunes might have fared better without his application of it to politics)’.

for its genuine contributions to the history of philosophy.⁶² This serves to clarify some of the essential insights of his thought, such as the significance of existing in a world of meaning and the unique role that ‘radical human finitude’ plays in its disclosure.⁶³ In doing so, Sheehan’s project opens up possibilities for this thought beyond what Heidegger attempted in the 1930s. However, something is lost in the process. Sheehan highlights the importance of Heidegger’s realisation of the significance of concealment, but the self-concealed as ‘earth’ is missing from his discussion. Perhaps for good reason, but this and other unique insights of Heidegger’s are inextricably linked with his ‘penchant’ for ‘privileged epochs’ and ‘new beginnings’.⁶⁴ Earth as ‘holy’ might be one such example, crystallising the attempt to think truth as appearance without recourse to a world ‘beyond’ this one. The ‘holy’ earth might serve as an invaluable contribution to scholarship and beyond in light of the increasingly alarming reports on the significance of climate change.⁶⁵ And what of the role of the work of art? Heidegger utilises this to establish the homeland, certainly, but his desire to think of art beyond aesthetics and his emphasis on its role in attuning one to a dimension of truth that is unavailable to philosophical discourse is an evocative suggestion.

The fear of nihilism may have caused Heidegger to establish a story about the history of being, and this development drew the proximity of his thinking and the significance of the National Socialist Party closer together, but by establishing the significance of meaningful intelligibility (*Sein*) in relation to the place of meaning (*Da*) that the human being sustains, the root for his support lies in the fabric of *Being and Time*. For Heidegger we cannot think ‘concealment’ and ‘mystery’ without some attempt to bring it to the understanding and in relation to the place that it emerges in. Due to this necessity in his thought, the earth becomes the homeland through Hölderlin’s poetry.⁶⁶ We may easily end up disguising these problems if we demythologise his thought for it is precisely through this mythology that the problems are rendered visible.

There are elements of Heidegger’s thought that resist this intersection with the National Socialist Party. For example, when he emphasises the importance of a

⁶²Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger*, pp. 16-20.

⁶³Ibid., p. 294. See also, *ibid.*, p. 22

⁶⁴Caputo, ‘Demythologizing Heidegger: *Alētheia* and the History of Being’, p. 519.

⁶⁵This is explored further by Glazerbrook, ‘Heidegger and Environmental Philosophy’.

⁶⁶On this, see Trawny’s notion of contamination in, Trawny, *The Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy*, p. 3.

receptive attunement when one thinks, and when he realises that the understanding of the meaning of being is ‘overpowered’ by nature. He evokes the ‘reverie’ of beauty, and there are at times almost ‘sacral’ resonances to his reflections on being. Implicitly then, he recognises that something pushes against *Dasein*’s attempt to make sense of the world. To be finite is to be in the midst of the ‘overwhelming’, and to reduce it to the understanding of the meaning of being requires great ‘violence’.⁶⁷ Thus, the ‘clearing’ that our finitude opens is constantly threatened by what exceeds its grasp,⁶⁸ a tendency of Heidegger’s thought we ought to exploit.⁶⁹ Had Heidegger incorporated the significance of this into his thought at this time, one wonders if he would have placed into question the necessity for a ‘will to expansion’.⁷⁰

The dimension of his thinking that resists the emphasis on the will results in a number of ambiguities in his thinking at this time. For example, the homeland is always an event of the future, which obscures and brings into question the attempt to establish a homeland in the present. Or, when the grounding of the truth of being and the understanding of concealment it would result in seems to instil a sense of the polysemy of the meanings of things within its people, despite that Heidegger believes that this truth *depends* on an authoritarian political order to be realised.⁷¹ Perhaps it is this last point we see his thinking move both toward and against National Socialism at the same time.

On the proximity of Heidegger’s thought and his support of the National Socialist Party then, the answer remains equivocal. His thinking fundamentally lends itself to this support, but it also resists this. In certain moments, it moves in both directions at the same time. Regardless, the focus on the will eclipses its tendency to resist, and the ‘overpowering’ nature finds its voice in the great poets of a nation, demanding the legislators to unfold itself so that the destiny of the German people can be willed to greater, existential, heights of disclosure.

One wonders about the place of ethics in his thought. The closest Heidegger gets to some kind of ethics is the attempt to establish the ‘*ethos*’ of a place through the tripartite structure of the legislator, the poet, and the state-creator.⁷² In this sense,

⁶⁷*EM*, p. 159.

⁶⁸Polt, ‘Meaning, Excess, Event’, esp. p. 32-38.

⁶⁹Levinas, ‘Heidegger, Gagarin and us’, p. 233. As Levinas argues, “[l]et us [only] remain masters of the mystery that the earth breathes’. Perhaps, even the term ‘master’ here is problematic, for this mystery should precisely place our ability to master into question, serving to humble us.

⁷⁰*NHS*, p. 55.

⁷¹*BP*, pp. 61-62

⁷²*HH*, pp. 144-145. See also, Young, *Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art*, p. 24.

