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Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies

ISSN: 1071-4413 (Print) 1556-3022 (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/gred20

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To cite this article: Anna Hickey-Moody & Daniel Marshall (2016) Working recognitions: An introduction, Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies, 38:1, 3-13, DOI: 10.1080/10714413.2016.1119639

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10714413.2016.1119639

THE REVIEW OF EDUCATION, PEDAGOGY, AND CULTURAL STUDIES
2016, VOL. 38, NO. 1, 3–13
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10714413.2016.1119639

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Anna Hickey-Moody and Daniel Marshall

> . . .Only by entering into exchange does one become "recognizable" and that recognition itself is a form and precondition of exchange. (Butler 1997, 277)

In her now famous response to Jurgen Habermas, Nancy Fraser (1990) argues that the lack of recognition of marginalized social groups excludes them from any possibility of belonging to a universal public sphere. Fraser contests the suggestion that such a public space, to the extent that we can say it currently exists, is actually able to be inclusive. For Fraser, the very notion of independent "citizens" is masculinist, because to function in the public sphere, one must rely on a certain level of domestic (private, usually female) unrecognized labor, stolen or repossessed land, and ignored identity politics. Especially since the 1990s, the question—in theory and in politics—of how subjects might participate in the social has nourished renewed critical engagements with the politics of distributive justice, the recognition of difference and the relationships between these things. Historically, these particular engagements have brought into relief broader theoretical and political tensions. Exchanges between Judith Butler and Nancy Fraser in the late 1990s offer one example of this work. In "Merely Cultural" (1997), Judith Butler responds to what she describes as a "culmination of sentiment" characterized by

> An explicitly Marxist objection to the reduction of Marxist scholarship and activism to the study of culture, sometimes understood as the reduction of Marxism to cultural studies … [and] the tendency to relegate new social movements to the sphere of the cultural, indeed, to dismiss them as being preoccupied with what is called the 'merely' cultural, and then to construe this cultural politics as factionalizing, identitarian, and particularistic. (Butler 1997, 265)

A key aspect to Butler's complaint was her critique of what she perceived to be "the tactical manipulation of the cultural/economic distinction to reinstitute the discredited notion of secondary oppression;" this, Butler contends, "will only reprovoke the resistance to the imposition of unity, strengthening the suspicion that unity is only purchased through violent excision or resubordination" (Butler 1997, 276). Against what Butler saw as the rearticulation of a political and theoretical unity "that caricatures, demeans, and domesticates difference," Butler explains "the Left's affiliation with poststructuralism" as "a way of reading that lets us understand what must be cut out from a

concept of unity in order for it to gain the appearance of necessity and coherence"; indeed, for Butler, "this resistance to 'unity' may carry with it the cipher of democratic promise on the Left" (Butler 1997, 276–77).

Throughout her essay, Butler focuses on the difference of sexuality to illustrate her critique, defending "the hard-won insight that sexuality must be understood as part of that mode of production" which is "the defining structure of political economy" (Butler 1997, 273). In response, Fraser rejects Butler's position, arguing

> if sexual struggles are economic by definition, then they are not economic in the same sense as are struggles over the rate of exploitation. Simply calling both sorts of struggles "economic" risks collapsing the differences, creating the misleading impression that they will synergize automatically and blunting our capacity to pose, and answer, hard but pressing political questions as to how they can be *made* to synergize when in fact they diverge or conflict. (Fraser 1997, 284–85; emphasis in original)

These concerns over a theory and politics made 'blunt' by what Fraser perceives as a lack of conceptual distinction is echoed in Fraser's subsequent critique of Butler as a "poststructuralist anti-dualist" who "reject[s] distinctions between economic ordering and cultural ordering as 'dichotomizing'", arguing instead "that culture and economy are so deeply interconnected, so mutually constitutive, that they cannot meaningfully be distinguished at all" (Fraser 2003, 60). This, contends Fraser in a memorable turn of phrase, "is to paint a night in which all cows are grey" (Fraser 2003, 60). Against this approach, Fraser theorises "perspectival dualism" which, like the "poststructuralist anti-dualists" she critiques "treat[s] *every* practice as simultaneously economic and cultural," whereas it "permits us to distinguish distribution from recognition—and thus to analyse the relations between them" in a manner that Fraser argued is sacrificed by the poststructuralist antidualists (Fraser 2003, 63; see also Fraser 2000).

