12 The compromise of kings

Philip II and Macedonian peace

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Introduction

In October 336 BC, Philip II of Macedon – at the pinnacle of his military and political career – took advantage of the occasion of the wedding of his daughter to stage extravagant celebrations at the court complex at Aegae. The Argead king marked recent victories and the launch of his Persian campaign with festivities that were due to culminate with the spectacular presentation of Philip, himself, in the theatre before distinguished guests from all over the Hellenic world. In his account of events Diodorus details how the Macedonian:

> σφόδρα ἐφιλοτιμεῖτο φιλοφρονεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ διὰ τὰς δεδομένας αὐτῷ τῆς ὅλης ἡγεμονίας τιμὰς ταῖς προσηκούσαις ὁμιλίαις ἀμείβεσθαι . . .
>
> . . . ἅμα δ᾽ ἡμέρᾳ τῆς πομπῆς γινομένης σὺν ταῖς ἄλλαις ταῖς μεγαλοπρεπέσι κατασκευαῖς εἴδωλα τῶν δώδεκα θεῶν ἐπόμπευε ταῖς τε δημιουργίαις περιττῶς εἰργασμένα καὶ τῇ λαμπρότητι τοῦ πλούτου θαυμαστῶς κεκοσμημένα· σὺν δὲ τούτοις αὐτοῦ τοῦ Φιλίππου τρισκαιδέκατον ἐπόμπευε θεοπρεπὲς εἴδωλον, σύνθρονον ἑαυτὸν ἀποδεικνύντος τοῦ βασιλέως τοῖς δώδεκα θεοῖς.
>
> τοῦ δὲ θεάτρου πληρωθέντος αὐτὸς ὁ Φίλιππος ᾔει λευκὸν ἔχων ἱμάτιον καὶ προστεταχὼς τοὺς δορυφόρους μακρὰν ἀφεστῶτας ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ συνακολουθεῖν· ἐνεδείκνυτο γὰρ πᾶσιν ὅτι τηρούμενος τῇ κοινῇ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εὐνοίᾳ τῆς τῶν δορυφόρων φυλακῆς οὐκ ἔχει χρείαν. τηλικαύτης δ᾽ οὔσης περὶ αὐτὸν ὑπεροχῆς καὶ πάντων ἐπαινούντων ἅμα καὶ μακαριζόντων τὸν ἄνδρα παράδοξος καὶ παντελῶς ἀνέλπιστος ἐφάνη κατὰ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐπιβουλὴ καὶ θάνατος.

> was determined to show himself to the Greeks as an amiable person and to respond to the honours conferred when he was appointed to the supreme command with appropriate entertainment . . .
>
> . . . at sunrise the parade formed. Along with lavish display of every sort, Philip included in the procession statues of the twelve gods wrought with

> great artistry and adorned with a dazzling show of wealth to strike awe in the beholder, and along with these was conducted a thirteenth statue, suitable for a god, that of Philip himself, so that the king exhibited himself enthroned among the twelve gods.
>
> Every seat in the theatre was taken when Philip appeared wearing a white cloak, and by his express orders his bodyguard held away from him and followed only at a distance, since he wanted to show publicly that he was protected by the goodwill of all the Greeks, and had no need of a guard of spearmen. Such was the pinnacle of success that he had attained, but as the praises and congratulations of all rang in his ears, suddenly without warning the plot against the king was revealed as death struck.
>
> (*Bibliotheca* 16.91.6–93.2)[1]

Diodorus skilfully builds the tension as Book 16 of the *Bibliotheca* moves to a dramatic climax, his account alternating between the salacious and the sinister as it anticipates the paradigmatic demise of a hybristic king who dared to claim a place among the divine.[2]

But what the sensational narrative of these stunning events tends to occlude is the ruined intention of the Macedonian king in hosting these lavish celebrations. This was a festival of reconciliation: with a new Panhellenic alliance formally instituted and the Macedonian general Parmenion already leading the latest Greek campaign in Asia Minor, Philip entertained allies old and new at court. The celebrations at Aegae were but one part of the Macedonian king's greater attempts 'to show kindness to the Greeks' (φιλοφρονεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας) even after his great success at Chaeronea. Secure after that decisive military victory over the southern *poleis*, Philip avoided further retribution and set out instead to construct a durable peace in mainland Greece.

This chapter will review those Macedonian efforts to reconcile with former adversaries and establish an enduring settlement in the Greek world, work that culminated with a Macedonian peace and the subsequent formation of the 'Corinthian League' early in 337 BC. These initiatives are of great importance, and not only because Philip's post-Chaeronea actions did much to shape the Hellenic world in the Hellenistic Age to come.[3] More immediately, a study of Macedonian proposals also offers an opportunity to consider not only the strategic importance of peace in an ongoing contest between rival powers, but also the practical realities of, and constraints on, peace in the mid-fourth century BC. As we shall see, Philip's careful and calculated approach highlights a genius for diplomacy, as the king institutes a series of integrative mechanisms (political and cultural) that aimed to negate or alleviate long-standing tensions and facilitate his own post-conflict transition from enemy to *hegemon*. And yet, many Hellenes would remain defiant. The Spartans, perhaps most notably, continued to challenge Philip even after Chaeronea; they 'scorned the king and his terms, reckoning that the pact was not peace but servitude, since it was not in the interest of the cities themselves but was being proposed by the victor' (Justin 9.5.3).[4] Consequently, modern responses to

the question of Philip's political motives in these years tend to be rather black and white:[5] although some scholars are positive in their judgements of the Argead's 'reasoned' attempts to unite the Hellenic world,[6] for others, Greek independence ended after Chaeronea and those Macedonian concessions that followed were little more than a pretence.[7] But without dismissing the severity of the measures Philip used to establish his supreme position – or ignoring the determination of those who continued to resist this threat to the freedom of the *poleis* – the means by which the Macedonian king subsequently exercised his rule over the Greeks are also worth our attention.