Heidegger is right to claim that in his thought the truth of *beyng* precedes the question of ethics.⁷³ The impact of this can be evaluated in light of the limitations of his thought that lends itself to support something like Nazism. For Heidegger, human finitude opens up a space of meaning that I am thrown into. By implicitly having a sense for what it means to be within this contextual horizon, I manoeuvre through this space, projecting meanings, and some of us establish new ways of being for those who come after us. But what places this understanding into question? Is anxiety-toward-my-own-death enough here? I'm not so sure. For although my being is placed into question, it is *my* being that I become concerned about, giving *me* the opportunity to project myself into greater levels of disclosure. Once Heidegger thinks of *Dasein* as a 'people' or 'nation', then the precedent of his thought as established in *Being and Time* reaches fruition in the totalising effects of the eternally recurring understanding that wills the truth of its *topos* to greater existential heights of disclosure through the poet, philosopher, and state-creator. There is no possibility to *rupture* this truth, nothing to learn *from*, no being, or *beyng*, or even ~~being~~, to which to be receptive, in any meaningful sense at least. Heidegger's starting point demands this, for it is only within the understanding that truth comes to be. Might an ethics that precedes ontology provide the conditions in which to place the understanding of *Dasein* into question?

There is pretence in his thought for this rupture: not the 'more' of the 'greater' but instead the unknowability of the mystery. I would encourage a reflection on this mystery in its absolute unknowability, perhaps even a good 'beyond' being to which Plato already tried to draw our attention. If we follow the trajectory of Heidegger's thought, then this 'beyond' becomes the unquestionable authority of the legislator. It is not because of the persecution of an authoritarian regime that the legislator cannot be questioned—even if Heidegger also supports such measures—but because the will of the legislator and the truth he grounds *precedes* the framework of what is questionable. We must take into account Heidegger's objection here, for if one was to think of this 'good' as *a* being then one would be repeating the metaphysics of presence, and there surely is something to the binding between 'Idea' and 'gaze'. My suspicion is that to think of Plato's good this way is to do a disservice to Plato also, but one must go *through* Heidegger's thought to move beyond him, if not because of

⁷³BH, pp. 352-354

the genuine insight and depth of his thought, then because of the major influence of his thinking.

Nonetheless, the traps of his thought suggest that if we are to think with Heidegger, we must in the same moment think against him, subjecting him to critical evaluation with resources from beyond his own thought.⁷⁴ Therefore, it is not enough to simply ‘demythologize’ him. Instead, if we are to transcend the sometimes dangerous limitations of his thought, one means by which we might proceed—if one was to take one’s impetus from this study—would be to return to Plato’s allegory of the cave, and especially his notion of the good beyond being. Heidegger reduces this ‘good’ to the vision of the legislator. On the contrary, it would seem that if there is any hope for a humbling of his philosophy, and for philosophy as such to have the capacity to say something that speaks not only to its time but beyond it, the significance of a good beyond the being of the philosopher is perhaps one place we could begin.

⁷⁴Nowell Smith reaches a similar conclusion. See Smith, *Sounding/Silence*, pp. 178-196.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

1. Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* and *Briefe*

Arendt, Hannah, and Martin Heidegger, *Briefe 1925-1975* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1998)

Heidegger, Martin, *Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache* (1953/54): 'Zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden', in *Unterwegs zur Sprache, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 12, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1959), pp. 79-146

————— *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 65, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989)

————— *Brief über den Humanismus*, in *Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 9, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), pp. 313-364

————— *Der Anfang der Abendländischen Philosophie: Auslegung des Anaximander und Parmenides*, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 35, ed. by Peter Trawny (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2012)

————— *Die Kehre*, in *Identität und Differenz, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 11, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006), pp. 113-124

————— *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*, in *Holzwege, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 5, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), pp. 1-74

————— *Einführung in die Metaphysik, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 40, ed. by Petra Jaeger (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983)

————— *Hölderlin's Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein", Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 39, ed. by Susanne Ziegler (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1980)

————— *Nietzsches metaphysischs Grundstellung im abendländischen Denken: Die Ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 44, ed. by Marion Heinz (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1986)

————— *Nietzsche: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 43, ed. by Bernd Heimbüchel (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985)

————— *Sein und Wahrheit: 1. Die Grundfrage der Philosophie 2. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 36/37, ed. by Hartmut Tietjen (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2001)

————— *Sein und Zeit, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 2, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann, 2nd edn. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2018)

————— *Überlegungen II-VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931-1938), Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 94, ed. by Peter Trawny (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2014)

————— *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, in *Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 9, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), pp. 177-202

————— *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 34, ed. by Hermann Mörchen (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1988)

————— *Was ist Metaphysik?*, in *Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 9, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), pp. 103-122

————— *Wozu Dichter*, in *Holzwege, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 5, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), pp. 269-320

————— *Zeit und Sein*, in *Zur Sache des Denken, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 14, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1969), pp. 3-115

Heidegger, Martin, and Fritz Heidegger, ‘*Martin und Fritz Heidegger: Briefe*’, in *Heidegger und der Antisemitismus: Positionen im Widerstreit, Mit Briefen von Martin und Fritz Heidegger* (Freiburg: Herder, 2016), pp. 15-142

2. English Translations of Heidegger’s Texts

Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time* rev. edn by Dennis J Schmidt, trans. by Joan Stambaugh, SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy, ed. by Dennis J. Schmidt (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010)

————— *Being and Truth*, trans. by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, *Studies in Continental Thought*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010)

————— *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: Insight Into That Which Is and Basic Principles of Thinking*, trans. by Andrew J. Mitchell, *Studies in Continental Thought*, ed. by John Sallis (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2012)

————— *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. by Albert Hofstadter, rev. edn (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1982; repr. 1988)

————— *The Beginning of Western Philosophy: Interpretations of Anaximander and Parmenides*, trans. by Richard Rojcewicz, *Studies in Continental Thought*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2015)

