1 Introduction

Imagining, establishing and instituting peace

E. P. Moloney and Michael Stuart Williams

Attitudes towards peace in the classical world have for many been summed up by two famous sayings, one Greek and one Roman. There is apparent confirmation that the world of classical Greece was endlessly fractious in the observation of the philosopher Heraclitus that 'war is both father of all and king of all', and it is no accident that the phrase is used in the title of a collection of essays on war both ancient and modern by the historian Victor Davis Hanson.[1] Roman attitudes, meanwhile, are often taken to be represented by the adage derived from the military writer Vegetius: 'if you want peace, prepare for war' – a slogan taken up with enthusiasm since, not least as an argument for nuclear deterrence.[2] Certainly, the modern image of the classical world is one of conflict and war, from the Greek and Persian warriors of *Troy* and *300* to the Roman armies and gladiatorial combats of *Cleopatra*, *Gladiator* and the television series *Rome*.[3] Armchair strategists have endlessly fought and refought the greatest battles of the classical era, from board games recreating the battles of Gaugamela or Alesia to contemporary video games such as *Rome: Total War*, and enthusiasts can even avail of a bi-monthly print magazine.[4] Museums regularly provide exhibits on ancient warfare and the classical world is well represented in military museums in Athens, Paris and at Vindolanda, among others.[5] Ancient and classical warfare are also a frequent focus of modern scholarship, with recent publications ranging from a 'very short introduction' published by Oxford University Press to a two-volume *Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare*; while, since 2013, scholarly activity has supported an annual International Ancient Warfare Conference.[6] Of course, much of this emphasis can be easily explained by the nature of scholarly materials: sophisticated warfare requires specialist equipment that leaves traces in the archaeological record; and our written evidence from Homer's *Iliad* to Gregory of Tours' *History of the Franks* and beyond is no less preoccupied with recounting war and conflict.[7]

Yet, the emphasis on conflict and war in our written evidence may allow us to approach an element bound up with them but that has received remarkably little independent attention: peace, and the associated ideas of conflict resolution and reconciliation. The modern discipline of Peace Studies can be traced without too much debate to the founding in 1964 of the International

Peace Research Association and the *Journal of Peace Research*. As a discipline grounded primarily in sociology and political theory it is heavily focused on policy and advocacy, but it also insists on an interdisciplinary approach incorporating the close analysis and use of historical examples. Nevertheless, scholars working in the discipline have paid relatively little attention to the classical world.[8] The one area of discussion into which classical precedents have consistently been brought is the controversy over 'democratic peace', which examines the question of whether democratic states consistently avoid war with one another: classical Athens has been put forward as an emblematic democracy whose actions may qualify the argument.[9] Even here, it is evident that the primary interest of scholars in peace studies remains modern democracies; all the same, classical scholars have begun to take an interest in the debate and to draw attention to some of the complexities of the relationship that existed in Athens between democratic ideology and military ventures.[10] A fuller sense of the historical conditions and attitudes that pertained in the ancient world can only be to the advantage of those seeking to use classical precedents to contemporary ends.

It is, of course, the case that classical scholars have long studied not only war but also aspects of peacemaking: detailed studies have been made of truces and leagues and other legal and institutional manifestations of the desire to make and maintain a peaceful coexistence with others.[11] Similarly, there has been a long tradition of investigation into the causes of ancient wars, much of it prompted by the meditations on that topic by the historian Thucydides.[12] Yet, peace in the classical world has rarely been an object of sustained study in its own right: the most valuable recent contribution, a 2007 volume edited by Kurt Raaflaub on *War and Peace in the Ancient World*, not only extends its reach far beyond classical Greece and Rome but also betrays in its title its conception of peace as an adjunct to war.[13] Although the contributors to Raaflaub's volume are all careful to allow peace at least as much consideration as warfare, the insistent coupling of the two concepts implies both that 'peace' is a concept that applies chiefly (if not only) to international or interstate relations and that it can be defined as the cessation or the absence of a formal state of war. This is not wholly misleading, but it is insufficient: it is to ignore a variety of common understandings of peace, and especially of conflict resolution and reconciliation, that existed in the classical world even outside the context of warfare as such. While a full study of peace in all its aspects is beyond the scope of a single volume, and although war can by no means be excluded from the discussion, it is the hope that by making peace alone the centre of attention it will be possible to acquire a broader and more inclusive understanding of its place and its value in the classical world.[14]