The peace that Philip brings may seem limited, especially to modern actors and agencies who tend to prioritise positive peace goals. But as Tim Murithi notes, settlements falling short of that ideal were long the norm and are often still of value, for 'One cannot proceed towards laying the foundations for positive peace without first establishing negative peace'.[8] Perhaps we might best view Philip's post-Chaeronea initiatives in this light, as a considered and conscious attempt to move towards a positive settlement of mainland Greece?[9] Jack Goldstone and John Haldon point out that:

> Although most states first evolved in the context of an imbalance between military coercion and cooperative participation, those that have been most successful have usually generated increasingly complex relationships of reciprocity, consensus, and interdependence with leading elements of conquered groups or previous political formations.[10]

After Chaeronea, Philip sought to advance his authority in a similar manner; he was careful to offer a secure peace even to those city-states fiercely opposed to his involvement in Hellenic affairs. Of course, not every Greek *polis* was hostile to the Argead court: many were allies already and others were quick to develop closer ties in an attempt to benefit from the new political arrangements. Demosthenes might rail against the blight of traitors consorting with the Macedonians, but, as Polybius highlights, a number of cities saw in Philip a champion more likely to defend their interests than the traditional Greek powers (18.14).[11] Philip would build on that obligation, a duty that should not be dismissed too readily. For, as recent work by John Ma has noted, we should be careful not to overstate the individual power of ancient kings, and remember that 'personal monarchy was . . . an ideological construct dependent on the collaboration of many for the ruler's will to be implemented'.[12] While the Macedonian king used force to establish his position he could not simply force the *poleis* to participate in his programme.[13] The enduring stability of the Macedonian position depended on negotiation and reciprocity, and so Philip's attempts to finally settle his differences with – and the differences among – the *poleis* were both sincere in motive and significant in purpose. There is something in the claim by Justin that, after his great victory, the king wanted none of the Greek states to think that he was their conqueror. Although the Macedonian success was comprehensive, any triumphalism would not help

Philip to build on that achievement.[14] And even though some would charge the Macedonian with cultivating a 'feigned *philanthropia*' in his dealings with the *poleis* (Dem. 18.231), it turned out that Philip was as determined to win the peace after Chaeronea as he was to win victory on the battlefield.

Peace of Philocrates (346 BC)

Although the consideration of Philip's diplomacy, and Macedonian-Athenian exchanges in particular, follows a very well-worn road, key initiatives are worth noting again, briefly, in order to review the range of peace options available to the king in his careful dealings with the Greeks.

We start with the Peace of Philocrates, a treaty signed between Philip and Athens (and their respective allies), after much wrangling, in 346 BC. The two sides had been at war since 357 BC, when Philip seized Amphipolis and Pydna: over the course of the following decade the Macedonian further extended his power in Thrace and Thessaly, and although Athens remained hostile she was unable to respond effectively as her own sphere of influence in the north contracted. Consequently, when in 348 BC the Macedonians signalled a readiness to settle their differences, the Athenians were receptive and sent representatives to Pella to negotiate.[15] This (first) embassy received Philip's proposals, and then conveyed them to the Assembly in Athens. While it is difficult to piece together events surrounding these discussions – given the contested account of events in Aeschines and Demosthenes – we need only make some general observations here on matters that are not key points of dispute.[16]

While no ancient source details the clauses of Philip's peace proposals in full, it seems that:[17]

1 The basis of the peace between Athens and Macedon was that each party should 'have what it holds' (ἔχειν ἑκατέρους ἃ ἔχουσι): each side would recognise the right of the other to the territories actually held at that moment.
2 There was to be alliance, as well as peace, with no time limitation.
3 The alliance was to be a defensive alliance.
4 The peace and alliance were to be binding on the allies of each party.
5 The treaty was also to contain a clause about containing the problem of piracy.

These were the key terms put to the Assembly when the Athenian embassy returned from Macedonia. Prime among them was that each side was to retain those territories held at the date of the conclusion of the peace, with the Athenians recognising all of Philip's territorial gains and finally accepting their loss of Amphipolis. But there would be an alliance and peace in the form of a bilateral treaty between Philip and the Athenian Confederacy. And an alliance and peace between those parties alone: Philip's next targets – Phocis and Halus, and the Thracian king Cersebleptes – were, significantly, omitted from the treaty, giving the Macedonian the freedom to deal with each in turn.[18]

Such was the fear in Athens of an imminent Macedonian advance into Greece that even Demosthenes argued in favour of accepting these terms, although he sought to deny it afterwards. In *On the Peace*, written shortly after the agreement was signed, Demosthenes acknowledges that:

> καὶ Φιλίππῳ νυνὶ κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας Ἀμφιπόλεως παρακεχωρήκαμεν, καὶ Καρδιανοὺς ἐῶμεν ἔξω Χερρονησιτῶν τῶν ἄλλων τετάχθαι, καὶ τὸν Κᾶρα τὰς νήσους καταλαμβάνειν, Χίον καὶ Κῶν καὶ Ῥόδον, καὶ Βυζαντίους κατάγειν τὰ πλοῖα, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς εἰρήνης ἡσυχίαν πλειόνων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι νομίζοντες ἢ τὸ προσκρούειν καὶ φιλονικεῖν περὶ τούτων.
>
> we have ceded Amphipolis to Philip in accordance with the treaty, and we allow the Cardians to be treated as separate from the other inhabitants of the Chersonese and the Carian to seize the islands – Chios, Cos, and Rhodes – and the Byzantines to detain ships, clearly believing that the tranquillity resulting from the peace benefits us more than aggression and contentiousness about these issues.
>
> (Dem. 5.25)[19]

With Athens vulnerable, her citizens must consider Philip's offer of a bilateral treaty with the Athenian Confederacy – what Demosthenes dubs a 'poor and unworthy' option.[20] But it is interesting to note that this peace was not the only initiative put forward for consideration in discussions in the Assembly. For the Athenian allies themselves proposed their own resolution, putting forward a motion that Athens discuss *only peace* with Philip, and that any terms should also be extended to all Greek states that wished to join. Aeschines tells us that:

> ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν ἀνεγνώσθη δόγμα κοινὸν τῶν συμμάχων, οὗ τὰ κεφάλαια διὰ βραχέων ἐγὼ προερῶ. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἔγραψαν ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης ὑμᾶς μόνον βουλεύσασθαι, τὸ δὲ τῆς συμμαχίας ὄνομα ὑπερέβησαν, οὐκ ἐπιλελησμένοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ἀναγκαιοτέραν ἢ καλλίω ὑπολαμβάνοντες εἶναι· ἔπειτα ἀπήντησαν ὀρθῶς ἰασόμενοι τὸ Δημοσθένους δωροδόκημα, καὶ προσέγραψαν ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλομένῳ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐν τρισὶ μησὶν εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν στήλην ἀναγράφεσθαι μετ' Ἀθηναιων καὶ μετέχειν τῶν ὅρκων καὶ τῶν συνθηκῶν.
>
> in the first Assembly a joint resolution of the allies was read out, which I shall first summarize for you briefly. First they proposed that you should reach a decision on peace alone; and they omitted the term 'alliance', not by oversight, but because they took the view that the peace was more a matter of necessity than something honourable. And then they wisely opposed Demosthenes' venality with a proposed antidote, adding in their resolution that any Greeks should have the right within three months to have their names registered on the same column with the Athenians and be party to the oaths and the treaty.
>
> (Aesch. 3.69–70)[21]

Disregarding Philip's offer, instead the Athenian allies propose that the peace with Macedon should be a *koine eirene*: a 'common peace', a broader peace in the style of earlier fourth-century agreements promising freedom and autonomy to all signatories, a multilateral peace that would apply to all Greeks. Such a *koine eirene* would give possible refuge to any Greek cities (like, for example, Phocis and Halus) that might find themselves threatened by Philip's ambition.[22] Which is the very reason why Philip did not propose such an agreement when he started negotiations with Athens, and why there was no way that he was going to agree to that type of peace now.[23] Philip's ambassadors quickly made it clear that a peace without alliance would not be acceptable. Ultimately, inevitably perhaps, Philip's offer of bilateral treaty – both peace *and* alliance – was accepted.[24]

But, as many have highlighted, the Macedonian's terms here could have been even more severe. The Athenians now had nothing to fear from Philip: they lost no territories of their own, and they were left with what remained of their confederacy intact.[25] Modern scholarly consensus is that, for whatever reason, at this time Philip wanted peace with Athens, and so he treated the city favourably. Indeed, J. R. Ellis, comparing this settlement to the King's Peace treaties of the 380s and 370s BC, maintains that the Athenians were, potentially, very well placed having agreed terms with Philip. For Ellis, Philip planned an agreement along the lines of those sponsored by the Persian king, with two degrees of hierarchy:

> in effect, a co-hegemony over the Greek world . . . Fundamentally, of course, the partnership would be unequal; but against this the Athenians would be able to balance the rewards accruing to them.[26]

An arrangement along the lines of a King's Peace would allow Philip to extract himself from the Greek political arena but, like Artaxerxes before him, maintain influence from a distance. It is an interesting suggestion, and one that highlights the ways in which different types of peace could operate in the fourth century BC. But even if we did accept that Philip was already thinking of an Asian campaign this early in his reign, as Ryder points out, 'Common peace treaties had a general stabilising effect which [Philip] could well have thought undesirable' at this point in time.[27] As we have seen, this sort of multilateral agreement, which would confirm and conserve the status quo in mainland Greece, was not an option Philip wanted to explore – yet. Indeed, the essential terms of the Peace of Philocrates were, as John Buckler describes, 'rather ordinary'; but Philip's treaty was purposeful and effective for all that.[28] For the Peace of Philocrates served the immediate strategic purpose of isolating Athens from the Greeks in general, while maintaining goodwill. Still wary of Thebes, with interests in Thessaly and central Greece to protect, and a war against the Thracians to conduct, Philip wanted to restrict Athenian initiative by binding that city, specifically, in a bilateral peace agreement and defensive alliance.[29]

Such an agreement best suited Macedonian interests in 346 BC, but within two years Philip was prepared to sponsor that Common Peace treaty between

the major powers. Now at a point when the state of affairs on the Greek mainland was more to his liking, the king proposed a new initiative that would preserve the balance of power as it stood in 344 BC. Once Philip had ended the Sacred War (346 BC) he spent most of 345 BC successfully campaigning against the Illyrians;[30] and although he also managed to secure control of Thessaly (344 BC), trouble was brewing in Athens, Thebes, and Sparta. Note, in particular, that the Spartans were worried by Macedon's growing influence in the Peloponnese, where – even prior to any offer of a Common Peace – Philip was again using peace initiatives to advance Macedonian interests by making further bilateral agreements with individual states (e.g. Arcadia, Elis, Argos).[31] In an attempt to soothe growing Greek discontent, allowing Philip the freedom to prepare for further campaigns in the east,[32] the king sent an embassy south to renew diplomatic contact.

The delegation to Athens was led by Pytho of Byzantium, who was also charged to convey the king's willingness to amend the Peace of Philocrates in any way the Athenians might care to suggest:

> ἐκέλευεν οὖν τοὺς λέγοντας ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τῇ μὲν εἰρήνῃ μὴ ἐπιτιμᾶν· οὐ γὰρ ἄξιον εἶναι εἰρήνην λύειν· εἰ δέ τι μὴ καλῶς γέγραπται ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ, τοῦτ᾽ ἐπανορθώσασθαι, ὡς ἅπαντα Φίλιππον ποιήσοντα ὅσ᾽ ἂν ὑμεῖς ψηφίσησθε.
>
> [Pytho] therefore urged those who speak in the Assembly not to find fault with the peace, saying that it is wrong to do away with a peace. But (he said) if any clause of it had been badly drafted, it should be revised and Philip would do whatever you might vote.
>
> ([Dem.] 7.22)[33]

The initiative here, to adjust the treaty, is Philip's, but it was left to the Assembly to submit proposals for consideration; and the Athenians immediately answered Pytho by suggesting two amendments – the second of which was one that Philip may have had in mind too, as, apparently, he readily agreed to it. According to Hegesippus, it was proposed:

> τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, ὅσοι μὴ κοινωνοῦσι τῆς εἰρήνης, ἐλευθέρους καὶ αὐτονόμους εἶναι, καὶ ἐάν τις ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς στρατεύῃ, βοηθεῖν τοὺς κοινωνοῦντας τῆς εἰρήνης, ἡγούμενοι καὶ δίκαιον τοῦτο καὶ φιλάνθρωπον, μὴ μόνον ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τοὺς ἡμετέρους καὶ Φίλιππον καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τοὺς ἐκείνου ἄγειν τὴν εἰρήνην, τοὺς δὲ μήθ᾽ ἡμετέρους ὄντας μήτε Φιλίππου συμμάχους ἐν μέσῳ κεῖσθαι καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν κρειττόνων ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτοις διὰ τὴν ὑμετέραν εἰρήνην ὑπάρχειν σωτηρίαν, καὶ τῷ ὄντι εἰρήνην ἄγειν ἡμᾶς καταθεμένους τὰ ὅπλα.
>
> that the rest of the Greeks, who do not share in the peace, should be free and autonomous, and that, if anyone marches against them, the participants in the peace should help them, since you thought it both just and considerate that the peace should not be restricted to us and our allies and