————— *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, trans. by Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu, *Studies in Continental Thought*, ed. by John Sallis (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2012)

————— ‘Follow the Führer! (1934)’, trans. by D. D. Runes, in *Martin Heidegger: Philosophical and Political Writings*, ed. by Manfred Stassen (London: Continuum, 2003), pp. 12-15

————— *The Essence of Truth: On Plato’s Cave Allegory and the Theaetetus*, trans. by Ted Sadler, *Athlone Contemporary European Thinkers* (London: Continuum, 2002)

————— *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, trans. by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, *Studies in Continental Thought*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995)

————— ‘Hölderlin’s Earth and Heaven’, in *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, trans. by Keith Hollier, *Contemporary Studies in Philosophy and the Human Sciences*, ed. by Hugh J. Silverman and Graeme Nicholson (New York: Humanity Books, 2000), pp. 175-208

————— *Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine”*, trans. by William McNeill and Julia Ireland, *Studies in Continental Thought*, ed. by John Sallis (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2014)

————— *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, *Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy*, ed. by James M. Edie (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988; repr. 1994)

————— *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, 2nd rev. edn (London: Yale University Press, 2014)

————— *Introduction to Philosophy: Thinking and Poetizing*, trans. by Phillip Jacques Braunstein, *Studies in Continental Thought*, ed. by John Sallis (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2011)

————— *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*, trans. by Wanda Torres Gregory and Yvonne Unna (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009)

————— *Logic: The Question of Truth*, trans. by Thomas Sheehan, *Studies in Continental Thought*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010)

————— *Nietzsche Volume I: The Will to Power as Art*, trans. by David Farrell-Krell (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979; repr. 1991)

————— *Nietzsche Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, trans. by David Farrell-Krell (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984; repr. 1991)

————— *Nature, History, State: 1933-1934*, trans. by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (London: Bloomsbury, 2015)

————— ‘Only a God Can Save Us: *Der Spiegel*’s Interview With Martin Heidegger’, in *Martin Heidegger: Philosophical and Political Writings*, ed. by Manfred Stassen (London: Continuum, 2003)

————— *Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, trans. by John Van Buren, *Studies in Continental Thought*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999)

————— *The Origin of the Work of Art*, trans. by Albert Hofstadter, in *Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964)*, ed. by David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1978; repr. Routledge Classics, 2011), pp. 83-140

————— ‘The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts’, trans. by Lisa Harries, in *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers*, ed. by Gunther Neske and Emil Ketterings (New York: Paragon House, 1990), pp. 15-32

————— ‘Selected Letters from the Heidegger-Blochmann Correspondence’, trans. by Frank W.H Edler, *Heidegger and the Political*, special issue, *Graduate Faculty of Philosophy Journal*, 14, 2-15, 1 (1991), 557-77

————— ‘The Self Assertion of the German University (1933)’, trans. by Karsten Harries, in *Heidegger: Philosophical and Political Writings*, ed. by Manfred Stassen (London: Continuum, 2003)

————— ‘Introduction to “What is Metaphysics”’, trans. by Walter Kauffman, in *Pathmarks*, ed. by William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 277-290

————— *Parmenides*, trans. by André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz, *Studies in Continental Thought*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992)

————— *Ponderings II-VI: Black Notebooks 1931-38*, trans. by Richard Rojcewicz, *Studies in Continental Thought*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2016)

————— ‘Political Texts, 1933-34’, in *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*, ed. by Richard Wolin (London: The MIT Press, 1993; repr. 1998), pp. 40-60

————— ‘Preface’, trans. by William J. Richardson, in William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 4th edn (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), pp. viii-xxii

————— *The Event*, trans. by Richard Rojcewicz, *Studies in Continental Thought*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2013)

————— *What Calls for Thinking*, trans. by Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray, in *Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964)*, ed. by David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1978; repr. Routledge Classics, 2011), pp. 261-277

————— *What is Metaphysics?*, trans. by David Farrell Krell, in *Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964)*, ed. by David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1978; repr. Routledge Classics, 2011), pp. 41-57

————— *What are Poets For?* in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1971), pp. 87-140

Secondary Sources

Absher, Brandon, 'Speaking of Being: Language, Speech and Silence in *Being and Time*', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, 30, 2 (2016), 204-231

Adorno, Theodor, *The Jargon of Authenticity*, trans. by Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will (London: Routledge Classics, 2003)

Allan, William S., *Ellipses: Of Poetry and the Experience of Language after Heidegger, Hölderlin, and Blanchot* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2007)

Anonymous, *Der Alemanne, May 3, 1933* 'The Philosopher Heidegger Enters the Nazi Party', trans. by Dagobert D. Runes, in *German Existentialism: Martin Heidegger* (New York: The Wisdom Library, 1965), pp. 13-15

————— *Der Alemaane, May 28, 1933* 'Inauguration of New Rector', trans. by Dagobert D. Runes, in *German Existentialism: Martin Heidegger* (New York: The Wisdom Library, 1965), pp. 16-17

Arendt, Hannah, 'Martin Heidegger at Eighty', in *Heidegger & Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays*, ed. by Michael Murray (London: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 293-303

————— *The Life of the Mind*, 2 vols (London: Harcourt Inc., 1971; repr. 1978), II

Babiche, Babette, 'From Van Gogh's Museum to the Temple at Bassae: Heidegger's Truth of Art and Schapiro's Art History', *Culture, Theory and Critique*, 44, 2 (2003), 151-169