There remains, of course, the difficulty of defining what exactly is meant by 'peace'. Modern scholars have often preferred to define it very broadly in terms of the absence of 'violence', which is itself susceptible to very broad definition. In some cases, as in the model promoted by Johan Galtung, this can extend to defining as violent – and so lacking peace – any situation in which there is

either restraint on an individual's potential or any structural social injustice.[15] This understanding has been influential but also much criticised, not least for its tendency to confound peace with freedom and justice, which are better understood as separate but related ideas: peace can exist without justice, and justice without peace.[16] Certainly, it is necessary in the discussion of the classical world to uncouple peace from an ideal of social justice, since the manifestly unjust treatment of women and slaves (among others) would in these terms disqualify the majority of classical societies from ever being peaceful. As Harald Müller has suggested, it is perhaps better to maintain a more restricted understanding of peace as an unexceptional state in which there is neither the open use of violence between identifiable groups nor the definite threat of such violence.[17] Moreover, since 'violence' has become a term of art and is increasingly taken to include broader forms of 'cultural' and 'structural' violence, it is often preferable to use an alternative term such as 'conflict' as a foil for the understanding of peace.[18]

Ultimately, however, there has been no effort to impose upon contributors to this volume a common vocabulary or theoretical approach. Not the least advantage in studying the classical world is the extent to which its assumptions depart from our own; and 'peace' is not to be so strictly defined when part of the purpose of the investigation is to emphasise the fit or the lack of it between modern definitions of peace and the classical understanding of *eirene* or *pax*.[19] It is for these reasons that the contributions to this volume have been divided into three parts: imagining, establishing, and instituting peace. Even though this scheme is imposed from without, and even though some contributions necessarily overstep the boundaries it creates, it has been chosen as reflecting three distinct aspects of peace as it appears in the study of the classical world: in modern terms, they might be taken as corresponding respectively to peace as such, to conflict resolution, and to reconciliation. Within each part the contributions are then offered in chronological order.

The first part examines the idea and ideology of peace in the classical world, and it makes clear that peace was a matter of concern not only to philosophers but also to politicians, poets, comedians: essentially, to anyone with an interest in the interpretation and reinterpretation of contemporary culture. William Allan thus begins with a detailed investigation of the language of the great Athenian poet and politician Solon, whose public rhetoric is shown to make heavy use of the language of military conflict as a means of raising the stakes of internal disputes – and, Allan argues, as a means of establishing his own role as a 'reconciler' and peacemaker. Solon's political poetry gives pride of place to *eunomia* (translatable perhaps as 'good order'): combined with his other imagery it conjures up a (semi-divine) figure capable of transcending petty squabbles and protecting the common interest of the population as a whole. A similar focus on common interests and values, and a similar emphasis not on *eirene* but on a related concept, is also to be found in William Desmond's discussion of ideas of peace as they

appear in Aristotle's more abstract philosophical speculations: although, in fact, Aristotle emerges as very much concerned with the practical conditions under which a future peace might flourish. Desmond points in particular to the significance of *philia*, which is to say a form of friendship that might be extended to serve as the basis for an ideal community, ultimately (as in Solon) transcending the political and social divisions to which humans for the present were prey.

The comic playwright Aristophanes was equally preoccupied with the balance between an idealised state of peace and justice and the divisions and violence he saw all around him; and as Ian Ruffell argues in his contribution to this volume, his solutions – driven to a large extent by the need to amuse as well as engage his audience – often struggled to reconcile advocacy for peace and peacemaking with a commitment to satire and blame directed at warmongers and (ostensibly self-interested) peacemakers alike. 'Irony's guns face in every direction', it has been said, and Aristophanes was too much the ironist to be willing to disarm unilaterally in a political cause.[20] Yet, Ruffell notes, too, an awareness in Aristophanes of the differences between concluding a truce and establishing (or instituting) peace; and it is perhaps telling that even the separate peace obtained by Dikaiopolis, the justly-named protagonist of *Akharnians*, is no more than a thirty-year truce.

