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Mission and Human Dignity in the Black Sea Region – Philosophical Considerations

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Abstract

Because human dignity presents us, in all regions of the world, with a cause for celebration and a steep challenge, it constitutes a problem for humanity. Engagement with the idea tends to happen when the problem makes itself felt and the ethical challenges that mark a region are therefore testified to in its writings on human dignity. Engaging with such writings make it possible, for example for the Black Sea Region, to move more concertedly towards appreciation of human dignity. This engagement is precious because it promotes both the understanding of and thereby the possible appreciation of the fundamental value of the human being. It is argued in this article that such promotion pertains to the central task of Christian mission, in so far as concern for human dignity stands at the heart of Christ's own mission.

Keywords

human dignity – mission – worldviews – ecumenism – philosophy – Black Sea region – ethics

1 Introduction

Missiology, as a branch of theology, presents us with a dilemma regarding human dignity. This dilemma concerns human dignity's metaphysical status: is theology required for us to understand it or is it not? If it is required, which

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kind of theology can elucidate human dignity and why? If it is not required, upon what does human dignity depend, and what guarantees it? Missiology must speak to this dilemma at the heart of missionary practice in so far as mission speaks to a world of unbelievers and those of different beliefs about what matters most to human beings.

Meanwhile, human dignity itself presents us, practically and politically, with a problem. We find it – both individually and collectively – to be of great importance as well as hard to live up to, and both are reasons for turning to God and to religion. We want to celebrate human dignity on the one hand, and we need help to meet its ethical and political challenges on the other. As people turn to God for this help in different religions, and as different religions in turn understand human dignity to raise different ethical expectations and to consist in somewhat different things, different understandings of human dignity encounter each other in any area where people of different persuasions live together – such as, for example, in the region around the Black Sea.

The philosophical problem of human dignity consists in bringing together these different understandings into a coherent whole, while also explaining the relationships they have with one another. It formulates the practical, experienced problem in its entirety, including the missiological dilemma as it contributes to the experienced problem: To the non-believer, namely, human dignity cannot rely on faith, since he believes he has human dignity but not faith, whereas to the believer it cannot be understood without faith, since he can only understand what it is in terms of his faith.

To clarify the challenge and the opportunity that the problem of human dignity constitutes for missiology, we shall first seek to further clarify the relations between it and the missiological dilemma (1). Then we shall propose a formulation of the philosophical problem of human dignity that takes account of the missiological dilemma and puts it in the context of different possible understandings of human dignity discovered in relation to Western European sources (2). Finally, we will discuss how the study of understandings of human dignity sourced in the area around the Black Sea might help us expand and deepen this understanding of human dignity, and how missiology might both contribute to and profit from such study (3).

2 The Missiological Dilemma and the Problem of Human Dignity

Let us look at a prayer that illustrates the missiological dilemma as regards human dignity:

> Year by Year, Lord / we recall the mystery of Easter, / the mystery which restored mankind to its lost dignity / and brought the hope of the resurrection. / Grant that we may possess eternally in love, / what we now worship in faith. / We make this prayer through our Lord.
>
> Morning Prayer on Wednesdays of the Easter Season. Roman Catholic Rite

This prayer shows how Christian faith recognises in human dignity a major, if not the most important, concern God has for humanity: God is both the giver and restorer of human dignity (McEvoy and Lebech 2020). However, human dignity cannot – and especially not after the Fall – be conceived without reference to God (Kendall and Woodhead 2006). God is therefore called upon to grant us, through our worship of God in faith, that the lost dignity of humanity be restored in love. Faith and love are, by this understanding, the means through which the merciful restoration of human dignity can take place.[1]