————— 'The 'New' Heidegger', in *Heidegger in the 21st Century*, ed. by Tziouannis Georgakis and Paul Ennis (Frankfurt a.M.: Springer, 2015), pp. 167-187

————— *Words in Blood, Like Flowers: Philosophy and Poetry, Music, Eros in Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Heidegger* (State University of New York: State University of New York Press, 2006)

Bambach, Charles R., *Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crises of Historicism* (London: Cornell University Press, 1995)

————— *Heidegger's Roots: Nietzsche, National Socialism, and the Greeks* (London: Cornell University Press, 2003)

Bartky, S.L., 'Originative Thinking in the Later Philosophy of Heidegger', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 30, 3 (1970), 368-381

Bate, Jonathan, *The Song of the Earth* (London: Picador, 2000)

de Beistegui, Miguel, *The New Heidegger*, Continuum Studies in Continental Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2005)

Bernasconi, Robert, 'Heidegger, Rickert, Nietzsche, and the Critique of Biologism', in *Heidegger & Nietzsche*, ed. by Babette Babiche, Alfred Denker, Holger Zabrowski (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2012) pp. 159-179

————— 'Literary Attestation in Philosophy. Heidegger's Footnote on Tolstoy's 'The Death of Ivan Ilyich'', in *Philosopher Poets*, ed. by David Wood (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 7-36

————— 'Poets as Prophets and as Painters: Heidegger's Turn to Language and the Hölderlin Turn in Context', in *Heidegger and Language*, ed. by Jeffrey Powell, *Studies in Continental Thought*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2013), pp. 146-162

————— 'Race and Earth in Heidegger's Thinking During the Late 1930s', *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 48, 1 (2010), 49-66

————— 'Who Belongs? Heidegger's Philosophy of the *Volk* in 1933-4', in Martin Heidegger, *Nature, History, State: 1933-1934*, trans. by Gregory Friend and Richard Polt (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), pp. 109-126

Biemel, Walter, *Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study by Walter Biemel*, trans. by J. L. Mehta (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976)

Blond, Louis P., *Heidegger and Nietzsche: Overcoming Metaphysics* (London: Continuum, 2010)

Bolt, Barbara, *Heidegger Reframed, Interpreting Key Thinkers for the Arts* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2011)

Bonic, Natalija, 'Obviousness and Semblant Truth with Heidegger', *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie*, 67, 1 (2005), 61-93

Bossart, William H., 'Heidegger's Theory of Art', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 27, 1 (1968), 57-66

Braver, Lee, *Groundless Grounds: A Study of Heidegger and Wittgenstein* (London: The MIT Press, 2012)

————— *Heidegger's Later Writings: A Readers Guide* (London: MPG Books Ltd., 2009)

————— *Heidegger: Thinking of Being, Key Contemporary Thinkers* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014)

————— *A Thing of This World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism*, Topics in Historical Philosophy, ed. by David Kolb, John McCumber (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007)

Brenahan, Aili, 'The Dynamic Phenomenon of Art in Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art"', *European Journal of Philosophy*, 25, 2 (2017), 294-311

Brencio, Francesca, 'Foundation and Poetry: Heidegger as a Reader of Hölderlin', *Studia Philosophiae Christianae*, 49, 4 (2013), 181-200

Bruin, John, 'Heidegger and Two Kinds of Art', *The Journal of Aesthetic and Art Criticism*, 52, 4 (1994), 447-457

van Buren, John, *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994)

Capobianco, Richard, *Engaging Heidegger* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010)

————— *Heidegger's Way of Being* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014)

Claxton, Susanne, *Heidegger's Gods: An Ecofeminist Perspective* (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017)

Caputo, John D., 'Demythologizing Heidegger: *Aletheia* and the History of Being', *Review of Metaphysics*, 41, 3 (1988), 519-546

Chytry, Josef, 'The Timeliness of Martin Heidegger's National Socialism', *New German Critique*, 58, 1993, 86-96

Collins, Jeff, *Heidegger and the Nazis*, Postmodern Encounters (Cambridge: Cox & Wyman Ltd, 2000)

Dahlstrom, Daniel O., *Heidegger's Concept of Truth*, Modern European Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)

————— 'Transcendental Truth and the Truth That Prevails', in *Transcendental Heidegger*, ed. by Steven Crowell and Jeff Malpas (California: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 63-73

Dastur, Francois, 'Language and *Ereignis*', in *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 355-369

Davis, Bret W, *Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit* (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007)

Derrida, Jacques, 'Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (*Geschlecht* IV), trans. by John P. Leavey, Jr., in *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 163-218

————— *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*, trans. by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (London: University of Chicago Press, 1989)

————— *The Truth in Painting*, trans. by Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987)

————— ‘Interpreting Signatures (Nietzsche/Heidegger): Two Questions’, trans. by Diane P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer, in *Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer/Derrida Encounter*, ed. by Diane P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer, SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy, ed. by Dennis J. Schmidt (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 58-71

Desmond, William, *Art, Origins, Otherness: Between Philosophy and Art* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003)

Dill, Matt, ‘Heidegger, Art and the Overcoming of Metaphysics’, *European Journal of Philosophy*, 25, 2 (2017), 294-311

Dostel, Robert J., ‘The Public and the People: Heidegger’s Illiberal Politics’, *The Review of Metaphysics*, 47, 3 (1994), 517-555

Dreyfus, Hubert, ‘Heidegger on the Connection between Nihilism, Art, Technology, Politics’, in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)

Edler, Frank H.W., ‘The Significance of Hölderlin for Heidegger’s Political Involvement with Nazism’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Toronto, 1992)

