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REVIEW ESSAY

Beside ourselves: worlds beyond people

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The posthuman, by R. Braidotti, London, Polity, 2013, 180 pp., £29.94 (paperback), ISBN 978-0-74-564158-4

New materialism: interviews and cartographies, by R. Dolphin and I. van der Tuin, Ann Arbor, MI, Open Humanities Press, 2012, 195 pp., £11.06 (paperback), ISBN 978-1-60-785281-0

Deleuze and education, by I. Semetsky and D. Masny, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2013, 264 pp., £21.34 (paperback), ISBN 978-0-74-867465-7

This review essay explores three books: Rosi Braidotti's *The Posthuman*, and two edited works – Rick Dolphin and Iris van der Tuin's *New Materialism: Interviews and Cartographies* and Inna Semetsky and Diana Masny's *Deleuze and Education*. I canvass the major lines of argument advanced in Braidotti's work, and, in the case of the edited collections, comment on the impressions left by the two very different collections.

Braidotti's commanding commentary on posthumanism begins with a summary of what she calls the posthuman condition: 'In my view, the common denominator for the posthuman condition is an assumption about the vital, self organizing and yet non-naturalistic structure of matter itself' (*The Posthuman* 2). Arguing for a monistic philosophy that rejects dualism 'and stresses instead the self-organizing or auto-poetic force of living matter' (3), Braidotti suggests that the posthuman condition shows we have already moved beyond the nature–culture continuum; that this foundational binary opposition between the given and the constructed is being replaced by a non-dualistic understanding of the nature–culture distinction. Braidotti further defines posthumanism as 'the historical moment that marks the end of the opposition between Humanism and anti-humanism and traces a different discursive framework, looking more affirmatively towards new alternatives' (37).

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Posthumanism emerges from anti-humanism and builds on its legacy while forming new versions of subjectivity. Braidotti draws our attention to work in contemporary science and technology studies, a field that has developed an analytic form of posthuman theory. Sarah Franklin, Celia Lury and Jackie Stacey, Nicholas Rose and Peter-Paul Verbeek each offer interesting interventions that yet fall 'wide of the mark, because ... [they] introduce ... selected segments of humanistic values without addressing the contradictions engendered by such a grafting exercise' (*The Posthuman* 42). Braidotti thus argues for a posthumanism that is not analytic but critical. She cites postcolonial theorists as exemplary of beginning this trajectory: Said, Gilroy, Mies and Shiva. Braidotti defines the critical posthuman subject 'within an eco-philosophy of multiple belongings, as a relational subject constituted in and by multiplicity, that is to say a subject that works across differences and is also internally differentiated, but still grounded and accountable' (49). Her position rejects individualism but also distances itself from nihilistic defeatism or relativism.

For Braidotti, there is a necessary link between critical posthumanism and the move beyond anthropocentrism. Man is no longer 'the measure of all things' (*The Posthuman* 13). Protagoras and da Vinci's formulation of human reason that set the standard for both individuals and their cultures has long been understood as a 'hegemonic cultural model' that is 'canonized' by Hegel's philosophy of history (14). This 'Eurocentric paradigm' understands difference as pejorative (16) and, in advancing her critique of this devaluation of difference, Braidotti is staunchly anti-humanist. Feminism, de-colonization, anti-racism, anti-nuclear and pacifist movements are all activist brands of anti-humanism that have proven the limits of humanism. Braidotti aligns herself with humanist feminism, alongside Haraway, Rich and Harding, explaining that:

The theoretical premise of humanist feminism is a materialist notion of embodiment that spells the premises of new and more accurate analyses of power. (*The Posthuman* 22)

Braidotti wants to replace the values of humanism with 'a more complex and relational subject framed embodiment, sexuality, affectivity, empathy and desire as core qualities' (26). Anti-humanism rejects the dialectical scheme of thought, 'where difference or otherness played a constitutive role, marking off the sexualised other (woman), the racialized other (the native) and the naturalized other (animals, the environment or earth)' (27). Dialectical and pejorative otherness induces 'structural ignorance' about others posited 'outside the norm' (28). However, the critical promise of anti-humanism is complex, because adopting an anti-humanist perspective is also fraught with difficulties. Humanist principles of emancipation, progressive politics and secularity are all entrenched in our thought; it is hard to leave them behind.