Whereas this makes good sense to the believer, the idea that human dignity should be impaired in its 'natural' state or be in any way be 'due' to God may seem revolting to the unbeliever who has not experienced the need for repentance or the gratuitous nature of God's mercy. Concern for the unbeliever's experience and the need to find common ways of speaking and understanding push theology towards affirming that human dignity can be known through reason alone (Roman Catholic Church 2024) even if it cannot, from a theological viewpoint, be definitively accounted for without theological ideas such as iconicity, redemption, or unification with God (Russian Orthodox Church 2008; Stoeckl 2014). It seems the missiological dilemma thus stems from the attempt to proclaim God's indispensable help to people who believe they do not need it. For this purpose, theology recognises 'layers' in human dignity, such that, ontologically speaking, it involves all the following elements in different proportions: (a) a divine gift or privilege, (b) human nature, (c) virtuous human action, and (d) restorative divine mercy. What theology is proposing is that human dignity consists in the fact that God addresses us as responsible for creation and entrusts us with its stewardship: human dignity relies on and consists in this *relation*. Should that not be believed by some, the gift as well as the restoration would still be effective, even if seen only by the believer.

1 Missiology should not be understood as a branch of *Christian* theology only because mission has parallels in Islam, Judaism, and other religions. Nevertheless, I shall here discuss the missiological dilemma in Christian terms.

Secular approaches, in contrast – especially if, post-Enlightenment, they find the idea of nature problematic – often emphasise political recognition as the relationship which carries human dignity. Habermas, for example (2010:472), claims that,

> the concept of human dignity transfers the content of a morality of equal respect for everyone to the status order of citizens who derive their self-respect from the fact that they are recognised by all other citizens as subjects of equal actionable rights.

For Habermas, human dignity signifies a morality of equal respect for everyone, imported into a state constituted by citizens recognising each other as subjects of equal, actionable rights. Political individuals can derive their self-respect either from recognition by others or from their own human dignity: echoing existing recognition to amplify it in the first case or relying on motivation stemming from human dignity itself in the second. The tension between the source of morality and the state, between human beings endowed with human dignity and citizens confirming each other's status within the state, may serve the common good so long as no undeniable affront to human dignity is perpetrated *by* the state.

Modernity, however, seems to make us face the possibility that the state – also the democratic state – can be a perpetrator of crimes against humanity by its very nature (Heller 1999). Thus, it seems fortunate that it remains possible for us – individually or collectively – to search for additional sources to inspire respect for human dignity and call on God's mercy to restore it, independently of whether it is recognised by the state or not. The missiological dilemma concerning human dignity is thus prolonged in the political problem of human dignity in so far as the latter needs to presuppose human dignity (for example, as 'natural' or 'given by God') so that the idea or principle can play a role as foundational for the legal order even when the factual recognition of it is found to be lacking and violations occur.

In this vein, Stein (2006:172–73) and Rupniewski (2022) recognise law as depending on the value-choices of the people who hold office (and/or elect representatives) within the state at any given time. This can be understood in such a way that politicians – enacting laws and governing to uphold sovereignty – rely on their values (for example human dignity) for knowing what laws to promote *in* the state. This 'importation' of values into the state, however, is often overlooked, and the view that a democratic 'consensus' *quasi*-automatically originates the values of the state – including human dignity – obscures it.

The missiological dilemma and the political problem of human dignity are thus linked by a kind of mutual implication. The missiological dilemma, on the one hand, presupposes there to be a problem with human dignity in the sense that human dignity is not 'finished' on its own in secular seclusion, but rather involves God in different, decisive ways, depending on the specific theological tradition. The political problem of human dignity, on the other hand, presupposes that human dignity 'is there', even when its challenge is not met, and thus that divine help could be enlisted to meet it if one were open to believing that it would. Human dignity therefore opens the political sphere as such to the divine, in so far as this sphere is faced with its own powerlessness to accomplish a society that is respectful of human dignity for all.

Nevertheless, the political and the philosophical problems of human dignity do not by themselves presuppose there to be a theological explanation of human dignity (even if they call for one). They are linked to the missiological dilemma only through those for whom it is a dilemma, i.e. through those who want to communicate God's solicitude for human beings to an unbelieving or differently believing world. These thus play the important role of allowing God to sustain the political order by restoring human dignity, i.e., restoring the valuing of it and respect for it, the 'belief' in it. In this way, human dignity is central to missiological concerns, which in turn are of fundamental political importance. Contributing towards the theoretical elucidation of the meaning of human dignity to the peoples to whom the good news is proclaimed therefore seems an obvious task for the missiologist, since this is where he encounters most indisputably these peoples' need for good news.

