The Arithmetic of Anxiety

'Demographic Aggression' Narratives in Majoritarian
Mobilisations in India and Northern Ireland

MLitt

Alex Paul O'Connell

Ollscoil
Mhá Nuad
Ollscoil na hÉireann
Má Nuad

Faculty of Arts

Department of Anthropology

Head of Department: Dr Abdullahi Osman El-Tom

Supervisor: Dr Chandana Mathur

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Abstract

For my thesis, I want to compare Hindu nationalist and Northern Irish Protestant fears about the rising population of Muslim and Catholic minorities respectively. Both areas have very well established state-enshrined communal divisions and a long history of demographic paranoia. These fears have a grain of truth in that the growth figures are slightly higher for Indian Muslims and Northern Irish Catholics, but overall the threat is greatly exaggerated. I want to look how these discourses are constructed, and how 'demographic aggression' is measured in both instances.

Northern Ireland was set up as a Protestant majority region and the population of Catholics within its borders has always been an issue. Now that Catholics are established in civil society they are thought to be in the ascendant and their higher population adds to this, fuelling fears of a disintegration of 'Protestant Ulster' in the next few years. In India the Muslim population is regarded as a homogenous, virile and aggressive group by *Hindutva* ideologues who allege that Muslims are attempting to dominate the country with their deliberate overbreeding.

I want to compare how both shape their threat as homogeneous fecund and innately threatening/antagonistic. I want to see how they measure this aggression and use their 'sites of contestation', how the symbolism is appropriated, maintained and developed. I want to see how such discourses are countered or subsumed by the minority group, whether they acquiesce to these generalisations, resist them or incorporate them in any way.

Declaration

I hereby declare that the dissertation submitted by me in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Letters and entitled "The Arithmetic of Anxiety: 'Demographic Aggression' Narratives in Majoritarian Mobilisations in India and Northern Ireland" represents my own work and has not been previously submitted to this or any other institution for any degree, diploma or other qualification.

Signed:…………………………………………

Acknowledgments

Glossary and Acronyms

ABVP – Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (All India Students Council) – A national students union, part of the **Sangh Parivar** and committed to promoting *Hindutva* values on Indian campuses.

Adivasi – 'Indigenous' inhabitants of India, also known as 'Tribals', 'Scheduled Tribes' (STs), and *vanvasi* (forest-dwellers).

Aryans – A term ostensibly used to refer to old speakers of Indo-European languages, it has been used to contrast between Indo-European influence in India with that of Dravidian peoples. In *Hindutva* usage, it denotes an ancient and idealised India, to which Indians should aspire. The idea of an Aryan/Dravidian divide in ancient India is hotly rejected by the *Hindutva* movement as an attempt by the British to divide and conquer the people of India.

Babri Masjid - A sixteenth-century mosque built during the reign of the Mughal ruler Babar. It became a site of conflict in the eighties when the *Hindutva* movement claimed it had been built on the site of temple commemorating the birthplace of Rama. It was torn down illegally in 1992 and the event and site have remained a source of conflict and division between Hindus and Muslims.

Belfast Agreement – See **GFA**

Bharat – The preferred *Hindutva* name for India; 'India' having foreign connotations.

Bharat Mata – 'Mother India', usually depicted astride a lion.

BJP – Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People's Party) – A right-wing political party currently in government. Associated with the RSS.

B–Specials – See **USC**.

Brahmin – The highest caste, Brahmins, (and brahminism) is more widely the normative model for contemporary Hinduism and its values are applied to all castes regardless of their status or history.

Dalit – 'Oppressed', Indians without caste, also referred to as '(ex-)Untouchables', 'Scheduled Castes' (SCs), and '*Harijans*'.

Ghar Wapsi – 'Homecoming', like ***Shuddhi***, a ceremony to convert Indians to Hinduism.

GFA – Good Friday Agreement – Also known as the **Belfast Agreement**, the GFA proposed devolved administration for Northern Ireland with a strong emphasis on parity of communities and power-sharing.

Hindutva – 'Hindu-ness': the philosophy of being a Hindu (rather than just 'being Hindu'), coined by V.D. Savarkar in a book of the same name in 1923.

IBI – Illegal Bangladeshi infiltrator – A trope repeatedly used by Hindutvavadis to refer to any questionable figure (not necessarily Bangladeshi, Bengali, or Muslim). It is particularly attached to Bengalis living in Assam who are believed to have infiltrated in order to claim citizenship, land rights and add to the growing Muslim population.

IRA – Irish Republican Army – Originally the Irish Republican Brotherhood, the IRA conducted a guerrilla campaign against British rule in Ireland, later fracturing during the Irish Civil War in 1922. Manifestations of the IRA continued to exist as marginalised groups in Ireland, before being revitalised in the late 1960s. Most of the republican violence during the Troubles was conducted by the Provisional IRA (PIRA).

JNU – Jawaharlal Nehru University - Delhi's main university, and the site of much of my Indian research.

Kaliyuga – Age of Demon/Vice – Part of the Sanskrit cosmology, Kaliyuga denotes an extended period of chaos and decline, and is used by Hindutvavadis to explain the perceived decline of Hindu civilisation in India.

Mleccha – 'barbarian', Sanskrit term used to denote foreigners and **Adivasis**.

Purdah – the act of 'veiling' women, conceptually by limiting their access to the public sphere and/or literally by veiling their body.

Rama – The hero of the *Ramayana* and mascot of the Sangh Parivar. Held to be the ideal man and worshipped as an avatar of Vishnu.

Rashtra – Difficult to translate to English but it means roughly 'spirit'. It was often used synonymously with nation, in the sense of a *Hindu Rashtra*: Hindu nation. This would be to use 'nation' in the spiritual sense it often assumes.

RSS – '*Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh*' – National Volunteers Organisation: The main organisation of the *Hindutva* movement.

RUC – Royal Ulster Constabulary – The main police force in Northern Ireland, founded in 1922 and replaced by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) in 2001.

Sangh Parivar – 'Family of the Sangh' – An umbrella term for the organisations associated with the RSS.

Sevaks – 'Volunteers', or ground activists for the RSS, also known as Pracharaks**.**

Shuddi – 'Purification', like *Ghar wapsi* a ceremony to convert Indians to Hinduism.

Shudra – The lowest recognised caste in Indian tradition, generally comprising of the farmers and producers. Higher than **Dalits.**

UDR – Ulster Defence Regiment – an infantry division of the British Army founded in 1970 to maintain order in Northern Ireland. Regrouped in 1992 into the Royal Irish Regiment (RIR).

USC – Ulster Special Constabulary – Formed largely from the UVF in 1920, the USC were a military police force charges with aiding the RUC in maintaining order in Northern Ireland. Largely mistrusted by the Catholic population, it was disbanded in 1969. Also known as the **B–Specials**.

UVF – Ulster Freedom Fighters – A loyalist militia founded in 1912 to block Home Rule for Ireland, later incorporated into the 36th Division of the British Army during WWI, and largely absorbed into the Ulster Special Constabulary (**USC**) in 1920. The name was revived by paramilitaries in 1966 to combat nationalism, still active but ending its campaign in 2007.

Ulema – 'Religious scholar', Islamic religious authority, referring here to Orthodox schools of Islamic authority which advised the Delhi Sultanate and Mughal Empire.

Introduction

During my Masters research in North India in 2009, a moral panic arose over 'love jihad' (Cohen, 2002). In the southern state of Karnataka, a controversial mixed marriage had prompted fears of mass seduction of naive Hindu girls by sinister Muslim men funded by Arab oil money. Thousands of women were reported to be missing, though the police insisted there was no evidence. Eventually, the panic receded, though it would occasionally resurface in the Indian public consciousness.

All this played out while I examined *Hindutva* perceptions of gender, and the need to protect women. My research mostly focused on the position of Muslim activist women in carving autonomy within the Muslim community in Jaipur, one of the main cities in North India. My research would not have been complete without examining the attitudes of Hindu nationalists, and so I found my way into the office of a local RSS *pracharak*. The *Hindutva* movement is a nationalist and xenophobic category of strident Hindus (usually upper-caste), who have been central to Hindu-Muslim tensions in India since the 1930s. Organised into various institutions, they make up an umbrella network called the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which influences mainstream Indian social thought and creates much of the 'common sense' stereotyping (Moodie 2011, Datta 1993) that affects Muslim Indians today. One of the key elements of anti-Islamism among my informants was the idea of the oppressed Muslim woman, a familiar trope in western Islamophobia too[1].

Kishore and his son were anxious to explain how Hindutva encouraged Muslim women to emerge from the shackles of Islamic patriarchy. Islam, he intoned, degraded women, treated them badly and subjugated their rights and freedoms. Hinduism in contrast exalted women, and allowed them to find their voice in society. It was a familiar discussion from Islamophobia, formulaic even. But, I protested, the activists I did research with were fully autonomous, and far from critical of Islam they promoted it. Kishore switched tack, declaiming how Islam

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[1] Lila Abu-Lughod's article on US militarism and Afghani women is a foundational text (Abu-Lughod 2002). Paola Bacchetta has done important work on representations of femininity in *Hindutva* spheres, including on Muslim women (Bacchetta 1994).

was poisonous to Indian society, its adherents criminals and animals. How did this tally with his positive depiction of Muslim women carving their autonomy I asked. Back and forth Kishore went between two parallel narratives that never quite met in the middle. Women were victims or heroes and Muslims were criminals, but positive Muslim women didn't register.

This was my first taste of the scripted rhetoric of the Hindutva movement, a discourse that relied on disciplined speech that followed the same line. In her examination of Hindutva ideology, Shubh Mathur explains how Hindutvavadis counter this:

> Our opponent s accuse us all of repeating the same things, but tell me, if you ask anyone the question—how much do two plus two make, the answer will be four. Anyone who answers that two plus two make five will be wrong. That's why we all answer alike. (Mathur 2008, 96)

Even the Hindutva retort is formulaic. It reflects the importance of practice and training to Hindutva, of creating disciplined men (and to a lesser extent, women) who will be the vanguard of a renewed Hindu *rashtra*[2]. The twin narratives of women who need masculine liberators, and homogenous Muslim enemies who need to be defeated could only fitfully intersect.

Love jihad provided a new avenue for protective Hindu warriors, expanding misogynistic Muslim control to Hindu women too. Part of the logic of love jihad was incredulity that 'decent' Hindus girls would agree to a relationship with Muslims as their reputation of cruelty spoke for itself. The *Organiser*, the *Hindutva* movement's main English-language publication explained that:

> Hindu-Muslim marriages "stink" because a girl brought up in atmosphere of freedoms is forced to sacrifice her own "way of life" and do things that are obnoxious to her nature due to her upbringing, for example, eating or cooking beef, wasting precious hours of life learning the Arabic language in order to read the Koran, even having to hide under a burqa or face cover, especially if she goes with him to his Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan or Turkey, etc. (Organiser 2009)

Furthermore, love jihad touched upon a wider discourse around Muslim fertility in India. Among the various allegations and points of conflicts invoked against Muslim

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[2] *Rashtra* translates as 'spirit' or 'nation', though here nation is meant as organic and ephemeral, in marked contrast to the technocratic 'state'. Fighting for the nation over the state allows both hindutvavadis and loyalists to claim to fight for a higher law.

Indians, the *Hindutva* movement had long harboured fears that the Muslim population's slightly higher population growth was deliberate. This drew together many divergent themes: the roots of the India/Pakistan Partition in 1947, Muslim misogyny and debasement of family values, the worth of increasing Muslim votes to mainstream parties and the general lack of collective Hindu action. The more I learned about *Hindutva* narratives of gender, agency and politics and population, the more familiar it seemed from an Irish perspective. Anti-Catholic and anti-Irish narratives often had a similar pattern: of oversexed males, beaten wives, and armies of neglected children. More extreme examples in Northern Ireland indicated a political desire to outbreed the majority Protestant population and demographically alter the political state of the region. Instances of this prejudice emerge periodically in areas of Catholic/Protestant tension such as Ireland, Scotland and the Netherlands.

The term 'moral panic' was coined by Stanley Cohen in his 1972 title *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, a discussion of media trends around violence (2002). 'Folk devils' is a suitable term for the caricature of Muslims and Catholics in these narratives, a negative trope that emerges when necessary to fulfil a particular social function, or make sense of a particular event. 'Folk devils' usually draw on existing stereotypes, in this case there a long history of sexualised and fecund imagery (Cohen 2002, 41). Both Islamophobia and anti-Catholicism promote similar visions of hordes of illiterate zealots under the sway of a politically-charged and essentially backwards religion. Both had similar gender stereotypes: of subjugated women forced by clerics into breeding masses of children. As is usual with moral panics, there is very little substance to allegations, rumour and media distortions create a story from nothing, then moving on before the details are clear. Cohen's work focuses on short episodes of heightened tension, though he notes the overall effect in producing lingering stereotypes. Love jihad and periodic outbursts of demographic paranoia in both fieldsites follow this pattern of episodic hysteria that highlights a persistent stereotype.

Both narratives draw on a selective interpretation of historical events, promoting a social memory of suffering and antagonism to locate present-day concerns in events of the past. The partition and consequent violence of India and Northern

Ireland are remembered and used in a remarkably similar way, reifying what were to become the markers of community strength and the route by which that strength was undermined. Islamophobic and anti-Catholic narratives preceded the traumatic events of these years and are partly to blame for the violence. But the violence itself has become the cornerstone of subsequent narratives and has usurped older ideologies and hegemonies. As Feldman notes, violence often overrides older narratives and subverts them (Feldman 1991, 20).

Overbreeding and Demographic Aggression

Beginning with Robert Malthus, and increasing with the development of the census as a measure of society, overbreeding and untrammelled growth among undesirable elements of society have been part of a narrative of privilege and threat for most of modernity. Whether by excessive immigration or rampant breeding, various categories of subaltern or minority have presented themselves in the imagination of civil society as a growing danger that may overswamp civilisation through sheer numbers. There are numerous examples in Britain, Europe and North America, whether it be the Irish influx of the late nineteenth century, the rise of an over-fecund degenerate working class, or illegal immigration from the Third World. The degree of danger presented by this phenomenon is comparable to Sherry Ortner's analysis of the relationship between purity and pollution. Drawing on Mary Douglas' seminal work, Ortner argues that the risk of pollution spreading and overwhelming purity is countered by rituals. The active element of ritual overcomes the passive if persistent nature of pollution:

> If pollution is so strong, how can anything be purified? When the purifying agent is introduced, why does it purify rather than become polluted itself? The answer in line with the present argument, is that purification is effected in a ritual context--that purification ritual, as a purposive activity that pits self-conscious (symbolic) action against natural energies, is more powerful than those energies. (Ortner 1972, 11).

She further argues that this relationship applies to similar and related dichotomies such as culture/nature and order/disorder. In all these cases the threatening 'lower' element is overcome by the smaller but active 'higher' element. In other words, the larger and perpetually threatening nature/pollution/disorder can be

defeated by a smaller but more powerful force for culture/purity/order, due to the active nature of the latter. This in turn creates a further dichotomy, between action and passivity. In regular population narratives, the threat of a passive but dangerous population growth among inferior populations needs to be overcome by action among superior peoples, usually in the form of immigration restrictions, and active defence of civilised values.

Demographic aggression narratives invert this order, framing population growth as an active process, and the higher element (the majoritarian population) as passive and weakened. This is reflected in contemporary concerns with 'unawakened' Hindus, who are oblivious to the Islamic threat facing modern India as *Hindutva* ideologues see it; or infantilised European/liberals dependent on state subsidies and American military power[3]. This is what differentiates demographic aggression narratives and standard demographic anxiety. Ordinary demographic anxiety argues for action against a growing but acephalous threat. Demographic aggression narrative takes this further as not only is action needed but agency must first be restored. This is quite a simplistic summary (the 'restoration' of agency, for example, is an action itself), but the basics are a restoration of agency, then a restoration of control/supremacy.

'Demographic aggression' — I borrow the term from *Hindutva* literature — assumes certain qualities that further distinguish it from standard overbreeding and degeneracy narratives. It implies a large degree of cohesion in the outgroup to which it is attributed. While racial categories or class groups are distinguished, stereotyped and reproduced in hegemonic narratives, there is rarely a large degree of organisation manifest. Dirty, uneducated, lazy and irrational are separate from politically motivated to destroy the ruling order. This degree of cohesion projected onto Catholics and Muslims is related to the degenerate stereotype of the lower orders: they are unable to think for themselves, are slaves, are easily led, etc. But overall they are uniformly antagonistic, are organised in the sense that they have clear leaders, and they are motivated.

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[3] For example, the work of Mark Steyn, Bruce Bawer and Ayaan Hirsi Ali dwell on the theme of how Europe is lost to the West.

Agency, Narrative and Legitimation

My primary aim in this thesis is not to expand on theoretical oversights or contribute to the ethnographic corpus of either Northern Ireland or India. Others are far better equipped to do this. My aim is to tease out a transnational metanarrative, demographic aggression, using familiar theoretical models and my two fieldsites as case studies. To do this I compare two fieldsites where it has a 'common sense' resonance, and revolves around dynamics of nationalism, modernity and secularism. In part this responds to Talal Asad's call for an ethnography of secularism, though I hope it is an ethnography of a range of social movements. The key ideas are governmentality; narrativity; class/caste; and gender. Colonial regimes implemented specific policies population categorisation, and these techniques of governmentality came to define identity formations in both fieldsites. Techniques of governmentality continued under autonomous governments, masked by rhetorics of liberal secularism that continued to marginalise subaltern populations. Narrativity, as developed by Ricoeur (1984), is central to the worldview construction of the thesis subjects; how they construct a world in which they are victims and their oppressors are stronger despite being inferior, poorer, marginalised, external etc. In particular the re-enactment of narratives, how they are lived out and renewed is central to an understanding of the social actions of social actors. In both cases, there is a strong dimension of social hierarchy to the tension, with idealised promotion of unity sitting uncomfortably with class and caste division. Demographic aggression fears demand a homogeneous response, against a common foe. This dynamic suggests a social utility to the narrative, though over time the sense of menace may weaken. Lastly, I will discuss gender construction and particularly masculinity ideals which are implicit or explicit in discussions of action in both sites (Connell, 2005). Masculinity is linked with ideas of agency and also victimhood, an emerging trend in masculinity studies. For many years now, the entrenchment of 'identity politics' and the light shone on male gaze and nodes of power has resulted in masculine appropriation of both female roles and minority roles. Both groups call for a renewal of authentic masculine values as an antidote to the demographic threat.

The uniting theme here is legitimacy and illegitimacy. The central aim of demographic aggression narratives is to delegitimise legitimate practices while legitimising illegitimate ones. Thus Muslims and Catholics having children becomes a subversive political act, while violence and discrimination are necessary acts of resistance. Secularism narrativity and agency all revolve around this nexus of awareness: that one's actions can be reconsidered from a moral perspective while those of the 'Other' can be vilified. A passage from the hardline paper the *Loyalist News* highlighted this early on:

> The old lady with the pioneer badge, shuffling around the city centre store, could she be planting incendiary devices? or maybe she's scouting the layout of the building. The priest walks unconcernedly through the city, is he really a priest, or some terrorist in disguise? (Loyalist News 1971b)

The central underpinning here, of an assumed digression, and equal justification for any and all sympathetic action is seen in discussions of secularism too. The very idea of identity politics revolves around the 'we have values, they have culture' dichotomy, resulting in explicit imbalances. Again, a Northern Irish example if the banning of the Irish tricolour as a terrorist symbol while the Union flag is venerated. Both occupy similar positions in the communities that fly them, both inspire violence and patriotism. But due to power imbalances, one as a respected state emblem and the other a marker of criminality.

The main means to discuss this is the 'public sphere', and particularly the work of Jürgen Habermas and Talal Asad. Habermas' seminal work, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1989), centralised the idea of public legitimacy in the modern era, with all the attendant inequality that went with it. While exclusion is not the key point of Habermas' work, its traces are unavoidable: the men-only salons, the exclusion of the non-literate, the slow expansion of the franchise, the oxymoronic role of the 'Public Voice' in channelling the concerns of elites in society.

> The important question, therefore, is not to determine why the idea of "modernity" (or the "West") is a misdescription, but why it has become hegemonic *as a political goal*, what practical consequences follow from that hegemony, and what social conditions maintain it... Modernity is a *project* – or rather a series of interlinked projects – that certain people in power seek to achieve. (Asad 2003, 13)

I aim to explore the outline of this series of projects here, and how they have impacted on everyday understandings of identity, society and power. As Asad suggests here, modernity can be considered as something of a normative force: a categorical tool designed to locate the object on a spectrum of value. For most of my thesis, modernity is the label majoritarians attach to themselves and to their practices to set them apart from competing value-systems. Modernity in this formulation is not a trajectory but a status, a system of value-judgments and forms of exclusion. James Ferguson's exploration of the failure of modernity narratives in Africa refers to it as a 'native category', more of an epistemological folk category than an objective unit of analysis (Ferguson 2005). Modernity becomes a marker of distinction between the Global North and South, or worse yet, reversible. As a status rather than a process (or an abhorrent process), the focus is on separation rather than integration (ibid., 192). For instance in Ireland modernity was the preserve of the Anglo-Irish. Any innovations from the Irish — entrepreneurial networks in the eighteenth century, mass social movements in the nineteenth — were construed as backwards (Ruane and Todd 1996, 27).

All this points to another similarity between India and Northern Ireland: the central role of *events* in the development of the narrative (Somers 1994). Demographic paranoia and often demographic aggression narratives lack a distinct basis. Degeneracy among the working-class or the creeping tide of Islamisation have no real defining moments, though weak attempts with events such as the Siege of Vienna in the case of the latter. Demographic narratives in India and Northern Ireland are defined by recent history, namely the partition of India and Pakistan, and the Partition of Ireland in 1920. While demographic concerns were a major part of the inter-communal narrative prior to these events, afterwards the narratives were defined by the contours of the events. In India, the sexual violence, and concern with abduction and conversion mirrors the levels of violence and abduction seen during the partition violence on both sides. In Northern Ireland, community and territory are almost synonymous (Todd, 1987), and demographic aggression is marked in concern over expansion and retreat. This mirrors the segregation of the communities and the reification of communal space after 1969.

Both sites share similar conceptions of territory and women as sites of contestation. As Deshpande (2003), Mathur (2006) and Anand (2011) have discussed, territory and fears of takeovers are part of Hindutva narratives. The loss of Pakistan and Bangladesh, the continued obsession with 'Greater India', secessionist fears in Kashmir and parts of the North-East, and 'mini-Pak' Muslim ghettoes contribute to a spatialisation of Hindu chauvinism. Nonetheless, space is mostly defined through its symbolism in India, whereas Northern Irish loyalism places little importance on territory rather than 'place' itself (Coulter 1999; Todd 1987). The partition of Pakistan is primarily depicted in terms of sexual assault and even the territorial loss is depicted as the mutilation of Mother India (Butalia, 2000; Das, 2007; Menon & Bhasin, 1993). Similarly, miscegenation and inter-religious relationships continue to generate unease in Northern Ireland (Donnan 1990; Leonard 2009). But gendered violence was rare[4], and narratives focus on spatialisation threats on the whole. My thesis briefly examines territorialisation in India and mixed marriage in chapters three and four respectively. For the most part, however, the evidence that emerged during fieldwork suggests the main preoccupations were different. In part my research charts the fluid nature of these threats so at times they may overlap more clearly.

The link between narrative and event is analysed by Feldman in his book *Formations of Violence.* Here, he describes how narrative is based on event, rather than the other way around as is usually supposed, and the different dynamics that surround the interplay between the two. He uses Ricoeur's idea of 'emplotment' to describe how narratives deal with events. As he puts it: "Emplotment transfigures a practical field through mimesis, conceived not as imitation, but as a configuring mediation of experience" (Feldman 1991, 15). It is this mediation that concerns us, the means by which violent events are rendered in narratives and how this shapes further narratives. Feldman also points out that 'narrative' means any action that tells a story. Just as the event fits the narrative, further actions and events are re-tellings of the narrative, in influencing the narrative, basis events ensure that further actions match their own. Thus the violence of 1947 and 1969 influences

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[4] Aretxaga (1997) argues that sexual violence was part of the state oppression of republican women, especially in custody and prison.

not only today's narratives of the threatening 'Other' but also the actions taken against those Others are a re-telling of the narrative too.

To return to emplotment, Ricoeur sees it as a means by which events can be filtered into a meaningful sequence, "the organization of events into a configurational system, a mode of historical explanation, and a normative intervention (Feldman 1991, 14). The relation between event and narrative is also dealt with Lévi-Strauss, who uses the idea of *bricolage* to explain how narratives change with events and incorporate new ideas using old materials (Lévi-Strauss 2004). In demographic narrative, there are certain tropes which alter slightly through different shifts. 'victim' women, threatening 'Others' and of course virtuous heroes. With the changes in circumstances, these basic tropes alter to fit new narratives. The victim women become weak women, then corrupt and finally dangerous, suiting whichever circumstance but remaining the same. Threatening Others expand to encompass figures such as the state and traitorous members of one's own community.

These narratives and ontological process are adopted by those I call majoritarians, self-defined activist groups concerned with thwarting the demographic threat to their community. I have drawn from a range of sources, ABVP activists, RSS volunteers, Hindutva literature, loyalist/'Orange' media, community activists and the Orange Order in Belfast. No comparison is perfect, and I am comparing not just different fieldsites, but different periods within those fieldsites. I hope I have sustained a cohesive argument while accommodating this diversity. My aim is to illustrate what Brubaker calls 'ethnopolitical entrepreneurs', and what Appadurai (2006) calls 'predatory identities': groups who claim to speak for much larger categories of identity than themselves and who use demographic fears to foster a hard identity in their image.

'The Arithmetic of Anxiety'
My title refers to the connection between enumeration, majoritarianism, hegemony and danger. There is an implicit assumption that majoritarianism carries an expectation of normalcy, that subalterns and minorities are not just non-normative but actively disruptive. Simply acknowledging minorities, as the social structure in

Northern Ireland and India is obliged to do, generates a narrative of antagonism, zero-sum contestation and reification. I have been fascinated by the level of threat located in something as innocuous as family-size or expressions of identity. The 'Arithmetic of Anxiety' refers to both the formula of hegemony and the danger that always lies within enumeration. Both fieldsites have long, unhealthy habits of calculating population and entitlement. If supremacy is based on numbers, then its opposition can be calculated the same way.

The title also refers to the significance of enumeration, the language of demography and the use of statistics in forming and sustaining narratives of demographic aggression. Demography emerged around the same time as anthropology and both have largely stuck to their founding methodological principles. Demography is ostensibly quantitative, positivist and functional, while anthropology prefers qualitative research, and holistic interpretation (Kertzer & Fricke, 1997). Both have struggled somewhat to outgrow their methodologies, though anthropology has been more successful in carving out space as an intellectual force in its own right. The early twentieth century also shaped the values central to both disciplines, emerging in a context of high modernity, colonialism and scientific racism. Demography was strongly marked by the anxieties of population, growth and control, though it tried to sustain itself as ideologically neutral[5]. Demography grounded neutrality in empiricism, leaving analysis to others. In doing so it was co-opted into social and state policy, cushioned from the application of its research, and remaining positivist after other social sciences began to question their social role (Riley & McCarthy, 2003, p. 62). As this thesis and other works illustrate, this leaves room for social and state imagination in both the creation of statistical tools and the interpretation of data (Kreager, 1997).

There has been a lengthy exploration of the role of census enumeration in categorising and reifying populaces in India (Cohn 1987, Appadurai 1993), and others have questioned the utility of massive decennial surveys in discussions of local population (Anderson and Shuttleworth 1998; Jeffery and Jeffery 2006). This thesis is not about challenging or refuting errors in demographic projection, but in

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[5] Anthropology's association with colonialism follows a similar trajectory.

highlighting the use of quantitative data to promote anxiety, and burnish moral panics with a veneer of science. In his wide-ranging discussion of enumeration and politics, Arjun Appadurai (2006) details the production of minorities and their abuse within national understanding of homogeneity. Appadurai locates the 'fear of small numbers' in the incomplete national project: the power of globalisation over national sovereignty, the persistence of poverty and social marginalisation, and the impossibility of ethnocultural purity. These inevitable factors produce anxiety demand an outlet.

"Globalisation, being a force without a face, cannot be the the object of ethnocide. But minorities can" (Appadurai 2006, 44). The national project produces and sustains images of minorities, it requires them as a safety-valve for the inadequacies of political projects[6]. His 2013 book *The Future as Cultural Fact* (2013), elaborates on the 'economy of slippage' between majority and minority, because of the mutability of enumerative ethods and statistics, resulting in excessive rage exhibited with this violence (Appadurai, 2013, p. 92). Returning to Mary Douglas, minorities are matter out of place, to be ritually cleansed. Part of Appadurai's fascination is the mix between statecraft, populations and the narratives they sustain, as discussed throughout this thesis. While he notes the utilisation of pseudo-demographic fears of minorities to reverse majority-minority roles, Appadurai focuses on the smallness of the minorities, the potential therein to complete the erasure of difference and achieve national purity (ibid. 57). My thesis focuses on a rather different sense of threat, and one where minorities pose an existential threat than an anxious reminder of incompleteness[7]. By this logic, the Republic of Ireland should have been more antagonistic to its tiny Protestant minority than Northern Ireland was to its sizeable Catholic minority. Catholics and Muslims do not represent incompleteness but the danger of growing disorder.

In addressing supremacy, I also need to address privilege. Hindutva is predominantly middle to upper-caste (and upper-class), though there has been

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[6] Appadurai offers the emergence of the Sikh threat in 1980s India as an example (Appadurai 2006, 45).

[7] Appadurai later explores the idea of minority/majority reversal, locating the threat in liberal proceduralism, census techniques and global mobility (Appadurai 2006, 83). These themes have some resonance for the arguments here, but shy away from the minority as a threat on its own terms.

considerable expansion across the socio-economic sprectrum in recent decades. Regardless of the socio-economic status, 'privilege' here is mostly about the maintenance of a cultural and political hegemony. This is more contentious in Northern Ireland, where Graham Walker has criticised its flippant use (Walker, 2008). Focusing on industrial employment, Walker argues that the Protestant working-class looked for the same status and rights as the working-class in Britain. To refer to them as 'privileged' ignores the drastic decline in employment since the 1950s, overlooks the class divisions within unionism, and implies that their employment losses were deserved (Walker 2008, 667). Today scholars like Sophie Long emphasise the need for working-class loyalists to regain a social voice and counter damaging media portrayals that dell on violence and rioting (Long, 2018). There is great potential in working-class loyalism re-interpreting the details of the past and building progressive social structures for the future. But this is not the focus of my study.

A Note on Terminology

The debate over terminology could fill a thesis in itself. That aside, I use the following terms. *Catholic* refers to the Roman Catholic population, and *Protestant* as a catch-all term for the various reformist churches of Britain and Ireland. In this I follow the overwhelming consensus, while acknowledging that there are people in the above-mentioned Protestant category who identify themselves as *Catholic*. In my experience they are as aware of the prevailing consensus as I am. My research focuses mainly on the ethnoreligious concerns and less on political ones. Where it is necessary, I refer to *unionists* and *nationalists*, with *loyalists* and *republicans* as the hardline/paramilitary subcategories respectively. The label *Orange* or *Orangemen* only refers to explicit associations with the Orange Order.

Ireland and Britain are the main islands, if referred to as a collective I will use *the Isles*, as is the normal usage. *Northern Ireland* refers to the six-county political statelet and *Ireland* refers to the independent state of the rest of the island. *Ulster* is the geographical north, comprised of nine counties (unless explicitly mentioned in unionist context). While at first glance it might seem pedantic to insist on *Northern Ireland* over *Ulster* as the name for the state, *Ulster* as a label is usually associated

with unionism (certainly *Ulstermen* only refers to unionists), and leans towards bias much like the republican label *Six Counties*.

The Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (**ABVP**) is the student wing of a broad social movement generally referred to as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (**RSS**), usually defined as a social or cultural organisation. The political branch of the RSS is the Bharatiya Jana Party (**BJP**) who currently govern India in a coalition, under the prime minister Narendra Modi. For convenience, all associations will be referred to by their initials. Activists have no collective name, though *swayamsevak* and *pracharak* both denote active members of an organisation. I use the generic term **Hindutvavadi** for anyone active in the name of the early-twentieth-century political philosophy *Hindutva*.

Communalism is a term used to denote inter-religious violence in India, usually Hindu-Muslim, though other religious conflicts occur. Originally a colonial term of categorisation it has shifted into use for religious/ethnic politics and conflict in India (Pandey, 2006). For simplicity I use it in the Northern Irish context in place of sectarianism; they mean effectively the same thing. *Demographic aggression* is an expression I took from *Hindutva* sources, it applies in both fieldsite. For the most part I refer to it as a narrative. I use term *majoritarian* to refer to agents and representatives of these movements. Majoritarian has a technical definition in terms of electoral politics, referring to a system of first-past-the-post systems that concentrate power in leading parties. Both fieldsites have this electoral system, though it is of secondary concern to this topic. I use majoritarian in the Indian sense, representing people who believe that a demographic majority allow them social priority. Finally, narrative is used in preference over discourse. While somewhat interchangeable, narrative suggests plurality and polysemy while discourse is singular and hegemonic. The narratives I discuss are/were often quite common but not universally accepted for the most part.

Chapter One - Ethnicity and Nationalism

> Because the state project is always an unfinished project, it is best observed at the margins – Das 2007, 183.

My thesis is primarily an examination of how religious minorities are regarded by both the state and nationalist hardliners within their respective countries. As Chatterjee points out; the hallmark of modern nationalism is the sovereignty of the people, however nebulous this idea may be. No matter what the mode of government is, it must reflect the wishes of the citizens in some fashion, even dictators act in their name.

This chapter is firstly an examination of this connection between the nation-state and its populations. There are two primary categorisations in nationalism studies, civic and ethnic, that intersect with the state and establish its legitimacy in different ways. While the distinction is too blurred to be analytically useful, it continues to be the benchmark by which we judge the state's relationship to the populations it governs. Minorities come under special scrutiny here, representing the margins of the nation, and exceptions to the 'people' both civic and ethnic nations aspire to represent. It is crucial to note that civic nationalism is just as capable of exclusion as ethnic identities, and just as willing to correct deviant subjects. This study focuses on how civic values are used to marginalise and demonise minorities, imbuing sinister purpose to innocuous social affairs while legitimating communal narratives and actions as duty.

Key to this is the creation and maintenance of group identities, whether ethnic, class, national or religious. If populations are central to nation, then their definition and limits become vital to the nation's self-conception and policies. From Bath onwards, anthropologists have examined the fluid nature of identity, and its relationship with boundaries and other identity groups. In the case of the Hindutva movement and loyalism, social actors prioritise creating coherent group identities that demarcate others and exclude them as much as possible from the public sphere. The preface to Peter Shirlow and Mark McGovern's 'Who are the People?' refers to graffiti routinely found in Northern Ireland (Shirlow & McGovern, 1997). While Shirlow and McGovern query the unity the slogan represents, they ignore

the implication of the message for Catholics. Just as 'Ulstermen' was synonymous with Protestant/unionist, 'the people' excludes Catholics as members of society. Jan-Werner Müller's examination of populism places 'the people' (as opposed to marginal populations, foreigners, and paradoxically the 'elite') at the centre of emerging western political movements (Müller, 2014). In a similar sense, Hindutva claims about the true Hindu nature of India routinely side-line and ignore Muslims, Dalits, Adivasis and peripheral regions. The expansion of 'illegal Bangladeshi infiltrator' to include practically any non-familiar minority group exemplifies the exclusion that these categorisations legitimise (Moodie, 2011). State policies have contributed enormously to creating compartmentalised identities, as well will discuss. But their recognition is also crucial to protecting minority interests in the face of demands to end appeasement and special interests. These calls are as likely to be driven by liberal rhetoric as ethnic exclusion.

Nationalism and Ethnicity

The intersection of religion, nationalism and modernity is crucial in understanding the two fieldsites. In both cases debates around nationalism followed the contours of modernity metanarratives, with minority groups negotiating intersecting ideals of progress and liberalism. Independence movements in India and Ireland were framed by their opponents as regressive and inward-looking, abandoning the cosmopolitan British empire in favour of cultural nationalism. In turn, nationalists framed internal opposition…

In India, independence was grudgingly bestowed by a post-war crumbling empire with few options. Independence was complicated by the regions multifaceted political, linguistic and religious elements, which were in turn dismissed and demonised by Indian nationalists as cultural nationalists, i.e. the same labels they had fought to overcome. In Ireland the trajectory was more fraught, as Britain identified closely with its sister island and large unionist minority. Irish national, strongly marked by second-wave ethnic nationalism was easily dismissed as regressive and even theocratic, with widespread concerns with how capable Irish Catholics were of maintaining a liberal demo cracy.

To navigate these intersections I will briefly dissect the normative values attached to theories of nationalism, and their application in public narratives. The crucial dichotomies usually lie between Anthony Smith's primordialist models of nationalism (1986) and constructivist accounts which are largely accepted today.

Smith's model presupposes large self-ascribed ethnic groups with some political power, whose influence eventually takes the form of the modern nation-state. The viability of modern states is assured by the largely homogenous population and common bonds of history and heritage. As an idea, this retains plenty of common-sense traction but little academic prestige. Since the 1980s, constructivists such as Ernest Gellner (1983), Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1983), and Benedict Anderson (1983) have challenged the taken-for-granted quality of nation-states, arguing that their histories are a lot more forced than Smith allows. For constructivists, states begin to emerge in Europe, after the Renaissance (the timescales and reasons offered vary widely), and impose a dominant culture on a heterogeneous subject population, creating a sense of shared identity and ethnicity. The constructivist formula is better suited to understanding postcolonial nationhood, as it put the statecraft and countering resistance at its core. Smith's formula presupposes large-scale identities such as the French, which are historically questionable (Schnapper, 2004). Focusing on statecraft also draws attention to the civic element of *staatsnation* and the arbitrariness of creating identities.

Both models have fundamentally different ideas of identity, which will become crucial to this discussion. Beginning with Frederik Barth, the assumption that identities are natural, static and self-replicating has been largely supplanted by models that characterise it as a process, a set of relations (1969). Barth insisted that inter-ethnic boundaries, far from defining and excluding cultural groups from each other, are sites of interaction and *creation* of ethnic identity. Furthermore ethnic identities are strategically foregrounded or suppressed depending on the situation. Lastly ethnic or cultural identities compete with a range of other identities, often ethnic themselves.

While these debates are settled for the most part in social sciences, the ideas of culture and ethnicity as primal and static retain popular support. Nationalism and ethnicity studies need to continue to study primordial models as 'social facts' which shape politics and identity around the world (Geertz 1963). There is a tendency to understand these ideas a false, and therefore of no further academic importance, despite their importance. Similarly, there is tendency to associate non-ethnic forms of identity with positive values, separating identity into good and bad forms, which allows for ethnic identity to be dismissed and demonised while good identity (seen as modern, individualist, and liberal) as positive. This thesis explores the interrelation between these models of identity in nationalist movements and how they allow exclusionary and discriminatory beliefs and actions under the guise of progression.

Using a specifically western frame of analysis, I will use modernity as the defining attribute of this shift. Immanuel Wallerstein charts the emergence of statism in the late fifteenth century, defined by bureaucratisation, monopolisation of force, and homogenisation (Wallerstein 1974, 136). The centralisation and power that went with statism separated earlier forms of governance from the structures of control that followed under colonial rule. Because of this I locate the defining shift in Anglo-Irish relations with the imposition of the Plantations rather than the earlier Norman settlement. In a similar sense, British colonisation was much more pervasive than earlier invasions from the north-west.

Richard Jenkins is as good a place as any to start with ethnicity. He draws on Weber's definition of ethnicity as primarily a shared belief in common descent, usually by members of a political collective (Jenkins 2008, 10). This belief enables group formation which draws on a range of cultural factors such as language, ritual, and history. Jenkins is careful to insist on it being a *belief* that leads to groupness, not a foregone collective. He also lays great emphasis on the idea of separation from other identity groups; ethnicity is as much about who's out than who's in (ibid., 11). Noting anthropology's shift from racial categories and 'tribes' to 'culture' and then 'ethnicity', the term has entered western social understandings, usually coterminous with nationalism.

There are a number of important factors to take from this. Going back to Frederik Barth's challenge to structural-functionalist models of static, bounded social units he highlights the importance of ascription and identity formation. Ethnicity here is fluid and relational, and defined against and through neighbouring identity groups. In effective Barth lays the groundwork for constructivism, which becomes central to theories of nationalism. More importantly still, power relations are highly important to the negotiation of these ethnic categories and boundary maintenance. Barth's focus was on agency and fluidity, but he left the task of ascribing identities (and attendant values) to the members of the ethnic group. Jenkins argues that anthropologists are reluctant to examine power and its influence on ascription, most notably in racial categorisations. Jenkins distinguishes between internal and external categorisations, noting the emphasis on the former and the neglect of the latter (Jenkins 2008, 76). Both interact with each other, and external categorisations convey power and domination. A classic example of Said's *Orientalism*, which outline the reductive categorisation of colonised populations in the Middle east and beyond, and how the dominant framework enabled domination and exploitation. The idea of developing us/them distinctions is crucial to my research, especially in how the Other is categorised and demonised in my field-sites.

Returning to self-ascription, Rogers Brubaker provides a useful discussion of the distinction between ethnicity and 'groupness'. Like Jenkins he distinguishes the belief in ethnicity from the social reality. Brubaker focuses on ethnicity as a process with many variables. He frames it not just as a belief, but as narrative encoding that provides a cognitive framework to perceive and make sense of the world around us. This narrative coding applies not just to others but to shifting political realities and the self-identity (Brubaker 2004, 17). He also emphasises the importance of leaders and agents, which he refers to as ethnopolitical entrepreneurs. These might be militant groups, states or influential social movements. These entities aspire to shape and create ethnicity as a project, a ploy that does not always work. My research focuses on the efforts of various social organisations to shape and lead ethnic polities. In the case of Northern Ireland, ethnic identities are an apt way of understanding Protestant un

ionist identities, though they intersect with other social classifications in interesting ways. In India, the Hindutva movement aspires to create something akin to an ethnic identity from the various frameworks provided by nineteenth century Hindu reform movements and the associated political movements. In their case the attempt to foster a single ethnic identity, is more fractured by caste, language and region to be successful, but nevertheless has a powerful influence in Indian society.

Constructivism and Colonialism

A lot of nationalism writing wrangles with its origin period. Proponents of constructivist ideas place it around the time of mass-literacy, or industrialisation, other such as Smith locate it much earlier in ethnic core groupings. My research has the advantage of sidestepping these arguments as nationalism came about in my fieldsites through the lens of colonialism. While colonialism may be a disputed term to use of Ireland, the underlying dynamics certainly applied during Ireland's formative period. India came about through British expansion, outlining the sprawling country that even today struggles to contain its contradictions (a common condition for colonies).

Both sites have tumultuous histories of shifting political and ethnic centres of power, with hybridisation and diversity giving way to colonial regimes of ordering and policing separate population groups. Michel Foucault describes how, in Machiavelli's writings, the divide between the ruler and the ruled was inviolate, and the goal of the ruler was to avoid aggravating this permanent threat. Machiavelli's critics rejected this viewpoint and thought of modes of governance that bound together the ruler and ruled in mutuality. The means of achieving this involved applying the art of 'government' to political affairs. Whereas the Prince was always separate from his subjects, the government is intimately part of the system it manages. Once a domestic term, 'economy' is now applied at the state level:

> To govern a state will therefore mean to apply economy, set up an economy at the level of the entire state, which means exercising towards its inhabitants, and the wealth and behaviour of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods. (Foucault 1991, 92)

'Surveillance and control' are what concern us here. Both sites involve huge exercises in cartography, as much of people as of places. The emphasis on specialised categories and population groups, and the adoption and evolution of these labels by the colonised after gaining autonomy led to a continuation of separation and divisive management. Following Foucault, it is important to explore the adoption of new hegemonies of identity by the populace. Coercive and arbitrary labelling has a long history, but its subjectification is crucial to understanding the passions that fuelled the creation of my fieldsites, and the violence that accompanied them. In this chapter, I want to explore the evolution of such thinking up to the point of independence. Both fieldsites became marked by communal violence along the lines marked out during colonial rule, and this violence became a keystone of the national narrative of self-identification.

Out of necessity, the expansive histories of both fieldsites are neglected in favour of a discussion of government, population and categorisation. Different groups were managed and accorded rights according to their accommodation of colonial policies. This effort involved a variety of strategies that developed over time and according to the people being colonised. There is a slight wrinkle in this distinction. Ireland was usually regarded as part of the United Kingdom rather than a colony, and the 'Britishness' of the (proto) unionist/Protestant population usually taken for granted. Nevertheless they were subjected to the same processes of categorisation and even discrimination endured by colonised people the world over. The Catholic Irish evolved over time in the evaluative eyes of the British Establishment, ultimately gaining the status of citizens on par with the Protestant population. But as Home Rule and everyday administration in Ireland made clear, the presumed rights of Catholic Irish were subject to the approval of mainstream British and Protestant Irish opinion. The ambivalence of Catholic citizenship continued under Stormont Rule. Indians were in principle treated equally as colonial subjects, with special attention paid to protecting their religious rights. Dealing with multiple intersections of class, caste, region, language, and religion, the British ultimately favoured normative pan-Indian schema for categorising the populace and promoted homogenisation of identity and religion as much as

possible. Over time the nebulous categories of 'Muslim' and 'Hindu' became relatively coherent, fomenting a new sense of religious ascription[8].

Civic and Ethnic Nationalism

One of the common points of discussion in nationalism studies is the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalisms. Friedrich Meinecke's seminal work in 1907 divided nations into *staatsnation* (state nation) and *kulturnation* (culture nation) proved central to nationalism studies, augmented by Hans Kohn's 1947 separation of Civic ('western') and ethnic ('eastern') nationalisms along the same lines (Larsen 2017). As Larsen points out, these dichotomies faced immediate criticism from academic circles, with unclear distinctions between the two. Larson suggests Meinecke's labels are the better, as they are less normative than Kohn's ostensibly good and bad nationalisms.

