

# PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN THE CLASSICAL WORLD



EDITED BY E. P. MOLONEY AND  
MICHAEL STUART WILLIAMS

ROUTLEDGE  


# Peace and Reconciliation in the Classical World

Warfare has long been central to a proper understanding of ancient Greece and Rome, worlds where war was, as the philosopher Heraclitus observed, 'both king and father of all'. More recently, however, the understanding of Classical antiquity solely in such terms has been challenged; it is recognised that while war was pervasive, and a key concern in the narratives of ancient historians, a concomitant desire for peace was also constant. This volume places peace in the prime position as a panel of scholars stresses the importance of 'peace' as a positive concept in the ancient world (and not just the absence of, or necessarily even related to, war), and considers examples of conflict resolution, conciliation, and concession from Homer to Augustine. Comparing and contrasting theories and practice across different periods and regions, this collection highlights, first, the open and dynamic nature of peace, and then seeks to review a wide variety of initiatives from across the Classical world.

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**Edited by E. P. Moloney and  
Michael Stuart Williams**

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# Contents

<i>List of illustrations</i>	viii
<i>List of abbreviations</i>	ix
<i>Notes on contributors</i>	xi
<b>1 Introduction: imagining, establishing, and instituting peace</b>	<b>1</b>
E. P. MOLONEY AND MICHAEL STUART WILLIAMS	
<b>PART I</b>	
<b>Imagining peace in the ancient world</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>2 Solon the peacemaker</b>	<b>15</b>
WILLIAM ALLAN	
<b>3 Aristotle on peace: biological, political, ethical, and metaphysical dimensions</b>	<b>27</b>
WILL DESMOND	
<b>4 (What's so funny 'bout) peace, love, and understanding? Imagining peace in Greek comedy</b>	<b>44</b>
IAN RUFFELL	
<b>5 Reconciliation in later Classical and post-Classical Greek cities: a question of peace and peacefulness?</b>	<b>66</b>
BENJAMIN GRAY	
<b>6 Negotiating ideas of peace in the civil conflicts of the late Republic</b>	<b>86</b>
HANNAH CORNWELL	
<b>7 Peace and empire: <i>pacare, pacatus</i>, and the language of Roman imperialism</b>	<b>102</b>
MYLES LAVAN	

<b>8 Blessed are the peacemakers: visions of Christian peace from Christ to Constantine</b>	115
DAVID M. GWYNN	
<b>PART II</b>	
<b>Establishing peace in the ancient world</b>	131
<b>9 Cyrus the Great: an unconventional peacemaker</b>	133
SELGA MEDENIEKS	
<b>10 International arbitration in Archaic Greece</b>	148
AIDEEN CARTY	
<b>11 Once an ally, always an ally: Sparta's approach to policing the oaths of her allies in the late fifth and early fourth centuries</b>	160
ANDREW J. BAYLISS	
<b>12 The compromise of kings: Philip II and Macedonian peace</b>	178
E. P. MOLONEY	
<b>13 <i>Deditio</i> in the second century BC: subjugation and reconciliation</b>	195
JOHN RICHARDSON	
<b>14 How wars end: three thoughts on the fall of Jerusalem</b>	202
JOHN CURRAN	
<b>PART III</b>	
<b>Instituting peace in the ancient world</b>	215
<b>15 Identity building as a means of conflict resolution, or: Thucydides' struggle with Hellenic discourses</b>	217
CHRISTOPH ULF	
<b>16 Monuments to victory and symbols of peace and reconciliation? Re-viewing post-war building in Classical Athens and Achaemenid Persia</b>	231
JANETT MORGAN	
<b>17 Peace and reconciliation, Athenian-style</b>	248
MICHAEL EDWARDS	

<b>18 Beyond war, imperialism, and Panhellenism: Xenophon's Eirenic thought</b>	255
JOSEPH JANSEN	
<b>19 Punishment and reconciliation: Augustine</b>	271
PETER IVER KAUFMAN	
<b>20 Reading reconciliation in late antique <i>altercationes</i></b>	285
MICHAEL STUART WILLIAMS	
<i>Bibliography</i>	304
<i>Index</i>	333

# Illustrations

## Figures

9.1	Bronze gate decoration from Balawat	135
9.2	Stepped construction of the Persian altar, within the altar of Artemis, at Sardis	139
9.3	Threshold stone from Sardis	141
9.4	Door-sill from the North Palace of Aššurbanipal at Nineveh	142
9.5	Silver stater from Miletos	143
15.1	Narrative structure of the <i>Iliad</i>	224
16.1	Photograph of the Athenian Acropolis and Parthenon	234
16.2	Tribute procession to the Great King, from the Apadana at Persepolis	239
16.3	Darius' Behistun inscription	241
16.4	Tomb of Darius at Naqsh-e Rostam	243

## Table

Appendix: occurrences of 'concept' words in Cicero's <i>Philippics</i>	97
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# Abbreviations

The names and works of ancient authors are generally abbreviated as in S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth eds., *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* (3rd edn. rev, 2003). The abbreviations of Classics periodicals follow *L'Année philologique* (Paris, 1928–).

<i>ABC</i>	A. K. Grayson, <i>Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles</i> . Winona Lake IN, 2000 [1975]
<i>AE</i>	<i>L'Année Épigraphique</i> . Paris, 1888–
<i>ANET</i>	J. B. Pritchard, <i>Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament</i> . 3rd edn with supplement. Princeton NJ, 1969
<i>ARAB</i>	D. D. Luckenbill, <i>Ancient Records of Assyria and Babylonia, Volumes I and II: Historical Records of Assyria</i> . Westport CT, 1968 [1927]
<i>CAH</i>	<i>The Cambridge Ancient History</i> . 2nd edn. 14 vols. Cambridge, 1970–2005
<i>Campbell</i>	D. A. Campbell ed., <i>Greek Lyric, Volume 1: Sappho and Alcaeus</i> . Loeb, 1982
<i>CIL</i>	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i> . Berlin, 1862–
<i>CTh</i>	T. Mommsen and P. Meyer eds., <i>Theodosiani libri XVI cum Constitutionibus Sirmondianis et Leges Novellae ad Theodosianum pertinentes</i> . Berlin, 1905
Degrassi, <i>Fasti</i>	A. Degrassi ed., <i>Inscriptiones Italiae xiii: Fasti et elogia</i> . Rome, 1937–63
<i>DNP</i>	H. Cancik and H. Schneider ed. <i>Der neue Pauly. Enzyklopädie der Antike</i> . 15 vols in 18. Leiden, 1996–2013. English translation: <i>Brill's New Pauly: Encyclopaedia of the Ancient World</i> . 15 vols. Leiden, 2002–10
<i>FGrHist</i>	F. Jacoby, <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> . 15 vols. Berlin & Leiden, 1923–64
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> . Berlin, 1873–
<i>IGSK</i>	<i>Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien</i> . Bonn 1972–
<i>ILLRP</i>	A. Degrassi ed., <i>Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae</i> . 2 vols. Florence, 1957–63

- I.Metropolis* B. Dreyer and H. Engelmann, *Die Inschriften von Metropolis I* (IGSK 63). Bonn, 2003
- IOSPE* B. Latyshev, *Inscriptiones antiquae orae septentrionalis Pontis Euxini Graecae et Latinae*. St. Petersburg, 1885–1901
- KA* R. Kassel and C.F.L. Austin, *Poetae Comici Graeci*. Berlin, 1983–
- Loeb* Loeb Classical Library. London / Cambridge MA, 1912–
- LSJ* H.G. Liddell and R. Scott (1940) *Greek-English Lexicon*. 9th edn, rev. H.S. Jones. Oxford, 1940; E. A. Barber ed., *A Supplement*. Oxford, 1968
- MAMA* *Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiqua*. London, 1928–1993
- ML* R. Meiggs and D.M. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*. Rev. edn. Oxford, 1988
- OCD* S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth eds., *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*. 3rd edn. rev. Oxford, 1996
- OLD* P.G.W. Glare ed., *The Oxford Latin Dictionary*. Oxford, 1968–82
- RE* A. Pauly, G. Wissowa, W. Kroll, et al., *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft: neue Bearbeitung*. 83 vols. Stuttgart, 1894–1980
- RINAP 4* E. Leichty and G. Frame, *The Royal Inscriptions of Esarhaddon, King of Assyria (680–669 BC). The Royal Inscriptions of the Neo-Assyrian Period: Volume 4*. Winona Lake IN, 2011
- RRC* M.H. Crawford, *Roman Republican Coinage*. Cambridge, 1974
- SAA II* S. Parpola and K. Watanabe, *Neo-Assyrian Treaties and Loyalty Oaths*. State Archives of Assyria 2. Helsinki, 1988
- SAA III* A. Livingstone, *Court Poetry and Literary Miscellanea*. State Archives of Assyria 3. Helsinki, 1989
- SEG* *Supplementum epigraphicum Graecum*. Leiden, 1923–
- SIG<sup>3</sup>* W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge inscriptionum graecarum*. 3rd edn. 4 vols. Leipzig, 1915–24
- TAM III* R. Heberdey, *Tituli Asiae Minoris III: Tituli Pisidiae, 1. Tituli Termessi et agri Termessensis*. Vienna, 1941
- TLL* E. Wöllflin et al., *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*. Leipzig / Berlin, 1900–
- Tod ii* M.N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, ii: From 403 to 323 BC*. Oxford, 1948
- TrGF* B. Snell, R. Kannicht and S. Radt eds., *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*. 6 vols. Gottingen, 1971–2004
- West* M.L. West ed., *Iambi et Elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum Cantati*. Oxford, 1989 [1972]

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# 1 Introduction

## Imagining, establishing, and instituting peace

*E. P. Moloney and Michael Stuart Williams*

Attitudes towards peace in the classical world have for many been summed up by two famous sayings, one Greek and one Roman. There is apparent confirmation that the world of classical Greece was endlessly fractious in the observation of the philosopher Heraclitus that ‘war is both father of all and king of all’, and it is no accident that the phrase is used in the title of a collection of essays on war both ancient and modern by the historian Victor Davis Hanson.<sup>1</sup> Roman attitudes, meanwhile, are often taken to be represented by the adage derived from the military writer Vegetius: ‘if you want peace, prepare for war’ – a slogan taken up with enthusiasm since, not least as an argument for nuclear deterrence.<sup>2</sup> Certainly, the modern image of the classical world is one of conflict and war, from the Greek and Persian warriors of *Troy* and *300* to the Roman armies and gladiatorial combats of *Cleopatra*, *Gladiator* and the television series *Rome*.<sup>3</sup> Armchair strategists have endlessly fought and refought the greatest battles of the classical era, from board games recreating the battles of Gaugamela or Alesia to contemporary video games such as *Rome: Total War*, and enthusiasts can even avail of a bi-monthly print magazine.<sup>4</sup> Museums regularly provide exhibits on ancient warfare and the classical world is well represented in military museums in Athens, Paris and at Vindolanda, among others.<sup>5</sup> Ancient and classical warfare are also a frequent focus of modern scholarship, with recent publications ranging from a ‘very short introduction’ published by Oxford University Press to a two-volume *Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare*; while, since 2013, scholarly activity has supported an annual International Ancient Warfare Conference.<sup>6</sup> Of course, much of this emphasis can be easily explained by the nature of scholarly materials: sophisticated warfare requires specialist equipment that leaves traces in the archaeological record; and our written evidence from Homer’s *Iliad* to Gregory of Tours’ *History of the Franks* and beyond is no less preoccupied with recounting war and conflict.<sup>7</sup>

Yet, the emphasis on conflict and war in our written evidence may allow us to approach an element bound up with them but that has received remarkably little independent attention: peace, and the associated ideas of conflict resolution and reconciliation. The modern discipline of Peace Studies can be traced without too much debate to the founding in 1964 of the International

Peace Research Association and the *Journal of Peace Research*. As a discipline grounded primarily in sociology and political theory it is heavily focused on policy and advocacy, but it also insists on an interdisciplinary approach incorporating the close analysis and use of historical examples. Nevertheless, scholars working in the discipline have paid relatively little attention to the classical world.<sup>8</sup> The one area of discussion into which classical precedents have consistently been brought is the controversy over ‘democratic peace’, which examines the question of whether democratic states consistently avoid war with one another: classical Athens has been put forward as an emblematic democracy whose actions may qualify the argument.<sup>9</sup> Even here, it is evident that the primary interest of scholars in peace studies remains modern democracies; all the same, classical scholars have begun to take an interest in the debate and to draw attention to some of the complexities of the relationship that existed in Athens between democratic ideology and military ventures.<sup>10</sup> A fuller sense of the historical conditions and attitudes that pertained in the ancient world can only be to the advantage of those seeking to use classical precedents to contemporary ends.

It is, of course, the case that classical scholars have long studied not only war but also aspects of peacemaking: detailed studies have been made of truces and leagues and other legal and institutional manifestations of the desire to make and maintain a peaceful coexistence with others.<sup>11</sup> Similarly, there has been a long tradition of investigation into the causes of ancient wars, much of it prompted by the meditations on that topic by the historian Thucydides.<sup>12</sup> Yet, peace in the classical world has rarely been an object of sustained study in its own right: the most valuable recent contribution, a 2007 volume edited by Kurt Raaflaub on *War and Peace in the Ancient World*, not only extends its reach far beyond classical Greece and Rome but also betrays in its title its conception of peace as an adjunct to war.<sup>13</sup> Although the contributors to Raaflaub’s volume are all careful to allow peace at least as much consideration as warfare, the insistent coupling of the two concepts implies both that ‘peace’ is a concept that applies chiefly (if not only) to international or interstate relations and that it can be defined as the cessation or the absence of a formal state of war. This is not wholly misleading, but it is insufficient: it is to ignore a variety of common understandings of peace, and especially of conflict resolution and reconciliation, that existed in the classical world even outside the context of warfare as such. While a full study of peace in all its aspects is beyond the scope of a single volume, and although war can by no means be excluded from the discussion, it is the hope that by making peace alone the centre of attention it will be possible to acquire a broader and more inclusive understanding of its place and its value in the classical world.<sup>14</sup>

There remains, of course, the difficulty of defining what exactly is meant by ‘peace’. Modern scholars have often preferred to define it very broadly in terms of the absence of ‘violence’, which is itself susceptible to very broad definition. In some cases, as in the model promoted by Johan Galtung, this can extend

to defining as violent – and so lacking peace – any situation in which there is either restraint on an individual's potential or any structural social injustice.<sup>15</sup> This understanding has been influential but also much criticised, not least for its tendency to confound peace with freedom and justice, which are better understood as separate but related ideas: peace can exist without freedom or justice, and both can exist without peace.<sup>16</sup> Certainly, it is necessary in the discussion of the classical world to uncouple peace from an ideal of social justice, since the manifestly unjust treatment of women and slaves (among others) would in these terms disqualify the majority of classical societies from ever being peaceful. As Harald Müller has suggested, it is perhaps better to maintain a more restricted understanding of peace as an unexceptional state in which there is neither the open use of violence between identifiable groups nor the definite threat of such violence.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, since 'violence' has become a term of art and is increasingly taken to include broader forms of 'cultural' and 'structural' violence, it is often preferable to use an alternative term such as 'conflict' as a foil for the understanding of peace.<sup>18</sup>

Ultimately, however, there has been no effort to impose upon contributors to this volume a common vocabulary or theoretical approach. Not the least advantage in studying the classical world is the extent to which its assumptions depart from our own; and 'peace' is not to be so strictly defined when part of the purpose of the investigation is to emphasise the fit or the lack of it between modern definitions of peace and the classical understanding of *eirene* or *pax*.<sup>19</sup> It is for these reasons that the contributions to this volume have been divided into three parts: imagining, establishing, and instituting peace. Even though this scheme is imposed from without, and even though some contributions necessarily overstep the boundaries it creates, it has been chosen as reflecting three distinct aspects of peace as it appears in the study of the classical world: in modern terms, they might be taken as corresponding respectively to peace as such, to conflict resolution, and to reconciliation. Within each part the contributions are offered in broadly chronological order.

The first part examines the idea and ideology of peace in the classical world, and it makes clear that peace was a matter of concern not only to philosophers but also to politicians, poets, comedians: essentially, to anyone with an interest in the interpretation and reinterpretation of contemporary culture. William Allan thus begins with a detailed investigation of the language of the great Athenian poet and politician Solon, whose public rhetoric is shown to make heavy use of the language of military conflict as a means of raising the stakes of internal disputes – and, Allan argues, as a means of establishing his own role as a 'reconciler' and peacemaker. Solon's political poetry gives pride of place to *eunomia* (translatable perhaps as 'good order'): combined with his other imagery it conjures up a (semi-divine) figure capable of transcending petty squabbles and protecting the common interest of the population as a whole. A similar focus on common interests and values, and a similar emphasis not on *eirene* but on a related concept, is also to be found

in Will Desmond's discussion of ideas of peace as they appear in Aristotle's more abstract philosophical speculations: although, in fact, Aristotle emerges as very much concerned with the practical conditions under which a future peace might flourish. Desmond points in particular to the significance of *philia*, which is to say a form of friendship that might be extended to serve as the basis for an ideal community, ultimately (as in Solon) transcending the political and social divisions to which humans for the present were prey.

The comic playwright Aristophanes was equally preoccupied with the balance between an idealised state of peace and justice and the divisions and violence he saw all around him; and as Ian Ruffell argues in his contribution to this volume, his solutions – driven to a large extent by the need to amuse as well as engage his audience – often struggled to reconcile advocacy for peace and peacemaking with a commitment to satire and blame directed at warmongers and (ostensibly self-interested) peacemakers alike. 'Irony's guns face in every direction', it has been said, and Aristophanes was too much the ironist to be willing to disarm unilaterally in a political cause.<sup>20</sup> Yet, Ruffell notes, too, an awareness in Aristophanes of the differences between concluding a truce and establishing (or instituting) peace; and it is perhaps telling that even the separate peace obtained by Dikaiopolis, the justly-named protagonist of *Akharnians*, is no more than a thirty-year truce.

Similar considerations also animate the investigation conducted by Benjamin Gray into the complex relationship between *eirene* and *homonoia*, which may be broadly conceived of as opposites to external war (*polemos*) and internal strife (*stasis*) respectively. Gray traces a move from *homonoia* understood as a form of commonality and unity which might as easily promote factional conflict as restrain it, towards an approach in the Greek cities that concentrated on the suppression of dissent under the banner of a common humanity and commitment to tolerance. This transference of the conditions of inter-state peace – which very often means no more than co-existence – to the internal politics of a city is also recognisable, as Gray himself notes, in Hannah Cornwell's contribution to this volume, in which she examines the changing terminology of *pax* (peace) and *concordia* (concord) in the later Roman republic. Here too we see a deliberate blurring of the distinction in the rhetoric adopted in particular by Cicero, who was determined to portray as an existential threat to the Roman state the actions of Julius Caesar and Mark Antony, whose own preference was instead to present themselves as conducting politics as usual. As Cornwell notes, this shift in vocabulary laid the ground for Caesar's great-nephew Octavian (Augustus) to celebrate bringing *pax* to Rome by his victory in a civil war.

Peace brought about through conquest has conventionally been considered to capture the sense of *pax* as the Romans used it, at least under the empire established by the successors of Augustus. Myles Lavan, however, offers a close examination of the ways in which *pax* and its derivatives are used by Roman authors and proposes a more nuanced understanding in which 'pacification' of territory is not to be taken as merely a euphemism for violent subjugation

but refers rather to the desired end of peaceful coexistence, however it may be achieved. Peoples and territories described by Latin authors as *pacatus* thus need not have been forcibly reduced to this state; although Lavan notes that the language is not therefore wholly benign, as it grants to Roman imperial expansion a purpose of promoting peace which might compare to modern projects of establishing 'civilisation'. This part of the volume then concludes by examining an ideology of peace which represented a contemporary challenge to Roman norms and which has had no less of a modern resonance: that put forward by the early Christians, whose views are examined here by David M. Gwynn. The beatitudes in the Gospel of Matthew famously praise 'the peacemakers' who 'will be called children of God', but although the authors of the New Testament persistently advocate peace and love, they also evince a recognition that their religious commitments would meet with and perhaps even justify violence.<sup>21</sup> The history of early Christianity is thus bound up with the encounter between an ideal of peace and a reality in which Christians were first targets of persecution and then, unexpectedly, potential agents of a new imperial regime which was no more pacific than its predecessors. Christian leaders and authors were thus obliged to examine very closely their commitment to peace in theory and its practical implications: and as Gwynn reminds us, the results provide a legacy of firm and principled opposition to military ventures but also a precedent for religious coercion and the beginnings of 'just war' theory.

The second part of the volume then takes up more practical concerns in addressing conflict resolution in classical antiquity, above all between states and other political communities and their leaders. It therefore takes its cue from a major strand of modern conflict resolution that treats it as part of the study of international relations, very often focusing on political strategies and formal agreements.<sup>22</sup> In the ancient world, however, in the absence of the modern system of nation-states and intergovernmental organisations such as the United Nations or NATO, peace was as likely to be imposed as negotiated between independent political actors.<sup>23</sup> The range of possibilities in such circumstances is seen in the contrast drawn by Selga Medeniëks between the Neo-Assyrian kings, whose conquests regularly ended in the complete subjection of the defeated party to the new ruler and to his gods, and the innovative approach adopted by their successor Cyrus the Great, whose self-representation in victory dwelt instead on the peace and good order he claimed to have brought to his empire. The arrangements for peace put in place by Cyrus seem to have allowed for the worship of other gods alongside or in association with his own, an integrative approach that secured his subsequent reputation for cultural sensitivity and tolerance and which no doubt did much to reconcile his subjects to their subordination.

This policy won Cyrus admirers even in the ancient Greek world, in which we are accustomed to see imperial powers rejected as enemies of a jealously guarded political independence. But freedom and self-determination could lead to difficulties of its own when it came to resolving disputes, not least of which

was the difficulty of reaching an agreement that could be accepted by all parties as fair. As Aideen Carty demonstrates in her analysis of international arbitration in Archaic Greece, it was not uncommon for states to submit themselves to the judgement of an *aisymnetes*, a term that Aristotle would later use to describe an 'elected tyrant' but that seems to have connoted a broader capacity to impose binding judgements on those who had abandoned hope of resolving conflicts any other way. Such a system was workable for as long as there were eminent individuals whose independence could be sufficiently guaranteed, and for as long as their decisions could be expected to be carried out without too much protest from the communities involved. These were conditions less often to be found in classical Greece, and Andrew J. Bayliss portrays Sparta in its fifth- and fourth-century heyday as participating instead in a complex diplomatic environment in which they sought to balance an insistence on legalism with actions and policies which can easily be recognised as self-serving. As Bayliss points out, Sparta's relations with those allies bound to her by oaths were often conditioned by a desire to maximise her own self-interest; but they were justified not by appeals to realism but to a language of justice and piety. Modern parallels may perhaps come to mind.

If relations between classical Greek states are the period of ancient history most recognisable as a precursor of the modern system of international relations, the rise of Macedon presented it with a return to the dominance of a single power and a leader who might be figured either as a tyrant or as a benevolent ruler in the mould of Cyrus the Great. Philip of Macedon, whose son Alexander is said to have venerated Cyrus, seems to have represented himself in terms similar to the Persian king in seeking to move from enemy and conqueror to an accepted governor of the formerly free Greek states. Eoghan P. Moloney suggests that Philip's efforts were a serious attempt to establish an effective and lasting peace on the basis of the panhellenic (or nearly so) League of Corinth; but notes that this seemingly idealistic approach was limited to outcomes that preserved his own hegemony over the Greek world, and that Philip was more than ready to abandon efforts at integration if pragmatism demanded it. Nevertheless, Philip's rhetoric is a reminder that even the most powerful states in the ancient world had to take account of the people they governed: a lesson learned also by Rome, as it intervened first in the Greek world and then came to dominate the Mediterranean Sea and beyond.

The final two contributions in this part discuss the treatment of conquered peoples by the Romans, and similarly demonstrate that even a hegemonic power could find itself restricted in the settlements it might impose. John Richardson provides a close analysis of an inscription from Spain from the second century BC, recording an agreement between a local population and their Roman conquerors. Richardson notes that although the text records a *deditio*, the surrender or capitulation of the provincials, the terms offered are remarkably generous; and he proposes this as a creative response to a reluctance on the part of the Roman senate to allow commanders in the field to

conclude a formal treaty, or *foedus*. Roman generals were not given free rein to make agreements on behalf of the state: those who did so made sure that all sides were agreed to present the situation as a Roman triumph and not a negotiation.

Nor was this wholly uncharacteristic even of the Roman empire, as John Curran suggests in his exploration of the end and aftermath of the Roman conquest of Judaea in AD 70. Curran restores to the triumphalist narrative insisted on by the Romans themselves a sense of the precariousness of their situation as they laid siege to a Jerusalem well built to withstand it; and he notes, too, the need for the Roman emperor Vespasian and his family, after the war had been won, to allow some leeway to the soldiers who had been so long frustrated but also to the Jews themselves. Hence the emperor's son, general and heir apparent, Titus, toured Judaea not only to display Roman power but to demonstrate through practical measures the commitment of the Romans to 'winning the peace'; and although the rhetoric on all sides was of total destruction, Curran recognises not only the continued Jewish presence in Jerusalem but also the interest taken by the imperial family in certain artefacts and principles of Jewish culture. None of this should diminish the horrors of war, nor the frequent ruthlessness of imperial armies. All the same, it is a reminder that establishing peace is not merely a matter of ending war.

This point then becomes central to the final part of this volume, which takes as its theme the move from conflict resolution to reconciliation. The precise nature of this distinction, and even the meaning of 'reconciliation' in particular, remains disputed in the modern literature, and no formal definition has been imposed on the contributors here.<sup>24</sup> Nevertheless, there is an emerging consensus around an understanding of reconciliation in which it applies chiefly to individuals involved in a broader conflict and requires adapting 'motivations, beliefs, and attitudes' as a means of accepting and appreciating the perspectives of other parties.<sup>25</sup> This is often presented as a matter of identities, individual and collective, but it is important to note that this need not mean abandonment or even significant weakening of an important identity: instead, as Herbert Kelman has suggested, reconciliation need require no more than merely 'acknowledging the validity and legitimacy of the other's narrative without necessarily fully agreeing with that narrative'.<sup>26</sup> Reconciliation may thereby be separated from a dedication to truth and justice, which may be valuable means to an end but which often relate to objective criteria and not subjective experience.<sup>27</sup> What is essential is therefore not the basis on which peace is achieved but a common commitment to instituting a stable and lasting peace: not an end to a particular conflict but a preference for avoiding any recourse to violence.<sup>28</sup>

These principles, and in particular the importance of identity-building as a means of reaching a durable peace, are applied by Christoph Ulf to the work of the historian Thucydides and his portrayal of attempts to create such a common identity among the Greeks of Sicily. Ulf uses the example of the Olympian Gods as they are portrayed in Homer and Hesiod to show that a

model for a negotiated common identity was available to Thucydides, but finds that he was unable or unwilling to apply this to his own day. The vaunted realism of his account of the Peloponnesian War can thus be presented as a true failure of imagination: the historian lacks the poets' grasp of the narratives by which the warring parties might have been reconciled.

The hope of reconciliation flowers most strongly perhaps in the aftermath of violent conflict, and Janett Morgan's contribution to this volume examines the evidence that it was one of the motivating factors behind major building projects in antiquity, including the Parthenon in Athens and the monumental Achaemenid cities of Pasargadae and Persepolis. Despite the peaceful reputation of Cyrus the Great and the symbolic value of the Parthenon and its frieze recalling the Panathenaic festival, Morgan remains sceptical that such immense projects reflect the institution of a lasting peace or the reconciliation of rival communities. On the contrary, she concludes that they as naturally reflect competition and division, with buildings offering rival philanthropists a means of establishing or displaying their political and economic power. A similar perpetuation of enmity in the guise of a generous accord is then recognised by Michael Edwards in the amnesty agreement by which the democrats of Athens were ostensibly reconciled with the Thirty Tyrants who had previously dominated the city – an agreement that contained a famous clause that none should recall past wrongs. Edwards offers modifications to a recent view of the document as in places unexpectedly harsh; but ultimately agrees that this amnesty, such as it was, could scarcely be enforced, and indeed that the memory of the Thirty had lost little of its motive power even two or three generations later.

Once again, it seems that a conditional commitment to *eirene* and an inability to see past traditional rivalries limited the prospects of a lasting peace in the classical Greek world, as elsewhere. This is also the diagnosis offered by Joseph Jansen, who presents the versatile Athenian writer Xenophon as an exception: a rare classical thinker who could look beyond civic and 'panhellenic' loyalties to come up with practical proposals for a more stable system of interstate relations. The vision of political and economic interdependence that Jansen finds in Xenophon's *Poroi* might have brought an end to the strife that characterised inter-state relations in classical Greece; but it should be noted that what was on offer in the *Poroi* was arguably no more than a lasting truce. Rather than anticipating any real change in the attitudes of individuals, Xenophon envisaged a remarkably modern (and limited) state of peace based on common economic interests, and preserved for Athens the right to use force in defence of those interests – including the use of slaves in its silver mines – when these appeared to be under threat. The language of unity and friendship here again gives way when closely examined: the temporary peace and security provided by trade relations seems likely to have been vulnerable when put under pressure.

But if reconciliation on the level of interstate relations seems constantly to run up against the constraints of realism, there is a case for examining the

prospects for reconciliation among individuals and on ideological grounds. The early Christians, whose commitment to an ideal of peace has already been emphasised, encountered with the advent of state support not only the need to engage with the political authorities but also to reach some agreement with those co-religionists whose loyalties did not wholly coincide with their own. The frequently violent disagreements that resulted from questions of heresy and schism have rarely been seen as redounding to the credit of those involved, and it seems clear that ‘the peace of the church’ was achieved in large part by the forcible suppression of dissent. This picture is not entirely to be rejected, although it has more recently been suggested that accusations of violence on all sides may well be exaggerated.<sup>29</sup> Hence, Peter Iver Kaufman looks closely at the view offered by the bishop and theologian Augustine of Hippo regarding what he would condemn as the heresy of Donatism, and finds that although he was by no means reluctant to employ the state machinery of punishment and repression to alter the allegiances of these malcontents, Augustine at least in principle balanced this with a consistent rhetorical emphasis on repentance and, perhaps ultimately, reconciliation. Similarly, Michael Stuart Williams picks out instances from late antiquity to suggest that even in a matter so unamenable to compromise as Christian heresy and schism, and even in texts that seem designed to portray the utter subjugation of an opponent, there remains the possibility of reconciliation at least in the mind of the reader. The confidence with which the opponents of the ‘orthodox’ figures in these texts are able to press their case may be taken, in the terms set out by Kelman, as a recognition of the validity of a rival position – even if no acceptance of it is urged. In both cases it must be noted that reconciliation was only on the terms of the winners: there was little room for compromise in matters of faith. But if this prospect falls short of an ideally multilateral agreement bought into from all sides, it may at least offer an example of peace – imposed, as so often, by a force from outside – which nevertheless aspired to a real alteration of hearts and minds.

Each of the contributions to this volume examines an individual case, and it is inevitable that concerns should overlap; and indeed that each in its own way should have dealt with all three significant themes of peace, conflict resolution and reconciliation. These divisions are for the sake of convenience, and to point up connections that might otherwise be overlooked. At the same time, of course, a number of these contributions might have slotted in nicely elsewhere in the volume, and it seems more an advantage than a disadvantage that themes should recur in widely separated essays. Each author has employed his or her own terms, and each has had the freedom to choose whether or not to engage with the discourse of modern peace studies and/or with the modern world. Even where such parallels are not explicitly drawn, however, it is to be hoped that the relevance of the study of peace in so many aspects has something to offer to those who may not be specialists in the classical world, as well as showing those who are already familiar with that world that there are aspects which are easily overlooked.

Naturally, there remain many notable gaps in the coverage provided by the contributions to this volume. This project had its origin in a panel organised by the editors as part of the Celtic Conference in Classics held in Edinburgh in August 2014; and some papers delivered on that occasion could not, for any number of good reasons, in the end be provided or included. Other contributions were commissioned for this volume where obvious gaps or missing perspectives were identified, and where appropriate expertise was available. Nevertheless, in a volume of this nature there can be no pretence of providing comprehensive coverage of such a wide-ranging topic, and where there are omissions it must be left to other scholars to recognise them and to make good the deficiency. It remains only for the editors to thank the participants in this project: the contributors to this volume, including those who were asked to write specially for it; those who spoke at the original conference panel, and those who chaired panels at that event and who came to listen and discuss the various issues; the organisers of the conference as a whole, Douglas Cairns and Anton Powell; the anonymous readers provided by the publisher, who took pains to offer careful and sympathetic feedback; and Michael Greenwood himself and all at Ashgate for their consistent support and attention to detail. Thanks to all of these, you now hold in your hands a collection of chapters which may not promise peace in our time, but which may allow a greater understanding of how the classical world imagined, established and instituted something resembling peace in *their* time.

## Notes

- 1 Heraclitus, *fr.* 53, preserved in Hippolytus of Rome, *Ref. haer.* 9.4: Πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς; Hanson (2010).
- 2 Vegetius, *De re militari* 3. *pref.*: 'igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum'; for some modern uses, see e.g. Haase (1977), Wallace (1981) and Bulkeley (1983).
- 3 *Troy*, Wolfgang Petersen, Warner Bros. (2004); *300*, Zack Snyder, Warner Bros. (2007); *Cleopatra*, Joseph L. Mankiewicz, 20th Century Fox (1963); *Gladiator*, Ridley Scott, Universal Pictures (2000); *Rome*, BBC-HBO-Rai Fiction (2005–2007).
- 4 *Alexander the Great* (Evansville, IN: Guidon Games, 1971); *Caesar at Alesia* (Renton, WA: Avalon Hill, 1976); *Rome: Total War* (Horsham: Creative Assembly, 2004). Magazine: *Ancient Warfare* (Rotterdam: Karwansaray, 2007–).
- 5 See the Athens War Museum ([www.warmuseum.gr](http://www.warmuseum.gr)), the Musée de l'Armée ([www.musee-armee.fr](http://www.musee-armee.fr)) and the Roman Army Museum ([www.vindolanda.com/roman-army-museum](http://www.vindolanda.com/roman-army-museum)); for classical warfare in major museums see e.g. the Metropolitan Museum's online guide to Warfare in Ancient Greece ([www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/gwar/hd\\_gwar.htm](http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/gwar/hd_gwar.htm)) and a teaching page on War in Ancient Greece established by the British Museum ([www.ancientgreece.co.uk/war/home\\_set.html](http://www.ancientgreece.co.uk/war/home_set.html)).
- 6 Sidebottom (2004); Sabin, Van Wees, & Whitby (2007).
- 7 Sabin, Van Wees, & Whitby (2007) i thus arguably understate the case in identifying war as 'the single biggest preoccupation of *historians* in antiquity' (emphasis added).
- 8 Notably, the papers collected in Evangelista (2005), a four-volume compendium of the most important contributions in peace studies, include not a single article addressing the ancient world and scarcely any mention of classical Greece or Rome. Such a presentist

approach may also be found in e.g. Pruitt and Kressel (1985) 1, which begins by noting that ‘Mediation must surely be one of the oldest and most common forms of conflict resolution’, illustrating the point with interpersonal relationships and the history of the United States before adding that ‘the mediation of disputes between nations . . . probably reaches back to the beginnings of the nation-state system’: mediation before the modern nation-state system is simply ignored. While some recent introductory works – e.g. Adolf (2009), Gitting (2012), and Stearns (2014) – do touch on ancient peace, the engagement with Classical societies still tends to be too fleeting.

- 9 The example of Athens was most notably put forward in Russett and Antholis (1992) and reiterated in Russett (1993); it was subsequently criticised by Bachteler (1997), to whom Russett appends a reply. Weart (1998) offers a further iteration of Russett’s view, criticised by Robinson (2001) which is likewise accompanied by a reply. The more recent exchange between Robinson (2006) and Russett (2006) reflects an increasing awareness of the difficulties in seeing classical Greece as either democratic or peaceful.
- 10 Thus, the overviews of democratic theory provided by Risse-Kappen (1995) and Rosato (2003) do not cite any ancient examples, although the former at least shows some awareness of the discussion of the ancient world. Among classical scholars, the most notable discussions are Raaflaub (1994), Pritchard (2005), and Keane (2010).
- 11 For example, Badian (1987); Cawkwell (1997); and the articles in De Souza and France (2008).
- 12 The discussion of Thucydides and the causes of war is too broad for more than one or two emblematic works to be cited: these might range from Sealey (1957), Andrewes (1959) and de Ste Croix (1972) to Lebow (1991) and Parmeggiani (2007). Kagan (1995) incorporates the question into an even broader comparative study; it may be noted that Evangelista (2005) devotes an entire volume to modern studies of the causes of wars.
- 13 Raaflaub (2007a); note also Dülffer and Frank (2009) where we have a tripartite split between peace, war, and gender. Evangelista (2005) 11 notes the paradox that ‘most scholars of peace studies spend their time studying conflict and war’; the extent to which this is an essential feature of the discipline is examined in Gleditsch, Nordkvelle and Strand (2014).
- 14 Offering here a wider review, for example, than those recent collections edited by Rocchi (2007) and Wilker (2012a).
- 15 Galtung (1969), (1990): see e.g. the application of this approach to the ancient world in Praet (2014).
- 16 Müller (2003) 57.
- 17 Müller (2003) 63.
- 18 Thus Deutsch (2006) offers various examples of conflict from the interpersonal to the international as his introduction to a study not of peace in the broadest sense but of the related idea of ‘conflict resolution’.
- 19 Ishida (1969) 137 insists on the importance of understanding peace in cross-cultural terms; his account of the meanings of these ancient terms is of course limited by the scope of his wider project.
- 20 Enright (1986) 110.
- 21 Matt. 5.3–10.
- 22 See e.g. Hauss (2010); the more interpersonal approach adopted in Deutsch *et al.* (2006) and which becomes dominant in the 2014 third edition is not easy to apply to the ancient world, given the paucity of evidence about ordinary individual actors; nevertheless, elements of this approach may be found in the third part of this volume, defined here as dealing with ‘reconciliation’.
- 23 On the use of ideologies of peace to justify hegemonic power, in ancient and modern times, see Parchami (2009).
- 24 See Bloomfield (2006) for an intelligent survey of the various meanings of reconciliation.

- 25 Bar-Tal and Bernink (2004) 11; this seems compatible with the various definitions put forward in De Gruchy (2002) 'a fundamental shift in personal and power relations' (25) and Hauss (2003) 'to lead individual men and women to change the way they think about their historical adversaries'.
- 26 Kelman (2010) 4.
- 27 Kelman (2010) 6.
- 28 This sense of reconciliation thus relates to the idea of a 'stable peace' as set out in Boulding (1987), as well as conforming in some ways to the definition of peace at Müller (2003) 62, which places an emphasis on the durability of peace and the disavowal of 'the possible use of violence by one against another'.
- 29 See especially the overview of recent research in Bremmer (2014).

## Part I

# Imagining peace in the ancient world

The first difficulty in understanding the significance of peace in the classical world is the sheer variety of its possible meanings. Peace might be the absence of war, or a mere pause between campaigns, or a truce or a treaty, whether negotiated or imposed. It could represent the start of negotiations, or a firm end to all debate. For some, it was a universal ideal, or a goddess; for others, a practical matter, or the product of (blessed) human peacemakers. A sincere wish or a euphemism, strongly advocated or gently satirised, the discourse of peace was never only the province of diplomats, soldiers and historians, but has always been part of the language of playwrights, poets, philosophers and prophets.



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## 2 Solon the peacemaker★

*William Allan*

We cannot separate ‘Solon the poet’ from ‘Solon the politician’, and the role of the poet as a public figure in Archaic Greece is nowhere clearer than with him. As archon in 594/3 BC, Solon introduced reforms that affected almost every area of the Athenian state, and later tradition celebrated him as a wandering wise man and one of the Seven Sages. Thus Solon’s reputation for wisdom and moderation<sup>1</sup> led Herodotus, for example, to depict his encounter in Sardis with Croesus, king of Lydia, who fatally ignores Solon’s reflections on the dangers of excessive wealth and the uncertainty of human life (Herodotus 1.29–33).<sup>2</sup>

The egalitarian thrust of Solon’s legal, economic, and political reforms make him a key figure in the development of democracy at Athens.<sup>3</sup> By weakening the power of the wealthy elite and their inherited privileges, and by focusing on the cohesion and benefit of the community as a whole, Solon laid the foundations for the classical concept of the free Athenian citizen, who is expected to play a part in running the city.<sup>4</sup> By the late fifth century Solon had become a quasi-legendary figure honoured in hero-cult,<sup>5</sup> hailed by some as the founding hero of Athenian democracy, by others as the guardian of a more conservative ancestral constitution (or *patrios politeia*). Although such attempts to co-opt Solon’s authority have influenced his presentation in the ancient sources, I would agree with P.J. Rhodes that there is likely to be more history than myth in the surviving accounts of his laws and reforms.<sup>6</sup>

In the surviving fragments we see Solon using all his skills as a poet to persuade his audience of the need for change and the wisdom of his policies.<sup>7</sup> Most of Solon’s poems were composed for performance at symposia, but we cannot rule out performance in more public settings – for example, at public meetings or city festivals. In any case, it is striking how, unlike Alcaeus or Theognis, for example, who address an audience that share their social and political views, Solon balances the competing demands of different sections of Athenian society, and uses all his rhetorical skill to persuade his listeners to accept his political and ethical values.<sup>8</sup>

Solon’s success in achieving such a balance is mirrored in his later fame as a *διαλλακτής* – that is, as a ‘reconciler’ or ‘mediator’ between the warring factions of Athens. The Aristotelian *Constitution of Athens* explains his rise to power as follows:

τοιαύτης δὲ τῆς τάξεως οὔσης ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, καὶ τῶν πολλῶν δουλευόντων τοῖς ὀλίγοις, ἀντέστη τοῖς γνωρίμοις ὁ δῆμος. ἰσχυρᾶς δὲ τῆς στάσεως οὔσης καὶ πολλὸν χρόνον ἀντικαθημένων ἀλλήλοις, εἶλοντο κοινῇ διαλλακτὴν καὶ ἄρχοντα Σόλωνα, καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἐπέτρεψαν αὐτῷ.

While the state was organized in this way, and the many were enslaved to the few, the people rose against the notables. The strife was fierce, and they held out against one another for a long time. Eventually the two sides agreed to appoint Solon as reconciler and archon [594/3 BC], and entrusted the state to him.

([*Ath. Pol.*] 5.1–2, trans. P.J. Rhodes)

The aim of this chapter is to consider how Solon recasts traditional imagery of warfare and violence in order to bolster his persona as a ‘reconciler’ and peacemaker. Perhaps the first thing to stress is that Solon is pleading for *internal* peace and the avoidance of civil war – he is not opposed to warfare *per se*, as the fragments of his poem *Salamis* make clear (fr. 1–3):

αὐτὸς κῆρυξ ἦλθον ἀφ’ ἱμερτῆς Σαλαμῖνος  
κόσμον ἐπέων ὠιδὴν ἀντ’ ἀγορῆς θέμενος.

I have come as a herald from lovely Salamis, adopting song, an ordered form of words, instead of speech.

εἶην δὴ τότε γῶ Φολεγάνδριος ἢ Σικινήτης  
ἀντί γ’ Ἀθηναίου πατρίδ’ ἀμειψάμενος·  
αἶψα γὰρ ἂν φάτις ἦδε μετ’ ἀνθρώποισι γένοιτο·  
“Ἀττικὸς οὔτος ἀνὴρ, τῶν Σαλαμιναφετέων”.

In that case I’d rather be from Pholegandrus or Sicinus rather than Athens, exchanging my homeland, for soon this report would spread among men: ‘This man’s an Athenian, one of those Salamis–ceders.’

ἴομεν ἐς Σαλαμῖνα μαχησόμενοι περὶ νήσου  
ἱμερτῆς χαλεπὸν τ’ αἴσχος ἀπωσόμενοι.

Let us go to Salamis to fight for the lovely isle and clear away harsh disgrace.

Solon’s poem (originally 100 lines long, according to Plutarch, *Sol.* 8.2) engages forcefully with Athens’ war against Megara for control of Salamis. As in the martial elegies of Callinus and Tyrtaeus, the speaker of *Salamis* stages a dramatic call to arms. Only three fragments (eight lines in total) survive, but they are

enough to show Solon's skilled use of *persona* and emotion, building on the elegiac tradition of martial exhortation.

Thus, he poses as a quasi-herald (κῆρυξ) in fr. 1: the image evokes the sacred inviolability and trust invested in the role of herald,<sup>9</sup> encouraging the audience to see Solon as a credible messenger acting in the best interests of Athens. Line 2 ('adopting song, an ordered form of words, instead of speech') plays on the incongruity of a singing herald and emphasizes that Solon's message will be all the more memorable for being in verse. Since κόσμος denotes civic order and good government,<sup>10</sup> the phrase κόσμον ἐπέων further supports Solon's claim to be offering sound political and military advice.<sup>11</sup> In fr. 2 Solon's quotation of anonymous criticism mirrors the use of τις-speeches in Homer<sup>12</sup> and evokes the shame of losing Salamis. His sarcastic neologism Σαλαμιναφότης ('one of those Salamis-ceders') gives the imaginary insult a punchy, humiliating ending. Finally, in fr. 3, as is typical of the martial exhortation of Callinus and Tyrtaeus (cf. Call. fr. 1; Tyrt. 10, 11) the strong language of disgrace (χαλεπὸν τ' αἴσχος)<sup>13</sup> motivates the call to arms.

So *external* war is fine, the problem is the civil war threatening Athens, which forms the background to all of Solon's surviving political poetry. Let's begin with fr. 4:

ἡμετέρη δὲ πόλις κατὰ μὲν Διὸς οὔποτ' ὀλεῖται  
 αἴσαν καὶ μακάρων θεῶν φρένας ἀθανάτων·  
 τοιῆ γὰρ μεγάλθυμος ἐπίσκοπος ὀβριμοπάτρι  
 Παλλὰς Ἀθηναίη χειρας ὑπερθεν ἔχει·  
 αὐτοὶ δὲ φθείρειν μεγάλην πόλιν ἀφραδίησιν 5  
 ἄστοι βούλονται χρήμασι πειθόμενοι,  
 δηήμου θ' ἠγεμόνων ἄδικος νόος, οἷσιν ἐτοῖμον  
 ὕβριος ἐκ μεγάλης ἄλγεα πολλὰ παθεῖν·  
 οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστανται κατέχειν κόρον οὐδὲ παρούσας  
 εὐφροσύνας κοσμεῖν δαιτὸς ἐν ἡσυχίῃ 10  
 . . . . .  
 πλουτέουσιν δ' ἀδίκους ἔργμασι πειθόμενοι  
 . . . . .  
 οὔθ' ἱερῶν κτεάνων οὔτε τι δημοσίων  
 φειδόμενοι κλέπτουσιν ἀφαρπαγῆι ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος,  
 οὐδὲ φυλάσσονται σεμνὰ Δίκης θέμεθλα,  
 ἢ σιγῶσα σύνοιδε τὰ γιγνόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα, 15

τῶι δὲ χρόνῳ πάντως ἦλθ' ἀποτεισομένη,  
 τοῦτ' ἤδη πάσῃ πόλει ἔρχεται ἔλκος ἄφυκτον,  
 ἐς δὲ κακὴν ταχέως ἤλυθε δουλοσύνην,  
 ἣ στάσιν ἔμφυλον πόλεμόν θ' εὔδοντ' ἐπεγείρει,  
 ὃς πολλῶν ἐρατὴν ὤλεσεν ἡλικίην· 20  
 ἐκ γὰρ δυσμενέων ταχέως πολυήρατον ἄστῳ  
 τρύχεται ἐν συνόδοις τοῖς ἀδικέουσι φίλους.  
 ταῦτα μὲν ἐν δήμῳ στρέφεται κακά· τῶν δὲ πενιχρῶν  
 ἰκνέονται πολλοὶ γαῖαν ἐς ἀλλοδαπήν  
 πραθέντες δεσμοῖσιν τ' ἀεικελίῳσι δεθέντες 25  
 . . . . .  
 οὕτω δημόσιον κακὸν ἔρχεται οἴκαδ' ἐκάστωι,  
 αὔλειοι δ' ἔτ' ἔχειν οὐκ ἐθέλουσι θύραι,  
 ὑψηλὸν δ' ὑπὲρ ἔρκος ὑπέρθορον, εὔρε δὲ πάντως,  
 εἰ καὶ τις φεύγων ἐν μυχῶι ἦι θαλάμου.  
 ταῦτα διδάξαι θυμὸς Ἀθηναίους με κελεύει, 30  
 ὡς κακὰ πλεῖστα πόλει Δυσνομίη παρέχει·  
 Εὐνομίη δ' εὐκοσμία καὶ ἄρτια πάντ' ἀποφαίνει,  
 καὶ θαμὰ τοῖς ἀδίκῳσι ἀμφιτίθησι πέδας·  
 τραχέα λειαίνει, παύει κόρον, ὕβριν ἀμαυροῖ,  
 αὐαίνει δ' ἄτης ἄνθεα φυόμενα, 35  
 εὐθύνει δὲ δίκας σκολιάς, ὑπερήφανά τ' ἔργα  
 πραῦνει· παύει δ' ἔργα διχοστασίης,  
 παύει δ' ἀργαλέης ἔριδος χόλον, ἔστι δ' ὑπ' αὐτῆς  
 πάντα κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἄρτια καὶ πινυτά.

Our state will never be destroyed by the dispensation of Zeus or the intentions of the blessed gods: such a stout-hearted guardian, daughter of a mighty sire, Pallas Athene, holds her hands over it. But the citizens themselves are prepared to destroy a great city by their foolish actions, persuaded by wealth, and the mind of the people's leaders is unjust, who are certain to suffer much for their great insolence. They do not know how to restrain excess or conduct the joyful festivities of the banquet in peace . . . and they grow

rich, relying on unjust deeds . . . sparing neither sacred nor public property, they steal by plunder all they can, nor do they respect the venerable foundations of Justice, who, silent, knows present and past, and in time assuredly comes to exact punishment. This is already coming upon the whole city as an inescapable wound, and swiftly it falls into vile slavery, which rouses strife within the tribe and sleeping war, destroyer of many's lovely youth. At the hands of its enemies the much-loved city is swiftly being torn apart in gatherings of those who wrong their friends. These evils roam at large among the people, and many of the poor are headed to foreign lands, sold and bound in shameful bonds . . . And so the public ill comes home to everyone, and the courtyard doors refuse to hold it back any longer, but it leaps over the high wall, and finds him out for sure, even if he seeks refuge in the innermost recess of his room. This is what my heart bids me teach the Athenians: Lawlessness brings the city countless ills, but Lawfulness reveals all that is well ordered and fitting, and many a criminal it puts in shackles. It makes the rough smooth, curbs excess, weakens insolence, and shrivels up the budding flowers of delusion; it straightens out crooked judgements, restrains arrogant behaviour, ends discord and the anger of bitter strife. Under its power all men's affairs are fitting and rational.

Though the transmitted text lacks some verses, the lacunae are unlikely to be large, and it is the second longest piece of Solon's to have survived (fr. 13, the so-called *Elegy to the Muses*, being by far the longest). One of the most striking features of fr. 4 is the way it applies the language of epic warfare to *stasis*, and so suggests that the dichotomies of war versus peace, and enemy versus self, do not work in contemporary Athens.

The poem opens in lines 1–4 with the ultimate reassurance for an Athenian audience, the protection of their 'guardian' (ἐπίσκοπος) goddess. The epithet ὀβριμοπάτηρ is unique to Athena and triggers the audience's awareness of her role in epic as Zeus' favourite child and the enforcer of his will,<sup>14</sup> enhancing the status of both Athena and her favourite city. χεῖρας ὕπερθεν ἔχει is a familiar gesture of divine protection:<sup>15</sup> Athena, then, will assuredly oppose the city's enemies. However, this turns out to be a red herring as the speaker turns our attention to internal enemies in lines 5–8, with the implication that even divine protection cannot help if you are fighting your own people.

Lines 9–10 focus on typical benefits of peace ('the festivities of the banquet'), but make clear that the citizens are not capable of enjoying them. Solon is thus undermining the traditional dichotomy of war versus peace – one might think, for example, of the city at war and the city at peace depicted on Achilles' shield, where there are two modes: either you are at war, where there is bloodshed, but also divine support and opportunity to win glory; or you are at peace, where there is law and order, and the pleasures of stable life such as weddings and feasts (*Il.* 18.490–540). But Solon departs from this by suggesting that in his world, though the Athenians are formally at peace, they have civil strife, which disrupts the dichotomy of enemy versus self and is harder to manage.

Lines 12–16 describe the greediness of the Athenian elite, but do so using the language of a sacked city (note especially ἀφαρπαγή, ‘by plunder’, line 13),<sup>16</sup> where the enemy run amok and plunder shrines (here the shrine of *Dikē* herself). Since this pillaging is internal, there is no ‘us’ versus ‘them’ as in a real war, and the selfishness of the factions is condemned.

As lines 17–22 make clear, the greediness of the leading citizens produces ‘slavery’ (18), i.e. the oppression of the *dēmos* by the powerful elite, whose consequence is στάσιν ἔμφυλον (19), ‘strife within the tribe’, as rival aristocratic factions compete for money and power.<sup>17</sup> In lines 21–2 the language of friends and enemies stresses the horror of civil war: the city’s enemies (ἐκ . . . δυσμενέων) are its own citizens, and the damning word φίλους (i.e. their fellow Athenians) is delayed for maximum effect. In the description of *stasis* itself in lines 19–20, the metaphor of war awakened from its ‘sleep’, familiar from epic,<sup>18</sup> is made more sinister by being applied to internal violence, while the destruction of ἐρατὴν . . . ἡλικίην evokes (typically Homeric) pity for the loss of ‘lovely youth’, but in a context of civil war, which makes their killing peculiarly shocking.

Overall, then, fr. 4 applies the language of epic warfare to *stasis*, and suggests that in Solon’s Athens the dichotomies of war versus peace, and enemy versus self, do not work. Thus, the solution, at the end of the fragment, is not heroic martial endeavour, under the protection of the gods, but *Eunomia* – that is, a divine (and abstract) peacemaker or reconciler, replacing the function of a warrior. At line 32 *Eunomia* restores the *kosmos* (‘order’), which in line 10 was one of the hallmarks of peace (κοσμεῖν . . . ἐν ἡσυχίῃ). And in lines 37–8 *Eunomia* finally resolves the discord and strife (*dichostasiē* and *eris*) besetting the city.

The manipulation of epic language and war imagery to support Solon’s role as reconciler is even more evident in fr. 5:<sup>19</sup>

δήμωι μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα τόσον γέρας ὅσον ἀπαρκεῖ,  
 τιμῆς οὔτ’ ἀφελὼν οὔτ’ ἐπορεξάμενος·  
 οἳ δ’ εἶχον δύναμιν καὶ χρήμασιν ἦσαν ἀγῆτοί,  
 καὶ τοῖς ἐφρασάμην μηδὲν ἀεικὲς ἔχειν·  
 ἔστην δ’ ἀμφιβαλὼν κρατερὸν σάκος ἀμφοτέροισι,  
 νικᾶν δ’ οὐκ εἶασ’ οὐδετέρους ἀδίκως.

5

I gave the people as much privilege as is sufficient for them, neither detracting from their honour nor giving more; and as for those who had power and were admired for their wealth, I also made sure they suffered no indignity. I took my stand holding my mighty shield over both, and did not allow either side an unjust victory.

The piece is carefully structured not only to reflect the idea of balance<sup>20</sup> – each group is given equal attention: 1–2 on the δῆμος, 3–4 on the elite – but also to underline Solon’s active authority and concern for all Athenians: he is the agent

of the main verbs (ἔδωκα, ἐφρασάμην, ἔστην, εἶασ'), and the final couplet is devoted to his success in preventing 'an unjust victory' for either side. The poem is thus calculated to appeal to as wide a swathe of the Athenian audience as possible.

The language of *timē* and *geras* in the opening couplet likens Solon to the ideal Homeric leader, who (unlike Agamemnon) knows how to apportion honour and privilege so as to create social harmony. But it is the concluding couplet that refashions martial imagery most strikingly, as Solon shields *both* sides in the conflict, stressing his fairness and concern for all Athenians.<sup>21</sup> By uniting all citizens under one shield, and by raising the possibility of civil strife – especially in the 'unjust victory' (νικᾶν . . . ἀδίκως, 6) of one side over another – the image emphasizes Solon's success as a mediator. ἔστην (5), in emphatic first position, focuses our attention on Solon, while the epic-sounding κρατερὸν σάκος characterizes him as a resolute protector.

This defensive shield metaphor will also have reminded the sixth-century BC audience that we're all part of the same hoplite line. The idea of protecting your comrade with the shield evokes the behaviour of the good hoplite, but Solon is able to cover *both* sides with his shield, whereas a real hoplite could cover only one comrade. Solon, then, is not only a good Homeric leader but also a kind of super-hoplite, on whom everyone depends – thus closer to the epic hero in that regard than to the hoplites, where the point is that everyone is equally dependent on one another.<sup>22</sup> So the imagery of war in fr. 5 communicates Solon's role as an outstanding and impartial protector, whose achievement has been to save the Athenians from unjust (i.e. internal) violence.

We find similarly bold use of the imagery of violence and protection at the end of fr. 36, which is one of the most fascinating surviving examples of the political use of iambus in the archaic period:

ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν οὐνεκα ζυνήγαγον  
 δῆμον, τί τούτων πρὶν τυχεῖν ἐπαυσάμην;  
 συμμαρτυροίη ταῦτ' ἂν ἐν δίκῃ Χρόνου  
 μήτηρ μεγίστη δαιμόνων Ὀλυμπίων  
 ἄριστα, Γῆ μέλαινα, τῆς ἐγὼ ποτε 5  
 ὄρους ἀνεῖλον πολλαχῆι πεπηγότας,  
 πρόσθεν δὲ δουλεύουσα, νῦν ἐλευθέρη.  
 πολλοὺς δ' Ἀθήνας πατρίδ' ἐς θεόκτιτον  
 ἀνήγαγον πραθέντας, ἄλλον ἐκδίκως,  
 ἄλλον δικαίως, τοὺς δ' ἀναγκαίης ὑπὸ 10  
 χρειοῦς φυγόντας, γλῶσσαν οὐκέτ' Ἀττικὴν

iέντας, ὡς δὴ πολλαχῆι πλανωμένους·  
 τοὺς δ' ἐνθάδ' αὐτοῦ δουλίην ἀεικέα  
 ἔχοντας, ἦθη δεσποτέων τρομεομένους,  
 ἔλευθέρους ἔθηκα. ταῦτα μὲν κράτει 15  
 ὁμοῦ βίην τε καὶ δίκην ζυναρμόσας  
 ἔρεξα, καὶ διήλθον ὡς ὑπεσχόμην·  
 θεσμούς δ' ὁμοίως τῶι κακῶι τε κάγαθῶι  
 εὐθεῖαν εἰς ἕκαστον ἀρμόσας δίκην  
 ἔγραψα. κέντρον δ' ἄλλος ὡς ἐγὼ λαβών, 20  
 κακοφραδῆς τε καὶ φιλοκτῆμων ἀνὴρ,  
 οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον· εἰ γὰρ ἤθελον  
 ἂ τοῖς ἐναντίοισιν ἦνδανεν τότε,  
 αὐτίς δ' ἂ τοῖσιν οὔτεροι φρασαῖατο,  
 πολλῶν ἂν ἀνδρῶν ἦδ' ἐχηρώθη πόλις. 25  
 τῶν οὔνεκ' ἀλκὴν πάντοθεν ποιέομενος  
 ὡς ἐν κυσὶν πολλῆισιν ἐστράφην λύκος.

The aims for which I called the people together, which of these had I failed to achieve before I stopped? May I call as my best witness in the court of Time the mighty mother of the Olympian gods, black Earth, whose boundary-markers, fixed far and wide, I removed – slave before, now she is free. And to Athens, to their homeland founded by the gods, I brought back many who had been sold, some illegally, some legally, and others who had fled out of compelling need, no longer speaking the Attic tongue, so far and wide their wanderings. And others suffering shameful slavery right here, trembling at their masters' whims, I set free. These things I achieved by my power, combining force and justice, and I carried out all my promises. I wrote laws for the lowly and the noble man equally, creating straight justice for all. If another had wielded the goad as I did, an unscrupulous and greedy man, he would not have restrained the people. If I'd been willing to do what the people's opponents wanted then, or in turn what the others had in store for them, this city would have been bereft of many men. So, defending myself on all sides, I turned about like a wolf amid a pack of dogs.

As in the elegiac fr. 5, Solon here defends his policies as being in the best interests of all Athenians, and boasts of his resistance to the extreme demands made

by both the δῆμος and their wealthy opponents. By focusing on the liberation of the Athenian land (3–7) and its citizens (8–15), Solon foregrounds the damage to Athenian society caused by greed, debt and enslavement for it, and presents his unbiased reforms as having prevented civil war (22–5).<sup>23</sup> But it is the concluding simile (26–7) that I want to draw attention to here, a simile that places Solon at the centre of events in a dramatically striking way.

Solon's wolf simile is highly ironic and stresses the ingratitude of the Athenians who assail him because of his reforms. Although Solon worked for the whole community, their reaction has forced him into the role of the wolf, while the two sides, the δῆμος and its opponents, have united (like a dog pack) to attack him, despite their incompatible interests. As with the shield simile of fr. 5, the animal simile here evokes Homeric epic, and adapts epic imagery to suit the new and disturbing context of civil war. In contrast to the shield simile, however, where Solon stands in the middle protecting both sides, here he is forced into the middle because he is under attack from all sides. Once again there is play on 'who is the enemy?': in fr. 5 the implication was 'no one, we're all on the same side', but here Solon is being treated as if he were the enemy, despite his beneficent behaviour. As in the other poems we've looked at, the citizens are incapable of distinguishing self from enemy.

Solon's simile in fr. 36 only becomes clear with the final word (λύκος), enhancing its impact. Since the wolf can have positive as well as negative associations in Greek thought, Solon's image works in different ways, but all to his advantage. As an animal known for its independence – one might compare the fable (346 Perry) of the 'free' wolf, who rejects the easy but 'slavish' life of the dog – it highlights Solon's courage in sticking to his principles and refusing to serve either side. On the other hand, the wolf's reputation as a selfish predator (even turning on its fellow wolves to get its prey: cf. *Il.* 4.471–2) emphasizes Solon's unfair treatment as an outsider, as he, the saviour of his community, is attacked by the group (the dog pack) and cast in the role of the anti-social animal.

My final example of the transformation of martial imagery comes from fr. 37 (*[Ath. Pol.]* 12.5), where Solon rebukes both sides for complaining that they did not get what they wanted:

καὶ πάλιν ὄνειδίζων πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον αὐτῶν μεμψιμοιρίας ἀμφοτέρων·

δήμωι μὲν εἰ χρηὴ διαφάδην ὄνειδίσαι,

ἃ νῦν ἔχουσιν οὐποτ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἄν

εὔδοντες εἶδον . . .

ὅσοι δὲ μείζους καὶ βίην ἀμείνονες,

αἰνοῖεν ἄν με καὶ φίλον ποιοῖατο.

εἰ γάρ τις ἄλλος, φησί, ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς ἔτυχεν,  
οὐκ ἄν κατέσχε δῆμον, οὐδ' ἐπαύσατο  
πρὶν ἀνταράξας πῖαρ ἐξεῖλεν γάλα·  
ἐγὼ δὲ τούτων ὥσπερ ἐν μεταίχμῳ  
ὄρος κατέστην.

10

Again, reproaching both parties for the complaints they made afterwards:

If I am to reproach the people openly, I say that what they now have they would never even have dreamt of . . . And those who are bigger and stronger should praise me and call me friend.

For if some other man, he says, had obtained this position,

He would not have restrained the people, nor have stopped until he'd churned the milk and lost the cream. But I took my stand in the middle ground between them like a boundary-marker.

In the concluding image, a striking mixed metaphor, Solon compares himself to a ὄρος ('boundary-marker') set in the μεταίχμιον ('the place between two armies'). The word μεταίχμιον is first attested here, but the idea of a space between two armies is a traditional feature of epic, and evokes those scenes where a warrior comes forward to challenge an opponent to face-to-face combat (e.g. Paris' ill-advised challenge to the Achaeans at the start of the fighting in the *Iliad*, a challenge met by Menelaus, *Il.* 3.21–9). Here, by contrast, Solon is coming out into the middle to reconcile the two sides, who are depicted as warring enemies.

The area between two armies is, of course, meant to be crossed since that is where, in normal circumstances, victory is sealed and glory won, but this is a civil war, and the paradoxical image of a boundary-marker set in the μεταίχμιον emphasizes the unacceptability of internal conflict. At line 6 of fr. 36 Solon boasted of removing the boundary-markers (ὄρους) from the land of Attica.<sup>24</sup> Here in fr. 37, however, Solon himself is the boundary, in a positive sense, between the warring factions (the δῆμος and the ruling elite). The image of the ὄρος thus works on many levels: it suggests there is a genuine distinction between the two parties, but also emphasizes that their conflict is best resolved not by civil war but by peaceful agreement (i.e. a lawful boundary-marker), a symbol of reconciliation embodied by Solon himself.

In conclusion, we can see Solon using two strategies in particular to communicate the importance of his role as peacemaker: the first is the way he applies military language and metaphors to political situations and relationships in order to highlight the evils of *stasis*:<sup>25</sup> the second is the way he recasts traditional imagery of warfare and violence in order to highlight his efforts, and his success, as a 'reconciler' (διαλλακτής) of the warring parties. As Nestor

says in the *Iliad*, ‘Clanless, lawless, hearthless is the man who loves the horror of war within his own people’ (ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιός ἐστιν ἐκεῖνος | ὄς πολέμου ἔραται ἐπιδημίου ὀκρυόεντος, 9.63–4). Solon’s poetry builds on this basic truth, and recasts traditional epic imagery so that his audience, in the shadow of civil war, will grasp the benefits of peace and reconciliation.

## Notes

- \* This chapter began as a paper for the ‘Peace and Reconciliation’ panel at the Celtic Conference in Classics in Edinburgh (June 2014). I would like to thank Dr Eoghan P. Moloney for the invitation to speak on the panel. The fragments of Solon follow the text and numeration of West (1989) (unless otherwise noted).
- 1 The latter a recurring idea in his political poems: see esp. fr. 4c, 5, 6, 7, 36, 37.
  - 2 It is possible that Solon encountered Croesus at the start of his reign (560 BC), but not (as Herodotus has it) within ten years of his archonship (c. 594/3–584/3 BC).
  - 3 Solon’s main economic reforms came in response to growing tensions between rich Athenian overlords and poor farmers. Solon’s solution, commonly known as the ‘shaking-off of burdens’ (or *seisachtheia*: see on fr. 36 below), probably meant that the farmers were no longer obliged to render up a sixth of their produce to their overlords; it also liberated those Athenians who had been enslaved for debt, repatriated those who had been sold abroad, and made the future practice of enslavement for debt illegal (cf. Stanley (1999) 210–18, Harris (2002), Forsdyke (2006) 347). Solon’s political reforms were geared to extending decision-making power beyond a narrow aristocratic elite. He created a new council (βουλή) of 400 members to consider business for the assembly. He also divided the citizenry into four classes based on the size of their annual harvest; although only the three highest classes could hold political office, the poorest were allowed to attend the assembly and thus have a say in the running of the state.
  - 4 Cf. Manville (1990) 124–56, Lewis (2006) 6.
  - 5 Kearns (1989) 198.
  - 6 Rhodes (2006) 259.
  - 7 As regards the chronology of the poems, some political pieces are likely to predate Solon’s archonship (e.g. 4, 4a, 4c), while others are evidently later because they defend his reforms (5, 34, 36, 37) or boast of having resisted the chance to become a tyrant (32–3).
  - 8 With a historically significant figure like Solon it is particularly tempting to interpret the primary narrator in a simple biographical manner, but while Solon’s poetry clearly draws on his own experiences as a politician and legislator, he, too, must fashion a convincing authorial persona. Solon’s self-presentation underlines his role as a moderate and impartial reformer, not a revolutionary, and by drawing on the language, ethics, and theology of Homer and Hesiod (especially in fr. 4 and 13), Solon imbues his commitment to justice and communal values with the authority of traditional wisdom.
  - 9 Cf. κήρυκες Διὸς ἄγγελοι ἠδὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν, *Il.* 1.334; κήρυκες . . . Διὶ φίλοι, 8.517.
  - 10 E.g. πόλεων κόσμοι, *Pl. Prt.* 322c.
  - 11 For praise of poetry sung κατὰ κόσμον, cf. *Od.* 8.489, *Hom. Hymn Herm.* 433.
  - 12 A particular concern of Hector’s in the *Iliad*: e.g. 6.459–61, 22.106–10.
  - 13 For Homeric *aíschos* and its root meaning of ‘ugliness’, see Cairns (1993) 54–5.
  - 14 E.g. *Il.* 5.747, *Od.* 3.135; cf. Allan (2006) 20–1.
  - 15 E.g. *Il.* 24.374, where Priam thinks a god may be helping him, but ironically does not understand how.
  - 16 Fr. 34.1 similarly uses ἀρπαγή of internal plundering.
  - 17 στάσις in the sense ‘civil war’ is first attested here.
  - 18 Cf. *Il.* 20.31 (of Zeus) πόλεμον δ’ ἄλιαστον ἔγειρε.
  - 19 In line 1, I prefer the *Ath. Pol.*’s ἀπαρκεῖ to Brunck’s ἐπαρκεῖν (accepted by West); cf. Mülke (2002) 186–7.

- 20 As Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010) 283 observes in her introduction to fr. 5, ‘Plut. *Sol.* 14.4 recalls how the maxim “what is balanced does not provoke war” (τὸ ἴσον πόλεμον οὐ ποιεῖ) helped Solon to find favor with the rich and the poor alike.’
- 21 Solon’s skilful adaptation of military language here is often underappreciated by commentators. Campbell (1982) 245 remarks ‘the metaphor “covering both sides with my stout shield” is not particularly happy’, while Gerber (1970) 134 observes ‘Solon clearly means that he protected both groups by his legislation, but the imagery used does not seem very appropriate.’
- 22 van Wees (2004) 166–83 doubts the existence of the hoplite phalanx in the early archaic period. But even if he is right (and many do not share his scepticism), Solon’s image of the protecting shield has a strong epic pedigree (take, for example, Teucer’s tactic of taking shelter beneath Ajax’s tower shield, *Il.* 8.266–72). The psychology and ideology of hoplite warfare in classical Athens, as discussed by Crowley (2012), continues this traditional insistence on mutual protection.
- 23 Cf. Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010) 481–2 on 36.23: ‘ἐναντίος is attested as a noun for the first time here; it was mainly predicative in Homer and Hesiod. When used in a hostile sense it focuses on the physicality of staying or moving ‘in front’ / ‘against’, and thus better than other more abstract designations of the enemies (like ἐχθροί, πολέμοι, etc.), it graphically evokes the turmoil of the civil war.’
- 24 Some have doubted the traditional interpretation of ὄροι as markers of mortgaged land and a sign of indebted ‘sixth-parters’ or *hektēmoroi*, but see de Ste. Croix (2004) 107–28. In any case, line 7 of fr. 36 makes clear that the stones symbolize (in Solon’s view) a damaging state of servitude between small farmers and their overlords.
- 25 In addition to those discussed above, note the ἔλκος ἀφυκτον (‘inescapable wound’) afflicting the city (fr. 4.17), the ῥύματα (‘defences’) of the demagogues (fr. 11.3), and Solon’s rejection of tyranny due to *aidōs* and *kleos* (fr. 32.3–4), which will ensure his political *victory*: πλέον γὰρ ὧδε νικήσειν δοκέω | πάντα ἀνθρώπους (fr. 32.4–5).

### 3 Aristotle on peace

#### Biological, political, ethical, and metaphysical dimensions

*Will Desmond*

The concept of ‘peace’ has many senses. Perhaps most salient is the purely political sense of peace as the opposite of war – the absence of hostilities (and the will thereto) between recognized states. Hostilities *within* communities highlight a second sense of peace, as the opposite of civil war and revolution. Finally, inner turmoil and conflict between the many facets of the self sharpens a sense of a deeper tranquillity that can seem like a blessedness beyond mere happiness. These senses have preoccupied individuals and traditions to differing degrees. Christ said to his Apostles ‘Peace be with you’, and the vision of the ‘peace of God’ in which all disharmonies are dissolved has often haunted the Christian world, spiritually, ethically, politically. Haunted by the spectre of civil war, Hobbes argued that one should use all means to end the chaotic violence native to human relations: the ‘first and fundamental law of nature’ is ‘to seek peace, and follow it’.<sup>1</sup> Rousseau and Kant extended Hobbes’ thinking to promote the ideal of peace between nations, and this has remained a foremost imperative for the modern world, haunted as it is by the aftermath and threat of global wars.

One might imagine that the genius of Aristotle would have insights on peace in each of these three senses. One imagines that he could be easily brought into dialogue on a theme that seems so perennial, so pressing. Alas, the task is not so straightforward. Aristotle’s world and horizons were significantly different from those of the Christian and post-Christian West. ‘Peace institutes’ and ‘peace studies’ were things unknown to Aristotle’s Greece. There were calls for wars of conquest against non-Greek ‘barbarians’. There was routine warfare between and within Greek cities. The old agonistic culture endured, with its love of competition and the virtues of the victor. The pantheon of Homeric gods delighted in war, and warred against each other, often treacherously. Such factors ensured that world peace was fairly inconceivable, and that even a Panhellenic peace was never as categorical an imperative for Archaic and Classical Greeks as it would later be for medieval Christendom or modern Europe.

Certainly ‘peace’ is not an important word in Aristotle’s vocabulary.<sup>2</sup> The term *eirēnē* occurs 33 times in his extensive corpus (according to the *TLG*), and just once in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Nowhere does he envision a world peace. He does not praise the Persian kings for imposing the habit of peace on unruly subjects – and so instantiating a world-government in miniature: the King’s

Peace of 386 BC does not elicit even a negative comment. Unlike Isocrates and others, he is not concerned to promote panhellenic unity and a Common Peace among Greek cities.<sup>3</sup> He does not analyse federal associations, like the Chalcidian League. Nor does he conceive happiness explicitly as tranquillity, harmony and concord of soul – the inner ‘peace’ that haunted Plato, Platonists and their Hellenistic rivals.<sup>4</sup> And yet, a sympathetic translation of the terms and concepts that Aristotle does use shows him to be a significant thinker on peace, in several of its senses. In attempting such a translation, this chapter will also offer a reconstruction and systematization of basic concepts in Aristotle’s politics, ethics, and metaphysics. The categories of potentiality and actuality, movement and rest, the subordination of material to final ends, the *telos* of happiness, its sole possibility within a well-ordered *polis* and really only within the divine substance – all these entail as a corollary ‘peace’ in several senses. Namely, Aristotle’s varied remarks do converge on the view that human beings can realize their actuality only in the fullness of familial and ethical friendship, political concord and contemplative tranquillity. Aristotle does not explicitly name these realities as variations of ‘peace’, though this is, in fact, what they are.

Let me begin *in medias res*, as it were. Book 8 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* opens onto the topic of *philia*, or friendship, with a programmatic proposition: ‘Friendship seems too to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it than for justice’.<sup>5</sup> The sentence, and chapter as a whole, thus isolates *philia* as a phenomenon at once ethical and political: a topic that mediates between the more individualistic eudaimonism of *Nicomachean Ethics* I–VII, and the more communitarian vision of the *Politics*. Ultimately, Aristotle places great weight upon this *philia*, as neither personal *eudaimonia* nor a well-constituted *polis* will be possible without proper and various ‘friendships’. As we will see, this *philia* might be taken Aristotle’s nearest substitute for the broader terms of civic ‘harmony’ and ‘peace’.

The word *philia* is usually translated as ‘love’ or ‘friendship’, but the terms ‘fellow-feeling’ or even ‘species-feeling’ are (I suggest) more faithful to the predominantly biological atmosphere of Aristotle’s thinking.<sup>6</sup> Many passages point to *philia* as the basic form of human relation: *philia* and not, say indifference, Darwinian rivalry, or mutual exploitation is the basic ground of association, because, most fundamentally, human beings are ‘political animals’, to be classed among the gregarious, social organisms. Many considerations support this view. First, human beings need each other to live and to live well; they therefore not only *tend* to associate together, but *like* to be with each other, apart from any considerations of utility.<sup>7</sup> Outside all human company, a person is more like a beast or a god.<sup>8</sup> Strangers on a journey seek each other’s company, and so a *philia* emerges spontaneously whenever two or more are gathered in association.<sup>9</sup> More enduring and fundamental is the *oikos*, and while need and desire go into its making, Aristotle frames its three constitutive relations in terms of *philia*. First, man is a ‘pairing creature’, male and female are made for each other and so have their proper *philia* uniting them in mutual self-realization.<sup>10</sup> Parents and children likewise have their appropriate form of ‘love’, as do siblings.<sup>11</sup> The same is true also for the master–slave relation. There is natural slavery,

of course, but Aristotle idealizes the relationship by making both master and slave symbiotically dependent on each other: slaves are human tools but they remain nonetheless *human*, with human souls, and at least the *passive* capacity for virtue and understanding reasons. Therefore, masters should speak with their slaves, set a virtuous example for them, and not merely issue peremptory commands. Indeed, Aristotle goes so far as to insist that masters and slaves can form a certain kind of friendship, for though one cannot ‘love’ a slave *qua* slave, one can by virtue of an equal, shared humanity.<sup>12</sup> Each of these forms of *philia* – between master and slave, sibling and sibling, parents and children, husband and wife – are at once natural, mutually beneficial and politically fundamental. They place the household beyond economic need or biological rivalry; they make it a potential haven of good will, mutual aid – and peace.

That lawgivers should care for these forms of household *philia* ‘even more than for justice’, is a conclusion that Aristotle does not draw explicitly. But it remains in the background elsewhere when he draws analogies between household relations and the more properly political relations between rulers and ruled. In this schema, kings are to their subjects as fathers to sons; aristocrats are to their subjects as husbands to wives; inhabitants of the democratic polity relate like siblings.<sup>13</sup> Aristotle does not explore these analogies at length, even though in the broader classification of constitutions, they are quite suggestive. For the three true or good constitutions are differentiated by the virtue and spirit of their rulers: in the good constitutions of monarchy, aristocracy, and polity, rulers exercise power for the good of all, but primarily for the good of the ruled.<sup>14</sup> In doing so (one might add), they act in the true spirit of *philia*, if indeed ‘it is a mark of friendship to give rather than to receive.’<sup>15</sup> By contrast, in the bad constitutions of tyranny, oligarchy and democracy, the ruling class effectively prefers to receive than to give: in Aristotle’s terms, they rule for their own exclusive advantage. That is, they rule despotically, like bad masters, and there is little *philia* between them and their subjects.<sup>16</sup>

The history of bad constitutions often shows the depths to which human beings can sink when neighbours and fellow citizens hate, fear, envy or despise each other. Given time and circumstances, such emotions can be magnified into the most horrific violence, particularly during periods of *stasis* and civil war. Among many historical examples, Aristotle recalls the party fighting in Argos in 371 BC, when the democratic party killed 1500 of their oligarchic opponents, with clubs. These and other atrocities ensured that the spectre of *stasis* haunted the early fourth century and may be the immediate inspiration for Aristotle’s ambiguous estimation of the human animal:

A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous . . . if he have not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony.<sup>17</sup>

This passage ambiguously names the ‘rational, political animal’ as potentially the best and worst, most holy and most savage. Impressed by the seeming realism of Hobbes’ state of nature and pessimistic view of human nature, so prey to competition, diffidence and ambition<sup>18</sup> – and impressed also by a quasi-Darwinian understanding of nature as the realm of amoral competition – many contemporary readers of this passage might overlook that for Aristotle man is also potentially holy and blessed, even if he is ‘not the best thing in the world’.<sup>19</sup>

Neglecting this, some readers might fasten on the relation of humans to lower animals as the only one worth considering. In fact, Aristotle does have many tantalizing suggestions about the continuity and qualitative differences between the natural and human realms. With regard to ‘war’ in both, the most salient passage is *History of Animals* 9.1. Here, the differing psychologies of animal species grounds different means of subsistence and modes of life, and these in turn foster perpetual ‘war’ and ‘enmity’ between certain types. Some of Aristotle’s examples are positively Aesopic<sup>20</sup> – the ‘eagle and the snake are enemies’, and ‘the wolf is at war with the ass, the bull, and the fox’ – yet the motivating generalities are more respectable: first, ‘there is enmity (*polemos*) between such animals as dwell in the same localities or subsist on the same food’; second, ‘all creatures are at enmity with the carnivores and the carnivores with the rest, for they all subsist on living creatures.’<sup>21</sup> In the first proposition, antipathy and ‘war’ are natural *between* species that compete for the same food; in the second (more Aesopic) conclusion, it is predator and prey that are locked in perpetual conflict. At the root of both is competition for food, struggle for existence. Here, Aristotle goes on to acknowledge a special case of the first principle:

If the means of subsistence run short, animals of the same species will *even* fight each other (καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ὁμόφυλα μάχεται) . . . male with male, and female with female, until one combatant kills the other, or one is driven away by the other; and their young do even in like manner.<sup>22</sup>

I have modified Thompson’s translation slightly, adding the emphatic ‘even’ (καί), as it is conceptually significant: the phrasing, the sense of unnaturalness that social animals like seals would kill their mates or their young, the hint of the horror of civil war (ἔμφυλος πόλεμος)<sup>23</sup> and the implication that scarcity of food is a temporary contingency – all these may offer an explanation why Aristotle focuses overwhelmingly on *inter-species* wars<sup>24</sup>: competition *within* a species seems more exceptional, temporary and contingent, and is rarest among gregarious animals who associate together out of innate affection (*philia*) for their own kind.<sup>25</sup>

If so, competition is not universal and, in fact, Aristotle suggests many examples of mutual aid within and even between species: shoaling fish are *philo*i to each other; the raven and the crow are *philo*i, having a common enemy in the merlin; the crow and heron, sedge-bird and lark, laedus and woodpecker, piphinx and harpe and kite, the fox and snake, the black-bird and turtle-dove

are separate groupings of *philoï*; while the crocodile and trochilus have almost a 'mixed' friendship, for by cleaning the crocodile's teeth, the bird gets food and the crocodile 'ease and comfort'.<sup>26</sup>

Regarding the struggle for existence, Darwin emphasizes natural competition, Kropotkin natural cooperation. Aristotle does not generalize, and it would be unfair to generalize about him from these few passages. Yet, he points to both 'friendships' and 'wars' among both animals and fishes.<sup>27</sup> Each of these relationships seems to have a certain contingency, as each has the potential to change into their opposites. In scarcity, natural *philiai* can be transformed into *polemoi*, as above, while in times or places of abundance, the opposite happens, as when bass and grey mullet give up their normally bitter *polemos* and shoal together,<sup>28</sup> or in Egypt, where crocodiles (the 'most ferocious' predator) live with the priests who feed them so well. Such transformations seem to happen everywhere, leading Aristotle to speculate that if there were no lack of food, all creatures would live together<sup>29</sup> – 'peaceably', adds D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson in his translation, making explicit what Aristotle only suggests: normally, one presumes, the crocodile is at 'war' with man, for both can prey on the other. But Egyptian abundance is unusual, and presumably extreme abundance and scarcity are in general contingent circumstances. All these considerations, taken together, envision organic nature as a patchwork of *philiai* and *polemoi*, some natural and permanent, others contingent on changing conditions, some between different species, others within a single species. Aristotle does not obviously fasten on either competition or cooperation as more basic. In fact, he explicitly generalizes that both war and friendship, conflict and mutual aid, are permanent means of subsistence and survival.<sup>30</sup>

Pursuing the metaphors of 'friendship' and 'war' from human relations to nature and back to mankind again is difficult. Yet, Aristotle insists on an overall continuity in nature, such that the psychological differentiations that are residual in animals become more obvious and developed among human beings: in the scale of nature, man is the animal whose character, disposition and nature is potentially most complete.<sup>31</sup> This may give context for the conclusion that when armed and unjust, man is potentially the 'most savage of animals'. Here, the savagery of vendetta, civil war or the *andrapodismos* comes easily to mind, though Aristotle does not actually state that the instinctual violence between and within animal species is 'perfected' in human wars, or that animal 'weapons' of attack and defence are perfected in human technologies of killing.<sup>32</sup> Instead, he does write somewhat cryptically that 'of animals, some are always enemies (*polemia*) to each other; others, like human beings, are so only contingently'.<sup>33</sup> But he does not here differentiate types of war, and compare (for example) Greek-barbarian wars with inter-species animal ones, or Greek-Greek wars and civic strife with intra-species conflict. Nor does he name the source of the contingency that drives human animals to fight each other, whether it be scarcity of food, or the rational deliberation to circumvent future scarcity, or some other cause. To anticipate somewhat, evidence from the *Politics* prompts one to conclude that Aristotle would

accept international war as inevitable and even endemic between competing states: the analogy of inter-species conflict might even ground his seeming approval of Greek–barbarian conflict as natural and just. Civil wars within states, on the other hand, are caused by imperfectly just *nomoi* – a contingency that can be ameliorated and even eliminated by proper deliberation.

The assumption that there is a political ‘art’, a body of knowledge that can help human beings to actualize their full natural potential, does much to confirm this latter inference. In particular, an assumption of the *Politics* is that conflict is not inevitable or even normal among human beings who inhabit the same social space of the household and city: the statesman can and should moralize such spaces by removing obstacles to natural justice and *philia*. In the charged politics of actual Greek *poleis*, of course, that space is often violated by contingent violence, yet this civil strife (*stasis*, *metabolē*) has definite causes and remedies that *Politics* 5 sets out to analyse and categorize for practical elimination. At first, the causes of usurpation or wholesale revolution seem legion, because contingent. Thus, in one passage Aristotle states that there are three, then seven, then more than seven causes of *stasis*, and the list that he plumps for in the end seems rather haphazard.<sup>34</sup> Yet, his analysis works its way to a deeper unity of explanation. Here, merely economic explanations are superficial, and he criticizes how Plato’s *Republic* blames class warfare on mere economic inequality. Likewise, Hobbes’ ‘three principal causes of quarrel’<sup>35</sup> are well included in Aristotle’s broader discussion of *hybris*, anger, envy, fear, contempt, and other psychological causes of conflict. Beneath the surface play of such emotions in times of *stasis*, Aristotle seems to suggest that there is a more basic, ‘revolutionary feeling’.<sup>36</sup> With no single, conventional name, this may seem rather indefinite, but it is grounded in something as fundamental as the intuition of natural justice – an intuition shared by all, rich and poor, oligarch and democrat. Natural justice is, of course, not the justice of mere following legal convention and contingent *nomos*. True justice is equity, and in the last analysis, a species of proportionality, i.e. equality either arithmetical or geometrical. For in activities of giving and receiving, rewarding and punishing, justice restores a proper equality between concerned parties, and when this right equality is lacking (or perceived as lacking), there can arise the ‘revolutionary feeling’ that one is being wronged. This brooding sense of dissatisfaction expresses itself variously in dissociative emotions like anger, fear, envy – and from these more proximate causes can erupt incidents that themselves spark broader *stasis*. Thus, ‘the universal and chief cause of this revolutionary feeling’ is injustice and the desire to receive goods equal to one’s merits:<sup>37</sup> each party may have different conceptions of their merits and just rewards, yet each does desire ‘just’ treatment. If so, the contingent causes of prolonged conflict within a *polis* are not as simple as animal hunger: the ‘political animal’ – uniquely endowed with deliberation, conscious memory, and the capacity to conceive of abstractions like ‘justice’ and ‘the good’ – fights against his own kind when his innate sense of justice is violated. Injustice (or the perception thereof) is the cause of *stasis* and social dissolution, just as justice is the necessary condition of harmony and political

association. Here, the art of politics seeks to supplement nature in the sense of fostering natural justice, and eliminating contingent, unjust relationships.

Yet, even in the sense of natural equity, justice is a somewhat superficial concept, and though it is a necessary condition for association, Aristotle often insists that it is not a sufficient condition for true community. A merely commercial entity governed by contract does not constitute a city, for a city is not a contractual arrangement, an assemblage of random people, or a peaceful grazing together in the same space:<sup>38</sup>

It is clear then that a state (πόλις) is not a mere society, having a common place (κοινωνία τόπου), established for the prevention of mutual crime and for the sake of exchange. These are conditions without which a state cannot exist; but all of them together do not constitute a state, which is a community of families and aggregations of families in well-being, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life. Such a community can only be established among those who live in the same place and intermarry. Hence arise in cities family connections, brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. But these are created by friendship, for the will to live together is friendship (τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἔργον· ἢ γὰρ τοῦ συζῆν προαίρεσις φιλία). The end of the state is the good life, and these are the means towards it.

(*Pol.* 1280b28–40)

The *polis* may not here be exhaustively defined, but its necessary elements include: a shared space, absence of crime or ‘injustice’, opportunity for mutual exchange, and most of all the communal will to share that space over many lifetimes and for the highest human ends. Much therefore is implied in the assertion that the city is a collection of families with an end to ‘living well’. Much is bound up in the statement that ‘such a thing’ – the city as union of sub-groups like families and brotherhoods? – is an *ergon philias*, the work or task or effect of friendship and love.<sup>39</sup> Complementing this passage are many other remarks in which Aristotle not only joins justice and *philia* as the bonds of human community, but writes of ‘friendship’ as the more basic and primordial bond.<sup>40</sup> All such remarks could be given more systematic form: for Aristotle, the city is constituted by the relationships effected by species-*philia* in its various guises; the most important of these relationships are the proper political relation of citizen-citizen (which includes many sub-species, notably rich-poor), as well as the household relations of husband-wife, parent-child and master-slave. Such ‘friends’ benefit each other in different ways, and this variegated mutual aid is the more primordial relation from which alone the just exchange of political and economic good can emerge: to adapt the old adage, even among thieves, there must be some ‘friendship’, a minimal sense of common motivation and good will, if they are to form a robber-band. Namely, the species-feeling of *philia* is the common feeling underlying, in different intensities, a network of ‘friendships’ that themselves constitute the *polis*.

Here it must be understood that *philia* is not for Aristotle a uniform phenomenon. In *EN* 8–9, he sketches its three sub-species – friendships of pleasure, utility, and character – each of which is formed for some shared goal. Friends are one in their desire for pleasure, advantage, or virtue, and the friendship lasts so long as the friendship is mutually beneficial. In three other, mixed forms, the two partners enter a friendship for different reasons, and the brief analogy between familial and political *philiai* represents even further particularizations, attempted applications of the ideal to monarchy, aristocracy, and timocracy. Here, the single analytic principle of ideal friendship could be seen to be differentiated progressively so as to cover a broader and broader array of the actual relationships that constitute different communities. If so, then in the limit (as it were), *all* real human relationships become species of *philia*, some stronger and closer to the ideal, others weaker and less perfect. Once again, ‘love’ or ‘friendship’ becomes the basic human relationship. One should not, of course, mistake the emotional tone of these statements: the reference of Aristotelian *philia* is broader than English ‘friendship’, and so his sense of communities of ‘friendship’ has none of the *Gemeinschafts-schwärmerei* that Yack complains of in some communitarian readers of Aristotle. Nevertheless, *pace* Yack, Aristotle’s is a communitarian vision for which solidarity, equality, fraternity and ‘love’ are more fundamental than division and hatred. Masters and slaves, strangers and strangers – any two human beings are *philoï* to each other, *qua* human, and inasmuch as they are ‘friends’, they are equal to some degree. It is this basic relation that the statesman seeks to ‘care for’ by actualizing it as much as possible between the different individuals making up a community.

At the centre, therefore, of the many differentiations of *philia* is a vision of ideal community: the ideal reciprocity, equality and even identity with which perfect friends are blessed. In perfect friendships of character or virtue, two people associate with each other for long-term ends of education, self-formation, and happiness. They are friends for the sake of virtue, and in sharing much time and experience, they shape each other’s character for the better. Aristotle makes much of the Platonic theme that one can love in the friend only what is good.<sup>41</sup> But a friend’s good *character* is not an accidental quality of the friend, but is the friend *himself*, and so friendship of character is the true friendship, in which one really loves the other as other. This fully reciprocal relationship has clear similarities with, for instance, the Golden Rule or Kant’s Kingdom of Ends: one loves one’s friend as one loves oneself, for the friend in his virtuous character and ambitions is an *alter ego*; one loves such a friend both instrumentally and purely, as both means and end; one may even love one’s friend as a model of virtue, a paradigm of the fully actualized human being. To love such a friend as oneself and to contemplate oneself in one’s friend has the rudiments of the self-contemplation that Aristotle associates elsewhere with the highest life: namely, God – Self-Thinking Thought, pure *energeia*, untroubled by practical *kinēsis* and imperfection.<sup>42</sup> Aristotle does not state it, but do these disparate definitions make ‘God’ the locus of the highest ontological peace in which all contrary strivings converge and vanish?

The nature of Aristotle's God, his relation to nature, and the relation of the contemplative and practical lives are controversial issues, to say the least. But even if the inner peace of the contemplative life, and of perfect friendships, are ideals too high for worldly actualization, nevertheless the ideal of reciprocity and equality of fundamental interests does sound the keynote, I suggest, for the statesman's imperative to promote *philia* where possible – that is, within the city, whether actual or ideal. Through the *Politics* are scattered an array of remedies to mitigate inequalities and promote solidarity and fraternity within the state: societies, festivals, common meals, redistributions of wealth, means to discourage *hybris* among the powerful and envy among the weak, measures to strengthen good will between different tribes and to ensure the amicable mixing of classes and other sub-groups.<sup>43</sup> Here, the many tricks by which tyrants can keep power are the mirror opposite of those which the true statesman should use: the tyrant sows mistrust and division in all associations, even the family, and actively suppresses *philia* between masters and slaves, spouses, friends, individual citizens, and whole classes.<sup>44</sup> One ploy very useful for the tyrant is to drum up external wars so as to unify the citizen body, and this Aristotle does recommend in more general terms: guardians of a constitution may find it useful to startle citizens with terrors, distant or near, real or invented, to keep them vigilant and loyal.<sup>45</sup> This passing thought could lead to the persecution of an inner enemy or a despised minority, and even to an Orwellian 'minute of hate'. But Aristotle lays no great emphasis on it, and certainly in his sketch of an ideal polity he would cultivate civic peace by more humane methods. Here, his proposed citizens will share a common education, a common round of activities as they train for external wars, hold office, administer priesthods, manage their lands, rule and submit to rule in turn:<sup>46</sup> democratically sharing the life of the city, they effectively share a life together, and it is one that is oriented towards virtuous *eudaimonia*, in a way that is at least analogous to friendships of character. For if friendship flourishes most in democracies where people are most equal, share the most in common, and can therefore associate like brothers<sup>47</sup> – then *a fortiori* friendship will flourish in the virtuous 'polity', where the majority or large plurality rule not despotically, but for the benefit of all – not only of citizens but also of women, children, metics, and even slaves.

Here Aristotle's ideal seems to be of a city whose constituent relations are *philia* in various appropriate degrees: each person is bound to every other by bonds of *philia* appropriate to him as relative, spouse, slave, co-worker, and so forth. Promoting *philia* of the right sort between the right people, to the right extent, for the right ends, all with a view to the city's local conditions, traditions and prevailing constitution: for this the artful statesman cares most of all, 'even more than for justice', and far more than for the mere party maintenance or revolution of prevailing laws. Presumably this task involves also the greatest degree of *phronēsis*, as the politician adapts a general ideal to the complexity of actual particulars, in such a way that husbands and wives, masters and slaves, fellow citizens and neighbours will each 'love' each other, in the degree and measure appropriate to their station. Promoting *philia* in this nuanced way is

to remove the ‘revolutionary feeling’ at the root of *stasis*, and so to allow the different natures constituting the political space to subsist in mutual benefit and even good will. This civic peace in turn may be said to be the implicit condition for Aristotelian happiness, as it is only in a well-ordered, non-oppressive and harmonious city that citizens will have the leisure, activities, and various relationships to cultivate their selves fully.

Such an association of peace with the goal, *telos* and *energeia* of happiness is not to be taken for granted, particularly in warlike societies that value strength and courage. As a Greek, Aristotle does not at all disavow the virtues of war. He does not make courage a virtue for peace-time, since courage is exemplified by those who stand in the battle-line. Indeed, courage comes first in Aristotle’s list of virtues in *EN*, and without it, one’s character would be incomplete. Similarly, Aristotle cannot envision a city without a military element. As if unimpressed by the King’s Peace, Common Peace, movements towards federalization and panhellenic sentiment generally, Aristotle seems to accept international war as the normal state of affairs. The political instinct may join individuals into families and cities; the political art may heal individual cities of *stasis*. Why could it not remove obstacles for *philia* to emerge between whole cities? Why does Aristotle seem to assume that inter-state *polemoi* will endure? Is this because such wars are the organic development of inter-species animal ‘wars’, as cities, like separate organisms, compete for the same border territory? Or do cities have more complex motives: not only deliberations about comparative advantage, but memories of historical injustices, considerations of honour?<sup>48</sup> Aristotle does not pursue such questions systematically. He is at his most explicit regarding wars with non-Greeks. He divides the ‘acquisitive art’ into the hunting of animals and the hunting of natural slaves – i.e. war: animals and ‘lower’ human beings are rightfully acquired as property, and so wars against them are ‘naturally just’. It is a small inference to interpret these as wars against non-Greeks, and in this passages one can see elements of the tradition used later by Plutarch: that Aristotle taught Alexander to lead the Greeks, but be a master (*despotēs*) to the barbarians.<sup>49</sup> Whatever the pretexts and deeper, natural reasons for war, Aristotle does assume without comment that there will always be the threat of violence from outside predators and rivals: even the ideal city he envisions with good defensible position, fortified walls, and a citizen-army.

Furthermore, there are hints that this is not an altogether deplorable situation. A few remarks look forward to Hegelian ideas of war’s purgative benefits. Peace can bring stagnation, and war has its galvanizing effects as it ‘compels men to be courageous and temperate, whereas the enjoyment of good fortune and the leisure which comes with peace tend to make them insolent’.<sup>50</sup> At the same time, Aristotle hardly accepts the classic Prussian understanding of war as the highest expression of the state. War is only one element in the life of both nature and the *polis*, and the expansionist, imperialist state is based on the lie of never-ceasing growth. Aristotle criticizes Dorian militarism, for instance, and its many enthusiasts: the Lycurgan constitution cultivated only the virtue of courage, and the Spartans failed to profit by the peace and empire that they

gained from the Peloponnesian War.<sup>51</sup> It were as if the Spartans cultivated the martial virtues as ends in themselves, and though Aristotle too takes the virtue of courage as both instrumental to and constitutive of *eudaimonia*, in the final reckoning he understands it as more means than end. Courage is necessary to secure the city's freedom, but it is definitely not the only virtue, and is fairly useless in peaceful conditions, when other virtues come into play.<sup>52</sup>

Therefore, in a key generalization, repeated several times, Aristotle divides all human life 'into two parts, business and leisure, war and peace'. In this scheme, peace is associated with leisure, the honourable, and the good; war with toil, the necessary and merely useful. War is waged for the sake of peace,<sup>53</sup> not peace for the sake of war, or war for the sake of war: possibilities, one might add, which seem as nonsensical as stating, say, that one seeks happiness for the sake of wealth. The hierarchy of ends is not socially constructed, but natural and intuitively clear to rational *nous*. Thus, another key passage asserts without proof the subordination of the practical to theoretical life. Here war and politics become necessary and useful when subordinated to the higher, more honourable and intrinsically valuable activity of contemplation. In this passage, Aristotle unambiguously orients the necessary and useful activities of war and politics to the higher, more honourable and valuable activity of contemplation. This alone is chosen for its own sake, and once again this pure activity is named 'God'. As that eternal, timeless Mind – unmoved by the worldly 'movements' of war or *stasis* for instance,<sup>54</sup> and yet the final focus on which all movements converge and which harmonizes them as their ultimate fulfilment – Aristotle's contemplative God could again, perhaps, be described as the deepest reality of peace.<sup>55</sup>

This most substantial and enduring reality is that which underlies any possibility of peace, and though the alarms and confusion of war surely prevent one entering into it, in some sense wars too in their practical necessity are oriented towards its deeper harmony. Aristotle obviously does not juxtapose war and the holy to endorse the notion of a 'sacred' or 'holy war', as waged for instance by the Amphictyonic Council twice in his lifetime.<sup>56</sup> Aristotle's God does not need defenders and human beings do not become 'holy' by fighting for this divine principle. Rather, the hierarchy linking immediate means and ultimate ends is long: in a natural world that is not wholly predictable or hospitable to human beings, war and courage are necessary to protect against the contingencies of external violence and enslavement; such protection maintains a common space in which justice, and the deeper union of *philia* between inhabitants can emerge; in the natural 'love' that binds households and tribes into an organic political whole, mutual aid allows for the cultivation of virtue and happiness; among the 'blessed' few, intellectual virtues and highest contemplative activity may afford a brief entry into the brilliant existence of the undying *Nous*.

Along this path, peace emerges as an ideal in many senses, though again the operative word for Aristotle is not *eirēnē* but *philia*. *Philia* is the relation most natural to human beings, and when contingent impediments are removed by

political deliberation, it will flourish between husbands and wives, brothers and sisters, parents and children, rulers and subjects, between strangers (e.g. citizens and metics), even masters and slaves. To ‘care for’ and promote *philia* in all its guises is a task even more important than that of arbitration, reconciliation and peace-making. Here the real political task is not to reconcile former enemies but to prevent them from falling out in the first place, by eliminating the conditions, causes, and petty incidents that can spark off political revolutions and prove to be the ‘beginning of evil’.<sup>57</sup> Here, the contingent causes of ‘evil’ are nullified when the statesman deepens the commonalities that define the species of *philia* and are the very condition of true community – the common pleasures, common interests and sources of advantage, common experiences, common ends and values, and shared humanity.<sup>58</sup>

‘Blessed are the makers of *philia*, for they make peace’, could be a rough translation and summary of Aristotle’s views on peace, if my reading and reconstruction is true. If so, then politics do indeed make strange bedfellows. From his teleological perspective, Aristotle revisits what the nominalist, materialist Hobbes baptizes as the first law of nature: ‘seek peace and promote it.’ And despite his typical Greek acceptance of war and martial courage as part of natural reality, Aristotle’s concern for civic peace and contemplative blessedness foreshadow the more radical blessing and imperative that Christ left his followers: ‘Peace be with you’.

## Notes

- 1 Hobbes, *Leviathan* Chapter 14.
- 2 This may be the reason that there has been (to my knowledge) no thorough analysis of Aristotle’s multi-dimensional approach to the concept of peace. If so, the situation is analogous to the relative lack of attention to his treatment of *stasis* and conflict highlighted in Yack (1993). Zampaglione (1973) 60–4 is a survey that touches only on the obvious passages mentioning *eirēnē* and he does not even explore how his own ‘four pacifisms’ (13) might be articulated by Aristotle, if one looks beyond his *ipsissima verba*. Ryder (1965) devotes two sentences to Aristotle in the page that he gives to Plato and Aristotle, their ‘obsession with the internal workings of the city-state’, and relative indifference to international politics and evolving notions of a Common Peace (116–7). Ostwald’s ‘Peace and War in Plato and Aristotle’ has more on Plato than Aristotle and like Zampaglione stays close to the obvious wording of the sources, which forces him, as he confesses, ‘to dwell at greater length on war than on peace’ ((2009) 89).
- 3 The Common Peace is mentioned in *Rhet.* 1399b13 but only in relation to rhetorical *topoi*. It surfaces again (again unnoticed by Ryder (1965)) in *Rhet.* 1410b30, with a quote from Isocrates’ *Philip* 73, but again the purpose is rhetorical, to give an example of a striking antithesis (i.e. of war and peace).
- 4 In Plato’s *Republic* Socrates argues that the inner ‘city’ of the soul can attain harmony and peace between its faculties only when it comes to know the eternal Good: progressive ignorance of this, and deepening fascination with more worldly goods brings the degeneration of the timocratic, oligarchic, democratic and tyrannical souls, which are ever more torn by movement and difference. In Books 8–9 especially, *stasis* is the dominant metaphor: the soul in psychological turmoil mirrors the interne-cine violence of a disunified city. In *Leg.* 626b–d the Athenian Stranger reduces wars between cities, villages, households, and individuals to the war ‘against ourselves going

- on within every one of us' (trans. Jowett). Here, the greatest victory is over oneself (τὸ νικᾶν αὐτὸν αὐτόν): a thought that influenced Hellenistic ideals of Stoic *apatheia*, Epicurean and Sceptic *ataraxia*. For Epicureans, for instance, the gods are admirable partly because in their atomic self-sufficiency they enjoy perfect peace. Hence Lucretius 'prays' to Venus for a victory over Mars, and a lasting *pax* (DRN 1.29–40).
- 5 NE 1155a22–24, ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις συνέχειν ἢ φιλία, καὶ οἱ νομοθέται μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτὴν σπουδάζειν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην (all translations of NE are by W.D. Ross).
  - 6 On this point cf. Konstan (1997) 68–70.
  - 7 'Tending' and 'liking' are, of course, two senses of the verb *philein*: Aristotle writes of the natural and universal human drive or tendency (ὄρμη) for society (κοινωνία, Pol. 1253a29–30), as well as the spontaneous longing people have for company, as if for life itself, without any ulterior end (Pol. 1278b20–30 ὀρέγονται τοῦ συζῆν . . . γλιχόμενοι τοῦ ζῆν). Such remarks are by-the-by, but suggest an approach that is far less pessimistic than Kant's understanding of human 'unsocial sociability'. This pessimism is captured more vividly in Schopenhauer's parable of the porcupines, who come together for warmth, only to retreat to a more comfortable distance when they prick and needle each other. There may be such a Schopenhauerian ring to Aristotle's singular statement that human beings are both gregarious and solitary animals (HA 488a7–10). Needless to say, the complex of ideas concerning what differentiates 'political' among 'herding animals' (ἀγελαῖα ζῶα) – whether it is *logos* (Pol. 1253a9–10), deliberation and memory (HA 488b12–24), a common *ergon*, or a combination of these – and what exactly makes man 'more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals' (Pol. 1253a7–9) is controversial: for more see e.g. Miller (1989), Kullmann (1991), Cooper (1993) and Nederman (1994).
  - 8 Pol. 1253a27–29.
  - 9 See e.g. EN 1155a19–22 (οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλον) and 1161b13–16. Cf. EN 1155a19–20: we praise those who are φιλιανθρώπους.
  - 10 EN 1162a16–32 speaks of how mutual pleasure, utility and moral improvement can come from the natural love between man and woman. Cf. Oec. 1348b8–20 for the *koinōnia* of male and female necessary for life, and among humans, the good life.
  - 11 Parents and children: e.g. EN 1155a16–19 (a natural *philia* common 'among birds and among most animals'), 1159a28–33, 1161b18–20, 1168a24–25. Siblings: e.g. 1161b30–33.
  - 12 *Philia* towards a slave *qua* fellow human being: EN 1161b1–8, ending with the emphatic (δῆ) generalization that suggests friendship is even more basic than justice (καὶ φιλία δῆ, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος). Recommendation to admonish and converse with slaves, and so to actively impart *aretē* to them, on the grounds that all human souls has a share of virtue and reason, even if 'they are present in different degrees': Pol. 1260a5–b7. Here, Aristotle shares Plato's metaphysical distinction between active and passive elements, but takes issue with the conclusion that one should 'command' and not admonish slaves (Leg. 777e4–778a5). For summary conclusions that the 'natural' master-slave relation is mutually beneficial, just, and as necessary as those between soul and body, whole and part, see Pol. 1.6, esp. 1255b10–15 and 1278b30–37 where the master rules the slave in his own interest and only 'accidentally considers the slave' – and thus is closer to outright tyranny than the other forms of rule (household and political) that are subsequently discussed. Furthermore, Aristotle generalizes that it is right and natural for the 'superior' and active element to do its task and 'rule' the 'inferior' and more passive: a hierarchy that he would extend to human-animal, male-female, old-young, virtuous-vicious and so forth, and slaves are like tame animals (Pol. 12254b5–25). Christian and post-Christian focus on the equality of all human creatures or rights-bearers finds it difficult to stomach Aristotle's seemingly aristocratic bias for the 'superior'. Heath (2008) looks past this distaste to show the internal consistency of Aristotle's ideas. Levin (1997) goes further to defend Aristotelian conceptions of justice and geometrical equality themselves, though eschewing the language of 'mastery' and 'slavery' for that of 'natural dominance' and 'subordination', which do not in themselves preclude fairness and mutual benefit.