It makes sense that theoretical engagement with the idea of human dignity would tend to occur when the political problem of human dignity makes itself felt. It would do that when a systemic falling short is identified and when communication about this is attempted (Lebech 2019). This would explain why theoretical engagement with the idea of human dignity tends to happen around fault-lines resulting from tensions characteristic of cultures, epochs, and regions: When people experience a fundamental ethical problem, they need to find a way to communicate about it in order to address it, and thus they name it, refer to it, and speak about it. What human dignity is, and what makes it what it is, is then brought out into the open to be thought and spoken about.

Appendix 1 lists the translations of the expression 'human dignity' into relevant languages and Appendix 2 gives the first clause of the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in select languages, to bring attention to the fact that the translation of this clause has occasioned 'human dignity' to be translated into most languages on the planet.

3 A Philosophical Formulation of the Problem of Human Dignity Trained on Western European Sources

A philosophical investigation of the idea of human dignity and its Western European sources suggests that it is meaningful to regard human dignity as the fundamental value of human beings, i.e., as the value (of human beings) to which no other value should reasonably (or could justifiably) be preferred (Lebech 2009 and 2019). The definition finds an echo, for example, in material promoted by a federation of course providers of courses on human rights: https://www.humanrightscareers.com/issues/definitions-what-is-human-dignity: 'At its most basic, the concept of human dignity is the belief that all people hold a special value that's tied solely to their humanity. It has nothing to do with their class, race, gender, religion, abilities, or any other factor other than them being human.'

By this understanding, the use of the expression 'human dignity' constitutes a commitment to the idea that human beings are of fundamental value, but does not by itself commit to any particular metaphysical or religious point of view (Glendon 2001:73–79). This seems to be reflected in the history of the making of the Declaration of Human Rights, and in particular in UNESCO's Philosophers' Committee accompaniment of this making. The concrete content of this commitment, in fact, looks different according to the worldview that serves as an interpretative framework for the one who makes the commitment, however implicit this commitment might be. Thus, different epochs in Western European history can be identified as characterised by distinct, typical frameworks obtaining in them, so that we can meaningfully speak of Classical Antiquity being characterised by a cosmo-centric framework, the Middle Ages by a Christo-centric one, Modernity by a 'nomo-centric' framework, and Postmodernity by a *polis*-or poly-centric (pluralist) framework, for the purposes of explaining what human dignity consists in (Lebech 2004).

Does this understanding of human dignity (the proposed formal characterisation of human dignity as a commitment to the value-fact that human beings have fundamental value *and* the possibility that the idea can be filled with content according to different frameworks characteristic of further existential and cultural commitments) make sense even if pursued in contexts other than that of Western Europe? It arguably makes sense *a priori*, since it is a matter of intuition that human dignity could be based on any of several factors: human nature, Christ, the principle of universalisation foundational for law, and/or social construction. However, this understanding may be typical of the West, and assuming it to be *a priori* may constitute a barrier to understanding how

(for example) the peoples of the Black Sea region have conceived of and now understand human dignity. To investigate this possible bias, a systematic mining of sources from, in this instance, the Black Sea region, together with an exploration of their meaning content, could aid us in widening the eidetic analysis and in assessing whether the epoch-determining frameworks in this region are identical to those of the West or not. Differences in frameworks and in their interaction would help us significantly understand the role played by the idea of human dignity in the region, in both historical controversies and contemporary ones.

4 Advancing Our Understanding of Human Dignity by Studying the Conceptualisation History of the Idea in the Black Sea Region: An Opportunity for Missiology

In so far as theoretical engagement with the idea of human dignity tends to happen around fault-lines resulting from tensions characteristic of cultures, epochs, and regions, we can expect that the understandings characteristic of the Black Sea region will, conversely, reveal the problems the region will have faced and with which it may still be struggling. Whether these will have engendered frameworks for making sense of human dignity distinct from those found in Western Europe is a question linked to whether those problems are typically distinct from those of Western Europe.