In my fieldsites this split was less of a factor than a value marker that glorified colonial domination while dismissing or demonising perceived ethnic nationalism. Anthropologists are trained to question this binary of good and bad values, with critiques as far back as Herder. The benevolent aims of civilising empires are easy to challenge, with transparent racism, avarice and cultural norms masquerading as natural or neutral[9]. The same tension that underlay Irish nationalism was true of the colonies; breakaway states were turning their backs on modernity and cosmopolitanism to embrace introspective identities.

If civilisation and colonialism are now seen as basic power-grabs masquerading as civic idealism, the same needs to be applied to civic states employing similar logic. The distinction between *staatsnation* and *kulturnation* has always been disputed by scholars of nationalism, though they are reluctant to scrap the distinction. More attention needs to be paid to what national movements *do* rather than what labels they adhere to. In this respect I am less interested in whether India or Northern Ireland (or the Irish Republic, UK or British Empire) were 'really' liberal, than in how they used civic markers to pursue discriminatory goals. At the same time

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[8] Mahmood Mandani, describes Indirect Rule as a similar process in African colonies: dividing the populace into distinct blocs that reified 'traditional' groups while providing easy colonial categories of governance (Mamdani 1996).

[9] Western gender norms are a good example, as Victorian sexism was transposed onto colonies in Africa and India and presented as progressive and modern (e.g. Mani 1999).

ethnic labels were ascribed to minorities and colonised national movements to diminish their claims. It is too reductive to explain Northern Ireland's discriminatory policies as the product of a sectarian state. *How* did Northern Ireland employ civic markers for communal purposes and what can we learn from that? Similarly, arguments that independent India failed to live up to its secular inclusive ideals leave the basic premise of these ideals unquestioned.

Brubaker dismisses the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism as simplistic moralising and latent neo-orientalism (Brubaker, 2004). The distinction of 'eastern' and 'western' nationalism is dismissed by continued ethnic tension in Spain and Ireland, and rising ethnic sentiment in Belgium. Meanwhile the language of civic nationalism elevates some national movements above others. As an analytic distinction, he argues the terms have lost all use among scholars of nationalism, the distinction is largely a political one. Brubaker insists the distinction is a false one, most countries have the traits of both civic and ethnic nationalism and it is often impossible to discern which category national traits fall under. Is the promotion of a key language ethnic in isolating linguistic minorities, or civic in ensuring a standardised language of citizenship? Furthermore civic nationalism is as capable of discrimination as any ethnic state, with the US being a typical example.

In a similar fashion, majoritarians have understood themselves to be agents of modernity in their respective sites, using the metanarrative as a framework to evaluate their actions and position those they feel are their enemies. This social myth provides not just a conceptual framework for interpreting the past, but a moral one based on their understanding of civic nationalism and ideals of tolerance. As discussed by Brubaker, civic and ethnic nationalism are laden with value:

> Civic nationalism is generally glossed as liberal, voluntarist, universalist, and inclusive, ethnic nationalism as illiberal, ascriptive, particularist, and exclusive. Who could have a good word for a form of nationalism routinely glossed as illiberal, ascriptive, and exclusive? …. How could one criticize a form of nationalism understood to be liberal, voluntarist, and inclusive? When civic and ethnic nationalism are paired, the former is invariably a term of praise, the latter of abuse. (Brubaker, 2004, pp. 140-141)

In short, actions regarded as positive are seen as civic and actions seen as negative are ethnic. Hindutvavadis and loyalists interpret their actions as modern, tolerant and civic and in turn ascribe negative values to the actions of their Other. The trajectory of modernity is part of the moral framework of majoritarianism, as threats to their position are framed as a threat to modernity itself.

Just as ethnicity and culture are now seen as extra-academic words, that have outgrown their original meanings and purpose (Wright, 1998), so too has the distinction between civic and ethnic outgrown its scientific origins. While most scholars of nationalism now regard the dichotomy as forced and redundant, it has attained a common sense understanding on public discussions of nationalism. It is this usage that social scientists need to grapple with, rather than worrying about the continued usefulness of the distinction.

Majoritarianism

Simply put, majoritarianism is a utilitarian[10] understanding of democracy: if the majority of a political district wish for something, then that should be pursued. Majoritarianism needs to be understood in relation to liberalism, as an idea its legitimation lies as much in democracy as it does in the belief in 'the will of the people'. In theory it can apply to any collective with a political desire, in practice it nearly always promotes ethno-nationalist projects. The recent furore of Brexit highlights the issues, as a plausibly civic choice was made in a democratic fashion it must be respected. A closer look suggests a strong English base to this 'will', and a disregard for Brexit's effects on peripheries such as Northern Ireland, Gibraltar and Scotland (all of whom voted to remain). To insist that this is a distortion of liberal democracy ignores how democracy and liberalism offer routes for ugly forms of politics.

While I cannot find a technical definition of majoritarianism, its usage is effectively the same: the argument that a majority of the population has elevated rights to define the public sphere and social and political control. It is a literalist interpretation of democracy, employing a reductive logic of 'common sense' rule. While the two are not necessarily related it fits closely in my examples with

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[10] Majoritarianism is connected through political philosophy with Utilitarianism, which has a peculiar relationship with the birth of statistic and Indian colonialism (Stokes, 1959; Majeed, 1992)

majority rule: the idea that a single party should have political control. Majority rule systems, while relatively common, are central to the logic of majoritarianism on both my fieldsites. It's also important to distinguish between majoritarianism and populism. While populism is variable and highly contested (especially today when it is blamed for a variety of political ills), it usually rests on a distinction between 'the people' and 'the elites', locating authenticity in the often imagined community of ordinary people. Like majoritarianism, populism is at its most potent when trying to reify this mythical people (Müller, 2014). Majoritarianism as depicted in my research is too wedded to power to successfully pull off populism however, as elites are often depicted as championing the masses. Hindutva in particular has been traditionally elitist, and has expanded to include lower castes and Dalits within its message while retaining Brahman centrality. The Orange Order could be depicted as an organisation shifting from majoritarianism (a self-perception of natural control based on its demographic majority) to populism (a grassroots organisation representing ordinary Protestants against well-off elites who treat loyalism as criminals).

My use of 'majoritarian' is problematic because the populations I examine identify as majoritarian and minoritarian simultaneously. Despite belonging to majorities on both fieldsites (though Northern Ireland is admittedly more precarious), both groups regard themselves as minorities in the wider region. Donald Horowitz discusses the fear of extinction that drives many ethnic conflicts, even where the population in fear has a majority (Horowitz, 2000, p. 178). Political space is fluid, he argues, and majorities often have to contend with shifting territorial circumstances. Nonetheless cases occur where the fear is irrational. Horowitz links these to apprehensions to competitive values, societies in a strong position still see the danger of subordination. Anxiety suits this condition better than fear: "anxiety flows from a diffuse danger of exaggerated dimensions; it limits and modifies perceptions, producing extreme reactions to modest threats" (Horowitz, 2000, p. 179). Horowitz further speculates that this fear is a projection, that majorities see their desires for homogeneity in the minorities they fear[11]. This

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[11] Chapter Five concludes with a discussion about pathology analogies and how the limit understandings of agency.

tallies closely with Appadurai's discussion of how minorities challenge the self-identity of majorities (Appadurai, 2006)[12].

India's sizeable Hindu majority is set alongside neighbouring Muslim countries, and Muslim countries more widely. Within India, activists often compare the united Muslim population (whole population is generally regarded as much higher than the census suggests) with a highly fractured Hindu community, split by region, caste, class, language and politics. In this sense Hindudvavadis regard themselves as the real minority. Furthermore, every secular policy of the state and elites is seen as designed to promote divisive cultural norms, minority faiths, and further scatter society, while undermining Hindu culture.

Northern Irish loyalists see themselves as minorities on the island of Ireland. Michael Poole outlines the variations on this minoritarianism in three ways (Poole, 1983). First many loyalists assume a Catholic majority in Northern Ireland is immanent. Second, they see themselves as a minority on the island as whole, with Catholics on both sides of the border as a united threat. Third, they can also be perceived as a minority within the UK. Poole describes it in terms of the Protestant (Northern?) Irish position in the UK and Ireland as a whole, though simply within the UK is also threatening if Britain is cast as secularised and uncaring about the North. A fourth factor not considered by Poole is the British worldwide decline. Loyalist commentators frequently referred to the wider Protestant British community of the UK, Canada and Australia (and sometimes Rhodesia), one that went into decline along with the empire and Catholic immigration. Canada — once an Orange Order stronghold—is now seen as lost to the wider British community (Kaufmann 2004b, 78). In this regard Northern Ireland is portrayed as the last bastion of authentic British values amidst a sea of secularism, ecumenism and Catholic encroachment.

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[12] I'm wary of Horowit'z reliance on psychological analysis to explain social patterns, following Finlay's critique of 'settler mind-set' reductivism in Northern Ireland (Finlay, 2001).

The Hindutva Movement

The *Hindutva* movement rose in the twenties and thirties, around the same time the idea of a separate state and territory (ultimately Pakistan and Bangladesh) for the Muslim Indians emerged. The *Hindutva* movement was isolated from mainstream Indian society due to its extreme position on minorities and outside influences, before gaining a new lease of life in the eighties. Encompassing many political groups, it is now a key feature in Indian politics and in much of the narrative on terrorism, nationalism and Indian and Hindu identity. There is a strong emphasis on asserting Hindu identity, often explicitly in the face of minorities, and a focus on anything that might weaken the nation such as religious and ethnic fragmentation. Particular symbols have been championed by the *Hindutva* movement, including Sanskrit as a national language, national sites that champion Hindus and erase 'intrusive' Islamic traces[13], and ideas of motherland, indigenism and primordiality (Thapar 2000). Religion has been politicised and rendered more antagonistic (Deshpande 2003, 95).

One of the key organisations in the *Hindutva* movement is the RSS, founded by Keshav Hedgewar in 1923. They form a similar group to the Orange Order: a fraternity dedicated to preserving traditional values and fostering a spirit of national unity. The rot is clearly identified by the Sangh: a lack of collective unity that enabled inferior enemies to dominate the Hindu populace and who continued to divide Hindus. The *Hindutva* movement is dedicated to renewing the Hindu spark they believe is found in all inhabitants of India, regardless of religion, caste, region or language.

Their conception of a unified Hindu, rooted in the inherent spark of *Hindutva* in all Indians, is at odds with regional, linguistic and caste differences. The *Hindutva* movement endeavour to create this world as much as re-create it, they assume its authenticity, but in their actions they project it as something yet to be realised. The spoken language of all Indians is Hindi, or at least a variant of Sanskrit, India's original language. All people are conventionally Hindu, by which I mean a Brahmin-centric conception of Hinduism, as reified and codified in the nineteenth century.

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[13] The most notable is the Babri Masjid dispute; in 1992 the *Hindutva* movement succeeded in demolishing a mosque they believed was built on the birth-site of the mythical deity Ram.

And while the borders of present-day India are a far cry from their true limits (not just Pakistan/Bangladesh, but parts of Myanmar, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka belong to Bharat Mata too), the legitimacy of *Hindu Rashtra* within India's contemporary borders is an unquestioned given. Even areas with long antagonistic histories are seen as the product of external interference. The RSS has various manifestations: political parties (BJP), religious organisations (VHP), trade unions (BMS) and student unions (ABVP). My main encounters were with the student unions in different universities in Delhi. Their main purpose was to inculcate patriotic values in young Indians and encourage the leaders of tomorrow. For the most past they distanced themselves from the Sangh Parivar, preferring to regard themselves as independent as opposed to the youth wings of different political parties. But the overlaps with the RSS in particular were obvious. The virtues to be instilled were guided by gender. Hindu Rashtra was the ideal society. And western-style secularism and minorities were a problem to be tackled, albeit in a more inclusive way than usually offered by the Hindutva Movement.

Sudip and Positive Nationalism

The ABVP's Delhi headquarters are in an unimposing residential block near the city centre, and it was there I made my first contacts with the student organisation. The ABVP office was staffed by pracharaks, volunteers who devote a couple of years to the cause and often go on to serve for their whole life[14]. The office doubled as a residence for ABVP workers, and my meetings there were punctuated by breakfast and morning chores. My first contact was unexpected: a Nepalese student named Sudip[15]. Sudip had studied geography in JNU, and joined the ABVP because of its avowed national values. He was quick to dismiss the ABVP's negative associations: he was living proof of their cosmopolitanism. Sudip felt that the national values espoused by the ABVP were an example for other countries to follow.

Sudip filled me in on the history of the ABVP. Founded in 1949, shortly after India's independence, it quickly aimed to fill what it perceived as a nationalist deficit among the student body. Its early focus was to encourage national unity, the old

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[14] India's current prime minister, Narendra Modi, is an RSS *pracharak*.
[15] Some of my ABVP informants requested that I change their names; for the sake of uniformity I have changed all ABVP names. Northern Irish informants retain their own names.

Hindutva concern. The ABVP dissociated from the BJP, in contrast with many political youth groups on India's campuses. It aims were avowedly social, not political. This mantra is the mainstay of the RSS, and regardless of their links to the BJP, no one I spoke to made any effort to distance themselves from the Swayamsevaks.

National unity as an aim meant embracing cultural diversity, and again Sudip was the man to emphasise diversity. The ABVP encouraged cultural exchange, funded schools in remote districts in India's isolated North-Eastern states, and encouraged students to think and act "not as citizens of tomorrow, but citizens of today". Sudip described the mixture of activities on Delhi's campuses: micro issues like library refurbishment but also protests over gang-rape. The enthusiasm for diversity and moderation expressed by Sudip is impossible to dismiss. Nevertheless, his unease with the ABVP's intolerant reputation raises questions. Many members tried to reassure me that the organisation's true values were often misrepresented, but they never refuted the allegations themselves.

The Hindutva Movement has less in the way of concrete glory years, relying on British colonial reification for their 'Golden Age' and simplified ideal society. Relying on Brahman sources for their understanding of Indian history and society, British colonials manufactured an India that was timeless, spaceless and static (van der Veer 1993: 26).

> Throughout the Raj, the Brahmans were the natural leaders; this was the case through time as well (with the exception of the Islamic conquest, which the British were helping to undo). The whole system was essentialised too; Hinduism, with strong caste and Brahman supremacy was regarded as the natural condition for India. Even where the British felt they were thwarting Brahman elitism they reproduced this narrow image of Hinduism (Mani 1999: 95).

British rule simplified and reduced the plethora of regional religious customs, beliefs and systems of worship into a few key religious identities, with recognisable authority figures. Along with recognising the Brahmans as natural heads of the Hindus, the British tended to agree with their idea of history: one of glorious historical antiquity, followed by degeneration and conquest: the Kali-yuga period. It gave the British common ground with Brahmans, something that became

stronger with the rise of Indo-European/Aryan consciousness and later racial categories (Said 2003: 98-9).

While this perception stressed the faded glory of Aryan India (as well as hinting at a warning to contemporary 'Aryans'), it provided a link between modern orientalism and the Brahman history of India. The British saw it as their duty to reinvigorate Hinduism, reintroducing it to the masses and preserving it in the name of a common Indo-European heritage.

In this climate came the reform movements. Both Muslim sects and Hindu tried to re-create a pure religion out of the corruption that colonial-era India presented to them, but the Hindu efforts are of most interest to us. As King points out, the key here is the idea of re-forming the old religion, of returning to a golden age, seen as enlightened by Indian and colonial alike:

The perceived shortcomings of contemporary 'Hinduism' in comparison to the ideal form, as represented in the text, thus created the belief (among both Westerners and Indians) that Hindu religion had stagnated over the centuries and was therefore in need of reformation. The gap between original (ideal) 'Hinduism' and the contemporary beliefs and practices of Hindus was soon filled, of course, by the rise of what have become known as 'Hindu reform movements' in the nineteenth century – groups such as the Brahmo Samaj, the Arya Samaj and the Ramakrsna Mission (King, 1999: 105-6).

India was set up with explicit secular, civic and liberal credential in mind. It immediately ensured universal franchise, sustained reservation systems for STs and SCs. After the partition violence with Pakistan and the assassination of Gandhi, it moved to ensure Muslims in India were welcomed. Nonetheless there remained Hindutva elements within Congress, most notably Sardar Patel. Hindutva positions itself as opposite to this tradition, challenging a pseudo-secular western Macauleyite corruption that keeps Indian thrall to the west.

Hindu Ethnicity – The Creation of a Hindu population
Unlike Loyalism, Hindutva defies an ethnic typology. Hindutva is best describes as casteist reformism, combining a series of Vedic texts with colonial categorisations and medieval Bhakti practices. Hinduism is a good example of Asad's state-

produced religion. Religious practices in India straddled an enormous variety of traditions and local faiths, sometimes blending with indigenous and Muslim faiths as well. This ironically is the state to which Hindutva aspires: seeing Hinduism as a localised, community-based set of practices.

Hinduism in its concrete form emerged in colonial India, under the East India Company and later the British Raj. Colonial powers assumed the faiths in India were distinguishable, homogeneous, and structured, and fashioned their policies accordingly. Brahmanism fitted this model most closely, and Hinduism began to coalesce as a distinct faith that fitted most of the Indian population, and guided by Brahmin texts and religious practices. As electoral politics became kore pronounced in the late nineteenth century, the importance of recruiting as many people as possible to form a majority led Hinduism to move away from its inherent casteism and exclusivism. Modern Hinduism draws for the most part on Brahmin practices, fitfully allowing lower castes and Dalits access to its traditions.

Bhatt observes: "both Indian and Hindu nationalism are conceivable in terms of upper-caste hegemony, power domination, ideology and systematic institutional discrimination against 'scheduled castes and tribes' and 'other backward' classes" (Bhatt, 2004) Ethnicity is difficult to fit into this, and it if far better to make use of nationalism as model. In terms of the old split between primordialist and constructivist models, Indian civic nationalism clearly follows the latter, though like most nationalisms it dips its toes in both streams of thought. Hindu nationalism follows a similar route, essentialising its past and charting a history of ancient glory. However, this history largely excludes most of India's population, which Hindutva only fitfully engages with.

In short, there is a Hindu ethnicity, but as an analytic category it is almost useless. As an ideology, Hindutva follows many of the precepts of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, and strives to create a primordialist identity. Bhatt notes the danger of labelling Hindutva as ethnic, arguing that it validates their worldview. Rather, we should aim to situate them in a complex of colonial categorisation, reform movements and political philosophies (Hansen, 1999, p. 13).

Loyalism and the Orange Order

The Orange Order was rooted in what is usually labelled the Protestant Ascendancy: the period of overtly Protestant triumphalist domination in both Britain and Ireland following the coronation of William III and the 'Glorious Revolution'. Anti-Catholicism has a long and peculiar history in British and Irish politics, becoming the defining attribute of Establishment politics in the early modern period (Weiner 1971: 27). It must be emphasised that this was based in part on a very real threat to the British monarchy offered by various Catholic figures and the Catholic hierarchy. Nevertheless, the basis for much of the early modern (English) national spirit was created in opposition to Catholicism, and it takes a distinct form that is defensive and often virulently misogynistic (McLauren 2002). It was in this period that anti-Catholicism moved from being a private matter of conscious and became a question of national integrity.

Religion in this time became entwined with the ethnic and later racial politics of the British crown. Catholicism became the preserve of the Celtic Fringe, just as lesser races retained Catholicism in Europe. Protestantism became the mark of a freer mind and Teutonic pedigree, with its epitome in the Lowland Scots (Gibbons 2004: 65). Catholicism, in its marginalised and illicit status also came to represent duplicity, rebellion, conspiracy and cowardliness. In short, Protestantism became the hallmark of a racially superior, straight-thinking and honest, manly, individualistic, free-thinking Briton, all markers easy to find in traditional British self-perceptions.

This explicitly Protestant identity eventually gave way before a gradual thaw between the Catholic hierarchy and the British Establishment. The latter part of the eighteenth century and much of the nineteenth century saw concessions and accommodation made to the Catholic faith in Britain and Ireland; unfortunately, such concessions were feared by some as thin-edge-of-the-wedge corruption of all that makes Britain great. Founded in the same year as St Patrick's College, Maynooth, the Orange Order represent a reaction to any concession to the normalistaion of Catholicism in Britain and a retention of the old Bill of Rights that presumed an actively Protestant centre for any national consciousness.

Particularly in independent Northern Ireland, the Orange Order presented their land as a final bastion of old-fashioned British virtue in a commonwealth increasingly out of touch with what once made it great.

> Ulster is an embarrassment to what we once called Great Britain. Sadly Britain is no longer great, for she has lost the very thing which Ulster possesses, Patriotism and pride in the land of one's birth (Loyalist News 1972).

Imperial Britain and the Commonwealth are continuously referenced and compared with the shoddy state of modern Britain and the loss of its dominions to Roman Catholic influence. Ulster's preservation is attributed to Protestantism and the ulster character, which unlike the English, is impervious to concession and duplicity:

The Ulster Protestant is a strong, robust character with a fierce loyalty to his friends. He is a rugged fellow, with determination, courage and a slight superiority complex. His thoughts run only in 'straight lines'. He has a guileless innocence, is a little stubborn, with a built-in honesty. A streak of shrewdness and much common-sense are part of his nature.

> Unhesitant about speaking his mind, the Ulster Protestant has no time for doubletalk, shady-dealing, hypocrisy or weakness. He despises traitors, political puppets, ecumenical jellyfish, opportunists, liars, crooks, apologists and snivellers. A salty character indeed (Protestant Telegraph 1971).

The masculine overtones of this description recur throughout the account of true Ulster character.

Values were never far from debates in Northern Ireland, especially as the loyal steadfastness of the Unionist population was compared with a chronically duplitious Catholic population. The Catholic Church was traditionally cast as incompatible with democracy, human rights and freedom. Occupying almost exactly the same position enjoyed by Islam today, it was seen as authoritarian, medieval, regressive, cruel on women, and at best a perversion of European, liberal and Enlightenment values.

As a distinct body, the Orange Order emerged from agrarian and proletarian violence in the late eighteenth century, in response to increased normalisation for Catholics and the resultant disadvantage faced by Protestant rentiers and workers.

The economic conflict developed political overtones during the 1798 rebellion, and while Protestant were a driving force in nationalism, the trope remained of loyal Protestant subject and rebellious bloodthirsty Catholics. The nineteenth century saw industrialisation and the expansion of urban centres, particularly Belfast. This expansion also had sectarian overtones, as workplace discrimination became common, and mass-movement to urban centres brought about more tension, resulting in periodic rioting. By the late nineteenth century, Belfast and Northern Ireland faced the prospect of Irish autonomy by dividing Northern Ireland and its sizeable population from the rest of Ireland. A key trope throughout was loyalism and the need for direct action. Drawing on a frontier tradition and social memory soaked in religious conflict, Ulster unionism sought legitimacy in contractual ideologies with the state, seeing their loyalty to a higher purpose than the current politics. When unionists signed the Ulster Covenant in 1912 threatening violence against any who curtailed their political wishes, this was not seen as a contradiction of loyalties at all (a position backed up by many in the British mainstream) (McIntosh 1999, Kee 2000). Constitutional nationalism was inherently illegitimate despite going through proper channels and enjoying democratic and legal legitimacy. This dualist understanding of legitimacy is what drove unionism towards autonomy within the UK, and much of the sectarianism that came after. The Orange Order and more extreme elements of unionism (particularly the military police that emerged from the UVF) were also embedded and legitimised in the new state of Northern Ireland. Catholics meanwhile were still regarded as untrustworthy for years after nationalist agitation subsided (Brewer & Higgins, 1998).

The Troubles undermined much of the self-belief and national myth of unionism. 'Protestant Britain' became an anachronism even in Britain, and the masculine industriousness of Belfast suffered the same decline seen in other post-industrial regions. Loyalism sought to protect and recalibrate the spirit of Protestant masculinity, promoting strong government, and confidence that industry would return once the conflict was over. Since the Good Friday Agreement and the decline of Unionism as a central pillar of Ulster it has seen its membership fall and its reputation tarnished once again. Its membership is at a historic (albeit static) low,

its international affiliations have become negligible and since the parades of the nineties, and particularly their refusal to accept any responsibility for violence during the Garvaghy Rd. dispute, the Orange Order has struggled to maintain a positive or even a redundant image in Northern Irish society. Despite their overtly religious role, the Orange Order is better thought of as a cultural organisation, devoted to the promotion of Ulster-Scots heritage, politics and values (Kaufmann 2007: 3).

Today, they occupy a much narrower ground than in their recent prime. No longer in charge of the Establishment, the Orange Order prefers to emphasise their role as a grassroots community organisation. Operating at the level of the community has given the Orange Order a much-needed role, though of course the Order has long been a vibrant part of local Protestant life.

Loyalist Ethnicity and Nationalism

In their work on Irish identity through history, Ruane and Todd (1996) suggest a number of intersecting factors. One of them was ethnicity. Ireland has roughly three ethnicities, paralleling the key religions. Ruane and Todd point out that religion and ethnic identity strongly overlap, making it hard to separate. Where there were overlapping identities, religion usually won out. The Old English had more in common with the English than the Gaelic Irish but were lumped together with them because of their Catholicism. Ulster Scots ethnicity was strongly marked by Presbyterianism, and the maintenance of a distinct identity outside of Gaelic Irish and Anglo-Irish. As Britain grew into an empire and Britishness became the primary identity, ethnicity as an explicit marker began to take a back seat. Britishness and unionism both drew heavily on civic nationalism, positing a state formation that held everyone as equal citizens, and ethnic identity as a separatist threat. While ethnic practices were tolerated and promoted in the Celtic Fringe, it was as politically toothless local colour, not a primary right in itself. British hegemony was anything but civic, and English ethnicity was the unquestioned norm. The rise of ethnic nationalism in Ireland in the mid-nineteenth century further highlighted the civilizational dichotomy: of a progressive outward looking civilisation versus a provincial inward looking ethnicity. In Northern Ireland this view of civic national continued well into the twentieth century.

Stormont Rule was defined by this disparity, as a nominally civic statelet championed an identity heavily marked by Ulster Scots, Scottish and English ethnicity, while marginalising and demonising Gaelic Irish ethnic practices. Recognising and promoting Irish culture became a key element of the peace process on Northern Ireland, confirming how many unionists felt about culture as a Trojan horse. Culture and ethnicity became unionism's preferred medium of decline in the 1990s, with claims that unionists were suffering from 'ethnic cleansing'. The policing of parades, bonfires and flags became an attack on the cultural unity of a beleaguered population, and cultural expression became the rallying cry for loyalism[16].

Other forms of ethnic expression have emerged. Just as the decline of the British Empire saw the slow rise of English nationalism, so too has Ulster Scots emerged as an ethnic as well as a civic identity (Gardner, 2016). The language Ulster-Scots is promoted as equivalent to Irish Gaelic, despite difficulty finding any committed speakers. With primordial identities come esoteric histories, as some claim the Ulster Scots are Ireland indigenous inhabitants, exiled by invading Gaels and back to reclaim their homeland. Overall though, Ulster Scots ethnicity struggles to stand out from civilizational, religious and political identities. Within loyalism class exerts another strong influence, with the middle and upper classes more likely to identify as British and the working classes by ethnic markers.

Ulster nationalism lies long the ragged edge of nationalism theories. Unionism is defined by its non-existence, their purpose is to be subsumed into the wider British entity. However, since the 1880s, Northern Irish unionism has insisted on managing its own affairs regardless of the wider Irish sentiment, or that in London either. When Northern Ireland was established as a separate entity within the wider United Kingdom, it developed its own brand of nationalism, based in regional identity as much as civic or ethnic. Ulster's affairs were best left to themselves. Because of the sensitivity towards the Catholic minority, Northern Ireland had special powers, was exempt from conscription during the Second World War, and maintained its own political dynamics. When the Troubles forced

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[16] Meanwhile similar moves by nationalists are castigated as insidious intrusion, as the continuing controversy over Irish language promotion shows.

London to absolve Stormont and resume Direct Rule, it was treated as a grave betrayal by unionists. Today unionists remain torn between normalising relations with the rest of the UK and maintaining special status. For example Northern Ireland maintains a ban on same sex marriage and abortion, positions supported broadly across the population but particularly among unionists. Interestingly, Hayes and Nagle, in their exploration of attitudes towards same sex marriage found that the reasons for opposing it were predominantly socio-economic for Catholics and ethno nationalist for Protestants. Protestants were more likely to see it as an attack on their way of life and British institutions. As Hayes and Nagle suggest, this could be because national identity has always been stronger among the PUL community (despite the label 'nationalists', many Catholics are deeply ambivalent about Irish nationalism, their place within Britain, though they maintain a strong sense of self in contrast to the PUL community). It's also likely that LGBT+ rights are conflated with 'minority rights' and regarded as another Trojan horse designed to erode their ascendancy (Hayes & Nagle, 2016).

Ethnicity and nationalism overlap in many ways here but the uniting factor is religion, or at least religious identity. Northern Irish loyalism, separate from its more refined unionist cousin, is more likely to be evangelical Christian, more likely to identify with Ulster Scots over established British high unionism. Together with class, these make for a shifting focus of loyalty that alternates between majoritarianism, minority victimhood, civilizational supremacy and ethnic nationalism (increasingly tinged with racism). As recently as the 2000s, loyalists prided themselves on their multiculturalism, proof of their tolerance, and acceptance of anyone who adhered to similar values. Now their cultural expressions such as bonfires are denounced as such for their racism as their sectarianism. The assumption that unionist/loyalist culture is hegemonic or normative has been firmly shattered after the Troubles, though still predominant in many areas of public life. The struggle to catch up with Catholic nationalism (which has actively engaged with practices of ethnicity for over a century) and carve a space within the contested landscape of Northern Irish regional identity has come to dominate loyalism.

Brubaker and Ethnopolitical Entrepreneurs

Rogers Brubaker starts out criticising the existence of common sense groupism, and the tensions and divergences it shrouds. He pays particular focus to the means by which it occurs, and the role of "participants' primordialism" or "psychological essentialism". By these he means the everyday reification of ethnic identity, regardless of social science and constructivism. Following Geertz, he argues that studying such constructs is valid and indeed necessary. The danger is social sciences reifying ethnic identities is moot, they are already quite firmly essentialised whether we approve or not. The focus of constructivists should not be to reiterate the reification of identity, according to Brubaker, but to explain *how* it manifests as a cogent cultural and political force. Brubaker proposes a focus on 'groupness' as a process rather than groups as taken-for-granted units.

> "Groupness" is a variable, not a constant; it cannot be presupposed. It varies not only across putative groups, but within them; it may wax and wane over time, peaking during exceptional-but-unsustainable moments of collective effervescence. Ethnicity does not require such groupness. It works not only, or even especially, in and through bounded groups, but in and through categories, schemas, encounters, identifications, languages, stories, institutions, organizations, networks, and events. The study of ethnicity-even the study of ethnic conflict should not, in short, be reduced to, or even centered on, the study of ethnic groups. (Brubaker 2004, 4)

Groupness highlights the activity that goes into constructing and maintaining the group, and the key actors involved in its creation. For Brubaker, the key thing to remember is that groups 'happen', that they are events. Furthermore they fail to happen far more than they succeed: the efforts to generate a state of ethnicity (or ethnic conflict) often fail to develop beyond isolated incidents. Another point worth mentioning is the cognitive element to groupness. Like narrativity discussed earlier, groupness helps makes sense of the world and provides a framework for 'perceiving, interpreting and representing the world'. In the case of interested groupists, it motivates unification and when events can be framed as ethnic (or whichever identity, class for instance) it adds a further layer of validation to identity formation. Chapter five focussed on the importance of interpreting past events as episodic, related through a hegemonic lens to fit the classification and narrative of present-day ethnic actors.

A key element to his understanding of groupness is the distinction between groups

and categories. A category is held to be a loose formulation of identity that may be utilised on occasion by actors, but is usually located somewhere amongst a series of possible identity performances depending on the occasion. Group identity on the other hand is a prominent identity among actors, and usually informs a lot of their self-conception and everyday perception of the world. As Marx once differentiated, is the difference between a class *in* itself and a class *for* itself. As Brubaker elaborates:

> Starting with groups, one is led to ask what groups want, demand, or aspire towards; how they think of themselves and others; and how they act in relation to other groups. One is led almost automatically by the substantialist language to attribute identity, agency, interests, and will to groups. Starting with categories, by contrast, invites us to focus on processes and relations rather than substances. It invites us to specify how people and organizations do things with, and to, ethnic and national categories; how such categories are used to channel and organize processes and relations; and how categories get institutionalized, and with what consequences. (Brubaker 2004, 24-25)

This raises an important distinction that is often eclipsed in examinations of ethnicity. The difference between weak and strong identity and the dangerous habit of assuming the prominent voices of the latter speak for the former has a totalising effect in practices of ethnicity. This raises another important element to groupness, the role of key actors or 'ethnopolitical entrepreneurs', people who "live 'off' as well as 'for' ethnicity" (Brubaker 2004, 10). Such figures are prominent in group formations, and often seek to speak for or co-opt people in the weaker categorical identity. For instance the Catholic population of Northern Ireland existed as a loose group with many intersecting identities and everyday concerns and practices outside of Catholicism nationalism. But the IRA were a tightly connected and devoted to the promotion of Catholic nationalism as a primary driving identity that could and ought to inform the actions of every Catholic in the North. The danger was when outsiders assumed that the highly motivated IRA acted on behalf of the wider Catholic community, obscuring the huge opposition within the Catholic community to the actions of the IRA, competing actors determining to promote their own vision of Catholic cohesion (constitutional nationalism for example). Arguably the IRA failed in their efforts, as the Peace Process came to dominate politics and peacebuilding took prominence. This fits Brubaker's point about ethnic conflict: that it rarely takes root. His example of is of Hungarian-Romanian tensions in a small city in Romania with a prominent historic

Hungarian community. Periodic flashes of ethnic tension broke out on occasion during the 1990s, and political figures in both communities exacerbated and tried to capitalise on resulting tensions. But aside from isolated flashes of street violence, a sustained ethic animosity failed to take root among the wider Hungarian and Romanian population of the city (Brubaker 2004, 26). Sustained group identity should not be assumed, and can fall away over time, as the fate of the Orange Order shows. Nor is it guaranteed to convert from categorisation. *Hindutva* as a political philosophy has many advocates, many of whom are not active members of any organisation. Undoubtedly their ideas have a wider social resonance, part of what Datta refers to as the social common sense (Datta, 1999). Nonetheless the sort of cohesion imagined by Hindutvavadis does not exist and may never. Similarly their ideologies of exclusiveness and chauvinist nationalism can be challenged. They should not be taken for granted.

The model of identity as processual is one I have tried to bear in mind when discussing Hindu and Protestant identities, and certainly the distinction between motivated groups and wider ethnic categories is paramount to the thesis. In both cases the motivated groupists have tried to assert their authority over the wider ethnic/religious category, speaking for them and stressing the need for the population at large to wake up and act as a concerted group. It remains to be seen how successful this strategy is for the *Hindutva* movement, in NI the unity of Orangeism has fragmented and the Orange Order can no longer claim to speak with for the entire Protestant community. It is also worth noting that the unity of purpose perceived by majoritarians in the minority community, the homogeneity and discipline of Muslim and Catholics to the point of reproducing children to further their aims, is precisely the opposite of how they perceived themselves. The heterogeneity of minority communities is downplayed or ignored, and a highly conscious group identity is assumed.

Chapter Two – Sites and Methodology

My fieldwork consisted of two phases, a year spent in South Belfast from 2011to 2012, and a year in Delhi from late 2012 to September 2013. My Masters research was built around a similar subject, examining how Muslim organisations and agents interpreted wider social phenomena through their activities. This time I would be dealing with a more volatile subject and with informants I was far less sympathetic to.

There has been a recent uptake in exploring this topic. Just as anthropologists have shifted from the exotic to the mundane, our research has shifted from the savage to 'suffering'. The common theme is sympathy, and anthropologists have often occupied the role of interpreter or advocate for the people they study and bond with (Bangstad, 2017). My research explores a topic I find dangerous and bigoted, mostly among people I am unsympathetic to. My informants are mostly adherents of the Hindutva Movement, which has a long and well-recorded history of violence and Hindu supremacy against various marginal populations in India. Directly inspired by fascism in the 1930s, it manifests a whole range of views from farcical to genocidal. My informants in Northern Ireland were predominantly loyalists, and members of the Orange Order. As an institution, the Order is opposed to Catholicism, and promotes an ethnic and religious social vision that has marginalised and discriminated against Catholic nationalists for centuries. Many loyalists continue to regard Ireland and nationalism as implacable enemies. As such I have engage with two social philosophies I find abhorrent, as well as personally antagonistic.

As a catholic and 'small-n' nationalist I also have to acknowledge my own background and prejudice in exploring loyalist and Protestant. My research focuses on the most hardline elements of loyalism, itself the extreme of unionism and Protestantism in Ireland. Demographic aggression narratives feed into wider anti-Catholic stereotypes of fecundity, and backwardness but my focus is on the highly charged conspiracy theories that intersect communalism with agency and

territory. My work looks at a small subset of loyalist tropes and doesn't represent the wider unionist or Protestant community. In a similar sense Hindutva has a wider resonance in Indian society, encompassing 'common sense' understandings of Muslims, nationalism and integration. Nevertheless the specific narratives of Muslims outbreeding Hindus as part of an international jihad with Pakistan the Middle East is specific to Hindutva hardliners. It is adherents of these narratives, rather than the wider religious communities that I focus on.

In both cases I focused on a relatively quiet context, away from explicit sites of conflict. Delhi campuses were prominent national educational spaces but not central to ABVP struggles. The campus I ended up focusing on, JNU, was more known for its radical leftism than Hindu chauvinism. Ballynafeigh, in South Belfast, was a far cry from the interfaces and patchwork of isolated communities in West and North Belfast. As a sedate community it had slowly shifted from Protestant to Catholic without generating massive communal rupture. In both cases I wanted to if 'banal communalism' (Jeffery & Jeffery, 2006) played a part in local affairs. This is crucial. Part of tackling difficult subjects was staying away from overtly provocative material and focusing on what they saw as normal, 'common sense' material. When I challenged them on specific points such as the level of control they expected Muslims to live under, they regarded it as my naivety rather than a serious threat. I was *not* there to confront or antagonise them, however I felt about the material and their complicity in violence. In studying a banal subject in a non-charged atmosphere, I felt I struck the right balance between accommodating the views of my informants without condoning them or compromising my own integrity.

Subjectivity and Complicity

My initial meetings with Hindutva activists were anxious affairs. I wanted to be friendly and understanding, but critical of their ideologies without ending the exchange[17]. I quickly realised that they were not antagonised by my scepticism,

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[17] Even buying Hindutva literature made me anxious. Despite the small amounts of money involved, I only felt better about funding the Hindu Right after writing my name in Urdu, the language associated with earlier Muslim dominance, in them.

and were happy to talk with, or at, a receptive audience regardless of their reception. One of my early interviews was with Umakant, a chief organiser for the ABVP in Delhi as a whole. I outlined my research to provide context, describing my comparison with Northern Ireland and India. Partly this was a sense of obligation, detailing the outline described in my Research Statement, partly it was to de-orientalise my research and make it seem less like I was here to judge the alien ways foreigners. I also thought it grounded my position ethically: demographic aggression concerns were groundless in Northern Ireland, and I was here to observe similar trends. But it was soon clear that this wasn't enough.

"You understand," Umakant said to me, "the dangers. This is a problem for all of us. We must *all* work together to stop terrorism, to stop attacks and bullying, inside and out". By now I realised he saw me a sympathiser, a European ally. Occasionally *Hindutva* literature strayed into wider 'clash-of-civilisations' rhetoric and the War on Terror had enabled a wider narrative of jihad to be challenged. Once in a while, the travails of Islamophobic politicians like Geert Wilders made it into discussions. And now here I was, open to talking about demographic aggression — even using the term — and comparing their concerns to similar strife in Europe.

I flustered and tried to hide behind academic credentials. "I'm here to study": subtext: I'm not here to judge. "The situation in Europe is different", I explained, "dangerous politicians use immigration as a scare tactic, to target ordinary Muslims. And Ireland proves the fear is groundless. Demographic aggression worries were nonsense in the end. Minority population were more integrated than scare-mongers could admit". But, my ABVP audience replied, many people are peaceful and decent, that is to be encouraged. Others want to harm and divide, and lead into terrorism. If this hasn't happened in Ireland it's because preventive measures worked. If it hasn't happened with Muslims it's because they aren't dangerous yet. I wasn't sure how to respond without laying my moral cards on the table and saying exactly what I thought about *Hindutva* ideology. "As I see it demographic aggression never truly happens, and probably never will." "But you're here to learn, Umakant replied. "You'll see".

Thus began an awkward compromise, where neutrality never lost the taint of complicity. To be considered an ally of majoritarians neatly mirrored the situation in Northern Ireland where I was associated with the minority population thanks to my background. In both cases my subjectivity was suspect, and my ethnography was contoured accordingly. In Northern Ireland I represented the danger: the peaceable Southerner moving into a quiet, formerly Protestant neighbourhood. Everyone I met was accommodating, friendly, and proud of the inclusive nature of the district. But I had come to see if any traces remained of older sectarian concerns in an everyday manner.

In India my neutrality and muted scepticism were met with maddening knowingness. During my previous research, on Muslim personal laws intersecting with social trends in India, one of my informants had no problem calling Muslims criminals and animals to my face. It was so jarring that I assumed he mistook me for a sympathiser, and quickly reminded him that my main informants were Muslims and good friends. He acknowledged the interruption before continuing the Islamophobic rant. What I thought didn't matter. The anthropological position is often that of a child, slowly and patiently inducted into the practices and ideas of the subject population. I alternated between ally and infant in the eyes of my ABVP informants, gaining access through my innocence to the thought-processes that drove their ideologies. If I protested or argued any point they told me I didn't understand.

I emerged with a series of surface-level discussions of formulaic discussions of the malignant Muslim problem, usually revolving around immigration or conversion, and obliquely touching off demographic aggression. Many of the discussions were cut short by being offered a pamphlet ("It's all in there," I was told). In both field sites this approach is also a symptom of the subjects I chose: activist organisations with specific agendas, strong messages and an underlying preoccupation with uniformity. Gaining access and accommodation is quite easy, and I was always received with kindness and often considerable accommodation. The relationships remained cordial but not friendly, once I listened and expanded on ideas over the course of about three interviews, I was passed on to another informant. This leaves the usual ethnographic considerations in a strange space: my informants remained

firmly representative of their organisations, rather than fully rounded people. The uniformity of opinion showed discipline and training in itself. The belief in the correct method and message was as much a practice of self-discipline as it was about being 'on message'. For all the emphasis on pluralism and heterogeneity, my contact with the ABVP (and to a lesser extent members of the Orange Order) gave an impression of unity that was almost visceral. The RSS believe in building their ideology from individuals up, and my interactions with various pracharaks across Delhi exemplified this foundation.

Field-sites

JNU

JNU is a sprawling complex of crumbling buildings, student artwork, fading posters and brushwood. Scattered haphazardly about the terrain are the faculty buildings, liberally covered in slogans of all stripes. At night it can be claustrophobic, light and chatter isolated amidst the ominous landscape. Absurdly I associate JNU with wilderness having only been to urban parts of India, shuttled between cities by plane, bus and train. JNU was my first encounter with the Orient embodied: a snake casually undulating along the kerbside, my first feverish night assailed by jetlag, heat, and a persistent mosquito; the army of ants than sprang like spontaneous germination near any spilt sugary chai. During the campus controversies of 2016, one MP claimed that JNU's expansive grounds were littered with beer bottles, used condoms, and bones from non-veg meals: JNU's very space conjured images of the animalistic debauchery that affirmed every hardliner's worst fears[18]. JNU's building had that beaten look of sixties concrete optimism, similar to a lot of Delhi's modernish optimistic architecture. It was a well-used looking campus, covered in tattered posters and elaborate murals. My first ever research proposal was to investigate the evolution of toilet graffiti in university campus toilets. The shifting nature of JNU's artwork reminded me of how art and space are part of a dialogue, quite a confrontational one at times.

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[18] It's worth thinking about the association between sex and meat in the imagination of Victorian-inspired moralists, and the long-held fear of meat-eating with frenzied sexual appetites. A Delhi graduate recently told me dirty talk and jokes were called 'non-veg' by Delhi's young.

JNU was where I spent my first night in India, in the Aravalli Guesthouse with a broken fan and steady stream of insect life. I first thought of JNU as on the periphery of Indian life (I was quite unaccustomed to city-living, and had no idea of the geography or scale of Delhi). Later I realised it has its own dynamic, as distinct a colony as any of the gated communities and enclaves in Delhi. Delhi University was broken up across the city, and other institutes lacked the scale or enclosed feel of JNU. It had its own *ethnie* and spirit, as attuned to Hindu chauvinism as Marxist sloganeering. Night-time was relatively vibrant, as parties debated and drummed at each other. Hunger protests (located near wifi hotspots) and demonstrations were unremarkable parts of the landscape. JNU encapsulated the ideal of vibrant, confrontational challengers of the status quo that all universities aspire to be, within reason. The people of JNU were for the most part scruffy, battered sandals and jeans being the norm. They ate and drank cheaply in every sense, spoke loudly, moved about in clumps. There was little sense of authority there, no obvious security, administration, teachers. Caterers, students and autowallahs made up JNU's population, with some bored guards at the entrance.

It was more through accident than purpose that I ended up focusing on JNU. My main points of contact with the ABVP were their main Delhi offices in the city centre, Delhi university and JNU. JNU happened to be where I developed my main informants, despite a much higher profile in Delhi university the ABVP there were less inclined to talk. Having built up rapport with JNU members, it made more sense to stay there, though I frequented the city centre offices too. I met regularly with various local members in the student body, usually outside with dhal curries and tea. Most interactions were casual, one-to-one or with a small assembly. Occasionally I attended ABVP meetings, though like any student group these tended to focus on the minutiae of university life. Some meetings were broad discussions of nationalism, with RSS members or occasional BJP MPs. My informants were nearly all men, relatively privileged and most were active members and *pracharaks*, devoted to the Hindutva cause.