- 13 *EN* 1160b22–1161a7 and *Pol.* 1.12 *passim*, 1259a37–b17.
- 14 *Pol.* 1278b30–1279a21 and 3.7 *passim*.
- 15 *EN* 1169b10–11 (φίλου μάλλον ἐστὶ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν). Cf. *EN* 1155b31, 1156a9–10 (wishing good to the friend); 1162b6–8; 1167b17–1168a27 *passim* where love and benefitting are active and hence superior to the passivity of being loved and benefitted.
- 16 Aristotle draws this conclusion explicitly with regard to tyrannies, where ‘friendships and justice are little found’ (*EN* 1161b4–11); cf. the tyrant’s Machiavellian ploys to maintain power, by fomenting mistrust between subjects, setting friend against friend (*Pol.* 1313b17), alienating the able and virtuous (ἐπιεικεῖς) from each other (1314a17–23), and even breaking up the *philiai* of households by inciting wives to inform against husbands, and slaves against masters (1313b32–35).
- 17 *Pol.* 1253a.29–37. All translations of *Politics* are Jowett’s, unless otherwise indicated.
- 18 *Leviathan*, Chapter 13. Hobbes’ ‘three principall causes of quarrell’ are directly inspired by Thucydides, *Hist.* 1.75.3–4 (δέος, τιμῆ, ὠφελία).
- 19 *EN* 1141a20–21.
- 20 For Aristotle’s treatment of fables, see Clayton (2008). The folkloric nature of some of his ‘information’ Aristotle sometimes seems to acknowledge, as when he relays that ‘people say’ that the eagle makes war on the wren because of his nickname, ‘the king’ (*HA* 615a17–20).
- 21 *HA* 608b19–25 and 608b25–7, respectively (translations of *Historia Animalium* by D. W. Thompson (1910), unless otherwise indicated). Of many examples of the first principle is the ‘war’ between the harpy and poynx, ‘as the two birds live on the same food’ (are ὁμοιοβίωτος, *HA* 617a10–11); or that between bees and wasps (626a14–15, 627b5) who do them ‘most injustice’ (626a7–8, ἀδικοῦσι αὐτὰς μάλιστα, my trans.). For the second principle, see the ‘war’ between strong and weak fish, for ‘the stronger eats them’ (610b17–18), as in Hesiod’s fable of the Hawk and Nightingale.
- 22 *HA* 608b21–25.
- 23 ἔμφυλος πόλεμος as in Solon (4.19, West). The mixing of tribes and racial groups is a common cause of *stasis*, particularly in new colonies (*Pol.* 1303a25–b3, στασιωτικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁμόφυλον). Similarly, slaves will be less likely to unite and rebel if they are not ὁμόφυλοι (*Pol.* 1330a25–7).
- 24 The contrast with Darwin is striking. *Origin of Species* makes the ‘struggle for life most severe between individuals and varieties of the same species’, or more precisely between ‘species of the same genera’ (Chapter 3). This difference is evident in the three passages (Chapters 3, 4, 15) where Darwin reverts from his preferred phrase, ‘struggle for existence’, to the older metaphor of a ‘war of nature’. There is the ‘war’ between rival mates (Chapter 4, ‘Sexual Selection’), and the age-old ‘war between insect and insect – between insects, snails, and other animals with birds and beasts of prey – all striving to increase, all feeding on each other, or on the trees, their seeds and seedlings’ (Chapter 3). As if struck by the pathos of this universal struggle, Darwin seeks consolation in the thought ‘that the war of nature is not incessant, that no fear is felt, that death is generally prompt, and that the vigorous, the healthy, and the happy survive and multiply’ (Chapter 3, *ad fin.*). The book ends with a consoling vision of the ‘grandeur’ and ‘beauty’ of life’s variety, as it rises ‘from the war of nature, from famine and death’ (Chapter 15, *ad fin.*).
- 25 The horse, for instance, seems particularly affectionate by nature (φύσει φιλόστοργον, *HA* 611a11–12), and male sheatfish are so concerned (φιλοστόργως) for their fertilized eggs that they court their own deaths (621a29–b2).
- 26 Fish: *HA* 610b1–2. Raven, crow: 609b30–4. List of examples: 610a8–13. Crocodile, trochilus: 612a20–4. Human beings, too, have their best friends: the woodcock is exceptionally fond of man (φιλόανθρωπὸν ἐστὶν ἐπιεικῶς, 617b26), as is the civet who does man no ‘injustice’ and does not fear him (630a9).
- 27 *HA* 610a33–b2.
- 28 *HA* 610b10–12.

- 29 *HA* 608b29–a4. The lion too is ‘most ferocious’ when eating, but when fed is ‘quite gentle’ (πραότατος), and ‘with animals that have been reared along with him and to whom he is accustomed’, he becomes ‘extremely playful and affectionate’ (στερκτικός, 629b10–12). One might think of Isaiah’s lion and lamb, but Aristotle again does not go on to speak explicitly of possible ‘peace’ between predator and prey.
- 30 *HA* 610a33–35.
- 31 *HA* 8.1 esp. 608a23 and 608b4–8 ([ἄνθρωπος] ἔχει τὴν φύσιν ἀποτελεσεσμένην); cf. 612b19–613b11, likening the solicitude of nesting swallows and pairing pigeons to that of human parents. More broadly, see *de Anima* on how all powers of vegetable and animal souls are taken up into the more complex unity of human life. On the more distant continuity between the elemental and human, *EN* 1155b1–9 mentions but dismisses as not quite relevant the analogy between human *philia* and the ‘desire’ between earth and heaven, or between opposite or similar elements.
- 32 See *Ph.* 199a15–17 for the general principle that *technē* either improves upon and adds to nature’s capabilities, or imitates them: a generalization easily extended to such inventions as spears and body armour.
- 33 Ἔστι δὲ τῶν θηρίων τὰ μὲν αἰεὶ πολέμια ἀλλήλοισι, τὰ δ’ ὥσπερ ἄνθρωποι, ὅταν τύχῳσι (*HA* 610a3–4, my translation).
- 34 His initial list includes ‘insolence, fear, excessive predominance, contempt, disproportionate increase in some part of the state . . . election intrigues, carelessness, neglect about trifles, and dissimilarity of elements’ (*Pol.* 1302a34–b5). He goes on to elaborate on these in *Pol.* 5.3 but adds ‘the situation of cities’ (τόποι, 1303b7–14) as another possible cause of *stasis*.
- 35 See *Pol.* 1263b16–23 for a somewhat snide refutation of the merely economic analysis of social evil, as if these could be cured by equality and community of possessions, and were not caused by ‘the wickedness of human nature’ (διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν).
- 36 Jowett’s translation of τὸ ἔχειν πῶς πρὸς τὴν μεταβολὴν (*Pol.* 1302a22–23).
- 37 *Pol.* V.2, 1302a25. Cf. Yack (1993) 224; Skultety (2009) 248–56 discusses the more superficial, immediate causes and *prophasesis* in detail but does not seem to give due emphasis to this deeper ‘root cause’ of *stasis*.
- 38 A city is not a commercial or military alliance that exists ‘for the sake of life only’, e.g. utility: *Pol.* 1280a31–1280b30. Nor is it an assemblage of random strangers or the ‘growth of a day’: *Pol.* 1303b26–7.
- 39 Could this (rather than, say, *logos* or deliberative rationality, which can be divisive, or so Yack (1993) insists) be the human *ergon* that in the terms of *HA* 488a7–8 defines man as a ‘political animal’?
- 40 See especially the programmatic statement introducing the whole two books on *philia*, *EN* 8.1, 1155a22–28 (partially quoted above, n.5); cf. *EN* 1159b25–1160a8 where friendship and justice have ‘equal extension’. Significant also is *EN* 1160a14–30, which makes each association (κοινωνία), whether social club, trade venture or religious guild, a part of the political community, and associates each with a particular kind of friendship, though it may be too much to read into Aristotle’s examples the three goals of pleasure, utility, and some ‘higher’ good (on which cf. Pangle (2003) 83). My whole analysis converges from a different angle on the ‘civic friendship’ discussed in Yack (1985) 103–10 and Cooper (1993); cf. Pangle (2003) 79–104. The phrase *politikē philia* is more important in *Eudemian Ethics*, but is equated also in *EN* 1167b2–16 with the more politically loaded *homonoia*. Here, both are excellences that can flourish only among the good (*eueikeis*), while the unvirtuous are prone to injustice and faction.
- 41 *ENVIII.2* with discussion of Plato’s *Lysis* in Pangle (2003) 20–36; cf. Nichols (2010) esp. 169–70.
- 42 For true love involving a kind of self-contemplation, and not only in true friends, but between relations, see *EN* 1161b17–1162a1, where parents ‘love their children as themselves’ and siblings love each other as images of themselves, for they are ‘in a sense the same thing, though in separate individuals’.

- 43 *Pol.* 5.8 *passim*. The most general principle of stability seems to be that of the mean and proportionality: balance the claims of the necessary elements of the state, e.g. of rich and poor (*Pol.* 1309b14–1310a1; cf. 1307a26–7). This would include measures of checks-and-balances between different groups: *Pol.* 1308b25–7. All the remedies that Aristotle touches on cannot be summarized here, but he seems to aim at an exhaustive compendium, as if the political art (to draw an analogy with his definition of rhetoric) were to discover all possible resources for the maintenance of a constitution. Discouraging *hybris* (especially among the rich) is particularly necessary: e.g. *Pol.* 1308a5–11, 1310a2–12, 1311a25–b23; cf. *Ath. Pol.* 5. Other remedies include combining compatible tribes (*Pol.* 1302b5 on ἀνομοιότης; 1303a25–b3) and settling places where inhabitants can mix freely (*Pol.* 1303b7–16).
- 44 See *Pol.* 1313a34–1314a29 for a list of measures reminiscent of Glaucon's perfect tyrant, or Machiavelli's prince: the effective tyrant will outlaw common meals, clubs, education, schools or literary gatherings (σχολαί) and other assemblies; stifle citizens' trust in each other, their sense of dignity, independence, courage, and virtue generally; turn friends against friends (1313b16–7), rich against the poor, slaves against masters and even wives against husbands (1313b32–35); raise taxes and keep people working and poor, and wage continuous war, all so that subjects remain ἄσχολοι, have no time to think, deliberate, hence plot against him; and surround himself with foreigners, mercenaries, flatterers and other dependents, and even with criminal types, but not with friends, citizens, upstanding or free people, because the tyrant 'wants to be alone in his glory' (1314a6–7). Tyrant as warmonger (πολεμοποιός): 1313b28–29. Utterly changing tactics, on the other hand, the tyrant can ingratiate himself to his subjects by *appearing* to be a good king who serves their welfare and the common good (1314a30–1315b10).
- 45 *Pol.* 1308a25–30.
- 46 Aristotle's definition of citizenship, as in e.g. *Pol.* 3.4 *passim*, *Pol.* 1252a15–16, 1283b42–1284a1 *et al.*
- 47 *EN* 1161b1–10.
- 48 *Pol.* 7.1–2 makes a direct analogy between individual and city: the city too has virtues, disposition, and ends.
- 49 Acquisitive art: *Pol.* 1256b20–26, drawing on the dichotomies in Plato's *Sophist*. Plutarch: *Alex.* 7.4–8.5. Cf. Plato *Rep.* 469b–471b where the company call conflict between Greek cities *stasis*, and conflict between Greeks and barbarians *polemos*.
- 50 *Pol.* 1334a25. This would suggest that human beings, unlike Egyptian crocodiles for instance, cannot be 'tamed' simply by being fed or made rich: on the contrary, wealth breeds *hybris* – a typical Greek association.
- 51 Criticism of Sparta, following that of Plato in *Leg.*: *Pol.* 1333b11–1334a11.
- 52 More means than end: *Pol.* 1325a5–7. Less useful in peace: e.g. *Pol.* 1265a35, 1269b34–5.
- 53 Basic division of *ascholia* and *scholia*, war and peace: *Pol.* 1333a30–36; cf. *EN* 1177b4–12 (πολεμοῦμεν ἢν εἰρήνην ἄγομεν); *Pol.* 1334a2–6, 1334a14–16. Cf. *Pol.* 1253a1–7 where man's 'political' nature is implicitly associated with a love of peace, or at least dissociated from the love of war, for the lover of war is like an 'isolated piece of draughts' – and hence a 'human' in name only, like the homonymous, painted eye of *de An.* 412818–22. Aristotle thus does not countenance as sustainable the Homeric characters to whom strife, wars, and battles are always beloved (*philē*, *Il.* 1.777, 5.888–91).
- 54 *Kinēsis* is commonly used for 'war', and revolution is signified by *metabolē* or a periphrasis like 'to move the constitution' (e.g. *Pol.* 1304b7). For Thucydides, the Peloponnesian War is a *kinēsis*, and just as Hobbes gives metaphysical primacy to motion over rest, and war over peace, so the term *kinēsis* might well capture the vast movements of men, arms and materials that fill Homer's *Iliad*, Tolstoy's *War and Peace*, or the annals of a campaign like Barbarossa.
- 55 Roochnik (2008) argues convincingly that *Pol.* 7.1 defends the theoretical life as ideal both ethically and politically. He gives details of Aristotle's rejection of imperial, expansionist politics and argues from e.g. *Pol.* 1325b14–32 that Aristotle's God – as

the self-contained, self-thinking thought – exemplifies determinate self-sufficiency for forms, organisms, art-works, and all beings, including cities. In this sense, God as pure *energeia* and highest substance is the ontological paradigm for the ideal city, the ‘city according to prayer’ (*Pol.* 1325b36), one that is to be truly self-sufficient, substantial, and cosmically grounded. Without contemplative thinking, people will not ‘get bored’, abuse good fortune, leisure, and civic peace and become hybriatic, as in *Pol.* 1334a25–8: a ‘brief statement that has terribly sobering consequences’ (733).

- 56 On the quarrel over an heiress that Aristotle gives as cause of *stasis*, and indirect cause of the Third Sacred War (356–346 BC), see *Pol.* 1304a10–13 with Buckler (1989) 18–20. (The Fourth Sacred War was fought from 339 to 338 BC.) Aristotle would disagree with Nietzsche’s chapter ‘Of War and Warriors’ in which he proclaims, ‘You say that it is a good cause that can even hallow war? I say unto you: good is the war that hallows every cause’ (my translation).
- 57 See *Pol.* 5.4 and 5.8 for many examples illustrating the general principle of 1303b26–31 ἀρχομένων εὐλαβεῖσται δεῖ τῶν τοιούτων . . . ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ γίνεται τὸ ἀμάρτημα and 1307b39–40. The *politikos*’ task is to recognize τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ γινόμενον κακόν: *Pol.* 1308a33–35. Aristotle’s repeated phrase, ‘the beginning of evil’ (e.g. 1304a5), suggests a single, determinate origin for war, and echoes momentous passages in Homer (*Iliad* 11.604, κακοῦ ἀρχῆ), Herodotus (5.97), Thucydides (2.12) and eventually Vergil (*Aen.* 4. 169) – heralding, respectively, the beginning of Achilles’ horrific rampage, the Persian Wars, Peloponnesian War, and the Punic Wars that Vergil’s myth traces back to Dido and Aeneas.
- 58 Thus, one can only agree with Zampaglione’s essential insight: ‘manifestly colored by a preference for peace’, Aristotle’s thinking is framed in terms that make it potentially universalizable in the Greek world and beyond it to all peoples – a ‘seed destined to grow in other teachings’ (1973) 63.

## 4 (What's so funny 'bout) peace, love, and understanding?

### Imagining peace in Greek comedy

*Ian Ruffell*

Peace is a fundamental theme of Greek Old Comedy. It dominates three of Aristophanes' surviving plays, *Akharnians*, *Peace* and *Lysistrata*, where it is the main goal of the central characters and central to the interpretation of the play. In the case of *Akharnians* and *Lysistrata*, there has been a great deal of discussion of how far the peace-making attempts of Dikaiopolis and Lysistrata were intended to be spurs to extra-dramatic political action. The seriousness of *Peace* has less often been questioned, given its date and proximity to the Peace of Nikias.<sup>1</sup> This chapter does not seek to engage directly with those debates, but rather to investigate the specific characteristics of peace and reconciliation as explored in Greek Comedy, particularly in the late fifth century.

For all that there is a great deal about peace in Aristophanes, there is much less concern for reconciliation, which is presented with lots of personality but rather less political substance. Aristophanic Comedy explores the motives for making peace, the desire for peace, the obstacles to making peace; it presents fantasies of peace-tinged utopias that are predominantly agrarian in nature; but it has less to say about how to bring sides together outside the comic world, or, importantly, how one might keep it that way. I shall argue that these characteristics are driven in large part by a tension within the genre between two major engines of humour: utopianism and blame.<sup>2</sup> Both reflect broader aspects of political culture within fifth-century Athens. The handling of peace also reflects specific aspects of peace-making in the period after the Persian Wars and the place of reconciliation within it. For all these reasons, it falls more easily to Greek Comedy to find the humour in peace and love than to promote international understanding.

#### **Peace?**

The three surviving plays of Aristophanes in which peace is central were produced in markedly different political circumstances. *Akharnians* was performed in early 425. Athens had been suffering from a series of traumatic experiences – regular invasions by the Peloponnesians and a plague that was exacerbated by the rural population being crammed as refugees within the Long Walls – and was yet to deal Sparta any serious blow, as it would do later that year at Pylos. *Peace* was performed at the Dionysia of 421, held

shortly before the signing of the Peace of Nikias (Thucydides 5.20.1). With the Athenian capture of Spartiates at Pylos (halting the invasions) offset by Spartan successes in Thrace, notably the capture of Amphipolis, the fighting had reached a tired stalemate. *Lysistrata* was performed, probably, in early 411. The city had suffered the disaster in Sicily, the Spartans were ensconced at Deceleia, and both sides were desperate for Persian money. Already, *stasis* was beginning to bubble to the surface, although it is unclear how far that was yet evident to the city at large.<sup>3</sup> In these different historical circumstances, there are many continuities in the way that peace is conceptualised, but also notable differences in terms of plot and in the aspects of peace that are emphasised.

All three have plots that are highly implausible or impossible. In *Akharnians*, peace derives from an individual, Dikaiopolis, making a personal peace treaty with the Spartans and their allies (128–133). While this in itself is merely historically and politically impossible,<sup>4</sup> it requires the assistance of the remarkably bogus figure of Amphitheos: supposedly a god on both sides but sufficiently non-divine to require journey-pay (46–54). The peace itself is enacted through libations that are peace just as much as they stand for it (186–199, 1020–1021, 1028–1035, 1047–1068). These logical, as well as physical impossibilities, make Dikaiopolis' settlement particularly hard to swallow (although, of course, successful within the world of the play for him and his family). In *Lysistrata* the sex strike (119–124) is socially and politically implausible, although not impossible to anything like the same degree as *Akharnians*; the seizure of the Acropolis (240–242) is a standard move in accounts of *stasis* and based on historical precedents, including from Athenian history itself, as the men's chorus acknowledge (271–282). *Peace* relies on tragic parody and the clearly physically impossible: fattening a dung-beetle to fly to heaven to confront Zeus and rescue Peace (72–77; cf. Euripides, *Bellerophontēs* fr. 306). As in *Akharnians*, there is a strong divine element: whereas in *Akharnians* there is a divine helper, in *Peace* the gods are responsible for kidnapping Peace; Trygaios secures some assistance from Hermes, but overall the gods are (following Euripides) the ones inflicting war on the Greeks. A logical impossibility is that the chorus manage to arrive to assist in the rescue of Peace without any flying capabilities. Their shifting identity adds another element of impossibility.

It is sometimes suggested in relation to *Akharnians* and *Lysistrata* (*Peace* often being left out of account) that the historical impossibility of these plots and their proposed peace means that *on those grounds* any such idea was not meant or taken seriously (in various senses). Thus, it has been suggested that peace-making by an individual would have been regarded as treachery, especially given the military situation in 425, and that Dikaiopolis' mode of argumentation depends upon comic imperatives rather than political reality.<sup>5</sup> Peace in 411 has seemed still more unlikely; it has also been suggested that the ludicrous idea that women might engage in politics was *in itself* enough to render *Lysistrata* non-serious.<sup>6</sup> Arguments from historical context can be challenged (thus both the idea of peace and the reality of political violence were central

in Athenian politics only weeks after *Lysistrata*), but such arguments are predicated upon the questionable assumption that effective political interventions cannot be made through implausible, impossible or exaggerated means, when the converse is more likely. The general case is not the topic of this chapter,<sup>7</sup> but it should be clear that the degree of impossibility of the plot *in no way* correlates with the perceived severity of the political circumstances facing Athens and the difficulty of achieving peace in the actual world.

Thus, the most implausible plot is that of *Peace*, with its giant flying dung-beetles and divine architecture. The likelihood that some of those responsible for the imminent Peace of Nikias were in the audience did not encourage any realistic or even human representation of peace-making, apart from the symbolic collective, and far from unified, rescue of the figure of Peace. In the darker days of 425 and 411, there are greater nods towards the process of peace-making. *Akharnians* at least involves the making of formal treaties, *spondai*, albeit made by a questionable agent and lacking any content other than the end of war. Dikaiopolis' eventual case for peace offers little basis for agreement between Athenian and Spartans. The closest to a plausible process of negotiation is in *Lysistrata*, where the Spartan and Athenian representatives respond to the actions of Lysistrata and her allies in order to come to terms – albeit led by the cock (1114–1121). Thus, the most plausible and politically realistic (if ithyphallic) of these fictional reconciliations comes when Athens is at its lowest ebb. Realism here correlates with the degree of *desperation* rather than the *likelihood* of peace.

The debates around peace in both *Akharnians* and *Lysistrata* are also far more engaged with contemporary politics, which may be a further reason why both plays have often been assessed in terms of political feasibility. Thus in *Akharnians*, the assembly's refusal to discuss peace sets up a pervasive theme of the (self-proclaimed) honest citizen against corrupt politicians who profit from their activity (including war). This is explored particularly in the repeated confrontations with Lamakhos. In *Lysistrata*, debate centres on competence, including that of the women to engage in the political process, as seen particularly in Lysistrata's confrontation with the *proboulos*. Part of a body instituted after the Sicilian disaster to rein in the democracy's excesses (Thucydides 8.1), the *proboulos* encapsulates the relationship between leadership, competence and military success and failure.

The mechanisms by which peace is engineered in the plays thus offer no more developed ideas about peacemaking than to suggest that it would be a good thing, somehow. Those mechanisms have much to offer audiences in *other* respects, but for peace and reconciliation, we have to look elsewhere, to the city of peace imagined by the protagonists, and the world of peace as actually engineered. Both are, however, quite circumscribed in how they present peace.

The plays of the 420s, *Akharnians* and *Peace*, share a strongly agrarian fantasy of peace, both in conception and eventual outcome. This fantasy is embedded in traditional associations of peace with fertility, going back to Hesiod, already

developed and embedded in Old Comedy, and heavily overcoded with self-reflexive Dionysiac connotations.<sup>8</sup> In *Akhamians*, at least, these elements are also rooted in practical political and strategic concerns.

Peace, for Dikaiopolis, means the end of the exile from the land caused by the annual Spartan invasions. As he explains to the audience in the prologue, this is why he has come to the assembly (28–39). The return is enacted first in the celebration of a Rural Dionysia at home (201–202, 241–279), before being interrupted by the chorus. He claims that peace has been ignored by those who dominate the assembly, and he claims to be a typical countryman. Economic grounds and agricultural destruction also motivate the chorus of *Akhamians* as fanatical proponents of war, but they are hardly presented as representative. The play is focalised heavily through Dikaiopolis, while the chorus act extremely immoderately and aggressively. Like the assembly operators, they try to prevent Dikaiopolis from even speaking (294–325). They are won over, first by Dikaiopolis' speech on the origins of the war and then by his assault on corruption that follows.<sup>9</sup>

Dikaiopolis' defence of his personal peace with the Spartans and the realisation of that peace following the *parabasis* are also rooted in the economic (primarily agricultural) aspects of the causes and conduct of the war, but focused on Athenian rather than Spartan actions. The Megarian Decree, which banned Megarians from the Athenian *agora* and harbours, was according to Thucydides the most important of the Peloponnesians' complaints prior to the war (Thucydides 1.139.1) and is the theme of Dikaiopolis' famous *rhēsis* (*Akh.* 497–556). During the war, the Athenians reinforced these economic measures with a blockade and retaliatory invasions, which no doubt fed the picture of the Megarians as starving.<sup>10</sup> An end to these measures is enacted in Dikaiopolis' personal *agora*, at which both Megarian and Theban traders arrive in the second half of the play with a variety of goods to sell: the Megarian with his thinly disguised pig-daughters, in a scene dense with sexual double entendre, and the Theban with his impressively varied selection of exotic foodstuffs.

The economic activity represented in these two scenes centres on food and sex, and thus continues the emphasis on fertility in Dikaiopolis' return to the land. Dikaiopolis' enjoyment of the fruits of peace contrasts markedly with the general Lamakhos. When the general returns seeking to share the benefits of peace, he finds Dikaiopolis cooking local as well as imported Theban produce. A strong visual difference is made between peace and war as Dikaiopolis is invited to the priest of Dionysos' feast (1085–1087), while Lamakhos is summoned away to war. Dikaiopolis packs up his goodies; Lamakhos is left with campaign rations. The visual point is repeated at the climax of the play, as the two characters return the worse for wear: Lamakhos pointedly wounded by a vine-prop (1175–1197),<sup>11</sup> Dikaiopolis heavily refreshed and supported by two girls that he has acquired (1198–1203) for sexual purposes.

This closing scene concludes the running theme of wine, associated both with peace and, through Dionysos, with comedy itself. The Dionysiac

element runs from the peace treaties through the family-oriented phallic procession (241–279), the highly self-reflexive speech of Dikaiopolis, through to this komastic ending.<sup>12</sup> The peace treaties were made concrete in the form of wineskins. In the second half of the play, Dikaiopolis' Athenian visitors come not to trade, but to beg a share of the peace/wine. Dikaiopolis' response is selective. He gives some to the bridesmaid (to aid the sexual celebration of her marriage), as women have no responsibility for the war (1061–1062), but refuses peace/wine to the farmer Derketes, the chorus and Lamakhos. This selectivity is one reason that critics have suggested that Dikaiopolis is being selfish, but it follows entirely from his being forced to make an individual peace treaty without other citizens daring to support him in the assembly, much as they want the benefit now.<sup>13</sup>

The best example of these associations of peace comes in the choral section (971–999), where War is described as a bad, violent, disruptive and anti-social drunk.<sup>14</sup> Not only does he fail to drink in a controlled fashion appropriate for the symposium, but he ends up wasting wine for everyone, rather than using and enjoying it:<sup>15</sup>

αὐτόματα πάντ' ἀγαθὰ τῷδέ γε πορίζεται.  
οὐδέποτ' ἐγὼ Πόλεμον οἴκαδ' ὑποδέξομαι,  
οὐδὲ παρ' ἐμοί ποτε τὸν Ἄρμόδιον ἄσεται 980  
ξυγκατακλινεῖς, ὅτι παροινικὸς ἀνὴρ ἔφν  
ὅστις ἐπὶ πάντ' ἀγάθ' ἔχοντας ἐπικωμάσας  
ἠργάσατο πάντα κακὰ, κἀνέτρεπε κἀξέχει  
κἀμάχετο, καὶ προσέτι πολλὰ προκαλουμένον  
“πῖνε, κατάκεισο, λαβὲ τήνδε φιλοτησίαν,” 985  
τὰς χάρακας ἦπτε πολὺ μᾶλλον ἔτι τῷ πυρί,  
ἐξέχει θ' ἡμῶν βίᾳ τὸν οἶνον ἐκ τῶν ἀμπέλων.

All good things are being provided to him of their own accord.

I will never welcome War into my home,  
and he will never sing the Harmodios by my side 980  
reclining with me – for he is a bad drunk.

He gatecrashed us when we were having a great time  
and caused total havoc: knocking things over, spilling drinks  
and fighting, and although I often invited him to  
‘drink, lie down, take this cup of friendship’, 985

he set my vine-props on fire all the more,

and he violently poured away the wine from my grapes.

(Aristophanes, *Akharnians* 978–987)

Conversely, Reconciliation (*Diallagē*) is characterised in the same choral system in terms of sexual desire and fertility (989–989). She is described as a companion of Aphrodite and the Graces, and the chorus articulate, rather wistfully, their desire for her – how they had forgotten her beauty (990), the fear that she might despise their age (993, 997), and what they would like to do to her (994–997) – all expressed through a series of jokes using agricultural imagery and leading to a prosperous oil harvest.<sup>16</sup> Their envy of *Dikaiopolis* (1008–1010) follows closely, as *Dikaiopolis* seems set to accomplish these desires.

The association of peace with fertility exploited in *Akharnians* has a long history in Greek thought. In Hesiod, Peace (*Eirēnē*) is one of the three Seasons (*Hōrai*), who collectively embody this connection. The visual iconography of Peace as an individual also begins to reflect this in the late fifth century, together with *Ploutos* (Wealth) and *Dionysos*.<sup>17</sup> Conversely, peace is an element of some Dionysiac scenes, not least in the *Bakkhai* (419–420). The representation of *Dionysos* in the play reflects the double-edged nature of wine that can also tip over into the violence that Aristophanes' chorus associate with war.<sup>18</sup>

The same conjunction of wine, food and sex can be seen in a particular type of comic utopia, which features lands of spontaneous abundance. A sequence of plays on the theme began by looking back in part to Hesiodic ideas in *Kratinos' Ploutoi* (*Wealth Gods*), probably performed in 429. The comic characteristics of this utopian world escalated in poets of the generation before Aristophanes: *Krates*, *Telekleides* and *Pherekrates*. The first two are not demonstrably active later than *Akharnians* and so when the chorus say (*Akh.* 978) that all good things are coming spontaneously to *Dikaiopolis*, Aristophanes is probably drawing on a developed comic tradition.<sup>19</sup> In *Telekleides' Amphiktyones*, certainly, peace was part of the mix:

λέξω τοίνυν βίον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὃν ἐγὼ θνητοῖσι παρεῖχον.

εἰρήνη μὲν πρῶτον ἀπάντων ἦν ὥσπερ ὕδωρ κατὰ χειρός.

ἡ γῆ δ' ἔφερ' οὐ δέος οὐδὲ νόσους, ἀλλ' αὐτόματ' ἦν τὰ δέοντα.

I will tell you the life which I provided from the very start.

First of all, there was peace to hand like water.

The earth did not produce fear or disease, but all necessities were there of their own accord.

(*Telekleides, Amphiktyones* fr. 1.1–3)

Peace here is only one consequence of the new order, but significantly first in a list of commodities which develops into a smorgasbord of increasingly implausible spontaneously produced food and drink. In *Akharnians* the associations (peace and fertility) are the same, but the causation is explicit: fertility derives from peace.

In *Akharnians*, the link is wrapped up in a self-reflexive association of comedy itself with wine and Dionysos. Famously, Dikaiopolis' self-defence, which deals extensively with the reasons for war, starts from a defence of comedy's capacity for intervening in moral and political debate, articulated through an extended parody of Euripides' *Telephos*. Euripides' beggar king is transposed to the upstart genre: 'Do not begrudge me, assembled spectators, if I speak while producing comedy (*trygōidia*). For comedy too knows what is right' (*Akharnians* 499–501). The first half of the play has built up through tragic parody to this moment, where Dikaiopolis labels the genre of comedy, *kōmōidia*, as *trygōidia*, 'song of the wine lees'.<sup>20</sup> The clear implication is that comedy is one of the Dionysiac elements *intrinsically* associated with peace.

All these associations of peace and the agrarian fantasy are picked up by *Peace*, which replays them in similar terms in a rather different plot. The central character, Trygaios, embodies both the fertility and the self-reflexive qualities (with the same *tryg-* root as *trygōidia*). After making it to heaven and discovering where Peace has been imprisoned, the chorus come to his aid. They are introduced as panhellenic (296–298, 302), but their points of reference are distinctly Athenian (346–360, 395, 1033–1035) and agricultural (550–559, 583–602, 1140–1071).<sup>21</sup> Peace herself was represented by an oversize statue (cf. 657–664), to the delight of Aristophanes' rivals.<sup>22</sup> She herself is not handed over to Trygaios, but rather two of her attendants are (523, 713–714), who embody her agrarian and ritual (and self-reflexive) dimensions: Theoria (Festivity) and Opora (Harvest). The former is handed over to the council (715–717, 871–908), sitting in their defined area, front and centre in the audience. Whereas in *Akharnians* the relationship between Dikaiopolis and the Athenian *polis* is necessarily ambivalent and difficult, *Peace* emphasises this civic dimension (including civic administration of festivals). Opora remains with the farmer Trygaios (851–855) and represents the peace in the countryside that is celebrated in the second half of the play.

As in *Akharnians*, food, drink and sex characterise this representation of peace as fertility.<sup>23</sup> There are also those who seek to enjoy the products of peace or gain compensation for the loss of profits from war. Thus Trygaios and his household are troubled by an arms-dealer and a seer (Hierokles), both of whom are sent packing. Unlike the former, Hierokles is not obviously associated with warmongering, but an important theme in *Knights* was the use of bogus oracles, not least by Kleon, the major Athenian proponent of war according to *Peace*.<sup>24</sup>

Opora herself combines the qualities of Reconciliation as described by the *Akharnians* and the girls Dikaiopolis brought back from the symposium.

*Peace* ends on an extended song that anticipates Trygaios' sexual enjoyment of Opora (1329–1359) and features familiar agricultural puns or other jokes, such as *τρυγήσομεν αὐτήν* ('we'll squeeze her' 1339 and 1340) and *τοῦ μὲν μέγα καὶ παχύ | τῆς δ' ἥδὸν τὸ σῦκον* ('his fig is big and thick, hers is sweet', 1354–1355). The consistent alignment of the chorus with Trygaios is one of the conspicuous differences from *Akharnians*. Trygaios makes a point of including them in his success. Furthermore, his inclusion of the audience continues after the handover of Theoria to the council, as he allows them to share in the physical consequences of peace (960–968).

So *Peace* in certain respects goes further than *Akharnians*. Although the latter does engage the audience, draw them in and align them with the central character,<sup>25</sup> it is a far more confrontational work. In *Peace*, the understanding of peace clearly looks back to the earlier play. Another extension of *Akharnians* comes in the substantial Euripidean parody which structures the first half of the play (*Bellerophontēs*, augmented by *Stheneboia* and *Aiolos*).<sup>26</sup> The repetition of these elements, along with the name of the character, suggests that a self-conscious intertextual point is being made, an emphatic restatement of the position articulated in *Akharnians*. Given the self-avowedly contentious nature of Aristophanes' earlier plays, particularly in relation to Kleon, *Peace* can be seen as an extended 'I told you so'.<sup>27</sup>

The political context had, however, changed considerably since 425. The capture of Spartan prisoners on Sphakteria had ended the annual invasions of Attika. The principal advocates of continued fighting (it is claimed), Brasidas on the Spartan side and Kleon on the Athenian side, had disappeared from the political stage. So, this agrarian fantasy seems to be relying on the inherited associations of peace and the utopian traditions of Old Comedy more than being driven by the political circumstances. Nor does the Megarian Decree feature in the plot or even substantially in the play's explanation of the war, which shares little with *Akharnians* except criticism of Perikles and his associates.<sup>28</sup> Although nods are made to the ongoing disruption of rural life and to farmers of all states being particularly affected by war (esp. 550–564), in fact the utopian outcome of *Peace* is far less implicated than that of *Akharnians* with the strategic economic aspects of the war and the way in which rural economies had been targeted.<sup>29</sup> *Peace* is more civic, more collective and more generalised than in the earlier play, with fewer inferences to be drawn from the success of one heterodox individual.

It has been suggested that the agrarian picture of peace was a distinctively Aristophanic means of opposing the war.<sup>30</sup> That may be drawing too much from Aristophanes' own rhetoric. Certainly, peace is a feature of a broader strand of comic utopianism. It is also difficult to imagine that Kratinos' *Hōrai* (*Seasons*) did not exploit the same idea, although the surviving fragments are not particularly helpful. Other poets also used the term *trygōidia*.<sup>31</sup> Yet, Aristophanes certainly does return repeatedly to the agrarian utopia. It would have appeared in the reworked second version of *Peace*<sup>32</sup> and demonstrably did so in the *Geōrgoi* (*Farmers*):

Εἰρήνη βαθύπλουτε καὶ ζευγάριον βοεικόν,  
εἰ γὰρ ἔμοι παυσασμένῳ τοῦ πολέμου γένοιτο  
σκάψαι κάποκλάσαι τε καὶ λουσαμένῳ διελκύσαι  
τῆς τρυγὸς ἄρτον λιπαρὸν καὶ ῥάφανον φαγόντι.

Peace, goddess of fertile riches, and my little oxen pair,  
I wish I could put an end to war and  
dig and dress vines and bathe and drink  
the rough stuff and eat bread with oil and cabbage.

(Aristophanes, *Geōrgoi* fr. 111)

Similarly, in fr. 105, a character, *Geōrgia* (Farming), describes herself as Peace's relative and helpmate.<sup>33</sup> The plot of *Geōrgoi* is uncertain, but the utopian conjunction of peace, fertility and sex is evident even in plays with plots radically different from *Akhmians* or *Peace*, such as *Knights*. There, the idea is introduced once the slave-demagogue Paphlagon has been displaced by the Sausage-Seller, who claims good intentions and rejuvenates Demos (The People). The new Demos has various attributes, including the dress and manners of the Athens after the Persian Wars. But he is also characterised by peace, represented in anthropomorphic form, analogous to *Dikaiopolis'* girls at the end of *Akhmians* and anticipating *Opora*:

Αλ. φήσεις γ', ἐπειδὴν τὰς τριακοντούτιδας  
σπονδὰς παραδῶ σοι. δεῦρ' ἴθ', αἱ Σπονδαί, ταχύ.  
Δημ. ὦ Ζεῦ πολυτίμηθ', ὡς καλαί· πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, 1390  
ἔξεστιν αὐτῶν κατατριακοντούτισταί;  
πῶς ἔλαβες αὐτὰς ἐτεόν;

Αλ. οὐ γὰρ ὁ Παφλαγῶν  
ἀπέκρυπτε ταύτας ἔνδον, ἵνα σὺ μὴ λάβῃς;  
νῦν οὖν ἐγὼ σοι παραδίδωμ' εἰς τοὺς ἀγροὺς  
ἰέναι λαβόντα. 1395

S-S You'll say so, when I give you the 30-year  
peace-treaties. Come here, treaties – quick.  
Ppl. Highly-honoured Zeus, how gorgeous: by the gods, 1390  
can I give them a good thirty years?  
How did you get hold of them, really?

S-S Didn't Paphlagon  
hide them away from you indoors, so you couldn't grab them?  
So now I hand them over to you  
to take with you back to the country. 1395

(Aristophanes, *Knights* 1388–1395)

Thus, there is a broadly consistent version of peace in the surviving plays of the 420s, whether as a major plot strand or as a more incidental element, oriented around themes of fertility – food, drink and sex – which draw on an existing strand of utopian material in Old Comedy. This concept of peace is both developed in relation to specific military and economic contexts and opened out into a more universalising notion drawn from the utopian spirit of hope.<sup>34</sup> These ideas seem to have been of specific interest to Aristophanes, although the lack of surviving plays by his rivals makes it difficult to tell how distinctive or original he was. What is known of plays dating from around the beginning of the war, notably Kratinos' *Dionysalexandros*, *Nemesis* and *Ploutoi*, suggests that they had more to say about the outbreak of hostilities or its aftermath than about the nature or possibility of peace.<sup>35</sup> At most, it is possible to say that the underlying idea of a utopian peace is not unknown in Aristophanes' rivals.

### Love?

*Lysistrata* does not deal so much in agrarian fantasy, largely because it does not have much of a vision of the future *at all*, except for an absence of war. The women's husbands will return and their sons no longer be killed. Thus, it is mainly a negative idea of peace: as not-war. The structure of the play puts the focus much more on the comic process of bringing the two sides to terms than on the worlds desired or achieved by the protagonist. As in other respects, this makes the play more grimly realistic than Aristophanes' earlier plays.<sup>36</sup>

There is surprisingly little direct discussion of peace in *Lysistrata*, either in general, or as it relates to the women's aims. Before Lysistrata's reconciliation of the warring parties, the idea of peace is explored only briefly in two places: when Lysistrata explains her ideas to the women in the prologue, and in the confrontation with the *proboulos*.

In the prologue, the talk (between Lysistrata and Kalonike) is initially much more oblique, referring to 'preservation' (*sōtēria* 30, cf. 40, 46). The reasons for Lysistrata bringing the women together are deferred through a series of jokes on sex and sexuality. Once the women have arrived, Lysistrata explains why she has called the meeting: to introduce the topic of peace, she asks whether they have been longing for the fathers of their children (τοὺς πατέρας οὐ ποθεῖτε τοὺς τῶν παιδίων | ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς ἀπόντας; 108–109), a question that both builds on the sexual humour and introduces the idea of parenthood, which later becomes more important. This longing for their husbands (parsed primarily as sexual) leads to the desire for peace. The extravagantly fervent claims of their readiness to pursue peace cools rapidly when Lysistrata reveals that she intends a sex strike (124–142).<sup>37</sup> Peace, then, is parsed as a (restoration of) sexual companionship between spouses.

Something more elaborate is offered in Lysistrata's confrontation with the *proboulos*. He is seeking money from the occupied Acropolis, which the women have seized in a more orthodox political/economic move. The first phase of their confrontation starts from the money, but turns towards the

women's capacity and need to speak (not least given male incompetence). The driver here is the loss of men (523–524) and again the need identified is preservation (525, of Greece, cf. 498, 499, 501 of the *proboulos*). The second phase again starts with notionally economic concerns: the women will remove the ludicrous sights of the Athenian market at war. These jokes lead into a more all-encompassing plan through the metaphor of woolworking. This begins with untangling the threads of the war, but develops into a cleansing of Athenian domestic and imperial politics. This political renewal seems to follow temporally, but not necessarily causally from peace (the reverse purports to be the case in *Knights*). The *proboulos* returns despairingly to the qualifications of women to pronounce on war (and peace). Lysistrata's rebuff to him reframes the cost of war from the women's perspective: the children they send off to war (589–590), and the women's loneliness, if married, their loss of marriage if not (591–597).

This vision of peace as correcting the privations of war is certainly heartfelt and meaningful, but lacks any strong vision of the future, utopian or otherwise. This is not a complete break with earlier comedy, but compresses the agrarian fantasy of peace into fertility and thence narrows it to sexuality, as in the prologue, from which other aspects of conjugal and familial life can sprout. The lack of an agrarian theme is surprising, given the state of the war. The Spartan fortification of Deceleia had led to another assault on Athenian agriculture and rural life, even worse, according to Thucydides (7.27), than that of the 420s. There are other, more obvious, silences too, which may explain the shift. The women complain mainly of absence, not loss, and they specifically mention the Thracian theatre and the Pylos outpost. Yet, missing husbands can surely only have suggested the Sicilian casualties, as an apotropaic utterance by the *proboulos* hints (590). The *proboulos* himself, member of a board set up to rein in the democracy after the Sicilian disaster, must have provoked memories of that trauma.<sup>38</sup>

The intertwining of sexuality and peace becomes most intense in the mute figure of Reconciliation (*Diallagē*). Lysistrata brings the Athenian and Spartan representatives to some kind of an agreement through the punning use of Reconciliation's body and their lustful responses.<sup>39</sup> Yet, compared with other peace plays (and even *Knights*), this display of sexuality is less exuberant: the ambassadors, unlike Trygaios, Demos or even *Dikaiopolis*, are restrained – they do not get to have Reconciliation in any sexual sense. Rather, the process of negotiation has them fantasising about sex, using familiar agricultural imagery (1173–1174), and the scene concludes by looking ahead to the reuniting of the representatives with their wives (1183–1188), confirming the restoration of the social norm of marriage.

A united sympotic celebration (at least for the ambassadors) does nod towards this established formula of wine, food and sex, albeit without the agrarian context. Even so, there are some stark differences in how these celebrations proceed compared with *Akharnians* and *Peace*. The chorus set the scene by teasing the audience with empty offers of hospitality, just as they

had earlier predicted they would be offering in the case of peace (1058–1071). They make two offers to the audience that slide from solidarity to mockery: to share their household luxuries (if only they can see any) and to help themselves to flour (although the door will be closed). These jokes set up the emergence of two members of the Athenian delegation, both thoroughly refreshed. In their account of the celebrations, their key suggestion for the future is that ambassadorial visits to Sparta would be best served by getting thoroughly drunk.

Neither the false offer nor the advocacy of wisdom in drink are unusual in Old Comedy,<sup>40</sup> but both suggest a modulation of tone compared with plays that more clearly exploit an agrarian utopia. They may not undermine the desire for peace or even its plausibility, but do indicate a certain cynicism in relation to peace or the Athenians' capacity to sustain it. There is 'wishful thinking' here, but no utopian peace.<sup>41</sup>

The far more noticeable utopian dimension of the play is provided by *panhellenism*, looking back to the Persian Wars and their immediate aftermath, where Athens and Sparta were allies. In the reconciliation scene, Lysistrata's first rebuke to the Athenians and Spartans emphasises a shared identity rooted in a common religious heritage, and a potential, as well as historical, military threat (1128–1135):

λαβοῦσα δ' ὑμᾶς λοιδορῆσαι βούλομαι  
 κοινῇ δικαίως, οἱ μᾶς γ' ἐκ χέρνιβος  
 βωμοὺς περιφραίνοντες ὥσπερ ξυγγενεῖς 1130  
 Ὀλυμπίασιν, ἐν Πύλαις, Πυθοῖ – πόσους  
 εἴποιμ' ἂν ἄλλους, εἴ με μηκύνειν δέοι; –  
 ἐχθρῶν παρόντων βαρβάρῳ στρατεύματι  
 Ἕλληνας ἄνδρας καὶ πόλεις ἀπόλλυτε.

I want to take you and rebuke you  
 together, justly, who sprinkle your altars  
 from a single source, as if you were related, 1130  
 at Olympia, Thermopylai and Delphi – how many others  
 could I mention, if I had to go on? –  
 and when enemies are at hand with a foreign army  
 you are destroying Greek men and cities.

(Aristophanes, *Lysistrata* 1128–1134)

The shared religious heritage was undoubtedly central in any idea of Greek rather than *polis* identity, and as such was indeed important in framing resistance to Persia at the time of the invasion and its aftermath. The shared religious dimension and one-time partnership between Sparta and Athens are reinforced in the closing hymns of the play, where the Athenian delegates are joined by the Spartans and they both sing in honour of Athena: the patron, in different manifestations, of both cities. These hymns also include further mention of the Persian Wars, specifically the battles of Artemisium and Thermopylai (1247–1261), which encapsulate naval/land Athenian/Spartan co-operation.

Panhellenism is a sentiment that Aristophanes can display elsewhere, even if its extent or straightforwardness can be overstated.<sup>42</sup> As with other contemporary strategic factors, its introduction in *Lysistrata* is notable for what is not said rather than what is. Persia was particularly pertinent because of the urgency with which both sides were seeking Persian gold and the apparent willingness of some Persians to be more openly engaged in Greek affairs again.<sup>43</sup> In terms of peace, however, the implications are troubling: despite an underlying shared identity, peace can only be founded on potential war with a third party. Here, too, the spirit is of grim realism rather than optimism or escape.

### Understanding?

Although I earlier made a distinction between Aristophanes' peace plays of the 420s and earlier fragmentary plays that dealt with the outbreak of the war, there are continuities between these types of play. Although neither the plot-mechanisms nor the imagined worlds of peace say much about reconciliation, I am not suggesting that Aristophanes' accounts of peace are indicative of nothing except a desire for peace alone, however sincere, plausible or persuasive. They do have plenty to offer in terms of understanding too, but rooted not in reconciliation, but in blame.

Thus in *Akharnians*, Dikaiopolis' personal peace treaty is predicated upon three accusations: against the political leaders for failing to consider peace, against the Athenians in general for hardline commitment to the war, and against both for provoking the war. The first is dramatised in the opening assembly scene, as Dikaiopolis is forced to watch in silence a parade of political actors more concerned with their own profit and comfort, notably the ambassadors to Persia accompanied by alleged envoys from the Persian King (61–127), and Theoros lately returned from Sitalkes (134–172). Clearly related are the Odomanti who are mercenaries. This theme fades as Dikaiopolis finds a voice against the threats of the Akharnian chorus, who represent the most committed prosecutors of the war (Thucydides 2.20.4, 2.21.3), but returns with the intervention of Lamakhos (*Akh.* 572–625) before the *parabasis*. The opposition between the self-interested supporters of the war (allegedly) and the peace-making Dikaiopolis continues to the play's conclusion.<sup>44</sup>

The centre-piece of the play, however, is Dikaiopolis' defence of his peace-treaty, to which the first half builds. This is an extensively-signalled parody of Euripides' *Telephos*, where the disguised king of Mysia, Telephos, argued in front of the Greek army against their insistence on war with Troy.<sup>45</sup> Dikaiopolis' version takes the opportunity to engage in a wide blame game, with a familiar cast of Athenian targets. Whatever the actual circumstances behind the Megarian Decree,<sup>46</sup> Dikaiopolis' account (513–543) stems from regular villains, the sycophants (517–522), and turns into a sexual fantasy of women-snatching (524–529), where blame is aimed initially at posh Athenians, kottabos-playing young rakes (νεανία . . . μεθυσκοκότταβοι 525), and culminates in an over-reaction by Perikles, acting like Olympian Zeus (drawing on the comic accounts of the origins of the war). As a result, the Megarians asked the Spartans to intercede (535–537). But as an understanding of the enemy's actions, you could blink and easily miss it: οὐκ ἠθέλομεν δ' ἡμεῖς δεομένων πολλάκις. κἀντεῦθεν ἤδη πάταγος ἦν τῶν ἀσπίδων, 'We were not willing, although they asked us many times; and then there was a clashing of shields' (538–539). There is an explicit, parodic invitation to see it from their point of view (540; cf. *Telephos* fr. 708), but smuggled in with another assault on the Athenians through two jokes: first, a puppy from the wretched island of Seriphos would be cause enough for the Athenians to respond in overwhelming force (541–543); second, that response is presented as a comic list (544–554), which takes emphasis away from the Spartans towards the Athenian over-reaction, a repeated feature of this speech.<sup>47</sup>

Similarly, the handling of the Megarians does not play overly against local Athenian prejudices. Whatever sympathy there might be for their goods being denounced by sycophants, the Megarians did retaliate by stealing Aspasia's girls. The joke on Megarian hunger, 'starving by inches' ('πεινῶν βάδην 535) is hardly sympathetic to a wartime opponent who had been part of the *casus belli*. Following the *parabasis*, these elements – Megarian sneakiness and hunger, and Athenian troublemakers – are amplified. A starving Megarian comes to Dikaiopolis' newly opened marketplace to sell some goods: his daughters (very) thinly disguised as piglets. In effect he is reduced to selling them, for a pittance, into slavery, with strong sexual implications: a series of puns that take off from the dual meaning of *khoiros* (piglet/female genitalia). He is immensely pleased with this 'Megarian scheme' (Μεγαρικά τις μαχανά 738), despite his daughters' scepticism and its evident transparency to Dikaiopolis:

	πότερα πεπρᾶσθαι χρήδδεν ἢ πεινῆν κακῶς;	
KOPA	πεπρᾶσθαι πεπρᾶσθαι.	735
Με.	ἐγὼνγα καὐτός φαμι. τίς δ' οὕτως ἄνους ὄς ὑμέ κα πρίαίτο, φανεράν ζαμίαν; ἀλλ' ἔστι γάρ μοι Μεγαρικά τις μαχανά, χοίρους γάρ ὑμέ σκευάσας φασῶ φέρειν. περίθεσθε τάσδε τὰς ὀπλὰς τὼς χοιρία.	740

Do you want to be sold or to starve horribly?  
 DAUGHTER Be sold, be sold. 735  
 Meg. I should say so. But who would be so stupid  
 as to buy you, an obvious loss?  
 In fact, I have a Megarian scheme:  
 I'll dress you up as pigs and say I'm bringing you to  
 market.  
 Put on these trotters. 740  
 (Aristophanes, *Akharnians* 734–740)

The stupidity, callousness and attempted deceit are hardly to the Megarian's credit, and he is clearly the butt of the humour. Jokes about the Megarians' lack of resources are similarly at his expense. He sells his girls for just a little garlic and salt (813–814), supposedly unavailable in Megara (760–763). The humour reflects more the ongoing economic measures against Megara, stretching back to the Megarian Decree, than any genuine reconciliation. There is also an obvious riff on the blame laid against Athenian troublemakers. In a reprise of Dikaiopolis' speech, an Athenian sycophant (informer) turns up to denounce these imports (817). This being Dikaiopolis' personal *agora*, the sycophant is threatened with flogging and forced off stage (824–828).

Similar themes recur when a second trader arrives, a Theban. Thebes had been consistently hostile to Athens in the fifth century, but not so directly implicated in the formal complaints against Athens nor subject to Athenian economic warfare in the same way. Even so, a similar picture emerges of Athens winning the peace with this enemy, through a new trade in commodities. The Theban has no shortages – indeed, quite the contrary. He brings an array of foodstuffs, including various wildfowl and the highly desirable Copaic eels (874–880). The Theban is, however, as clueless a trader as his Megarian colleague, if less crooked or immoral. There is a further riff on the theme of Athenian informers (also assaulted in the intervening choral song, 836–859) as Dikaiopolis comes up with the inspired suggestion that the Theban accept that distinctively Athenian commodity, packed up like a pot, in return for these tasty foodstuffs:

Θη. ἀφύας ἢ κέραμον; ἀλλ' ἔντ' ἐκεῖ·  
 ἀλλ' ὅ τι πὰρ ἀμὶν μὴ ἴστι, τᾷδε δ' αὖ πολὺ.  
 Δι. ἐγῶδα τοίνυν· συκοφάντην ἔξαγε,  
 ὥσπερ κέραμον ἐνδησάμενος.  
 Θη. 905 905 905  
 λάβοιμι μέντ' ἀγαθὸν κέρδος ἀγαθὸν καὶ πολὺ,  
 ἄπερ πίθακον ἀλιτρίας πολλῶν πλέων.  
 Δι. καὶ μὴν ὁδὶ Νίκαραχος ἔρχεται φανῶν.  
 Th. Sprats or pottery? They're available there.  
 Sell me whatever we don't have but you have in abundance here.

Dik. Alright, I have an idea; take away an informer,  
wrapped up like a pot.

Th. By the two gods 905  
I'd win lots of profit if I took away one of those,  
chock-full of mischief, like a monkey.

Dik. And look here comes Nikarkhos to denounce us.  
(Aristophanes, *Akharnians* 902–908)

Luckily enough Nikarkhos has turned up to denounce this latest trade, which allows Dikaiopolis to make the exchange (926–958). The Theban is as delighted as the Megarian was earlier. There is little room for reconciliation here, simply competitive advantage.

In *Peace*, similar figures of obstruction and profiteering again feature. The two main obstacles to peace, according to Kydoimos (Din), were Kleon and Brasidas (259–284). Kleon was a major target in *Akharnians*, mainly for his alleged assault on Aristophanes, but also by association with the politicians who were preventing discussion of peace.<sup>48</sup> He was clearly an obstacle to peace in *Knights* (745–747). When Peace is rescued, the blame (μομφήν 664) she assigns (through Hermes) likewise focuses on personalities – Pheidias, Perikles and Aspasia – for causing the war (604–611) and also the Athenian allies for conspiring against Athens (619–631, with a modest disclaimer of overenthusiastic Athenian reprisals). As for the longstanding rejection of peace, she blames the politicians, the gullible and short-sighted people, and above all the malign influence of Kleon (647–669). When the play turns to the enjoyment of peace, there is, as in *Akharnians*, further opportunity to laugh at others identified with a stake in the war: Hierokles the seer (1052–1126) and the anonymous arms-dealer and associates (1207–1264).

By contrast, the rescue of Peace offers two exemplary modes of bringing people together, as Trygaeus seeks help from both chorus and audience. Just as in *Akharnians*, however, securing peace facilitates the blame game. First, Trygaios makes a broad appeal (289–300) to men of Greece (ἄνδρες Ἑλληνες), all peoples (ὅ πάντες λέει) and a cross-section of professions, to assist in the rescue. He is answered by the chorus, again identifying as Greeks in general (Πανέλληνες), although that identity does become more tightly focused as Athenian or as farmers, which is in part a way of engineering a common interest between Athenians and others. The collective efforts to pull out Peace, which implicate both chorus and audience, seem to enact a spirit of co-operation, but in fact lead to the picking out of individuals, groups and cities who are not contributing to the rescue: Lamakhos, reprising his role as a target from *Akharnians* (473–474); war-profiteering professions or trades, prefiguring the later treatment of the arms dealer; the Boiotians (464–466), Argives (475–477) and Megarians, still starving (481–483, 500–502). Trygaios' rebukes perhaps locate these disruptive elements among the (somewhat) panhellenic chorus or in the offstage world, but might also suggest ambassadors in the audience, similarly representative of the larger communities.<sup>49</sup>

Such complaints clearly acknowledge the reluctance of Sparta's allies to make peace,<sup>50</sup> but offer little idea how to bring them onside. There are, at least, nods to the reality of the strategic situation in 421, with the references to the Spartiate prisoners held in Athens ('the only Spartans interested in peace') and, very generally, in the suggestion that Athens give up its land ambitions (503–507), but the coming together in *Peace* is much more about laying blame than it is in finding common ground.

Finally, the explicit presence of a figure called Reconciliation in *Lysistrata* would appear to be promising territory for some kind of genuine coming together. A closer look at the scene reveals that the only thing the ambassadors agree on, aside from the need for urgent sexual relief, is that only Lysistrata can reconcile them (1103–1104; 1111).<sup>51</sup> Lysistrata's approach, however, is again to play the blame game, 'rebuking' the Athenian and Spartan ambassadors in turn (λοιδορη̄σαι 1128). In a play that pokes so much fun at the Athenian democracy's manipulation of tradition, it is unsurprising that she finds particular fault in the forgetting of the past: the Athenians for forgetting their assistance to Sparta after the earthquake and helots' revolt of 464 (1137–48), Sparta for forgetting their removal of Hippias (1149–1158). Both are consonant with her panhellenic and anti-Persian moves: Hippias' future career extended to accompanying the Persian raid at Marathon (Herodotus 6.102, 107); the Athenian assistance to the Spartans marked the last throw of their nominal alliance from the Persian Wars. Yet both sets of rebukes are really speaking to the Athenian audience. Forgetting Sparta's involvement in removing Hippias is *the* foundational act of the democratic ideology that the zealous male semi-chorus of *marathonomakhoi* embody and espouse. Just as, in fact, the bulk of the play assaults the economic basis of their war and (with the *proboulos*) the quality of their political leadership, this blame game assaults the ideology of democratic nationalism.

The horse-trading that follows Lysistrata's assault on the delegates is the closest that Old Comedy comes to a genuine process of negotiation and compromise. The ambassadors' geographic priorities – Pylos (the 'gate' in Sparta's rear, 1162–1167), the Malian Gulf and Megarian 'legs' (= walls, 1168–1172) – are based less on strategic concerns than the potential for sexual puns and complementary sexual gratification. (Pylos is a plausible enough negotiating piece, but the Spartans were hardly likely to give up Megara by negotiation.) Although both Athenians and Spartans grab a piece of the sexual action, this is no model of diplomacy, but, as in *Akharnians*, a skewed transaction. It is predicated upon jokes at the alleged Spartan preference for anal intercourse (unambiguously so at 1174), leaving vaginal intercourse for the Athenians. Accordingly, the Athenians do rather better out of these negotiations than they might expect even under a more favourable military scenario than actually existed. The Spartans get a bum deal, like the Megarian and Theban before them. Even so, both the fact that these negotiations are taking place under extreme duress and the nature of the sexual horsetrading suggest a deep cynicism towards the practice of peace-making.

### Conclusion: what's so funny?

Overall, two main trends can be seen in the representation of peace in Old Comedy, especially in Aristophanes. First, there is an emphasis on utopianism, above all an agrarian utopia, which can, but need not, be connected with immediate economic concerns. This is more muted after the 420s, but an attenuated form underlies the sexual fantasy of *Lysistrata*, which further develops other utopian strands, not least panhellenism. Second, the three plays I have discussed in detail share a propensity for blame, whether for starting the war, profiteering from war, or preventing peace. These attacks can implicate non-Athenian targets, and the extent to which there is actual reconciliation in the plays is limited, with Athens implicitly or explicitly winning the peace. Yet the majority of targets remain Athenian.

These characteristics clearly draw on broader trends in the genre, of utopianism and attack (the *iambikē idea* of Aristotle).<sup>52</sup> The Athenocentrism is hardly surprising given the predominantly Athenian audiences.<sup>53</sup> Approaching peace through a cocktail of utopian ideals and political blame means that there is very little focus on how a peace might *actually* come about. Thus the contribution that Old Comedy makes towards imagining peace and reconciliation is limited, however powerfully expressed. For similar reasons, although it is outside the scope of this chapter, Aristophanes faces a difficult juggling act when pitching heavily for *internal* reconciliation, notably in *Frogs*.<sup>54</sup>

These comic preferences need not betray a lack of persuasive intent. Rather, they may reflect the best means of persuading a local audience in a comic context: on the positive side, fantastic, overstated possibilities, on the negative, the ridicule of past behaviour, and at all events avoiding the impression of presenting a prosaic programme. The polar split between utopianism and blame may also reflect a fundamental problem in the way that Greeks of the fifth century conceptualised peace.

Greek offers two different, but overlapping, terms that are conventionally translated as 'peace': *eirēnē* and *spondai*. The *spondai* are the libations that are poured at the making of peace, which are used metonymically (or synecdochically) for the abstract idea, which is more properly denoted by *eirēnē*. In certain expressions they are almost entirely interchangeable: making peace can be rendered as either *spondas poieisthai* or *eirēnēn poieisthai*. Aristophanes uses both terms in very close proximity in *Knights* 794–796, but the concepts do differ. It is *eirēnē* that is associated with the condition of peace and the abstract idea of peace; she can be personified; and she is associated, as I have noted, with fertility and agricultural success. By contrast, *spondai* are far more implicated in the political process of ending hostilities: with making an armistice (or a treaty) rather than creating the condition of peace. The difference is clear in *Lysistrata* where *spondai* are used mainly in relation to the act of making peace (σπονδας ποιεῖν: 154, 951, 1006; of a treaty at 513; only slightly more generally at 1264), but *eirēnē* much more about the state of peace (e.g. εἰρηνην ἄγειν 121, 169; see also 118, 144, 190, 502, 1053–1054, 1081). The difference is encapsulated in Diodorus' account of the Athenian ambassadors who agreed the Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta: 'they agreed an armistice and established the

peace' (τὰς σπονδὰς συνέθεντο καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ἐβεβαίωσαν 12.7). The path from one to the other is fraught with difficulty.

More specifically, the kind of international treaties in which comic characters are interested are characterised in this period by being time-limited: the Thirty Years' Peace itself was much in mind, but there was also a thirty-year peace between Sparta and Argos (Thucydides 5.14.4), while the Peace of Nikias of 421 was of fifty years' duration.<sup>55</sup> In *Akharnians*, as I have discussed, the *spondai*, in their literal form as wine, can be implicated in the agrarian utopianism of the play. Yet, it is not entirely possible to evade the contradictions. When Amphitheos returns from Sparta with 'peace' (186–200), he has a selection of flavours or vintages, each with their own bouquet (186–200): five or ten years, redolent of rearmament and embassies respectively, both rejected by Dikaiopolis, and a thirty-years treaty that smells of ambrosia and nectar, an end to military rations, and free movement of people. *Spondai* marking a thirty-year peace are also handed over to the rejuvenated Demos in the following year's *Knights* (1388–1395). The problem that Dikaiopolis, Demos and Lysistrata face is that thirty-year treaties involving Athens had a habit of breaking down after less than fifteen.<sup>56</sup>

So it may be that the tension there is in Old Comedy between its twin engines of short-term blame and utopian ideals reflect not only traditions of humour or a failure of comic imagination or a tactical avoidance of difficult political problems, but also a much broader tension in the way that peace was conceptualised and the difficulty in bridging short-term political process with longer-term stability. When making peace is, in any practical sense, seen as setting a lull in hostilities, particularly at Athens, it is perhaps no surprise that peace and reconciliation remain a utopian dream.

## Notes

- 1 See, however, Sicking (1967).
- 2 On utopianism in Old Comedy, see Farioli (2001), Pellegrino (2000) and Ruffell (2000), all with bibliography; for freedom of speech in comedy in its cultural context, see Halliwell (1991); for invective in Athens generally, see Worman (2008) and for blame in relation to the poetic tradition, see Rosen (1988).
- 3 Here, I follow the most commonly (but by no means universally) accepted allocation of *Lysistrata* to the Lenaia festival and *Thesmophoriazousai* to the Dionysia festival of 411. For *Lys.*, the year is secure, but there is some doubt as to the festival. For discussion, see Sommerstein (1977), Henderson (1987) xv–xxv, Wenskus (1998) and Austin and Olson (2004) xxxiii–xliv. For *Lysistrata* as a post-Decelean peace play, see especially Dillon (1987).
- 4 Although even here, we might perhaps compare Herodotus' account (3.83) of the autonomy of Otanes and his family among the Persians. Parody of Herodotean accounts of Persia have long been suggested elsewhere in *Akharnians*, in the prologue (64–90) and in the women-snatching of the Telephos speech (515–34). Fornara (1971) esp. 24–9 has made strong arguments against that view, although I believe that allusions or reminiscences remain a possibility.
- 5 Forrest (1963); the language of treachery was adopted by the equally influential article of Foley (1988) 38–9, 45–6 and the standard commentary of Olson (2002) l; de Ste. Croix (1972) 366–7, 370 offered an opposite analysis of the military situation; Carey (1993)

- 245–6 is more even-handed. Carey also denies that Dikaiopolis would have been seen as a traitor in any legal sense. His overall position, largely based on the political opinions expressed, is that *Akharnians* is ‘escapist fantasy’.
- 6 See, respectively, Westlake (1980) and Wilson (1982). On the latter, see sensible criticism by Dillon (1987) 104.
  - 7 See Ruffell (2011), with bibliography.
  - 8 For detailed examination of these themes, see especially Wilkins (2000).
  - 9 Compton-Engle (1999) argues that Dikaiopolis acquires increasing urban characteristics after the *parabasis*. Although markets and trade are important there, it is notable that he remains wedded to a barter economy (Olson (1991) 202–3).
  - 10 Despite the arguments of de Ste. Croix (1972) 225–89 in favour of a primarily religious motive, I am taking the Megarian Decree as at least mostly an economic measure. For the blockade see Thucydides 2.93.4 and 2.94.3, 3.51 and 4.67.3; for annual invasions, Pausanias 1.40.4. They are both alluded to at *Akh.* 758–63. See generally de Ste. Croix (1972) 243–4, who would, however, divorce these wartime measures from the measures taken in the Megarian Decree itself.
  - 11 See esp. Foley (1988) 35, 38–9.
  - 12 For the theme of wine in *Akharnians*, see especially Edmunds (1980).
  - 13 The case of Derketes is perhaps the least explicable of the men who are refused, as he has not explicitly been presented as standing in the way of peace, unlike the chorus and Lamakhos. As there was a real Derketes of Phyle, there may be a historical joke that we are missing (MacDowell (1983) 158–60, L.P.E. Parker (1991) 206). Some of the comic work being done here is the pun on Derketes’ name as he cries his eyes out (*derkomai* = ‘I look’), but that is unlikely to be sufficient to bear the whole weight. As a male citizen, Derketes does implicitly bear responsibility for the lack of peace, as Parker argues (so also Carey (1993) 248).
  - 14 Although there are similarities to Dikaiopolis after the feast, the latter is not violent.
  - 15 For the social regulation of wine as a way of articulating norms within comedy, see especially E.L. Bowie (1995) and A.M. Bowie (1997); also Wilkins (2000) esp. 202–256 and Pütz (2007). There are similarities between War and Dikaiopolis at the end of the play, but violence and waste are the crucial differences. There may also be a difference in context of drinking: public dining for Dikaiopolis (cf. Schmitt-Pantel (1992)) contrasted with private dining for War and the chorus.
  - 16 On the representation of both war and reconciliation in this choral part, see also Newiger (1980) 224–5 and A.M. Bowie (1997) 16–17.
  - 17 Calyx krater by the Dinos Painter (Vienna 1024 = *ARV* 2 1152, 8 = *LIMC s.v. Eirene* no. 11); also *ARV* 2 1316, 3 = *LIMC s.v. Eirene* no. 12 (Group of Naples 3235). The connection with Dionysos can be seen on a round altar and inscription from Brauron dating c. 410–400 (Brauron Museum 1177 = *LIMC s.v. Eirene* no. 10).
  - 18 For the negative, as well as positive aspects of wine, see E.L. Bowie (1995) esp. 116–9 and A.M. Bowie (1997) esp. 9–12, 18.
  - 19 On these plays, see Baldry (1953); Ruffell (2000); Pellegrino (2000); Farioli (2001). For comedy, agriculture, fertility and peace in Old Comedy generally, see Wilkins (2000) 103–55.
  - 20 Possibly thus inventing the term; for *trygōidia*, see in the first instance, Taplin (1983).
  - 21 For discussion of this fluid but inclusive identity, see Ruffell (2011) 300, with further bibliography.
  - 22 Joked about by Eupolis, *Autolykos* fr. 62 and Platon, *Nikai* fr. 86.
  - 23 In addition to those passages noted above on the chorus’ farming orientation and on Opora, see also 535–7, 566–81, 865–7, 1261–3, 1336–59.
  - 24 Hierokles is not obviously associated with Kleon in our evidence, although his advice was clearly sought on significant political matters, including the aftermath of war, as in the Athenian imposition on Khalkis in 446 (*IG* I 3 40.66). See also Eupolis, *Poleis* fr. 231. Thucydides 8.1.1 suggests that there was a backlash on the profession after the failure

- of the Sicilian expedition. For their public role more generally, see Bowden (2003) and R.C.T. Parker (2005) 112–13, 116–18.
- 25 See especially MacDowell (1983) 144–9; for broader audience engagement in the play see Slater (1993); Slater (2002) 43–58.
- 26 For discussion of the interaction, see Ruffell (2011) 317–26.
- 27 See also Ruffell (2011) 410–26, with references to other discussions, notably that of Hubbard (1991).
- 28 The decree is mentioned only briefly at 609.
- 29 Except for the Megarians again: 481–3, cf. 246–9.
- 30 Dillon (1987) 97.
- 31 See n.20 above.
- 32 Probably a reworking rather than a complete rewrite; there are, however, too few fragments to make substantial claims about it.
- 33 See also Dillon (1987) 99.
- 34 See especially Bloch (1986).
- 35 An alternative date for *Dionysalexandros* after the outbreak of the Samian Revolt has gained some currency (see, for example, Storey 2006), but the arguments depend upon interpretations of the papyrus hypothesis (such as over the nature of *emphasis*) that I do not find persuasive. Of the plays mentioned, *Ploutoi* exploited agrarian utopianism, but not obviously integrated with the concept of peace.
- 36 For such a distinction, on somewhat different grounds, see Dillon (1987).
- 37 The logic of the strike has been questioned, given the absence of so many men or the possibility of other outlets, but this is to miss much of the point. Certainly, other human outlets are possible – Kinesias refers to prostitution (the pimp Philostratos at 957–958) and the Athenian ambassador to Kleisthenes (1092) – but these are regarded here as poor alternatives. There is an acknowledgement (even if framed sexually) that the relationships between wives and husbands are distinct and important.
- 38 Less apocalyptically, these overseas spouses ignore the concentration of forces at Samos, although that is alluded to elsewhere in the play (313).
- 39 Emblematic, as the play took one of its alternative names, *Diallagai*, from this process of reconciliation: see Henderson (1987) xv n.1.
- 40 For wisdom in drink, see *Knights* 85–100; Kratinos, *Pytine* fr. 203. Rösler (1995) discusses truth and wine. For the false offer, see also *Ekkl.* 1144–8.
- 41 ‘Wishful thinking’: Henderson (1987) xix.
- 42 As notably by Hugill (1936). For the limits of panhellenism in *Peace* see below.
- 43 Although the theme would suit any period in which both sides were actively seeking Persian gold (Sommerstein (1977) 121), it is unlikely that the audience was entirely unaware of what was developing on the other side of the Aegean. If the play was performed in early February 411 shortly after the assembly at which Peisander addressed the *dēmos* (Thucydides 8.53; so Sommerstein (1977) esp. 122 and Henderson (1980*b*) 153), or even if that assembly occurred shortly afterwards, then further Persian entanglement was even more firmly on the public agenda.
- 44 Largely following the analysis of L.P.E. Parker (1991).
- 45 Telephos had been wounded in an earlier abortive expedition, where the Greeks had ended up fighting the Mysians. For the details of *Telephos*, see Collard, Cropp and Lee (1995) 17–52, with bibliography.
- 46 The main evidence is Thucydides 1.139.1, 1.144.2, 1.67.4 and Plutarch *Per.* 29–31.1. See also n.10 above.
- 47 Spartan peace overtures are also mentioned at 652, albeit to secure Aristophanes, the giver of good advice.
- 48 Theoros, one of the ambassadors in the prologue, is identified elsewhere by Aristophanes as an ally of Kleon (*Wasps* 41–2).
- 49 Thucydides makes a point of saying that the Peace of Nikias took place immediately after the Dionysia (Thucydides 5.20.1), which might suggest activity at Athens (suggested

- tentatively by Meiggs in *HCT* IV.18); there had been much diplomatic interaction in the preceding months (5.17.2) and the period of the Dionysia had been used earlier for the truce of 423 (4.118.2). For ambassadors at the Dionysia, see Thucydides 5.23.4.
- 50 The Megarians and Boiotians were two of the four main Peloponnesian allies who were unwilling to make peace (Thucydides 5.17.2).
- 51 For Lysistrata as a paradoxical figure, see especially 1108–9.
- 52 *Poetics* 1449b7–9.
- 53 Even at the Lenaia, there would be non-Athenians in the shape of the metics (resident foreigners), as Aristophanes explicitly acknowledges at *Akharnians* 507–8.
- 54 Especially *Frogs* 674–758, where the idea of internal reconciliation is combined with an assault on current political leadership. New Comedy lacks much overt interest in either, but does explore reconciliation on a social level through domestic dramas.
- 55 The supposed treaty between Athens and Persia, the Peace of Kallias, does not seem to have had the same sort of limit (for discussion and bibliography see Meiggs (1972) 129–51, 487–95 and de Ste. Croix (1972) 311–4), although there is evidence that renewal would be needed with a new Persian king, as in the Athenian treaty with Darius, probably of 424/3 (ML 70 with addenda; cf. Andokides 3.29). Treaties of alliance, by contrast, could be specified for longer periods or as open-ended.
- 56 The peace between Sparta and Argos did at least last thirty years, but it was not renewed immediately (Thucydides 5.14.4). The subsequent fifty-year peace (5.41) lasted no time at all.

# 5 Reconciliation in later Classical and post-Classical Greek cities

A question of peace and peacefulness?

*Benjamin Gray*

## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

This chapter addresses the question: at what type of social relations among fellow citizens should a process of reconciliation aim? In other words, what is the opposite state to hateful civil strife (*stasis* in Greek)? Is that desirable state best conceptualised and described as stability? Or, on the contrary, should it be treated as a state of dynamism, movement and flexibility, the literal opposite of *stasis*? Moreover, should that desirable opposite of *stasis* be regarded principally as a state of harmony and unity of purpose, or rather as one of peace and non-violence?

The chapter's focus is the wide range of approaches adopted by Greek cities, from the end of the Peloponnesian War to the early Roman Empire, to the problem of resolving and overcoming *stasis*. It concentrates on Greek ideas concerning reconciliation, including the ways in which they were embedded in institutions and practices. The institutional, legal and ideological aspects of civic reconciliation in Greek *poleis* have been intensively studied by modern scholars.<sup>2</sup> This chapter seeks to bring a new dimension to these debates, by approaching ancient Greek reconciliation through the questions raised above. Accordingly, it compares Greek approaches to reconciliation within a city and to peace among separate states: it discusses how far Greeks' conceptions of internal civic reconciliation resembled their conceptions of interstate peace, order and harmony,<sup>3</sup> and how far the two diverged. What role did virtues of peacefulness and restraint play in the two contexts?

A picture emerges of complex Greek debates about the best ways to achieve reconciliation among fellow citizens, tied to differing and developing ideas about how best to achieve non-violent co-operation across separate states. These ancient debates underwent significant changes across the period discussed. In particular, in the period when the Romans came to dominate the Greek world, from the second century BC onwards, many Greeks developed complex new approaches both to internal civic solidarity and to interstate peace, which reduced the distance between the two: they emphasised a peaceful, gentle, tolerant model of social relations, applicable both within and beyond civic frontiers. These new ideas about peace, peacefulness and reconciliation in the later Hellenistic world and early Roman Empire are

of particularly direct relevance for modern debates about how to sustain both citizenship and peace in a cosmopolitan, mobile, unequal world.

### **Two analogous pairs: *polemos* and *eirene*, *stasis*, and *homonoia***

Around the time of the Peloponnesian War, the Classical Greeks developed a powerful and influential pair of conceptual oppositions for capturing different types of conflict, and different types of peace. On the one hand, there is war between different states or communities: *polemos*. The opposite of *polemos* is *eirene*, peace: the absence of war, but perhaps also sometimes something more substantial, involving at least some mutual benevolence and tolerance on the part of the previously or potentially warring parties. On the other hand, there is conflict and (civil) war within a single *polis* or community: *stasis*. The opposite of *stasis* is not straightforward peace, but something more complex and substantial: *homonoia* (concord or 'one-mindedness').

The use of the word *homonoia* to describe peace, reconciliation and order after civil conflict had not fully taken hold in the closing decades of the fifth century BC. Euripides, in a fragment of his *Kresphontes*, makes his chorus appeal to the personified goddess of peace, Eirene, as the saviour of the *polis* of Messene from internal strife (described as both *stasis* and *eris*).<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, even in the later fifth century, *eirene* was overwhelmingly used to describe interstate, rather than internal, peace. This is Thucydides' consistent practice. In his famous discussion of *stasis* in Corcyra, for example, he makes reference to *polemos* and *eirene* only in order to identify them as external conditions which determine the political, social and ethical condition of a *polis*.<sup>5</sup>

By the early fourth century, as Lysias' speeches attest, the crucial verbal distinctions were becoming established in Athenian civic rhetoric.<sup>6</sup> Later in the fourth century, the authors of the central works of fourth-century Athenian political philosophy treated it as generally recognised that *homonoia* is the opposite of *stasis*.<sup>7</sup> The conceptual opposition between *homonoia* and *stasis* also remained vibrant into the Hellenistic period and beyond, featuring, for example, in Polybius' account of early Sparta.<sup>8</sup>

The championing of *homonoia* as the ideal, harmonious state of civic life, the opposite of strife, also features prominently in civic inscriptions and cult of the fourth century, Hellenistic period and early Imperial period.<sup>9</sup> Particularly relevant are the numerous inscriptions of those periods which directly address issues of *stasis* and reconciliation. Relevant inscriptions attest the measures taken by *poleis* to reconcile their citizens after *stasis*, or to quell incipient conflict before it developed into full *stasis*.<sup>10</sup> Some of the relevant surviving inscriptions give detailed presentations of wide-ranging reconciliation settlements after full-scale *stasis*.

Most such inscriptions attest the involvement of a panel of arbitrators or judges. From the later fourth century onwards these arbitrators and judges were often brought in from abroad: they were individuals chosen, in theory at least, for their transparent impartiality. Such foreign judges and arbitrators are also central to the second, more numerous category of relevant documents: cities' honorific decrees praising those arbitrators' and judges' virtues and justice. Most of those praised

were charged with resolving intractable disputes within cities in moments of high tension,<sup>11</sup> usually before full *stasis* broke out, but sometimes afterwards; disputes related to debt were commonly central.<sup>12</sup> The crucial conceptual opposition was made explicit in a second-century BC example from the *polis* of Phalanna in Thessaly, in which a foreign judge was praised for reconciling all the citizens without giving cause for complaint; removing *stasis*, he restored the citizens to *homonoia* (διέλυσεν πάντας ἀνεγκλήτως καὶ στάσιν ἀνελὼν εἰς ὁμόνοια[ν κα]τή[γαγ]εν).<sup>13</sup> This pair of opposing concepts also features in an inscription of another type, from the first century AD, which casts light on concepts of peace, reconciliation and civil war: the inscription recording the arrangements for the creation of a new Roman province in Lycia in the mid-first century AD. In that text, recent disturbances in Lycia are described as *stasis*, lawlessness (*anomia*) and ‘pillaging’ (*leisteiai*); they have now been superseded by *homonoia*, together with the rule of law.<sup>14</sup>

The parallel with the other pair, *eirene* and *polemos*, also remained a well-established way of conceptualising different types of conflict and peace. The second-century AD orator Aelius Aristides, in his speech to the Rhodians on *homonoia* itself, argues against the view that *stasis* is as much worse than *polemos* as *polemos* itself is worse than *eirene*; *polemos* is sometimes preferable to *eirene*, but *stasis* is never preferable to *homonoia*.<sup>15</sup> The sense that *eirene* is a matter of relations among larger, more dispersed groups, whereas *homonoia* is what is appropriate at the level of the city, is evident in the work of the early Imperial Stoic philosopher Epictetus. He comments that, if each individual takes care of his own will or *prohairesis*, as the only thing of real importance for his own well-being, that situation makes for *philia* in the household, *homonoia* in the *polis*, and *eirene* in or among (larger) ethnic groups (*ethne*).<sup>16</sup> These three levels of social interaction could thus strike a Greek thinker as demanding very different types of relationship and solidarity, perhaps more so than they would many modern observers.

### ***Homonoia* as a special type of reconciliation and peace, particularly complex and intense**

The linguistic tendencies discussed in the previous section had deep social and ideological roots. The predilection of the later Classical and Hellenistic Greeks for the word *homonoia* as the best way of describing true, durable civic reconciliation was an expression of a fundamental, widespread approach to restoring civic order after *stasis*. According to this approach, in order to achieve true civic peace, it is not sufficient merely to bring conflicting individuals to tolerate one another, and to coexist in the same place without antagonism. Rather, it is necessary to incorporate them all, as citizens, within a civic community, governed by an ordered political structure or *politeia*, itself grounded in political and ethical standards of justice and in local cultural values. The result should be both highly complex and highly integrated. This approach involves complex procedures and processes of reconciliation (*dialysis*, *diallagai*), leading eventually to *homonoia*.

Aristotle captures this widespread Greek aspiration very well, in his comment that lawgivers aim most of all at friendship and *homonoia*, in order to drive out *stasis*. The civic friendship he has in mind is a very intense type: it can even make strict justice superfluous,<sup>17</sup> because the friendly citizens trust and understand one another so well. It is also necessarily structured by the laws and a constitution (*politeia*), which Aristotle thinks a prerequisite of any true civic community.<sup>18</sup>

The same aspiration to a special, complex type of integration among citizens is also evident in the different types of Greek inscription concerned with overcoming or pre-empting *stasis*, introduced in the previous section. Greek civic reconciliation settlements were usually designed to rebuild a complex, integrated *polis*, governed by law and a constitution and united through shared values and traditions. This is particularly evident from the content of the oaths that such settlements often required some or all citizens to swear.<sup>19</sup> One such oath is recorded in a recently discovered fourth-century BC reconciliation settlement after *stasis* from Dikaia (Chalkidike).<sup>20</sup> Through that oath, the reconciled Dikaiopolitan citizens promised to participate in, and defend, a complex political and social system in their *polis*, held together by ties of reciprocity, tradition, religion and good faith. They explicitly committed themselves both to abstract justice and to their ancestral constitution (*politeia*), embracing both as structuring principles of their civic life.<sup>21</sup>

This oath was in keeping with a broader Greek tendency to make shared commitment to the rule of law and the *politeia* a central, explicit feature of civic reconciliation.<sup>22</sup> It was usually made explicit, as at Dikaia, that citizens were joining together in loyalty to a previous constitution, the ‘ancestral constitution’, strongly supported by tradition; this was also a centrepiece of the famous Athenian amnesty and reconciliation of 403 BC, after the rule of the Thirty Tyrants.<sup>23</sup> Such rhetorical stress on tradition did not necessarily prevent revisions of laws and procedures in a way deemed appropriate by both sides, which occurred at Athens after the oligarchies of 411 and 404–3.<sup>24</sup>

In addition to oaths and attention to the *politeia*, Greek reconciliation settlements also made use of other institutions, rituals and rhetoric designed for building complex, integrated civic communities. It was also common to make use of religious rituals for this purpose. One of the most striking such rituals is the ‘brother-making’ attested in a reconciliation settlement from Nakone in Western Sicily in the fourth or third century BC: new artificial ‘brotherhoods’ of five citizens were to be formed, each containing one member of each of the factions in the recent *stasis* and three neutral citizens. These brotherhoods were then to take part in an annual festival, partly dedicated to *Homonoia* herself.<sup>25</sup> In other cases, rituals of reconciliation could take the more conventional form of a collective sacrifice, procession or prayer.<sup>26</sup>

As well as seeking to rebuild trust and order through oaths, rituals and reinforcement of the *politeia*, those charged with devising durable terms of reconciliation also sought to tackle the more mundane, specific and intricate practical problems presented by a post-*stasis* situation. Prominent among

these problems were property disputes<sup>27</sup> and issues of retrospective justice and amnesty.<sup>28</sup> Such practical measures, too, were an integral part of the project of rebuilding a complex, carefully balanced interlocking structure of political institutions and relationships. As I have argued in detail elsewhere, responses to such practical problems could help to articulate distinctive ideological visions of the best form of civic order: more community-centred or more contractual.<sup>29</sup> Most commonly, these different approaches were combined and blended together, as those charged with reconciliation sought to achieve a delicate and complex balance between strict justice, the rule of law, institutional functioning, solidarity, the common good, and the flexibility which comes through arbitration, amnesty and compromise.<sup>30</sup>

It is possible to draw out from this discussion several specific respects in which this type of civic reconciliation was commonly regarded as something distinct from basic peace, of the type that might regularly be achieved among separate, self-interested *poleis* or other states. First, *homonoia* intrinsically required a much greater level of consensus: 'one-mindedness' demanded a coalescence in views about fundamental issues such as legitimate law, political interests and ethical values, even if it allowed considerable disagreement concerning more specific issues and preferences.<sup>31</sup> That is to say, *homonoia* was an intrinsically political state, requiring collective endorsement of, and interaction within, a sophisticated framework of both institutions and ideals, especially ideals of justice, citizenship and equality.

This point can be explored with the aid of a distinction drawn by F. Wendt between different conceptions of peace prominent among modern political theorists: first, 'ordinary peace', a form of 'non-violent coexistence based on *modus vivendi* arrangements'; second, 'ambitious peace', a type of peace 'beyond compromise', which involves a much greater level of mutual understanding and consensus, at least concerning 'second-order', foundational issues concerning law, politics and often also morality and the good life.<sup>32</sup> *Homonoia*, as an ideal, was much closer to the latter, more ambitious type: it involved substantial solidarity and unity among citizens. Interstate peace, by contrast, could easily be considered by ancient Greeks justifiably limited to a *modus vivendi* compromise, for the sake of stability, among separate states that retained very different interests and outlooks.

This is not to deny a point which also emerges elsewhere in this volume: the Greek word most commonly used to describe interstate peace, *eirene*, could also, in certain contexts, itself take on a far more substantial, even utopian form in Greek thinking and practice, inching towards 'ambitious peace'.<sup>33</sup> This is all particularly well attested for the fourth century BC. For example, the fourth-century notion of a widespread or 'common peace', *koine eirene*, across the Greek world and beyond, by which all signatories renounced violence against one another, could be embraced in the highly idealistic spirit of an aspiration to peaceful unity across frontiers, of the kind richly attested in Isocrates' speeches.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, a fourth-century 'common peace' was also based, in practice, on a complex formal structure of oaths and guarantees.<sup>35</sup>

Eirene was also worshipped in Greek cities as a goddess: it was something far more complex, admirable and desirable than mere makeshift compromise. There was a fourth-century statue of Eirene in the Athenian agora, portrayed cradling wealth.<sup>36</sup> Though this was probably not principally a sign of ‘nascent pacifism’, but rather a celebration of the role of recent peace agreements in humbling Sparta and enriching Athens,<sup>37</sup> its existence does suggest that the fourth-century Athenians regarded interstate peace as worthy of celebration in itself. Something closer to a form of pacifism may be evident in the later fourth-century cult at Athens of Eirene, which could be documented in official records alongside sacrifices to *Demokratia* herself:<sup>38</sup> internal democratic order should ideally be accompanied by a stable, prosperous state of peace across the wider Greek world.<sup>39</sup>

Nonetheless, though it could be an ideal in itself, it is doubtful that Greeks often conceived *eirene* as involving anything like the level of integration and shared purpose characteristic of *homonoia*: *eirene*’s core associations were with non-violent coexistence. Moreover, even if some Greek peace agreements were complex and idealistic, Greek peaces did not tend to have the level of institutional complexity commonly found in civic reconciliation agreements: they did not unify the signatories as consensual supporters of a single complex *politeia* or world-view. As Chaniotis argues, Hellenistic Greeks of the third and earlier second centuries BC may well even have rowed back from the more idealistic and rich notions of interstate peace prominent in the fourth century BC, in favour of a more contractual and pragmatic notion of interstate peace as a cessation of hostilities between particular parties; new cults and statues of Eirene are not well-attested for the Hellenistic world.<sup>40</sup>

This leads onto the second major reason why the later Classical and Hellenistic Greeks tended to distinguish internal civic reconciliation from interstate peace: *homonoia* within a *polis* demanded a set of emotions, attitudes and dispositions that were distinct from those characteristic of ‘ordinary’ peace, whose participants usually remain quite detached from one another. In a state of basic, relatively undemanding peace, participants’ attitudes tend towards the calm, gentle, mild and uninvested: ordinary peace is a state of mutual tolerance or, at most, gentle, relatively detached benevolence. It is also a state of disarmament, literal and metaphorical. In a fully reconciled and unified Greek *polis*, by contrast, citizens were commonly expected to show patriotic fervour, as well as zeal to protect the city’s constitution and freedom: consider, for example, the Dikaiopolitan oath, discussed above. They might also be expected to show spirited, emotional, brotherly solidarity, as in the Nakone brother-making.<sup>41</sup>

These heightened, focussed attitudes encouraged, or demanded, something quite different from mere physical and moral disarmament in relations between fellow citizens. Moreover, they militated against disarmament of any kind in relations with outsiders: internal solidarity was often even dependent on military patriotism and scepticism, if not outright hostility, towards outsiders. Indeed, in the Dikaiopolitan oath, all citizens had to swear not to admit any foreigners (*xenoi*, perhaps mercenaries) into the city to the detriment of the community. In an even

more emphatic case, a third-century oath of *homonoia* from Chersonesos Taurica on the Black Sea explicitly committed all citizens not to collaborate with external forces of any kind, in order to preserve the safety and freedom of the city:

I will participate in concord (*homonoia*) concerning the salvation (*soteria*) and freedom (*eleutheria*) of the *polis* and the citizens, and I will not betray Chersonesos or Kerkinitis or Kalos Limen or the other fortifications or the other territories which the citizens of Chersonesos enjoy or enjoyed to anyone, either Greek or barbarian.<sup>42</sup>

This oath of *homonoia* from Chersonesos Taurica may well have been a factional oath, binding together one political grouping against another gathered in strongholds nearby.<sup>43</sup> Nonetheless, this oath indicates well how intense internal cohesiveness could go hand in hand with heightened scepticism towards the outside world; passionate solidarity did not readily coalesce with easy-going tolerance, or eirenic serenity. To put it another way, achieving *homonoia* was not normally a question of superseding or curbing aggression, but rather of channelling it into acceptable, patriotic civic forms.

This is closely related to the third major difference between full, internal reconciliation and 'ordinary' peace. Ordinary peace can be extended across a very wide population and area, potentially the whole world or Greek world: for example, a Greek 'common peace' was, by its very nature, very wide-ranging. By contrast, internal *homonoia* was best suited by far to a smaller, more particularist and often exclusive community, whose members could achieve, or aspire to, the political consensus and emotional solidarity explored above.

The argument of this section should not, however, be taken to imply that there were sharp barriers in general between Greek approaches to internal civic and interstate relationships. On the contrary, there was great interpenetration of concepts, vocabulary and institutions between the two spheres.<sup>44</sup> The institutions and procedures for building interstate paces, alliances and stronger bonds were often very close in character to those found in reconciliation agreements.

The similarities are understandably particularly strong in the case of settlements uniting two cities together in a special close bond, or even as one new city, through *isopoliteia* or *sympoliteia* or similar arrangements.<sup>45</sup> This is an explicable overlap: in both cases, the aim was to unify within a single political system divergent groups that had, at least until recently, pursued different or even conflicting aims and loyalties. One striking case of a union between *poleis*, the so-called *homopoliteia* of Cos and Kalymna in the later third-century BC, immediately evokes by its name the ideal of *homonoia* within a single *polis*. The oath included in that union also closely resembles the oaths of civic reconciliation discussed above: it includes promises to respect the constitution; to avoid deceit and treachery; to act fairly in legal and political life; and to enhance the strength and power of the new, expanded *polis*.<sup>46</sup>

Nevertheless, civic reconciliation settlements could also be echoed in the formulation of weaker, less full-blooded interstate agreements and bonds, not

least in oaths, pledges and requirements to renounce and abstain from treachery, deceit and collaboration with enemies, in favour of loyalty to allies and to agreements.<sup>47</sup> Such pledges could even feature in agreements to respect and enforce interstate peace, such as the oath sworn by the members of the League of Corinth, formed after the victories of Philip of Macedon over much of the Greek world in the early 330s BC: that oath required participants to respect the peace and agreements, to abstain from aggression against one another, and to respect existing political arrangements in participating states.<sup>48</sup>

At the level of ideology and concepts, it was probably easiest and most common for ideas and vocabulary from the sphere of domestic and civic relations to be transferred and adapted to suit interstate relations. For example, the notion of friendship (*philia*) was very often applied, more or less metaphorically, to cordial relations between Greek states in alliance with each other. In a less ubiquitous example, agreements restoring non-hostile bonds between states could be described as *dialysis*<sup>49</sup> or *diallagai*.<sup>50</sup> *Homonoia*, too, was quite commonly applied to interstate relations, though it was usually chosen with a specific intention to emphasise the richness, strength and closeness of the relevant bonds. As Thériault shows, *homonoia* seems first to have been applied to interstate relations by Isocrates in the fourth century BC, as a way of capturing the ideal of unblemished Greek solidarity, in opposition to the barbarians. The theme of very widespread, multi-lateral *homonoia* is seldom attested for the Hellenistic period, though it surfaces in the rhetoric of the Chremonidean War, but it returns to prominence in Greek conceptualisations of the Roman Empire.<sup>51</sup> From the third century BC onwards, and especially in the Roman Empire, *homonoia* was also increasingly used to describe warm, close bilateral relationships between Greek cities, often but not always relationships which had been restored after strife.<sup>52</sup> The developments following the Roman conquest were part of a wider blurring of distinctions between internal civic and interstate relations, explored in the next section.

Migration of concepts and vocabulary in the other direction is not as noticeable, at least for the fourth century and early Hellenistic period (contrast the next section, on later Hellenistic developments). This is probably partly because interstate relations were themselves so often couched in terms familiar from internal civic relations in the first place. Nonetheless, terms that did have a distinctive association with interstate relations were not necessarily always easy to apply to internal civic relations.

In particular, it seems to have been relatively rare for Classical and early Hellenistic Greeks to conceptualise fully developed internal civic peace and reconciliation as *eirene*. The most significant evidence for this claim is the fact that *eirene* scarcely features in the quite copious surviving evidence for the epigraphy of civic reconciliation discussed in this section. Since these inscribed texts were the products of wide-ranging, usually inclusive political processes, and designed for wide consumption and application, they provide the best available evidence for ancient Greeks' instinctive ideas and word-choices. It is significant that they seem generally to have steered away from the possible option of treating developed, durable interstate reconciliation,

involving sustainable non-violent stability, as a form of *eirene* in official documents. There were, however, notable exceptions and changes in the later Hellenistic period and early Roman Empire; this is the concern of the next section.<sup>53</sup>

In literary sources of the fourth century and early Hellenistic period, there are some uses of *eirene* to describe internal civic reconciliation, but this seems to have been quite rare. Some attested cases are themselves revealing, and confirm the wider Greek tendency to differentiate civic from interstate peace. Xenophon uses the word *eirene* to describe the initial ceasefire between the Athenian factions which eventually led to the reconciliation of 403 BC. However, this is clearly not yet a full reconciliation: immediately afterwards in Xenophon's account, unreconciled oligarchs form their own enclave, with the acquiescence of their opponents, in Eleusis. A complex combination of speeches and legal processes eventually leads to a more substantial civic reconciliation, including the famous amnesty. Xenophon describes that more intense and integrated form of reconciliation in different terms: ever since this point, the Athenians have been conducting their civic life 'together' (ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὁμοῦ . . . πολιτεύονται).<sup>54</sup> Initial *eirene* is thus superseded by something much more substantial, closer to *homonoia*.

Plato, for his part, self-consciously plays with the common Greek distinctions between *stasis* and *polemos*, *homonoia* and *eirene*. From Plato's critical perspective, these distinctions are misleading. The Greeks claim that their interstate wars are something more acceptable and glorious than *stasis*, but they are, in fact, tragic internecine struggles, which hinder true Greek unity. Conversely, it is wrong to separate out internal *stasis* as a distinct type of conflict, when all forms of armed struggle among Greeks should be analysed and condemned together.<sup>55</sup> This is made clear in the *Laws*, where Plato's Athenian speaker describes armed struggle within a polis as 'so-called *stasis*': it is, in fact, simply a particularly acute and brutal form of war, *polemos*. This rhetorical strategy explains why the Athenian speaker at the same time describes internal civic reconciliation, not only as friendship (*philia*), but also as peace (*eirene*):<sup>56</sup> he has a special interest in challenging and playing down distinctions between civic and interstate relationships and conflicts. Plato's approach shows that the entrenched distinctions between *homonoia* and *eirene*, and between inside and outside the polis, were open to question and revision, in ways which became more intense in the later Hellenistic period. This is the focus of the next section.

### **A later Hellenistic and early Imperial alternative approach to reconciliation and civic order, and their relationship with peace**

The approaches and distinctions discussed in the previous two sections certainly endured with strength into the later Hellenistic and Roman Imperial periods (after *c.* 150 BC).<sup>57</sup> In those periods, however, some Greek thinkers and citizens came to give new prominence to an alternative model of civic relationships suitable for putting an end to, or pre-empting, *stasis*. According

to this view, civic order and reconciliation should not be based solely or even principally on hard-headed, rationalistic justice, consensual institutions, mutual aid and shared commitment to the common good. This is because order and reconciliation should not be a matter solely of citizens rationally and soberly making judgements about personal and collective interests and values, in a way leading to self-control and the kind of considered consensus which the literal association of *homonoia* with concord among minds seems to require.<sup>58</sup> Rather, according to this alternative view, a very considerable role in civic order and political reconciliation should also be played by gentler virtues and emotions, based on friendliness and tolerance: decency (*epieikeia*), mildness (*praotes*), tamedness or civilisation (*hemerotes*) and humanity (*philanthropia*).<sup>59</sup> These were more obviously and intrinsically states of disarmament: they involved relaxation of hard-headed aggression, suspicion, scepticism and calculation, and of the more stern and austere aspects of self-control.

The roots of this approach are evident in the explanation given by Polybius in the second century BC for the stability of the communities of his home region of Arcadia in the Peloponnese, to which the acute *staseis* suffered by the city of Kynaitha were a glaring exception. Polybius argues that the citizens of Kynaitha had neglected key features of a good and stable *polis*, but the features on which he concentrates are not justice, sobriety, rational debate or intense emotional solidarity around shared ideals of the common good. Rather, he offers the distinctive argument that the people of Kynaitha had disregarded traditional Arcadian music and dance, which usually served to soften hard-bitten Arcadian souls, made severe by hard work in the fields. Order, stability and co-operation can be durably achieved within an Arcadian *polis* only, Polybius suggests, if citizens are encouraged towards mild and gentle forms of solidarity and mutual concern. These milder virtues are more a matter of fellow-feeling and sympathy, which can potentially be extended to all human beings, than of solidarity with an exclusive group. Indeed, Polybius opens the whole section by saying that the Arcadians are famous for both their humanity or 'love of humanity' (*philanthropia*) and their love of foreigners (*philoxenia*).<sup>60</sup>

Polybius' interest in humanity (*philanthropia*), a mild and gentle virtue that can potentially be applied to all fellow humans, is paralleled in the approach to *stasis* and its avoidance adopted by the first-century BC historian Diodorus Siculus. Diodorus does, though, invest this approach with a notably paternalistic, or even elitist, aspect. While discussing the first Sicilian 'Slave War', Diodorus makes some general comments about the best ways to maintain peace and harmony within a household or city. According to Diodorus, elite citizens within a city, like good heads of households, should treat their inferiors, both citizens and their slaves, with paternalistic kindness (*philanthropia*, *epieikeia* and *praotes*). This is the best way to avoid the revolts and *stasis* which arise when inferiors feel that they are treated without mildness (*ἀνημέρωτος*).<sup>61</sup>

This approach remained prominent in the early Imperial period. Plutarch, for example, developed a political ideal of gentle, hierarchical solidarity among citizens, in which *philanthropia* and related virtues play a prominent

part.<sup>62</sup> In his work on *How a Republic should be Governed*, as in his work on *Whether an Old Man should Participate in Politics*, Plutarch develops a picture of the good citizen and leader as moderate and humane, uninterested in dramatic interventions or overly ambitious ideals. At one point in the former work, in his discussion of the best way for contemporary civic leaders to appeal to the Greek political past, Plutarch even appeals directly to previous Greek practices of reconciliation.

His argument is that appeals to the victories of the Persian Wars should be restricted to exercises in rhetorical schools. In actual political rhetoric, orators should appeal, not to the military exploits of the Classical Athenians, but to their more pacific, moderate and gentle actions. These admirable Athenian precedents include the famous Athenian amnesty of 403 BC. The context makes clear that Plutarch favours the amnesty as an example of mildness, restraint, decency and tolerance. The other positive models he cites from Classical Athens include the Athenians' magnanimous celebration of the refounding of the city of Thebes, one of Athens' bitterest traditional rivals, after its destruction by Alexander; and the Athenians' expiatory sacrifice when they learnt of the civil unrest and *skytalismos* in Argos, which involved the clubbing to death of many citizens. They also showed similar sympathy and decency towards an individual by declining to search the house of a newly married man during their investigations into the Harpalus affair.<sup>63</sup> Plutarch thus here recasts Classical Greek reconciliation as a matter of decency and mildness, symbolic of the kind of mutual sympathy and humanity which, he thinks, can hold together a good *polis*.

This newly prominent strand in thinking about the nature of good relationships among citizens led to subtle changes in the way some Greeks conceptualised the relationship between internal civic order and interstate peace. Some Greek thinkers of these later periods reduced or downplayed the differences between the two: if civic solidarity was largely a matter of mildness, decency and humane tolerance among citizens who were not instinctively unified in patriotic fervour, then civic solidarity might now much more closely resemble peaceful understanding and coexistence among separate states. Indeed, it seems to have become more straightforward in these later periods to conceptualise complex, fully realised civic reconciliation of civic factions as a state similar to peace between previously warring states. Use of the word *eirene* in such contexts was still not widespread, but there are some interesting cases.

A significant example is Plutarch's account of the complex and close-knit reconciliation between Sikyonian exiles and their compatriots at home achieved by Aratus of Sikyon, with the help of Ptolemaic money, after his own return from exile in 251 BC. Plutarch describes that settlement, using traditional Greek vocabulary of reconciliation, as involving *homonoia* and *dialysis* among richer and poorer Sikyonians. However, he later takes the more distinctive step of introducing the concept of *eirene* to describe this fully developed reconciliation, much more than a mere ceasefire or accommodation between the factions: Aratus 'achieved and fitted together peace and friendship for the citizens' (κατεργάσατο καὶ συνήρμοσε φιλίαν καὶ εἰρήνην τοῖς πολίταις).<sup>64</sup>

Plutarch thus here consciously or unconsciously reduced the gap between peace, on the one hand, and concord, friendship and reconciliation, on the other: the Sikyonian fellow citizens lived together in a state of solidarity which was simultaneously a state of peace. Plutarch was well aware of the traditional Greek parallel pairs of *polemos* and *eirene*, *stasis* and *homonoia*. He relies on this scheme in his *How a Republic should be Governed*, in his discussion of how *poleis* should exist within the wider world, where he distinguishes interstate conflict, now largely abated, and internal civic conflicts, which still break out. Even there, however, as in the *Aratus*, Plutarch portrays *homonoia* itself as something milder than common in much earlier Greek rhetoric. Plutarch's argument is that, in the new Greek world devoid of its traditional political and military power, in which a Roman proconsul can overrule any Greek civic magistrate, the most important remaining political role for elite Greeks in their cities is gently to coax their fellow citizens towards concord and friendship, by teaching them the folly of personal acrimony. The best life for a wise Greek citizen is now not one of ceaseless political ambition, but one of *homonoia* and 'quietness' (*hesychia*).<sup>65</sup>

Plutarch was not alone in bringing *homonoia* closer to ideals of gentleness and even peace. The pairing of *homonoia* and *eirene* to capture a desirable, enduring state of internal civic reconciliation and solidarity, much more than a mere ceasefire, features in later Hellenistic and early Imperial political thought and rhetoric. This development occurred even though relevant authors continued, like Plutarch, to use *eirene* with overwhelming frequency to refer to interstate peace. Both the first-century BC historian Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the first- and second-century AD orator Dio Chrysostom used the pairing of *homonoia* and *eirene* to describe desirable states of civic reconciliation and order in past societies. In describing the aspirations of Appius Claudius Crassus to become a *decemvir* in fifth-century BC Rome, in order to introduce new laws, Dionysius portrays him as wishing to set his fellow citizens on the path of *homonoia*, *eirene* and them 'all thinking the *polis* to be one'. Dionysius suggests that these initial aspirations to unity and peace through enlightened law were sincere, even though Appius later came close to seeking tyranny.<sup>66</sup> Dio Chrysostom, for his part, suggests, in his speech refusing the office of archon, that the combination of the two states was achieved in the Greek cities of Italy, precisely during the period when the Pythagoreans were in charge of their civic affairs: for as long as the Pythagoreans were influential, those cities flourished and conducted their civic life with 'the greatest concord and peace' (τοσοῦτον χρόνον εὐδαιμονήσαντας καὶ μετὰ πλείστης ὁμονοίας καὶ εἰρήνης πολιτευσαμένους).<sup>67</sup> The philosophical, ethical guidance of the Pythagoreans thus ensured peaceful harmony in the politics of these cities.