Ehrmantraut, Michael, ‘Nihilism and Education in Heidegger’s Essay: ‘Nietzsche’s Word: “God is Dead”’, *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 48, 8 (2016), 764-784

Eiland, Howard, ‘Heidegger’s Political Engagement’, *Salmagundi*, 70/71, Intellectuals (1986), 267-284

Elpidorou, Andreas, and Lauren Freeman, ‘Affectivity in Heidegger I: Moods and Emotions in *Being and Time*’, *Philosophy Compass*, 10, 10 (2015), 661-671

Emad, Parvis, “‘Heidegger 1,’ ‘Heidegger II,’ and *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*”, in *From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, Desire: Essays in Honor of*

William J. Richardson, S.J., ed. by Babette E. Babiche, *Phaenomenologica*, vol. 133 (Dordrecht: Springer, 1995), pp. 129-146

————— ‘Heidegger’s Stance on Hölderlin in the *Beiträge*’, *Studia Phaenomenologica*, 12, 2012, 359–381

————— *On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy* (London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2007)

Engelland, Chad, *Heidegger’s Shadow: Kant, Husserl and the Transcendental Turn* (London: Routledge, 2017)

————— ‘The Phenomenological Kant: Heidegger’s Interest in Transcendental Philosophy’, *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 41, 2 (2010), 150-169

Farias, Victor, *Heidegger and Nazism*, trans. by Paul Burrell, Dominic Di Bernardi and Gabriel R. Ricci (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987)

Farrell-Krell, David, ‘Art and Truth in Raging Discord: Heidegger and Nietzsche on the Will to Power’, *Boundary 2*, 4, 2 (1976), 378-392

————— *Ecstasy, Catastrophe: Heidegger from Being and Time to the Black Notebooks* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015)

————— *Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger’s Thinking of Being* (London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986)

————— *The Purest of Bastards: Works of Mourning, Art, and Affirmation in the Thought of Jacques Derrida* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000)

Faye, Emmanuel, *Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy in Light of the Unpublished Seminars of 1933-1935*, trans. by Michael B. Smith (United States of America: Yale University Press, 2009)

————— 'Nazi Foundations in Heidegger's Work', trans. by Alexis Watson and Richard J. Golsan, *South Central Review*, 23, 1 (2006), 55-66

Fell, Joseph, *Heidegger and Sartre: An Essay on Being and Place* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979)

Gadamer, Hans-Georg, *Heidegger's Ways*, trans. by John W. Stanley (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994)

————— *Truth and Method*, trans. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd rev edn. (New York: Continuum, 1999)

Galston, William A., 'Heidegger's Plato: A Critique of Plato's Doctrine of Truth', *Philosophical Forum*, 13, 4 (1982), 371-383

Games, Ken, 'Postmodernisms Use and Abuse of Nietzsche', in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 62, 2 (2001), 337-360

Gessman, Martin, 'Heidegger and National Socialism: He Meant What he Said', in *Heidegger's Black Notebooks: Responses to Anti-Semitism*, ed. by Andrew J. Mitchell and Peter Trawny (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), pp. 114-129

Gethmann-Siefert, Annmarie, 'Heidegger and Hölderlin: The Over-Usage of Poets in an Impoverished Time', trans. by Richard Taft, *Research in Phenomenology*, 19, 1 (1989), 59-88

Glazerbrook, Trish, 'Heidegger and Environmental Philosophy', in *The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger*, ed. by François Raffoul and Eric S. Nelson (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 433-440

Gonzalez, Francisco J., *Plato and Heidegger: A Question of Dialogue* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009)

Gordon, Haim, and Rivca Gordon, *Heidegger on Truth and Myth: A Rejection of Postmodernism* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 2006; repr. 2007)

Gosetti-Ferencei, Jennifer Anna, *Heidegger, Hölderlin and the Subject of Poetic Language: Toward a New Poetics of Dasein* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004)

Gray, J. Glenn, 'Heidegger "Evaluates" Nietzsche', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 14, 2 (1953), 304-309

Grossman, Andreas, 'The Myth of Poetry: On Heidegger's Hölderlin', trans. by Donald F. Goodwin, *The Comparatist*, 28, 2004, 29-38

Guignon, Charles, 'Truth as Disclosure: Art, Language, History', in *Heidegger Reexamined Volume 3: Art Poetry, Technology*, ed. by Hubert Mark Wrathall (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 47-62

Haar, Michel, 'Heidegger and the Nietzschean 'Physiology of Art'', in *Exceedingly Nietzsche: Aspects of Contemporary Nietzsche Interpretation*, ed. by David Farrell-Krell and David Wood (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 13-30

——— *The Song of the Earth*, trans. by Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993)

Habermas, Jürgen, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, trans. by Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987; repr. 1998)

Harries, Karsten, *Art Matters: A Critical Commentary on Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art"*, Contributions to Phenomenology, vol. 57, ed. by Nicolas de Warren and Dermot Moran (Netherlands: Springer, 2009)

————— 'Heidegger as a Political Thinker', *The Review of Metaphysics*, 29, 4 (1976), 642-669

Hersey, John M., 'The Question of Ground and the Truth of Being: Heidegger's WS 1931/2 Lecture Course *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet*' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Catholic University of America, 2008)

Holy-Luczaj, Magdalena, 'Heidegger's Support for a Deep Ecology Reexamined Once: Ontological Egalitarianism or Farwell to the Great Chain of Being', *Ethics and the Environment*, 20, 1 (2015), 45-66