In my time there, JNU was quite sedate, which in a sense suited my research. I was interested in the banal communalism, the everyday manifestations of national pride and subtle phobias rather than explosive rhetoric. My topic was quiet in that

time, there were rumblings in the news from earlier in 2012 about violence in the eastern state of Assam. Fear of Bangladeshi infiltration was the predominant anxiety of the RSS at the time, and the ABVP demonstrated on the matter and loaded me with pamphlets entitled *Truth Behind Assam Violence 2012* and *Unchecked Infiltration, Insecure Borders*. My main focus was love jihad, which had fascinated me from afar in 2009, and which continued to rumble in the stories of Muslim seduction on campus. JNU was largely residential, and included mixed-sex accommodation, which the ABVP opposed. JNU flaunted its reputation for left-wing activism, progressive politics and to a lesser extent sexual activism.

In the year after I left the BJP rose to become the main party of government, and Modi, once reviled as a toxic politician with blood on his hands was elevated to cult status by many Indians. To date his governance has steered clear of addressing the Muslims question (he remained notoriously tight-lipped about Gujarat during his election campaign), focusing instead on being the business-friendly reformists determined to sweep Congress corruption of governance. BJP central rule has seen an increase in communalism, revolving around beef-eating, terrorism, Kashmir and 'anti-nationalism'. The ABVP have been central to campaigns to highlight degeneracy and anti-nationalism on Indian campuses, with particularly vitriolic campaigns against Dalit students and those associated with the Left. JNU saw a prolonged period of aggravation and police action, as sedition charges were laid against student union leaders and lecturers, and claims of anti-nationalism became rife. Staff and students alike were threatened physically and legally, with falsified evidence. The rapport between the ABVP as an organisation and BJP ministers (in particular the Human Resource Development Minister, Smriti Irani) was central to the complaints been acted on by authorities. Whereas they distanced themselves from the BJP while I was there the ABVP became a key node in the government's attack on JNU leftist autonomy.

My interactions with the ABVP centred around their promotion of nationalism. I have noted in their opposition to negative labels, they were not *against* anything as much as *for* the nation. Often I was told they avoided politics to focus on 'nation-building'. This focus has become uglier over time as 'anti-nationalism' becomes the catch-all term for any opposition to the government, *Hindutva* or Modi. Anti-

nationalism can be as diverse as challenging multi-national mining corporations from destroying the lives of Adivasis, failing to show due deference to the nation by refusing to stand for the anthem in cinemas, encouraging the cessation of hostilities with Pakistan, or teaching anything even vaguely critical of India's history or society. The ABVP has been at the forefront of these attacks, policing universities, colluding with the BJP, and acting with impunity to counter any opposition. All of this is validated — indeed it is their duty — by their repeated commitment to nationalism.

Ballynafeigh

Shifting from India, I want to compare the perspective on the past with my other field-site, Ballnafeigh in South Belfast. Like JNU and DU, Ballnafeigh is a low-key site of contestation. As a classical Protestant moiety, such as the Shankill district, it has little to offer. There are no 'peace walls', and no flash points (though there had been some conflict over the local parade passing over the bridge into a Catholic Lower Ormeau area in the 1990s). The river and the park offer some protection and the northernmost population is relatively stable. The supposedly high levels of integration offer interest in another sense. In Ballynafeigh, the decline in Protestant numbers – muted by the multifaceted nature of the shift (graduates and middle-class as well as middle-class Catholics), the protection afforded by the Lagan and changing political circumstances – has been met with more of a willingness to interact with the incoming Catholic population, an effort which has been reciprocated by and large. It would be rash to presume that Ballynafeigh represents the future of integrated neighbourhoods, as the lack of active loyalist engagement and the lack of peace walls suggest an atypical neighbourhood. The middle-class tone of South Belfast also indicated the specific circumstances that allow for more mixed living, conditions that are not applicable across Belfast (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006).

Ballynafeigh is bordered to the north and west by the Lagan River, and partly to the East by the Ormeau Park. It comprises mainly terraced red brick Victorian houses typical of Belfast. There is a housing project – the Annadale Flats – adjacent to the river, built in the fifties and still classed as social housing. This is important, as public housing tends to be more stable in its population, seeing as it's not

subject to private demand. The mostly private terraced housing further south has seen a slow shift from a Protestant to a Catholic majority. The population now stands at roughly 57 percent Catholic and 27 percent Protestant in the Ballynafeigh ward (NINIS 2017).

Sectarian symbols are scant. Along the river there are Union Flags and St. George's Cross flags, ironically along the side most secure. In the Annadale flats area there is a faded UFF mural, the occasional Rangers flag and kerbstones painted red, blue and white. The closest to threatening symbolism is some graffiti painted near the river - "Fat people are harder to kidnap" – possibly directed at the many joggers in the area. There is an Orange Hall, though it is quite small by Belfast standards. The lack of overt Orangeism and the lower-than-average age of Ballynafeigh residents ensure that the Orange marches are not much of issue. The UDA/UFF has been relatively weak in the area (though there were a number of shootings and conflict with the nearby lower Ormeau Catholic community across the Lagan); overall that aspect of loyalism has been relatively weak. Unusually there are a number of mixed institutions in the area. A number of pubs along the Upper Ormeau Road are 'mixed', one of them (The Pavillion) deliberately so, as it were. The local school is Catholic (reflecting the demographic shift towards Catholics) but with a firm commitment to integration. The area also has a high rate of mixed marriages for Belfast, or indeed Northern Ireland.

I arrived in Belfast in July 2011, in time for the annual parades controversies. Growing up in the 1990s, the Troubles were effectively over and parades remained the major visual point of contention. Images of petrol bombs and angry mobs made more of an impact on me than discussions of police reform or 'talks about talks'. Ballynafeigh's main thoroughfare crosses the Lagan River and leads north towards the city centre. Across the bridge the Ormeau road runs through a predominately Catholic area. This became a sectarian flashpoint in the mid-nineties with the first major state opposition to Orange parades passing down the length of the Ormeau Road. As discussed in Chapter two, the Northern Irish Office slowly shifted from implicit support for unionism towards a more neutral stand in the nineties. The protests and reactions around the Ormeau Road were a catalyst for this shift, and

also the first major sign to unionism that they would not always get their way. Ormeau Road was an early sign of what was seen as state betrayal.

By 2011 the issue was long resolved and the Orange Order were resigned to taking a circuitous route through the Holylands, a student neighbourhood mostly empty in the summer. Ballynafeigh itself was reasonably cosmopolitan, with Roma children playing on street corners, a Buddhist meditation centre two minutes away, and an Irish supermarket, Dunnes Stores, the most convenient spot for milk. I attended the Annadale Flats residents' barbeque, where the food provided by local residents was Indian.

Ballynafeigh represents an ambivalent possibility for Northern Ireland's future. The locality prided itself on offering a positive model of inclusivity and a 'tradition of tolerance'. At the same time, the older unionist/Ulster-Scots traditions felt neglected. By the time my fieldwork finished in July 2012, the UK was gearing up for the London Olympics, the Queen had visited Belfast[19], and had her Diamond Jubilee while Prince William and Princess Kate were sustaining world headlines with marriage and children. There was never a better time to wave the Union Flag yet celebrations of Britishness in Ballynafeigh were muted. Discussions of public identity displays in Northern Ireland have long been dominated by nationalist versus unionist antagonisms, and the long-held feeling that plural public symbols could only flourish at the expense of unionist/British symbolism (Finlay 2001). Dread and defiance over the perceived 'cleansing' of unionist public spaces have resulted in violent reactions and protests. Ballynafeigh was different, here it felt as though the embarrassment over defiant displays of Britishness was the reason there was less public celebration of Britishness than there could have been.

Archival Sources

In my research a frequent and frustrating issue was the overlap of ethnographic and archival material. Many of my informants directed me to read and there was a steady stream of pamphlets and online articles plumbing the various facets of

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[19] Her historic handshake with Sinn Féin Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness was just across the river from the Annadale Flats, at the Lyric Theatre.

demographic threats. In Delhi these segued neatly into one another. In Belfast however, I knew what I wanted to study was largely a historical legacy. Demographic fears were in the past, ironic given they were never more real than today. As early as the 1970s *The Orange Standard* calmly dismissed rumours of population takeover, jocularly reminding readers that the same old voices had been voicing this doom on twelfth platforms for decades. Nonetheless the *Standard*, and other less reputable publications frequently returned to the subject, finding new manifestations of threats as context dictated.

My research has roughly four sites of date, two ethnographic and to archival. For my Delhi research I mainly focused on ethnographic research, which makes up the bulk of my discussion. Interspersed with the ethnographic data is material from *The Organiser*, the main English-language weekly paper of the Hindu Right. As social media expands its range there is considerable scope for how traditional print media intersects with new online material and the vertical nature of most Hindutva ideology. For the most part this was not widespread in English social media in 2013 and I limit myself to a couple of blogs. In addition to the Organiser, I use a proliferation of pamphlets and short books on topics like Christian conversion, and biographies that incorporate figures like Ambedkar and Gandhi into the Hindutva pantheon. Lastly there are key texts like Savarkar's *Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?* (1923); Golwalker's *Bunch of Thoughts* (1966) and H.V. Seshadri's *RSS: A Vision in Action* (2001). Spanning a wide range time range, these form the foundational texts for a lot of Hindutva ideology.

For the most I focused on *The Orange Standard* for archival sources on loyalist resistance to shifting political circumstances and the role of demography. Like *The Organiser*, the *Standard* aimed to provide a guiding light to counter the divisive powers that threatened the Protestant population of Northern Ireland. Its scope was national (and occasionally international, mostly of this focus was on events in the Republic of Ireland) and it represented a 'paper of record' for the Orange Order and loyalism in general. Founded in the 1970s when the Order felt the need for its own media presence, it charts the decline of the Order and its shifting tropes of anxiety, moving from Catholicism to the IRA to legacy issues, parading and flags after the Good Friday Agreement. The Standard maintained a moderate tone for

the most part, downplaying overt demographic paranoia, consistently denouncing violence and focusing on solidarity. For a sense of more hardcore material I have used Ian Paisley's paper *The Protestant Telegraph* and John McKeague's *The Loyalist News*. I focus on their reporting during the late sixties and early seventies when the conflation of religion and IRA terrorism was at its most fluid.

In each fieldsite the archival material represents national policies, ideologies and narratives, which overlap wth the locality of my ethnography. In Delhi there was little variation between the voice of media (and the RSS in general) and the students I spoke with. Of course the ABVP focused on student activities, and local activism. They took a slighlty more positive and liberal attitude than the national media, partly because of the liberal environs and partly I suspect because of how they wanted to be depicted by a westerner. In Belfast there is a lot more divergence between the position of the Standard and many of the issues I saw on the ground. The main reason is the Northern Irish archival material covers a greater time span, given my interest in historical shifts. The divergence also points to the heterogeneity of loyalism and everyday life in a post-peace neighburhood, compared with the unifying aspiration of the Order and the Orange Standard. Where they often overlap is a sense of decline and marginalisation that still bears traces of demographic anxiety and homogenised threat in the Catholic Other.

'Dark Anthropology' – Metholodology and Comparative Research

In her review of anthropological theory since the 1980s Sherry Ortner points out the flourishing of what she calls 'dark anthropology': the expansion of research into the realms of power, alienation and abjection (Ortner, 2016). Drawing on representational critiques from the 1980s, as well as engagement with theorists like Michel Foucault and postcolonial studies, anthropology has provided insight into areas as diverse as the effects of neoliberalism, racial inequality and structural violence. Scholars like Didier Dassin, Phillipe Bourgois, and Paul Farmer have been to the fore in pushing anthropology's duties in this respect.

Of particular use here is growing research into the far right[20] by anthropologists since the 1990s, especially in the context of European fringe groups rising to power. Researchers have attributed a range of reasons to this, mostly focusing on the dislocations of globalisation, especially in spread of neoliberal government. Kaufmann points out the role of proportional representation in allowing extremists the oxygen of democratic representation (Kaufmann, 2004b, p. 79). While drawing on traditionalist modes of identity and expression, most authors agreed that it was the engagement with modernity, whether in the form of capitalism, migration or new structures of governance that spurred the growth of far-right nationalism. Their growth has to be understood as an engagement with modernity, *not* as a rejection. Authors such as Holmes (2000) and Banks and Gingrich (2006) emphasise the holistic nature of these movements, not just ideologies but social phenomenon with a wide range of expressions.

There are a number of limitations to these early analyses. Firstly they relied on a simplistic understanding of ethnic identity as antithetical to civic identity or enlightenment values. While they were engaged with modernity they hearkened back to a simpler time, and homogeneous formations of identity. There was little attention given to movements that drew on 'enlightenment values', and civic formations of identity. This has increasingly been addressed y Lentin and Titley (2011), Halikopoulou et alia (2013) and Hage (2016), but the assumption remains that far-right nationalism is a manifestation of bad 'ethnic' nationalism rather than more western-based civic models. The normalisation of the far-right in other contexts such, as Donald Trump's electoral victory and the xenophobia of the Brexit referendum win on the UK challenges the assumption that electoral systems are at fault.

Most importantly, the alienation model used by Holmes in particular: that provincial people feel marginalised and cut off from centres of power and cultural control are what leads to a resurgence of interest in more localised, traditional identity (Holmes, 2000, p. 7). The idea of alienation needs to be applied to narratives of modernity as well as transitions. What happens when modernity

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[20] Or 'new-right', 'neo-nationalism', 'alt-right' and even 'alt-light'. The mushrooming of titles suggests habitual reinvention of the wheel, while strategies and foci of power change, the same underlying factors unite these trends.

assumes a different trajectory from the familiar rhetoric, or even appears to go into reverse? For example, a mainstay of modernity is secularism and the general decline of religion as a public influence. Europe has come to terms with the surprising rise of Christian fundamentalism (something that always stubbornly refused to die in the US, as the narrative dictates), Islamic public assertiveness, industrial decline, state coercion and the reversal of values such as feminism.

These fears are exaggerated, and usually ignore everyday manifestations of discrimination. Rather than a reversal, these trends usually point to the contradictions and coercions of modernity, hidden for so long but impossible to supress forever (Asad 2003). Or the hypocrisy of accommodating established religious models while rejecting the 'wrong religions' such as France's contrasting attitudes towards Catholicism and Islam (Fassin 2010). Or when models of global mobility are attempted not just by first-world travellers who see the word as their oyster, but migrants and refugees from other parts of the world who treat borders with the irreverence westerners are used to (Hage 2016). A lot of the contemporary anxiety about post-secularism, globalisation and 'identity politics' comes from realising trends that have affected less fortunate parts of the world for centuries.

A large part of my research examines what happens when the narratives of success and modernity that majoritarians build - no matter how contradictory or exaggerated that may seem – start to unravel. In India both the Nehruvian consensus of secular pluralist India and the Hindutva conception of Hinduism as the only truly tolerant religion are challenged by the contradictions of their social narrative and the refusal of Muslim Indians to see the light or fade into irrelevance. In Northern Ireland a substantial part of unionist self-identity was built on a platform of progressive values set within the wider British empire, in contrast to ethnically inclined Irish nationalism. When nationalists began to demand access to the public realm, employment and access to governing models of structure, at a time when Britain and Northern Ireland's values began to erode under secularism, industrial decline and shifting international relationships, the sense of alienation at the emerging civic model justified violence and the attribution of malevolence to the mildest catholic nationalist demands.

Along with research on the new right and less sympathetic subjects, anthropologists have had to confront the ethnics and subjectivities of such research. Banks and Gingrich are surprisingly frank in their 2006 introduction to the topic: they note that most anthropologists studying the topic avoid fieldwork with the far-right. Studies like Holmes' focus on ordinary people sympathetic to neo-nationalism rather than activists themselves (Holmes, 2000). Other anthropologists focus on textual resources and history: "websites, surveys, autobiographical accounts, interviews, newspaper articles and political manifestos" (Banks & Gingrich, 2006, p. 7). Researchers can adapt anthropological theory and insight from other ethnographic research to interpret neo-nationalism . They note that anthropologists have often been in dangerous situations, and have studied figures in relatively powerful positions before, even if they're not the norm. But for reasons of 'moral hygiene', ethnographers have avoided face-to-face ethnographic fieldwork (ibid. 11).

Today the situation has shifted somewhat. Sindre Bangstad (2017) notes the continued reluctance to engage in fieldwork, but draws attention to successful research like Parvis Ghassem-Fachandi's fieldwork in the aftermath of the Gujurat massacres in 2002 (Ghassem-Fachandi, 2012), Nitzan Shoshan on neo-Nazis in East Berlin (Shoshan, 2016), or Cathrine Thorlieffsen's exploration of Islamophobia in Hungary (Thorleifsson, 2017). Bangstad persuasively argues that anthropologists need to move beyond studying among people we can sympathise with and meet the challenge of studying outside our comfort zone. Taking this further, Agnieska Pasieka asks how we frame our understanding of populist and far-right movements (Pasieka, 2017). Noting the focus on eastern nationalism (especially a focus on Polish and Hungarian autocracy, ignoring long established figures like Marine le Pen and Geert Wilders, or the place for Victor Orban's Fidesz in the mainstream European People's Party despite the overt Islamophobia and dog-whistle antisemitism). She challenges lazy depictions of provincial bigotry, and relocates the momentum for these movements at the heart of western political currents. She also confronts those inclined to depict the far-right as marginal figures, driven by isolation or fear and worthy of depiction on the anthological spectrum of sympathy (ibid. 27). Instead, she insists we locate these new and

unsettling currents within our own moral and epistemological networks instead of isolating or reducing them to misled bygone relics.

> Anthropologists have long argued against notions of false consciousness and mystification, highlighting the multidimensionality of agency and resistance. It seems continuously hard to accept that the results of agency and resistance are not always what we would like to see (Pasieka, 2017, p. 28).

Comparative Anthropology

In the introduction to *Anthropology, by Comparison* (2002) Fox and Gingrich query the idea of comparative anthropology, noting that it seems simple at first glance but impenetrable when examined closely. They chart the fortunes of comparative anthropology from ambitious models of early theorists like Ruth Benedict through to the crisis of representation of the late twentieth century. Comparative anthropology once served to compare distinct cultures, usually to test some universal theory. As anthropology came to regard subject communities as fluid and participant in the same globalising webs of power and meaning, comparative anthropology has come to have a different purpose. Comparative anthropology also depended on the devotion to hard-science methodology, measuring the replication of anthropological theories in different settings. This subservience to hard science methodology came under scrutiny in the debates on representation.

The reinvigoration of comparative anthropology is required in part because of globalisation. Gingrich in his paper notes how 'globalisation' discourse has become a "fashionable catchword", noting it precedes the end of the Cold War. My research extends this considerably, to consider the effects of colonialism and modernisation in different parts of the world. To a lesser extent, my research dwells on the collapse of the British Empire, and the decline of a global British identity (Bell, 2007) that encompassed white populations around the commonwealth.

My research aims to understand how two distinct political movements have come to have uncannily similar ontologies of the Other: political ideologies masquerading as religions, unwashed masses following priests, the same devotion to degeneracy and subterfuge as opposed to honour and honesty, the same role models for family and templates of abuse (e.g. women as 'baby-factories'). My interest is in what links these field-sites: namely a specific interaction with colonial governmentality, and the fusion of public and domestic priorities and policies in

fears around normative family values, gender roles and their relationship to emerging nationalism. A major focus of my comparison is to draw away from seeing Indian communalism as an oriental affair, grounded in the tribal religious bigotry of an exotic clime. In a similar sense, most studies of Northern Ireland away from the 'atavistic hatred' model, which essentialises Northern Irish people and strips them not only of history but of external influence, collaboration and blame for contemporary tensions. While both Northern Ireland and India have been framed as echoes of ancient grievances, I want to examine how quintessentially modern tropes – modernity, secularism and civic identity – are integral to continuing narratives of fear and antagonism, not just in my field-sites but across the world.

Lastly a word needs to be said about comparisons between India and Ireland. This has fascinated scholars across a range of disciplines, but particularly focusing on colonial and postcolonial history (O'Malley, 2008). Ireland's influence on Indian nationalism and the cultural and social crosscurrents has been the object of much study (Foley & O'Connor, 2006). Sikata Banerjee's study of masculine nationalism compares how both nationalisms adopted to Victorian colonial masculinity (Banerjee, 2012).

My research shifts this comparison to India and Northern Ireland. My focus is less on how these states became autonomous, which in Northern Ireland's case is highly ambiguous. Rather I want to focus on how they saw partition reshaping their country. In this sense rather than see Northern Ireland braking away from Ireland, I want to look at it from a British perspective: Ireland broke away from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, choosing Catholic isolation over a progressive and mighty empire. In a similar sense Pakistan's breakaway from India has framed as the triumph of divisive religion of secular pluralism.

Chapter Three – Governing Through Numbers

This chapter gives a brief history of modern state governmentality in Ireland and India[21]. Both states are strongly marked by the policies of colonial governmentality, eager to manage populations with a minimum of fuss. In both cases rhetoric of citizenship sat uneasily with the reality of domination and state coercion. The shift to autonomy led to awkward triangulations as central authorities tried to accommodate divergent identities with universal citizenship. While downplaying nationalist rhetoric of colonial divide-and-rule tactics, statecraft such as separate franchises, different legal codes (highly discriminatory ones in Ireland) and the homogenisation of populations all played a part in the subsequent rise of grassroots identities. By the late nineteenth century, Indian politics had to contend with reformist movements that saw the demographic value of India populations. Ireland crept slowly towards integration with the UK, normalising Catholics while antagonising a Protestant tradition that defined itself through privileged access to centres of power. In both fieldsites mostly grassroots and ostensibly religious social movements stoked communal violence and led to partition and religiously-themed states.

This chapter examines the post-partition period for both fieldsites, starting in 1921 for Northern Ireland and 1947 for India, and the efforts of national governments in managing the established population groups. India's achievement was marred by the Partition while Northern Irish unionism had not intended a semi-independent status. In both cases, the newly created state went about ordering and building its new status on a civic model that stressed modernity, universalism and enlightenment values in contrast to the ethnoreligious values espoused by the partitioned states Pakistan and Ireland. In both cases, however, the rhetoric of civic inclusivity and progression masked underlying communalism that eventually became impossible to ignore. Both countries now negotiate more equal

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[21] Both regions are considered in their pre-partition colonial state for the sake of simplicity. Elsewhere I will clearly distinguish between the Republic and Ireland and Northern Ireland, and India as structured after its partition.

recognitions of multiculturalism, shared political and social space, but also contend with the imperfections that go with it.

Both Northern Ireland and the Republic of India emerged from sectarian partitions with a moral mission to uphold principles of progress and civilisation which they felt would be swiftly abandoned in the countries with which they split. Both countries embarked on remarkably similar political projects: creating stable, highly centralised power structures that could dependably rule a fragmented population. Both used 'first-past-the-post' political systems to build and maintain single-party hegemonies in heterogeneous societies, leading to stagnation and backlash. Moreover, both measured the success of their state in development, industrialisation and the promotion of civic equality. The states against which they measured themselves, Pakistan and the Irish Free State/Republic of Ireland, were in turn marked by their ethnic and religious exclusion and isolation from the twentieth century. In India, Congress enjoyed an extended period of central command and exerted control (politically and militarily) over unruly peripheries. Northern Ireland was ruled for 50 years by the UUP, under leaderships that lasted decades. My aim is to connect the rhetoric of egalitarianism and civic society with the reality of privilege and marginalisation. I want to outline the implicit discrimination at the heart of government and how it managed minorities, the hegemonic shift from narratives of modernisation towards 'identity politics', and examine the success and downsides of a focus on 'multiple publics' (Fraser 1992).

India

Colonial Categorisation

British Rule began in the mid-eighteenth century when the East India Company gained control of Bengal and slowly extended their influence across India, leading to direct rule by the British government after the 1857 uprising. Whereas the Muslim invaders over various periods of time managed to integrate and assimilate reasonably well with the local environment[22], the British introduced a completely new manner of government that affected India in many direct and indirect ways.

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[22]As did the early officers of the East India Company (Nandy 1983, 4-5).

Behind their 'native' tools of administration were 'enforced traditions', and an ideology that insisted that this was the correct and only way to govern (Dirks, 1992). This ideology led to enormous shifts in how India was constituted, as it did later in other colonies (Mamdani, 1996).

There was a huge emphasis on detailing every aspect of the land and its people. The East India Company had a strongly utilitarian perspective on information, and gathered as much data about their expanding territories as they could, for purposes of administration and above all profit (Sengoopta 2004, 38). After the uprising in 1857, the British authorities replaced the East India Company with direct control. They also saw a direct need for even more comprehensive knowledge of the local populations and religious customs, with increased emphasis on race as time went on.

This cartography of the population in India took many forms. Bernard Cohn outlined the development of the census in British colonial thinking, as an administrative tool designed to ensure effective management of populations. The census would help in matters such as quantifying and segregating the 'martial races' for use in the army, and establish the correct balance between Hindus and Muslims in the public service (Cohn 1987, 243; Bose and Jalal 2006, 79). Another form of cartography was photography. Christopher Pinney details how photographic collections were made of Indian 'races and tribes', with an emphasis on classification and differentiation of separate peoples (Pinney 1997, 29). These collections were assembled by the authorities, as well as by amateurs. Their purpose was to capture declining cultures, as well as having a practical use in identifying belligerent populations (Pinney 1997, 34). Chandak Sengoopta describes how anthropometrics and fingerprinting were increasingly used to chart and track the native populations, particularly the 'criminal castes' (Sengoopta 2004, 123). Lastly, as the nineteenth century progressed, race came to the fore of categorisation, with caste and race increasingly entwined (Sengoopta 2004, 43; Cohn 1987). Aryan origin theories validated the superiority of Brahmin-centric casteism in colonial eyes, and consoled the British in their domination (Dirks 2001, 210).

During this process, there was a firm conviction that native institutions and traditions needed to be respected, especially religious ones. The focus on religion suggests an Orientalist infatuation with a spiritualist East, as opposed to the secular modern West (van der Veer 2002). As we have seen, religion was a minimal political or ethnic concern before colonisation. Indeed, 'religion' as a reified concept only emerges with the Enlightenment (Asad 1993), and first manifests itself in India through the actions of Europeans. It was during the rule of the British that the many faiths of India were reduced to a few key religions, for example through census enumeration and classification (Muhajir 2010). During this time 'Hinduism' was reified, and the numerous strands of faith that fell under the label 'Islam' were placed squarely under the authority of the *Ulema*.

It was during the Company rule that sacred texts were made central to the conception of their respective faiths. Ironically the *Ulema*, who drew their authority from readings of the Koran, finally had the authority they were denied under Mughal rule (Bose and Jalal 2006, 58). In the case of Brahminical texts, the British controlled interpretations of the texts and their enforcement, all the while operating under the mantle of disinterested observer (Mani 1999). Just as they struggled to reveal the 'true' nature of texts from the corruptions they believed had crept in over the years, they also made a point of granting the masses access to 'their' texts.

This promotion of one distinct textual religious tradition as representative of all variants of that religion had far-reaching effects on how populations were managed. Umair Ahmad Muhajir writes about the religious communities that did not adhere to 'mainstream' orthodox practices. As he points out, before the late nineteenth century these would undoubtedly have outnumbered what came to be considered orthodox Hinduism and Islam (Muhajir 2010, 28). With the increased colonial focus on population, the religious elites were forced to confront the composition of 'their' flocks. With the census came a shift in how people saw themselves (at least officially), as they were pigeonholed into religious categories that made little sense at a local level. It was part of the grand mapping of culture and religion: sorting out, quantifying and clearing up inconsistencies.

By the time of the British Raj, religious communities were reifying at a political as well as a cultural level. The 1905 partition of Bengal along religious lines was designed specifically to weaken the nascent Congress movement. Using their new census data, the British administration created reservations for members of 'depressed castes' and religious minorities, chiefly Muslims (Bose and Jalal 2006, 84). The Morley-Minto reforms in 1909 brought in an increased franchise, but with separate votes for Muslims, underlining colonial belief that only Muslims could represent Muslims (Metcalf and Metcalf 2002, 159). Communal splits like these were ambiguously recognised by the Muslim community. The Muslim League was initially an elite advocacy group, later taken over by middle-class nationalists like Jinnah who co-ordinated the Lucknow Pact. Similarly, the separation of franchises was perceived as blatant divide-and-rule by middle-class Bengalis of any religion, though it was the result of Muslim Nawab lobbying. Many Muslims were wary of the Hindu nationalism they saw in Congress, particularly after the 1905 partition of Bengal, and associated with the British government. If not at a local level, then the growing national consciousness was split at an elite level into expansive political identities.

Outside politics and government it is debatable how much effect these categorisations had on the subject populations:

> Muslim social identities in late-nineteenth century Indian remained fractured by class, region and the rural-urban divide. The innumerable divisions – doctrinal, sectarian as well as heterodox – of Islam in South Asia even today suggest that the construction of an Indian Muslim identity, much less a coherent one, in the late nineteenth century occurred more in the mind of latter-day scholars than in the actual unfolding of societal rules and relations. (Bose and Jalal 2006, 137)

The same goes for so-called Hindus. All this reification had a negligible effect at a local level, but it certainly had an effect among self-ascribed (and/or colonial promoted) community leaders, who saw the need to cement fuzzy ethnoreligious boundaries. The late nineteenth century saw the rise of various reformist parties such as Tablighi Jamaat and the Arya Samaj (Muhajir 2010, 28; Metcalf and Metcalf 2002). These groups attempted to homogenise and monopolise the broad religious identities promoted under British rule, for a variety of reasons. Indian nationalism, for instance, internalised the Orientalist clichés and reversed their values. Indian

superiority would be marked by its spiritual ascendancy over a materialist and historically shallow West (Chatterjee 1993, 120). Another key reason was the realisation that politics was increasingly tied to population instead of elites. Cementing population groups became central to demands for a political voice. It is in this time that upper-caste Hindus reluctantly adopted Dalits and lower-caste Indian as Hindus. The Arya Samaj organised *shuddhi* ceremonies, to cleanse non-Brahmins into the Hindu fold, and convert Muslims and Christians who were seen as natural Hindus led astray by foreign religions (Pandey 2006, 119).

More ominous than reformist movement were the increasing prevalence of communal riots. As Pandey points out, it is possible to read communal motives into earlier riots only if one is looking for communalism (Pandey 1990). However, from the beginning of the twentieth century, communal violence is reported over issues such as cow slaughter and agrarian revolts (Pandey 1983; Chatterjee 1982). As Sanskritisation and Hindu reform cut across emerging nationalism and Victorian gender roles, women became the lightning rod of communal tension[23]. In nationalist discourse, the woman and the domestic sphere had become the locus of the spirit of the country. The division of nationalist thought between modern (or material) and traditional (or spiritual) resulted in a cleavage between the outer and the inner, or 'the world' (*bāhir*) and the home (*ghar*). The world, where exposure to modernity/westernisation was greatest, was a male domain. It was Indian men who sacrificed their spiritual integrity in order to cultivate the necessary skills of modern state-building (Chatterjee 1993). Home was the domain of women and the refuge of a pre-colonial Hindu purity. Orthodox Hindu marriage became the model of social bliss, with the veneration of chaste Hindu wives by adoring husbands the germ for future independence. The perfect Hindu marriage cultivated a holistic national paternalism, blending western government with eastern reverence. Western marriages were seen as a microcosm of colonialism: exploitative and utilitarian (Sarkar 2001).

The public/private model of society was increasingly emphasised in Victorian times, particularly the conflation of home/religion/woman. For instance, polite

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[23] The papers collected by Sangari and Vaid are essential to this discussion, especially the essays of Lata Mani and Uma Chakravarti (Sangari and Vaid 1989).

society was unsettled in this time by Catholic nuns crusading against urban squalor. Apart from residual unease with Catholicism, these were *women* actively involved in *public* affairs using their *religious* role to highlight social problems (Griffin 2004, 123-124). Victorian men felt as emasculated as their colonial subjects with the unease generated by the working classes and increasing suffragette agitations. Like the Indian middle-class, Victorian men crafted a model of society built around domestic roles, with benevolent but stern fathers, and beatific housewives. Sarkar notes the confused nature of 'traditional' Indian gender norms with Victorian social norms: Queen Victoria was cited as the perfect example of the chaste widow (Sarkar 2001, 43).

Women had become the site of community honour, as well as its weakest link, as Brahmin notions of respectability seeped further into other castes. The first big panic this raised was the question of widow conversion. The increased concern with respectability among lower castes meant more rigid forms of marriage, increased concerns with purity and the fear that oversexed widows might end up aligning with oversexed Muslims (Gupta 2002:298). Widow remarriage had been a part of the reform project, mostly out of concern for the welfare of these women and an effort to draw away from stereotypes of *sati* that that the British used to justify their rule. In 1909, Upendra Nath Mukherji's book *Hindus: A Dying Race* argued that virile Muslims would prove irresistible to sexually frustrated Hindu widows who were repelled by lazy, thriftless Hindu males (Datta 1999, 30). The danger began to extend beyond widows, with forced abductions entering the narrative in the mid-twenties. Attacks on women of all denominations by colonial officials shifted to a concern with Hindu women being attacked by Muslim goondas, which shifted again to attacks by Muslims generally. The cases cited by Datta illustrate the blanketing nature of the narrative. Many of the cases he cites from the time indicate mistreatment of Hindu women by husbands and parents. But their agency is quickly subsumed within the wider community panic (Datta 1999).

Towards Independence and Partition

Regardless of whether the top-down imposition of religious-based communal categories had much currency at a local or individual level, it remained the means of ordering government at the state level. Parties such as the Muslim League were afforded more authority than perhaps they deserved, while Congress used its blend of secularism and Hindu populism as justification for mass-representation. At any rate, the Congress party and British administration talked with organisations that represented, in their view, large chunks of the population. Accommodation with these organisations became an important part of any new nation, especially after the spectre of a separate nation for Muslims became popular.

The rise of Congress and Indian nationalism made an independent India increasingly likely as time went on, with the looming question of Muslim participation. The increasing steps towards autonomy saw the Muslim League emerge as the main political party in areas with a Muslim concentration and the figurative idea of a Muslim nation began to take on geographical shape (Metcalf and Metcalf 2002, 205). The Muslim League's vision of Pakistan included the united provinces of Bengal and Punjab, ensuring the retention of a minority population to balance the inevitable Muslim minority left unrepresented in India (Bose and Jalal 2006, 145-146). This was strongly rejected by Congress and the non-Muslims living in Muslim-majority states. This model continued to be pushed by The Muslim League and the British Administration as a bargaining tool, despite the potential for communal tensions. Elections in 1946 gave the Muslim League a strong majority in Muslim provinces, emboldening their claims and sparking communal violence that careened out of control. Seeing the increased radicalisation, the British decided to leave India as soon as possible and bullied the League into accepting a smaller Pakistan or none at all (Bose and Jalal 2006, 152). The Muslim League acquiesced to the partition of Bengal and Punjab, and the colonial administration drew up a haphazard border for the new countries.

Partition Violence

The Partition came into effect in August 1947. Inter-ethnic violence began the previous year, however, when the idea of two separate nations became apparent but before the borders could be drawn. Instead, the borders were drawn at a local

level, in the ethnic population of towns and villages. There was an unprecedented level of violence. It is impossible to get precise figures, but estimates indicate around 400,000 to 500,000 altogether are thought to have died, and millions displaced (Das 2007). Bose and Jalal give the figure 17 million displaced (Bose and Jalal 2006, 157), while Menon and Bhasin give eight million (Menon and Bhasin 1993, 3). Lastly, around 100,000 women are thought to have been abducted and/or raped (Das 2007, 20). The Indian and Pakistani governments, both newly created, were completely overwhelmed by the violence.

Pandey describes how such violence is dealt with at a local level in his book *Remembering Partition*. "The stories of these attacks and the events surrounding them ... employ a variety of techniques to elide the violence or consign it – often against their own testimony – to happenings somewhere else ('out there')" (Pandey 2001, 177-178)[24]. The violence and mayhem are externalised, presented as someone else's history. This happened at the official level where the state distanced itself from any responsibility for the violence. "Official and even historical accounts of Partition see it as the unfortunate outcome of sectarian and separatist politics, and as a tragic accompaniment to the exhilaration and promise of freedom fought for with courage and valour" (Menon and Bhasin 1993, 2). In a way, the recovery operations formed part of an attempt to reassert authority after the Partition violence: "The state distanced itself from the 'depths of moral depravity' which the populace had shown and took upon itself the task of establishing civilized government" (Das 2007, 26).

One of the effects of the Partition, which was preceded by the political manoeuvrings at the elite level but which hadn't necessarily been felt at the local level, was the mass-reification of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. The communal violence brought this shift about with a vengeance. People were suddenly isolated from their native land, designated as outsiders and often threats to be eliminated. Muslims who left for Pakistan confirmed the hardline views that they weren't true nationalists after all (Pandey 2001, 169). Those that remained were by no means trusted.

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[24] Urvashi Butalia also examines this pattern of externalising violence (Butalia 2000).

Abductions

We have seen how the rise in communal tensions in the early twentieth century saw women emerge as potential sites of corruption and contamination, with both Hindus and Muslims positing women as sexually dangerous/vulnerable. The Partition set this motif in stone, as women became the site for a contention over religion, nationalism and politics. With the rise in inter-religious strife, women became the chief medium for inflicting shame on the other side.

> The material, symbolic and political significance of the abduction of women was not lost on either the women themselves and their families, on their communities, or on leaders and governments. As a retaliatory measure, it was simultaneously an assertion of identity and a humiliation of the rival community through the appropriation of its women. When accompanied by forcible conversion and marriage, it could be counted upon to outrage both, family and community honour and religious sentiments. (Menon and Bhasin 1993, 3)

Gyanendra Pandey offers a contrasting perspective on the status of women (Pandey 2001, 165), as objects belonging to the men who possess them, they did not have a nationality or a religion of their own. He points out, however, that the evidence often pointed the other way, "that they came for a moment to stand for nothing else" (ibid.).

The experiences of the abducted women varied greatly. While Bose and Jalal criticise Das for romanticising to an extent the abductors who then married their victims (Bose and Jalal 2006, 164), the experiences of women were not uniformly horrific. Menon and Bhasin describe how some were left behind y their families as hostages, others separated during escapes were sheltered and protected. Some married into their new religion and lived with considerable dignity.

Suicide was resorted to by many women, to avoid falling into the hands of marauders or afterwards when they were released (Menon and Bhasin 1993, 3). In Punjab historiography, there is a persistent narrative of women taking their own lives to avoid the ravages of invading Muslim armies. This tradition was re-enacted to deal with the events of the Partition, with the celebration of female suicides (Das 1995, 65). This glorification of sacrifice and bravery is juxtaposed with the silence and censorship surrounding women who had 'succumbed' to the attackers (ibid.). Sometimes when women were taken the family denied she ever existed, to avoid

bringing shame on the family and community (Pandey 2001, 174). Many families refused to see their womenfolk after they had been recovered (Menon and Bhasin 1993, 7). As mentioned above, death at the hands of male kin was very much a part of the threat offered by Partition too (Butalia 2000, 35). "It was not only 'miscreants', 'outsiders' or 'marauding mobs' that they needed to fear – husbands, fathers, brothers and even sons, could turn killers" (Menon and Bhasin 1993, 2). In the official narrative, these murders would be construed as honourable deaths, often begged as favours by the women.

Pandey also talks of the contrast between the silence surrounding the rapes and the glorification of the suicides. The tales of suicide - of women fighting and dying alongside men, or jumping down wells en masse – are well rehearsed, while more 'shameful' stories are frowned upon (Pandey 2001, 193). The official narratives were chiefly about the community. The community is reinforced in these stories, with the men and women conforming to old ideals. The communities were set apart and cleansed. "Violence – indeed, excessive, unforgiving violence – is sometimes thought to have been indispensable in the struggle to establish these new – 'pure', 'real' – communities on secure foundations: and it is no shame to declare it" (Pandey 2001, 198).

Anything that might interfere with the purity and demarcation of these ethnic boundaries is frowned upon. Pandey goes on to describe how communities that straddled the Hindu/Muslim divide were done away with[25]. Similarly, the women who were abused by members of the opposite group similarly compromised the newly reified groups:

> In the crystallized narratives of the family, then, women who had the potential of confusing sharp divisions between Hindus and Muslims, women who had been abducted or raped, and women who had borne children by Muslim men and yet chosen to live, were all 'forgotten.' (Das 1995, 63)

Veena Das could as easily be talking about 'communities'. Here, we have another facet of the suffering women were confronted with. First they were the victims of marauders and rapists. Then they were the victims of their own menfolk, families and communities. Lastly, they became victims of ethnic discourse, with the official

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[25] Shail Mayaram explores the continued disjuncture between the reality of syncretic belief systems among the Meos in Rajasthan, and their categorical liminality for the government (Mayaram 2003).

narratives of the community having no room for the horrendous experiences of the women involved (Ibid.). Das later discusses the silence of women around their experiences, having become the embodiment of partition their stories were cast aside. Given the eagerness to reject tainted women, this silence is understandable. If the bodies of women were surfaces to inscribe victory and masculine aggression, the victims converted this passivity into agency, by internalising and hiding the violence, using metaphors like pregnancy or drinking poison (Das, 2007, pp. 54-55)

The State

The last great sequence of abuse towards women was the states of India and Pakistan agreeing to recover the women they had 'lost' during the violence. One immediate problem that arose was how a woman, who had been born and raised in India, could now qualify as 'belonging' to Pakistan, a territory and a state she had never visited. The same problem arose for Hindu or Sikh women in Pakistan. Here we see the beginnings of a strange relationship between the state and its 'daughters'.

The state had to deal with Muslim women in its own territory and the returning Hindu women from Pakistan. This created some trouble. For the most part, women were sent back to their families or rehabilitated to a greater or lesser degree (Menon and Bhasin 1993, 5). But for many women it was a trauma relived. The police in India were given great latitude to pick up women they suspected of being abductees to be brought to camps. There was much scope for abuse and mistakes were frequent. As we have seen, many of the women had become happily settled into their new community (Pandey, 2001, p. 182). The state thought they knew better and had them sent back.

The government of India was always far more concerned about 'its' women than the state of Pakistan was about 'theirs'. Perhaps this was because the Partition was a victory for Pakistan, whereas it was a terrible defeat for India, one often imagined as the mutilation of 'Mother India'. Questions about the fate of children illustrate this. When women were returned from Pakistan, it was decided that any children - the children of Muslim fathers - should be left behind. Children born to abducted

Muslim mothers and Indian fathers were to stay in India. Muslim women in general presented a threat to the purity of the nation. While they remained in the country they contributed to its 'immorality'. Returning Muslim women would purify the barbarism of their Hindu and Sick rapists (Das, 1995, p. 70). Muslim women in India were, after all, born citizens of India. The Indian government maintained a secularist, democratic stance, but the decision made here resulted in women of a certain religion being carted away against their wishes (Menon and Bhasin 1993, 3).

Das queries whether the state worked with the families or whether they had their own interests. She uses Jacques Donzelot, who argues that a collusion arose between states and families in the eighteenth century Europe, whereby the state took care of unwanted individuals in institutions such as orphanages and asylums; the family were cleansed of shame and the state had more resources (Donzelot 1980). Das compares this approach to Herzfeld, who argues that post-colonial states adopted many of the characterisations classical Orientalist thought up for them (Herzfield 1987). Thus, the Indian state upheld traditional notions of purity and honour that were seen as integral to Indian culture. Das falls between these two, arguing that the state was concerned with the honour of families, but also concerned with its own honour and status, both in terms of purity but also as a modern 'civilised' country.

As so often happens, women became the medium the state used to illustrate its position. Just as the marauders and mobs used women as 'semiotic objects' in the name of their own ethnicity or religion, with recovery, the state used women to promote its ideas of purity and honour, not at a family or community level, but at a national level. Families who refused to acknowledge their kinswomen were chided by the statesmen (Menon and Bhasin 1993, 7). When questions about the purity of women arose, the government had the final say on their status, at one point arguing that the menstruation of the women was enough to 'cleanse' them of any pollution.

Independent India

The Indian National Congress Party dominated India's early independence, promoting the first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru's vision of an industrial, secular nation-state. While efforts to address caste inequality, religious accommodation and regionalism were central to the 'Nehruvian Consensus', power and wealth continued to be concentrated in upper-caste circles. Militarisation and force remained central to state practice, and over time the hollowness of inclusivist rhetoric became evident. During the turbulence that followed, the *Hindutva* movement gained momentum as an agent of unity, increasingly focusing opposition to enemies of the nation as they saw them. In this time Muslim Indians gained a central place in the *Hindutva* imagination, and their numbers re-emerge as an existential threat to the nation.

Nehruvian Secularism

The new state faced a multiplicity of regional, linguistic, class, caste and ideological tensions. Like Northern Ireland, it sought to prove itself a secular modernised country, with huge focus on a strong central state, industrialisation and liberal inclusivity. Inclusion was a strong feature of Indian independence politics, with reservations, universal suffrage, and a strong 'unity in diversity' message at the heart of India. Nevertheless, power remained in the hands of the key architects of Indian independence. Liberal democracy has always fallen short of its ideal, most obviously in gender balance, but also in acknowledging structural limitations on language, race or social strata. The main division in India remains one of class and caste — with strong political undertones to debates about caste reservations, 'minorityism' and Dalit activism — and an understanding of governmentality is central to understanding the relationship between state and subaltern groups. Much of the tension between liberal individualism and techniques of governance have translated into religious demarcation too, especially with the normalisation of *Hindutva* politics in India's mainstream.

Congress was the architect of Indian independence and it ruled from 1947 till 1977. In the early election it enjoyed a monopoly of power, with 75 percent of the seats, albeit with only 45 percent of the popular vote (Scott 2010, 132). Post-independence India had a sizeable problem after partition, but a lot of optimism

and strong leadership. Combined with colonial-era social categories, the result is a system that falls between two stools. India had its particular secular formulation, one that western ideas of multiculturalism started to reflect, specifically minority rights and state intervention on their behalf. Indian secularism was more concerned with religious pluralism and management than the separation of church and state, a state of affairs also increasingly acknowledged in western societies. Partition violence and the assassination of Gandhi quashed any desire for a *Hindu Rashtra* (Scott, 2010). While gruesome, these events placed the horrors of communal divide and the dangers of majoritarian extremism at the forefront when it came to defining India in her early years.