Certain features of the geography have conditioned a distinct geo-political role for the region. We can think of the exposure to Asia and to the many migrating peoples crossing the Eurasian steppe; the formation of great, multi-ethnic Central and Eastern European powers surrounding and dominating the region at various times in history (Alexander the Great's Empire, the Eastern Roman Empire, Byzantium, the Kyivan Rus, the Habsburg Monarchy, the Ottoman Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Russian Empire, the Napoleonic Empire, Austria-Hungary, the Third Reich and the Soviet Union); the concentration of Jews in these states; the Ottoman dominance where once the Eastern Roman Empire had ruled; the religious contest between Christians and Muslims which followed; and the proximity to the Ancient Middle East with its intense philosophical and religious movements (e.g., Wisdom literature, Gnosticism, and Neoplatonism). All these features are distinctive compared to the West.

For this reason, one can hypothesise that the Byzantine form of government would give rise to a framework distinct from, even if similar to, the Western Christo-centric one. A Muslim theocratic framework might have to be distinguished from a Christian one, and a specifically Jewish theocratic (or

theo-centric?) framework might need to be considered. Might it be the influence of Far-Eastern forms of government/empire formation through steppe (Hunnic to Mongol) invasions as well as Turkic settlements that explains the autocratic slant of frameworks seemingly specific to the region? Might steppe life ('the Wild East') have conditioned forms of household and government that challenged and thereby consolidated or conditioned such autocratic, absolutist or totalitarian forms of caesaropapism? Whether any such possible alternative frameworks would challenge the idea that human dignity can be understood as the commitment to the value-fact that human beings have fundamental value is doubtful, but it is possible that the idea of value, independent of a metaphysical framework, would not come so easily to people of the region for reasons linked to the nature of the frameworks, which it would then be of interest to discuss. Is it an idea that relies on capitalist experience, such that it itself is dependent on yet another metaphysical framework? If so, we will be aided in seeing that too from a comparison with understandings of human dignity in the Black Sea region.

András Máté-Tóth (2020) has proposed that, for the purposes of mission, Central and Eastern Europe – to which the region of the Black Sea belongs – can be understood to be traumatised or wounded in five ways, which all impact the region's ability to receive the good news. For our purposes (and to the extent that Máté-Tóth is correct), the region (including the Black Sea region) would also be affected in its understanding of human dignity by these wounds, since human dignity, from a missiological perspective, forms part of the good news. Máté-Tóth describes these wounds as follows:

1. 'A lack of nation-state autonomy and sovereignty due to occupations by three big hegemonic powers. The in-between geopolitical and geocultural position of the entire region prohibited the building and/or rebuilding of sovereign nation states for between 100 and 400 years.'
2. 'A prohibition of exercising human rights, especially of ethnic minority rights. One of the main consequences of the lack of [nation-] state sovereignty and of the looser overlap between cultural/ethnic and nation state borders is the overall minority status of larger populations in the region.'
3. 'Forced mobility. Under state forced mobility [we understand] two kinds of mobility throughout the 20th century; first, the mobility of ethnic minorities [...], and, second, forced status mobility, i.e. a forced mobility between social strata and career paths as required by loyalty to the new regime.'
4. 'Persecution of religion, churches, and dissidents. [...] Every perspective and institution which did not share the ideology and the goals of the [...] rulers [were] seen as an opposing power[.]'

5. 'Genocides and other mass killings. First, early in the 20th century, it was the communist state that caused millions of deaths; then, the dictatorship of National Socialism [...].'

We could link the first and second 'wound' to the existence of multi-ethnic empires mentioned above. Wounds 3, 4 and 5 could be seen to be consequences of political attempts to reinforce rule by forcefully creating a uniform society for the purposes of rendering the task of governing easier across such multi-ethnic empires. None of these wounds is unknown in the West, but the size and complexity of the multi-ethnic empires (and the consequent relative weakness of the nation-states) create a difference in relation to them all.

The cultural fault lines marked off by the wounds are likely to be the places where the idea of human dignity will have been suggested and where the expression 'human dignity' has in consequence been pushed into service, so as to deal with the underlying problems in the only way they can be dealt with: in a collective, collaborative way. How exactly the conceptualisation history of human dignity in the Black Sea region reflects the wounds remains to be seen, but it is highly likely that it does. Studying how the wounds affect the understanding of human dignity in the region is both a challenge and an opportunity for missiology, since human dignity not only forms part of the good news itself, but also concerns human beings of the region as intimately as anything.