Similar considerations also animate the investigation conducted by Benjamin Gray into the complex relationship between *eirene* and *homonoia*, which may be broadly conceived of as opposites to external war (*polemos*) and internal strife (*stasis*) respectively. Gray traces a move from *homonoia* understood as a form of commonality and unity which might as easily promote factional conflict as restrain it, towards an approach in the Greek cities that concentrated on the suppression of dissent under the banner of a common humanity and commitment to tolerance. This transference of the conditions of inter-state peace – which very often means no more than co-existence – to the internal politics of a city is also recognisable, as Gray himself notes, in Hannah Cornwell's contribution to this volume, in which she examines the changing terminology of *pax* (peace) and *concordia* (concord) in the later Roman republic. Here too we see a deliberate blurring of the traditional distinction in the rhetoric adopted in particular by Cicero, who was determined to portray as an existential threat to the Roman state the actions of Julius Caesar and Mark Antony, whose own preference was instead to present themselves as conducting politics as usual. As Cornwell notes, this shift in vocabulary laid the ground for Caesar's great-nephew Octavian (Augustus) to celebrate bringing *pax* to Rome by his victory in a civil war.

Peace brought about through conquest has conventionally been considered to capture the sense of *pax* as the Romans used it, at least under the empire established by the successors of Augustus. Myles Lavan, however, offers a close examination of the ways in which *pax* and its derivatives are used by Roman authors and proposes a more nuanced understanding in which 'pacification' of territory is not to be taken as merely a euphemism for violent subjugation

but refers rather to the desired end of peaceful coexistence, however it may be achieved. Peoples and territories described by Latin authors as *pacatus* thus need not have been forcibly reduced to this state; although Lavan notes that the language is not therefore wholly benign, as it grants to Roman imperial expansion a purpose of promoting peace which might compare to modern projects of establishing 'civilisation'. This part of the volume then concludes by examining an ideology of peace which represented a contemporary challenge to Roman norms and which has had no less of a modern resonance: that put forward by the early Christians, whose views are examined here by David M. Gwynn. The beatitudes in the Gospel of Matthew famously praise 'the peacemakers' who 'will be called children of God', but although the authors of the New Testament persistently advocate peace and love, they also evince a recognition that their religious commitments would meet with and perhaps even justify violence.[21] The history of early Christianity is thus bound up with the encounter between an ideal of peace and a reality in which Christians were first targets of persecution and then, unexpectedly, potential agents of a new imperial regime which was no more pacific than its predecessors. Christian leaders and authors were thus obliged to examine very closely their commitment to peace in theory and its practical implications: and as Gwynn reminds us, the results provide a legacy of firm and principled opposition to military ventures but also a precedent for religious coercion and the beginnings of 'just war' theory.

The second part of the volume then takes up more practical concerns in addressing conflict resolution in classical antiquity, above all between states and other political communities and their leaders. It therefore takes its cue from a major strand of modern conflict resolution that treats it as part of the study of international relations, very often focusing on political strategies and formal agreements.[22] In the ancient world, however, in the absence of the modern system of nation-states and intergovernmental organisations such as the United Nations or NATO, peace was as likely to be imposed as negotiated between independent political actors.[23] The range of possibilities in such circumstances is seen in the contrast drawn by Selga Medenieks between the Neo-Assyrian kings, whose conquests regularly ended in the complete subjection of the defeated party to the new ruler and to his gods, and the innovative approach adopted by their successor Cyrus the Great, whose self-representation in victory dwelt instead on the peace and good order he claimed to have brought to his empire. The arrangements for peace put in place by Cyrus seem to have allowed for the worship of other gods alongside or in association with his own, an integrative approach that secured his subsequent reputation for cultural sensitivity and tolerance and which no doubt did much to reconcile his subjects to their subordination.