The Congress Party and Nehru are usually singled out for particular attention when it comes to this secularism, but Bose and Jalal criticise this focus and draw attention to the role of the civil service bureaucracy in sustaining a secular ethos. Partly this reflects the continuation of pre-independence policies, which the civil service carried over into independence policies and modernist/secular projects (Bose and Jalal 2006, 169). Congress introduced the reservation system for Dalits and Adivasis (known as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes or SCs and STs). However, Muslims were another matter. In an attempt to woo the Muslim community back to the idea of a united India, they promised retention of Muslim personal laws, even as calls for a universal civil code were enshrined in the constitution. The government that eventually rose from independence and the Partition was a mix of centrist and secular ideology with pragmatism towards the peripheries and minorities.

Upper-caste Hindus dominated government, and it was their views and perceptions that dominated and defined India for the next sixty years (Menon and Nigam 2007, 19). Before independence, the Congress party had an unfortunate Brahmin vibe that undermined their ability to garner support from minority religions, Adivasis and other marginal groups. Congress had to appeal to the masses, but it also had to respect the foci of power that were in place under the British and the dominance of Brahmins. This caused public rifts with figures such as Ambedkar and Jinnah, but ultimately their balanced approach paid and it became the government position (Anderson 2012). For the next sixty years, the

balance of upper-caste cultural and secularist championing of minority statuses continued to work, but with a few large problems along the way.

Secularism was tied into independent India's other challenges: eradicating caste and gender inequality, eradicating poverty, and ensuring universal suffrage and equality. Equality did not mean ignoring the realities that faced low-caste Hindus and other minorities, and affirmative efforts were made to ensure their position in society and state machinery. Modernisation and industrialisation were to tackle poverty and backwardness, seen as the main barriers to equality as well as symptoms of British oppression (Scott 2010, 127). To this end, Nehru focused efforts on agricultural advancement, promoting the Green Revolution in India, which helped with food security.

Overpopulation was first critically examined by the British and later by aid donors such the US. Before independence many nationalists wedded nationalism and modernism, and birth control and demographic statistics were central to modernist conceptions of the new state. Malthusian formulae combined with eugenics to foster a fear that not only was India's population overbreeding, but the lower castes and Muslims were the main culprits (Ahluwalia, 2004, p. 186). The private habits of families were increasingly subject to public scrutiny, as the modern Indian state required virile men of good breeding. Coercive policies of sterilisation began as early as the fifties (Connelly 2006), though, they were to become closely associated with the Emergency. However, responsible family planning was both the prerogative of the state and the duty of individual households, and all geared towards modernising Indian society. In this respect lower castes and Muslims were marginalised from the project of modernity and the improvement of the state.

'Indira is India, and India is Indira'
The policies of Nehruvian secularism were born out of pragmatism and recognition of both post-Partition realities and colonial-era categorisations rather than idealism. For all that, it worked remarkably well in the medium-term. Over time though, the inconsistencies started to build up, in particular the complacency of upper-caste domination of social circles and the impression that they would

benignly represent minorities and marginalised sections of society. This tension resulted in the turmoil of the seventies and the 'Emergency', which sought to neutralise threats to the state as it had developed.

Lal Bahadur Shastri followed Nehru as leader of Congress, a candidate backed by the senior Congress figures, collectively known as 'The Syndicate'. Language conflicts and war with Pakistan marked Shastri's tenure, both of which had festered under Nehru before erupting. Indira Gandhi, who was chief of staff to her father and communications minister under Shastri, was then selected as leader when Shastri died suddenly in 1966. She was another candidate The Syndicate felt they could control, but she proved to be less pliable than they hoped. Like Shastri, Gandhi cannot be solely blamed for the failures of previous Congress governments, in particular the frustrated programme of equality. The policies developed under Nehru failed to bring about widespread social change. While the military and industrialisation prospered, land reform was scant and employment still quite poor (Bose and Jalal 2006:175). After a poor showing in the 1967 election, Congress began to split between those who favoured more privatisation of the public services and those like Gandhi, who wanted to continue socioeconomic reforms. The 1971 election was fought on precisely such a platform with an increasingly leftist populism, regaining ground for Gandhi's Congress, but creating expectations that the government had no intention of fulfilling. Together with the rising frustration over poverty eradication, and wider economic upsets across the globe in the early seventies, the result was a rise in leftist agitation.

The seventies illustrated a slow shift from covert to overt authoritarianism from Gandhi, facing regional insurgencies, threats to the centre's power, and dissent within her party (Bose and Jalal 2006). The seventies are when the façade of benign upper-caste control begins to slip, and minorities assert the right to representation. Sparked by economic grievances such as food prices, a broad range of mass opposition to Congress under Gandhi formed in the mid-seventies, united by the desire to see her removed from power (Metcalf and Metcalf 2002, 250). The government responded with increasingly brutal crackdowns on protests, polarising the situation further. When the Allahabad High Court ruled that Gandhi's electoral success in 1971 be fraudulent, the resulting clamour for her resignation

prompted the declaration of Emergency. The opposition were arrested, and Gandhi moved to consolidate the supremacy of Congress.

Intending to cement the primacy of Congress, the Emergency eradicated any popular support the party retained. A series of brutal reforms were enforced, most notoriously massive slum clearances and sterilisation projects. Lower-caste and Muslim citizens were particularly affected by these coercive policies, eroding Congress' traditional support bases (Metcalf and Metcalf 2002:252). Authoritarian policies such as these had long been part of the rule of government. Aggressive population control methods had been around since independence, with most of their focus on marginalised populations (Connelly 2006). However, the Emergency magnified this coercion and discrimination was thrown into sharp relief.

Most efforts at consolidating power failed. Political opposition grew while Congress popularity plummeted, and efforts at curtailing the judiciary and press failed. Massive resentment and democratic pressure built up, with Gandhi relenting after two years and allowing elections. The Janata Party gained power, ending thirty years of Congress rule and introducing overtly *Hindutva* figures to state office. The Janata Party government is mainly remembered as divided and inept, but they faced considerable instability (Metcalf and Metcalf 2002, 253). The tensions that plagued Congress had not gone away, and the same democratic surge that followed the Emergency and empowered JP also wreaked havoc in the form of student protests, a heavy police strike and caste agitation (Menon and Nigam 2007, 6). The lack of a coherent opposition to Congress was ascribed to the weakness of nationalist politics, especially by Hindu nationalists, and a new ethnopolitical party, the BJP, was founded in 1980. The BJP, like its predecessor, was not strictly affiliated with the RSS but followed their lead on the questions of *Hindu Rashtra*, hostility towards the Left, India's immediate neighbours and of course marginalised citizens.

Congress reacted to the new trend in politics by emulating it. Their return to power was marked by a shift towards 'soft *Hindutva*' as well as a neo-liberal

economic shift. The rise of a secessionist movement in Punjab[26] also afforded Congress a new basis for national unity, with Sikhs castigated as enemies of India. If the Emergency represented the nadir of India's democratic project, the assassination of Indira Gandhi and the resultant violence revealed the façade that secularism had become. After her murder, and the ascension of Rajiv Gandhi to the role of prime minister, members of Congress went on a communal rampage against Sikhs. Roughly three thousand Sikhs were killed. Many more Sikhs were wounded and raped, with a concentration of casualties in Delhi (Scott 2010, 152).

Soft and Hard *Hindutva*

The 1980s saw the failure of some Congress policies which tried to alleviate divergent threats. Rajiv Gandhi's 1984 election campaign was fought on three bases: revulsion over his mother's assassination, separatist strife in Punjab and, ironically enough, secularism. The election granted Congress their highest number of seat to date. The nascent BJP, Muslim minorities and the Khalistan movement could all be presented as inimical to tolerance and inter-group harmony that independent India always strove for. Minority movements of all stripes were the enemy. Just as Indira Gandhi inherited the problems that had festered under Nehru, Rajiv inherited the communal trend that had developed under his mother.

Congress' 1984 triumph proved short-lived. The government stumbled from one crisis to the next, subverting Supreme Court Ruling on Muslim Personal Law reform to placate the unrepresentative All-India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB), ignoring the heterogeneity of the Muslim public while confirming *Hindutva* accusations of vote-bank manipulation (Das 1995). In response, Congress then handed control of Babri Masjid over to Hindus (Hansen 1999, 150). Blatant pandering to both communal fringes succeeded in alienating everyone and drove the BJP to increasingly assertive demands to bolster their position as saviours of India's heritage. While at a local level Congress was highly involved in communal agitation, the main party line was unable to abandon secularism as a guiding principle, even if it was barely noticeable in practice. Meanwhile, the country was plunged headlong into neoliberal reforms, breeding a host of corruption scandals

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[26] Congress opposed Punjab's main party, Akali Dal, and supported the political movement that led to secession demands.

that would oust Rajiv Gandhi and his party by 1989. Gandhi was assassinated two years later by Tamil extremists for his government's intervention into the Sri Lankan civil war. The demise of Congress gave rise to coalition governments in the nineties, incorporating centrist parties, with regional, caste and leftist political groupings. As Chakravarti has noted, the rise of Dalit parties in particular has been condemned as regressive, although the everyday practice (and discrimination) of caste continues for many Indians (Chakravarti 2003, 143). Eventually, a BJP-led government assembled a coalition, ruling from 1998 to 2004.

The early 1990s saw the implementation of the Mandal Report, which recommended occupational and educational reservations for 'Other Backward Classes', prompting outrage from upper-caste Hindus. Dalits and Adivasis had reservations for decades, but reservations began for other economically marginalised Hindu communities. Some Muslim communities were registered as OBCs, but overall their benefits from reservations have been minimal (Hasan 2005). The opening of public employment and influence to lower classes and castes meant upper-caste and privileged sections of society increasingly took to private enterprise. However, at the same time upper-casteists opposed the increase in reservations, claiming clientelist politics and the values of meritocracy. As Mamdani noted of other colonial settings (Mamdani 1996), elites adopt the language of individualism and liberal universalism when it suits their interests. The implementation of the recommendations caused street protests and violent agitation. The *Hindutva* movement led charges of favouritism and called for a meritocratic system which would necessarily favour the upper-castes. In 2006 the questions of reservations and minority interests were raised again with the Sachar Report highlighted the need to redress the low economic and educational status of India's Muslims. As a whole, the Muslim public had one of the lowest socio-economic standings in India but was unable to avail of caste reservations because they only applied to Hindus. Once again, the *Hindutva* movement argued that deserved or not; minority redress schemes cemented the problems they were trying alleviate and sustained a toxic political dynamic of buying votes. Again, the *Hindutva* movement appealed to the liberal ideal of the abstract citizen and stressed that meritocracy was integral to Hinduism.

From the 1980s onwards, the *Hindutva* movement re-emerged as a serious influence in the Indian public sphere, coalescing a range of concerns, from upper-caste privilege, Islamophobia, territorial disputes with Pakistan and China and corrupting Western values (though heavily pro-capital). By the early 1990s, Hindutvavadis had a range of the main issues already touched on here. The Mandal Report was seen as a direct attack on the egalitarianism on Indian public service, targeting the upper-castes who were most likely to be *Hindutva* acolytes. Meanwhile, the dispute over Babri Masjid as the birthplace of Ram prompted the head of the BJP, L.K. Advani to organise a series of 'chariot tours' or *rath yatras* to mobilise support and raise funds awareness (Mathur, 2006). In 1992 the mosque was torn down. Both the *rath yatras* and demolition of the mosque prompted violence and rioting across India, with the majority of victims being Muslims (Brass 2003; Engineer 1991).

The shifts towards mainstream 'soft' *Hindutva* which began under Congress in the 1980s came to fruition in the 1990s under the BJP which eventually gained power in 1998. They managed to cultivate an emerging middle-class vote concerned with increased visibility of the Muslim community and the Mandal Commission's insistence on 'special privileges' for 'other backwards castes' (OBCs). As Appadurai notes, the upper-castes have much more to fear from lower-castes and Dalits than anyone does from Muslims. The Muslim 'Other' deflects from the many inequalities within the Hindu category (Appadurai 2006, 74). The eradication of a state socialist project pitted communities against one another, allowing all parties to cherry-pick their voters while bemoaning vote-bank politics. In power, the BJP renewed antagonism with Pakistan and placed a huge emphasis on a nuclear weapons programme. The shift to neoliberalism which began under Rajiv Gandhi continued in earnest, as India measured its modernity in global accessibility and foreign investment.

The 'War on Terror' was another influential factor. While Islamophobic and anti-Pakistani sentiments were a constant of *Hindutva* ideology, narratives of terrorism allowed for even greater coercion (Pandey, 2006). Anti-terrorism and 'encounter' killings increased in this period, disproportionately affecting Muslims. In Gujarat, in 2002, a railway carriage of *Hindutva* volunteers returning from Ayodhya caught

fire, and Muslim arsonists were blamed. In retribution the Muslim population in Gujarat was roundly attacked, with over a thousand killed and thousands forced from their homes. Excused by Hindutvavadis as a natural response to an atrocity, the anti-Muslim violence was planned for months in advance (Sarkar 2002). The state government, headed by a central BJP politician (the current prime minister of India Narendra Modi) at best ignored the widespread violence, and at worst actively colluded in the mob violence. In the aftermath, there has been little restitution or justice for the victims. Gujarat remains a highly segregated state, with many Muslims displaced during the violence. Meanwhile, Gujarat and Modi's governance were hailed as economic champions, pioneering new levels of neoliberal policies.

Colonisation in Ireland

Populations in Ireland

Ireland's colonial history has long been subject to governmentality. The Irish had been categorised and ranked before Reformation-era confessionalisation or the emergence of insular nationalisms. The Kilkenny Statutes in the fourteenth century grappled with hybrid categories of Anglo-Irish that straddled legal and social systems before the Reformation drew new categories that came to define class and privilege. Later influxes of adventurers and settlers — split among themselves by religion, nationality and wealth — further complicated the state's efforts to order the population. Ireland could be regarded as a colony outright, a settler-state or an integral part of Britain, depending on the argument, and often on the population in question. Particularly after the Act of Union and the slow enfranchisement of the wider population, the British government wavered between recognising the Irish as colonial subjects and peripheral Britons. Straddling the line between citizens and subjects, colonisers and colonised, the Irish often suffered the worse fates of both, as mistreated as any colony without enjoying any privileges or special 'recognition'. And just as colonial subjects internalise the patterns of power they are subjected to, the Irish response to their liminal state was to embrace both coloniser and subject roles in Ireland, the UK and the Empire more generally. The

Irish developed an ambivalent relationship with their neighbour that continues to this day.

In part because of the confusion regarding Ireland's status, I will explore Britain's relationship with the Irish as a whole, including the Ulster-Scots and Anglo-Irish. Like the 'native' Irish, these groups were all subject to the whims of government and its flirtations with liberalism vis-à-vis the rights of the Irish. Questions of colonialism generate more heat than light[27], but all sectors of the Irish population can be examined under the rubric of governmentality.

'The Devil's Arse' – Modernising Ireland

British political control over Ireland remained quite weak until the consolidation of power under the Tudor dynasty and the eventual control of Ireland under the plantation schemes. Starting with Mary I and tentative plantations in the midlands, the lands controlled by the English crown grew under Elizabeth I until all of Ireland was under control. In many cases, the original chiefs and nobility retained control and swore allegiance to Elizabeth. In more brutal cases, the nobility were expelled or killed, and English adventurers took their place. Numerous reprisals and revolts ensured this was a dangerous vocation, with atrocities committed by all sides. By the reign of James I, the Irish were firmly under foot. As the longest to hold out and the last to be planted, the northern territory of Ulster was planted more thoroughly than other parts. While the aspiration was to replace the 'mere Irish' populace with loyal (and increasingly Protestant) English settlers, by and large the natives had remained on the land, under English/Anglo-Irish rulers. The only place to see an extensive population shift was Ulster, which slowly gained a Scottish Presbyterian populace through the seventeenth century. Here the Gaelic-Irish were pushed to the margins and poorer land where they continued to pose a threat to settlers, and to a lesser extent to the political status quo.

The extension of Tudor monarchy to Ireland and the consolidation of English common law there added to the divide between Irish and English. To this point the problem was seen as one of progression: the Irish needed to adjust to civilising governance. Serious problems with this approach began to manifest under

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[27] *Ireland and Postcolonial Theory*, edited by Clare Carroll and Patricia King, gives an excellent overview of the issues, especially David Lloyd's contribution (Carol and King 2003)

common law as Irish juries failed to return results favourable to the crown for instance. Carroll argues that a new model of the Irish emerged at this time. Whereas medieval forces assumed the Irish were barbarous but ultimately reformable, the early modern thinking began to regard the Irish as irredeemable (Carroll 2003, 69). The Irish were increasingly regarded as inherently inferior, treacherous, idolatrous and savage. Furthermore, the assimilation of the Old English proved they could corrupt those in contact with them.

Religion became central to this characterisation as the Irish began to be defined largely by their Catholicism. Churches in Ireland were expected to adhere to Anglican practice, preach in English and enforce attendance, but in practice there was very little enforcement (Brewer and Higgins 1998, 17). Calvinist discourses on predestination held that certain peoples were saved and others damned, adding a proto-racialist dimension to the conflict (Carroll 2003, 70). Sectarian bigotry increased in the seventeenth century with the mass influx of Scottish Presbyterians in Northern Ireland and Cromwellian settlements in the south. Protestants and particularly Calvinists drew on the Old Testament and analogies with the Israelites and their Promised Land. In this scenario, the fabled fertility of Ireland took on a new tone: it was a plentiful land currently wasted by its inhabitants. The Irish fitted the role of the Canaanites, and were subsequently the target of annihilation. The defensive attitude of settlers, and the pervasive local hostility, meant there were few efforts to convert the local population (Akenson 1992).

Thus was the demographic scene for modern Ireland set: a large Catholic population composed of mainly Gaelic Irish with some Norman settlers, a sizeable population of Scottish Presbyterians in Ulster and a minority of Anglicans spread across Ireland composing the landed elite class. The divisions between Anglican and non-conformist churches lasted until the nineteenth century. Presbyterians thought of Anglicans as too wedded to Catholic ideas, while Presbyterians were seen by Anglicans as fickle and disloyal (Brewer and Higgins 1998, 23). Both united in the face of a common Catholic enemy when necessary, though a pan-Protestant identity only emerged in the nineteenth century with the evangelical shift in Anglicanism (ibid.: 36). To a lesser extent, Irish Catholicism was split between remnants of older Brehon-based practices of worship and the Tridentine reforms

brought about during the Counter-Reformation. One side-effect of the Plantation was the increased effort to standardise religious practice, in a manner reminiscent of India's shift towards homogenisation. The institutionalised weakness of the Catholic church, lessened this impact however and, like pan-Protestantism, Catholicism was divided till the mid-nineteenth century (Brewer and Higgins 1998; Ruane and Todd 1996).

Religious divides were complicated by a range of intersecting interests, as laid out by Joseph Ruane and Caroline Todd (1996). As a rule the split between Protestant and Catholic (loosely speaking) defined degrees of access to power and the public sphere, with important exceptions. Class was problematic, with Protestant tenant farmers facing (but also tackling) the same challenges as the Catholic peasantry in other parts. Loyalty also remained a nebulous affair, as monarchical struggles spilt over into Ireland and divided the populace. The ambiguous nature of Scotland's links with the British Establishment was also felt in Ireland, most particularly in the North, where the dominant Ulster-Scot populace felt itself much closer to Scotland than to other parts of the Isles. The end of the seventeenth century saw the succession of William III, and the 'Glorious Revolution' paved the way for an unprecedented dominance based firmly in religion. The Hanover dynasty was defined by its Protestantism, and considerable efforts were made in the subsequent Bill of Rights to ensure a Protestant monarch. In Ireland and Britain, one's access to government, education and status were determined by closeness to the Anglican Establishment, with both Presbyterian 'dissenters' and Catholics facing varying levels of discrimination and marginalisation. Under the Penal Laws, Catholics had no means of effecting change in parliament, often had significant restrictions on their religious practice and were subject to various laws designed to humiliate and denigrate their status. Land could not be inherited normally and was equally divided. The right to bear arms or own a horse worth more than five pounds was forfeit. These laws were not universally enforced, and many managed to escape or avoid major disadvantage.

As the eighteenth century drew to a close, Catholicism ceased to be a threat to British society. The major fear became republicanism, fostering a modern Irish nationalism that in principle cut across class and religion. The period of political

unrest of the 1790s was spearheaded by the United Irishmen, led by mainly Northern Presbyterian but associated with many Catholic agrarian groups. Ireland was drawn into the United Kingdom in 1801, but popular British attitudes towards Irish Catholics did not change considerably with their inclusion as full members of the UK. Agrarian disturbances in Ireland continued to feed long-standing British images of violent peasants and outlaws in a country mired in backwardness and poverty. Unfortunately, it was a savagery that was beginning to make its way into British society via mass immigration amidst the Industrial Expansion. Luke Gibbons describes how the Irish influx became one of the key markers of urban squalor: they were regarded as dirty and disease-ridden, creating rather than suffering the horrendous conditions they lived and worked under (Gibbons 2004, 48). Cholera was nicknamed the Irish disease in a typical mode of association. In addition, they were blamed for undermining the conditions of the English working-class, driving down wages and fostering a split between the upright working man and a 'pauperized underclass' (Gibbons 2004, 62).

As well as degrading living conditions and disease, Gibbons also describes how the Irish were feared for more insidious corruption. The Irish were regarded as rife with secret societies and anarchists. A hangover from Jacobite and Jesuit fears, the popular perception of the Irish was a religious and racial characteristic that dealt in "imposture, duplicity, and invisibility" (Gibbons 2004, 61). The strong Irish presence on emerging trade unions and the Chartist movement was interpreted in this manner. Rather than seen as the product of a history of forced organisation, Irish Catholic social movements were regarded of proof of their conspiratorial nature, and their collective nature (as opposed to the individualist Teutons). Any obvious organisation, such as Chartism, was seen as inevitably concealing a deeper layer of political subterfuge (Gibbons 2004, 70).

The Settlers

As previously noted, Ireland's colonial past has less of the complexity of Britain's balancing act between broad religious populations. Nevertheless the British centres of power had to contend not just with the native Irish but the Anglo-Irish and Ulster-Scots. Both were notionally pro-British and part of the colonial scheme. But like colonials in places like the American states, Irish colonials could be as

difficult to manage as the Gaelic Irish. We have seen how the Old English eventually came to pose more of a threat to English power than the unruly natives. New waves of settlers would pose equally troubling questions to colonial authority.

The most influential settlers were English adventurers and soldiers, often rewarded for military service with land in Ireland. They enjoyed relative security after the turbulent early years of the plantations. While the initial plan was to replace native labour with an influx of dependable, loyal English tenants, ultimately very few lower-class English took that risk. The new landowners had to accustom themselves to Gaelic tenants and workers, just as the Gaelic Irish had to accustom themselves to new masters, laws and social structures. Over time, this developed into the 'Protestant Ascendancy' of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The settlers identified with the forces of change sweeping through England and much of Britain. As seen later with orientalism, the English colonisers liked to define themselves in opposition to their subjects. The savagery, superstition and difficult language of the Irish reflected well on the new England they were central to: civilising, modern and assertive. It was in this time that anti-Catholicism went from being a private matter to the defining attribute of Establishment politics (Weiner 1971, 27). This was initially based on a serious threat to the British monarchy offered by various Catholic figures and the Catholic hierarchy. Nevertheless, the basis for much of the early modern national spirit was created in opposition to Catholicism, and it takes a distinct form that is defensive, masculine and often virulently misogynistic.

These traits were even more pronounced in the Scottish planters who moved to Northern Ireland in large numbers through the seventeenth century. Mostly followers of more puritanical Calvinist strains of belief, the Ulster-Scots were guided in part by an affinity with the Israelites of the Old Testament and regarded the conquered land as their birth-right (Akenson 1992). Often at odds with the English establishment, and subject to horrendous massacres from the dispossessed Gaelic Irish in the 1640s, Ulster-Scots developed a strongly independent and defensive ethos, wary of central authorities and completely hostile to the native

Irish (Kee 2000, 394). Much has been written of the settler/defender 'mentality'[28] that has characterised Northern Ireland's Protestants. As a distinct segment of the Irish population, they begin to show a degree of autonomy in the seventeenth century as the main forces opposed to Royalism. Support for the deposition of James II and republicanism further emphasised the radical political streak of the North. But this autonomy was strikingly conservative towards Catholics, and any move that strengthened the hand of ordinary Catholics was fiercely and often violently resisted.

The Penal Laws, beginning at the end of the seventeenth century, cemented these identities in place in law and society. The Protestant Ascendancy was mainly Anglican landowners who took their cue from England. Presbyterians and other smaller churches were discriminated against but still maintained a respectable level in society. Catholics had very few rights and were barred from any positions of authority as a matter of course. By the end of the eighteenth century, Catholicism was less of a threat than republicanism, and some of their rights were restored. However, it took mass movements in Ireland in the nineteenth century and persistent action to grant Catholics and the Irish the same rights as other citizens of the UK.

As state hostility to Catholicism passed, more localised hostilities began to emerge in the late eighteenth century. The shift away from explicit anti-Catholicism in UK politics, accommodation with the Catholic hierarchy, a new wave of evangelism in Presbyterianism and new employment patterns brought about by increasing industrialisation all reframed sectarianism in new ways (Ruane and Todd 1996; Brewer and Higgins 1998, 42). Penal Laws aside, religious discrimination was more of a social contract rather than a legal decree in rural Ulster, with Protestant landlords favouring co-religionists and emerging linen industries continuing the trend. Shifts towards capitalist economics from the 1770s onwards precluded employment restrictions and brought about downward mobility for many protestant labourers (Gibbon 1975, 30-31). The old threat of violent expulsion was reframed as attacking Protestant economic security, ironically made possible by

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[28]In a useful critique, Andrew Finlay questions the casual pathology of 'settler mindsets' (Finlay 2001).

the poor conditions Catholics had been forced to endure (Kee 2000, 393). Faced with a new set of challenges, old tactics of violence and intimidation re-emerged. The medley of parochial bands and agrarian groups (often inter-religious) began to be replaced by organised groups such as the Catholic Defenders and the Orange Order. Hundreds of Catholic weavers were attacked and expelled in Armagh in the year the Order was founded, and mills were intimidated into firing their Catholic employees (Gibbon 1975, 39). The early Orange Order exhibited the same unease that was to recur throughout its history: of a grassroots proletarian organisation in a loose and uneasy alliance with Protestant elites. By challenging Catholic mobility, Protestant aggressors felt they were upholding the Glorious Revolution, and their actions were justified by a deeper social epistemology than the adherence to laws, another recurrent trend in grassroots Protestant activism.

Irish Partition

The latter half of the nineteenth century began with the loss of over a quarter of the Irish population, nearly all of it in the lower tenant classes. In many ways the horrors of the Great Famine encapsulated the position of Ireland: wealthy landowners capitalised on the situation to make their lands more profitable, while the British Establishment concerned themselves far more with economic liberalism than with their own citizenry. Over the course of the century, however, the strictures that had ensured dominance for Anglo-Protestantism were eroded, and the old stereotypes challenged. The turn of the century would see a build-up towards independence and partition, and bring the fears of political Catholicism to the fore.

Many of the barriers to Catholic participation in public life were dismantled in the late eighteenth century, though the Catholic population was not in a position to effect these changes themselves. The Emancipation campaign of the 1820s, which eventually intimidated a British government used to thinking of organised Irish activity as innately rebellious (Gibbons 2004), was the first time the Catholic populace managed to exert their influence. Despite being nominally citizens of the UK, the Irish population in general were as stigmatised and typecast as ever.

Industrialisation led to further opportunities to denounce covert Irish intrusion, as they began to emigrate in large numbers to urban parts of Britain. Resurgent religious Catholicism in the later nineteenth century added to the fears. The Catholic church slowly adjusted to being a respectable part of British and Irish society and began to consolidate their position among the masses, holding aggressive missions and securing control over the emerging education system.

The greatest act of unification and agitation was over the abolishment of tithes in 1869 by Gladstone. Gladstone was eager to solve the 'Irish problem' and believed that the tithes paid by all Irish farmers to the Church of Ireland were a part of the solution, along with limited land reform. In truth, the tithes were a minor problem, though as Kee points out, it was symbolically important as the first time Westminster passed a law solely because the Irish wished it (Kee 2000, 356). Nevertheless it generated a huge reaction from Protestant Irishmen, particularly in the Orange Order. The state role of the Church of Ireland was based on the Bill of Rights and as we shall see, any attempt to reform that basis, no matter how sensible or legal or popular was met with the utmost horror. Committees were set up; fiery speeches were held all over the country, and various boasts were made of the might that the Order and other Protestant organisations could drum up if need be. Legality was not a concern because the Order felt that any tinkering with the constitution automatically delegitimised the government, an inaccurate and dangerous belief, but one that gave much comfort.

Disestablishing the Church of Ireland had little material effect on the welfare of ordinary Irish tenant-farmers, and land reform continued to dominate Irish affairs. Aggressive mass movements such as the Land League were successful in keeping the issue in the spotlight and grudging reforms were enacted over time. Eventually, the Land League gave way to the demand for Home Rule: separation from the UK while remaining in the British Empire. The combination of a motivated and increasingly enfranchised Irish Catholic populace and sympathetic sections of the British political and social classes provided the perfect storm to unionist-minded Ulster Protestants. The Orange Order had opposed the Land League where they could, though it largely operated outside of their stronghold. They made plans to assist Charles Boycott in his conflict with local tenants in Mayo, but they were

called off as potentially violent. When the first Home Rule bill was presented, there was not much concern with its chances, but by the time the second Home Rule Bill came around in 1886 it had become a pressing concern.

It was in this time that Ulster Unionism became distinct from the South. Ulster Protestantism had always displayed Presbyterian radicalism, and it was the prime base for the Orange Order, with Belfast eventually replacing Dublin as the Order's capital. Most early opposition to Home Rule opposed it on an island-wide basis, but it eventually became clear that the best chance for Ulster was to claim a special status for itself in the Union. The idea was rejected by most politicians at the time. Unionists south of the border were aghast at being left as an even smaller minority in a Dublin-ruled state. In its traditional nine-county form, Ulster had 17 nationalist candidates to 16 unionist ones by 1886, so it made no democratic sense. Demographically, it made little sense either as the population was 52 percent Protestant and 49 percent Catholic (Kee 2000, 402). The land area of Ulster was largely Catholic, with most of the Protestant population concentrated in Antrim and Down. Nevertheless this became the kernel of an idea that would ultimately lead to partition. The first bill was defeated as the House of Lords retained a veto on anything they didn't like. But separate status for Ulster became a central plank of unionist politics.

The Rise of 'Ulster'
After the first Home Rule bill, there followed a long period of Conservative rule, which was instinctively unionist. This period saw the strategy 'killing Home Rule with kindness': introducing a series of measures to improve the conditions for ordinary Irish tenants. Together with various coercion bills and the Home Rule implosion following the Kitty O'Shea affair, the Union seemed secure. Irish nationalism began to manifest itself through culture rather than politics, with the Gaelic revival of the turn of the century.

Home Rule came to the fore again after 1910, when the Liberals needed Irish parliamentary support. Once again, the fears of Home rule meaning 'Rome Rule' emerged. In 1911, the veto of the conservative House of Lords was rescinded, leaving the way open for legislation to be passed based purely on parliamentary

order. The decline of the House of Lords was the last major step (before universal franchise) towards full democracy in the UK, a shift that was gradual and largely peaceful. As if to emphasise Ireland's liminal position in the UK, however, the novelty of the shift of power between the monarch, the Commons and the Lords became the main sore point in this shift. The debate around the Parliament Act 1911 centred mainly on Home Rule and its now inevitable success. Many unionists could not accept that the law was changed in a constitutional manner and that Home Rule could be passed in an entirely legal and transparent fashion (Kee 2000, 468-469; McIntosh 1999, 8). As a result, various mutinous opinions began to emerge, in Ulster in particular, questioning the legitimacy of the whole process and taking the law into their own hands. From this, the Ulster Volunteer Force sprang[29].

The Home Rule Bill had passed in early 1913 and would have come into effect in 1914 had the First World War not broken out. The war was not expected to last long, and Home Rule was shelved till its conclusion, or for six months should it continue for longer. In the meantime a unity government was created, with unionists in key positions in government. Most of the UVF and many of the nationalist volunteers enlisted with the British army, believing that participating would help their political chances[30]. Both suffered heavy losses, particularly at Somme in 1916 and Gallipoli in 1917.

As the war dragged on and Home Rule remained unimplemented, a growing dissatisfaction between hardline republicans, national volunteers opposed to enlistment and militant labour unions coalesced into the Easter Uprising of 1916. The uprising was unpopular and brief, causing considerable damage and hardship in Dublin. It also reminded Westminster that the 'Irish Problem' was not resolved but that the vast majority of Irish people did not rebel. Efforts were made to renew the Home Rule act but with no compromise from either side in Ireland and a unionist veto in the war cabinet, procrastination returned. The continued denial of their constitutional and hard-won rights further alienated the Irish masses, along with the executions of rebels. For unionists though, the uprising confirmed general

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[29] Jonathan Bardon notes that preparations for armed resistance began sooner than many realise with early plans to import weapon in November 1910 (Bardon 1992).
[30] Gandhi called for similar support in this time, hoping to secure British support for Indian independence.

Catholic duplicity and baseness: an instinct to strike when the rival was it his weakest. Happening at a time thousands of unionists (and nationalists, though this was ignored) were dying at the Battle of Somme, these contrasting attitudes would inform unionist impressions of the south for generations to come.

Independence and Partition

Home Rule did not survive the First World War and British reluctance to engage with the ongoing problems. The hardline nationalist party Sinn Féin won overwhelming nationalist support in the general election in 1918. Shortly afterwards, they set up their own parliament in Dublin and unilaterally declared independence for all of Ireland. In the meantime the IRA, which was provisionally under Sinn Fein control, began a guerrilla campaign against the police force and army stationed in Ireland. While the political moves had a popular mandate there is very little evidence that the IRA had any popular support in their campaign. The violent and often indiscriminate backlash by state authorities on the Irish public eventually increased support for the IRA (Kee 2000).

After protracted fighting and a complete breakdown of order, Sinn Féin negotiated a settlement with Westminster and Ireland became effectively autonomous. The settlement led to further fighting between pro and anti-treaty forces, causing more bloodshed and disorder. In this environment—and with the secession from the UK—many unionists left Ireland, most of them Protestant. The whole period saw quite a lot of assassinations and intimidation of anyone regarded as sympathetic to Britain, and the remaining landed gentry were also subject to many attacks. The newly established Northern Ireland escaped the breakdown in law and order and settled into a state system with a permanent unionist majority. The partition was barely palatable to Northern Catholic nationalists as a temporary measure but events completely overtook them, and they were helpless against the newly established borders and a new reign of discriminatory state forces.

Of particular concern is how independence affected the minorities, north and south. The population of Protestants in Ireland declined dramatically in the early years of the Free State and continued to fall for most of its history. Unionists saw this decline as irrefutable proof of Catholicism's genocidal plans for the island, and

of the fate of Protestants anywhere Catholics became a majority. The Protestant population fell from roughly 314,000 in 1911 to 208,000 in 1926, a drop of 106,000 or 33.5 percent in total (Kennedy 1988, 152)[31]. The reason for this decline is still disputed with a range of social, economic political factors as well as coercion and threats by the IRA. While only a small minority were directly attacked or intimidated, the fear of violence was widespread and the new Free State government frankly admitted it was in no position to protect civilians.

Northern Catholics suffered badly in the lead up to the newly independent Northern Ireland. The 1920 local elections had been intended to show how relatively isolated the emerging nationalists were and in Northern Ireland at least it was true, with most votes going to Labour parties, unionists and moderate nationalists. The number of unionists in local councils had declined however. Together with the spread of sporadic IRA violence into Northern Ireland, unionists were determined to reorganise the UVF. Mistrust with the predominantly Catholic police force (the Royal Irish Constabulary, or RIC) was also high and just as Sinn Féin and the IRA began to assume control over large parts of the south, the UVF became a major part of law and order in the North.

The result for anyone seen as anti-unionist was catastrophic. Catholics were attacked on the shipyards of Belfast and forced out. Practically the entire Catholic populations of Banbridge, Lisburn and Dromore were forced out (Bardon 1992, 470; Elliott 2000, 374). Catholic reprisals were inevitable, with attacks in Belfast and Derry's Bogside. But they were quite outnumbered and not nearly as well armed. Rioting was endemic in Belfast and roughly a quarter of the Catholic population was forced out (Kennedy 1988, 45). As mentioned, the newly independent Irish government supported the northern IRA, which caused far more suffering and distrust than protection. Provoked by the IRA campaign, the new government hastily assembled paramilitaries such as the B Specials, drawn mainly from veterans of the war. As with the campaign in the south, Catholic civilians were targeted in lieu of an obvious enemy. As well as assuming widespread support for the IRA among Catholic civilians, rumours of infiltration from the south were rife, and the perception that Catholic numbers were artificially high due to a lack of

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[31] Bowen gives similar percentages for Anglicans specifically (Bowen 1983).

Catholic engagement in the First World War (Kennedy 1988, 104). Beliefs such as these justified mass expulsion for many. In this time, the RIC was replaced by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and a strong image of fierce anti-Catholic bias in the police forces built up in the Catholic community. As time went on there would be very little recruitment from among Catholics due to the perception of bias.

Stormont Rule

Northern Ireland assumed direct control over its affairs from December 1922 onwards, under the leadership of James Craig. The first years were marked by sectarian violence, with a resentful IRA attempting to undermine the new state, and a unionist parliament determined to stamp out republicanism. The state was largely left to its own devices, with little interference from London. While enjoying the same degree of autonomy as the South, Northern Ireland retained close links with mainland Britain, a state of affairs further strengthened by the Second World War. Relations with the South were mutually hostile with no official state visits between the regions till the 1960s.

Parliament in the North abolished proportional representation in the late 1920s, bringing it in line with the rest of the UK. The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) dominated, taking a commanding amount of votes and governing continuously till 1972. The nationalist party had a smaller share and acted as the opposition; other political groupings were negligible. Dennis Kennedy argues that elections were used to wither any alternative movements, such as socialists or liberal unionism (Kennedy 1988, 143). The South provided a continuing existential threat which demanded a show of unity and maintained the UUP as the single political voice of unionism, strongly backed by the Orange Order (Kennedy 1988, 228). Frequent elections had a similar effect on the Nationalist Party which was almost unopposed in their demographic.

One unfortunate effect of this political monopoly was stagnation. Northern Ireland was ruled for substantial periods by complacent ministers and MPs, with both nationalist and unionist candidates standing unopposed in many general elections. Craig served for 19 years, followed briefly by John M. Andrews (who kept most of

Craig's octogenarian cabinet), and then Basil Brooke for 20. The turbulence of the sixties ensured a quicker turnover. Furthermore, most of the ministers and political elite were from landed gentry and peers, with little middle-class and no working-class representation. Nationalist politics was also dominated by the same old faces, who neither expected or demanded change for their constituents. This stability saw Northern Ireland through a difficult war, the increasing presence of Labour politics in Britain and the gradual deindustrialisation that followed the decline of the British Empire. However, overall it contributed to the turmoil across the province by the sixties.

Economically the province was supported by industry in the east. Compared to the UK as a whole it performed poorly, though the worse situation in the South masked this. Industry was dominated by textiles and shipbuilding, both dependent on an empire. Beginning in the 1950s, Northern Ireland started to see serious unemployment, partly due to the overlong incumbency of Basil Brooke. Backbench unionists and eventually Whitehall administrators pushed for his resignation in 1963, but there was little improvement in the figures. Industrial decline once again raised the prospect of labour politics in Belfast, with the brief rise in the NILP (Finlay 2011). The UUP's strength lay in its ability to unite unionism across class and regional divides, largely by emphasising the modernist covenant and highlighting external threats. Nascent labour movements were quashed by the Ulster Unionist Labour Association in 1919, which targeted trade unionists and socialists as well as activists (Farrell, *in* Finlay 2011, 98). Protests in the 1930s over employment were characterised as more Catholic agitation. While denying simplistic Marxist analyses of unionist class policy as a ruling class strategy to rule, Finlay stresses the intersections of ethnopolitics and class dynamics. Gillian McIntosh makes a similar point when she claims that not just Catholics were excluded as a matter of course from public life in Northern Ireland, but anyone who did not fit the 'Ulsterman' stereotype (McIntosh 1999, 221).

Employment was notoriously biased in favour of Protestants, with periodic purges of Catholic workers at the shipyards and factories. The state as a whole accommodated its Catholic population, eventually funding the Catholic schooling system and opening up membership of the UUP to Catholics. However, it was in

local government that Catholics faced severe discrimination with lasting effects (Shirlow and McGovern 1997). Local authorities were responsible for housing, a sore subject for many. Local councils were also subject to extensive gerrymandering, ensuring that even Catholic areas had Protestant councillors where possible. Catholics were as likely to discriminate in employment and often did. However, their smaller share of property and employment, in general, meant this made little difference.

During the war, conscription was introduced across the UK, except Northern Ireland. The hostility of nationalists was the given reason, though volunteering from the Unionist community was consistently poor too. One reason suggested was the fear of Catholics from the south taking advantage and stealing their jobs while loyal Ulstermen fought abroad (Kennedy 1988, Kaufmann 2011). This was how Irish migrants working in Britain during the war was perceived: while the British sacrificed their lives, the Irish took advantage. There were occasionally low-key concerns during peacetime too, of Irish crossing the border to lower wages or benefit from welfare, this was one of the justifications for employment discrimination (Brewer & Higgins, 1998).

By and large, Ulster unionism felt it was securely tolerant, and that Catholics had only themselves to blame for non-participation. The Government of Ireland Act of 1920 prohibited discrimination, and on paper there was no explicit bias against Catholics. In terms of religion and education Catholics enjoyed considerable autonomy[32]. For the most part, unionism defined itself by the values of 'high unionism' widespread in Britain and blind to its hegemony (Todd 1987; Aughey 1997)[33]. But as a social and political grouping Catholics suffered under localised forms of discrimination, especially in interactions with the state administration.

The Troubles

By the 1960s, many of the tensions and contradictions within Northern Irish politics and society had begun to rupture. Economic stagnancy was growing, and

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[32] In contrast, Protestants in the Free State saw their rights impinged by news on issues such as divorce.
[33] As Aughey points out, the recent rediscovery of One Nationism in the UK owes much to this approach, while remaining blind to the Anglican, home counties prism through which it views the world (Aughey, 1997).

as always it was Catholics who felt it most acutely. There were, however, promising signs. Terence O'Neill became leader in 1963 and set about normalising relations with the South and accommodating Catholicism within the Unionist fold. For its part, Catholicism saw the emergence a well-educated middle class who were beginning to demand a role in Northern Irish society, rather than fulminate about a united Ireland. The civil rights protests of the mid-sixties, both a symptom of an increasingly globalised narrative and NI's first major international exposure, petitioned Stormont, not Dublin. The Catholic population were in the same predicament as African-Americans: a distinct population, who had suffered discrimination, and who nonetheless wanted recognition by the state. This is a departure from the assumption that Catholics were inherently disloyal, or republican, they looked to Stormont for recognition and acceptance as equal citizens.

O'Leary and McGarry (O'Leary and McGarry 1996) outline some seemingly mundane social and economic factors which contributed strongly to Unionist unease. Starting in the 1950s, Ireland gradually abandoned its aggressive attitude and began to focus on liberalising the Irish economy, cooperating with the UK and opening access to Northern Ireland. When the IRA resumed bombing, the South reintroduced internment without trial. Meanwhile, the UK was expanding its welfare base and moving beyond commonwealth conservatism. Wilson under Labour was resentful of Unionist Tories and felt that electoral reform was overdue in the North. The expansion of the welfare state was enormously beneficial to Catholics; while local services were open to discrimination, welfare was universal. Together with prior expansions in education, this created a Catholic middle-class that began to focus on equal rights as British citizens. Improved economic circumstances reduced emigration and boosted their numbers, further adding to Catholic confidence.

Concern had been growing over O'Neill before the civil rights protests and growing economic uncertainty. When they all came together, along with increased Loyalist paramilitarism and engagement with the South, the narrative of defensive unity took centre stage. The concessions O'Neill was prepared to make were too mild for many Nationalists, but any concession was a betrayal for hardline loyalists.

Meanwhile, Northern unionism had an anti-government streak which began to be used against Stormont as well as Westminster. In this time the class divide which had been papered over in the past reappeared in a new narrative: that O'Neill and the UUP were elites out of touch with working-class troubles and the feelings on the streets of Belfast and Londonderry.

The protests developed into riots, as the police and B Specials assumed an agency of their own. Increased British intrusion was interpreted in the usual perfidious fashion, and increased global attention was another manifestation of Vatican power, all of which confirmed a new siege mentality. The assumption was that the IRA, despite being a negligible presence for years with almost no popular support among Catholic communities, was masterminding the civil rights agitations. Some of the rising voices in the protest movements, such as Bernadette Devlin, saw the chance to foster a greater wider social agitation rather than placate Catholic discrimination. However, beyond that, there was little evidence for more sinister designs aside from pre-conceived narratives. Pre-conceived narratives were all the authorities needed, however. Police brutality was met with rioting, and Loyalist associations began to spring up to assist in keeping the peace. Under Westminster pressure the B Specials were disbanded, confirming British betrayal. In this period the first murders began, with riots leading to shooting and arson. Pogroms took place in Belfast and Londonderry, as minorities were forced out of hostile neighbourhoods, and peace walls began to define the new sectarian contours of Belfast. Political reaction was sporadic and biased, with Nationalists targeted by internment without trial. By 1972, Westminster was forced to suspend Stormont Rule and assume direct control. Having resisted devolution from Westminster in the 1920s, unionists were now doubly betrayed by the resumption of Direct Rule. The army became a central presence on the streets and roads of Northern Ireland, and sectarian bloodshed, bombings and 'No-Go' areas became the norm.

Direct Rule to Good Friday Agreement: Security or Politics?
In 1972, Westminster resumed direct control over Northern Ireland, through the Northern Ireland Office. (NIO). Direct Rule was a designed as a restitutive and temporary measure, and the British planned to reintroduce peace and some measure of political balance. Both measures failed, and Westminster became

embroiled in Loyalist violence, with many unanswered questions about their complicity in some of the sectarian violence at the time. From the nationalist perspective the British quickly became associated with loyalist belligerents, and the dormant narratives of united Irelands, brave republicans, and vicious Black and Tans re-emerged.