By its nature, such an investigation must involve people of the region who can identify sources contributing to the history of the conceptualisation of human dignity and who can explain their cultural heritage to a universal public. Their interest would be linked to the idea playing an important role in international law at EU and UN level, in so far as both organisations depend on human dignity as a fundamental principle in their founding documents.

Cataloguing and reflecting on texts where the expression has been used (and where the commitment it expresses has therefore been made) gives us, in the first place, a kind of 'empirical', incontrovertible basis for forming an understanding of what it is we mean by the expression 'human dignity' ('empirical,' because it is a *fact* that the expression has been used in the texts in which it occurs, and has been used in exactly the way its occurrences document that it has). Beyond that, the cataloguing also provides us with a key to the social history of a region: a history it is important to be aware of and understand for all those living in and interacting with the region. In so far as such history is like an intimate portrait of peoples' existential engagement for the human being, however successful or unsuccessful, every detail validates and critically assesses ethnic and religious specificities. At the same time, those details also portray the tensions that arise when integrating these specificities

in a changing landscape of migration, competition between ethnic groups for self-expression in nation-states or multi-ethnic empires, and imperial and totalitarian tendencies to dominate indiscriminately. Knowledge of this history and understanding of how the history of the idea of human dignity concretely reflects the tensions and struggles of a region while illuminating them from within, both facilitate acceptance of different versions of history and integration of these into a more inclusive narrative. In this way, being in a minority as well as being in a majority can be culturally productive for all, since all have an interest in human dignity, and therefore in how others perceive it.

The concept of a common human dignity which transcends ethnic and religious identities can in fact provide a basis for the promotion of other loyalties, a basis for respecting and learning from the rich heritage and experience of others. It can offer a foundation for a human community of a different kind to that of nations, states, and churches, bringing an equilibrium to communities torn by ethnic or religious strife. There is no magic to it, however, and we are not to expect that conflicts would disappear, since the history revealed by the conceptualisation history of human dignity makes it obvious that different understandings of human dignity have both co-existed and been at odds throughout history. Yet, it is still possible that they all formally constitute a commitment (however implicit) to the principle that the human being is of fundamental value, i.e., of a value that cannot justifiably be subordinated to any other value.

Realising this is of great importance to all concerned because it is a fundamental commitment to share, even if the practical consequences that are understood to flow from the formal principle cannot easily be agreed upon. Human dignity's formal identity, paired with its diverse and context-dependent content, allows for a rich tapestry of meaning in which the oppressed as well as the governing all have a positive role to play as guardians and defenders of human dignity. Engagement with and around human dignity will not be, nor has it ever been, without conflict and opposition. Learning from this can itself be salutary, in contemporary debates where one can easily become stuck in the moment or on the horns of the missiological dilemma. Sharing the purpose of deepening our understanding of human dignity may, in contrast, allow for the appreciation of a wide variety of contributions that would be even more interesting the more they differ. It is helpful to see that the idea is not dependent on one framework for its being affirmed, so that it is not necessary to belong to any ethnic, religious, or ideological group to be able to commit to it – or therefore, in consequence, to 'have' it according to one's own understanding. Its formal grammar attributes it to each human being (including

myself, therefore), and no framework is required, strictly speaking, to make this attribution, although it is very frequently justified by appeal to a specific framework.

For mission to be effective and respectful in lands where several frameworks coexist, it therefore makes sense to study both the theological dilemma and the region's conceptualisation history of human dignity. Doing so might prevent the missiological dilemma from getting in the way of mission, and it also would allow for better coordination with other efforts to promote and respect human dignity, whether they be secular or religious. Politicians, educationalists, lawyers, and indeed anyone interested in social life will likewise need to understand the dynamics at play, since they too need to know what human dignity is, to know how to respect it.

To deepen our understanding of human dignity through texts from the Black Sea region, we must be open to the specificity of the Black Sea region's contribution to the history of the idea's conceptualisation. In this way, the commitment to human dignity shows itself to be simultaneously a commitment to understand both history and culture as focalised by the idea.