Braidotti argues that: ‘it is impossible, both intellectually and ethically, to disengage the positive elements of Humanism from their problematic counterparts: individualism breeds egotism and self-centredness; self-determination can turn to arrogance and domination; and science is not free from its own dogmatic tendencies’ (30).

Within humanism we find the ideals of human emancipation and secularism. Popular culture has also increased the post-secular trend. However, in our contemporary, post-secular condition (*The Posthuman* 31; see also Braidotti 2008; Braidotti et al. 2014; Habermas 2008) which features a twentieth-century feminism so proud of its secularity, a spiritual dimension emerges expressed in the work of Lorde, Rich and Walker. For Braidotti: ‘Complexity becomes the key word, as it is clear that one single narrative does not suffice to account for secularity as an unfinished project and its relationship to Humanism and emancipatory politics’ (*The Posthuman* 35). Embracing an emancipatory complexity, Braidotti advocates a vitalist materialism, drawing on Spinoza’s assertion that ‘matter, the world and humans are not dualistic entities structured according to principles of internal or external opposition’ (56). Monism, or ‘radical immanence’, rejects all forms of transcendentalism. Braidotti favours a neo-Spinozist approach for a posthuman critique of anthropocentrism, seeing matter as intelligent and relational; it is not cut off from the rest of organic life. The vitalist approach has normally been associated with *bios* (i.e. *anthropos*) but Braidotti connects it to *zoe* – ‘the non-human, vital force of Life’ (60). Posthuman theory is thus a brand of vital materialism. Braidotti believes that ‘the political economy of bio-genetic capitalism is post-anthropocentric in its very structures, but not necessarily or automatically post-humanistic’ (65). It is also inhuman(e).

The posthuman dimension of post-anthropocentrism is a deconstructive move; it deconstructs species supremacy. When the common standard ‘Man’ is displaced: ‘In the ontological gap thus opened, the other species come galloping in’ (*The Posthuman* 67). The anthropocentric relationship between humans and animals has long been entrenched as ‘familiar, oedipalized, and hence ambivalent’ (69), and needs a new system of representation which is non-exploitative; ‘deep *zoe*-egalitarianism between humans and animals’ (71). Braidotti advocates an updated brand of Spinozist monism ‘as a democratic move that promotes a kind of ontological pacifism’ (86). This is inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Spinoza and their use of the term ‘chaos’ as a roar of cosmic energy. Chaos, or ‘choasmos’, contains ‘the infinite expanse of all virtual forces’ (86).

The post-anthropocentric shift away from the hierarchical relations that had privileged ‘Man’ requires a form of estrangement and a radical repositioning on the part of the subject. The becoming-machine nature of the posthuman is beyond metaphorization now. Cyborgs are ‘the dominant social and cultural formations that are active throughout the social fabric, with many economic and political implications’ (*The Posthuman* 90). All

technologies have a bio-political effect on the embodied subjects with which they intersect. Cyborgs include 'not only the glamorous bodies of high-tech, jet-fighter pilots, athletes or film stars, but also the anonymous masses of the underpaid, digital proletariat who fuel the technology-driven global economy without ever accessing it themselves' (90). Braidotti wants to argue for a vitalist view of the 'technologically bio-mediated other' (91). Invoking Deleuze and Guattari's becoming-machine and bodies without organs, Braidotti identifies two aims:

- (1) To rethink our bodies as part of a nature-culture continuum;
- (2) Add an explicitly political dimension 'by setting the framework of recomposition of spurious efficiency and ruthless opportunism of advanced capitalism' (*The Posthuman* 92).

Braidotti discusses Guattari's posthuman need for a 'new virtual social ecology' (93), which includes social, political, ethical and aesthetic dimensions plus transversal links between them: ecologies of the environment, the social nexus and the psyche. Transversal lines run through all three and the transversality of relations is key; it actualizes *zoe*-centred egalitarianism as an ethics and a method. Braidotti describes becoming-machine as 'matter-realism' (Fraser et al. 2006, 95) and advocates non-melancholic, affirmative yet critical post-anthropocentrism, incorporating the notion of *zoe* as a non-human yet generative life force.