The NIO's first reforms were political, reintroducing proportional representation and abolishing majoritarian rule. The Sunningdale Agreement established political parity, with representatives from the Nationalist community and token representation for Ireland at the Council of Ireland. However, it offered no clear path on social and economic reforms necessary for progress in the Troubles (Ruane 2014b). The Agreement was staunchly opposed by hardline loyalists who rejected any accommodation of nationalism, and the deal collapsed after five turbulent months. 'Securitisation' (the treatment of paramilitary convicts as 'ordinary decent criminals') and 'Ulsterisation' (the promotion of the UDR and a militarised RUC as replacements for the British army) replicated Stormont's coercive policies. Ultimately the NIO fell into the same trap as Stormont before it. Both maintained a façade of impartiality which belied everyday inequality and implicit coercion. Northern Ireland maintained many state force practices which were flagrantly illegal in Britain, as had Stormont before it (O'Leary and McGarry 1996, 196).

In 1985 the Irish and British heads of government, Thatcher and FitzGerald, signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement (IAI). It was quite a limited document, which set forth cooperation between the two governments on issues of security and Northern policy. The South was granted a consultative role in Northern Irish policy while power remained with the NIO. The majoritarian status of NI was reemphasised and agreed by the Irish government[34]. The Agreement drew widespread condemnation in Northern Ireland, where Unionists, in particular, felt the British had gone behind their backs. 'Unionism without the Unionists' was their perception; that decisions were now made elsewhere, and with Irish intervention (O'Leary and McGarry

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[34]The AIA was denounced as contravening the Irish constitution's claim on all of Ireland. *De jure*, the AIA allowed for the possibility of a united Ireland, with the right majority. *De facto* it recognised the demographic reality that the North was British by popular will (O'Leary and McGarry 1996, 225).

1996, 227). The Agreement alienated most unionists and reignited loyalist paramilitarism (Mallie and McKittrick 2001, 68).

Talks eventually led to the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). Like Sunningdale, the new agreement called for shared power, with ministries shared across the political divide. Unlike Sunningdale it enjoyed pan-national support[35], had a strong input from British and Irish governments, and most unionists. It established not only political but social and cultural parity between Catholics and Protestants. The Agreement was passed by referendum with overwhelming support from nationalists but a slim majority of unionists. Opposition centred around Ian Paisley and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and parades such as Drumcree became a focus of unionist discontent and disillusionment.

Good Friday Agreement and Consociationalism
Present-day Northern Ireland is arranged along consociational lines: with deference given to 'both communities' in Northern Ireland in the GFA in 1998. This scheme attempts to address the historical deficiency of Catholic/nationalist input into Northern Irish governance and society. The trouble with this model, as pointed out by Taylor (1994) and Finlay (2008), is the reification of antagonistic categories in post-Conflict society. Rather than moving away from the divisions of the Troubles, the Belfast Agreement cements them. This is pragmatic and in the short-term it resolves the problem, but it ensures that antagonistic categories will remain central to Northern Irish identity; not only does it reify hem but it legitimises them (and arguably the violence carried out in their name).

Many years on from the Belfast Agreement, these concerns are still valid. Time has put some distance between the Troubles and everyday life in Northern Ireland but the old social divides are still there. In parts of Belfast they are arguably strengthened by the further erection of 'peace walls'. Ongoing disputes about parades, flags and public spaces highlight the remaining problems. However, the political and social structure has endured despite considerable trials, an achievement in itself. Also, the attention given to flag protests and periodic violence overlooks the everyday peace that citizens enjoy, and a new generation

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[35]Aside from hardline dissidents who were to make their position clear in Omagh later that year, killing 28 people.

takes for granted. While moves to create new categories of citizenship have largely failed (or rather were never seriously enacted), it seems they are not needed. As pointed out by Brubaker et al. most ethnic differences do not result in conflict (Brubaker, Feischmidt, et al. 2006), and the assumption based on the Troubles that Catholic and Protestant or Nationalist and Unionist divisions are necessarily antagonistic is not the case.

Andrew Finlay presents a strong critique of reified and protected communal groups. Describing the political situation in Northern Ireland, he argues that the accommodation of cultural groups at a liberal state level may be useful for securing short-term peace, but ultimately it drives the communities further apart. The basis for what he calls consociationalism is the 'old' idea of culture, an essentialist, outmoded view that was current before contemporary models of constructivism came to the fore (Finlay 2008). Finlay rightly criticises the reductionism of Northern Ireland 'diversity' into two communities, with little recognition of those who opt out or don't belong to the unionist or nationalist population. He focuses on how the biopolitics of the past have transmuted into the present, with the 'telling' techniques of distinguishing the religious background of individuals now co-opted into employment practices (Finlay 2015). While he utilises Foucault's ideas of power, Finlay's analyses are curiously blind to power outside of the microaggressions that consociationalism adopts. Firstly the crux of 'parity of esteem' clauses in the GFA stress the 'politics of acknowledgement' that recognise past wrongs and present-day improvements (Jenkins 2006). Given the manner in which Irish/Catholic identity was politicised and rendered toxic in the past, it is integral to nationalist positioning in contemporary Northern Ireland.

Overall Finlay criticises consociationalism for continuing old ideas of culture, and biopolitical techniques of power, but fails to consider the power relations in alternative forms of government, particularly liberal humanist approaches. Present-day Europe is saturated with examples of exclusion and coercion operating under the mantle of liberalism and 'post-racial' perspectives that assume that racism is firmly in the past (Lentin and Titley 2011). Finlay ignores the degree to which Stormont and its policies of coercion and discrimination drew on normative liberalism. Catholics were excluded because they were untrustworthy,

uneducated and backwards, labels justified by liberalism as much as Protestantism.

Conclusion

In both states, the narrative of modernity and civic engagement fell apart at the eventual recognition of discrimination and social stagnation. Identity politics have been presented as a divider of people in recent times, but the implicit entitlement inherent in both states proves this wrong. Identity politics were a means of telling the have-nots, and as their problems grew more acute the identity itself was not the problem. Gyanendra Pandey, comparing Dalit oppression in India and racism in the US discusses the difference between what he calls universal prejudice and vernacular prejudice (Pandey 2013). Vernacular prejudice is evident and falsifiable, usually something quite serious like dehumanising narratives around race. Easily identified prejudices gain attention, criticism and are easy to disprove. Universal prejudice, on the other hand, is commonly assumed and rarely recognised, let alone questioned. In both states, what is evident is a universal prejudice of entitlement, built around the belief in equality. Like the American Dream, anyone can achieve their goals if they try hard enough. But just as the American Dream masks and endless series of barriers to upward mobility and social equality, so too the biases inherent in universal prejudices become apparent over time. The narratives of modernity/universal prejudices that drove India and Northern Ireland began to founder, and be recognised for the vernacular prejudices they were. Increasingly impossible to maintain the illusion, both states began to acknowledge the population divisions that were part of everyday life, and accommodate them, alternating between explicit majoritarianism and some form of multiculturalism.

It is important to remember that, acknowledged or not; the communities were managed by governments with strong authoritarian tendencies and a strong sense of the danger posed by the periphery. Identity politics is as much about labelling as it is about self-ascription, and recognising, policing and controlling problem populations had been a central part of the state apparatus (O'Leary and McGarry

1996; Anderson 2012). Now, attention is increasingly turned to the newly self-aware majoritarian identities, long latent at the heart of government, now to be recognised and managed too. Suddenly Unionist and *Hindutva* concerns are addressed openly. Rogers Brubaker spends much time discussing the distinction between category and group, and the role of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs in turning one into another (Brubaker 2004). Regarding everyday lived experience, it is certainly true that majority populations recognise and experience their identity far less regularly than minority groups (whether defined by ethnicity, gender, race, etc.). Obliged to practice their identity more often, minority populations have a keener sense of self, and of course other. Brubaker calls these 'marked populations', with ethnic Hungarians in Romania as his main example (Brubaker, Feischmidt, et al. 2006). However, Romanian identity is no less explicit. Indeed it is the norm. As such it goes unremarked, much like the universal prejudice. What happened in the turbulent years of both states is that the taken-for-granted identity starts to be recognised, both to be challenged by the minority, and channelled by its leaders. Aggravating the 'groupness' of a category becomes a vital part of what happens over the course of time in both countries, as majoritarian identities start to politicise instead of simply dominate.

For those who bemoan the sudden politicisation of identity, there is almost no recognition of prior identity, based on privilege. 'We have values, they have culture', is a refrain that masks quite a lot of prejudice, but only for so long. Partha Chatterjee argues that calls for a return to liberal politics — of a return to the abstract, neutral citizen not judged on their gender, race or religion — is usually the preserve of the (formerly?) privileged (Chatterjee 2004). Minority groups prefer governmentality and population management because it has greater potential to recognise population groups as legitimate, instead of 'problem groups'. Using Ambedkar and Dalit reservations as for his example, he describes the tension between Ambedkar's desire for universal citizenship and his realist appraisal of their chances in upper-caste dominated civil society (Chatterjee 2004, 24). Akhil Gupta's discussion of population and governmentality also notes that the fundamental aim is to improve the lot of the populations in question (Gupta, 2012,

p. 239)[36]. Ambedkar was fortunate to be operating in a colonial system that had long recognised the problem of caste and representation and had tried various methods of reservation and exclusive franchises, for Muslims as well as Dalits. Indeed, Chatterjee sees the welfare state and post-WW2 western policies such as multiculturalism as progressions from more idealist notions of individual liberty. In post-colonial states, however, the chronology was reversed, and techniques of governmentality often predate independent citizenship by over a century (Chatterjee 2004, 36).

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[36] He rightly notes that nowhere does Foucault, writing about a period of massive colonial expansion, discuss the wellbeing or happiness of colonised populations.

Chapter Four – Demographic Aggression

Jawaharlal Nehru University is a sprawling wilderness in South Delhi dotted with concrete architecture, isolated cafes and guesthouses. My first night in India was spent here, and I felt at home returning to JNU for doctoral research. At a quiet student café I met Alok, who became my chief informant in JNU. Like many ABVP activists I had met, Alok had finished his studies (in management) and was now volunteering for a couple of years for the organisation. JNU is notable for its liberal ethos, and fierce left-wing political activism. As such, the ABVP was much more moderate on this campus than Delhi University, as were many of the general activists I met. Alok, however, did not disappoint.

JNU offered particular challenges to Alok and his associates. The progressive politics and spirit of the campus made the ABVP uncomfortable and muted their message. Often my ABVP contacts in JNU were keen to emphasise a progressive face. Later, discussing JNU with former students from the ABVP, the university presented them with the usual the signs of India's weakness. Many students and organisations were leftist, some proudly communist[37]. Some of the residential accommodation was mixed, enabling the sexual corruption the ABVP warned against elsewhere. Love jihad was not spoken about much among the members in JNU but when I went to Delhi University, they were obsessed with the levels of infiltration in JNU as they saw it.

In JNU the ABVP had a relatively small proportion of members, but regular meetings, lectures from visiting officials, and occasional rallies. These were inevitably quiet and civilised affairs, quite a contrast with the rowdy activism of many student groups. More left-wing informants in JNU would tell me of the other side of the ABVP, the more aggressive campaigning, the shoutier meetings and confrontations. In the charged atmosphere of campus politics this sounded more

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[37] In February 2016 the ABVP alleged that 'anti-national' politics were rife on the campus, prompting the arrest of the president of the JNU Students' Union. The ABVP were also implicated in the suicide of Rohith Vemula, a Dalit student, at Hyderabad University in central India in January 2016. In both cases the ABVP used their influence with the ruling BJP party to pressure university administrations into compliance. http://www.caravanmagazine.in/vantage/how-the-abvp-brought-the-state-into-jnu

typical. "We try to present ourselves", one pracharak [full-time volunteer] told me. "We groom and dress appropriately, but other students wear dirty sandals, old kurtas. They have their uniform, we have ours!"

As with all fresh encounters with ABVP members, Alok first treated me to a comprehensive history of the organisation's values and activities. Discussion quickly moved on to female participation. All of the ABVP meetings I attended were almost exclusively attended by men, and all my key informants were men. He assured me however, that membership was almost 50/50. The president of the JNU branch of the ABVP was a woman named Mamta, a PhD candidate studying Sanskrit. And what gender policies did the ABVP champion in JNU?

> -In 2013 we will organise so many programmes for college girls, for self-defence programmes and social teachings also... In Indian culture, women are considered as a devi, a goddess, so respected like that, in culture also, to regain that we are trying awareness programmes.

The self-defence programmes were a reaction to 'Eve-teasing', everyday physical or verbal harassment of women in public. Many conversations about gender were framed by the gang-rape and murder of Jyoti Singh Pandey in December 2012, which sparked huge protests across India and exhaustive media coverage, focusing attention on female safety and sexual violence. This topic quickly brought Alok to love jihad:

> Alok - We are against, against love jihad ... we are opposing this. This is against our traditions... this is planned! This is planned conversion, from Hindus to Islam. We are opposing this. This is especially in Kerala.
>
> Alex - You haven't found any incidents in Delhi, or...
>
> - There are incidents in Delhi also.
>
> - Are they planned also?
>
> - You just think about this. Not every case is a case of love jihad.
>
> - You get genuine-
>
> - You get cases of love also. When intention is to convert one person from Hinduism to Islam, and the whole planning around the girl is done in that mindset, we are opposing that.

During my Masters research in 2009, love jihad was a moral panic in Kerala and Karnataka: allegations emerged that young Muslim men were being paid to target, seduce and marry women of other religions, to convert them to Islam. It has

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particular resonance in parts of India where laws surrounding conversion are strict and cases of abduction have been brought against Muslim husbands who married Hindu women. Although some Christian organisations have spoken about love jihad, it was mainly the *Hindutva* movement which drove the scare. Hindutvavadis I spoke to in Rajasthan became quickly familiar with the narrative. Its frames were quite familiar: vulnerable Hindu girls, devious Muslim boys, suspicious Arab funding, and Hinduism dishonoured. It also drew on a long history of inter-caste tensions, with coercion charges frequently brought against lower-caste men in relationships with upper-caste women (Chakravarti 2003)[38]. By the time I came back, in late 2012, love jihad was being reported on campuses in a low-key way. Since I left in late 2013, mass protests against love jihad occur periodically in the central state of Uttar Pradesh.

Alok and I met regularly, usually for tea in the JNU sunshine, and occasionally at the ANBVP offices in Rafi Marg. Many of our conversations revolved around gender, the right way for men and women to behave, and how to restore proper values to young nationalists. Love Jihad typified both the problem and the answer for normative roles, offering a salutary lesson for women students who didn't respect themselves or their communities. Alok suggested population was the key: Muslims needed more fertile wombs and preferred to reduce the number available to Hinduism. This was the 'demographic aggression' I expected to find, though only rarely had I heard it linked to love jihad:

> Alok - Muslims have a saying, you know... *ham panch hamare paccīse*: us five, our twenty-five. With this the Muslims will quickly overtake the main demographics. But where to find the extra women? There is a long history here, of using, of stealing, and kidnapping Hindu girls.
>
> Alex - You mean from the Partition?
>
> - Always, even before then, this is the case.

The quote offered here, 'us five, our twenty-five', is not a Muslim quote, but a *Hindutva* canard. It distorts an old family-planning slogan, 'us two, our two'. The five are a Muslim man and his wives, the twenty-five are his children. Family

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[38] The opposite is quite acceptable, and a good deal of upper-caste violence against lower-castes involves rape (Chakravarti 2003; Pandey 2006, 163). In a similar fashion, inter-religious relationships that involve Hindu men with Muslim girls are celebrated as liberating, They're certainly not framed as seduction or conversion.

planning and concerns with population overgrowth are central to India's sense of modernity and progress. As with Northern Ireland's understanding of the uneasy Protestant majority, population is not just a question of abstract figures in India, but a political project, tied to perceptions of modernity on the one hand and backwardness (if not chaos) on the other. And the fear is that Muslims are not just failing to do their duty, but bulking their population while decent Hindus reduce theirs.

Demographic Aggression has **many manifestations** in the eyes of the *Hindutva* movement. First was the idea that the Muslim population of India is substantial and **growing**, with an influence that far exceeds its fraction of the census. The birth rate of Muslim Indians is statistically higher, as is common in populations with a lower socio-economic status. The difference is minimal given the enormous populations involved, and the fact that Muslim growth is slowing at the same rate as the general population.

Nevertheless the 'common sense' view is that while most modern Hindu families plan their families responsibly, Muslims continue to spawn large, unsustainable numbers. At best these children become another burden on the state and chapter in the minority's victimology. The lack of restraint is put down to ignorance and devotion to Islamic restrictions on contraception. But like conversion and immigration, large families are usually interpreted as part of the plot to outbreed Hindus, to create a large and unified Muslim bloc in the heart of India while further fragmenting Hinduism.

More aggressive is **conversion**, settling alongside a lesser threat of Christianisation. Dalits and Adivasis were seen as particularly vulnerable to manipulative conversion campaigns by either missionaries or Muslims. In a sense this has been the least threatening of the manifestations, partly because it peaked as a fear in the 1980s, because reconversion rituals were possible and perhaps the links associations with the Christian campaigns made its overt Jihadist implications less clear in a post 9/11 climate. The third manifestation is a fear of **immigration** from Muslim countries, most particularly Bangladesh. This threat waxes and wanes over time, but like the others it always provides a background

hum of suspicion about both the intentions of immigrants (usually referred to as 'infiltrators', and the governments who are supposed to be maintaining the border). Broadly territorial, this fear has associations with the perennial thorn that is Kashmir, and the smaller fear of Pakistani immigration. It also chimes with North-East secessionism fears, with much of the violence in places like Assam with already substantial conflicts. If conversion fears are a battle for the soul of the country, and the ability of Hinduism to maintain its presence in the hearts of fringe populations, then infiltration is a battle for the body of India herself, and those who insist in infecting and mutilating it from within.

 The ranking of these fears varies with time and circumstance. Natural growth is more of a perennial low-key concern, while infiltration and conversion have acute periods of panic. Lately **love jihad** has added another dimension to demographic aggression, combining the growth and conversion narratives in new and terrifying ways. Two elements stand out in particular here. Firstly, like the other threats, the mainstream parties either ignore the problem or secretly accommodate the increase, securing future votes in return. The association between left-wing politics and demographic strategy has cropped up in the US, Europe and now Israel too. Secondly there is the gender aspect. One of the main purposes of the Sangh was to counter colonial stereotypes of effeminate Indians, mostly by recourse to Victorian masculine ideals. In Muslim population the old taunt is renewed: virile Muslim men bred with impunity while Hindu men look on, unable to protect even their own daughters from being incorporated into the baby factory.

'Natural' Growth

Pradip Datta begins his discussion of *Hindutva* demography by describing the widely held assumptions he took for granted as a child about Islamic fecundity and polygyny, and their violent consequences for the minority. He traces the assumption back through the decades to Mukherjee's book *Hindus: A Dying Race*, constantly renewed and reformed through the decades without any critical investigation. This he calls 'communal common sense: the taken-for-granted nature of inflammatory and ungrounded rhetoric (Datta 1993). The idea of common sense understandings of *Hindutva* demography springs up repeatedly in

challenges to the narratives of deliberate overpopulation, a reaction to assertions so overwhelmingly accepted, hollow and dangerous all at once[39].

For this reason, discussion of natural growth was surprisingly difficult with my informants. The high population growth was simply a given, and it was much easier to discuss projections of growth rate or how it linked with immigration than get to the details of *how* the population was actually growing. For the most part they were more interested in conversion or immigration, but deep discussions led to the usual suspects: polygamy, family planning and higher sex drives. One of my main informants was an official at the ABVP offices in Rafi Marg. Umakant wasn't attached to the Delhi universities but worked with the wider national ABVP framework. We met every once in a while to touch base, which could be a frustrating exercise as he was given to repeating earlier claims. Umakant's main preoccupation was with immigration and geographic shifts. But he was conversant in other factors of demographic aggression that seemed like obvious points.

> Alex - Even without other factors, what causes the high Muslim growth? Without conversion, why do you think Muslim families are large?
>
> Umakant - They have always been large. One demographic setup changes naturally, from last hundred years demography will change. Since independence in India, there is 4 crore [1 crore is 10 million] Muslims and now there are about 14 crores. Out of that, 4 crores are from Bangladesh or Pakistan or from other countries. But 10 crore populations growth in last 65 years naturally.
>
> - But how does it naturally-
>
> - Somehow there is a liberty to marry two or three women. They have 10-15 childs. This is one thing. But still, that is natural.
>
> - And this is planned, or normal?
>
> - Yes, this is a slow process to change.

First, a quick summary of the figures. India's population, as of the 2011 census is c. 1.2 billion. The breakdown for religion was published in 2015, with the delay prompting lots of speculation and talk of a cover-up. It showed a modest rise in the Muslim population to 14.23 percent (Commissioner 2015). Each census since the first post-independence census in 1951 has shown a rise in Muslim figures. The

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[39] Patricia and Roger Jeffery point out that it's not only Hindus that believe the narrative; during research they met Muslims who believed it was likely (2006, 33).

figures are reasonably consistent across India, with the major division between North and South. Southern states tend to have a more integrated Muslim population with lower growth rates and higher education.

Religious Percentages of Population – 1951-2011

Religion	1951	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001	2011
Hindu	84.1%	83.45%	82.73%	82.30%	81.53%	80.46%	79.80%
Muslim	9.8%	10.69%	11.21%	11.75%	12.61%	13.43%	14.23%
Christian	2%	2.44%	2.60%	2.44%	2.32%	2.34%	2.30%
Sikh	1.89%	1.79%	1.89%	1.92%	1.94%	1.87%	1.72%
Buddhist	0.74%	0.74%	0.70%	0.70%	0.77%	0.77%	0.70%
Jain	0.46%	0.46%	0.48%	0.47%	0.40%	0.41%	0.37%
Others	0.56%	0.52%	0.50%	0.51%	0.52%	0.78%	0.88%

Patricia and Roger Jeffery provide a useful summary of the variables most demographers value over religion (2006). Region features strongly as a variable in their analysis, as well as discussions of education and economic status. More Muslims live in northern states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh where growth rates are universally higher. The total fertility rate (TFR) in Uttar Pradesh was 6.39 for Muslims and 5.82 for Hindus, while in Tamil Nadu the rates are 3.64 and 3.43 respectively. In other words, Hindus in Uttar Pradesh have higher birth-rates than Muslims in Tamil Nadu. There are higher proportions of Muslims living in urban areas, often in poverty (Jeffery and Jeffery 2006, 34). Alaka Basu points out that visibility might be part of the problem, as urban clusters of impoverished Muslim make the population seem bigger than it is (Basu 1996, 132)[40]. One final factor worth mentioning is mortality rates, which among children in particular are lower for Muslims [41]. Unlike immigration or resistance to family planning, mortality rates

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[40] Similar issues occur with 'Dish Cities' in the Netherlands (Buruma 2006). The centrality of Muslim neighbourhoods makes their four percent of the population look like an underestimate.
[41] Their own data from rural Bijnor suggests higher infant mortality for Muslims, but it's an aberration from the national figures (Jeffery and Jeffery 2006, 41).

aren't politicised, despite being as significant a factor in the higher growth rate (Jeffery and Jeffery 2006, 37).

Family Planning

Inspired by Thomas Malthus, India's colonial officers took a keen interest in India's population. Malthus argued that 'civilised' countries—knowing peace, health and security—were prone to overpopulation unless strict chastity and Christian behaviour was imposed. Less civilised countries on the other hand could rely on infanticide, sterilising diseases, famine and war to reduce their surplus population. As Eastern India suffered famines in the late nineteenth century, British peace and progress were increasingly blamed and commentary on population and surplus was integral to the emerging census data (Caldwell 1998, 683). Independent India maintained the same themes, and looked to artificial means to curtail population growth.

Since the 1950s, family planning played a large part on India's modernisation schemes, with aggressive targets for reducing various impoverished populations in a humane and progressive manner. Malthusian concerns merged with a eugenic focus on 'qualitative' planning, and even before independence Congress under Nehru expressed concern with lower-caste and Muslim fertility (Connelly 2006, 632). Coercive family planning is particularly associated with the Emergency period but at a state level different pressures were brought to bear on the population to reach control targets. The Indian government itself was pressured by the US, with direct threats to withhold food aid if targets weren't met (Connelly 2006). In India, population control was not just about contraception and Malthusian predictions. Nehru saw increased modernisation, industrialisation, increased food production, and education all contributing to a reduced growth rate, or a rate that could be better accommodated (Johnson-Hanks, 2008). India's family planning was the first national policy of its kind and was envisioned as part of India's brighter future (Gupta, 2012). Smaller families weren't just a private concern but a national duty and one associated with progression and modernity. Whether or not the policies as a whole have been a success, the birth rate has declined by 40 percent since the 1950s (Maharatna 2002, 978).

All of which made lower Muslim participation more suspect. Muslims had been long among the population targeted for reduction, and on the whole they remained reluctant to take up planning.

> Elder's study, for instance, revealed that in every district examined far fewer Muslims submitted to sterilization than would be expected from their share of the population. In fact, some Muslim political leaders encouraged their followers to out-reproduce everyone else. It did not help matters that well over 90 percent of senior family planning officials - at least among those Elder interviewed in Uttar Pradesh - were high-caste Hindus. (Connelly 2006, 660)

Muslims had been among the populations suggested by Congress in the 1930s for particular focus. During the Emergency, Muslims reported being particularly targeted (Jeffery and Jeffery 2006, 29; Scott 2010, 139), though this might have been a reflection of their socio-economic status rather religious. Either way the *Hindutva* perception remained that Muslims refused to participate in family planning schemes. All at once the national duty of decent Hindus was undermining their religion's future existence, while Muslims whether through religious backwardness or more sinister design were improving their own odds.

Multiple wives was another widely-believed canard about Muslims and population growth (Datta 1993)**.** Polygyny has been illegal for Hindus since the fifties and was rarely practised in any community. In Muslim communities it is technically legal, but almost unheard of, for practical reasons if nothing else (Basu 1996, 138). There is no correlation between polygamy and family size, though narratives of polygamy often imply that the 'extra' women necessary come from Hindu communities (Jeffery and Jeffery 2006, 31). Muslim Personal Law and polygyny was discussed by one informant from DU, Sakesh. Sakesh accepted that polygyny had been normal for Hindus, that his grandfather had two wives.

> Sakesh - Our constitution says you can marry just once and we accepted it. No Hindu will tell you that *sati* was very good. Because *sati* was wrong, and we accepted that it was wrong. And we got rid of it, and nobody says no. We saw that caste discrimination was wrong and we have reservation, positive discrimination.

The modernisation and reform seen in Hinduism over time were not reciprocated among Muslims, for whom special rights remained and traditions were ring-fenced. Logistical gaps, such as the economic burden and the availability of wives, are explained with the usual answers: a compliant welfare state and sourcing

females in the Hindu community. As Pradip Datta discusses, the common sense presumption of multiple wives owes more to a matrix of meanings than objective reality, such as the sexual excess of Muslim men and potentially Hindu women (Datta 1993, 1314).

The ideal of family—strongly informed by Victorian British tropes: hardworking father, virtuous mother, and obedient children—is perverted under Islam, and as we shall see later, Catholicism. The ideal of masculinity is caring, patriarchal, sexually controlled and supremely responsible. These are the traits encouraged by the *Hindutva* movement, promoted at *shakhas* and in their literature. It's resemblance to Victorian British masculine ideals is not a coincidence. By contrast, Muslim men are usually thought of as universally irresponsible, sexually voracious, unthinking of their family's welfare. The stereotype of multiple wives fits this image, placing sexual gratification above manly devotion to his wife. And of course this leads to darker suggestions, of rape and brutality against wives and Hindu girls.

The stereotype of the typical Muslim woman borrows from the same perversion of Victorian ideal. The mother and wife, the spiritual and nourishing hearthstone of the family and exemplar of the nation's virtue are reduced to a mechanical role, mass-producing babies with no time for affection, mostly in conditions of oppression, religious subjugation (quite different from enlightened religious learning) and ignorance. Instead of being independent the family reproduces at the behest of a wider scheme, and with no thought to their welfare. Children brought up in this environment, as a means rather than an end and without a positive role-model, with undoubtedly repeat the process in the next generation. Their lives, job prospects and individual needs are ignored in light of communal politics.

Conversion

> Every man going out of the Hindu pale is not only a man less, but an enemy the more - Vivekananda[42]

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[42] From an interview with the journal *Prabuddha Bharata* in April 1899. Acessed at http://www.ramakrishnavivekananda.info/vivekananda/volume_5/interviews/on_the_bounds_of_hinduism.htm on 07 July 2015.

In some ways conversion is the oldest canard about Islamic demography, drawing on the widespread assumption that Muslims in India were converted 'by the sword'. It is quite common to hear that Muslim Indians (and Christian Indians) are Hindus at heart, but that their ancestors were violently forced to convert. Now they straddle the awkward line between ancient victims and contemporary enemies. Sincere conversions are out of the question.

> Already, India has the third largest Muslim population of the whole world – after Indonesia and Bangladesh. Islamic predominance is in any case rising in India from year to year, with all communities in India practising family planning, but not so the Muslims. Now, a new wave has begun – of conversions. According to reports, conversions are being planned on a massive scale. (Organiser 1981)

In recent times the threat of Islamic conversion has receded, though it briefly loomed in popular imagination in rural Tamil Nadu in the early 1980s. Hundreds of Dalit villagers in a village named Meenakshipuram converted to Islam, prompting the usual soul-searching about casteism and Hinduism's need for reform, but also suspicions of organised manipulation[43].

> The funds that are being earmarked for conversions in India run into billions of dollars. The aim is to secure a million conversions in a year so that the Muslim population in India will be one and a half times of the present number- along with the extra rise of nearly 8 to 10 percent in the population growth. Like Meenakshipuram has been renamed Rahamatnagar or some such thing, India can then be called Mindia.
>
> The conspiracy is deep-rooted. Nets have been cast far and wide to encircle this country. Confederation of Pakistan and Bangladesh is not a mere wishy washing thing but is taking concrete shape daily. (ibid.)

The above quote from the *Organiser* emphasised the planned nature and foreign source of funds. 'Petro-dollars' feature heavily in these schemes, though their application usually remains vague. Meenakshipuram became a marker and particular attention was paid to reconverting the Dalits from Islam, with apparently little success. And while conversion by explicit force is seen as rare, conversion by duplicity or bribery is seen as the norm, with foolish villagers duped into abandoning their heritage by well-funded agents.

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[43] Pandey describes the conversions as a reaction to caste antagonism, especially around protests Dalit reservations at colleges (Pandey 2006, 168).

Conversion to Christianity, Buddhism, Sikhism or Islam is a periodic occurrence among the more marginalised sections of India's population. Lower-caste shifts to Buddhism and Jainism date back millennia in some regions. Rather than sweeping violent mass-conversions, Islam slowly seeped through populations already estranged from Brahmanism, for instance among Buddhist population in what became Pakistan and Bengal (Bose and Jalal 2006, 20; Mathur 2008, 66). In recent years attention has shifted to Christianity as a corrupting force, another well-funded foreign religion that capitalises on marginalisation and aims to undercut the Hindu essence of India. In such articulations Christianity is lumped with Islam as another fanatical faith, determined to use every underhand means to seduce as many gullible souls as possible.

During discussions of demographic aggression with ABVP activists, conversion was sometimes alluded to, though like natural increase it was regarded as more of given than a central topic of discussion. I tried once or twice to get Alok to elaborate on how the logistics of conversion: who performed conversions, how widespread was it supposed to be and whether there were links between Islamic and Christian conversion. For the most part these efforts went nowhere, aside from emphasising the foreign impetus (and funding) of the threat. Alok's impression of me, as a westerner and presumably a Christian may have been the reason for this opacity. But Alok had no problem outlining the dangers of Christianity in general. Just as with most facets of demographic aggression, details were usually ignored in favour of the broader idea. For the most part, discussions of conversion shifted to Love Jihad – the overlaps between the two are obvious – and more often the inherent nature of the religions in question. Proselytising simply proved how dogmatic, fanatical and predatory Abrahamic religions were[44]. In this there was no distinction between Christianity and Islam (and my question of a link was sidelined).

> Now as against this Indian tradition there is the Judeo-Christian tradition. In this tradition there is neither freedom of thought in religion nor respect for the religious beliefs of others…. The term "witch" was applied in the middle ages to

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[44] Judaism was only discussed once as I recall, to celebrate the efforts of Israel in fending off Islamic attacks. The US was usually categorised this way, another champion in the War on Terror. But when it came to Christian proselytisation or complaints of discrimination then the US were back to being Christian fanatics.

the secret adherence of European paganism who kept alive the spirit of scientific enquiry. (Organiser 1979)

It is worth looking at the usual converts. Converts are overwhelmingly Dalits and Adivasis, as well as North-Eastern populations who may belong to one of the above groups. The common denominator is marginalisation, religiously, socially, economically, and regionally. These offer compelling reasons to leave a religion that insists on the rights to discriminate, and even in a secular context conversions offer a strong critique of continued social stratification. Ambedkar offered a particularly telling example of the frustrations of Dalit Indians, ostracised by the progressive Congress, converting to Islam and then ultimately Buddhism (Roy 2014). His vehemence has been difficult to avoid and is downplayed for the most part[45]. Intellectuals such as Kancha Ilaiah continue to reject the appropriation of Dalit identity by those simultaneously co-opt and marginalise them (Ilaiah, 1996). For the most part, groups who convert—usually Adivasis and usually to Christianity—are treated by the *Hindutva* movement as gullible fools, easily bought by transparent bribery such as schooling or medicine. The efforts of missionaries to improve their lives have led to bans in many states against 'forced' conversion, with any incentive to convert labelled a corrupt (and of course foreign-funded) tactic[46]. The agency of Adivasis and Dalits (often referred to as the weaker sections of Hindu society) to choose their own paths and to improve their social circumstances is entirely ignored, a pattern repeated in ideas of love jihad. Paternalistic Hinduism must look after the interests of its weaker members be they women, uneducated or marginalised. More recently, discussions of 'crypto-Christianity' have begun to emerge in relation to quotas, especially in universities. In the past year, the anti-national character of many activists in JNU has been linked to secretive Christianity

Ghar Wapsi

What has been the *Hindutva* response to these moves? For many years the VHP in particular has run *shuddhi* (purification) and *ghar wapsi* (homecoming)

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[45] Recent anniversaries have attempted to reclaim the 'Father of the Constitution', but studiously avoid any hint of anti-Brahminism. Meanwhile Dalit student-groups set up in his name have been labelled hate-groups for discussing subjects detrimental to unity and caste harmony. See also note 27.

[46] More violent incidents include the murder of missionaries, e.g. Graham Staines and his family, in Odisha in 1999.

ceremonies, cleansing rituals to restore Indians to their natural Hindu faith. Gyanendra Pandey dates *shuddhi* practices back to Arya Samaj fears for the enumeration of India's population.

> As the colonial state's codification and classification of "customary" divisions and practices developed, and the question of numbers gained importance, Hindu leaders and reformers grew active in the effort to "reclaim" the Dalits and "re-educate" them in their identity as Hindus. (Pandey 2013, 64)

Borrowing directly from Christian missionary ideals and tactics, Hindu missionaries began aggressively reclaiming non-Hindus back 'into the fold' of Hinduism. This approach has always been accompanied by criticism of upper-caste exclusion, though in practice the reclamation of Dalit Hindus has had little effect (Pandey 2013). Inspired by *shuddhi's* invocation of pollution and cleanliness *ghar wapsi* ceremonies avoid conversion and reconversion are avoided altogether by insisting that foreign religions are an aberration and Hinduism is primordial. Charu Gupta emphasises the comforting language of home and family, while Christian/Muslim conversion is tainted with language of theft (Gupta 2014). This avoids anti-conversion laws even though precisely the same tactics are used. Like missionaries, the *Hindutva* movement often provides social support: schools and medical centres and assurances of caste-acceptance and social mobility. While such tactics are denounced in other conversion efforts, here they are part of the *Hindutva* movement's many acts of charity and 'social work'.

Territory and Assam

The months before I began my fieldwork in India were marked by violence in Assam, bordering Bangladesh. The area had seen large population movements during the time of the British Raj, and many Muslim Bengalis had settled in the area. Starting in the seventies, inhabitants of Assam began to question the presence of these Bengalis, arguing that they were recent immigrants from newly independent Bangladesh and were intent on overwhelming the local population.

> The current problem is the result of the tension between the local communities who are genuine citizens of the nation and the Bangladeshi Muslims who are illegal migrants. The RSS demands from the government to implement all effective steps immediately to curb the infiltration from Bangladesh and to detect them here, delete their names (from electoral lists),

and to deport back in order to put a permanent halt to this problem. Also, the National Register of Citizens (NRC) should be prepared without further delay and non-citizens should be treated accordingly. (Organiser 2012)

The presumed immigrants presented many opportunities to the RSS. They were infiltrators, coming with the tacit support of Pakistan's ISI. Bangladeshis have occasionally served as scapegoats for Muslim extremism, with Jaipur in 2008 a particularly brutal example (Moodie 2011). The citizenship of Bengali Muslim Indians usually held as proof of Congress' vote-bank shenanigans, rather than proof of their established place in Indian society (Moodie 2011). The ABVP members I spoke to ranked 'IBIs' — illegal Bangladeshi infiltrators — quite high on their list of dangers[47]. In my archival research it crops up repeatedly, before other concerns, before being co-opted in the master-narrative of demographic aggression. I want to discuss the permutations of the story as an example of a convoluted process reduced to serve a simple pan-national paranoia. In *Hindutva* discussions of Assam the innumerable intersections between politics, colonial migration, variable identity politics and economics are reduced to a simple idea of invasion and resistance.

'Greater Bangladesh'

Theories of Bangladeshi expansion have been prevalent since its independence from Pakistan in 1971, after a vicious war which resulted in widespread bloodshed and displacement. Accounts of the partition of India and Pakistan usually dwell on the violence in Punjab and Kashmir, with less emphasis on the more placid partition of Bengal and the creation of 'East Pakistan'. Nevertheless the partition was strongly opposed by many who feared that a confessional split destroyed a much deeper cultural-linguistic unity. As with any partition there were loose ends, and many Bengali-speaking Muslims remained in the newly created state of West-Bengal in India, as well as smaller communities in the states bordering what is now Bangladesh. It is these communities that have come under scrutiny in recent years. Throughout the British colonial period, Bengali migration was encouraged, and sizeable communities of Bengali Muslims were established in neighbouring states before the Partition. Following increased tensions, any Bengali-Muslims – even

[47] Henceforth I will use IBI without inverted commas, though I want to stress the fictionality of the illegal Bangladeshi infiltrator figure. Regardless of the question of migration from Bangladesh, the IBI is a stock figure for the RSS, a folk devil applied as necessary to any questionable figure.

those settled quite legally in Indian states for generation – are subject to infiltration accusations.

Assam's population currently stands at over 31,000,000 of whom 30 percent are Muslim and 27 percent (going by 2001 figures) are Bengali-speaking (Borooah 2013). The assumption that all Bengali Muslims in Assam are IBIs is undercut by their large numbers, nearly 25 percent in the 1951 census, shortly after the Partition. Bengali Muslim movement to the area began in forest clearance projects in 1914, and continued into the 1930s and 1940s. The increase from 25 percent in 1951 to 31 percent in 2001 is ascribed to IBIs, though Borooah highlights the fallacies in reductive calculating. Comparing the higher population growth of Indian Muslims to the local population, he argues that the rise in population is almost entirely natural. The negligible numbers of IBIs actually caught is far more likely a symptom of their non-existence than weakness in the system (Borooah 2013, 48).

The partition also saw large-scale movements of Hindus from east Bengal, something that continued as the sectarian character of East Pakistan/Bangladesh developed. After the 1971 war, nearly ten million Bangladeshis of all religions fled to India (UN 2000). Most returned within a year but the perception of a fluid border continues to confuse the question of national belonging, flavouring the fears of local politics. Beginning in the late 1970s, activists began to agitate over reports of massive immigration from Bangladesh. This infiltration had a number of supposed purposes. There was a military strategy designed to enable Bangladesh's expansion. The increased Muslim population could also enable a demographic takeover. The result was massive bloodshed and ethnic cleansing against anyone regarded as an IBI. The All Assam Students Union (AASU) spearheaded a violent campaign against infiltrators, a conflict that quickly became communal.

The most notable violence was the Massacre at Nellie in 1983, in which at least 4,000 Muslims were killed and many more expelled (Weiner 1983). The attacks were spurred by the 1983 state elections, which the AASU boycotted on the grounds that Bangladeshis spoiled the vote. By 1985 the Assam Accord was agreed, and efforts were made to separate legal from illegal Bangladeshi residents, with

any immigrants from after 1971 counting as infiltrators. The AASU enjoyed an extended period in politics but failed to find evidence of any large-scale immigration/infiltration they alleged. Meanwhile Bengali communities supported the revision of the electoral rolls as vindication of their long-standing place in Assam. Now it is Assamese chauvinists who are trying to stall the process they initiated, sustained the bogey of the IBI while refusing to back it up (Azad 2015).

Assam, Bodoland and the 'Green Corridor'

As discussed in Chapter two, post-independence India recognises Adivasis and OBTs, though often inculcating more problems than they solved by pandering to some identities over others. One long-running example is the communities of Bodo people scattered across Assam. Their calls for an independent state and freedom from local Assamese centres of power are usually ignored, spurring violence against mostly innocent Assamese and other minorities. One of the problems with state autonomy for 'Bodoland' is the large number of other groups living in the proposed regions, among them migrants from the colonial period. Bengali Muslims make up a large proportion, as well as Adivasi groups who worked the tea plantations. Both have come under attack from Bodo extremists eager to bolster their claim for a separate state.

The Assamese/Bangladesh question was the earliest example of contemporary demographic aggression I found in my archival research. Periodic reports of Lakhs of Bangladeshi Muslims, often armed, resulting in the violence seen in Assam, and soon to be seen in West Bengal and Bihar (Chartterji, 2004). Mention of violence excludes the detail that Assamese violence was exclusively targeted at Muslims, leaving thousands dead, and hundreds of thousands displaced. The Muslim nature of the infiltrators is usually used to contrast with legitimate Hindu Bangladeshis who flee religious violence. The idea of 'non-violence invasion' fits neatly with wider concerns of insidious takeovers.

So far we have mainly discussed Assam as a test case, and a site of occasional violence. The specific condition seen in Assam are repeated in some other border areas such as West Bengal and Bihar. But the idea of IBI has much wider currency in India, though without the specific issues seen in Assam.

> Umakant - One demographic setup changes naturally, from last hundred years demography will change. Independence in India, there is 4 crore Muslims and now there are about 14 crores. Out of that, 4 crore are from Bangladesh or Pakistan or from other countries. But 10 crore populations growth in last 65 years naturally. Somehow there is a liberty to marry two or three womens. They have 10-15 childs. This is one thing. But still, that is natural. But, in the border area of North-Eastern India, which is border of Bangladesh, there is planned demographic change. People, villages, and villages from Bangladesh infiltrate to border areas, border districts of India. And: demography changes. This is planned demographic changes.

The above statement was given to me by an ABVP official at their headquarters in central Delhi. Umakant linked the infiltration question to the wider concern with demographic aggression, arguing that the enormous population shifts perceived by the *Hindutva* movement were caused by immigration as well as 10-15 children families. The expansion plan was not simply to add to the general population. Umakant backed up the idea of specific population clusters designed to strengthen infiltration, precisely as was argued along the Assamese border. This was referred to as a Green Corridor: the takeover of villages along the border to assist immigration. And not just immigration, Umakant argued that mosques and madrasa were dotted along the border, far more than the population required. These amenities were for infiltration and terrorism.

Sakesh, my main Delhi University contact, went further, arguing that a Muslim population cluster in the territory linking the North-East to the rest of India was one of the plans afoot to deepen the division of India's geography. India's North-East, already seen as vulnerable from secessionist movements and the Chinese, is now in danger of being partitioned off. For the most part such discussions were rare, when my informants talked about infiltrators it was in reference to Assam, all-India population shifts or terrorism/criminality in general[48]. Umakant's discussion of green corridors was echoed in the literature he provided to me, about the ABVP's ongoing efforts to highlight infiltration in the area. More far-fetched ideas of Muslim corridors partitioning the country were thankfully marginal.

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[48] Dibyesh Anand has a prolonged discussion of plans for a 'Mughalistan' stretching between Pakistan and Bangladesh, annexing large portion so of North India with large Muslim minorities (Anand 2011, 55-62). Even by the standards of *Hindutva* paranoia this was an ambitious plan, and I didn't hear of any such plots in my discussions.

Congress comes into much discussion for its role in handing out citizenship in return for votes. The failure to discover any significant blocs of IBIs is usually ascribed to political subterfuge rather than lack of numbers.

> Umakant - Some political parties, so-called secular parties, so-called Marxist, they use these people as their votes. They give them ration cards, they give them voter ID, they give them ... and use their votes. This is the major problem we are facing.

The focus on Left parties and Congress is interesting; add another level to the spectrum of culpability. Individual Bangladeshis are usually placed somewhere in the middle of the grade, at best acting as cheap labour, but at worst depicted as a source of crime and squalor, and even as terrorists and militants. Most IBIs are ranked in between, as criminals and general welfare claimants, whose presence and number alone is enough to weaken India. As with Northern Ireland, the role of governments must be added to this spectrum. The role of Bangladesh never became clear, other than a general sense that they permit this to happen. Pakistan held more culpability in the eyes of ABVP activists I spoke to, somehow still controlling the movements of Bangladeshis. The broader pan-Muslim bogey ranks higher than the Bangladeshi state overall. But top of this list is usually Congress. Congress enables immigration (even armed infiltration); Congress refuses to defend the border even as damning reports of brutality are published. And most of all Congress benefits from the increased vote-bank and looks the other way on crime and terrorism.

Discussion of IBIs with informants focused on the Bodo-Bengali violence of 2012, and as always the assumption was that a vulnerable population fought against foreign invaders.