This policy won Cyrus admirers even in the ancient Greek world, in which we are accustomed to see imperial powers rejected as enemies of a jealously guarded political independence. But freedom and self-determination could lead to difficulties of its own when it came to resolving disputes, not least of which

was the difficulty of reaching an agreement that could be accepted by all parties as fair. As Aideen Carty demonstrates in her analysis of international arbitration in archaic Greece, it was not uncommon for states to submit themselves to the judgement of an *aisymnetes*, a term that Aristotle would later use to describe an 'elected tyrant' but that seems to have connoted a broader capacity to impose binding judgements on those who had abandoned hope of resolving conflicts any other way. Such a system was workable for as long as there were eminent individuals whose independence could be sufficiently guaranteed, and for as long as their decisions could be expected to be carried out without too much protest from the communities involved. These were conditions less often to be found in classical Greece, and Andrew J. Bayliss portrays Sparta in its fifth- and fourth-century heyday as participating instead in a complex diplomatic environment in which they sought to balance an insistence on legalism with actions and policies which can easily be recognised as self-serving. As Bayliss points out, Sparta's relations with those allies bound to her by oaths were often conditioned by a desire to maximise her own self-interest; but they were justified not by appeals to realism but to a language of justice and piety. Modern parallels may perhaps come to mind.

If relations between classical Greek states are the period of ancient history most recognisable as a precursor of the modern system of international relations, the rise of Macedon presented it with a return to the dominance of a single power and a leader who might be figured either as a tyrant or as a benevolent ruler in the mould of Cyrus the Great. Philip of Macedon, whose son Alexander is said to have venerated Cyrus, seems to have represented himself in terms similar to the Persian king in seeking to move from enemy and conqueror to an accepted governor of the formerly free Greek states. Eoghan Moloney suggests that Philip's efforts were a serious attempt to establish an effective and lasting peace on the basis of the panhellenic (or nearly so) League of Corinth; but notes too that his seemingly idealistic approach was limited to outcomes that preserved his own hegemony over the Greek world, and that Philip was more than ready to abandon efforts at integration if pragmatism demanded it. Nevertheless, Philip's rhetoric is a reminder that even the most powerful states in the ancient world had to take account of the people they governed: a lesson learned also by Rome, as it intervened first in the Greek world and then came to dominate the Mediterranean Sea and beyond.

The final two contributions in this part discuss the treatment of conquered peoples by the Romans, and similarly demonstrate that even a hegemonic power could find itself restricted in the settlements it might impose. John Richardson provides a close analysis of an inscription from Spain from the second century BC, recording an agreement between a local population and their Roman conquerors. Richardson notes that although the text records a *deditio*, the surrender or capitulation of the provincials, the terms offered are remarkably generous; and he proposes this as a creative response to a reluctance on the part of the Roman senate to allow commanders in the field to

conclude a formal treaty, or *foedus*. Roman generals were not given free rein to make agreements on behalf of the state: those who did so made sure that all sides were agreed to present the situation as a Roman triumph and not a negotiation.

Nor was this wholly uncharacteristic even of the Roman empire, as John Curran suggests in his exploration of the end and aftermath of the Roman conquest of Judaea in AD 70. Curran restores to the triumphalist narrative insisted on by the Romans themselves a sense of the precariousness of their situation as they laid siege to a Jerusalem well built to withstand it; and he notes, too, the need for the Roman emperor Vespasian and his family, after the war had been won, to allow some leeway to the soldiers who had been so long frustrated but also to the Jews themselves. Hence the emperor's son, general and heir apparent, Titus, toured Judaea not only to display Roman power but to demonstrate through practical measures the commitment of the Romans to 'winning the peace'; and although the rhetoric on all sides was of total destruction, Curran recognises not only the continued Jewish presence in Jerusalem but also the interest taken by the imperial family in certain artefacts and principles of Jewish culture. None of this should diminish the horrors of war, nor the frequent ruthlessness of imperial armies. All the same, it is a reminder that establishing peace is not merely a matter of ending war.

This point then becomes central to the final part of this volume, which takes as its theme the move from conflict resolution to reconciliation. The precise nature of this distinction, and even the meaning of 'reconciliation' in particular, remains disputed in the modern literature, and no formal definition has been imposed on the contributors here.[24] Nevertheless, there is an emerging consensus around an understanding of reconciliation in which it applies chiefly to individuals involved in a broader conflict and requires adapting 'motivations, beliefs, and attitudes' as a means of accepting and appreciating the perspective of other parties.[25] This is often presented as a matter of identities, individual and collective, but it is important to note that this need not mean abandonment or even significant weakening of an important identity: instead, as Herbert Kelman has suggested, reconciliation need require no more than merely 'acknowledging the validity and legitimacy of the other's narrative without necessarily fully agreeing with that narrative'.[26] Reconciliation may thereby be separated from a dedication to truth and justice, which may be valuable means to an end but which often relate to objective criteria and not subjective experience.[27] What is essential is therefore not the basis on which peace is achieved but a common commitment to instituting a stable and lasting peace: not an end to a particular conflict but a preference for avoiding any recourse to violence.[28]