So much of the debate, then, centers on the conceptual and definitional perimeters of the "cultural," the "economic" and the "material," and, relatedly, on different views about the precise nature of the structure of these things. Indeed, a key summary point of difference that distinguishes Butler and Fraser is the different ways they put the notion of the "economic" to work in their arguments, reflecting distinct theoretical approaches to the economy as structure. That this difference is itself a matter of recognitions—Butler and Fraser effectively disagreed over the proper perimeters of the economic—reveals how these debates, since the 1990s, has been driven by a contest in working recognitions, where the struggle over the politics of recognition can be seen to play out not only in terms of its situation within the redistribution/recognition debate (where the work of recognitions is largely harnessed by the prerogatives of a politics of cultural difference) but also, more widely, in terms of how we recognize the very concepts and structures

that give the redistribution/recognition binary recognizable form. These critical reflections invite us to think about some of the ways competing recognitions are put to work in contemporary debates, and the articles assembled in this special issue exhibit, through their divergent recognition work, some of what we term the *working recognitions* characteristic of contemporary theoretical-political engagements with difference. Assembled together, they foster a reflection on how recognitions are being worked in relation to the prospects of difference in the academy today.

The work gathered in this collection demonstrates the utility and endurance of recognition as a notion through which a range of interconnected concerns can be elaborated. These include issues of subject formation, social belonging, civic participation, and the exchange of cultural value. Etymologically, we might think of recognition as a persistent act of learning again[1] and it is in that context that we want to revisit, rethink, and revalue ways we learn about difference through acts of recognition. In various ways, the articles assembled here speak both to a desire for recognition as well as an investment in the agentic act of recognizing something or someone. We want to put the idea of recognition to work, and we do so realizing that this concept has a long and esteemed scholarly history in political theory, incorporating a range of scholarship that is beyond the scope of what we can engage with here. This history is a core lineage of political theory, but in some respects could also be characterized as masculinist, and in that sense it provides a backdrop to the concerns articulated across the set of papers collected here which reflect various investments in feminist debates on/of recognition and the tools for resourcing minoritarian struggles generated by these debates.

Recalling the disputes between Butler and Fraser, and the common territory they share in acknowledging the material dimensions of the cultural politics of difference, these articles variously engage the materialist concerns evident in acts of being recognized as a subject and being a subject who does the work of recognizing other lives and things in the world. Experiences of being (mis)recognized in life time and again call us back to our subjectivity, often sharply and forcefully, revealing the contingent production of the self as a subject made legible through observed allocations of race, class, gender, ability, sexuality, and citizenship status. Being recognized, then, as an inaugurating site of the subject offers itself as a self-evident starting point for politics, even while the process of recognition is so unsteady as to always jeopardize a clear understanding of the scope and tenor of this politics, calling forward as it does the mixed emotions of belonging, empathy, understanding, fear, alienation, resentment, and disavowal. Thus, these politics of recognition are an enduring site of contest, which is linked to the everyday struggles of the material world.

Scholarly attention to the politics and materialities of everyday life and to the ways everyday lives are inflected by core differentials, especially including

class, race, and gender, is a foundational component of the intellectual legacy of British Cultural Studies scholarship, exemplified by the field-defining work of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in the 1970s and 1980s and the waves of research and activism it inspired. Pursuing this interest in minoritarian experiences of the everyday, the articles in this collection engage with an everyday politics of difference and the various institutional and policy contexts, which enable and disavow such politics.