> To ascribe ethnicity as the main cause of recent riots that engulfed several districts in lower Assam will be to shy away from the reality. The clashes between armed groups of Bodo tribals and illegal Bangladeshi migrants claimed 70 plus lives on both sides and massive destruction of public and private property. About 500 villages were torched and about four lakh persons – both Bodos and Bangladeshis – were forced to flee their homes in terror (Khosla 2012).

The Bangladeshi label isn't so much as queried, just casually applied as in the above case.

Love Jihad

The method is simple. Young women, usually attending university or some other measure of relative freedom, are approached by handsome, generous young Muslim men, who befriend them, assist them and shower them with devotion and gifts. Often these men will keep their religious background subdued or actively lie about it. When the victim is ensnared, family ties are cut, and threats and coercion compel her to distance herself from her former life and change her religion and perhaps marry. The Muslim will move on to the next victim. This moral panic spread rapidly in Karnataka, in Southern India, as well as neighbouring Kerala. Different figures arise in different accounts, with a total of 35,000 allegedly missing across South India (Hindu Janjagruti Samiti 2009b). The sources of these figures, or any of the widely varying estimates, are not divulged. So far there have been no convicted cases and investigations into the matter have uncovered no evidence for its existence.

A number of themes emerge which fit with a wider frame of Islamophobia. For example, the systematic nature of the alleged activity is emphasised:

> Angad: Why not be a Romeo? These boys are receiving a lot of money-
>
> Alex: From the Arabs?
>
> - Ha, Arab oil-barons pay them. They get paid to lead a promiscuous life. They get mobiles, bikes, cash, anything they need to attract young girls. Girls are tempted, many girls are also financially vulnerable too.
>
> - Why do the Arabs fund them? There's no love lost-
>
> - Arabs have the cash, and want Global Jihad. All over they are doing this, not just in India. Germany, France, UK all see this... occurring.

Usually rich Arab states and Pakistan are labelled as the funding behind this sort of activity. The overall purpose is to increase the Muslim population, shame and antagonise the target community, raise the number of child-rearing women in the Muslim community to help bolster their numbers and further strengthen their demographic position:

> If the converted Hindu brides go on giving them countless more Muslims then secularism and democracy in Bharat will not only be seriously endangered but wiped out. We cannot watch our slow extinction. (Organiser 2009)

Bharat is not the only one under threat. Parallels are made with European countries, all thanks to Arab petrodollars.

> Angad - Muslims, especially in Arabia, know that oil will not last, that resources are there to be used. The oil, when it runs out, what will replace it? A drastic situation will ensue. Population will be the new resource used by Muslims, this will be their influence.

The women who end up in inter-religious marriages are assumed to be married under coercion. As the *Organiser* points out, Hindu women do not voluntarily marry into alien customs (Organiser 2009). And drudgery and rearing babies is the least of it, more extreme fates suggested for abducted women are prostitution in Pakistan, and suicide bombing at home.

One result of this panic has been an increase in vigilante behaviour by *Hindutva* groups concerned with interactions across religious barriers. The People's Union for Civil Liberties commissioned a report which showed the extensive interference in people's lives caused by *Hindutva* groups in the area. Numerous reports were collected of inter-religious couples, meeting in public spaces with the most innocent of intentions, being heckled and threatened (People's Union for Civil Liberties, Karnataka 2009). Extending beyond the inter-religious context, St. Valentine's Day has become a source of tension in Karnataka and elsewhere in India. Seen by the *Hindutva* movement as a Western import which encourages licentious behaviour in public, anyone caught acting in a romantic fashion in public is confronted and questioned. All in all, the atmosphere reported by the PUCL and recorded in other parts of India shows an increase in coercive and restrictive activities by vigilantes concerned with 'their' women. Tradition, religion and the sinister motives of non-Hindu men are cited as legitimate reasons to attack and interfere with inter-religious relations.

These actions and this narrative point to the incapacity of women to look after themselves. As we have seen, sweets, motorbikes and easy cash are all it takes for a chaste virtuous young lady to fall for a 'Jihad Romeo'. The vulnerability and indeed the inherent threat of corruption presented by women needs to be countered by a vigorous and vigilant male body of defenders. This schema juxtaposes the opposing masculinities and neatly defines femininity as both vulnerable and worthy of protection, yet malignant and corrupting at the same time. Women are

formulated as possessions to be fought over, objects of violation, manipulation, and reproduction. I raised this juxtaposition with Delhi University ABVP members.

> Sakesh - Most women are capable, but women can be duped, anyone can be duped. The key thing is to build awareness. Once ladies, and men, realise that love jihad is happening they are free of it. If it occurs, education... awareness... must be increased. Till we are sure.
>
> -And you keep an eye out regardless?
>
> -We always watch because it is better to have many eyes out.

Awareness and awakening is a recurrent theme in *Hindutva* literature, both for men and for women. Love jihad is one of the many things the *Hindutva* movement feel people need to be made aware of: for men to be vigilant and women to be careful.

The 'Cautionary Tale'

The emergence of this discourse is not restricted to right-wing Hindus in India. Rumours have surfaced of similar behaviour in Britain, of Muslim students targeting Hindu and Sikh women, usually of college-age (Sian 2011). The tropes are identical: young women tasting independence being seduced by handsome young Muslims masquerading as Hindus/Sikhs before abducting the victim. As in India, there is a mountain of apprehension built without a shred of primary evidence; not a single case has been referred to British police. More recent controversies centre on Muslim-sex rings targeting vulnerable female youths in Rotherham, and Manchester, with extensive media coverage of Muslim predators and police forces more concerned with political correctness and protecting South Asian Muslim communities. In 2014 a report into the failures that led to such crimes apparently laid the blame on political correctness, and the reluctance to damage minority community relations (Jay 2014). In fact the report argued that the bulk of the problem lay in a refusal to engage with and believe the victims, regardless of the background of either the victims or the perpetrators (Jay 2014).

Sian compares the Sikh/Hindu discourse to 'white slavery' fears in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe and US. Here the vulnerable white girl was targeted by foreigners, usually Jews, and forced into prostitution. Beginning as a drive to protect vulnerable prostitutes, it became consumed by its own sensationalism and took on a life of its own, becoming a linchpin of anti-Semitism

and fears about new technology such as the cinema and motor-cars (Doezema 2000). In this period women were becoming more independent, feminism was taking its first steps and the technology of transport was showing its potential. This led to a climate of panic about failing family values, aforementioned fears of population degeneracy, and the lure of urban centres. Without any evidence, but with plenty of emotive imagery the concept became a full-blown moral panic until the First World War (ibid.).

Like white slavery, love jihad discourses in both Britain and India share a common purpose: they are myths that call for control of female sexuality under the guise of protecting women (Doezema 2000, 26). Sian describes them as cautionary tales: myths corresponding to old narratives from the partition of India and Pakistan and recreating both the community and its enemies. It helps resolve the community's relation to its environment, as the threats posed by liberal society are reinscribed into a compelling narrative with set roles.

Just as Western societies were confronted with urbanism and other social shifts in the early twentieth century and the dangers suggested by its changes (Bristow 1982), Britain's immigrant community react to the integration of their daughters into British society in a similar manner. Similarly, western practices are seen as an insidious threat to India, where young women are exposing themselves to the dangers of jihad romeos. When discussing prevention strategies with informants, most cited awareness campaigns and also the need for women to remember the Vedic gendered ideal. Always presented in positive terms, such as Indian women are goddesses etc. But the implication was the incorrect behaviour led to wanton ways. Numerous archival evidence pushes this further, blaming 'western' customs of sexual licence for corrupting Hindu youth. The widely reported brutality in Mangalore in 2009 followed this pattern, when a gang of *Hindutva* men set upon, beat and sexually molested women they accused of licentious behaviour.

The moral of love jihad tales is obvious. Muslim men are on the offensive and so far Hindus have been caught sleeping. What is needed is organisation and renewal of Hindu community spirit. This is the key theme of the *Hindutva* movement generally, as seen in the name of their chief English newspaper, the *Organiser*.

Roger Brubaker analyses the difference between 'groups' and 'categories', in a manner which bears on the problem presented here (Brubaker 2004, 13-14). He describes the transitory nature of 'groups', how they need to be enacted rather than existing *a priori*. While categories are simple enough terms of identification, 'groups' are categories that are more self-aware and orientated. What the *Hindutva* movement ultimately seeks to do is turn the category 'Hindu' into an all-encompassing, self-realised 'group'. The *Hindutva* movement act as group actors, initiating group 'events', though all the while taking such groups for granted. This is how they imagine Muslims to act and organise: as part of a self-aware and ambitious group hell-bent on domination. The imaginary Muslim collective is both the root threat and the inspiration for what the *Hindutva* movement wants to achieve.

One the one hand you have a predatory and assertive body of attackers, as represented here by local Muslim men:

> Hindu-Muslim marriages are extremely offensive for the reason that the Muslim groom imagines himself to be a "conqueror" of one of the kafirs in the way of his ongoing personal jehad against kufr (Organiser 2009).

This 'conqueror' fits a number of clichés: he is rapacious yet devout (though more to a political cause). The seventy-two virgins promised in heaven instead become an earthly realisation, with the fact that they are non-Muslim virgins as an added bonus. He is contributing to his religion's political machination, weakening and insulting opposing religions, fulfilling his hypersexual desire and being paid handsomely to do it.

> Muslim males are out and about on their own like lone hunters while self-respecting Hindu and Sikh young men, brought up in ethical family atmosphere, are conditioned to respect parents, culture and social norms. A Muslim, inspired by his Koran, gets thrill introducing his non-Muslim girl to his family and friends while a Hindu boy will think twice before even talking to a Muslim female, leave aside take her to his parents' home. He is conscious of their disapproval and afraid of attack by someone from the enraged Muslim community (Organiser 2009).

This overtly sexual and predatory Muslim is compared to the defender, the role the men of *Hindutva* groups aspire to. They are devout and chaste, respecting their parents, traditions, country, and religion. Foremost they respect and defend women, or at least those who deserve it. Hindu men, and especially activist Hindu

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men, are seen as perfect husbands due to their sobriety, respect and dedication. In her interesting analysis of *Hindutva* perceptions of Muslim women over time, Paola Bacchetta (1994) describes how numerous letters were written to the *Organiser*. The letters were purportedly from Muslim women expressing dissatisfaction with their married lives, and especially their lecherous husbands. The letters expressed a desire for Hindu husbands, who would treat them with respect and tolerance.

These two images of masculinity are fairly well matched: rapacious/chaste; belligerent/defensive; backward/modern, tolerant. They correspond quite well with British Victorian concerns about masculinity that juxtaposed the character of manliness in different classes. Upper-class men were supposed to be chaste, high-minded, respectful, patriotic and restrained in their behaviour. The men of the lower-classes were held to be the opposite: brash, lusty, violent and assertive. British Victorian society held that the behaviour of the lower classes was a necessary evil, until concerns began to emerge about degeneracy and the rising population of working classes threatening the integrity of British society (Childs 2004; Boddice 2011).

As have seen, love jihad narratives prefer to see women as hapless victims who wouldn't dream of living in a Muslim family. Much of the discourse on white slavery was based on the idea that no white woman would willingly submit to the degradations of prostitution (Doezema 2000, 29). The vulnerability, and also the weakness, of women is illustrated by the sort of enticements offered by Jihad Romeos. Despite a virtuous upbringing in a wholesome environment, Hindu and Sikh (and in Karnataka at least, Christian) girls are susceptible to handsome men armed with motorbikes, ready cash and sweets. In some cases a slightly less demeaning incentive of financial aid to students is offered but largely the honey trap presented by the Jihad Romeos stands as a damning indictment of young women and the ease with which they fall. Their weakness, of course, further reflects on the wider community, justifying the jealous paranoia displayed in love jihad discourse.

However sometimes the vulnerable nature of women leads to harder views and stronger actions. It should be noted that part of the white slavery discourse

involved the division of prostitutes into deserving vulnerable 'white' victims, and 'fallen women' who seduced family men, spread disease and corruption and deserved nothing but contempt (Doezema 2000, 27). Some women are simply beyond the pale and without the community-imposed role of virtue-bearers they are afforded no virtue at all. Indian law is full of cases where the integrity of a woman is pegged to her community standing, for example it is almost impossible for example to be convicted of raping a prostitute as she is a 'fallen woman' and she is incapable of saying 'no' due to her nature (Das 2008; Menon 2000; Kannibran 1996).

In Mangalore, Karnataka, in 2009 there was an incident which made national and international headlines, and inspired the report by the PUCL into cultural policing. A group of young women in a bar were attacked, molested and dragged out into the street to the waiting media. They were attacked by men associated with *Sri Ram Sena*, one of the *Hindutva* activist groups in the area. They were attacked because they were supposedly drinking and dancing promiscuously. The incident caused a storm of controversy in India, where it laid bare a problem mentioned above: that of vigilante 'cultural police' attacking law-abiding and peaceful behaviour they perceived as staining the image of their community. The women attacked in Mangalore were treated as 'fallen women'; not only were they attacked but they were sexually molested and called whores (People's Union for Civil Liberties, Karnataka 2009).

Delhi Demographic Aggression

The wider picture fits with discourses on 'Youth Bulges' and the idea that Islam is going through a wider revival over the past few decades (Huntington 2002). The narrative of love jihad revolves around a concern with changing circumstances and efforts to confront those changes. The anxiety comes down to a perception of agency and passivity. A key theme - to my mind *the* key theme - of these narratives is the perception of an active enemy, such as the predatory Muslims. For too long the besieged community and its men in particular have acted as passive emasculated victims, their inherent superiority lost for the time being. These narratives draw on a past image of glory, such as mythological India or

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European colonial dominance. Now the tables are turned and the less civilised are in the ascent, using the very features that marked them as inferior: their hypersexuality and backward attitude.

The solution is to restore a sense of agency and manliness, and this is what the various narratives call for. Men are to assert themselves once more, organising, defending themselves and keeping a close eye on their own womenfolk and their sexuality. With this restored sense of agency, victory is inevitable. And so the narrative villainises Muslim men, otherises them, and attempts to instil a sense of unity, purpose and integrity in the beleaguered community. The results vary, but the basic sentiment is the same.

Overall the idea of demographic aggression was omnipresent and all-pervasive during my research with the ABVP. Other *Hindutva* concerns, crypto-Christianity, historical revision touched upon it, establishing a mesh of narratives, all sustained by each other, and rarely by any external evidence. In later chapters I want to discuss the self-fulfilling nature of narratives, how they recreate and vindicate the very fears they espouse. Among the ABVP, and in contact with other activists and publications of the *Hindutva* movement, there was a constant revolution around the same key principles, with only minor details changing. As always my position faltered between polite bemusement and disbelief, and perhaps the assumption of sympathy. My ethnographic methodology leans heavily on the innocent abroad, and my informants rarely credited me with any great insight. There was no ambiguity in my research, and very little variety. Aside from a more welcoming attitude towards Muslims (though I didn't see it in practice), my fieldwork in Delhi confirmed my early impressions of Hindutvavadis in Jaipur. I saw this as signs of a narrative in full flower, confident of itself and able to subvert any narrative to its purpose. How expansive this particular narrative is beyond *Hindutva* circles I cannot say. My friends in Delhi were all aware of the stereotypes of Muslim fertility, though assumptions of sexual predation took a backseat to more general discussions of gang-rape and general toxic masculinity. Love jihad as a specific narrative was more exclusive to university friends, though again Muslim men were seen as religious. One associate told me of a former boyfriend who had insisted she convert. He was Iranian, and while insistent, he wasn't guileful about it.

Traditions of Tolerance

The narrative of tolerance, consociational respect and shared traditions was cost common among Ballynafeigh's community groups. The most prominent, with a large office on Ormeau Road across from the park, is the Ballynafeigh Community Development Association (BCDA). Founded in 1974, it has been part of the community for generations now, and currently boasts many home-grown staff, as well as more professional social workers. The other notable community organisation is the Ballynafeigh Clergy Association (BCF): a gathering of the various clerics that serve the community and its environs. The BCF came together in response to the outbreak of violence in Belfast and strove to promote unity and understanding between the many different faiths in Ballynafeigh. Both groups have contrasting ideas about community leadership and their role in fostering an inclusive future. But in contrast to Loyal Orange Lodge no. 10, they offer a practice of shared living.

Ballynafeigh Community Development Association

When I arrived at the BCDA, it was quite a prominent building on the Ormeau Road, facing the gates to Ormeau Park, and close next to the Bakery, probably the most iconic building in Ballynafeigh. I was met by Gerry Tubritt, originally of Waterford but living in Northern Ireland for long enough to acquire a pronounced northern lilt. Gerry explained the borders of Ballynafeigh to me, offering to give a tour of the neighbourhood, and explained the local landmarks. The discussion was quite territorial, and I sensed the BCDA might be too. Within that territory, though, all were welcome. The BCDA based itself in the much-vaunted tradition of Ballynafeigh: of inclusivity and tolerance to all. South Belfast was relatively untouched by the Troubles, compared to northern neighbourhoods, but there were still deaths, intimidation and paramilitaries. The BCDA was formed in response to this threat: to counter the social role often played by paramilitaries but also the counter any segregation of religious populations. To this end the organisation arranged many events designed to bring people together.

One such initiative to bring Ballynafeigh together was the fifth Annual Shared Neighbourhood Festival, which went on for ten days and involved a variety of events. Some of them, such as quiz nights and barbeques were normal events,

uncontroversial and popular. Others were more complicated. The first event I attended at the festival was a bluegrass festival near Annadale flats. Bluegrass/Appalachian music might seem an odd thing to encounter in urban Belfast, but many Protestants cherish the links between Ulster-Scots and those who emigrated to America, often forming the backbone of the early independent US. Figures like George Washington and Andrew Jackson are proudly claimed as Ulster-Scots. Ulster Protestants prefer to identify with their independence and frontier spirit, as well as their bluegrass music.

Held in a little patch of communal ground, sheltered by the flats, the concert was a small affair, with local musicians and a Scottish member. Organised by Annadale Housing Committee, all newcomers were welcomed and directed to the food stall. Promised barbeque food, what was offered was Indian from a local takeaway, supplied by men in cowboy hats who lived in the flats. The music and the food were good, the crowd small but appreciative. The aim was to open the Annadale flats and make them less intimidating, a plan somewhat hampered by the abundant unionist heraldry: all Union Jack bunting and English and Scottish flags. But the people I talked to were welcoming, the mood was quiet and while somewhat introverted still open.

Another event organised was an Irish Gaelic appreciation night, discussing the place-names and history of Ballynafeigh. Links with Scots Gaelic were emphasised and Ullans was mentioned more than once also, but it was nevertheless a politically loaded topic. There is little Irish in evidence in Ballynafeigh (or Ullans for that matter) and the language has yet to throw off the stigma of being attached to a particular section of republican nationalism (O'Reilly 2001). While efforts to broaden the language continue in other parts of the city, in Ballynafeigh people are content to let sleeping dogs lie. The discussion however, was presented as an interesting take on the etymology of the district: one that includes French as well as Irish. It was not meant as a contemporary discussion of Irish and wasn't taken as such. The territorial theme was there nevertheless.

There is little to suggest that either of these events were divisive or even segregated. I saw people from the Flats at both events, and no one was surprised.

And there were as many non-aligned events as communally tinged ones, cooking classes fairground day, etc. But the communal question was there. There was a debate on shared sports grounds and an open day for the local Orange Lodge. This was a festival that didn't shy away from the questions, and didn't whitewash its history. The festival in September was when the BCDA came into full service but overall the BCDA had a quieter but no less important time. For the most part, local participation with the BCDA was mundane, use the office facilities, get help and advice about CVs, post notices. Much of their work was given over to helping local families, providing space for former paramilitaries to talk, offering space to African church communities too small to have their own hall or church. These were affairs less open and more difficult to get access to, but they make up the bulk of the BCDA's work.

Ballynafeigh Clergy Fellowship

Ballynafeigh was established as a distinct community in the late nineteenth century, when Belfast expanded rapidly during its industrial dominance. Ballynafeigh benefited from not having any pre-established religious status quo, which made it a place of equal footing for all Christian churches. Ormeau Road has a wide variety of religious denominations: Presbyterian, Roman Catholic, Anglican, Methodist and Baptist. More recently immigrants from Africa have brought smaller evangelical churches which met occasionally at the Anglican church or the BCDA.

My main contact with the BCF was a retired member, Jim Cambell, who had been the minister of the local Methodist church. Jim gave me the history of the organisation. Founded in the wake of increasing violence, the BCF formed to counter the increased polarisation of religious communities in Belfast. The seventies were particularly bad for random sectarian murders, perpetrated by both sides. The BCF organised ecumenical church services and events, and in the event of a Troubles-related attack on a community member they made a point of sending a Catholic and Protestant minister to visit the victims.

Jim made much of the tradition of tolerance that ran through much the communities groups and organisations, citing the tradition of tolerance as one that made the work of the BCF possible in the first place. However Jim placed more

emphasis than most other organisations on the importance of good leadership. While other organisations were careful to emphasise the role of the community and the position of their organisation as a catalyst of sorts for the latent community spirit, Cambell emphasised the importance of having the right clergymen as well as the right community spirit. It was further than anyone had gone in claiming a role as 'community leaders'. As religious leaders, rather than local residents it may have been an easier role to imagine for themselves, reflecting as it does, a more traditional view of community organisation. And it is indisputably true that Ballynafeigh was fortunate to have a collection of ecumenically-minded clergy who were prepared to work together for the benefit of the community, in an atmosphere of sectarian suspicion and lingering church rivalry rather than cooperation. This was a period when mixed marriages were still routinely condemned by all sides and ecumenism was mistrusted by many.

Mixed relationships are relatively rare in Northern Ireland, estimated at around 10 percent (conversations with an activist with the Northern Ireland Mixed Marriage Association reckoned from his experience that it was much higher). A study conducted in 1995 estimated that seven percent of Catholics and 24 percent of Protestants in Ballynafeigh were in mixed relationships, compared to the average of five percent Catholic and two percent Protestant (Hanlon 1994, 60). Judging from the 2001 census information this estimate is now much higher, but it shows that Ballynafeigh has been an attractive residence option for mixed couples, for Protestants in particular. This higher than average incidence of mixed marriages in Ballynafeigh correlates with its liberal, middle-class image.

Ballynafeigh had become a magnet for mixed marriages, middle-class refugees of more closed areas, and, more recently, immigrants. All the churches had felt a decline in attendance though they didn't seem bothered by this fact, at least not that they would admit to me. The only churches to see a growth were small independent African churches that were still marginal to both Ballynafeigh and the BCF. There was no representation from these churches at the meetings I attended, though efforts had been made to reach out to them. The local Anglican church, St. Jude's, was one of their venues so contact on a one-to-one basis was held between

the new churches and the more established sects. The only other growth mentioned was the influx of South Asian attendants at the local Catholic church.

The main demographic shift was social rather than religious, the rise of the middle-class and renters such as myself. There were also some refugees from the Holylands across the water, students and reportedly the occasional lecturer. None of these were particularly religious, as Father McKenna admitted, and the BCF were declining in importance as time went on, the need for inter-religious harmony faded, and other organisations such as the BCDA took prominence. The BCF had accepted this shift, indeed (perhaps with the benefit of hindsight) Jim Cambell presented the rise of the BCDA as an anticipated part of the BCF's project, gradually having role filled by community members and more professional social workers such as Katie Hanlon.

In the meantime though, the BCF met monthly, made private ecumenical jokes and arranged ecumenical services, inter-school events, and various other acts of participation. It had been long since there was need for visits to victims of the Troubles. Gaps still remained, such the lack of secular schooling. The BCF was therefore still involved in getting young people to meet and enjoy activities together. The Rosetta sports club was one such venture and the GLU (God Loves yoU) summer camp.

The different takes on community and organisation in Ballynafeigh reflect wider Northern Irish society as well as Ballynafeigh. The competing narratives of Ballynafeigh: of tradition in the past inspiring inclusion and peace; and of former Protestant well-being in the past, gradually fading into more cosmopolitan future with little room for former glory. Both reflect reasonably well on Northern Ireland as a whole. I found very little in ordinary residents' views that didn't tally with one organisation or the other. Partly this is because the organisations themselves serve as a useful conduit for the residents and recommended people to talk to. The community groups were far more concerned with practical aspects of shared living, schools, local employment, housing. They reflected the diverse neighbourhood of Ballynafeigh, with room and awareness for migrant residents.

The care and attention that had been paid to countering sectarian violence now went to fostering a unified and vibrant district.

Northern Ireland: Loyalism and Social Memory

In 2001, Andrew Finlay drew attention to a widespread trope of contemporary Protestant unionism: defeatism and a siege mentality (Finlay 2001). Increasingly evident after the AIA, this defeatism is rooted in atavistic mindsets that emphasise the marginal security of Ulstermen and the constant dread of the natives. Much of the literature just outlined corroborates the more feverish ideas of abandonment by London and encircling Catholics. Finlay is quick to dismiss the idea of it as a mindset, let alone a collective pathology. Instead he locates the displacement of most Protestants in the collapse of imperial progression and industry.

> If I am correct to suggest that this kind of ideology linking Protestantism and unionism with modernity and progress was a significant current, particularly among the protestant working class, then, it seems to me that this goes someway to explaining why, amid all the other changes - constitutional, legal, political and demographic - the collapse of the traditional industries upon which the ideology was based has been such a blow. (Finlay 2001, 15)

Protestants identified with civilisation and progress, and associated Catholics with thriftless backwardness. In a post-industrial climate there was a vacuum in self-worth. At the same time, identity politics came to the fore and Catholics were much better equipped to capitalise on the new discussions of multiculturalism and mutual respect. The tensions over public displays of Orange culture could be explained by this ambivalence towards identity, as working-class Protestants relocate their values in a post-industrial public sphere.

Here I outline public displays of Protestant culture, their links to working-class issues and the performance of loyalism down the years. The decline of working-class neighbourhoods is not just charted in lost employment but also the shifting populations of working-class neighbourhoods. The emphasis Finlay lays on cultural identity becomes more stark as the decade of commemorations advances. In Ballynafeigh at least, rather than create tension, the commemorations have illustrated the possibilities of identity cultivation in a positive fashion.

Loyal Orange Lodge No. 10

The local branch of the Orange Order – Loyal Orange Lodge Number 10 – was located in a handsome Venetian Gothic building on Ormeau Road. Its resident officer, Noel Ligatt, was my only informant there. This branch was a later addition to the Orange Order, springing up in the late 1800s. It was one of the smaller branches, and a little cut off from the others. Boasting a small but active membership it stood out among the lodges due to its ward's reputation for tolerance and mixing. The Lodge, like the rest of the Orange Order, is happy to promote the impression of inter-religious respect and accommodation, though exactly what the LOL 10 did to promote such feeling is unclear.

As discussed earlier, the local lodge came to prominence in the 1990s for the opposite reason: the opposition to parading down the Lower Ormeau Road. Along with the Garvaghy road in Portadown, this became the *cause célèbre* of the Orange Order, though thankfully with less violence attached. In accordance with the Order's stand, the local branch refused to negotiate with the Lower Ormeau residents because of their IRA connections (Smithey 2011, 132). Now they refuse to meet with the Parades Commission, though they accept the Commission's rulings and follow the prescribed route. Over the years the route has improved, allowing the Orange Order to recover some of their ground. By and large the Order has retreated from making too much fuss over parade routes, and focuses on local membership and their needs.

When I first met with Noel Ligatt he showed me around the lodge, in a well-rehearsed tour. The Lodge was open during the Ballynafeigh Shared Neighbourhood Festival, with Noel providing tours. The mainly consisted of showing the history of the lodge in membership notices, plaques, and other memorabilia. Much emphasis was placed on local members who died in the First World War and were commemorated at the lodge. Afterwards Noel and I sat down to talk. He described the membership as small but committed: mainly older families that had roots in the neighbourhood and the lodge for generations. He was such a person himself. When he described the role of the lodge, in contrast to the BCF he focused entirely on the role of the community, as opposed to the lodge leaders or wider Orange organisation. The lodge, as he described it, was an empty

vessel that served the needs and wishes of its members and was very much grassroots-based instead of top-down.

Like the BCF, it was no secret that membership was down though in the case of the Orange Order membership declined because of the divisive actions of the Orange Order during the nineties especially in relation to parades. For this purpose, the present-day Orange Order focuses on membership, focusing on making the local branches relevant to the lives of local members and increasing (or at least sustaining) membership that way. It also explains why divisive issues such as parades are neglected, at least when speaking to Irish Catholic researchers such as myself.

There was one issue which Noel felt quite strongly about. Without going into the specifics of why the parade became divisive in the nineties, he bemoaned the loss of access for the annual parade down the Lower Ormeau. Why is it, he asked, that every other day of the year Protestants from Ballynafeigh are allowed to walk down the road? He also emphasised the connection with the Lower Ormeau as held by local Protestant residents, with doctors and other such links below the bridge. It became clear that the gradual shift of the Lower Ormeau from a working class Protestant to a largely Catholic area in the past few decades was a source of anger. Without blaming anyone of the shift, he made it clear that the area was traditionally a Protestant one. This was a new take on the tradition of Ballynafeigh: he was also the only person I spoke to in Ballynafeigh who thought of the area across the river as part of Ballynafeigh, or rather the Ormeau district. The LOL 10 covered the Lower Ormeau area as well it seems, in theory now if not practice.

This was not an aggressive stake, and while he was not happy with the ban on parading down the Lower Ormeau Road he accepted the status quo. But this perspective on the Ormeau road, as a formerly united district, one proudly both Protestant working-class and tolerant, was unique among the organisations in Ballynafeigh. The BCDA was happy to accept from any local residence and the BCF working when it could with the few churches there were across the bridge. But these were aspirations of *future* cooperation and attempts to forge links, rather than wistful nostalgia for a lost golden era of unity. It didn't fit the prevailing

narrative of looking entirely for good in the past and hope for the future. The past was a source of loss for the LOL 10, and the hope of the future was tainted with the decline apparent over the course of recent history. This theme, running counter to the prevailing narrative, is often visible in wider fears in Belfast and Northern Ireland of the peaceful fading of Protestant unionism, exemplified by the decline of the Orange Order, the replacement of the RUC and issues such as what flags can be flown where and when. The inspecifity of territory and place is also reminiscent of Todd's observations that loyalism has a more concrete idea of territory than of place (Todd 1987, 6).

Parades

In my time in Belfast there was a concerted period of parades[49]. The season begins in June and continues through late August, depending on the lodge and the Parades Commission. The most important parade is the 12th July parade held to commemorate, and celebrate, William III's victory over James II in 1690, ensuring the centrality of Britain's monarchy/parliamentary system and the 'Protestant Ascendancy' in Britain and Ireland. Parading has a long and varied history in Northern Ireland, with support and official sanction waxing and waning with the fortunes of the Order. Dominic Bryan charts the periodic bouts of respectability over time, with parades balancing a diverse population of social elites, rural groups and 'rough' elements of society with more martial undertones and blood-and-thunder music.

> From 1795 until the 1870s Orange parades were widely viewed, even by many Protestants, as 'rough' events that simply served to foster disturbances and demanded heave policing. In the period after the 1870s Orangeism became patronised by many more Ulster landowners, the bourgeoisie and petit-bourgeoisie in Belfast, parades came to be seen as more 'respectable' and there was a consistent attempt to marginalise the rougher elements. 'Respectable' Orangeism reached its zenith with the formation of the state of Northern Ireland in 1920 and the parades effectively became rituals of state. (Bryan 2000, 9)

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[49] A brief note on terminology: I will refer to the Orange Order demonstrations as 'parades', though the term 'marches' is also often used, and the term 'marching season' has fairly current public use. The Orange Order prefer parades, as this is a less combative term, and emphasises the celebratory and positive spirit, exemplified in other parades such as Gay Pride and St. Patrick's Parade. It is also the term used by the Parades Commission. The parades are sometimes quite combative in tone but the Orange Order rightly feel that this element is overly emphasised by media, the public, and academia alike.

In recent years the main parades have become less respectable, as tensions over routes lead to confrontation and sometimes violence. The Orange Order has lost many of its moderate members, state approval, and media coverage. Efforts to rebrand the Twelfth as Orangfest have so far failed to generate the fun atmosphere more usual at local parades and sadly the most visible manifestation of Orangeism is the most unappealing. It is worth pointing out that the vast majority of parades are not controversial, even major parades usually take place with a minimum of fuss or communal tension (Smithey 2011, 120). The focus on major flashpoints is perhaps inevitable but certainly unrepresentative.

I attended many parades while I lived in Ballynafeigh, the biggest being the annual 'Twelth' parade. The parade began at 8.30am. The bands gathered along the Ormeau Road outside the Orange Hall and eventually got going. The parade was allowed to pass across the bridge, and cut sharply to the left to avoid the controversial Lower Ormeau area. Instead they would pass up through the student area: the Holylands. The Holylands were as likely to house Catholics and those of a nationalist bent, but were not organised and as students they were absent during the summer. The parade then passed down Botanic Avenue, turned onto Donegall Pass (A small Protestant neighbourhood) and back onto the Lower Ormeau road, having passed the residential area by. From there it was straight into the city centre by about half ten or eleven to join with the other parades and then onto the Field.

The mood of the crowd was quite different from 'mini-parades'. This had the feel of a display rather than a celebration or a tradition, it felt more like a political demonstration to me. The parades were highly disciplined (by and large the Order tries not to let unruly behaviour happen on their watch), the followers (not all that many) were relatively quiet and the large (to me) police presence added a dour tone. But there was no hostility. Crossing the bridge was a muted affair, till we turned left and the drums erupted. A pre-planned provocation or a spontaneous eruption?

The mood among the crowds at City Hall was equally sombre. There were some nods to the Orangefest spirit of the Twelfth but they were scanty and emphasised

the homogeneity of the event. A world food fair languished in the City Hall grounds, two lonely stalls[50]. The burger vans were doing a roaring trade however. The din of drums was enormous. From there the parade assembled and marched southwards through the city centre, down the Lisburn Road and out to 'the Field'.

Later in the evening the parade returned, reforming around Botanic Avenue for a parade through the Holylands, up the Stranmillis Embankment, onto the bridge and back to the Hall. This time there was trouble, thankfully little. One or two students were out and a scuffle broke out between attendants and one gangly ill-wisher. Other participants with an eye out for trouble quickly settled their companion. When we got to the bridge a rather hostile crowd had gathered on the Lower Ormeau, with plenty of police in between. Again, discipline and organisation kept everything quiet but it was a tense moment. The parade ended shortly afterwards.

By way of contrast, every small local neighbourly parade was a delight. It was this sort of event I assume Ruth Dudley Edwards had in mind when she claimed that Orange parades were charming community celebrations (Dudley-Edwards 1999). Coincidentally the weather was better for them, more July-like. The parades marched through Protestant areas, around my street and the Annadale Flats, down Sunnydale street and often out towards Ravenhill. Residents lined the streets to watch them go by. Orangemen would drop out of the parade to chat with friends, children would march along with the parade for a bit. The music was a lot less blood and thunder.

Balmoral Commemoration

On the 19th of May, 2012, the Orange Order held a huge commemoration of the 1912 Balmoral Review parade, a gathering that led to the Ulster Covenant later that year. It was held down the road from me in Ormeau Park. This marked the unionist beginning of the 'decade of commemorations'. This period, starting with the signing of the Ulster Covenant in 1912 and ending presumably with the cessation of the Free State's civil war in 1923, has defined the politics and society

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[50] The 2015 parade had a much better food fair.

of Ireland for a century. No event in those ten years is shared (those that are, such as the Battle of the Somme, are downplayed), but they all have the potential to unleash renewed tension and anger in societies moving beyond these events. The 50th anniversary of the 1916 Uprising was held as partly responsible for the subsequent Troubles, and today there are any number of dissident figures, both republican and loyalist who need the publicity that hijacking or disrupting a major commemoration could provide.

Aside from all that, the Ormeau Park commemoration was the first major Orange event of the year and Ormeau's first time in the Orange spotlight since the parade protests of the nineties. Given all of that, I expected the commemoration to be a somewhat tense affair. There was little media coverage leading up to it, most of that was speculation and concern over the routes various lodges would parade down to get to the park and the 'UVF' uniforms certain groups wanted to wear (WWI UVF as it turned out, and legitimate enough).

I was quite surprised to see that rather than a tense and sombre gathering, with much rattling of sabres and complaints about the future of Orangeism, it was quite fun. The weather was perfect for a day in the park. The tone was one more of celebration than commemoration, with a certain air of carnival, not usually encountered among orange sashes. The Covenant itself was somewhat sidelined and the purpose was to gather and celebrate rather than moan. 1912 itself was somewhat displaced by 1916, as the WWI uniforms and exhibitions took prominence in commemoration. (McKay argues that for some loyalists the Battle of the Somme was regarded as a victory rather than a tragic loss, McKay 2005, 57). The central area was dominated by a stage where different bands played one after the other. For the most part, the place was dominated by bouncy castles, tea-cup rides, and other family distractions. Even the burger vans had to compete with ice-cream vans. Children and families made up the bulk of the crowd, with a more discreet sprinkling of bowler hats, sashes and uniforms.

All this stood in stark contrast to the Orangfest of 12th July, supposedly the jewel in the crown of positive renewed Orange parading. There, the atmosphere was far from celebratory and both the crowds and the bands manifested a passive

aggression. The only note towards inclusivity was a meagre world food fair in the City Hall grounds, two stalls occupying that lonely expanse. The mood in Ormeau Park was far more reminiscent of the mini-12th parades held in the first week of July, in Protestant neighbourhoods and very much for the benefit of the locals. These had a strong spirit of positivity and community, something largely absent from the 12th parades. This spirit was in evidence on a much larger scale in Ormeau that day. On the 29th of September, the official commemoration took place in the form of parades to Stormont. 100 bands and 20,000 people took part. Again, the media speculation of trouble proved unfounded, though it was reportedly a much more sombre affair in keeping with the gravity of the event commemorated.

The decade of commemoration has drawn focus on the perennial issue that is communal identity in Northern Ireland, and its persistence well after the Troubles. Commemoration like the Ulster Covenant signing, the Larne and Howth gun-running, major events of WWI, the Easter Rising of 1916 and steps towards independence from 1918 onwards will all provide fuel for those convinced that nothing good and plenty bad can and will come from continuing emphasis on sectarian identity. The Ormeau and Stormont commemorations have shown that such events can pass off peacefully, indeed they have set a solid precedent for the decade. Handled with tact and dignity, there is no reason for enthusiasts to abandon a key part of their identity, and plenty of incentive to keep it from being taken by those who wish only to spread discord.

Conclusion: Myth and Memory

Neil Jarman's book on parading in Northern Ireland discusses the importance of memory and ritual as the key to understanding the importance of Orange parades. I want to expand on that theme here. Having discussed the creation and sustenance of narrative, and their role in recreating actions (as re-tellings of the narrative), I now want to focus on the why, and see how social memory interacts with social formation. I also want to examine how social memories clash with the idea of identity and modernisation. James Ferguson explores the interplay between power, ideas of modernity/backwardness and social meaning in his works on

development in regions of Africa (Ferguson 1999). I want to compare his discussion of modernity and its expectation with how 'high cultures' interact with post-modernity and burgeoning identity politics.

James Ferguson, in his work on the decline of industrialisation in Zambia, outlines the economic and social problems that emerge from shifting industrial fortunes. But his focus is on the perception of modernity that industrial decline challenges, the assumption that modernity was unidirectional and progressive, and that Zambia was finding its place in the developed world. This was an assumption shared by Zambians and western social scientists alike, and all who believed in the myth of modernity. Modernisation here was a metanarrative *par excellence*, held to be universal and the driver of global economic and political forces. The reversal of industrial progress was keenly felt by Zambians, who had to readjust not just economic expectations, but ontological expectations of their place in the wider world. Ferguson stresses the role of social myths in conceptualising the world, myths are popularly defined as inaccurate depictions of the world while anthropological definitions see myths as socially useful:

> A myth in this sense is not just a mistaken account but a cosmological blueprint that lays down fundamental categories and meanings for the organisation and interpretation of experience.... The myth of modernisation (no less than any other myth) gives an understanding of the world, providing a set of categories and premises that continue to shape people's experience and interpretation of their lives. (Ferguson 1999, 13-14)

For the people of Ferguson's study, this particular myth or metanarrative formulated an optimistic view of the future of ever-increasing prosperity, urbanisation and access to global networks. All of this has re-adjusted in light of the failure of the narrative.

In a similar fashion, majoritarians have understood themselves to be agents of modernity in their respective sites, using the metanarrative as a framework to evaluate their actions and position those they feel are their enemies. This social myth provides not just a conceptual framework for interpreting the past, but a moral one based on their understanding of civic nationalism and ideals of tolerance. As discussed by Brubaker, civic and ethnic nationalism are laden with value and civic is nearly always held to be morally superior to ethnic actions.

> Civic nationalism is generally glossed as liberal, voluntarist, universalist, and
> inclusive, ethnic nationalism as illiberal, ascriptive, particularist, and exclusive.
> Who could have a good word for a form of nationalism routinely glossed as
> illiberal, ascriptive, and exclusive? .... How could one criticize a form of
> nationalism understood to be liberal, voluntarist, and inclusive? When civic
> and ethnic nationalism are paired, the former is invariably a term of praise, the
> latter of abuse. (Brubaker 2004, 140-141)

In short, actions regarded as positive are seen as positive and actions seen as
negative are ethnic. Hindutvavadis and loyalists interpret their actions as modern,
tolerant and civic and in turn ascribe negative values to the actions of their Other.
This moral framework is fractured if we take the other part of Ferguson's analysis,
modernity is threatened in both contexts by backwards illiberal threats which pose
a great threat to the prosperity. The trajectory of modernity is part of the moral
framework of majoritarianism, as threats to their position are framed as a threat to
modernity itself.

The Paranoid Style

Both historiographies draw on different trajectories for different ends, yet the
similarities are remarkable. In both cases a long history of paranoia is traced back
to ancient history, and the actions of the present laid out in understandings of the
past. The apocalyptic nature of the threat, a continuous existential crisis demands a
balance of ever-thwarting resistance, the doughty example of past heroes as a
stirring example to the present. Another means to balance impending doom with
continuous narrative is the slight changes in narrative over time, with the nature of
the threat altering slightly while the underlying menace remains constant.

As Hofstadter points out in his influential essay *The Paranoid Style in American
Politics* the chief attribute here is the meaning-making that goes into political
paranoia. The problems his subjects perceive are almost identical to the elitist
betrayal challenged in my fieldsites.

> Those earlier movements felt that they stood for causes and personal types
> that were still in possession of their country—that they were fending off
> threats to a still established way of life. But the modern right wing...feels
> dispossessed: America has been largely taken away from them and their kind,
> though they are determined to try to repossess it and to prevent the final
> destructive act of subversion. The old American virtues have already been
> eaten away by cosmopolitans and intellectuals; the old competitive capitalism
> has been gradually undermined by socialistic and communistic schemers; the
> old national security and independence have been destroyed by treasonous

> plots, having as their most powerful agents not merely outsiders and
> foreigners as of old but major statesmen who are at the very centers of
> American power. Their predecessors had discovered conspiracies; the modern
> radical right finds conspiracy to be betrayal from on high. (Hofstadter 1964)

The clarity of paranoia cuts through the complexities of the social project. The totality of the danger is evident, with all aspects of public life under threat of corruption or takeover, each feeding into the other. Bangladeshi infiltration is simultaneously a reflection of the weakness of the Indian state and the degree of control they have over population movements. Not only is the danger total, but it is also consistent through time, as the historiographies examined here illustrate. Both fieldsites read contemporary narratives of religious genocide into the past, highlighting the relevant historical details and obscuring any context. A remarkably clear picture emerges, confirming the atavistic nature of the threat and the steps necessary to prevent disaster. Key dates and imagery emerge as the paratactic narratives: visual bursts that reaffirm the moral status quo. For the *Hindutva* movement, the violence against women over centuries by Muslims – as invaders, partitioners, or a present-day fifth column – represents a constant calibration of the moral framework that Hindus must remember. In Northern Ireland history furnishes violent milestones to sectarian violence and the threat that Catholicism offers when the opportunity arises. In either fieldsite, total annihilation was supposedly prevented by the courage and resilience of the majoritarians, attributes that will prove essential in times to come. As pessimistic as these degeneracy narratives are, they provide a clear identity for the majoritarians, a moral framework that enables a strong identity project to form. By way of contrast the efforts to create a history of Europe marked by existential threats has largely failed[51]. While Islamophobia and racism are growing threats, pan-European signifiers of fear have yet to ground themselves in the past or provide much unifying momentum to political actors determined to unite Europe in the face of danger.

Hofstadter goes on to point out a strange feature of paranoid politics: the mimicry involved.

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[51] It remains to be seen whether a future of existential threat proves attractive. If so, there will be fresh efforts to reframe the past in a way that suits Islamophobia.

> The Ku Klux Klan imitated Catholicism to the point of donning priestly vestments, developing an elaborate ritual and an equally elaborate hierarchy. The John Birch Society emulates Communist cells and quasi-secret operation through "front" groups, and preaches a ruthless prosecution of the ideological war along lines very similar to those it finds in the Communist enemy (ibid).

The persistent fear of corruption, deterioration and of abandonment by the powerful in society is always balanced by the strength, influence and unity of the Other. Pluralism is both the cherished virtue of the majoritarian and his greatest weakness, and to challenge the might of the organised Other the same degree of authority and homogeneity is necessary. It is this pattern of emulating the enemy that I will examine in the last chapter, the ongoing project to reinvigorate the public body of the majority population, fighting the minority Other at its own game.

Chapter Five – Narrative, Degeneracy, and Ontology

The higher paranoid scholarship is nothing if not coherent–in fact the paranoid mind is far more coherent than the real world (Hofstadter, 1964, p. 86)

In a political culture the self that narrates speaks from a position of having been narrated and edited by others—by political institutions, by concepts of historical causality, and possibly by violence. (Feldman, 1991, p. 13)

So far we have examined how shifting political, economic and social ideologies created and sustained population groups, categories of privilege and government mechanisms to manage disparate elements. The national myth underpinning both India and Northern Ireland, that they were states devoted to progress and modernity, was badly shaken towards the end of the twentieth century as their inequality and de facto minority policing became obvious and the contradictions of progress impossible to ignore. The result, is the rise of majoritarian narratives of danger. The state and national apparatus are seen as under attack from ruthless minorities who utilise their sense of collective identity to further their interests. The attributes that makes the minorities 'lesser' - their regressive religion, their lower class, their preference for atavistic identity over high ideals of progress and modernity – are precisely the means by which they achieve a high growth rate and increase their influence.