Howey, Richard Lowell, *Heidegger and Jaspers on Nietzsche: A Critical Examination of Heidegger's and Jaspers' Interpretation of Nietzsche* (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973)

Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book, General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. by F. Kersten (Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983)

————— *Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology and The Confrontation with Heidegger (1927-1930)*, trans. and ed by Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 1997)

Hyland, Drew A., 'Caring for Myth: Heidegger, Plato and the Myth of Cura', in *Research in Phenomenology*, 27, 1 (1997)

Ijsseling, Samuel, 'Mimesis and Translation', in *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 348-351

Inwood, Michael, 'Truth and Untruth in Plato and Heidegger', in *Heidegger and Plato: Toward Dialogue*, ed. by Catalin Partenie and Tom Rockmore (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2005), pp. 72-95

Ireland, Julia, 'Naming Physis and the "Inner Truth of National Socialism": A New Archival Discovery', *Research in Phenomenology*, 44, 2014, 315-346

Janicaud, Dominique, 'The "Overcoming" of Metaphysics in the Hölderlin Lectures', in *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 383-391

Jaspers, Karl, 'Letter to the Freiburg University Denazification Committee (December 22, 1945)', in *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*, ed. by Richard Wolin (London: The MIT Press, 1998) pp. 144-151

Karpowicz, W. J. Korab, 'Heidegger's Hidden Path: From Philosophy to Politics', *The Review of Metaphysics*, 61, 2 (2007), 295-315

Kisiel, Theodore, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time* (London: University of California Press, 1993; repr. 1995)

————— 'Measuring the Greatness of the Great Men of Grand Politics: How Nietzsche's "Dynamite" Rendered Heidegger "kaputt"', in *Heidegger & Nietzsche*, ed. by Babette Babiche, Alfred Denker, and Holger Zabrowski (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2012), pp. 195-222

————— 'On the Purported Platonism of Heidegger's Rectoral Address', in *Heidegger and Plato: Toward Dialogue*, ed. by Catalin Partenie and Tom Rockmore (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2005), pp. 3-21

Koch, William, 'Phenomenology as Social Critique', in *Horizons of Authenticity in Phenomenology, Existentialism, and Moral Psychology: Essays in Honor of Charles Guignon*, ed. by Hans Pederson and Megan Altman, Contributions to Phenomenology, vol. 74, ed. by Nicholas de Warren and Dermot Moran (London: Springer, 2015), pp. 311-328

Kockleman, Joseph J., *Heidegger on Art and Artworks* (Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986)

————— *On The Truth of Being: Reflections on Heidegger's Later Philosophy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984)

Kolb, David, 'Heidegger at 100 in America', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 52, 1 (1991), 140-151

Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, *Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction of the Political*, trans. by Chris Turner (Paris: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1990)

Levinas, Emmanuel, 'Heidegger, Gagarin and us', in *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, trans. by Séan Hand (United States of America: Athlone Press, 1990)

Long, Christopher P., 'Art's Fateful Hour: Benjamin, Heidegger, Art and Politics', *New German Critique*, 83, Special Issue on Walter Benjamin (2001), 89-115

Löwith, Karl, 'My Last Meeting with Heidegger in Rome, 1936', *New German Critique*, 45, special issue on Bloch and Heidegger (1988), 115-116

————— 'The Political Implications of Heidegger's Existentialism', in *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*, ed. by Richard Wolin (London: The MIT Press, 1993; repr. 1998), pp. 167-187

Magrini, James, 'Speaking the Language of Destiny: *Heidegger's Conversations with Hölderlin*', in *Philosophical Writings*, 42, 1 (2014), 34-52

————— 'The Work of Art and Truth of Being as "Historical": Reading Being and Time, "The Origin of the Work of Art," and the "Turn" in Heidegger's Philosophy of the 1930s', *Philosophy Today*, 54, 4 (2009), 346-363

Malpas, Jeff, *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place: Explorations in the Topology of Being* (London: The MIT Press, 2012)

————— *Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World* (London: The MIT Press, 2006)

————— 'Heidegger's Topology of Being', in *Transcendental Heidegger*, ed. by Steven Crowell and Jeff Malpas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 119-134

Maly, Kenneth, 'Turnings in Essential Swaying and the Leap', in *Companion to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy*, ed. by Charles E. Scott, Susan M. Schoenbohn, Daniela Vallega-Neu and Alejandro Vallega (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001)

de Mann, Paul, *Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism*, 2nd rev. ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983)

McDonnell, Cyril, *Heidegger's Way Through Phenomenology To the Question of the Meaning of Being: A Study of Heidegger's Philosophical Path of Thinking from 1909 to 1927* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2015)

————— 'Understanding and Assessing Heidegger's Topic in Phenomenology in Light of His Appropriation of Dilthey's Hermeneutic Manner of Thinking', *Maynooth Philosophical Papers*, ed. by Cyril McDonnell and Thomas Kelly, 4, 2007, 31-54

McNeill, William, 'Heidegger's Hölderlin Lectures', in *The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger*, ed. by François Raffoul and Eric S. Nelson (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 223-236

Meillassoux, Quentin, *After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency* (London: Continuum, 2011)

Mitchell, Andrew, *Heidegger Among the Sculptors: Body, Space and the Art of Dwelling* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010)

————— 'Heidegger's Breakdown: Health and Healing Under the Care of Dr. V.E. von Gebattel', *Research in Phenomenology*, 46, 2016, 70-97