5 Conclusion

Can we say that Christ came to restore human dignity out of concern for it, and that that is what we continue to celebrate whenever we celebrate the mystery, the holy exchange, the death, and resurrection of Christ, *for us*?

If we can, how much more does it make sense that we should participate in that mission and share his concern for us as *our* mission? Attempting to understand both what is lost in the Fall when human dignity is violated, and what is regained in its restoration, is an obvious approach in and through which we might hope for wisdom and alignment with the Divine intention. Contemplating this intention in its object can reveal to us God's view of us and of the world – even if we do not know God. In this way, the promotion of, understanding of, and engagement with human dignity forms not only the centre of mission but also the field of mission itself where we meet Christ in his most intimate concern for us, whether for the first time, or again and again until consummation.

In human dignity we are one since it pertains to all. Not only is human dignity shared by every human being; to violate it in relation to one person is to violate it in all, since witnessing the violation is also a violation of human dignity to the one who witnesses it. Its conceptualisation history in the West illustrates how we have struggled to make the principle foundational for positive

law (Lebech 2019). It is very likely that the conceptualisation history in the East will show a similar struggle, but with accents characteristic of the region, which in turn will enable us to look at the Western conceptualisation history with new eyes – in context.

Even if human dignity pertains and is available to all, it may however be attested to and understood in different ways reflecting different worldviews. That we all understand it to be the same human dignity, albeit understood in different ways, is clear from the fact that we use that same expression in concert to designate what we refer to, even if we don't agree about its material content. Since this is the case, the discussion of different understandings of human dignity would itself bring us closer to God's own concern, mission, and desire; touching it, so to speak, whether we see through to it being God's own desire of love for humanity, a legal value importing moral content into the state, or a natural (or indeed a rational) privilege.

Where different types of theology have shaped and reshaped collective identities – as in the borderlands of the countries around the Black Sea – consideration of these questions becomes both inevitable and beneficial. They become inevitable because a common culture cannot be relied upon practically and politically to 'solve' the problem of human dignity by relegating the sorting of the missiological dilemma to subconscious habituality. They become beneficial because consideration of them promotes clarity and ability to distinguish between different conceptions, which can then be compared and evaluated. It can also be considered whether these differences are at the root of current controversies, or whether they stem from other factors.

Deepening our understanding of human dignity through engagement with texts from the Black Sea region is, for all these reasons, both a challenge and opportunity for missiology. By engaging with how the idea has been conceived, as evidenced in culturally relevant texts, awareness of its implicit commitment to the idea that human beings have fundamental value shines through as God's own intention for us. In this way, the mission to communicate that message is furthered even if perhaps not fully accomplished. The engagement with and promotion of human dignity also furthers a socio-political balance by transcending nationalism and sectarianism, while allowing for collective identities to work towards the good of all.

Appendix 1: Linguistic Correspondences

human dignity (English)

In languages spoken in countries with coast on the Black Sea:
човешко достойнство (choveshko dostoĭnstvo) (Bulgarian)
ადამიანური ღირსება (adamianuri ghirseba) (Georgian)
Menschenwürde (German)
emberi méltóság (Hungarian)
demnitate umană (Romanian)
человеческое достоинство (chelovecheskoye dostoinstvo) (Russian)
кеше хөрмәте (Tatar)
insan onuru (Turkish)
людська гідність (lyuds′ka hidnist′) (Ukrainian)

In languages of countries pertaining to the Black Sea region, beyond those with a coast on the Black Sea:
dinjiteti njerëzor (Albanian)
كرامة الإنسان (karamat al'iinsan) (Arabic)
մարդկայինարժանապատվությունը (mardkayin arzhanapatvut'yuny) (Armenian)
insan ləyaqəti (Azerbaijani)
годнасць чалавека (hodnasć čalavieka) (Belarusian)
ανθρώπινη αξιοπρέπεια (anthrópini axioprépeia) (Greek)
rûmeta mirovî (Kurdish)
човечкото достоинство (čovečkoto dostoinstvo) (Makedonian)
људско достојанство (ljudsko dostojanstvo) (Serbian)