In the following chapter I want to explore how majoritarians perceive the society that allows this to happen. While the threatening minority is always presumed to be collected and homogenous, ready to grab their advantage, the nation/state should be capable of protecting itself and true citizens. But the narrative of minority advancement is always accompanied by a narrative of civilisation's decline, imperial retreat and social decay. Particularly this is perceived as a historical process, with present-day problems read backward into history. The role of memory and historiography is crucial in providing symbolic capital to the present-day struggles. Interpretations of history vary from perceiving a continuous threat from minorities, nation-states providing a clear moral standpoint, or perhaps a slow decline and onslaught.

Mainly what I will focus on in this chapter is the communal reading of history, of inscribing apocalyptic scenarios on 'details' of the past, in order to cement present-day paranoia and identity formation. Pradip Kumar Datta uses the phrase historical *details* instead of *facts* in his discussion of the manipulations of history in communalism (Datta, 1999). Comparing the role of history for authors such as Partha Chatterjee, Gyan Pandey and Veena Das, he argues that even critiques of nation-state historiography reify the past, that facts always implies a positivist connotation, a true history to be uncovered. Nationalist historiographies even more normative, not only defining the 'correct' interpretation of historical events, but also ensuring national amnesia for inconvenient episodes (Amin, 2006). Datta suggests *details* instead, allowing for the multiplicity of meaning:

> Details then, are not simply facts, but verifiable specificities that embody an interplay between the possibilities for expansive signification and an internal resistance to that very prospect. This dialectic defines the process of debate rather than the proclamation of absolute truths, as the distinctive basis for the historical discipline. The scope for reworking the signification of details allows them to yield fresh insights and be mobilized by different narratives and perspectives (Datta, 1999, pp. 3-4).

It is this 'process of debate' that I want to examine, the ways in which past events and current scenarios are read in a matter that validates the concerns and prejudices of social actors.

Paul Ricoeur provides an intriguing analysis of how we interpret the past. Drawing on earlier work on metaphor, he conflates history and fiction, arguing that one usually acts like the other.

> We understand history as events that are tragic, and historical characters as heroic, for example, and it is in this way that history repays our debt to the dead. Conversely, it is because fictional accounts are related as if they were historical that we can learn moral lessons from them (Simms, 2003, p. 99).

Interweaving history and fiction, narratives require more than interpretation, they demand action. The process of remembering and configuring is an active process. In discussing narrativity I will draw particularly on Margaret Somers, and her call for narrative identity studies in the early 1990s (Somers, 1994). Facing a renewal in identity politics as well as the rising respectability of narrative as social theory, she argues for conceptualising identity not just as category, but in a temporal schema as well. Events are interpreted in relation to other events (much as

categories are identified in relation to other categories), but through time, and often with accompanying value-systems and ontological schema. "Narratives are constellations of relationships (connected parts) embedded in time and space, constituted by casual emplotment" (Somers, 1994, p. 616). Like Ricoeur, Somers stresses the importance of this process of emplotment, in giving a meaning and direction to social narratives, and turning isolated events into related episodes (no matter how weak the relation might actually be). Emplotment is heart of signification in social narratives, the moral that ties the story together.

And the narratives are acted out and reconstituted though new experiences. It is through narrative, social memory and oral history that majoritarians have centred their place in society and history, in reconfiguring past events to make sense of their present and presumed future. In doing so, they recreate old identities, preferring circularity to linear progression. Narratives not only make sense of the past (through present concerns), they provide guidance for action. The multiplicity of narratives, often cutting across cultural, economic and local identities adds to the reserve of possibilities (Somers, 1994, p. 614). In this confusion, the necessity for simple stories takes centre stage. Neil Jarman's work on parading and commemorative practices in Northern Ireland emphasises the importance of social memory, and the reframing of the past to shape identities in the present. Memories provide a medium for understanding the past, a set of interpretive tools that change as our present needs and interpretations change (Jarman, 1997, pp. 4-5). Like narrativity, remembrance here is an active process. Jarman's focus is on rituals as a means to reconnect a community and recollect the past, important social functions that re-inscribe social meanings for another year. Rituals and the attendant memories are emotive rather than analytic, and performative. In short they are embodied. The brief and selective nature of commemoration, with memorial aides such as banners are paratactic narratives: rough tableaux with no trajectory. Simple visuals can be used in this way, to give short sharp bursts of narrative and rekindle memory. This was the means by which stained-glass windows were used to educate or recall key episodes of Christian liturgy to an illiterate audience. This emphasis on brief bursts of socially-laden memory that serves to rekindle social identity is key to how I see the past being used in

majoritarian narratives. Both the Hindutva Movement and Northern Irish loyalists use key periods of history, often involving violence or paradigm-shifting events, to create a shorthand for communal history, interpreting the past in ways that make sense of their present plight.

The importance of paratactic narratives draws back to Feldman, who charts the nebulous connections, between events, agency and narrative. Narration *is* agency, and the narrative is a 'cultural tool-kit' his informants use to mediate and locate violence (Feldman, 1991, p. 14). Narrative and action are woven together through Ricoeur's ideas of mimesis, as the reconfiguring of experience. Narrative is embodied in action, and violence becomes the retelling of the narrative. To illustrate this, Feldman critiques competing theories of why violence began in the 1960s. Comparing the Catholic/nationalist grievance, and the socio-economic explanations, he sees them both as 'processual models', that begin "in grievance (material or ideational), moves to expression, and culminates in violence in the absence of redress" (Feldman, 1991, p. 19). In contrast he argues that regardless of the structure, violence creates its own narrative and transforms the underlying structures. Prior structure, and external context are rendered secondary to the shifting narrative expressed through violence. Northern Ireland had a long history of spatial demarcation, which was often expressed through violence, forming its own narrative. Thus when civil rights protestors attempted to adapt American civil rights marches in Northern Ireland, they contradicted a long history of parades and marches as ethnic territorial rituals. In the same fashion, micro-partition reconstituted old identities and patterns of violence laid out in the geography of the city. Belfast in 1969 split along sectarian lines, just as it had during turbulent periods in the past. Feldman links the emotional intimacy with past events with present 'spatial symbolics', and historical events are replayed at a local level.

> In urban Belfast, alongside local oral history, violence emerges as a mnemonic for historicizing space and spatializing history. Historical imperatives are transferred from space to performance genres and the social actor as mobile parts of the spatial whole. There is a convergence in the materialization of historical identity in spatial constructs and the resort to material transformations of the social order through topographic violence (Feldman, 1991, p. 27).

What I want to discuss here is the way in which violence and tensions around demographic aggression narratives, are driven by key episodes in the historiography of the majoritarian actors. Both field-sites have a massive partition and ethnic cleansing at the heart of their origins, a marker like territory that communalism draws on to retell the narrative through action, and reconfigure the past to suit present-day performances. Through Jarman's frame, violence can also be framed as a ritual that rekindles memories, re-creates social identification and renews social bonds. The attempts by majoritarian groups to kindle a 'groupness' in ethno-religious population categories is done through invoking and recreating these episodes in the past and drawing parallels between past traumas and present troubles.

In India this narrative of violence is rooted in the concept of *Kali Yuga*, the age of demons. According to this idea, India has long been plunged into a period of decline and horror, with barbaric outsiders dominating society and politics and a golden age tragically lost. More specifically a Golden Vedic age where Hinduism reigned supreme and all was in balance eventually gave way to degeneracy and decline, with invaders dominating Indian society and Hinduism falling into decline. The desecration of temples, conversion to other faiths and emasculation of Hindu men are all symptomatic of this decline. In contemporary times India continues to be dominated by foreign elements, with western secularism defining the nation and external influences like Islam and Christianity partitioning the country. In more extreme versions of the narrative, the partition of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh is part of the degeneracy but even within India the need for a Hindu resurgence is evident. The Hindutva Movement is determined to educate the wider Indian public about historic grievances and how the relate to contemporary evils such as love jihad.

In Northern Ireland, the timescale is much shorter, but the narrative remains the same. The demographic aggression narrative draws on a long history of Protestant-Catholic conflict and locates the British Commonwealth and the struggles of their ancestors as key markers of this campaign. Unfortunately, the government at Westminster became increasingly compromised, as secularism and liberalism rotted the Protestant monarchist core of the nation from the inside out.

Northern Ireland remained as one of the last great bastions of Protestant Britishness, though with a close eye on British decline in Africa, North America and Britain. The 50 years of Stormont Rule act as a sort of Golden Age, with a glorification of peaceful rule, strong government and industrial might. Alas, the evils that plague British identity eventually come to roost in Stormont and moderate MPs and ecumenism create an environment of tolerance which Catholics abuse and renew their violent ways. The Troubles are an outline of what happens when firm rule slackens and terrorists are indulged. The encroachment of secular values, EU bureaucracy, Irish infiltration and Catholic normalisation all contribute to a state of affairs where Britain is utterly compromised and loyalists must look out for themselves. As the peace progress grows and shared devolution becomes the norm, the history of Protestant decline abroad, in Canada, Britain and Ireland is held up as a stark reminder of the dangers that peaceful co-existence still hold for British identity.

Kali-yuga: Hindu Degeneracy

Historiography has long been one the key battlegrounds of Hindutva thought. As orientalism began to piece together traces of Indo-European culture, and locate Sanskrit as a linchpin in proto-Indo-European linguistics, western scholars began to describe an ancient Hindu civilisation that mirrored other 'Aryan civilisations'. Emerging archaeological details of Indus Valley civilisations seemed confirmed the existence of a centralised culture far superior to contemporary Indian society. What scholars found most intriguing was the evident degeneracy of Indian civilisation, from a civilisation comparable to Classical antiquity to its current abased form (Rocher, 1993). Degeneracy was blamed on a range of environmental factors and racial mixing with the indigenous population, with some allowance for better bloodlines among the higher castes (Pollack, 1993). The assumption of degeneracy largely sprang from reading Vedic myths and applying the puranic schema of historical cycles to Indian history (Thapar 2014; Sarkar, 2001, p. 173). The idea of a once enlightened civilisation deteriorating under superstition and ritual also chimed with Enlightenment narratives of past glory marred by medieval

ritualism. Lastly the potential of Hinduism to renew itself was promoted by colonial administrators, and adapted as a principle by Hindu reformists[52].

The theme of classic idealism often cropped up with my student informants in Delhi. Though they were content to regard Rama and Sita as mythic, they still represented an idealised version of gender roles and Hindu values. For example I conducted a couple of interviews with Sakesh, a former JNU student who went on be an activist in Delhi University (DU), a more traditionally Hindutva stronghold. Sakesh and I met for coffee in Connaught Place, with a couple of his friends in row. Compared to the relatively liberal attitude in JNU, he told me it was a den of vice and a breeding ground for all sorts of harm to naïve Hindu girls. Like Alok, he stressed the need for girls to learn how to protect themselves, in part by learning to abandon western, feminist and external influences. Repeatedly I heard that Vedic veneration of women was the perfect solution to present-day sexism and particularly the concern with rape. I pressed Sakesh on what this meant exactly, but he and his friends were unclear what Vedic veneration practically meant when it came to interactions with women. Women as goddesses was used as a shorthand way of Sangh-approved idealised gender roles.

Hindutva history is a product of these colonial-era histories, which were reductive in the extreme. Sources such as Mill divided Indian history into three distinct periods: Hindu/Vedic, Muslim, and lastly British. The key elements of Vedic historiography are as follows. India was seen as unified under a variety of local rulers who nonetheless shared a Brahman cultural milieu, centred round an Aryan identity and Sanskrit language. Society was divided along caste lines, with Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Shudra and Varnas (and Dalits). One important deviation from British ideas is the origin of the Aryan/Vedic people. British historians developing the Indo-European hypothesis argued that a proto-Indo-European people originated in one location before spreading across central Asia, Europe and North India. The original homeland was disputed, but the migratory (if not openly warlike) nature of the early Indo-Europeans was naturally accepted. While Muslim and British intrusion was easy to date, Brahman historians, motivated by nationalism, preferred to think of India as the original homeland from whence

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[52] As discussed in Chapter Three.

Indo-Europeans spread[53]. Firstly, this grants Hindus indigenous claims to the subcontinent, instead invaders like the Muslims and British. In a similar vein, efforts to protect Adivasi peoples, usually recognised as more indigenous than Indo-European speakers are opposed by Hindutva interpretations of history. Hinduism, Sanskrit languages, and the Aryan 'race' and society are all essentialised and rendered organic, as much a part of India as its flora and fauna. This interpretation of history flies on the face of most of what is known about Indo-European linguistics, and Sanskrit links with earlier Indian languages like Dravidian. It ignores a considerable amount of archaeological evidence that has come to light since the early British theories of Hindu civilisation, particularly the discovery of the Indus Valley civilisations. Efforts to inscribe a Vedic/Aryan identity onto these ruins have been unsuccessful, yet remain key to Hindutva understandings of its past.

Aside from the dubious origins of the Vedic Golden Age, much interpretation and re-evaluation goes into the history of Islamic activity on the subcontinent. In particular the encroachment of 'Islamic rule' is treated as an ancient manifestation of religious fanaticism and 'global jihad' on behalf of the new rulers. The spread of Islam in the North-West and North-East is offered as proof of conversion 'by the sword'. While sources at the time paid scant attention to the religion of the invaders (Talbot, 1995), modern Islamophobia narratives enable a simplified understanding of the past. Muslims of diverse backgrounds, languages and ethnicities are all presented as a singular threat, whose totalitarian motives are consistent across time. Much attention is paid to the blight of temple destruction and general religious iconoclasm that was said to have accompanied Turkish and Mughal armies. The Babri Masjid controversy of the past 30 years highlights a lot of the language around symbolic imposition, treating mosques as monuments to aggression, supremacy and Hindu defeat[54]. The religion of the new rulers was barely remarked upon in the reports of the time, they were usually referred to by

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[53] Scholars have largely settled on the Caucasus region as the most likely source. India is still a possibility, a chance on which advocates for 'Out-of-India' theories have been hanging their assertions for quite some time now.

[54] Interestingly, Gaelic submission to English rule is marked by similar claims. Kelleher describes the destruction of the Uí Neill coronation stone in Ulster and its incorporation into an Anglican church (Kelleher, 2003). The fate of the Stone of Scone has coloured Anglo-Scottish relations of centuries.

ethnic or foreign labels rather than religious. Brahman scheme comparing invading armies with demons were more reflective of Brahman concerns, they held similar views of anyone not of their liking.

Lastly, Hindu interpretations like to chronicle the role of brave Hindu rulers who opposed encroaching Islamic theocracies and succoured Hinduism in their refuges. Alone of the countries Islam invaded, India managed to hold them at bay, just as they did Alexander the Great in his time. This was a favoured theme of many of my informants. During my masters thesis research I was given a comprehensive history of Indian resistance over time, from Alexander, through Muslim encroachment, onto Christian missionaries. The importance of key heroes in the past is central to Hindutva conceptions Hindu manliness, and to the belief that a spirit of authentic Hindu resistance resides unawakened in the heart of every true Indian.

Contemporary Indian Degeneracy

> Muslims and Christians have a goal, namely, to bring the entire world under their fold. Hindus did not have any such goal. That is why they became weak. They forgot their own ideals and the country lost a large part of its territory. Today we need to recreate a sense of self-respect among Hindus (Organiser 2004)

India's independence was not welcomed by Hindutva forces, who like Deobandi Muslims were far more concerned with spiritual purity than national independence. Furthermore, for Hindutvavdis independence is eclipsed by the their perspective on the Partition: the mutilation of Bharat Mata and mass-rape of Hindu women. Post-independence India was defined by Nehruvian secularism and securing India's place in the world, while the backlash against Gandhi's assassination and ongoing socio-economic woes all delegated Hindu assertiveness to the background. From a Hindutva point of view independent India was identical to colonial and Mughal India only now the subjugation was voluntary.

The greatest mark of contemporary degeneracy is Nehruvian secularism. Secularism is central to the Indian nation-state's self-conception, and a powerful tool in socialising Indian citizens. The nature and origins of this sense of secularism are opposed by Hindutvavadis. Citing Nehru's cosmopolitan self-image, they see secularism as another foreign hegemony, and like colonialism and Abrahamic

religions its key purpose is to denigrate Hinduism. 'Secularism', like multiculturalism in Europe[55], becomes a catch-all term for any policy, or social value held to undermine the *Hindu Rashtra*, and impose Western, Islamic or minority values in its place. Like multiculturalism, 'pseudo-secularism' is blamed for the perceived dominance of identity politics, and minority interests in India's public sphere at the expense of a normative Hindu identity and abstracted Indian citizenship. Continuing the idea of a divide-and-conquer British policy to fragment Indian public opinion, the modern state continues to pander to minorities, entrenching discord and validating forces like Kashmiri separatists. The Shah Bano affair (recounted in Chapter Three), epitomised this, as Muslim Personal Laws were not just detrimental to the rights of women, but also attacked the national unity of India. One reason the AIMPLB adamantly resisted any intrusion on personal laws was the undisguised labelling of minority rights as anti-national and a threat to unity. In the Supreme Court ruling that asserted the primacy of national law over personal law, the judge also indicated the necessity for UCC as a social unifier. Congress' subsequent quashing of the ruling confirmed their treachery and short-sightedness in the eyes of the Hindutva Movement.

During my research period, the best example of Congress betrayal was the perennial issue of Bangladeshi infiltration, encouraged by Congress to prop up their vote-bank. In Assam, any evidence that Bengali Muslims have lived there for generations was brushed aside, and proof of citizenship underlined the depth of corruption. At the very least, I was told, the high rates of infiltration point to a complacent or ineffective government. But more likely it points to a party that holds its own electoral aims higher than the integrity of the party. In a similar vein ABVP members occasionally criticised what they saw as leftist and foreign-influenced elites. Critical Indian voices, especially those recognised internationally, are regularly denounced as self-loathing, aloof from everyday concerns, and rewarded for their portrayal. Arundhati Roy is a typical example, whose Booker Award confirms the impression that such figures crave western attention and are easily for sale. In JNU the ABVP were highly critical of the predominant leftist student groups, and their dominance of student politics. While ABVP JNU were

[55] See Lentin and Titley 2011 for a detailed examination of multiculturalism discourses.

more progressive than the Hindutva average, they still saw as a corrosive influence on Indian society[56].

The active promotion of division and minority privilege is mirrored in the marginalisation of normative Hinduism from Indian public life. Normative here means a Brahman ideal that assumes the respect of anyone who falls under the umbrella term 'Hinduism'. To the Hindutva Movement Hinduism is the only culture not openly promoted in society and by that state, and is often directly attacked to the benefit of others. Just as Hinduism has suffered historically, today it continues to be maligned by many who seek external validation or follow western values at the expense of a moral and social frame that is organic to India, and naturally a better fit.

> The approach cultivated in the Sangh towards strengthening the unifying and harmonising impulses of society is entirely positive in its content. Its guiding note is self-reformation and not laying the blame on others for our downfall and degeneration. There is no room in it for any negative feelings such as anti-Muslim or anti-Christian, or even anti-British for that matter...'Emphasise the unifying factors and just ignore the differences' — this is another positive feature of the approach of the Sangh (Seshadri 2001: 9).

'Emphasise the unifying factors and just ignore the differences' is an invitation to celebrate the unity of religious feeling rather than focus on the divides. It translates as 'monotheism is divisive', as Hinduism is the only faith system capable of accommodating Allah, Jesus, and the Hindu Pantheon. Emphasising the unifying factors means a search for the lowest common denominator, and the stigmatisation of any divider. Ironically such an accommodating idea can only accommodate polytheism, by definition Christianity and Islam are monotheistic, divisive, anti-secular and unwelcome. Hinduism manages in this formulation to be the only religion suited to secularism. Monotheistic faiths can only be accommodated in emasculated forms. This formulation enables Hindutva spiritualism to be the entirely positive and non-discriminatory. The only thing not tolerated is of course intolerance itself. The problem lies in an overly broad definition of intolerance, whereby any devout monotheist is a potential negative force.

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[56] In February 2016 ABVP JNU renewed allegations of sedition on the campus, prompting the arrest of the student Union president and highlighting what they perceived as institutionalised anti-nationalism among the student organisations and staff.

A good example of this is the shifting fortunes of famed artist MF Husain. Beginning in 1996, Maqbool Fida Husain was attacked by the Hindutva Movement for his depictions of Indian goddesses, often naked or semi-naked. Because of his Muslim identity he was subjected to legal action, death threats, his exhibitions attacked and eventually seeking exile abroad. Husain drew on a long history of naked Hindu imagery, locating this imagery within a 1960s sexually liberated view of Indian history. Furthermore, as a Muslim inspired by Hindu iconography, he exemplified the secular Indian comfortable with pluralism. However to the Hindutva Movement, his religious background is used to explain what they describe as rape:

> The entire campaign has revolved around the designation of M.F. Husain as a 'Muslim' artist, producing a terrifying equation between the painter's religion, his so-called immoral passion for nude figures, and his urge to disrespect Hindu sentiments (Guha-Thakurta, 2006).

His depiction of goddesses in a supposedly degrading manner makes him a typically idolatrous Muslim, placing him in a long history of rapacious iconoclastic Muslim tyrants[57]. To the Hindutva Movement, the supposed contradiction between Hindu-baiting bigot and modern secular citizen is not contradictory at all. It is exactly how they regard mainstream secularism: obsequious to the West, appeasing to Islam, and as supportive of minorities as they are contemptuous of Hindu tradition. M.F. Husain's fall from grace represents a number of Hindutva trends, the increased extremism, Muslims as primarily antagonistic and above all the fear of female humiliation. The question of gender and masculine anxieties were ever-present in discussions of India's problems, the solutions and requirements of the country.

As detailed earlier, rape was a huge concern during my time in Delhi, and the international attention drew unwelcome on the country of eve-teasing[58]. In JNU and DU, the ABVP activists stressed the importance of female safety and the need for greater protection and punishment. Many of our conversations dwelt on the idea of Muslims as sexually predatory, either in starkly coercive terms or in more

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[57] Ironically Husain was lauded by Hindutvavadis in the 1980s because of his embrace of Hindu iconography. In a glowing report in 1984, he is praised as a Hindu-Muslim model for a future assimilated Indian population. Hindutva publications at the time were not shy of posting naked Hindu imagery themselves.

[58] The BBC documentary on the 2012 gang-rape incident was dismissed as soft-power sabotage, by a country threatened by rising Indian dominance.

insidious seductions that nonetheless carried connotations of violation and manipulation. But they were quite prepared to discuss Hindu men as potential rapists too. The underlying cause for Hindu rapists was a lack of Hindu values western sexualisation and. Today's generations had drifted from the mooring of Hindu virtue, becoming isolated from a spiritual base. The solution promoted by the Hindutva Movement is to re-engage such men with their Hindu heritage, to educate them in traditional ways of respecting women and practising proper masculine virtue. Then comparison with Muslim action is telling: Hindu men rape because they are disunited and passive while Muslims men rape because they are active and united.

Ireland's 'Ethnic Cleansings'

Orange Historiography

In the long and turbulent history of Anglo-Irish politics, and settlement on the island, key dates emerge in both nationalist and unionist historical frames. Irish nationalism built on a long antagonistic history to create a dense network of meanings and trajectories in plantation policies, reformation politics and the slow shift towards parliamentary democracy in the UK. Similarly, unionism interpreted key historical events to root their social understanding of Ireland and their place therein. In the context of sectarian violence, both sides select and prioritise a sympathetic facet of events usually mired in local and contemporary context. Here I will explore the unionist version of Anglo-Irish aggression, which focuses particularly on the perceived genocidal consequences of assertive Catholicism.

The idea of expulsion and extermination is an old one, though how old depends on interpretation[59]. For most Loyalists, the genocidal tendencies of Catholicism first date back to the 1641 Rebellion in which thousands of Ulster Protestants were

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[59] Some of the more esoteric accounts of ancient Irish history hold that the original inhabitants of Ireland were the direct ancestors of today's Ulster-Scots **Invalid source specified.**. Their sovereignty was threatened in prehistoric times by Celtic invaders and by the period of recorded history, the Ulaid were pushed back into the far corners of North-East Ulster, from where they would travel to Scotland and settle there. The Ulster Plantation was the return of the Ulaid to their ancestral homeland **Invalid source specified. Invalid source specified.**.

killed and many more driven off their land in the winter to shelter in walled towns or perish.

> Protestants were murdered in the tens of thousands, driven into the great forests which covered the North of Ireland in 1641, and they were hunted and murdered, thrown into rivers and lakes, and butchered in the most foul manner.
>
> Yet, the Plantation survived and the survivors and later arrivals built new towns and villages and created a prosperous land in what had been a wilderness (Orange Standard, 2002b).

Estimates of the dead from the period vary, but generally stand at around 4,000 murdered and a further 8,000 dying of exposure, coming to roughly 12,000 (Lecky, 1982, p. 79). The motives of the Catholic aggressors are bound up with the complicated politics of the time (Canny, 1995). A deliberate genocidal intent is usually ruled out however; for the most part it seems to have been an attempt by the dispossessed Northern Irish to reclaim their land in the context of a wider Catholic rebellion against Protestant political forces. Some Unionist sources acknowledge the injustice done to native Irish (while condemning the brutal events of 1641), others ignore this aspect (McIntosh, 1999, p. 22). For the most part they agree that it was pre-meditated and genocidal, none of which is supported by present-day historians. It fits a model of ordinary hardworking Protestants being massacred by bloodthirsty Catholic savages claiming their territory and led by priests.

A lesser cousin of 1641 is the 1798 Rebellion which saw cases of mass-murder carried out against innocent Protestants in County Wexford by forces under the command of parish priests. The political context for these massacres is even more muddled than 1641 (many Loyalists were proud to have United Irishman ancestors) and is not as local as the Ulster massacres of 1641. Nevertheless, atrocities such as the massacre at Scullabogue enter the narrative as another example of what happens when Catholic passions are let loose.

> No sooner ... was the rebellion on the apparent high-road to success, than the mask was thrown off, a holy war was proclaimed, priests assumed command of the rebel army, and the extermination of the Protestants became the avowed aim of the victorious insurgents (Hamilton, *in* McIntosh 1999: 24).

For the most part the next major event is the 1920s expulsion of Protestants from the South. The population of Protestants in declined dramatically in the early years, confirming Catholicism's sinister designs on the island and of the fate of Protestants anywhere the Catholics became a majority. It certainly justified their opposition to Home Rule.

The Free State's Protestant population fell about a third between 1911 and 1926. One quarter of this drop is ascribed to military withdrawal after 1921, between officers and their families. Some left from civil service positions and the police, though these figures are small compared to the military element. Efforts were made to maintain stability in these offices by retaining as much of the old staff as possible (Bowen, 1983, pp. 20-22). The reasons for the rest of the drop are manifold. Many were killed in the violence and intimidation that accompanied independence in the south, though accurate figures and the question of motive obstructs and real discussion of this occurrence. Many left due to intimidation, a fear of such, or general allegiance to Britain and being disinclined to live under a Dublin-based government. In many cases it was all of the above. The question is complicated by differing motives, for instance over deaths. Protestants were killed for a variety of reasons: their religion, their wealth, their Unionist sympathies, and their alleged conspiracy with enemies of republicanism. Again, often a mix of many of these factors is involved and singling out a chief cause is impossible and counter-productive. The wealth of interpretation afforded to intimidation of Protestants in this period has enabled differing parties to fashion the events to suit their agenda. For instance, republicans and defenders of intimidation claim that the attacks and threats were not sectarian, that any who suffered (regardless of religion and many Catholics were threatened and killed) were either actively or passively anti-republican and a legitimate threat to some degree. On the other hand, Loyalists downplay any political or class-based motive for attacks and ascribe an underlying plan of expulsion and overt sectarianism to every action undertaken. Occasionally the presence of non-Protestant victims of republican violence are mentioned, usually killed for their supposed sympathy and support for British rule. Political killings such as these are highlighted by Northern Unionists, but rarely conflated with the deaths of Protestants. In other words,

Protestants were always attacked for religious reasons, Catholics for political reasons. This pattern of interpreting violence and threats in the most suitable way is later seen in similar violence during the Troubles in rural and border regions.

To Loyalists the pattern was obvious: of inevitable discrimination in a Catholic majority region. Various figures for the 'ethnic-cleansing' are given, of 50,000 either from 1920-26 or from 1920-22; another article lists it at two third of the Protestant population (which, going by the 1911 census gives a figure of 209,300); rural Protestants were down by 40% by 1924; 24,000 in the twenties; 230,000 (down from 350,000); and a loss of 220,000 between 1916 and 1926 (from a figure of 330,000). All of the above are from the Orange Standard, most mentions coming from this century. This extraordinary variance of figures undoubtedly comes from the multitude of sources on an already fractious issue. However the inconsistency of figures is typical of discussions of ethnic cleansing and demographic paranoia in general. Concerns over the death figures in 1641 reflect a similar problem, which is dismissed by Loyalists as irrelevant to the overall horror suffered at the time.

> No definite figure has been agreed as to how many Protestants died in that awful winter in 1641. The most recent figure quoted by a historian on BBC Radio Ulster was 4,000. That is a formidable total, given the small population of Ulster at the time.
>
> But the actual total is not important. Whether it was 4,000 or 40,000, these poor people should not have suffered such a terrible fate (Orange Standard, 2008).

While the figures for the Protestant exodus from the south vary, the narrative is fairly consistent. Betrayed by the British and by the assurances of the new Irish government, large numbers were forced to flee, often with no preparation or forewarning. Anecdotes, or possibly just the one anecdote repeated over and over, talk of the packed ferries, filled with fleeing families. Destitute Protestant families became a familiar sight on the streets of Belfast, London and Liverpool. Orange lodges were set up in Belfast of the newly exiled. The three 'lost counties': Donegal, Monaghan and Cavan saw large shifts in population across the border.

After the initial unrest, the Protestants who remained in the Free State or returned grew accustomed to the new status quo. They were well-represented in the Dáil and Senate, and economically maintained their status as comfortably middle and

upper-class for the most part (Bowen, 1983, p. 35). By the time the Troubles broke out, differences between Catholic and Protestant were largely superficial, and the sectarian conflict in the North made both communities realise both how much they had in common with each other and how little they had in common with their co-religionists north of the border. Loyalists were generally disgusted when Protestants in the south occasionally praised the Irish government, often doing so in reaction to Unionist criticism (e.g. Kennedy 1988: 155). As it became clearer that southern Protestants were often sympathetic to nationalism, more ecumenically inclined (most were Anglican), and also relatively secular, their input and influence in various cross-border religious bodies came under criticism, and they were relegated to the same status as moderate Unionists, and the British: fallen cousins of a sort.

'A Cold House for Protestants'

The betrayal of unionism by southern Protestants, fits the wider abandonment of the British Project, nominally the empire its moral and civilizational mission to improve the world. Discussion of colonialism in the Orange Standard focussed on missionary activities around the world, and the beneficence of spreading the gospel to grateful natives. It also focussed on sympathy for white supremacists in Tanzania and South Africa. More than declining colonial influence, unionism discussed declining Britishness in former sister-states such as Canada and Australia, and railed against what they saw as the struggle to maintain British identity in the face of attacks from migrants (usually Catholic, often Irish). The monarchy referendum in Australia in 2000 exemplified the dangers, though the OS credited the failure of the referendum in part to South East Asian migration, populations who appreciated the values the British monarchy stood for even if they weren't Protestant themselves. By and large the narrative is one of decline, exacerbated by membership of the European Union and continued Irish migration. That migrants, usually Catholic at that, had automatic access whereas commonwealth partners were treated like foreigners rankled with the sense of pan-protestantism the OO aspired to.

> While people from the former Dominions – Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc., who still cherish the British connection, have to queue like foreigners, at

> entry points into the UK, citizens of the Irish Republic step off the Dublin boat and walk into Britain as if they were subjects of the Queen.

> Paddy, always astute when it comes to taking advantage of English naievity, has not been slow to help himself to some British cash, and a couple of recent examples underline this fact....

> An even more recent revelation, in the "Sunday Express" of April 12, reveals that thousands of Eire students are poised to flood into Britain to study for degrees, at the expense of the British taxpayer, of course.

> Officials from British colleges have flown to Eire to recruit students for places they cannot fill because of the falling British birthrate....

> With a vast army of unemployed, and a birthrate the highest in Europe, it is hardly surprising that the Republic is happy to take advantage of this latest act of generosity from the Saxon.

Immigration from Ireland and a rising middle-class Catholic population were frequently alluded to as threats to the integrity of British state institutions, labour organisations and social cohesion. While lawlessness and labour unrest were attributed to unruly immigrants, the Catholic middle-class was more insidious, occupying important positions in British media, administrative and political circles. Meanwhile the declining British qualities were marked in social change, particularly encroaching secularism, and an increasingly permissive society. Homosexuality and drug-taking were symptomatic of the loss of values that once made Britain great. On the other hand, the Orange Standard stressed the positive contribution of immigration and multiculturalism to British society (in marked contrast to a mono-cultural Irish republic[60].

Most vitriol was reserved for British indifference to Northern Ireland, and the plight of unionism. Since the return of Direct Rule in 1972 loyalism felt betrayed by an interfering Westminster that were far too susceptible to Catholic slyness.

> It is a way of life to commit wrong and then plead innocence, to the average Englishman this is just the irrepressible Irish, and treat them as a figure of fun, more to be laughed at than pitied

Dismantling the B-Specials, co-operating with the Irish Republic, and subverting majoritarian democracy were seen as direct attacks on the hard-won sovereignty of Ulster Unionists, and illustrated at best a profound naivety regarding the gravity of the dangers in Northern Ireland, and at worst a deliberate attempt to sell out

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[60] More extreme publications like the Loyalist News took a far more racist view, equating Irish and other ethnic minority immigration as collectively destroying Britain.

unionism. The hardening of attitudes as peace set in and parading became more contentious further confirm the betrayal of mainstream Britishness of old-fashioned loyalism.

In Ballynafeigh, the changes to Lower Ormeau Road and the resulting parading tensions illustrated the dense of decline for many unionists. Working class Protestant neighbourhoods had hollowed out by the 1960s, and the lower Ormeau Rd area became more Catholic over time. Across the road in the Holylands, the university exerted its influence and mixed neighbourhoods developed, slowly shifting to (mostly Catholic) student housing. In everyday discussions with residents of Ballynafeigh, they thought of this area as a neighbouring district, but Orange order members regarded it as a lost part of their neighbourhood. This created a subtly different perspective on the past of Ballynafeigh. While community groups and locals saw a shared history of mutual respect and efforts to maintain peace through troubled times, the unionist perspective saw decline as well as sharing the positive depiction of respect and affiliation. Through a different spatial imagination, Ballynafeigh itself was reconfigured, and an alternative narrative of loss and antagonism was added to the locale's history.

The most prominent result of the shift on Lower Ormeau was resulting tensions over the annual parade route, which traditionally ran through Ormeau Road straight to the city centre. By and large sectarian conflict was absent in the area, but in the 1990s an attack on a bookie's in Lower Ormeau inflamed tensions. Later that year, the Orange parade provoked unprecedented hostility and the authorities eventually agreed to divert the parade through less provocative areas. To loyalists this was a direct challenge to their tradition, to their assumed access to Lower Ormeau, and — coinciding with a prolonged peace process that built momentum over the 1990s — final proof of British betrayal. The parade was fully banned from Lower Ormeau in 1995, and has taken an alternate route ever since. The diversion, has lessened over the years, with the parade crossing the bridge and marching through the less contentious Holylands area instead of along the main road. During the summer the area has a less dense student population, and the new route includes the loyalist Donegall Pass area. Nevertheless, the altered route is an

annual reminder of loyalism's loss, and the decline in displays of British identity in South Belfast.

Conclusion

Demographic narratives confirm the majoritarian impression of the world, offering an ontological framework with which to interpret events. Demographic aggression confirms the moral dichotomy of Self and Other, seeing social weakness and the status of majority populations threatened in often innocuous ways. The majoritarian remains simultaneously superior to their opponents but threatened by their agency and organisation. Earlier I used Hofstadter's famous essay *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*. Conspiracy theory scholars have shied away from the work paranoid when possible, and indeed Hofstadter qualifies it as a style, not a pathology (Butter, 2014). To talk of delusion, and even 'mind-sets' allows us to dismiss and pathologies what are often highly coherent responses to world events (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2003, p. 296). Similarly attributing populist narratives to 'fear' or ignorance patronises the people in question (Pasieka 2017).

Conspiracy theories have evolved from governmental fears of insurgency and outside agents, to bottom-up fears of governmental control and social influence. An enduring fear is the loss of agency, described by Tim Melley as 'agency panic' (Melley, 2002). This is the fear that unseen corporate or social systems have gained the ability to control individuals. These fear parallels in welfare systems, mass media, advertising anxiety, and ever more efficient techniques of statecraft. Conspiracy theories offer a 'master narrative' that contains the phenomenon without confronting or fully revealing it (ibid. 59). These conspiracies were invulnerable, and undetectable. They involved a network of actors and organisations, with many moving parts and strands across time. Their goal is invariably to attack individual agency.

Melley describes conspiracy theories as the uncomfortable engagement of individualism with social structures, arguing that they are basically crude social theories. Jean and John Comaroff describe how enlightenment reasoning (with its focus on transparency, casting light and the "liberating power of knowledge" creates the obverse: concealment, shadows and distortion that local actors grapple

with in everyday uncertainties (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2003, p. 293). Their focus is mostly on the precariat, while Melley focuses on literary characters in twentieth century American fiction. It is worth reflecting on how these narratives of control and autonomy work in social formations, in position s of power. The 'rugged autonomy' model is prominent in Hindutva and loyalist masculine imaginings, balanced with the need for solidarity in the face of homogeneous threats.

Narratives of degeneracy provide an ontological blueprint for what the Other is, and what is lacking in the struggle against it. For majoritarian narratives to work they need a strong underpinning, a key event that the wider population can draw on and use to build solidarity around. In my research it is clear that the partition provides a focus point, a moment of heroism, villainy, familiar tropes (abducted women, isolated farms attacked)   that underscores the present-day malaiase[61].

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[61] In the Epilogue I contrast this situation with Islamophobia in Europe. While potent in its own right, it lacks a founding narrative that the average European can engage with.

Chapter Six – Liberalism and the State

In Chapter Three we say how colonial practices of governance through population and numbers carried though after independence, leading to communal discord. Just as with colonialism, the main issue here is how state practice impacts on social understandings of population. This chapter will largely be a discussion of how state governmentality intersects with communal narratives of privilege and democracy. Consociationalism in Northern Ireland refers to the respect and equality shown to population groups, and their recognition in official circles. Secularism, on the other hand, comes with various interpretations and semantic baggage, but in India largely means the same thing: recognition of separate communities and their enshrinement in society. Both policies straddle the line between pragmatic governance and aspirational politics. I want to examine how both intersect with nationalism, ethnicity, and most importantly: liberalism.

In both fieldsites the emergence of a separate state (semi-separate for Northern Ireland) straddled the aspiration of modern inclusivity and catering for dominant ethnic group. In both cases the language of liberalism and modernity framed how the state and its majority saw themselves, as well as marginal groups. The visibility and growth of these communities should be accommodated by a pluralist society but instead their visibility was met with oppression and scaremongering. How can marginal populations be demonised in secular societies? The obvious answer is to reframe India and Northern Ireland as ethnic states, latently supremacist and majoritarian. To an extent this is true: all countries follow cultural hegemonies and can revert to ethnic posturing if necessary. But for my final chapter I want to see what role the self-perception of progressive modernity played here and how unpicking its power dynamics is crucial to understanding majoritarianism not just in my fieldsites but across the west.

In both areas ethnic/religious identities blend with liberal modernism in interesting ways. Quite a lot of the Hindutva historiography seeks to imagine a glorious united past when 'Hindu society' was hegemonic. They rely heavily on ethnic markers such as language, homogeneous religion and shared heritage.

Nonetheless their efforts are clash with India's heterogeneity: its diverse religious, linguistic and historical base. This ethnic historiography blends with secular modernity, attempting to (re)claim the future as well as the past. To reframe Brubaker's title, Hindutva represents 'groupness without ethnicity'. Hindutva rejects depictions of Hinduism as irrational and backwards, promoting instead a scientific faith that captures the mysteries of cosmic unity in ways that western physics are only beginning to understand. Hindutva claims Hindu legends prove nuclear weaponry and flight were evident in India thousands of years ago. NASA is co-opted to confirm the former presence of an ancient land-bridge between Sri Lanka and India, built by Rama's monkey army in the *Ramayana*.

Most importantly, Hindutva frames itself a modern progressive force in direct opposition to Islam. Labels they have fought off — 'fanatic,' 'misogynist,' 'backwards'—are used to marginalise Muslims and cast them as agents of tyranny. The wider 'war on terror' reframed Islamophobia away from Pakistan and onto tropes of 'global jihad'. Curiously this narrative inverts orientalism, casting Hindus as rational and Muslims as superstitious barbarians:

> Orientalism understands Indian Muslims within a framework of "foreignness" that ultimately derives from the long history of western (Christian)-Arab (Muslim) rivalry. The Muslim is the quintessential other in Orientalist discourse, and this relates perfectly to precolonial Hindu discourses on Muslim "otherness" (*yavanna, mleccha*) and also, ultimately, to Muslim discourses on their own distinctiveness. (van der Veer, 1993, p. 33)

By way of contrast the loyalist movement and the Orange Order have a much better claim to ethnic identification: there is a strong sense of shared history, broad religious unity and shared cultural practices[62]. Nonetheless loyalism has preferred to promote civic identities, touting a tradition of democracy, freedom and pluralism. 'Ethnicity' is attributed to Irish nationalism, whose Gaelic aspirations and rural fundamentalism was derided as regressive. Loyalism fetishized industry, one of the main markers of difference between Britain (including Northern Ireland) and Ireland. It valued the pluralism of pan-Protestantism, contrasting it with the autocracy of Catholicism and the dogma of nationalism.

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[62] This skates over historic divisions, as discussed in Chapter Two. Relative to Hindutva, it is stable however.

In each case the language of culture is couched by positive forms of cultural expressions and dangerous ones. The split brings to mind Lentin and Titley's distinction between 'good and bad diversity':

> Diversity, as a form of governmentality involved in specifying and acting upon forms of 'good' and 'bad' diversity in (post-) multi cultural societies, is prevalent in the European Union, where diversity is publicly and officially celebrated yet where not everybody qualifies to be recognized as the right kind of diverse subject. In the European shift to the privatization of race, the shifting border between good diversity, requiring celebration and cultivation, and bad diversity, diverse matter recognized as out of place, is central to understanding a particularly influential inflection of anti-racialism. (Lentin & Titley, 2011)

The designation and management of diversity is what I discuss here, and how communalism adopts modernist narratives to demonise minorities.

Secularism, (Theory) and Practice

Definitions of secularism vary enormously[63]. There are three major factors in western models of secularism: the separation of church and state, the decline of religion in the public sphere and the general decline in religious belief at an individual level (Taylor 2007). Within these parameters there exists enormous variation of thought and potential for a fresh perspective. However, it has become increasingly clear that secularism - however one wishes to define it or trace it back through history – exists primarily as a social practice, rather than an idealised political model or social theory. Like modernity, it serves more as common sense social understanding than, a floating signifier associated with modernity and progress but applicable to almost any situation (Cannell 2010). The call for ethnographies of secularism draws on this realisation, seeking to understand how it is applied in everyday situations and political systems around the world.

Questions around secularism have a long history in India, where Indian ideas of secularism seemingly clashed with 'normative' western models. Noting that secularism was adopted rather than avoided by *Hindutva* ideologues, Partha Chatterjee traces its form back to imperialist intervention in religious practices

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[63] Fenella Cannell provides a useful summary of anthropology's engagement with secularism, at the level of theory, government practice, and ethnography (Cannell 2010).

and reformist efforts which redoubled under the new government (Chatterjee 1994). Nandy makes a similar point that secularism in India differs from a normative western model (Nandy 1995). Caught between idealised models of social progress and the perceived religiosity of the Indian masses, secularism there assumed a hybrid role, finding a balance with the promotion of the right religion and the right politics. Nandy is guided for the most part by Mohandas Gandhi in advocating a syncretic religious practice that most Indians can relate to. At the same time he notes the propensity for Hindu 'zealots' to assume their religion is the most tolerant, and therefore the most secular. Nandy fails to note the divisions within what he calls folk religion (Dalit opposition is ignored), and the similarity between the supposedly 'tolerant' religion of the masses and the vision of Hindu universalism touted by Hindu fundamentalists. Nevertheless, he highlights the growing dangers that secularism's oversights and arrogance generate.

Despite contrasting Indian secularism unfavourably with 'normative' secularism in the West, Nandy acknowledges that western secularism is falling prey to its own oversights and assumptions, facing challenges from ethnicities and religions that stubbornly refuse to be subsumed into a modernist hegemony. A basic tenet of secularism—that modernity would refute and marginalise religion as time went on—has now become unavoidably redundant (Habermas 2008). The increasing realisation that European secularism is not a global inevitability, the shifting role of religion as a public voice, and the question of immigration and multiculturalism have forced secularism in Europe to question its primacy. Habermas traces the history of secularism as a pragmatic *modus vivendi* of the early modern European states which ran into trouble with the encroachment of democracy and the ever-widening Public Sphere.

Much of the rethinking of secularism, however, has focused on the falsity of its impeccable progressive credentials and argues that these new threats are a consequence of many of the hidden lapses in the ideology of secularism as a force for modernity and tolerance. Authors such as Charles Taylor and Jose Casanova point out that, rooted in a Christian and European past, secularism was often unsuited to global historical trajectories as a whole (Cannell 2010). Problems arose in particular when the progressive and modernist trappings of empire and

colonialism were tied to secularism, as arguably happened in the Middle East. The 'Arab Spring' of 2011 has renewed focus on the authoritarian model of secularism often seen in the Near East, with Turkey and Iran serving as templates for what happens when religious populism overtakes secular authoritarianism (Buruma and Margalit 2005).