Moran, Dermot, 'What Does Heidegger Mean by the Transcendence of Dasein?' in *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 22, 4 (2014), 491-514

Murray, Michael, 'Heidegger's Hermeneutic Reading of Hölderlin: The Signs of Time', *The Eighteenth Century*, 21, 1 (1980), 41-66

Nietzsche, Friedrich, *Beyond Good and Evil*, in *Basic Writings*, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 2000)

Nicholson, Graeme, 'The Ontological Difference', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 33, 4 (1996), 357-374

O'Brien, Mahon, *Heidegger, History and the Holocaust* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015)

Ó Murchadha, Felix, *The Time of Revolution: Kairos and Chronos in Heidegger* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013; repr. 2014)

Ott, Hugo, *Martin Heidegger: A Political Life*, trans. by Allan Blunden (London: Fontana Press, 1993)

Palmer, Richard E., *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969)

Payne, Michael, 'Derrida, Heidegger, and Van Gogh's 'Old Shoes'', *Textual Practises*, 6, 1 (1992), 87-100

Peperzak, Adriaan T., 'Heidegger and Plato's Idea of the Good', in *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 258-285

Petzet, Heinrich Wiegand, *Encounters and Dialogues with Martin Heidegger: 1929-1976*, trans. by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (London: Chicago University Press, 1993)

Phillips, James, *Heidegger's Volk: Between National Socialism and Poetry* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005)

Plato, *Apology*, in *Plato: Symposium and the Death of Socrates*, trans. by Tom Griffith (London: Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, 1997)

Pöggeler, Otto, *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, trans. by Daniel Magurshak and Sigmund Barber (United States of America: Humanities Press, 1978; repr. 1990)

————— *Philosophie und Politik bei Heidegger* (Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber GmbH, 1972)

Polt, Richard, *The Emergency of Being: On Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy* (London: Cornell University Press, 2006)

————— 'The Event of Enthinking the Event', in *A Companion to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy*, ed. by Charles E. Scott, Susan M. Schoenbohm, Daniela Vallega-Neu and Alejandro Vallega (Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2001)

————— ‘Meaning, Excess, Event’, *Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual*, 1, 2011, 26-53

Richardson, William J., *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 4th edn (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003)

Rickey, Christopher, *Revolutionary Saints: Heidegger, National Socialism, and Antinomian Politics* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002)

Ridling, Zaine, *The Witness of Being: The Unity of Heidegger’s Later Thought* (Missouri: Access Foundation, 2001)

Rigby, Kate, ‘Earth, World, Text: On the (Im)Possibility of Ecopoesis’, *New Literary History*, 35, 3 (2004), 427-442

Rockmore, Tom, *On Heidegger’s Nazism and Philosophy* (Oxford: University of California Press, 1992)

Rohkrämer, Thomas, ‘Heidegger and National Socialism: Great Hopes, Despair and Resilience’, in *Reading Heidegger’s Black Notebooks: 1931-41*, ed. by Ingo Farin and Jeff Malpas (London: The MIT Press, 2016), pp. 239-252

Rosemann, Philipp, ‘Heidegger’s Transcendental History’, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 40, 4 (2002), 501-523

Rosen, Stanley, ‘Remarks on Heidegger’s Plato’, in *Heidegger and Plato: Toward Dialogue*, ed. by Catalin Partenie and Tom Rockmore (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2005), pp. 178-191

Safranski, Rüdiger, *Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil*, trans. by Ewals Osers (London: Harvard University Press, 1998)

Sassen, Brigitte, 'Heidegger on Van Gogh's *Old Shoes*: The Use/Abuse of a Painting', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 32, 2 (2001), 160-173

Schapiro, Meyer, 'The Still Life as a Personal Object—a Note on Heidegger and Van Gogh', in *Theory and Philosophy of Art: Style, Artist and Society* (New York: George Braziller, 1998), pp. 135-151

Schüwer, André, 'Nature and the Holy: On Heidegger's Interpretation of Hölderlin's Hymn "Wie wenn am Feiertage"', *Research in Phenomenology*, 7, 1 (1977), 225-237

Shalow, Frank, *The Renewal of the Heidegger Kant Dialogue: Action, Thought and Responsibility* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992)

Scholtz, Janae, *The Invention of a People: Heidegger and Deleuze on Art and the Political* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015)

Schürmann, Reiner, *Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy*, trans. by Christine Marie-Gross and Reiner Schürmann (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987)

————— 'Political Thinking in Heidegger', *Social Research*, 45, 1 (1978), 191-221

————— 'The Ontological Difference and Political Philosophy', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 40, 1 (1979), 99-122

Sheehan, Thomas, 'Emmanuel Faye: The Introduction of Fraud into Philosophy?', *Philosophy Today*, 59, 3 (2015), 367-400

————— 'Kehre and Ereignis: A Prolegomenon to *Introduction to Metaphysics*', in *A Companion to Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics*, ed. by Richard Polt and Gregory Fried (London: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 3-16

————— *Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift* (London: Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd, 2015)

————— ‘A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research’, *Continental Philosophy Review*, 34, 2 (2001), 1-20

Sinnerbrink, Robert, ‘Heidegger and Nietzsche on the End of Art’, in *Heidegger & Nietzsche*, ed. by Babette Babich, Alfred Denker & Holger Zabrowski (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2012), pp. 417-428

Sluga, Hans, ‘Heidegger’s Nietzsche’, in *A Companion to Heidegger*, ed. by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), pp. 102-120

Smith, David Nowell, *Sounding/Silence: Martin Heidegger at the Limits of Poetics* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013)