These principles, and in particular the importance of identity-building as a means of reaching a durable peace, are applied by Christoph Ulf to the work of the historian Thucydides and his portrayal of attempts to create such a common identity among the Greeks of Sicily. Ulf uses the example of the Olympian Gods as they are portrayed in Homer and Hesiod to show that a

model for a negotiated common identity was available to Thucydides, but finds that he was unable or unwilling to apply this to his own day. The vaunted realism of his account of the Peloponnesian War can thus be presented as a failure of imagination: the historian lacks the poets' grasp of the narratives by which the warring parties might have been reconciled.

The hope of reconciliation flowers most strongly perhaps in the aftermath of violent conflict, and Janett Morgan's contribution to this volume examines the evidence that it was one of the motivating factors behind major building projects in antiquity, including the Parthenon in Athens and the monumental Achaemenid cities of Pasargadae and Persepolis. Despite the peaceful reputation of Cyrus the Great and the symbolic value of the Parthenon and its frieze recalling the Panathenaic festival, Morgan remains sceptical that such immense projects reflect the institution of a lasting peace or the reconciliation of rival communities. On the contrary, she concludes that they as naturally reflect competition and division, with buildings offering rival philanthropists a means of establishing or displaying their political and economic power. A similar perpetuation of enmity in the guise of a generous accord is then recognised by Mike Edwards in the amnesty agreement by which the democrats of Athens were ostensibly reconciled with the Thirty Tyrants who had previously dominated the city – an agreement that contained a famous clause that none should recall past wrongs. Edwards offers modifications to a recent view of the document as in places unexpectedly harsh; but ultimately agrees that this amnesty, such as it was, could scarcely be enforced, and indeed that the memory of the Thirty had lost little of its motive power even two or three generations later.

Once again, it seems that a conditional commitment to *eirene* and an inability to see past traditional rivalries limited the prospects of a lasting peace in the classical Greek world, as elsewhere. This is also the diagnosis offered by Joseph Jansen, who presents the versatile Athenian writer Xenophon as an exception: a rare classical thinker who could look beyond civic and 'panhellenic' loyalties to come up with practical proposals for a more stable system of interstate relations. The vision of political and economic interdependence that Jansen finds in Xenophon's *Poroi* might have brought an end to the strife that characterised inter-state relations in classical Greece; but it should be noted that what was on offer in the *Poroi* was arguably no more than a lasting truce. Rather than anticipating any real change in the attitudes of individuals, Xenophon envisaged a remarkably modern (and limited) state of peace based on common economic interests, and preserved for Athens the right to use force in defence of those interests – including the use of slaves in its silver mines – when these appeared to be under threat. The language of unity and friendship here again gives way when closely examined: the temporary peace and security provided by trade relations seems likely to have been vulnerable when put under pressure.

But if reconciliation on the level of interstate relations seems constantly to run up against the constraints of realism, there is a case for examining the

prospects for reconciliation among individuals and on ideological grounds. The early Christians, whose commitment to an ideal of peace has already been emphasised, encountered with the advent of state support not only the need to engage with the political authorities but also to reach some agreement with those co-religionists whose loyalties did not wholly coincide with their own. The frequently violent disagreements that resulted from questions of heresy and schism have rarely been seen as redounding to the credit of those involved, and it seems clear that 'the peace of the church' was achieved in large part by the forcible suppression of dissent. This picture is not entirely to be rejected, although it has more recently been suggested that accusations of violence on all sides may well be exaggerated.[29] Hence, Peter Iver Kaufman looks closely at the view offered by the bishop and theologian Augustine of Hippo regarding what he would condemn as the heresy of Donatism, and finds that although he was by no means reluctant to employ the state machinery of punishment and repression to alter the allegiances of these malcontents, Augustine at least in principle balanced this with a consistent rhetorical emphasis on repentance and, perhaps ultimately, reconciliation. Similarly, Michael Stuart Williams picks out instances from late antiquity to suggest that even in a matter so unamenable to compromise as Christian heresy and schism, and even in texts that seem designed to portray the utter subjugation of an opponent, there remains the possibility of reconciliation at least in the mind of the reader. The confidence with which the opponents of the 'orthodox' figures in these texts are able to press their case may be taken, in the terms set out by Kelman, as a recognition of the validity of a rival position – even if no acceptance of it is urged. In both cases it must be noted that reconciliation was only on the terms of the winners: there was little room for compromise in matters of faith. But if this prospect falls short of an ideally multilateral agreement bought into from all sides, it may at least offer an example of peace – imposed, as so often, by a force from outside – which nevertheless aspired to a real alteration of hearts and minds.