Although Dionysius and Dio, like Plutarch on Sikyon, were discussing past societies, their conceptualisations of desirable, lasting civic unity as a blend of *homonoia* and *eirene* reflected ideas and concerns of the later Hellenistic and early Imperial periods themselves.<sup>68</sup> Dio's conception of the peaceful harmony of the Western Greek cities, based on cultural guidance and education, was not very far removed, for example, from Polybius' picture of the unity of the

Arcadian *poleis*, based on music and collective celebrations, or from Plutarch's ideal of a moderate, educated *polis* of decency.

Dio himself also applied the newly prominent approach to contemporary civic politics. In his speech to the Alexandrians, when criticising their tendency to disorder during theatrical events, he accuses them of disrupting *peace* within the city: as soon as they hear music, they can no longer maintain *eirene*.<sup>69</sup> Jewish and Christian authors of these and following centuries further developed the view of *eirene* as a crucial, rich binding force within (as well as between) communities, associated with humility, piety and fraternity, and sometimes also the peace of God himself; their approaches are explored in other chapters in this volume.<sup>70</sup> Augustine, for example, was to have no difficulty in talking of the 'peace of the city' (*pax civitatis*), itself a form of *concordia* among citizens; he lists it among the different, interrelated types of peace which bind together body, soul, household, city and heavenly city.<sup>71</sup>

A striking inscription from Sagalassos, in Pisidia in southern Asia Minor, shows this alternative approach to civic reconciliation being put into practice in the politics of a Greek city, beyond the confines of intellectual debate. This is an honorary decree of the first century BC for a certain Manesas, a citizen of Termessos, another Pisidian *polis* with which Sagalassos had long-term links. Manesas had played a leading role in reconciling the Sagalassians after a period of unrest. The unrest in question was probably connected with the regional repercussions of the Roman civil wars, and in particular the controversial inclusion of Pisidia in the new kingdom of Mark Antony's appointee, the Galatian King Amyntas, in the period 39–25 BC.<sup>72</sup> The decree praises Manesas as follows:

he exceeded their enthusiasm and love of honour concerning our affairs; and he made himself most useful in private to each of our citizens who came across him, as a result of which there was univocal testimony about him by all before the council, and he conducted himself in a most good-willed way towards our public affairs; and when he recognised the recent situation, with civic strife and most harsh war enveloping our *polis* (φιλοτειμίας πολιτικῆς καὶ πολέμου χαλεπωτάτου περιέχοντος τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν), treating our situation as a personal setback (τὴν καθ' ἡμᾶς περίστασιν ἴδιον ἐλάσωμα διαλαβὼν εἶναι), he showed endurance throughout the whole time, and spending time with us, urging us towards the best things (συνὼν ἡμεῖν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄριστα προτρεπόμενος), offering advice like a saviour (συμβουλευὼν σωτηρίως) and not deviating at all from hatred of evil, he was most responsible for the peace and concord among us (αἰτιώτατος τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς εἰρήνης καὶ ὁμονοίας ἐγένετο).<sup>73</sup>

This decree thus praises Manesas for using his powers of persuasion to bring the Sagalassians from a state of conflict (*philotimia*) and war (*polemos*) to a state of peace (*eirene*) and concord (*homonoia*). This seems, therefore, to be a very rare case of a Greek decree about internal civic reconciliation<sup>74</sup> giving a prominent role to *eirene* – indeed, even presenting *eirene* as an

intrinsic part of a complex, durable state of civic reconciliation, much more developed than a mere ceasefire or truce.

It might be objected that this inscription does not, in fact, celebrate internal civic *eirene*, but reproduces the traditional distinction between internal civil conflict (here called *philotimia*) and interstate *polemos*, and their respective opposites (*homonioia* and *eirene*). According to this view, the word *polemos* in this text would refer to the wider disturbances in Asia Minor and the broader Mediterranean associated with the Roman civil wars. However, the decree does not really support this alternative interpretation. Most importantly, Manesas' contributions to the outcome of *eirene* and *homonioia* are presented as successful interventions in guiding the Sagalassians themselves, rather than in mediating between them and external opponents: Manesas spent time among the Sagalassians coaxing and educating them, in such a way that they achieved peace and concord. The specific word order and choices also militate against the alternative interpretation, even if they do not in themselves rule it out. First, the order of the different terms does not support the alternative view: *philotimia* and *polemos* are superseded by *eirene* and *homonioia*; it would have been clearer to express the second pair as '*homonioia* and *eirene*', if *homonioia* was intended specifically to correspond to *philotimia* and *eirene* to *polemos*. Second, the *eirene* and *polemos* are explicitly said to have been achieved 'among us' (καθ' ἡμᾶς), which suggests an internal focus.

There are, therefore, striking overlaps between the rhetoric and spirit of this decree and those of the literary sources discussed above: Manesas helped to achieve an eirenic, mild kind of harmony among the Sagalassians, through gentle, non-violent advice and urging (συνὸν, προτρεπόμενος, συμβουλεύων).<sup>75</sup> He supposedly did so in the manner of a benevolent saviour, concerned with the welfare of all rather than particular political principles or interests. Although this example is quite isolated among inscribed rhetoric of reconciliation, there are some parallels for its general approach: for example, the foreign judge who helped to reconcile the citizens of Phalanna in the second century BC (see p. 68 above) was praised for doing so 'with all humanity' (*philanthropia*).<sup>76</sup>

Moreover, the increased ease with which Greeks could associate *eirene* with internal civic harmony and order was reflected in a widespread institutional innovation of the first century AD, richly attested for the cities of Asia Minor: the new civic magistracy of the 'eirenarch' ('magistrate of the peace'), an official charged with maintaining public order in a city's territory and arresting miscreants.<sup>77</sup> The eirenarch and his staff of 'pursuers' (*diogmitai*), sometimes working in tandem with another magistrate or magistrates charged specifically with supervising the countryside (*peripoloi*, *paraphylakes*), constituted something similar to a police force.<sup>78</sup> Although the eirenarch would have been concerned principally with external intruders and nomadic brigands, he was also charged with preventing or punishing internal unrest and disorder: eirenarchs were responsible, for example, for rounding up Christians who refused to participate in sacrifices to the emperor.<sup>79</sup> The office and activities of the eirenarch thus helped further to assimilate internal civic order to peace, *eirene*, of the kind which can also obtain across civic frontiers. The connection between the eirenarch's title and

the ideal of peace was sometimes made explicit: for example, an eirenarch of Metropolis in Phrygia was praised for having discharged the office in a peaceful way (εἰρ[ηναρχή]σαντα εἰρη[νικῶς]).<sup>80</sup>

It is possible to identify several plausible explanations for the underlying processes which created and sustained the new approaches to civic reconciliation, and its relationship with peace, discussed in this section. Roman influence on Greek thinking must have been a key factor. In the course of the first century BC, with the Roman civil wars spreading out across the Mediterranean, the Romans themselves blurred their own distinction between concord (*concordia*) and peace (*pax*); Hannah Cornwell explores this development elsewhere in this volume. From the mid-first century BC onwards, the Romans began to conceptualise order and stability within the Roman *res publica* itself, no longer only as *concordia*, but also as *pax*. This development culminated in the Emperor Augustus' claims to have brought *pax* to Rome, and the Roman world, after civil war. This development certainly had direct Greek repercussions: a coin from Ephesus of 28 BC praises Augustus for liberating the Romans, with *Pax* on its reverse.<sup>81</sup> The Sagalassian decree for Manesas of Termessos, discussed above, may well also directly reflect the influence of the Roman shift from *concordia* to *pax*: Manesas, almost like a benevolent Augustus, pacified the Sagalassians after internal unrest, bringing both *eirene* and *homonoia*, a form of salvation.

The new Roman ideal of *pax* extended far beyond the limits of Rome itself: the *pax Augusta*, and *pax Romana*, were soon held to cover the whole civilised world. It is easy to see how this change too would have helped to shape the developments considered in this section. If the Greek cities were now closely woven into a Mediterranean-wide fabric of Roman peace, then the distinction between inside and outside the *polis* began to lose much of its force.<sup>82</sup> Relations of peaceful mutual tolerance and respect across the Empire could even serve as a model for local civic life.

Roman influence must, however, have acted in concert with internal Greek developments. Both the Roman and Greek changes can partly be attributed to long-term changes in Greek civic life, which some even see as processes of 'depoliticisation': the government of cities came to be considered slightly less in terms of highly political questions of justice, equality and solidarity, and correspondingly more as a question of peaceful stability and public order. As a result, civic unity came to be sometimes as much a question of non-violent coexistence as of hard-won consensus based on open, equal and strenuous debate among citizens about political matters of common concern.

This process had the effect of reinforcing the status quo, involving major inequalities of wealth and power within most Greek cities. Indeed, conceiving the existing civic order as peace helped to denude of legitimacy any attempts radically to question or overturn that status quo: dissidents were now necessarily violent rebels or even brigands, disturbers of the peace who were the legitimate focus of the eirenarch's sanctioned violence. When the province of Lycia was established, for example, the inscription celebrating the process (compare p. 68 above) explicitly described the recent unrest in the region as

'brigandage': this is quite likely to have been an ideological way of discrediting popular revolt, perhaps involving calls for greater equality and attempts at redistribution.<sup>83</sup> There are also signs in the oratory of this period of attempts to stigmatise dissenters for preferring to foment internal unrest tantamount to war (*polemos*), rather than to enjoy the benefits of peace.<sup>84</sup>

From this perspective, the shift towards conceiving internal unity as something gentle and peaceful, even a form of *eirene*, was of a piece with the rise in the later Hellenistic and early Imperial period of an increasingly paternalistic civic elite in the Greek cities, which exercised sustained power over civic affairs, perhaps even something like minor kings.<sup>85</sup> These elite figures, such as Manesas of Termessos, were no longer always constrained by the almost automatic solidarity and spirit of equality which had come with sustained collective military engagement by the male citizenry. As a result, they could sustain an ideology that cast them as gracious defenders of peace and security<sup>86</sup> and of public order and welfare, who deployed decency, humanity and education to quell conflicts and unrest.

There was, therefore, a markedly elitist and anti-democratic dimension to newly prominent conceptions of civic gentleness, humanity and peace.<sup>87</sup> Nevertheless, these newly prominent ideas can also be interpreted less pessimistically: they did not simply flatten out Greek civic politics, but also took it in new directions, with some attractions for modern political thought and practice. The post-Classical rapprochement between *homonoia* and *eirene* in some contexts can itself be seen as yielding an attractive middle way: a more peaceable, gentle type of *homonoia*, and a more political, idealistic type of *eirene*. Indeed, it offers a historical candidate, worthy of careful consideration, for the kind of compromise between strong ethical consensus and mere pragmatic coexistence which modern liberal democratic theorists of peace have considered a highly desirable goal.<sup>88</sup>

Moreover, the broader post-Classical Greek wider vision of civic unity as something gentle and peaceful chimes with wider modern liberal interest in adapting traditional notions of citizenship and solidarity in a more peaceful, cultural, cosmopolitan and pluralist direction. Citizenship and political values remained very important after *c.* 150 BC, but the good citizen was now expected to assign special importance to cultivating habits of gentleness and decency appropriate for peaceable civic life, now at least as important as martial virtue. In first-century BC Priene, for example, the elite citizen Aulus Aurelius Zosimos, a foreigner who had been granted Prienian citizenship, was praised for introducing a literary tutor for the ephebes in the gymnasium, in such a way that he led their souls towards virtue and 'humane emotion'. Zosimos was also praised for attending to sacrifices which preserved the *homonoia* of the city of Priene, in a way which he knew would promote both individual and collective well-being. Prienian citizens thus presented themselves as united in an interdependent community of peaceable, pious, cultured *homonoia*.<sup>89</sup> The shifting of much political and military decision-making into Roman hands was partly a loss, but it also created the space for these new styles of citizenship.

The revised ideal of civic solidarity also brought an increased openness to outsiders from the traditional citizen-body of men of shared descent.<sup>90</sup>

Women played a more prominent role in civic life from the later Hellenistic period onwards, though their role was still significantly limited.<sup>91</sup> The scope for foreigners, such as Zosimos himself, to play a significant or even leading role in civic life also increased. There are also some signs of increased pluralism about values, perhaps related to changing evaluations of peaceful coexistence or tolerance. Very varied gods, cults and philosophical movements thrived, side by side in the agora and beyond. In later Hellenistic Athens, for example, ephebes attended lectures at a range of different philosophical schools: Academy, Ptolemaion and Lyceum.<sup>92</sup> This move may have been partly motivated by pragmatic considerations of space, with philosophers of different schools circulating between different locations,<sup>93</sup> but its celebration in honorary epigraphy brought out its symbolic pluralism and enlightenment.

The newly prominent ideals of civic order did not drive out more militaristic approaches: many Hellenistic *poleis* remained very active in warfare and military training,<sup>94</sup> and even *poleis* of the Imperial period that had lost active military functions and institutions retained many military symbols and values.<sup>95</sup> At Priene, Zosimos was praised for providing weapons for the ephebes' drills, as well as their literary tutor. Nonetheless, more open, peaceable and cosmopolitan ideals of civic order and citizenship did come to be major rivals to more exclusive, aggressive and patriotic ones in the Greek world, from the later Hellenistic period onwards. The dialectic and rivalry between the two can even be seen as fundamental to post-Classical Greek civic life.<sup>96</sup>

## Conclusion

The later Classical and post-Classical Greeks developed complex ideas about how to achieve civic reconciliation among fellow citizens, and the relationship between internal reconciliation and interstate peace. The dominant approach in the period discussed here was to treat internal civic reconciliation as a special state, more intense and complex than interstate peace, requiring complex measures, rituals and rhetoric. The measures and values on which Greek cities relied offer very rich case-studies relevant to modern debates: for example, ongoing debates about how to achieve a balance between amnesty, forgiveness and just punishment for past wrongs after internal conflict.

Greek approaches to reconciliation and peace in the later part of the period discussed here, especially the first centuries BC and AD, have so far been less intensively studied. Nonetheless, they enable new perspectives on contemporary debates about how to combine civic and republican ideals of national citizenship with internationalist aspirations to peace and cosmopolitanism. Indeed, the political debates and changes of that later period brought into focus the challenges and opportunities involved in pursuing a very difficult balance, or even reconciliation, between distinct political ideals: peace, peacefulness and cosmopolitan openness, on the one hand, and justice, equality, democracy, freedom and fraternity, on the other.<sup>97</sup>

## Notes

- 1 I am very grateful to Eoghan P. Moloney and Michael S. Williams for their help with this chapter. For epigraphic abbreviations, see the *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*.
- 2 See, for example, Asheri (1969), (1989); Lonis (1991); Loraux (2001), (2005); Dössel (2003); Shear (2011); Carawan (2013); Gray (2013b), (2015) chapters 1–2; Boulay (2014) Part III, chapter 3. On *stasis* itself, see especially Gehrke (1985).
- 3 On the latter, see recently Low (2007); Mack (2015), with much further bibliography.
- 4 Euripides fr.453 Nauck.
- 5 Thucydides 3.82.1–2.
- 6 See Lysias 25.30; cf. 18.17.
- 7 See Plato, *Republic* 351d4–6; Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.6.14; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1155a24–6.
- 8 Polybius 6.4.6–7.
- 9 Thériault (1996), especially chapter 1.
- 10 For analysis of the full range of relevant texts, see Dössel (2003).
- 11 On the summoning of foreign judges as a response to crisis, see Crowther (1995).
- 12 On Greek approaches to resolving debt disputes, see Asheri (1969).
- 13 *IG IX 2* 1230, ll.11–13.
- 14 *SEG* 51.1832, a, ll.16–24.
- 15 Aelius Aristides, *To the Rhodians, On Concord* 562, ll.15–19.
- 16 Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.5.35.
- 17 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1155a23–8.
- 18 Aristotle, *Politics* 1276b1–2. On Aristotle's ideas, compare Will Desmond's contribution to this volume.
- 19 On oaths of reconciliation, see recently Sommerstein and Bayliss *et al.* (2013) 129–44.
- 20 *SEG* 57.576 (Dikaia, 365–59 BC), ll.67–84.
- 21 Compare Gray (2013b).
- 22 Compare, for example, the oath restoring civic order at Hellenistic Itanos, which includes varied pledges to abstain from revolutionary behaviour: *IC III iv* 8, ll. 9–38.
- 23 On this amnesty, see in detail Michael Edwards' contribution to this volume.
- 24 See Dössel (2003) 55–146; Shear (2011) chapters 3 and 8; Carawan (2013), all citing earlier bibliography. For constitutional reforms in other parts of the Greek world, often designed to resolve conflicts, see Bencivenni (2003).
- 25 See *SEG* 30.1119, with *SEG* 51.1185, analysed in Asheri (1989); Ampolo (2001); Loraux (2001), especially 215–28; Dössel (2003) 235–47.
- 26 See, for example, Rhodes and Osborne (2003) 85A and B, ll.39–49.
- 27 See especially Lonis (1991).
- 28 See, for example, Carawan (2013); Michael Edwards' contribution to this volume.
- 29 See Gray (2013b) and (2015) chapters 1–2.
- 30 Compare Crowther (1995) 92; Roebuck (2001) 24–5, 282; Dössel (2003) 256, 262.
- 31 Compare Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.4.16.
- 32 Wendt (2013).
- 33 On the complex range of Greek and Roman approaches to peace, see Raaflaub (2007a), with earlier bibliography.
- 34 See especially Isocrates 8 (*On the Peace*), e.g. 8.16, 21.
- 35 On *koine eirene*, see Ryder (1965); Jehne (1994).
- 36 Pausanias 1.8.2; 9.16.2.
- 37 Parker (1996), 229–30, quoted in Raaflaub (2007b) 14.
- 38 *IG II2* 1496, ll.126–36, concerning 332/1 BC.
- 39 Compare Isocrates 8.20.
- 40 Chaniotis (2005) 184–5, 252–3.
- 41 On the emotional dimension of civic reconciliation: Chaniotis (2010).
- 42 *IOSPE* 401, ll. 5–12.

- 43 Dössel (2003) 187–90.
- 44 This is a prominent theme of Low (2007); Mack (2015).
- 45 On such unions between cities, see now, in general, Mack (2014), citing much earlier bibliography.
- 46 See *IG XII 4 1 152*; for a partially very similar, partially quite different Hellenistic internal civic reconciliation, brokered by Coan arbitrators in the small island *polis* of Telos, see *IG XII 4 1 132*.
- 47 For a rich selection of agreements between *poleis* containing mutual assurances and protections, see the Hellenistic Cretan examples collected in Chaniotis (1996), e.g. no. 6, ll.46–60; no. 26, ll.13–25. Similar pledges would probably have featured, for example, in the oaths which cemented Athens' alliances in its fourth-century Second Athenian Confederacy: for confirmation that such oaths were sworn, see Rhodes and Osborne (2003) 23 (concerning Methymna), ll.11–19.
- 48 See Rhodes and Osborne (2003) 76, esp. ll.4–17.
- 49 E.g. Thucydides 4.19.1.
- 50 E.g. Lycophron, *Alexandra*, ll.1447–8.
- 51 Thériault (1996) 102–111.
- 52 Thériault (1996) chapter 2.
- 53 An earlier possible epigraphic exception is the decree of the Athenian deme of Aixone praising Demetrius of Phaleron for his role in reunifying the Athenian *polis* after unrest involving both external intervention and internal discord (*IG II<sup>2</sup> 1201*, ll.9–10); but this possible reference to *eirene* is very uncertain, because it is part of a modern restoration of very fragmentary lines.
- 54 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.4.38–43.
- 55 Compare Manicas (1982), especially 687–8.
- 56 Plato, *Laus* 628a9–d1. For a similar blurring of the boundaries between *polemos* and *stasis*, in a way which associates internal stability closely with *eirene*, compare the herald Kleokritos at Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.4.21–2.
- 57 For the continuing importance of interstate war for the Hellenistic cities, which often preserved their own citizen-armies, see Ma (2000a); Boulay (2014).
- 58 For the prominent Greek tendency to associate civic order with good *judgement* by citizens, and *stasis* with its lack, compare, for example, Thucydides 3.82–3.
- 59 For the increasing prominence of gentler, more humane ideals in Greek culture more generally in this period, compare Konstan (2001a).
- 60 See Polybius 4.17–21. Compare Gray (2013a) 160–2.
- 61 Diodorus 34/35.2.33; Gray (2013a) 159–60.
- 62 See Ma (2000b); Roskam (2014).
- 63 Plutarch, *Præcepta gerendae reipublicae* 814a–c.
- 64 Plutarch, *Aratus* 14.
- 65 Plutarch, *Præcepta gerendae reipublicae* 824c–f.
- 66 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Roman Antiquities* 10.54.7.
- 67 Dio Chrysostom 49.6.
- 68 Compare also Lucian, *Hermotimus* 22.
- 69 Dio Chrysostom 32.59–60.
- 70 Compare, for example, Philo, *De mutatione nominum* 240 on the importance of conducting social life (*politeuesthai*) with *eunomia* (good government) and *eirene*. A possible fragment of Philo (Philo fr. 30 Lewy (1932)) also associates *eunomia* with *homonoia* and *eirene*, even calling *homonoia* 'the mother of *eirene*'; but the connection of this aphorism with Philo himself is difficult to prove. For later cases, compare Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagogus* 3.12.101; Themistius, *On the Humanity of the Emperor Theodosius* 227a Harduin.
- 71 Augustine, *On the City of God* 19.13.
- 72 See Waelkens (2002) 316; cf. *SEG* 44.1113.
- 73 *TAM* III 1 7, ll.1–15.

- 74 Compare Waelkens (2002) 316: the decree is a response to ‘serious internal strife’.
- 75 On local elites playing this role in the Imperial period, see Brélaz (2005) 60–1.
- 76 *IG IX 2 1230*, l. 5.
- 77 See Brélaz (2005) 90–122; (2008) 197–204.
- 78 Brélaz (2008) 168–9; cf. Chaniotis (2008) on Hellenistic forerunners.
- 79 See Brélaz (2005) 103–06, with 52–6; (2008) 185–7.
- 80 See Brélaz (2005) 103, discussing *MAMA IV 130*, ll.4–5.
- 81 For the Roman developments, and their Greek impact, see Raaflaub (2007b) 14, discussing the Ephesian coin (*RIC 476*). Plutarch also assimilated this changed Roman approach: see Plutarch *Caesar* 23.6 (disruption of both the *eirene* and the *homonoia* of the Roman *politeia*).
- 82 See, for example, Dio Chrysostom 40.27. For new Greek conceptions of interstate relations within a newly unified Mediterranean, compare, for example, Mack (2015) chapter 5.
- 83 *SEG 51.1832*, a, ll.16–24, with Thornton (2008).
- 84 Compare Brélaz (2008) 182–3.
- 85 Compare Gauthier (1985). For recent debates about the post-Classical *polis*, and the role of elites, see van Nijf and Alston (2011); Mann and Scholz (2012); Martzavou and Papazarkadas (2013).
- 86 Compare Chaniotis (2005) 34–5.
- 87 Compare Ma (2000b).
- 88 See Wendt (2013).
- 89 See *I.Priene2* 68, ll.73–6; 69, ll.68–70.
- 90 On broader cosmopolitan tendencies in the early Roman Empire: Richter (2011).
- 91 See van Bremen (1996).
- 92 *IG II2 1006* (122/1 BC), ll.19–20.
- 93 Compare Haake (2007) 44–55.
- 94 See Ma (2000a); Chaniotis (2005), especially chapter 2. For striking new later Hellenistic evidence, see *I. Metropolis 1* (an honorary decree recording the workings of the local citizen militia).
- 95 Compare Brélaz (2008) 157–8.
- 96 Compare Ma (2008) on the intrinsic paradoxes of the post-Classical *polis*.
- 97 The tensions between peace and other attractive political values in antiquity were a focus of A. Momigliano’s research early in his British exile, including his lectures on ‘Peace and Liberty in the Ancient World’: Murray (2010).

## 6 Negotiating ideas of peace in the civil conflicts of the late Republic

*Hannah Cornwell*

The *Fasti Triumphales Capitolini*, which formed part of an Augustan trophy-bearing arch,<sup>1</sup> present the entire history of Roman triumph from Romulus' victory over the Caenineses in 753 BC down to L. Cornelius Balbus' victory over Africa in 19 BC. Perhaps the most striking entries in the lists record the celebrations awarded to Mark Antony and Octavian in 40:

Imperator Caesar son of the divine, son of Gaius, triumvir for the restoration of the *res publica*, celebrates an ovation in the year 40 BC because he made peace (*quod pacem fecit*) with Marcus Antonius.

Marcus Antonius, son of Marcus, grandson of Marcus, triumvir for the restoration of the *res publica*, celebrates an ovation in the year 40 BC because he made peace (*quod pacem fecit*) with Imperator Caesar.<sup>2</sup>

These two entries, along with that of 44, which records Caesar's ovation *ex monte Albano*, are the only celebrations that are not explicitly linked to a defeat of a people or place.<sup>3</sup> The unusual nature of Caesar's Alban ovation, by which he was granted the honour of returning to the city on horseback after the *Feriae Latinae*, may be understood as part of the triumphal honours awarded to the dictator.<sup>4</sup> The honours also included the right to offer the *spolia opima* 'as if he had slain some hostile general with his own hand' (Cass. Dio 44.4.3: ὥσπερ τινὰ πολέμιον αὐτοστράτηγον αὐτοχειρῖα πεφονευκότι), which suggests that, although the ovation of 44 was not for a victory over an enemy, the occasion was used to solidify Caesar's position within the state through traditional triumphal rituals, and was later conceptualised as a triumphal display in the *Fasti Triumphales*.<sup>5</sup> The celebrations of Antony and Octavian likewise ostensibly commemorated no victory or defeated opponent, but rather the avoidance of conflict through the establishment of peace, although equally celebrated 'as if in triumph' (Cass. Dio 48.31.3: ὥσπερ ἐν ἐπινικίῳ). The triumphal entries of 40 are striking not just because of their justification for the ovations (*quod pacem fecit*), but also because the peace was made between two Roman magistrates, as opposed to with an external enemy.<sup>6</sup>

That the avoidance of war was celebrated in a ritual that stressed Rome's military dominance must be understood within the context of the period. The civil wars of the late Republic brought about a politicisation of peace,

whereby the concept was negotiated, redefined and manipulated by different political agents, attempting to control their position during a period of instability and uncertainty.<sup>7</sup> This chapter examines the discourses and debates concerning negotiation and peace during the civil conflicts of the late Republic, focusing on the literary testimony of Cicero and Caesar. It argues for the importance of peace within the discussions of the crisis the Republic faced and the effect this had on the understanding and usage of the term itself.

The central focus will be on the term *pax*, which became the dominant concept in the discourse of peace in the 40s. This is not to ignore the use and application of other terms relevant to the Roman imaginary on peace, and indeed the terms *concordia* ('harmony'), *otium* ('inactivity; ease'), *quies* ('quiet; rest'), and *tranquillitas* ('tranquillity') were still in use.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, these concepts should not be seen in isolation, but as part of a wider nexus of ideas that were frequently deployed together to engage with concerns of public stability.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, an examination of the political language during the 40s shows a propagation of discourses on *pax*, which should be examined in relation to the nature of the civil conflicts of the time.

It is worth briefly noting that whilst, in the literary sources examined here, the term *pax* is prominent, the verb *pacare* and the participle/adjective *pacatus*, *-a*, *-um* are rarely used. Where they are used, they are almost exclusively applied to foreign concerns, notably the provinces.<sup>10</sup> It is, then, revealing of the context within which the language of peace is negotiated in these texts, when *pacare* is used to describe relations between Romans, as is the case in Cicero's *Philippics* against Antony.<sup>11</sup>

## The language of war and peace

The language and terminology adopted by political actors in the late Republic, particularly in its final decades, was a means to orientate one's position in relation to the *res publica*, as well as to stress the threat posed to the state by one's opponents. Of course, in the context of the civil wars of the period, the meaning and application of the term *res publica* became increasingly problematised.<sup>12</sup> The political game was to prove one's ability to maintain the idea of the *res publica*, and the central ideological values one espoused in relation to it (*libertas*, *concordia*, *fides* etc.), whilst also demonstrating the threat one's opponents posed. Indeed, a brief look at the way Cicero presents the relationship between the *res publica* and conspirators of 63 in his second Catilinarian speech illustrates how the language of war (*bellum*) could be used to conceptualise one's political opponents in late Republican politics.

For there is no nation which we fear, there is no king who can make war (*bellum*) against the Roman people; all external threats are brought into a state of peace (*pacata*) by land and sea by the virtue of one man;<sup>13</sup> domestic war (*domesticum bellum*) remains: the traps are on the inside, the danger is shut within, the enemy (*hostis*) is inside the gates. [. . .] Here I acknowledge myself as your leader in war, Quirites.<sup>14</sup>

Cicero's purpose is to use and manipulate commonly held ideas about war and peace in order to present his own position, and that of his opponents, within the state. He goes so far as to present Catiline as a *hostis* ('public enemy of the state'), even though he has yet to be declared one. The use of the term *hostis* illustrates the ideological battle being fought in Roman politics in order to discredit one's opponents.<sup>15</sup> The viability of placing someone outside the rights of a citizen enabled a conceptual shift from civil conflicts to a foreign war, both in terms of language used and also honours afforded to the victor. Nevertheless, such language and categorisations could be contested and alternative solutions to the political tensions presented: twenty years on, in 43, whilst Cicero strove to have Antony declared a *hostis* and a state of war acknowledged, the elder statesman L. Iulius Caesar (*cos.* 64) argued for replacing the word *bellum* with *tumultus* ('disturbance'), and for labelling Antony an *adversarius* ('adversary') rather than a *hostis* ('public enemy'), thus re-orientating the debate at the start of the year around an internal dispute, as opposed to open war.<sup>16</sup>

The conflicts of the late Republic were thus subject to debate and redefinition, depending on whose side of the argument was being voiced: should it be perceived as an internal disagreement or open war, and what consequences did this distinction have for the language of peace? The lack of definitive certainty as to how to categorise the tensions that arose at the end of 50 and at the start of 43 is reflected in the relatively diverse and fluid language used by political actors.

In his correspondence from late 50 to mid 49, Cicero voices his concerns for the stability of the state and the need for reconciliation between Caesar and Pompey by means of a peaceful settlement. In the initial stages of his deliberations (9–10 December) Cicero is concerned with the establishment of *concordia*, which he sets up in opposition to both victory and war: 'As to the political situation, [Pompey] hinted certain war (*non dubium bellum*). There is no hope of agreement (*ad spem concordiae*).'<sup>17</sup> A week later (17 December), Cicero introduced *pax* into his language, and whilst he continued to use *concordia* (even together with *pax*), the new term dominates his letters: in 49, Cicero uses *concordia* eight times, and *pax* thirty-eight times. The idea of agreement (*concordia*) is maintained as an element required for the establishment of peace.<sup>18</sup> But as the certainty of war became more apparent – since by 11 January Caesar had crossed the Rubicon and been declared a *hostis* – *pax* became the explicit alternative.

The application of a language of open war directly influenced how peace and reconciliation were expressed and debated. *Pax* conventionally stood in opposition to *bellum*,<sup>19</sup> and whilst Rome described a foreigner (*peregrinus*) in terms of being 'made peaceful/pacified' (*pacatus*), the enemy (*hostis*) was characterised in relation to war and conflict.<sup>20</sup> War (*bellum*) and peace (*pax*) were part of the language through which one described the enemies and subjects of the *res publica*. The fear of the situation in the 40s drew on the language of war and its external aspect to contextualise relations between Romans, and in turn brought the concept of *pax* more explicitly into discussions of domestic stability. The increased use of *pax* in part emphasises the recognition and acceptance of open civil war as opposed to an internal disagreement, and provided tools

for the struggle for political legitimacy and supremacy in the armed conflicts of the period.<sup>21</sup> In this context of civil war, the possibilities of what peace meant in terms of the dynamics of relations between two opposing sides were still open to negotiation, as we will discuss below in reference to both the discourses of Cicero and Caesar.

Before turning to consider these possibilities of peace it is worth stressing the importance of understanding the individual contexts in which the ideas of peace were negotiated and debated. In late December 50, Cicero explicitly makes a distinction between what he says in public discourse and what he privately believes and endorses:

You will say ‘what therefore will your opinion be?’ Not the same as what I will say (in public). For my private opinion will be that all steps should be taken to ensure there is no civil conflict, but publicly I shall say what Pompey says and I shall not do it in an abject manner.<sup>22</sup>

Cicero was, of course, attempting to persuade Pompey of the benefits of reconciliation, away from the public debate. Nevertheless, he found it politically expedient to side with Pompey irrespective of the position adopted by him in relation to peace.<sup>23</sup> Yet, by the end of March, a letter he had written to Caesar (*Att.* 9.11a) was circulated, in which he stressed his role in advocating to both Pompey and the senate the path of reconciliation with Caesar, and Cicero expressed his relief to Atticus that his opinions on peace would be publicly on record (*Att.* 8.9.1). Cicero clearly felt confined by the political situation in late 50–early 49 due to his relationship with Pompey, which left him unable to express publicly his views regarding peace. In contrast to the stance he took in 49, by 43 Cicero utterly rejects the concept of peace through negotiation with Antony, arguing that peace for the state can only be achieved through Antony’s defeat. Similarly, the arguments on behalf of peace that Caesar makes in his correspondence in 49 are operating in a different context to his arguments in the *de bello civili*, once the outcome of the conflict was clear.<sup>24</sup> The context of the debate and the intended audience determined the language and stances adopted in relation to peace.

### Possibilities of peace

The civil conflicts that arose in 50/49 and 44/43 brought to the fore the question of the possibility of peace, and the possible interpretations of peace. It is worth noting that in the senatorial debates in both December 50 and January/February 43, the majority of the senate seemed to favour a peaceful settlement, or at least expressed a more cautious approach than explicitly declaring the outbreak of war. Appian records that on 1 December Curio put the question to the senate as to whether both Caesar and Pompey should lay down their commands, which received 370 to 22 votes ‘in order to avoid civil discord (ἄπὸ τῆς ἔριδος)’.<sup>25</sup> Similarly, the decision of the senate to send two

embassies to Antony in early 43 (one actual, the other decided upon but never sent)<sup>26</sup> indicates the majority were in favour of negotiations and the avoidance of conflict. Even the decision to declare a *tumultus* as opposed to a *bellum* in February 43 suggests a cautious approach to the tensions and a fear of actually confirming a state of civil war.<sup>27</sup>

Despite the resolve of the senate in December 50, Cicero's correspondence over the next several months narrates the precarious nature of the situation. Attempts to secure a peace without an armed conflict ultimately failed due to the rejection of negotiations by at least one of the political military leaders, if not both. It is clear from Cicero's letters that Pompey rejected the notion of peace from the start (although he did send Magius to discuss peace with Caesar in March 49),<sup>28</sup> and whilst Caesar and his agents appear to promote the idea of negotiation, Cicero questions their intentions, believing Caesar's actions belied his words.<sup>29</sup>

What, then, did peace mean for both Cicero and Caesar in 49? Several times in his letters Cicero speaks of the 'conditions of peace' (*condiciones pacis*),<sup>30</sup> implying that *pax* was a state to be achieved through negotiations between two sides. Caesar also uses the phrase several times in his *de bello civili*, as well as stressing the aspect of negotiation through the phrases: *legati de pace*; *colloquia de pace*; *oratio de pace*.<sup>31</sup> Indeed, 22 of the 23 instances of *pax* in *de bello civili* are used in the context of negotiation and discussion.<sup>32</sup> The final instance (3.90) comes in an indirect address of Caesar to his troops on his achievements. Whilst both Cicero and Caesar present similar interpretations of the mechanics of peace, their discourses also reveal their different intentions regarding the purpose of peace.

For Cicero, the self-proclaimed *auctor pacis*,<sup>33</sup> peace was a vital necessity for the stability of the state, whereas victory was to be avoided at all costs: 'Peace is needed (*pax opus est*). Out of victory will come both many evils and certain tyranny' (*Att.* 7.5.4). Whilst conventionally peace was the result of victory over one's opponents in war, Cicero re-orientates the relationship of these concepts. His reasoning is grounded in the fact that victory in civil war would involve the defeat and subjugation of Romans on one side of the equation. Peace, on the other hand, which Cicero conceptualises as an alternative to war, would avoid such an outcome.<sup>34</sup>

In March 49, L. Cornelius Balbus wrote to Cicero to convince him of Caesar's sincerity and desire for reconciliation with Pompey, sending copies of Caesar's letter to Balbus and Oppius on the subject.<sup>35</sup> The letter of Caesar indeed attests a desire to reconcile with Pompey, urging that the general should choose their friendship over relations with people who were 'most unfriendly' (*inimicissimi*) to them both, and whom he blames for the current political situation. Yet, Caesar also places a strong emphasis on the language of victory:

I decided that I should show myself as moderate as possible, and that I should work hard to reconcile myself (*ut reconciliarem*) with Pompey. Let us try by this means to see if we can recover the hearts of all and enjoy a lasting victory (*diuturna victoria*), since the rest have not been able by cruelty

to escape hatred nor to hold onto an enduring victory (*victoriam diutius*), except Lucius Sulla alone, whom I am not going to imitate. Let this be a new style of conquest (*haec nova sit ratio vincendi*) so that we are fortified by mercy and generosity.<sup>36</sup>

For Caesar, to be reconciled with Pompey was an opportunity to secure his position within the state, and therefore his own ‘victory’. Yet, he appears eager to avoid the image of a Roman victor imposing defeat and destruction on fellow Romans, as Sulla was perceived to have done.<sup>37</sup> Caesar is, in a sense, redefining the concept of victory (*haec nova sit ratio vincendi*), here demonstrated through clemency and reconciliation to his opponents as opposed to defeating them in battle. He even includes an example of his clemency – his capture and immediate release of one of Pompey’s engineers – hoping that this action will cause Pompey to prefer Caesar’s friendship. In effect, Caesar is attempting to engage in a discourse of peace and reconciliation that will enable him to maintain power within the state, through allying with Pompey against those trying to strip him of his position.

Whilst Caesar redefined victory, his desire to talk of it in the context of peace appears at odds with Cicero’s removal of the causal link between the conventional interpretations of peace and victory. Furthermore, Cicero remained unconvinced by Caesar’s actions and saw his besieging of Pompey at Brundisium (an act of war) as a rejection of peace: ‘where is the peace about which Balbus wrote that he was tearing himself up over?’<sup>38</sup>

In his correspondence of 49, Caesar espouses a desire for reconciliation and uses the language of *amicitia* to articulate his relationship with Pompey.<sup>39</sup> He clearly associates his ability to manipulate the situation in terms of ‘reconciliation’ in order to secure the most successful outcome for himself. What is apparent, through a comparison with his later work, the *de bello civili*, is that once Caesar’s position in 48 was secured, his presentation of victory and the administration of peace intensified. In his commentary he propagates a discourse on *pax*, which he used to attack those who, unjustly, sought to bring war to the state, as opposed to accepting his offers to negotiate for peace. In his justification of his actions in 49–48, he plays on the opposition of war and peace, of hostility and friendship. Although Caesar begins his narrative describing his opponents as *inimici* (‘personal enemies’), the term *hostis* (‘public enemy’) is employed far more frequently: 69 times, whilst *inimicus* (and its derivatives) is used 17 times, and only three times after *hostis* is introduced in 1.41.<sup>40</sup> Furthermore, in the instance when Caesar first uses the term *bellum*, in his assessment of the siege of Brundisium (1.25–26), he assigns responsibility for this state to his opponents’ inability to negotiate an agreement. By casting his opponents as the bringers of war, he was able to present himself as working to achieve peace for the state against violent enemies whose actions were tearing down the fabric of the *res publica*.<sup>41</sup>

Caesar continues to reiterate his desire to achieve negotiations through his use of friends and associates to relay *mandata*: Caninius (a *familiaris* and

*necessarius* of Libo) is sent to persuade Libo to promote peace with Pompey (1.26); Vibullius Rufus, Pompey's chief engineer, is sent to propose negotiations (3.10); and A. Clodius (a *familiaris* of both Caesar and Scipio) is sent to persuade Scipio of peace (3.57). Perhaps the most interesting of these negotiations in terms of the insight it offers for Caesar's definition of peace is the *mandatum* he sends to Pompey with Rufus. Caesar's argument is that at the current time he and Pompey are equals (*pares ambo videntur*), having both suffered setbacks. It is their equality that makes peace a viable option, as were the situation to change and one of them assume a position of superiority the possibility of negotiating peace would be lost; he would not be happy for an equal division, if he held all the cards.<sup>42</sup> On the definition of peace that Caesar here presents to his opponents, the *condicio pacis* in civil war is one of equality. This is striking, since it seems to run contrary to the conventional power dynamics between opponents in foreign war, where there was a discernible stronger and weaker party.<sup>43</sup>

Caesar's representation of both sides as equal is part of his manipulation of the language of war and peace to justify his position. At the eventual meeting of the two sides to discuss terms at the river Apsus, Caesar's legate, Vatinius, stresses the necessity of peace between fellow citizens in order to prevent civil conflict (*ne cives cum civibus armis decertarent?* BC 3.19.2). By treating both sides as citizens and equals Caesar demonstrates his leniency and efforts to secure the state, his *ratio vincendi* as it were. The response that Caesar puts in the mouth of Pompey's legate, Labienus, confirms their choice of violence against the state over reconciliation with Caesar: 'then let us stop talking about a settlement. As far as we are concerned, unless Caesar's head is bought back there is no possibility of peace (*pax*)'.<sup>44</sup> His opponents, through their words and actions, cast themselves in the role of *hostes* in the war against the state.

The discourse of *pax* propagated in Caesar's *de bello civili* is, of course, part of his tactics in the wake of his victories of 48. We have seen how Cicero disputed Caesar's claims of reconciliation, and similarly Caelius Rufus warned Cicero of the genuineness of Caesar's clemency in April 49, claiming that with victory Caesar's cruelty against his opponents and even those who had not sided with him would become apparent.<sup>45</sup> With the acknowledgement of civil war, the possibility of peace became a political tool with which to claim one's position within the state.

### The impossibility of peace?

The Pompeians' inability to acknowledge peace negotiations in Caesar's *de bello civili* is a tool for characterising his opponents as enemies of the *res publica*, in contrast to his own position; although as Batstone *et al.* have emphasised in their analysis of book 1, Caesar, in order to use the structure of the book as a vehicle for his overall argument of his beneficial role for the state and to provide an allegory for the whole war, brings closure to the conflicts with reconciliation after the battle of Ilerda (1.74–87).<sup>46</sup> Here, peace is only possible once the Pompeians seek a colloquium (as opposed to their usual rejection of negotiations) and agree

to the conditions Caesar presents: 'this is the one and ultimate condition of peace (*pacis condicionem*)' (1.85.3). Peace here is still possible, because ultimately its accomplishment is the basis for Caesar's self-justification.<sup>47</sup>

It is only in 44/43 that Cicero brought the possibility of peace firmly into question, contradicting his usual stance as *auctor pacis* by vehemently rejecting any suggestions of peace with Antony. In his 4th *Philippic*, delivered in the public assembly on 20 December, Cicero argues for the impossibility of peace with Antony, in that Antony's position in relation to the state could not even be conceptualised along the lines of conventional enemies:

Your ancestors, Men of Rome, had to deal with the kind of enemy (*eo hoste*) who possessed a state (*rem publicam*), a senate, a public treasury, a consensus of like-minded citizens (*concordiam civium*), and a consideration for a peaceful treaty (*pacis et foederis*), if events had developed that way. This enemy of yours (*hic vester hostis*) is attacking your state (*vestram rem publicam*), but he himself has none. He is eager to destroy the senate, the council of the world, but himself has no public council. He has emptied your treasury, but has none of his own. As for a united citizenry (*concordiam civium*), how can he have that when he has no community? What basis for peace (*pacis*) can there be with a person whose cruelty taxes belief and whose good faith is non-existent (*fides nulla*)?<sup>48</sup>

Cicero had, as early as his speeches against Verres, used the language and the imagery of the enemy of the state (*hostis*) to characterise homegrown threats, even before war was a necessity.<sup>49</sup> Verres was never officially declared a *hostis*, whilst it was only after his flight from Rome (after *In Cat.* 2 on 9 November 63) that Catiline was declared one. In the case of Antony, it was only after the delivery of Cicero's last *Philippic* (21 April 43), in which he is still demanding a declaration from the senate, that Antony was named *hostis*. Cicero strengthens his argument and purpose by creating the illusion that his opponents already were *hostes*, or in the very least should be understood as such. He goes one step further by declaring that Antony cannot even be understood on such rationalised terms as that of a *hostis* – a position, which would allow for eventual negotiation and treaties. Whilst Cicero seats much of his argument in the language of war (*bellum* occurs 186 times and *hostis* 128 times), he marks out Antony as distinct from conventional enemies of the state. He questions the very possibility of Antony being brought into a state of peace: *poteritne esse pacatus Antonius?* (7.24). His use of the adjective *pacatus* to describe Antony is particularly striking, as Cicero only uses *pacatus*, *-a*, *-um* twice in the *Philippics*, both times to describe Antony, whilst the noun *pax* is deployed 118 times (a frequency table of terms in the *Philippics* is provided in appendix 1).<sup>50</sup> The repetition of the idea of *pax*, coupled with the rejection of Antony as *pacatus* serves to emphasise Cicero's argument for the impossibility of peace. Unlike traditional enemies of Rome, who could after defeat be 'made peaceful', such a relationship with Antony is untenable.

Whilst Cicero's attitude appears to be a contradiction to his usual view, he argues that his position is based on the specifics of the current situation.<sup>51</sup> Unlike previous civil conflicts, where peace was possible even if not fully achieved, Cicero argues that Antony's actions demonstrate his total disregard for the values of peace and harmony that were vital for the survival of the *res publica*. In an attempt to rupture any potential negotiations of peace (which as we saw above received support from the senate), Cicero twice equates the concept with slavery (12.14; 13.2), and once contrasts it to victory (12.9), preferring to achieve peace for the state by victory over Antony:

Do you think that Aulus Hirtius (*cos.* 43) and Gaius Caesar [= Octavian], whose letters declaring the hope of victory (*spem victoria*) I hold in my hand, want peace (*pacem*)? They seek to conquer (*vincere*) and they have desired the sweetest and most beautiful name of peace (*pacisque dulcissimum et pulcherrimum nomen*) not through negotiation (*pactione*), but by victory (*victoria*).<sup>52</sup>

For Cicero, Antony is the ultimate enemy of the *res publica*. Victory over him, without the possibility of negotiation or peace, was the only route to restoring the state. This meant that at times the focus of Cicero's language on victory was a rejection of the name (rather than his own concept) of peace.<sup>53</sup> In the context of his *Philippics*, Cicero saw victory over Antony as the process through which *pax*, for the stability of the state, could be achieved.

Cicero's insistence on the impossibility of peace (as negotiation) obscures the debates in which his speeches were set, where different and opposing stances were adopted in relation to peace and the classification of war: the debate in the senate on 2 February proposed three different solutions to the tensions: peace/*pax* (Calenus), war/*bellum* (Cicero), and the recognition of internal discord/*tumultus* (L. Caesar). The speeches made by Calenus, in January and February, insist on the role of Antony in the restoration of stability and peace.<sup>54</sup> One of the arguments Calenus had made on 2 February was to correlate peace with the safety of all citizens.<sup>55</sup> Cicero, however, reverses this argument based on his definition of a *bonus civis*, illustrating how, in the civil conflicts of the late Republic from the Gracchi onwards, actions were at times necessary against citizens who threatened the *res publica*. Cicero's rhetoric against Calenus exemplifies how the language of peace was politicised in civil conflicts: his refutation of the viability of peace, with an opponent such as Antony (whose rejection of the terms of the first embassy merely added fuel to Cicero's argument), demonstrates the centrality of peace and negotiation to the discourse of political relations.

In the context of the continued debate over the possibility of peace in late March 43,<sup>56</sup> Cicero reflects on the recent historical contexts for the discourses on civil conflict and reconciliation in the late Republic:

Is peace (*pax*) with all men possible, or is there such a thing as an inexpiable war (*bellum inexpiable*), in which a pact of peace (*pactio pacis*) is a law for slavery? When Sulla tried, or pretended to try, to make peace (*pax*)

with Scipio,<sup>57</sup> it was not unreasonable to hope that if they came to terms a tolerable state of the community (*statum civitatis*) would emerge. If Cinna had been willing to come to an agreement (*concordiam*) with Octavius,<sup>58</sup> the Republic might have retained some degree of health (*sanitas*). In the latest war (*proximo bello*), if Pompey had been a little less serious and Caesar a great deal less greedy, we could have had a stable peace (*pacem stabilem*) and some semblance of a Republic (*aliquam rem publicam*).<sup>59</sup>

Here Cicero emphasises that the stability of the state hinged on the possibility of peace between warring citizens. Furthermore, he alludes to the idea that the act of making or seeking peace was generally understood as necessary for the state to function: Sulla, in Cicero's presentation, was aware of the importance of being seen to make peace, even if his intentions were not sincere. Historically, peace had indeed been possible in theory, if not in practice. Yet from the outset of his thirteenth *Philippic*, Cicero asks the Senate to consider whether the lure of peace might in fact be of detriment to political freedom (*libertas*)<sup>60</sup> – a key ideal of the *res publica*. The old conception and meaning of peace, which could previously be exercised between political leaders, is no longer possible.<sup>61</sup> The civil war of the present becomes, in Cicero's interpretation, a battle for the freedom of the state, in which the politicised nature of peace is manipulated to convince the audience of the impossibility of peace with Antony.

Cicero's arguments for the impossibility of peace were not immediately successful, and indeed Antony was only declared a *hostis* after his defeat at Mutina, which enabled the awarding of two victories against him.<sup>62</sup> In a sense, Cicero's version of Antony's relationship to the *res publica* was eventually proven correct. Victory over him, without the possibility of negotiation or peace, was the only route to restoration the state.

### The triumph of peace

The affirmation of the central position of *pax* in political discourses of the 40s is attested by a coin minted on behalf of Caesar by L. Buca in 44. The coin depicts the personification of Peace, as a diademed, veiled female bust, accompanied for the first time by an identifying legend (*PAXS*) on the obverse, with the joined hands of *concordia* on the reverse.<sup>63</sup> The appearance of Peace personified may be paralleled to the earliest labelled personifications of *CONCORDIA*, which appear on coinage minted between 66 and 61. Whilst there is some debate as to the precise date of these coins, minted by L. Aemilius Paullus (*cos.* 50) and L. Scribonius Libo, they illustrate the political relevance of the concept for at least the Aemilii and Scribonii, and perhaps offer a further contextualisation to the centrality of *concordia* to the political debates in the 60s, of which Cicero's policy and actions in 63 are a part.<sup>64</sup> In a similar vein, it is plausible that this first appearance of *PAXS* on the coinage in 44 reflects the term's growing prominence in political discourse, and that before this time there was not a need or desire to represent it on the coinage,<sup>65</sup> as

its place in political discourse was only fully established through the debates during the conflicts of the 40s. It is notable that the coin links *PAXS* with the clasped hands of *concordia*, echoing earlier coinage of Caesar minted in 48, which depicted *PIETAS* on the obverse, and the hands of *concordia* clasped around the *caduceus* (the symbol of *pax*).<sup>66</sup> This association aimed to strengthen the message propagated in Caesar's *de bello civili* of peace achieved through negotiation and agreement, in the name of (re)establishing the *res publica* securely.

The growing prominence of *pax* within political discourse of the late Republic was, in part, dependent on the language used to describe and analyse the conflicts of the period, and the different ways Roman politicians oriented themselves in relation to 'peace' and 'victory', ultimately as a means of expressing the stability (or lack thereof) of the state, and their position within it. It is possible to see a 'politicisation' of *pax* as a means of negotiating and reconciling relations between Romans. This manipulation of *pax* reached a culmination in 40, with the ovations of Mark Antony and Octavian. Unlike the discourses of 49 and 43, in the celebrations of 40 *pax* is used even where civil war is not openly acknowledged. Indeed, Lange has argued, 'the context and wording ought to convince most that this is about avoiding civil war'.<sup>67</sup> In the context of the *Fasti Triumphales*, the treaty at Brundisium in 40 may be seen as a commemoration of the triumph of *pax* over war, or at least civil conflicts.

The *Fasti Triumphales* entries of 40 present a normalisation of the use of *pax* in terms of describing relations between Romans in the context of civil conflicts. Reconciliation had achieved stability for the state, and it was conceptualised as a victory. This use of peace and reconciliation was far nearer to the definition of victory that Caesar spoke of during his conflicts with Pompey than to Cicero's vision of a *pax* achieved through victory and defeat of Antony. Perhaps the senate had hoped that this would be a 'lasting victory' for the state and that the peace established would continue. The employment of *pax* within the victory rhetoric of the final civil wars of the late Republic enabled the victors to commemorate their achievements and positions within the state without having to directly refer to their victory over fellow Romans. The culmination of this was that Augustus would remove the need for an ostensible opponent, celebrating the achievement of *pax parta terra marique*.<sup>68</sup>

The conflicts of the final decades of the late Republic cultivated the use of the language of war and peace in discourses on political stability, as a means to describe and articulate relations between political actors. Whilst we observe the rise in prominence of the term *pax* in the political debates of the 40s, what is most notable is the ways in which the use and application of the term were negotiated in relation to the context of the situation and the aims of the political agents. *Pax* became a politicised concept as a means of confirming and asserting one's position within the state and of alluding to the opposing position of one's rivals. The politicised nature of peace would ultimately lead to it becoming a central tenet of the emerging political system of the Principate as a means of justifying the new order; as Tacitus cynically noted, 'it was in the interests of peace that all power be conferred on one man'.<sup>69</sup>

Appendix Occurrences of 'concept' words in Cicero's *Philippics*

CONCEPT														
	<i>bellum</i>	<i>concordia</i> †	<i>felicitas</i> ‡	<i>fidelis</i> ‡	<i>hostis</i>	<i>libertas</i>	<i>otium</i>	<i>pactio</i>	<i>pax</i>	<i>pietas</i>	<i>salus</i>	<i>spes</i> ★	<i>tumultus</i>	<i>victoria</i>
<i>Phil.1</i>	1	2	0	0	0	2	1	0	6	0	3	1	0	0
<i>Phil.2</i>	20	3	3	1	7	8	2	0	9	2	3	4	0	1
<i>Phil.3</i>	4	3	3	3	7	17	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	2
<i>Phil.4</i>	1	3	1	2	16	10	0	0	3	0	1	3	0	1
<i>Phil.5</i>	3	6	3	1	9	11	1	0	4	1	6	8	2	0
<i>Phil.6</i>	11	1	0	3	0	4	1	0	2	1	1	1	2	1
<i>Phil.7</i>	10	1	0	2	11	5	0	0	24	0	2	7	0	0
<i>Phil.8</i>	31	1	0	3	5	4	3	0	13	1	1	3	12	1
<i>Phil.9</i>	5	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	1	0	0
<i>Phil.10</i>	7	1	0	1	1	16	2	0	2	0	2	3	0	0
<i>Phil.11</i>	39	1	0	4	15	5	3	0	1	0	3	3	0	2
<i>Phil.12</i>	13	0	0	5	8	4	0	2	31	0	4	9	1	5
<i>Phil.13</i>	25	3	1	6	15	9	1	1	21	5	4	0	0	0
<i>Phil.14</i>	16	0	6	3	34	7	0	0	2	3	7	4	0	14
	<b>186</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>27</b>

Notes

† *concordia* here refers to the *actes concordiae* 8 out of its 25 occurrences.

‡ the term *felix* (11) is included in the concept category of *felicitas*, and the terms *fides* (14) and *fidelis* (3) are included in the concept category of *fidelis*.

★ *spes* occurs with the genitive 32 times; most notably with *pacis* (6); with *libertatis* (5); with *victoriae* (3); with *salutis* (2); with *virtutis* (2); with *res publicae* (1), and with general restoration (2).

## Notes

- 1 Nedergaard (1994–95), Rich (1998), Dio 54.8.3: ἀνῆδι τροπαιοφόρῳ ἐτιμήθη.
- 2 Degrassi, *Fasti* 1.87, frag. XL of the *Fasti Triumphales Capitolini*: *Imp. Caesar Divi f. C. f. IIIvir r(ei) p(ublicae) c(onstituendae) ov[ivans, an DCCXIII] / quod pacem cum M. Antonio fecit, [—] / M. Antonius M. f. M. n. IIIvir r(ei) p(ublicae) c(onstituendae) ovans, an DCCXIII] / quod pacem cum Imp. Caesare fecit, [—]*; *RE* 18.1896. See Cass. Dio 48.31.3.
- 3 For the ovation as a ‘minor triumph’ see Gell. *NA* 5.6.20–21; Plin. *NH* 15.19; Dion. Hal. 8.67.10; Cass. Dio 19.16.11; Serv. *Aen.* 4.543; *RE* 18. 1890–1903; DNP 9.110; *OCD* 1084; Versnel (1970) 166–71; Lange (2014).
- 4 Dio 44.4; Suet. *Caes.* 79; Degrassi, *Fasti* 1.87, frag. XL.
- 5 Lange (2014) 75–6.
- 6 An ovation for the establishment of a truce was awarded to Manlius Volso (*cos.* 474) for the establishment of a 40-year treaty with Veii: *RE* 18.1896; whilst Livy 2.54 records that Manlius conducted no war: ‘The Veientes fell to Manlius as his province. There was no war; however, a forty years’ truce (*indutiae*) was granted on their request, and they were ordered to provide food and money. Peace abroad (*paci externae*) was at once followed by discord at home (*discordia domi*)’, Dion. Hal. 9.36.3 states that Manlius received the ovation because he put an end to the war.
- 7 Notably, *pax* received little mention in Hellegouarc’h’s *Le vocabulaire Latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la république* (1972) and is in no way marked out there as a necessary or relevant vocabulary of Republican politics.
- 8 The Roman concept of peace has received a certain amount of attention in scholarship since the early twentieth century: Fuchs (1926); Waddy (1950); Weinstock (1960); Jal (1961); Zampaglione (1973); Petit (1976); Gruen (1985); Milani (1985); Valvo (1985); Sordi (1985c); Woolf (1993); Rich (2003); Barton (2007); DeBrohun (2007); Raaflaub (2007b); Rosenstein (2007); de Souza and France (2008); Parchami (2009); Mastino and Ibba (2012); Gittings (2012). See Akar (2013) for the most recent and in depth study of *concordia*; see also Weinstock (1960) 74; Jal (1961); Weinstock (1971) 260–9; Rosenstein (2007) 231–2; Lobur (2008); On *otium*: Wirszubski (1954); Wirszubski (1960) 92–3; Valvo (1985) 155; Milani (1985) 25; Narducci (1991) 183–8; Barton (2007) 251.
- 9 Cic. *De leg. Agr.* 1.23 (63 BC): ‘We will find nothing so popular as peace, harmony and ease (*quam pacem, quam concordiam, quam otium*)’; *de leg. Agr.* 2.102 (63 BC): ‘There cannot be anything more popular than that which I deliver to you, this year, as a consul of the people: peace, tranquillity and ease (*pacem, tranquillitatem, otium*)’; *Att.* 9.11A (49 BC): ‘that a man of your admirable statesmanship would wish to act for the ease, peace and agreement of the citizens (*de otio, de pace, de concordia civium*)’; *Phil.* 2.24 (44 BC): ‘I did not cease to be the author of peace, harmony and agreement (*pacis, concordiae, compositionis auctor*)’.
- 10 All instances of *pacare* in Caesar’s *de bello civili* refer to external affairs (Gallia, Germania and the two Hispaniae): 1.7; 1.39; 1.85; 3.73. Myles Lavan explores the ambiguities inherent in *pacare/pacatus* in the language of Roman imperialism in this volume.
- 11 In Cicero’s *Philippics* *pacare* is used only twice, both times as a past participle/adjective to describe Antony or his character (*Phil* 5.24; 7.24); see the discussion below.
- 12 Morstein-Marx and Rosenstein (2006) 625–6; Batstone (2010); Flower (2010a); Flower (2010b) 135–53, 161–64; Wiseman (2010); Hölkeskamp (2013) 14–15.
- 13 The reference here is to Pompey.
- 14 Cic. *Cat.* 2.11: *Nulla enim est natio quam pertimescamus, nullus rex qui bellum populo Romano facere possit; omnia sunt externa unius virtute terra marique pacata; domesticum bellum manet: intus insidiae sunt, intus inclusum periculum est, intus est hostis. [ . . . ] Huic ego me bello ducem profiteor, Quirites.*
- 15 The practice of declaring citizens *hostes* was initiated by L. Sulla in 88: see Lintott (1968) 155; Bauman (1973); Bauman (1983) 337–40; Gaughan (2010) 126–31; Allély (2012) 21–8; Roselaar (2014).
- 16 Cic. *Phil.* 12.17; Allély (2012) 97.

- 17 Cic. *Att.* 7.4 (10 December 50); cf. Cic. *Att.* 7.3 (9 December 50): ‘whether the matter can be lead to an agreement (*ad concordiam*) or to a victory for the *boni* (*ad bonorum victoria*)’.
- 18 In a letter to Caesar, written on 19 March 49 (*Att.* 9.11a), Cicero states: ‘I, a friend of peace (*pax*) and of both of you, should be so supported by you that I may be able to work for agreement between you and amongst our fellow citizens (*me et pacis et utrisque vestrum amicium, et ad vestram et ad civium concordiam per te quam accommodatissimum conservari*)’. He seems to imply a correlation between the need for agreement both amongst the citizen body and between Caesar and Pompey themselves, that peace might be achieved. On Cicero’s search for harmony in 49, see Temelini (2005).
- 19 Gellius *NA* 10.27.3–5, citing Varro, records that a Roman embassy of 218 BC offered Carthage one of two options: the *hasta* (spear), symbolising war (*bellum*), or the *caduceus* (herald’s staff), symbolising peace (*pax*); see also Cic. *Phil.* 8.3: ‘there is no halfway house between war and peace’ (*etenim cum inter bellum et pacem medium nihil sit*).
- 20 Varr. *LL.* 5.5 categorises five types of territory: *Romanus, Gabinus, peregrinus, hosticus, incertus* (‘Roman, of Gabii, foreign, hostile and uncertain’), and goes on to qualify foreign land as *pacatus*; cf. Cic. *Rep.* 2.6: *pacatus an hostis si* (‘whether they are friend or enemy’). See Lavan in this volume on the ambiguities of *pacatus*.
- 21 On the use and manipulation of the language of internal stability see Achard (1981) 72–109; Lobur (2008) esp. 1–12; Akar (2013) 332–439.
- 22 Cic. *Att.* 7.6.2: *Dices ‘quid tu igitur sensurus es?’ non idem quod dicturus. Sentiam enim omnia facienda ne armis decertetur, dicam idem quod Pompeius, neque id faciam humili animo.*
- 23 Cic. *Att.* 7.3.5, although his attempts were unsuccessful: *Att.* 7.8.4.
- 24 See Batstone *et al.* (2012) 31–2 on the issues of dating the composition of *de bello civili*, though it is generally agreed to have been begun shortly after the events it relates.
- 25 Appian *BC* 2.30.
- 26 See Gotter (1996) 149–55 on the debate about the embassies, 155–72 on the opinion of the senate. On Cicero’s agreement to be part of the second embassy see Hall (2008).
- 27 Cic. *Phil.* 8.1–2: ‘everyone saw that war existed in fact, whilst there were some who wanted the term ‘war’ removed . . . we do not want this to be seen as a war (*omnes esse bellum quidamque id verbum removendum arbitrarentur . . . nolimus hoc bellum videri*)’.
- 28 Cic. *Att.* 7.4.2, 7.8.4, 7.9.4, 8.1.4, 8.11.2, 8.15.2, 9.7.3. See *Att.* 9.13a for the embassy of Magius to Caesar.
- 29 Cic. *Att.* 7.17.2, 7.18.2, 7.20.1, 7.23.1, 9.14.2, 9.18.
- 30 Cic. *Att.* 8.8.1, 8.12.2, 11.25.3; *Fam.* 5.21, 6.4. See also Caes. *BC* 1.26, 1.85, 3.10, 3.17.
- 31 Caes. *BC* 1.74, 3.18, 3.19. He also uses the construction *de concilianda pace* (1.26, 1.85).
- 32 Caes. 1.11, 1.26 (×2), 1.74, 1.85 (×5), 3.10 (×3), 3.17, 3.18, 3.19 (×6), 3.57 (×2).
- 33 Cic. *Lig.* 28; *Deiot.* 29; *Att.* 9.11a.2; *Fam.* 7.23.2; *Pro Marc.* 15; *Phil.* 2.24, 7.7, 7.8, 14.20.
- 34 Cic. *Att.* 7.14.3 (25 Jan 49): ‘Indeed, I do not cease from urging that matters pertain to peace (*ad pacem*); an unjust peace (*iniusta*) is more advantageous than the most justified war with citizens (*iustissimum bellum cum civibus*)’. Cicero’s desire for achieving peace between the two political leaders even prompted him to request from Atticus a work by a contemporary Greek scholar, Demetrius of Magnesia, entitled *περὶ ὁμονοίας*: *Att.* 8.11.7; 8.12.6; 9.9.2; see Temelini (2005).
- 35 Cic. *Att.* 9.7b: ‘From which you will see how much he desires to reconcile his agreement and Pompey’s (*concordiam suam et Pompei reconciliare*)’.
- 36 Cic. *Att.* 9.7c.1: *constitueram ut quam lenissimum me praeberem et Pompeium darem operam ut reconciliarem. temptemus hoc modo si possimus omnium voluntates recipere et diuturna victoria uti, quoniam reliqui crudelitate odium effugere non potuerunt neque victoriam diutius tenere praeter unum L. Sullam quem imitaturus non sum. haec nova sit ratio vincendi ut misericordia et liberalitate nos muniamus.*
- 37 Caesar’s rejection of the Sullan model may be a reply to Cicero’s concerns, voiced at least to Atticus, of Pompey’s desire for Sullan despotism, Cic. *Att.* 8.11.2: ‘now, as before, he desires that kind of Sullan rule (*Sullani regni*)’; Cic. *Att.* 9.7.3: ‘or our Gnaeus has a desire to emulate the rule of Sulla (*Sullani regni*) in a most bewildering manner’.

- 38 Cic. *Att.* 9.14.2: *ubi est illa pax de qua Balbus scripserat torqueri se?* (in response to Balbus' own comment in *Att.* 9.13a.2: 'I am tearing myself up (*torqueri*) after I again came into the hope of peace (*spem pacis*)').
- 39 Cic. *Att.* 9.7c.2: 'They ought to urge Pompey to prefer my friendship (*mihi esse amicus*) rather than those men who have always been the bitterest opponents (*inimicissimi*) to him and me'.
- 40 The distinction between *hostis* and *inimicus* is more than merely public versus private enemies; it is also entailed 'direct and violent confrontation': Gaertner and Hausburg (2013), 186; see also Raaflaub (2009b) 182, 189–91.
- 41 See Batstone *et al.* (2012) 33–88 for an analysis of the themes Caesar sets up in the structure of *de bello civili* 1 to create a sense of closure and stress his achievements.
- 42 Caes. *BC* 3.10: *non esse usurum condicionibus pacis eum, qui superior videretur, neque fore aequa parte contentum, qui se omnia habiturum confideret.*
- 43 This relationship of inequality is expressed through the weaker party seeking peace, or the stronger party offering it. A model for this power dynamic may also be seen in the concept of *pax deorum*. The Romans sought peace and forgiveness (*pax et venia*) from the gods through a dynamic process in order to achieve stability and safety for the state. See Santangelo (2011) for a thorough examination of the concept and extensive bibliography on the subject; see also Fuchs (1926) 186–8; Sordi (1985c) 146–50; Rosenstein (1990) 54–91; Rosenstein (1995) 64–6; Linderski (2000); Santangelo (2013) 80–2.
- 44 Caes. *BC* 3.19.8.
- 45 Cic. *Fam.* 8.16.
- 46 Batstone *et al.* (2012) 75–84.
- 47 Coins minted by Decimus Brutus in 48 BC depicted the personification of *PIETAS* on the obverse, with the joined hands of *concordia* and the *caduceus*, symbolising *pax*, on the reverse, which seems to echo the message of *de bello civili*: *RRC* 450/2, 451/3.
- 48 Cic. *Phil.* 4.14.
- 49 Cic. *Verr.* 2.1.9, 2.1.38; 2.2.17, 2.2.48, 2.2.51, 2.4.75; cf. *In Cat.* 3.15, 3.22, 3.28 and *passim*; *Phil.* 14.10, 14.12 and *passim*. On declarations of Romans as *hostes* see Allély (2012).
- 50 *Pacatus*, -a, -um: 7.24; 5.24: 'No one could endure his wickedness, even if it was peaceful (*pacatam*)'. Whilst Antony's villainy is here characterised as *pacata*, Cicero immediately follows this with the claims that Antony waged war (*bellum intulit*) on the province of Gaul, and of Decimus Brutus at Mutina, an act for which, Cicero claims, Antony cannot be viewed as a *civis*, but surely a *hostis*.
- 51 Manuwald (2007) 821.
- 52 Cic. *Phil.* 12.9; cf. *Ad Brut.* 2.5; *Fam.* 10.6.
- 53 Cic. *Phil.* 14.20: 'so that I, who have always been an advocate of real peace (*verae pacis auctor*) was hostile (*inimicus*) to this name of pestilent peace (*pestiferae pacis*)'; cf. Cic. *Att.* 7.8.4; 14.15. For the idea of a false *pax* see also Tac. *Ann.* 1.10.3: 'with the image of peace . . . a peace, which without doubt after this, was truly a bloody one'.
- 54 Dio 46.1–28; Cic. *Phil.* 8.11–19; Akar (2013) 430–438.
- 55 Cic. *Phil.* 8.13: 'And you described yourself as one who has always wished for peace (*pacem*), always wanted all citizens be safe (*civis salvos*)'.
- 56 Letters advocating peace with Antony were sent by Plancus, governor of Central Gaul (Cic. *Fam.* 10.6), and Lepidus, governor of Gallia Narbonese and Nearer Spain (Cic. *Phil.* 13.7a–21, 49; *Fam.* 10.27), whilst Antony claimed to have received communications from Hirtius and Octavian regarding the discussion in the senate about reconciliation (Cic. *Phil.* 13.36).
- 57 83 BC, Cic. *Phil.* 12.27.
- 58 87 BC, Appian *BC* 1.69–70.
- 59 Cic. *Phil.* 13.2.
- 60 Cic. *Phil.* 13.1: 'the insidious condition of peace might destroy our zeal for the recovery of freedom'.

- 61 Cic. *Phil.* 13.9 sets up a contrast between the kind of peace (*qualem . . . qua pace*) that Lepidus achieved with Sextus Pompeius, and the kind of peace that would exist between Antony and Rome.
- 62 Cic. *Ad Brut.* 1.3a, 27 April 43; see Allély (2012) 98–100. Earlier in the 70s Pompey and Metellus had been awarded triumphs for their victories in Spain, although Sertorius was never formally declared a *hostis*: Florus 2.10; Plut. *Crass.* 11.8; Allély (2012) 40–2. On the issues of receiving a triumph in civil war see Gellius 5.21; Val. Max. 2.8.7; Havener (2014).
- 63 *RRC* 480/24. This coin is agreed to represent the personification of the quality *pax* rather than a cultic figure. *Pax* as a goddess, rather than a concept or quality, had no history in the Republic: see Clark (2007) 8–9 and n. 15, 159–61; Weinstock (1971) 260–69. The unusual spelling of the legend (*PAXS* instead of *PAX*), might be paralleled to the variant spelling of *libertas* as *LEIBERTAS* on coins of Brutus (*RRC* 501/1, 506/6) and Cassius (*RRC* 500/2–5) minted on the move in 43/2 BC. Notably however, earlier coins of both Brutus (*RRC* 433/1, 54 BC) and Cassius (*RRC* 428/2, 55 BC) minted at Rome use the spelling *LIBERTAS*.
- 64 Crawford (1974) 441 dates the coins to 62, and sees them as representative of the political ideology of Cicero in 63. Akar (2013) 245–51, however, argues against a definitive link to Cicero's politics, and interprets the coinage as evidence of a wider engagement of the political elites with the concept in the 60s.
- 65 Gruen (1985) 52; Fears (1981) 773–804. Woolf (1993) 176 and Parchami (2009) 17 both state that *pax* as a coin legend occurs from Sulla onwards, although Parchami (2009) 17 n.11 does concede that the 'identity of the female deity on Sulla's coin is contested'. The caduceus does appear on some of Sulla's coinage (*RRC* 366 and 367); however, *PAX* as an identifying legend does not appear on Sulla's coinage (see *RRC* 366).
- 66 See n.47 above.
- 67 Lange (2013) 80.
- 68 See Augustus' victory inscription at Nikopolis: *pace parta terra [marique]* (AE 2009, 96); *RG* 13: *cum per totum imperium populi Romani terra marique esset parta victoriis pax*.
- 69 Tac. *Hist.* 1.1: *omnem potentiam ad unum conferri pacis interfuit*.

## 7 Peace and empire

### *Pacare, pacatus, and the language of Roman imperialism*

*Myles Lavan*

This chapter explores the intimate connection between the idea of peace and imperialist politics in the Roman empire.<sup>1</sup> My focus is not on the use of ‘pacification’ as a trope for conquest and annexation, which is familiar and banal, but rather on some more subtle ways in which the Latin lexicon of peace accommodates imperial ambitions. This is part of a broader project exploring how the Roman ruling class imagined their imperial project through the close analysis of language and discourse.<sup>2</sup> *Pax* is clearly a central value in Roman political culture, but it can only be understood fully as part of a wider system.

It is well known that the Roman elite and above all the emperors were deeply invested in the idea that Roman arms and monarchical rule had brought unparalleled peace to the world. There is no need to rehearse all the evidence here, given the massive bibliography on the subject.<sup>3</sup> Whenever Roman texts articulate a grand vision of the Roman imperial project, they regularly turn to the language of peace. Think of the use of *pax Romana* or *pax nostra* as metonymy for the *imperium Romanum* – not quite as common in Latin authors as in modern scholarship, but still a recurring trope.<sup>4</sup> Or the enigmatic but canonical statement of the Roman project by Virgil’s Anchises: ‘Remember, Roman, to rule peoples with *imperium* and to stamp habit/morality on peace (*pacique imponere morem*), to spare the abject and war down the proud’ (*Aeneid* 6.851–3). Whatever we make of *morem* here, the importance of *pax* is clear.<sup>5</sup> Among emperors, Augustus ostentatiously oversaw three closures of the gates of the Temple of Janus and the construction of the Ara Pacis and was probably responsible for introducing the public cult of Pax; the Flavians constructed the massive Templum Pacis complex in the centre of the city.<sup>6</sup>

It is also well established that the language and imagery of peace appear in contexts that seem to us incongruous. Augustus famously proclaimed a universal ‘peace born of victory’ (*parta uictoriis pax*, *RGDA* 13). The Flavian temple to Peace displayed trophies taken from the Jewish temple and was almost certainly funded by the spoils of the Jewish War.<sup>7</sup> In art, the personification of Peace regularly appears alongside Victories and the martial figure of Roma. *Pacifer* (‘the peace-bringer’) can be an epithet of Mars, the god of war, among others.<sup>8</sup> It is clear that Romans saw no contradiction in idealising peace and militarism simultaneously. Many scholars who have noted

these incongruities have explained them by positing that *pax* means different things in the spheres of domestic politics and foreign relations, denoting concord in the former and the subjugation of enemies in the latter.<sup>9</sup> Although it has its uses as a first approximation for those unfamiliar with the Latin language of *pax*, this dichotomy is reductive. It collapses the ambiguities that gave the language of peace such enduring appeal. Even when writing about subject peoples, Roman writers often use *pax* to denote the absence of internal conflict and external threat as well as conformity to the Roman order. Moreover, the distinction between domestic and foreign spheres is often blurred. Indeed, it is precisely its capacity to denote any or all of civic concord, stability in the provinces and expansion in the periphery that made it such a strong and persuasive word for both rulers and subjects. These ambiguities are the subject of this chapter.

Rather than try to add to the massive bibliography on *pax* in the compass of a short chapter, I focus instead on the cognate verb *pacare* and past participle *pacatus*, usually translated as ‘pacify’ and ‘pacified’ respectively and taken to exemplify the equation of *pax* with subjugation in the external sphere. The tropes of ‘peace-making’ are a familiar feature of the discourse of *pax*, but they have received little analysis.<sup>10</sup> Yet, they can shed considerable light on the surprising but productive ambiguities that are inherent in the Roman language of peace. Both words are considerably more complex than the glosses ‘pacify’ and ‘pacified’ suggest. *Pacare* is not a technical term for annexation, as sometimes suggested, but rather a relatively rare and much vaguer verb (‘make peaceful’, ‘bring into a state of peace’) that evokes a grand project of peacemaking, of which conquest is merely a single element. *Pacatus* is even more complex. As the past participle of *pacare*, it has the indeterminacy and flexibility of ‘made peaceful’ or ‘brought into a state of peace’ rather than the relatively narrow ambit of English ‘pacified’ (which has fossilised as a euphemism for the suppression of resistance to state power). More importantly, *pacatus* can also function as an adjective without any verbal sense, meaning ‘at peace’, ‘peaceable’ and/or ‘friendly’. The resulting ambiguity of meaning – conflating those who are peaceful and those who have been made so, the ‘peaceful’ and the ‘pacified’ – is perhaps the single best illustration of the way that the Roman idea of peace abroad encompasses an order founded on violence without being reducible to it.

What follows is a close semantic analysis of the Latin lexemes *pacare* and *pacatus* aimed at highlighting the ways in which the lexical field of peace is structured differently in Latin than in English and exploring what is lost in translation – particularly the ways in which the Latin language of peace works to motivate and legitimate an imperial project.<sup>11</sup> My approach is synchronous. Far too much scholarly energy has been devoted to speculations about the etymology and early history of the noun *pax*, far too little to mapping the complex semantics of the language of peace in the period in which most of our texts were written. The evidence base is thin: we have only around 250 instances of the lexemes *pacare* and *pacatus* in all Latin down to

Tertullian – and more than half of those are concentrated in just three authors (Livy, Cicero and Caesar). That is a meagre sample from which to map any semantic change. But it is enough to show that the meaning of both lexemes was always more complex than the literature on *pax* allows.

### ***Pacare***

The verb *pacare* is rarer than one might think. Setting aside for a moment the perfect participle *pacatus*, *-a*, *-um* because of the additional problems it raises, the other forms of the verb occur only around thirty times in all surviving Latin literature of the Republic and early Principate.<sup>12</sup> It is much rarer than other verbs in the lexicon of conquest: *subigere*, *domare*, *perdomare*, *in dicionem/in potestatem redigere* and their like.<sup>13</sup> A grand verb, quite at home in verse, it is a particular favourite of Caesar (6×), Ovid (5×) and Statius (4×), who together account for almost half of all attestations.

*Pacare* is all too often translated as ‘pacify’ or ‘subdue’. The *OLD* identifies only two primary senses: ‘1. To impose a settlement on (territories, peoples, etc). 2. To bring under control, subdue (individuals).’ But the core meaning of the verb – entirely ignored by the *OLD*, but recognised by the *TLL* – is ‘to make peaceful’ or ‘to bring into a state of peace’.<sup>14</sup> Far from being a specialised term for conquest or even annexation, it a much vaguer and more capacious word that can encompass a wide range of activities, defensive as well as offensive, civil as well as military, subsuming them all within a grand project of peace-making. It is, of course, understandable that many translators have seen fit to puncture this fine-sounding rhetoric to reveal the violence that lies behind it. In so doing they stand in a tradition that stretches back to the Romans themselves. The tendentiousness of Roman claims of peace-making was not lost on reflective Roman writers.<sup>15</sup> But this mistranslation comes at a cost. It obscures both the ambition of the claims being made and the surprising ambiguities to which they give rise by blurring the distinction between violence and other pillars of the imperial order.

The inadequacy of translations along the line of ‘bring under control’ or ‘subdue’ emerges most clearly from a few instances where the object of the verb is not some foreign territory or people, but something much closer to home. Describing the occupation of the Capitol by exiles and slaves led by Appius Hordonius in 460 BC, Livy has a Roman senator rebuke his fellow citizens for inaction, saying that they should ‘have rushed upon the Capitol; have brought liberty and peace (*liberare ac pacare*) to that most august house of Jupiter Optimus Maximus’ (3.17.5, trans. Foster, Loeb, 1922). The elder Seneca writes that the declaimer Romanus Hispo made a case for the justice of the killing of Cicero by arguing that ‘the Republic could not have been restored to peace (*pacari*) without the removal of that disturber of the quiet (*turbator otii*)’ (*Cont.* 7.2.13). *Pacare* clearly does not mean ‘subdue’ or ‘bring under control’ in these examples. Even ‘pacify’ would be a misleading translation, insofar as the English verb implies that the object of the verb was

the source of the disturbance, which *pacare* does not. ‘Make peaceful’ might work, but most translators have rightly preferred a circumlocution such as ‘bring peace to’ or ‘bring into a state of peace’.

Augustus had a particular predilection for the tropes of peace, but there is only a single certain instance of the verb *pacare* in his *Res Gestae*, an oblique reference to the war against Sextus Pompeius in Sicily: *mare pacavi a praedonibus* (25.1).<sup>16</sup> The ablative of separation in the adverbial phrase *a praedonibus* clearly shows that *pacare* can bear the sense of ‘protect against some external threat’ in a way that English ‘pacify’ cannot.<sup>17</sup> The difficulty we experience in translating Augustus’ statement nicely illustrates the disjunction between the Latin and the English (and French) tropes of pacification: ‘I freed the sea from pirates (Shipley, Loeb: 1924). ‘J’ai libéré la mer des pirates’ (Scheid, Budé: 2007). ‘I made the sea peaceful and freed it of pirates’ (Brunt & Moore, Oxford: 1967). ‘I brought the sea under control from pirates’ (Cooley, Cambridge: 2009, sacrificing English idiom in the pursuit of fidelity to the Latin, but adhering too closely to the *OLD*’s misleading translation).

There is no need to posit a sharp semantic discontinuity between these examples where peace is achieved by warding off some external threat and the use of the verb in the context of conquest, as when we read about Caesar ‘bringing peace’ to Gaul and Germany (*omnem Galliam Germaniamque pacaverint*, *BC* 1.7.6), Cicero to the Amanus (*pacare Amanum*, *Fam.* 15.4.8–10), Gracchus to Sardinia (*eam provinciam pacare*, *Livy* 41.15.6), Augustus to the Alps (*Alpes pacat*, *Sen. Brev. Vit.* 4.5), Domitian to the earth (*pacantem terras*, *Stat. Silv.* 5.1.261, ‘giving peace to the world’ in Shackleton Bailey’s Loeb translation), Tiberius to Germany (*delegatus pacandae Germaniae status*, *Suet. Tib.* 16.1) or the Roman people to the whole world (*totum orbem pacavit*, *Florus* 2.13.1).<sup>18</sup> To translate any or all of these as ‘pacify’ or ‘subdue’ or – worse – ‘reduce’ or ‘conquer’ (as many have done) is to mistake reference for sense. In many of these cases, the actions to which the verb refers clearly include what we would regard as wars of conquest. But the fact that *pacare* is capable of denoting (in the strict sense of referring to) particular acts that we would describe as conquest does not mean that we should construe or gloss it as ‘subdue’ or ‘bring under control’. No less than the earlier examples, the verb means ‘bring into a state of peace’.

*Pacare* does not mean ‘bring under control’ or ‘subdue’, though it is often used in the context of annexation. It is a much more capacious verb that can encompass a wide range of Roman actions, subsuming them all within a single overarching project of extending, preserving or restoring the domain of *pax* in the world. It can do so because it focuses on the lasting outcome of action rather than the transient action itself – on the peace that results rather than the particular means of achieving it. Because it focuses on ends not means, it tells us little or nothing about the precise nature of the activity described: that must be deduced from the context, if at all. Both the sense of imperial purpose and the useful vagueness are lost if we trivialise this relatively rare and grand word by construing it as merely another term for conquest.

***Pacatus, -a -um***

The participial form *pacatus, -a, -um* is around seven times more common than the other forms of the verb *pacare*.<sup>19</sup> All too often, it is unreflectingly construed as the perfect passive participle of the verb *pacare* and translated as ‘pacified’, ‘subdued’, etc. But *pacatus* raises more profound problems of interpretation, because it can also function as a simple adjective, flexibly expressing some connection with *pax* without any obvious verbal sense.<sup>20</sup>

There are certainly cases where the syntax and/or context clearly require it to be understood as a participle, as for example at Livy 41.11.9: *Histria tota trium oppidorum excidio et morte regis pacata est* (‘All Histria was made peaceful by the destruction of three towns and the death of the king’). The passive perfect retains the vagueness of *pacare* and does not necessarily imply conquest or annexation, even when the subject is a foreign people or territory. A particularly good illustration can be found in Cicero’s speech on the allocation of the proconsular provinces in 56 BC:

Macedonia, which used to be fortified not by towers but by the trophies of many generals and which has long been kept at peace (*pacata*) by many victories and triumphs, is now so vexed by barbarians . . . that the people of Thessalonica, situated in the heart of our empire, are forced to abandon their town and fortify their citadel.

(*Prov. Cons.* 4)

It is clear from this sentence (and those that follow) that *pacata* here refers to Rome’s efforts to protect the province from external threats (efforts now jeopardised by greedy and incompetent governors), not the earlier conquest or annexation of the province itself.<sup>21</sup> Rome has (until recently) preserved Macedonia and its inhabitants in a state of peace by overawing the barbarians beyond its borders.

But *pacatus, -a, -um* is not always to be construed as a past participle. There are many instances where it is equally clearly functioning as an adjective without any obvious verbal function. A few clear examples: Vitruvius refers to ‘times that are peaceful and without fear’ (*pacatis et sine metu temporibus*, 10.9.7). Ovid writes of ‘a branch of peaceful olive’ (*pacatae ramus oliuae*, *Pont.* 1.1.31).<sup>22</sup> Pliny the Elder describes attempts to estimate the dimensions of the Mediterranean and other seas as *pacata audacia* – ‘peaceful daring’ or ‘daring in peacetime’ (*HN* 6.208). Martial exclaims *tam pacata quies* of the emperor’s slaves and freedmen (9.79.6) – ‘so unruffled their calm’ in Shackleton Bailey’s translation). In none of these cases does it make sense to construe *pacatus* as the perfect passive participle of *pacare*: there is no obvious reference to past action. Instead, *pacatus* is functioning as a simple adjective. On my own reading, the use of *pacatus, -a, -um* as an adjective without any obvious verbal sense is more common than its use as the past participle of *pacare* throughout Latin literature – though any attempt to assess relative frequency is complicated by the difficulty of conclusively disambiguating between the two senses (a problem I will return to).<sup>23</sup>

The meaning of the adjective can be modulated by the context to focus variously on external state ('at peace', 'undisturbed', 'not at war') or internal disposition ('peaceable', 'calm', 'not warlike').<sup>24</sup> It also often refers specifically to a disposition towards or relationship with the focaliser ('at peace *with us*', 'with whom *we* are at peace'). This relational sense is a particularly common and peculiarly Latin idiom, equivalent to English 'friendly' ('friendly nations', etc.). Cicero writes of the vulnerability of coastal cities given the difficulty of determining whether someone arriving by ship is *pacatus* or *hostis* – where we would say 'friend or foe' (*Rep.* 2.6). It is in this sense that *pacatus* can function as an antonym of *hostis* ('enemy') and a near-synonym of *socius* ('ally') and *amicus* ('friend'). This is also the sense in which even Roman commanders on campaign can be described as *pacati*. In Livy, for example, the city of Kibyra sends envoys to a Roman commander begging him 'to enter its territory *pacatus* ('in peace', 'as a friend') and restrain his troops from pillaging' (38.14.5). Later some Balkan peoples send ambassadors to the senate to complain about a Roman consul:

They said that the consul Cassius had commanded them to provide guides to show him the way as he led his army into Macedonia. He had left their territory *pacatus* ('peaceably', 'as a friend') as if to wage war on someone else. Then, returning from the middle of his journey, he had traversed their territory as an enemy (*hostiliter*). There was slaughtering, plundering and burning everywhere.

(43.5.3–4)

In neither of these cases is there any suggestion that these Romans are men of peace, in the sense of unwarlike or not at war – still less that they have been subdued. What *pacatus* describes is their disposition towards the people who are speaking. Even in its adjectival sense, therefore, *pacatus* is much more flexible than English 'peaceful', which tends to select for the meaning 'at peace' (state) when qualifying times or places and for the meaning 'peaceable' (disposition) when qualifying persons or peoples and cannot convey the relational sense of *pacatus* at all. Hence, it is often necessary to resort to circumlocutions to translate the adjectival uses of *pacatus* into English.

Both the *OLD* and the *TLL* recognise the distinction between the participial and adjectival uses of *pacatus*. The *OLD* has two separate entries, one for the adjective *pacatus*, *-a*, *-um* ('existing in conditions of peace'; 'disposed to peace'; 'associated with peace'), another for the verb *pacare* with its participle *pacatus*. The *TLL* has only one entry, but sharply distinguishes instances of the verb *pacare* (21.20–22.37), including the use of *pacatus* as participle, from the use of *pacatus* as an adjective (22.38–24.18). Where both mislead is in the confidence with which they assign particular instances to one or other category. In reality, it is often very difficult to disambiguate between the adjectival and participial senses. Syntax alone is rarely conclusive. Even when *pacatus* is combined with the copula *esse*, it can be construed as an adjective as well as

a participle. *Provincia pacata est* makes equally good sense as ‘the province is peaceful’ (describing a state) and ‘the province was made peaceful’ (referring to an action). Similarly, the ablative absolute *provincia pacata* can be construed either as ‘when the province had been made peaceful’ (participle) or as ‘with the province at peace’ (adjective). There are a few cases where the syntax selects for one or the other meaning, e.g. in the presence of an adverbial phrase expressing agency or instrument, which would select for a verbal sense, or when the tense of *esse* is not one normally used in the analytic tenses of the passive (e.g. *provincia pacata fuit*), which would select for the adjectival sense. In all other cases, only context can select between ‘peaceful’ and ‘made peaceful’ – and it is rarely conclusive. For a Roman reader, there was probably little at stake in the distinction: either way, the focus is on the lasting state of peace. As I have already pointed out, the verb *pacare* focuses on the end, not the means – on the peace that results rather than the particular mode of peace-making.

### *Ciuitates pacatae*

One might perhaps expect the participial sense to predominate when *pacatus* is applied to foreign peoples and places. But a few examples clearly show otherwise. Perhaps the most striking is to be found in Cicero’s speech in defence of L. Valerius Flaccus, a former governor of Asia who was prosecuted for extortion in 59 BC. Because the Jews of the province were among the groups giving evidence against Flaccus, Cicero spends some time mobilising the jurors’ contempt for them in order to discredit their testimony. He dwells on their long-standing antipathy to Rome:

When Jerusalem stood and the Jews were *pacati* (*stantibus Hierosolymis pacatisque Iudaeis*), even then that superstition recoiled from the splendour of this empire, the dignity of our name and the customs of our ancestors; this is all the more true now that that race has shown with arms (*ostendit armis*) how it feels about our empire. Just how dear it is to the immortal gods was shown by the fact that it was defeated, given to the tax farmers, made a slave.  
(*Flac.* 69)

This is Cicero at his most frankly imperialist, expressing contempt for the Jews and their religion and celebrating their defeat and metaphorical enslavement to Rome – precisely the context in which one might expect *pacatus* to be a bare euphemism for conquest. It is perhaps understandable that the *TLL* goes astray in citing this passage as an example of the use of *pacare* in the context of military victory (s.v. *pacare* 21.32). But a closer look shows that the ablative absolute *pacatis Iudaeis* cannot mean ‘when the Jews had been made peaceful’, i.e. conquered by Rome, because the context requires precisely the opposite chronological reference – to the period before the Roman conquest. Cicero is contrasting the Jews’ conduct before and after the internal conflict (misrepresented here as a rising against Rome) which gave Pompey a pretext to

intervene, capture Jerusalem and impose tribute in 63 BC.<sup>25</sup> Pompey destroyed the city's walls and those of the temple precinct; hence Cicero's reference to the time 'when Jerusalem (still) stood'. *Pacatis Iudaeis* is implicitly contrasted with *ostendit armis* in the following sentence. It can only mean 'when the Jews were at peace' or – since the Jews were regularly at war with their neighbours in this period – 'when the Jews were at peace *with us*' (the relational sense) – as all good translators have seen.<sup>26</sup> Even in the most avowedly imperialist rhetoric, *pacatus* can just mean 'peaceful', without any suggestion of conquest. This demonstrates not just that *pacatus* does not always mean 'made peaceful' when qualifying a foreign people, but that this cannot even be its most salient meaning, or more disambiguation would have been needed here.

A second example, from Cicero's speech in defence of Sestius: 'Foreign wars against kings, peoples, tribes have been extinguished for so long that we now have excellent relations with peoples whom we allow to be *pacati* (*quos pacatos esse patiamur*)' (*Sest.* 51). *Pacatos esse* here is clearly describing a state, not an action: Cicero's point is that if foreign peoples are not at war with Rome, it is because Rome has chosen not to wage war on them – not the reverse. Peace is in Rome's gift alone. Livy, too, uses *pacatus* in contexts where any suggestion of conquest would be entirely out of place. Making the case for a Roman invasion of Africa in 205 BC against the objections of more cautious senators, Scipio argues that it harms Rome's reputation abroad to have it said 'that Africa was attacked by our armies and fleets in the previous Punic war when we were fighting for Sicily, whereas now, when we are fighting for Italy, Africa is *pacata* (*Africam pacatam esse*)' (28.44.13). This clearly cannot mean 'that Africa has been *made* peaceful'. *Pacata* is explicitly contrasted with *oppugnata* ('attacked') and means 'undisturbed', i.e. it has not been invaded by Rome. Elsewhere, recording the migration of a group of Gauls over the Alps into Italy in 179 BC, Livy notes that they sent an embassy to Rome requesting permission to settle, asking that 'they might be *pacati* under Roman rule' (*ut pacati sub imperio populi Romani essent*, 40.53.5). *Pacati* here is simultaneously a request (that the Romans leave them in peace) and a promise (that they will live peaceably). It is certainly not a request to be pacified. Later, during the Achaean revolt of 146 BC, Livy describes the leading citizens of other Greek cities debating whether they should request a Roman garrison: some thought it would be a useful precaution; others felt that it would be humiliating 'for peaceful and allied states (*pacatae et sociae ciuitates*) to accept what was customary for those who were taken in war (*bello captae*) and hostile' (43.17.8). Here *ciuitates pacatae* are explicitly contrasted with those that have been conquered.

I have focused on Cicero and Livy, because their large oeuvres together account for more than half of all surviving instances of the lexeme *pacatus* and best illustrate its full semantic range. These examples should suffice to demonstrate that the context of empire is not in itself sufficient to select for the participial ('made peaceful') rather than adjectival sense ('at peace', 'peaceable', 'friendly'). Even here, *pacatus* can – and often must – be construed as an adjective without any obvious verbal sense. The *ciuitates/gentes pacatae* and the *pacati*

(the adjective used as substantive) that figure so often in Latin writing are not specifically conquered peoples, though they certainly include some peoples that were conquered; they are peoples with whom Rome is at peace, who pose no threat to the Roman order and/or who live in a state of peace (an ambiguity I will return to).

It is this common non-verbal sense that explains the strong appeal of *Pacatus* as a personal name throughout the empire. One notable example is Julia Pacata [Induta?], wife of the equestrian procurator Julius Alpinus Classicanus (*RIB* 12) and daughter of the Treveran noble Iulius Indus who led an *ala* of loyalist Treveri against his rebellious countrymen during the Gallic revolt of 69–70 CE (*Tac. Ann.* 3.42). Sherwin-White suggested that Indus ‘celebrated’ the defeat of the rebels ‘by giving his daughter the name of Pacata or “Pacified”’.<sup>27</sup> But there are no grounds for connecting her birth to the events of 70 and the gloss ignores the primary, adjectival sense of *pacatus* – ‘peaceable’ and/or ‘at peace’, not ‘pacified’. Iulia Pacata is only one of many *Pacatae* and *Pacati* attested on epitaphs from all over the western provinces.<sup>28</sup> Their numbers include Roman citizens as well as peregrines, Italians as well as provincials. Their names are not coded references to conquest; rather they express a much more general commitment to the ideal of *pax* and thereby to the new order established by Rome and the emperor.

### ***Pacare, pacatus, and the Roman Imperial imagination***

The last section could easily be extended with close readings of other passages, seeking to disambiguate between the participial and adjectival uses. But this would be tedious and would quickly become highly subjective. Although there are some cases where *pacatus* clearly must be construed as an adjective without any obvious verbal sense and others where it demands to be construed as a participle, in many passages both senses are plausible. More importantly, it is almost certainly misguided to insist on disambiguation in all cases. *Pacatus* is an inherently ambiguous word and we need to recognise those ambiguities to understand the importance of *pax* and its cognates in Roman discourse.

What is most interesting about the lexemes *pacare* and *pacatus* is not that they were used as euphemisms for conquest, but that they were never restricted to this usage. They always retained their capacious and evocative senses – ‘make peaceful’ and ‘(made) peaceful’ – and continued to be used in a wide range of other contexts. Hence, it is often impossible to distinguish a statement that a people or territory were made peaceful (in whatever manner) from a statement that they are peaceful. At the root of the ambiguity is the meaning of the verb *pacare*, which focuses on the outcome of the action – a lasting state of peace – rather than the action itself. Latin writers had other words at their disposal that could have avoided the ambiguities created by *pacatus*. Alternatives include participles such as *domitus* and *subactus* for denoting those who had been subdued by force and adjectives such as *quietus* and *tranquillus* for denoting those who were peaceable or at peace or *amicus* or *socius* for denoting those who were well disposed to Rome. Yet Romans continued to favour *pacatus* in all these contexts.

The ambiguities of the Latin language of peace can be hard for us to grasp because of the structure of the lexical field of peace in English, where the adjective 'peaceful' and the participle 'pacified' restrict each other's semantic range. In translating *pacatus* into English, for example, we are often forced to choose between the two words. The decision is an important one because they imply mutually exclusive conceptions of the character of the people described and their relation to the imperial power. At stake is a distinction between a peace based on choice and one based on coercion. Yet this need to disambiguate is an obstacle to understanding insofar as it collapses the polysemy of the Latin lexeme. It obscures the possibility that the different senses of *pacatus* can interact and that meaning might even be suspended between them.

This semantic richness was surely central to the appeal and power of the language of *pax* in Roman discourse. In a single word *pacatus* encompasses a whole vision of the imperial project: peoples who live peacefully can expect to be left in peace by Rome and to enjoy peaceful security from all other threats, guaranteed by Rome; conversely, those who are a threat to peace are Rome's natural enemies and can expect to be treated accordingly, in the pursuit of universal *pax*. The different facets of meaning noted earlier ('peaceable', 'friendly', 'undisturbed') can coexist superimposed, unless the context selects for one in particular. The polysemy of *pacatus* also explain why it finds a place not just in accounts of Roman campaigning (where we would expect to find reference to peoples and places being *made* peaceful by Roman arms) but also in descriptions of the depredations of Roman magistrates and soldiers in the provinces, in which *pacatus* takes its place alongside *socius* as one of the terms of choice for the victims of predation.<sup>29</sup> These texts are intended to elicit outrage at the abusers and sympathy for the victims. The point is not that they have been conquered, but that they are peaceable peoples with whom Rome is at peace. It is an outrage to treat them like enemies.

Moreover, it is probably misleading to try to evacuate the adjective *pacatus* of all verbal meaning. Given the lexeme's participial form and the obvious link to the verb *pacare*, the sense of having been *made* peaceful must always be there to be recuperated, even if it is not particularly salient in many contexts. To describe a people or territory as *pacatus* is always to admit the implication that they have been made so, in some way or other. At a deeper level, the very form of the lexeme encodes a distinctively Roman perspective on the state of being peaceable and at peace as something that is produced in the world, rather than natural to it. One might compare the English adjective 'civilised'. Although it has the form of a past participle, when we write of 'civilised peoples' or 'civilised societies' we are normally describing a state, without any obvious reference to a past action. Yet, the past-participle form encodes an implicit belief that all civilisation is made. *Pacatus* similarly locates the state it describes in the sphere of culture rather than nature; its very form implies that peace depends on some peacemaker. Conversely, to insist on sharply distinguishing passages where *pacatus* is a participle – especially those where it is used in the context of conquest – from those where it is an adjective meaning 'at peace', 'peaceable' or

'friendly' is to obscure the ambition inscribed in the verb. Peoples who have been *made* peaceful are immediately subsumed into the category of those who already were peaceful. The verb expresses a remarkable confidence in Rome's ability to transform its conquered subjects – to make them peaceful.

The language of peace-making is obviously ideological in that it ascribes a larger purpose to Roman expansion. If anyone was 'duped' by this, it was surely the imperial elite as much as their provincial subjects. It allowed them to see themselves as working in the service of a grand project of almost cosmological ambition.<sup>30</sup> At a general level, this is a familiar idea. The goal of this chapter has been to go deeper, by looking closely at the semantics of two key words in the lexicon of peace. I have sought to illustrate some ways in which the lexical field of peace is structured differently in Latin than in English, particularly regarding the intersection between peace and coercion, and to explore the cognitive implications of that lexical structure, i.e. the consequences for how Roman writers wrote, and presumably thought, about peace.

Roman writers' obvious comfort with the ambiguities created by the use of *pacare* and *pacatus* reveals a striking indifference to distinctions we might think important, such as between conquest and defence or between an order based on volition and one based on violence. The language of peace animated a much more ambitious vision of the imperial project than that implied by contemporary tropes of pacification. Construing or translating *pacare* and *pacatus* as 'pacify' or 'pacified' obscures the colossal ambition and confidence of an imperial culture committed to making the world peaceful through conquest.

## Notes

- 1 I am grateful for the comments and suggestions of Hannah Cornwell, Michael Reeve, Beppe Pezzini, Chris Whitton, Nicolas Wiater, Gareth Williams and other discussants in Columbia University and the conference in which this volume originated.
- 2 Initiated in Lavan (2013).
- 3 Particularly useful compilations of the evidence: Mastino and Ibba (2012), Koch (1949) and Christ (1938) 103–12. On the ideological importance of peace in Roman imperial culture see, above all, Woolf (1993).
- 4 *Pax Romana*: Sen. *Prov.* 4.14, *Clem.* 1.4.2, Plin. *HN* 27.3, Martial 7.80.1. *Pax nostra*: Silius 14.685, Tac. *Ann.* 12.33. *Pax Latina*: Stat. *Silv.* 3.2.137–8.
- 5 On the difficulties of interpretation see Horsfall (2013) ad loc. and Kraggerud (2011) (arguing provocatively for the reading *pacisque imponere mores*).
- 6 Weinstock (1960) 44–52, Noreña (2003), Mastino and Ibba (2012).
- 7 Noreña (2003).
- 8 *TLL* s.v. *pacifer* 12.34–5, mostly from the late-second and third centuries.
- 9 Some examples: '*Pax* was no longer a pact among equals or peace but submission to Rome, just as *pacare* began to refer to conquest. But submission guaranteed peaceful life and the Romans liked to stress this point' (Weinstock (1960) 45, the last sentence is an important qualification omitted by many who have echoed him). '*Pax*, when applied to the peoples under Roman sway, referred to those who had been subdued and pacified' (Gruen (1985) 52). 'Outside of the Republic, *pax* rang of war, defeat, humiliation, compulsion' (Barton (2007) 247). 'Peace to the Romans meant something quite different from modern conceptions. It was the product of victorious war, something imposed on the vanquished, the product of surrender, humiliation, and a

- breaking of the enemy's spirit.' (Rosenstein (2007) 27). 'The concept behind the Latin *pax* is often best rendered as "pacification"' (DeBrohun (2007) 257). 'Pax has a dual meaning . . . *Pax* in [the] domestic and civilian sense must not be confused with the sort of *pax* that the Romans imposed upon conquered peoples. This other, militaristic *pax* . . . was the product of foreign conquest' (Noreña (2011) 127).
- 10 The most significant exceptions are the short note on *pacare* by Wölfflin (1888) and the brief responses by Fuchs (1926) 201 n.2 and Christ (1938) 111–12. There is also the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* article on *paco* by F.M. Fröhlke (1982), which is also the only substantial discussion of the semantics of *pacatus* that I am aware of, but the *TLL* format obviously precludes any discussion of the word's wider significance.
  - 11 My analysis is informed by both structuralist and cognitive approaches to the problem of meaning variation in lexical semantics, but I have kept technical terms to a minimum.
  - 12 A search in the Library of Latin Texts – Series A (Brepolis) yields only thirty-two instances in all authors up to and including Tertullian.
  - 13 A crude measure is the relative frequency in the LLT-A database of the 3rd person perfect (both singular and plural), as would be expected in historical narrative: *subegit/-erunt* (69×), *domuit/-erunt* (41×), in *dicionem/potestatem redegit/-erunt* (13×), *perdomuit/-erunt* (10×), *debellauit/-erunt* (7×), *pacauit/-erunt* (3×).
  - 14 *TLL* s.v. *pacare* 21.14–15: *efficitur status quietus populorum, terrarum*, sim. This will not come as a surprise to good Latinists. Note the translations by e.g. D. R. Shackleton Bailey and Manfred Fuhrmann quoted below.
  - 15 Tacitus is the most obvious example, several times alluding to the way the language of peace serves to cloak violence and exploitation. Most famous is the *sententia* he attributes to the British chieftain Calgacus: 'where they make a desert, they call it peace' (*ubi solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant*, Ag. 30.5). Elsewhere, he writes of British peoples who united against Rome in the aftermath of the Claudian invasion because 'they feared our peace' (*pacem nostram metuebant*, Ann. 12.33). It is striking that Tacitus' own narrative voice altogether avoids the verb *pacare* in the context of empire.
  - 16 *Pacui* is regularly restored in the lacuna at 26.2: *Gallias et Hispanias provincias, iſtem Germaniam, qua incluſit Oceanus a Gadibus ad ostium Albis fluminis pacui*. . . .]. But the Greek translation there (*en eirēnei kateſtēsa*) is different from that offered for *pacui* at 25.1 (*eirēneusa*) and other restorations have been suggested, including *composui*, *constitui*, *pae deuinxi* and *in pace posui*. See the apparatus in Malcovati (1969). Note also [*Alpes*] . . . [*pacari feci*] or [*pacificau*]i at 26.3 (*eirēneusthai pepoiēka* in the Greek translation). The multiple periphrastic constructions in the Greek version illustrate the difficulty the translator experienced in rendering the Latin tropes of peace-making in Greek. The use of *eirēneuō* as a transitive verb to translate *pacare* at 25.1 is unparalleled. Elsewhere, the verb always means 'to be peaceful', not 'to make peaceful'. The innovative use of *eirēnē* and cognates in the translated *Res Gestae* does not seem to have had any influence on later Greek writers. The closest equivalent Greek literature of the imperial period offers to *pacare* is *hēmeroō* ('tame', closer to Latin *domare*) e.g. at Cassius Dio 26.37.3, 42.5.3 (both referring to freeing the sea from pirates) and also 40.43.3 and 53.13.1.
  - 17 *Pacatus* is similarly used with an ablative of separation at Livy 34.24.4 (in an appeal by the Achaeans for Roman help against the Spartan tyrant Nabis and his Aetolian allies): *uos rogamus . . . ita res Graeciae constitutis ut ab latrocinio quoque Aetolorum satis pacata haec relinquatis*: 'we ask you . . . to set Greek politics on a footing that will leave Greece at peace and safe from the brigandage of the Aetolians too'. See the perceptive note in Weissenborn and Müller (1880–1924) ad loc., observing that *pacatus* encompasses the sense *tutus*.
  - 18 It is probably significant that when *pacare* is used in the context of warfare, the noun it takes as its object is more often in the category of territories than that of populations, inviting an interpretation along the lines of 'make somewhere peaceful (by eliminating some threat)'.
  - 19 A search of the LLT-A database up to and including Tertullian yields 209 examples, as against only 32 instances of other forms of *pacare* (cf. ratios of 32:2 in Cicero, 9:5 in Caesar and 87:3 in Livy).