The twentieth-century relationship between the body and machinery is highly sexualized and gendered. Modernism celebrates the inhuman nature of the artistic object, but the 'inhuman is not what it used to be' (*The Posthuman* 109). Postmodernism heralds an ironic distance from the technological object. Ways to die, ways to inflict death and ways to suffer loss are proliferating everywhere, and since Foucault this has been referred to as bio-political, but Braidotti asks: 'What does life (*bios*) have to do with it?' (115). She suggests we look beyond this into death studies, and think about the *zoe* dimension of the politics of dying. The necro-political dimension means that 'the political representation of embodied subjects nowadays can no longer be understood within the visual economy of bio-politics in Foucault's (1978) sense of the word' (118). The representation is not visual (as in post-Platonic simulacrum), or specular; it has become 'schizoid, or internally disjointed' (119). Braidotti believes that the central premise of Foucault's political anatomy (in his earlier work) remains valid: that 'bio-power also involves the management of dying' (119).

Achille Mbembe (2003) argues that bio-power and necro-politics are two sides to the same coin, technological sophistication in necro-politics sees death as a concept remaining caught in contradiction, but posthuman theory is 'filling this vacuum and making important contributions' (*The Posthuman* 128). Seeking to strengthen this important contribution with 'affirmative

ethics' (129), Braidotti constructs a positivity she links to *Aion*, eternal time, rather than the *Chronos*, or measured time, of the hegemonic political order. So what does posthuman death in measured time look like? It depends on one's view of life. Life as *zoe*, as cosmic energy, can still hurt: '*Zoe* is always too much for the specific slab of enfleshed existence that constitutes single subjects' (131). *Zoe* is impersonal and, following Deleuze, if we view life as impersonal, we must view death in the same way. Braidotti stresses *zoe*; 'which means the productive aspect of the life-death continuum' (132). Death does not propel us forward; it is 'behind us' (133). Again she invokes *Aion*; 'perpetual becoming, not only the linear and individualized *Chronos*. The temporality of death is time itself, by which I mean the totality of time' (133). De-familiarization (equated with critical distance) is a useful method for knowing and approaching death differently. With this philosophy of death comes a philosophy of life, and Braidotti sees the human subject as an 'in-between that is plugged into and connected to a variety of possible sources and forces' (139). It is from this position that she moves to consider life beyond theory.

The humanities cannot help but be affected by posthumanism: 'The displacement of anthropocentrism and the scrambling of species hierarchy leaves the Human un-moored and unsupported, which deprives the field of the Humanities of much-needed epistemological foundations' (*The Posthuman* 145). Braidotti cites animal studies and eco-criticism as two excellent examples of posthuman scholarship, and perceptively notes that 'The fast-changing field of disability studies is almost emblematic of the posthuman predicament' (146). Gender, feminist and postcolonial studies are the prototypes of 'these new experimental areas which have provided so much in terms of instruments as well as innovative concepts' (148).

Braidotti characterizes the 'science wars' of the 1990s as a low point in the relationship between sciences and the humanities, arguing that blaming 'post-structuralism for breaking the bad news is to mistake the messenger for the message' (*The Posthuman* 151). She endorses the call for an epistemological turn in the humanities, but believes this is held back by the lack of a tradition of epistemological self-reflexivity in the field. Matter-realism, such as Barad's work on agential realism and Parisi's work on complexity theory, can transform and inspire the humanities. Cartographic accuracy with the corollary of ethical accountability, trans-disciplinarity, the importance of combining critique with creative figurations, the principle of non-linearity, the powers of memory and the imagination and the strategy of de-familiarization (163) are the principles we can take from agential realism and complexity theory.