> Philip and his allies, which would expose those who are neither our allies nor his to lie in the middle and be wronged by any who are stronger than they, but that they too should enjoy the security on account of your peace, and that we should lay down our weapons and keep the peace in earnest.
>
> ([Dem.] 7.30–31)

The amendment proposed here calls for the terms of the bilateral Peace of Philocrates to be extended and reinforced by the establishment of a Common Peace – a different settlement that Philip seeks to exploit in order to 'reduce the points of possible friction'.[34] As G. T. Griffith notes, although clearly a tactical move driven by Philip's needs and interests, with this *koine eirene* the Macedonian also proposed to 'limit himself' and his actions in the Greek world, which was surely a significant gain for the major *poleis*.[35] And yet Philip's offer was rejected, marking a significant turning point in relations between the powers.[36]

Now it was the Athenians who cast out the proposal of a Common Peace, because this time the status quo it would confirm and conserve would not be to their advantage. Demosthenes and his supporters maintain that even in peace Philip was not to be trusted. But, crucially, they also complain that Athens had gained so little from the Peace of Philocrates – why would the city extend it? Central to the anger and unease of this group in Athens was the fact that Macedon prospered in peacetime, as Demosthenes makes clear in *On the False Embassy*. Answering Aeschines' assertion that peace with Macedon has brought many benefits to Athens,[37] Demosthenes tells the jurors:

> πρὸς δὴ ταῦτ᾽ ἐκεῖν᾽ ὑμᾶς ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ, ὅτι καὶ τὰ Φιλίππου πράγματ᾽ ἐκ τῆς εἰρήνης γέγονεν εὐπορώτερα πολλῷ, καὶ κατασκευαῖς ὅπλων καὶ χώρας καὶ προσόδων αἳ γεγόνασιν ἐκείνῳ μεγάλαι.
>
> γεγόνασι δὲ καὶ ἡμῖν τινές. ἡ δέ γε τῶν πραγμάτων κατασκευὴ καὶ τῶν συμμάχων, δι᾽ ἣν ἢ αὐτοῖς ἢ τοῖς κρείττοσι τἀγαθὰ πάντες κέκτηνται, ἡ μὲν ἡμετέρα πραθεῖσ᾽ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀπόλωλε καὶ γέγονεν ἀσθενής, ἡ δ᾽ ἐκείνου φοβερὰ καὶ μείζων πολλῷ.
>
> you should respond that peace has significantly increased Philip's resources too, especially in the status of his arms, territory, and revenues, which have become significant.
>
> 'But we too are not without resources'. On the contrary, since it is the condition of one's assets, especially with regard to allies, that determines whether men use their possessions for themselves or cede them to a stronger party, because our assets have been sold by these men [supporters of Philip, like Aeschines], they are ruined and depleted, while Philip's are formidable and have grown significantly.
>
> (Dem. 19.89–90)[38]

Peace would not work for Athens. Earlier in *On the Peace* Demosthenes acknowledged that settling with Philip was acceptable when the Athenians

believed that 'the tranquillity resulting from the peace benefits us more than aggression and contentiousness' (5.25). Now, however, the orator maintains that keeping the peace will be more injurious than war, and so he will rally the Athenians once more, overturn the Peace of Philocrates, and risk all again in battle.[39] On the other side of the table, Philip's exploitation of these peace proposals and initiatives as instruments of policy was as carefully considered and cynical as it was customary. That Philip's functional peace rested on, and was itself an expression of, Macedonian power and force is entirely typical of the contests between the major powers in the fourth century BC.[40] Indeed, Demosthenes' key complaint in *On the False Embassy* was that the Athenians were not able to exploit, and benefit from, the Peace of Philocrates as much as the Argead king did.[41]

The League of Corinth

When the road to war later led both sides to the field of Chaeronea in 338 BC, the Macedonian army again proved its superiority in battle, routing the allied army and establishing Philip as the master of Greece. The question then was how would the 'barbarian warmonger' treat the established Hellenic powers now that he was supreme? How would Philip deal with the Athenians, whose belligerence perhaps sparked this conflict in the first place? What fate would Thebes suffer, the former ally who rejected his call to arms?

According to Plutarch, some advisors urged Philip to subdue all the cities.[42] The king did not go quite that far, but he would establish Macedonian control of mainland Greece by a combination of force, diplomacy, and coercion. After Chaeronea, and even ahead of any Panhellenic settlement, Philip first established bilateral treaties with key states, treaties that provide a foundation for the agreement to come.[43] Most importantly Philip renewed a treaty of 'friendship and alliance' with Athens (φιλίαν τε καὶ συμμαχίαν Diodorus 16.87.3), but there were also further agreements with Arcadia, Argos, Megalopolis, Tegea, and Messenia.[44] Of course, these settlements aimed to weaken the extended influence of the major cities; to further that end the Athenian Confederacy was disbanded, punitive terms were imposed on Thebes, and Philip mounted a brief campaign in the Peloponnese that ravaged Spartan territory. Finally, in those sites where his political influence could not be assured, Philip installed garrisons of Macedonian troops; strongholds at Thebes, Corinth, Ambracia, and possibly Chalcis – the 'fetters of Greece' (πέδας Ἑλληνικάς in Polybius 18.11.5) – that some feel betray the 'true spirit' of Philip's dealings with the mainland Greeks.[45] All in all, in the immediate aftermath of Chaeronea we see occupation, proscriptions, pacification: as Nicholas Hammond notes, such severity in settling with conquered enemies was not unusual in Greek interstate politics, and Philip was certainly not about to let any hard-won advantage slip away.[46] But, again, even accepting that the Macedonian peace was imposed by force-of-arms, subsequently Philip did favour the path of mediation and tended to avoid further retributions in favour of reconciliation with old enemies.