In Slavic and Baltic languages:
ljudsko dostojanstvo (Croatian)
Lidská důstojnost (Czech)
Inimväärikus (Estonian)
Žmogaus orumas (Lithuanian)
Cilvēka cieņa (Latvian)
Godność człowieka (Polish)
људско достојанство (ljudsko dostojanstvo) (Serbian)
Človekovo dostojanstvo (Slovene)
Ľudská dôstojnosť (Slovak)

In ancient languages of importance in the region:
ἀξία ανθρώπινη, αξιοπρέπεια (axia anthropine, axioprepeia) (Byzantine Greek)
Dignitas humana (Latin)
Chelovecheskoye dostoianie (Old Church Slavonic/Old Slavonic/Slavonic)

Appendix 2: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble, First Clause (in Select, Relevant, Attainable Languages)

Whereas recognition of the inherent **dignity** and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the **human** family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world, (English)

Като взе предвид, че признаването на **достойнството**, присъщо на всички членове на **човешкия** род, на техните равни и неотменими права представлява основа на свободата, справедливостта и мира в света, (Bulgarian)

İnsan ailesiniñ cemi azalarına has olğan menlik duyğusı em de olarnıñ musaviy ve ayırılmaz aqlarınıñ tanılması adalet ve umumiy barışıqlıqnıñ temeli olğanını nazarğa alaraq; ve (Crimean Tatar)

Da die Anerkennung der angeborenen **Würde** und der gleichen und unveräußerlichen Rechte aller Mitglieder der Gemeinschaft der **Menschen** die Grundlage von Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und Frieden in der Welt bildet, (German)

Tekintettel arra, hogy az **emberiség** családja minden egyes tagja **méltóságának**, valamint egyenlő és elidegeníthetetlen jogainak elismerése alkotja a szabadság, az igazság és a béke alapját a világon, (Hungarian)

Considerînd că recunoaşterea **demnităţii** inerente tuturor membrilor familiei **umane** şi a drepturilor lor egale şi inalienabile constituie fundamentul libertăţii, dreptăţii şi păcii în lume, (Romanian)

Принимая во внимание, что признание **достоинства**, присущего всем членам **человеческой** семьи, и равных и неотъемлемых прав их является основой свободы, справедливости и всеобщего мира; (Russian)

İnsanlık ailesinin bütün üyelerinde bulunan haysiyetin ve bunların eşit ve devir kabul etmez haklarının tanınması hususunun, hürriyetin, adaletin ve dünya barışının temeli olmasına, (Turkish)

Беручи до уваги, що визнання **гідності**, яка властива всім членам **людської** сім'ї, і рівних та невід'ємних їх прав є основою свободі, справедливості та загального миру; і (Ukranian).

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Resumen

La dignidad humana constituye un problema para la humanidad ya que, en todas las regiones del mundo, nos presenta un motivo de celebración y un gran desafío. El involucramiento con el concepto tiende a ocurrir cuando el problema se hace sentir y, por lo tanto, los desafíos éticos que marcan una región quedan plasmados en sus escritos sobre la dignidad humana. Un involucramiento con este tipo de escritos permite, en la región del Mar Negro por ejemplo, avanzar de manera más concertada hacia la apreciación de la dignidad humana. Este compromiso es valioso porque promueve tanto la comprensión como, por ende, la posible apreciación del valor fundamental del ser humano. En este artículo se argumenta que tal promoción compete a la tarea central de la misión cristiana, en la medida en que la preocupación por la dignidad humana se sitúa en el centro de la misma misión de Cristo.

摘要

因为人的尊严问题在世界各地既为我们带来庆祝的理由，也带来严峻的挑战，它构成了人类的一项问题。通常当这一问题显现时，人们才会开始关注这一理念，因此一个地区的伦理挑战往往体现在其关于人类尊严的著作中。通过接触这些著作，例如在黑海地区，可以更加坚定地推动对人类尊严的理解和重视。这种接触尤为宝贵，因为它既促进了对人类尊严的理解，也因此可能带来对人类作为基本价值的认同。本文主张，这种推动与基督教宣教的核心任务息息相关，因为对人类尊严的关切位于基督自身使命的中心。