So, thinking of life beyond theory, what is the most adequate model of the university for the globalized era? Digital virtual campuses. University needs to become a 'multi-versity' (Wernick 2006, 561 in *The Posthuman* 179). 'In other words, the contemporary university needs to redefine its posthuman planetary mission in terms of a renewed relationship to the

global city where it is situated' (180). The current state of the neoliberal university is deplorable; 'academics function more like mid-ranking executives in a business organization run by accountants and financial advisors than independent scholars in a self-organized community' (182). Braidotti is adamant that for the humanities to survive, we need to be pragmatic but optimistic: 'Posthuman Humanities are already at work in the global multi-versity, not only to fend off extinction, but also to actualize sustainable posthuman futures' (185).

In concluding, Braidotti returns to the four questions she asked in the introduction, arguing that the posthuman is not postmodern, 'because it does not rely on anti-foundationalist premises' (*The Posthuman* 188), and it is not poststructuralist, 'because it does not function within the linguistic turn or other forms of deconstruction' (188). Rather, the posthuman nomadic subject is 'materialist and vitalist, embodied and embedded' (188). Life for Braidotti is 'neither a metaphysical notion, nor a semiotic system of meaning; it expresses itself in a multiplicity of empirical acts: there is nothing to say, but everything to do' (189–190). This is, then, still a very humanist notion of a posthuman life.

Dolphin and van de Tuin's collection was published a year before *The Posthuman*, and Braidotti's philosophy of the posthuman certainly resonates in her contribution to this volume and informs the mapping of the terrain undertaken by this astute and engaged collection. Divided into interviews and then mappings, *New Materialism* offers some diverse perspectives on new materialism. Part 1, interviews, features conversations with Braidotti, Manuel DeLanda, Karen Barad and Quentin Meillassoux. Barad's theory of intra-action is enacted across the first part of this book, because it 'is not the interviewers or the interviewee or even the oeuvre of the interviewee that deserves our special attention, but it is the sense of orientation that the interview gave rise to (the action itself) that should engender us' (15).

Braidotti offers a genealogy of new materialism, drawing on Lyotard's 'rewriting' and Deleuze's 'creation of concepts'. Braidotti discusses 'neo-materialism' as 'a method, a conceptual frame and a political stand, which refuses the linguistic paradigm, stressing instead the concrete yet complex materiality of bodies immersed in social relations of power' (*New Materialism* 21, 25, 28). Braidotti believes there is a need for a 'systematic meta-discursive approach to the interdisciplinary methods of feminist philosophy' (25). Feminist thought is currently locating itself somewhere in between post-humanism on the one hand and post-anthropocentric theories on the other. Braidotti uses Deleuze's concept of the univocity of being in order to highlight difference as a verb or process of becoming, and within this she states that 'sexual difference plays a crucial role' (28).

DeLanda characterizes new materialism as a dynamic morphogenesis. DeLanda's 'neo-materialism' makes use of Deleuze and Guattari, invoking Deleuze and Guattari's concept of 'double articulation' as part of the

process of a non-dialectical, non-essential account for a material world independent of our minds, and explains their (and his) use of Hjelmslev's terms 'content' and 'expression':

A rock like limestone or sandstone, for example, is first articulated through a process of sedimentation (the slow gathering and sorting of pebbles that are the component parts of the rock. Then it is articulated a second time as the accumulated sediment is glued together by a process of cementation. (De Landa, quoted in *New Materialism* 39)

Hjelmslev's terms, whilst linguistic in origin, are not used in a linguistic sense by DeLanda here. Unlike many leftist materialist thinkers, DeLanda rejects Marx's thought and suggests Braudel instead, arguing that 'It is our duty as Leftists to cut the umbilical cord chaining us to Marx and reinvent political economy ... Marx did not see trade or credit as sources of wealth, but Braudel presents indisputable historical sources that they are' (41).

DeLanda echoes the interviewers' desires to move beyond the rejection of dualisms (e.g. Cartesian mind-body, subject-object) and instead posit the 'many': 'What we need is to replace the reified generalities with concrete assemblages: many bazaars, many regional trading areas, many national markets' (*New Materialism* 44). DeLanda is anti-idealist and believes that theory of the subject, whilst necessary, should be based on Hume rather than Kant; 'subjective experience not as organized conceptually by categories but as literally composed of intensities (of color, sound, aroma, flavor, texture) that are given structure by habitual action' (46).