With preliminary arrangements in place, Philip's plans for a grand political and military pact with the *poleis* were announced at a congress in Corinth in the winter of 338–337 BC. The initiative was subtler than many of his enemies expected; following discussions in the Greek assemblies Philip proposed to establish another Common Peace and found a new Panhellenic federation of states.[47] This may have been a new Macedonian proposal, but it was also a carefully crafted agreement that sat within the tradition of the *koinai eirenai* of previous decades.[48] For example, among the standard features Philip retained in his new peace we find a promise that the 'Greeks shall remain free and independent' (ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καὶ αὐτονόμους τοὺς Ἕλληνας [Dem.] 17.5), with all individual and existing constitutions preserved (10), as well as the assurance that there would be collective action against any outside attack (6, 8, 19).[49]

But there were also some significant differences from previous Greek agreements, differences that arose from Philip's creation of a formal federation at the assembly of the Greeks in Corinth. First, a 'synod' of all member-states was established (Aesch. 3 (*Against Ctesiphon*) 161), which had the power to pass decrees that were binding on all members and also exercise jurisdiction in any of the city-states. Once representatives from the different cities elected Philip leader, his position as *hegemon* of the league was formally established ([Dem.] 17.4), creating an office that gave the king the authority to intervene against any state deemed to be in breach of any terms. These innovations were needed to address some of the weaknesses fatal to earlier Common Peace agreements, and were improvements key to the later longevity of the league.[50] They also established Philip as an advocate of the peace and placed him at the centre of the alliance. All of which meant that, while a council of delegates from all allied states administered the League, the executive officer was the Macedonian king himself. Critics of the League highlight the authority of the *hegemon*'s position and the 'façade' of a consultative and cooperative process in meetings with an allied congress,[51] but it is also the case that Philip's measures 'served to create stable relations between the cities of a kind that Greece had never known.'[52] Crucially, Philip proved consistent in his dealings with the Greek powers, and the settlement he imposed on the cities was on a par with the peace proposed in previous discussions with Athens back in 346–344 BC. It was a settlement that Philip perhaps had in mind from very early in his reign.[53] The Macedonian *hegemon* gave the Greeks an effective and enduring peace settlement, he gave *koinai eirenai* an ordered and stable institutional foundation for the first time, and Philip also gave the League an offensive campaign to unite his new allies under his command.[54]

At the second formal meeting of the allies at Corinth, later in 337 BC, Philip outlined the rest of his plan for the new federation. As Diodorus tells us:

> διαδοὺς δὲ λόγον ὅτι βούλεται πρὸς Πέρσας ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πόλεμον ἄρασθαι καὶ λαβεῖν παρ᾽ αὐτῶν δίκας ὑπὲρ τῆς εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ γενομένης παρανομίας ἰδίους τοὺς Ἕλληνας ταῖς εὐνοίαις ἐποιήσατο. φιλοφρονούμενος δὲ πρὸς ἅπαντας καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν

> ἀπεφαίνετο βούλεσθαι διαλεχθῆναι περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων. διόπερ ἐν Κορίνθῳ τοῦ κοινοῦ συνεδρίου συναχθέντος διαλεχθεὶς περὶ τοῦ πρὸς Πέρσας πολέμου καὶ μεγάλας ἐλπίδας ὑποθεὶς προετρέψατο τοὺς συνέδρους εἰς πόλεμον. τέλος δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἑλομένων αὐτὸν στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα τῆς Ἑλλάδος μεγάλας παρασκευὰς ἐποιεῖτο πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς Πέρσας στρατείαν. διατάξας δ᾽ ἑκάστῃ πόλει τὸ πλῆθος τῶν εἰς συμμαχίαν στρατιωτῶν ἐπανῆλθεν εἰς τὴν Μακεδονίαν.
>
> [Philip] spread the word that he wanted to make war on the Persians on the Greeks' behalf and to punish them for the profanation of the temples, and this won for him the loyal support of the Greeks. He showed a kindly face to all in private and in public, and he represented to the cities that he wished to discuss with them matters of common advantage. A general congress was, accordingly, convened at Corinth. He spoke about the war against Persia and by raising great expectations won the representatives over to war. The Greeks elected him the general and absolute ruler of Greece, and he began accumulating supplies for the campaign. He prescribed the number of soldiers that each city should send for the joint effort, and then returned to Macedonia.
>
> (Diodorus, *Bibliotheca* 16.89.2–3)

Avoiding the language of kingship, Philip's proposals again adapt traditional hegemonic initiatives for quite different ends.[55] Although the idea of a common crusade against the Persian empire was not new to fourth-century political thought,[56] the Macedonian married it to the concept of the *koine eirene*, combining 'the negative undertakings of a Common Peace with the positive obligations of an alliance'.[57] Philip also recognised that a balance between war and peace was required for, as Xenophon notes, coming to terms with old enemies in Greek politics often meant 'not peace but an exchange of war' (*Hellenica* 7.4.10). Past experience showed the king that 'a passive aim such as merely the keeping of the peace, however important it might be, was not likely in the long term to be sufficient to banish all causes of discontent'.[58] No Classical peace ever foreclosed the possibility of future conflict, and so Philip balanced a pragmatic peace in the *poleis* against war with Persia.[59] Once again, we see that the link between peace and war was still an essential and practical reality in the fourth century BC. Philip's use of coercion and concession after Chaeronea was, crucially, synchronic not sequential; his plans for long-term peace and stability in Europe were both deliberately double-sided and bound to an aggressive Panhellenic initiative that now threatened those beyond the Greek world.