- 20 All participles admit of attributive use (i.e. performing the normal function of a true adjective) alongside their usual predicative function (i.e. completing the verbal predicate). My argument is that *pacatus* is one of the relatively small number of past participles that were usually or exclusively used attributively and that do not necessarily imply past time or even a passive meaning (other examples being *tacitus* and *quietus*).
- 21 So also Fuhrmann (1970–82): ‘viele Siege and Triumphe hatten ihr längst den Frieden gebracht’.
- 22 A proper appreciation of the regularity of the use of *pacatus* as an adjective meaning ‘peaceful’ rather than a participle removes much of the pressure to emend this supposedly anomalous instance of *pacatae* (Reeve (1974) 117–18 suggested *bacatae*).
- 23 One crude, but independent, measure is the *TLL* entry for *pacare*, which devotes 150 lines to the adjectival sense of *pacatus*-, -a, -um (22.37–34.18) compared with 108 lines for the verb proper including, but not limited to, the past participle (21.14–22.37).
- 24 In the latter sense, the quality of being *pacatus* is often contrasted with a propensity for anger. See e.g. Val. Max. 9.3.2, Sen. *Ira* 1.5.3, Stat. *Silv.* 1.3.39, Silius 7.560.
- 25 For the historical context see Sherwin-White (1984) 214–8 and Smallwood (1976) ch.1 and 2.
- 26 See e.g. ‘als die Juden noch mit uns im Frieden lebten’ (trans. Fuhrmann (1970–82)) and ‘when . . . the Jews were at peace with us’ (trans. MacDonald, Loeb, 1977).
- 27 Sherwin-White (1967) 54–5.
- 28 Lörincz (1994–2002).
- 29 A few examples from Cicero: 2 *Verr.* 1.56, *Leg. Agr.* 1.2, *Dom.* 23 and 60 and *Pis.* 85. For the use of *socii* in the same context see Lavan (2013) 43 n.71.
- 30 On the operations of ideology on the dominant and privileged rather than their subordinates, see e.g. Scott (1990) 67–9 (‘The self-dramatization of domination may actually assert more rhetorical force among the leading actors themselves than among the far more numerous bit players’) and Jameson (1971) 380 (‘Ideology is designed to promote the human dignity and clear conscience of a given class at the same time it discredits their adversaries’) and, in the Roman context, Woolf (1994) 118–9.

## 8 Blessed are the peacemakers

### Visions of Christian peace from Christ to Constantine

*David M. Gwynn*

Blessed are the poor in spirit,  
for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.  
Blessed are those who mourn,  
for they will be comforted.  
Blessed are the meek,  
for they will inherit the earth.  
Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness,  
for they will be filled.  
Blessed are the merciful,  
for they will be shown mercy.  
Blessed are the pure in heart,  
for they will see God.  
Blessed are the peacemakers,  
for they will be called children of God.  
Blessed are those who are persecuted because of righteousness,  
for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.

(Matthew 5:3–10)<sup>1</sup>

Peace lies at the heart of the Christian message. It is a theme that resounds throughout the books of the New Testament, and in every church service the congregation pray for peace for all mankind. Yet from the time of the disciples to the present day, arguments have raged over the vision of peace that Christ taught and the place of Christians in a sinful and violent world. Were the original Christians truly pacifists, who renounced violence even as it was directed against them? How did attitudes change as the early Christians struggled to maintain peace for themselves, their communities, and between the expanding Church and the Roman empire? Did the reign of Constantine (306–337), the first Christian Roman emperor, mark a decisive turning point in Christian conceptions of peace and violence? These are questions that have been debated for centuries, and which continue to arouse controversy within modern dialogues on Christian pacifism and holy war.<sup>2</sup>

Christian peace holds many meanings and has always been open to diverse interpretations. The Hebrew term *shalom*, the Greek *eirene* and the Latin *pax*

can all express a variety of different connotations, and the peace that Christ taught to his disciples embraced peace between humanity and God, peace within human society, and peace for individual men and women both in this world and the next.<sup>3</sup> True peace for the Christian believer is achieved through the promise of salvation after death, a peace that unlike earthly peace cannot be broken or lost. 'Peace I leave with you; my peace I give to you. I do not give to you as the world gives. Do not let your hearts be troubled and do not let them be afraid' (John 14:27). In the words of the Apostle Paul, this is 'the peace of God, which surpasses all understanding' (Philippians 4:7). But this promise of future peace in heaven is also a message of reassurance to those facing the challenges of the present, and a call for Christ's followers to promote harmony between individuals and across the nations of the world.

Within the narrow focus of peace between human men and women, Christ's words and example in the New Testament can be interpreted in varying ways according to the emphasis placed upon different scriptural passages.<sup>4</sup> The verse 'Blessed are the peacemakers' forms part of the Beatitudes, which in turn form the beginning to the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5:3–7:27).<sup>5</sup> Later in the Sermon, Jesus tells his audience that 'You have heard that it was said, "An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth". But I say to you, do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also' (Matthew 5:38–39).

This is more than a simple call for passive non-resistance, for Jesus then urges his listeners to care even for those who threaten them. 'You have heard that it was said, "You shall love your neighbour and hate your enemy". But I say to you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you' (Matthew 5:43–44). Elsewhere in the Gospel of Matthew, Jesus reprimands his disciple who tried to resist the men who came to arrest Jesus and cut off the ear of the high priest's slave. 'Put your sword back into its place; for all who take the sword will perish by the sword' (Matthew 26:52).<sup>6</sup>

These fundamental teachings to love one's neighbour and meet persecution with peace recur throughout Jesus' preaching in the Gospels, and again in the letters of Paul who called upon his readers to 'bless those who persecute you; bless and do not curse them' (Romans 12:14). Generations of Christian pacifists have found inspiration in Jesus' words, taking their example from Christ, the Prince of Peace, who suffered on the cross for our sake rather than resort to violence against his accusers.<sup>7</sup> Yet, even in the Gospel of Matthew, Jesus recognises that his own message will cause conflict not harmony. 'Do not think that I have come to bring peace to the earth; I have not come to bring peace, but a sword. For I have come to set a man against his father, and a daughter against her mother' (Matthew 10:34–35). The same warning occurs in the Gospel of Luke (12:51–53),<sup>8</sup> where we also find an explanation for why Jesus' followers had swords at the time of his arrest. For when Jesus was preparing his disciples for his own departure, he urged them that 'the one who

has no sword must sell his cloak and buy one' (Luke 22:36).<sup>9</sup> Weapons could therefore be carried, presumably for self-defence, while Jesus himself could commit violent acts for a righteous cause. The Gospel of John depicts Jesus entering the temple in Jerusalem and beholding the market stalls and money-changers there. 'Making a whip of cords, he drove all of them out of the temple, both the sheep and the cattle. He also poured out the coins of the money-changers and overturned their tables' (John 2:15). And the famous conversion of Saul into the Apostle Paul was itself achieved through force, the misguided persecutor blinded and compelled to recognise the truth of Christ (Acts 9:1–19).

Such individual examples hardly represent a call to open warfare, and the underlying message of Jesus was emphatically one of peace. But within that message resided a potential justification for the Christian use of violence in the service of God. 'Peacemakers' (*eirenopoioi*) are not simple pacifists, but those who bring conflict to a righteous end. The Old Testament offers numerous examples of warriors whose faith brought them victory, from Joshua's conquest of Jericho (Joshua 5:13–6:21) to David killing Goliath (1 Samuel 17:32–51), and in Revelation the Word of God rides forth on a white horse leading the armies of heaven against the corrupt nations (Revelation 19:11–15).<sup>10</sup> Paul acknowledged that a peaceful life could not always be achieved, teaching that 'if it is possible, so far as it depends on you, live peaceably with all' (Romans 12:18). Insults should not be met with violence, for vengeance lies with God, but it is God's will that legitimate authority may mete out justice on his behalf. 'If you do what is wrong, you should be afraid, for the authority does not bear the sword in vain! It is the servant of God to execute wrath on the wrongdoer' (Romans 13:4). In passages like these lay the foundation upon which a Christian doctrine of just war might be built, particularly in the changed world that emerged following the conversion of a Christian Roman emperor.

In the three centuries that separated Christ and Constantine, the early Christians had to maintain peace for themselves and their communities. As hopes for an imminent Second Coming receded, Church structures and the canon of Scripture began to emerge as Christians came to terms with the need to live in the present world. The Roman empire provided the setting within which the new religion could expand, but the relationship between Church and empire varied from toleration to outright persecution. Nevertheless, the underlying message presented by our Christian sources remained one of peaceful coexistence. Church tradition insisted that the early Christians played no role in the Great Jewish Revolt against Roman rule that led to the sack of Jerusalem in AD 70, although whether this was universally true remains open to debate.<sup>11</sup> The martyrs who died for their faith found solace in the promise of perfect peace in heaven, while the communal support and charity that Christians offered to those around them improved social harmony and attracted converts to the faith. Much of our

knowledge of Christian attitudes in this period comes from the ‘Apologists’, the writers of the second and third centuries who defended Christianity against charges of immorality and threatening the Roman empire. In their writings, the blessings of peace and the Christian renunciation of violence are recurring themes.

‘We who formerly used to murder one another, now not only refrain from making war upon our enemies, but also, that we may not lie nor deceive our examiners, willingly die confessing Christ’ (Justin Martyr, *First Apology* 39). Justin, who was martyred in Rome in *c.* 165 during the reign of Marcus Aurelius, set the tone followed by many Christian writers of the pre-Constantinian era. The North African Tertullian (*c.* 160–*c.* 225) composed his *Apology* at the end of the second century.<sup>12</sup> Tertullian declared that Christians acknowledged the authority of the Roman emperor and prayed for his safety and the bravery of his armies. ‘Why need I say more of the religious awe, the piety, of Christians where the emperor is concerned? We must needs respect him as the chosen of our Lord’ (*Apology* 33.1). But Christians renounce violence themselves, whatever violence may be directed against them. ‘If we are bidden to love our enemies, whom do we have to hate? If when injured we are forbidden to retaliate, lest we become as bad ourselves, who can suffer injury at our hands?’ (*Apology* 37.1).

Elsewhere in his writings, Tertullian expressed the same arguments in still more forceful terms.<sup>13</sup> In the treatise *On Idolatry*, Tertullian insisted that Christians could not swear an oath of service to the emperor as soldiers, having already sworn themselves to the service of Christ.

How will a Christian man go to war, nay, how will he even serve in peacetime, without a sword which the Lord has taken away? For even if soldiers came to John and received advice on how to live, and even if a centurion became a believer, still the Lord afterwards, in disarming Peter [John 18:10–11], disarmed every soldier.

(*On Idolatry* 19)

Tertullian likewise condemned the entire military life as unbefitting for a Christian in *On the Military Crown*, written after a Christian soldier was martyred in *c.* 208–211 for refusing to wear the military garland. Once again, a Christian cannot serve two masters or wield a sword against the command of the Prince of Peace, and soldiers who convert to Christianity must abandon the military life to follow Christ (*On the Military Crown* 11).<sup>14</sup>

For the Greek-speaking Christians of the eastern Mediterranean, a similar voice could be heard from Tertullian’s younger contemporary Origen (*c.* 185–254). *Against Celsus* was written by Origen in 248 to refute the *True Doctrine*, an attack on Christianity by the ‘pagan’ scholar Celsus a generation earlier.<sup>15</sup> Throughout his work, Origen maintained that Christians have been forbidden either to defend themselves or to take another person’s life. On the contrary:

To those who would ask us where we have come from or who is our author, we reply that we came in accordance with the commands of Jesus to beat the spiritual swords that fight and insult us into ploughshares, and to transform the spears that formerly fought against us into pruning-hooks. No longer do we take the sword against any nation, nor do we learn war any more, since we have become sons of peace through Jesus.

(*Against Celsus* 5.33)

In response to Celsus' accusation that Christians refused to defend the emperor or the empire, however, Origen like Tertullian insisted that Christians proved their loyalty to Rome through their prayers. Christians could not take up weapons or join the military, yet still they defended the emperor. 'Though we do not become fellow-soldiers with him, even if he presses for this, yet we are fighting for him and composing a special army of piety through our intercessions to God' (*Against Celsus* 8.73).<sup>16</sup>

The third century was a period of great upheaval for the Roman world, but also a period in which Christianity's influence expanded across all levels of Roman society. In the opening years of the fourth century, against the backdrop of the Great Persecution unleashed against Christianity by the emperor Diocletian in 303, the Christian teacher Lactantius (c. 250–c. 325) composed his *Divine Institutes*.<sup>17</sup> Writing less than a decade before Constantine's conversion, Lactantius repeated the earlier arguments that violence and warfare were entirely incompatible with Christianity. Universal worship of God will in turn bring universal peace, and true piety only exists 'where people know nothing of wars, live in concord with all, are friendly even to enemies, love all men like brothers' (*Divine Institutes* 5.10.10). Therefore, no one can be pious if they cause harm to others, and under no circumstances whatsoever may a true Christian be a soldier or justify the killing of a fellow human being.

When God forbids killing, he doesn't just ban murder, which is not permitted even under the law. He is also recommending us not to do certain things which are treated as lawful among men. A just man may not be a soldier, since his warfare is justice itself, nor may he put anyone on a capital charge. Whether you kill a man with a sword or a speech makes no difference, since killing itself is banned. In this commandment of God no exception at all should be made. Killing a human being is always wrong because it is God's will for man to be a sacred creature.

(*Divine Institutes* 6.20.15–17)

From Justin Martyr's *First Apology* to Lactantius' *Divine Institutes*, the message of these Christian Apologists is consistent. Christ's teachings require his followers to turn away from violence and to love friends and enemies alike. No Christian should carry a weapon or raise their hand against a persecutor, and so in turn military service is incompatible with the Christian faith. In modern debates over Christian attitudes towards war and peace, the Apologists have

often been cited as proof that the early Church was fundamentally pacifist before the conversion of Constantine.<sup>18</sup> Such a conclusion, however, needs to be treated with caution. Despite the influence that they have exerted upon later generations, Tertullian and Origen in particular were far from representative of the Christians of their own time. Their very insistence upon a pacifist ideal for Christianity indicates that at least some contemporaries held rather different views, and there is considerable evidence for Christians serving in the Roman army during the second and third centuries AD.<sup>19</sup>

The New Testament offers no explicit support for the argument that soldiers who became Christians had to abandon military service. Jesus did not question the profession of the centurion in Capernaum who begged him to heal his servant (Matthew 8:5–13), and it was another centurion, Cornelius, who was the first Gentile convert to the new faith (Acts 10).<sup>20</sup> Tertullian certainly knew of serving Christian soldiers in the later years of the second century, and their existence would seem to be confirmed by a famous episode from the reign of Marcus Aurelius. During Marcus' campaign against the Quadi in 172, a legion surrounded and weakened by thirst were saved by a sudden thunderstorm.<sup>21</sup> This 'Rain Miracle' was already attributed by Christians to the prayers of the Christian soldiers present by the time Tertullian wrote his *Apology* (5.6), and the story is narrated in further detail in Eusebius of Caesarea's *Ecclesiastical History* (5.5).<sup>22</sup> While non-Christians had their own explanations for the miracle,<sup>23</sup> there were obviously a sufficient number of Christians within the army to make the Christian claim plausible. Exact figures are impossible to determine, nor can we know whether such Christians converted before or after enlistment, but what evidence we have from inscriptions and the accounts of military martyrs suggests that this Christian military presence continued across the third century.<sup>24</sup> Both Lactantius and Eusebius (c. 260–c. 339) report that the Great Persecution in 303 was preceded several years earlier by a purge of the Christians in the army (Lactantius, *On the Deaths of the Persecutors* 10.4; Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History* 8.4), a necessary first step before the outbreak of this last unsuccessful attempt by the 'pagan' Roman emperors to crush the rising strength of the Church.

Like the divine Scriptures themselves, the witness of the early Church to Christian visions of peace is open to alternative interpretations. The fundamental ideal was still one of peacefulness and love, and for a number of our surviving authors Christians should play no part in violence. At the same time, there were Christians in the Roman army, and even writers like Tertullian and Origen who denied Christian participation in war prayed for the military success of the 'pagan' emperors. It must also be remembered that certain crucial questions that would trouble later Christian generations had not yet arisen. The first Christians held neither political nor military power, and systematic violence had never been a possibility worthy of serious debate. Whereas the doctrine of jihad was embedded within Islam from the very beginning, Christianity existed for three centuries before Constantine's conversion placed a Christian emperor at the head of an army.<sup>25</sup> What role should a Christian

ruler play in bringing about the peace to which all Christians aspired? Was violence justified, if employed to achieve that higher aim? And, in seeking answers to these questions, to what extent does the reign of Constantine mark a watershed in Christian attitudes towards peace and war?

Constantine was a soldier long before he was a Christian.<sup>26</sup> He was hailed emperor by the Roman army in Britain after his father died at York in 306, and he seized control over the empire through a series of bloody civil wars. His conversion to Christianity in 312 was confirmed by his victory at the battle of the Milvian Bridge outside Rome, a battle won by soldiers bearing the sign of Christ,<sup>27</sup> and his last eastern rival was only defeated in 324 when Constantine united the Roman world under his rule. The wealth and privileges that Christianity received during Constantine's reign transformed the Church, and demonstrated publicly the favoured position that Christianity now held. Christians within the empire were freed from the threat of persecution, and Constantine brought even Christians living outside the empire under his protection.<sup>28</sup> For the first time, Christianity had a patron with both the will and the means to use force in support of the Church.

This is not to say that Constantine himself encouraged the use of violence to achieve religious aims. Before his conversion he had witnessed the failure of the Great Persecution to impose religion upon the empire, and the vast majority of his subjects still followed traditional Greco-Roman religion. Shortly after he united the empire in 324, Constantine circulated a letter across the eastern provinces. The emperor made no secret of his Christian beliefs and denounced the errors of the 'pagans'. But he rejected those who wished to use sanctions to compel non-Christians to convert to the true faith:

Let no one use what they have received by inner conviction to the detriment of another. Rather, let everyone as far as possible apply what they have seen and understood to the benefit of their neighbour, and if that is impossible then let them relinquish the attempt. It is one thing voluntarily to undertake the contest for immortality, it is quite another to compel others to do so from fear of punishment.

(Constantine, *Letter to the Eastern Provincials*,  
quoted in Eusebius, *Life of Constantine* 2.60)

By the time that Constantine issued this edict, however, he had already been responsible for an outbreak of religious persecution – not against 'pagans' but against fellow Christians. The Donatist Schism that divided the Church in North Africa emerged out of the Great Persecution, and was the earliest internal Christian conflict to attract the attention of a Christian emperor.<sup>29</sup> Constantine initially attempted to resolve the dispute through diplomacy and councils of bishops. When this failed, he tried to crush the Donatists by force. As an emperor chosen by God, Constantine believed implicitly in his duty to defend the purity of Christianity, and it took less than a decade after his conversion

for the first Christian ruler to openly persecute a dissident Christian sect. The attack on the Donatists was futile and swiftly abandoned, a failure Constantine acknowledged when he wrote that 'It is a fool who would usurp the vengeance which we ought to reserve to God' (Constantine, *Letter to the catholic Church* in North Africa, c. 321, quoted in Optatus, *Against the Donatists*, Appendix 9). Nevertheless, the persecution of the Donatists, brief though it was, symbolised the change that Constantine had wrought. Christian authorities could now turn to violence in order to correct those in error, whether the targets were 'pagans' or 'false' Christians who threatened the Church with heresy or schism.

Constantine died in 337, and under his Christian successors episodes of religious conflict grew more frequent. Book XVI of the *Theodosian Code*, the collection of laws from 312 onwards compiled under Theodosius II (408–450), records the restrictions placed on heretics, 'pagans' and Jews.<sup>30</sup> Libanius of Antioch complained of Christian monks attacking 'pagan' shrines in his *On Behalf of the Temples* in c. 386, even before emperor Theodosius I (379–395) passed a series of laws that finally banned all forms of traditional worship in 391–2. The 'pagan' philosopher Hypatia was lynched in Alexandria by a Christian mob in 415 (Socrates, *Ecclesiastical History* 7.15), and in 418 the entire Jewish population of the island of Minorca were forcibly converted to Christianity.<sup>31</sup> By the early fifth century, while significant 'pagan' and Jewish populations endured, the Roman empire was very much a Christian empire.

It must be emphasised that such outbreaks of religious violence were exceptional, despite their prominence in our surviving evidence, and peaceful coexistence was the norm.<sup>32</sup> Neither Constantine nor his successors encouraged conflict and instability within their empire, and the Christian ideals of peace and love for one's neighbours remained strong. But imperial support for Christianity had created an environment in which the resort to persecution could be justified to protect the innocent and prevent errors from corrupting the true faith. Constantine himself, although firm in his belief that as emperor he was doing God's work, felt this tension between the ideal of peace and the justification of violence. His decision to postpone his baptism until just before his death was entirely normal by the standards of his time, for baptism in the early fourth century did not mark admission into the Church but the one unrepeatable cleansing of past sins. Upon receiving baptism, however, Constantine refused to take up once again his imperial purple robes (Eusebius, *Life of Constantine* 4.62), for he held the strict moral standards expected of a baptised Christian to be incompatible with the duties required of a soldier emperor.

How far did Christian attitudes to peace and war actually change in the years that followed Constantine's conversion? On the practical question of Christians fighting in the Roman army, no widespread debate appears to have arisen.<sup>33</sup> Military service was already an accepted Christian profession, and like the empire overall the Late Roman army became progressively more Christian. By the late fourth century the very oath that soldiers took as part of their enlistment had taken on a Christian form:

They swear by God, Christ and the Holy Spirit, and by the Majesty of the Emperor which second to God is to be loved and worshipped by the human race. For since the Emperor has received the name of the 'August' [i.e. Augustus], faithful devotion should be given, unceasing homage paid him as if to a present and corporeal deity. For it is God whom a private citizen or a soldier serves, when he faithfully loves him who reigns by God's authority.

(Vegetius, *Epitome of Military Science* 2.5)<sup>34</sup>

The religious allegiance of the fourth-century army was not always as clear cut as such evidence might suggest. After following Constantine and his Christian sons for almost fifty years, the army with little apparent protest switched their loyalty to Julian 'the Apostate', Constantine's nephew and the last 'pagan' Roman emperor.<sup>35</sup> Upon Julian's death during his ill-fated invasion of Persia in 363, his army then reverted once more to follow the Christian emperor Jovian. There were also still some Christians for whom the life of a soldier was incompatible with their faith, most prominently Martin of Tours (d.397) who renounced his military career with the words 'I am a soldier of Christ, I am not allowed to fight' (Sulpicius Severus, *Life of Martin* 4.3). Nevertheless, by the early years of the fifth century the Late Roman army was an essentially Christian institution.<sup>36</sup>

Constantine's Christian contemporaries felt no hesitation in proclaiming his achievements as the work of God. Lactantius, who in his *Divine Institutes* had declared that a just man could not be a soldier, hailed Constantine's decision to 'mark the heavenly sign of God on the shields of his men' (*On the Deaths of the Persecutors* 44.5) before the decisive battle of the Milvian Bridge. Indeed, when Lactantius added an *Epitome* to the *Divine Institutes* in c. 320, one significant revision was to remove military service from the catalogue of unlawful killing (*Epitome* 64). Eusebius of Caesarea first acclaimed the rise of a Christian emperor in book 10 of his *Ecclesiastical History*, and then in greater detail in the *Life of Constantine*. The battle of the Milvian Bridge is likened to the liberation of the Old Testament Hebrews from Egypt, with Constantine's rival Maxentius hurled into the river Tiber just as Pharaoh and his chariots were overwhelmed by the Red Sea (*Life of Constantine* 1.38; cf. Exodus 15:4). Constantine's *labarum*, the standard shaped like a cross which bore the monogram of Christ, is described in terms recalling the Ark of the Covenant and was carried before the imperial armies as proof of divine favour (*Life of Constantine* 1.31).<sup>37</sup>

The triumphs of a Christian emperor were thus proudly celebrated,<sup>38</sup> and Christians served openly in the Constantinian army. As we have seen, however, neither Christian prayers for God's chosen emperor nor the presence of Christian soldiers were new to the fourth-century Church. Constantine's conversion unquestionably increased Christian support for imperial power and Roman military success, but this was not surprising or revolutionary. And perhaps most fundamentally, the underlying Christian conception of war and peace remained largely unaltered. Whatever the praise for Constantine's victories, the

ideal preached by Christ was for every man and woman to love their neighbour, and violence even for a true cause was at best a necessary evil.

For the Christians living in the dramatically changing world of the fourth and fifth centuries, the tensions arising between peaceful ideals and legitimate violence were impossible to avoid. It was now acceptable for a leading bishop like Athanasius of Alexandria (c. 295–373), writing to the monk Amoun in the early 350s, to comment in passing that ‘it is not right to kill, while in war it is lawful and praiseworthy to destroy the enemy’. But even Christian soldiers could still be held accountable for the bloodshed they had caused. The Cappadocian Basil of Caesarea (c. 330–379) laid down his verdict on how such men should be regarded by the Church in c. 374.

Our fathers did not consider killings committed in war to be murders, I presume because they allowed a concession for men fighting in defence of virtue and piety. Perhaps, though, it might be advisable for them to abstain from communion for three years, for their hands are not clean.

(Canon 13 in Basil, *Letter 188 to Amphilochius of Iconium*)<sup>39</sup>

In the Latin west, Basil’s contemporary Ambrose of Milan (c. 339–397) drew upon the Roman philosophy of Cicero and the values of the Old Testament to honour those who risked their lives fighting to protect their country.<sup>40</sup>

It is indeed considered a glorious thing for a man to place himself at risk to ensure peace for all, and to think it far more worthy of praise to have saved his country from destruction than to have kept danger from himself.

(*On the Duties of the Clergy* 3.23)<sup>41</sup>

Yet in the same argument he condemned anyone who resorted to violence for selfish reasons, going so far as to deny that a true Christian should wield a weapon even in self-defence as opposed to the defence of others:

I do not think that a Christian, a just and a wise man, ought to save his own life by the death of another. Therefore when he meets with an armed robber he cannot return the robber’s blows, lest in defending his life he should stain his love toward his neighbour. The verdict on this is plain and clear in the books of the Gospel: ‘Put your sword back into its place; for all who take the sword will perish by the sword’ [Matthew 26:52]. What robber is more hateful than the persecutor who came to kill Christ? But Christ refused to be defended from the wounds inflicted by his persecutor, for he wished to heal all through his wounds.

(*On the Duties of the Clergy* 3.27)<sup>42</sup>

Against this complex background, it fell to Augustine of Hippo (354–430) to compose the first extensive justification for Christian violence in the service

of God.<sup>43</sup> Augustine did not actually construct a systematic Just War Theory, which evolved over the following centuries down to the time of Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274). Nor did Augustine in any sense celebrate the glory won through military victory. Writing in a period when the Roman empire was coming under increasing pressure, and when his own North African Church was divided by the Donatist Schism and threatened by rival religious movements like Manichaeism, Augustine regarded war as a necessary evil, a reflection of the flawed world in which we live. If peace is to be maintained on earth, then violence may be required. At the very end of the fourth century, in a treatise against the Manichaean teacher Faustus, Augustine expressed his belief that war might itself be righteous, if fought in obedience to God.

Much depends on the causes for which men undertake wars, and on the authority they have for doing so. The natural order, which seeks the peace of mankind, ordains that the monarch should have the power of undertaking war if he thinks it advisable and that the soldiers should perform their military duties on behalf of the peace and safety of the community. When war is undertaken in obedience to God, who wishes to rebuke, humble or crush the pride of man, then it must be acknowledged to be a righteous war.

*(Against Faustus 22.75)*

A righteous man serving under an unrighteous king may still be innocent for performing his duty to the state, while those who fight on the authority of God must surely be blameless for God's commands cannot be unjust. Augustine recognised the tensions that such an argument inevitably raised when set against the New Testament injunctions to love one another and turn the other cheek. A Christian needed to uphold those principles and reject cruelty and vengeance, even during participation in a just war, and so for Augustine inner conviction was more important than physical action.

If it is supposed that God could not enjoin warfare, because in later times it was said by the Lord Jesus Christ, 'I say to you, do not resist an evil-doer. But if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also' [Matthew 5:39], the answer is, that what is here required is not a bodily movement, but an inward disposition.

*(Against Faustus 22.76)*

In the early years of the fifth century, not long after writing *Against Faustus*, Augustine carried his argument to its logical conclusion. When he was younger he had opposed religious coercion whatever the cause, but the conflict with the Donatists in North Africa led him to change his mind. In a letter to Vincentius of Cartennae, a former friend who was now a Donatist bishop, Augustine formulated one of the earliest Christian justifications for the repression of those in error and their forced conversion to the true faith.

You are of the opinion that no one should be compelled to follow righteousness; and yet you read that the householder said to his servants, 'Whomsoever you shall find, compel them to come in' [Luke 14:23]. You also read how he who was at first Saul, and afterwards Paul, was compelled, by the great violence with which Christ coerced him, to know and to embrace the truth; for you cannot but think that the light which your eyes enjoy is more precious to men than money or any other possession. This light, lost suddenly by him when he was cast to the ground by the heavenly voice, he did not recover until he became a member of the Holy Church. You are also of the opinion that no coercion is to be used with any man in order for his deliverance from the fatal consequences of error; and yet you see that, in examples which cannot be disputed, this is done by God, who loves us with more real regard for our profit than any other can.

(Letter 93.5)

One can hardly exaggerate the implications of this argument, and Augustine's acceptance that violence and coercion could be righteous if performed to fulfil God's commands remains enormously controversial.<sup>44</sup> It was not a step that Augustine took lightly. The central theme that runs throughout his many writings is God's love and compassion for mankind, and Augustine would have been horrified by some of the actions that in subsequent centuries his teachings were invoked to justify. Strikingly, when Augustine wrote about war in his *magnum opus*, the *City of God*, it was the evil of war and the damage it wreaks upon the human spirit that he particularly emphasised. True peace will only be fully achieved in the blessed world to come, and the wars fought to preserve earthly peace are not to be celebrated even if their cause is just.

The wise man, they say, will wage just wars. Surely, if he remembers that he is a human being, he will rather lament the fact that he is faced with the necessity of waging just wars at all. For if they were not just, he would not have to engage in them, and consequently there would be no wars for a wise man. It is the wrong done by the opposing side that lays on the wise man the duty of waging wars. And even should no need for war arise, the wrong alone, since it is the wrong of human beings, should inspire grief in a person's heart. Whoever, then, reflects with sorrow on such grievous evils in all their horror and cruelty, must acknowledge their misery. Whoever experiences such evils or even contemplates them without heartfelt grief is assuredly in a far more wretched state, if he thinks himself happy simply because he has lost all human feeling.

(City of God 19.7)

It is very easy to regard Augustine's vision of Christian just war as the natural culmination of the changes that Constantine's conversion set in motion. Imperial favour transformed the status and privileges of the Church, and for the first time placed military power openly in Christian hands. Nevertheless, to

treat Constantine's reign as a watershed, which diverted the path of Christianity from pacifism to militarism, is an obvious over-simplification. From the original disciples to the present day, Christians have never shared a single uniform attitude towards peace and violence. To live in harmony and love with one another has always been the ideal, but within the teachings of Christ himself lay a potential justification for harming others in the cause of righteousness. Some early Christians did uphold pacifist beliefs, renouncing any resort to force in the face of persecution, just as in the twentieth century there were Christians who refused to fight in two world wars. Other Christians argued that violence was a necessary consequence of living in an imperfect world, a lesser evil to achieve a greater good. Such debates already occurred in the time of Tertullian and Origen and inevitably acquired far greater significance from Constantine onwards, raising questions that continue to trouble Christian consciences today. Across the diversity of early Christian attitudes both before and after Constantine, however, one theme remained consistent. Violence and war were never good in themselves, even when required by a higher cause. In a letter written in *c.* 418, Augustine reassured the Roman general Boniface that a soldier might indeed act in a manner pleasing to God. Yet war is only justified when fought to secure peace, a vision that still strikes a chord with many Christians grappling with the problems of the modern age.

War should be waged only as a necessity, and waged only that God may by it deliver men from the necessity and preserve them in peace. For peace is not sought in order to kindle war, but war is waged in order that peace may be obtained. Therefore, even in waging war, cherish the spirit of a peacemaker, that by conquering those whom you attack you may lead them back to the advantages of peace; for our Lord says: 'Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God'.

(Augustine, *Letter* 189)

## Notes

- 1 All Biblical translations are from the NRSV (New Revised Standard Version, Oxford 1995).
- 2 The scholarship on these questions is vast. Classic surveys include Cadoux (1919), Bainton (1960), Zampaglione (1973) and Hornus (1980), while more recent interpretations have been offered by Kalantzis (2012) and Iosif (2013). Many of the key texts are conveniently assembled in translation in Swift (1983) and Lee (2007) 176–211.
- 3 For an introduction, see Brueggemann (2001) and Swartley (2006).
- 4 Compare the arguments of Yoder (1994) and Yoder Neusfeld (2011) with those of Brandon (1967) and Aslan (2013) for a sense of the extremes to which contrasting interpretations can be taken.
- 5 On the place of the Sermon within the wider text of Matthew's Gospel, see Davies (1989) and Clarke (2003).
- 6 The disciple in question is named as Peter in John 18:10. In the version given in Luke 22:49–52, Jesus heals the wounded ear.
- 7 The variety of forms that Christian pacifism has taken down the centuries is reflected in Yoder (1976), Brock (1998) and the articles collected in Long (2011).

- 8 In the Lukan version, Jesus brings 'division' instead of 'a sword'.
- 9 On Luke's vision of peace, see Cassidy (1978) and Swartley (1983). The pacifistic interpretation of this passage is that the sword here is metaphorical, although this is not the obvious meaning of the text.
- 10 On reconciling Revelation with peaceful Christianity, see Neville (2013).
- 11 'The members of the Jerusalem church, by means of an oracle given by revelation to acceptable persons there, were ordered to leave the city before the war began' (Eusebius of Caesarea, *Ecclesiastical History* 3.5).
- 12 For modern surveys of the disputed chronology of Tertullian's life and writings, see Barnes (1985) and Dunn (2004).
- 13 Gero (1970) argued that Tertullian's attitude towards Christian military service evolved in the early third century with his conversion to the rigorist sect of Montanism and in particular with changing practices of Roman army recruitment under the ruling Severan dynasty. By contrast, Dunn (2004) 44–5 attributes the shifting emphases of Tertullian's different works to the changing demands of rhetorical purpose and audience, and sees no significant alteration in Tertullian's personal view that Christians should not serve in the army.
- 14 The same argument occurs in the *Apostolic Tradition*, probably written in Rome in the early third century and traditionally attributed to Hippolytus: 'A soldier of the civil authority must be taught not to kill men and if he is ordered so to do, he must refuse. Nor should he take the oath. If he will not agree, he should be rejected. Anyone who has the power of the sword or who is a civil magistrate wearing the purple must resign or be rejected. If a catechumen or a believer wishes to become a soldier they should be rejected, for they have despised God' (*Apostolic Tradition* 16). On this complex text, see further Bradshaw, Johnson and Philips (2002).
- 15 The traditional date of Celsus' work is *c.* 178, although it could have been written as late as *c.* 200. For a discussion of Celsus' arguments, which survive only through Origen's refutation, see Hargis (1999) 17–61. *Against Celsus* is translated by Chadwick (1980).
- 16 See further Caspary (1979) esp. 126–134.
- 17 Translation and commentary in Bowen and Garnsey (2003).
- 18 'The accession of Constantine terminated the pacifist period in church history' (Bainton (1960) 85).
- 19 This issue was first discussed in detail by von Harnack (1905) and then by Helgeland (1974), and the evidence (both literary and archaeological) is surveyed at length in the recent books of Ubiña (2000), Shean (2010) and Iosif (2013).
- 20 Likewise, when soldiers came to John the Baptist seeking repentance, he did not command them to lay down their arms but only instructed that they must 'not extort money from anyone by threats or false accusation, and be satisfied with your wages' (Luke 3:14).
- 21 For the historical background, see Birley (1987) 171–4 and 251–2. The miracle is depicted in scene 16 of the Aurelian Column that still stands in Rome.
- 22 Eusebius identifies one of his sources for this story as Apollinaris of Hierapolis, who claimed that the legion now received from the emperor the title *Fulminata* ('bearer of thunder'). In reality, the *Legio XII Fulminata* had already held that title for more than a century.
- 23 In Cassius Dio, *Roman History* 71.8–10, the miracle is attributed to the Egyptian magician Harnouphis invoking the aid of Hermes (Mercury), the god of the air.
- 24 Helgeland (1974) 161–3 rightly rejects the suggestion of Cadoux (1919) 15–16 and Bainton (1960) 79–81 that Christians were prepared to act as soldiers in performing police work but not to serve in war. No early Christian source makes any such distinction, which rests on a modern separation of policing and military service that had no parallel in the Roman world.
- 25 On the comparison between Christian and Islamic conceptions of holy war, see Johnson (1997) and the articles edited by Hashmi (2012).
- 26 Among the many modern studies of Constantine's life and beliefs, see in particular here Drake (2000), Van Dam (2007) and Barnes (2011).

- 27 According to Lactantius, *On the Deaths of the Persecutors* 44, on the eve of the battle God commanded Constantine in a dream 'to mark the heavenly sign of God on the shields of his soldiers'. In the slightly different account recorded by Eusebius, *Life of Constantine* 1.28–29, the emperor and his soldiers first saw a vision of the cross earlier while on campaign. Then, while Constantine slept 'the Christ of God appeared to him with the same sign which he had seen in the heavens, and commanded him to make a likeness of that sign and to use this as protection in all engagements with his enemies'.
- 28 Constantine's letter to Shapur II of Persia encouraging proper treatment of Christians under Persian rule is quoted by Eusebius, *Life of Constantine* 4.9–13, although the authenticity and interpretation of this letter remains subject to debate.
- 29 The standard work, although increasingly dated, is still Frend (1971). See also Tilley (1997).
- 30 See further Hunt (1993).
- 31 Bradbury (1996).
- 32 The role of violence in the 'Christianisation' of the Roman empire is emphasised by MacMullen (1997), although note the cautionary remarks of Salzman (2006). See also Gaddis (2005).
- 33 Canon 3 of the council of Arles (314) and canon 12 of the council of Nicaea (325) have both been cited as evidence for a shift in Christian attitudes to military service under Constantine. The first refuses communion to soldiers who either throw down or thrust out their weapons (the Latin *arma proiciunt* is ambiguous) in time of peace. The second is one of a series of Nicene canons concerning those who lapsed during the preceding periods of persecution, and condemns those who left military service on the grounds of being Christian but subsequently returned to their previous positions.
- 34 Translation and commentary in Milner (1993).
- 35 There were a handful of military martyrs under Julian, their stories exaggerated by later Christian tradition (e.g. Sozomen, *Ecclesiastical History* 5.17; Theodoret, *Ecclesiastical History* 3.11).
- 36 In 416, 'pagans' were banned from serving in the imperial *militia* (*CTh* 16.10.21). This has sometimes been interpreted as a ban on 'pagan' military service, but *militia* here is also the general term used for the imperial bureaucracy. By contrast, when Jews were explicitly barred from the army in 418, the relevant law specifies that Jewish recruits must leave *militia armata* (armed imperial service). There is certainly no doubt that there were still non-Christians fighting in the Late Roman army throughout the fifth century and beyond.
- 37 On the recurring parallels Eusebius draws between Constantine and Moses see Rapp (1998) and Williams (2008) 36–42.
- 38 For the increasingly Christian identity of the ceremonies surrounding imperial victory from the fourth century onwards, see McCormick (1986).
- 39 On the arguments of Athanasius and Basil here, see McGuckin (2006).
- 40 Swift (1970).
- 41 Ambrose honoured the Christian emperors who fought in the name of God. See *On the Faith* 2.136–43 concerning emperor Gratian, and *On the Death of Theodosius* 17.
- 42 Ambrose particularly insisted that clergy should play no part in violence and indeed should not carry weapons at all (*On the Duties of the Clergy* 1.175). On the issue of arms-bearing clergy, which was the subject of much later debate in the medieval west, see Duggan (2013).
- 43 Again, the bibliography on Augustine's vision of just war and its later influence is enormous. For an introduction, see among many others Russell (1975) 16–39, Stevenson (1987), Lenihan (1988), and Mattox (2006).
- 44 For a more detailed examination of Augustine's views on the relationship between Christian values and secular authority, written from a very different perspective, see the contribution of Kaufman later in this volume.



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## Part II

# Establishing peace in the ancient world

For the politician and the historian, establishing peace is primarily a practical matter: a question of how to bring an end to the conflicts and disputes that inevitably arise. Despite the rhetoric most often espoused in the aftermath of a conflict, however, this is rarely achieved by means of a total and annihilating victory. In the vast majority of cases it is easiest to negotiate once the likely outcome is clear: the terms of the agreement that results will then naturally favour the stronger party, but to be an agreement at all it must at least have the (grudging) assent of the defeated too. Hence peace after war is most often imposed – but almost never completely dictated. As the examples in this section show, both victor and vanquished had something to gain from a cessation of hostilities.

Of course, there were also other interested, and sometimes disinterested, parties. Where a war was most likely to serve very little purpose for anyone involved, it was possible for those involved to agree to appeal to a third party for resolution, and so agree to a peace established by outside agents. In other cases, such an agreement was not needed: a great power might choose to intervene in a lesser dispute and impose peace from above. Even here, however, the new arrangement had in some sense to be acceptable to the parties involved. An emperor might make an offer that could not be refused: but only because it was clear that the alternative – and there was always an alternative – was a deal on much worse conditions.



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## 9 Cyrus the Great

### An unconventional peacemaker

*Selga Medenicks*

The approach of the founder of the Persian empire, Cyrus the Great, to the establishment and consolidation of his rule in newly conquered territories was a major departure from that of his predecessors in the ancient Near East, the Neo-Assyrian kings (c. 934–609 BC). The centuries-old model of reinforcing military victory ideologically, with religious triumphalism and the imposition of Assyrian gods into the lives of new subjects, was turned on its head by Cyrus' unique policy of religious acculturation. Cyrus pioneered an imperial strategy that neither extinguished nor subjugated local belief systems, instead facilitating the acculturation of his own religion and its customs to foster social cohesion and bring about reconciliation to Persian hegemony. In his trailblazing foray into Anatolia about 547 BC we may glimpse the formative period of this approach to peacemaking, later made manifest in the Babylonian 'Cyrus Cylinder' and reflected in the Old Testament, which shaped Cyrus the Great's reputation for religious tolerance in posterity.<sup>1</sup>

#### **Neo-Assyrian kings and the use of religion in conquest**

The expectations of indigenous populations on the advent of the Persians in the mid-sixth century BC were no doubt influenced by their previous experiences of invasion and domination by another foreign, imperial power: Assyria.<sup>2</sup>

In the ancient Near East it was prosperity, rather than the absence of war, that characterised the state of 'peace'. The Assyrian populace, particularly, was long conditioned to regard regular military campaigns as necessary for security and to extend trade, taxation, and tribute. The contentment of the gods with the actions of the king and his subjects was evident to the people in their economic success – and the gods' displeasure equally apparent in times of adversity. Tellingly, the god and goddess of war, Aššur and Ištar, were lauded and appealed to, but there were no corresponding deities of peace.

The king of Assyria was the high priest of the state god Aššur. It was his duty to expand the empire through conquest in Aššur's name and create new subjects to pay the god tribute. The so-called 'weapon of Aššur' travelled in a chariot at the head of the army. The lance topped with the symbol of the king's protector deity represented the god and figured in religious rituals conducted during

military campaigns. Palace reliefs show standards of Aššur and other protector gods accompanying the king or his lieutenants in battle, and placed in stands in the royal encampment.<sup>3</sup>

Neo-Assyrian kings planted the weapon in the centre of defeated cities,<sup>4</sup> sometimes actually within the temple of the protector god of the losing side. The action was intended to have religious as well as political significance, according to the annals of King Sargon:

The weapon of Assur, my lord, I appointed as their deity [in Ḥarḥār/Kār-Šarrukīn, formerly Median territory].<sup>5</sup>

It was before the lance that defeated kings were forced to swear oaths of fealty to Aššur and the Assyrian king. The ‘*adū* of Aššur and the great gods’<sup>6</sup> recognised the supreme authority of Assyrian deities, who acted as witnesses; even the local gods were bound by oath to accept subordination.<sup>7</sup> The vow was recorded in writing and the tablets deposited in the temples of the gods concerned. In this way breaches of loyalty became sacrilegious acts, punishable by the gods, and the ideological basis for punitive wars. The so-called ‘Vassal Treaties of Esarhaddon’ also connect the political and religious elements of the oath by outlawing any other agreement made before gods:<sup>8</sup> doing so might constitute a political alliance and, moreover, an attempt to recruit supernatural support for an uprising.

Disobeying the Assyrian king was equivalent to impiety and neglect of Aššur, and viewed as a sign of political rebellion. Words put into the mouth of a penitent client king in a letter of the Assyrian king Esarhaddon to his god illustrate this dogma:

Whoever is negligent toward Assur, king of the gods, does not listen to the command of Esarhaddon, king of the universe, his lord . . . It was a grievous sin which I committed against the god Assur, when I did not listen to the word of the king, my lord.<sup>9</sup>

Worship of Assyrian deities was integrated into the system of taxation that sustained the empire, and so inevitably Assyrian cult and the concurrent ideology of rulership was felt in all its territories to some degree.<sup>10</sup> According to King Aššurbanipal, his subjects’ acknowledgment of their new sovereign god and king took the form of worship:

Not [with] my [own strength], not with the strength of my bow, but with the power [. . . and] strength of my goddesses, I made the lands disobedient to me submit to the yoke of Aššur.

Unceasingly, yearly they bring me [sumptuous] presents and protect daily the gate of Aššur and Mullissu.

They seek peace with me in prayer and in supplication; with observance and prayers, they kiss my feet.<sup>11</sup>


To be certain that defeated peoples and their gods understood who was in control, the Assyrians left further stamps of their deities in the public spaces and even in the temples of conquered cities. Stelas engraved with the image of the king worshipping Assyrian divinities were erected (Figure 9.1). Particularly in sacred locations, the presence of the stela and/or weapon of Aššur served to remind the local population that their own gods were committed to Assyrian rule.

In ancient Near Eastern conflicts, religious sanctuaries were invariably looted; on some occasions they were even destroyed. Statues of the gods were carried off as hostages. The intention was to annihilate ideological centres of resistance to Assyrian rule. If the defeated king took the oath of loyalty before the weapon of Aššur, kissed his conqueror's feet, and begged, the statues might be returned and a semblance of former religious life resumed. However, even this could have a catch. We read in one Assyrian king's records of such a concession:

I [Esarhaddon] refurbished . . . the gods of the Arabs, and I inscribed the might of the god Aššur, my lord, and (an inscription) written in my name on them.<sup>12</sup>

The inscription leaves no doubt that the Arabs were expected to remember that they and their gods remained subordinates of Aššur and the Assyrian king, to whose largesse they now owed their cult.

This was how 'peace' agreements were struck in the Neo-Assyrian world – through a defeated people's complete subjection and submission, expressed in religious terms. Depending on how rapidly and fully they accepted 'the yoke of Aššur', i.e. relinquished the wealth of their land and demonstrated obedience to the Assyrian god and king, conquered kingdoms could retain or regain a degree of cultic continuity. As Foster (2007) observed:



*Figure 9.1* Bronze gate decoration from Balawat, showing the rituals conducted by the Assyrian king Shalmaneser III upon reaching the shores of Lake Van. The king pours a libation into the water while a soldier throws the legs of a sacrificial animal into the mouths of divine sea monsters. Behind them are the king's image carved into the mountainside and two lances topped with divine standards

Source: King (1915), plate I. Photograph © Trustees of the British Museum.

Defeated people were incorporated into the Assyrian administrative and ideological network. Peace meant only inclusion within Assyria, rather than Assyrian tolerance of some other state. The Mesopotamians expressed this as ‘causing to hear as one’ or ‘speaking with one mouth’.<sup>13</sup>

The only exception made was in the case of Babylonia. Overland and maritime trade routes converged in the southern half of Mesopotamia – and the bureaucrats of the temple cities held the keys to the administration of these valuable economic organs.<sup>14</sup> The conquering Assyrians strengthened ties with the populations of these urban centres through religious assimilation, creating common genealogies for divinities, syncretising those with similar attributes, and by meeting traditional Babylonian obligations of kings in relation to the gods: temple building and maintenance, granting benefices to the priestly classes, and participating in customary public ceremonies. The policy aimed at fostering a degree of unity between Assyrians and Babylonians, as well as peaceful coexistence.

Evidently, it was not thought necessary or beneficial to engage in the same manner with subjects elsewhere. The Assyrian strategy to induce compliance and secure the loyalty of provinces and client kingdoms through a combination of military and religious intimidation was, ultimately, a failure: allegiances were sworn and lost repeatedly over the centuries. The hostility generated by the loyalty oath is illustrated by the removal of these particular tablets from a temple storeroom to the throne room of the Assyrian king during the destruction of Nimrud in 614 BC, where they were smashed into hundreds of small pieces and burned.<sup>15</sup>

### **Cyrus the Great and the use of religion in conquest**

When Cyrus the Great conquered Babylonia in the mid-sixth century BC, he, too, approached matters in the diplomatic fashion that had won the Assyrians favour there. He intended to portray himself as inheritor of ancient Assyrian power through fidelity to the model of the earlier Assyrian king Aššurbanipal (669–c. 630 BC) – harking back to an era that contrasted favourably in the collective memory with the rule of the newly deposed Babylonian king Nabonidus. The Cyrus Cylinder, a Babylonian foundation deposit inscribed with the deeds of the Persian king, contains a few hints in this vein.<sup>16</sup> Its very literary form (and, perhaps, the unusual arrangement of the text in a single column)<sup>17</sup> reflects not the style of the most recent Babylonian kings but that of earlier rulers from Assyria, specifically the texts of Aššurbanipal.<sup>18</sup> Overall the task of the Cylinder was probably to commemorate Cyrus’ piety in restoring Babylonian buildings and the Marduk cult,<sup>19</sup> as Aššurbanipal did before him when he returned the looted statue of the god to the temple of Marduk and re-established regular sacrificial offerings.<sup>20</sup> The Cylinder text explicitly recounts the fortuitous discovery of an inscription of Aššurbanipal during Cyrus’ renovation works, a trope

evidently intended to emphasise that the gods had chosen him as rightful inheritor of Aššurbanipal's authority.<sup>21</sup>

The Cylinder contains specific references to 'peace':<sup>22</sup>

[22]. . . When I went as harbinger of **peace** i[nt]o Babylon [23] I founded my sovereign residence within the palace amid celebration and rejoicing. Marduk, the great lord, bestowed on me as my destiny the great magnanimity of one who loves Babylon, and I every day sought him out in awe. [24] My vast troops were marching **peaceably** in Babylon, and the whole of [Sumer] and Akkad had nothing to fear. [25] I sought the safety of the city of Babylon and all its sanctuaries.<sup>23</sup>

The establishment of peace in Babylonia was associated very closely with the concept of cosmic order, which depended on the harmonious relationship between the king and the gods. Once the proper worship of Marduk and other major deities was reinstated and sacred cities were accorded their traditional privileges, divine blessings would follow. Written by Babylonian priests plainly supportive of Cyrus' attitude towards their cult, the Cyrus Cylinder projects an idealised image of the conqueror as respectful of local religion and restorer of religious liberties:

[30] . . . I sent back to their places to the city of Ashur and Susa, [31] Akkad, the land of Eshnunna, the city of Zamban, the city of Meturnu, Der, as far as the border of the land of Gutu – the sanctuaries across the river Tigris – whose shrines had earlier become delapidated, [32] the gods who lived therein, and made permanent sanctuaries for them. I collected together all of their people and returned them to their settlements, [33] and the gods of the land of Sumer and Akkad which Nabonidus – to the fury of the lord of the gods – had brought into Shuanna, at the command of Marduk, the great lord, [34] I returned them unharmed to their cells, in the sanctuaries that make them happy.<sup>24</sup>

Clearly, the reinstatement of exiled populations and their gods to their homes, along with the commitment to act as 'provisioner' to their shrines, were believed to be acts so obviously righteous that they would ensure recognition of Cyrus as the divinely sanctioned king. The people would 'call blessings on my kingship. I have enabled all the lands to live in **peace**.'<sup>25</sup> An inscription from Ur also asserts the connection between peace and being delivered by the gods into Cyrus' control: 'I am Kurash . . . The great gods have delivered all the countries into my hands. The land I have made to dwell (in) a **peaceful** habitation.'<sup>26</sup>

But, in an important contrast to the kings of Assyria, Cyrus' strategy in Babylonia was not exceptional. A parallel to Cyrus' restoration of Babylonian gods and their dwellings is described in the Old Testament books of Ezra and Chronicles. These record the Persian king's permission for the return of exiled Jews to Jerusalem and his support for the rebuilding of their temple:<sup>27</sup>

[2] Thus says Cyrus king of Persia: The Lord, the God of heaven, has given me all the kingdoms of the earth, and he has charged me to build him a house at Jerusalem, which is in Judah. [3] Whoever is among you of all his people, may his God be with him, and let him go up to Jerusalem, which is in Judah, and rebuild the house of the Lord, the God of Israel – he is the God who is in Jerusalem.

(*Ezra* 1: 2–3)

Just as the Cylinder emphasised that everything occurred at the behest of the Babylonian god, the Old Testament proclaimed Cyrus the instrument of Yahweh. Isaiah called him the Lord's 'shepherd' (44:28) and his 'anointed' (45:1), terms usually reserved for the king and Messiah, respectively. More than any other honour, it is perhaps this exceptional description of Cyrus that has shaped and preserved his reputation through the centuries as defender of religious freedoms.


Less well known is Cyrus' conduct in Anatolia, his earliest foreign possession. The evidence here also demonstrates Cyrus' use of religion to pacify newly vanquished lands and is most interesting because it shows him to have been uniquely innovative in his approach.

According to Strabo (*Geog.* 11.8.4–5), who was born and raised nearby, a sanctuary of Anāitis and other Persian deities was established by the Persians at Zela (modern Zile) in the Black Sea region, and was the antecedent of the later temple there. It is described as a man-made mound encircled by a wall. An open-air, elevated site would certainly fit with the early Persian custom of worship of the elements. In one account of the festival inaugurated at the time, it is said to have been consecrated by Cyrus 'to the goddess of his fathers' (11.8.5). The Zela sanctuary and festival were in all likelihood devoted to Anāhitā, a western Iranian goddess of whom Cyrus can have been a devotee. The sanctuary was located some 150km north of Kerkenes Dağ, the site of Cyrus' battle with the Lydian King Croesus, described by Herodotus (1.76), and might conceivably have been a victory monument.<sup>28</sup> Similarly, Tacitus (*Ann.* 3.62) records that Cyrus dedicated a shrine to 'Persian Diana' at Hierocaesarea in Lydia, possibly another offering to Anāhitā in gratitude for victory. The establishment of sanctuaries for the god of the victor in a conquered territory was not an unusual practice in the ancient Near East or Anatolia and is usually indicative of an aggressive religious stance. Yet, there is no indication in this case that the establishment of Persian places of worship was to the detriment of local religions. Instead, what we find in Anatolia is Persian participation in and support of local religious traditions.

In Lydia, state formation was focused on the institution of kingship and the signifier of divinely-sanctioned authority was the monumental tumulus tomb.<sup>29</sup> The tomb type and the technology were restricted to the royal court until after the fall of King Croesus,<sup>30</sup> when observance of this burial and commemorative practice was permitted for those outside of royal circles. Tumulus burials of the early Persian period (late sixth and fifth centuries BC) from east Lydia

near modern Güre testify to the continuity of another tradition, namely the making of offerings in precious metals: over 300 such pieces of jewellery and vessels have come from only nine tombs there.<sup>31</sup> Such was the liberty in terms of religious custom that there were rapid developments in formerly highly standardised chamber tomb decoration and even incorporation of Persian elements. Examples include painted walls, ornamentation of doorways, and most importantly, funerary couches.<sup>32</sup> It was a fundamental principle of the Iranian tradition to keep the body of the deceased from polluting the earth and the innovation of tomb benches may have served to separate the two. Prior to Persian rule, such couches are not attested in Lydia.

Soon after the Persian occupation, a massive Near Eastern-style stepped altar of solid calcareous tufa stone blocks was erected in the Pactolus Valley at Sardis (Figure 9.2). It was a rectangular pyramid, of four steps above a foundation course, preserved today at 1.18m in height, over eight metres in width north to south (8.14m), and slightly longer running east to west (8.82m).<sup>33</sup> In late Classical or early Hellenistic times the altar was enclosed within a larger, rectangular construction with a set of steps on the west side, and then the spectacular Hellenistic temple of Artemis was constructed behind it. The gradual acculturation of Persian religious practices with those of the local populace may help explain the renovation of the altar.<sup>34</sup>



*Figure 9.2* In the middle distance: the stepped construction of the Persian sixth-century BC altar exposed within the later Greek altar of Artemis at Sardis, Lydia

Source: Photograph © Archaeological Exploration of Sardis/President and Fellows of Harvard College.

The development of Greek cult and the sanctuary of Artemis around the altar comprises a striking example of the flexibility in religious matters for which Cyrus, other Persian rulers, and governors would become renowned. Both freedom and finance existed for a syncretistic kind of public worship in the satrapal capital,<sup>35</sup> which took root as language and other ethnic barriers fell in a peacetime climate encouraging cultural integration.

Acculturation of the Persian and Greek goddesses was greatly aided by the Persian custom of aniconic worship. There were no statues or other preconceived imagery to be elided into a new cultural context. The Lydians and the Ionian Greeks were free to visualise the female deity in a familiar manner and draw parallels between her worship and that of their own goddess Artemis. Similarities between the cults – associations with water, the protection of vegetation, and fertility<sup>36</sup> – meant that the Greeks could recognise the goddess of the new ruling power and, conversely, that Artemis could be patronised by the Persians. The fusion of the identities of the Persian goddess Anāhitā and the Greek deity Artemis was reflected on the coins of Hierocaesarea showing a goddess wearing Greek costume but labelled ΠΕΡΣΙΚΗ.<sup>37</sup> The conversion of the Persian stepped altar to a conventional Greek shape and the formation of the Artemis precinct around it are incontestable evidence of the willingness of Persian authorities to their subjects' religious preferences.

Although the assimilation of the cults was not possible, given the Persian aversion to burning offerings, a combination of traditions is certainly evident in Anatolia. Holocaust offerings were considered a profanation of fire and had no part in Persian religious practices, but there are indications that the religions did merge to involve somehow both animal sacrifice and fire – perhaps offerings made before fire, rather than consumed by it. A stela from the area of tumulus burials near Ergili, Daskyleion, depicts two Persian priests standing before a (false?) tomb door. Beside them in some sort of a container are the heads of a bull and a ram, apparently sacrificial animals.<sup>38</sup> There is no fire altar visible in the surviving part of the relief but we may draw a comparison between the scene and the Taş Kule tomb near Phokaia: a similar ritual combining Greek and Persian customs may have taken place before the false door at this tomb, which had a fire bowl incorporated into the stone above it.

The Persian period also saw the introduction of the reclining banquet in association with mortuary practice. Cyrus' tomb in Persia contained a couch for his coffin, as well as a table and drinking cups.<sup>39</sup> The evidence of tomb inclusions at Sardis (mostly drinking vessels and unguentaria) and the prevalence of the scene on funerary stelae across Anatolia show the popularity of the practice.<sup>40</sup>

A wall painting in an early Persian-period tomb (around 525 BC) at Kızılbey, near Elmalı in northern Lykia, features a funerary banquet scene with stone couch and table for drinking vessels, reflecting the chamber's actual furnishings.<sup>41</sup> This tomb is notable for another reason: a Persian quat-foil design painted on the floor.<sup>42</sup> The intention was, it seems, to create the

effect of a rug in front of the couch where the body of the deceased lay. The design turns out to be an important clue in the search for evidence about Persian influence or participation in Anatolian religious contexts.


Identical stylised flowers in panels also appear on a marble slab from Sardis (Figure 9.3). With its interposing guilloche bands, it, too, resembles a carpet. The slab has been tentatively identified as coming from the threshold of the sanctuary of the Lydian goddess Kybebe.<sup>43</sup> It was found with other architectural and ornamental fragments from the sixth and fifth centuries originating from a sanctuary and temple ‘of the Mother’.<sup>44</sup> Very few pieces are identifiably part of the archaic sanctuary (ἱρόν) of the Lydian deity mentioned by Herodotus, burned down at the time of the Ionian revolt (Herodotus 5.102); the threshold stone and a few sculptures were reused in its Classical period replacement, visited by Themistocles (*Vit. Them.* 31.1). Fortunately, the literary sources illustrate the perpetuation and elaboration of the worship of the Lydian goddess during the Persian period.

The quatrefoil design seems to have originated in the Near East in sacred contexts, making its way from Egypt, where it appeared among tomb decorations and on furnishings, as well on the funerary jewellery of princesses;<sup>45</sup> to Assyria, where it adorned temple walls and apotropaic carved stone thresholds of royal buildings (Figure 9.4);<sup>46</sup> to Iran, as seen on wall plaques from Hasanlu, Azerbaijan, and the Elamite city of Susa, and on glazed tiles from a ‘temple-palace’ near Bukān, Kordestān;<sup>47</sup> and eventually to western Anatolia in the sixth century BC, first making a fleeting appearance on orientalising pottery and on gold and



Figure 9.3 Threshold stone from Sardis, possibly of the temple of the Lydian goddess Kybebe

Source: Photograph © Archaeological Exploration of Sardis/President and Fellows of Harvard College.



*Figure 9.4* Gypsum door-sill from the North Palace of the Neo-Assyrian king Aššurbanipal, Nineveh, about 645 BC

Source: Photograph: BM 124962 © Trustees of the British Museum.

electrum appliques forming part of a votive deposit at Ephesos, and later reintroduced via the Persian conquest.<sup>48</sup> In addition to its prominence on the threshold of the Kybebe temple, in the Persian period the symbol was promulgated on some of the earliest coinage to feature anything other than incuse impressions on the reverse (Figure 9.5). Minted by Miletos, the city that famously offered its allegiance to Persia before the invasion of Lydia (Herodotus 1.76, 143), the coins paired a familiar regional symbol of sovereignty and power, a lion's head, with the Near Eastern quatrefoil, now associated with an important Anatolian goddess. This curious combination could perhaps be viewed as a manifestation of Cyrus' nascent social strategy utilising religion in the exercise of power.

The significance of the Sardian threshold stone is that it connotes a Persian influence on the construction of a Lydian religious building. Like changes to tomb culture and like the modification of the Artemis altar, the development points to Persian and Greek acculturation in the most sacred of settings. The temple of Artemis at Ephesos, completed in the Persian period, also demonstrates the Persian tactic of integration rather than imposition of their own culture. Predominantly in Ionic style, the temple carried typically Persian bull



Figure 9.5 Reverse of a silver stater from Miletos, mid to late sixth century BC

Source: Photograph: Object ref. no. CGR58237 © Trustees of the British Museum.

reliefs on its antae (or propylon) and showed a Persian man in local dress among the processing Greeks on its sima frieze.<sup>49</sup>

The observations on post-conquest religious building works are all the more interesting because during the Persian period other kinds of building activities in Lydia were ‘modest’.<sup>50</sup> Religious building must have been not only permitted but encouraged by the administration; in this way, Cyrus can have sought to direct his prosperous subjects away from other projects that had the potential to stimulate nationalistic ambitions, such as fortifications, civic structures, and palatial architecture, simultaneously defusing potential revolts based on claims of religious wrongdoing.

The reasoning behind the Persian king’s innovative program remains conjecture. Lessons may have been learned from his Median compatriots: among the religious ignominies they experienced as Assyrian vassals, foreign idols were erected in their cities and installed in their temples.<sup>51</sup> Cyrus’ successful military campaigns were not consolidated in the Assyrian way: local deities were not removed or made subservient to the god of the victor, nor were symbols of Persian military and religious superiority erected in prominent or sacred spaces. Earth and water, symbols of sovereignty, could be offered ceremonially to the Persian king to pre-empt war;<sup>52</sup> but a profession of loyalty to Cyrus was not articulated or construed as an act of submission to a foreign god. Perhaps

the absence in the Old Iranian tradition of a religious imperative to undertake military conquest played a part in forming Cyrus' ideology. Whatever the influence, his was a unique method of peacemaking.

No imperial ruler before Cyrus had facilitated the acculturation of his own religion whilst not interfering with the freedoms of local religions and religious institutions. The religion and religious institutions of the conquered, rather than the conqueror, were pivotal to the taking and exercise of power in newly-subordinated provinces – an original approach to peacemaking and reconciliation that brought about Cyrus the Great's positive reputation in posterity.

## Notes

- 1 This chapter is a modified version of a paper presented in June 2014 at the 8th Celtic Conference in Classics hosted by the University of Edinburgh. With thanks to Dr Eoghan P. Moloney, who invited me to contribute to the panel something on the Near Eastern approach to peacemaking.
- 2 Neo-Assyria was the most recent but by no means the first to propagate a form of religious imperialism in Anatolia. Remarkably, the principal elements of the Assyrian policy can be found as far back as the Bronze Age Old Kingdom and traced through the Hittite period into the Neo-Hittite kingdoms. It is only with the arrival of the Persians in the second half of the sixth century BC that a new approach to the use of religion in the exercise of political power can be detected, one which adapted or did not employ earlier conventions: see Selga Medenieks (2013) *Cyrus the Great, Religion, and the Conquest of Ancient Anatolia*, PhD thesis, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland.
- 3 See, for example, drawings of the reliefs from rooms 2 and 14 of the palace of King Sargon II by Eugène Flandin (1849), plates 56–57 (Vol. 1), 158 and 146 (Vol. 2), reproduced in Albenda (1986), plates 113 (showing the standard mounted on a chariot during battle), 114 (showing the standard in detail), and 137 (showing standards in a cultic setting within a fortified camp). The weapon appeared in the context of scenes depicting the conquest of Ḫarḫar and Kišešla (formerly Median territory).
- 4 Holloway (2002) 161 observed that all known instances occurred between 745 and 696 BC.
- 5 *ARAB II* 6 §11.
- 6 Explicitly stated, for example, on the Nimrud prism of Sargon II: Gadd (1954) 177.
- 7 A letter to Aššurbanipal from the Babylonian front reads: 'Let (these) people, their sons and their wives together with their gods enter into (the ceremonies) of the oath of the king my lord ...' See Waterman (1930) Letter 202.
- 8 '[Y]ou will not make an agreement before gods ... nor conspire with each other': Parpola (1972) 32 §153ff; Wiseman (1958) 40–42. On Neo-Assyrian treaties and oaths taken by their subjects generally, see *SAA II*.
- 9 *ARAB II* 232 §594–595. For a recent translation of the entire letter, see *RINAP 4* 79–86, no. 33.
- 10 See Bedford (2009).
- 11 *SAA III* 3 'Aššurbanipal's Hymn to the Ištar of Nineveh and Arbela.'
- 12 *RINAP 4* 19, no. 1, col. iv §10–15.
- 13 Foster (2007) 70.
- 14 Holloway (2002) 349–350.
- 15 Mallowan (1956) 12–15.
- 16 Discovered in March 1879 at Omran, Babylon, by a team led by Daoud Toma, excavator Hormuzd Rassam's overseer at Babylon: Taylor (2013) 49–50. Once thought to have been deposited at the site of the temple of Marduk or its archives, the Cylinder is now believed to have been situated in a niche in one of the Babylonian walls repaired by Cyrus:

- see reappraisal by Taylor, *ibid.* 58–59. In burying the inscription within the structure of a renovated building, Cyrus was following the example of great Mesopotamian kings, who recorded their deeds for posterity – and the approval of the gods: Michalowski in Arnold and Michalowski (2006) 427. However, fragments of a conventionally-shaped tablet engraved with the Cylinder text, discovered recently in the British Museum collection, demonstrate that the Cylinder’s messages were also circulated and publicised: Finkel (2013b) 2.
- 17 Taylor (2013) 67.
  - 18 Harmatta (1971) 219ff.
  - 19 See Kuhrt (1983) 88, 92.
  - 20 The departure of the cult statue from the Assyrian capital city, Assur, and its arrival in Babylon is recorded in the Babylonian Chronicles (*ABC* 1 §35–36; 14 §35–36; 16 §1–8) and on clay cylinders which also describe Aššurbanipal’s lavish gifts to the temples of Marduk and others (*ARAB II* 954; 956–957; 962; 963; 970–971; 975; 979; 989; 998–999; 1016; 1119–1120). On the cosmic harmony brought about by the restoration of the statue, see Nissinen and Parpola (2004) 214–215.
  - 21 Line 43. The inscription found and reburied by Cyrus might have been one currently in the British Museum commemorating similar work carried out by the Assyrian king to the walls of Babylon: *ARAB II* 963–964. For more on the motivations of both Nabonidus and Cyrus in relation to invoking Aššurbanipal, see Michalowski (2014).
  - 22 For the use of Akkadian *sa-li-mi-iš* and the adverbial *šū-ul-ma-niš* for ‘peace’ in the Cyrus Cylinder text, see Schaudig (2001) 244; 666.
  - 23 My emphases. Translation from Finkel (2013c) 6. Note that §25 is translated somewhat differently in *ANET* 315–316: ‘I strove for **peace** in Babylon and in all his (other) sacred cities’.
  - 24 Translation from Finkel (2013c) 6–7.
  - 25 Translation from Finkel (2013c) 7 §36.
  - 26 Gadd and Legrain (1928) 58, no. 194.
  - 27 *Ezra* 1:1–6; 6:1–5; 2 *Chronicles* 36: 22–23. On the disputed authenticity of the ‘edict’ of Cyrus contained in *Ezra*, see Grabbe (2004) 71–84; 271–276.
  - 28 On traditions concerning the sanctuary and its possible antiquity, see Saprykin (1989) 125–127.
  - 29 Other manifestations of religion in combination with political institutions were inherited from the Anatolian tradition, such as ceremonial city gates and kingship rituals at this and other civic structures: for example, the apotropaic parade of a lion, symbol of Lydian kingship, around the city walls (Herodotus 1.84).
  - 30 Ratté (2011) 64.
  - 31 Kerschner (2008) 224.
  - 32 A number of examples of funerary couches in Lydian tombs survive. For example, at Bin Tepe, the Sardinian necropolis, Tomb BT 62.4, dated to the late sixth or early fifth century BC: see catalogue entry in Ratté (2011) 77–80, no. 3. At Sardis: Tomb BK 71.1 and Tomb 77.1, both second half of the sixth century BC; and Tomb 82.1, third quarter of the sixth century BC: *ibid.* 86–88, no. 10; 89–90, no. 11; 90–92, no. 12. Tomb 89.11, sixth to third centuries BC, has three limestone benches built into the walls without lower supports, but which must have served the same function as couches: *ibid.* 92–93, no. 13.
  - 33 See Ratté (2011) 123–124 for construction details. Only three steps survived the remodelling of the original altar, but Frazer and Hanfmann (1975) 91 point out that setting marks on the third step show that a further course existed.
  - 34 According to Brosius (1998) 227, it was the Greek cult of Artemis that became ‘persianised’. In this location, at least, either the reverse was true or the merger reflected a joint endeavour: on recent archaeological investigations proving there were no antecedents of the Hellenistic temple of Artemis here, see Cahill (2011) 211.
  - 35 As Dusinberre (2003) 64 observed.
  - 36 Brosius (1998) 237.

- 37 See Imhoof-Blumer (1897) 5–22 and plate I; and Robert and Robert (1948) on the numismatics of the region. Note the objections of Brosius (1998) 230 to the idea that the goddesses were equated. According to her, the legend on the above mentioned coins was simply a Greek epithet to identify the place where the goddess was worshipped: *ibid.* 234–235.
- 38 For a photograph of the stela, now in the Istanbul Archaeological Museum, see [www.cais-soas.com](http://www.cais-soas.com). For rites at false doors of tombs, see Cahill (1988) 495–498.
- 39 Arrian, *Anab.* 6.29.4–11, and Strabo, *Geog.* 15.3.7, both citing accounts of Aristobulus.
- 40 Dussinberre (2003) 134; 95. The advent of the Achaemenids had a palpable effect on all social strata, as changes in ceramics and diet attest. Achaemenid drinking bowls outnumber Lydian vessels in the earliest excavated ceramic assemblage, dating about fifty years after the conquest of Lydia. See further *ibid.* 29 and chapter 8.
- 41 Mellink (1998) 24–25, 59–60. The Assyrian painting technique employed as well as some of the subject matter (*ibid.* 63) may have been transferred through Urartian or Persian contacts. Note the caution of Briant (2002) 84 that the scenes could belong ‘to the local repertoire and do not presuppose Persian influence’.
- 42 Mellink (1998) 39–40 and Fig. 3.1.
- 43 Ratté (2011) 14 and n. 48, App. 1 no. A4 and Figs 234–238, citing an identification made by Crawford H. Greenewalt, Jr.
- 44 The slab was among others, one with an inscription identifying it as coming from the sanctuary ‘of the Mother’, found in a re-used context in the Roman synagogue at Sardis: Mitten (1964). For the inscription (Inv. 63.121), see L. Robert in Mitten (1964) 34 and Gauthier (1989) 47–49.
- 45 Of special note is the prominence of the motif on the rudder of one of the funerary boats buried outside the Northern Pyramid at Dahshur (of the Twelfth Dynasty Pharaoh Senusret III, r. 1870–1831 BC) and on models of funerary boats within tombs: de Morgan (1895) 81–83 and pl. XXXI; Schäfer (1908) 100–101 and Abb. 161–162; Steindorff (1896) 35 and Taf. X.4; 37 and Taf. X.9. For the motif on funerary headbands: depicted among the Old Kingdom murals of the tomb of Pharaoh Sahure, see Borchardt (1913) Blatt 16; and embellishing the gold crown of the Middle Kingdom Princess Sit-Hathor-Yunet, found in her tomb at Luhan: Vernier (1925) 201–202 and pl. XXXVIII, catalogue no. 52641; Aldred (1971) 83 and pl. 20.
- 46 Surviving examples all date to the Neo-Assyrian period. For examples of wall plaques from Ashur: Andrae (1925) 63–76 and pl. 33; from Ba’shiqa (Tell Billah), Arban (Tell Ajaja), and the Kidmuri temple of Ishtar, Nimrud (northern Iraq), all dating to the reign of Aššurnasirpal II (r. 883–859 BC), in the British Museum collection: Albenda (1991); from Balawat: Dayton and Dayton (1978) 374–375 and Fig. 338. For door-sills, again all of the Neo-Assyrian period, see Albenda (1978). According to Dominique Collon on the British Museum website, where several examples can be found today, the design of the door-sill ‘may have played a similar role to those depicted on royal garments and throne covers, as symbolically protective and representative of the king’s power’: see <http://culturalinstitute.britishmuseum.org/asset-viewer/part-of-a-stone-sill-from-a-doorway-in-the-north-palace-of-ashurbanipal/2QHdKHf1WGDQaQ>.
- 47 For ninth-century BC wall plaques at Hasanlu: de Schauensee (1988) 49 and Fig. 18; and at Susa: Heim (1989) 93–98 and Figs 22–25. For seventh-century BC glazed tiles: Soudavar (2003) 84; 166, Figs 78 (with enlarged central rosette) and 80.
- 48 Few occurrences of the motif can be attributed to early sixth-century BC Anatolia with any certainty. For an example on pottery in the ‘Wild Goat’ style, a cauldron-shaped bowl found at Cerveteri but probably made in Teos, now in the Musée du Louvre collection, cat. no. E 659/inv. no. CP 21: Coulié (2014) 164–167, cat. no. 41; for the votive deposit containing over 800 pieces dating from the seventh century BC and not later than the early years of the sixth century BC, found beneath the so-called ‘central basis’ at Ephesos (above which the Artemision was later built), see Hogarth (1908) 36, 111, pl. VIII.6 and 13–16, and pl. X.27, and Bammer (2008) 244. The motif also occurred

on terracotta roof (sima) tiles from Sardis, Gordion and perhaps other locations but it is uncertain whether they date to the early or middle part of the century. For Sardian examples see: Shear (1926) 34–40, items 16–20, Figs 18–20 and pl. XI; Åkerström (1966) 76 and Taf. 45:3; Princeton University Art Museum inv. nos y1929–45 and 1999–23.1; Ramage (1978) 26, item 42 and Fig. 83; 27, items 47, 49–50 and Figs 90, 92–93; Ratté (1994) 379, item 19 and Pl. 86; for similar tiles from Gordion: Åkerström (1966) 140–141, *Giebelsima* items a and b, Taf. 69.6 and 69.4; and tiles from ‘southwest Asia Minor’, in the collection of the Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek, Copenhagen (inv. nos 3433–3440): Johansen *et al.* (1994) 231, no. 161.

49 On the frieze, see Muss (2008b) 49.

50 Ratté (2011) 11. For architectural and ornamental fragments of the sixth and early fifth centuries, from small structures, grave markers, votives, and small altars, see the survey and analysis in Ratté (2011) 13–16.

51 At Ḥarḥār, as described above at n.5, but also known to have occurred in the city of Kišesim in Median territory: *ARAB II* 5 §10. See Holloway (2002) 157–159, nn. 251 and 252, on the royal inscriptions describing these events.

52 Kuhrt (1988). See also Munn (2006) 221–225 on the Lydian origins of these tokens of sovereignty.

# 10 International arbitration in Archaic Greece

*Aideen Carty*

## **Introduction: clearing confusion and posing a puzzle**

For an Irish-woman of my vintage, pondering peace and reconciliation inevitably calls to mind Northern Ireland and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, which followed decades of war, violence, and entrenched attitudes.<sup>1</sup> While the Good Friday Agreement was engendered by the interested parties themselves, the midwives were a trio of international mediators led by Senator George Mitchell of the United States.<sup>2</sup> Mitchell's memoirs of the period reveal the tenacity, delicacy, and cajoling required of well-resourced, government-supported mediators in difficult circumstances.<sup>3</sup> How, then, could a single individual, without the backing of governments, and without extensive resources, impose a solution on two warring sides in the intra- and inter-*polis* conflicts of Ancient Greece? This is all the more puzzling as arbitration differs from mediation: mediators facilitate the finding of a solution by the disputants themselves; arbiters impose their own decision. Unlike mediation, arbitration is binding for the disputants, and the stakes are thus higher for all involved. According to Emerson, who notes that the two types of mechanism can often be confused, arbitration is 'the voluntary agreement of states or persons to submit their differences to judges of their own choice and to bind themselves in advance to accept the decisions of judges, so chosen, as final and binding'.<sup>4</sup> In international arbitration, it follows that outsiders are chosen to occupy a position of great power, responsibility, and opportunity.

While third-party intervention in conflicts can be seen in all periods in ancient Greek history,<sup>5</sup> an unusual characteristic of the Archaic period is the prevalence of individuals resolving disputes under the pressure of binding arbitration. Some of these intermediaries were famous tyrants, some were famous sages, and some were otherwise unremarkable. The trend of appointing individuals to these roles seems to have declined from the Classical period onward. Kurt Raaflaub has this impression, arguing that it would be difficult to find arbiters with sufficient trust and authority in the context of the superpower blocs of the Classical and Hellenistic periods of ancient Greek history.<sup>6</sup> However, in his survey of evidence for arbitration in Greek history, Tod lists examples of individual arbiters for the Classical and Hellenistic periods,<sup>7</sup> and concludes that appeal to individuals

was frequent throughout Greek history, but appeals to cities were simply more common.<sup>8</sup> A decline in the use of individual arbiters after the Archaic period can be accounted for below, when we examine evidence for how they were appointed. This latter issue is one of the three main questions I address on looking into arbitration in Archaic Greece. Firstly, I begin with the question of how the terminology for an elected tyrant could be confused with that for an international arbiter. According to Aristotle's definition of an *aisymnētēs* as 'an elected tyrant', there would not appear to be a connection. But I shall argue that, in the Archaic period, *aisymnētēs* was one of a range of terms used to describe arbiters, both on a domestic level and on the international stage. Secondly, I approach the question of when disputants should submit to binding arbitration. The simple answer is 'when the strongest party has lost its head'. And thirdly, who could be trusted with the role of intermediary in a binding arbitration? Apollo would appear to have known best, with Delphi as a major human-resource network for international arbiters. It is the connection between Delphi and the nomination of individual arbiters that may explain a decline in their use as third-party arbiters in Classical- and Hellenistic-period disputes.

Perhaps it is needless to say that all the examples given hereafter refer to events and figures in Archaic Greece, and, as we are dealing with the Archaic period, our evidence is scanty. But there is one clear thread running through my chapter and that is Periander, the tyrant of Corinth. It is through him that we can see (a) the link between *aisymnētai* and international arbitration, (b) the optimum point for submission to arbitration, and – to a certain extent – (c) the role of Delphi in nominating arbiters. Much of the chapter will focus on the dynamics of international arbitration, but we shall turn first, and briefly, to the question of terminology and how an *aisymnētēs* could be an international arbiter.

### **The link between *aisymnētai* and international arbitration**

Terms used to describe an arbiter of the Archaic period are mainly *diallaktēs* and *katartistēr*. *Diallaktēs* has been defined as a 'reconciler', and was used to refer to a group of Spartans arbitrating between Megara and Athens over Salamis (Plut. *Solon* 10),<sup>9</sup> as well as Solon's mediation between the Athenian classes (Plut. *Solon* 14). *Katartistēr* and its cognates were used by Herodotus regarding two separate international arbitrations of the Archaic period: first, that of Demonax of Mantinea who arbitrated in the civil strife of Cyrene (Hdt. 4.161); and second, a committee of Paros' 'best men', who arbitrated in the civil strife of Miletus (Hdt. 5.28–9). However, another extant term should be examined, and its meaning expanded to cover arbitration in both domestic and inter-*polis* conflicts. The term is *aisymnētēs*.

There were magistrates termed *aisymnētēs* in cities such as Miletus, and the term goes back at least as far as Homer, where *aisymnētai* took charge of the dancing during the Phaeacians' games in *Odyssey* Book 8 (l.258)<sup>10</sup> – this example

helps to define the term as ‘umpire’ or ‘judge’ (*LSJ*). In general, the early references to *aisymnētēs* imply a role equivalent to that of lawgivers, until a change in definition becomes apparent in the Classical period.<sup>11</sup> When we come to Aristotle’s *Politics* in the fourth century BC, the term is given a much more specific meaning: he describes the *aisymnētēs* as a tyrant elected for a set goal, and goes on to argue that this legal form of single rule was not hereditary, and that the term of the office was fixed (Arist. *Pol.* 1285 a 29–1285 b; cf. 1295 a 14).

δύο μὲν οὖν εἶδη ταῦτα μοναρχίας· ἕτερον δ’ ὅπερ ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Ἑλλησιν, οὓς καλοῦσιν αἰσυμνήτας. ἔστι δὲ τοῦθ’ ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν αἰρετὴ τυραννίς, διαφέρουσα δὲ τῆς βαρβαρικῆς οὐ τῷ μὴ κατὰ νόμον ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ πάτριος εἶναι μόνον. ἦρχον δ’ οἱ μὲν διὰ βίου τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην, οἱ δὲ μέχρι τινῶν ὠρισμένων χρόνων ἢ πράξεων, οἷον εἴλοντό ποτε Μιτυληναῖοι Πιττακὸν πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας ὧν προειστήκεσαν Ἀντιμενίδης καὶ Ἀλκαῖος ὁ ποιητής. δηλοῖ δ’ Ἀλκαῖος ὅτι τύραννον εἴλοντο τὸν Πιττακὸν ἐν τινι τῶν σκολιῶν μελῶν· ἐπιτιμᾷ γὰρ ὅτι τὸν κακοπάτριδα Πιττακὸν πόλιος τᾶς ἀχόλω καὶ βαρυδαίμονος ἐστάσαντο τύραννον μέγ’ ἐπαινέοντες ἀολλέες. [fr. 348 Campbell] αὗται μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ τε καὶ ἦσαν διὰ μὲν τὸ δεσποτικαὶ εἶναι τυραννικαί, διὰ δὲ τὸ αἰρεταὶ καὶ ἐκόντων βασιλικαί

but there was another [type of monarchy] among [the earlier] Greeks, meaning those termed *aisymnētēs*. To put it simply, it is an elected monarchy, and it only differs from the barbarian style of monarchy by not being hereditary, not that it implies ruling outside of the laws. Such [barbarian-style monarchs] ruled for life, but these [*aisymnētēs*] for fixed periods or specific tasks. For example, in such manner the Mytileneans once chose Pittacus in opposition to the exiles who were led by Antimenides and the poet Alcaeus. In one of his *skolia*, Alcaeus makes clear that Pittacus was elected as a tyrant: ‘Indeed, they honoured that low-life Pittacus, and praised him, setting him up as tyrant of the cringing, luckless city.’ So they were, as they are now, tyrants because of their despotism, and kings through election and assent.

(Arist. *Pol.* 1285 a 29–1285 b)

The illustrative example given by Aristotle brings us back to the Archaic period: he points to the tyrant of Mytilene on Lesbos, Pittacus – otherwise known as one of the Seven Sages (or, to his contemporary and eventual enemy Alcaeus, as a base-born ‘Potbelly’). According to Aristotle’s exposition, Pittacus was given tyrannical power in order to deal with exiles from the city’s civil strife. While Aristotle’s definition of *aisymnētēs* focuses on the election of a tyrant, Pittacus’ task of dealing with exiles from civil strife might, at a stretch, link the Aristotelian definition of *aisymnētēs* with its more general meaning of ‘umpire’ or ‘judge’. But, considering Aristotle’s narrow definition of the term, how may we expand the definition of an *aisymnētēs* to include ‘international arbiter’?

Unfortunately, there is no use of the term *aisymnētēs* in what is extant of Alcaeus' poetry, and the line Aristotle refers to is one where Pittacus is 'set up as a *tyrant*', not as an *aisymnētēs* (Alcaeus fr. 348 Campbell = Arist. *Pol.* 1285 b). Mainly because of this lack of an explicit connection between Pittacus' tyranny and an *aisymnētia*, it has been suggested that Aristotle simply used the example of Pittacus to give his theory of political *homonoia* an historical basis in fact, with his emphasis on the aspect of election in Pittacus' rise to power supposed to show the *homonoia* of the Mytileneans. As a result of this apparent shoe-horning of historical detail into political theory, Aristotle's definition of *aisymnētēs* has been deemed 'questionable'.<sup>12</sup>

Unfortunately, Pittacus is the sole example Aristotle gives of an *aisymnētēs*. But if an *aisymnētēs* were only an 'elected tyrant', what should we make of the term being applied elsewhere to Periander, the tyrant of Corinth? He is described as an *aisymnētēs* by Diogenes Laertius (1.100), and is included in a list of *aisymnētai* referred to by the Byzantine scholar, Theodorus Metochites:

νῦν δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ γ' ἐκόντες ὄντες κατὰ χρεῖαν δὴ τινα, καὶ αὔθις διὰ νόσον ἐν λογισμοῖς σωφρονικοῖς καὶ ποθοῦσιν ἰατρειᾶν ἐπὶ ταῖς συμφοραῖς καὶ ταῖς στασιώδεσιν ἐπιρῆϊας ἀλλαττόμενοι καὶ ἀνθαιρούμενοι δεσπότης ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς ἀνευθύνους καὶ τυραννικὴν ἐπιστασίαν βελτίστων ἀνδρῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐκλογίμων, καὶ γαλήνην δυναμένων ἐμποιεῖν ἐν πολιτικοῖς κλύδωσιν, οὓς αἰσυμνήταις τὸ παλαιὸν ἐκάλουν, οἷος Πιττακὸς ἦν ἐν Μιτυλήνῃ, καὶ Περιάνδρος ἐν Κορίνθῳ, καὶ Φοιβίας ἐν Σάμῳ, καὶ τῆ κατὰ Ἴόνιον Ἀπολλωνία Χαιρήμων, καὶ ἄλλοι παρ' ἄλλοις.<sup>13</sup>

But [other people] – willingly, according to some necessity, and because of a disease of reason and wisdom – desire a cure against disasters and the bitterness of strife. They alternate and freely elect unaccountable despots on certain conditions, and there is tyrannical strife amongst those men considered the best for virtue and ability to calm the political seas. Such men were called *aisymnētēs* in ancient times – men such as Pittacus in Mytilene, Periander in Corinth, Phoibias in Samos, Chairemon in Ionian Apollonia, and yet more besides.

(Theodorus Metochites, *Miscellanea* XX)<sup>14</sup>

From the context of this list, Theodorus is clearly using Aristotle's definition of an *aisymnētēs* as an elected tyrant, and yet all our evidence points to Periander having inherited the Corinthian tyranny from his father, Cypselus. We do not know where Theodorus Metochites sourced this list, and one cannot easily comprehend how Periander, tyrant of Corinth, could be described as an Aristotelian *aisymnētēs*. To make sense of the application of the term to Periander, Salmon suggests that it may have been a method of formalising a tyrant's position within a city;<sup>15</sup> in the same vein, Parker proposes that *aisymnētēs* was a generic term.<sup>16</sup> Yet the question of Periander as an *aisymnētēs* is puzzling only if we limit our understanding of the term to Aristotle's definition. When we return to the more

general sense of an *aisymnētēs* as a judge or an umpire, Periander certainly played this part on the international stage. According to the *Chronika* of Eusebius, it was in the last decade of the seventh century BC that Periander acted as an arbiter in a dispute between Athens and Mytilene over a city near Troy called Sigeion. Neither of the sources which call Periander an *aisymnētēs* refers specifically to this incident, and Herodotus – who never uses the expression or its cognates at all – uses the term *diaitētēs* to describe Periander’s role in the Sigeion arbitration (Hdt. 5.95). Unsurprisingly, a *diaitētēs* is defined as an ‘arbitrator’ or ‘umpire’ (LSJ). The tentative proposition I extend at this point is that, before Aristotle limited the definition of *aisymnētēs*, it had been synonymous with *diaitētēs*, *diallaktēs*, and *katartistēr* meaning ‘mediator’ or ‘arbiter’; that it was one of a range of general terms used to refer to international arbiters, such as Periander, as well as those arbitrating in domestic strife, such as Pittacus.

### **The optimum point for submission to arbitration**

Despite the involvement of a group of Spartans in the Salamis dispute (Plut. *Solon* 10), and a group of Parian arbiters in Milesian strife (Hdt. 5.28–9), historical evidence for committees of arbiters is relatively rare for the Archaic period, as it is mainly individuals whom we find being called upon to settle disputes at home or abroad. But how can the decision of outsiders bind competing sides in agreement, particularly when it is a question of lone individuals? The key point to consider here is timing. Once a dispute has reached what is termed ‘a mutually hurting stalemate’,<sup>17</sup> and one or both sides needs to withdraw from the conflict while saving face, there are increased chances of both sides agreeing to submit to binding arbitration. Binding arbitration, rather than non-binding mediation, is particularly useful in providing face-saving cover before the domestic audiences on each side of the dispute.<sup>18</sup> In general, leaders on each side can emphasize the legality of a binding agreement – as arranged in advance of the arbitration – and highlight the reputational costs to their own citizens of breaking this type of agreement. In other words, it is easier for rival leaders to ‘sell’ an agreement to their citizens when it is the verdict of an impartial and reputable third-party following upon a thorough examination of the dispute.<sup>19</sup>

Let us look at the case of Periander’s arbitration in Sigeion as an example.<sup>20</sup> For an event of the Archaic period, we have a considerable amount of detail regarding the conflict over Sigeion, particularly the build-up to the call for arbitration. Also, while much of the detail is from later sources, we suspect that the contemporary poetry of Alcaeus informed them. The conflict was between Athens and the Lesbian *polis* of Mytilene, and chronographic tradition sets the date *c.* 607/6 BC (Euseb. *Chron.*). Mytilene had founded the colony of Sigeion in the Troad, and the assumption is that it was part of a colonizing drive north, as Mytilene had also founded Sestos on the European side of the Dardanelles.<sup>21</sup> Yet, for some unknown reason, Athenians invaded the colony, driving the Mytileneans out. (I say Athenians, rather than Athens, as we do not know whether the invasion was state-sanctioned or not – the precise situation in

Athens around this time is unclear.)<sup>22</sup> Having lost possession of their colony to the Athenians, the Mytileneans retaliated, and attacked Sigeion in turn. Unusually, the conflict seems to have involved an attempt to resolve the dispute through single combat – perhaps the close proximity of Troy inspired heroic ambitions. On the Athenian side, their general stepped forward: a former Olympic victor called Phrynon. Against him, Pittacus stood for the Mytileneans, and he was not yet a tyrant, according to the traditional chronology. Most challenges to single combat are simply part of the general events of battle,<sup>23</sup> but our sources seem to suggest that the duel between Phrynon and Pittacus was aimed at deciding the claim to Sigeion.<sup>24</sup> If these late sources are right in their assumptions, it may be that the rival sides chose single combat as their first method of binding dispute resolution. If so, it was disappointing. The outcome of the Pittacus–Phrynon duel was ostensibly clear-cut, for Pittacus slew Phrynon, but it appears that Pittacus may have cheated. In the midst of the fighting, Pittacus pulled out a net, cast it, and reeled a trapped Phrynon to him, all the better to land the killer-blow. Most sources are unequivocal in their understanding of a sleight of hand, with an emphasis on the net being hidden: indeed, Polyaeus (1.23) says that Pittacus hid the net despite an agreement to have equal weapons.<sup>25</sup>

It appears that both sides agreed to submit to an arbiter in the wake of this duel. Why did they decide to do so at this particular point? In other examples, we simply hear that the warring sides had inflicted significant damage on each other prior to calling for arbitration (e.g. Hdt. 5.28; Plut. *Solon* 10), but with respect to Sigeion we have a lot more detail. Indeed, it was a case of the ‘mutually hurting stalemate’, while both sides could also hope for a favourable outcome in any arbitration. In terms of a stalemate, the Mytileneans remained locked out of Sigeion – despite their best efforts it was still in Athenian hands; and the Athenians were far from the support of their metropolis – to establish themselves securely, they needed the Mytileneans to withdraw. In terms of optimism, the outcome of the duel meant that both sides could nurse hopes of an arbiter ruling in their favour: the Athenians held the disputed *polis*, and could make a charge of cheating against Pittacus; while the Mytileneans could point to their founding of the *polis*, and Pittacus’ victory, if indeed the outcome of the duel was meant to decide the matter. On the Mytilenean side, perhaps there is also the issue of saving face. They had been rooted out of their own colony in the initial invasion, had failed to retake the city by force, and had not managed to establish a decisive outcome in the duel between the rival leaders. All of this would cause enormous reputational damage back in Mytilene. But if binding arbitration went against them, at least it gave them a way out, and someone else to blame.

There is a strikingly similar scenario in the background to our example of arbitration in Cyrene, according to Herodotus (4.161). Again, we have substantial detail regarding the background to the arbitration. The royal family – the Battiads – had split into warring factions, with the monarch’s brothers attacking Cyrene from their base in Barca. They routed the king’s forces and the king was throttled by his brother, Haliarchus. However, Haliarchus was

murdered in turn, by the king's widow. At this point, both sides turned to Delphi for arbitration, and the oracle ordered an Arcadian to resolve the crisis; he did so by reorganizing the tribes and the division of powers between *demos* and king (Hdt. 4.161).<sup>26</sup> As in the case of Sigeion, where the Athenians held possession of the city but had lost their general, in Cyrene the victorious side had lost what appears to have been one of their leaders. Despite positions of relative strength, both the Athenians in Sigeion and the rebel royals in Cyrene faced crises of confidence from a loss of leadership. In both cases, this meant the stronger disputants were as willing to submit to arbitration as the weaker parties.

### **The role of Delphi in nominating arbiters**

What, then, were the ideal characteristics of any putative arbiter in whom the disputants would rest their faith? Binding arbitration is a zero-sum game – establishing the rights and wrongs of situations such as territorial disputes – rather than non-binding mediation, which tends towards a win-win outcome and has lower stakes.<sup>27</sup> It is felt, therefore, that an unbiased intermediary will naturally be chosen in cases of binding arbitration. Impartiality is thus a prerequisite, and, along with it, the qualities of persuasiveness, a reputation worthy of respect, and an in-depth knowledge of the affair.<sup>28</sup> Modern intermediaries also require substantial resources, but this does not appear to have been the case in Archaic Greece.<sup>29</sup>

If impartiality is the most desirable characteristic for the third party in a case of binding arbitration, then how did the archaic Greeks source their international arbiters? The networks of consul-like *proxenia*, and *xenia* ('guest-friendship') between high-status individuals from different cities, gave disputants access to any number of outsiders, but questions of bias would have precluded their acceptance by the opposing side. According to Gabriel Herman, a guest-friend was obliged to come to the aid of his *xenos*, with military support if possible, thus their impartiality would always be in doubt.<sup>30</sup> A third party would have to be acceptable to both sides in the dispute, and thus be a mutual friend, or else be appointed at one or two removes through sympathetic channels. In the latter case, following a tradition of submitting disputes to divinities which stretched back from Greece through the Levant to Sumerian texts,<sup>31</sup> the gods could be counted upon to point the way.

We are told that 'the Cyreneans' submitted their plea for arbitration to Delphi, where the Pythia ordered them to seek an intermediary from Mantinea;<sup>32</sup> it was the Mantineans who offered Demonax for the task, as he was their most respected citizen (Hdt. 4.161). Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that Demonax was king of Mantinea at this point (*P. Oxy* 1367; *FGrHist* 1026 F 3). One may assume that such religious involvement in the appointment of an intermediary would afford the important protection of personal inviolability to the chosen arbiter, such as was afforded to heralds or others declared to be 'under truce'.<sup>33</sup> Delphi is also said to have been responsible for sending Epimenedes, the Cretan sage, to Athens, where he is supposed to have helped purify and

consecrate the city in the wake of the Cylonian conspiracy, and helped Solon prepare the city for his reforms (Diog. Laert. 1.110; Plut. *Solon* 12). In the Sigeion affair, the sources suggest that Athens and Mytilene chose Periander as an arbiter directly – there is no mention of Delphi. This is despite the fact that Periander seems to have acted as an agent of Delphi in another international conflict, passing intelligence from Delphi to Miletus during the war between Miletus and the kingdom of Lydia (Hdt. 1.20). For most of his tyranny, his relations with Delphi seem to have been very good, as had his father's before him.<sup>34</sup> As an indication of his links with the oracle, Periander also makes it onto some, though not all, of the lists of the Seven Sages who appear to have been inextricably linked with Delphi.<sup>35</sup> Those of the Seven Sages for whom we have evidence of involvement in arbitration include Solon, Epimenedes, Pittacus, and possibly Bias of Priene.<sup>36</sup> But if Delphi was not involved in the choosing of Periander, perhaps it should have been, and if, on the other hand, Delphi had been instrumental in his appointment as *aisymnētēs*, then the Mytileneans will have had cause for complaint.

Storing up trouble for the future, Periander ruled that both Athens and Mytilene should hold what they possessed at the time of the arbitration (Hdt. 5.95).<sup>37</sup> In other words, Athens retained possession of Sigeion, while Mytilene held its base nearby at a site called Achilleion. There was a report that Periander helped the Mytileneans to fortify Achilleion against the Athenians with stones from Troy (Timaeus *FGrH* 566 F 129) – a report that was roundly censured as mistaken, 'For how', said Strabo (13.1.39), 'could the opponent of the Athenians have been chosen as arbiter?' Viewed as a prequel to the arbitration, this aid to the Mytileneans would be a sign of bias. However, we must remember that it was the Athenians who came out of the arbitration with the best deal. As a sequel to the arbitration, aiding the Mytileneans with the fortification of Achilleion could have been part of Periander's settlement, and an effort to please both sides of the dispute by helping the Mytileneans to establish Achilleion permanently. But perhaps Periander *was* biased. His bias may not have been towards the Mytileneans but in favour of the victorious Athenians. For the Greeks had a custom of naming children after their grandparents, and, as Athens had an eponymous archon called Cypselus in the year 597/6 BC, there is a theory that Periander had a sister who was married to an Athenian man and thus became the mother of the Athenian Cypselus.<sup>38</sup> Such a link would make it very difficult for Periander to be impartial, and – if the theory is correct – then the proposal of Periander as an arbiter was flawed, skewing the outcome in favour of Athens even before the submission of arguments. Either way, the arbitration did not settle the dispute for long. The Mytileneans and Athenians continued to fight over Sigeion (cf. Hdt. 5.94).<sup>39</sup>

Interestingly, when Athens later disputed possession of Salamis with Megara, a group of five Spartans arbitrated, and they also found in Athens' favour (Plut. *Solon* 10). But Delphi was involved in that case: according to Plutarch, it supplied oracles supporting Athens' claim to Salamis (Plut. *Solon* 10).

**Conclusion: the decline of individual arbiters**

While Delphi played a leading role in nominating arbiters for international disputes in the Archaic period, there appears to have been a decline in the use of this service, corresponding to a decline in the use of individual arbiters. With his focus on the Classical and Hellenistic periods, Tod is surprised at the lack of appeals for arbitration to the Delphic oracle, noting that appeals were made directly to cities.<sup>40</sup> I suggest that this was a result of the oracle's own reputation for impartiality being compromised in the late sixth century BC, when it was found to have been bribed by the Alcmaeonids to arrange the ousting from Athens of their rivals, the Peisistratids (Hdt. 5.63; 6.123). As Delphi's susceptibility to corruption became public knowledge, the resultant loss of innocence must have played its part in the decline of binding arbitration, for who could nominate the arbiters? The range of 'manifestly awkward incidents' involving the Delphic oracle's bias and corruptibility has been remarked upon,<sup>41</sup> including the bribery that led to the deposal of Demaratus, one of Sparta's kings. Once known, such a lack of probity may not have affected the attitude to Delphi of ordinary citizens of Greek *poleis*, nor that of their ruling elites in the course of normal business. But the terribly delicate question of choosing an arbiter in a domestic or international dispute clearly could not be left to the administrators of the Delphic oracle without some qualms.

Another factor that will have militated against a continuing preference for individual arbiters will have been the upsurge in the popularity of oligarchies and democracies from the early Classical period onwards. For, while single rule continued throughout the Greek world, wherever it was found it was held in increasingly firm check by other offices of the state, written laws – which separated the law from the individual law-giver – and the conservation of constitutions.<sup>42</sup> Thus, in the Archaic period, when the contemporary lack of prejudice against one-man rule was allied with religious sanction from Delphi, it was relatively easy for communities to accept a binding verdict as laid down by a single individual, even if that man was a stranger from a distant city. In later periods, individual arbiters are attested, but conditions mitigated in favour of a more collegial set of arbiters, and the more abstract third-party intervention of a whole *polis*. Individuals could rarely attain the control over their local political systems which gave men such as Periander sufficient distinction, authority and freedom to arbitrate beyond the power structures of their home *polis*.

**Notes**

- 1 My thanks to Eoghan P. Moloney for inviting us to ponder such noble questions for the Celtic Conference in Classics 2014 – the experience was enlightening; thanks are also due to Michael S. Williams for co-editing this work, and to Ernst Baltrusch for useful and thought-provoking comments on an earlier draft. Note that, unless otherwise stated below, translations from the Greek are my own.
- 2 Mitchell eclipsed his colleagues in the public imagination, but his fellow mediators were Canadian General John de Chastelain, and former Finnish Prime Minister Harri Holkeri.