Barad develops new materialism as agential realism and diffractive methodology. In response to the interviewers' provocation that her work is a 'critique' of many theorists' refusal to accept the material-discursive and performative nature of intra-actions, Barad advocates diffraction as a welcome alternative to the notion of critique. She points out that 'going critical' refers to the point of 'critical mass', wherein 'a single neutron enters a critical sample of nuclear material which produces a chain reaction that explodes with ideas' (*New Materialism* 49). She adds: 'As a physicist I find this metaphor chilling and ominous'. For Barad, diffractive readings are 'respectful, detailed, ethical engagements' (50). She believes that the entanglement of matter and meaning questions the dualism of nature and culture, and consequently questions the separation of humanities and sciences. Citing Haraway, Barad presents diffraction as 'a metaphor for another kind of critical consciousness' (51). The key factor about the process of diffraction for Barad is that it 'allows you to study both the nature of the apparatus and also the object' (52), thereby operating like physical rather than geometrical optics in physics. Again, using Haraway's analogy: 'Diffraction, understood using quantum physics, is not just a matter of interference, but of entanglement, an ethico-onto-epistemological matter' (52).

In response to questions about the nature of the ‘agent’ in agential realism, Barad explains that agency is not a quality or something that can be possessed: ‘Agency is not held, it is not a property of persons or things; rather, agency is an enactment, a matter of possibilities for reconfiguring entanglements’ (*New Materialism* 54). Barad explains her use of Bohr’s quantum physics by suggesting that in any experiment there is an entanglement or inseparability of apparatus and observed object. According to Bohr:

the properties that we measure are not attributable to independent objects. Independent objects are abstract notions. This is the wrong objective referent. The actual objective referent is the phenomenon – the intra-action of what we call the electron and the apparatus. And so the fact that its ontology changes when we change the apparatus is not a surprise, because we are investigating an entirely different phenomenon. (*New Materialism* 61)

Barad denies that her work constitutes a manifesto for agential realism:

Agential realism is not a manifesto, it does not take that all is or will or can be made manifest. On the contrary, it is a call, a plea, a provocation, a cry, a passionate yearning for an appreciation of, attention to the tissue of ethicality that runs through the world. (70)

Meillassou’s interest is in speculative materialism and its capacity to radicalize the relation between ontology and epistemology. He opposes correlationism to what he terms ‘subjectivists’ (*New Materialism* 72). The subjectivist’s thesis, according to Meillassoux, ‘absolutizes various figures of subjectivity’ (72). Subjectivists range from what Meillassoux describes as Hegel’s speculative idealism, to various strands of vitalism such as those found in Nietzsche and Deleuze. Meillassoux uses the concept of the arche-fossil to elucidate ‘strong’ correlationism in opposition to subjectivist metaphysics: for him, the ‘aporia’ of the arche-fossil demonstrates the ‘demand for an elucidation of science’s conditions of thinkability’ (74).

Materialism for Meillassoux is summed up in the following two theses:

- (1) Being is separate and independent of thought (understood in the broad sense of subjectivity),
- (2) Thought can think Being (*New Materialism* 79).

Part two of the collection, mappings, argues that new materialism favours a monist perspective or a philosophy of immanence, rejecting Cartesian dualism which has favoured mind over matter. Chapters on transversalities (disciplinarity, paradigms and spatio-temporality of theory), working through dualisms, sexual differing and posthumanism, sketch out various terrains of posthumanist thought. Drawing on Braidotti and DeLanda’s work, the authors assert that:

Reworking and eventually 'breaking through' dualism appears to be the key to new materialism. Dualism comes to the fore as the structuring principle of the transcendental and humanist traditions that they want to shift in their work. Prioritizing mind over matter or culture over nature is a transcendentalizing gesture following humanist and dialecticist thought. (*New Materialism* 97)