Conclusion: this king's peace

In spite of the best efforts of his ancient detractors, the Macedonian king's reputation for considered action does still endure. Returning to Diodorus again, one thinks of his final assessment of Philip:

> Φίλιππος μὲν οὖν μέγιστος γενόμενος τῶν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἐπὶ τῆς Εὐρώπης βασιλέων . . . δοκεῖ δ᾽ οὗτος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐλαχίστας μὲν εἰς τὴν μοναρχίαν ἀφορμὰς παρειληφέναι, μεγίστην δὲ τῶν παρ᾽ Ἕλλησι μοναρχιῶν κατακτήσασθαι, ηὐξηκέναι δὲ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν οὐχ οὕτω διὰ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἀνδραγαθίας ὡς διὰ τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὁμιλίας καὶ φιλοφροσύνης. φασὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Φίλιππον σεμνύνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῇ στρατηγικῇ συνέσει καὶ τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὁμιλίας ἐπιτεύγμασιν ἢπερ ἐπὶ τῇ κατὰ τὰς μάχας ἀνδρείᾳ· τῶν μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς ἀγῶνας κατορθωμάτων μετέχειν ἅπαντας τοὺς στρατευομένους, τῶν δὲ διὰ τῆς ὁμιλίας γινομένων ἐπιτευγμάτων αὐτὸν μόνον λαμβάνειν τὴν ἐπιγραφήν.
>
> Philip made himself the greatest of the kings in Europe in his time . . . He is known to fame as one who with but the slenderest resources to support his claim to a throne won for himself the greatest empire in the Greek world, while the growth of his position was not due so much to his prowess in arms as to his adroitness and cordiality in diplomacy. Philip himself is said to have been prouder of his grasp of strategy and his diplomatic successes than of his valour in actual battle. Every member of his army shared in the successes which were won in the field but he alone got credit for victories won through negotiation.
>
> (Diodorus, *Bibliotheca* 16.95.1–4)[60]

As Giuseppe Squillace has suggested, the positive image of Philip that we find here – and, in part, in Justin – may preserve parts of a contemporary-Greek, pro-Macedonian, presentation of the king as a benevolent *hegemon*.[61] This 'Philip' is a strong but reasonable ruler, ready to strive in word and deed to achieve his goals; this 'Philip' is the king who, according to Satyrus, would marry after every war.[62] And this positive portrayal of the Macedonian could be maintained – perhaps even needed to be maintained – because Philip campaigned comparatively little in Greece. While the king's actions against the Illyrians and Thracians were both extensive and bloody, Philip is usually presented as more measured in his dealings with his 'fellow Greeks' to the south, seemingly following Isocrates' advice to be a master of the barbarians, a king for the Macedonians, but a benefactor for the Greeks.[63]

Of course, such reputations, if not a deceit, are certainly something of a conceit of kings. This articulation of the positive benefits of Philip's reign – aiming at a peaceful conquest of the *poleis* and putting an end to conflict – is little distinguishable from the ideology of other conquerors in ancient history. In particular, we could note the self-presentation of the ancient Persian kings, and the 'Achaemenid ideology of a divinely requested order of peace, maintained by just rulers and loyal subjects alike'.[64] Here, too, we have the ideology of benevolent kings, promising unity and peace after conquest and submission. But, as Pierre Briant reminds us, even the famed *Pax Persica* was 'an ideological construction that transformed reality by transfiguring it through the vision of those who held power'.[65] And that altered image of imperial power is one that combines *both* the

martial and peaceful, adding the latter to the former in a new presentation aimed at a wider audience. Rolf Strootman highlights that imperial peace propaganda does not occlude the ruler's previous and ongoing military success: instead, 'war and peace are two sides of the same coin. In order to bring peace and prosperity, war must first be waged'.[66] In the ideology of Philip, his son Alexander, and the later Hellenistic rulers, the victorious king remains one who 'secured peace through victory . . . [who] was a harbinger of joyful tidings'.[67]

Ultimately, our appraisals of Philip's achievements must also take heed of both the martial and the peaceful, considering each evenly and seriously. Of course, to maintain that the king was himself serious about peace is not to diminish or disregard the Macedonian pacification of the *poleis*. However, we must also accept that *eirene* was far from benign in the mid-fourth century BC and that military power maintained even the most considered settlement. And the Macedonian Peace – with alliance – was a considered settlement; for even post-Chaeronea, Philip recognised that he could not just do as he pleased. In addition to the practical limitations on his power, the expectation that the good king brings peace after victory also imposed some level of restraint and obligation on Philip's authority.[68] But, even so, as positive and ambitious as his attempt at a *koine eirene* may have been, it remained primarily an expression and instrument of hegemonic power fixed to secure Macedonian interests.

One last comment from a speech by Demades. Considering the reality of the situation facing the city after defeat at Chaeronea, the Athenian statesman advised his fellow citizens: Εἰρήνην δεῖ καὶ οὐ λόγον ἀντιτάττειν τῇ τῶν Μακεδόνων φάλαγγι, 'It is with peace, not argument, that we must stand against the Macedonian phalanx' ([Demades] 1.29). Unfortunately for the Athenians, Philip fully appreciated that supremacy came not through force of arms alone.[69]

Notes

1 Text and translation of Diodorus throughout this chapter taken from Bradford Welles (1997).
2 On the presentation of Philip as 'tragic tyrant' here see Easterling (1997) 220.
3 On the Corinthian League see Hammond and Griffith (1979) 623–46 and Hammond and Walbank (1988) 571–9, more recently Poddighe (2009) 103–5 and Müller (2010) 177–9. On the issue of whether Philip's settlement was a Common Peace (*koine eirene*) and/or an alliance, we accept that the king established a peace first and then outlined his military plans almost immediately after. For arguments see Buckler and Beck (2008) 250–2.
4 See Hammond (1994) 159. On Sparta and the Macedonians see Roebuck (1948) 83–9, McQueen (1978) 40–64 and Magnetto (1994) 283–308. Even as late as 336 BC, the Athenians, too, were not yet 'ready to concede the hegemony of the Greeks to Macedon' (Diodorus 17.3.1–2).
5 The reading of Philip's relationship with the *poleis* in such categorical terms has come under question. As Harris (1995) 154 notes: 'it is necessary to distinguish among varying degrees and types of support for Philip and Alexander. There was a spectrum of responses to the growth of Macedonian power, ranging from stubborn resistance to willing subordination.'
6 Hammond (1994) 164 offers the most favourable reading of the Macedonian's motives: Philip wanted 'the city-states to be independent, self-governing and united, and

thereby to contribute their wealth of ideas and their expertise in trade to the future world which Philip had in mind and Alexander realised'. For Buckler (2003) 489–519, Philip crafted 'a genuine and general peace that would appeal to the majority of the Greeks' (511).

7 Cawkwell (1996) 98–100 on the loss of Greek autonomy is especially noteworthy. Most recently Worthington (2014) 90 notes: 'Philip's victory at Chaeronea changed the face of Greek politics forever. Gone were the Greeks' cherished ideals of *autonomia* and *eleutheria*, and even though the *polis* as an entity continued to exist, the Greeks now had to contend with the practical rule of Macedonia.'