- 3 G. Mitchell (1999).
- 4 Emerson (1970) 157.
- 5 It is characterized by Mosley (1973) 96 as ‘an established feature of inter-state relations from quite early times’.
- 6 Raaflaub (2009a) 234.
- 7 He refers to the following examples: Themistocles in a dispute between Corinth and Corcyra (Plut. *Them.* 24); an Athenian called Bunas or Bulias in a dispute between the Eleans and the Callionaei ([Plut] *Proverb. Alex.* 23); and Maco of Larisa in a dispute between Phthiotic Thebes and Halus (*JG* ix.2.215). Themistocles played the part in a dispute between Corcyra and Corinth at some point in the early fifth-century BC (Plut. *Them.* 24). This dispute appears to have concerned the colony of Leucas, as Themistocles ordered both Corinth and Corcyra to share the administration of Leucas; he also imposed a fine of twenty talents on Corinth. Unsurprisingly, he was later made welcome in Corcyra during his exile from Athens.
- 8 Tod (1913) 92–4.
- 9 The men are named as Critolaidas, Amompharetos, Hysechidas, Anaxilas, and Cleomenes (Plut. *Solon* 10). It is interesting to note the number of committee members – currently, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague tends to assign international disputes to committees of three or five members.
- 10 It is also used as an adjective to describe Hermes in *Iliad* 14.347 – as such, it is generally translated as ‘princely’ (*LSJ*).
- 11 Hölkeskamp (1999) 60.
- 12 Romer (1982) 45. Despite this, it remains the case that Aristotle’s (re-)definition pervades modern scholarship (Hölkeskamp (1999) 220).
- 13 Text here from Müller and Kiessling (1821) 668–9 (Essay XX), with my own translation.
- 14 There is no other evidence of Phoibias or Chairemon, who were *aisymnētai* on Samos and in Apollonia. In my own work on Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos (Carty (2015) 34–6), I speculate that Phoibias might be an error. Bias of Priene is said to have made his name from leading an embassy on Samos (Plut. *QG* 20 – referring to events of the early sixth century BC), and, once we look past Aristotle’s definition of an *aisymnētēs*, there is no necessity to understand Theodorus Metochites’ Phoibias as a Samian: perhaps the name Phoibias was transmitted erroneously.
- 15 Salmon (1984) 206.
- 16 Parker (2007) 34; at this point, Parker is discussing the term in connection with Pittacus of Mytilene, rather than Periander of Corinth.
- 17 Arthur (1999) 78–9.
- 18 Gent and Shannon (2010) 369.
- 19 Arguing in favour of more recourse to arbitration in the modern American context, Emerson claims that ‘[arbitration] embodies the principles of independence, self reliance, equality, integrity, and responsibility, all of which are of inestimable value to any community’ (Emerson (1970) 157). Such claims may not translate well in their application to our examples from Archaic Greece, where it is often difficult to establish whether the whole community engaged in the process of choosing to go to arbitration and choosing the particular arbiter(s).
- 20 The date of the arbitration has been the cause of some dispute, owing in large part to different readings of Hdt. 5.94–96: a misinterpretation of the passage results in synchronizing Periander, Pittacus, and Phrynon with Peisistratus and his son Hippias (Page (1955) 154–6). In general, Victor Parker argues for a lowering of all Cypselid dates: Cypselus’ reign from 630–600 BC; Periander from 600–560 BC; and the Sigeion dispute c. 560 BC (Parker (1993)). For the date of the Sigeion dispute c. 560 BC, supporting evidence is given as the dating of the ‘Sigeion stele’ to the second quarter of the sixth century BC (Parker (1993) 405 and n.113; Jeffery (1990) 72).
- 21 Podlecki (1984) 63–4.
- 22 For instance, Page – raising questions of an Athenian context for the invasion of Sigeion, and the specific purpose of the expedition – points out that ‘Athens gained nothing

- but a new and vexatious commitment, a useless outpost surrounded by enemies' ((1955) 158 n.2). Considering the later Athenian Philaids' connections with Sigeion, under Peisistratus and his natural son Hegesistratus (Hdt. 5.94), it is unlikely that the Sigeion invaders can be seen as exiled Alcmaeonids. Perhaps they represent survivors of the Cylonian conspiracy who fled Athens while the Alcmaeonids were rooting out Cylon's supporters (Hdt. 5.71; Thuc. 1.126; Plut. *Solon* 12).
- 23 Van Wees (2004) 133.
- 24 Polyaeus (1.23) is most explicit, saying that the duel was over Sigeion; and Diogenes Laertius (1.74) connects the winning of the duel with recovering the territory. The only similar example known to us is that of the Battle of the Champions in the middle of the sixth-century BC, when 300 Spartans fought 300 Argives to settle a claim to territory, which was to go to the side with the last man standing (Hdt. 1.82; Paus. 2.20). Because of disagreement over the rules, that battle was indecisive, and the Sigeion duel appears to have been just as disappointing.
- 25 Strabo (13.1.38) explains the presence of the net by saying that Pittacus grabbed his fishing-gear on hearing of Phrynon's challenge – in other words, he was in a mad dash and grabbed what was to hand, hence the net.
- 26 He arranged Cyrene's population into new tribes according to their origins, and reformed the government by granting most of the royal powers to the demos. This was agreed under King Battos II ('the Lame'), but his heir – Arcesilaus II – caused fresh strife by agitating for a restoration of the monarchy's full array of powers (Hdt. 4.162–7, 200–203; cf. Chamoux (1953) 134–52).
- 27 Gent and Shannon (2010) 367 review the scholarly debate concerning the importance of a lack of bias to successful mediation and arbitration; while they assert that the matter of a correlation is still 'unsettled', they point to a correlation between a type of resolution mechanism and the importance of lack of bias, and the inherent requirement of a non-biased intermediary in binding arbitration.
- 28 Young (1967).
- 29 From the evidence of Plutarch's *Life of Solon* 10 – for what it is worth – in a situation similar to a law-court setting, the arbiter(s) appear to have heard the case put by representatives of each side and decided on the basis of this information alone. There is not even evidence of an Archaic arbiter's retinue, unlike what is needed in terms of the extensive resources of modern arbiters (for communications, inspections, technical/military expertise etc. – see Young (1967) 90).
- 30 Herman (1987) 26–7.
- 31 Hermann (2008) 210–12.
- 32 Lynette Mitchell assumes that it was a council or assembly of 'the Cyreneans' who decided to go to arbitration and agreed on the choice of Demonax (L. Mitchell (2013) 125 and 131). However, considering that the disputants were members of the same royal family, it seems more likely that the decision was made among a small number of the elite, and the general population presented with a fait accompli.
- 33 Such inviolability was not limited to the periods of panhellenic athletic contests and heralds; for instance Maeandrius, the refuge-seeking tyrant of Samos in the late sixth century, was allowed to flee ὑπόσπονδος (Baltrusch (1994) 122 n.182; cf. Adcock and Mosley (1975) 229).
- 34 Cf. de Libero (2001) 8–14.
- 35 There are numerous accounts of the golden tripod that was to be presented to 'the wisest' and that give varying lists of recipients who were then labelled as the Seven Sages, e.g. Diogenes Laertius 1.27, 1.32, 9.3.1–3 and Plutarch *Solon* 4 (cf. Wiersma (1933–34)). However, Periander is left out of lists such as that of Plato (*Protagoras* 343 B). It has been argued that Periander's relations with the oracle broke down in the 590s BC, after Periander's allies in Crisa lost control of Delphi in what is dubbed the First Sacred War 594–585 BC (Salmon (1984) 227; *contra* de Libero (2001) 14, n.53).
- 36 See n.7 above.

- 37 Diogenes Laertius (1.74) asserts that Pittacus recovered Sigeion for Mytilene as a result of the duel. However, this contradicts Herodotus (5.95), where Athens is clearly in possession of Sigeion at the time of Periander's arbitration.
- 38 Davies (1971) 295–6 and Table 1; cf. Salmon (1984) 217; Shapiro (1983) 306–7.
- 39 One of the key reasons for the long-term failure of disputes settled through binding arbitration is the instability of the final settlement owing to one or both parties' lack of satisfaction with the verdict. Pruitt and Rubin (1995) 137 argue that submitting to a third-party decision is less stable and mutually beneficial than solutions which reconcile both parties' interests.
- 40 Tod (1913) 95–7.
- 41 Lloyd-Jones (1976) 68.
- 42 Cf. L. Mitchell (2013).

## 11 Once an ally, always an ally

Sparta's approach to policing the oaths  
of her allies in the late fifth and  
early fourth centuries

*Andrew J. Bayliss*

The Spartans were well known for their obedience to their laws, as Demaratus' famous statement '*nomos* is their master' ably demonstrates.<sup>1</sup> But the Spartans were not noted merely for their obedience to secular laws or customs. Sparta was a society where 'the will of the god rated higher than the will of men',<sup>2</sup> and everyday behaviour was 'utterly conditioned by the divine'.<sup>3</sup> According to Richer:

In the Spartan mind . . . supernatural powers were to be found everywhere. One had to secure the favor of such powers by appropriate actions. This sort of thinking and behavior can be seen to have underpinned the entirety of the young Spartans' education, and it can also be seen to have informed the conduct of adults in war and peace alike.<sup>4</sup>

But despite the Spartans' well-deserved reputation for doing the right thing when it came to their own secular laws and religious matters, modern scholars often perceive the Spartans as willing to overstep the boundaries of international law to get their own way. This can be seen most clearly in modern analyses of Sparta's treatment of her allies in the first half of the fourth century BC. A prime example is Cartledge's claim that the Spartans acted 'strictly *ultra vires* in coercing and punishing allies' who had rebelled against their authority.<sup>5</sup> This in turn creates the impression of a dichotomy. On the one hand, the Spartans are famously pious and rule-abiding, but on the other, they are content to violate international agreements and consequently risk offending the gods who witnessed the oaths that made those agreements binding. But we need to tread carefully when assessing Sparta's actions when it comes to international treaties, for international relations are seldom simple. Accusations of treaty violations are not uncommon,<sup>6</sup> and disputes are generally a matter of interpretation rather than fact.<sup>7</sup> As recent wars in the Middle East demonstrate clearly, one state's military intervention can be seen as either a righteous act or an atrocity depending on who is telling the story. When assessing the Spartans' actions we need to consider the possibility that actions that were 'conditioned by the maxim *salus patriae, suprema lex*' might also be legally justified.<sup>8</sup>

This chapter re-examines how the Spartans policed the loyalty of their allies in the late fifth and early fourth centuries BC when Sparta's relationships with her Peloponnesian allies – particularly Corinth, Mantinea and Elis – were decidedly changeable and problematic, in order to better understand Spartan behaviour regarding religious and secular law. It inevitably takes the Spartan side – not as an apology for Spartan behaviour – but in order to demonstrate how the Spartans justified their often apparently dubious foreign policy decisions to themselves and others. The key for the Spartans was not whether their treatment of their allies was consistent with international law, but whether they could give the outward appearance of legitimacy to their actions. The Spartans achieved a balance between their seemingly irreconcilable aims of abiding by secular and religious laws and upholding their own interests as the supreme law by treating their alliances and the oaths that sealed them as both permanent and more important than later potentially contradictory or conflicting agreements made by both parties. This self-serving balance allowed the Spartans to develop a rather eccentric set of beliefs or understandings regarding their alliances and the religious rituals that underpinned them, including:

- a strong belief that once a state was allied to Sparta and had sworn an oath of loyalty that state would always be an ally of Sparta;
- an understanding that if their allies broke their oaths their perjury would not only incur divine displeasure but also provide the Spartans with an excuse to punish them when they were ready to do so;
- an understanding that the oaths of loyalty to Sparta had priority over any more recent oaths to other states;
- a strong belief that the Spartan view was correct and pious as long as there was a good excuse to see it that way.

These self-serving rules influenced how the Spartans responded to allies who had broken their sworn obligations to Sparta. Acting in a way that is often morally repugnant, but clinging to the air of legitimacy, the Spartans can thus be seen to be operating from a belief that an oath to be allies will bind her allies to her forever, regardless of whether those allies still desire it or not.

### **The Spartans and their allies and the 'rules' of Greek interstate agreements**

One of the main reasons the Spartans were able to adopt such a self-serving stance is that, by the end of the fifth century BC, they were well used to getting their own way. This started close to home in their relationships with the subordinate *perioeci* who 'mobilized at the Spartans' command',<sup>9</sup> and the helots over whom they had the power of life and death. But the Spartans were also used to getting their own way abroad, dominating the Peloponnesians via a system of bilateral alliances or *Bündnisssystem* known to modern scholars as 'the Peloponnesian League', but to the ancient Greeks as either 'the Lacedaemonians

and their allies' or 'the Lacedaemonian alliance'.<sup>10</sup> This *Bündnissystem* ensured that each of Sparta's allies was bound to them by an open-ended oath of loyalty initially 'to follow the Spartans whithersoever they might lead', and later to have the same enemies and friends as the Spartans, and to assist the Spartans should anyone invade their territory.<sup>11</sup>

Sparta's dominance of the Peloponnese was based more on authority and prestige than physical coercion. Indeed, Plutarch claimed that 'the Lacedaemonians implanted in the Greeks not only a willingness to obey, but a desire to be their followers and subjects'.<sup>12</sup> The oaths of alliance, especially the clause 'to follow the Spartans whithersoever they might lead' – what Cartledge has called the *Hegemonieklausel* – indicated that the allies had accepted Spartan hegemony.<sup>13</sup> Essentially, Sparta gave orders and her allies followed. That the allies literally 'followed' the Spartans can be seen in Xenophon's description of how the Spartan king Agesilaus mustered an army in 387/6 BC. Agesilaus led the citizen hoplites out, and 'upon his arrival at Tegea he sent horsemen hither and thither among the *perioeci* to hasten their coming, and likewise sent *xenagoi* (literally 'leaders of the foreigners') to the various cities of the allies'.<sup>14</sup> The majority of the allies were therefore treated little differently to the subordinate *perioeci*, which is not entirely surprising given that many of the allied contingents would have supplied the Spartans with far fewer soldiers than the *perioeci*. As long as the right mix of moral authority and military might was in place Sparta's allies obeyed their oaths to follow the Spartans. But when either was diminished rebellions might occur. A prime example is the insurrection by the Arcadians in the 460s BC at the time of the great Helot revolt. With Sparta obviously weakened militarily the Arcadians rose up against them. But Sparta's dramatic victory at the Battle of Dipaea – Isocrates tells us that the Spartans were so outnumbered that they fought in a single line<sup>15</sup> – not only proved their military superiority, but also restored their moral authority and their hegemony over the Peloponnesians. Thus soon after in 458 BC when the Spartans put together an army to defend the Dorian homeland some 10,000 Peloponnesians including the Arcadians followed them.<sup>16</sup> The open-ended nature of the alliances meant that the Spartans could receive the defeated Arcadians back into their *Bündnissystem* after their brief show of force almost as if the rebellion had never happened.

But when considering how the Spartans respond to rebellions like that of the Arcadians it must be remembered that all ancient Greek alliances and peace treaties from the sixth century BC onwards were sealed by oaths that invoked divine witnesses and cursed transgressors.<sup>17</sup> It was therefore understood that any party failing to keep its oath would incur divine displeasure and, ultimately, divine punishment. The ultra-religious Spartans appear to have paid considerable attention to this issue. Thus, when the Spartans decided that the Athenians had violated the oaths of the Thirty Years' Peace treaty of 446/5 BC the Spartan ephor Sthenelaidas argued, 'let us go against the wrongdoer with the favour of the gods'.<sup>18</sup> When the Spartans asked Apollo at Delphi whether they should go to war against Athens, they were delighted to be given the firm answer that

Apollo would fight with them whether invoked or not.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, when the Persian satrap Tissaphernes broke a sworn truce he made with Agesilaus, the Spartan king greeted his envoys 'with a beaming face' declaring that 'he was profoundly grateful to Tissaphernes for his perjury by which he had gained the hostility of the gods for himself, and made the gods his allies'.<sup>20</sup> Agesilaus' subsequent successes, which led to Tissaphernes' replacement by the Persian king, were surely thought by the ultra-pious Spartan king, and his chief eulogist Xenophon, to have been divinely inspired.<sup>21</sup>

So, when Sparta's allies broke their open-ended oaths of alliance, as they did with some frequency, the law-abiding and highly religious Spartans would have naturally felt that they were not only in the wrong, but also asking for trouble from the gods. It is therefore quite likely that the Spartans would have felt that the gods would help them in battle against their renegade allies. Indeed, after the Corinthians violated their sworn agreement with the Spartans by refusing to follow the Spartans on campaigns against Athens in 403 BC,<sup>22</sup> Elis in 402 BC,<sup>23</sup> and Thebes in 395 BC,<sup>24</sup> and following that breach with a new alliance with Sparta's enemy Argos,<sup>25</sup> the Spartans defeated the Corinthians and their Argive allies in circumstances that were seen to be so miraculous that it was felt that the gods must have intervened to help the Spartans. According to Xenophon:

This was certainly an occasion when the god gave an opportunity beyond anything they could have prayed for. Here was a great mass of their enemies delivered over to them in a state of utter panic, offering them unprotected sides, with no one making the least effort to fight and everyone doing everything possible to ensure his own destruction: what can one call this except an instance of divine intervention?<sup>26</sup>

Thus, Xenophon, and presumably also the Spartans, felt that while the gods ordained the deaths of the Corinthians and the Argives for their sacrilege, the punishment was carried out by Spartan hands.<sup>27</sup>

Thus far we have been dealing with clear-cut cases of disobedience by Spartan allies. But not all cases were so unambiguous. It is important to bear in mind that oath violations became a significant risk in the Classical period as many Greek states found themselves bound by an increasing number of treaties that could place them in awkward positions. This is particularly clear in Thucydides' account of the events leading up to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. By the time war broke out Sparta and Corinth had been sworn allies since the mid-sixth century BC, bound to fight together and to have the same enemies and friends. But Sparta and Corinth were both at peace with Athens, bound also by the oaths that sealed the Thirty Years' Peace of 446 BC. When the Corinthians felt that the Athenians had violated those oaths, and wanted the Spartans to fulfil their sworn obligations and lead them to war against Athens, the god-fearing Spartans felt bound by their own oaths to the Athenians. When the Spartans dithered the Corinthians accused them of risking perjury and threatened to withdraw from the alliance and make a new

alliance with Sparta's old enemy Argos instead, which would have meant the Corinthians were risking perjury themselves!

Anyone who has read Thucydides knows what happened next: Sparta opted to lead Corinth to war against Athens, thus ending Corinth's threat to make an alliance with Argos. But what I want to consider here is not what happened, but *why* events panned out as they did, and what this tells about how the Spartans perceived the 'rules' of interstate relations. For a close reading of Thucydides shows that Sparta used oaths to justify going to war against Athens; first because they decided that Athens had broken the oaths relating to the peace, and secondly because they could argue that they were bound to do so by the earlier agreement they had made with Corinth. This does not negate Thucydides' much-discussed claim that Sparta went to war because they were afraid of Athens. Rather, it explains the excuse the Spartans employed to get around the peace treaty they had made with Athens. Their logic at the time was that the older oath to Corinth had more weight than their more recent oaths to the Athenians. As I have argued elsewhere, this meant that the Spartans felt they were 'not only justified in going to war, but positively required to do so'.<sup>28</sup> Rather perversely, the Spartans could therefore paint the breaking of the peace treaty with Athens as an act of piety.

### **Sparta and her allies: old oaths have priority**

It is somewhat ironic that it was the Corinthians rather than the notoriously deceptive Spartans who came up with such a perverse line of thought.<sup>29</sup> For the Spartans were not at all averse to using oaths to assist their foreign policy aims. I have already argued elsewhere that the Spartans developed a reputation for using their blunt speech and reputation for piety to frame short-term sworn agreements to their advantage, a phenomenon that I have termed 'Laconic Swearing'.<sup>30</sup> A good example is Dercylidas' alleged capture of Scepis by a deceptive oath that if the city's tyrant Meidias came out for a conference he would send him back to the city quickly. When Meidias emerged, Dercylidas forced Meidias to open the gates and dragged him into the city while announcing, 'Now I release you to the city, for I swore this, and I am coming in with my force, for I did not swear about doing that'.<sup>31</sup> Dercylidas' gleeful explanation of his stratagem aptly demonstrates that as far as Spartans were concerned an action was pious if they could explain that it was pious.<sup>32</sup>

So, when the Corinthians argued the Spartans should prioritise the older oath they supplied the Spartans with an argument that suited their self-interested and legalistic understanding of piety. According to Thucydides the Corinthian argument was as follows:

For the present, help your allies and Potidaea in particular, as you promised, by a speedy invasion of Attica, and do not sacrifice friends and kindred to their bitterest enemies, and drive the rest of us in despair to some other alliance. Such a step would not be condemned either by the gods who

received our oaths, or by the men who witnessed them. The breach of a treaty cannot be laid to the people whom desertion compels to seek new relations, but to the power not helping those with whom they have sworn oaths. But if you will only act, we will stand by you.<sup>33</sup>

In essence, the Corinthian case is fivefold:

- 1 Sparta is free to act because Athens is in the wrong.
- 2 Rather than worrying about the need to keep their oaths to the Athenians, they should prioritise the earlier oath they swore to Corinth.
- 3 If the Spartans do not lead the Corinthians against Athens they will be committing perjury.
- 4 Spartan perjury will allow the Corinthians to make an alliance with a new leader, e.g. Argos,<sup>34</sup> without committing perjury themselves.
- 5 If the Spartans do lead the Corinthians to war the Corinthians will be obedient, i.e. they will keep their oaths.

The Athenians countered that the Spartans would be violating their oaths to them if they went to war rather than submit the matter to arbitration, arguing, 'If you refuse we shall invoke as witnesses the gods by whom our oaths were sworn, and shall endeavour to make reprisals on those who begin the war, following the path in which you have led the way'.<sup>35</sup> But the Spartans ultimately found the Corinthian argument more persuasive. They did so for several reasons. First, by arguing that the Spartans would be committing perjury if they did not help them against Athens the Corinthians played upon the Spartans' need to do the right thing by the gods. Secondly, the Corinthians made it clear that if the Spartans prioritised their more recent oaths to the Athenians they would be risking an even greater threat to their survival, for if the Corinthians were able to leave the Peloponnesian League legitimately the whole *Bündnis*system would collapse like a house of cards. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the Corinthians supplied the Spartans with an argument that suited their preference for a good religious pretext. But their advice handed the Spartans not only a pretext for going to war against Athens in spite of the Thirty Years' Peace, but also what would prove to be a very useful tool in the future when their allies rebelled against them.<sup>36</sup>

### **When Sparta's allies refuse to obey: Spartan weakness or Spartan patience?**

The notion that the Spartans could and did indeed prioritise the old oaths of alliance over newer agreements can be seen to condition how they responded to rebellions by their allies after they made peace with Athens in 422/1. The Spartans clearly expected that their allies would automatically follow them in joining the Peace of Nicias as they were bound by their oaths to have the same enemies and friends as the Spartans. The old oath would lead them to swear

the new one by default,<sup>37</sup> as indeed many of the smaller states did. But many of the larger allies, including the Thebans, Corinthians, Eleans, and Mantineans, were not prepared to do so. The Corinthians not only refused to join the Peace of Nicias, they actively agitated for the Argives to put together a defensive coalition as an alternative to Sparta's *Bündnis*system. The Eleans also looked to the Argives for support when they refused to abide by the Spartans' decision as hegemon that Lepreum should be autonomous from Elis.<sup>38</sup> Their hostility would grow so strong that they would even bar Sparta from the sanctuary at Olympia.<sup>39</sup> The Mantineans also clashed with Sparta around this time, not because of the treaty itself but because their attempt to set up a mini-hegemony in Arcadia had led to a territorial dispute with Tegea, another Spartan ally.<sup>40</sup> Although the Thebans refused to join the peace they ultimately made a separate renewal of their alliance with Sparta that effectively neutralised the problem for both states.<sup>41</sup>

The Corinthians, Mantineans and Eleans were each taking a mighty risk in prolonging their opposition to the Spartans, because each had been bound by their oaths of alliance to accept Spartan leadership for perhaps as long as two centuries.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, since at least the 440s BC each had sworn to maintain the same friends and enemies as the Spartans.<sup>43</sup> So, by refusing to join the peace all three states were in grave danger of violating their oaths. By descending into outright warfare with another Spartan ally Mantinea was already in breach of her oaths. The Spartans bluntly warned the Corinthians in front of representatives of the other allies that making an alliance with Argos would constitute an outright breach of their oaths:

if Corinth was to desert Sparta and join Argos, she would be guilty of breaking her oath; she was already in the wrong in refusing to accept the treaty with Athens, when it was expressly laid down that a majority vote of the allies should be binding on all, unless the gods or heroes prevented it in any way.<sup>44</sup>

But despite the Spartans' blunt warning all three would break their oaths by making an alliance with Argos. When the Argives made it clear that it was open to offers of a defence-only alliance (*epimachia*) the Mantineans were the first to take up the offer.<sup>45</sup> The Eleans and Corinthians joined them soon afterwards.<sup>46</sup> This led to the quadruple alliance between Argos, Athens, Mantinea and Elis in 421 BC,<sup>47</sup> from which the Corinthians sensibly remained aloof.<sup>48</sup> The quadruple alliance would drag the Mantineans into battle against the Spartans alongside their new Argive allies,<sup>49</sup> and the Eleans would help the Mantineans against Sparta's ally Epidaurus.<sup>50</sup> The Spartans would thus be able to argue that all three were in violation of their sworn obligations, and would be free to chastise them if they chose to do so.

Yet, the Spartans opted not to chastise them, and accepted each back into the *Bündnis*system with relatively minimal fuss. Within a matter of months the Corinthians would be preparing to follow the Spartans into battle against

the Argives,<sup>51</sup> after their 'thoughts returned to the Spartans'.<sup>52</sup> The Spartans made peace with the Mantineans soon after defeating them at the Battle of Mantinea in 418 BC,<sup>53</sup> and again accepted them as their allies.<sup>54</sup> The Spartans would later treat the Eleans as if they were part of their *Bündnis*system without requiring a formal peace treaty. The big question here is why were the Spartans so easily reconciled with their rebellious allies?

An obvious explanation is that Sparta's failure to punish her allies at the time of the breaches is a sign of weakness,<sup>55</sup> and it is indeed very likely that the Spartans were not strong enough to tackle them all at the time of their perjury without causing themselves too many difficulties. But I would argue that there is more to Spartan inactivity than weakness and that when it comes to their rebellious Peloponnesian allies the Spartans are playing a waiting game based on their belief that the old oaths of alliance were permanent and therefore trumped all subsequent agreements. The oaths the Corinthians, Mantineans and Eleans broke could not be unbroken, and the resulting ill-will of the gods could not be undone either. But neither the gods, nor the Spartans, needed to act against them straight away.<sup>56</sup> The Spartans were most likely allowing their renegade allies to return to their *Bündnis*system with little fuss, not because all was forgiven, but to give the impression that all was forgiven so that they could wait for the right moment to chastise them. Indeed, when the right opportunity arose to strike at their two-timing allies the Spartans seized it. The Eleans were hit not at the time of their disobedience, but almost twenty years later when the Peloponnesian War was over and Sparta was free to act. The right moment for handling the Mantineans came later still after the near coincidence of the King's Peace in 387/6 BC and the lapsing of the thirty-year treaty made with Mantinea in 418/7 BC left Sparta free to act.

The Corinthians escaped punishment in the short term partly because they successfully used the old oaths argument to justify their disobedience in refusing to join the Peace of Nicias. According to Thucydides when the Spartans warned them that they were acting unjustly by refusing to join the peace the Corinthians argued successfully that joining the peace would not be possible because it would violate their 'old oaths' to their Thracian allies. In front of the representatives of other Spartan allies who were refusing to join the Peace, the Corinthians replied:

that they could not betray their allies in Thrace, to whom, they said, they had sworn a separate oath at the time when Potidaea first revolted [433 BC], and had given other guarantees later; they were not, therefore breaking their oath to their allies by not accepting the treaty with Athens; they had given guarantees in the name of the gods to those others in Thrace, and to betray them would amount to perjury.<sup>57</sup>

But while the Spartans appear to have accepted that the old oaths allowed the Corinthians to opt out of the Peace of Nicias, they did not accept that the argument allowed them to make an alliance with Argos. The threat to join up

with Argos failed the Corinthians where it had earlier succeeded because this time they had no leverage to convince the Spartans that they would be acting impiously if they did not do what Corinth wanted. Previously Spartan inactivity would have been impious, but this time the Corinthians would be the ones risking impiety because of their old oath to obey the Spartans.<sup>58</sup> Sparta could therefore afford to be inactive because if the Corinthians went ahead with their plan to make an alliance with Argos they would definitely be in the wrong and the gods would be against them. The Corinthians clearly knew this, because they did not try to justify their plan to make an alliance with Argos using the old oaths argument, but rather stated that ‘they would discuss this matter with their friends and do what they decided was the right thing’. Ultimately the ‘right thing’ meant stopping short of making a full alliance with the Argives,<sup>59</sup> thus diminishing the magnitude of their crime in Spartans eyes. But when the Corinthians rebelled again in the 390s BC, this time unequivocally, as we have already seen, the Spartans felt that they punished the Corinthians on the field of battle with divine assistance. The Spartans were clearly prepared to watch and wait when it came to policing the old oaths that held their *Bündnissystem* together as the following two sections will show.

### **Once an ally, always an ally: the retrospective punishment of Elis**

We can clearly see the Spartans playing a waiting game when it came to dealing with the perjury of the Eleans. As noted earlier, the Eleans broke with Sparta in 421 BC over their refusal to allow Lepreum to be independent, going so far as to make a formal alliance with Sparta’s enemy Argos and even preparing to fight against the Spartans in pitched battle, although the battle never took place. But the Spartans seem to have left the Eleans to their own devices once the active opposition ended. There is no record of a formal end to their hostilities, and no obvious reconciliation procedure. Indeed, Falkner argues that ‘Elis had no reason to be reconciled with its former hegemon’<sup>60</sup> due to their refusal to accept Spartan control of Lepreum. But, in practice, it appears that it did not matter whether the Eleans wanted reconciliation or not, for as soon as the war with Athens was concluded the Spartans demanded that the Eleans join their other allies in handing over their quota of the costs of the war against Athens.<sup>61</sup> The implication is obvious: the Spartans still consider the Eleans to be their allies, albeit allies who had committed perjury. The fact that the Eleans did not deny the validity of the Spartan claims, but instead responded with a counter claim that the Spartans were enslaving the Greeks, signals that they too consider themselves to be still formally allies of Sparta. The fact that Spartans also demanded that the Eleans ‘grant independence to all outlying cities now in their control’,<sup>62</sup> shows that the dispute was still essentially that which had led to the breakdown in relations some twenty years earlier.

Xenophon’s observation that the Spartans ‘had been angry for a long time with the Eleans’ because they had made an alliance with Athens, Argos, and

Mantineia makes it clear that the Spartans were aiming to punish them for the broken oath of loyalty.<sup>63</sup> But the Spartans were clearly allowing the Eleans an out. If they paid up and accepted the independence of Lepreum, they could be readmitted into the *Bündnis*system as the Corinthians and Mantineans had been earlier. But the Spartans were also setting them up for a fall.<sup>64</sup> If they refused to obey they would be adding a new act of disobedience to their earlier perjury. So, when the Eleans refused to surrender control of Lepreum the Spartans had extra cause to set about punishing them. The fighting that followed was relatively short and swift. A Spartan invasion force plundered Elean territory and set up a garrison, which prompted a revolt by the Lepreans and other Elean subjects. The writing was on the wall for Eleans who presumably now realised that they would not be able to resist the Spartans now that they were no longer distracted by the war against Athens. The Eleans submitted to the Spartans, and the two parties 'came together in peace and alliance'.<sup>65</sup>

The Spartans clearly profited from waiting to punish the Eleans for their perjury. Not only were the Spartans able to delay enforcing their authority until they were free to do so, they had also made it clear to their other allies there was a penalty for disloyalty.<sup>66</sup> Moreover, their punishment was accepted by the Eleans and the majority of their allies, and thereafter the Eleans became once again reliable allies of the Spartans. Thus, we find the Eleans fighting alongside the Spartans and their allies at the Battle of Nemea River in 394 BC,<sup>67</sup> and contributing ships along with Sparta's other Peloponnesian allies to assist in Sparta's naval campaigns against the Athenians in the 370s BC.<sup>68</sup> So, by delaying their response to Elean perjury the Spartans gained renewed moral authority and a reliable ally to boot.

### **Retrospective and pre-emptive punishment: Sparta deals with Mantineia**

We can see the same logic at play when the Spartans delayed acting against the Mantineans.<sup>69</sup> Although the Mantineans had perjured themselves before the Eleans, it was not until the 380s BC that the Spartans found the right opportunity to punish them. Just as the Spartans had held off punishing the Eleans until after the Peloponnesian War was over the Spartans did not act against the Mantineans until the King's Peace of 387/6 BC released them from the Corinthian War. It is also surely no coincidence that only a year earlier the thirty-year peace treaty between Spartan and Mantineia had lapsed. No longer distracted by the Corinthian War and freed from the religious constraints of the sworn treaty the Spartans attacked the Mantineans, swiftly defeated them, and broke their city up into its constituent villages.

Although Xenophon makes it clear that the Spartans were clearly punishing the Mantineans for their long history of disloyalty, their motives have often been misunderstood. Modern scholars usually see the Spartans as using the autonomy clause of the King's Peace as an excuse for attacking Mantineia and destroying its walls.<sup>70</sup> But this is clearly a mistake, for our sources do not state

that the Spartans were invoking the autonomy clause at this time. Xenophon makes it clear that the reason the Spartans attacked Mantinea was their previous disloyalty:

the Spartans . . . now turned their attention to those of their allies who had been more inclined to the side of their enemies. These the Spartans decided should be punished or reorganised in such a way that they would not be disloyal.<sup>71</sup>

There is no mention of autonomy here at all. The issue is that of loyalty, i.e. the Mantineans had broken their oaths. Rather than invoking the terms of the King's Peace the Spartans were exploiting the fact that the sworn terms of the peace treaty prevented anyone helping the Mantineans when they chose to punish them for violating their older agreement. We can see this in the fact that the Athenians felt unable to intervene when the Mantineans appealed to them for assistance.<sup>72</sup> Stylianou argues that the Athenian refusal to help shows that Sparta invoked the autonomy clause against Mantinea.<sup>73</sup> But it is far more likely that the Athenians were unable to help because if they were to attack Sparta they would be violating the peace treaty themselves.

That the Spartans were concerned with Mantinean loyalty rather than autonomy can be seen in list of allegations Xenophon has the Spartans dredge up against the Mantineans: they had sent grain to the Argives when they were at war with Sparta; they had not served in all the Spartan armies (i.e. they had refused to follow); at times they had served badly or unwillingly;<sup>74</sup> they had even 'enjoyed' it when the Spartans had suffered reverses in fighting.<sup>75</sup> We should also not forget the outright breach in the 420s BC, even if Xenophon appears to have done. Indeed, the timing of their attack on Mantinea, so close to the lapsing of the thirty-year treaty could not be more obvious, and the punishment – the forcible breakup of the city – is the ultimate punishment for Mantinea's attempt to build a mini empire towards the end of the Archidamian War that led to their disobedience in the first place.<sup>76</sup>

From the Spartans' perspective their intervention against Mantinea allowed them to restore the integrity of the *Bündnis*system while preserving the appearance of legality. Thus, all their allies followed them into the field against the Mantineans,<sup>77</sup> with even their soon-to-be nemeses Epaminondas and the Thebans assisting the Spartans in battle.<sup>78</sup> Moreover, not only did their actions confirm their authority over their allies, just like the Eleans, the Mantineans were transformed into loyal Spartan allies, most notably assisting the Spartans in the immediate aftermath of Leuctra.<sup>79</sup> Furthermore, other allies took note of what the Spartans were doing. According to Xenophon oligarchic exiles from Phlius perceived that the Spartans were 'reviewing the ways in which their various allies had behaved towards them during the Corinthian War' and reminded the Spartans that whereas Phlius had once 'joined in all expeditions' the current regime was 'willing to follow them nowhere'.<sup>80</sup> This is obviously a reference to the oath to 'follow the Spartans whithersoever

they might lead'. The Spartans were quick to accept the opportunity that was presented to them. They attacked the Phliasiens and brought about regime change, restoring the exiles who were more likely to remain loyal to Sparta. Certainly, the arguments used by the Phliasian exiles were convenient for the Spartans,<sup>81</sup> but this does not mean that the Spartans' actions could not be justified at least technically speaking. In fact, the convenience of the argument to the Spartans shows that their actions could indeed be justified! The efficacy of their actions was clear to the Spartans themselves in that thereafter, like Elis and Mantinea, Phlius was once again a loyal Spartan ally. The Phliasiens fought effectively at Leuctra,<sup>82</sup> stood by the Spartans after the battle,<sup>83</sup> and endured the brunt of attacks by Sparta's enemies in the 360s BC.<sup>84</sup> As with their punishment of Elis and Mantinea, prioritising the older oath allowed the Spartans to justify their punitive actions and to bolster their *Bündnissystem* as a whole.

But there seems to be more going on than policing past behaviour when it comes to the Spartans' treatment of the Mantineans. Xenophon makes it clear that before attacking the Mantineans the Spartans demanded that they tear down their walls because they 'could not feel confident that Mantinea would not side with their enemies'.<sup>85</sup> The logic here seems to be that because the Mantineans had been deemed guilty of the crime of disloyalty in the past they were therefore likely to be guilty again in the future. So, the Spartans appear to be simultaneously retrospectively and pre-emptively punishing the Mantineans for their disloyalty. The pre-emptive nature of the Spartan actions is reminiscent of the story Herodotus has the Spartan king Leotychides relate about a Spartan named Glaucus, who was punished by Apollo for merely *thinking* about swearing a false oath. When Glaucus asked Apollo whether it would be acceptable to lie under oath he received the chilling response: 'Horkos (Oath) has a child with no name, nor hands, nor feet, but swift in pursuit, until he has in his grasp all a man's offspring and household, which he destroys', and 'that to tempt the god and to do the deed were the same thing'. Leotychides explains that there were no descendants of Glaucus, nor any household that bore his name at Sparta in his day,<sup>86</sup> all because he considered swearing a false oath. The Spartans appear to be treating the Mantineans as Apollo treated Glaucus: their previous perjury and their potential future perjury are one and the same, thus providing the Spartans with further justification for their chastisement.

Reinterpreting Spartan actions also allows us to re-assess the quality of Xenophon's testimony about them. Xenophon is frequently dismissed as a pro-Spartan apologist so partial or incompetent that he fails to criticise what are perceived as breaches of the autonomy clause of the King's Peace so obvious that even Diodorus notices them.<sup>87</sup> But we should remember that Diodorus' account is based on Ephorus who was 'writing over forty years later, when Spartan misdeeds had merged into a single sin',<sup>88</sup> and his judgement is therefore influenced heavily by Sparta's notorious violation of Theban autonomy in 382 BC.<sup>89</sup> Although Diodorus sees the war against Mantinea as a violation of the treaty, as one of his supporters and a strong critic of Xenophon notes,

'the Spartans and their supporters of course saw things differently'.<sup>90</sup> Xenophon excuses the Spartans not because of a lack of objectivity, but because he knew that the Spartans were policing the older oaths, as indeed the Mantineans, Phliasian, and other Spartan allies must have known too. One of the reasons the Spartans could do this is that they almost certainly swore to the peace on behalf of their allies. Therefore, technically, Mantinea, Phlius, and other Spartan allies were not entirely autonomous at the time the Spartans chose to police the older oath.<sup>91</sup> From Xenophon's silence, Badian argues that 'it follows that the Peace in some way left Sparta free to deal with her allies', and laments that 'the precise wording of the clause giving her power, if indeed there was one, cannot be recovered'.<sup>92</sup> But the interpretation here removes the need for a special clause in the peace. It was the Spartans' willingness to prioritise the older oaths over the sworn terms of the King's Peace, rather than any hypothetical missing clause in the peace, which allowed them the latitude to act against the Mantineans and Phliasiens.

Indeed, other Greeks were well aware of the fact that the older oath to follow effectively took away Sparta's allies' autonomy. This can be seen in later criticism of the Spartans levelled by the Athenian ambassador Autocles:

Now you always say, 'The cities must be independent', but you are yourselves the greatest obstacle in the way of their independence. For the first stipulation you make with your allied cities is this, that they follow wherever you may lead. And yet how is this consistent with independence? And you make for yourselves enemies without taking counsel with your allies, and against those enemies you lead them; so that frequently they who are said to be independent are compelled to take the field against men most friendly to themselves.<sup>93</sup>

When assessing Xenophon's capacity for objectivity we should not forget that there are very clear limits to his partiality. Xenophon explicitly criticises the Spartans for their violation of Theban autonomy, and even goes so far as to explain that the Spartan defeat at Leuctra was brought about by the gods because of this impious act:

Many examples could be given . . . to show the gods are not indifferent to irreligion or to evil things. Here I shall mention only the case which occurs at this point in my narrative. The Spartans had sworn to leave the cities independent, and then they seized the Acropolis of Thebes. Now they were punished by the actions of these men, and these men alone, whom they had wronged, although before that time they had never been conquered by any nation on earth.<sup>94</sup>

There is no need to follow Stylianou in seeing the attack on the Cadmea as 'such a blatant instance that even he could not refrain from openly condemning it'.<sup>95</sup> Xenophon's disgust at the Spartan treatment of Thebes could not be clearer.

Rather than acting as an inept apologist for Sparta, Xenophon does not criticise the Spartans for their punishment of the Mantineans and Phliasians for their perjury because he no doubt would have agreed with the Spartan viewpoint, as his address to the Ten Thousand when the Persian Tissaphernes violated a sworn truce with them reveals:

We have plenty of reasons to be optimistic about our survival. Above all this is because we have stayed true to the oaths we swore before the gods, while our enemies have lied and broken the truce, in violation of their oaths. Under these circumstances the gods are likely to line up against our enemies and to fight on our side – and the gods are capable of humbling the strong in an instant and should they choose to do so, of effortlessly delivering the weak even from terrible danger.<sup>96</sup>

Little wonder then that Xenophon felt that the gods punished the Spartans for breaking their oaths when they acted against Thebes, just as the Spartans themselves had earlier punished the Corinthians, Eleans and Mantineans for their perjury.

## **Conclusion**

The Spartans' treatment of their Elean, Mantinean and Phliasian allies in the first half of the fourth century BC has damaged their reputation for obedience to secular and religious laws. But this chapter has argued that the Spartans' reputation for rule-following can be rescued to a considerable extent if we think about Greek interstate relations in a less black and white manner. Yes, the Spartans did ruthlessly punish their allies for breaking their oaths of alliance, and at times their actions did appear at odds with their sworn obligations to other treaties. But the ambiguity created by the timing of different international agreements allowed the Spartans wiggle room to maintain the appearance of legitimacy and piety while getting what they wanted. The key for the Spartans was not whether their treatment of their allies was entirely consistent with all international treaties, but whether or not they could demonstrate to both themselves and their other allies that their actions would be legitimate in the eyes of the gods. The Spartans found an acceptable religious pretext for punishing their allies irrespective of other sworn obligations by treating the oaths that bound them together as permanent and as more important than later potentially contradictory or conflicting agreements made by either party. The religious pretext of the older oaths gave the Spartans' violence the appearance of secular and religious legitimacy they desired.

But while the Spartans' actions can be reassessed as technically legitimate, there is clearly something unhealthy about the fact that they were prepared to use force to compel their recalcitrant allies to maintain their relationship with them. Ultimately the Spartans lost their grip on their allies by crossing the line between arguable piety and outright perjury when they violated the autonomy

of Thebes in 382 BC contrary to the terms of the King's Peace. Modern scholars and our surviving sources are united in their condemnation of this act as a religious atrocity and rightly so. But the Spartans were so used to getting their own way with their rebellious allies that dissenting voices, such as the Spartan king Agesipolis who declared that the Spartans should 'abide by their oaths and not enslave Greeks contrary to the common agreements',<sup>97</sup> were ignored on the grounds that the atrocity 'was good for the city'. Ultimately, their desire to have things their own way cost the Spartans their reputation for piety, and according to Xenophon the favour of the gods. Xenophon's vivid account of how only a few years later seven champions were able to liberate Thebes reminds us of his statement that the gods are capable of humbling the strong and effortlessly delivering the weak in matters of perjury.

But in the end the Spartans do seem to have learned their lesson. For when the Corinthians asked for permission to end their relationship with Sparta once and for all in 366/5 BC in order to make peace with Sparta's enemies the Thebans, the Spartans gave them their blessing. According to Xenophon:

the Spartans advised the Corinthians to make peace. They also gave permission to any of their other allies who were unwilling to carry on the war in their company to stop fighting. But for themselves, they said they would fight or take the lot that heaven sent them.<sup>98</sup>

Although they could finally bring themselves to accept that the relationship was over, to the last the Spartans' behaviour regarding their allies was marked by their own peculiar brand of self-obsessed piety.

## Notes

- 1 Herodotus 7.104.
- 2 Herodotus 8.63.
- 3 Munson (1993) 42.
- 4 Richer (2007) 237.
- 5 Cartledge (1987) 13.
- 6 Simma and Tams (2012) 576 suggest somewhat facetiously that 'one might even argue all nations, almost all the time, consider their rights under a given treaty to be violated'.
- 7 Aust (2007) 352 argues 'most disputes between states . . . involve, mainly or partly, the interpretation or application of a treaty'.
- 8 Cartledge (1987) 13.
- 9 Richer (2007) 236.
- 10 For a discussion of the evidence for these titles see Cartledge (1987) 9.
- 11 There is considerable debate at the wording and dating of that oath, but almost all modern commentators agree that by the time of the outbreak of the Archidamian War Sparta's allies were bound by an oath to follow the Spartans into battle and to have the same friends and enemies (Sommerstein and Bayliss (2012) 212–234; Lendon (1994); Cawkwell (1993); Cartledge (1987) 10–11; de Ste. Croix (1972) 108). Bolmarcich (2008) argues that the full oath was not used until the fourth century BC. Precisely what the Spartans swore is not spelt out by our sources.
- 12 Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 30.

- 13 Cartledge (1987) 10; de Ste. Croix (1972) 108–9.
- 14 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.1.33.
- 15 According to Isocrates (6.99) ‘the men who at Dipaea . . . stood arrayed with but a single line of shields, [yet] they raised a trophy over thousands upon thousands’.
- 16 Thucydides 1.107–8; Diodorus 11.80.
- 17 See Sommerstein and Bayliss (2012) for a full discussion of the role of the gods as witnesses in interstate agreements.
- 18 Thucydides 1.86.5.
- 19 Thucydides 1.118.3. Although it should be borne in mind that when the war went against them the Spartans decided that they were being punished by the gods because they had rejected the Athenian offer of arbitration (Thucydides 1.78; 7.18.2).
- 20 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.4.11; *Agesilaus* 1.10–14.
- 21 Dillery (1995) 109 argues that in Xenophon’s account ‘this alleged participation of the divine in Agesilaus’ expedition elevates the campaign above previous Spartan efforts’.
- 22 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.4.30.
- 23 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.2.25.
- 24 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.5.17, 23.
- 25 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.2.14.
- 26 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.4.12.
- 27 It is worth bearing in mind also that the Spartans soundly defeat the Corinthians and the Argives at the Battle of Nemea River in 394 with large casualties for the enemy and only eight Spartan dead. See Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.3.1; Diodorus 14.83.2.
- 28 Sommerstein and Bayliss (2012) 250.
- 29 For the image of the Spartans as deceitful or duplicitous see Bradford (1994).
- 30 Bayliss (2009).
- 31 Polyaeus frag. 39.
- 32 To borrow a line from George Costanza in the US television sitcom *Seinfeld* who argued ‘It’s not a lie if you believe it’, the Spartans appear to have taken the line that ‘It’s not impious if you believe it to be pious’.
- 33 Thucydides 1.71.4–6.
- 34 Although de Ste. Croix (1972) 60 argued that the Corinthians were threatening to make an alliance with Athens, the obvious implication is that they will make an alliance with Argos (Hornblower (1991) 116; Sommerstein and Bayliss (2012) 229). Hornblower suggests that the Corinthians may have been being ‘deliberately vague’, and that vagueness might well have been an attempt to minimise the potential impiety of their threat to make an alternative alliance.
- 35 Thucydides 1.78. The fact that the Athenians repeat the phrase ‘the gods by whom our oaths were sworn’ almost word for word (Hornblower (1991) 117) in their counterargument indicates the centrality of the oaths to the crisis.
- 36 This is not the only episode involving Spartans where an older oath was used as a negotiation tool. According to Thucydides (3.59) the Plataeans tried a similar argument when negotiating with the Spartans during the opening phases of the Peloponnesian War. They argued that Sparta should remember the oaths that they exchanged during the Persian Wars, oaths which certainly predate any sworn obligations the Spartans have to the Thebans who had fought on the wrong side at Plataea. The Thebans, too, made use of the prior oaths argument. According to Thucydides (5.42) they cited ‘old’ (*palaios*) oaths ‘that neither [they nor the Athenians] should inhabit the district [of Panactum] but they should graze it common’ as a pretext to destroying Athenian fortifications there before returning it to Athens in accordance with the peace treaty. For more see Hornblower (1991) 98–99.
- 37 Capree (2008) 496 argues that Sparta demanded ‘its allies needed to abide by the “old oaths” and sign the peace’. The use of scare quotes implies that when Thucydides’ uses the wording ‘old oaths’ (5.30) he is referring to the oaths of alliance with Sparta. But the reality is that Thucydides is referring to very different old oaths when he states ‘this was the Corinthian statement with regard to their old oaths’.

- 38 Thucydides 5.31.
- 39 Thucydides 5.49.
- 40 Thucydides 4.134. For more on Mantinea's imperial ambitions see (Capree 2014).
- 41 Thucydides 5.39.
- 42 We do not know precisely when their formal alliance began, but the Corinthians had been linked with the Spartans since joint expedition against Samos in the mid-sixth century (Herodotus 3.48); according to later tradition the Eleans had been allies since the seventh century BC (Strabo 8.3.33); Mantinea's proximity to Laconia suggests their connection with Sparta cannot have come much later than that of Tegea in the sixth century BC. By 480 BC all three states were close enough to Sparta to have mustered at the Isthmus under Spartan leadership (Herodotus 8.72), and they must each have numbered among 'the rest of the Peloponnesians' who fought alongside the Spartans at the Battle of Tanagra in 458 (Thucydides 1.107; Diodorus 11.79). They were all definitely allied with the Spartans by the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, for Thucydides notes that all of the Peloponnesians except the Argives were allied to Sparta (Thucydides 2.9). For more on Sparta's relations with her allies in the middle of the fifth century see Sommerstein and Bayliss (2012) 222–228.
- 43 See note 11 above.
- 44 Thucydides 5.30.
- 45 Thucydides 5.29.
- 46 Thucydides 5.31. Thucydides (5.38) later states that the Thebans refused even to make a defence-only agreement with Corinth because they were afraid to make a treaty with a state that was a 'deserter' from Sparta. This suggests that the Thebans suspected what might happen to a state that broke its oaths of loyalty to Sparta.
- 47 Thucydides 5.43–7; *IG I<sup>3</sup>* 83.
- 48 The Corinthians twice refused a full alliance (Thucydides 5.49, 5.50).
- 49 Thucydides 5.58, 63–74.
- 50 Thucydides 5.75.5.
- 51 Thucydides 5.54. However, it should be noted that the battle of Mantinea took place before the Corinthians (and other Spartan allies) could get there (see Thucydides 5.75).
- 52 Thucydides 5.48. As Salmon (1984) 329 aptly puts it, 'After her brief and foolish flirtation with Argos, Corinth settled down'.
- 53 Thucydides 5.81; Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.2.2.
- 54 Diodorus 12.80 puts a more negative spin on things, stating that the Mantineans were compelled to become subjects of the Spartans.
- 55 Bolmarcich (2008) 66.
- 56 Aesop (*Fables* 170, Perry 239) portrayed the god Horkos as a lame old man who revisited each city to find wicked men only every thirty or forty years to explain why punishment for perjury might be slow.
- 57 Thucydides 5.30.
- 58 Sommerstein and Bayliss (2012) 240.
- 59 Thucydides 5.32, 5.49.
- 60 Falkner (1996) 21.
- 61 Diodorus 14.17.5.
- 62 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.2.23.
- 63 The fact that Xenophon (*Hellenica* 3.2.21) lists the Eleans' alliance with Argos as the first allegation the Spartans raise against them means that there is no need to follow Diodorus in seeing the debarring of the Spartans from Olympia as the 'most serious' charge the Spartans brought against them.
- 64 Diodorus (14.17.6) surprisingly astutely remarks that the Spartans began looking for 'pretexts for themselves and plausible openings for war' against the Eleans.
- 65 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.2.31. Diodorus 14.34.1 puts it more negatively, the Eleans, 'standing in fear of the strength of the Lacedaemonians, undid the war with them'.

- 66 Falkner (1996) 23–4 argues that the punishment of Elis ‘might have been meant at least partly as a salutary warning to the Corinthians of the effects of . . . incurring Spartan anger’.
- 67 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.2.16.
- 68 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.2.3.
- 69 Indeed, Tuplin (1993) 88 argues that ‘the full expose of these justifications formally recalls the case of Elis’.
- 70 Stylianos (1999) 167 claims, ‘it would appear that as the *prostates* of the Peace Sparta invoked the Peace and its autonomy clause against Mantinea’. See also Ryder (1965) 47; Rhodes (2008) 20.
- 71 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.2.1.
- 72 Diodorus 15.5.1–2.
- 73 Stylianos (1999) 167.
- 74 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.2.2.
- 75 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.5.18.
- 76 See note 40.
- 77 Polyaeus (2.25) states that the Spartans were ‘followed by their allies’ when they moved against the Mantineans.
- 78 Plutarch, *Pelopidas* 4; Pausanias 9.13.1.
- 79 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.6.18.
- 80 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.2.8.
- 81 Wickersham (1994) 99 claims the actions against Phlius were ‘purely in Spartan interests’. Similarly, Tuplin (1993) 91 calls it ‘a rather partial account of their opponents’ iniquities’.
- 82 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.4.9.
- 83 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.4.18.
- 84 Xenophon (*Hellenica* 7.2.1–23) devotes considerable space to the travails of the Phliansians on behalf of the Spartans.
- 85 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.2.1.
- 86 Herodotus 6.86.
- 87 Thus Stylianos (1999) 167 calls it a ‘glaring contradiction to the autonomy clause’. See also Dmitriev (2011) 25, 86; Kennell (2010) 137; Buckler and Beck (2008) 72–3; Rhodes (2008) 19–20; Ryder (1965) 47. Stylianos (1999) 165 argues that we should favour Diodorus who (15.5.1) criticises the Spartans for attacking Mantinea contrary to the treaty. Stylianos argues that Xenophon’s silence does not prove that Diodorus was wrong, and cites Cartledge ((1987) 242f., 259) as what he calls ‘a correct view’ of proceedings. I am inclined to follow Badian (1991: 44) who criticises what he sees as ‘the inexplicable modern consensus in following Diodorus against better evidence’.
- 88 Badian (1991) 44 n.39.
- 89 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.2.25–32.
- 90 Stylianos (1999) 167.
- 91 For more on this see Sommerstein and Bayliss (2012) 273–4.
- 92 Badian (1991) 44.
- 93 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.3.7–8. Citing this passage Stylianos (1999) 167 argues that the Spartans’ obliging their allies to follow them was ‘in glaring contradiction to the autonomy clause’. But clearly the Spartans did not see things that way.
- 94 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.4.1.
- 95 Stylianos (1999) 169.
- 96 Xenophon, *Anabasis* 3.2.
- 97 Diodorus 15.19.4.
- 98 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 7.4.7–11. Cf. Diodorus 15.76.3.

## 12 The compromise of kings

### Philip II and Macedonian peace

*E. P. Moloney*

#### Introduction

In October 336 BC, Philip II of Macedon – at the pinnacle of his military and political career – took advantage of the occasion of the wedding of his daughter to stage extravagant celebrations at the court complex at Aegae. The Argead king marked recent victories and the launch of his Persian campaign with festivities that were due to culminate with the spectacular presentation of Philip, himself, in the theatre before distinguished guests from all over the Hellenic world. In his account of events Diodorus details how the Macedonian:

σφόδρα ἐφιλοτιμεῖτο φιλοφρονεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ διὰ τὰς δεδομένας αὐτῷ τῆς ὅλης ἡγεμονίας τιμὰς ταῖς προσηκούσαις ὀμιλίαις ἀμείβεσθαι . . .

. . . ἅμα δ' ἡμέρα τῆς πομπῆς γινομένης σὺν ταῖς ἄλλαις ταῖς μεγαλοπρεπέσι κατασκευαῖς εἶδωλα τῶν δώδεκα θεῶν ἐπόμπευε ταῖς τε δημιουργίαις περιττῶς εἰργασμένα καὶ τῇ λαμπρότητι τοῦ πλοῦτου θαυμαστῶς κεκοσμημένα· σὺν δὲ τούτοις αὐτοῦ τοῦ Φιλίππου τρισκαίδεκατον ἐπόμπευε θεοπρεπὲς εἶδωλον, σύνθρονον ἑαυτὸν ἀποδεικνύντος τοῦ βασιλέως τοῖς δώδεκα θεοῖς.

τοῦ δὲ θεάτρου πληρωθέντος αὐτὸς ὁ Φίλιππος ἦει λευκὸν ἔχων ἰμάτιον καὶ προσεταχῶς τοὺς δορυφόρους μακρὰν ἀφ'esτῶτας ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ συνακολουθεῖν· ἐνεδείκνυτο γὰρ πᾶσιν ὅτι τηρούμενος τῇ κοινῇ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εὐνοία τῆς τῶν δορυφόρων φυλακῆς οὐκ ἔχει χρεῖαν. τηλικαύτης δ' οὔσης περὶ αὐτὸν ὑπεροχῆς καὶ πάντων ἐπαινούντων ἅμα καὶ μακαρίζόντων τὸν ἄνδρα παράδοξος καὶ παντελῶς ἀνέλπιστος ἐφάνη κατὰ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐπιβουλή καὶ θάνατος.

was determined to show himself to the Greeks as an amiable person and to respond to the honours conferred when he was appointed to the supreme command with appropriate entertainment . . .

. . . at sunrise the parade formed. Along with lavish display of every sort, Philip included in the procession statues of the twelve gods wrought with

great artistry and adorned with a dazzling show of wealth to strike awe in the beholder, and along with these was conducted a thirteenth statue, suitable for a god, that of Philip himself, so that the king exhibited himself enthroned among the twelve gods.

Every seat in the theatre was taken when Philip appeared wearing a white cloak, and by his express orders his bodyguard held away from him and followed only at a distance, since he wanted to show publicly that he was protected by the goodwill of all the Greeks, and had no need of a guard of spearmen. Such was the pinnacle of success that he had attained, but as the praises and congratulations of all rang in his ears, suddenly without warning the plot against the king was revealed as death struck.

(*Bibliotheca* 16.91.6–93.2)<sup>1</sup>

Diodorus skilfully builds the tension as Book 16 of the *Bibliotheca* moves to a dramatic climax, his account alternating between the salacious and the sinister as it anticipates the paradigmatic demise of a hybristic king who dared to claim a place among the divine.<sup>2</sup>

But what the sensational narrative of these stunning events tends to occlude is the ruined intention of the Macedonian king in hosting these lavish celebrations. This was a festival of reconciliation: with a new Panhellenic alliance formally instituted and the Macedonian general Parmenion already leading the latest Greek campaign in Asia Minor, Philip entertained allies old and new at court. The celebrations at Aegae were but one part of the Macedonian king's greater attempts 'to show kindness to the Greeks' (φιλοφρονεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας) even after his great success at Chaeronea. Secure after that decisive military victory over the southern *poleis*, Philip avoided further retribution and set out instead to construct a durable peace in mainland Greece.

This chapter will review those Macedonian efforts to reconcile with former adversaries and establish an enduring settlement in the Greek world, work that culminated with a Macedonian peace and the subsequent formation of the 'Corinthian League' early in 337 BC. These initiatives are of great importance, and not only because Philip's post-Chaeronea actions did much to shape the Hellenic world in the Hellenistic Age to come.<sup>3</sup> More immediately, a study of Macedonian proposals also offers an opportunity to consider not only the strategic importance of peace in an ongoing contest between rival powers, but also the practical realities of, and constraints on, peace in the mid-fourth century BC. As we shall see, Philip's careful and calculated approach highlights a genius for diplomacy, as the king institutes a series of integrative mechanisms (political and cultural) that aimed to negate or alleviate long-standing tensions and facilitate his own post-conflict transition from enemy to *hegemon*. And yet, many Hellenes would remain defiant. The Spartans, perhaps most notably, continued to challenge Philip even after Chaeronea; they 'scorned the king and his terms, reckoning that the pact was not peace but servitude, since it was not in the interest of the cities themselves but was being proposed by the victor' (Justin 9.5.3).<sup>4</sup> Consequently, modern responses to

the question of Philip's political motives in these years tend to be rather black and white:<sup>5</sup> although some scholars are positive in their judgements of the Argead's 'reasoned' attempts to unite the Hellenic world,<sup>6</sup> for others, Greek independence ended after Chaeronea and those Macedonian concessions that followed were little more than a pretence.<sup>7</sup> But without dismissing the severity of the measures Philip used to establish his supreme position – or ignoring the determination of those who continued to resist this threat to the freedom of the *poleis* – the means by which the Macedonian king subsequently exercised his rule over the Greeks are also worth our attention.

The peace that Philip brings may seem limited, especially to modern actors and agencies who tend to prioritise positive peace goals. But as Tim Murithi notes, settlements falling short of that ideal were long the norm and are often still of value, for 'One cannot proceed towards laying the foundations for positive peace without first establishing negative peace'.<sup>8</sup> Perhaps we might best view Philip's post-Chaeronea initiatives in this light, as a considered and conscious attempt to move towards a positive settlement of mainland Greece?<sup>9</sup> Jack Goldstone and John Haldon point out that:

Although most states first evolved in the context of an imbalance between military coercion and cooperative participation, those that have been most successful have usually generated increasingly complex relationships of reciprocity, consensus, and interdependence with leading elements of conquered groups or previous political formations.<sup>10</sup>

After Chaeronea, Philip sought to advance his authority in a similar manner; he was careful to offer a secure peace even to those city-states fiercely opposed to his involvement in Hellenic affairs. Of course, not every Greek *polis* was hostile to the Argead court: many were allies already and others were quick to develop closer ties in an attempt to benefit from the new political arrangements. Demosthenes might rail against the blight of traitors consorting with the Macedonians, but, as Polybius highlights, a number of cities saw in Philip a champion more likely to defend their interests than the traditional Greek powers (18.14).<sup>11</sup> Philip would build on that obligation, a duty that should not be dismissed too readily. For, as recent work by John Ma has noted, we should be careful not to overstate the individual power of ancient kings, and remember that 'personal monarchy was . . . an ideological construct dependent on the collaboration of many for the ruler's will to be implemented'.<sup>12</sup> While the Macedonian king used force to establish his position he could not simply force the *poleis* to participate in his programme.<sup>13</sup> The enduring stability of the Macedonian position depended on negotiation and reciprocity, and so Philip's attempts to finally settle his differences with – and the differences among – the *poleis* were both sincere in motive and significant in purpose. There is something in the claim by Justin that, after his great victory, the king wanted none of the Greek states to think that he was their conqueror. Although the Macedonian success was comprehensive, any triumphalism would not help

Philip to build on that achievement.<sup>14</sup> And even though some would charge the Macedonian with cultivating a ‘feigned *philanthropia*’ in his dealings with the *poleis* (Dem. 18.231), it turned out that Philip was as determined to win the peace after Chaeronea as he was to win victory on the battlefield.

### Peace of Philocrates (346 BC)

Although the consideration of Philip’s diplomacy, and Macedonian–Athenian exchanges in particular, follows a very well-worn road, key initiatives are worth noting again, briefly, in order to review the range of peace options available to the king in his careful dealings with the Greeks.

We start with the Peace of Philocrates, a treaty signed between Philip and Athens (and their respective allies), after much wrangling, in 346 BC. The two sides had been at war since 357 BC, when Philip seized Amphipolis and Pydna: over the course of the following decade the Macedonian further extended his power in Thrace and Thessaly, and although Athens remained hostile she was unable to respond effectively as her own sphere of influence in the north contracted. Consequently, when in 348 BC the Macedonians signalled a readiness to settle their differences, the Athenians were receptive and sent representatives to Pella to negotiate.<sup>15</sup> This (first) embassy received Philip’s proposals, and then conveyed them to the Assembly in Athens. While it is difficult to piece together events surrounding these discussions – given the contested account of events in Aeschines and Demosthenes – we need only make some general observations here on matters that are not key points of dispute.<sup>16</sup>

While no ancient source details the clauses of Philip’s peace proposals in full, it seems that:<sup>17</sup>

- 1 The basis of the peace between Athens and Macedon was that each party should ‘have what it holds’ (ἔχειν ἐκατέρου ἃ ἔχουσι): each side would recognise the right of the other to the territories actually held at that moment.
- 2 There was to be alliance, as well as peace, with no time limitation.
- 3 The alliance was to be a defensive alliance.
- 4 The peace and alliance were to be binding on the allies of each party.
- 5 The treaty was also to contain a clause about containing the problem of piracy.

These were the key terms put to the Assembly when the Athenian embassy returned from Macedonia. Prime among them was that each side was to retain those territories held at the date of the conclusion of the peace, with the Athenians recognising all of Philip’s territorial gains and finally accepting their loss of Amphipolis. But there would be an alliance and peace in the form of a bilateral treaty between Philip and the Athenian Confederacy. And an alliance and peace between those parties alone: Philip’s next targets – Phocis and Halus, and the Thracian king Cersebleptes – were, significantly, omitted from the treaty, giving the Macedonian the freedom to deal with each in turn.<sup>18</sup>

Such was the fear in Athens of an imminent Macedonian advance into Greece that even Demosthenes argued in favour of accepting these terms, although he sought to deny it afterwards. In *On the Peace*, written shortly after the agreement was signed, Demosthenes acknowledges that:

καὶ Φιλίπῳ νυνὶ κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας Ἀμφιπόλεως παρακεχωρήκαμεν, καὶ Καρδιανοὺς ἐῴμεν ἔξω Χερρονησιτῶν τῶν ἄλλων τετάχθαι, καὶ τὸν Κῆρα τὰς νήσους καταλαμβάνειν, Χίον καὶ Κῶν καὶ Ῥόδον, καὶ Βυζαντίους κατὰγειν τὰ πλοῖα, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς εἰρήνης ἡσυχίαν πλειόνων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι νομίζοντες ἢ τὸ προσκρούειν καὶ φιλονικεῖν περὶ τούτων.

we have ceded Amphipolis to Philip in accordance with the treaty, and we allow the Cardians to be treated as separate from the other inhabitants of the Chersonese and the Carian to seize the islands – Chios, Cos, and Rhodes – and the Byzantines to detain ships, clearly believing that the tranquillity resulting from the peace benefits us more than aggression and contentiousness about these issues.

(Dem. 5.25)<sup>19</sup>

With Athens vulnerable, her citizens must consider Philip's offer of a bilateral treaty with the Athenian Confederacy – what Demosthenes dubs a 'poor and unworthy' option.<sup>20</sup> But it is interesting to note that this peace was not the only initiative put forward for consideration in discussions in the Assembly. For the Athenian allies themselves proposed their own resolution, putting forward a motion that Athens discuss *only peace* with Philip, and that any terms should also be extended to all Greek states that wished to join. Aeschines tells us that:

ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν ἀνεγνώσθη δόγμα κοινὸν τῶν συμμάχων, οὗ τὰ κεφάλαια διὰ βραχέων ἐγὼ προεῶν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἔγραψαν ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης ὑμᾶς μόνον βουλευέσασθαι, τὸ δὲ τῆς συμμαχίας ὄνομα ὑπερέβησαν, οὐκ ἐπιλεησμένοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ἀναγκαιοτέραν ἢ καλλίω ὑπολαμβάνοντες εἶναι· ἔπειτα ἀπήντησαν ὀρθῶς ἰασόμενοι τὸ Δημοσθένους δωροδόκημα, καὶ προσέγραψαν ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλομένῳ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐν τρισὶ μῆσιν εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν στήλην ἀναγράφεσθαι μετ' Ἀθηναίων καὶ μετέχειν τῶν ὄρκων καὶ τῶν συνθηκῶν.

in the first Assembly a joint resolution of the allies was read out, which I shall first summarize for you briefly. First they proposed that you should reach a decision on peace alone; and they omitted the term 'alliance', not by oversight, but because they took the view that the peace was more a matter of necessity than something honourable. And then they wisely opposed Demosthenes' venality with a proposed antidote, adding in their resolution that any Greeks should have the right within three months to have their names registered on the same column with the Athenians and be party to the oaths and the treaty.

(Aesch. 3.69–70)<sup>21</sup>

Disregarding Philip's offer, instead the Athenian allies propose that the peace with Macedon should be a *koine eirene*: a 'common peace', a broader peace in the style of earlier fourth-century agreements promising freedom and autonomy to all signatories, a multilateral peace that would apply to all Greeks. Such a *koine eirene* would give possible refuge to any Greek cities (like, for example, Phocis and Halus) that might find themselves threatened by Philip's ambition.<sup>22</sup> Which is the very reason why Philip did not propose such an agreement when he started negotiations with Athens, and why there was no way that he was going to agree to that type of peace now.<sup>23</sup> Philip's ambassadors quickly made it clear that a peace without alliance would not be acceptable. Ultimately, inevitably perhaps, Philip's offer of bilateral treaty – both peace *and* alliance – was accepted.<sup>24</sup>

But, as many have highlighted, the Macedonian's terms here could have been even more severe. The Athenians now had nothing to fear from Philip: they lost no territories of their own, and they were left with what remained of their confederacy intact.<sup>25</sup> Modern scholarly consensus is that, for whatever reason, at this time Philip wanted peace with Athens, and so he treated the city favourably. Indeed, J. R. Ellis, comparing this settlement to the King's Peace treaties of the 380s and 370s BC, maintains that the Athenians were, potentially, very well placed having agreed terms with Philip. For Ellis, Philip planned an agreement along the lines of those sponsored by the Persian king, with two degrees of hierarchy:

in effect, a co-hegemony over the Greek world . . . Fundamentally, of course, the partnership would be unequal; but against this the Athenians would be able to balance the rewards accruing to them.<sup>26</sup>

An arrangement along the lines of a King's Peace would allow Philip to extract himself from the Greek political arena but, like Artaxerxes before him, maintain influence from a distance. It is an interesting suggestion, and one that highlights the ways in which different types of peace could operate in the fourth century BC. But even if we did accept that Philip was already thinking of an Asian campaign this early in his reign, as Ryder points out, 'Common peace treaties had a general stabilising effect which [Philip] could well have thought undesirable' at this point in time.<sup>27</sup> As we have seen, this sort of multilateral agreement, which would confirm and conserve the status quo in mainland Greece, was not an option Philip wanted to explore – yet. Indeed, the essential terms of the Peace of Philocrates were, as John Buckler describes, 'rather ordinary'; but Philip's treaty was purposeful and effective for all that.<sup>28</sup> For the Peace of Philocrates served the immediate strategic purpose of isolating Athens from the Greeks in general, while maintaining goodwill. Still wary of Thebes, with interests in Thessaly and central Greece to protect, and a war against the Thracians to conduct, Philip wanted to restrict Athenian initiative by binding that city, specifically, in a bilateral peace agreement and defensive alliance.<sup>29</sup>

Such an agreement best suited Macedonian interests in 346 BC, but within two years Philip was prepared to sponsor that Common Peace treaty between

the major powers. Now at a point when the state of affairs on the Greek mainland was more to his liking, the king proposed a new initiative that would preserve the balance of power as it stood in 344 BC. Once Philip had ended the Sacred War (346 BC) he spent most of 345 BC successfully campaigning against the Illyrians;<sup>30</sup> and although he also managed to secure control of Thessaly (344 BC), trouble was brewing in Athens, Thebes, and Sparta. Note, in particular, that the Spartans were worried by Macedon's growing influence in the Peloponnese, where – even prior to any offer of a Common Peace – Philip was again using peace initiatives to advance Macedonian interests by making further bilateral agreements with individual states (e.g. Arcadia, Elis, Argos).<sup>31</sup> In an attempt to soothe growing Greek discontent, allowing Philip the freedom to prepare for further campaigns in the east,<sup>32</sup> the king sent an embassy south to renew diplomatic contact.

The delegation to Athens was led by Pytho of Byzantium, who was also charged to convey the king's willingness to amend the Peace of Philocrates in any way the Athenians might care to suggest:

ἐκέλευεν οὖν τοὺς λέγοντας ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τῇ μὲν εἰρήνῃ μὴ ἐπιτιμᾶν· οὐ γὰρ ἄξιον εἶναι εἰρήνῃν λύειν· εἰ δέ τι μὴ καλῶς γέγραπται ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ, τοῦτ' ἐπανορθώσασθαι, ὡς ἅπαντα Φίλιππον ποιήσοντα ὅσ' ἂν ὑμεῖς ψηφισήσθε.

[Pytho] therefore urged those who speak in the Assembly not to find fault with the peace, saying that it is wrong to do away with a peace. But (he said) if any clause of it had been badly drafted, it should be revised and Philip would do whatever you might vote.

([Dem.] 7.22)<sup>33</sup>

The initiative here, to adjust the treaty, is Philip's, but it was left to the Assembly to submit proposals for consideration; and the Athenians immediately answered Pytho by suggesting two amendments – the second of which was one that Philip may have had in mind too, as, apparently, he readily agreed to it. According to Hegesippus, it was proposed:

τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλληνας, ὅσοι μὴ κοινωνοῦσι τῆς εἰρήνης, ἐλευθέρους καὶ αὐτονόμους εἶναι, καὶ ἐάν τις ἐπ' αὐτοὺς στρατεύῃ, βοηθεῖν τοὺς κοινωνοῦντας τῆς εἰρήνης, ἡγούμενοι καὶ δίκαιον τοῦτο καὶ φιλόανθρωπον, μὴ μόνον ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τοὺς ἡμετέρους καὶ Φίλιππον καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τοὺς ἐκείνου ἄγειν τὴν εἰρήνην, τοὺς δὲ μήθ' ἡμετέρους ὄντας μήτε Φιλίππου συμμάχους ἐν μέσῳ κείσθαι καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν κρειττόνων ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτοις διὰ τὴν ὑμετέραν εἰρήνην ὑπάρχειν σωτηρίαν, καὶ τῷ ὄντι εἰρήνην ἄγειν ἡμᾶς καταθεμένους τὰ ὅπλα.

that the rest of the Greeks, who do not share in the peace, should be free and autonomous, and that, if anyone marches against them, the participants in the peace should help them, since you thought it both just and considerate that the peace should not be restricted to us and our allies and

Philip and his allies, which would expose those who are neither our allies nor his to lie in the middle and be wronged by any who are stronger than they, but that they too should enjoy the security on account of your peace, and that we should lay down our weapons and keep the peace in earnest.

([Dem.] 7.30–31)

The amendment proposed here calls for the terms of the bilateral Peace of Philocrates to be extended and reinforced by the establishment of a Common Peace – a different settlement that Philip seeks to exploit in order to ‘reduce the points of possible friction’.<sup>34</sup> As G. T. Griffith notes, although clearly a tactical move driven by Philip’s needs and interests, with this *koine eirene* the Macedonian also proposed to ‘limit himself’ and his actions in the Greek world, which was surely a significant gain for the major *poleis*.<sup>35</sup> And yet Philip’s offer was rejected, marking a significant turning point in relations between the powers.<sup>36</sup>

Now it was the Athenians who cast out the proposal of a Common Peace, because this time the status quo it would confirm and conserve would not be to their advantage. Demosthenes and his supporters maintain that even in peace Philip was not to be trusted. But, crucially, they also complain that Athens had gained so little from the Peace of Philocrates – why would the city extend it? Central to the anger and unease of this group in Athens was the fact that Macedon prospered in peacetime, as Demosthenes makes clear in *On the False Embassy*. Answering Aeschines’ assertion that peace with Macedon has brought many benefits to Athens,<sup>37</sup> Demosthenes tells the jurors:

πρὸς δὴ ταῦτ’ ἐκεῖν’ ὑμᾶς ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ, ὅτι καὶ τὰ Φιλίππου πράγματ’ ἐκ τῆς εἰρήνης γέγονεν εὐπορώτερα πολλῶ, καὶ κατασκευαῖς ὄπλων καὶ χώρας καὶ προσόδων αἱ γεγόνασιν ἐκείνῳ μεγάλαι.

γεγόνασι δὲ καὶ ἡμῖν τινές. ἡ δὲ γε τῶν πραγμάτων κατασκευὴ καὶ τῶν συμμάχων, δι’ ἣν ἢ αὐτοῖς ἢ τοῖς κρείττοσι τὰγαθὰ πάντες κέκτηνται, ἡ μὲν ἡμετέρα πραθεῖσ’ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀπόλωλε καὶ γέγονεν ἀσθενής, ἡ δ’ ἐκείνου φοβερὰ καὶ μείζων πολλῶ.

you should respond that peace has significantly increased Philip’s resources too, especially in the status of his arms, territory, and revenues, which have become significant.

‘But we too are not without resources’. On the contrary, since it is the condition of one’s assets, especially with regard to allies, that determines whether men use their possessions for themselves or cede them to a stronger party, because our assets have been sold by these men [supporters of Philip, like Aeschines], they are ruined and depleted, while Philip’s are formidable and have grown significantly.

(Dem. 19.89–90)<sup>38</sup>

Peace would not work for Athens. Earlier in *On the Peace* Demosthenes acknowledged that settling with Philip was acceptable when the Athenians

believed that ‘the tranquillity resulting from the peace benefits us more than aggression and contentiousness’ (5.25). Now, however, the orator maintains that keeping the peace will be more injurious than war, and so he will rally the Athenians once more, overturn the Peace of Philocrates, and risk all again in battle.<sup>39</sup> On the other side of the table, Philip’s exploitation of these peace proposals and initiatives as instruments of policy was as carefully considered and cynical as it was customary. That Philip’s functional peace rested on, and was itself an expression of, Macedonian power and force is entirely typical of the contests between the major powers in the fourth century BC.<sup>40</sup> Indeed, Demosthenes’ key complaint in *On the False Embassy* was that the Athenians were not able to exploit, and benefit from, the Peace of Philocrates as much as the Argead king did.<sup>41</sup>

### The League of Corinth

When the road to war later led both sides to the field of Chaeronea in 338 BC, the Macedonian army again proved its superiority in battle, routing the allied army and establishing Philip as the master of Greece. The question then was how would the ‘barbarian warmonger’ treat the established Hellenic powers now that he was supreme? How would Philip deal with the Athenians, whose belligerence perhaps sparked this conflict in the first place? What fate would Thebes suffer, the former ally who rejected his call to arms?

According to Plutarch, some advisors urged Philip to subdue all the cities.<sup>42</sup> The king did not go quite that far, but he would establish Macedonian control of mainland Greece by a combination of force, diplomacy, and coercion. After Chaeronea, and even ahead of any Panhellenic settlement, Philip first established bilateral treaties with key states, treaties that provide a foundation for the agreement to come.<sup>43</sup> Most importantly Philip renewed a treaty of ‘friendship and alliance’ with Athens (φιλίαν τε καὶ συμμαχίαν Diodorus 16.87.3), but there were also further agreements with Arcadia, Argos, Megalopolis, Tegea, and Messenia.<sup>44</sup> Of course, these settlements aimed to weaken the extended influence of the major cities; to further that end the Athenian Confederacy was disbanded, punitive terms were imposed on Thebes, and Philip mounted a brief campaign in the Peloponnese that ravaged Spartan territory. Finally, in those sites where his political influence could not be assured, Philip installed garrisons of Macedonian troops; strongholds at Thebes, Corinth, Ambracia, and possibly Chalcis – the ‘fetters of Greece’ (πέδας Ἑλληνικάς in Polybius 18.11.5) – that some feel betray the ‘true spirit’ of Philip’s dealings with the mainland Greeks.<sup>45</sup> All in all, in the immediate aftermath of Chaeronea we see occupation, proscriptions, pacification: as Nicholas Hammond notes, such severity in settling with conquered enemies was not unusual in Greek interstate politics, and Philip was certainly not about to let any hard-won advantage slip away.<sup>46</sup> But, again, even accepting that the Macedonian peace was imposed by force-of-arms, subsequently Philip did favour the path of mediation and tended to avoid further retributions in favour of reconciliation with old enemies.

With preliminary arrangements in place, Philip's plans for a grand political and military pact with the *poleis* were announced at a congress in Corinth in the winter of 338–337 BC. The initiative was subtler than many of his enemies expected; following discussions in the Greek assemblies Philip proposed to establish another Common Peace and found a new Panhellenic federation of states.<sup>47</sup> This may have been a new Macedonian proposal, but it was also a carefully crafted agreement that sat within the tradition of the *koinai eirenai* of previous decades.<sup>48</sup> For example, among the standard features Philip retained in his new peace we find a promise that the 'Greeks shall remain free and independent' (ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καὶ αὐτονόμους τοὺς Ἕλληνας [Dem.] 17.5), with all individual and existing constitutions preserved (10), as well as the assurance that there would be collective action against any outside attack (6, 8, 19).<sup>49</sup>

But there were also some significant differences from previous Greek agreements, differences that arose from Philip's creation of a formal federation at the assembly of the Greeks in Corinth. First, a 'synod' of all member-states was established (Aesch. 3 (*Against Ctesiphon*) 161), which had the power to pass decrees that were binding on all members and also exercise jurisdiction in any of the city-states. Once representatives from the different cities elected Philip leader, his position as *hegemon* of the league was formally established ([Dem.] 17.4), creating an office that gave the king the authority to intervene against any state deemed to be in breach of any terms. These innovations were needed to address some of the weaknesses fatal to earlier Common Peace agreements, and were improvements key to the later longevity of the league.<sup>50</sup> They also established Philip as an advocate of the peace and placed him at the centre of the alliance. All of which meant that, while a council of delegates from all allied states administered the League, the executive officer was the Macedonian king himself. Critics of the League highlight the authority of the *hegemon*'s position and the 'façade' of a consultative and cooperative process in meetings with an allied congress,<sup>51</sup> but it is also the case that Philip's measures 'served to create stable relations between the cities of a kind that Greece had never known.'<sup>52</sup> Crucially, Philip proved consistent in his dealings with the Greek powers, and the settlement he imposed on the cities was on a par with the peace proposed in previous discussions with Athens back in 346–344 BC. It was a settlement that Philip perhaps had in mind from very early in his reign.<sup>53</sup> The Macedonian *hegemon* gave the Greeks an effective and enduring peace settlement, he gave *koinai eirenai* an ordered and stable institutional foundation for the first time, and Philip also gave the League an offensive campaign to unite his new allies under his command.<sup>54</sup>

At the second formal meeting of the allies at Corinth, later in 337 BC, Philip outlined the rest of his plan for the new federation. As Diodorus tells us:

διαδοὺς δὲ λόγον ὅτι βούλεται πρὸς Πέρσας ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πόλεμον ἄρασθαι καὶ λαβεῖν παρ' αὐτῶν δίκας ὑπὲρ τῆς εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ γενομένης παρανομίας ἰδίους τοὺς Ἕλληνας ταῖς εὐνοίαις ἐποιήσατο. φιλοφρονούμενος δὲ πρὸς ἅπαντας καὶ ἰδία καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν

ἀπεφαίνετο βούλεσθαι διαλεχθῆναι περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων. διόπερ ἐν Κορίνθῳ τοῦ κοινοῦ συνεδρίου συναχθέντος διαλεχθεὶς περὶ τοῦ πρὸς Πέρσας πολέμου καὶ μεγάλας ἐλπίδας ὑποθεὶς προετρέψατο τοὺς συνέδρους εἰς πόλεμον. τέλος δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλομένων αὐτὸν στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα τῆς Ἑλλάδος μεγάλας παρασκευὰς ἐποιεῖτο πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς Πέρσας στρατείαν. διατάξας δ' ἐκάστη πόλει τὸ πλῆθος τῶν εἰς συμμαχίαν στρατιωτῶν ἐπανῆλθεν εἰς τὴν Μακεδονίαν.

[Philip] spread the word that he wanted to make war on the Persians on the Greeks' behalf and to punish them for the profanation of the temples, and this won for him the loyal support of the Greeks. He showed a kindly face to all in private and in public, and he represented to the cities that he wished to discuss with them matters of common advantage. A general congress was, accordingly, convened at Corinth. He spoke about the war against Persia and by raising great expectations won the representatives over to war. The Greeks elected him the general and absolute ruler of Greece, and he began accumulating supplies for the campaign. He prescribed the number of soldiers that each city should send for the joint effort, and then returned to Macedonia.

(Diodorus, *Bibliotheca* 16.89.2–3)

Avoiding the language of kingship, Philip's proposals again adapt traditional hegemonic initiatives for quite different ends.<sup>55</sup> Although the idea of a common crusade against the Persian empire was not new to fourth-century political thought,<sup>56</sup> the Macedonian married it to the concept of the *koine eirene*, combining 'the negative undertakings of a Common Peace with the positive obligations of an alliance'.<sup>57</sup> Philip also recognised that a balance between war and peace was required for, as Xenophon notes, coming to terms with old enemies in Greek politics often meant 'not peace but an exchange of war' (*Hellenica* 7.4.10). Past experience showed the king that 'a passive aim such as merely the keeping of the peace, however important it might be, was not likely in the long term to be sufficient to banish all causes of discontent'.<sup>58</sup> No Classical peace ever foreclosed the possibility of future conflict, and so Philip balanced a pragmatic peace in the *poleis* against war with Persia.<sup>59</sup> Once again, we see that the link between peace and war was still an essential and practical reality in the fourth century BC. Philip's use of coercion and concession after Chaeronea was, crucially, synchronic not sequential; his plans for long-term peace and stability in Europe were both deliberately double-sided and bound to an aggressive Panhellenic initiative that now threatened those beyond the Greek world.

### Conclusion: this king's peace

In spite of the best efforts of his ancient detractors, the Macedonian king's reputation for considered action does still endure. Returning to Diodorus again, one thinks of his final assessment of Philip:

Φίλιππος μὲν οὖν μέγιστος γενόμενος τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐπὶ τῆς Εὐρώπης βασιλέων . . . δοκεῖ δ' οὗτος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐλαχίστας μὲν εἰς τὴν μοναρχίαν ἀφορμὰς παρεληφέναι, μεγίστην δὲ τῶν παρ' Ἑλλησι μοναρχιῶν κατακτήσασθαι, ἠϋξηκέναι δὲ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν οὐχ οὕτω διὰ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὄπλοις ἀνδραγαθίας ὡς διὰ τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὁμιλίας καὶ φιλοφροσύνης. φασὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Φίλιππον σεμνύνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῇ στρατηγικῇ συνέσει καὶ τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὁμιλίας ἐπιτεύγμασιν ἢ περ ἐπὶ τῇ κατὰ τὰς μάχας ἀνδρεία· τῶν μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς ἀγῶνας κατορθωμάτων μετέχειν ἅπαντας τοὺς στρατευομένους, τῶν δὲ διὰ τῆς ὁμιλίας γινομένων ἐπιτευγμάτων αὐτὸν μόνον λαμβάνειν τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν.

Philip made himself the greatest of the kings in Europe in his time . . . He is known to fame as one who with but the slenderest resources to support his claim to a throne won for himself the greatest empire in the Greek world, while the growth of his position was not due so much to his prowess in arms as to his adroitness and cordiality in diplomacy. Philip himself is said to have been prouder of his grasp of strategy and his diplomatic successes than of his valour in actual battle. Every member of his army shared in the successes which were won in the field but he alone got credit for victories won through negotiation.

(Diodorus, *Bibliotheca* 16.95.1–4)<sup>60</sup>

As Giuseppe Squillace has suggested, the positive image of Philip that we find here – and, in part, in Justin – may preserve parts of a contemporary–Greek, pro–Macedonian, presentation of the king as a benevolent *hegemon*.<sup>61</sup> This ‘Philip’ is a strong but reasonable ruler, ready to strive in word and deed to achieve his goals; this ‘Philip’ is the king who, according to Satyrus, would marry after every war.<sup>62</sup> And this positive portrayal of the Macedonian could be maintained – perhaps even needed to be maintained – because Philip campaigned comparatively little in Greece. While the king’s actions against the Illyrians and Thracians were both extensive and bloody, Philip is usually presented as more measured in his dealings with his ‘fellow Greeks’ to the south, seemingly following Isocrates’ advice to be a master of the barbarians, a king for the Macedonians, but a benefactor for the Greeks.<sup>63</sup>

Of course, such reputations, if not a deceit, are certainly something of a conceit of kings. This articulation of the positive benefits of Philip’s reign – aiming at a peaceful conquest of the *poleis* and putting an end to conflict – is little distinguishable from the ideology of other conquerors in ancient history. In particular, we could note the self–presentation of the ancient Persian kings, and the ‘Achaemenid ideology of a divinely requested order of peace, maintained by just rulers and loyal subjects alike’.<sup>64</sup> Here, too, we have the ideology of benevolent kings, promising unity and peace after conquest and submission. But, as Pierre Briant reminds us, even the famed *Pax Persica* was ‘an ideological construction that transformed reality by transfiguring it through the vision of those who held power’.<sup>65</sup> And that altered image of imperial power is one that combines *both* the

martial and peaceful, adding the latter to the former in a new presentation aimed at a wider audience. Rolf Strootman highlights that imperial peace propaganda does not occlude the ruler's previous and ongoing military success: instead, 'war and peace are two sides of the same coin. In order to bring peace and prosperity, war must first be waged'.<sup>66</sup> In the ideology of Philip, his son Alexander, and the later Hellenistic rulers, the victorious king remains one who 'secured peace through victory . . . [who] was a harbinger of joyful tidings'.<sup>67</sup>

Ultimately, our appraisals of Philip's achievements must also take heed of both the martial and the peaceful, considering each evenly and seriously. Of course, to maintain that the king was himself serious about peace is not to diminish or disregard the Macedonian pacification of the *poleis*. However, we must also accept that *eirene* was far from benign in the mid-fourth century BC and that military power maintained even the most considered settlement. And the Macedonian Peace – with alliance – was a considered settlement; for even post-Chaeronea, Philip recognised that he could not just do as he pleased. In addition to the practical limitations on his power, the expectation that the good king brings peace after victory also imposed some level of restraint and obligation on Philip's authority.<sup>68</sup> But, even so, as positive and ambitious as his attempt at a *koine eirene* may have been, it remained primarily an expression and instrument of hegemonic power fixed to secure Macedonian interests.

One last comment from a speech by Demades. Considering the reality of the situation facing the city after defeat at Chaeronea, the Athenian statesman advised his fellow citizens: Εἰρήνην δεῖ καὶ οὐ λόγον ἀντιτάπτειν τῇ τῶν Μακεδόνων φάλαγγι, 'It is with peace, not argument, that we must stand against the Macedonian phalanx' ([Demades] 1.29). Unfortunately for the Athenians, Philip fully appreciated that supremacy came not through force of arms alone.<sup>69</sup>

## Notes

- 1 Text and translation of Diodorus throughout this chapter taken from Bradford Welles (1997).
- 2 On the presentation of Philip as 'tragic tyrant' here see Easterling (1997) 220.
- 3 On the Corinthian League see Hammond and Griffith (1979) 623–46 and Hammond and Walbank (1988) 571–9, more recently Poddighe (2009) 103–5 and Müller (2010) 177–9. On the issue of whether Philip's settlement was a Common Peace (*koine eirene*) and/or an alliance, we accept that the king established a peace first and then outlined his military plans almost immediately after. For arguments see Buckler and Beck (2008) 250–2.
- 4 See Hammond (1994) 159. On Sparta and the Macedonians see Roebuck (1948) 83–9, McQueen (1978) 40–64 and Magoni (1994) 283–308. Even as late as 336 BC, the Athenians, too, were not yet 'ready to concede the hegemony of the Greeks to Macedon' (Diodorus 17.3.1–2).
- 5 The reading of Philip's relationship with the *poleis* in such categorical terms has come under question. As Harris (1995) 154 notes: 'it is necessary to distinguish among varying degrees and types of support for Philip and Alexander. There was a spectrum of responses to the growth of Macedonian power, ranging from stubborn resistance to willing subordination.'
- 6 Hammond (1994) 164 offers the most favourable reading of the Macedonian's motives: Philip wanted 'the city-states to be independent, self-governing and united, and

- thereby to contribute their wealth of ideas and their expertise in trade to the future world which Philip had in mind and Alexander realised'. For Buckler (2003) 489–519, Philip crafted 'a genuine and general peace that would appeal to the majority of the Greeks' (511).
- 7 Cawkwell (1996) 98–100 on the loss of Greek autonomy is especially noteworthy. Most recently Worthington (2014) 90 notes: 'Philip's victory at Chaeronea changed the face of Greek politics forever. Gone were the Greeks' cherished ideals of *autonomia* and *eleutheria*, and even though the *polis* as an entity continued to exist, the Greeks now had to contend with the practical rule of Macedonia.'
  - 8 Murithi (2009) 5–6, who adds: 'In effect, negative and positive peace lie on the same spectrum of peacebuilding'. For Howard (2001) 2 negative peace can be defined as the absence of war, but positive peace implies 'a social and political ordering of society that is generally accepted as just. The creation of such an order may take generations to achieve, and social dynamics may then destroy it within a few decades.' However, as Low (2012) 131 notes, a 'more functionalist and belligerent understanding of peace was generally more usual in the fourth century BC'.
  - 9 Indeed, Errington (1990) 90 wonders whether, post-Chaeronea, 'the prospects were perhaps not unfavourable that a certain consensus might be found that could provide a basis for long-term friendly coexistence.'
  - 10 Goldstone and Haldon (2009) 11–12.
  - 11 See above note 5. Demosthenes 18.295–296 and 19.259–267 present long attacks on those leading men who betrayed Greece to the Macedonians; however, Polybius informs us of Philip's popularity in the Peloponnese, in those states allowed 'to breathe freely and entertain the thought of liberty' (18.14.6) after the humbling of Sparta. Aeschines 2.160 also tells of small cities turning to the Macedonians. See Ryder (1994) 232–42, Walbank (2002) 97–101, and Tritle (2007) 181.
  - 12 Ma (2013) 336. On the negotiated relationship between the Hellenistic kings and cities see Ma (1999) 179–242, who observes that 'the reality of interaction between ruler and ruled is a process of reciprocity, rather than simply a vertical relationship of control and exploitation' (179–80).
  - 13 Borrowing from Lobur (2008) 211 on the Roman imperial system under Augustus. On the 'paradox of conquest and precariousness' see Ma (2008) 374.
  - 14 'His joy for this victory was artfully concealed . . . and as far as was in his power, he managed his conquest that none might think of him as a victor' (Justin 9.4.1). On Philip's post-Chaeronea celebrations as a *topos* in the ancient sources see Moloney (2015) 54 and Pownall (2010) 57–8.
  - 15 Soon after the fall of Olynthus in 348 BC, Greek allies arrive in Athens and communicate that Philip was 'very well disposed toward the city. . . [and] also wanted to become its ally' (Aesch. 2.12–17). Having failed to gather support in the Peloponnese for a stand against the Macedonians, the Athenians decide to consider Philip's proposals (Dem. 19.10–2). Ten envoys were sent north in the winter of 347/6 BC, the terms of the peace were finally sworn to by Philip and the Athenians later in 346 BC.
  - 16 On the negotiations see Harris (1995) 70–7. See also Efstathiou (2004) 385–407 for an attempt to unravel the sequence of events.
  - 17 See Hammond and Griffith (1979) 338–9 for Philip's terms; the notes that follow draw on that review.
  - 18 Sommerstein and Bayliss (2012) 287 note that the settlement had the greatest impact on the Thracians, who were at war with Macedon at the time of the peace.
  - 19 Translations of Demosthenes' speeches 1–17 from Trevett (2011).
  - 20 Earlier in *On the Peace*, Demosthenes states it would have been better for Athens had the peace – which is 'not wonderful or worthy of you' (5.13) – never been made. See Hunt (2010) 67 on the orator's cautious tone here.
  - 21 Translations of Aeschines from Carey (2000); Harris (1995) 72 offers a full review of the discussions.

- 22 Phocis and Halus had close ties with Athens but were not official allies under the terms of the Peace of Philocrates, and as a result were not protected by it.
- 23 Hammond and Griffith (1979) 340 suggest that 'the only thing wrong with these proposals of the allies was that they were made in fairyland.'
- 24 See Aesch. 3.72, and Cawkwell (1978) 100 for comment on the choices facing Athens.
- 25 Buckler (2003) 454 maintains that 'Even if some [Athenians] thought the peace imperfect, they found it largely satisfactory.'
- 26 Ellis (1976) 12. See Buckler and Beck (2008) 259 for a review of opinions on Philip's treatment of Athens.
- 27 Ryder (1965) 98. Hammond and Griffith (1979) 464 note, too, that 'a *koine eirene* still was a restraint on freedom of action, and could facilitate an organized opposition to [Philip] if he could be represented as an aggressor'.
- 28 Buckler (2003) 447. As discussed by Low (2012) 124, the Peace of Philocrates is more in the category of a negative agreement 'whose main function is to guarantee that the parties involved will refrain from some sort of action'.
- 29 As Hammond and Griffith (1979) 340 highlight; and observe it is significant that 'Philip did not choose, then, the avenue via the Panhellenic congress and the *koine eirene* as his approach to a presence in Greece in these next years. He chose instead the Amphictyony and its Council' (465). See Worthington (2008) 84–104 for a review of events.
- 30 On this 'Illyrian War' see Cawkwell (1963a) 126–7 and Hammond and Griffith (1979) 469–74.
- 31 On Philip in the Peloponnese see Hammond (1994) 103–4.
- 32 In particular the subjugation of Thrace, which followed in 342 BC (see Diodorus 16.71.1–2). Although Diodorus does say that Philip was now anxious to make war against the Persians (16.60.5), matters closer to home still had to be resolved.
- 33 See Trevett (2011) 113 on the authorship of *On Halonnesus*: the consensus is that it was composed by Hegesippus, a contemporary of Demosthenes.
- 34 Hammond and Griffith (1979) 490. In spite of Demosthenes' accusations that Philip repeatedly broke the terms of the agreement, Buckler (2003) 459–60 argues that he had not breached the peace and that, again, most of the Greek states were now supporting Philip rather than the traditional powers.
- 35 Hammond and Griffith (1979) 490.
- 36 For Borza (1990) 224: 'the apparent resistance to his offers had begun to make Philip doubt that an accommodation with Athens was possible'. Worthington (2014) 99 suggests the Peace of Philocrates taught Philip that 'any voluntary settlement of Greece was ephemeral'.
- 37 See Aesch. 2.172–7 for a review of the blessings peace previously brought to Athens.
- 38 Translations of Demosthenes 18 and 19 from Yunis (2005).
- 39 As Raaflaub (2009a) 241 notes, in the ancient world 'peace was observed until one power believed it could gain more by war'. See Errington (1990) 79–80 on Athenian 'warmongering' during these years.
- 40 Paraphrasing Cartledge (2004) 87. Of course, previous Common Peace agreements were not entirely peaceful and were also exploited as a tool of power politics by Persia, Sparta, Athens, and Thebes in turn. On 'hegemony through peace' in the fourth century BC see Raaflaub (2009a) 240–1.
- 41 Hunt (2010) 236 observes of Common Peace discussions in the fourth century BC, 'these had as their real and stated goal the establishment of peace in the whole Greek world. But it was always peace on the terms of one state or another; that a legal analogy was used did not mean that the result did not involve winners or losers.'
- 42 See Plut. *Mor.* 177d (= *Regum* 26.4): 'After his victory over the Greeks, when some counselled him to keep the cities in subjection with garrisons, he said that he wished to be called a good man for a long time rather than remembered as a despot for a short while.'
- 43 In all this Philip was backed by pro-Macedonian support in many *poleis*, as Cartledge (2004) 39 notes: 'Philip in hard actuality had been very careful to ensure that, before the

- oaths were sworn, his partisans were in control of their cities. In this, as in other ways, the Macedonian Empire was little distinguishable from the Persian.' See Roebuck (1948) 73–92, Ellis (1976) 199–204, and Jehne (1994) 141–151 on Philip's pre-settlement activity.
- 44 These arrangements are reminiscent of those that structured the Athenian Confederacy earlier, with cities bound to a hegemonic power even before the establishment of a multilateral community. See Low (2007) 67 and Buckler (2003) 513.
- 45 Cartledge (2004) 87.
- 46 Hammond (1994) 159. Thebes, for example, was forced to pay for the return of the fallen and captured at Chaeronea, and, in addition to a garrison, a pro-Philip government of restored Theban exiles was also installed in the city (Justin 9.4.6–8).
- 47 Diodorus tells us of consultations with the city-states beforehand (16.89.2–3). Most information about the League of Corinth comes from the Demosthenic *On the Treaty with Alexander* ([Dem.] 17, dating to later in the 330s BC); in addition, it is generally accepted that the inscription IG II<sup>2</sup> 236 (= Rhodes and Osborne (2003) no.76) details the terms of the peace (although Worthington (2009) 213–23 presents arguments against this reading). See the review of evidence by Ager (1997) 39–43.
- 48 Buckler and Beck (2008) 28. The organisation of the League, as Flower (2000b) 98 notes, 'was surely meant both to recall and to be the successor of the Hellenic League of 480 BC'. On Philip's 'complex plan of unity' see Borza (1978) 241. The echoes of earlier civic reconciliation oaths in this agreement are noted by Benjamin Gray in his contribution to this volume.
- 49 In addition, there were also appeals throughout to more general concepts such as freedom, non-aggression, and the security of the seas ([Dem.] 17.19). For a review see Buckler (1994) 113–18.
- 50 Cawkwell (1996) 115, for example, identifies the 'lack of unifying force' as a key flaw in previous agreements.
- 51 Worthington (2008) 161; see also Cawkwell (1996) 100 and Cartledge (2004) 86–7.
- 52 As Briant (2010) 29 notes. The League was an instrument of empire, but it was not an insignificant institution; the analysis of Poddighe (2009) 104 strikes the right balance as it notes: 'The council's wide authority encompassed arbitration, protection of the social order, and ratification of war but, in the crucial areas, it was firmly controlled by the Macedonian state.'
- 53 From the start of his reign, Borza (1978) 241 suggests.
- 54 As Buckler (2003) 513 notes. Hammond (1994) 163 overstates things by maintaining that Philip's arrangements were even 'far in advance of the present system of the European Community'.
- 55 Perlman (1985) 173 points out that Philip 'was careful not to create the impression that he wanted monarchical, unrestrained rule or imperial hegemony in Greece'. See Fowler and Hekster (2005) 31 on the 'elaborate terminology of 'alliance, *symmachia*, evolved by the Macedonian kings'.
- 56 See the summary offered by Walbank (1957) 308 (on Polybius 3.6.13). Gorgias first advanced ideas of *homonoia* and a war against Persia (c. 392 BC) shortly after the short assault by Agesilaus. Lysias revived the suggestion at Olympia in 388 BC, adding also a campaign against Dionysius I of Sicily. Isocrates sets out his proposals in the *Panegyricus* (380 BC), which may have been supported by Jason of Pherae (c. 374 BC), and also in a public letter addressed to Philip in 346 BC. On the latter see Moloney (2015) 65–71.
- 57 Low (2012) 125–6, also on the balance of 'peace and war' in Common Peace treaties (with reference to Jehne (1994) 7–19).
- 58 Errington (1990) 88.
- 59 Low (2012) 131 highlighting how Greek agreements allowed for (and sometimes required) war against those not involved in discussions. On those connections between peace in Greece and war against Persia in Isocrates' *On the Peace* see Hunt (2010) 264. See also Joseph Jansen's contribution to this volume for further discussion of the 'Panhellenic formula'.

- 60 See also Justin's long comparison of Philip and Alexander (9.8.7–10), where it is noted that the father's 'compassion and his duplicity were qualities that he prized equally, and no means of gaining a victory would he consider dishonourable'.
- 61 Squillace (2010) 74–75. For some of Justin's more favourable comments see 9.4.1–0 and 9.8.1–21 in full.
- 62 Athenaeus 13.557 b–e = Satyrus, *The Life of Philip*. As far as we can tell, each of Philip's seven marriages were made for political reasons: see Cawkwell (1996) 105 and Carney (2000) 51–81.
- 63 Isocrates, *To Philip* 154. For Philip's adaptability see Ellis (1976) 231–3. On Philip and the Illyrians see Greenwalt (2010) 289–94, for his campaigns against Thrace (343–341 BC) see Worthington (2008) 122–35.
- 64 Wiesehöfer (2007) 134. Wiesehöfer also highlights that Persian ideology, which stressed 'the reciprocity of royal care and loyalty of the subjects', owed much to earlier Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian practices (126). On the diplomacy of Assyrian and Persian kings see Selga Medeniek's contribution to this volume.
- 65 Briant (2010) 140–1. Criticising recent comparisons of 'Argead brutality' and 'Achaemenid enlightenment', Briant maintains that the 'Persian elites were neither more nor less inclined towards peace or war than the Macedonian elites.'
- 66 Strootman (2014b) 327.
- 67 Ibid. 332, drawing on Versnel (1970) 371–96.
- 68 Harris (1995) 153. On the symbiotic relationship between kings and subject cities later in the Hellenistic period see Bringmann (1993) 7–24.
- 69 For Buckler (2003) 504 Philip, crucially, 'knew how to win the peace after having won the war.'

## 13 *Deditio* in the second century BC

### Subjugation and reconciliation

*John Richardson*

Let me begin with two admissions. The first is that it might well seem strange to include a chapter on *deditio* in a volume on peace and reconciliation: the word, according to the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, means ‘surrender’ or ‘capitulation’, scarcely a basis for reconciliation. The second is that the discussion that follows is not about *deditio* throughout the Roman world in the second century BC but only about two areas, in which this particular form of peacemaking (if that is the right word for it) had a particularly prominent role: one is the two *provinciae* in the Iberian peninsula (*Hispania Ulterior* and *Hispania Citerior*) and the other is Rome itself. It is in these two contexts that, I believe, we can trace the development through the second half of the second century of a way of ending conflicts, which came about as the result of two sets of confrontation, one between Roman commanders and their Spanish enemies in the peninsula and the other between these same commanders and the Roman senate. The result reveals variations of intention and of ambitions between those in the field and those in the senate house in Rome over the cessation of conflicts and the means by which this might be most appropriately achieved.

I begin with my first item, the *Tabula Alcantarensis*, found near Alcántara, in the province of Cáceres, on the River Tagus and first published in 1984. It is not the least remarkable inscription among the rich harvest of inscriptions from Spain in the last half-century. The tablet contains the only example of the recording of a *deditio* on an inscription; its contents, especially in the context of the warfare which took place in the Spanish *provinciae* in the second century, are therefore very interesting.<sup>1</sup> The text I give is based on the reading by the original editors, with supplements of my own.<sup>2</sup>

- 1 C.Mario *vac.* C.Flavio *vac.* [cos
- 2 L.Caesio C.f. imperatore populus SEANOC[... se
- 3 dedit. L.Caesius C.f. imperator postquam[ eos in deditio[n]em
- 4 accepit ad consilium retolit quid eis im[perandum
- 5 censerent. De consili sentential imperav[it ut omnes
- 6 captivos equos equas quas cepissent[ traderent. Haec
- 7 omnia dederunt. Deinde eos L.Caesius.C.[f. imperator liberos
- 8 esse iussit. Agros et aedificia leges cete[ra omnia

9 quae sua fuissent pridie quam se dedid[erunt quae tum  
 10 extarent eis redidit dum populus[ senatusque  
 11 Roomanus vellet; deque ea re eos[ qui aderunt  
 12 eire iussit *vac.* legatos Cren[us? . . . f.  
 13 Arco Cantoni.f *vac.* legates

1.2 Last letter C,G,O or Q

1.3 or [ deditionem

1.7 Cf. *ILLRP* 514

1.10 Surely *SENATVSQVE* (as suggested by Stylow); cf. *ILLRP* 514

In the consulship of C. Marius and C. Flavius. The people of *SEANOC*. . . surrendered themselves to L. Caesius, son of Gaius, *imperator*. L. Caesius, son of Gaius, *imperator*, after he accepted their surrender, referred to his advisory council what demands they considered ought to be imposed upon them. On the advice of the council he ordered that they hand over all captives, horses, mares which they had captured. All these they surrendered. Then L. Caesius, son of Gaius, *imperator*, ordered that they were free. He handed back to them such lands and buildings, laws and all other things which were theirs on the day before they surrendered, which were in existence at that date, for so long as it pleases the people and senate of Rome. With regard to this matter, he ordered those present to go as ambassadors. Crenus, son of . . . Arco, son of Cantonus, were the ambassadors.