According to DeLanda's non-dualist argument regarding new materialism, anti-representationalism is an immanent gesture; neither realist nor social constructivist, these discourses are 'recognized, though shifted' (98). New materialism 'cuts across or intersects dual oppositions in an immanent way' (100). Braidotti's enfleshed Deleuzean subject is presented as a cartography which 'shows that new materialism has something to say about Reason' (107). Radical immanence, radical materialism, understands matter as undergoing an ongoing metamorphosis or 'morphogenesis' (DeLanda 1996, 2002), escaping every possible representation. In answer to the question of how linguisticity (Butler) is escaped through new materialism, they discuss how Kirby reads matter itself as speaking and possessing a literacy. Analogously, Ahmed is another figure who presents new materialism as not discarding signification but rather 'directs it to its proper place and qualitatively shifts the linguistic turn accordingly' (2008, 34, in *New Materialism* 110). The authors' understanding of the term 'cartographical' in relation to new materialism relates to de-territorializing the ways in which cultural theory has been classified (110). This is a move away from the classificatory towards the cartographical, in which Barad's neologism intra-action is again instrumental.

The chapter on dualism discusses the ways Continental philosophers establish a philosophy of difference through a 'double move concerning ontology on the one hand and methodology on the other' (*New Materialism* 115). New materialism traverses modernity's dualisms and thinks a new conception of difference; it is posited here as a 'radical rewriting of modernity' (120). All thought which begins with classification or with the repudiation of thought 'cannot set forth a revolution in thought' (120). According to Grosz (2005, 165), only in radical rewriting can revolutions in thought come into being. After Deleuze and Guattari (1991), we can see that, rather than dualisms, an onto-epistemology is proposed in which the philosopher creates their own concepts. This results in an affirmative rather than a negative type of relationality. New materialism instead installs a 'philosophy of difference by engaging in the activity of creating concepts, which is an onto-epistemological activity' (*New Materialism* 126–127).

The chapter on sexual differing considers the 'double bind' (*New Materialism* 139) of biological essentialism and social constructivism that has been dominating discourses of feminism for a long time. If these poles are traversed, a 'minor' (139) tradition of feminist historiography allows feminism to move beyond this, beginning with the work of de Beauvoir, then Cixous,

Kristeva and Irigaray, and more recently Braidotti and Grosz. Butler's reading of de Beauvoir is criticized for inscribing a 'strict dualism' between gender as a form of expression and sex as a form of content, and for restricting herself to:

an oversimplified idea of language which refuses to see how the politics active in sex and gender build upon a series of statements and states of things that have always been intrinsically intertwined with one another and that are always in processes of morphogenesis corresponding to one another. (New Materialism 144)

The authors advocate a move from sexual difference to sexual differing (153).

The final chapter in the collection, 'The End of Wo(Man)', discusses how we can map a new materialism without the presupposition that all (feminist) theories of the subject imply a human-subject-centred epistemology (*New Materialism* 159). Whilst Spinoza is invoked in the previous chapter in terms of his thinking of desire, the authors do not equate the metaphysics of new materialism with Spinozism. Monism, however, 'has run like an electrical current through our conceptualization' (160). Examples of non-anthropocentric new materialism can be found in Barad's intra-action and DeLanda's morphogenesis.

Deleuze's 'the tree greens' and Whitehead's 'we enjoy the green foliage of the spring greenly' are cited as examples of greenness as an 'active expression' (*New Materialism* 163) or, to use Whitehead's (1929) term, a 'prehension'. This metaphysics is a non-anthropocentric, non-linguistic process, focused first on the activity and, secondly, they have been 'queered'.

Opposing Meillassoux's reading of Kant, the authors produce an affirmative reading of Kant through Foucault's description of Kant's second Copernican revolution as a 'humanist revolution' (*New Materialism* 166). Both Meillassoux and Foucault are concerned with rewriting Kantian paradigms, but they do this in very different ways. Foucault wants to push Kant's dualist thinking to its limit, whereas for Meillassoux Kant's metaphysics is critiqued as 'correlationism'. It is not fully negated, but weak correlationism is where he sets up the possibility of speculative materialism. This chapter ends with a discussion of the role that mathematics plays in the thought of Meillassoux, DeLanda, Barad, Massumi, Stengers and others. Stengers, Massumi and DeLanda appear to agree that topology (a 'difference in degree' rather than set theory's 'difference in kind'; 176) is the most applicable model for new materialism because of its smoothness. Specifically, they argue for: a 'pointless topology' (177), after Peter T. Johnstone (1977); and 'mereotopology', after Whitehead (1929). Pointless topology is 'the one infinite mechanism that is all' and 'liberates a new materialism' (178).