8 Murithi (2009) 5–6, who adds: 'In effect, negative and positive peace lie on the same spectrum of peacebuilding'. For Howard (2001) 2 negative peace can be defined as the absence of war, but positive peace implies 'a social and political ordering of society that is generally accepted as just. The creation of such an order may take generations to achieve, and social dynamics may then destroy it within a few decades.' However, as Low (2012) 131 notes, a 'more functionalist and belligerent understanding of peace was generally more usual in the fourth century BC'.

9 Indeed, Errington (1990) 90 wonders whether, post-Chaeronea, 'the prospects were perhaps not unfavourable that a certain consensus might be found that could provide a basis for long-term friendly coexistence.'

10 Goldstone and Haldon (2009) 11–12.

11 See above note 5. Demosthenes 18.295–296 and 19.259–267 present long attacks on those leading men who betrayed Greece to the Macedonians; however, Polybius informs us of Philip's popularity in the Peloponnese, in those states allowed 'to breathe freely and entertain the thought of liberty' (18.14.6) after the humbling of Sparta. Aeschines 2.160 also tells of small cities turning to the Macedonians. See Ryder (1994) 232–42, Walbank (2002) 97–101, and Tritle (2007) 181.

12 Ma (2013) 336. On the negotiated relationship between the Hellenistic kings and cities see Ma (1999) 179–242, who observes that 'the reality of interaction between ruler and ruled is a process of reciprocity, rather than simply a vertical relationship of control and exploitation' (179–80).

13 Borrowing from Lobur (2008) 211 on the Roman imperial system under Augustus. On the 'paradox of conquest and precariousness' see Ma (2008) 374.

14 'His joy for this victory was artfully concealed . . . and as far as was in his power, he managed his conquest that none might think of him as a victor' (Justin 9.4.1). On Philip's post-Chaeronea celebrations as a *topos* in the ancient sources see Moloney (2015) 54 and Pownall (2010) 57–8.

15 Soon after the fall of Olynthus in 348 BC, Greek allies arrive in Athens and communicate that Philip was 'very well disposed toward the city. . . [and] also wanted to become its ally' (Aesch. 2.12–17). Having failed to gather support in the Peloponnese for a stand against the Macedonians, the Athenians decide to consider Philip's proposals (Dem. 19.10–2). Ten envoys were sent north in the winter of 347/6 BC, the terms of the peace were finally sworn to by Philip and the Athenians later in 346 BC.

16 On the negotiations see Harris (1995) 70–7. See also Efstathiou (2004) 385–407 for an attempt to unravel the sequence of events.

17 See Hammond and Griffith (1979) 338–9 for Philip's terms; the notes that follow draw on that review.

18 Sommerstein and Bayliss (2012) 287 note that the settlement had the greatest impact on the Thracians, who were at war with Macedon at the time of the peace.

19 Translations of Demosthenes' speeches 1–17 from Trevett (2011).

20 Earlier in *On the Peace*, Demosthenes states it would have been better for Athens had the peace – which is 'not wonderful or worthy of you' (5.13) – never been made. See Hunt (2010) 67 on the orator's cautious tone here.

21 Translations of Aeschines from Carey (2000); Harris (1995) 72 offers a full review of the discussions.

22 Phocis and Halus had close ties with Athens but were not official allies under the terms of the Peace of Philocrates, and as a result were not protected by it.
23 Hammond and Griffith (1979) 340 suggest that 'the only thing wrong with these proposals of the allies was that they were made in fairyland.'
24 See Aesch. 3.72, and Cawkwell (1978) 100 for comment on the choices facing Athens.
25 Buckler (2003) 454 maintains that 'Even if some [Athenians] thought the peace imperfect, they found it largely satisfactory.'
26 Ellis (1976) 12. See Buckler and Beck (2008) 259 for a review of opinions on Philip's treatment of Athens.
27 Ryder (1965) 98. Hammond and Griffith (1979) 464 note, too, that 'a *koine eirene* still was a restraint on freedom of action, and could facilitate an organized opposition to [Philip] if he could be represented as an aggressor'.
28 Buckler (2003) 447. As discussed by Low (2012) 124, the Peace of Philocrates is more in the category of a negative agreement 'whose main function is to guarantee that the parties involved will refrain from some sort of action'.
29 As Hammond and Griffith (1979) 340 highlight; and observe it is significant that 'Philip did not choose, then, the avenue via the Panhellenic congress and the *koine eirene* as his approach to a presence in Greece in these next years. He chose instead the Amphictyony and its Council' (465). See Worthington (2008) 84–104 for a review of events.
30 On this 'Illyrian War' see Cawkwell (1963a) 126–7 and Hammond and Griffith (1979) 469–74.
31 On Philip in the Peloponnese see Hammond (1994) 103–4.
32 In particular the subjugation of Thrace, which followed in 342 BC (see Diodorus 16.71.1–2). Although Diodorus does say that Philip was now anxious to make war against the Persians (16.60.5), matters closer to home still had to be resolved.
33 See Trevett (2011) 113 on the authorship of *On Halonnesus*: the consensus is that it was composed by Hegesippus, a contemporary of Demosthenes.
34 Hammond and Griffith (1979) 490. In spite of Demosthenes' accusations that Philip repeatedly broke the terms of the agreement, Buckler (2003) 459–60 argues that he had not breached the peace and that, again, most of the Greek states were now supporting Philip rather than the traditional powers.
35 Hammond and Griffith (1979) 490.
36 For Borza (1990) 224: 'the apparent resistance to his offers had begun to make Philip doubt than an accommodation with Athens was possible'. Worthington (2014) 99 suggests the Peace of Philocrates taught Philip that 'any voluntary settlement of Greece was ephemeral'.
37 See Aesch. 2.172–7 for a review of the blessings peace previously brought to Athens.
38 Translations of Demosthenes 18 and 19 from Yunis (2005).
39 As Raaflaub (2009a) 241 notes, in the ancient world 'peace was observed until one power believed it could gain more by war'. See Errington (1990) 79–80 on Athenian 'warmongering' during these years.
40 Paraphrasing Cartledge (2004) 87. Of course, previous Common Peace agreements were not entirely peaceful and were also exploited as a tool of power politics by Persia, Sparta, Athens, and Thebes in turn. On 'hegemony through peace' in the fourth century BC see Raaflaub (2009a) 240–1.
41 Hunt (2010) 236 observes of Common Peace discussions in the fourth century BC, 'these had as their real and stated goal the establishment of peace in the whole Greek world. But it was always peace on the terms of one state or another; that a legal analogy was used did not mean that the result did not involve winners or losers.'
42 See Plut. *Mor.* 177d (= *Regum* 26.4): 'After his victory over the Greeks, when some counselled him to keep the cities in subjection with garrisons, he said that he wished to be called a good man for a long time rather than remembered as a despot for a short while.'
43 In all this Philip was backed by pro-Macedonian support in many *poleis*, as Cartledge (2004) 39 notes: 'Philip in hard actuality had been very careful to ensure that, before the