Reflections on recognition—how we recognize something and how we ourselves are recognised—offer opportunities to re-think recognition, and to re-think how difference and the subject get fused together in shifting conceptions of identity and relationships between identified subjects and institutional arrangements of the state. As demonstrated by the exchanges between Butler and Fraser, recognition/redistribution debates are propelled by agreements about their interlocked relation, accompanied by disagreements about the scope of their meaning, and the proper moments of their divergence one from the other in terms of reach and requisite methods for redress. Butler emphasizes the intimate relation between the two, suggesting that, "only by entering into exchange does one become 'recognizable' and that recognition itself is a form and precondition of exchange" (Butler 1997, 277). Similarly, Fraser argues, "that justice today requires *both* redistribution *and* recognition" (Fraser 2003, 9). Beginning with an illustration of "the two-dimensional character of gender" (Fraser 2003, 20–22) and then proceeding to consider race, class and sexuality, Fraser argues, "for practical purposes, then, virtually all real-world axes of subordination can be treated as two-dimensional" (Fraser 2003, 25). For Fraser, the labor and struggles associated with minoritarian and social justice politics require a two-handed approach, bringing together redistributive remedies to ameliorate political-economic injustices alongside measures of recognition to address "injustices" understood to be "cultural" and which are "presume[d] to be rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication" (Fraser 2003, 13). Recognition as a concept is a way of assessing and exchanging respect, esteem, and prestige; recognitions enact the ways society values different traits, activities, and patterns of cultural value. The focus of recognition as a concept is designed to show how social institutions respect and disrespect through their practices of allocating (or withholding) value.

The role of institutions and institutional power is taken up in divergent ways across the contributions to this special issue, reflecting a variety of considerations as to how institutions allow or disallow parity of participation which allows equal respect, and which emotionally and socially embrace the subtleties of difference in terms of race, religion, gender, sexuality, and so on. For Fraser, recognition's work is, importantly, more social than psychic, and more public than private, underlining the need to critically engage with relevant institutional arrangements. In her theorization of the "*status model*

of recognition" (Fraser 2003, 29), Fraser departs from the theorization of recognition as "a matter of self-realization" (evident, she suggests, in the work of Taylor [1994] among others), focusing instead on a theorisation of what she describes as "recognition as a matter of justice" (Fraser 2003, 28):

> To view recognition as a matter of justice is to treat it as an issue of *social status*. This means examining institutionalised patterns of cultural value for their effects on the *relative standing* of social actors. If and when such patterns constitute actors as *peers*, capable of participating on a par with one another in social life, then we can speak of *reciprocal recognition* and *status equality*. When, in contrast, institutionalised patterns of cultural value constitute some actors as inferior, excluded, wholly other, or simply invisible, hence as less than full partners in social interaction, then we should speak of *misrecognition* and *status subordination*…
>
> On the status model, misrecognition is neither a psychical deformation nor an impediment to ethical self-realization. Rather, it constitutes an institutionalized relation of *subordination* and a violation of justice. To be misrecognised, accordingly, is not to suffer distorted identity or impaired subjectivity as a result of being depreciated by others. It is rather to be constituted by *institutionalized patterns of cultural value* in ways that prevent one from participating as a peer in social life. On the status model, then, misrecognition is relayed not through deprecatory attitudes or free-standing discourses, but rather through social institutions. It arises, more precisely, when institutions structure interaction according to cultural norms that impede parity of participation. (Fraser 2003, 29)

Thus the role of institutions in relation to "the norm of *participatory parity*" is central to Fraser's theoretical-political engagement with recognition: "participatory parity is the proper standard for warranting [justice] claims" (Fraser 2003, 31; 42). Usefully, the centrality of this norm to Fraser's politics of recognition raises questions about what counts as participation and about the desirability of parity as a political goal. These questions get further highlighted by Fraser's expressed desire to deploy this norm in a nonsectarian way, where this desire for nonsectarianism raises questions about how consensus might be achieved regarding difficult questions about the proper perimeters of the field into which participation should be sought and what counts as legitimate "social interaction" in the context of a pluralized experience of the social (Fraser 2003, 31). Mapping out a procedural politics of recognition in practice, Fraser discusses some of the necessary work that struggles for recognition ought to entail:

> To justify their claims, recognition claimants must show in public processes of democratic deliberation that institutionalised patterns of cultural value unjustly deny them the intersubjective conditions of participatory parity and that replacing those patterns with alternative ones would represent a step in the direction of parity. (Fraser 2003, 47)

Promisingly, Fraser offers accounts of how, through application, work towards the norm can shift notions of participation and parity which might

threaten to appear static when presented in the context of an academic formulation. "The norm of participatory parity", explains Fraser, "must be applied dialogically and discursively, through democratic processes of public debate" (Fraser 2003, 43). Further, "precisely because interpretation and judgement are ineliminable, only the full, free participation of all the implicated parties can suffice to warrant claims for recognition. By the same token, however, every consensus or majority decision is fallible. In principle revisable, each provisional determination remains open to later challenges" (Fraser 2003, 43–44). Finally, Fraser surmises that, "the dialogical approach allows for historical dynamism" in part because it "enjoins parity in the social practices of critique, including deliberation about what forms of interaction *should* exist" (Fraser 2003, 45; emphasis in original). In this "pragmatic" formulation of working towards the norm, Fraser suggests that efforts to negotiate "obstacles" to "participatory parity" then also carry with them the prospect of destabilizing what is understood as the obstacle and as the field of participation (Fraser 2003, 48; 47).

The struggle toward the norm then carries with it the promise of transforming the norm itself. This is made explicit in Fraser's reflections on "affirmation or transformation?" (Fraser 2003, 72–78): "all other things being equal, then, transformative strategies are preferable" (Fraser 2003, 77). This emphasis on a transformative politics undergirds Fraser's theorization of "misrecognition as status subordination" because it "locates the wrong in social relations, not in individual or interpersonal psychology" (Fraser 2003, 31). Thus, for Fraser, "to overcome subordination" requires "changing institutions and social practices … The status model, in other words, eschews, psychologization" (Fraser 2003, 31). These twin characteristics—an emphasis on institutional power and a depathologising engagement with the subject—frame our critical interest in the work of recognitions.

Fraser refers to the concept of recognition as a "folk" paradigm (Fraser 2003, 11), which expresses "*a distinctive perspective on social justice*, which can be applied in principle to the situation of *any* social movement" (Fraser 2003, 12; emphasis in original). We take this folk paradigm of recognition as the ethics and ethos that draws together the scholarly investigations advanced in this collection, which respectively examine issues of race, class gender, multiculturalism, gender, and sexuality across subcultural, countercultural, and formal schooling sites.

We begin with Margaret Somerville's work, in which she develops what she calls a "queering analytic" as a way of rereading and recognizing place. Somerville's queering analytic operates at the intersection of feminist theories of the body and collaborative research with Australian Aboriginal people. Deploying an auto-ethnographic approach, Somerville's queering analytic offers a fragile history of the present. The first article in this collection, then, explores queering movements in the intertwining of two major influences on

Somerville's research about relationships to place: the queering of feminist poststructuralism within the feminist body theory of the 1990s, her critical engagement with the Indigenous/non-Indigenous binary. Somerville emphasizes the importance of sexuality and sexual difference in the context of knowledge production, raising questions about the perspectives offered by autoethnographic research.

Moving from Somerville's reflections on recognition and autoethnography to a policy based approach to particular sites of class recognition, Clay and George examine the promotion of social justice in schools and classrooms in the United Kingdom. They consider the ways contemporary social justice agendas have been shaped by the shifts in United Kingdom national policy over the past fifteen years and discuss these changes through the examination of the *Every Child Matters* (2003) policy that was introduced by the Labour Government and applied to England and Wales. *Every Child Matters* sets out to ostensibly meet the needs of all children and young people in a holistic way. In light of the abrupt reversal in overall policy relating to educational provision with the formation of the Conservative/Liberal Democratic coalition Government in 2010, Clay and George consider whether or not the ambitions of the policy were ever realized, taking up Beck and Lau's theorization of second modernity to offer a social-structural perspective on these ebbs and flows in policy and practice.