Part of this process was the increased scrutiny of secularism's background and practices. Prominent here is Talal Asad's examination of the history of secularism, locating it firmly within a western Christian process of negotiating power within the public sphere (Asad 2003). The idea of religious and secular is a false binary; rather religion and the sacred become another means for the state to control its subjects. In this approach, Asad is indebted to Foucault, particularly for the focus on subjectivities of power and the means by which desire and practice are inscribed into everyday lives. Asad's call for an ethnography of secularism was taken up by Saba Mahmood[64]. Her work, most notably her 2005 book *Politics of Piety*, has become central to the canon of ethnographies of secularism (Mahmood 2005). Approaching old questions from a new perspective Mahmood centres on an old canard of progression: the oppressed Muslim woman. Critiquing both the Egyptian state's efforts to promote a 'folk custom' from of Islam and (her own) liberal feminist arguments, Mahmood locates the agency of her subjects in their piety and conformity to conservative Islamic teachings.

These challenges to normative secularism have generated considerable resistance[65]. Aditya Nigam discusses how the critiques of secularism by Nandy and Chatterjee described above resulted in a spirited defence by various Indian scholars (Nigam 2006, 155). Aamir Mufti's *Why I Am Not a Postsecularist*, rejects the assumption that secularisation theory predicted the inevitable demise of religion, and focuses his concern on the reification of non-western religious practices (especially Islam), (Mufti 2013). In a similar vein, Stathis Gourgouris worries that secularism needs deconstruction just as any sacralised system does:

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[64] Other notable studies are Fassin's work on French laïcité (2010) and Verkaaik and Spronk on shifting applications secularism across Europe (2011).
[65] The Social Science Research Council (SSRC) have hosted a continuing and lively debate on secularism and political trends at www.blogs.ssrc.org/tif.

> If indeed secularization takes at some point a normative track (whereby the
> law of God becomes automatically reconfigured to Law as such — Law as God,
> one might say) and therefore secularism emerges as a new metaphysics, the
> response is surely not to subscribe to an allegedly liberational space of "native-
> religious" sentiment suppressed by colonial or imperial power but, rather, to
> unpeel the layers of normativity from secularist assumptions and
> reconceptualize the domain of the secular. (Gourgouris 2008, 440)

Both examinations separate secularism as a political practice from secularisation,
an idealised form of critique. Gourgouris follows Asad's thinking quite closely: that
modernity entails the sacralisation of values, thus creating a new moral cosmology.
For Gourgouris this is a hypothetical danger, but for Asad it is central to the history
of secularism. Ethnographies of secularism 'unpeel the layers,' exposing the
statecraft of modernity, and the suppression of heterogeneity. Reconceptualising
secularism means acknowledging its inherent power structures, not rejecting
modernity wholesale[66].

Critics of the anthropology of secularism routinely castigate its proponents as
legitimising religious fundamentalism, and ethnographers like Mahmood are
accused of complacency or outright support for extremism:

> The fact that Mahmood seeks to derive an "ethics of virtue" from the practice
> of *da'wa* suggests that her enthusiasm for the Salafi movement goes beyond
> the professional empathy of the ethnographer—questionable as the latter may
> be for investigating the Far Right. (Cooper 2013)

The word 'practice' becomes key here. Cooper suggests that practice stands in for
essentialism, allowing Asad *et al.* to confer a normative and legitimising status on
the phenomenon they study without falling into the trap of essentialism (Cooper
2013, 28). This tension between idealised secularism and practices of coercion is
repeated in the following section on the public sphere and tolerance. Nigam
emphasises the 'cognitive arrogance' central to universal assumptions of secular
modernity, "lodged in the multiple dislocations brought about by modern
development" (Nigam 2006, 171). The same arrogance resurfaces in Northern
Ireland. Individualist liberalism fails to fully account for social division, firstly as a

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[66] Wendy Brown makes a similar point about 'tolerance' in her book *Regulating Aversion* (Brown
2006). Her book is not intended as a rejection of tolerance, but locates it within wider social
structures and barriers.

'native category'[67] contributing to marginalisation and communalism, and in building social consensus afterwards.

The Public Sphere

Along with a critique of secularism as a modernist project, the public sphere is a concept increasingly scrutinised. Strict discussions of secularism that stress the separation of church and state ignore the potential this space offers not just to religion, but to power relations that frame what counts as religion and whether it is acceptable. In 1989, Jürgen Habermas's: *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* was translated into English, and came to occupy a prominent spot in discussions of civic society. His thesis was straightforward and historically detailed: in the rise of capitalist Europe, a class emerged separated from the peasants and aristocracy. They were based in expanding urban areas and focused on trade and regulation. Marked by education and rational debate, they came to constitute a distinct body in society (Habermas 1989). Located in English coffee-houses, French salons, and German table-societies, this new bourgeoisie challenged the state and inherited status, arguing instead for critical reason and stable government. Over time they became part of the established structures of power, with the gradual enfranchisement of the population and the increasing prominence given to 'public opinion', newspapers and the voice of the people.

The public sphere was in principle accessible, and guided primarily by rational debate. In practice it was a collection of wealthy, educated gentlemen with increasingly significant access to spheres of state power. The uneducated, poor and women were excluded as a matter of course. The discrepancy between a rhetoric of inclusivity and the reality of privilege and exclusion was evident from early on, criticised for example by Marx (Habermas 1989, 125). One salient point that emerges early on is the discrepancy between the idea of the bourgeoisie, men of power and wealth, and the self-description of themselves as rational, autonomous and disinterested beings. Marx rightly saw the massive self-interest and promotion which the new public sphere obscured. That this development is exclusivist and highly privileged isn't disputed by Habermas, though he emphasises the potential for inclusivity. Feminists such as Nancy Fraser have highlighted the inherent

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[67] Here I borrow from Ferguson's discussion of modernity as a social myth (Ferguson 2005, 177).

sexism that underlay liberal enlightenment ideologies of rationality and public roles, and the institutional exclusion of women from the start (Fraser 1987).

Talal Asad takes another approach arguing that secularism as a discourse provides a means of excluding the 'wrong' religions. Hegemonic interests decide who can access the public sphere, and which efforts to impact on the public sphere are interpreted as congruent with mainstream interests and which are deviant. For instance, he discusses Islamic schools in secular Arab countries, which often relegate Islam to a position of folk tradition[68]. Islam can exist within the private sphere in truncated form, but efforts to set up schools or public commentary are an intrusion on the secular public sphere (Asad 2003, 199). The ease with which public sphere can intrude on private sphere gives it an all-encompassing power, for instance in education and religion. Through this lens, and with a firm emphasis on secularism as practice first and foremost, Asad argues that secularism is another means by which a dominant power structure maintains itself, with secularism ensuring that regressive religion does not taint the public sphere.

The central component here is legitimisation and delegitimisation. Secularism enables the exclusion and peripheralisation of social elements based on their acceptability in the public sphere, and how well they integrate. What integration looks like depends entirely on the hegemony, as the fate of 'assimilated Jews' in Europe shows (Lentin and Titley 2011). Wendy Brown dissects the process of legitimacy in contemporary western thought and practice (Brown 2006). Discussing how 'tolerance' overtook ideals of justice and equality, Brown outlines the elisions of power and structure that tolerance masks, presented as a universal virtue associated with individualism and liberalism, instead of socially and historically situated within a web of Foucauldian power-structures. In particular, she highlights its para-legal, para-statist status, operating outside of explicit power structures in the murkier world of social normativity (Brown 2006, 12). Tolerance always functions as a marker of inferiority, peripherality and externalising force on its object, while naturalising the tolerant subject. Furthermore, Brown centres the idea of depoliticisation in tolerance, positioning culture as an essential attribute that reduces race, religion and culture, reifying their attributes while stripping

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[68] Islam as folk tradition is also explored by Saba Mahmood in Egypt (Mahmood 2005).

them of any economic, historical or social connotations (The reduction of The Troubles in Northern Ireland to atavistic tribalism is a good example of this). As well as toxifying and essentialising traits of culture/religion/race, tolerance discourse depoliticises its hegemonies and structures of power. Based on norms of liberalism, tolerance is regarded by its subjects as universal, rational, and individual. Drawing on Mahmood Mamdani, she posits that tolerance is a marker of controlled culture: the tolerant subject treats culture as optive, while the tolerance object is controlled by their culture. 'We have values; they have culture'. Brown links it to the rhetoric of secularism: both operate outside of the limitations they attribute to their 'Others'.

> Liberalism presumes to master culture by privatizing and individualizing it, just as it privatizes and individualizes religion. It is a basic premise of liberal secularism and liberal individualism that neither culture nor religion are permitted to govern publicly; both are tolerated on the condition that they are privately and individually enjoyed. (Brown 2006, 21)

The ultimate result is the legitimisation of coercive and exclusionary practices of state and society, with a hierarchy of social norms tied to religion, culture, values and race. Tolerance, secularism and the ideals of the public sphere (if not the historical practice) are shielded from the taint of culture and religion, themselves constructed as marginalised and inferior. Thus power and exclusion are legitimised, even when they act outside the legal norms. Meanwhile, anything construed as cultural, publicly religious, or intolerant is politicised, delegitimised, and rendered open to social, legal and paramilitary correction.

Majoritarianism and Liberalism

In *Rethinking Ethnicity* (2004a), Eric Kaufmann distinguishes between dominant ethnies and ethno-nationalism[69]. Ethno-nationalism refers to aspiring national movements whereas the focus of this collection is groups in power. Kaufmann describes 'national' as intellectually fuzzy, though it's unclear why 'ethnie' is any better. …This intersects with ideas of ethnicity and its relationship to nationalism. The anthropological focus on ethnicity follows the assumption that ethnic groups are minorities, and that national identities are for sociologists to study. As I am primarily interested in majorities (and majoritarianism) this will be crucial. I find

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[69] The other focus of the book is dominant minorities, such as the Anglo-Irish and Afrikaaners.

Kaufmann's argument that dominant ethnicities need to be studied on their own terms unconvincing. Nationalism has enough flexibility to accommodate 'dominant ethnicities'. However I feel it is more important to focus on nationalist/state *practices* than labels and identities; as such I disagree with Kaufmann's distinction between US cultural hegemony and WASP culture. Power is often surprisingly absent from discussion of *who* gets to ascribe labels, *what* counts as ethnic (bad) or civic (good) and *how* hegemonies manifest themselves.

Kaufmann offers the decline of White Anglo-Saxon Protestants as an example of the relationship between ethnies and the state. In the US, this ethno-religious category largely controlled the US' economic, social and political affairs but slowly shifted to accommodate incoming Catholic and East European populations. Despite early Anglo-Saxon romanticism of the independence movement and the actions of nativist groups like the Know Nothings in the mid-nineteenth century, WASP elites largely welcomed immigrants and by the twentieth century had ceded cultural dominance to 'ethnic' groups like the Italians. By the mid-twentieth century, WASPs were a minority and immigrants integrated into the public sphere, rising to political prominence with Eisenhower and Kennedy (Kaufmann, 2004b, p. 68). The shift is from ethnic dominance under the WASPs to a liberal-egalitarian pattern with less ethnic hierarchy. Similarly, the Anglo-Protestant spirit of Canada slowly shifted over the nineteenth century, becoming a multicultural secular country by the late-twentieth century.

Kaufmann's analysis, written in 2004, confidently dismisses any sort of nativist resurgence in the US, four years before Tea Party politics came to define the US Right. The shift from Anglo-Protestant ethnie to liberalism ignores the liberalism of Anglo-Saxon romanticism, with its focus on the 'mother of parliaments' and the Magna Carta. It also ignores the liberal rhetoric at the centre of much anti-Catholicism, castigating Catholicism as oppressive, backwards, dogmatic and antidemocratic. Looking forward, his analysis ignores the WASPishness of the melting-pot thesis, and the neutering effects of cultural appropriation. He says little about class and confines race to a footnote. The WASP hegemony was never as dead as he imagines, even in 2004. It changed over time, slowly incorporating the Dutch, Scots-Irish, Catholic Irish/German, South and East Europeans, and now

lighter-skinned East Asians and Hispanics. By extension the rhetoric of exclusion and smug liberalism separates older immigrant groups from the routine racism and marginalisation faced by African Americans and recent immigrants[70].

Frames of Identity

Both majoritarian groups have seen their roles in society shift over the years, changing their positive perceptions. While the Orange Order has had to significantly alter interpretations of their past, the *Hindutva* movement has slowly built up a strongly ambiguous identity with different emphases depending on the occasion. In this section I will detail how some of these changes occur before moving onto their contemporary forms of positive self-identification.

The class/caste composition of both groups is worth comparing. The Orange Order has waxed and waned over the centuries, maintaining consistent working class/agrarian base. Different periods have seen bouts of respectability, most notably over the course of the past century. In this time, the Orange Order could reasonably claim to broadly represent the Protestant population of Northern Ireland, with strong representation in both rural and urban areas and across the class spectrum. Its focus was elitist however; the Order has been dominated by urban Establishment figures and gentry for quite some time. In recent years, this upper-class element of the Order has once again faded, leaving them with a mostly working-class and rural base and the strong need to reset their orientation and goal. Rather than represent themselves as the voice of the Establishment, The Order has had to realign itself as the voice of the downtrodden and marginalised. The *Hindutva* movement has quite a different trajectory, having been traditionally a party of the upper-caste Brahmin tiers of Indian society. Its orientation made it exclusivist not just against Muslims but against Dalits and anyone not of 'authentic' Northern Indian values. The solution was to homogenise all Hindu values, making them synonymous with Brahminism. While this has had some success the *Hindutva* movement has nevertheless realised the need to broaden its appeal. Beginning in the seventies, there has been a concerted attempt to expand its base among lower

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[70] Ignatiev provides a concentrated version of this phenomenon in his book on Irish assimilation and subsequent adoption of racism (Ignatiev, 1995). Recent shifts in 'alt-right' politics place the Irish-American experience at its centre, with the adoption of 'Irish as slaves' historiographies and the centrality of Irish-Americans in the Trump administration.

castes. Part of this is a broadening of concerns, taking the issue of rights and liberalism on board. 'Bangladeshis are not just diluting Hindu society in this view, they are stealing jobs' etc.

Despite different compositions, both groups have elitist values that become a liability. Without abandoning their old-fashioned values (adherence to imperialist perceptions/Brahmin elitism), they have broadened their concerns to be more palatable to lower class members of society. But while the *Hindutva* movement does this as means to expand their influence, the Orange Order does it out of necessity. In India the *Hindutva* movement aspires to unite the Hindu populace, promoting the idea that Hindus are an organic entity that has been corrupted. Hindus represent a classic 'category' in Brubaker's model, far too loose to be considered a group, with multiple identities and everyday concerns pushing an explicit Hindu consciousness to the periphery of social experience. This peripheralisation, fluid and highly relative to the social context, is regarded as India's greatest problem in the eyes of Hindutvavadis. For them Hinduism is the primary identity, as it ought to be for any self-respecting Hindu. And the lack of primary Hindu consciousness among the wider Hindu population is a symptom of degeneracy, British brainwashing, and ongoing external manipulation. The effort to awaken 'Hindu consciousness' is a straightforward example of groupism as a process, a project of ethnopolitical (and religious) entrepreneurs. Not only is the past coded in such a way as to validate a groupist Hindu identity, but the perceived indifference of the population-at-large can be interpreted through historiographic ideas of Hindu deterioration, and 'macaulayism[71]'.

Hindu consciousness has some considerable hurdles to cross in terms of regionalism, caste, language and national ideologies. The Orange Order, and 'Establishment' Unionism in general represents a better example of groupist behaviour, which came to dominate Northern Ireland politically and socially. Over time though this unity has eroded, and now unionism in general (and the Orange Order in particular) has adjusted to a more fragmented unionist/protestant public

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[71] Thomas Babington Macauley, an officer with the East India Company, argued for the introduction of English and western education in the 1830s. The term 'Macauley's children' refers to Indian nationals perceived to be too westernised.

sphere. Even at its height it faced considerable intra-ethnic resistance, from liberal unionism, socialism, urban-rural differences, and denominational animosity. Nevertheless the degree of cohesion is remarkable as was the strength of the key social actors. The Unionist Party and the Orange Order worked together to create a hegemonic society with state, economy, media and society all manifesting a singular identity. The more obvious dissenters such as nationalists were labelled and marginalised, while intra-unionist dissidents were ignored or crushed. Over time the autonomy of unionism was challenged by shifting external and internal forces, as nationalists became more vocal, industry declined and the UK shifted towards cooperating with Ireland and Europe and away from commonwealth goals. As the Troubles eroded political autonomy and unionist dominance, it became impossible to equate orange practices with normative social order. The parade disputes of the 1990s confirmed the new position of unionism within wider NI and Anglo-Irish politics, and the intransigence of the Orange Order saw it lose most of its membership.

The Orange Order maintains a specific social goal. While they have realigned themselves as a party of the dispossessed and marginalised, they harken back to a time of supposed Protestant unity, when all respectable members of society were Orangemen. Their goal then, is to re-establish a Protestant identity in the heart of Ulster. More than Catholics, Protestants have been subject to class division, social mobility and secularism (McKay 2005). The slow decline of participation of average Protestants was charted by the Orange Order in their depictions of 'Flymo Prods': an increasingly apathetic section of the Unionist population who cared little for sectarianism or the threat posed by republicanism and wished merely to carry on with their lives. Essentially, they stopped believing in the existential threat posed by republicanism and British perfidy.

> This has been due to a number of factors – apathy, growing affluence and indifference, and an inability to comprehend what has been happening to their Province.
>
> There are elements within the middle-class just cannot – or refuse to – accept the fact that a war has been going on for the past 25 years in which the very existence of Protestants as a vibrant community within the island of Ireland has been at stake. (Orange Standard 1994)

The situation was not so bad in western areas where 'ethnic cleansing' has woken

the majority community to their fate[72]. But there is no room for spectators, "as Ulster battles for its very existence" (Ibid).

The modern manifestation of this ethnic cleansing, the neutralisation of public space, is what orangeism hopes will rally the troops. Part of this is a sincere concern with what the process entails for traditional displays of Britishness in public. Britishness is, however, no more popular among 'lay' Protestants than among ordinary Britons, and the Union Flag has long been dominated by the BNP. Recent protests over the flag and such symbolism further alienate the average unionist from their political symbols (Nagle 2014). Prolonging protests over flags runs the risk of turning the Union Flag into a loyalist instead of a Unionist, Protestant or even British symbol and further estranges orangeism and loyalism from the mainstream they hope to lead.

On the cultural front, the Order may have more success. It has been pointed out that organisation sees itself as much as an Ulster-Scots society than a religious or political society, though all these factors have come into play over time. As even conservative strands of Protestantism feel the pinch of secular society and growing apathy towards religious norms, and loyalty to Britain has long been discarded in all but it's most nominal forms, the cultural element has grown. Partly this reflects the decline in Anglican influence, which identified with England rather than the more rugged Scottish heritage of the north. Partly it was a reaction to the strong cultural element of Catholic nationalism, which gained much of its legitimacy from language and ethnic ties, even where such ties were quite tenuous. Lastly the UK as a whole has shifted towards nationalisation, with devolution to Scotland and Wales, and an increased recognition of English nationalism that had been subverted by an undeserving Britain.

Culture is a double-edged sword here. As Halikiopoulou. et al. show, the language of liberalism and rights tend to mix poorly with promoting ethno-culturalism (Halikiopoulou, Mock, and Vasilopoulou 2013). And culture is no more likely to spur the hearts of Unionists than religion or British heritage. Some of the problems can be seen in the difficulties faced by Ulster-Scots promoters, often derided as a

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[72] See Donnan earlier, for discussion of rural sectarianism and perceptions of decline.

joke or a drain of public money by Protestants of any ancestry.

Conclusion

In both fieldsites the modern period has seen the re-emergence of explicit identity politics, along with recognition of the necessity for addressing universal prejudices. More than ever, the question of identity, liberal citizenship and representation are being addressed. The result has not always been promising, and many have drawn attention to the central position communalism now occupies Northern Irish and Indian politics. However, attention is also paid to the power differentials and the gaps that representation acknowledges. This is itself is a progression from the days in which citizenship and access to the public sphere were equated with establishment ethnic and civic identities, and marginal populations were regarded as subversive. While neither fieldsite shows a strong path forward, the language of power has now shifted to at least acknowledging these discrepancies.

Meanwhile, the older narratives linking implicit majoritarian identities with citizenship now contend with an unsettling scenario, where their monopoly on the public sphere is not only challenged, but the very terms by which they now must claim access are the terms that marked former enemies of the land. Identity politics are the means to reassert their primacy, and once again identity politics are masked as common sense, right-thinking and liberal citizenship. Minority populations are both a lesson in unity as well the marker of social degeneracy, while politics and the public sphere need to be realigned to 'true' citizenship.

Demographic aggression fits into both efforts, though at different points. Demographic aggression narratives are partly the outcome of latent identity politics, another way to demarcate problem populations and delegitimise their very presence as dangerous. In India DA continues to frame the narrative of the Muslim Other, shaping itself to national threats: Love jihad, territorial aggression, and population control. In Northern Ireland, demographic aggression was the means by which Catholics were marked as dangerous, but it has faded with time. Many years have gone by since the Catholic population could be represented as homogeneous and universally subversive.

Conclusion

My research has drawn from a variety of sources and fieldsites, attempting to establish some basis for a comparison between particular narratives of exclusion in different contexts. My aim was to highlight one particular aspect of communalism that highlights a range of facets in inter-communal relations. Demographic aggression narratives are relatively rare (as opposed to demographic fears which are quite common but don't assume an agency on behalf of the suspect population), but they are worth looking at as narratives in their own right. I have examined two such narratives which offer concentrated visions of communal antagonism while also reflecting wider anxieties about groupism, social coherence and leadership, and the fears that surround incorrect gender roles. Both sites have specific dynamics, histories, structures of power and external factors, but share key elements. Analysing these conditions is essential to understanding and avoiding concentrated conflicts in other sites in the future.

Building on my Masters research into Hindutva chauvinism, my main interest has been the ABVP in Delhi, focusing on how the *Hindutva* student organisation utilised the idea of demographic aggression to promote their vision of India's boundaries, potential and threats. Incorporating a range of threats, the ABVP articulate a moral universe of political enemies, subversive foreign influences, heroic sites of resistance, and idealised practices of behaviour. Demographic aggression offers them the opportunity to relive the conflicts that shaped their nation's early days and the trauma of Partition, renewing the ontologies of patriotism and betrayal, and re-enacting the roles of masculine saviours. I highlight how this narrative incorporates recent historical events into a singular thread, with multiple threats over time manifesting as the 'same old enemy', whether in Assam, the government or on campus.

I think it is important to compare this potent narrative with earlier instances of such thinking. While largely obsolete, the fears and social ontologies that drove demographic aggression continue to colour communal imagination in Northern Ireland. Ballynafeigh in South Belfast has slowly become a majority Catholic

neighbourhood, the recurrent fear among the more extreme end of Ulster loyalism. I charted the changing dynamic of danger in hardline loyalism, from Catholic fecundity before the Troubles, republican genocide during the prolonged paramilitary violence, onto the cultural war and 'ethnic cleansing' of the post-GFA days. The narrative of encroaching peril and need for resilience remains consistent across a range of economic, political and social conditions, though ultimately the narrative wears thin in the present-day. My interest was to see whether the anxieties of the past would manifest amidst the various factors shaping Ballynafeigh today. Not so much a Catholic as a cosmopolitan and middle-class neighbourhood, Ballynafeigh views its past not as decline or change, but as consistently inclusive and positive. This perspective of the past has a place for orangeism, but their historiographies sit uncomfortably together. In the meantime loyalism continues to chart its social position in terms of public displays, aiming to reinscribe traditions such as parading as positive displays of identity rather than triumphalist and exclusivist.

The key issues of my thesis, are how governmentality shapes and inspires new formations of identity, spreading from statecraft to ethnic formation. In both cases the state — utilising existing religious and ethnic divides — fashioned population categories which led to segmented societies and lots of potential for communal/sectarian tension. The results have often been quite indirect and counter-productive from a state perspective. The rise of distinct religious populations in India – used cynically or otherwise - can be traced to a specific temporal and political colonial context. Similarly, colonial history of Ireland has always revolved around managing populations and land, and these are the contours the present-day tensions continue to shape themselves by. In each case, the interplay between colonialism, citizenship and their interplay with communal categorisation led to political upheaval, violence and ultimately partition. This partition appears repeatedly as a founding narrative in the historiography of this thesis' subjects, an Original Sin that hovers over the actions and ideals of the resulting nations and their interactions with the remaining minorities in particular.

This pattern continued after both sites became autonomous. Independent India and Northern Ireland under Stormont Rule maintained policies of secularism and

civic nationalism while continuing to promote hegemonic interests in government and society. Rather than dissipating over time, minority identities festered under majoritarian rule and over time increasingly challenged the doxa of the Establishment. In India a variety of agents chafed under Congress Rule: separatist movements, language activists, caste activism, feminism and religious communalism. Increasingly India's government was unable to accommodate or contain these divergent interests, leading to authoritarianism and social discord. Today the Centre continues to juggle multiple competing interests, while India's Muslims are increasingly ostracised as the nation's Others. In Northern Ireland the overt discrimination of the Unionist government led to campaigns for civic equality for Catholics. These demands were met with fury and violence, developing into sectarian conflict and a slow realisation that peace required some semblance of power-sharing and recognition. Today Northern Ireland maintains an uneasy balance of political power between the dominant communities, while critics question whether such a system is sustainable in the long-run or even truly inclusive. In both cases the conflict revolves around ideals of secularism and civic nationalism, with both terms contested and used to justify exclusive practices.

My main aim was to explore the similarities between two ostensibly different contexts that produced identical narratives of overbreeding and infiltration. I have highlighted the importance of history in shaping policy and populations in these fieldsites, though I don't think the role of the British colonialism is particularly instrumental. Most modern nation-states have grappled with heterogeneous regions without the depth of suspicion seen in this thesis. It is my argument that a range of circumstances produced these demographic aggression narratives, combining to produce a particular formula of paranoia. Colonialism plays an important part, building strong identities and pegging politicising categories of population. It also left a legacy of state coercion determined to protect the integrity of the autonomous state at all costs. A strong identity is built upon nascent categories, incubated by techniques of government but driven by a firm sense of their identity and with strong organisation. These actors claim leadership of their communities, a role tacitly allowed by state authorities. There is slippage here between colony and state: in both cases the divide between them is blurry. Ireland

continued to be governed as a colony in many respects after joining the UK, and much of the Home Rule tension sprang from an inability to treat Irish demands as seriously as those of other British peoples. India's independence has been marred by annexing neighbouring territories and maintaining martial law in peripheral regions such as Kashmir. Like the UK and Ireland, the rhetoric of inclusive citizenship clashes with practices of governance that continue to rely on coercion and bio-politics.

A point I frequently return to is the inequality masked by narratives of citizenship. In each case a semblance of idealised citizenship is used often nakedly to promote majoritarian interests, an increasingly untenable tactic. Both fieldsites defined their autonomous periods by their modernity, secularism and civic values, often contrasting sharply with the backward failures of their rivals. That these progressive values are backed with strong state power is given as testament to the dangers they face. The majority discriminates and barriers to full equality — not just ethnoreligious but class, regional and gender — are politicised and rendered suspect while access to the public sphere is granted to those who transcend identity politics. As this tension becomes unsustainable the rhetorical efforts to exclude minorities and subalterns becomes more extreme.

Chapter Five aims to draw these manifestations of demographic aggression together, highlighting how differing circumstances and chronologies contribute to the idea of demography as a danger. Both fieldsites face the same paradox: a majority who perceive themselves as minorities, loci of power construed as beleaguered victims. History is enlisted to account for the trajectory of decline, with present-day tropes projected on the multiplicity of the past. Both sites create a distinct narrative former glory and subsequent degeneration, resulting in the problems of today while suggesting potential renewal. Remembrance is an active process here, creating suitable social myths that provide an ontological framework for understanding the challenges majoritarians see and erase uncomfortable details.

The focus of my research has been activist groups rather than the communities they claim to represent. Demographic aggression is not generally accepted, but it is

located on an expansive spectrum of fear, and periodically informs wider social concerns about population and the future. As extremists grow in influence they shift the centre of common sense discourse increasingly towards the peripheral conspiracies. Examining the groups is central to understanding and challenging the narratives. It takes specific ontologies to construe a marginal minority as the dominant social force: a partial take on the past and good ethnopolitical entrepreneurship use the existing social facets to fit their own agenda. Thus casteism and class divisions are symptomatic of colonial interference and social degeneracy. Both movements share strong models of action, using unity and masculinity to create a simple remedy to perceived ills. Creating a threat means creating a response, but conversely they need the idea of demographic aggression and sinister minorities to achieve their goal. This may be the key to tackling demographic aggression, highlighting the heterogeneity of all categories through time, and the need for aspiring groupists to create problem populations and folk-devils.

Demographic aggression narratives are characterised by their emphasis on the single-minded deliberation of the minority Other. Regardless of size, majoritarians partly base their superiority in tin terms of action, drawing on a history of active agents thwarting larger by passive threats. As Chapter Five illustrates, they believe this has reversed, the superior force becoming passive, allowing inferior groups to assert themselves. My informants sought to restore their supremacy by actively and collectively challenging the minority, focusing on ideals of unity, organisation and discipline. Caught between the rhetoric of pluralism and the dangers of divergence, they strive to create the conditions they see in their enemies without the negative associations. The language of restoration is key: they seek to reawaken normative values that have been allowed to lapse. *Hindutva* and loyalist movements aim to establish their ideology as an unquestioned social identity, with the attendant values, ontological schema and cognitive threats. Central to this process is restoring 'authentic' gender norms, especially males ones. Both manifestations of demographic aggression, attacks on women and territory, are articulated as masculine failures. To restore and unify the groupist identity, masculinity must be renewed and re-embodied in the men of the future.

Groupness, masculinity and agency coalesce as the antidote to the dangers of demographic aggression.

My main question is how the legitimate becomes illegitimate, and vice versa. How do appeals for equality become subversive attempts to undermine the nation? How does rearing children become a conspiracy? And conversely, how do discrimination and violence become legitimate acts? The efforts to craft stories of Vatican intrigue, global jihad, and insidious invasion all seek to undermine normal (even normative) behaviour. The civil rights campaign of the 1960s could have been the final hurdle towards Catholic unionism but instead it opened deeper fears of nationalist encroachment. The features of supposed attacks are civic themselves: the threat of voting, owning property, and civic participation in general.

The degree of legitimisation is noteworthy as well. The loyalist prisoner slogan *their only crime was loyalty* is telling. Similar cognitive elision characterises *Hindutva* approaches to communal violence and furious denials of 'saffron terror,' pointing to a conceptual frame that prejudges regardless of the action. Drawing on both the discourses and presumed values of secularism and pluralism allows for abominable action in both regions. A wider recourse to protecting the nation is also evident: the state can be corrupted and laws manipulated, so a deeper sense of nationhood allows for breaking the law and interpreting the true dangers. This sort of discourse is becoming prevalent in Europe, which faces its own moral panic of Islamophobia. 'Aggressive liberalism' and Enlightenment fundamentalism are increasingly channelled to protect the spirit of Europe from its governments, leftist elites and foreign interlopers.

The title of this thesis, *The Arithmetic of Anxiety*, came from realising this underlying claim in demographic aggression paranoia. In both sites the majoritarian population enjoyed privilege while passing that off as liberal modernity, theoretically open to all but in practice closed off to many. Privilege here means access to the public sphere, access to centres of political power, privileged access to work, and cultural hegemony. This privilege was tied implicitly – sometimes even explicitly – to the idea of a majority, the dominant hegemony

was the unmarked, unquestioned social actor. Challenging this privilege (or even highlighting it) was dismissed as 'identity politics', as minoritarians pleading special privilege instead of assimilating. Assimilation was always an incomplete project, the Irish Catholics never gained acceptance as full citizens, reservations were always resented against subalterns. Patricia and Roger Jeffery refer to this as banal communalism, whether in terms of everyday practice or institutional discrimination, these are the routine limitations that define and access and marginalisation. The extremes of violence and narrative are not spontaneous but highlight an ever-present communalism (Jeffery and Jeffery 2006, 90).

If privilege was pegged to majoritarianism and population, so too was the social anxiety. Reservations and consociationalism were viewed as a zero-sum game, a case of taking from normal people to give to divisive and vested forces who grew all the time and demanded more. If liberalism was the sphere of the privileged it also became its threatened flank: voting and civic participation were the means of communal domination. Even tax-paying could be construed as threatening if the intent of the minority was in question. The more innocent the gesture, the deeper the threat[73].

Demographic aggression narratives are for the most part apocalyptic, though they often include ray-of-hope scenarios. This usually involves the normalisation of the threatening population, as they become a neutral or benevolent part of society. The eventual fading of demographic aggression in Northern Ireland lies in part in the increased recognition of discrimination, in the difficulty of portraying Catholics as homogenous, or in thrall to religion or terrorism. Middle-class Catholics in public employ and the normalisation of the republic of Ireland both make sweeping generalisations ridiculous. At the same time the unity of unionism has eroded, as neoliberalism and the Good Friday Agreement redefines the haves and have-nots (Coulter, 2014). Working-class unionism, including loyalism, emerged from the Troubles and economic reform with a stronger sense of class division. Orangeism now reflects this class divide, with grassroots definitions as opposed to the older

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[73] Charlie Hebdo had long been accused of racism and peddling stereotypes, a claim they dismissed as mistranslation, and not getting the joke. In 2015 they published an explicitly Islamophobic article, insisting that peaceable Muslims citizens were a bigger threat than terrorists as they spread their ideas openly.

Establishment image. The associations with 'rough loyalism' and 'settler mind-sets' remain, resurfacing recently with the Flags dispute (Guelke, 2014). Nonetheless, centenary commemorations offer (less-discussed) alternative practices of identity, with the positive engagement with the past and social symbolism (Bryan, 2015).

Epilogue

My research in Belfast concluded in July 2012 and in Delhi in September 2013, and in both cases the topics I discussed became active soon after I left. In India immediately after I left the moral panic of love jihad erupted again, this time in Uttar Pradesh[74]. Like in 2009, there was no concrete evidence of any wrongdoing but plenty of tales of caged women in mosques. An upcoming election was key to the episode, as the BJP sought to make gains in the area. The BJP's rise to power under their former pracharak leader Narendra Modi has led to a turbulent time of growth in Hindutva extremism. Indian campuses have been battlegrounds over what values are permitted, with the ABVP policing students for their anti-nationalism. Cow protection has re-emerged as a key site of conflict, as Muslims and Dalits are harassed and killed in North India over allegations of beef consumption (Ghassem-Fachandi, 2009). Recently the Supreme Court has ruled that political parties cannot mobilise along caste or religious lines, a ruling welcomed by Hindutvavadis. *Hindutva* transcends religion, and therefore the BJP and the Sangh are immune from the charges of fostering religious hatred, just as the ABVP are immune from the charge of political agitation.

In the meantime, after much delay the most recent population growth figures recording religious belonging were released in 2015 (Azad, 2015). There had been speculation that the figures were withheld because of massive demographic changes and the government's reluctance to publish them. In truth very little had changed. The Muslim percentage continued to grow but at 0.8 percent it was negligible. With the BJP in political ascendance wider fears of population shift have receded again, and more attention is paid by the *Hindutva* movement to strife in Kashmir with Pakistan, and India's place as a rising superpower. 'Anti-nationalism' is now presented as the gravest threat, and the government uses the same legislation used by colonial authorities and Congress to suppress any perceived dissent in the Indian public sphere. Anti-nationalism has most recently been utilised to attack NGOs who protect land rights such as Greenpeace, who are

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[74] http://www.caravanmagazine.in/vantage/love-jihad-sangh-parivar-sexual-politics-another-name

accused of trying to hold the economy back. Amnesty was recently attacked for highlighting the human cost of military occupation in Kashmir. Any group who challenges the status quo, whether for caste, religious, economic or economic reasons now faces persecution in the name of *Hindutva's* most vaunted ideal: national unity.

A few months after I left Belfast, the City Council voted to only fly the Union Flag on certain public holidays, mostly royal birthdays. An alliance of nationalist and centrist city councillors voted to allow the lowering of the flag for most of the year. The move was met with fury by many unionists who saw it as further dilution of British symbolism in one of the UK's key cities (Nagle 2016). Protests and rallies were arranged and Belfast city centre saw sustained rioting and protests. The Alliance party was targeted with arson and death threats. Violence aside, unionists began flying the Union Flag as prominently as possible in their communities, and attendance at parades was strengthened that year. The assertion that a cultural war was ongoing took centre stage, confirming the direction of ethnic cleansing, though potentially isolating those for whom the flag is not a highly charged symbol of resistance but a quiet indicator of loyalism.

For the most part society continued as normal in Northern Ireland, with everyday Belfast politics working normally, and parades for the most part passing off peacefully. The decade of commemorations saw more demonstrations, but nothing antagonistic. The main political parties maintained their dominance, but with distinct challenges to their peripheries. For the DUP the threat from radical loyalism continues unabated, with groups like the Traditional Unionist Voice offering a voice for those who feel that the DUP have become too conciliatory. The aggression shown against the Alliance Party during the Flag protests was seen in part as a deliberate attempt by the DUP to reclaim some of their radical edge, and get back at an electoral rival (Melaugh, 2013).

Just as many issues in Northern Ireland have been shaped by external forces, the most recent could prove to be seismic. In Jun 2016, the UK voted to leave the EU, with a small majority of 52 percent in favour. Northern Ireland as whole voted to

remain in the EU, with 55 percent voting to stay. The 'Bremain' vote crossed the spectrum, though a higher percentage of nationalists voted to remain. The DUP voted to leave, though their members stressed that very little should change in terms of structural funding (Northern Ireland gets a special grant from the EU), and cross-border relations with the South. The result has polarised the UK, with increasingly antagonistic Brexit advocates pushing for stringent con trolls on immigration, the removal of any laws or rights granted by the EU, and a vilification of any opponents as 'Enemies of the People'. To date it is quite unclear how the UK will split from the EU without causing great harms, socially and economically, as well as possibly spurring Scotland to independence.

Northern Ireland is left in a strange position, with much of its Good Friday Agreement-based structures now challenged by this constitutional earthquake. The DUP First Minister, Arlene Foster has determined that Northern Ireland should respect the wider UK vote and support Westminster's efforts to negotiate a separation. Opponents argue that Foster is ignoring the majority in favour of remaining in the EU, putting her party goals ahead of her duty to Northern Ireland's population. Her partners in Sinn Féin have not helped by immediately demanding a vote to reunite the island, a choice still unattractive to most unionists, and many nationalists too. Northern Ireland needs to find a new trajectory in light of an increasingly Anglo-centric UK, that has paid almost to heed to the practicalities of Northern Ireland's finances and borders in light of Brexit. The UK itself may split in the near future, fracturing a unionist equation of Scottish cultural heritage and British civic loyalty. In light of these changes, the question of demographic aggression, population as a whole and even Northern Ireland as a distinct entity may become moot as macro-political shifts come to a head.

Demographic Aggression and the West

One of my aims here was to de-exoticise the narratives discussed here, locating them at the heart of liberal modernity where they belong. In the years since I finished fieldwork events have caught up with me and now Europe, the US and Australia face variations of #whitegenocide. The fear of Europe becoming 'Eurabia' has been around in some form since the 1990s, and has been widespread in the US since the 2000s (Sanders, 2012). It has not taken firm root in Europe,

amidst fears that our 4-5 percent Muslim population will overrun and subjugate us (Bangstad, 2013). Like demographic aggression elsewhere it remains a fringe idea that feeds on a more widespread fear of immigration, boundaries and fecundity. Islamophobia has a number of outlets and western liberalism is proving every bit as paranoid as illiberal states to the east. Both the manifestations in my research— sexual danger to women and territory—appear in some form, sometimes together. New Year 2016 saw mass panic of a series of sexual assaults in Cologne, quickly and falsely attributed to the influx of refugees from Syria. Vigilante groups have assembled in Scandinavia and Germany to protect 'our' women at night, even if our women are apparently asking for it by being out at night. Meanwhile Europe has seen a proliferation of 'no-go' areas and 'rape capitals', where Sharia law reigns and police fear to tread (Titley, 2017).

I want to focus in two areas of relevance to my thesis: love jihad and narrativity. As we have seen, the love jihad discourse in India has distinct parallels with Hindu and Sikh communities in Britain (Sian, 2011). There is quite likely a similar root to these discourses, at least tracing back to the Partition in 1947. Similar discourses have cropped up in Israel, with concern over interactions between Jewish and Arab Israelis (Hakak, 2016). An Israeli Arab was convicted of raping a Jewish woman after lying to her about his religious background. While consensual, their sex was regarded as rape by the judge as it was obtained under false pretences. Conservative rabbis in Jerusalem have issued warnings about deceptive Arab men who will change their name and try to seduce young Jewish women. Media reports describe identical scenes to those of Karnataka, of gangs of men engaged in cultural policing, particularly of 'problem girls' (Burton 2015).

While the idea of Muslim men systematically converting Western women has not emerged in mainstream European Islamophobia, there have been similar sentiments surrounding marriage, immigration and integration, in France in particular (Fassin 2010; Sarkis 2010). A large number of citizenship via marriage applications are rejected if French officials decide that the marriages are bogus, something they're much more likely to do if the applicant is a Muslim man. In particular France has become more stringent on marriage rules on annulment, fraudulent marriages and promoting more 'republican marriages' (Sarkis 2010).

Secularism and debates on religious behaviour increasingly resemble *Hindutva* concerns over protecting the virtue of the community through exercising control over the freedom of women.

For the most part the victims of this discourse are the women themselves, women attacked as drunks of low morals in Mangalore, young women denied the freedom to attend university or engage in any unsupervised public activity, women attacked for publicly displaying adherence to Islam (and now legislated against along similar lines in France and Belgium) marriages being annulled by the state ostensibly in the name of freedom and equality. Just as women's rights are often overshadowed by communal/minority rights and the integrity of the community or tradition or religious custom, such expectations are now made of women in the increasing tempo of the self-realised 'clash of civilisations'.

'2083' and the Quest for Memory

Narratives like the partition that define India and Northern Ireland are entirely possible in other parts of the world, but for the most part don't occur. I want to discuss when narratives fail to take root, and whether narratives gaps are part of the cause. In particular I want to focus on discussions of Islam in Europe, and the ambiguity about its Muslim population. Islam has long been the Other of a Western Huntingtonian clash of civilisations, and Europe has long been regarded as on the frontline. History is reimagined to see Moorish invasions of Spain as a jihadist wave or postcolonial immigration as degenerative. For the most part, however, demographic aggression narratives have failed to emerge. Many exist, particularly among right-wing American perspectives of Europe, and among the hard-right in Europe. While demographic details are important, and the Muslim populations of Europe increasingly typecast and excluded, sinister plots are usually dismissed.

In part this is because no prior narrative of Islamic encroachment has popular purchase in Europe. Possible candidates are the Moorish invasion of Spain, supposedly pushed back by Charles Martel of the Franks. Another frequently referenced point is the Siege of Vienna in 1683, which inspired a prominent Islamophobic blog (Gatesofvienna.net), as well as influencing Anders Breivik's manifesto title *2083*. Both interpret Europe's long engagement with its Muslim

neighbours as part of a historic struggle of civilisation, just as Hindutvavadis interpret Turkish and Mughal aggression as fundamentally Muslim rather than dynastic. Just as the Ottoman Empire was rarely regarded as Muslim at the height of its power (though the Muslim angle was incorporated into a wider oriental despotism narrative), neither were Spain's Moors seen as particularly Muslim till after the Re-Conquest.

Regardless of the actual history, neither event has much social purchase. European identity is notably opaque, and even 'Christendom' falls well behind Reformation-era divisions in creating identity and recognising the past. While Friedland and Breivik could still foster a sense of Vienna as a 'key episode' in European history, imbibing it with the same sense of continuity that ancient jihadism or presumed genocide in Ireland offer to contemporary narratives today. At the moment it seems very unlikely that there is any appetite for such re-imaginings of history. Arguably the 9/11 attacks in the US qualify as a foundational memory, a watershed moment that galvanises identity and action. But Europe had a long history of terrorism (though never on such a scale, and rarely from Islamist extremists), and the fervour of the war on terror was quickly subsumed in the moral quagmire that was neo-conservative policy in general, and Iraq in particular.

There is one possibility that seems more plausible. As I have said, European identity is opaque, and European social memory practically non-existent. There is one powerful historical episode that most of Europe, and indeed the world recognises: fascism. Without examining too closely the historical impact of the Third Reich, the Second War or fascism in general, the post-WWII social imagination has Nazis, Hitler and the Holocaust centred firmly in much of the world. 'Islamo-fascism' succinctly covers this theme: the idea that Islamism closely mimics the intolerance of fascism . Ian Buruma discusses the legacy of WWII in his exploration of multicultural anxiety in the Netherlands. Repeatedly Dutch narratives of tolerance returned to nazism, and the failure to protect Jews in the Netherlands (Buruma 2006). Muslims were compared to Nazis, an invading force fuelled by hate, while complacent liberals do nothing. Anti-semitism among many Muslim migrants encourages this viewpoint. Even more so than nazi analogies, liberals as appeasers dominate narratives of degeneracy.

Northern Ireland and India provide a trajectory that can help to explain how the possible threat of demographic aggression narratives unfolds in the West. Loyalist preoccupations with population, takeovers and Vatican intrigues belong firmly in the past, with only remnants of influence such as the more extreme reactions to consociationalism and public symbolism. India is in the grips of communal agitation. Rather than negating the fear of establishment politicians in power manipulating populations for their own ends, the BJP in power have shifted this tension to NGOs, 'westernised' individuals, foreign capital and contemptuous Muslims. As long as the Hindutva movement continues to define cultural legitimacy by stigmatising others it will continue to exploit existing population patterns for its own ends. The solution in both cases and the challenge for the West, is to understand cultural difference without reifying it or confusing 'our' values with universal ones.

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