Each of the contributions to this volume examines an individual case, and it is inevitable that concerns should overlap; and indeed that each in its own way should have dealt with all three significant themes of peace, conflict resolution and reconciliation. These divisions are for the sake of convenience, and to point up connections that might otherwise be overlooked. At the same time, of course, a number of these contributions might have slotted in nicely elsewhere in the volume, and it seems more an advantage than a disadvantage that themes should recur in widely separated essays. Each author has employed his or her own terms, and each has had the freedom to choose whether or not to engage with the discourse of modern peace studies and/or with the modern world. Even where such parallels are not explicitly drawn, however, it is to be hoped that the relevance of the study of peace in so many aspects has something to offer to those who may not be specialists in the classical world, as well as showing those who are already familiar with that world that there are aspects which are easily overlooked.

Naturally, there remain many notable gaps in the coverage provided by the contributions to this volume. This project had its origin in a panel organised by the editors as part of the Celtic Conference in Classics held in Edinburgh in August 2014; and some papers delivered on that occasion could not, for any number of good reasons, in the end be provided or included. Other contributions were commissioned for this volume where obvious gaps or missing perspectives were identified, and where appropriate expertise was available. Nevertheless, in a volume of this nature there can be no pretence of providing comprehensive coverage of such a wide-ranging topic, and where there are omissions it must be left to other scholars to recognise them and to make good the deficiency. It remains only for the editors to thank the participants in this project: the contributors to this volume, including those who were asked to write specially for it; those who spoke at the original conference panel, and those who chaired panels at that event and who came to listen and discuss the various issues; the organisers of the conference as a whole, Douglas Cairns and Anton Powell; the anonymous readers provided by the publisher, who took pains to offer careful and sympathetic feedback; and Michael Greenwood himself and all at Ashgate for their consistent support and attention to detail. Thanks to all of these, you now hold in your hands a collection of papers which may not promise peace in our time, but which may allow a greater understanding of how the classical world imagined, established and instituted something resembling peace in *their* time.

Notes

1 Heraclitus, *fr.* 53, preserved in Hippolytus of Rome, *Ref. haer.* 9.4: Πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς; Hanson (2010).
2 Vegetius, *De re militari* 3. pref: 'igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum'; for some modern uses, see e.g. Haase (1977), Wallace (1981) and Bulkeley (1983).
3 *Troy*, Wolfgang Petersen, Warner Bros. (2004); *300*, Zack Snyder, Warner Bros. (2007); *Cleopatra*, Joseph L. Mankiewicz, 20th Century Fox (1963); *Gladiator*, Ridley Scott, Universal Pictures (2000); *Rome*, BBC-HBO-Rai Fiction (2005–2007).
4 *Alexander the Great* (Evansville, IN: Guidon Games, 1971); *Caesar at Alesia* (Renton, WA: Avalon Hill, 1976); *Rome: Total War* (Horsham: Creative Assembly, 2004). Magazine: *Ancient Warfare* (Rotterdam: Karwansaray, 2007–).
5 See the Athens War Museum (www.warmuseum.gr), the Musée de l'Armée (www.musee-armee.fr) and the Roman Army Museum (www.vindolanda.com/roman-army-museum); for classical warfare in major museums see e.g. the Metropolitan Museum's online guide to Warfare in Ancient Greece (www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/gwar/hd_gwar.htm) and a teaching page on War in Ancient Greece established by the British Museum (www.ancientgreece.co.uk/war/home_set.html).
6 Sidebottom (2004); Sabin, Van Wees, & Whitby (2007).
7 Sabin, Van Wees, & Whitby (2007) i thus arguably understate the case in identifying war as 'the single biggest preoccupation of *historians* in antiquity' (emphasis added).
8 Notably, the papers collected in Evangelista (2005), a four-volume compendium of the most important contributions in peace studies, include not a single article addressing the ancient world and scarcely any mention of classical Greece or Rome. Such a presentist