Continuing the focus on practices of governance as a site of recognition, while moving the context to Australian schooling, Watkins and Noble examine how multicultural policies in Australia have provided a set of programs which frame how individuals respond to cultural diversity. From the early 1970s on, Australian schools developed a range of programs to ensure all students cultivate a particular ethic in dealing with cultural difference. Yet, as Watkins and Noble show us, despite its benefits, multicultural education as it is currently practiced in Australian schools doesn't actually address the challenges of the multiracial and multicultural Australian everyday. Schooling remains governed by regimes of cultural recognition premised on a view of 'culture' *as difference*, shaped by assumptions about distinct, cohesive and unchanging ethnic communities, which are often historically formed.

Moreover, this Australian multiculturalism has been, and remains, premised on a moral discourse of respect, which does not have the features of deep appreciation that are held within Fraser's idea of recognition, which helps to bypass the problems that arise from models of distributive justice that focus on who gets what. Watkins and Noble argue that Australian multiculturalism fosters an unreflexive civility, based on redistributive justice that reproduces a politics of identity that detracts from a critical interrogation of the constitutive nature of cultural practices. Critiquing this culture of complacency surrounding intellectual workers and practitioners, Watkins and

Noble argue that teachers as public intellectuals and activists need to think *beyond* the politics of recognition to develop forms of cultural intelligence; that is, to not only adopt a capacity for critique but to also apply critical understandings in productive ways within their diverse school communities. Drawing on research in schools as part of the Rethinking Multiculturalism/Reassessing Multicultural Education Project, Watkins and Noble examine the politics of recognition that often informs teaching practices.

From concerns with generating a culture and ecology of recognition that can actually cultivate more effective practices of recognition within schools, the collection turns to consider possibilities for a similar ethos of recognition of and for status when acknowledging the arts based work of young people in and out of schools. Focusing on the development of youth voice through arts, Anna Hickey-Moody critically reviews her concept of little public spheres which she has developed in her earlier work to understand young people's arts practice as a mode of civic participation. Hickey-Moody argues that little publics are, by definition, multiple and of diverse political orientation. Depending on the investments that constitute the little public sphere in question, little publics can be spaces very much aligned to social or political norms, hegemonic agendas, or they can be spaces of resistance. They can be conflicted political sites brought together around shared aesthetic or intellectual concerns that unite politically divergent communities. Little publics are as heterogeneous as young people. Hickey-Moody expands on her theorization of little publics through examples of youth arts work in and out of schools as expressions of civic voice. She shows that, to constitute a little public, a group of young people need to author a text that calls an audience to attention. Little publics articulate the expression of youth voice in the many political tones it can have. The concept is significant because it explicates the fact that young people often express collective positions in nonverbal ways. Being able to hear and understand this voice will allow for effective practices of recognition.

Moving from a concept that facilitates rethinking how we recognize the voices that comprise equity agendas to a discussion of how idioms of recognition facilitate or engage equity agendas, Mary Lou Rasmussen examines the work of Raewyn Connell and Elizabeth Povinelli to think about theorizing gender and justice on the periphery of educational research. Rasmussen provides a critical response to Connell, reading Connell as arguing that queer theory and deconstruction have acted as impediments to struggles for global gender justice in research in education. Rasmussen reads Povinelli and Connell together because they have both sought to problematize the proper objects of research on gender and sexualities. Drawing on their work, Rasmussen seeks to bring together aspects of their critical engagements with identity politics and gender and sexuality in relation to settler colonialism.

Furthering Rasmussen's focus on queer as a methodology for thought and action, Daniel Marshall offers a closing paper on queer television and some reflections on questions of method. Drawing on queer theorizations of narratives and representations of queer childhood and adolescence, Marshall reflects on the phenomenon of mass televisual LGBT cultural representation that has become such a defining characteristic of the popular recognition of queer life in the early twenty-first century. Through a reading of one particular example—the BBC's *Beautiful People* (2008–2009)—Marshall reflects on contemporary cultural politics of queer recognitions.