The second collection, *Deleuze and Education*, is very different in register and in many respects this is a very 'non Deleuzian' approach to thinking about education, if there can be such a thing. Deleuze is famous for asserting

that we must assess artworks and concepts in relation to the terms they have established for themselves. This collection certainly does not develop criteria drawn from work on Deleuze that is happening within education, although it does contain some strong work from select scholars in the field.

Four years after the established educational ethnographers Elizabeth St. Pierre and Wanda Pillow published their Deleuze-inspired methodological smorgasbord *Working the Ruins* (2000) showcasing Patti Lather's work, Inna Semetsky (2004) began publishing on Deleuze, and nine years later Masny (Masny and Cole 2009) developed her theory of multiple literacies augmented with Deleuze's ideas. Since 2000 a number of academics with international research profiles, such as Maria Tamboukou (UEL, London), Jan Jagodzinski (Alberta), Emma Renold (Cardiff), Jessica Ringrose (UCL, London), Stephanie Springgay (OISE, Toronto), Dennis Atkinson (Goldsmiths), Maggie McLure (Manchester), Bronwyn Davies (Melbourne) and Kaustuv Roy (USCD, San Diego), along with more recent but important voices such as Greg Thompson, Eve Myers and Matthew Carlin have made significant contributions to the field of Deleuze and education. As such, it is a shame not to see these known voices in this field included in this collection, and surprising to read the suggestion that 'While less visible in education, [Deleuze's] ... body of work has been the subject of research and practical applications that have been continuously traced by the editors of this volume in their earlier works' (*Deleuze and Education* 1). Not only is the first date the editors mention as their own invention of this field four years after *Working the Ruins* was published, the field is later summarized by education-focused panels at Deleuze Studies Conferences, which clearly do not constitute a global account of work in this space. Not to suggest the field actually began with Lather's work, but this is a rather large point to miss and indicative of the blinkered view of the field offered by the collection. Mark Bonta's chapter in this collection notes that: 'Semetsky (2008b) follows authors such as Elizabeth St Pierre, who pioneered qualitative research based on Deleuzian "nomadic inquiry" in the 1990's' (60). The editors' work would benefit from such a contextually aware approach to their field.

This imagined gap in scholarship is remade throughout this collection, which is characterized by a lack of acknowledgement of existing work in the field. Some chapters are more contextually aware than others, and I discuss two of these contributions below. Bouge's discussion of materialist pedagogy, of the teacher swimming and the sea teaching the student how to swim, is interesting, although this quickly becomes overshadowed by Deleuze's very humanist pedagogy, which stands in contrast to his posthuman or materialist leanings. Indeed, this very point is made later in the volume by Bonta, who in his insightful piece asserts that:

Given his philosophy, one can hardly imagine Deleuze as the classroom dictator, and indeed 'its not a question of following everything or of listening to

everything, but to keep a watch so that one grasps what suits him or her at the right moment'. (*Deleuze and Education* 62)

Julie Allan's fabulous discussion of the materiality of making is a high point in the collection. She discusses the politics of disability in education as made and remade by art. In a case study of 'Art Lab', she interrogates the sounds and relationships with objects that formed part of the art-making experience and also highlights the learning from and with matter that is part of young people's creative learning. Allan explains how students asked to compile words or phrases and accompanying actions around a wheelchair that positioned as a pedagogical object. The materiality of art and learning is re-machined through Deleuze's thought and matter is seen as pedagogical. Across discussions of being inside/outside the classroom and pedagogical approaches in mathematics and science, *Deleuze and Education* presents some strong works that have been rather short-sightedly collected. It will be useful reading for those new to the field.

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