(*Tabula Alcantarensis* [104 BC])

The first thing to notice is that this inscription is a record of a process, carefully and clearly laid out. First the *populus SEANOC* (an unknown and unidentifiable group) are said to have surrendered themselves to L. Caesius, who thereupon consulted with his *consilium* as to what should be required of them; on the advice of the *consilium*, they were ordered to hand over the captives, horses and mares that they had taken, and, once that had been done, they were declared by Caesius to be free. The word *liberos* (line 7), or something to the same effect, is a certain supplement, since unless this had happened the *populus* would not have been able to receive the grant that followed of the return of their lands, buildings, laws and everything else that had been theirs on the day before they surrendered and which were in existence at that date. This grant is made conditional by the clause *dum populus senatusque Roomanus vellet*, which I translate ‘for so long as it pleases the people and senate of Rome’, and to which I will return shortly. It ends with Caesius having sent some persons (I have suggested those who were present) to go as ambassadors, though the meaning and syntax of this sentence is unclear; and with the names of two ambassadors.

At this point we may consider two documents (or, more precisely, one document and one pseudo-document) which provide a context for Caesius’ inscription. The first is the well-known decree of L. Aemilius Paullus, found

near Alcalá de los Gazules, some 40 kilometres east of Cadiz, and to be dated to 190 or (more probably) 189 BC.<sup>3</sup>

L. Aimilius L. f. inpeirator decrevit  
utei quei Hastensium servei  
in turri Lascutana habitarent  
leiberei essent agrum oppidumqu(e)  
quod ea tempestate posedisent  
item possidere habereque  
iuosit dum poplus senatusque  
Romanus vellet. Act(um) in castris  
a. d. XII K. Febr.

L. Aemilius, son of Lucius, *inpeirator*, has decreed that the slaves of the Hastenses who live in the Turris Lascutana are to be free. They are to possess the land and town which they possessed at that time for so long as it pleases the people and senate of Rome. Enacted in camp, 21 January.

Although this decree is not a *deditio* it has some similarities with the *tabula Alcantarensis*. In it, Paullus orders that the slaves of the people of Hasta (*Hastensium servei*) who lived in the Turris Lascutana should be free and that they should hold and possess the land and the township which they possessed at that time, for so long as it pleases the people and senate of Rome. This last phrase we have already seen in Caesius' inscription, including the (to us) unexpected inversion of the words 'senatus populusque Romanus' (or, at Alcántara, 'Roomanus'). It is also worth noticing that Paullus' decree is less careful in its formulation. Despite using phrases taken directly from Roman law (notably *possidere habereque*), it refers to the slaves of the Hastenses as possessing the land and township before they are declared free, something no Roman slave could do.<sup>4</sup> While it is true that we do not and cannot know precisely what the status of the *Hastensium servei* was in their own context (and they may have been more like serfs than chattel slaves), this casual mention of *possessio* by slaves is odd and contrasts with the careful language of dates and times (to say nothing of horses and mares) that marks the *deditio*.

The second parallel is provided by Livy, in his account of the *deditio* of the town of Collatia, previously held by the Sabines, to the Roman king, Tarquinius Priscus.<sup>5</sup>

Collatia et quidquid citra Collatiam agri erat Sabinis ademptum; Egerius – fratris hic filius erat regis – Collatiae in praesidio relictus. deditosque Collatinos ita accipio eamque deditiois formulam esse: rex interrogavit:

‘estisne vos legati oratoresque missi a populo Collatino ut vos populumque Collatinum dederetis?’– ‘sumus.’– ‘estne populus Collatinus in sua potestate?’– ‘est.’– ‘deditisne vos populumque Collatinum, urbem, agros, aquam, terminos, delubra, utensilia, divina humanaque omnia, in meam populique Romani dicionem?’– ‘dedimus.’– ‘at ego recipio.’

Collatia and the land that was on this side of Collatia was taken away from the Sabines; Egerius, the son of the king’s brother, was left in Collatia to garrison it. I gather that this was the way in which the Collatii surrendered, and that this was the formula of the surrender: the king asked, ‘Are you the ambassadors and spokesmen sent by the Collatine people in order that you might surrender yourselves and the Collatine people?’ ‘We are.’ ‘Is the Collatine people under its own power?’ ‘It is.’ ‘Do you surrender yourselves and the Collatine people, its city, its lands, its water, boundaries, shrines, tools, and all things both divine and human into my control and that of the Roman people?’ ‘We do so surrender.’ ‘I accept.’

This, of course, is not a document in the sense that the two we have just been looking at are. Livy is careful to say that he is reporting what he has gathered from others. A parody in Plautus<sup>6</sup> shows that the words Livy gives were at least recognised as part of the *deditio* formula in the early second century. As in the *Tabula Alcántarensis*, what Livy gives is an account of a process, and one which takes a logical path. The ambassadors of Collatia identify themselves, the town is established as being *in sua potestate*, there is a definition of what is being surrendered and the Roman king accepts it. None of this appears in Caesius’ account, because it is covered by the words ‘populus SEANOC se dedit’, that is the act of *deditio* properly so called. There are, however, parallels between what Tarquinius lists as the items surrendered by the people of Collatia (‘urbem, agros, aquam, terminos, delubra, utensilia, divina humanaque omnia’ – ‘its city, its lands, its water, boundaries, shrines, tools, and all things both divine and human’) and what Caesius returns to those who have surrendered to him (‘agros et aedificia leges cete[ra omnia] quae sua fuissent’ – ‘lands and buildings, laws and all other things which were theirs’).<sup>7</sup> What the Alcántara document contains is not so much the *deditio* as what followed from it, the reconciliation rather than the subjugation.

That reconciliation is, of course, on Roman terms; and indeed on terms that were entirely at the disposal of L. Caesius, *imperator*, on the advice (as he prudently makes clear) of his *consilium*. Which brings me back to those ambassadors. It has been suggested that the place that the ambassadors are being ordered to go is, in fact, Rome, and that the *dum vellet* clause in fact means not ‘for so long as the PSQR wishes’ but ‘on condition that the PSQR wishes’. The clause could mean either, and there is room for ‘Romam’ on the inscription. I am fairly certain, however, that the clause does not mean that. The only occasions on which such embassies went from Spain to the senate over a *deditio* were when there was a disagreement between those who had surrendered (or were argued

to have done so) and the Roman commander. We shall be looking at such a case below. But there is no sign of such a disagreement here; and the *dum vellet* clause does not imply that the senate had to be consulted before the *deditio* was valid. It appears, as we have seen, in Aemilius Paullus' decree, and there is no suggestion there that the ex-slaves from the Turris Lascutana were about to mount an embassy to the senate. Furthermore, the same words appear in Greek translation in Appian's account of the outbreak of the Celtiberian war in 153 BC, where they refer to a concession that had been given to the city of Segeda on the payment of taxes (the words are μέγρι ἄν αὐτῆ [that is the senate] καὶ τῷ δήμῳ δοκῆ); and here the sense is clearly chronological rather than conditional.<sup>8</sup> If this is right, the point of the clause is that the decision is made and the terms laid down by Caesius, though the people and senate have the right to withdraw the grant in the future; but the initiative remains in the commander's hands and does not require validation from Rome.

Which brings me to the first of two cases I want to look at of *deditio* in action in the literary sources: the account in Appian of M. Claudius Marcellus' campaign against Numantia in 152 and 151 BC.<sup>9</sup> Marcellus, consul in 152, had succeeded the consul of the previous year, Q. Fulvius Nobilior, as commander in Hispania Citerior, continuing the same war which had resulted from the arguments with the Celtiberian communities over the expansion of Segeda. Nobilior, after initial success against the Segedans, had found himself confronted by the united forces of three groups, the Arevaci, the Belli and the Titthi, at the city of Numantia, where he suffered a number of defeats. Marcellus was more successful and entered into negotiations with one group of the Celtiberians, who asked for leniency and a return to the conditions that had been laid down twenty-five years earlier by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. Marcellus insisted that, if this were to be agreed, the three major groups, the Arevaci, the Belli and the Titthi, should all agree. This caused a division among the Celtiberians (it appears from a fragment of Polybius' history that the Arevaci wanted peace but that the other two resisted this, because they feared the power of the Arevaci).<sup>10</sup> Marcellus sent embassies from both sides to Rome for the senate to decide. The senate heard from both parties, and also from Marcellus' *legati*, but decided that the war should continue. The reason that Appian gives is that the senate was offended that the Arevaci had not, in fact, made a formal *deditio*, a demand that Nobilior had made, probably after his initial success, and so proceeded to raise another army to go out under the command of L. Licinius Lucullus, consul in the following year. Their decision was not given to the Arevaci, who were told that Marcellus would inform them on their return. Marcellus, keen to gain the credit of concluding the war, did indeed tell the Celtiberians what the senate had decided, but then engineered a *deditio* at Numantia and so brought the war to an end.<sup>11</sup> Because the process of *deditio* was in the hands of the commander, the senate's intentions were effectively flouted and by the time Lucullus and his army arrived he had to find another foe, which he did by attacking another group of Celtiberians, the Vaccaei, who had not previously been involved in the war at all.

If the case of Marcellus shows the strength of the position of the commander when dealing with a *deditio*, that of Q. Pompeius, consul in 141 BC, who also attempted to end the war centred on Numantia which had been stirred up by the Lusitanian leader, Viriathus, among the peoples of the north, reveals that the senate was not as incapable of intervening as they seem to have been with Marcellus. Pompeius had been notably unsuccessful in his campaigns in 141 and 140 and this culminated in the losses described by Appian.<sup>12</sup> By the time this occurred, he was further encumbered by a group of senatorial commissioners, whose presence suggests that Pompeius had been sending misleadingly optimistic accounts of his progress back to the senate. To rescue some credit, he now proposed to the Numantines that they should surrender themselves (both sides being eager to end the war) and apparently undertook secretly to arrange a favourable outcome in return for the handing over of captives, deserters, hostages and a sum of money. In Appian's somewhat confusing account, Pompeius changed his mind once his successor, M. Popilius Laenas, consul in 138, arrived and, despite the arrival of a second tranche of the money promised by the Numantines and the testimony of senators present and some of his own officers, denied that there had been any agreement. When this was debated in the senate at Rome (and it was a debate, not, as Appian calls it, a trial),<sup>13</sup> the senate decided that the war should continue.

At first sight, the actions of Pompeius seem very like those of Marcellus, though the outcome was quite different. The formal difference, however, emerges from other accounts of what happened in 139. Cicero, who mentions Pompeius' action three times, makes it clear that what the senate regarded Pompeius as having done was not to have accepted a *deditio* (despite his insistence, according to Appian, that this was the only acceptable end to the war) but to have concluded a formal treaty, a *foedus*, and it was this that they rejected.<sup>14</sup> Such a treaty, unlike a *deditio*, could not be made without the involvement of the senate and people. It might, of course, be argued that Marcellus' arrangements also amounted to a *foedus*, but it seems that the senate, since and perhaps because of Marcellus' flouting of the senate's wishes, had become more cautious and more diligent in their dealings with the claims of commanders in Spain.

To return finally to the *Tabula Alcantarensis*, I am inclined to think that the outcome of Pompeius' debacle (not to mention the disastrous consequences of Mancinus' capitulation to the Numantines three years later and the *foedus* he agreed to as a result) had had their effect on the drafting of Caesius' account of the process he undertook with the *populus SEANOC*. As already noted, the inscription is not so much a description of the *deditio* itself but as of the consequences of that *deditio*, which took place, not by agreement with those who had surrendered but on the order of L. Caesius, *imperator*, on the sage advice of his counsellors. We cannot, of course, know what discussion had taken place between the two parties beforehand; but it does appear that Caesius has taken great care, in this public account of the process, that the decisions were made by him and his *consilium* alone, and only after the *populus SEANOC* had surrendered themselves. This was a *deditio*, and in particular, it was not a *foedus*.

Whether the *populus SEANOC*, now freed and once again in full possession of their belongings and their laws, noted the distinction is, of course, harder to determine but in this setting that hardly seems to matter. The significance of the difference belonged not to the context of the war in Hispania Ulterior but to that of the senatorial debate in Rome. Unlike the cases of Marcellus or Pompeius, we know nothing of the military events that preceded Caesius' reception of the surrender of the *populus SEANOC*, but it is clear that for the senate the only way for a commander to terminate a conflict was by a *deditio* and if he could not achieve this, the decision was to lie with the authorities in Rome. The reason for this determination by the senate is not hard to see. In the late 150s and early 140s BC the commanders in the Spanish provinces were to a large extent consulars, rather than the praetorians who had held the *provinciae* in the first half of the second century. They were men of prestige, and the conclusion of a war would bring them still greater lustre.<sup>15</sup> It was this which made the senate, the cockpit of political activity for the political class in Rome, the place where the credentials of anyone claiming to have ended a conflict, especially in Spain, would be most ruthlessly scrutinised. That scrutiny, or the threat of it, lies behind the scrupulous care that Lucius Caesius deployed in drafting his account of the results of the *deditio* that is recorded on the *Tabula Alcantarensis*.

## Notes

- 1 For a thorough exposition of the legal aspects of this inscription, see Nörr (1989).
- 2 López Melero, Sánchez Abal and García Jiménez (1984); Richardson (1986) 199–201; Díaz Ariño (2008), 194–6. See the last for a fuller set of variant suggestions.
- 3 *ILLRP* 514. See also Díaz Ariño (2008) 191–4.
- 4 So, for instance, Gaius 2.87.
- 5 Livy 1.38.1–2.
- 6 Plautus, *Amphitryo* 258–9.
- 7 On this, see Ando (2012) 34–5.
- 8 Appian, *Iberike* 44.183.
- 9 Appian, *Iberike* 48–51.
- 10 Polybius 35.3.1–3.
- 11 Appian, *Iberike* 50.211–51.215.
- 12 Appian, *Iberike* 78.332–337.
- 13 Appian, *Iberike* 79.344: κρίσις.
- 14 Cicero, *de fin.* 2.17.54; *de off.* 3.30.109; *de rep.* 3.18.28.
- 15 See Richardson (1986) 140–55.

## 14 How wars end

### Three thoughts on the fall of Jerusalem

*John Curran*

The Reverend Sydney Smith said of Robert Malthus' *Essay on the Principle of Population* (1789) that it was a book more talked about than read and in some ways the same is true of one of the most important episodes in Josephus' *Jewish War*: the siege and fall of Jerusalem. The contemporary upsurge of interest in Josephus is one of the phenomena of the discipline; it is difficult to imagine a more dynamic area of study, which now generates international conferences and published scholarship at a dizzying rate. Much of the scholarship, however, with regard to the *Jewish War* actually frequently overlooks the bulk of Josephus' book.<sup>1</sup> This is because it is taken, understandably, to be a history of the conflict between Rome and the Jews and as such its substance is chiefly of interest to military historians.<sup>2</sup> Very few studies of first-century Judaism treat Josephus' account of the war in any real detail. Jonathan Price's *Jerusalem under Siege* is an honourable exception.<sup>3</sup> By contrast, Martin Goodman's 639-page *Rome and Jerusalem: The Clash of Civilizations* has precisely three pages on it.<sup>4</sup> Historians tend to be interested in the causes of the war, not its course.

In the context of conflict and resolution, however, there is actually a great deal in Josephus that merits consideration. In this chapter three themes in and around the sack of Jerusalem in September AD 70 will be explored in order to illustrate how much is to be gained by looking again at some unregarded details in Josephus' testimony.

When it comes to the ending of the war between Rome and the Jews, in one sense, nothing could be clearer or more straightforward. The Jews revolted against Rome, and won an initial victory in AD 66 against Roman forces that gave them unrealistic hopes of independence. More reasonable and moderate members of the Jewish community (including Josephus) attempted to dampen these unrealistic hopes and 'crash-land' the revolt; they sought to avert disaster and to come to some kind of settlement with Rome. They failed, however, and the Jews were led into disaster by extremists whose recklessness drew down upon the rebels the terrible retribution of the Romans led by Vespasian and Titus, the latter destroying the ancient Temple of the Jews in Jerusalem before proceeding with his father to the celebration of their military success – a success that above all effected their transformation from usurpers to the agents of Roman vengeance.<sup>5</sup> The most impressive monuments surviving in Rome,

the Arch of Titus and above all the Colosseum, are testament to the narrative of Roman military supremacy.<sup>6</sup>

The account of Josephus, paraphrased above, has a relentlessness to it; it is a story of folly culminating in catastrophe. The fall of Jerusalem and the destruction of the Jewish Temple are both events that are almost impossible to exaggerate in terms of historical importance. All too often, however, historians, interested in the tides of imperial politics or the ‘parting of the ways’ between Christianity and Judaism, quickly digest Josephus’ account of the fall of Jerusalem and proceed to what seem like more compelling themes. In particular, the idea that the logic of usurpation required of the Flavians a great military victory can easily combine with a certain reading of Josephus to suggest an inevitability to the fall and sack of the city of Jerusalem.<sup>7</sup> It can require some effort to return to the undetermined reality of 70 CE but it is worth making the attempt since it affords us some fresh perspectives on a number of issues surrounding the destruction of the city.

One of the features of Josephus’ *Jewish War* that has impressed modern scholars least is the role played in his account by the eight major speeches made by various protagonists, from Titus to Josephus himself and, most famously, Eleazar ben Yaïr, the Zealot. They are almost universally regarded as unusable due to their overwrought, contrived and derivative nature. Jonathan Price, for example, on Titus’ speech to the Jews at *BJ* 6. 328–50 declared it: ‘almost all lies, which represent Josephus’ crudest attempts in the [*Jewish War*] to pass off a self-serving or Roman propagandistic untruth and to whitewash Titus’ incompetencies and cruelties’.<sup>8</sup> Assessments like these are perhaps understandable and are valid to a certain extent but they can lead us to overlook something important; specifically, that the war in its latter stages, according to Josephus, featured persistent vocal contact between the combatants.

There are two reasons why this was so. First, the siege of Jerusalem was unusual in that the Roman forces had within them Jews who knew many of the defenders well. It is clear, in addition, that communication between the besiegers and the besieged was perfectly possible. This is why Josephus is to be found calling out to people as he made his way around the fortifications.<sup>9</sup> His knowledge of individuals and his capacity to speak with them were his chief utility to the Romans.

But the second reason why these contacts are so significant is that they provide the key to what might be interpreted as a rather sophisticatedly wrought counter-narrative in Josephus’ account of the siege and fall of Jerusalem. One of the most welcome developments in contemporary scholarship on Josephus is the recognition that he was rather more than a slavish propagandist for the Flavians.<sup>10</sup> As is well known, ancient history-writing expected rhetorical set-pieces in dramatic circumstances such as these.<sup>11</sup> But the arguably contrived form of the speeches on the page is an altogether different area of study compared with their *position* in the narrative. In the latter context, and in particular in the unproblematic proposition that such speeches were both possible and made, what is their importance for understanding the fall of Jerusalem?

As Price noted, Josephus was free to essay on Roman military power and the various admirable qualities of Titus, not least his heroic recklessness in exposing himself to danger.<sup>12</sup> But according to Josephus, what the vocal contacts reveal are repeated attempts on the part of the Romans to bring the siege to a negotiated conclusion. In all, four offers were made to the Jewish leaders, sometimes through Josephus, to come out of the city and fight on open ground or to surrender straight away.<sup>13</sup> Two of the most dramatic speeches reported by Josephus occur at critical phases in the reduction of the city: in August 70, Josephus spoke directly to those holding the Temple Mount before the Romans broke out from the Antonia fortress that overlooked it; and following its capture, when the rebels had been displaced into the Lower City, Titus, positioned on the Xystus, spoke again through an interpreter.<sup>14</sup> All the reported Roman offers of battle elsewhere were declined.

As we know well, Josephus depicted Titus as a reluctant wager of war on account of his natural moderation. The strongest expression of this idea comes in Josephus' account of a council of war held immediately prior to the Temple's destruction on 10th Av – that is, in August of AD 70.<sup>15</sup> According to Josephus, Titus expressed the view that the structure should be preserved, thus depicting the son of Vespasian as a moderate and clement man.<sup>16</sup> But what seems to be a different interpretation deriving from the lost account of Tacitus' *Historiae* portrays Titus as the pre-meditated destroyer of the Temple.<sup>17</sup> The debate on the 'real' character of the fateful council and the actual views of Titus presented at it has thus tended to focus on the process of weighing up the testimony of Josephus as against that of Tacitus/Sulpicius Severus.<sup>18</sup>

But if the council is located within the context of Josephus' broader counter-narrative then an alternative to the narrow episodic focus becomes available. Scholars have been too easily distracted by the idea that Josephus' account of the siege was above all a vehicle for essaying on the traditional literary themes of combat: heroism, fate and savagery. The latter are indeed all to be seen in his text. But they take their place in what is a structured account of the sustained encounter between Jewish and Roman combatants. And interwoven into Josephus' account of the siege are details that show an altogether plausible ebb and flow to the conflict. Titus' first reconnoitring of the site of the city, for example, almost resulted in his falling into Jewish hands – a near catastrophe.<sup>19</sup> *Legio X* narrowly avoided rout on the slopes of the Mount of Olives.<sup>20</sup> It is clear that the Romans struggled to come to terms with the problems presented by the topography of the site; Titus was slow to comprehend that the walls and gardens on the northern side of the city required levelling in order to counter damaging Jewish sorties.<sup>21</sup> The parading of the Roman forces, like the grotesque and exemplary destruction of prisoners under the walls, was designed to intimidate the defenders of the city but they show that the Roman 'assault' was, in fact, two-paced; periods of violent contact alternated with other activities.<sup>22</sup> It is no surprise, then, to find that, in fact, the Romans were uncertain about the approach to be taken to the problem of Jewish resistance in Jerusalem. In early June, earthworks erected at the approaches to the Antonia

fortress were undermined. According to Josephus, the situation was saved – yet again – by the heroic intervention of Titus. But he also reported that the Romans ‘were in deep dejection, having lost in one hour the fruit of their long labour, and many despaired of ever carrying the town by the ordinary appliances’.<sup>23</sup> The set-back prompted *another* council of war, which revealed a serious difference of opinion between those who believed that the city could be carried by storm and those who thought it would be better to avoid direct combat altogether and starve the enemy out.<sup>24</sup> Titus, depicted by Josephus as impatient for swift success and ‘renown’ (*eukleia*), nevertheless erected a huge circumvallation around the parts of the city still in Jewish hands; a significant change of strategy.<sup>25</sup> What the counter-narrative of Josephus – of which the speeches are a key part – suggests is that the Romans may not have considered the capture of the city as *possible*.<sup>26</sup>

The Epitome of Dio, summarising a presumably independent literary account of the siege, corroborates the account of Josephus by reporting offers of a settlement.<sup>27</sup> But in addition, the epitomator offered the interesting comment:

some of the Romans, too, becoming disheartened, as often happens in a protracted siege, and suspecting, furthermore that the city was really impregnable, as was commonly reported, went over to the other side. The Jews, even though they were short of food, treated the recruits kindly, in order to show that there were deserters to their side also.<sup>28</sup>

Josephus mentioned some of them assisting the besieged in firing weapons that had been captured from C. Cestius’ aborted campaign of 66.<sup>29</sup> The land around Jerusalem was quickly de-forested, meaning that supplies had to be brought from distance, and with the Jews in possession of the only water-spring in the area, water, too, had to be transported in to the besiegers.<sup>30</sup> Dio also makes it clear that securing water supplies for the besieging army made acute demands of the Roman commissariat: ‘the Romans suffered most hardship from the lack of water’.<sup>31</sup> The approximately 8,000 Roman troops who achieved the reduction of Masada over the course of two months in 73 or 74 required approximately 26,000 litres of water *per day* for the duration of the siege.<sup>32</sup> They consumed 16 tonnes of food and provisions every 24 hours.<sup>33</sup> Titus led an army of at least 65,000 men at Jerusalem and while the city’s territory was not the desert around Masada, it is not in the least implausible, just as Josephus says, that this force struggled to keep itself safely watered.<sup>34</sup>

Titus’ reluctance to wage full-scale war, written up by Josephus as the manifestation of his moderate character, thus conceals (or rather does not conceal) that the general and/or a significant number of the men he led doubted whether the task could be accomplished at all. Historians of the Roman army rightly acknowledge the capability that it possessed for storming small towns and fortified camps. It is not too much to say, however, that the Roman imperial army was never set a task as daunting as that posed by the defenders of Jerusalem.<sup>35</sup> One of many outstanding Roman talents was the capacity to

read landscapes. The first Roman general to set eyes on Jerusalem had been Pompey who, standing on Mt Scopus in the summer of 63 BC looking out over the city, ‘noted the solidity of the walls and the formidable task of their assault, the frightful ravine in front of them, and within the ravine the temple also so strongly fortified as to afford, after the capture of the town, a second line of defence to the enemy’.<sup>36</sup> Josephus suggests that Pompey’s siege would have been endless had not the Jews refrained from labour on their Sabbath.<sup>37</sup>

The Jerusalem with which Titus was confronted was significantly stronger: Herod’s magnificent Temple was vertiginously placed on the enormous platform of the temple mount. The Antonia fortress had been re-modelled and was more formidable than before.<sup>38</sup> In addition, Agrippa I had unwittingly been permitted to construct much of a ‘third’ wall on the north and north-western side of the city, making Titus’ approach significantly more dangerous than Pompey’s had been.<sup>39</sup>

The rejection of repeated offers of battle outside the city’s fortifications condemned thousands of Roman and allied soldiers not only to the prospect of the many hardships of a long and most unwelcome siege but also to the horrors of street-fighting against a determined guerrilla army – an experience unknown to almost all of them.<sup>40</sup> If we know anything about the conduct of war it is that the twin faces of men in combat are heroism and atrocity, just as Josephus depicted it. To paraphrase John Keegan, inside every army is a mob and the strongest fear with which every commander lives is that of his army reverting to a mob.<sup>41</sup> At the climax to the battle for the Temple Mount, Titus – persistently unsteady in his prosecution of the siege – lost control of his soldiers. The destruction of the Temple, just as Josephus says, was an expression of fury, not reason.

The implications of this brief reflection are rather serious. Without abandoning the idea that the Flavians sought a swift military victory to see them credibly to power, it is important to acknowledge the evidence that suggests that right up until the city was stormed they would have settled either for a bloodless success or a conventional battlefield victory. When these options were ruled out, the Roman army of Titus was set the extraordinarily difficult task of reducing one of the most forbidding citadels in the empire. The campaign unsurprisingly tested Titus’ legionaries to the utmost and more than once it would seem that the task was considered by some as impossible.

When it came to the destruction of the Temple, Titus may well have deliberated one way or the other – Josephus and Sulpicius Severus/Tacitus cannot both be right – but the important personalities may actually have been the anonymous enraged legionaries to whom Josephus drew our attention. Their exposure to danger and deprivation had been extreme. ‘Caesar, finding himself unable to restrain the impetuosity of his frenzied soldiers’ was overtaken by events; when he issued instructions for the fire to be contained, the soldiers’

respect for Caesar and their fear of the officer who was endeavouring to check them were overpowered by their rage, their hatred of the Jews, and a lust for a battle more unruly still . . . [T]he end was precipitated

by one of those who had entered the building, and who, when Caesar rushed out to restrain the troops, thrust a firebrand, in the darkness, into the hinges of the gate.<sup>42</sup>

My second theme concerns what one might call the ‘choreography’ of victory in the Roman Near East. Historians of the Flavians, taking their lead from what they identify as Josephus’ major themes in his work, are apt to think of the epilogue to the Jewish War as constituted by two events: the great triumphal ceremony of the Flavians in Rome in 71 CE and subsequently the famous reduction of Masada in 74.<sup>43</sup> This is, however, to overlook information included by Josephus on the months immediately following the capture of Jerusalem that merits comment.

When the Temple Mount had finally fallen into Roman hands the rebel leaders sent a message to Titus offering finally to leave the city. He replied, according to Josephus, with an uncompromising and contemptuous response, referring to his own previous offers but granting them one last opportunity to surrender to him. They made it clear, however, that they would not accept a guarantee from him of their safety but wished to leave the city unmolested and retire to another place. The exasperated Titus dismissed them and prepared to resume hostilities in the Upper City.<sup>44</sup> But he was approached by another group identified by Josephus as ‘the sons and brothers of King Izates’ (and ‘many prominent citizens’), who begged for their lives, and succeeded.<sup>45</sup> The sons were sent to Rome as guarantors of the good faith of their country. Izates had been king of Adiabene, a kingdom lying east of the Tigris in the orbit of Parthia – and thus beyond Roman control. He had converted to Judaism as a result of meeting a Jewish merchant *circa* 60 CE. Izates was at the time a guest of the king of Spasinou Charax, a kingdom on the Persian Gulf and as such another dynasty under Parthian oversight.<sup>46</sup> The treatment of the sons of Izates prompts us to consider the question of how Titus negotiated the months that followed the sacking of Jerusalem.

He did not return immediately to Rome. He went to Caesarea Maritima, the capital city of the province of Judaea, where prisoners and booty were deposited.<sup>47</sup> From there, he travelled to Caesarea Philippi, twenty-five miles north of Galilee and one of the major towns in the territory of Agrippa II, an ally of Rome and great-grandson of Herod the Great.<sup>48</sup> Although Josephus does not mention Agrippa by name, it is highly likely that the Herodian prince was there – along with his sister Berenike, with whom Titus was by now enjoying a public liaison.<sup>49</sup> The town was an overwhelmingly gentile settlement and Titus was free to feed into its public entertainments many of the prisoners from Jerusalem. They died in wild-beast hunts (*venationes*) and gladiatorial combats (*munera*).<sup>50</sup> He was back in Caesarea Maritima in October to celebrate Domitian’s birthday (24 October), again with violent spectacles, and then travelled to the Roman colony of Berytus, capital of the province of Syria in November for Vespasian’s birthday (17 November).<sup>51</sup> The emperor doubtless received a particularly warm welcome in the city; it was a Roman military

colony, founded in 15 BCE when it was settled by Latin-speaking legionaries.<sup>52</sup> He received news of agitation against the Jewish community in Antioch, but made no decision because he was making his way to Zeugma on the Euphrates, the boundary between zones of Roman and Parthian power. There he received a golden wreath from the Parthians in recognition of his military success.<sup>53</sup> Returning, he called into Antioch and there upheld the rights of Jews in the city before making his way via Jerusalem to Alexandria and Rome in the spring of 71.<sup>54</sup>

Josephus included the details because they were part of his portrayal of the character of Titus. Modern scholars have seen the itinerary as designed to pre-figure the Roman triumph that would take place the following year.<sup>55</sup> But there is rather more to the matter than this. Taken together, we see Titus discharging the classic responsibilities of generations of Roman military commanders in the region: supporting Greek civic authority, fostering Roman military settlements, resolving disputes and protecting civic order, and conducting international diplomacy. To put it another way, through Josephus we are witnessing the months that were devoted to the transition from the 'hard' power of war to the 'soft' power of peace and diplomacy. More than the reduction of Masada, this journey constitutes the epilogue to the Jewish War.

My final theme considers the victors and the vanquished. Most historians attuned to Flavian ambitions see the success of their usurpation manifested above all in the joint triumph of Titus and Vespasian at Rome in 71. Josephus' description is the fullest we have of the triumphal ceremony.<sup>56</sup> It was a spectacular celebration of Roman military power, but there are some noteworthy aspects that can easily be overlooked. Josephus explains that several hundred Jewish prisoners-of-war had been specially reserved for the occasion. They were the most beautiful men among the captured, and on the day itself they were exquisitely dressed up in clothes designed to hide any battle scars. The enslavement of beautiful men lent the occasion, on top of everything else, arguably, a sexual and aesthetic dimension designed to signal the subjugation of alien youth.<sup>57</sup> The fate of the women of Jerusalem can scarcely be imagined.<sup>58</sup>

The victors' triumph culminated in the execution at the Mamertine Prison in the Forum of the leader of the Jewish forces, one Simon bar Gioras. This was the traditional protocol. But Simon was not the only Jewish leader in custody. Another was one John of Gischala – the arch enemy of Josephus from their days as Jewish commanders in Galilee in 67.<sup>59</sup> For John a rather curious fate was reserved: that of 'life imprisonment' – not a penalty formally recognised in Roman law.<sup>60</sup> As such, however, he illustrates in a negative sense what Josephus does in the positive: that the *triumphatores* made a number of *ad hominem* arrangements with those in their power, whether as prisoners or demonstrably, like Josephus, as *clientes*. For at least some of his life in Rome, Josephus thus resided in a city that accommodated a living John of Gischala. The situation might have some bearing on the startlingly divergent portrayals of the latter in the *Life* compared to the *Jewish War*.<sup>61</sup>

One of the most striking arrangements surrounding the triumph of Titus and Vespasian concerns the fate of the spoils taken from the Temple. In September of 70, as Titus prepared his final assault upon the Upper City in Jerusalem, he offered a pardon to a priest called Jesus of Thebuthi, 'on condition of his delivering up some of the sacred treasures' of the Temple. Jesus came into Titus' camp and then made his way to the ruins of the Temple on the Temple Mount where he is reported to have

handed over the wall of the sanctuary two lampstands similar to those deposited in the sanctuary, along with tables and bowls and platters, all of gold and very massive; he further delivered up the veils, the high-priest's vestments, including the precious stones, and many other articles used in public worship.<sup>62</sup>

Famously, the arch of Titus depicts the parading of the treasures of the Temple, but not all. The sacred copy of the Law was not depicted. A recent analysis of the frieze explains the omission as due to the fact that the object was not obviously one of great value, but Josephus in his account of the order of objects displayed in the triumph is explicit: 'last of all the spoils was carried a copy of the Jewish law'.<sup>63</sup>

The copy of the Law and the curtain covering the entrance to the Holy of Holies never made it to the Flavians' Temple of Peace, completed in 75; they were kept in the imperial palace.<sup>64</sup> This is likely to be because Titus and Vespasian knew what they had in their possession, knowledge derived from the many Jews who had served them during the siege. As is well known, one of the powerful myths that accompanied the rise of the Flavians was a prediction that destiny had delivered the Roman empire to them. Including Josephus, priests from three separate cultures (Jewish, Greek and Syrian) had predicted good fortune for Vespasian and his son.<sup>65</sup> Now, in 71, the emperors were content to share the gold looted from the temple with the Roman people, but the esoteric books of the Jews and the veil of their Holy of Holies they kept for themselves. The sense of destiny and extraordinary divine favour was reinforced by the presence of remarkable objects in their own home. That sense may have served to diminish the appeal of the title 'Judaicus' which the Flavians for whatever reason never took.<sup>66</sup>

And what of the vanquished? One of the most powerful narratives of Jewish history tells of how the resilient Jews overcame the destruction of their Temple and their expulsion from Jerusalem to emerge as a people led by rabbis centred at Javneh on the Mediterranean coastline.<sup>67</sup> The narrative serves to establish a continuity from Temple-based Judaism to rabbinic Judaism. Modern scholarship is more sanguine, however, and continues to explore the very real contest that these 'rabbis' had with other Jewish authorities both before and in the aftermath of the disaster.<sup>68</sup> But archaeology is revealing something rather different. At Mekor Hayim in a western suburb of modern Jerusalem coins of Domitian have been found among

Jewish burials. And at the settlement of Shu'afat 4 km north of the Old City, on the site of the ancient road between Jerusalem and Nablus, lie the remains of a settlement dating to the period just after 70 that clearly accommodated Jews (their ritual baths can still be seen).<sup>69</sup> These remains show that after the fall of Jerusalem Jewish survivors lived close to the site of the Temple.<sup>70</sup> Eusebius of Caesarea in his fourth-century *Ecclesiastical History* could name fourteen bishops of Jerusalem (all Jews) who had lived between the death of James the brother of Jesus and the emperor Hadrian's reign.<sup>71</sup> According to the Acts of the Apostles, followers of Jesus continued to attend the Temple after his death. There is good reason to believe that following the destruction of the Temple, at least some of them continued to live near the site.<sup>72</sup> This evidence proves that there was no ban on Jews living in Jerusalem. We must imagine instead that age-old image of the living victims of war: survivors picking among the traces of their homes. But not ready to accept that the Temple might no longer have importance in their worship. The 'Christian' book known as *The Revelation of John* is only one of a number of works from the last years of the first century and early years of the second to be found apparently predicting the demise of Rome. Apparently Jewish works, apocalypses of Baruch, or Ezra, or Abraham, show similar expectations of the fall of Rome and the return of redeeming figures.<sup>73</sup> It is easy to think of Christianity in this period as establishing itself in the Greek towns and cities visited by (Saint) Paul of Tarsus. But archaeology is revealing the survivors of the horrors of the siege of Jerusalem and reminding us that some of the most impassioned debates are likely to have taken place almost in the shadow of the ruined Temple.

The themes explored here highlight how in thrall historians continue to be to the narrative that the Flavians told about themselves in the aftermath of the fall of Jerusalem. Relayed by their apologists and indelibly stamped on the topography of the city of Rome, it declared that destiny, shrewd political calculation and stunning military power had elevated them to leadership of the Roman world. The identification of Flavius Josephus simply as a mouth-piece of the regime is thankfully subsiding but some of the details that he offers on the siege and fall of Jerusalem permit us to go rather further in establishing him as a credible independent observer of events. The ambivalence of his treatment of Titus has already been recognised but there is a larger context to that ambivalence. It is that the Flavians did not originally contemplate sacking Jerusalem. Far from completing the project of usurpation, the protracted siege may, in fact, have threatened it. The fury that accomplished the city's destruction exorcised the memories of repeated Roman frustration and the lethality of Jerusalem's defenders. The disingenuousness was defiantly public: the final lines of the great Flavian inscription originally erected over one of the main entrances to the Circus Maximus referred to Titus as the man who had 'subdued the Jewish people and destroyed the city of Jerusalem, which all generals, kings, and peoples before him had either attacked without success or left entirely unassailed'.<sup>74</sup>

It is also clear from the testimony of Josephus that the Flavians appreciated that some careful diplomacy was required in the months after the fall of Jerusalem. Some may have sensed the shock that Rome's legions had endured in the war against the Jews; for more than four years a subject people without a formal army had held off the largest Roman force seen in Judaea for a century. Reasserting Roman authority was not simply a matter of military power and Josephus shows how assiduously Titus oversaw the resumption of peace, first renewing Rome's partnership with the Greek cities of Judaea and Syria and then presenting himself with careful choreography to the Parthians as victor.

Eusebius of Caesarea claimed that a divine revelation had warned the Christians of Jerusalem that they should flee the city of Jerusalem prior to the outbreak of war in 66.<sup>75</sup> The story sought to separate Jewish and Christian history at this momentous point in history; God saved the followers of Jesus and condemned the faithless Jews to destruction. Contemporary scholarship now rightly views the relationship between the communities as one of high complexity for decades after the fall of the city. But archaeology reminds us that some of the most anguished reflections on what the destruction of the Temple might mean took place almost in the shadow of the ruins.

The possession or re-possession of the same site continues to motivate the most radical contemporary thinking in Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Those seeking to change the present arrangements court disaster. The terrible truth for modern peace-makers in the Middle East is that the Roman emperor Titus' shortcomings at Jerusalem may have condemned us all to war.

## Notes

- 1 This situation is greatly to be addressed by the forthcoming volumes of the Brill *Flavius Josephus: Translation and Commentary* project.
- 2 See the accounts of Bloom (2010), Faulkner (2002) and Sorek (2008).
- 3 Price (1992).
- 4 Goodman (2007) 440–43; Grabbe (1992) 459: 'The details of the siege are given at length by Josephus and would be tedious to relate here.' Isaac (1992) offers no account; similarly Berlin and Overman (2002) include a number of essays on Galilee but none on Jerusalem.
- 5 See Goodman (2007) 440–43 for the need for a swift and ruthless campaign to legitimise the 'thuggish non-entity' that was Vespasian. See too Barnes (2005) 129 on the victory of the Jews as 'the foundation myth for the Flavian dynasty'; Overman (2002) for the classic Flavian narrative.
- 6 See Millar (2005); Alföldi (1995).
- 7 Influentially stated by, for example, Goodman (1987) 235. Contrast an extrapolation of McLaren (2011) 151: 'Common to the discussion of why a seemingly forlorn war was entered into has been the enduring influence of Josephus' interpretative framework . . . However, the material remains from the war highlight the importance of not allowing the post-war reconstruction of Josephus to control our investigation.'
- 8 Price (1992) 173 n.34. For more general hostility see the arresting title of U. Rappaport's 1994 essay: 'Where was Josephus lying? In His *Life* or in the *War*? Rappaport (1994).
- 9 For example 5.362: 'Josephus . . . went round the wall . . . endeavouring to keep out of range of missiles and yet within ear-shot, repeatedly implored them to spare themselves and the people.' Cf. 5.458–9 (Titus abused from the walls); 5.538 (the traitor Judas calls out to the Romans in preparation for admitting them); 5.541: 'Josephus while going his

- rounds – for he was unremitting in his exhortations – was struck on the head by a stone'; 5.546 Josephus 'came forward . . . shouting to his foes that he would ere long be avenged on them for his wound'. For a recent discussion of Josephus as interpreter/mediator, see den Hollander (2014) 143–55.
- 10 An expression of the older view can be found in Overman (2002) 216: 'Josephus' role in the development of Flavian policy is substantial. He was an important source for Flavian and immediate post-Flavian writers who were actively developing the images and narrative around the Revolt which proved so important to the Flavian line.' Compare, for example, Mason (2009) 80: 'Broadly speaking, then, the entire *War* is ironic in a way that not all histories are.'
  - 11 See Woodman (1988) 13: 'Verbatim speeches and classical historiography are a contradiction in terms.' Rajak (2002) 80–81; Newell (1989) 284–6 in Feldman and Hata (1989), arguing against 'free invention', another issue than that considered here. See Paul (1993) for the suggestion that Josephus was capable of deploying established rhetorical techniques in his portrayal of Titus.
  - 12 Cf. the proemium of Valerius Flaccus, *Argonautica*: 'Your [Vespasian's] son tells of the overthrow of Idume, for he is able, and his brother begrimed with the dust of Jerusalem, scattered firebrands and causing havoc in every turret.' See Taylor (1994).
  - 13 *BJ* 5.334 late May/early June following the breaching of the second wall of the city); 6.94 August, following the cessation of the *Tamid*; 6.124, August, following the failure of Josephus' approach; 6.350, following the displacement of rebels from the Temple Mount to the Lower City.
  - 14 *BJ* 6.94; Titus: 6.328 ff.
  - 15 See Rives (2005) 146 n.1 for earlier bibliography.
  - 16 *BJ* 6.236–43.
  - 17 Barnes (2005). Rives (2005) argues that the destruction of the Temple proceeded from the Roman desire to destroy the Jews' allegiance to the Temple interpreted as a rival definition of community. See the rabbinic attribution of responsibility to Titus: *b Gitt.* 56 b.
  - 18 Sulpicius Severus *Chronica* 2.30.36. See Stern (1980) 64–7. The controversy is discussed most recently by Schwartz (2012) 136–9.
  - 19 *BJ* 5.54–66.
  - 20 *BJ* 5.75–97.
  - 21 *BJ* 5.106–8.
  - 22 Paying the soldiers: *BJ* 5.350–55; executions: 5.450.
  - 23 *BJ* 5.490.
  - 24 *BJ* 5.491–501. Opinions reported included that of those who 'advised that they should dispense with these [earthworks] and resort to a blockade, merely guarding against the egress of the besieged and the introduction of supplies, and that, leaving the city to the famine, they should avoid direct conflict with the foe'.
  - 25 *BJ* 5.494–501, a passage depicting Titus as rhetorically justificatory in response to other views. See Price (1992) 142–4 for the circumvallation. It 'completely changed the complexion of the war as viewed from inside the city'.
  - 26 Even Price (1992) who characterises Roman technology available for siege warfare as 'awesome' (123) is led to wonder: 'Perhaps it is not entirely vain to wonder how much longer Jerusalem could have held out had the defenders actually spared and rationed food and planned strategy, making more effective use of their considerable resources.'
  - 27 55 (56).4.1: '[Titus] undertook to win them over by certain representations and promises but, as they would not yield, he now proceeded to wage war on them.'
  - 28 55 (56).4.4.
  - 29 *BJ* 5.268.
  - 30 Deforestation: *BJ* 6.5–6; water: Dio 66.4.5: 'The Romans suffered most from the lack of water; they brought water from a distance, and even that was bad. The Jews found strength in their tunnels, for they had them dug from within the city, underneath the

- walls, extending far out into the country, and going out through them they attacked the water-carriers and harassed stragglers from the ranks. Titus blocked up all the tunnels.' See Price (1992) 248–54. For Masada with a similar problem, see *BJ* 7.275–8.
- 31 65 (66).4.5.
- 32 Roth (1995) 90. Magness (2011) 346 thought the water must have been brought from springs at Ein Gedi (16 km distant), Jericho and Ein Boqeq (12 km).
- 33 Roth (1995) 90. *BJ* 5.519 does say that there were plentiful supplies of corn and other supplies provided by Syria and other provinces but does say (at 523) that timber had to be brought from a distance of 90 furlongs (*heneukonta stadion*).
- 34 See Bloom (2010) 158.
- 35 Volandum in Armenia, stormed by Corbulo's troops, was a fortress (*castellum*) (*Tac. Ann.* 13. 39); the attempted siege of walled Placentia failed (*Tac. Hist.* 2.20–22) while the Rome that fell to the Flavians was without serviceable walls.
- 36 *BJ* 1.141. Cf. Tacitus *Histories* 4.2: 'There remained the siege of Jerusalem which promised to be a hard and uphill task, more because of the peculiar character of its mountain site and the bigotry of its inhabitants than because it had the means to endure a desperate struggle'; 5.12: 'The temple was built like a citadel, with walls of its own, which were constructed with more care and effort than any of the rest; the very colonnades about the temple made a splendid defence.'
- 37 *BJ* 1.146.
- 38 See the famous descriptions of Josephus at *BJ* 5.190–226 and *AJ* 15.410–16.
- 39 *BJ* 2.218–19: 'had it been completed [it] would have rendered ineffectual all the efforts of the Romans in the subsequent siege.' The more detailed account of *BJ* 5.147–60 makes it clear that Agrippa's unfinished wall enclosed a northern section of the city that had extended beyond the older fortifications.
- 40 See Roth (1999) 314–19.
- 41 I owe the reference to Faulkner (2002) 257.
- 42 *BJ* 6.260; 263; 266.
- 43 See, for example, Goodman (2007) 449–58; Sorek (2008) 125–47.
- 44 *BJ* 6.323–55.
- 45 *BJ* 6.356–7.
- 46 Conversion: Jos. *AJ* 20.17–96. For the kingdom see Millar (1993) 493–4.
- 47 *BJ* 7.20.
- 48 *BJ* 7.23–4.
- 49 *BJ* 7.23.
- 50 *BJ* 7.23.
- 51 *BJ* 7.37–39 (at Berytus 'multitudes of captives perished in the same manner as before').
- 52 Millar (1993) 279–85. At 279: 'this unique island of Roman culture in the Near East'. Its distinctive Latin character was so marked that it later became a great centre for the study of Roman law.
- 53 *BJ* 7.105.
- 54 *BJ* 7.106–116.
- 55 For example, Beard (2007) 266–7. Cf. Ando (2000) 257: 'Titus was doing more than touring the eastern provinces . . . [He] was teaching the cities of the East that characteristically Roman variation on the arrival [*adventus*] that was the triumph, with its pageantry and ideologically charged images of conquered and unconquered.'
- 56 Jos. *BJ* 7.123–62. For it, see Östenberg (2009) 112–19; Beard (2007) 93–6.
- 57 *BJ* 7.96–118. Pliny *NH* 28.7. 39 provides the single isolated reference to the *triumphator's* chariot being marked underneath with a phallus. For the difficulties of interpreting the unique text, Beard (2007) 83. And for the strategic selection of prisoners Beard (2007) 119. The practice was in evidence as late as the triumph of Belisarius in 534 CE.
- 58 One survivor might be Claudia Aster [Esther?], 'Hierosolymitana captiva' who died in Campania. See Noy (1993) no. 26. It is the only inscription known to refer to a captive from Jerusalem.

- 59 *BJ* 7.434.
- 60 Examples of protracted imprisonment are very rare: Caesar had suggested imprisonment (presumably indefinite imprisonment) for the Catilinarian conspirators (Sallust *Catiline* 51; 52). Cf. Ulpian, writing on the duties of a proconsul, who specifically stated that governors ought not to detain people in chains as a punishment but only while awaiting trial (*D XLVIII.19.8.9*). [I am grateful to my colleague Prof. Brian Campbell for assistance on these points].
- 61 In Josephus' *War* he is an inveterate rebel while in the *Life* he is depicted as a force for moderation. See Mason (2001) 47–8, commentary on *Vita* 43. Did Josephus' view of John soften between the writing of *War* and the *Life*, the latter post-dating the former by at least 15 years?
- 62 *BJ* 6.387–9. The passage is followed by the handing over of treasures by Phineas, treasurer of the Temple: 6.390–91: 'those services procuring for him, although a prisoner of war, the pardon accorded to all the refugees.'
- 63 *BJ* 7.150. Östenberg (2009) 116.
- 64 Millar (2005) 109 states that it is unclear whether the objects were ever displayed in public.
- 65 Tac. *Hist.* 2.4 (Titus at the temple of Venus on Paphos); 2.78 Vespasian on Mt. Carmel; Josephus, *BJ* 6.312–13. More generalised predictions: Tac. *Hist.* 1.10; 2.1; 5.13; Suet. *Vesp.* 4.5; *Tit.* 5; Dio 65 (66).1.
- 66 *BJ* 7.216–7 reports that following the war Vespasian held the territory of the Jews as his private possession. Overman (2002) 215 stresses the restoration of *pax* as the Flavian message that made the taking of the title unnecessary.
- 67 The traditional periodization is in, for example, Cohen (2006) 5 and 205. Schwartz (2012) explores some revisionist thinking.
- 68 See Cohen (2006) 205–23; Schwartz and Weiss (2012), esp. the essay by Daniel Schwartz therein.
- 69 See Price (2011) 412–16; Magness (2011) 85–6.
- 70 Magness (2011) 86: 'The evidence of a relatively prosperous, Romanized life-style combined with Jewish purity observance suggest that this was a settlement of elite families including priests who remained as close to Jerusalem after 70, perhaps awaiting the rebuilding of the Temple.' Price explores the possibility that it might be the settlement mentioned by Josephus at *BJ* 5.51. See Cotton (2007).
- 71 *HE* 4.5.1–3.
- 72 Acts 3: 1–26; 5: 19–21, 42. Cf. Luke 24: 53.
- 73 For this literature, see Grabbe (2000) 116–20.
- 74 *CIL* 6.994. Tacitus was aware of Pompey's capture of Jerusalem: *Histories* 5.9.
- 75 *HE* 3.5.4.

## Part III

# Instituting peace in the ancient world

If peace is to last it must not only take into account the interests of the parties involved at the moment at which it is agreed, but must also address the future. Instituting peace therefore means considering more than a cessation of hostilities, and pushing instead for what can be called reconciliation. This need not necessarily mean compromise – one can reconcile oneself even to circumstances one would never have chosen – but it does mean considering the causes of conflict and the manner in which it is pursued. In the ancient world efforts at reconciliation can often be found not only in the practical measures undertaken in the aftermath of a conflict but also in literary and symbolic representations of conflicts and their resolutions. These were not often dreams of a world without conflict, but took on the more immediate question of how to transform a particular conflict into anything close to a lasting peace.



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# 15 Identity building as a means of conflict resolution, or: Thucydides' struggle with Hellenic discourses

*Christoph Ulf*

Modern overviews of Greek history often state, sometimes regretfully, that 'the Greeks' never became a political unit. This fact is all the more remarkable as nowadays it is commonly held that 'Greek' history started with the Mycenaean culture or even earlier.<sup>1</sup> From the early-nineteenth century on, the lack of political unity was explained by the special landscape of the Greek peninsula, the many small plains separated from each other by mountain ranges. This hindered the development of political units across these natural borders. To prove that the Greeks were a unit all the same, it was assumed that being Greek was not a matter of politics, but of culture: a common religion, common festivals and sanctuaries like Olympia and Delphi.<sup>2</sup> But did the ancient Greeks, the Hellenes, think of themselves in this way? To answer this question, it makes good sense to take a closer look at the difference between the terms 'Hellenes' and 'Greeks'.

It is not trivial to give a reminder of the well-known fact that 'Greeks' (Γραικοί) is a term applied from outside, i.e. by the Romans, to designate the inhabitants of the southern Balkans. At first 'Graikoi' was a name for the population of Epirus and the Romans picked up the term and expanded its reach to encompass all people we also call Greeks.<sup>3</sup> In contrast, the ancient Greeks called themselves 'Hellenes'. In anthropology, this kind of difference is designated 'etic' and 'emic' perspectives. An emic perspective conveys the view that people have of themselves, while an etic perspective imparts the structuring, but not necessarily impartial, view from outside. Since the nineteenth century, delineations of Greek history picked up the Roman perspective and posited that Greeks were an ethnic unit from the very beginning. This view was taken in parallel with the establishment of the European nation state model and is based on the notion that nations and peoples are discrete and essential units.<sup>4</sup>

Only in the last decades when the term nation was historically contextualized, and '(collective) identity' and 'ethnicity' were given their due attention as analytical tools, did primordial ethnic units disappear from the description of Greek history.<sup>5</sup> They were replaced by the notion that ethnic units result from various economic, social and political processes. The analysis of these processes reveals that they are driven by the perceptions that people have of themselves and their environment. Therefore these processes are determined by different forms of social cognition, entailing different and sometimes also

contradictory discourses of one's own identity.<sup>6</sup> This kind of thinking about oneself can be triggered by, or based on, an instrumentalist perception of the world; the resulting identities are often, even though they are not thought of as primordial, again interpreted as essentialist.<sup>7</sup> Against the backdrop of parallel and also conflicting discourses, it becomes clear that to develop a collective identity needs a strong point or points of reference where the various processes of perception and the interconnected worldviews can converge. A common name that seems to convey commonality offers this possibility. Therefore, we must attempt to take the emic view and ask what the terms 'Hellenes' and 'Hellas' meant in the eye of the Greeks.

According to how the ancient sources reported, or better, reconstructed, the past, the Hellenes were – unlike the Dorians or Ionians – never an ethnic unit, wandering from somewhere to their place of destination. Significant for Hellenes is that the reach of the name was extended to cover a growing but not homogenous population. The Hellenes were first only a small population in the south of Thessaly. They attracted, then, other populations to join them. Thereby other non-Hellenic people were included under the name Hellenes.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, 'Hellas' was at first, i.e. in the *Iliad*, the name of a small region and only in the course of time designated a continuously growing territory. In the *Odyssey* it encompasses central Greece and finally in Xenophanes most of what is called the Greek world from the angle of modern and etic perspective.<sup>9</sup> The obvious flexibility of both terms echoes the genealogy of Hellen. In his first attestation in the *Catalogue of Women*,<sup>10</sup> Hellen is the son of Deukalion and Pyrrha and the father of Doros, Xouthos and Aiolos; the children of Xouthos are Achaïos, Ion and Diomedes (frg. 2, 9 and 10a West). Graikos, here the son of Pandora and Zeus, was not included in this genealogy; nor were many of the other Greeks. Never did the genealogy of Hellen encompass all Greeks.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, there were different genealogies of Hellen. For Hekataios of Miletos (*FGrH* 1 F 16), Ion is the son of Physkos and elder brother of Lokros, whereas Euripides presented a genealogy fitting the goals of Athenian policy in the Peloponnesian War. In his tragedy *Ion* (49–75, 1553–1605) he construes a godly descent for Ion as son of Apollo, makes him the first source of the Athenian – interpreted as Ionian – power concerning the area of the Delian League, and Doros and Achaïos stem from Ion's foster father Xouthos, thus subordinating them to Ion.<sup>12</sup>

Against the normally held view that one of those narratives about Hellas and Hellen became dominant and was diffused by Delphi and/or Olympia,<sup>13</sup> it is more plausible to assume that differing and even contradicting stories could be told, parallel to one another.<sup>14</sup> This is supported by the very plausible assumption that 'intrahellenic identities probably existed prior to their subsumption under a more overarching sense of Hellenicity'.<sup>15</sup> This presupposed, it becomes less convincing that the Persian Wars were the sharp turning point for 'the Greeks' to modify their self-interpretation and change from an aggregative to an oppositional identity. The obvious struggle of Thucydides with the Hellenic identity enhances these doubts.

## **Thucydides and the Hellenes**

When considering the origin of the Hellenes, often Thucydides' well-known statements in his so-called 'archaeology' serve as points of reference.<sup>16</sup> He states in this introduction to the account of the Peloponnesian War that 'what today is called Hellas' was almost void of population in early times. The Pelasgians spread most widely (1.2–3); only some people in southern Thessaly were called Hellenes (1.2.5). In another passage Thucydides (4.109) states that even the Athenians were originally Pelasgians and only in the course of time became Hellenes. Moreover, Thucydides applied the name Hellenes to persons who returned from the (mythical) Trojan War and settled in Ionia, Italy and Sicily. Yet, he also maintains that the Hellenes never knew a common bond. Obviously then, according to him, the Hellenes did not originate from a common ethnic root, but were the outcome of different processes taking place over a long period of time, cultural change and migration. Therefore, it seems only right to ask whether there is any evidence at all to support a cultural and/or ethnic commonality as is inherent in the etic name 'Greeks'.

As indicated above, it is often assumed that the external threat of the Persian Wars gave rise to a definite feeling of a common Hellenic bond. It thus comes as a surprise that we do not discover much mention of such a notion in Thucydides' text.<sup>17</sup> He knows, of course, that the principle of freedom allows a difference to be made between Hellenes and Persians. Yet freedom is always a relative issue in his text. The notion, for instance, that the barbarian Persian came 'to enslave Hellas' (1.18) is also used to characterize the Athenians or the Spartans. Both are accused of calling themselves 'liberator of Hellas', but not of acting as such in the current war (1.69; 2.71; 3.10; 6.76).<sup>18</sup> This kind of relativity also appears in the context of Hellenic norms and customs. To give only one example, the validity of those norms is contested when the Corinthians challenge the Spartans to give up their inert 'old-fashioned ways' (1.71.2) and go fight the Athenians.<sup>19</sup> The weakness of the Hellenicity of customs becomes even more obvious when the Athenians reproach the Spartans for not upholding their own customs or any other Hellenic customs when they are abroad (1.77).

This means that no cultural features can clearly be designated Hellenic. It would seem that in Thucydides' day in Athens, and elsewhere in Greece, the unity of the Hellenes was a topic of debate, but there were doubts whether such a unit existed at all.<sup>20</sup> From the perspective of this chapter, regarding how to settle a conflict, it is worth noticing that among the possible cultural traits it is nowhere mentioned that the Hellenes should not fight each other. But Thucydides does allude to this when he deals with the conflict between the Sicilian towns of Camarina and Gela.

## **Hermocrates' speech in Gela**

In summer 424 BC, facing the direct military involvement of the Athenians, the representatives of all the Sicilian towns involved in the confrontation between

Gela and Camarina met in Gela to resolve the conflict (4.58).<sup>21</sup> At the meeting (ξύνοδος) Thucydides let the Syracusan Hermocrates give a long speech, in which he attempted to explain how peace could be achieved (4.59–64).<sup>22</sup>

Hermocrates starts out by naming the goal of his argument: it is about the precept (γνώμη) that would serve all of Sicily best (4.59.1). The Sicilian towns waging war against each other believe they can gain profit (πλέον) from the war. Hermocrates compares the relationship between the Sicilian towns with the ruinous strife among the citizens of a city-state (4.61.1: στάσις; 4.61.8: διαφορά). Therefore, Hermocrates urges his listeners not to look solely for their own advantage, but to communicate with each other about how to gain an equal part (τὸ ἴσον) for everyone. If they were not able to create this kind of community, they would let the Athenians, their natural enemies, arbitrate their case. In the next step of his argument, he moves to the ethnic discourse. He warns against believing that aligning themselves with kinship (ξυγγένεια) promises security (4.61.2). This is a mistaken conclusion, for the Athenians do not respect such a bond. Hermocrates does not reproach the Athenians for their way of thinking, because it is human nature (τὸ ἀνθρώπειον) to so think. The Sicilian towns should, however, recognize that.

He goes on to state that it is their ‘sacred duty’ (4.61.6: πρεσβύτατον) to take a stand against the danger posed by the Athenians. The quickest way to do this would be to reach out to each other and make peace (ἀλλήλους ξυμβαίνειν). Then the Athenians would lose all support and have to leave Sicily. This peace would prove advantageous for everyone. To counter the argument that this would cancel each individual’s profit, Hermocrates reminds them that in the past asserting their rights or using violence was often to their disadvantage. Consequently, they should band together, at best forever (4.63.1: ἐς αἰδίων ξυμβαίνειν), or at least agree to postpone their conflicts (ἴδιαι διαφοραί). This call for the Sicilians to relent then proceeds to a vision of a life in which all the towns live together as neighbours in a common country, where everyone would be called Siceliot. This vision is not blind to a future in which they will all fight each other like the citizens of a city (4.64.5: οἰκεῖος πόλεμος). But the vision also embraces the perspective that they will put aside their strife without an arbiter from outside. In this way Sicily will become a free country, free of foreigners (4.64.4: ἀλλόφυλοι).

This is a remarkable speech. This becomes clear when it is compared with the two other speeches Hermocrates gives in Thucydides’ work.<sup>23</sup> Nearly ten years later, in winter 415/14, the Athenians are again meddling in Sicilian issues and Hermocrates speaks to the Syracusan assembly (6.33–34: ἐκκλησία). To be sufficiently prepared for the coming fight he suggests sending messengers to make agreements (ξυμμαχία) with the Siceliot, but also with the rest of Sicily (ἄλλη Σικελίη), as well as with towns in southern Italy and with Carthage (6.34); only at the end of this list of possible allies does he name Sparta and Corinth. In response, the leader of the lower class citizens, Athenagoras, dismisses this last proposal as being driven by the interests of the aristocrats and the young people (6.36–40). At the proposal of an unnamed general the Syracusans alone commenced to prepare for war (6.41).

When the Athenians landed in Sicily, a citizens' assembly was held in Camarina (6.75) to listen to the arguments of the Syracusans and the Athenians. Here Hermocrates gives his third speech. Even though he reproaches the Siceliot for not uniting (6.77.1: οὐ ξυστράφεντες), he emphasizes the ethnic argument that runs against any Siceliot unity. Syracusans and Camarinians are both Dorians from the free Peloponnese, who now live in Sicily (6.77). The Ionians, their enemies, are attacking them. If the Camarinians do not support Syracuse, Dorians will betray Dorians. But if Syracuse ultimately wins the war, Syracuse will be their enemy (6.80).

The three speeches are characterized by distinct differences. In the assembly in Syracuse Thucydides makes the case that the Athenians are dangerous, but does not touch on the latent internal differences between the lower class Syracusans and the aristocratic and young Syracusans. He does not show the way to a common Syracusan identity and thus fails to convince his fellow-citizens that his suggestion best serves the interests of all Syracusans. In Camarina, he argues on a more general level. He laments the fact that the Siceliot are not united, but bases his call for an alliance between Syracuse and Camarina on their common Dorian origin, even though he knows that to refer to common ethnic origin is a weak argument. Only in his speech in Gela does Hermocrates draw exclusively on a political level to be located above the quarrels in and between the Sicilian towns, namely on the identity of the Siceliot that overarches all the Sicilian city-states.<sup>24</sup> This kind of identity includes the Greek towns as equal partners and excludes the interference of non-Sicilian powers in Sicilian issues. Although Hermocrates was able to bring the conflict to a halt, the agreement did not last long. Why? Modern Peace Studies may give an answer.

### **Modern Peace Studies**

Modern Peace Studies<sup>25</sup> mainly deal with two questions: how can conflicts be solved, and how can peace agreements be made durable? To answer these questions, Peace Studies analyse all types of peace negotiations. Instead of giving abstract descriptions, it makes better sense to sketch a brief textbook example for successful peace negotiations.<sup>26</sup>

For more than a decade, from 1980 to 1992, some 75,000 people lost their lives in violent conflicts in El Salvador. The conflict was triggered by social inequality, because the agrarian and working classes were repressed and excluded from political decision-making. But '[a]fter three years of negotiations the government and the largest rebel group signed a historic comprehensive peace accord that brought an end to the war and instituted wide-reaching political and social reforms'.<sup>27</sup> How did this conflict come to a relatively quick conclusion?

The switch to the Bush Snr. administration was accompanied by new strategic positions on the part of the United States and together with the decline of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War in 1989, and the defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua's 1990 elections led to a fundamental change in the political situation. With these changes both parties to the conflict lost most of

their external military and financial support. The population's increasing war weariness exerted internal pressure on political leaders on both sides to resolve the conflict. At this point the leaders of the parties realized that neither of them was likely to be able to defeat the other militarily. The new situation was a 'mutually hurting stalemate', as it is called in Peace Studies. That means both sides 'were forced to reconsider their relative positions, their chances of decisively defeating the other side militarily, and the cost-benefit ratio of continued fighting versus a political settlement'.<sup>28</sup>

But, also some other factors laid the foundation for successfully negotiating the agreement. The political leaders were strong enough to overcome opposing voices in their parties; they were flexible enough to try new ideas, open to trust-building measures and willing to make concessions, and Alvaro de Soto of Peru, the United Nations Special Representative, was able to strengthen the mutual trust between the conflict parties and, if necessary, put pressure on the political actors to continue the negotiations. Crucial for the consent of the rebel forces was the guarantee that the demobilized fighters would be included in the newly created Civil Police. They thus became an integral part of Salvadorian society.

The factors that lead to a durable solution of political conflicts can be summarized as follows: exclusion of external actors, mutually hurting stalemate, measures to build trust, re-evaluation of the situation, negotiated settlement, and new integrative identity. It is interesting to see that Hermocrates addresses these factors in his speech in Gela: an external arbiter should be excluded; the conflict parties do not make profit from their (internal) conflicts; he prompts them to think about how to gain an equal part for everyone; he looks at the situation from the angle of human nature; they all could be Siceliots.

And still, something important is missing. He emphasizes that Siceliot identity would make all parties to the agreement equal, but he does not make clear what steps must be taken to achieve and maintain equality as the precondition for an integrative identity and what that would entail in political life. Irrespective of the extent to which this flaw is due to Thucydides' narrative art or the real political situation, it is worth noting that Hermocrates' exceptional speech in Gela does not take advantage of the full scale of arguments available in fifth century BC.

### **Herodotus' reference to Homer's and Hesiod's gods**

Apart from his focus on 'political history',<sup>29</sup> nobody would assume that Thucydides' account provides us with all the information needed to give a full picture of his contemporary world. This becomes all the more clear as recent studies have brought to the fore many parallel running discourses out of which historiographic sources like Thucydides seem to favour the one(s) which fit(s) best the basic goal of its narrative.<sup>30</sup> Different ways have been chosen to reveal the existence of multiple discourses and how they intersect, intertwine and/or contradict. Recently, for example, the notion of a unilineal evolution of Greek

culture, embodied in the term ‘revolution’, has been replaced by the various forms of transformation from which the dynamics of Greek culture derive.<sup>31</sup> Probably more familiar is the often mentioned opposition between oligarchs and democrats, a contrast indicative of opposing worldviews and respective discourses.<sup>32</sup> The ambivalent appropriation of Persian products (‘Perserie’) reveals contradictions within the discourse, or between different discourses, of the elite.<sup>33</sup> The language of the sophists grows dangerous when the ‘polis’ is about to turn into a closed political system.<sup>34</sup> ‘Local traditions’ indicate critique directed from below to the upper ranks of society.<sup>35</sup> To close this incomplete list of discourses, a sometimes scathing debate was going on about what religion is or should be.<sup>36</sup> From this sketchy outline of parallel running discourses, it seems obvious that the political thinking of his day was more complex than what we see from Thucydides’ writing. From the angle of conflict resolution, I shall single out only one important point that is missing in his account.

It has often been observed that Thucydides excluded religion from his description and explanation of the causes of the Peloponnesian War even though ancient life was inextricably connected with religious beliefs and rituals.<sup>37</sup> Part of the accompanying religious discourse is a famous statement by Herodotus that, admittedly, is normally not seen as belonging to the political discourse but tells us much about the impact of religion on politics. In his Egyptian narrative Herodotus deals widely with the origin of the Hellenic gods. He names three origins (Hdt. 2.53.1–2). Many of them were originally Egyptian, some were Pelasgian gods, and a few were truly Hellenic. In conclusion he states: ‘But the origin of every single god or if they were all always the way they look, is something the Hellenes did not know yesterday or the day before.’ Then he continues: It was Homer and Hesiod who ‘fashioned a theogony for the Hellenes and gave the gods their epithets and patronymics and portioned among them honours and competencies and signalled their forms’.<sup>38</sup>

The role Herodotus assigns to Homer and Hesiod goes beyond a mere statement about where the Hellenic gods originated. In Herodotus’ view, both poets determined the relations between the gods and thus laid the basis for the Hellenic system of deities. Nobody doubts that the gods are the core element of religion and that religion was seen as an integral part of Hellenic identity. But Herodotus’ statement is not only about the cultural traits of the Hellenes; he tells his contemporaries that there was no Hellenic religion before Homer and Hesiod. This might have been an attack on those who argued for the longevity of the Hellenic identity and thus makes his statement political. That is why we need to know how and for what purpose Homer and Hesiod installed the Hellenic gods and why Thucydides took no notice thereof.

### **The creation of the Olympian order in the *Iliad***

Strife in general is central to the plot of the *Iliad*.<sup>39</sup> We normally think only about the distorted relationship between Agamemnon and Achilles, but conflicts also exist among the Trojans and especially the gods. As set out in Figure 15.1, the




Figure 15.1 Narrative structure of the *Iliad* (A = Agora; B = Boule)

Source: Christoph Ulf.

main narrative threads of the *Iliad* refer to what is happening on the battlefield situated between the wall of Troy and the wall of the camp of the Achaeans, erected only in the course of the battle. What Trojans and Achaeans discuss in their assemblies during the four days of battle is determined by thrust and retreat on the battlefield, as indicated by the arrows in the scheme. The figure also makes visible that the relationship between the gods changes in accordance with the success and defeat of Trojans and Achaeans in the battle.<sup>40</sup>

It is rarely noticed that at the beginning of the *Iliad* several groups of gods are in conflict with each other, like human beings.<sup>41</sup> The first group consists of gods from the distant past. They are not active in the narrative, but still play a role in how it unfolds. These gods include the gods who created the cosmos, like Okeanos and Tethys, but also the night and presumably the mighty winds as well.<sup>42</sup> The gods who took sides with Zeus in the brutal battles between the different generations of gods make up the second group of gods. These are Achilles' mother, Thetis, and, for instance, Briareos, whom Thetis called to help her safeguard Zeus.<sup>43</sup> Other gods in this group are Typhoëus, who is named only in a simile, Dione and her warlike daughter Aphrodite and finally Apollon Smintheus. The third group of gods comprises Zeus, his contemporary gods and their children.

The narrative commences with a violent Zeus, who defeated the gods of earlier generations and now reigns over all the gods. But how he interprets his leadership creates resistance. The resistance is kindled by Zeus' intention that the Achaeans should suffer as a result of Achilles' retreat from the battlefield. This agreement between Zeus and Thetis revives old resistance to Zeus on the part of all the gods that goes back to former times of battle. In this way, the narrator creates a situation that enables the audience to

become aware of the violence inherent in Zeus' rule. From this point on, the narrator guides the audience through his analysis, his questioning of this order and his development of an alternative for the gods and human beings alike.

Hera scathingly criticizes Zeus because of his new plan. In response, he openly threatens her with violent consequences (*Il.* 1.566–567). The ensuing uproar among the gods (*Il.* 1.570: ὄχθησαν) – presumably here not coincidentally called the children of Uranos and thus alluding to the strife between former generations of gods – does not escalate only because Hera gives in to Hephaistos' advice and sleeps with Zeus. Now Zeus purposely provokes Hera by suggesting he could reconcile the human conflict parties. In response, Hera openly announces that all the gods will resist this plan (*Il.* 4.25–29). What so far was only strife (νεῖκος), threatens to become a riot (μέγα ἔρισμα, *Il.* 4.37–38). Although Zeus is angry about Hera's reaction, he comes around in the face of this danger (*Il.* 4.30, 68). But when the Achaeans erect a wall around their camp, again he shows his mighty power and prohibits the gods from interfering in the humans' battle. He threatens to beat them or throw them into the Tartaros if they break his rule (*Il.* 8.5–17). To make clear that this is no empty threat he tells the gods that with a golden chain he would be able to pull all of them up to the height, earth and ocean included (*Il.* 8.19–27).<sup>44</sup> The gods cannot but conduct themselves accordingly. When rebuked by Athene, Zeus admits that he had not thought ahead (πρόφρων) and that he will relent. Even Poseidon concludes that Zeus is mightier than everybody else; he is afraid of Zeus' violent power (*Il.* 8.198–211).<sup>45</sup> When Athene and Hera nevertheless engage in the humans' battle, Zeus sends Iris with a warning (*Il.* 8.397–408): if they meet him in battle, he will make their horses lame, fling the goddesses from their throne and smash their chariots to pieces; their wounds would not heal in ten years. At this point Hera relents and argues that she no longer wants to fight Zeus on account of human beings (*Il.* 8.426–431).

Zeus appears to have reached the peak of his power. Content with his strength and power, he leaves Olympus for peoples far away (*Il.* 13.1–9), so creating a power vacuum among the gods. At this point in the story the Trojans reach the Achaeans' ships; Poseidon, observing this, can no longer keep to himself and enters the battle (*Il.* 13.345–360). His becoming active despite his fear of Zeus is prompted by his anger about the death of his mortal nephew (*Il.* 13.10–125). Thus encouraged, Hera enacts a far-reaching plan to keep Zeus away from the battlefield for as long as possible; this is the famous scene of the deception of Zeus.<sup>46</sup> Hera seduces Zeus with the help of Aphrodite and prolongs the time for Zeus to be distracted from the human war with the support of Sleep (ὕπνος), in order to give Poseidon enough leeway to turn the battle in the Achaeans' favour – against the will of Zeus. Hera's action means revolt since she knows of Zeus' claim to be the only one who pulls the strings. On awakening, Zeus notices Poseidon on the battlefield and recognizes Hera's cunning deception (*Il.* 15.14: κακότεχνος δόλος). Remarkably, however, Zeus does not become violent, as he previously threatened. He reminds Hera that she was violently punished for her bad treatment of Heracles (*Il.* 15.14–33), but he understands leadership differently now. His temper immediately abates

when Hera proves to have an emotionally strong relationship with him. She swears by the river Styx that she did not encourage Poseidon to engage in the humans' battle (*Il.* 15.36–46). But why this change in Zeus' behaviour?

As the story continues to unfold it reveals a new arrangement of power. With Poseidon on the scene, Zeus cannot be sure he is mightier than all his adversaries. The new situation resembles a mutually hurting stalemate. From this point on, Zeus no longer exerts the violence he previously did, but espouses a new rule for the future on how to define the relationships between all the gods: if Hera agreed with Zeus in future, Poseidon would also agree with them. This would hold true, even if Poseidon did not intend to do so (*Il.* 15. 49–52). Consequently, Zeus announces that he is going to start negotiations with Poseidon. The willingness to start negotiations clearly signals that the gods have chosen justice instead of violence as the new standard for their actions. The next assembly of the gods symbolically confirms this change. When Hera enters the assembly, she accepts only the welcome cup offered to her by Themis (*Il.* 15.85–89). Then she tells of Zeus' anger and his bad actions (*κακὰ ἔργα*). When the gods become upset, she smilingly calls them fools (*νήπιοι*); they get angry without thinking about the ensuing consequences (*Il.* 15.101–105). Hera thus creates a basis for trust between the gods of Zeus' generation and their children, and real negotiations can start.

Iris is to bring Zeus' proposal to Poseidon. It contains the message that Zeus is mightier than Poseidon, but he is also older (*Il.* 15.162–167). For the negotiations to be successful it is important that Poseidon be able to meet Zeus from a position of strength. For Poseidon is as powerful as Zeus. He reminds Zeus of the old agreement about sharing power by lots. The children of Cronos and Rhea, Zeus, Poseidon and Hades, have the same social standing (*time*). Poseidon received the sea, Hades the underworld, and Zeus the heavens; the earth and Olympus were held by them jointly (*Il.* 15.186–199). Poseidon thus will not bend to Zeus. Wisely, Iris now brings Zeus' new rule into the play: the mind of the good ones is flexible (*Il.* 15.203: *στρεπταὶ δὲ μὲν φρένες ἐσθλῶν*). She repeats the second part of Zeus' message: the Erinys always accompany the elders (*Il.* 15.204). Here, Poseidon concedes that she spoke understandably (*κατὰ μοῖραν*) and knows what is appropriate (*Il.* 15.205–217: *αἴσιμα*). Therefore, he shall submit to Zeus. But if Zeus does not keep his part of the agreement that Troy will be destroyed (*Il.* 15.211–217), violent conflict (*ἀνήκεστος χόλος*) will break out between the gods. Zeus judges the agreement to be most useful (*πολὸν κέρδιον*) for both sides (*Il.* 15.226). If strife had arisen, the gods who were banned to Tartaros (*ἐνέρτεροι θεοί*) would have learned of it. This can only be taken to mean that the order of the entire cosmos would have been endangered (*Il.* 15.221–226).

The subsequent assemblies of the gods serve to settle open questions on the new Olympian order. Central to these negotiations is how to end the problematic involvement of the gods in the affairs of humans. Men can cause physical pain to the gods since the fate of men and gods is intertwined.<sup>47</sup> To bring this unbearable situation to an end, a formula is coined: it is not appropriate to

torment a god because of humans (*Il.* 21.328).<sup>48</sup> Translated into the language of Peace Studies, this means that external actors are now excluded from godly issues. To signal that the new order is established, for the first time it is Themis who gathers the gods for the assembly. The narrator states that all the gods arrived, except Oceanus; even Poseidon came willingly (*Il.* 20.14–9: ἄλός). The assembled gods want to know Zeus' plan (βουλή).

Since the gods have settled their conflicts forever, they can now partake in the battle of men without endangering the new order. Back from battle, they discuss the fate of Hector, and Zeus consents to the decision of his fellow-gods: Fate is an independent power that escapes even the influence of the gods. This is symbolically illustrated by Zeus taking the scale of fate, meaning that Hector has to die. None of the gods can appeal this decision. Finally, at the last assembly, Thetis arrives for the first time among the gods, is welcomed by Hera and seated to the right of Zeus (*Il.* 24.22–119). Thus, it seems, the entire cosmos is newly arranged.

### Thucydides' dilemma

Obviously, the newly created order of the Olympian gods includes most of the elements considered by Peace Studies to be decisive for the success of a peace process. The Olympian order is based on a negotiated settlement of the various conflicts, loaded with long reaching histories. The negotiations are accompanied by trust-building measures. The leaders, Zeus, Hera, and Poseidon are strong enough to assert the new rules. Those enable the formerly conflicting parties to distance themselves from their past and create a new integrative identity. In this order the gods are recognized according to their personal capacity and are, in this respect, all equal.

If one assumes that Herodotus' reference to Homer as the creator of the Greeks' gods was no coincidence, his picture of the gods imparts also their order as it was established in the course of the story in the *Iliad*. This intention becomes all the more apparent as the order of the Olympian gods is almost exactly matched by the story of Hesiod's *Theogony*.<sup>49</sup> If we also assume that with Hermocrates' proposals in Gela, Thucydides wanted to give an idea of how to settle conflicts, he, unlike the nearly contemporary Herodotus, did not draw a lesson from Homer (and Hesiod). For the Siceliot identity recommended by Hermocrates lacks the crucial element that characterizes the order of the Olympian gods: Zeus does not stand out from his fellow gods by rank, only by the smartness (μῆτις) which, according to Hesiod, he swallowed (*Hes. Theog.* 886–893). In Hermocrates' speech it is not clear how the Siceliot identity could integrate all Greek towns in Sicily as equal members. Therefore, Hermocrates could not persuade the Sicilian city-states not to make agreements with external powers, Athens and Sparta, and this identity had no lasting pull-effect.

If Hermocrates' proposal can be taken as an example for mainland Greece,<sup>50</sup> even greater difficulties are encountered. As mentioned above, Thucydides

cannot give a clear definition of Hellenic identity. Since he almost completely excludes from his narrative gods and religion as driving forces for human actions, he cannot use the order of the Olympian gods as a role model for how the Hellenic order should look. The genealogy of Hellen also leaves Thucydides alone with his dilemma. No matter when exactly and where the genealogy of Hellen was created, it is not a fitting tool to build an integrative identity of equal members. For by necessity, every genealogy is hierarchical. This is best explained by the term ‘conical clan’, as used in anthropology. The point to which all persons in a conical clan relate is the ancestor. The children’s rank is decided by their date of birth according to the principle of seniority. From the first evidence, the genealogies of Hellen are construed along this pattern. The ranks are fixed and there is no doubt about the political intention underlying each of its variants.

Obviously, Thucydides wanted to show a way out of the violent conflicts of his day,<sup>51</sup> but had no convincing tool with which to persuade his contemporaries not to hope for external support and thus believe in their superiority and ability to defeat the opponent. Because there was no generally recognized and strong Hellenic identity, whether integrative or not, he retreats to the non-moralizing statement that the greed for power is the basic feature of human nature. However, this often applauded definition of the human being would seem to reveal a lack of appropriate instruments for analysing history, rather than provide a fundamental insight into the social and political nature of men.

## Notes

- 1 Cf. e.g. Deger-Jalkotzy and Lemos (2006); Schnapp–Gourbeillon (2002).
- 2 Cf. Ulf (2011) 87–89; Ulf (2012b) 129–34.
- 3 For the problems connected cf. Cassola (1996) 8–9; Malkin (1998) 147–49; West (1985) 54–5.
- 4 McInerney (2001) 52–5.
- 5 For an overview cf. Luraghi (2014); cf. also Ulf (1996); Hall (2004).
- 6 DiMaggio (1997) 266–74; Brubaker *et al.* (2004); McInerney (2001) 63–7; Konstan (2001b) 30–43.
- 7 Brubaker *et al.* (2004) 49–52.
- 8 This holds true despite the problem of how to explain the term Panhellenes; cf. Hall (2002) 129–32.
- 9 Hall (2002) 131–4.
- 10 For the debate about how to date this text cf. Hirschberger (2004) 42–51; Hunter (2005).
- 11 Cf. Hall (1997) 47; Hall (2002) 27–9, 168–71.
- 12 Osborne (2009) 50–1 gathers the main arguments to support the notion that the migration stories were invented for political reasons not earlier than in the archaic period.
- 13 Hall (2002) 134–68; the argument is strongly connected with the notion, prominent in the nineteenth century, that the great festivals like Delphi and Olympia were the centres of the Greek nation.
- 14 For Athens, Steinbock (2013) 48–99 discusses various social groups memorizing and transmitting their own stories regarding the past and the occasions on which this took place; shifting identities are discussed in Derks and Roymans (2009).
- 15 Hall (2002) xvii.

- 16 Up to date introductions to the current debates on Thucydides: Tsakmakis and Rengakos (2006); Rusten (2009).
- 17 For the following cf. Ulf (2015).
- 18 Cf. Raaflaub (2004) 59–65, 84–9; Raaflaub (2003) 60.
- 19 Cf. Leppin (1999) 99–100; Luginbill (1999) 82–104.
- 20 Cf. e.g. Raaflaub (2016) for evidence of a ‘panhellenic’ discourse, and Cingano (2010); for doubts about the Hellenic origin of the Greeks see Thomas (2001) 217–27; Price (2001) 371–7.
- 21 For a short description of the political circumstances, referring to Timaeus’ account, see Zahrnt (2006) 638–41.
- 22 Thorough analysis of Hermocrates’ speech: Landmann (1932); Connor (1984) 119–26. Neither the question of when Thucydides wrote the speeches nor whether he invented them or not is of importance for the following. For Hermocrates cf. Hinrichs (1981).
- 23 Cf. Connor (1984) 168–76, 180–4.
- 24 Hammond (1973) noticed the peculiarity of this speech deriving from the ‘universal elements’ that dominate the whole argument.
- 25 Introductions to Peace Studies e.g.: Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011); Cheledin, Druckman and Fast (2003).
- 26 Pugh (2009) 83–105.
- 27 Pugh (2009) 83.
- 28 Pugh (2009) 84.
- 29 Strasburger (1954) called Thucydides the inventor of political history.
- 30 Ober (1994) points out traces of the counter-hegemonic discourse in Thucydides.
- 31 Goldhill and Osborne (2006).
- 32 See e.g. Shear (2011).
- 33 Miller (1997).
- 34 See e.g. Scholten (2003).
- 35 Dougherty and Kurke (2003); Kurke (2011).
- 36 See e.g. Rubel (2000).
- 37 This is highlighted by Hornblower (1992); see also Furley (2006).
- 38 Translation: Hall (2002) 230.
- 39 Ulf (1990); van Wees (2008). For an overview of narrative structure see Schein (1997), Kullmann (2011), and from a different point of view Ulf (2010).
- 40 For a more detailed description cf. Ulf (2012a); Ulf (2012b).
- 41 From the viewpoint of a ‘Greek’ religion this causes difficulties; cf. Kearns (2004), Hirschberger (2011).
- 42 For the connection of Tethys with the cosmogonic ‘oriental’ concept cf. Burkert (2004) 30–2; West (1997) 383–4.
- 43 Achilles reminds Thetis of the episode when she called Briareos to help keep Zeus safe from the other gods who were about to tie him up (*Il.* 1.396–406, 488).
- 44 West (1997) 371 parallels the golden chain of Zeus with a concept of Babylonian theology in the first millennium. Here, ‘the supreme god holds all the other gods on a lead-rope (*serrettu*), like a victorious warrior leading his captives, and this lead-rope may be identified as the bond or mainstay (*maraksu*) of heaven and earth.’
- 45 Poseidon adds the argument that will later become central to the negotiation between his brother and himself: Zeus is older and knows more (*Il.* 13.355).
- 46 For the crucial role of the scene in the development of the relations between the gods cf. Ulf (2012b).
- 47 Cf. *Il.* 5.381–41: Dione tells Aphrodite about the great suffering of the gods that the men could cause, since gods hurt each another.
- 48 Violence among the gods is mentioned one last time, in the introduction to the description of the shield of Achilles. Here, Thetis reminds Hephaistos that he was thrown to the earth by Zeus and was sheltered by her and Eurynome (*Il.* 18.395–405). The fundamental change of the relationship between the gods is indicated by another

story that Agamemnon tells when he confesses that he was driven by *Atê*. He wants to make Achilles accept the offered gifts. The story is about how even Zeus was blinded by *Atê* when Hera hindered the birth of Heracles and Zeus threw *Atê* from heaven to earth amidst the human beings (*Il.* 19.95–131).

49 Ulf (forthcoming); cf. Pucci (2009) 68–70.

50 This presumes Strasburger (2009) 214–17; see also Connor (1984) 126 n. 42, 175–76; Raaflaub (2002) 32–5.

51 See Gehrke (2006); also Marincola (2001) 88–90; Bolmarcich (2012).

## 16 Monuments to victory and symbols of peace and reconciliation?

### Re-viewing post-war building in Classical Athens and Achaemenid Persia

*Janett Morgan*

In his analysis of ancient Greek thinking about war and peace, Kurt Raaflaub notes that ‘a strong desire for peace pervades Greek literature’.<sup>1</sup> From the poems of Homer to the philosophy of Aristotle, Greek writers opine on how to end war and achieve lasting peace.<sup>2</sup> We can see these debates clearly in the literature of Classical Athens. Athens had played a central role in the fifth century BC wars against the Achaemenid Empire, and in the fifth and fourth centuries it was at the heart of the internal wars for hegemony, battling against other Greek communities, including Sparta, Thebes and Macedon. Unsurprisingly, the conduct of war and achievement of peace are at the forefront of many Athenian writers’ thoughts.<sup>3</sup> In his play *Ecclesiazusae*, written in the early fourth century BC, Aristophanes suggests that a lasting solution to the constant *stasis* at Athens can be achieved by re-organising the physical and social space of the city. His heroine, Praxagora, will break down the boundaries between buildings and citizens to create one community:

Βλέπυρος: τὴν δὲ δίαιταν τίνα ποιήσεις;

Πραξάγορα: κοινήν πᾶσιν. τὸ γὰρ ἄστῳ  
μίαν οἴκησίν φημι ποιήσῃσιν συρρήξασ’ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα,  
ὥστε βαδίξῃσιν ὡς ἀλλήλους.

Βλέπυρος: τὸ δὲ δεῖπνον ποῦ παραθήσεις;

Πραξάγορα: τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ τὰς στοῖας ἀνδρῶνας πάντα ποιήσω.

Bl: And what kind of lifestyle are you going to create?

Pr: One common to all. For I say that I shall make the city into a house, smashing all together into one, so that everyone can walk into each other’s.

Bl: And where will you serve dinner?

Pr: I will make all the lawcourts and *stoas* into *andrones*  
(Aristophanes, *Ecclesiazusae* 672–709)

She will create a monumental building that will house the entire community and force them to act in harmony as a single household. For Zeitlin, Praxagora is creating a ‘harmonious commonwealth’, where all will share clothes, food, shelter, drink and sex equally.<sup>4</sup> Praxagora’s building will encourage unity, reflect peace and facilitate reconciliation. In this Chapter I will re-examine the relationship between peace and monumental building and look more closely at the question of whether monumental building programs illustrate the existence of peace and can be viewed as symbols of communal unity and reconciliation. I will focus my investigation on the building programmes of Classical Athens and Achaemenid Persia.

### **Building peace**

It is important to begin by looking at the reasons why monumental buildings are created and why their existence might offer us a view of peace or a community reconciled. At a simple level, monumental buildings require a considerable input of human capital to construct, suggesting that a large labour force is present. This labour force will be predominantly male and capable of hard physical labour, which implies that we have a situation of internal stability, allowing building materials to be brought into the city and allowing workers, whether slave or free, to work and be properly supervised. The construction of a monumental building may also require the existence of a sense of collective identity that is reflected in the approval of and participation in a shared enterprise and in the desire to create a lasting symbol of group unity. As Knapp notes, monumental buildings can be ‘physical manifestations of social order and collective will’.<sup>5</sup>

We identify a relationship between peace and monumental building most clearly in the period after a community crisis. War disrupts the community while peace offers an opportunity to re-group and re-forging community links. So, after war or civic conflict, communities come together to bury their dead, to replace what has been damaged and to re-plant their crops. Post-conflict construction programs restore the fabric of the community, as well as the community itself. Damaged buildings are replaced and order is restored through reconstruction. Restoration is a hugely symbolic act, reflecting both the rise of the community in the face of those who would destroy it and the re-forging of community links and identity. So, after the sack of Athens, the community re-built its monumental walls as a symbol of their continued survival, to re-assert the rise of the community and to restore the faith of residents in their safety.<sup>6</sup> Monumental buildings can also be built to commemorate achievement. In post-conflict settings, they can offer a statement of victory, honour the dead for sacrifices made on behalf of the community or thank supernatural powers who are seen to have assisted in the survival of the community. These achievements can be made by the community or for the community.<sup>7</sup> So Root suggests that, after defeating rebellions in the early part of his reign, Darius constructed and decorated Persepolis as a symbol of the new, harmonious

and united community that he was creating, and also to give thanks to Ahura Mazda, whose support helped him to achieve success.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, scholars see the emergence of monumental temples in Archaic Greece as a sign of civic accord. Shipley notes that the construction of the Hekatompedon at Samos offers evidence of civic consciousness, revealing the ability of the community to mobilise large amounts of labour and materials.<sup>9</sup> These examples show how monumental buildings can reveal group identity and offer a statement that the community is reconciled and at peace.

While we can see monumental buildings as a vital part of community identity and a symbol of peace, this is not the only interpretation. Monumental buildings can also reflect individual or group power within a community and can be used to make political statements about control or social distinctions within it. For Trigger, monumental buildings are political symbols that reveal the power of the owner or user to control human energy and direct it to their own advantage.<sup>10</sup> Whilst in exile from Athens, the Alcmaeonid family constructed a new temple for Apollo at Delphi.<sup>11</sup> Their temple used the finest materials, brought across great distances, and its position, in a vitally important panhellenic sanctuary used by Athenian elites, was a potent symbol that they continued to have political influence and visibility despite their banishment. Monumental structures can awe and intimidate as much as reconcile. Darius' buildings at Susa reflected the reach of his power over his people, as we can read in the list of luxury building materials in the Foundation Tablets and the lists of people who came from far distances to bring those materials to the Great King.<sup>12</sup> There are many reasons why monumental structures are erected and it is clear that in order to understand whether a specific monumental building offers us a view of peace, we must consider it in its unique socio-political and historical context.

### **Building peace in fifth century BC Athens**

Throughout the fifth century BC, Athens set up a range of monumental buildings. New temples were established on the Acropolis and in the wider city, while others were restored and the Agora was embellished with a range of political and social structures.<sup>13</sup> Scholars have little difficulty in identifying these buildings as the products of a time of peace that followed success in the Greco-Persian wars, and suggest that they offer a vision of the city united as an imperial power. At the heart of this view lies the Parthenon, which even as a ruin dominates the landscape and offers an imposing physical presence (Figure 16.1). For Evans the Parthenon temple is a 'striking image of Athenian superiority and transcendence', while its art shows 'Athena's victories over chaos and foreigners'.<sup>14</sup> For Castriota, the Parthenon is a victory monument with its sculptures referencing the Athenian people's victory over the Persians, while the Parthenon Frieze shows Athens united as an imperial power.<sup>15</sup> Morris, too, notes that the statue of Athena Parthenos wore the gold of the Delian League, while the young men on horseback on the Parthenon Frieze offered a display of the integration of elite and *demos* in support of the Empire.<sup>16</sup> Ratté offers a



*Figure 16.1* Photograph of the Athenian Acropolis and Parthenon viewed from the southwest

Source: Photograph by Dimitrios Constantin, 1865. The J. Paul Getty Museum, Los Angeles, Object Number: 84.XM.366.2. Digital image courtesy of the Getty's Open Content Program.

clear model of Athenian motives for building in the fifth century BC that links the structures to peace and reconciliation.<sup>17</sup> He notes that Athens reconstructed and then refortified before setting up monuments when their financial situation improved with the establishment of the Athenian Empire.

So, can we see the Parthenon as a symbol of peace? It is immediately apparent that the Parthenon was not the first monumental building constructed at Athens. Our earliest evidence for monumental building at Athens comes from the sixth century BC, when our sources tell us that the city was under the sway of powerful elite factions and under the rule of tyrants. In the sixth century BC, when the Pisistratid family dominated Athens, monumental constructions shot up on the Acropolis and in the Agora.<sup>18</sup> On the Acropolis, Pisistratus is linked to the construction of one of the Old Temples of Athena at around 530 BC.<sup>19</sup> This building provided a home for the offerings to Athena but was also intended for display. It was lavishly decorated with images of sphinxes, lions, leopards and gorgons carved onto it, as well as Heracles and monsters.<sup>20</sup> In the Agora, public and religious buildings were set up. The Heliiaia and the Stoa Basileus were built around 550 BC.<sup>21</sup> A temple to the Mother of the Gods, a Phrygian deity, was established in the Agora at around the same time as the Altar of

the Twelve Gods.<sup>22</sup> Facilities were created for public benefit, such as South East Fountain House, while Building F, set up at around 550–525 BC, seems to have been a monumental dining place, whether for public or private use.<sup>23</sup>

While it is possible to argue that the reign of a tyrant can be a time of peace and stability, and reflected in a monumental building programme, this ignores textual evidence for the way that power was achieved and reflected in archaic Athenian society. Pisistratus came to power in the context of factional warfare.<sup>24</sup> Aristotle writes that archaic Athens was a community run by the elite or ‘well-born’ members of society, who held power through their control of land and political offices.<sup>25</sup> In order to control local power, elites had to compete. Foxhall notes that the archaic *poleis* of Greece were little more than a ‘stand-off between the members of the elite who ran them’.<sup>26</sup> For Forsdyke, intra-elite competition was the driving force behind changes in this period, including monumental building, which became a battleground for elite competition.<sup>27</sup> It is by no means certain that all of the monumental buildings in Athens were Pisistratid constructions. Anderson suggests that the ‘Bluebeard’ temple was constructed by the Alcmaeonid family rather than the Pisistratids.<sup>28</sup> Camp and Hurwit note that the many smaller buildings on the Athenian Acropolis could be small treasuries or dining halls, providing places for elite families to display their gifts to the goddess and display their wealth and their status in comparison with other elite families.<sup>29</sup> So, evidence from the archaic period at Athens reveals a link between monumental building and elite competition.<sup>30</sup>

This early monumental building fits well with Trigger’s vision of its value as a conspicuous display of human energy.<sup>31</sup> The establishment of a monumental structure makes a statement about the creator’s ability to control and display power over people and resources. In a situation of political stalemate, where a small number of groups in a locality are competing for power, directing human energy towards your cause can tip the balance significantly towards your particular group; but in order to attract human energy, something needs to be offered in return. For Hammer this was achieved in Athens through ‘plebiscitary politics’, an accord between Pisistratus and the *demos* where support was given in exchange for political or other benefits.<sup>32</sup> Monumental building not only made a statement to elite rivals but benefitted the community. Temples brought the favour of the gods, while improvement to water supplies and the development of infrastructure projects improved daily life and provided work. The buildings of the Pisistratid tyrants were not benevolent public works at a time of peace but efforts to show their power, to keep the affiliation of the people and to diminish the power of rivals.<sup>33</sup> They were competitive statements.

Competition between elites continued in Athens throughout the reign of the Pisistratids, who were eventually removed in an Alcmaeonid coup.<sup>34</sup> Towards the end of the fifth century, a member of the Alcmaeonid family called Cleisthenes developed a new way for elites to engage with the *demos* and compete for their support, through seeking their approval in the Assembly.<sup>35</sup> Although scholars see democracy as an intended solution to elite *stasis* in

Athens, it had the effect of internalising elite competition. Stein-Hölkeskamp notes that elites were now competing to become the best democrats.<sup>36</sup> Elite agents still fought to capture and control the energy of the *demos*, but they achieved this by battling for votes in the assembly rather than acting as patrons in the manner of archaic elites. Elite power became more rather than less dependent on the approval of the *demos*.<sup>37</sup> As Eder points out, Cleisthenes created a 'constitutional tyranny' through his 'leaderless riot'.<sup>38</sup> Rather than building to authorise their own power in the city, elites began to make conspicuous displays of largesse to harness human resources to their cause and to compete with their fellow elites by showing that their ability to control and use the will of the *demos* was greater than others'.<sup>39</sup>

The advent of democracy created an internal war to acquire the right to display largesse on a monumental scale in the city. This elite war intensified rather than diminished in the period after the Greco-Persian Wars.<sup>40</sup> Our sources offer us a clear view of competition between Themistocles and Cimon. Themistocles rebuilt the city walls.<sup>41</sup> While this was a post-war necessity for the purposes of security, it was also a monumental undertaking that offered an opportunity for him to make a popular statement. According to Thucydides, the Spartans had appealed to the Athenians to abstain from re-building their walls.<sup>42</sup> Themistocles travelled to Sparta to divert their attention while the walls were re-built, and asked that all the people of Athens contribute their energy to the re-building in his absence.<sup>43</sup> Thus Themistocles not only harnessed and directed the energy of the people to his cause but allied himself to the popular anti-Spartan stance, at the expense of members of the pro-Spartan faction, including Cimon. While Themistocles' walls had a clear public benefit, Themistocles appears to have gone too far with the construction of the temple of Artemis Aristoboule.<sup>44</sup> The epithet Aristoboule ('Best Counsel') referenced his advice to Athens at the time of the Persian War and was unpopular with the Athenians who saw him 'promoting himself unduly through his dedications'.<sup>45</sup> This allowed his enemies to strike. Themistocles was exiled and ended his days in the east as a vassal of the Achaemenid King.<sup>46</sup>

Themistocles' rival Cimon was renowned for his wealth and close ties to Sparta.<sup>47</sup> He also built monumental structures that, while ostensibly for public benefit, brought kudos to him and his family. Cimon beautified the Agora and built at the Academy, commanding the *demos* to embellish the city.<sup>48</sup> According to Plutarch, the funds for this programme came from Cimon's victory at Eion and it thus served as monument to his military success.<sup>49</sup> Cimon encouraged links between himself and the hero Theseus.<sup>50</sup> He recovered the bones of Theseus and built a shrine for them to the east of the Agora.<sup>51</sup> This was powerful symbolism as the burial of bones was the right of a legitimate heir.<sup>52</sup> Pausanias attributes to him the construction of the Painted Stoa (*Stoa Poikile*) at around 470–60 BC.<sup>53</sup> The walls of the stoa were painted with friezes, including an Amazonomachy, a scene of the defeat of Troy, the Battle of Oenoe and the Battle of Marathon. The Marathon scene showed Cimon's father Miltiades in his role as one of the heroic generals who had produced a

victory for Athens, reminding the viewer of Cimon's own, heroic ancestor and 'fostering' connections between his father and Theseus.<sup>54</sup> As with the buildings of Themistocles, Cimon's buildings were a perfect marriage of patronage and self-promotion and represented a massive and very visible expenditure of wealth and human energy. The buildings of Themistocles and Cimon were not symbols of peace but chess pieces in an elite war for power that was played out through the auspices of public benefit.<sup>55</sup>

It is in light of these earlier examples that we must re-consider the Periclean building program and the construction of the Parthenon. Athenian politics at the time of Pericles remained divided into factions. Sources associate Pericles with the democratic reforms of Ephialtes, which sought to give more power to the *demos*. These reforms diminished further the power of the Council of the Areopagus and transferred its power to the Assembly, Boule and law courts.<sup>56</sup> Ephialtes also opened the selection of officials and juries to a wider range of citizens, reducing elite control of appointments, widening the range of candidates and allowing juries decide the outcome of trials.<sup>57</sup> Aristotle tells us that 'Ephialtes and Pericles curtailed the Council on the Areopagus, and Pericles established wages for serving in the law-courts, and in this way each of the demagogues led them [the *demos*] increasingly onwards to the present democracy'.<sup>58</sup>

The reforms of Ephialtes and Pericles represented a new means to gain and control the power of the *demos*. As Cimon lavished gifts on the people in the manner of a patron, so Pericles extended more power to them, using their suspicion of elites to control elite behaviour and using state money to fund his 'gifts'.<sup>59</sup> The power of traditional offices was diminished and instead concentrated in the office of the *strategōs* rather than the archon, enabling Pericles to receive his power directly from the people and give authority to his formidable abilities to attract and control the *demos*.<sup>60</sup> Perlman suggests that Pericles' ostensibly panhellenic policies, the Congress Decree, the Panathenaic Festival and the settlement at Thurii, were designed to further weaken his opponents in Athens and expand the authority of Athens in the eyes of wider Greek communities. They worked by making Pericles more and more popular and giving him more power to command the people of Athens.<sup>61</sup> In using official channels and giving state funds to the *demos*, Pericles could achieve a position of ultimate power, without the stigma of tyranny. Thucydides reports that, 'What was happening was democracy in name, but in fact the domination of the leading man'.<sup>62</sup>

The 'Periclean' building programme certainly began after peace had been confirmed with Persia at around 450 BC. It included a new Temple for Athena Parthenos on the Acropolis and a new Propylon in 437–432 BC.<sup>63</sup> Temples to Poseidon and to Ares were constructed at around 440 BC.<sup>64</sup> The Temple of Apollo Delphinios was built at around 450 BC and the Hephaestion was started in 449 BC and finished in 415 BC.<sup>65</sup> These were not reflections of peace and reconciliation but a continuation of elite wars for political control in Athens. Pericles gave power to the *demos*, thus granting them a pseudo-elite status and in exchange he received their support.<sup>66</sup> Gribble notes that in art, sculpture and in Pericles' Funeral Oration, the elite values of birth, excellence and fine death had

become the values of the whole community and the customs of the elite became the customs of all.<sup>67</sup> Miller puts Pericles' behaviour into a more pragmatic context, noting that he 'worked to elevate the whole of the *demos* to aristocratic standing'.<sup>68</sup>

On the Acropolis, Pericles achieved the perfect combination of public benefit and personal status. The Acropolis was rebuilt by the people, for the people, under the patronage of Athena, but the programme of rebuilding was clearly linked to Pericles.<sup>69</sup> As a result, Pericles was not without criticism in Athens. Ostraka have been found in the Athenian Agora with Pericles' name inscribed on them, although he was never exiled. Plutarch records complaints about the building program. Pericles was accused of taking funds from the Delian League to finance the buildings and decking Athens out in a whore's finery.<sup>70</sup> In order to protect themselves from accusations of exploiting public funds, builders at this time appear to have set up inscribed accounts for their constructions.<sup>71</sup> Rhodes notes that it was important to the people that the buildings were not paid for by one man, as this carried implications of tyranny.<sup>72</sup> It also offers an explanation for the Spring House Decree, which sets out clearly the gratitude of the community to an offer by Pericles and his sons to pay for a new Spring House but rejects it.<sup>73</sup> This might have placed the community too far in Pericles' debt and his rejection required careful handling; the erection of a monumental stele recording his offer was a suitable compromise, giving visible praise, without obligation.