The contributions gathered together reflect a wide range of different theoretical, methodological, and political approaches to the critical issues at hand, which in some respects are antagonistic to each other. As such, this special issue does not represent an endorsed or shared approach; instead, these contributions are presented here as provocations to stimulate critical discussion. For us as editors, the theme of recognition brings with it a historicized political sensibility that shapes the subject and object of research intended to achieve social justice. To recognize is to see a likeness, to remember a past or imagine possible futures in a present. Taking the critical practice of recognition as our organizing point of departure, the articles gathered here reflect on disciplinary, theoretical and methodological acts of recognizing knowledge. Understanding recognition as a practice of re-thinking, this issue fosters a purposeful critical effort to reflect on, and learn again, some of the ways research questions, methods, analyses, and responses are recognized and given form under the broader categories of research in cultural studies and education.

Practices of recognition and formation are set in relief by work that traverses identity boundaries. Athough recent turns to the "new" materialism and posthumanism have further complicated the use of identity-based discourses, contributions to this edition revisit the significance of politics of identification. More than this, though, we want to gesture toward the fact that the act of recognition plays a part in constructing specific futures. To see potential in a situation, and in people's distinctiveness, to act in a generative way that is historically aware and politically mindful, is indeed an act of recognition. This volume brings together pieces that provoke critical reflections on the relationships between acts of recognition, interpretations of culture, practices of pedagogy, and ideas of the past and of the future that routinely bind such relationships.

Pursuing this analytic of recognition as a political act of seeing that has a temporal dimension, we invite the reader to consider what it is that we recognize as the proper objects and subjects of research in cultural studies and education. How are recognitions of proper subjects recalibrated when we loosen an investment in the imagination of these fields as separate to one another, and what do we learn about cultural studies and education as research fields from recognizing their histories of connection, overlap, and hybridization? In what ways does working with the concept of culture as pedagogy create space for the

politics of recognition, while also providing opportunities for marking out the pedagogical limits of culture? As the contributions brought together in this collection demonstrate, the practice of recognition is by no means straightforward. It involves active, contestable, and often contentious processes of remembering as processes of shaping the present and possible futures.

As a process through which order and sense is attributed to knowledge, practices of recognition are acts of interpretation. Through critical engagements with the social-cultural politics of difference, specifically in relation to young subjects, this issue also prompts reflections in relation to the perimeters of recognition by exploring ways recognitions are produced through disciplinary knowledges and how research is oriented and recognized through particular disciplinary perspectives in and across cultural studies and education, including how mutual disciplinary recognitions are negotiated within the context of a researcher's critical practice.

As a critical commitment to acknowledgment, the theme of recognitions invites a critical reflection on remembrances and futures. It is a call for actualizing the messy, nonidentitarian histories of cross-fertilization that now constitute scholarly fields that have assumed distinct identities. It is in this context of historical recognition, that this issue draws attention to the contingent ways knowledge can be assembled across disciplinary borders, opening up lines of inquiry for thinking through notions of futurity. Active remembrances are critical to shaping present and future experiences and acts of seeing possible futures are core to any practice of pedagogy. Contributions to this collection provoke critical discussions about what gets recognized and how recognition and remembrances occur in research, and how pedagogical acts are part of shaping futures. More than this, though, encourage fresh reflections on the act of recognition as both an interpretive practice requiring remembrance and as a form of pedagogy that invokes possible futures.

Note

1. Where the dictionary suggests that "recognize" derives etymologically thus: "[alteration of Old French *reconuiss-*, stem of *reconoistre* <Latin *recognōscere* < *re-* again +*com-* (intensive) +*gnōscere* to learn.]" (Barnhart and Barnhart 1981, 1744).

Acknowledgments

We would like to offer our most sincere gratitude to Professor Baden Offord who has very kindly mentored the realization of this project and to everyone at the *Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies* for their support for this special issue. We would like to also thank the contributors to this project, as well as all of our anonymous reviewers. This special issue grew out of an Invited Symposium at the Australian Association for Research in Education conference in Hobart in 2011 and at the British Education Research Association conference in Manchester in 2012, and we want to thank everyone involved in the presentation of the work at those events.

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