approach may also be found in e.g. Pruitt and Kressel (1985) 1, which begins by noting that 'Mediation must surely be one of the oldest and most common forms of conflict resolution', illustrating the point with interpersonal relationships and the history of the United States before adding that 'the mediation of disputes between nations . . . probably reaches back to the beginnings of the nation-state system': mediation before the modern nation-state system is simply ignored. While some recent introductory works – e.g. Adolf (2009), Gitting (2012), and Stearns (2014) – do touch on ancient peace, the engagement with Classical societies still tends to be too fleeting.

9 The example of Athens was most notably put forward in Russett and Antholis (1992) and reiterated in Russett (1993); it was subsequently criticised by Bachteler (1997), to whom Russett appends a reply. Weart (1998) offers a further iteration of Russett's view, criticised by Robinson (2001) which is likewise accompanied by a reply. The more recent exchange between Robinson (2006) and Russett (2006) reflects an increasing awareness of the difficulties in seeing classical Greece as either democratic or peaceful.

10 Thus, the overviews of democratic theory provided by Risse-Kappen (1995) and Rosato (2003) do not cite any ancient examples, although the former at least shows some awareness of the discussion of the ancient world. Among classical scholars, the most notable discussions are Raaflaub (1994), Pritchard (2005), and Keane (2010).

11 For example, Badian (1987); Cawkwell (1997); and the articles in De Souza and France (2008).

12 The discussion of Thucydides and the causes of war is too broad for more than one or two emblematic works to be cited: these might range from Sealey (1957) and Andrewes (1959) to Lebow (1991) and Parmeggiani (2007). Kagan (1995) incorporates the question into an even broader comparative study; it may be noted that Evangelista (2005) devotes an entire volume to modern studies of the causes of wars.

13 Raaflaub (2007a); note also Dülffer and Frank (2009) where we have a tripartite split between peace, war, and gender. Evangelista (2005) 11 notes the paradox that 'most scholars of peace studies spend their time studying conflict and war'; the extent to which this is an essential feature of the discipline is examined in Gleditsch, Nordkveller and Strand (2014).

14 Offering here a wider review, for example, than those recent collections edited by Rocchi (2007) and Wilker (2012a).

15 Galtung (1969), (1990): see e.g. the application of this approach to the ancient world in Praet (2014).

16 Müller (2003) 57.

17 Müller (2003) 63.

18 Thus Deutsch (2006) offers various examples of conflict from the interpersonal to the international as his introduction to a study not of peace in the broadest sense but of the related idea of 'conflict resolution'.

19 Ishida (1969) 137 insists on the importance of understanding peace in cross-cultural terms; his account of the meanings of these ancient terms is of course limited by the scope of his wider project.

20 Enright (1986) 110.

21 Matt. 5.3–10.

22 See e.g. Hauss (2010); the more interpersonal approach adopted in Deutsch *et al.* (2006) and which becomes dominant in the 2014 third edition is not easy to apply to the ancient world, given the paucity of evidence about ordinary individual actors; nevertheless, elements of this approach may be found in the third part of this volume, defined here as dealing with 'reconciliation'.

23 On the use of ideologies of peace to justify hegemonic power, in ancient and modern times, see Parchami (2009).

24 See Bloomfield (2006) for an intelligent survey of the various meanings of reconciliation.

25 Bar-Tal and Bernink (2004) 11; this seems compatible with the various definitions put forward in De Gruchy (2002) 'a fundamental shift in personal and power relations' (25) and Hauss (2003) 'to lead individual men and women to change the way they think about their historical adversaries'.
26 Kelman (2010) 4.
27 Kelman (2010) 6.
28 This sense of reconciliation thus relates to the idea of a 'stable peace' as set out in Boulding (1987), as well as conforming in some ways to the definition of peace at Müller (2003) 62, which places an emphasis on the durability of peace and the disavowal of 'the possible use of violence by one against another'.
29 See especially the overview of recent research in Bremmer (2014).