We can see further evidence to link Athenian monumental building to internal elite competition in the fact that despite the death of Pericles, the Athenian building program continued. On the Acropolis, the Temples of Athena Nike and the Erechtheion were constructed in 435 BC and 421–405 BC respectively.<sup>74</sup> In the Agora, the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios was set up in 430–420 BC.<sup>75</sup> By 420 BC the monument to the Eponymous Heroes had been set up here too.<sup>76</sup> A new Bouleuterion was built in 415–416 BC.<sup>77</sup> The South Stoa was constructed at the end of the fifth century and a complex of three buildings with 'irregular shape' was set up in the North East corner of the Agora.<sup>78</sup> The construction work was not exclusive to the urban centre but also continued in the Attic demes.<sup>79</sup> A temple to Demeter was set up at Thorikos in 425–420 BC.<sup>80</sup> The Temple of Nemesis at Rhamnous was finished in 431 BC.<sup>81</sup> All of these structures were created and constructed during the period of the Peloponnesian Wars.<sup>82</sup> Despite being at war with Sparta and later with the Spartan and Persian alliance, Athens kept building. While there may have been lulls in the construction program at times of stress, Athens does not appear to have diverted building funds to the war effort neither did it end its construction projects in response to any financial or military constraints. In light of this evidence it is hard to see monumental buildings in Athens as anything other than a reflection of internal *stasis* and elite competition, rather than expressions of post-war peace and unity.<sup>83</sup>

### **Building peace in Achaemenid Persia**

In the mid-sixth century BC, the army of Cyrus II defeated Astyages and the Medes, leaving Achaemenid rulers as the pre-eminent power in antiquity until




Figure 16.2 Tribute procession bringing gifts to the Great King, carved onto the Apadana at Persepolis

Source: Photograph by Luigi Pesce c. 1840s–60s. Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. Accession Number: 1977.683.61. Gift of Charles K. and Irma B. Wilkinson, 1977. [www.metmuseum.org](http://www.metmuseum.org).

the second half of the fourth century BC.<sup>84</sup> Achaemenid Kings were builders of great renown. First Cyrus II and later Darius I built huge monumental structures at Pasargadae and at Persepolis.<sup>85</sup> Again, scholars have seen these programs as symbols of imperial control and the peace that comes with victory. For Kuhrt, the buildings symbolise ‘imperial power’, while Wiesehöfer and Waters see the Achaemenid reliefs and architecture combining to present an image of order, whether ‘universal order’ or ‘order established and preserved by a benign king’.<sup>86</sup> Stronach sees Pasargadae and Persepolis as monuments to the victories of their builders.<sup>87</sup> For Root, the carved figures on the Persepolis Apadana are part of a sculptural program that revealed the integration of King and people in a study of imperial harmony.<sup>88</sup> The images of peaceful procession on the Achaemenid palaces, as shown in Figure 16.2, certainly contrast with the images of war and victory in Assyrian art, offering an image of peace, harmony and powerful rulership.<sup>89</sup>

After his victory over Astyages, Cyrus began a program of expansion, moving west to conquer Lydia and take control of the Ionian cities, before returning


east to take Babylon.<sup>90</sup> At some point in this period, Cyrus chose to build a series of monumental structures at the site of Pasargadae.<sup>91</sup> These structures included large columned halls, landscaped gardens and a monumental tomb for his remains.<sup>92</sup> Cyrus integrated Assyrian, Egyptian and Mesopotamian styles in his art and architecture.<sup>93</sup> As Root points out, continuity was an important part of the ideology of rulership in the Near East, as new kings deliberately sought to reveal the legitimacy and continuity of their reign by emulating earlier kings.<sup>94</sup> The buildings at Pasargadae were enclosed by open porticoes and the whole site lacked a defensive wall. This open aspect and the absence of defences may reflect a time of peace but may also offer a symbolic statement of Cyrus' absolute power and ability to protect his works. According to Herodotus, Cyrus died whilst on campaign against the Massagetae in the north and was succeeded by his son Cambyses.<sup>95</sup> Cambyses' reign, although brief, followed the same pattern of integrating forms from wider cultures.<sup>96</sup> Stronach notes that Cambyses used the same styles as his father for his building at Dasht-I Gohar but added Mesopotamian influences, possibly reflecting the time he had spent there.<sup>97</sup>

Darius I began to build at Persepolis around 35 years after Cyrus took power in the Near East. He built first at Susa before moving on to Persepolis at about 515 BC.<sup>98</sup> Construction began with the creation of a large, artificial terrace.<sup>99</sup> This terrace raised the buildings up from the plain, making them visible to all who approached. The buildings on the terrace were set up across time by a number of Achaemenid kings, so that building continued at the site until around 450 BC.<sup>100</sup> Darius is linked to the construction of the Treasury, Apadana and the 'Palace of Darius'.<sup>101</sup> Schmidt notes that Darius could only begin his large-scale building program at Persepolis in 515 BC, as he had finally managed to achieve a form of peace.<sup>102</sup> According to the tale of Herodotus, Darius took power as head of a group of conspirators who unseated a 'pretender' to the throne.<sup>103</sup> His reign began with revolts and military action, which encompassed even the centre of the kingdom at Fars.<sup>104</sup> This combination of *stasis* and monumental building fits Trigger's association of monumental architecture with early state formation and instability.<sup>105</sup> The instability of Darius' early reign may have been a product of his tenuous right to the throne. Darius needed first to assert his claim through military prowess before asserting his legitimacy through manipulating the landscape and creating a monument to his success.<sup>106</sup> In contrast, Cyrus' buildings reflected his assumption of power and right of control over the forms of the conquered lands.

While the Achaemenids left behind no corpus of texts, they did leave behind inscriptions and study of these in conjunction with building programs offers us an opportunity to consider the King's motives for building in more detail.<sup>107</sup> As Wiesehöfer notes, the key subjects of the inscriptions are the qualities of the King, the importance of his subject's loyalty and the stability of the King's lands under the control of the King and auspices of benevolent deities.<sup>108</sup> They also assert the ancestry of the King and his right to exercise power.<sup>109</sup> While it is important to remember that the inscriptions are official documents and have a whiff of propaganda, they frequently elucidate and emphasise a relationship

between peace and buildings. In the Cyrus Cylinder, Cyrus maintains that he undid the destruction of his predecessor at Babylon, respecting the cult centres, receiving tribute and returning the gods and the people back to their homes.<sup>110</sup> In fragments from lines 38–42, he writes of strengthening walls, completing the buildings left unfinished by earlier kings and building anew.<sup>111</sup> His comments offer a manifesto for future Achaemenid monarchs.

Darius' inscriptions similarly contrast the chaos and disorder before his reign with the peace and order that he created.<sup>112</sup> The Behistun inscription, set up at around *c.* 520–519 BC, offers a narrative of revolts in the earlier part of Darius' reign from Darius' perspective.<sup>113</sup> As Figure 16.3 shows, in the large scene carved into the side of a mountain, the 'Liar-Kings' who brought disorder are paraded before Darius as prisoners and trampled into the ground. The text notes that Darius 're-established' the kingdom and 'put it back in its place'.<sup>114</sup> This replacement had a physical dimension, including the re-building of cult centres, restoration of grazing lands and herds and the returning of property to the dispossessed. Alongside the restoration of the people, Darius notes that he 'restored our house to its legitimate place'. The same theme of order is echoed in an inscription from Susa, which notes that the lands 'were in turmoil' but are now 'in place' and subject to Darius' laws.<sup>115</sup> The Foundation Tablets from Susa also offer a clear correlation between peace and building under Darius. At Susa, one clay foundation tablet was found under a threshold in the southern area of the palace. Written in Old Persian, it describes the construction of Darius' palace at Susa and how he brought workmen and materials from different parts of the empire to build the structure for him.<sup>116</sup> This behaviour echoes the relationship between displays of human energy and power that we have already



*Figure 16.3* Photograph of Darius' Behistun inscription, showing the King trampling on his enemy after defeating the 'Liar-Kings who rebelled against him'

Source: By Hara1603 (Own work) [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons.


observed in Athenian elite society. The inscriptions from Persepolis also follow the same formula, except that this time Darius emphasises that he is the first builder. There was 'previously no fortress' until he built and beautified one.<sup>117</sup>

Closer examination of the building programs of Cyrus and Darius raises doubt about the idea that their buildings were intended wholly as symbols of peace and reconciliation. While the program at Pasargadae might have been conceived and designed by Cyrus, inscriptions reveal that it was completed by Darius. This is not exceptional. The construction of Persepolis took place on a piecemeal basis, with different buildings being added at different times.<sup>118</sup> Many buildings were begun by one king and finished by another. Given that Darius was seeking to establish himself as ruler of Cyrus' lands, completing Cyrus' works offered a statement of legitimacy.<sup>119</sup> While Cyrus had taken power by right of conquest and Cambyses by right of birth, Darius was a usurper.<sup>120</sup> Darius' act of completion set a pattern followed by later kings. Xerxes finishes Darius' buildings, extending his own legitimacy by 'building into' the achievements of his father.<sup>121</sup> At Persepolis, Xerxes lauded the achievements of his father and noted that 'what had been built by my father, I took into my care and other work I added'.<sup>122</sup> The kings who followed Xerxes also developed this line of authority. Artaxerxes I built onto the constructions of his father Xerxes (A1Pa), while Artaxerxes II built onto the structures of his grandfather Darius (A2Sa).<sup>123</sup> Both Artaxerxes III and Darius III built at Susa.<sup>124</sup>

What is especially interesting about Darius' construction at Pasargade is the time at which this building work took place. Waters' chronology notes that the main construction period at Pasargadae was between 530 and 510 BC.<sup>125</sup> Building work ran from the time after the death of Cyrus, through the reign of his son Cambyses and through into the early years of the reign of Darius.<sup>126</sup> This means that while battling against rebellions and revolts and undertaking campaigns against the Scythians, Darius was also completing the construction of monumental buildings at Pasargadae and had commenced building at Persepolis. Again, this suggests that the buildings were not post-conflict symbols of peace and empire but could have had a more political purpose. For Gell, art is an active medium, 'intended to change the world' rather than simply to express ideas about it.<sup>127</sup> Achaemenid building may have been more concerned with the future than the past. It was a manifestation of power and potential rather than a symbol of peace.

This possibility can be attested in Achaemenid inscriptions. While the inscriptions look at what the King did in the past and has achieved in the present, they also look to the future. At Persepolis, one inscription includes the interesting phrase, 'may that which a disloyal man may think, not happen'.<sup>128</sup> Briant suggests that the monumental buildings offered a symbol of the King's co-operation with his nobles but statements such as this have the air of a threat.<sup>129</sup> Wiesehöfer points out the contrast between the ideological programme of art and the political reality of disloyalty at the court.<sup>130</sup> As Stolper notes, Achaemenid inscriptions communicate the presence of the king and the use of three languages reveals his power over his subjects.<sup>131</sup> The words may thus present different messages of power for different audiences. For Elamites

and Babylonians, the inscriptions are not necessarily there to be read but to offer a visual symbol of power. They show the power of the king to take and use their own languages to enforce his rule. For fellow Persians, the inscriptions may represent an assertion of the king's control over all and thus his right to rule. It is a statement designed to intimidate and quell resistance. We can read these messages in Darius' constant reference to the authority and support of Ahura Mazda for his actions and we can also read them in his use of images and text to represent the stability of his reign and support of the people. On the South wall of the Persepolis terrace, Darius placed an inscription in Old Persian that attributed his kingship and exercise of power to Ahura Mazda and noted, 'may Ahura Mazda bring me aid, together with all the gods . . . protect this country from armies of enemies, from famine and from the lie'.<sup>132</sup> Any Persian noble reading this inscription could not fail to notice the protection of the god and also the re-appearance of the lie, a phrase used by Darius in the Behistun inscription to justify his action in stamping out revolt (see Figure 16.3). Darius further revealed his uncompromising approach to disloyalty in inscriptions on his tomb, shown in Figure 16.4. Here, he is pictured at an altar with Ahura



*Figure 16.4* The Tomb of Darius, carved into the rock face at Naqsh-e Rostam. The king faces a fire altar while Ahura Mazda hovers above and the people of the kingdom are shown below

Source: By Pastaitaken (Own work) [CC BY-SA 3.0 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0>) or GFDL (<http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html>)], via Wikimedia Commons.

Mazda above him and the people of the kingdom below him. He commands the reader, 'Do not be disobedient' and also notes, 'The man who co-operates, him do I reward . . . He who does harm, him I punish'.<sup>133</sup> Any insider who sought to attack Darius also attacked Darius' people and risked the stability of the empire. Darius' use of monumental art and architecture sought to avoid this possibility. As Stronach notes, the act of construction was a 'potent instrument of propaganda'; it was also a warning.<sup>134</sup>

## Conclusion

If we look at any of the great urban centres of modern Europe, we can identify a clear relationship between post-war peace and monumental building, and it is equally easy to assume that we can read the same relationship within buildings of the ancient past. A closer examination of ancient monumental buildings in their historical and socio-political context shows that their purpose and message is far more complex than this. They illustrate division as much as reconciliation. Athens was still at war with Sparta at the time when Aristophanes wrote *Ecclesiazusae* and it was also racked by internal discord. Even after the removal of the Thirty Tyrants and the decision 'not to remember', the city remained divided into factions, defined by their adherence to or rejection of Sparta and Persia.<sup>135</sup> There are oblique references to Spartan and Persian culture embedded within the passage on Praxagora's building programme, set out at the start of this chapter. She will make the men eat in a common mess hall, like Spartans. Likewise, the only man with a house big enough to contain all the people of Athens was the Achaemenid King. Praxagora will build a Persian palace for the people of Athens.

Praxagora's building is not a post-war statement of victory or an attempt to assert elite status within the city, but is something new. In her newly constructed Athens, the monumental building will enclose all of the families and all of the factions, irrespective of their internal battles for power and political stance on whether Athens should side with Sparta or Persia. It will put all men into one building, binding them together as one household. Aristophanes is offering his audience a reminder that, whatever their different political perspectives, they are one community and this unity should have primacy over individual disputes. Praxagora's building is not a sign of peace but an attempt to build peace. It acts as a poignant paradigm for a world where warfare was endemic, peace was momentary and where the construction of ancient monumental buildings was more often a statement of power and a sign of internal conflict and elite competition, rather than proof of peace.

## Notes

- 1 Raaflaub (2009a) 227.
- 2 For specific examples, see Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this volume.
- 3 See also Edwards (Chapter 17, this volume).
- 4 Zeitlin (1999) 174.
- 5 Knapp (2009) 47.

- 6 Plut. *Them.* 19.
- 7 Hansen and Fischer-Hansen define monumental buildings as 'built by the public ... for public use', although it is not always clear who the builders are (1994) 23 n.2.
- 8 Root (1979) 311.
- 9 Shipley (1987) 28.
- 10 Trigger (1990) 125.
- 11 Herodotus 5.62.2–3.
- 12 See Kuhrt (2007) 492–97; Perrot (2013).
- 13 For descriptions of these buildings, see Camp (1986, 2001).
- 14 Evans (2010) 90–1.
- 15 Castriota (1992) 134–74, 184–201.
- 16 Morris (2003) 16. See also duBois (1982) 67; Osborne (1994).
- 17 Ratté (2003) 45.
- 18 Boersma (1970) 11–27.
- 19 Camp (1986) 36; (2001) 30. On the Acropolis buildings see Hurwit (1999).
- 20 Hurwit (1999) 107–9.
- 21 Camp (1986) 108; Lawrence (1983) 337; Camp (1986) 100.
- 22 Camp (1986) 93.
- 23 For differing opinions see Thompson (1940) 18–34; Camp (1986) 44; Holloway (1999); Boersma (2000); Anderson (2003), 88–91; Lavelle (2005) 231.
- 24 Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 13.4–5
- 25 Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 3.1–3.
- 26 Foxhall (1997) 119. On arbitration, see Carty (Chapter 10, this volume).
- 27 Forsdyke (2005) 16.
- 28 Anderson (2003) 106–8.
- 29 On the 'treasuries' see, Camp (1986) 9, 36; (2001) 32; Boersma (1970) 18; (2000) 52–3; Hurwit (1999) 112–16; Anderson (2003) 107; Klein (2015).
- 30 Stein-Hölkeskamp (2009).
- 31 Trigger (1990).
- 32 Hammer (2005).
- 33 Morgan (2016) 106–23.
- 34 Herodotus 5.62.1–65.2.
- 35 Herodotus 5.69.2; Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 20.1, 4.
- 36 Stein-Hölkeskamp (1989).
- 37 Gribble (1999) 44–5.
- 38 Eder (1998) 135, 105.
- 39 Morgan (2016) 129–38.
- 40 Hammer notes that elites could gain glory through 'political heroism' (2005) 115.
- 41 Plut. *Them.* 19. For other Themistoclean structures see Boersma (1970) 42–81; Camp (2001) 59–60.
- 42 Thucydides 1.90.1–93.2.
- 43 Thucydides 1.91.4.
- 44 Plut. *Them.* 22.1–2; Camp (2001) 62.
- 45 Mikalson (2003) 103.
- 46 Thucydides 1.135–38; Plut. *Them.* 28.1–29.7.
- 47 On Cimon's links to Sparta and elite behaviour see Paus. 4.24.6; Andoc. 4.33; Plut. *Cim.* 10.5; Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 27.3; Powell (2001) 285; Camp (2001) 63–72; Pomeroy *et al.* (1999) 209–10.
- 48 Plut. *Cim.* 13.8, *Mor.* 818d. He also built fortifications at the Acropolis (Paus.1.28.3), while Camp links him to the construction of the aqueduct, the Tholos and the use of herms to celebrate individual achievement (Camp 1986, 63, 77, 95).
- 49 Plut. *Cim.* 12–15; Raaflaub (2009b) 92.
- 50 Francis (1990) 2 and Ch.3.
- 51 Paus. 1.17.2–7; Plut. *Thes.* 36. This shrine has not been found (Camp (1986) 66).

- 52 Hence Lysias is denied the right to bury his father by the Thirty Tyrants who then appropriate his property (Lys. 12.18).
- 53 Paus. 1.17.4, 1.15.3; Kousser (2009) 273.
- 54 Podlecki (1966) 14.
- 55 Morgan (2016) 138–40.
- 56 Pomeroy *et al.* (1999) 211.
- 57 Powell (2001) 285–6.
- 58 Arist. *Pol.* 1274a.6–12; [*Ath Pol.*] 27.4; Plut. *Per.* 9.2–4; Pl. *Gorg.* 515e5–7.
- 59 On Pericles' 'buying' power' see Rhodes (2010) 59; Ober (1989) 84–86. See also Morgan (2016) 140–44.
- 60 Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 44.4; Thucydides 1.139–40; Pl. *Phaed.* 269e.
- 61 Perlman (1976).
- 62 Thucydides 2.65.8–10.
- 63 See Rhodes (2010) 67–70; Root (1985). On the Propylon see Lawrence (1983) 204.
- 64 Lawrence (1983) 234; Spawforth (2006) 146, 136.
- 65 Spawforth (2006) 135; Camp (2001) 102–104.
- 66 Morgan (2016) 147–54, 175–87.
- 67 Gribble (1999) 45–6; Luke (1994) 18.
- 68 Miller (2006) 142.
- 69 Plutarch sets out a number of contemporary sources on the building programme (Plut. *Per.* 12–14).
- 70 Plut. *Per.* 12.1–2. Powell (2001) 66; Camp (2001) 73; Ratté (2003) 51–2.
- 71 Jenkins (2006) 32–3.
- 72 Rhodes (2010) 69.
- 73 IG 13 49. Tracey (2009) 33.
- 74 Lawrence (1983) 212; Spawforth (2006) 144; Camp (2001) 93–100.
- 75 Camp (1986) 106; Lawrence (1983) 338.
- 76 Camp (1986) 97.
- 77 Camp (1986) 90.
- 78 Lawrence (1983) 337; Camp (1986) 108.
- 79 Camp lists Sounion, Rhamnous, Eleusis, Acharnai, Thorikos and Brauron (1986) 63.
- 80 Spawforth (2006) 146.
- 81 Lawrence (1983) 234.
- 82 For details of building in the Peloponnesian Wars see Boersma (1970) 82–96.
- 83 Morgan (2016) 144–47.
- 84 Herodotus 1.128–30; Olmstead (1948) 34–58; Waters (2014a) 8.
- 85 On Pasargadae see Stronach (1963), (1964), (1965). For Persepolis see Wilber (1989).
- 86 Kuhrt (2007) 470; Wiesehöfer (1996) 23; Waters (2014a) 144.
- 87 Stronach (2001) 95, 106.
- 88 Root (1979) 311.
- 89 Reade (1998) 80–91; Llewellyn-Jones (2013) 55. On Assyrian conquest, see Medeniëks (Chapter 9, this volume).
- 90 Waters (2014a) 39–42 (Lydia and Ionia), 43–46 (Babylon).
- 91 Schmidt (1953) 20–5; Root (1979) 46–9.
- 92 For descriptions see Stronach (1985) 838–55.
- 93 Root (1979); Curtis and Razmjou (2005) 54.
- 94 Root (1994) esp. 25, 31.
- 95 Herodotus 1.201–214.
- 96 On evidence for the reign of Cambyses see Kuhrt (2007) 104–34.
- 97 Stronach (2001) 100–1.
- 98 On Susa see Perrot (2013); on Persepolis see Curtis and Razmjou (2005) 34.
- 99 Wilber (1989) 28–36, 2.
- 100 Wiesehöfer (1996) 23.

- 101 Wilber (1989) 36. Wilber also links Darius to the Tripylon but this has been disputed by Roaf (1983) 142–4. For an architectural history of the site see Roaf (1983) 150–9.
- 102 Schmidt (1953) 39. Briant suggests that Darius ended the revolts in a year but this seems highly optimistic (2002) 13.
- 103 Herodotus 3.70–87. On Darius as ‘usurper’ see Stronach (2001) 101; Briant (2002) 110–11; Waters (2014a) 65.
- 104 Briant (2002) 97–122.
- 105 Trigger (1993) 74–81.
- 106 Briant notes that it is only with Darius that the new empire stabilises (2002) 138.
- 107 On Darius’ motives for building at Persepolis see Briant (2002) 185–6; Mousavi (2005).
- 108 Wiesehöfer (1996) 25.
- 109 Waters (2014b).
- 110 Kuhrt (2007) Ch.3, n.21 (25, 28–30, 32). Note that for Medeniek (Chapter 9, this volume), the cylinder reflects the piety of Cyrus; but in taking and using the cultures of the defeated, it may also assert his power and control.
- 111 Kuhrt (2007) Ch.3, n.21 (38–42).
- 112 Waters (2014a) 64.
- 113 Wiesehöfer (1996) 13–21; Curtis (2000) 41; Briant (2002) 136–9.
- 114 On the motif of trampling see Wiesehöfer (1996) 20. For translations of the Behistun inscription (DB) see Kuhrt (2007) Ch.5, n.1; Lecoq (1997) 187–217.
- 115 DSe (Kuhrt (2007) Ch.11, n.12; Lecoq (1997) 232–4). See also DSf, DSz and DSaa (Kuhrt (2007) Ch. 11, n.13(i) – (iii)).
- 116 Curtis and Razmjou (2005) 56
- 117 DPf (Kuhrt (2007) Ch.11, n.10; Lecoq (1997) 229).
- 118 Kopsacheili (2011) 20–1.
- 119 Wiesehöfer (1996) 14.
- 120 Stronach (2001) 101.
- 121 Schmidt (1953) 40; Roaf (1983) 138–9 and Fig. 152.
- 122 XPf (Kuhrt (2007) Ch.7, n.1; Lecoq (1997) 254–6). See also XSa (Kuhrt (2007) Ch.7, n.84; Lecoq (1997) 261–2), XSd (Kuhrt (2007) Ch.7, n.84; Lecoq (1997) 262), XPa (Kuhrt (2007) Ch.12, n.4; Lecoq (1997) 251–2)
- 123 A1Pa (Kuhrt (2007) Ch.8, n.5 (i); Lecoq (1997) 265), A2Sa (Kuhrt (2007) Ch.9, n.22; Lecoq (1997) 272–3.
- 124 Kuhrt (2007) 471.
- 125 Waters (2014a) 221.
- 126 Stronach notes that Darius completed the buildings at Pasargadae (2013) 71. See also Stronach (2001) 99.
- 127 Gell (1998) 6.
- 128 DPf see Kuhrt (2007) Ch.11, n.10; Lecoq (1997) 229.
- 129 Briant (2002) 185–6.
- 130 Wiesehöfer (1996) 31.
- 131 Stolper (2005) 18, 24. We can see a similar message in a statue of Darius from Susa, which depicts Darius in Egyptian artistic style but wearing a Persian court robe. The base uses Egyptian and three other cuneiform scripts to say ‘Here is the stone statue which Darius ordered to be made in Egypt, so that he who sees it in the future will know that a Persian man holds Egypt’ (Curtis and Razmjou (2005) 99).
- 132 DPd (Kuhrt (2007) Ch.11, n.8).
- 133 DNa, DNb (Kuhrt (2007) Ch.11, n.16.§6, n.17.§2c).
- 134 Stronach (2001) 101.
- 135 Rhodes (2010) 293–310. See also Edwards (Chapter 17, this volume).

# 17 Peace and reconciliation, Athenian-style

*Michael Edwards*

At the end of the Peloponnesian War, the victorious Spartans imposed on the defeated Athenians an oligarchic regime known as The Thirty, who ruled by terror and were quickly overthrown after a brief civil war. The subsequent restoration of the democracy was accompanied in 403/2 by a reconciliation agreement, in which the democratic party of the Piraeus, who had defeated the tyrants, showed remarkable restraint in refraining from seeking revenge on the oligarchic party of the City and agreeing ‘not to recall past wrongs’. In both ancient and modern times this agreement has been held up as a model of conflict resolution, and it has been the subject of extensive research and debate. It has recently been discussed afresh by Edwin Carawan in his book *The Athenian Amnesty and Reconstructing the Law*. Now, books by Carawan are always challenging and are always products of the highest levels of scholarship. They also always provoke scholarly debate, and this one will prove to be no exception. This chapter has been written in the light of the book, and it deals in particular with two contentions Carawan puts forward that do not persuade me concerning the various provisions of the Reconciliation Agreement which are recorded in the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians* 39. These relate to what Carawan lists as provisions 5a and 6a. I shall supplement my comments on these with two observations on the later portrayal of the Thirty in the orators.

Firstly, then, the various clauses of the Agreement run as follows (I give the Greek text, followed by Carawan’s breakdown of the various provisions):

[1] τοὺς βουλομένους Ἀθηναίων τῶν ἐν ἄστει μεινάντων ἐξοικεῖν ἔχειν Ἐλευσίνα ἐπιτίμους ὄντας καὶ κυρίους καὶ αὐτοκράτορας ἐαυτῶν καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν καρπουμένους. [2] τὸ δ’ ἱερὸν εἶναι κοινὸν ἀμφοτέρων, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δὲ Κήρυκας καὶ Εὐμολπίδας κατὰ τὰ πάτρια. μὴ ἐξεῖναι δὲ μήτε τοῖς Ἐλευσινόθεν εἰς τὸ ἄστυ μήτε τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως Ἐλευσινάδε ἰέναι, πλὴν μυστηρίους ἐκατέρους. συντελεῖν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν προσιόντων εἰς τὸ συμμαχικὸν καθάπερ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἀθηναίους. [3] ἐὰν δὲ τινες τῶν ἀπιόντων οἰκίαν λαμβάνωσιν Ἐλευσίνι, συμπεῖθειν τὸν κεκτημένον. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ συμβαίνωσιν ἀλλήλοις, τιμητὰς ἐλέσθαι τρεῖς ἐκάτερον, καὶ ἦντιν’ ἂν οὗτοι τάξωσιν τιμὴν λαμβάνειν. Ἐλευσινίων δὲ συνοικεῖν οὐς ἂν οὗτοι βούλωνται. [4] τὴν δ’ ἀπογραφὴν εἶναι τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐξοικεῖν, τοῖς

μὲν ἐπιδημοῦσιν ἀφ' ἧς ἂν ὁμόσωσιν τοὺς ὄρκους δέκα ἡμερῶν, τὴν δ' ἐξοίκησιν εἴκοσι, τοῖς δ' ἀποδημοῦσιν ἐπειδὴν ἐπιδημήσωσιν κατὰ ταῦτά. [5] μὴ ἐξεῖναι δὲ ἄρχειν μηδεμίαν ἀρχὴν τῶν ἐν τῷ ἄστει τὸν Ἐλευσίην κατοικοῦντα, πρὶν ἂν ἀπογράφηται πάλιν ἐν τῷ ἄστει κατοικεῖν. τὰς δὲ δίκας τοῦ φόνου εἶναι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, εἴ τις τινα αὐτοχειρία ἔκτεινεν ἢ ἔτρωσεν. [6] τῶν δὲ παρεληλυθότων μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδένα μνησικακεῖν ἐξεῖναι, πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς τριάκοντα καὶ τοὺς δέκα καὶ τοὺς ἔνδεκα καὶ τοὺς τοῦ Πειραιέως ἄρξαντας, μηδὲ πρὸς τούτους, ἐὰν διδῶσιν εὐθύνας. εὐθύνας δὲ δοῦναι τοὺς μὲν ἐν Πειραιεῖ ἄρξαντας ἐν τοῖς ἐν Πειραιεῖ, τοὺς δ' ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἐν τοῖς <ἐν τῷ ἄστει> τὰ τιμήματα παρεχομένοις.

- (1) 'Of those Athenians having remained in the City, those who wish to relocate shall hold Eleusis, being fully enfranchised, autonomous and in control of their property and proceeds'.
- (2) a. 'The sacred precinct is to be common to both sides, under supervision of the Kerykes and Eumolpidai, according to ancestral rules'.
- b. 'But it is not permitted for those from Eleusis to come to the City, nor for those from the City to go to Eleusis, except for each side to participate in the Mysteries'.
- c. Those who relocate to Eleusis 'shall contribute from their revenue to the (Spartan) alliance, just as the other Athenians'.
- (3) 'If any of those emigrating take possession of a house at Eleusis, they are to reach an agreement with the owner. If they do not agree, they are each to choose three assessors'.
- (4) 'The registration for those desiring to emigrate shall be within ten days from the date of their oath-taking, for those present in the City; their relocation (shall be within) twenty days. For those abroad (relocation proceeds) on the same terms whenever they arrive'.
- (5) a. 'It is not permitted for anyone residing at Eleusis to hold any office in the City, until he registers to reside in Athens once again'.
- b. 'Suits for homicide shall proceed according to ancestral rules if anyone killed or wounded by his own hand'.
- (6) a. 'But it is not allowed for anyone to recall wrong for what is past against anyone, except the Thirty, the Ten, the Eleven and those who governed in Peiraieus; and not against them if they submit to accounting'.
- b. 'Those who governed in Peiraieus shall render accounts to those in Peiraieus; and those (who governed) in the City to those <in the City> providing assessment'.

([*Ath. Pol.*] 39, trans. Carawan (2013))

Carawan points to a conflict between the provisions of 2b and 4, where the two communities of Eleusis and Athens are firmly separated after a brief window of opportunity, and that of 5a ('until he registers to reside in Athens once again').<sup>1</sup> Carawan therefore interprets 5a as referring to those 'who are currently residing

at Eleusis under the oligarchs, not those who are soon to leave Athens under provisions 1–4'. Nevertheless, he goes on to suggest that the arrangement in 5a might apply to the second settlement of 401/0, allowing emigrants from Athens in 403 to return to the city. Hence the return rule in 5a, which was originally designed in 403 to apply to residents of Eleusis, was adapted in 401/0 to include those who emigrated from Athens but decided to return after the reunification, and this in turn led the author of the *Ath. Pol.* 'to regard the reunification as already anticipated in the first settlement, thus to include in his account of the first treaty other adaptations that properly belonged to the second'.

This is an extremely clever argument, but it is the words *once again* (in the Greek *πάλιν*) that concern me. Carawan has to interpret them as referring to people originally resident in Eleusis 'who resided at Athens during the Decelean war and returned to Eleusis in 404 or 403', who were now being compelled to leave Eleusis and return to Athens 'once again' by clause 3 of the agreement ('If any of those emigrating take possession of a house at Eleusis, they are to reach an agreement with the owner. If they do not agree, they are each to choose three assessors'). This seems a particularly harsh clause, which has the effect that a resident of Eleusis cannot refuse to sell his home if an oligarch wishes to buy it. But I am not fully persuaded that it is only these unfortunate Eleusinians who are allowed to register to reside in Athens 'once again' – what if they had never resided there before? It seems to me that the regular interpretation of 5a is a far more natural one and follows the sequence of the clauses: having just referred to emigrants in clause 4, the document now makes allowance for those who change their minds and wish to return to the City to stand for office. The fact that clause 2b prohibits those from Eleusis from coming to the City other than to participate in the Mysteries is perfectly reasonable in the circumstances – oligarchs who have chosen to live in Eleusis cannot simply be allowed to return to Athens when they want. And the window of opportunity for oligarchs to leave Athens for Eleusis is again perfectly reasonable in the circumstances – they must make up their minds and leave. But they are given the opportunity by clause 5a to change their minds at a later date, which might seem a generous provision. As Peter Rhodes points out in his commentary on the *Ath. Pol.*, Lysias 25.9 implies that there were indeed people who registered for Eleusis but then either stayed in Athens or returned there:<sup>2</sup>

εἰσὶ δὲ οἵτινες τῶν Ἐλευσῖνάδε ἀπογραφεμένων, ἐξεληθόντες μεθ' ὑμῶν, ἐπολιόρκουν τοὺς μεθ' αὐτῶν.

Among those who had registered their names for Eleusis, there were some who marched out with you and besieged those on their own side.

(Lysias 25.9, trans. Todd (2000))

Carawan discusses this statement in a different context and takes it to indicate that hostilities 'with Eleusis loomed even within the first few months, while latecomers were still registering to relocate . . . Whatever *prevented* [my italics]

those who had registered from actually relocating must have come in the first few months<sup>3</sup> – though, in fact, according to clause 4, registration was ten days after taking the oath and relocation within twenty days, apart from those who were abroad. Lysias may be referring to the latter; but while he might also naturally be taken to be referring to people who had registered for Eleusis but did not go, it is only necessary to posit that something ‘prevented’ them if we assume that Lysias *cannot* be referring to anybody returning to Athens in accordance with clause 5a.

The second contention where I am inclined to disagree with Carawan concerns clause 6a of the Agreement (‘But it is not allowed for anyone to recall wrong for what is past against anyone, except the Thirty, the Ten, the Eleven and those who governed in Peiraieus; and not against them if they submit to accounting’). Noting that neither Andocides nor Xenophon refers to the City Ten who succeeded the Thirty after the defeat at Munychia,<sup>4</sup> Carawan takes this clause as being incongruous. If the Spartans were dictating terms for the oligarchs, and even more if the oligarchs were partners in the agreement,

we would expect an option favourable to them to be formulated as a positive guarantee: the Thirty *et al.* shall control Eleusis, but any of them who choose may submit to accounting and reclaim their citizen status at Athens . . . . Instead the provision as we have it assumes that the Thirty *et al.* will be *denied that option*, will not be protected by the covenants and the pledge against reprisal, unless and until they come to trial.<sup>5</sup>

This is one way of reading it, but I think it is equally possible to read the wording of the agreement as also being positive. Given that it was the victorious democrats (‘victorious’ whilst bearing in mind that Thrasybulus was, in fact, narrowly defeated by the Spartans after the initial victories at Phyle and Munychia) who were effectively dictating the terms, whether through the Spartans or even more so with the surviving members of the Thirty, it seems hardly surprising that the agreement is framed in this way – the hated and now deposed oligarchs are still held accountable for their rule, unless indeed they submit to an accounting procedure. Carawan’s view is that it is unlikely that any of the Thirty actually did submit to audit,<sup>6</sup> and so he takes Lysias 12, *Against Eratosthenes*, not as a speech delivered at his *euthynai*, but as ‘a ‘prepared speech’ for a trial that would never come’.<sup>7</sup> But if this is the case, it merely reflects the fact that the Thirty and the other groups mentioned knew they had little or no chance of successfully passing an audit in the aftermath of their overthrow, and the clause in the agreement (if indeed the *Ath. Pol.* records the wording accurately) then reflects the harsh reality of the situation. It does not have to be an indication that this was a later agreement, as Carawan would have it.

Clause 6a contains the well-known expression ‘it is not allowed for anyone to recall wrong for what is past against anyone’. The main message that comes out of Carawan’s book is that the rule μή μνησικακεῖν was far from being an

amnesty (a word not yet then current) or a general promise to forgive and forget. Thus, the decisions that had been made in private suits and arbitrations under the old democracy remained valid (as And. 1.88). Rather, the Reconciliation Agreement concerned public suits from the archonship of Euclides (403/2). Even so, there were plenty of Athenians who were unwilling to forget the past and tried to exact revenge regardless of μή μνησικακεῖν. This is abundantly clear from the numerous trials that are attested in the works of Andocides, Isocrates and especially Lysias, as well as the trial of Socrates, and also from opinions expressed in the speeches. All these trials are carefully and extensively examined by Carawan, with a mixture of perspicuous insight and provocative interpretation. I shall therefore confine myself here to noting that memories were indeed long. Interestingly, there is no mention of the Thirty in the surviving speeches of Isaeus, some of whose speeches overlap with Lysias' logographic activity, but this may be explicable by the fact that the speakers in inheritance cases tend to be restrained in their attacks on their relatives. This factor does not apply to Isaeus 5, however, which was technically delivered not in an inheritance trial, but in a prosecution to compel Leochares to discharge his liability as surety (a *dike engues*). This speech may also be the earliest surviving speech of Isaeus, dating to 389, and in it the speaker, Menexenus, takes the opportunity to attack his relative Dicaeogenes at length for his lack of public services and private benefactions towards his family and friends. Even here, no mention is made of the Thirty, though there is one oblique reference to the period:

ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐνείμαντο τὸν κλῆρον, ὁμόσαντες μὴ παραβήσεσθαι τὰ ὠμολογημένα, ἐκέκτητο ἕκαστος δώδεκα ἔτη ἃ ἔλαχε· καὶ ἐν τοσοῦτῳ χρόνῳ οὐσῶν δικῶν οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν ἤξιωσε τὰ πεπραγμένα εἰπεῖν ἀδίκως πεπρᾶχθαι, πρὶν δυστυχησάσης τῆς πόλεως καὶ στάσεως γενομένης.

When they had divided up the estate, swearing not to violate the agreement, they each possessed their share for twelve years; and in all this time, although there were courts in session, none of them thought of saying that what had been done was unjust until the time when the city was faring badly and civil strife arose.

(Isaeus 5.7, trans. Edwards (2007))

Note that the parties to the settlement swore an oath that they stuck to – but only for so long, before Dicaeogenes claimed the whole estate (in fact, in 399). On the other hand, of the five orators of the period after Isaeus (excluding the nonagenarian Isocrates), four make plenty of references to their opponents acting like the Thirty. The exception, I note, is the Corinthian Dinarchus; all the others (Aeschines, Demosthenes, Hyperides and Lycurgus) were, of course, Athenians and prominent politicians. Take Lycurgus. He prosecuted Leocrates for treason, after the latter fled Athens in the wake of the defeat at Chaeronea in 338, sold his property in Attica and lived abroad until returning in 331. As part of his attack Lycurgus refers to the decree of Demophantus:

οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔτι βούλομαι τῆς στήλης ἀκοῦσαι ὑμᾶς τῆς ἐν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ περὶ τῶν προδοτῶν καὶ τῶν τὸν δῆμον καταλόντων· τὸ γὰρ μετὰ πολλῶν παραδειγμάτων διδάσκειν ῥαδίαν ὑμῖν τὴν κρίσιν καθίστησι. μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς τριάκοντα οἱ πατέρες ὑμῶν, πεπονθότες ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν οἷα οὐδεὶς πώποτε τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἤξιώσε, καὶ μόλις εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν κατεληλυθότες, ἀπάσας τὰς ὁδοὺς τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἐνέφραξαν, πεπειραμένοι καὶ εἰδότες τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἐφόδους τῶν τὸν δῆμον προδιδόντων. ἐνηφίσαντο γὰρ καὶ ὤμοσαν, ἔάν τις τυραννίδι ἐπιτιθῆται ἢ τὴν πόλιν προδιδῶ ἢ τὸν δῆμον καταλύῃ, τὸν αἰσθανόμενον καθαρὸν εἶναι ἀποκτείναντα.

I still want you to hear what the stele set up in the Council-house says about traitors and men who subvert the democracy, since learning from many examples makes your decision easy. After the Thirty, your fathers, who had endured the kind of suffering no Greek ever deserved, soon after their return from exile, shut off all paths to crime, since they knew from experience how the opponents of democracy got their start and made their attack. They voted and swore an oath that if anyone tried to set up a tyranny or destroy the city or subvert the democracy, the person who saw this and killed him was free from pollution.

(Lycurgus 1.124–125, trans. Worthington *et al.* (2001))

Edward Harris, in his note to the Texas translation, observes that Demophantus' motion, which is also referred to at Demosthenes 20.159, was passed after the fall of the Four Hundred in 411, and that 'Lycurgus mistakenly dates the measure to after the overthrow of the Thirty in 403'.<sup>8</sup> Subsequently, however, in an article in *Classical Quarterly* in 2012 he and Mirko Canevaro conclude that Demophantus' decree is not the one cited as a law of Solon by Andocides at 1.96–98, but was passed after Andocides' trial in 400/399.<sup>9</sup> Their argument depends on the dismissal of the genuineness of the document in the text of Andocides on the grounds of its wording, an approach that did not convince Carawan,<sup>10</sup> who suggests that the records of laws and decrees in speeches do not necessarily need to be verbatim transcripts. Either way (but especially if Lycurgus does mistakenly – or indeed even deliberately – connect Demophantus with the Thirty), what I want to emphasise here is the rhetoric of the situation in 331, over seventy years after the Thirty but drawing an emotive and barely relevant parallel to an episode that was still very much remembered – and as Chris Kremmydas notes on the Demosthenes passage, one of the rhetorical advantages of invoking this law was that 'the allusion to the stele of Demophantos also exploits its visibility as a physical presence in a public space of the city'.<sup>11</sup>

I shall end with an example from Hyperides. During his prosecution of the pro-Macedonian Philippides in 337/6 for proposing an illegal decree honouring the Presidents (*proedroi*) of the Council, Hyperides cannot resist alluding to another tyrant of past times, indeed Thirty of them (2.7–8):

καὶ ἔν μὲν σῶμα ἀθάνατον ὑπέλιπας ἔσεσθαι, πόλεως δὲ τηλικαύτης θάνατον κατέγνωσ, οὐδ' ἐκεῖνο συνιδών, ὅτι τῶν μὲν τυράννων οὐδεὶς πώποτε τελευτήσας ἀνεβίωσεν, πόλεις δὲ πολλαὶ ἄρδην ἀναιρεθεῖσαι πάλιν ἴσχυσαν. οὐδὲ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα ἐλογίσασθε, οὐδ' ὥς καὶ τῶν ἐπιστρατευσάντων καὶ τῶν ἔνδοθεν συνεπιθεμένων αὐτῇ περιεγένετο.

You assumed one person [i.e. Philip II] would be immortal, and you condemned to death this ancient city of ours. You did not realize that no dead tyrant has ever come back to life, but many cities that have been utterly destroyed have regained their power. You and your associates have not considered the history of the Thirty and how the city prevailed over the forces that marched against it and those that joined the attack from within.

(Hyperides 2.7–8, trans. Worthington *et al.* (2001))

Nelson Mandela took a short walk to freedom from Victor Verster Prison on 11 February, 1990. His had been a long journey, with a twenty-seven-year term of imprisonment – roughly the length of the Peloponnesian War. Lysias took a slightly longer walk from Megara to Phyle, and returned to Athens alongside Thrasylbulus and the exiled democrats, despite narrow defeat at the hands of Pausanias. I am no expert on how successfully or otherwise South Africa has come to terms with apartheid in the years since. But I am fairly certain that reconciliation in Athens, though it prevented further bloodshed in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Thirty, was not easily accomplished. Seventy or eighty years later leading politicians were still very much remembering past evils.

## Notes

- 1 Carawan (2013) 72–73.
- 2 Rhodes (1981) 467.
- 3 Carawan (2013) 79.
- 4 Carawan (2013) 74 n.15.
- 5 Carawan (2013) 75.
- 6 Carawan (2013) 167.
- 7 Carawan (2013) 169.
- 8 Harris (2001) 194 n.90.
- 9 Canevaro and Harris (2012) 124–125.
- 10 Carawan (2013) 18.
- 11 Kremmydas (2012) 445–446.

# 18 Beyond war, imperialism, and Panhellenism

## Xenophon's Eirenic thought

*Joseph Jansen*

'[T]he greatest impediment to peace is . . . a lack of imagination',<sup>1</sup> which, as trite and sentimental as it may seem, actually comes close to the mark when one considers the attitudes towards war and peace of Athens' three greatest resident intellectuals of the fourth century BC: Plato, Isocrates and Aristotle. While their writings sometimes exhibit scathing indictments of war, militarism and imperialism vis-à-vis the city-states of the Greeks, a more universal conception of peace that included non-Greeks is generally lacking.<sup>2</sup> What one often finds in them is a rehashing of the Panhellenic formula of internal *polis*,<sup>3</sup> or Greek, harmony through perpetual war against the 'barbarians', who were deemed racially inferior to the Greeks and thus deserving of domination and enslavement.<sup>4</sup> If one then wanted to come up with a short-list of obstacles to a true and lasting peace during the fourth century BC, Panhellenism, especially in its Athenocentric-Isocratean variety, would have to be near the top of the list, since it played a major part in the political and economic exploitation of both Greeks and non-Greeks, in which the Athenians had been actively engaged since the Persian Wars.<sup>5</sup> In regards to peace and reconciliation, I cannot help but agree with one historian's assessment that 'Athens was very badly served by her resident political theorists'.<sup>6</sup>

But Xenophon cannot be lumped in with this group. Scholars over the past quarter century have come to see Xenophon as an original thinker whose writings are far from pedestrian and whose ideas about history, politics and economics often contrast sharply with those of his contemporaries.<sup>7</sup> In what follows I do not mean to overlook his failings (he was a product of his age after all, who had a number of harmfully entrenched views about the world), but by the end of his life, Xenophon did come to reject the politics of Panhellenism and advocated a concept of peace, practical in its application but wide in its scope, far more radical than any other Greek thinker of his age.<sup>8</sup> I will first explain how Xenophon got there in his thinking by examining the supposed 'Panhellenic' moments in the *Anabasis*, particularly those concerning the establishment of Greek settlements in the East. I suggest that Xenophon's personal experience as a leader of a campaign against the Persians, which ultimately failed as a Panhellenic enterprise, motivated him to write the work as a response to Panhellenic apologists like Isocrates, who were appropriating the legend of the Ten Thousand to bolster the prospects of an

invasion and takeover of Asia. I will then examine his proposals in the *Poroi*, which break new ground by making economic interdependency and mutualism *and* diplomacy the catalysts for a lasting and universal peace.

### **Xenophon's rejection of Panhellenic conquest**

Panhellenism is a polyvalent concept with a range of possible foreign policy implications, but in its most basic sense it promoted the notion of Greek social, political, cultural and racial superiority over the 'barbarian', with whom the Greeks should be at war instead of with each other.<sup>9</sup> By the early-fourth century BC, due in no small part to the political and economic turmoil that came as a result of the Peloponnesian War (to say nothing of the Persian King's 'meddling' in Greek affairs at the tail end of that war), intellectuals and politicians began to give voice to a slightly new variant of Panhellenism, one that aimed to promote 'concord' (*homonoia*) among warring Greeks through the takeover of all, or large parts, of the Persian Empire.<sup>10</sup> Isocrates was the most vociferous advocate for such a Panhellenic 'crusade' against the Persians, first in the *Panegyricus* (380 BC) and then in his discourse *To Philip* (346 BC).<sup>11</sup> In addition to unifying the Greeks, Isocrates thought this united action would solve many of their socio-economic problems, especially the widespread poverty that led many people to become mercenaries, who tried to enrich themselves at the expense of many Greek cities.<sup>12</sup> As he declares famously in the *Panegyricus* (c. 380 BC), a war against the barbarians in recompense for the wrongs of the past, from the rape of Helen to the King's Peace of 387/6 BC, will be 'the only war better than peace, being more like a sacred mission than a military expedition' because it will allow quietists to reap the fruits of their own labour without fear and soldiers to win great wealth from others (4.182). But such an immense undertaking required a *hegemon*, and Athens fit the bill nicely for Isocrates, since the city, with a few missteps notwithstanding, had shown itself to be a capable leader against the Persians during the heyday of its empire.<sup>13</sup> Perhaps more important than historical precedent, the Athenians were already by the late 370s BC beginning to regain their lost hegemony by implementing many of the same imperialistic policies they had executed in the fifth century BC.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, the 'ghost' of Pericles' empire had come to possess the Athenians,<sup>15</sup> and rather than trying to exorcise it from their national ethos, Isocrates made it a part of his life's mission to conjure it and rechannel its power against non-Greeks, even when both the political reality and dream of a reconstituted Aegean-wide empire was becoming difficult to maintain after the setbacks incurred during the Social War (357–355 BC).<sup>16</sup>

On the face of it, *On the Peace* (355 BC) does evince this new defeatist reality, for Isocrates appears to have renounced not only his enmity towards the Persians, abandoning his Panhellenic crusade and even advocating a return to the terms of the King's Peace (8.16), which he once said was the 'beginning of evils for Greece' (4.119), but also his enthusiasm for the Athenians 'to rule over all men . . . and wage war on practically the whole world' (8.44). Indeed, one

would be hard pressed to find clearer and more eloquent explanations of the dangers of empire than in this work (see, e.g., 8.29–40, 69–70, 99–105). And yet, all the while being deferential to the rhetoric of peace and justice, Isocrates still finds it hard to shake the allure of expansionism, urging the Athenians to appropriate land from the Thracian Chersonese as a way to alleviate the poverty of the Athenians and other Greeks (8.24).<sup>17</sup> This was not some idle proposal, since the Athenians followed Isocrates' advice two years later (353 BC) when they dispatched Chares to Sestos, who stormed the city, slew the adult men and enslaved the remaining inhabitants for reasons unknown, but perhaps for being pro-Persian.<sup>18</sup> Cleruchs were sent out soon after, and the grain-rich city became an Athenian 'breadbasket' for years to come.<sup>19</sup> In the *Panegyricus*, Isocrates had felt the need to justify Athens' enslavements of Melos and Scione on grounds that these two states were not technically 'allies' of Athens, whereas loyal allied states 'never experienced such disasters' (100–2). Sestos required no such apology. Perhaps no one took notice or even cared.<sup>20</sup> Panhellenism, even in its less ambitious forms, had found fertile ground in Athens, and thus land grabs from non-Greeks would remain popular for a long time to come.<sup>21</sup>

It was once common to view Xenophon as a champion of this kind of Panhellenism because on a number of occasions in the *Anabasis* he seems to entertain the possibility of settling the Greek army in Persian territory.<sup>22</sup> Recent re-examinations of the issue, however, have problematised this interpretation.<sup>23</sup> Xenophon was a good judge of his audience, among whom consisted many die-hard Panhellenists. Isocrates, in fact, used the Ten Thousand as an exemplum in his exhortations for an invasion of Persia, even going out of his way to defend the expedition against those who saw it as a 'failure' because the Greeks did not vanquish the Persians when they had the chance (5.90ff, 124, 137; cf. 4.145–52). The vitriol that some of these Panhellenists had for the Persians provoked Xenophon to coin a new word for them: 'Persian-haters' (μισοπέρσαι).<sup>24</sup> But Xenophon was far from being a *misopersēs*; he was not only a soldier of fortune but also a traveller-adventurer in the Herodotean mould,<sup>25</sup> who, to be sure, held many ethnocentric convictions, but found much to respect about Persian culture, and unlike many of his fellow intellectuals back in Athens who never ventured to Asia, he actually counted some Persians as his 'friends'.<sup>26</sup> These facts alone should caution against seeing him as a dyed-in-the-wool Panhellenist, but as the following analysis suggests, Xenophon appears to go out of his way to present the Ten Thousand as a 'negative paradigm' for a Panhellenic expedition against Persia.<sup>27</sup> Whether it was his intention or not, his rejection of Panhellenic conquest prepares his audience for a different, non-imperial solution to the socio-economic problems of the Greeks, such as we find explicated in the *Poroi*. While there is much evidence to consider, I will restrict my discussion to the three instances in the text where he contemplates the colonisation of Asia.

The first opportunity for settlement occurs shortly after the Battle of Cunaxa and the arrest of the generals, which left the Greek army in the precarious position of being trapped deep within enemy territory without guides. Debating whether to stay or begin the perilous march home, Xenophon the

general proposes colonising a part of Persia, noting how the Lycaonians, a dissident people living in the middle of the Persian Empire, ‘occupy strongholds (ἐρυμνά) in the plains and cultivate land that belongs to the Persians’ (3.2.23). Before Cunaxa, the Persians actually feared that the Greeks might destroy a bridge over the Tigris, which would have created an island between the river and an irrigation canal, and then ‘remain there permanently, using it as a defensive base (ἐρύματα) . . . and having provisions from the middle of the territory, which is both large and fertile, since it is full of people who cultivate it’ (2.4.22). Settlement therefore is a real possibility, but as becomes immediately apparent, Xenophon’s proposal is meant only as a ruse to elicit the assistance of the King, who would rather spirit the Greeks home than have them settle in his territory (3.2.24). Even so, Xenophon demurs at the idea:

For I fear that once we learn how to live idly and amidst so much plenty (ἀργοὶ ζῆν καὶ ἐν ἀφθόνοις βιοτεύειν), consorting with the great beautiful women and maidens among both the Medes and Persians, we may forget our way home just like the Lotus-eaters. Thus, I think it fitting and just (δίκαιον) first to try to arrive home to our families in Greece and then to demonstrate to the Greeks that they are poor (πένονται) of their own accord since it is possible for them to see those who now live at home in a state of hardship rich after they are brought here.

(*Anab.* 3.2.25–6)

As commentators have pointed out, the mention of corrupting eastern luxuries – a *topos* in Greek literature with negative undertones – and the reference to the Lotus-eaters in particular, whose function in the *Odyssey* is unmistakably dangerous, suggests that settlement in Persia would be hazardous and thus ill advised.<sup>28</sup> But Xenophon’s rationale is couched in this traditional framework largely because that is what would have resonated most with the soldiers at the moment. Another explanation for departing should be sought in his ethical philosophy, which abhors ‘indolence’ (τὸ ἀργόν) and commends ‘toil’ (πόνος) as a way of life, with the former being classified as a vice and the latter a virtue.<sup>29</sup> In the famous Prodician ‘Choice of Heracles’ from the *Memorabilia*, for example, Xenophon has Virtue say that if the hero ‘wish to have land that bears abundant fruits (καρπούς ἀφθόρους φέρειν), he must cultivate the land himself, rather than ‘have these things from the labour of others’ (2.1.25, 28). True happiness, among a whole host of other blessings, is to be found among those who are prepared to toil, not the indolent (2.1.33). If we recall that the Greek word *πένομαι* (‘to be poor’) is etymologically connected to *πόνος* (‘toil’), then Xenophon’s advice to the army (and his readers) becomes immediately intelligible: Greeks should prefer their poverty even when given the chance to enrich themselves in Asia because virtuous toil is always preferable to indolence. This sentiment completely flies in the face of Panhellenic thought because easy enrichment ‘without fear’ at the expense of the

Persians was the panacea for alleviating the socio-economic woes of Greece (Isoc. 5.126; cf. 4.182). To drive the point home, though readers have failed to pick up on it, Xenophon actually frames the entire issue in terms of justice when he claims that returning to Greece is the ‘just’ (δίκαιον) thing to do, which suggests that settling in Asia would be unjust. As we shall see below, sustaining people from their own territory is the ‘most just’ (δικαιοτάτων) (*Vect.* 1.1) solution to the problem, but that answer is moot as long as the army remains in Persia. Much like his guest-friend Proxenus, Xenophon wanted ‘much wealth’ and he did profit handsomely from the expedition, but he refused to acquire it ‘unjustly’ (μετὰ ἀδικίας) (*Anab.* 2.6.17–8). In the end, Xenophon recommends returning home, which, of course, is what the army wanted anyway.<sup>30</sup> One may reasonably question then why he even brings up staying in the first place. Given that the permanent settlement of Greeks in Asia was never a real possibility in 401 BC,<sup>31</sup> it seems likely that he embellished parts of the speech as way to introduce contemporary Panhellenic ideas into the context of a real-life military expedition in the East in spite of the anachronism it created.

That Xenophon is entering into dialogue with the Panhellenists of his day is borne out further by two other colonising attempts later in the narrative. After the Greeks reach the relative safety of the Black Sea, no longer having to endure Persian harassment, they begin to initiate one illicit plundering raid after another, first in order to get provisions, then to enrich themselves with booty.<sup>32</sup> Xenophon emphasises how this behaviour led directly to a breakdown in their discipline and cohesion as a fighting force; in fact, the very first raid that takes place without the approval of the generals ends in a rout of the Greeks, which ‘had not yet been done to the army during the campaign’ (5.4.18). One particularly egregious incident was a raid on a ‘small and undefended’ non-Greek village, which had been on friendly terms with the Greeks because they had sold, among other necessities, ‘livestock for sacrifice’ (5.7.13). After the assault failed, ambassadors from the village tried to come before the army to lodge their complaint, only to be stoned to death by some of the Greek survivors of the attack (5.7.19). Xenophon emphatically calls the violent actions of these men who went out on their own, not for necessities, but for ‘plunder’ (ἀρπαγή) (5.4.16), ‘lawlessness’ (ἀνομία) (5.7.33–4). The behaviour of the army at this point in the narrative bears a striking resemblance to Isocrates’ detested ‘wandering bands, who for the want of necessities commit outrages against whomever they chance upon’ (5.120; cf. 5.96; 4.168), namely ‘brigandage, violence and lawlessness’ (ἀρπαγῆς καὶ βίας καὶ παρανομίας) (8.45), all for the sake of enrichment (4.17, 183).<sup>33</sup>

It can hardly be a coincidence therefore that just as the army begins to march in the pursuit of lucre Xenophon contemplates establishing a colony at Cotyora on the south shore of the Black Sea: ‘It seemed to him a fine thing to gain territory and power for Greece if they founded a city’ (καλὸν αὐτῷ ἐδόκει εἶναι χώραν καὶ δύναμιν τῇ Ἑλλάδι προσκτήσασθαι πόλιν κατοικήσαντας) (*Anab.* 5.6.15). The Panhellenic character of the initiative is suggested not only by the mention of ‘Hellas’ but also by the locale of the

proposed founding, which was just to the east of Sinope. When Xenophon was composing the *Anabasis* in the mid to late 360s BC, the more ambitious plan of a full-scale Panhellenic invasion was becoming more and more unrealistic given the rise of Theban power; but the second-best option among Panhellenic desiderata was to ‘cut off’ a large section Asia Minor, ‘from Cilicia to *Sinope*’, for the purposes of settling mercenaries ‘into cities that would [thenceforth] become the boundaries of Greece’.<sup>34</sup> Whereas colonising a part of Persia after Cunaxa was rejected as something unjust, it now appears ‘noble’ because Xenophon intends to unify the army in a common enterprise as a way to combat the centrifugal forces that were ripping it apart.<sup>35</sup> In other words, colonisation becomes a vehicle for achieving *homonoia* – that crowning slogan of Panhellenic ideology. That Xenophon was sincere in his desire to establish a colony on the Black Sea is supported by his detailed and wistful description of Calpe Harbour, which was located further down the coast at an even more promising location for a colony: being ‘halfway between Byzantium and Heraclea’, it has natural fortifications and a harbour, room to accommodate 10,000 settlers, fresh water, trees of all kinds, and, above all, fertile soil that could produce everything a Greek would want to consume save the olive (6.4.2–6). The site, he intimates, even had the potential of one day becoming a bona fide ‘polis’ (6.4.71 cf. 6.6.3), and given his vivid account, a self-sufficient polis comprising citizens who would farm the fertile territory. A colony would thus afford the army an opportunity for adopting an alternative and honest ‘way of life’ to the wanton, self-seeking plundering lifestyle that many had come to adopt. In this one important respect, his motivations are very different from those of Isocrates, who promotes Asian colonisation as a way to remove society’s unseemly elements at a distance far from the virtuous inhabitants of Greece: Xenophon, on the other hand, sees colonisation as a way to make the mean and unruly elements of the army into virtuous citizen soldiers.<sup>36</sup>

Be that as it may, when he recounted these episodes decades later, Xenophon acknowledges subtly that his desire ‘to gain territory and power for Greece’ was not very different from the army’s own unscrupulous longing for lucre and thus ill-advised. His word-choice, *προσκτήσασθαι*, ‘to gain (in addition to)’, casts an ominous shadow on the proposal given that both Herodotus and Thucydides use this same word to describe the failed expansionist policies of Xerxes and Alcibiades respectively, which can hardly be considered ‘propitious intertexts’, especially when one is also reminded that at this point in the narrative the positive references to Greek unity exhibited during the Persian Wars are beginning to be replaced by allusions to the divisive politics of the Peloponnesian War and the failures of the Athenians in particular.<sup>37</sup> Indeed, his vivid description of Calpe Harbour evidences the same kind of ‘Pontomania’ that had gripped Pericles, Lamachus and the countless other Athenian imperialists when they established settlements in the area in 430s BC.<sup>38</sup> Remarkably, the site’s ability to be populated by 10,000 settlers is a figure that does not even represent the true numbers of the Greek forces at this time but one that uncannily equals the number of colonists sent to Ennea Hodoi in the 460s BC.<sup>39</sup>

And much like that ill-fated colony that was rich ‘in timber for shipbuilding’ (Thucydides 4.108.1) and the scourge of local Thracian tribes (4.102.2), Calpe Harbour was surrounded by hostile Bithynian Thracians, who ‘commit terrible acts of violence’ against any Greek they come upon (*Anab.* 6.4.2) – a policy they gladly executed upon five hundred soldiers when for want of food they tried to plunder their land (6.4.24). Calpe Harbour was a far cry from a ‘utopian’ haven, as one scholar claims, but it was far from ideal.<sup>40</sup> In a passage from the *Hipparchicus* that has direct bearing on the situation of the army at this moment, Xenophon duly notes that ‘it is no easy thing to get food or to obtain peace’ (οὐ ῥάδιον οὔτε βιοτεύειν οὔτε εἰρήνης τυχεῖν) (8.8; cf. *Oec.* 20.15). The point he seems to be driving at is that life in Asia for the Greeks, whether lived as virtuous husbandmen or unjust brigands, offered little opportunity for peace and stability in spite of its great wealth.

In the end, it is difficult to see how these failed attempts at establishing settlements in Asia amount to a ringing endorsement of Panhellenic conquest. If the *Anabasis* is a ‘Panhellenist tract [it is] only on the most simple and unreflective of readings’, which ignores Xenophon’s repeated efforts to call attention to the moral and practical difficulties involved in Greeks colonising and living in Asia.<sup>41</sup> As we shall see below, the *Poroi*, though very different in scope and purpose, picks up where the *Anabasis* leaves off, aiming to solve one of the main problems that confronted the Greek army on the march: how to support a community with the necessities of life without resorting to acts of injustice that would compromise both its safety and ability to live in peace.

### The political economy of peace in the *Poroi*

The *Poroi* was published sometime in late summer or early fall of 355/354 BC,<sup>42</sup> when Athens had just concluded peace with its former allies earlier in the summer.<sup>43</sup> Xenophon therefore shares the same preoccupation with peace and all the perceived advantages that accrue therefrom that can be found in other thinkers and politicians of the period.<sup>44</sup> His concern, however, is not with persuading the Athenians about the necessity of making or observing the terms of the recent peace, but rather with occasioning and maintaining a general and lasting peace.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, he hopes to achieve this new peace through the cultivation of commerce and industry at home, which, as the prologue evidences well, contradicted the Athenians’ preferred mode of production:

I have always held this opinion: that the constitutions of states are determined by the character of its leading politicians. But when some of the leading politicians at Athens kept saying that they understood justice (τὸ δίκαιον) no less than other men, but on account of the poverty of the multitude they felt that they were compelled to be somewhat unjust in their treatment of the cities (ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἔφρασαν ἀδικώτεροι εἶναι περὶ τὰς πόλεις).

(*Vect.* 1.1)

A generation earlier, Pericles had argued that ‘war was necessary’ (χρὴ ὅτι ἀνάγκη πολεμεῖν) because the Athenians were unwilling to give up their lucrative empire (Thucydides 1.144.3), and now it seemed that even after the Social War, Athens’ political leaders were still ‘beholden’ (ἀναγκάζεσθαι) to imperial parasitism because it provided the necessary wherewithal to support the poor. But if the socio-economic factors motivating Athenian imperialism could be mitigated, Xenophon contends, the leaders would have no excuse to propose and execute unjust policies against ‘the cities’ subject to Athenian domination.<sup>46</sup> Accordingly, he proposes the ‘most just’ (δικαιοτάτον) solution: ‘that the Athenians be maintained from their own territory’ in order ‘to be relieved of their poverty’ (*Vect.* 1.1).

Yet, the city’s wealthy elite shared some of the blame for Athens’ unjust foreign policy because they, too, benefited financially from empire. They, of course, complained of burdensome war-taxes and liturgies and the radicalisation of the democracy that came about because of the thalassocracy, but what many of the wealthy class wanted was to rule the empire in their own favour.<sup>47</sup> Failing that what they sought above all else was to enjoy the income of their estates at home, free from the fear of despoliation and usurpation coming at the hands of enemies both foreign and domestic. Again, Isocrates’ writings are illuminating in this regard. According to Baynes, Isocrates’ domestic and foreign policy go hand and hand, aiming to win ‘security’ (ἄσφάλεια) for the elite by settling disruptive and grasping Greek mercenaries far away in Persia at no cost to themselves.<sup>48</sup> This is precisely the reason why he boasts of a Panhellenic expedition against Persia being ‘better than peace’ (4.182); peace is worthy of the name only if it is accompanied with financial security, and security is obtainable only in the event that the undesirables of society are settled far from home, never to interfere, militarily and politically, in Greek affairs again (cf. 6.49–51). By insisting that the Athenians seek a non-imperialistic solution to their socio-economic problems, Xenophon was at odds with many of his contemporaries over the issue of war and peace.

However, Xenophon knew he needed the support of both the city’s political leaders and the wealthy for his reforms to have any chance of being implemented.<sup>49</sup> For many of these (e.g., the enhancement of the metics and the improvement of the commercial sector) necessitated ‘benevolent legislation’ (*Vect.* 2.1–3.6), whereas his more ambitious plan of providing every Athenian with a daily three-obol stipend (drawn from the revenues of leasing out state-owned slaves to mining concessionaires) required a ‘capital fund’, which is to be seeded by a voluntary public subscription (i.e., *epidosis*) (3.6–10).<sup>50</sup> But unlike in a traditional *epidosis*, where money was given strictly as a donation, bringing at most prestige and honour to the contributor, Xenophon also promises sponsors a ‘return’ on their capital, because they, too, will receive a daily triobolon, yielding them between 18 and 100 per cent interest, depending on their contribution levels.<sup>51</sup> That he speaks of the return on 1,000 drachmae as yielding ‘nearly as much income as on a bottomry loan’ (usually around

20 per cent), which was a more risky investment than real estate but one that was becoming increasingly common during the fourth century BC, is a strong indication of Xenophon's desire to ingratiate himself with the financial elite by means of investor-friendly schemes.<sup>52</sup> For example, Xenophon underscores the idea that such investment will be 'in the *polis*, which appears to be *the safest* (ἀσφαλέστατον) and most enduring of human institutions' (3.10) – a point Xenophon emphasises at the end of the work, where he boasts that if the Athenians adopt his proposals, they will live 'with more *security*' (ἀσφαλέστερον) and 'have a prosperous *polis* with *security*' (μετ' ἀσφαλείας) (6.1). Xenophon's confidence in the power of the *polis* to buffer risk better than individuals (he offers specific examples of this at 4.30–32) serves as a reminder to his elite readers that their hoped-for ἀσφάλεια can be achieved without war.

Nevertheless, judging from the imagined objections he raises later in the work, war was on the mind of his readers, who may mistake his proposals as a move towards pacifism:

But someone may ask me: Even if someone should wrong the city, are you saying that it is necessary to maintain peace even against one such as this? I would say that it is not necessary. But what I would rather say is this: that we would take vengeance on our enemies if we should not be the ones initiating acts of injustice against another; for how would an aggressor find an ally in this situation?

(5.13)

The old soldier could not be clearer on the issue of war: maintain peace, but if attacked, a spirited defence of the *polis* is justified if not required. Required because Athens' mining interests were located in the *chora*, and if the revenues from the mines were disrupted, then the ability of the Athenian poor to have sufficient subsistence would be jeopardised, and without this assistance a return to war and imperialism would become necessary once again. The memory of the Spartan invasions of Attica during the Peloponnesian War, especially the occupation of Decelea, which resulted in the defection of thousands of mining slaves, was still fresh and may have contributed to the lack of elite investment in the mines during the first half of the fourth century BC.<sup>53</sup> Fear of invasion was therefore well grounded, but Xenophon is confident in the ability of the city to defend itself with no great loss to the mining industry (4.40–41). He even maintains that the mines do not have to be abandoned in the event of war provided the Athenians make the appropriate defences in the area and use their cavalry to harass invaders (4.43–48). By allowing the Athenians to sally forth in defence of their *chora*, Xenophon renounces Pericles' wartime strategy, which was not popular among property owners, whose fortunes were ruined when the Peloponnesians ravaged and burned their estates.

Nonetheless, Xenophon entertains this hypothetical invasion scenario largely to make a necessary concession to garner elite sponsorship of his proposals, not

because he anticipates serious conflict between the city and its neighbours. Just the opposite: a prosperous Athens will occasion a virtuous circle of peace in which all possible rival states will see it in their self-interest to trade with Athens, not make war on her:

I suppose the happiest states are said to be those that preserve peace for the greatest span of time, and of all states Athens is by nature [cf. 1.5] best suited to grow in prosperity. For if the city is in a state of peace, who would not need her?

(5.2–3)

Xenophon then goes on to mention a large variety of different classes of people who will find what they need at Athens, from traders and agricultural producers to intellectuals and tourists (5.4). This idea of Athens satisfying peoples' 'needs' is actually a running motif throughout the work; for example, he declares that: 'Greeks and barbarians *need*' Athens' 'imperishable stone' (1.4); 'people' generally 'have *need*' of Athenian goods (3.2); and 'whenever states are doing well, people have a strong *need* for silver' because 'men want to spend money on fine arms, good horses, and magnificent houses and buildings, whereas women desire expensive clothes and gold jewellery' (4.8; cf. 4.45). Commerce is not zero-sum for Xenophon – a view often held among the ancients<sup>54</sup> – but rather an opportunity for strengthening the bonds of friendship between states. He promises foreign traders who exchange their goods for Athenian silver a substantial profit from their transactions because of its high exchange value (3.2) and leaves open the mining industry to foreign exploitation (4.12). More astounding still is his call for foreign investment in the city's capital fund:

I think if the city's benefactors were to have their names inscribed for all time, many foreigners would contribute . . . And I hope that even some kings, tyrants, and satraps would be eager to partake in paying us a favour (χάριτος).

(3.11)

At a time when many Athenians were calling for open conflict with 'the barbarian', Xenophon offers an olive branch to the whole non-Greek world by welcoming them to partake in the city's economy of *charis*, where honour and glory were trafficked as forms of capital oftentimes more precious than silver.<sup>55</sup> Honours such as public commendation through written memorialisation are the very things that 'would make people want to hasten to us as friends' (ὡς πρὸς φίλους) (3.4). In short, Athens' 'might' (κρατεῖ) (1.4) resides not in its military strength, but rather in its native goods, silver especially, the need for which will promote the bonds of friendship between the city and the rest of the world. A robust economy, built upon the foundations of justice, will therefore serve as the vehicle for obtaining a kind of universal peace.<sup>56</sup> The originality of the *Poroi*,

as Polanyi rightly observes, ‘lies in the thought that wealth, power, and security can be the product of peace rather than war.’<sup>57</sup>

In addition to exploiting its comparative advantages, Xenophon is confident the city can become a harbinger of peace through enhancing its diplomatic efforts. First, he declares that, ‘if the city is to reap a full share of revenues, it is necessary for peace to exist first’, and then suggests creating a board of ‘peace guardians’ (εἰρηνοφύλακες) (5.1). ‘Were an office such as this elected’, he continues, ‘it would make the city more friendly and welcoming for all peoples to visit.’ Unfortunately, he does not flesh out the details, and thus we can only speculate about what exactly he has in mind here in regard to the duties and scope of this office. The prevailing wisdom is that these officials would have been Athenian financial officers charged not with establishing but maintaining peace by making sure Athens stayed commercially vibrant and attractive to foreign trade.<sup>58</sup> This interpretation is plausible given that a few lines later Xenophon underscores how an Athens at peace will be more attractive to traders and many other visitors (5.3–5). However, a diplomatic role for the *eirenophylakes* cannot be ruled out. The word *eirenophylakes* itself is extremely rare, and aside from one ambiguous usage in Aeschines, the comparanda suggests diplomatic, not economic prerogatives.<sup>59</sup> The circumlocution φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης also occurs in fourth-century sources: Isocrates applies it to the Persian king for his role in brokering the Common Peace of 387/6 BC, emphasising in particular the ‘autonomy’ clause (4.175), and Diodorus to Agathocles of Syracuse for reconciling the city with its exiles after a factious struggle in 317 BC (19.5.5). Interestingly, later in the chapter Xenophon encourages the Athenians to do these very things: ‘to try to make peace between cities at war with each other’ and ‘to reconcile competing factions within states’ (*Vect.* 5.8). In other words, they are to be the champions not only of interstate peace (*eirene*) but also of internal civic reconciliation (*homonoia*), which, as Gray contends in this volume, was a more ‘ambitious’ kind of peace because it went beyond the basic compromises of *modus vivendi* arrangements between states, involving a ‘much greater level of mutual understanding and consensus, at least concerning “second-order”, foundational issues [of] law, politics and often also [of] morality and the good life’.<sup>60</sup> This yoking together of *eirene* and *homonoia* is yet another poignant example of Xenophon’s commitment to universal peace. If these then are the duties he intends for the *eirenophylakes*, it would seem that Xenophon is calling for Greece’s first permanent board of elected magistrates devoted to diplomacy. Some commentators have found this scenario impossible,<sup>61</sup> but this interpretation should not be dismissed too quickly: many of Xenophon’s proposals, though rooted in traditional practices and institutions, are pushed well beyond the limits of conventionality in the *Poroi*.<sup>62</sup>

Whichever interpretation is correct, whether these diplomatic efforts are to be in the hands of the *eirenophylakes* or Athens’ annually elected ambassadors, the connection with the Persian King mentioned above is instructive but should not be pushed too far. According to the terms of the first Common Peace, the king is ‘[to] wage war together with those who wish to abide by

the terms of the peace' against treaty-breakers and recalcitrant cities (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31), whereas Xenophon explicitly disallows the Athenians from 'joining in war' (μὴ συμπολεμοῦντες) against fellow Greeks for achieving such ends (*Vect.* 5.9). If anyone conceived of Athens as the enforcer of a new 'common peace' on Persian models, that person is Isocrates in *On the Peace*, who calls for a 'just' but 'powerful' Athens whose military, 'watchful and prepared', stands ready to strike (unilaterally if need be) against any who dare oppress another Greek state – a policy that would make not only Athens but all of Greece 'prosperous', and earn the Athenians the sole right to be called 'the saviours of Hellas' (8.134–141; cf. 7.84). Because of the central role the city is to play in orchestrating the foreign policy of Greece as its *hegemon*, Isocrates' Panhellenism is unmistakably Athenocentric. Although Xenophon speaks in similar terms, the two thinkers could not be more different in their fundamental approach to securing peace. Xenophon wants Athens to recover her moral standing among the Greeks and thereby become their *hegemon*, as does Isocrates, but aims to accomplish this not through 'war' and 'coercion' (βιαζόμενοι) but 'peace' and 'euergetism' (εὐεργετοῦντες) (*Vect.* 5.5).<sup>63</sup> Moreover, while his outlook is essentially Athenocentric too, with the city being both the source of, and solution to, many of Greece's problems, Xenophon seeks to establish a peace that reaches well beyond the Greek world: 'If you openly show that you are concerned with trying to establish peace throughout *every land and sea*, I do think that *all peoples*, after their own countries, will include Athens first in their prayers of salvation' (5.10). With this sentiment, Xenophon turns the paternalistic, parochial and imperialistic ideology of Athens on its head. He is not saying that, by ending wars between Greek states and factious strife within them, Athens will become the 'saviour of Hellas', a specious designation anyway that the Athenians had used since the early fifth century BC to justify their imperial hubris. Rather, by promoting universal peace, foreign peoples will transcend their own parochialism and pray for Athens' safety and security, knowing that if the city is at peace, everyone will benefit by living in a more prosperous and peaceful world. Xenophon's belief in mutualism as a way to occasion peace and security completely flies in the face of Isocratean conceptions of *asphaleia*, which, as argued above, can be achieved only through the violent conquest of non-Greeks.

## Conclusion

If, with these proposals, Xenophon was trying to respond to 'the widespread longing among fourth-century Greeks for a "new world order"',<sup>64</sup> as one historian contends, one that broke from the traditional mould of achieving peace through war, then the *Poroi* is one of the most original and inspiring documents to come out of classical Greece. Indeed, his fellow citizens on average were at war more than two out of every three years from the Persian Wars (479 BC) to Chaeronea (338 BC), 'never enjoy[ing] a period of peace for as long as ten consecutive years'.<sup>65</sup> 'And what most men call peace', claims Plato with not much exaggeration, 'is only a name, since in reality there exists by nature for all

people at all times an undeclared state of war against all *poleis*' (*Laws* 625e). The great frequency of wars and the extent to which the Athenians fought them had significant and lasting consequences on their institutions and values.<sup>66</sup> Even the city's most astute intellectuals could hardly fathom life without war. At best they denounced war as evil, but war against non-Greeks seemed to be an exception – a just and defensible enterprise if waged with the intent of promoting Greek unity and harmony. Xenophon was no pacifist, as some maintain,<sup>67</sup> but a staunch anti-imperialist who went to great lengths to demonstrate to his readers that viable alternatives to imperialism and Panhellenic conquest existed. Perhaps even more revolutionary was his belief that commerce (but as argued above, not commerce alone) could contribute greatly to occasioning peace and prosperity, an idea that did not find fertile ground in Europe until the eighteenth century.<sup>68</sup> But as radical as Xenophon was for his day, his perspicacity did not allow him to see the one glaring contradiction of his proposals: ending the unjust exploitation of foreign peoples necessitated the continuation and advancement of slavery in the silver mines of Attica. In this one important respect, Finley's judgment of the *Poroi* hits its mark: 'Xenophon's ideas, bold in some respects, never really broke through the conventional limits.'<sup>69</sup>

## Notes

- 1 Carter quoted in Somerville (2008) 14.
- 2 For a collection of relevant passages, see Kraut (2002) 10 n.13; cf. also Zampaglione (1973) 54–64, Balot (2006) 138–76 (*passim*) and Hunt (2010) 252–3, 256–7. Desmond (in this volume) offers a more sympathetic view of Aristotle's contribution to the topic (but see Ostwald (1996) 103 and my comments in note 4 below). For Isocrates' views, see Davidson (1990), and below. In general, see Raaflaub (2009a).
- 3 The popularity of Panhellenism in fourth-century Athens is evidenced among both intellectuals (Badian (1958) 443–4 and Markle (1976)) and the general populace (Flower (2000b) 105–7).
- 4 For Greek ethnocentrism and proto-racist attitudes toward non-Greeks, see Tuplin (1999) and Isaac (2004). More than the ideas of Isocrates (Isaac (2004) 285–8) and Plato (*ibid.* 284 and Hirsch (1985) 140–5, who gives a more favourable interpretation but ignores *Rep.* 469b–c, where Plato urges Greeks to refrain from 'enslaving' fellow Greeks but to do so to the 'barbarians'), Aristotle's views on climate and geography's role in determining group characteristics (Isaac (2004) 69–74), his theory of natural slavery and his belief that 'barbarians' are slaves by nature (for the connection between these latter two ideas, see Rosivach (1999) 142–57), meet the requirements of proto-racist thinking. These ideas must be kept in mind when recalling Aristotle's advice to Alexander 'to be a leader to the Greeks but a despot to the barbarians' (*Plut. Mor.* 329b with Badian (1958) 440–3, who argues for the genuineness of the tradition) and to colonise parts of Asia (*Frag.* 648 (Rose)).
- 5 Perlman (1976) 30 and Isaac (2004) 278.
- 6 Davies (1995) 36.
- 7 For an overview, see the introductory essays in Tuplin (2004), Gray (2010) and Hobden and Tuplin (2012).
- 8 For previous treatments, see Zampaglione (1973) 100–6 and Hunt (2010) 259–62. Dillery (1993) and Jansen (2007) chapter 4 examine Xenophon's anti-imperialism.
- 9 The bibliography on Panhellenism is extensive: in general see Dobesch (1968); Hartog (1988), Hall (1989), Green (1996) and Isaac (2004) 109–33, 283–98 who focus on how

- the Athenians came to understand themselves as superior to non-Greeks; Perlman (1976) and Flower (2000a) examine the origins of fourth-century Panhellenism in the previous century; and Sakellariou (1980) and Flower (2000b) for the Panhellenism of Alexander.
- 10 For the concept of *homonoia* (internal reconciliation) and how it differs from *eirene* (inter-state peace), see Gray (this volume). Generally speaking, the two ideas were categorically distinct; but at the level of ideology it was common for thinkers in the fourth century to transfer ideas and vocabulary from the domestic sphere to suit interstate relations, such as we find in the Panhellenic writings of Isocrates.
  - 11 Baynes (1955) 151–60, Bringmann (1965), Dillery (1995) 54–8, Too (1995) 130–146, Green (1996) and Pownall (2007).
  - 12 See 4.168, 5.120–121, 8.24, 44–46 and *Epist.* 9.9–10 with Baynes (1955) 153–9, Green (1996) 20–2 and Pownall (2007) 20–3 who underscore the economic dimension of Isocrates' Panhellenism. For the socio-economic problems of the fourth century and the dangers of wandering mercenaries, see van Soesbergen (1982–3).
  - 13 Even after he reassigns the leadership position to Philip in 346, the Athenians, especially the wealthy class, are still intended to be the main beneficiaries of his Panhellenic campaign against the Persians (Green (1996) 22; cf. Baynes (1955) 159–60). For the Athenocentric stamp of Isocrates' Panhellenism, see Baynes (1955), Too (1995) 130–46 and Green (1996) 22.
  - 14 For the Athenians' attempts to renew their imperial ambitions in the early-fourth century, see Seager (1967). The period during the Second Athenian League is more complicated, but the attempts of Griffith (1978) and Cargill (1981) to sugarcoat Athenian 'foreign policy' (not 'imperialism' in their estimation) are unconvincing and have the ring of apology: Hornblower (1982). Badian (1995) provides a more balanced and persuasive account.
  - 15 Badian (1995) 81.
  - 16 On 'the main theme of his career' (Flower (2000b) 98 n.10) see *Panath.* 12–13 (339 BC) (cf. 12.142; 15.318). For this infelicitous union of Panhellenism and Athenian imperialism, see Perlman (1976) and Green (1996) 22.
  - 17 Contra Raaflaub (2009a) 243. For Isocrates' proto-racist views toward non-Greeks (including Thracians), see 4.67 and Isaac (2004) 285–288.
  - 18 Diod. 16.34.3 with Cargill (1995) 26–7 and Sealey (1993) 118–9. The people of Sestos were Thracian (see previous note), which may have contributed to the execution of the *andropodismos*.
  - 19 Diod. 16.34.4 and *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1613.297 with Moreno (2007) 296.
  - 20 Griffith (1978) 143.
  - 21 Contra Hunt (2010) 255, who believes a 'decline in enthusiasm for war [took place] in the fourth century'. What may have existed was not a 'general antipathy to war', but rather a mild aversion toward certain wars that were costly both in terms of finances and human life. The fervour of the Athenians for 'easy' (see, e.g., Herodotus 6.132.1; Thucydides 6.24.2–3; and Isocrates 5.126) campaigns against smaller or perceived 'weaker' *poleis* (non-Greek states particularly), the victory over which promised huge material gains for the demos, seems never to have subsided throughout the fifth and fourth centuries.
  - 22 For example, see Morr (1926–7), Luccioni (1947) 33–8, 194, Delebecque (1957) 467–8, Cawkwell (1972) 23–4 and (2004) 64–7, van Soesbergen (1982–3) 141–2 and Green (1996) 14.
  - 23 Dillery (1995) 77–91, Rood (2004) and (2005) xxxi–xxxiv, and Flower (2012) 170–88. Although Dillery argues that Xenophon rejects the simple 'plunder and return' form of Panhellenism, he nonetheless believes the Ten Thousand functions as a general 'paradigm of Panhellenism' in the work, which Rood rightly challenges (cf. Tuplin (2004) 182).
  - 24 *Ages.* 7.1. As Hirsch reminds us, supposed 'Panhellenic' moments such as this are apologetic and not representative of Xenophon's personal views (Hirsch (1985) 39–55).
  - 25 Flower (2012) 186.

- 26 E.g., Megabyzus (*Anab.* 5.3.6) and Cyrus (3.1.5; cf. Diog. 2.58) (cf. 5.5.18). See Hirsch (1985) 6–38 for the evidence of Xenophon’s ‘respect and even outright admiration for the Persians’ (cf. Isaac (2004) 288–9).
- 27 Tuplin (1997) 185–6, Rood (2004) 320 and Waterfield (2006) 207–8
- 28 Van Soesbergen (1982–3) 141, Dillery (1995) 62, Rood (2004) 316 (cf. Rood (2005) xxxii) and Flower (2012) 182.
- 29 E.g., *Mem.* 1.2.57 with Johnstone (1994).
- 30 See also 5.6.15 and 6.4.8 with Dillery (1995) 68.
- 31 Tuplin (1997) 186.
- 32 These raids were illicit in two respects. First, the Greeks had sworn oaths not to obtain victuals by plunder after locals had initially offered a market (*Anab.* 3.3.3 (cf. 2.3.26–7) with Jansen (2014) 125–126) – a policy to which they still adhered even after they reached Trapezus (5.5.13–21). Such raids also needed the approval of the generals (5.1.7). Secondly, soldiers were not allowed to go off on plundering missions without the cognisance of the generals (5.1.8).
- 33 Rightly noted by van Soesbergen (1982–3) 141, although he errs in his judgment that Xenophon shares Isocrates’ Panhellenic outlook.
- 34 Isoc. 5.120 (346 BC), but the phrase ‘from Cilicia to Sinope’ appears to have been commonplace (cf. *Hell. Oxy. FGrH* 66, F 1, 533). On the date of the *Anabasis*, see Cawkwell (2004) 47–51 and Flower (2012) 29–30.
- 35 Dillery (1995) 87 and Waterfield (2006) 162.
- 36 Waterfield (2006) 168–9.
- 37 Herodotus 7.8a1–2; 7.9.2 (δύναμιν προσκτᾶσθαι) and Thucydides 6.24.3 (προσκτήσεσθαι δύναμιν) (cf. 6.18.2) with Rood (2004) 320–1 (cf. Waterfield (2006) 161–2). Isocrates uses the same word in his call upon Philip to ‘gain in addition [to his own] (προσκτήσει) another great [sc. the Persian] empire without danger’ (2.18).
- 38 On the military nature of the proposal, see Tuplin (1997) 185 and Dillery (1995) 86–7. For Athenian ‘Pontomania’, see Moreno (2007) 161–9.
- 39 Thucydides 1.110.3; 4.102.2. At Cerasus the army numbered 8,600 (*Anab.* 5.3.3) and were several hundred less by the time they reached Calpe Harbour: Waterfield (2006) 166–7.
- 40 Dillery (1995) 86–7.
- 41 Flower (2012) 187.
- 42 The title Πόροι was translated into Latin as *De Vectigalibus* (hence the *OCD* abbreviation *Vect.* used here), but *Ways and Means* is much closer to the Greek (Jansen (2007) 24–7).
- 43 Bloch (2004) and Jansen (2007) 50–5.
- 44 For Xenophon’s influence on Eubulus, who was the supposed leader of a ‘peace party’ (Mossé (1973) 55), see Cawkwell (1963c) 56. Comparisons of the *Poroi* to Isocrates’ *On the Peace* (e.g., Mathieu (1925) 181–5, Luccioni (1947) 205–6, 283, Delebecque (1957) 474–5, Bringmann (1965) 73 and Breitenbach (1967) 1754) tend to be superficial (see below).
- 45 Xenophon uses the phrase εἰρήνην ἄγειν and not τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγειν in the *Poroi* (5.1, 5.2, 5.13; cf. 4.40); the latter means to ‘observe the terms of [a particular] peace’, whereas the former means ‘to be at peace’ (Seager (1969) 134).
- 46 The word αἱ πόλεις is shorthand for all cities subject to Athens and not strictly ‘allies’ (as Gauthier (1976) 40 maintains). Xenophon uses the term ‘the islanders’ (*Vect.* 5.6) to refer to the allies proper, although a few allies did not inhabit islands. Elsewhere in the *Poroi* (*Vect.* 2.1, 3.11, 5.2, 5.8), αἱ πόλεις means Greek cities and at 4.8–9 (cf. 1.4–5) cities more generally, Greek and non-Greek. In his other works, ‘the cities’ can apply equally to non-Greek states (e.g., *Hell.* 3.1.6, 4.12; 4.1.1; *Anab.* 2.4.22; 3.2.23).
- 47 See Thucydides 8.48.6 with Jansen (2007) 269–70. See Moreno (2007) 77–143 for elite estates abroad.
- 48 Baynes (1955) 153–60 (cf. Green (1996) 22 and Pownall (2007) 22–3).
- 49 Jansen (2007) 56–104 argues that the *Poroi* was circulated as a political pamphlet among sympathetic politicians whom Xenophon hoped would introduce his proposals to the assembly as specific motions.

- 50 For the inner workings of this financial scheme, see Jansen (2007) 338–52.
- 51 Jansen (2007) 340.
- 52 Jansen (2007) 388–90.
- 53 See Thucydides 7.27.5 with Jansen (2007) 356–71, who argues that many of these slaves were from the mines.
- 54 Runciman (1990) 351.
- 55 See Jansen (2012) 740.
- 56 *Poroi* 1.4, 3.2, and 4.8 (quoted and discussed below).
- 57 Polanyi (1977) 196.
- 58 Cawkwell (1963c) 56 and Gauthier (1976) 198.
- 59 Cf. Aeschin. 3.159 with Cawkwell (1963c) 56 and Plut. *Numa* 12.3–4.
- 60 See Gray (this volume).
- 61 Gauthier (1976) 197.
- 62 Xenophon was a diplomat himself (as evidenced throughout the *Anabasis*) and wrote about the theory and practice of diplomacy in the *Cyropaedia*, especially in regards to how generosity and reciprocity factor into the diplomatic efforts of Cyrus: see Lendon (2006). For claims based on reciprocity and friendship in Greek interstate relations, see Low (2007) 33–76, but the evidence she adduces pertains to discussions of going to war, not making peace.
- 63 Xenophon, it seems, always remained ‘faithful . . . to his favourite theory, namely that benevolence provides more lasting and safer results than violence’ (Luccioni (1947) 297).
- 64 Cartledge (1997) 227.
- 65 Finley (1987) 67.
- 66 Finley (1987) 68, 74.
- 67 von der Lieck (1933) 10 and Rostovtzeff (1941) 1358 n.4.
- 68 Hirschman (1977).
- 69 Finley (1999) 163.

## 19 Punishment and reconciliation: Augustine

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Punish the sin; not the sinner; more easily said than done, and Augustine did say it (*peccata persequeris, non peccantem*). Preaching on the second psalm and purporting to address ‘all who judge the earth’, he wrestled with problems related to punitive measures and their contributions to two types of reconciliation, social and personal (and so terial). What follows sifts the results of other, similar efforts and attends to their polemical and pastoral contexts, with special emphasis on Augustine’s campaigns to retrieve Donatist dissidents resisting reconciliation with the African church from which, he said, their predecessors seceded in the early fourth century. At stake toward the end of that century and three decades into the next, was the influence of Catholic Christianity in the provinces that supplied Italy with much of its staples, prepared for export in Augustine’s see, of Hippo, as well as in Carthage. But also at stake was the fate all sinners whose sins were to be punished in this world to encourage their repentance so that they might not be punished horrifically in the next.<sup>1</sup>

Augustine began his sin-not-sinner sermon, which was probably preached in Carthage late in the second decade of the fifth century, rather far from the magistrates who ‘judge the earth’. It opens with an appeal to ordinary Christians who were encouraged to tame their discreditable instincts – interpreted as their ‘earth’ or clay. Augustine reminded them of the Apostle Paul’s imperatives, specifically that faithful followers ‘rule that earth [they] carry’ as their bodies (*Enarrationes in Psalmos* 75.8).<sup>2</sup> Keen on the virtue of self-discipline, Augustine was under no illusion that the faithful were inherently able to resist temptations and suppress shameful cravings. To oblige the apostle and their preacher – to grip ‘the rod of discipline’, he said elsewhere – they would have to believe in and to ‘lean upon the staff of God’s mercy’ (13.1–3).<sup>3</sup>

The sermon’s transition to judgment and punishment in what Augustine called ‘the widely accepted sense’ is not smooth, but he retained his emphasis on humility. Magistrates and princes had been elevated above the ordinary, yet they were still ‘earth judging earth’, which was Augustine’s way of saying that they had feet of clay (13.4). They needed instruction; before punishing others they were to punish themselves. Augustine started explaining that lesson by referring to Jesus’ encounter with the Pharisees in the eighth chapter

of the Gospel of John. They had taken an adulterous woman to him. He had not objected to the law requiring that she be stoned. Instead, he asked only that those who punished her sift their conduct to ensure they were without sin (13.4). Justices, the sermon continues, should live well. Augustine knew that they had frequently paid for their positions, yet he allowed that some simply purchased opportunities to serve (13.6–7). What was far more important to him than the merit or money responsible for the justices' appointments was their readiness to judge themselves. 'Sit in judgment of yourself', he told magistrates, commending a regimen of introspection.<sup>4</sup> Twenty years earlier in his *Confessions*, he more elaborately discussed memory as an instrument for retrieval, for sifting expectations as well as prior commitments. Augustine's sermon, in 418, was less concerned with the technology of self-sifting and more interested in the result, repentance. Magistrates should have experienced torment after their self-inventories, for they were 'of the earth', susceptible to temptation. Augustine would have them condemn themselves, follow that sentence with repentance, and thereby 'punish sin penitently' (13.7).<sup>5</sup>

Introspection, self-lacerating criticism, and repentance prepared magistrates to judge others in such a way that they could assail sins yet save sinners. Augustine's sermon promptly (and rather oddly) follows that formula with a distinction between sinners and persons, as if he were vexed by the distinction between sinners and their sins (13.8). God makes the persons who make themselves sinners, Augustine explained, and the latter were especially egregious when they persisted in sin, despite magistrates' and prelates' efforts to reclaim them. Even those who refused correction, however, were not to be executed. Augustine placed a limit on punishment; capital punishment extinguished all hope for the sinners' repentance and reconciliation. Magistrates could be formidable without becoming ruthless. Compassion kept souls breathing, souls that could yet be saved more meaningfully – eternally – by their contrition and reconciliation. Augustine trusted justice was served by mercy and lost or destroyed when sinners were destroyed along with their sins (13.8).

He would have had magistrates apply parental pressure. He was not about to scatter additional caveats and to fit various penalties to crimes, leaving specific directions underfoot for magistrates to trip over or closet away. Better, he apparently figured, to tease general prescriptions from what he imagined to be perfect parental practice. In families, he said, shame was more effective and humane than fear. Clemency caused progeny to be ashamed of having offended loving, lenient parents, whereas kindling fear in their children did parents little good. Fear, Augustine noticed, enraged rather than calmed and corrected youth. Yet discipline was indispensable. Turning a blind eye to impudent and unruly children was hardly a sound strategy. Augustine's sermon therefore insists that cruelty was kindness under some circumstances. 'Even when a father strikes [his child], he expresses love' (13.9).<sup>6</sup> To let children go unpunished and undisciplined was to let them run to their ruin.

Augustine's sermon proceeds from self-discipline to the preparation of magistrates, and finally to the family woodshed, but it hovers above the smoldering,

still irksome crises of his time that punitive measures were introduced to resolve. He did not remain aloof from them, so we cannot; it is inconceivable that one can study his responses to several of those crises, moreover, without confronting controversial questions about his perception of the relationship between the government's authority to punish and the church's role in reconciling sinners, secessionists, heretics, and pagans to its influence.

Controversies surface whenever historians, historical theologians, and ethicists consider to what extent and how warmly Augustine had welcomed secular political intervention in the life of the church. Christoph Horn and Charles Mathewes, for example, concede that Augustine only reluctantly summoned magistrates to punish threats to the faith and damage to particular churches.<sup>7</sup> Horn's Augustine thought that magistrates' measures were 'morally flawed but functionally necessary', that the safety of African Christians and the unity of their church depended on their enemies' fear that magistrates would aggressively punish obstinate secessionists and pagan thugs. Augustine's caution on that count nearly disappears, however, from some studies. Peter Burnell, for one, maintains that the bishop embraced magistrates as allies. Burnell teases from Augustine's comments on political authority what he calls 'an essential continuity' between punitive measures required to keep the peace and 'the unavoidable necessity' of punishing sinners to reconcile them to Christianity. That continuity develops, on Burnell's watch, into that religion's consonance with the demands of citizenship. His premise is that Augustine interpreted the incarnation as having been (and continuing to be) 'elaborated in human society'. Hence, citizenship became part of a Christian's duty to the divine. 'The religious and political are not ultimately distinct'; 'all civil society is religious'. Magistrates, in effect, had become the faith's and the church's *ex officio* diocensans, wielding 'the sword' to preserve public discipline.<sup>8</sup>

One could read Augustine's scorching criticisms of Donatist Christian extremists as attempts to transform the government's courts into church tribunals and to justify magistrates' punitive measures. The extremists, he said, made common cause with thugs known as circumcellions, who acquired their name, it seems, by frequenting if not billeting around the rural shrines commemorating Christianity's martyrs (*Contra Gaudentium* 1.28, 32).<sup>9</sup> Many were soi-disant martyrs, who risked death to provoke reprisals, Augustine said, portraying them as vagrants-turned-terrorists intent on discrediting Catholic Christians, victims-turned-persecutors. A government edict in 412 suggests that the thugs were something more than a disorganized collection of criminals but less than a terrorist network. Predictably, Augustine's references, which constitute most of what we know about the circumcellions, have them often drunk and easily stirred to action by prominent Donatists, notably Bishop Optatus of Thamugadi, who joined the short-lived African rebellion against Rome in the late fourth century (*Contra epistolam Parmeniani* 2.9, 19; epistle 185.12). Another Optatus, Bishop of Milevis in Numidia, who was writing against the Donatists before Augustine returned to Africa – before the rebellion – described the circumcellions as 'crazed'; Augustine wrote about

armed and fanatical flocks that Donatist extremists turned to their purposes, turned against not only the Catholic Christians but dissidents within – and secessionists from – their own sect.<sup>10</sup>

He also wrote about extremists and circumcellions to embarrass Donatist moderates. Early in the fifth century Augustine was not yet convinced by his Catholic Christian colleagues that government intervention and punitive measures (fines, confiscations, incarcerations, and exiles) were necessary to reunite the African church. He believed he might nudge moderate secessionist bishops with arguments drawn from the sacred literature Donatists and Catholics alike respected. Appealing to Bishop Emeritus of Caesarea (in Mauretania), he warned that persisting in schism was heresy. Persistence, moreover, defied authorities entrusted with the church's welfare. Augustine reminded Emeritus of the fate of Hebrew insurgents – of Dathan, Abiram, and their confederates – whom God punished mercilessly. Most died by fire; the two ringleaders were swallowed by the earth. The episode, drawn from the Pentateuch, was timely and telling, not just because Emeritus and other Donatist moderates refused to reconcile but also because they refused to condemn the aforementioned Optatus of Thamugadi, who had been executed after he linked the fate of his church with that of an abortive rebellion against Rome. Augustine then shrewdly switched from talk of God's wrath in sacred texts and the grim fate of Emeritus' notorious colleague to approach his correspondent's predicament more sympathetically. The moderates' refusal to denounce Optatus, he suspected, was motivated by their desire to avoid dividing Donatism. Though the rebellion was reprehensible, Emeritus' failure to censure his colleague was understandable: Augustine admitted that Emeritus could not have snubbed Optatus without creating factions and undermining Donatism's consensus and continuity. Yet such qualms, he argued, should lead Emeritus to reconcile with Catholic Christians, from whom the first Donatists seceded after condemning and shunning Bishop Caecilian of Carthage in the early fourth century (epistle 87.4).

Caecilian had been accused of befriending colleagues who collaborated during the persecution that preceded Emperor Constantine's conversion to Christianity. To Christians whose faith was anchored by their admiration for confessors and martyrs, Caecilian seemed to honour their heroes too temperately, if at all. Furthermore, one of the colleagues he asked to participate in his consecration, Felix of Aphungi, had been accused of collaborating with persecutors. Dissenters protested to the new Christian emperor who referred the matter to a council of European prelates, over which Bishop Miltiades of Rome presided. The verdict acquitted Bishops Felix and Caecilian. Dissenters pressed for another chance to prove their case, and a second church council was called at Arles in 314. The dissenters, again frustrated, returned to Africa and elected an alternative to Caecilian who, from their perspective, had seceded from the authentic Christian church that properly valued Jesus' suffering, prized martyrdom, and had survived for centuries without government interference. Augustine pointed out an inconsistency; dissidents – by then known as the *pars Donati* or Donatists – had themselves appealed to the government against

Caecilian's cohort. Also, by the time Augustine had returned from Italy and began to write against them, Donatist Christians outnumbered the Caecilianists or Catholic Christians, thanks, in large part, to the long tenure of their most enterprising bishop of Carthage, Donatus of Casae Nigrae (313–355). Despite Donatists' numbers and persistence, the results of the two early fourth-century councils cinched matters for Augustine (*pro me sunt gesta omnia*): Caecilian was accepted as bishop of the African Christian church, recognized in the rest of Christendom; Donatism was a regional and secessionist sect (Dolbeau, 1996, sermon 2.22). For their part, Donatist extremists and moderates alike considered the Catholic Christian church fatally flawed and unable to convey God's grace in its sacraments. Caecilianist bishops, much like Caecilian, had nothing to offer the laity. They had forfeited their right to baptize or to absolve – Caecilian, because he was a collaborator or friend of collaborators long ago, and likewise those who remained loyal to him and traced their grace (in baptism, ordination, or consecration) to priests and bishops loyal to him. The Catholic Christian church, Donatists professed, was corrupt; its bogus bishops were powerless. And, as just noted, late in the late fourth century Donatists were more numerous than the Catholic Christians in at least two of Rome's African provinces. Yet the fragments of their polemic that survive in Augustine's replies betray what the historian Elena Zocca depicts as a siege mentality. Donatists claimed that sin and error prevailed beyond their basilicas – that Jesus' heroism was commemorated and divine grace was available exclusively within them. Persecution was their *thème préféré*. They assigned guilt to others, boasted of their innocence, and touted their defiance of the government.<sup>11</sup>

Donatists seemed less troubled than Augustine about their isolation. He was upset by their interpretations of biblical passages that, in their polemic, lifted their regionally concentrated sect above the faith's many other congregations in and beyond North Africa. And he was increasingly impatient with the Donatists' disaffection: they ought to connect with churches elsewhere, ideally willingly but, if necessary, coerced into communion (sermon 46.37). In the 380s, Emperor Theodosius I decreed that Christians who had not embraced Catholic Christianity were disreputable (*infames*) – beyond the pale. Augustine would have preferred not to coerce the Donatists into submission, conformity, and reunion. 'Who doubts', he asked, 'that it is better to be taught and persuaded than to be compelled' to conform? Yet, as his correspondence with Emeritus suggests, his successes persuading Donatist moderates were negligible. Furthermore, he explained, long before he wrote his 'who doubts', he had learned that Donatists forced to abandon their sects and to embrace Catholic Christianity grew grateful for the threats, punishments, and 'pain' prompting them. What the Carthaginian playwright Terence had noticed and stipulated more than five hundred years before still applied: parents were most gratified whenever they could discipline their children tenderly, shaming them to restrain them. Augustine agreed but he also observed, dealing with the Donatists, that discipline most often required punishments and fear of punishment (epistle 185.21).<sup>12</sup>

God planned wisely when welcoming emperors and magistrates into the faith. They became disciplinarians supplementing what the church's authorities did to ensure conformity and obedience. Public officials were converted to Catholic Christianity in Africa to protect it, drawing secessionists to colleagues who consistently acknowledged the political regime's function and who set forth generous conditions for the dissidents' reconciliation. Augustine never tired of recalling that Donatists were the first to appeal to the government – to Constantine – formulating their case against Caecilian before the Caecilianists' overtures were even contemplated. Donatists soured on magistrates' interference only when they lost influence with magistrates in Africa, having lost influence with Emperors Theodosius I and his son Honorius, who ruled in the West from Rome and Ravenna from the 390s to 423. The moderate Donatist Bishop Emeritus complained at the Council of Carthage in 411 about the partnership between African Catholic Christian bishops and government officials. What Augustine called discipline, Donatists experienced as unjust punishment and abuse. But Augustine had convinced officials that moderates and extremists among the sectarians were shameless, stubborn, and arrogant. If left unpunished, their sense of superiority to other African Christians could lead to a politically subversive stand against magistrates faithful to the churches from which the sectarians had seceded, and faithful to the emperors whose interest in the controversy the sectarians derided.<sup>13</sup>

The more the Donatists' stubbornness seemed impenetrable to Augustine, the more it seemed subversive. Who could tell whether (or when) accusations hurled against a regime that confiscated their basilicas and exiled their prelates might turn moderates into extremists – and turn both, as it had Optatus of Thamugadi, into insurgents (epistle 87.7)? The dissidents were 'terribly agitated', Augustine said, insinuating that the fear of punishment could distract them and deter reckless action against the government. The Donatist secessionists, he continued in a letter justifying magistrates' intervention, would be grateful for having had their anxieties quieted once they experienced paternal punishments that drew them to Catholic Christianity (epistle 93.1). The truths of the sacred texts would grip them, if only they were obliged to look beyond Donatist exegesis.

Augustine was fond of retelling the story from the Gospel of John of the persecutors at the Cross who decided to cast lots for – rather than to divide – Jesus' seamless tunic. He compared them favourably to sectarians who divided the church and perpetuated the schism.<sup>14</sup> Donatists had a response at the ready, contrasting Jesus' restraint with Catholic Christians' apparent rush to punish. Jesus censured the Apostle Peter for having attacked one of the intruders who had come to apprehend him. Augustine answered by reversing roles. Donatists were not to be paired with the victim of Peter's assault but with the villains in that episode, with the armed men sent to take Jesus into custody. The secessionist extremists, especially their accomplices among the circumcellions, ordinarily were armed, as were Peter's and Jesus' enemies. The Donatist moderates, moreover, claimed exclusive custody of the grace that initiated

and absolved – grace that Jesus left to and for a unified, compassionate church. Finally, distinguishing between punishments intended to harm and punitive measures implemented to help, Augustine argued that the Donatists whom magistrates punished ought not to be coupled with persecuted apostles and their murdered messiah. Those who persecuted the first Christians, others who made martyrs of their heirs, and the depraved, drunken, vicious circumcellions who assaulted Africa's Catholic Christians were out to harm their victims. Authorities in the late fourth and early fifth centuries disciplined Donatists to help them.<sup>15</sup>

And to help the Catholic Christians' churches! For the schism was not irreparable. Sectarian African 'branches' of the universal church were not forever lost; they might be grafted back onto its African limb. Augustine borrowed the Apostle Paul's prophecy (Romans 11: 19–21), that the Jews would be grafted into the church, to reassure his parishioners (and probably local magistrates) that – once their regime's threats, fines, seizures, and incarcerations had drawn penitent dissidents into the Catholic Christian church – God would be pleased, as would they, for the attention they had received (sermon 162[A].9).