Sparrow, Tom, *The End of Phenomenology: Metaphysics and the New Realism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014)

Switzer, Robert, “‘Raging Discordance.’ Heidegger and Nietzsche on Truth and Art’, in *Heidegger & Nietzsche*, ed. by Babette Babich, Alfred Denker & Holger Zabrowski (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2012)

Taminiaux, Jacques, *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*, trans. by Michael Gendre (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991)

Taminiaux, Jacques, ‘On Heidegger’s Interpretation of the Will to Power as Art’, in *New Nietzsche Studies*, 3, 1 and 2 (1999), 1-22

Taminiaux, Jacques, ‘The Origin of “The Origin of the Work of Art”’, in *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 392-404

Thomson, Iain D., 'The Failure of Philosophy: Why Didn't *Being and Time* Answer the Question of Being', in *Division III of Heidegger's Being and Time: The Unanswered Question of Being*, ed. by Lee Braver (London: MIT Press, 2015), pp. 285-310

————— 'Heideggerian Perfectionism and the Phenomenology of the Pedagogical Truth Event', in *Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics*, ed. by Kevin Hermberg and Paul Gyllenhammer (London: Bloomsbury, 2013)

————— 'On the Advantages and Disadvantages of Reading Heidegger Backwards: White's *Time and Death*', *Inquiry*, 50, 1 (2007), 103-120

————— 'Ontotheology' in *The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 319-28

————— *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011)

————— *Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)

————— 'Ontotheology? Understanding Heidegger's *Destruktion* of Metaphysics', *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 8, 3 (2000), 297-327

Tonner, Philip, 'Are Animals Poor in World? A Critique of Heidegger's Anthropocentrism', in *Anthropocentrism: Humans, Animals, Environment*, ed. by Rob Boddice (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 203-221

Trawny, Peter, *Heidegger and the Myth of a Jewish World Conspiracy*, trans. by Andrew J. Mitchell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015)

Vadén, Tera, *Heidegger, Žižek on Revolution* (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2014)

Vabalaitė, Ruta Marija, 'Activity and Passivity in the Creation of Art: Heidegger and Later Philosophers', *Filosofija Sociologija*, 28, 1 (2017), 3-10

Vallega-Neu, Daniela, *Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy: An Introduction* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003)

————— 'Poietic Saying', in *Companion to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy*, ed. by Charles E. Scott, Susan M. Schoenbohm, Daniela Vallega-Neu, and Alejandro Vallega (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001), pp. 66-80

————— 'Thinking in Decision', *Research in Phenomenology*, 33, 1 (2003), 247-263

Versényi, Laszlo, *Heidegger, Being, and Truth* (London: Yale University Press, 1965)

Warminski, Andrzej, 'Monstrous History: Heidegger Reading Hölderlin', *Yale French Studies*, 77, 1990, 193-209

White, Carol J., *Time and Death: Heidegger's Analysis of Finitude* (England: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005)

Wilkerson, Dale, 'Preservation-Enhancement as Value-Positing Metaphysics in Heidegger's Essay "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead'"', in *Heidegger & Nietzsche*, ed. by Babette Babiche, Alfred Denker, Holger Zabrowski (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2012), pp. 121-143

Wolin, Richard, 'Introduction', in *The Heidegger Controversy*, ed. by Richard Wolin (London: MIT Press, 1993)

————— 'Introduction' to, Karl Jaspers, 'Letter to the Freiburg University Denazification Committee (December 22, 1945)', in *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*, ed. by Richard Wolin (London: The MIT Press, 1998), pp. 144-147

————— *The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990)

Wood, David, 'Reiterating the Temporal: Toward a Rethinking of Heidegger on Time', in *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, ed. by John Sallis (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 136-159

Wood, Robert E., 'The Heart in Heidegger's Thought', *Continental Philosophy Review*, 48, 4 (2015), 445-462

Wrathall, Mark, *Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011)

————— 'Heidegger on Plato, Truth and Unconcealment: The 1931-32 Lecture on the Essence of Truth', *Inquiry*, 47, 5 (2004), 443-463

Vadén, Tera, *Heidegger, Zizek on Revolution* (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2014)

Vattimo, Gianni, 'Aesthetics at the End of Epistemology', in *Heidegger Reexamined, Volume 3: Art, Poetry, Philosophy*, ed. by Hubert Dreyfus, Mark Wrathall (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 1-8

Young, Julian, *Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)

————— *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)

————— *Heidegger's Later Philosophy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)

Zimmerman, Michael E., *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990)

Žižek, Slavoj, *Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism* (London: Verso, 2012; repr. 2013)

Zuckert, Catherine H., 'Martin Heidegger: His Philosophy and His Politics', *Political Theory*, 18, 1 (1990), 51-79

————— *Postmodern Platos: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Gadamer, Strauss, Derrida* (London: University of Chicago Press, 1996)

Zwart, Megan Halteman, 'What Simple Descriptions ... Cannot Grasp: Heidegger and the Plato of Myth', (unpublished doctoral thesis, Graduate Program in Philosophy, Norte Dame, Indiana, 2009)

Online Sources

Richard Polt, Interview with 'Ereignis', Available at
<<http://www.beyng.com/RichardPoltInterview.html>> [accessed 24/06/16]

Thomas Sheehan, 'Heidegger and the Nazi's', *The New York Review of Books*, 16 June 1988. Available at <<https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1988/06/16/heidegger-and-the-nazis/>> [accessed 15 Sep 2018]