oaths were sworn, his partisans were in control of their cities. In this, as in other ways, the Macedonian Empire was little distinguishable from the Persian.' See Roebuck (1948) 73–92, Ellis (1976) 199–204, and Jehne (1994) 141–151 on Philip's pre-settlement activity.

44 These arrangements are reminiscent of those that structured the Athenian Confederacy earlier, with cities bound to a hegemonic power even before the establishment of a multilateral community. See Low (2007) 67 and Buckler (2003) 513.

45 Cartledge (2004) 87.

46 Hammond (1994) 159. Thebes, for example, was forced to pay for the return of the fallen and captured at Chaeronea, and, in addition to a garrison, a pro-Philip government of restored Theban exiles was also installed in the city (Justin 9.4.6–8).

47 Diodorus tells us of consultations with the city-states beforehand (16.89.2–3). Most information about the League of Corinth comes from the Demosthenic *On the Treaty with Alexander* ([Dem.] 17, dating to later in the 330s BC); in addition, it is generally accepted that the inscription *IG* II^2 236 (= Rhodes and Osborne (2003) no.76) details the terms of the peace (although Worthington (2009) 213–23 presents arguments against this reading). See the review of evidence by Ager (1997) 39–43.

48 Buckler and Beck (2008) 28. The organisation of the League, as Flower (2000b) 98 notes, 'was surely meant both to recall and to be the successor of the Hellenic League of 480 BC'. On Philip's 'complex plan of unity' see Borza (1978) 241. The echoes of earlier civic reconciliation oaths in this agreement are noted by Benjamin Gray in his contribution to this volume.

49 In addition, there were also appeals throughout to more general concepts such as freedom, non-aggression, and the security of the seas ([Dem.] 17.19). For a review see Buckler (1994) 113–18.

50 Cawkwell (1996) 115, for example, identifies the 'lack of unifying force' as a key flaw in previous agreements.

51 Worthington (2008) 161; see also Cawkwell (1996) 100 and Cartledge (2004) 86–7.

52 As Briant (2010) 29 notes. The League was an instrument of empire, but it was not an insignificant institution; the analysis of Poddighe (2009) 104 strikes the right balance as it notes: 'The council's wide authority encompassed arbitration, protection of the social order, and ratification of war but, in the crucial areas, it was firmly controlled by the Macedonian state.'

53 From the start of his reign, Borza (1978) 241 suggests.

54 As Buckler (2003) 513 notes. Hammond (1994) 163 overstates things by maintaining that Philip's arrangements were even 'far in advance of the present system of the European Community'.

55 Perlman (1985) 173 points out that Philip 'was careful not to create the impression that he wanted monarchical, unrestrained rule or imperial hegemony in Greece'. See Fowler and Hekster (2005) 31 on the 'elaborate terminology of 'alliance, *symmachia*, evolved by the Macedonian kings'.

56 See the summary offered by Walbank (1957) 308 (on Polybius 3.6.13). Gorgias first advanced ideas of *homonoia* and a war against Persia (*c.* 392 BC) shortly after the short assault by Agesilaus. Lysias revived the suggestion at Olympia in 388 BC, adding also a campaign against Dionysius I of Sicily. Isocrates sets out his proposals in the *Panegyricus* (380 BC), which may have been supported by Jason of Pherae (*c.* 374 BC), and also in a public letter addressed to Philip in 346 BC. On the latter see Moloney (2015) 65–71

57 Low (2012) 125–6, also on the balance of 'peace and war' in Common Peace treaties (with reference to Jehne (1994) 7–19).

58 Errington (1990) 88.

59 Low (2012) 131 highlighting how Greek agreements allowed for (and sometimes required) war against those not involved in discussions. On those connections between peace in Greece and war against Persia in Isocrates' *On the Peace* see Hunt (2010) 264. See also Joseph Jansen's contribution to this volume for further discussion of the 'Panhellenic formula'.

60 See also Justin's long comparison of Philip and Alexander (9.8.7–10), where it is noted that the father's 'compassion and his duplicity were qualities that he prized equally, and no means of gaining a victory would he consider dishonourable'.
61 Squillace (2010) 74–75. For some of Justin's more favourable comments see 9.4.1–0 and 9.8.1–21 in full.
62 Athenaeus 13.557 b–e = Satyrus, *The Life of Philip*. As far as we can tell, each of Philip's seven marriages were made for political reasons: see Cawkwell (1996) 105 and Carney (2000) 51–81.
63 Isocrates, *To Philip* 154. For Philip's adaptability see Ellis (1976) 231–3. On Philip and the Illyrians see Greenwalt (2010) 289–94, for his campaigns against Thrace (343–341 BC) see Worthington (2008) 122–35.
64 Wiesehöfer (2007) 134. Wiesehöfer also highlights that Persian ideology, which stressed 'the reciprocity of royal care and loyalty of the subjects', owed much to earlier Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian practices (126). On the diplomacy of Assyrian and Persian kings see Selga Medeniek's contribution to this volume.
65 Briant (2010) 140–1. Criticising recent comparisons of 'Argead brutality' and 'Achaemenid enlightenment', Briant maintains that the 'Persian elites were neither more nor less inclined towards peace or war than the Macedonian elites.'
66 Strootman (2014b) 327.
67 Ibid. 332, drawing on Versnel (1970) 371–96.
68 Harris (1995) 153. On the symbiotic relationship between kings and subject cities later in the Hellenistic period see Bringmann (1993) 7–24.
69 For Buckler (2003) 504 Philip, crucially, 'knew how to win the peace after having won the war.'