In the early fifth century, Augustine and his colleague Alypius, bishop of Thagaste, wrote to two brothers in Bagai. The first, Maximian, a Donatist bishop, relinquished his see rather than cause conflict in the city. The second, Castorius, a Catholic Christian, was urged to take his brother's place; but before trumpeting the virtues of their candidate, Augustine and Alypius praised Maximian's piety and passion for peace. His resignation, they wrote, attested his estrangement from the 'mad, maddening pride' of other incorrigibly sectarian Donatists. His selfless commitment to the unity of the church in Bagai made it easy for Augustine and Alypius to forgive him, to practise what they preached – that those who forgive are forgiven (sermon 181.8; epistle 69.1–2) – even as they advocated punishment. Augustine knew that – and why – Christians preferred to think about mercy rather than divine wrath or rage. Who would want to contemplate how badly life after death could go wrong for them? Better to rely on God's tenderness than to contemplate terrible torments (*Enchiridion de fide, spe, et caritate* 112). But Augustine's *City of God* explicitly concedes that the fate of the faith relied, to a great extent, on fears that punishment awaited those who denied or betrayed it, as its sacred literature forecast. Likewise, the solidarity of Catholic Christianity in Africa seemed to Augustine to depend on threats of force in this world and the fear of fire in the next in order to awaken secessionists to the seriousness of their offences against the peace and unity of the African church. The tender-hearted favoured frequent clemency. They yearned to spare sinners eternal punishment; but Augustine knew, as they apparently did not, that they thereby jeopardized the faith.<sup>16</sup>

Disciplining the Donatists was God's work. Augustine would have readily admitted that his knowledge of the connections between punishing secessionists and strengthening the church had nothing to do with the strategy or success of both endeavours. Nor had colleagues' trickery or bribery played into the punitive measures magistrates judged necessary. But Donatists were known to

deceive, Augustine confided, recycling a single report that they had pretended to be Catholic Christians in order to retrieve a few basilicas from rival dissidents. (Augustine intimated that the presiding proconsul colluded for cash or was simply inattentive [*Enarrationes in Psalmos* 57.15]). God apparently let that matter pass yet saw what Augustine came to see, specifically, that ‘medicine that molests’ or terrifies patients with laws and penalties would be required if intransigent Donatists were to be reconciled with the church decreed legitimate by the regime (epistle 185.26).

In a letter to a less corrupt and less capricious proconsul than the one who returned churches to the Donatists, Augustine countenanced setting limits to punishment. Proconsul Apringius was preparing to pronounce sentence on Donatists who had murdered one and mutilated another Catholic Christian in 411. The culprits had confessed. Theirs was a capital crime; Apringius’ brother Marcellinus presided over the Council that reiterated the proscription of Donatism that very year. But Augustine asked that Apringius forego the death penalty. He argued that the blood of their assailants would somehow stain the victims’ sacrifice. Catholic Christians, in general, he said, displayed fortitude in the face of Donatist enemies. To shed the blood of the latter – to return harm for harm, evil for evil – was unworthy of the faith. Augustine carried his point to an apparent extreme, stipulating that the perpetrators should go free, if alternatives to the scaffold were wanting. Lethal reprisals, he continued, were unworthy of his faith. He urged that Apringius consider and condone more humane punishments. Sparing the perpetrators, moreover, gave Catholic Christians an opportunity to reform them. ‘As you allow the enemies of the church to live, you provide a stretch of time for them to repent’ (epistle 134.3–4).<sup>17</sup> Augustine’s position, here and – we will see – elsewhere, was inconsistent with the effects he expected from inspiring among secessionists a fear of punishment, yet it corresponded perfectly with his explanation of how one can strike at the sins yet save the sinners. It also corresponded with what he took to be God’s practice. For God seldom punished promptly when creatures strayed; rather, the strays were given time to repent (sermon 13.8).<sup>18</sup>

Writing to Apringius’ brother, the tribune Marcellinus, Augustine patched other considerations into his case for clemency and let them eclipse the question of the offenders’ repentance and rehabilitation. He accepted the possibility that clemency could be construed as weakness or negligence, yet he trusted that the gain would outweigh any loss of credibility. For lenient verdicts that spared the misguided perpetrators of the most abominable outrages against Catholic Christian churches and personnel threw into greater relief the kindness and compassion of the victimized Catholic Christian communions willing to forego vengeance and reconcile with their enemies (epistle 139.2). A few years later Augustine wrote to Macedonius, Vicar of Africa, addressing another likely reservation magistrates must have articulated. He granted that unforeseeable consequences of amnesties and leniency might tell against the reprieves he commended, inasmuch as some recidivism could be expected. Sparing sinners might not save them. Successful reintegration in society was not guaranteed. Nonetheless, Augustine held that

the possibility of good results should be uppermost in magistrates' minds. He hoped they would be receptive to their pastors' and bishops' counsel and that they would, selectively, punish lightly to confirm the high moral standards of the Catholic Christian faith, its superiority to Donatist extremists and moderates, and the wisdom of pronouncing punishments (or pardons) that permit rebellious sectarians' reconciliation (epistle 153.18).

Augustine considered that the principal work of reconciling Donatist secessionists to Catholic Christianity was pastoral. Punitive measures and the fear of punishment pried them from their sects and undermined their eccentric, unwarranted sense of superiority. Punishments also served the purposes of their polemicists who paired the punished with the martyrs they venerated; but Augustine and his Catholic Christian colleagues had a rejoinder. They asserted that punishment disgraced rather than dignified dissidents, who should not be regarded as virtuous just because the government fined or exiled them. Their punishments and persistence only signalled their stubbornness and arrogance. The *City of God* put Augustine's counter succinctly and soterially: 'we remain under God's pardon'; hence, 'whatever insignificant virtue [creatures] called their own' derived from the humility which came to them with God's grace (*De civitate Dei* 10.22).<sup>19</sup>

Augustine's sermons urged the faithful to live well so their behaviour would attract others to their faith. Sins damaged the faith's and the faithful's reputations, yet sinning was habitual, unavoidable. To keep it from subverting piety, Catholic Christians must fast, pray, and be charitable every day. Highly placed prelates were no exceptions. They, too, must be vigilant, unsparingly self-critical, penitent, and selflessly compassionate. The Donatists, he complained, failed at all that. They rated themselves and especially their bishops well above the ordinary run of sinners, and they ranked Donatus above Jesus (Dolbeau 1996, sermon 26.45, 52, and 56). So said Augustine, although complaints of that sort now seem suspicious. But what matters is that Augustine believed that impieties of that magnitude took place in every dissident congregation when its bishop rebaptized Catholic Christians in the belief that Caecilian's sin had contaminated the church officials presiding over the original baptisms. The Donatist priests or bishops presiding over the new baptism purported to be undefiled. In effect, and unlike the apostles, they usurped Jesus' role as mediator.<sup>20</sup> Their pretensions to purity exhibited their lack of humility, which was assumed to arrive in the faithful with God's grace. Augustine told parishioners that he was outraged at holier-than-thou Donatist prelates who read the psalms yet denied their rivals in Africa were part of a more universal or Catholic Christian communion that better represented the church that the psalmist had promised the faithful, a church *permixta*, with some not yet strenuously struggling for virtue and others close to victory, a church spread to the ends of the earth. No wonder Augustine sanctioned the government's punitive measures (*Enarrationes in Psalmos* 21[2].29).

Had he not been distressed by his disappointments at having failed to persuade secessionists with arguments, Augustine might have been more reluctant

to condone coercion. Yet, his overtures to them had obviously failed to reunify the church. A few militants among them and the circumcellions terrorized society. Punitive measures seemed necessary and appropriate. But if Augustine's had been more than a grudging concession to necessity, one would expect him to have embraced the government's provisions for the church's courts. His lively participation as arbiter and magistrate in what were known as bishops' 'audiences' – together with his enthusiasm for the government's punitive posture towards and measures against Donatists – conceivably could forge that 'essential continuity' between the church and 'state' that Burnell believes he sees.<sup>21</sup> To be sure, emperors after Constantine 'scaled back' the jurisdiction of bishops' courts;<sup>22</sup> but during Augustine's pontificate the courts still gave prelates the chance to take into their own hands matters on the frontier between regime and religion. The faithful could avoid the prejudices harboured by pagan magistrates as well as what A.H.M. Jones calls the 'excessively slow' delivery of verdicts for which the government bureaucracy became known. Jones surmises that 'the humblest citizens' could count on a 'rough-and-ready, cheaper, speedier justice . . . before the local bishop'.<sup>23</sup> Clara Gebbia adds that the regime's courts in Africa were not just slow but usually shockingly ineffective (*impotente*).<sup>24</sup> Augustine was scrupulous. He seemed intent on avoiding the appearance of impropriety, as when he summoned several distinguished local laymen to help referee a case in his audience involving an argument about a legacy willed to the church. At least, he looks to have been attempting to ensure that the grievances of the estates' other heirs would get a fair hearing (sermon 355.3). He was conscientious, yet he never warmed to his role as magistrate. He handed over his court duties years before he died, letting his lieutenant preside from 426 (epistle 213.5). And Augustine never seems to have sought to integrate or identify his court or the church's courts with the government's initiatives.<sup>25</sup>

A few of his remarks show how uncomfortable he was sitting in judgment and trying to make peace between self-righteous and aggressively selfish litigants. His temperament was better suited to fathoming mysteries than to playing magistrate. Besides, as he confided, preaching on the psalms, his work as a magistrate cramped his effectiveness as a pastor. He began one sermon advising parishioners who behaved at times as if they were the only upright persons in the congregation or in the courtroom. Augustine explained to them that churches were threshing floors with both wheat and chaff (*permixta*, once again). The good and wicked worshipped together. But the good who were uncharitable and quick to assume that fellow parishioners' causes were unjust were no longer as good or upstanding as they thought (*Enarrationes in Psalmos* 25[2].5). Before he concluded his sermon, however, he returned to the problems that intolerance and contention created in churches and in church courts, explicitly alleging that litigants' recriminations impaired his pastoral care, for them and for others. His tone suggests that there was nothing he loathed more than adjudicating cases, and so disappointing parishioners whose anger at the outcome placed them beyond his influence. Losers accused him of accepting bribes from

winners. Augustine wanted both to be fair and to reconcile the quarrelsome, yet, as magistrate, he forfeited a place in parishioners' affections which he had tried to preserve by the impartiality he showed in his audience (*Enarrationes in Psalmos* 25[2].13; *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 118[24].3). He recalled that the Apostle Paul counselled Christians not to bring their quarrels before secular judges. The apostle was unequivocal but also itinerant; he never settled anywhere long enough to play magistrate and realize how difficult it might become to reconcile belligerent litigants. He would not have foreseen the pastoral predicaments bishops' judicial determinations might leave in their wake. And he would never know the incessant demands that contention in church courts would make on prelates' patience and time (*De opera monachorum* 37; epistle 48.1).

Despite his complaints, however, one of Augustine's letters suggests to some scholars that he relished opportunities to reconcile querulous Christians in court. He wrote to Eustochius, a Christian who must have been learned in the law, inquiring in detail about the rights of parents, tenants, and landlords with respect to the status of slaves (epistle 24\*). Elsewhere, he expressed his opposition to slave traffickers, but the letter to Eustochius addressed less sinister specifics than the kidnapping that filled slavers' ships and coffers. Augustine's letter, that is, was no strategically crafted prelude to a campaign for emancipation. Perhaps it probed to ensure that he justly reprimanded and punished those who illicitly enslaved tenants or offspring. But Augustine may well have been asking for information in order to relieve the anxieties that attended his pastoral counselling when he repeated the sacred texts' directive that slaves among the faithful obey their masters. He may have been seeking legal advice to avoid counselling those wrongfully enslaved to submit. He asked, for example, whether slaves were still slaves when parents who farmed them out died. Did that death render them 'independent' and free to sell their labour? Surely, had Augustine been enthusiastic about the role of the bishops' courts to prescribe punishments for the exploitation of forced labour, he would have explored the possibility of challenging current custom. Instead, he sought information about prevailing practices. Eustochius' response has not survived; in its absence, evidence of Augustine's research for his supposed judicial activism remains inconclusive.<sup>26</sup>

And when he wrote about slave trafficking, rancorously and at length, he made a point of leaving punishment to government authorities. The letter was sent to Alypius who was then (in the 420s) in Italy. Augustine was baffled and scandalized by the freedom with which Galatian slave traders raided Numidia *maxime*, but other African provinces as well, and used the port of Hippo to assemble and deport their catch. His church managed to ransom a few captives, yet the problem required more comprehensive remedies. He urged Alypius to ask officials at Court to instruct their representatives in Africa to implement measures to check slavers' foraging but did not mention the bishops' courts at all (epistle 10\*.5–7).

Augustine only infrequently lectured the regime's magistrates in Africa on the connections between punishment, rehabilitation, and reconciliation. He reserved for his church a critical role in the latter two but did not think his court or audience could make significant contributions. The regime's

contribution was protection. As Charles Mathewes suggests, Augustine would have conceded that ‘no realistic political psychology can do without’ the fears prompted by the prospect of punishment.<sup>27</sup> Still, one can readily imagine Augustine acknowledging as well that the power to punish was not just an indispensable attribute of political authority but was also one of several symptoms of the ‘lust to dominate’ which characterized or afflicted all authorities ‘in this wicked world’ – and which revolted him (*De civitate Dei* 3.14 and 18.49).

Augustine relished time for contemplation and learned conversation. Still, he acquiesced to being ordained in the early 390s and to serving the laity while trying to live honourably (*Contra Faustum Manichaeum* 22.56).<sup>28</sup> That service committed him to proposing, defending, and mitigating punishments aimed at resolving his parishioners’ problems and ending battles between them. But the battles directly related to a more profound reconciliation were those raging within his parishioners. Creatures were not equipped to prevail over their envy and desires to acquire. From Augustine’s perspective, philosophies had little to contribute to that end. They commended self-control or at least the appearance of control, but they underestimated the extent to which temptations overtaxed efforts to restrain ‘the flesh’. Professing self-control, moreover, was tantamount to arrogant self-assertion, which turned attempts to cope with disgraceful desires into interminable, unwinnable struggles. Pastors began with their parishioners’ sense that they were losing – and that the punishments they would face were far worse than a government could have prescribed – and preached a repentance and reconciliation that replaced the fear of punishment with a love of righteousness.<sup>29</sup> Such reconciliation would have had some influence on Christians’ conduct in civil society; the faithful, ideally, were more compassionate, better prepared to yield to magistrates’ determinations. Yet one imagines that, if Augustine had his way, yielding would have preceded litigation. He would have had the faithful let injudicious remarks that normally prompted libel suits and inextinguishable animosities go unremarked. His pastoral duty was to persuade parishioners that the celestial peace their faith, composure, and love for God and neighbour would purchase was far more valuable than avenging insults or securing revenues and temporal rights.

Persuading magistrates to release the convicted and condemned, bishops might blunder. Beneficiaries of their interventions could disappoint. One reprieved malefactor might murder many innocents. Even the most vigilant prelates, as pastors, could not infallibly oversee and guarantee every rehabilitation. The best they could do was set examples of forgiveness and make their faith compelling in a world dominated by self-love and retributive justice. Their objective was to make an other-than-terrestrial reconciliation the aim of every reprimand (epistle 153.18).

Penitentiaries confine to punish and, ideally, to inspire repentance, to rehabilitate, and ultimately to reintegrate offenders into society. Yet, we are constantly confronted with the limits of practices that penologists continue to commend to those ends and with vexatious disappointments that are not unrelated to Augustine’s. To reunify the church in Africa, he sanctioned punishment, to a

point; Donatism, however, survived. To punish sin and save sinners, he countenanced punishment as what we might term tough love – foregrounding divine forgiveness and mercy as well as repentance – and went well beyond the purposes of contemporary penology.

## Notes

- 1 Sermon 13.8. Embedded citations to Augustine's work hereafter give the book, section, or chapter numbers used in modern editions, the most accessible of which is online at <http://www.Augustinus.it/latino/index.htm>, drawn from vols. 32–45 of the *Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Latina*, J.-P. Migne, ed. (1844–1864) Paris: Garnier. See Lancel (1999) 211–16, for the economic importance of North Africa at the time. References to the sections of Sermon 13 in the next few paragraphs in the text are placed in parentheses.
- 2 *terram quam portas rege*.
- 3 Also see sermon 366.6 ('*in baculo misericordiae fidenter incumbere*'), commenting on 1 Corinthians 9:26–27.
- 4 *te esto iudex in te*.
- 5 *bene audisti si sic audisti, et procul dubio paenitendo peccatum punisti*. For memory, see Augustine, *Confessiones* 10.8 and Hochschild (2012) 139–49.
- 6 *pater et quando ferit, amat*.
- 7 Horn (2010) and Mathewes (2010).
- 8 Burnell (2005) 136–7, 148, 159. Von Heyking (2007) 677 sifting recent interpretations of Augustine, proposes that Burnell's book 'takes the strongest view' connecting public policy with political theology. My study suggests not only that Burnell understates the importance of Augustine's emphasis on the contrasts between the political and the celestial or eschatological but also that those contrasts signal Augustine's acquiescence to the role of government in punishment and reconciliation was more grudgingly given than others have assumed.
- 9 *cellas circumiens rusticanas*.
- 10 See Optatus, *De schismata donatistarum* 3.4: *insanientes*; *Contra epistulam Parmeniani* 2.3, 6; and *Contra Cresconium* 3.49, 54. Brent Shaw (2004), (2006), and (2011) 630–64 rightly suspects that the descriptions of circumcellions' 'binge drinking' and excessive violence were exaggerated to shame the Donatist moderates and to justify the government's intervention. Augustine's accounts are probably not as 'fictive' as Shaw suggests, although the traditional scholarly accounts tend to be a tad too trusting; see, for example, Diesner (1964) 81–90; Frend (1971) 172–8, 257–63; and Kriegbaum (1986) 152–4. But also consult Kaufman (2009) and Barreteau-Revel (2010).
- 11 Lamirande (1998) 217; Zocca (2004) 126–7.
- 12 *Melius esse quidem quis dubitaverit ad Deum colendum doctrina homines duci quam poena timore vel dolore compelli?* For Theodosius' regulations, consult Bond (2014). Augustine, *Contra litteras Petiliani* 2.97, 224 compares the verdicts rendered and edicts issued when Constantine, the first faithful emperor, judged in favour of Catholic Christianity with the decrees restoring basilicas to the Donatists issued by the apostate emperor Julian. In this connection, see Szidat (1990).
- 13 Augustine, epistle 105.7–9; Augustine, *Contra epistulam Parmeniani* 2.7, 13; and Kaufman (2009) 132–33. See Lancel (1972–5) 3:1226 for Emeritus' dissent, citing, *inter alia*, the Gospel of John (15: 18–19), the passage in which Jesus explained to his disciples that they were not 'of the world', which 'despised' them (*de mundo non estis . . . propterea odit vos mundus*). Hugoniot (2002) 2084 suspects that a number of municipal officials in Hippo may have been Donatists during Augustine's pontificate.
- 14 *In Evangelium Joannis tractatus* 13.13, referring to John 19: 23–24.

- 15 *Contra litteras Petilianus* 2.89, 194–95, referring to John 18: 10–11; epistle 93.8.
- 16 *De civitate Dei* 21.23 (*enervabitur fides*), discussing the condemnation of the Devil in the Gospel of Matthew 25: 41–46.
- 17 *tu inimicis Ecclesiae viventibus relaxa spatium poenitendi*.
- 18 Julian of Eclanum deployed the observation about strays to underscore the importance of human effort; Augustine elaborated rather than contradicted it. See his *Contra Julianum opus imperfectum* 5.64, 1.
- 19 *ipse quantulacumque virtus quae dicitur nostra, illius est nobis bonitate concessa . . . sub venia viveremus*.
- 20 Dodaro (2004) 96–9.
- 21 Burnell (2005).
- 22 Lamoreaux (1995).
- 23 Jones (1964) 1: 517. For legislation creating the church's courts, see Cimma (1989) and Drake (2000) 323–9.
- 24 Gebbia (1988) 693–4.
- 25 For Augustine's presumed effort to expand his audience's jurisdiction and influence secular jurisprudence, compare Raikas (1997) with Kaufman (2003). Also consult Uhalde (2007) 66–7, 135–7.
- 26 Lepelley (1983) knits Augustine's specific questions for Eustochius into a case that conceivably was pending in the bishop's court.
- 27 Mathewes (2010) 49–51.
- 28 *honeste ambulans ad eos qui foris sunt*.
- 29 For example, see sermon 154(A).1–3. Also consult Nisula (2012) 264–5.

## 20 Reading reconciliation in late antique *altercationes*

*Michael Stuart Williams*

Some books against Deism fell into my hands; they were said to be the substance of sermons preached at Boyle's Lectures. It happened that they wrought an effect on me quite contrary to what was intended by them; for the arguments of the Deists, which were quoted to be refuted, appeared to me much stronger than the refutations; in short, I soon became a thorough Deist.

Benjamin Franklin (1916) 1.178

Debates and dialogues are the classical literary forms that most obviously put on display both an unresolved dispute and the efforts made towards its resolution. In the classical world this sort of practice is most closely associated with Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries BC, which saw not only a turn towards public democratic debate in political decision-making, but also the influential literary representation of Socrates as engaging in a freewheeling and open-ended approach to philosophical debate.<sup>1</sup> Although there is room to doubt the link thus drawn between political and cultural circumstances and literary forms, it has nevertheless led to some criticism of late antique Christianity (in particular) as having brought to an end a classical era of free expression, instead 'reinforcing and indeed demanding a strict hierarchical world picture, a single truth'.<sup>2</sup> This, of course, is to overstate the case, and it is widely accepted that the form of the dialogue was by no means foreign to late antique Christian writers.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, it has recently been argued that public disputation remained a vital element of Christian late antiquity and that Christians maintained a powerful commitment to the idea that opponents were to be reconciled to the truth by means of persuasion and rational debate.<sup>4</sup>

Yet, the case continues to be made that Christian debates and dialogues in late antiquity were qualitatively different from their classical forerunners: that, as Simon Goldhill has put it, there is something 'about the expression of conversation in the form of a dialogue that makes it integral to democracy and difficult for early Christianity'.<sup>5</sup> There remains a suspicion that the dialogues engaged in by Christians lacked the 'uncertainty' and genuine 'threat' of a more classical kind of dialogue; that Christians no longer permitted 'open dialectical discussion of opposing points of view'.<sup>6</sup> This argument is summed up by Averil Cameron as making the case that:

Open debate ended with the success of Christianization: Christians debated, but they could not ‘dialogue’ in the Socratic sense of conducting open-ended discussion. The end was always a foregone conclusion; thus what may seem to be dialogues do not represent genuine dialogue or debate, but something more sinister, an artificial genre or an authoritarian discourse leading not to the opening up of debate but rather to its closing down.<sup>7</sup>

There are immediate problems with identifying such difficulties with Christian dialogue alone. For one thing, it is far from clear that Socratic dialogues are as open-ended as they pretend, and if the outcome was not a foregone conclusion the conversation is nevertheless directed towards certain ends.<sup>8</sup> In addition, political dialogue even in the absence of Christianity brings with it the prospects of ‘dissent, persuasion (spin) and the repression of minority views’.<sup>9</sup> It was after all, as Goldhill points out, democratic Athens that executed Socrates, ‘at least partly because of how he did dialogue’.<sup>10</sup> If we are to understand what difference Christianity made in its use of dialogue, then we need to distinguish carefully between the various claims that are made for dialogue, regarding both its processes and its possible outcomes. Such an investigation can earn its place in a volume on peace and reconciliation in classical antiquity by understanding dialogue, as I propose to do here, in terms of a modern understanding of the nature of reconciliation and dispute resolution.<sup>11</sup>

### **Dialogue, dispute resolution, and reconciliation**

Modern dispute resolution theory tends to recognise the need to balance, on the one hand, the assertion and maintenance of one’s own positions and interests and, on the other, an awareness of and an empathy towards the positions and interests of other parties.<sup>12</sup> Although these may be in tension, it should be kept in mind that they are not necessarily opposite ends of a scale, or in any way incompatible. Instead, they can perhaps be conceived of as perpendicular axes, with one’s attitude in a dialogue or negotiation corresponding to a position in respect to each. Hence a determination to assert and hold on to one’s interests may exist alongside a readiness to acknowledge the interests and commitments of others, or with a complete uninterest in them; and likewise, an empathy with an opponent’s position need not imply a willingness to abandon one’s own. In these terms, we might imagine an idealised Socratic dialogue as exhibiting a low level of assertion and a high level of empathy: participants are encouraged not to commit to fixed positions, and are instead expected to show a high level of interest in and awareness of the views of others. An Athenian democratic debate would similarly be characterised by a high level of awareness of the views of others – invited by the very form of a democratic debate – while at the same time enabling a strong assertion of and commitment to one’s prior interests. That such a debate would normally end in a vote should make this clear: the point is not that it should end in a consensus, nor even necessarily a compromise between rival positions, but that a single position should be chosen.

Democracy on the Athenian model, as in its descendants, allows for and even encourages the victory – or tyranny – of a majority.

The advantage of taking this perspective is that it clarifies the ways in which Athenian democracy and Socratic dialogues are similar: both provide for the open expression of differing opinions and interests, and this is presumably what has led to their being accepted as genuine ‘dialogue’. Goldhill repeatedly picks this element out in his definitions of democratic debate: the assembly is central to it because it ‘is predicated on the assumption that different views must be laid open to public scrutiny if the best decision about action is to be reached’; and this puts dialogue at the heart of it because ‘it is only after hearing both sides of the question and allowing different views to be expressed, that a vote can properly be held’.<sup>13</sup> What is vital here is the procedure, not the outcome of the discussion: a true dialogue, it seems, is one in which all views get an airing, even if a final vote will privilege one view over the rest. This, in turn, makes clear the grounds on which Christianity is criticised: it is the suppression of alternative opinions that makes it problematic.<sup>14</sup> The issue is the unwillingness in Christianity to admit – that is, to recognise or empathise with – the possible alternatives to its own established and authoritative positions. Even those Christian texts that seem to adopt the dialogue form are criticised for offering little more than stock questions and answers, instructing their readers in fixed responses instead of exposing them to radical ideas.<sup>15</sup>

There are, of course, exceptions, and it has already been noted that the contrast here was deliberately over-drawn. But the response to such accusations seems to make an unexpected jump from one axis to another: from the claim that Christian dialogues reveal a lack of empathy to the claim that they are insufficient because they reveal an essential inflexibility. If this is what is meant by the ‘commitment to certainty and the repression of difference’ which is identified by Goldhill as largely incompatible with dialogue, then it is important to note that these can be understood as two different things.<sup>16</sup> The repression of difference may mean silencing dissent, but it may mean simply insisting on the rightness of one’s position – an inflexibility that was at the core of Christian belief. This is to say that Christians necessarily found themselves at an extreme end of the scale in regard to asserting their positions and interests. Christianity was defined in relation to revealed truths which, if not self-evident, were certainly non-negotiable. They were not therefore intrinsically hostile to rational debate, nor even necessarily saw it as a threat to their beliefs. Reason was valued in principle by the likes of Augustine of Hippo, but was not a reliable guide to religious truths, which transcended it.<sup>17</sup> Late antique Christians were often eager to participate in disputations; but they did so in the knowledge that they had been given the answers in advance; and their faith was unlikely to be shaken by apparent defeat in debate, which could always be represented as the illusory triumph of deceitful rhetoric.<sup>18</sup>

Christian dialogues accordingly score highly on the scale of assertion and maintenance of positions and interests: Christian debaters were unlikely to be induced to change their views like participants in a Socratic dialogue. It is

also true that a high proportion of these Christian dialogues are ‘polemical or controversial’ in intent and that ‘many, if not all . . . were indeed composed to demonstrate the truth of a foregone conclusion’.<sup>19</sup> They ultimately enforce a single orthodoxy and insist on the bankruptcy of any alternative. And yet this inflexibility need not exclude them from the category of ‘genuine’ dialogues. As we have seen, it is not the case that a true dialogue requires that the parties are willing to give up their established positions: it is certainly not a requisite element of Athenian democratic dialogue, in which it is perfectly conceivable that one party achieves its aim outright. Nor is it the case, therefore, that the model by which Christianity is criticised is one which assumes ‘that the object of dialogue is consensus and that the protagonists start from comparable and equal positions’.<sup>20</sup> Christian dialogues do not need defending on these grounds: the point is not that the outcome should involve each side giving up some interest, but that the process enables all the relevant parties to be heard. And this is true not only of our emergent definition of a dialogue, but also when it comes to modern dispute resolution.

Herbert C. Kelman, for instance, distinguishes carefully between ‘conflict settlement’ and ‘conflict resolution’, in which the former is directed towards compromise on the level of interests but leaves the relationship untouched; while the latter requires precisely a ‘transformation of the relationship between the parties’.<sup>21</sup> As we have seen, this need not involve abandoning prior commitments or interests on either side, but rather a recognition of ‘each other’s needs and constraints’.<sup>22</sup> And while this is proposed as an essential element in the resolution of a conflict, Kelman offers a further step in the process: reconciliation. This institutionalises peace through each party’s ‘acceptance of the other’s identity’, which requires ‘acknowledging the validity and legitimacy of the other’s narrative without necessarily fully agreeing with that narrative’.<sup>23</sup> Reconciliation is not often the basis for the resolution of an immediate conflict, and indeed may not even accompany it; but it is the aspect of peacemaking that arguably has the most significant long-term effect. Significantly, it is also the aspect most visible in Christian dialogues, many of which presuppose the prior resolution of a conflict – sometimes by violence or proscription, which are also, of course, means of conflict resolution – but nevertheless seem to allow for this awareness and recognition of alternative views. Indeed, it may be argued that reconciliation along these lines is inherent in the form of a dialogue, which as Cameron notes ‘seems to presuppose plurality’.<sup>24</sup> Both Cameron and Goldhill invoke Mikhail Bakhtin’s idea of the ‘dialogic’, and Cameron explicitly proposes a reading of certain Christian dialogues with attention to the *heteroglossia* which enables the voicing of alternative perspectives.<sup>25</sup> It should be no surprise when ‘orthodoxy’ wins out in a Christian dialogue. But even the simple act of representing the voice of the other requires an exercise of empathy on the part of the author, and demands it, too, of the reader.

Of course, alternative voices are not always given a full and fair presentation. Christian dialogues, in particular, are picked out by Goldhill as often treating the less favoured party as ‘canon fodder’ [*sic*] for the protagonist.<sup>26</sup> This is not

unique to Christianity: dialogues and debates are always to some extent staged, and are often subject to the control of an author.<sup>27</sup> But even if early Christians were unusually authoritarian in their discourse, it is possible to identify occasions on which a dialogue provides a more vivid and apparently sympathetic portrayal of an opponent than would seem to be required. The remainder of this chapter will focus on two late antique Latin dialogues – styled *altercationes* – in which the designated hero wins the day for orthodoxy, but in which the defeated party is treated with what seems a surprising level of empathy. Neither protagonist gives any ground from his original position: compromise and consensus are always on the inflexible terms of the orthodox. But one text seems at least to hint at reconciliation, as the parties do their best to see the other's point of view. And while the other takes a harder line, and ends in open animosity, it, too, gives its antagonist a remarkably sympathetic hearing. Whether or not these nuances were intended by the authors, they give the reader the chance to view the process from both sides. Even as they portray the inevitable triumph of Christian orthodoxy, they offer the reader the room to adopt a (marginally) broader perspective.

### Sympathy for the Luciferians

The first text is Jerome's fourth-century dialogue against the Luciferians.<sup>28</sup> This was the label given to those who, along with the Sardinian bishop Lucifer of Cagliari, refused to join the majority of the church in permitting to return to the fold, with their episcopal status intact, bishops who had previously accepted a view at variance with present orthodoxy.<sup>29</sup> Such an amnesty had been agreed in AD 362 at the Council of Alexandria, which itself responded to previous councils at Rimini-Seleucia and Constantinople: at those meetings, a large number of bishops had subscribed to a creed that they later recanted, and which came to be regarded as heretical 'Arians'.<sup>30</sup> Lucifer refused to allow that any bishop who had collaborated in heresy should be granted the opportunity to continue in orthodox office; and although he himself died in 371, it seems that in the west, in particular, his hard line was continued by scattered groups of Christians, who maintained their objections to bishops they considered to be compromised by their past affiliations.<sup>31</sup> The majority of the church came to regard these Luciferians as schismatics, separating themselves not through any difference in doctrinal belief but by an inappropriately rigorous approach to Christian institutions. By the time Jerome wrote his dialogue in around AD 379, he was therefore expressing the dominant position, which in this case favoured amnesty and forgiveness over a narrower kind of purism.

There is no doubt that this was a work designed to put the case for the existing orthodoxy. This agenda is made clear from Jerome's setting of the scene at the very beginning, which establishes that this is a dispute between a Luciferian, whose undistinctive name (Helladius) is noted the first time he speaks and never again, and a 'son of the church', who appears throughout the dialogue as 'Orthodoxus'.<sup>32</sup> From this derives the conventional title of the

work, *Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi*; and its generic identity is paradoxically underlined by the token effort made by Jerome to present it as the record of an actual debate.<sup>33</sup> But if there is no real effort to portray a realistic or historical setting, the scene does seek to establish a tone of violent disagreement, with insults flung on both sides and the protagonists ‘almost spitting in each other’s faces’.<sup>34</sup> The stage would appear to be set for a triumph of the orthodox, and the fierce repression of difference. But, in fact, this is a rather misleading set-up for a conspicuously friendly debate, marked explicitly as between one son of the Church and another, and for a distinctly sympathetic portrayal of this Luciferian and his views.

The debate is a long one, and there is space here to note only a few of the moments at which this element is especially striking. The first half of the dialogue is devoted to rehearsing the arguments on each side, before we come to what appears to be the core of the disagreement. On the one hand, ‘Orthodoxus’ focuses on his opponent’s willingness to extend forgiveness to laymen baptised by ‘Arian’ bishops, and argues that this should lead him to agree also with the further point:

If an Arian is able to baptise, then he is able to be bishop. If he is not able to baptise, then you reject the layman, and I in turn shall not accept the bishop. I shall follow you wherever you go: we shall either stick in the mud together, or make progress together!<sup>35</sup>

Yet, this apparently solid argument earns a full and confident reply, in which ‘Luciferianus’ insists on the difference between the two cases:

A layman, even though baptised in the faith of the church, is received as a penitent; as for a bishop, either he does not do penance and retains his status, or else, if he does penance, he ceases to be a bishop. Hence we are right both to accept the penitent layman and to reject the bishop, if he wishes to continue in his office.<sup>36</sup>

If not necessarily an authentic position adopted by Luciferians, this nevertheless seems to be a sensible and fundamentally sustainable point. There is certainly no strong sense that it is a position set up to be ridiculed or dismissed; and although there is scope for further argument on the point at issue – it is not, as ‘Orthodoxus’ points out, wholly clear that a bishop who does penance must lose his status – there is, in fact, no further progress in the debate as such. ‘Orthodoxus’ repeats his stance and the debate seems to reach a stalemate.

At this point the dialogue shifts as ‘Luciferianus’ suddenly offers new terms:

I beg you to lay aside the methods of the philosophers and talk with me in Christian simplicity, if that is you are willing to follow not the dialecticians but the fishermen. Does it seem proper to you that an Arian should be a bishop?<sup>37</sup>

'Orthodoxus' in reply again repeats the argument he has been pursuing: 'You prove him to be a bishop, in receiving those whom he has baptised.' But he immediately takes up the offer of a move beyond 'philosophical' argument and laments instead that they must be at odds: 'Why are there walls dividing us, when you agree with us both in faith and in the admission of Arians?'<sup>38</sup> The move away from philosophical debate and the appeal instead to charity and common sense is a characteristic Christian manoeuvre, and it confirms the impression that late antique Christianity was less than committed to the sort of ideally rational debate we might associate with Socrates.<sup>39</sup> It is also convenient for 'Orthodoxus' that the initiative here is presented as coming from his opponent. To the extent that this is a move that betrays some anxiety about the strength of one's case, it is only 'Luciferianus' who is afflicted. 'Orthodoxus' retreats from none of his arguments, and indeed accepts the offer of a truce on condition that his opponent accept his position entirely.<sup>40</sup> 'Luciferianus' soon throws in the towel, and the rivals are reconfigured as master and disciple.

This is fairly obviously a comprehensive defeat for 'Luciferianus', whose reluctance to go on with the debate has required him to concede his position entirely. Indeed, his concession is explicitly figured in terms of military conflict. His reluctance to abandon his right to argue is derided by 'Orthodoxus' – 'Since you beg for peace with a shield, I must offer my olive branch grafted to a sword' – and his immediate response continues the metaphor: 'Look, I am dropping my hands in submission: you have conquered.'<sup>41</sup> Jerome's idea of orthodoxy is maintained and none of its positions relinquished: there is no give-and-take, and the dispute is resolved entirely on one party's terms. And yet, there is something more to be said about the character of the dialogue. Certainly, once the main dispute is over – at a point when half the dialogue remains – the relationship becomes openly friendly. This is perhaps only fitting since the characters now interact more as teacher and pupil: 'Orthodoxus' thus congratulates 'Luciferianus' for his decision to turn away from the Sardinians and align himself with the rest of the world; while 'Luciferianus' himself plays the eager pupil, gladly abasing himself where necessary: 'Would you be so kind as to explain to me . . . not as an opponent, but as a disciple?'<sup>42</sup> It would be a mistake, of course, to make much of this: it is easy to be gracious in victory. Indeed, it is proof of the completeness of the victory that one's opponent should be so abject, and so easily patronised.

Nevertheless, the dialogue continues to convey the impression that 'Luciferianus', and the Luciferians in general, deserve some sympathy. After all, 'Luciferianus' is not overcome by rational debate, any more than was his opponent. It is true that he takes the initiative in abandoning that approach, but 'Orthodoxus' immediately responds with an appeal to Christian unity. Rather than pursue the discussion any further he draws attention to the points of agreement, and he returns to them shortly afterwards in an elegant entreaty: 'We agree on the faith, we agree on receiving heretics, let us agree on a common assembly!'<sup>43</sup> This is what finally prompts 'Luciferianus' to accept his opponent

as teacher; and it is a move that can be understood neatly in the language of dispute resolution. Throughout the first part of the discussion both parties remain firm in asserting and maintaining their own positions: very little ground is given on either side. Once the core of the disagreement is identified – and their attitudes towards ecclesiastical discipline shown to be fundamentally incompatible – there is an effort to resolve the dispute by shifting the focus instead towards common ground. Jerome's dialogue does not shy away entirely from rational debate, but it is concerned not to represent such debate as the solution to this particular dispute. Instead, we are offered a model of conflict resolution and reconciliation that transcends specific points of disagreement, and relies instead on empathy for the nature and interests of one's opponent.

This approach is wholeheartedly approved by 'Luciferianus' in the comment with which he wraps up the discussion:

You should not think that you alone have won: *we* have won. Each of us carries off a palm: you have defeated me, and I my error. And may it always be so for me when I argue, that in coming to the better argument I leave behind the one I wrongly held. One thing, however, I must confess, since I know very well the character of my friends, and they can be more easily defeated than persuaded.<sup>44</sup>

Despite the invocation of a shared victory this appears to be sheer self-abasement, and it does little to place the disputants on an equal footing. There is no disguising here the heavy hand of the author, who has 'Luciferianus' collaborate so enthusiastically in his own defeat; and it becomes sinister indeed if the final line is taken to mean that Luciferians respond only to brute force. But even on this reading it may communicate only a recognition that rational debate is not always effective when one is faced with a committed opponent; and that unity and harmony – even if that means only submission to the dominant party – can often best be achieved by other means. Both interlocutors agree, after all, that (orthodox) Christianity can be justified by reason and argument, and both seem to agree that rational debate would be the best way to persuade the dissenters. It is only if the other Luciferians are too hostile or too stubborn to engage in such a debate, as 'Luciferianus' suggests, that it will have to be replaced by more forceful measures. If this is to be taken as expressing something of Jerome's own view, it is striking that what we have here is a Christian complaining that (other) Christians are too sure of themselves to 'do dialogue'.

And even so, we cannot in this case characterise Jerome's approach as restricted to attacks on opponents who are 'lambasted as half-witted heretics and cantankerous backbiters'.<sup>45</sup> That some sympathy is on show for the Luciferian view is suggested by the scrupulous presentation of their prime concerns, and by the fact that their arguments are never actually refuted in the course of the debate. The conspicuous courtesy on display in the second half of the discussion has also been remarked, and it is suggestive that, with the dispute resolved, 'Orthodoxus' offers praise for the arch-schismatic himself, Lucifer of Cagliari:

Indeed he himself was a good shepherd, but one who left behind a great spoil for the wolves. I pass over what certain detractors maintain as if they were definite facts: that he did this from a love of glory or for the sake of passing down his name to posterity, or on account of a grudge he held against Eusebius [of Vercelli] . . . I believe none of this in the case of such a man; and I will say one thing, which remains true even now: that his difference with us lies only in words, and not in things.<sup>46</sup>

There is perhaps a hint of Tacitean irony here, with ‘Orthodoxus’ careful to list the charges made against Lucifer even as he rejects them; but it is not unreasonable to think that Jerome himself would have endorsed this view, in light of his qualified praise of Lucifer elsewhere.<sup>47</sup> Indeed, Jerome had his own links to Lucifer, although he was not inclined to make much of them; and respect for the Luciferian position was made easier by its frequent classification as a schism and not a heresy: it amounted to, if anything, an excess of orthodox feeling.<sup>48</sup> And, of course, it was easy from a dominant position to condescend to the Luciferian minority, and it did little to prevent the schism from being firmly repressed. But it remains the case that this dialogue, although it ultimately reinforces a hegemonic Christianity, at the same time provides a voice for an alternative point of view.

### **Witness for the prosecution**

It is not entirely surprising that Jerome’s dialogue should express some sympathy for the Luciferians, since the two sides had much in common and that their dispute could be understood as a procedural matter – and since it ends in a reconciliation. We should be far more surprised to find it in a dispute in which the issue at stake is heresy, and even more so in a text that claims to express the point of view of a minority faction suffering persecution. And yet, we may see at least a hint of this sympathetic rendering of an opponent in another *Altercatio*: more raw and less carefully managed than Jerome’s, and certainly more difficult to place. This is the anonymous and rather mysterious *Altercatio Heracliani cum Germinio*, which presents itself as a stenographic account of an actual debate in the mid-fourth century AD.<sup>49</sup> It is therefore much more precise than Jerome’s dialogue in establishing a plausible setting and date for its disputation between a laymen, Heraclianus, and the (real) bishop of Sirmium, Germinius.<sup>50</sup> Nevertheless, the dialogue as we have it is evidently fictionalised to some extent, as shown not only by certain oddities and inconsistencies but also in its representation of Heraclianus as a layman of astonishing theological sophistication.<sup>51</sup> The issue at stake is the creed put forward at the Council of Rimini, to which Germinius is shown to subscribe, and which Heraclianus represents as ‘Arian’ heresy. The view that the Rimini creed was heretical would ultimately win out, but it was not the consensus at the time this debate is set, and the validity of the creed of Rimini remained uncertain for decades afterwards.<sup>52</sup> What we see in this text, then, is a series of ‘anti-Arian’ talking

points that may represent either the views of a rigorist minority at the time, or subsequent elaborations by a growing majority.<sup>53</sup> But regardless of its authenticity, the fundamental purpose of the text is clear: to portray the resistance of an orthodox layman to persecution at the hands of a heretic.

As Richard Flower has emphasised, the text is modelled after the acts of the martyrs, with the 'Arian' bishop Germinius taking the role of the persecuting official. The general tenor of the text can be observed from the opening exchanges:

GERMINIUS SAID TO HERACLIANUS: Why did it seem right to you to urge men towards *homoousios*, which was composed by foolish men?

HERACLIANUS SAID: So, were the three hundred and more bishops foolish?

GERMINIUS SAID: What does *homoousios* mean?

HERACLIANUS SAID: You, who are preaching this as a stumbling-stone for the people, are also able to speak Greek.

GERMINIUS SAID: The exiled Eusebius [of Vercelli] has taught this to you, as has Hilary [of Poitiers], who has recently returned from exile.<sup>54</sup>

Germinius begins with *ad hominem* arguments against the bishops at the Council of Nicaea, which first formally adopted the term *homoousios*, and against the exiled bishops Eusebius and Hilary who were at the time advocating it against the consensus achieved at Rimini. The initial response of Heraclianus is to reassert the authority of Nicaea. But he goes on to insist on his right to speak on his own account as a Christian, an opportunity that Germinius was seemingly disinclined to grant:

HERACLIANUS SAID: I speak with the right and authority of the sacred Scriptures. Why do you address these things to me, in order to divert me from the way of truth? Let us argue according to the divine laws! For the opportunity of speaking and disputing lies open.

GERMINIUS SAID: And who might you be, wicked slave? Are you a presbyter or a deacon?

HERACLIANUS SAID: I am neither a presbyter nor a deacon, but, as the least of all Christians, I speak with my life as my warrant.

GERMINIUS SAID: See how much he speaks! Has no one knocked out his teeth? Then Jovinianus the deacon and Marinus the lector beat him.<sup>55</sup>

The dialogue thus presents Germinius as aiming to suppress dissent: precisely the charge so often laid against the Christian approach to debate. Moreover, although Heraclianus shows himself ready to engage in dialogue, his designated role as the obdurate hero precludes him from offering any compromise. We might therefore expect a wholly unproductive dialogue: the hero standing his ground, and the persecutor responding with helpless violence. The core of a martyr act, after all, was not persuasion but confrontation.<sup>56</sup>

Germinius seems set to occupy the role of a Roman official in the pre-Constantinian martyr acts: a less sympathetic villain it is difficult to imagine.

But although it is clear from the start that Heraclianus will win the debate, there are times when the mask of villainy worn by the bishop appears to slip. Immediately following the beating above, for example, Germinius attempts to establish common cause, recalling that he himself had baptised Heraclianus with a trinitarian formula – and implying that this might form the basis for a renewed agreement between them.<sup>57</sup> Heraclianus refuses the gesture and continues to insist on his view, however, and is able soon to argue the bishop into silence.<sup>58</sup> But Germinius tries again to make a personal connection, and he is urged to continue this strategy by the crowd:

Germinius began to praise him, saying ‘You have a good heart and you are well born, and we have known you since your infancy; turn back to our church.’ And all the others said to him: ‘Lord bishop! He was the one who fought against the heretics of the shady Photinus. How can he now have become a heretic?’<sup>59</sup>

This approach is perhaps intended as another example of Germinius’s impotence, and of his eagerness to avoid the issue under debate; moreover, in appealing to Heraclianus’s previous good character and inviting him to return to his former status, it also reflects the trials and temptations of numerous Christian martyrs.<sup>60</sup> The advocacy of the crowd is also, of course, to Heraclianus’s credit, establishing his *bona fides* and making Germinius seem unreasonable. But the response of the bishop in turn appears to complicate the picture.

Having abused Heraclianus at the start of the proceedings for being influenced by Eusebius of Vercelli, Germinius suddenly appeals to that bishop’s authority: ‘GERMINIUS SAID: I explained my faith to Eusebius and made it clear, and it was pleasing to him.’<sup>61</sup> This remarkable claim has been the subject of much discussion, and it may be a genuine detail: Germinius, to judge by other contemporary references, was rather more accommodating than might be expected of a persecutor.<sup>62</sup> Yet, it is a detail that seems to undermine the guiding premise of the text: so much so that it has been thought to be a later interpolation.<sup>63</sup> Germinius, indeed, is at this point given a paragraph of his own in which to expound on his own understanding of the faith; and it is a plausible statement of actual beliefs and arguments of the time, even if it is predictably refuted by Heraclianus.<sup>64</sup> Clearly, an author concerned to promote the views of Heraclianus had no need to get these details right; and if they are right because they were taken down correctly at the time, it seems odd that they should have been left intact when so much else was surely fictionalised. But regardless of how these elements made it into the text, the undoubted effect is to make the *Altercatio Heracliani* rather more of a dialogue than it needed to be. Germinius, the designated villain, becomes a potentially sympathetic figure: his views are coherent, even if wrong, and at times he displays a touching desire for reconciliation.

This is not to say that Germinius entirely abandons his role as persecutor, and by the end of the dialogue he has returned to the intolerance and violence of the beginning:

Germinius was filled with anger and indignation and began to shout and say: 'He is a heretic, because he says that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are all God. He is homoousian; don't believe him.' And, speaking, he made a request to the people that any male or female servant of God who met with him should exorcise him, because he was now dead. And he swore with an oath to send him into exile.<sup>65</sup>

The heightened language may lead us to overlook that the sentence is only exile, and that, indeed, was all that a bishop could impose on a charge of heresy. But rather than leave it at that, and suggest that Germinius was restrained only by the limitations placed upon him from taking any further action, the dialogue seems to go out of its way to provide a different impression. Hence, when Heraclianus and his co-defendants had been sent away,

Some of the people who were present shouted: 'Let them be brought to the governor and killed, because they have created discord and have made two communities from one!' And these people compelled them to subscribe to the creed of the heretics. And they redoubled their shouts, saying: 'Let them be brought to the governor and killed!' Then Germinius said: 'Don't, brothers! They do not know what they say. If bishops were made to believe this, how much more were these men.' . . . And they have escaped from the hands of these men up to the present day.<sup>66</sup>

Various explanations might be given for this sudden turn: perhaps the author was faithful to actual events, or perhaps it was known that there had been no actual martyrdoms at Sirmium on the charge of heresy. But as far as the central story goes, there is no good narrative reason for Germinius to be suddenly so sympathetic. Manlio Simonetti has noted that this final twist does little to offset the generally negative image of Germinius in the rest of the text, but comments that it gives the text 'an air of authenticity'.<sup>67</sup> It seems authentic because of the empathy extended to Germinius's position: in part, as we have seen, because he is given genuine arguments, even if these are then easily overcome by Heraclianus; and at the end as he transcends his role as the stock villain and grants mercy to his opponents. This may not amount to a reconciliation, but it is nevertheless remarkable for a persecutor to be shown softening his attitude instead of hardening his heart.

The text, therefore, hints at a model of dispute resolution that is able to progress beyond assertion and counter-assertion, or immovable object meets immovable object. Admittedly, the intransigence of Heraclianus is very often more than matched by the beatings and insults he receives at the hands of Germinius; and the debate plays out in predictable fashion, Heraclianus emerging triumphant having given no ground on his starting position. But although Heraclianus wins the debate, Germinius is not made wholly unsympathetic, and there is room to applaud his desire for a peaceful and consensual solution to the issue. Perhaps this was never intended by whoever produced the text we

have, but it emerges from the dialogue nevertheless. Intellectually, the reader is no doubt meant to be convinced by the hero. But, the choice of the dialogue form means that both author and reader are forced, if only temporarily, to see things from another point of view. The antagonists remain unreconciled to the end; but the reconciliation that fails to occur on the page may still come to happen in the mind of the reader.

### **Conclusion: Strawman has a point?**

Tom Stoppard once commented that he became a playwright 'because dialogue is the most respectable way of contradicting myself'.<sup>68</sup> Stoppard, who also once claimed that in his school debates 'I remember being completely indifferent as to which side of any proposition I should debate on', is perhaps not an ideal guide to the mindset of a Christian polemicist.<sup>69</sup> And yet, those late antique Christians who wrote dialogues were staging debates in the same way as any dramatist. If a novel, as Bakhtin would insist, can be read as containing numerous voices that need not all be identified with the author's, then the same kind of *heteroglossia* is even more fundamental to the dialogue form, which revolves precisely around such a display of multiple perspectives. Hence, if we focus on only the winners of Christian dialogues, we may miss the extent to which they record and sometimes even respect alternative views. These are not, we should take it, presented so that the reader should favour them over a triumphant orthodoxy. But they nevertheless open up space for empathetic understanding on the part of the reader, which in turn makes these dialogues more open-ended than they are for the protagonists.

It is possible to understand this open-endedness as a deliberate recognition on the part of the authors of these dialogues that there exists a kind of reconciliation which does not depend on rational persuasion on the level of intellectual propositions. There remains the need for concessions and compromise, and we often see one party completely abandoning its original position. But this is very often portrayed as a willing concession made on the basis of a common Christianity. That late antique Christians were able to rely on authority as well as on reason did not, of course, mean that they ceased to argue: they merely argued instead about the value and significance of various different authorities.<sup>70</sup> But where they did so in debate amongst themselves – and these are precisely the debates that are often taken to exemplify 'a commitment to certainty and the repression of difference' – they were also able to fall back on the appeal to a common set of assumptions.<sup>71</sup> The reconciliation may not be within the terms of the original dispute, but instead is taken to transcend it. But in its emphasis on engagement with the other party, on a recognition of common values, and on a mutual desire for reconciliation, it may amount to a genuine dialogue all the same.

We should not be too quick to accept this: the written dialogues we possess are not innocent of a level of complex artistry. Nor must we represent them as especially progressive: it is generally the majority that insists on the

virtue of unity; and it is those who were always destined to lose who are obliged to abandon their views for the common cause. And, of course, we must be wary that we are not simply being led up the garden path. It is a highly effective rhetorical strategy to make the reader feel that an opposing view has been fairly represented in its strongest form – it makes the inevitable triumph of the author’s position all the more impressive. To some extent, then, the kind of readerly response I have been identifying may have been anticipated, and deliberately inserted to serve the author’s purposes. We can see the effect in Frances Young’s reading of a later dialogue, the *Eranistes* of Theodoret of Cyrillus, which also features a heroic advocate figure named ‘Orthodoxus’. Summing up the presentation of the case, Young notes that:

Considering that Orthodoxus represents the author’s view, one feels that in this dialogue Eranistes has been given quite a good chance to present his position . . . [The dialogue provides] a fairly realistic and sympathetic picture of a typical Monophysite debater . . . If the other side had been able to read Theodoret’s work with an open mind, there is little doubt that accommodation could have been reached.<sup>72</sup>

This response would have delighted Theodoret. The rhetorical value of the dialogue form was precisely that it enabled this kind of thinking: the sense that the opponent had been fully represented, that the dialogue was fair and balanced, and as a consequence, that anyone with an open mind would surely have been persuaded by the winning arguments. That response, however, may prove the skill of the author as much as the accuracy of the portrayal. We should not believe too easily that authors openly engaged in polemic are consistently so scrupulous.

Still, it may be true that Theodoret took unusual care to present the Monophysite position. We have seen that Jerome had reasons to be sympathetic to the Luciferians, and so may have sought to represent them fairly; and the portrayal of Germinius in the *Altercatio Heracliani* may conceivably have been influenced by the historical bishop’s rather ambiguous doctrinal stance. These dialogues may therefore be exceptions to a general rule according to which the antagonists in Christian debate were routinely dismissed if not derided. Yet, we cannot in every case appeal to such authorial attitudes in order to explain away what seems to be a genuine *heteroglossia* in Christian representations of dialogue. Even the most maligned and unsympathetic antagonists, and even those allowed the least opportunity to justify themselves, can sometimes provoke a certain empathy in the reader, in contexts where it was surely not intended by the author. The most famous example sees early Christians suffering martyrdom at the hands of the Roman authorities, in the course of an open letter by Tertullian to a Roman governor warning him of the perils of persecuting. But after recalling a series of persecutors who came to suffer for their actions, Tertullian concludes by citing the case of Arrius Antoninus, proconsul of Asia in the late second century AD, and his response to the martyrs:

When Arrius Antoninus was persecuting fiercely in Asia, all the Christians of the city presented themselves as a body before his tribunal. Then he, having ordered a few to be led away for execution, said to the remainder: 'Wretched people, if you want to die, you have cliffs or ropes.' If we decide to do this here too, what will you do about so many thousands of people . . . ?<sup>73</sup>

The vivid representation of Arrius Antoninus's point of view has struck many readers since, including modern scholars: Glen Bowersock, for instance, who begins his study of Christian martyrdom with this text, sympathises more than a little with the 'exasperated proconsul'.<sup>74</sup>

The *Ad Scapulam* is not written in the form of a dialogue, although in one sense it presents itself as opening up a channel of communication with Scapula, the Roman governor. It may be noted that Tertullian follows the practice already identified in Christian dialogue, that of appealing to a higher unity – here not only a shared respect for imperial authority but also a common humanity.<sup>75</sup> And, indeed, Tertullian is to some extent commending the example of Arrius Antoninus to other Roman governors: it is better to leave the Christians alone than to insist on killing them *en masse*. But are we really to suppose that Tertullian's reader is meant to sympathise with Antoninus, and with the problems of the persecutor? His aim is surely to glorify Christian resistance, and to promote the idea that Christians can endure persecution if only by sheer weight of numbers.<sup>76</sup> The limited sympathy extended to Antoninus – and to Scapula, who had already tortured Christians – is shown by Tertullian's reference to the governor's pressing the population hard (*persequeretur instanter*).<sup>77</sup> Equally, Antoninus is not given an argument of his own, nor does he recognise common ground: he does the opposite, expressing only bafflement at the Christians' wholly alien agenda. But the remark Tertullian gives him is enough to suggest a whole point of view, and one that has unwittingly led at least some readers to find themselves less outraged than he may have hoped. Putting words in the mouth of the persecutor gives him a voice and creates a dialogue, and no dialogue can shut down entirely the scope for continuing the debate. The reader may be shown how it is all supposed to come out; but in being exposed to both sides, is prompted to an awareness of their different views and interests. And sometimes the reader can therefore see what the participants cannot: the possibility, however remote, of reconciliation.

## Notes

- 1 Goldhill (2008b) 2: 'there is a prima facie plausibility to the claim that dialogue as a literary form is integrally related to its genesis in the fifth- and fourth-century BCE culture of democratic Athens'; he goes on to cite the frequent links made between that political context and the flowering of dialogic literary genres.
- 2 Goldhill (2008b) 7.
- 3 The case is made most strongly in Cameron (2012), emphasising e.g. at 10 the 'very large' number of dialogues that continued to be written in Christian late antiquity 'all the way to the very end of Byzantium and beyond'; this point is expanded in Cameron (2014)

- 14–20. Goldhill (2008b) 7 anticipates and allows for this response: ‘One answer to the question of why Christians didn’t do dialogue is to note that actually they did.’ The contributors to his volume likewise give the claim rather more nuance: thus, in particular, Clark (2008) and Cooper and Dal Santo (2008).
- 4 Thus Van Nuffelen (2014), esp. 167. Much of this argument is directed against the claim in Lim (1995) that the tendency of Christianity in late antiquity was away from public disputation; Lim (2008) 162–6 explicitly separates literary dialogues from a more antagonistic popular Christianity, but allows that the latter may also be understood as dialogic; on this see also Cameron (2014) 10–12.
- 5 Goldhill (2008b) 8; note that this follows his acknowledgement of the doubtful links between dialogue and democracy and the continuing involvement of Christians in apparently free and open exchanges.
- 6 Goldhill (2008b) 6–7, criticising Prudentius’ allegorical *Psychomachia* for not granting evil ‘the attractive threat it is likely to pose in less controlled social circumstances’; Miles (2008) 147, on Augustine’s exertion of control over his correspondence.
- 7 Cameron (2014) 8.
- 8 A point universally made in this connection: Cameron (2014) 12–13; Van Nuffelen (2014) 150; acknowledged also at Goldhill (2008b) 3, noting ‘the tension in Platonic writing between the drive towards ideal, normative, authoritative knowledge and the slipperiness and playfulness of dialogue as a means of expression’.
- 9 Goldhill (2008b) 1.
- 10 Goldhill (2008b) 3.
- 11 As also proposed in Cameron (2012) 5.
- 12 My terms here are influenced by the ‘dual-concern’ model based on Kilmann and Thomas (1977) and Thomas (1988), elaborated in Rubin, Pruitt and Kim (1994) 40–7. Mnookin, Peppet and Tulumello (1996) emphasise in particular the pairing of assertiveness and empathy. It should be noted, however, that my use of this language does not follow these authors with strict consistency.
- 13 Goldhill (2008b) 2, 1.
- 14 Thus Goldhill (2008b) 7, pointing to ‘the physical suppression of any sign of the uppity’ and asking, ‘Would an ideal Christian community find difference of opinion unwelcome or even dangerous?’
- 15 Goldhill (2008b) 5–7.
- 16 Goldhill (2008b) 7; note that at 7–8 Goldhill couples ‘resistance to dialogue’ with ‘orthodoxy’s resistance to heresy’.
- 17 Van Nuffelen (2014) 150: ‘ancient Christianity understood itself as an improved system of *knowledge*’ (italics in original); for Augustine, see Clark (2008) 119, 123.
- 18 Van Nuffelen (2014) 162–3.
- 19 Cameron (2014) 16; (2012) 17.
- 20 Cameron (2012) 5.
- 21 Kelman (2010) 2.
- 22 Kelman (2010) 2.
- 23 Kelman (2010) 4.
- 24 Cameron (2012) 7.
- 25 Goldhill (2008b) 9; Cameron (2012) 17; (2014) 16–17.
- 26 Goldhill (2008b) 6.
- 27 Van Nuffelen (2014) 164–6; note also Goldhill (2008b) 2: ‘the exchange of *staged debate* as a form of discourse is privileged in any version of democratic theory’ (my italics).
- 28 Text: A. Canellis (CCSL 79B, 2000); for discussion, see Canellis (1997).
- 29 A brief biography of Lucifer may be found at Flower (2013) 84–5; on the Luciferians, see Simonetti (1975) 443–5, and now Pérez Mas (2008).
- 30 For these developments see Ayres (2004) 157–86.
- 31 Jerome, *Chron.* s.a. 371; Luciferians are found petitioning the imperial college in 383–4: *Coll. Avell.* I.2.
- 32 Jerome, *Alt. Luc.* 2.

- 33 Jerome, *Alt. Luc.* 1: the effort is limited to the first words, 'proxime accidit', and the final sentence, 'uisum est utriusque sermonem a notario excipi'. On the title, see Canellis (1997) 247–9.
- 34 Jerome, *Alt. Luc.* 1: 'conspitata paene inuicem facie recesserunt'; earlier, we are told of the Luciferian that 'odiosa loquacitate contendens, caninam facundiam exercuit'.
- 35 Jerome, *Alt. Luc.* 11: 'Arianus baptizat, ergo episcopus est! Non baptizat, tu refuta laicum et ego non recipio sacerdotem! Sequar te quocumque ieris: aut pariter in luto haesitabimus, aut pariter expediemur!'
- 36 Jerome, *Alt. Luc.* 13: 'Laicus, etiam in Ecclesiae fide baptizatus, paenitens recipitur; episcopus uero, aut paenitentiam non agit et sacerdos est, aut si paenitentiam egerit, esse episcopus desinit. Quamobrem, nos recte, et laicum suscipimus paenitentem, et episcopum, si in sacerdotio perseuerare uult, repudiamus.'
- 37 Jerome, *Alt. Luc.* 14: 'Oro te ut, philosophorum argumentatione deposita, christiana simplicitate me cum loquaris, si tamen non dialecticos sequeris, sed piscatores. Aequum ne tibi uidetur ut Arianus episcopus sit?'
- 38 Jerome, *Alt. Luc.* 14: 'Tu eum episcopum probas, qui ab eo recipis baptizatum, et in hoc reprehendus, quare a nobis parietibus separeris, cum et in fide et in Arianorum nobis cum receptione consentias.'
- 39 Cameron (2012) 4; Lim (1995) 221.
- 40 Jerome, *Alt. Luc.* 14: 'Si contendis, iam tibi responsum est . . . Si discere cupis, in meam aciem transgredere!'
- 41 Jerome, *Alt. Luc.* 14: 'Quia tu pacem cum scuto petis, et nos oliuae ramum gladio inserimus'; 'En tollo manus, cedo, uicisti.'
- 42 Jerome, *Alt. Luc.* 14: 'Gratulor interim tibi . . . quia a nimia salsitate Sardorum ad totius orbis te saporem contulisti'; 16: 'Sed quaeso te ut mihi . . . non quasi aduersario, sed quasi discipulo explices.'
- 43 Jerome, *Alt. Luc.* 14: 'Consentimus in fide, consentimus in haereticis recipiendis, consentiamus et in conuentu!'
- 44 Jerome, *Alt. Luc.* 28: 'Non solum aestimes te uicisse: uicimus. Vterque nostrum palmam refert: tu mei et ego erroris. Vtinam que mihi sic semper disputare contingat ut, ad meliora proficiens, deseram quod male tenebam! Vnum autem tibi confiteor, quia mores meorum apprime noui, facilius eos uinci posse quam persuaderi.'
- 45 Rebenich (2002) 105.
- 46 Jerome, *Alt. Luc.* 20: 'bonus quidem ipse pastor, sed multam praedam bestiis relinquit. Praetereo illa quae quidam ex maledicis quasi satis firma defendunt: hoc illum amore gloriae et nominis in posteros transmissione fecisse, necnon et similitate quam aduersum Eusebium . . . susceperat. Nihil istorum de tali uiro credo; unum, quod etiam in praesenti constat, eloquar: uerbis eum a nobis dissentire, non rebus.'
- 47 E.g. Jerome, *uir. ill.* 95: 'mirae constantiae et praeparati animi ad martyrium'.
- 48 The case is put by Kelly (1975) 63–4; Jerome had links with Paulinus of Antioch, who had been Lucifer's candidate in the schism there, but note *Ep.* 16 in which he refuses to take sides on the issue. Aug. *De haer.* 81 notes that neither Epiphanius nor Filastrius had included Luciferianism among their definitive lists of heresies, and supposes that they characterised it as a schism; he himself suggests that they may be considered heretics since they hold so stubbornly to their dissenting position (*quia dissensionem suam pertinaci animositate firmarunt*), but ultimately suspends judgement on the matter. For brief discussion see Bonner (1999) 73; I owe this point and the Augustine reference to Richard Flower.
- 49 Text: C. P. Caspari (*Kirchenhistorische Anecdota*, Oslo, 1883: 133–47), repr. A. Hamman (PLS I, 1958: 345–50); references below are to Caspari's edition. Full discussion in Simonetti (1967); discussion and translation in Flower (2013) 1–6, 230–7. Translations below are taken from Flower, with occasional adaptations.
- 50 The title gives not only the year (AD 366) but the precise date (the Ides of January) and day (Friday), all of which appear to be accurate and correspond to a time when Germinius was bishop: Williams (1996) 350 is content to refer to it as 'a document from the mid-360s'.

- 51 Simonetti (1967), esp. 41–4; Williams (1996) 350–1; Flower (2013) 230.
- 52 For details of the Council of Rimini see Hanson (1988) 367–91; for its continuing validity see Duval (1969) and Williams (2013).
- 53 Williams (1996) 350; Flower (2013) 230.
- 54 *Alt. Her.* 133–4: ‘GERMINIUS DIXIT AD HERACLIANUM: Quid tibi uisum est suadere hominibus in omousion, quod uani homines composuerunt?  
HERACLIANUS DIXIT: Ergo trecenti et eo amplius episcopi uani fuerunt?  
GERM. D.: Quid uult esse omousion?  
HER. D.: Tu, qui pro scandalo hoc in populo praedicas, et Graece nosti dicere  
GERM. D.: Hoc Eusebius ille exiliaticius te docuit, et Hilarius, qui nunc ipse de exilio uenit.’
- 55 *Alt. Her.* 134: ‘HER. D.: Ego iure et auctoritate diuinarum scripturarum loquor. Quid mihi haec apponis, ut extollas me a uia ueritatis? Diuinis legibus contendamus! Dicendi enim et altercandi facultas patet.  
GERM. D.: Tu quasi quis, male serue? Presbyter es, aut diaconus es?  
HER. D.: Neque presbyter sum, neque diaconus, sed tanquam minimus omnium Christianorum pro uita mea loquor.  
GERM. D.: Uidete, quantum loquitur! Nemo illi dentes eruit?  
Tunc percusserunt eum Iouinianus diaconus et Marinus lector.’
- 56 Goldhill (2008b) 5–6: ‘there is never space for an extended dialogue in the martyr text’.
- 57 *Alt. Her.* 134.
- 58 *Alt. Her.* 135: ‘Germinius tacuit horam amplius unam.’
- 59 *Alt. Her.* 135–6: ‘Germinius coepit eum collaudare, dicens: Bonum cor habes, et bene natus es, et ab infantia tua nouimus te; conuertere ad ecclesiam nostram. Cui et alii plures dicebant: Domne episcope! Ipse erat, qui contra haereticos tenebrosi Photini contendebat. Quomodo nunc ipse haereticus factus est?’
- 60 Compare the pleas of Perpetua’s father in *Passio Perpetuae* 5, or the appeals to family and upbringing rejected by the pseudo-martyr Victoria in Victor of Vita, *Hist. pers.* 3.26; one might also see a reminiscence of Pilate’s interrogation of Christ in the gospels.
- 61 *Alt. Her.* 136: ‘Germinius dixit: Ego fidem meam exposui Eusebio et manifestauit, et placauit ei.’
- 62 Simonetti (1967) 46–9; Williams (1996) attempts to trace and classify the doctrinal views of Germinius, although he denies (at 351) ‘that the Sirmium bishop was becoming sympathetic to the Nicene creed’; cf. Hanson (1988) 594–5: ‘Germinius had by now abandoned Homoian Arianism’.
- 63 Simonetti (1967) 45.
- 64 Note e.g. the statements that ‘the Son is not like the Father in all things’ and the proof texts from the Gospel of John, both of which seem to align closely with the real position of Germinius. That one of the proof texts was notoriously vulnerable to attack as a conflation may have been intended to undermine it, although the error goes unmentioned by the participants: for this see Flower (2013) 233 n.8.
- 65 *Alt. Her.* 145–6: ‘repletus est ira et indignatione Germinius et uociferare coepit et dicere: Haereticus est, quia patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum totum deum dicit. Omousianus est; nolite ei fidem habere. Et rogabat populum, dicens, ut quicumque obuiaret, ei seruus uel ancilla dei, exsufflent eum, quia iam mortuus est. Et iure iurando iurabat, ut eum exilio deportaret.’ I follow Flower (2013) 237 n.39 in preferring *uociferare* to *nociferare*.
- 66 *Alt. Her.* 146–7: ‘pars sociorum ipsorum clamabat: Consulari offerantur et occidantur, quia seditionem fecerunt, et de uno populo duos fecerunt! Et cogebant eos, ut subscriberent in fide haereticorum. Et congeminabant uocibus, dicentes: Consulari offerantur et occidantur! Tunc Germinius dixit: Nolite, fratres! Nesciunt, quid dicunt. Si episcopis persuasum fuerat, quanto magis istis. Et alii cogebant eos, ut humiliarent se sub manibus eius. Et illi sic fecerunt. Et euaserunt de manibus eorum usque ad hodiernum diem.’
- 67 Simonetti (1967) 41: ‘vari particolari . . . hanno tutto l’aspetto di essere autentici’.
- 68 Tynan (1977) 44.
- 69 Tynan (1977) 46.

- 70 Van Nuffelen (2014) 166–7, following Graumann (2002).
- 71 Goldhill (2008a) 7: ‘difference’ glossed explicitly as ‘heresy’.
- 72 Young (1983) 281–3.
- 73 Tert., *Ad. Scap.* 5.1–2: ‘Arrius Antoninus in Asia cum persequeretur instanter, omnes illius ciuitatis Christiani ante tribunalia eius se manu facta obtulerunt. Tum ille, paucis duci iussis, reliquis ait: Ὡ δειλοί, εἰ θέλετε ἀποθνήσκειν, κρημνοῦς ἢ βρόχους ἔχετε. Hoc si placuerit et hic fieri, quid facies de tantis milibus hominum . . .?’ Text: Bulhart, CSEL 76 (1957).
- 74 Bowersock (1995) 1: Antoninus is also ironically called ‘obliging’ and the Christians ‘pious’.
- 75 Tert., *Ad Scap.* 2.8: ‘Itaque et sacrificamus pro salute imperatoris’; 4.1: ‘humanitatis meminisse.’
- 76 Rebillard (2012) 41–2.
- 77 Tert., *Ad. Scap.* 5.1, 4.2; Rebillard (2012) 41.

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# Index

Note: f denotes a figure; t denotes a table; n denotes a note.

- Achaean 24, 109, 113n17, 224–5  
Achaemenids 146n40; enlightenment  
194n65; ideology 189; post-war  
building 8, 231–47  
Achilleion 155  
Achilles 19, 43n57, 223, 224, 229n43,  
229–30n48; shield 19, 229–30n48  
Acropolis 45, 53, 172, 233, 234f, 235,  
237–8, 245n19, n48  
*adversarius* 88  
Aegae celebrations 178–9  
Aelius Aristeides 68  
Aemilius Paullus, L. (consul 50 BC) 95  
Aemilius Paullus, L. of Macedon  
196–7, 199  
Aeschines 181, 182, 185, 191n11, n21, 265  
Aesop 30, 176n56  
African church 271, 273–83  
*Against Celsus* (Origen) 118–19  
*Against Faustus* (Augustine) 125  
Agamemnon 21, 223, 229–30n48  
Agathocles of Syracuse 265  
Agesilaus 162, 163, 175n20–1, 193n56  
Agesipolis 174  
agriculture 54  
Agrippa I 206  
Agrippa II 207  
Ahura Mazda 233, 243, 243f  
*aisymnetes* 6, 149–52, 155  
*Aiolos* (Euripides) 51  
Aixone 84n53  
Akar, P. 98n8, 99n21, 100n54, 101n64  
*Akharians* (Aristophanes) 4, 44, 45–52,  
54–60, 62, 62n4, 62–3n5, 63n12, 65n53  
Alban ovation 86  
Alcaeus 15, 150–1, 152  
Alcmaeonids 156, 157–8n22, 233, 235  
Alexander the Great 6, 190; Aristotle's  
advice 36, 267n4  
Alexandria, council of 289  
Alexandrians 78  
Allan, William 3, 25n14  
*altercationes* 285–303  
Alypius, Bishop of Thagaste 277, 281  
Amazonomachy 236  
ambassadors (embassies) 54, 55, 56, 59, 60,  
61, 107, 172, 183, 196, 198, 259, 265  
ambitious peace 70  
Ambrose of Milan 124, 129n41–2  
*amicitia* 91  
Amompharetos (Spartan arbiter) 157n9  
Amphictyonic Council 37  
*Amphiktyones* (Telekleides) 49  
Amphipolis 45, 181–2, 260–1  
Amphitheos 45, 62  
Amyntas, King 78  
*Anabasis* (Xenophon) 255, 257–8, 260–1,  
269n34, 270n62  
Anāhitā 138, 140  
Anatolia 133, 138, 140–1, 144n, 145–6n  
Anaxilas (Spartan arbiter) 157n9  
Anderson, G. 235  
Andocides 251, 252, 253  
*andrapodismos* *see* civil war  
aniconic worship 140  
*anomia* 68  
Antholis, W. 11n9  
Antonia fortress 204–5, 206  
Aphrodite 49, 224, 225, 229n47  
Apollinaris of Hierapolis 128n22  
Apollo 149, 162–3, 171, 233  
Apollonia 157n14  
Apologists 118–20, 171, 210, 255  
*Apostolic Tradition* 128n14  
Appian 89, 199, 200  
Appius Hordonius 104  
Apringius, proconsul 278  
Aratus of Sikyon 76

- arbitration 148–59, 165, 193n52, 252  
 Arcadia/Arcadians 75, 78, 154, 162, 166  
 Arcesilaus II, King 158n26  
 Archidamian War 170, 174n11  
 Areopagus Council 237  
 Arevaci 199  
 Argives 59, 158n24, 163, 166–7, 168, 170, 175n27, 176n42  
 Argos 29, 164, 166, 167–8, 176n52, n63  
 Arians 289, 290–1, 293–4  
 Aristophanes 4, 44–65, 231–2, 244  
 Aristotle 4, 27–43, 231, 235, 255;  
   *aisymnetes* 6, 149, 150–1; Areopagus  
   Council 237; citizenship 35, 42n46;  
   equality 32–3, 35; *homonoia* 69; slavery  
   34, 36, 39n12, 267n4  
 Arles, council of 129n33, 274  
 Arrius Antoninus 298–9, 303n73  
 Artaxerxes I 183, 242  
 Artaxerxes II 242  
 Artaxerxes III 242  
 Artemis 140, 145n34; temple 139, 139f,  
   142–3, 145n34, 236  
 Artemisium 56  
*ascholia* 42n53  
 Aspsia 57, 59  
*asphaleia* 266  
 Aššur 133–4, 135  
 Aššurbanipal, King 134, 136–7, 142f,  
   144n7, n11, 145n20–1  
 Assyria, Neo-Assyrian kings 5, 133–6, 144n2  
 Astyages 238–9  
 Athanasius of Alexandria 124  
 Athenagoras 220  
 Athene/Athena 18, 19, 225, 238  
 Athenian Confederacy 181, 182, 186, 193n44  
 Athenian Confederacy, Second 84n47,  
   268n14  
 Athens/Athenians 8, 69, 71, 76, 82, 219,  
   228n14; Acropolis 45, 53, 172, 233,  
   234, 234f, 235, 237–8, 245n48; amnesty  
   of 403 BC 69, 74, 76; Athenocentrism  
   266; *Constitution* 15–16, 248–52;  
   debate 285, 286–8, 299; democracy  
   15; democratic peace 2; *eirene* 74;  
   Epimenedes 154–5; Greek comedy  
   44–65; Hermocrates' speech 220–1;  
   Macedonian peace 181–7, 190; oaths  
   69, 84n47; Parthenon 8, 233–4, 234f,  
   237; peace and reconciliation 248–54;  
   post-war building 231–47; Sigeion  
   152–4, 155, 157–8n22, 159n37; Solon  
   3, 15–26, 149, 155; Thirty Tyrants 8,  
   69, 244, 246n52, 248–9, 251, 253–4;  
   Thirty Years' Peace 61–2, 65n56,  
   162, 163–4, 165; Xenophon's Eirenic  
   thought 255–70, *see also* Greece/Greeks  
 Attica 24, 164, 252, 263, 267  
 Atticus 89, 99n34  
*auctor pacis* 90, 93  
 Augustine of Hippo 124–6, 129n43–4,  
   287, 300n17; and Boniface 127;  
   *pax civitatis* 78; punishment and  
   reconciliation 9, 271–84  
 Augustus, emperor (Octavian) 4, 80, 86,  
   96, 102, 105  
 Aulus Aurelius Zosimos 81–2  
 Aulus Gellius 99n19  
 Autocles 172  
  
 Babylon/Babylonia 133, 136–8, 144–5n16,  
   229n44, 240, 241, 243  
 Badian, E. 172, 177n87–8, 267n4, 268n14  
 Bakhtin, Mikhail 288, 297  
*Bakkhai* (Euripides) 49  
 Balawat 135f  
 barbarians (non-Greeks) 27, 36, 42n49,  
   73, 189, 255, 256, 264, 267n4;  
   (non-Romans) 106  
 Bar-Tal, D. 12n25  
 Barnes, T. D. 211n5, 212n17  
 Barton, C. A. 112n9  
 Basil of Caesarea 124  
 Batstone, W. W. 92, 99n24, 100n41  
 Battiads 153–4  
 Battos II, King 158n26  
 Bayliss, Andrew J. 6, 160–77  
 Baynes, N. 262, 268n13  
 Beard, M. 213n55–6  
 Beatitudes 116  
 Behistun inscription 241, 241f, 243  
*Bellerophontēs* (Euripides) 45, 51  
 Belli 199  
*bellum* 87–8, 90, 91, 93, 94  
 Bernink, G. H. 12n25  
 Berytus 207–8, 213n51  
 Bias of Priene 155, 157n14  
 blame 44, 56–60, 61, 62, 153  
 Bloomfield, D. 11n24  
 'Bluebeard' temple 235  
 Boiotians 59, 65n50  
 Bolmarcich, S. 174n11  
 Boniface, *comes* 127  
*bonus civis* 94  
 Borza, E. N. 192n36, 193n53  
 Boulding, K. E. 12n28  
 Bowersock, G. W. 299  
 Brasidas 51, 59

- Bremmer, J. 12n29  
 Briant, Pierre 189, 193n52, 194n65, 242  
 bribery 156  
 brigandage 81, 113n17, 259  
 Brosius, M. 145n36  
 brotherhoods 69  
 brother-making 69, 71  
 Brundisium 91, 96  
 Buca, L. 95  
 Buckler, John 183, 191n6, 192n25–6, n28,  
   n34, n44, n48–9, n54, 193n44, 194n69  
 Bunas (or Bulias) 157n7  
*Bündnis*system see Peloponnesian League  
 Burnell, Peter 273, 278, 283n8
- Caecilian of Carthage 274–5, 276, 279  
 Caecilius Metellus Pius, Q. 101n62  
 Caelius Rufus, M. 92  
 Caesius, L. 195–201  
 Calenus 94  
 Callinus 16, 17  
 Calpe Harbour 260–1  
 Camarina 219–21  
 Cambyses 240, 242  
 Cameron, Averil 285–6, 288, 299n3,  
   300n4, n7–8, n11, n19, n20, n24–5  
 Camp, J. 245n13, n19, n21–3, n29, n41,  
   n44, n47–8, n51, 246n65, n70, n74–9  
 Canevaro, Mirko 253  
 Capreedy, J. 175n37, 176n40  
 Carawan, Edwin 248–53  
 Carey, C. 62–3n5, 63n13  
 Cargill, J. 268n14, n18  
 Carthage 99n19, 220, 271, 274, 275;  
   council of 276  
 Cartledge, P. A. 160, 162, 177n87,  
   192n40, 192–3n43, 193n45, n51  
 Carty, Aideen 6, 157n14, 245n26  
 Cassius Longinus, C. 107  
 Castorius 277  
 Castriota, D. 233  
*Catalogue of Women* 218  
 Catiline 88, 93  
 Cawkwell, G. L. 191n7, 192n24, n30,  
   193n50–1, 194n62  
 Celsus 118–19, 128n15  
 Celtiberian war 199  
 Cersebleptes 181  
 Chaeronea 179–81, 186, 190, 191n7, n9,  
   n14, 193n46, 252, 266  
 Chairemon 157n14  
 Chalcidian League 28  
 Chaniotis, A. 71, 84n47, 85n78, n86, n94  
 Chares 257
- charis* 264  
 Chersonesos Taurica 72  
 ‘Choice of Heracles’ 258  
 Chremonidean War 73  
 Christianity: Augustine on punishment 9,  
   271–84; Christ and peace 27; Christ to  
   Constantine 115–29; debate 285–99;  
   early Christians 5, 9  
 church court (aka *audientia episcopalis*)  
   280, 281  
 Cicero 4, 87–101, 104, 106–9, 114n29,  
   124, 200  
 Cimon 236–7, 245n47  
 circumcellions 273–4, 276–7, 280, 283n10  
 citizenship 67, 70, 81–2; Aristotle 35,  
   42n43; Augustine 273  
*City of God* (Augustine) 126, 277, 279  
 City Ten 251  
*ciuitates pacatae* 108–11  
 civic friendship 41n40  
 civic order 74–82  
 civil war: Aristotle 29, 30, 31–2; Hobbes  
   27; Roman 78, 79, 80, 86–7, 88–9  
 Claudius Crassus, Ap. 77  
 Claudius Marcellus, M. 199–200  
 Clayton, E. 40n20  
 Cleisthenes 235–6  
 Cleomenes (Spartan arbiter) 157n9  
 Cleruchs 257  
 Clodius, A. 92  
 coercion 111, 112, 125–6, 180, 186, 188, 266  
 coinage: Domitian 210; Hierocaesarea 140;  
   Persian 142, 143f; Roman 95–6, 100,  
   101n64–5  
 Collatia 197–8  
 Collon, Dominique 146n  
 colonisation 257, 260  
 comedy, Greek 44–62  
 Common Peace 28, 36, 38n2, 70, 72,  
   265–6; Macedon 183–5, 187–8, 190,  
   190n4–7, 192n43, 193n52–3  
 communitarianism 28, 34  
 Compton-Engle, G. 63n9  
*concordia* (harmony) 4, 78, 80, 87, 88, 95–6  
*Confessions* (Augustine) 272  
 Constantine I, emperor 115, 120–3,  
   126–7, 128n26, 129n27, 274  
*Constitution of the Athenians* 15–16, 248–52  
 Corcyra 67, 157n7  
 Corinth/Corinthians 149, 151, 157n7, 161,  
   163–8, 174, 175n27, n34, n37, 176n42  
 Corinthian League 6, 73, 179, 186–8,  
   190n3, 193n52  
 Corinthian War 169, 170

- Cornelius Balbus, L. 86, 90, 91, 100n38  
 Cornelius (centurion) 120  
 Cornwell, Hannah 4, 80  
 Cos 72  
 Cotyora 259  
 courage, in Aristotle 36, 37, 38  
 Crawford, M. H. 101n64  
 Critolaïdas (Spartan arbiter) 157n9  
 Croesus, king of Lydia 15, 25n2, 138  
 Cunaxa, battle of 257–8  
 Curio 89  
 Curran, John 7  
 Cylon 155, 157–8n22  
 Cypselus 151, 155  
 Cyrene 149, 153–4, 158n26  
*Cyropaedia* (Xenophon) 270n62  
 Cyrus Cylinder 133, 136–7, 144–5n16, 241  
 Cyrus the Great 5, 6, 8, 133–47, 238–42
- Dahshur 146n45  
 Darius I 232–3, 239, 240, 241–3, 247n106–7,  
 n126, n131; tomb 243–4, 243f  
 Darwin, Charles 31, 40n24  
*de bello civili* 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 99n24,  
 100n41, n47  
 de Gruchy, J. W. 12n25  
 de Soto, Alvaro 222  
 de Ste. Croix, G. E. M. 26n24, 62n5,  
 63n10, 65n55, 174n11, 175n13, n34  
 DeBrohun, J. B. 113n9  
 Decelea 250, 263  
 Deceleia 45, 54  
*decemvir* 77  
 decency (*epieikeia*) 75  
 Decimus Brutus 100n47, n50  
*deditio* (surrender) 6, 195–201  
 Delian League 218, 233, 238  
 Delphi 149, 154–6, 162–3, 233  
 Demades 190  
 Demaratus 156, 160  
 Demetrius of Phaleron 84n53  
 Demokratia 71  
 Demonax of Mantinea 149, 154  
 Demophantos 252–3  
*demos* 235–6, 237–8  
 Demosthenes 180, 181, 182, 185–6,  
 191n11, n19–20, 192n33–4, n38, 253  
 depoliticisation 80  
 Dercylidas 164  
 Derketes 48, 63n13  
 Desmond, Will 4, 267n2  
 Deutsch, M. 11n18, n22  
*diaitētēs* 152  
*diallaktēs* 149, 152  
 dialogic 288, 299n1, 300n4  
*dialysis* (or *diallagai*) 64n39, 68, 73, 76  
 Dicaeogenes 252  
 Dikaia (Chalkidike) 69  
 Dikaiopolis 4, 71  
 Dillery, J. 268n11, n23, 269n28, n30, n35,  
 n38, n40  
 Dio Cassius 205, 212–13n30  
 Dio Chrysostom 77–8, 85n82  
 Diocletian, emperor 119  
 Diodorus 61–2, 75, 171, 176n42, n54,  
 n61, n63–5, 178–9, 187–9, 192n32,  
 193n47, 265  
 Diogenes Laertius 151, 158n24, n35, 159n37  
*diognitai* 79  
*Dionysalexandros* (Kratinos) 53, 64n35  
 Dionysia 44, 47, 49, 50  
 Dionysius of Halicarnassus 77  
 Dionysos/Dionysus 47, 49, 50, 63n17  
 Dipaea, battle of 162, 175n15  
 dispute resolution theory 286  
*Divine Institutes* (Lactantius) 119, 123  
 Domitian, emperor 105, 210  
 Donatists 9, 271, 273–80, 283, 283n12,  
 n13; Schism 121–2, 125  
 Donatus of Casae Nigrae 275  
 Dorians 36, 162  
 Dunn, G. D. 128n12
- Ecclesiazusae* (Aristophanes) 231–2, 244  
 Eder, W. 236  
 Edwards, Michael 8, 83n23, n28, 244n3,  
 247n135  
 eirenarch (magistrate of the peace) 79–80  
*eirene* 3–4, 8, 27, 38n2, 66–8, 70–1, 73–4,  
 76–81, 84n53, n56, n70, 85n81, 265,  
 268n10; Greek comedy 49, 61; *Res*  
*Gestae* 113n16  
 Eirene (goddess) 67, 71  
*eirenophylakes* 265  
 El Salvador 221–2  
 Eleusis 74, 249–51  
 Elis/Eleans 161, 166–7, 168–9, 173,  
 176n63–5, 177n66, n69  
 elitism 81, 235–6, 237–8  
 Ellis, J. R. 183  
 Emeritus of Caesarea 274, 275, 276  
 Emerson, F. D. 148, 157n4, n19  
*Enarrationes in Psalmos* (Augustine) 271,  
 278, 279, 280–1  
*energeia* 34, 36, 43n55  
 ephebes 81–2  
 Ephesian coin 85n81  
 Ephesos/Ephesus 80, 142–3, 146n48

- Ephialtes 237  
 Ephorus 171  
 Epictetus 68  
 Epicureans 39n4  
 Epidaurus 166  
*epidosis* 262  
*epieikeia* 75  
 Epimenedes 154–5  
 Epitome of Dio 205  
*ergon* 33, 39n7, 41n39  
 Errington, R. M. 191n9, 192n39  
 Esarhaddon, King 134, 135  
*ethne* 68  
 ethnocentrism 257, 267n4  
 Eubulus 269n44  
 Eucleides 252  
*eudaimonia* 28, 35, 37  
*Euergetism* 266  
*eunomia* 4, 20, 84n70  
 Euripides 45, 218  
 Eusebius of Caesarea 120, 122, 123,  
 128n11, 152, 210, 211, 294, 295  
 Eustochius 281  
 Evangelista, M. 10n8, 11n12–13  
 Evans, N. 233  
 evil, in Aristotle 38, 43n57
- fables: Aesop 30, 176n56; Aristotle 40n20  
 Falkner, C. 168, 177n66  
 fantasy of peace 46, 50, 51, 53, 54  
*Fasti Triumphales Capitolini* 86, 96  
 Faustus 125  
 Felix of Aphthungi 274  
*Feriae Latinae* 86  
 fertility, in Greek comedy 46–7, 49–50  
 Finley, M. I. 267  
 Fischer-Hansen, T. 245n7  
 Flandin, Eugène 144n3  
 Flavians 102, 203, 206–11, 211n5,  
 212n10, 213n35, 214n66  
 Flavius Marcellinus 278  
 Flower, Richard 294  
*foedus* 7, 200  
 food 30, 31, 47, 58, 232, 261; and drink  
 and sex 49, 50, 53, 54  
 Foster, B. R. 135–6  
 Foxhall, L. 235  
 Franklin, Benjamin 285  
 freedom 3, 5, 71, 72, 82, 95, 100n60, 138,  
 144, 183, 192n27, 193n49, 219  
 friendship *see philia*  
 Fröhlike, F. M. 113n10  
 Fulvius Nobilior, Q. 199  
 funerary boats 146n45
- Galtung, Johan 2–3  
 Gebbia, Clara 280  
 Gela 219–21, 222, 227  
 Gell, A. 242  
 genealogies 218, 228  
 Gent, S. E. 157n18, 158n27  
*Georgoi* (Aristophanes) 51–2  
 Germinius of Sirmium 293–7, 298,  
 301n50, 302n54, n58–9, n61–2, n64–6  
 Gero, S. 128n13  
 Glaucus 171  
 God, in Aristotle 34–5, 37, 42–3n55  
 Golden Rule 34  
 Goldhill, Simon 285, 286, 287, 288,  
 299n2, 300n3, n5–6, n8–10, n13–16, n  
 25–7, 302n56, 303n71  
 Goldstone, Jack 180  
 Good Friday Agreement 148  
 Goodman, Martin 202, 211n4–5, n7  
 Gospel of John 116, 117, 271–2, 276,  
 302n64  
 Gospel of Luke 116–17  
 Gospel of Matthew 5, 115, 116,  
 120, 284n16  
 Gray, Benjamin 4, 83n2, n21, n29, 84n  
 60–1, 193n48, 265, 268n10, 270n60  
 Greece/Greeks 1–8; Aristotle on peace  
 27–38; comedy 44–62; Common Peace  
 28, 36, 38n2, 70, 72, 183–5, 187–8,  
 190n3, 192n40–1, 193n57, 265–6;  
 identity building 217–28; international  
 arbitration 148, 149; later Classical and  
 post-Classical cities 66, 68, 71, 72, 73,  
 77, 79, 80, 81, 82; Macedonian peace  
 178–90; post-war building 231–44;  
 Xenophon's Eirenic thought 255–67,  
*see also Athens/Athenians; poleis*
- Gregory of Tours 1  
 Gribble, D. 237–8  
 Griffith, G. T. 185, 190n3, 192n23, n27,  
 n29, n30, n35, 268n14, n20  
 Gruen, E. 112n9  
 Gwynn, David M. 5
- Haldon, John 180  
 Haliarchus 153–4  
 Hall, J. M. 228n5, n8–9, n11–13, n15  
 Halus 157n7, 181, 183, 192n22  
 Hammer, D. 235, 245n32, n40  
 Hammond, Nicholas G. L. 186,  
 190n3–4, n6, 191n17, 192n23, n27,  
 n29–31, n34–5, 193n46, n54, 229n24  
 Hansen, M. H. 245n7  
 Hanson, Victor Davis 1

- Harpalus affair 76  
 Harris, E. M. 190n5, 194n68, 253  
 Hauss, C. 11n22, 12n25  
 Heath, M. 39n12  
 Hector 25n12, 227  
 Hegelian ideas 36  
*hegemon* 168, 179, 187–8, 189, 256, 266  
*Hegemonieklause* 162  
 Hegesippus 184–5, 192n33  
 Hekataios of Miletos 218  
 Hekatompodon 233  
 Helgeland, J. 128n19  
 Helladius 289  
 Helot revolt 162  
*hemerotes* 75  
 Hephaistos 225, 229n48  
 Hera 225–6, 227, 230n48  
 Heraclianus 293–7  
 Heraclitus 1, 10n1  
 heresy 9, 122, 274, 289, 293, 296  
 Herman, Gabriel 154  
 Hermocrates 219–21, 222, 227, 229n22  
 hero-cult 15  
 Herodotus 15, 43n57, 62n4, 138, 141, 142, 149, 152, 153, 171, 223, 227, 240  
 Hesiod 7–8, 25n8, 26n23, 40n21, 46–7, 49, 223, 227  
*heteroglossia* 288, 297, 298  
 Hierocaesarea 138, 140  
 Hierokles 50, 59, 63n24  
 Hilary of Poitiers 294  
*Hipparchicus* (Xenophon) 261  
 Hippias 60  
 Hippolytus of Rome 128n  
 Hirsch, S. 268n24, 269n26  
*History of Animals* (Aristotle) 30–1, 40n21, 41n29  
 Hittites 144n2  
 Hobbes, T. 27, 30, 32, 38, 38n1, 42n54; ‘three principal causes of quarrel’ 32, 40n18  
 holy war 37  
 Homer 1, 7–8, 25n8, 26n23, 149, 223, 227, 231  
*homonoiia* 4, 41n40, 67–74, 75–7, 79, 81, 84n70, 85n81, 151, 256, 260, 265, 268n10  
*homopoliteia* 72  
 Honorius, emperor 276  
 hoplites 21  
*Hōrai* (Kratinos) 51  
 Horkos 171, 176n56  
 Horn, Christoph 273  
 Hornblower, S. 175n34–6  
 Hostilius Mancinus, C. 200  
*hostis* 88, 91, 92–3, 95, 100n40, n50, 107  
 Howard, M. 191n8  
 Hugoniot, C. 283n13  
 humanity (*philanthropia*) 75–6, 79, 181  
 Hunt, P. 192n41, 193n59, 268n21  
 Hurwit, J. M. 235  
*hybris* 32, 35, 42n43, n50, 43n55  
 Hypatia 122  
 Hyperides 253–4  
 Hysechidas (Spartan arbiter) 157n9  
 iambus 21–2  
 Iberian Peninsula, *deditio* 195, 199, 201  
 ideology 4, 5, 73, 81, 114n30, 134, 144, 189–90, 240, 260, 266  
*Iliad* 24, 25, 218, 223–7  
 imperialism: Eirenic thought 255–70; Roman 102–14  
 impossibility of peace 92–5  
 impossibility of plot, in Greek comedy 45–6  
*inimicus* 91, 100n53  
 inter-species wars 30, 31–2  
 inter-state peace *see eirene*  
 inviolability 17, 154, 158n33  
*Ion* (Hekataios of Miletos) 218  
 Ionians 140, 221  
 Iseus 252  
 Ishida, T. 11n19  
 Islam 120, 128n25, 211  
 Isocrates 28, 38n3, 73, 162, 175n15, 193n56, n59, 194n63, 252, 255, 256–7, 262, 265–6, 268n10, n12–13, n17, n21, 269n33, n37, n44  
*isopoliteia* 72  
 İstar 133  
 Iulia Pacata 110  
 Iulius Caesar, L. 88  
 Iulius Indus 110  
 Izates, King 207  
 Jameson, F. 114n30  
 Jansen, Joseph 8, 255–70  
 Jason of Pherae 193n56  
 Jerome 289–93, 298, 300n31–2, 301n33–8, n40–4, n46–8  
 Jerusalem, fall of 7, 117, 202–14  
 Jesus of Thebuthi 209  
 Jewish Temple 102, 202–3  
 Jews: fall of Jerusalem 7, 202–14; military service 129n33, n36; Minorca 122; *pacatus* 108–9; Paul’s prophecy 277; Persian kings 137–8; revolt 117  
 John the Baptist 128n20  
 John of Gischala 208

- John, Gospel of 116, 117, 271–2, 276,  
302n64
- Jones, A. H. M. 280
- Josephus 202–11, 211n1, n4, n7–9, 212n10,  
n11, n13, 213n38, 214n61, n65, n70
- Jovian, emperor 123
- Julian the Apostate 123, 129n35
- Julian of Eclanum 284n18
- Julius Caesar 4, 86–101, 104, 105, 206–7;  
Alban ovation 86
- ‘just war’ theory 5
- justice 3, 68–70, 75, 80, 104, 117, 119, 226,  
257, 259, 261, 264; Aristotle 32–3, 39n12
- Justin 179, 180, 189, 191n14, 193n46,  
194n60, n61
- Justin Martyr 118, 119
- Kallias, Peace of 65n55
- Kalymna 72
- Kant, I. 27, 34, 39n7; Kingdom of Ends  
34; unsocial sociability 39n7
- katartistēr* 149, 152
- Kaufman, Peter Iver 9, 129n44, 283n10,  
n13, 284n25
- Keegan, John 206
- Kelman, Herbert 7, 9, 288
- Kibyra 107
- kinēsis* 34, 42n54
- King’s Peace 28, 36, 167, 169–70, 171–2,  
174, 183, 256
- Kizilbel 140–1
- Kleokritos 84n56
- Knapp, A. B. 232
- Knights* (Aristophanes) 52, 54, 61, 62
- koine eirene* see Common Peace
- Kratinos 49, 51, 53
- Kremmydas, Chris 253
- Kresphontes* (Euripides) 67
- Kressel, K. 11n8
- Kropotkin, Peter 31
- Kuhrt, A. 239, 247n110–11, n114–15,  
n117, n122–4, n128, n132–3
- Kybebe 141, 141f, 142
- Kynaitha 75
- Labienus, T. 92
- Lacedaemonians 161–2
- Lactantius 119, 120, 123, 129n27
- Lamakhos 46, 47, 48, 59, 63n13
- Lange, C. H. 96
- Lavan, Myles 4–5, 98n10, 99n20, 112n2,  
114n29
- leisteiai* 68
- Leochares 252
- Leocrates 252
- Leotychides 171
- Lepelley, C. 284n26
- Lepreum 166, 168–9
- Leucas 157n7
- Leuctra 170–2
- Levin, M. 39n12
- ‘Liar-Kings’ 241, 241f
- Libanius 122
- Lim, R. 300n4
- Livy 98n6, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109,  
113n17, 197–8
- Lobur, J. A. 191n13
- logos* 39n7, 41n39
- love, in Aristotle 28–9, 33, 34, 35, 37,  
40n15–16, 41n42
- Low, P. 191n8, 192n28, 193n44, n57,  
n59, 270n62
- Lucifer of Cagliari 289, 292–3
- Luciferians 289–93, 298, 300n29, n31,  
301n48
- Licinius Lucullus, L. 199
- Luke, Gospel of 116–17
- Lycaonians 258
- Lycia 68, 80–1
- Lycurgan constitution 36
- Lycurgus 252–3
- Lydia 15, 138–43, 145n29, n32, 146n40,  
155, 239
- Lykia 140–1
- Lysias 67, 193n56, 246n52, 250–2, 254
- Lysistrata* (Aristophanes) 44, 45–6, 53–6,  
60–2, 62n3, 65n51
- Ma, John 180, 191n12–13
- Macedon 6, 178–94
- Macedonius, Vicar of Africa 278
- McLaren, J. S. 211n7
- Maco of Larisa 157n7
- Maeandrius 158n
- Magness, J. 213n32, 214n69–70
- Malthus, Robert 202
- mandatum* 91–2
- Mandela, Nelson 254
- Manesas 78–9, 81
- Manichaeism 125
- Manlius Volso, Cn. 98n6
- Mantineans 154, 161, 166–7, 169–73,  
176n54
- Marathon, battle of 236–7
- Marcus Aurelius 120
- Marduk cult 136–7, 144n16
- Mark Antony 4, 86–90, 93–6,  
98n11, 100n50, n56, 101n61

- Mars 102  
 Martial 106  
 Martin of Tours 123  
 Masada 207  
 Mathewes, Charles 273, 281–2  
 Matthew, Gospel of 5, 115, 116, 120, 284n16  
 Maxentius, emperor 123  
 Maximian, emperor 277  
 Medeniaks, Selga 5, 144n2, 246n89, 247n110  
 mediation 11n8, 148  
 Megara 155  
 Megarian Decree 47, 51, 57, 58, 63n10  
 Meidias 164  
*Memorabilia* (Xenophon) 258  
 Menelaus 24  
 Menexenus 252  
 mercenaries 256, 260, 262, 268n12  
 mildness (*praotes*) 75  
 Milesian strife 152  
 Miletos 142, 143f, 149, 155  
 Miletus *see* Miletos  
 militarism 36, 102, 127, 255  
 military service 119, 120, 122, 123  
 Millar, F. G. B. 213n46, n52, 214n64  
 Miller, M. C. 238  
 Miltiades of Rome 274  
 Miltiades the Younger 236–7  
 Milvian Bridge, battle of 121, 123  
 mining industry 263, 267  
 Minorca 122  
 Mitchell, George 148  
 Mitchell, Lynette 158n32  
*modus vivendi* arrangements 70, 265  
 Moloney, E. P. 191n14, 193n56  
 Momigliano, A. 85n97  
 Monophysites 298  
 monumental building programs 231–47  
 Morgan, Janett 8, 245n33, n39, 246n55, n59, n66, n83  
 Morris, S. P. 233  
 mortuary practice 140–1  
 Müller, Harald 3, 12n28  
 Murithi, Tim 180, 191n8  
 museums 1, 10n5  
 Mutina 95  
 ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ 222, 226  
 Mytileneans 150, 151, 152–3, 155, 159n37  
  
 Nakone 69, 71  
 natural justice, in Aristotle 32–3  
 Nemea River, battle of 169, 175n27  
*Nemesis* (Kratinos) 53  
  
 Neo-Assyrian kings 5, 133–6, 144n8  
 Nestor 24–5  
 New Testament 120  
 Nicaea, council of 129n33, 294  
 Nicaragua 221–2  
*Nicomachean Ethics* (Aristotle) 27, 28, 83n7, n17  
 Nietzsche, F. 43n56  
 Nikias, Peace of 44, 45, 46, 62, 64–5n49, 165–6, 167  
*nomos/nomoi* 32, 160  
*nous* 37  
 Noussia–Fantuzzi, M. 26n20, n23  
 Numantia 199–200  
 Numidia 273, 281  
  
 oaths: Greeks 69, 70, 71–3, 83n22, 84n47, 269n32; Sparta 160–77  
 Ober, J. 229n30  
 Octavian *see* Augustus, emperor  
*Odyssey* 218, 258  
*oikos* 28  
 Okeanos 224  
 Old Testament 117, 123, 124, 133, 137–8  
 Olympia 55, 166, 176n63, 193n56, 217, 218, 228n13  
 Olympian gods 22, 57, 223–8  
*On the Deaths of the Persecutors* (Lactantius) 129n27  
*On the Duties of the Clergy* (Ambrose of Milan) 124, 129n42  
*On the False Embassy* (Demosthenes) 185, 186  
*On Idolatry* (Tertullian) 118  
*On the Military Crown* (Tertullian) 118  
*On the Peace* (Demosthenes) 182, 185–6, 191n20  
*On the Peace* (Isocrates) 193n59, 256–7, 266  
 Oppius 90  
 Optatus of Milevis 273  
 Optatus of Thamugadi 273, 274, 276  
 ordinary peace 70  
 Origen 118–19, 120, 127  
 Osborne, R. 228n12  
 Ostwald, M. 38n2  
*otium* (inactivity/ease) 87  
 Overman, J. A. 211n4–5, 212n10, 214n66  
 Ovid 106  
  
*pacare* 87, 98n10, 102–14  
*pacatus* 5, 87, 88, 93, 99n20, 102–14  
*pacavi* 105, 113n16  
 pacifism 71, 115; Christianity 115, 116, 120, 127, 127n7

- Panegyricus* (Isocrates) 193n56, 256, 257  
 panhellenism 55–6; Eirenic thought  
     255–70  
*parabasis* 47, 56–7, 63n9  
 Parchami, A. 11n23, 101n65  
 Paris 24  
 Parker, Victor 151, 157n16, n20  
 Parmenion 179  
 Paros 149  
 Parthenon 8, 233–4, 234f, 237  
 Parthians 207, 208, 211  
 Pasargadae 8, 239, 240, 242  
*patrios politeia* 15  
 Paul, apostle 116, 117, 271, 277  
 Paul, G. M. 212n11  
 Paulinus of Antioch 301n48  
 Pausanias 236, 254  
*pax: deonum* 100n43; Romans 4, 80, 87–101,  
     102–6, 110–11, 112n4, 112–13n9  
*Pax Persica* 189  
*Peace* (Aristophanes) 44–7, 49–52, 59–60  
 peace of the city (*pax civitatis*) 78  
 Peace of Kallias 65n55  
 Peace of Nikias 44, 45, 46, 62, 64–5n49,  
     165–6, 167  
 Peace of Philocrates 181–6, 192n22,  
     n28, n36  
 Peace Studies 221–2, 227  
 Peisistratids 156  
 Pelasgians 219  
 Peloponnesian League 161–2, 165, 166–7,  
     168–71  
 Peloponnesian War 8, 37, 67, 163, 167,  
     175n36, 219, 223, 248, 256  
*peregrinus* 88  
 Periander 149, 151–3, 155, 158n35  
 Pericles 237–8, 246n59, 262, 263  
*perioeci* 161, 162  
 Perlman, S. 193n55, 237, 268n9  
 persecution 116, 117, 119–22, 127  
 Persepolis 8, 232–3, 239, 240, 242–3;  
     Apadana 239, 239f  
 Persian Wars 55–6, 76, 218, 219  
 Persians 256–9; post-war building 231–47,  
     *see also* Cyrus the Great  
 Peter, apostle 276  
 Phalanna 68, 79  
 Pheidias 59  
 Pherekrates 49  
*philanthropia* 75–6, 79, 181  
*philia* (friendship) 4, 28–9, 30–8, 39n11–12,  
     40n16, 41n31, 68, 73; sub-species 34,  
     41n31  
 Philip of Macedon 6, 73, 178–94  
*Philippicus* 93, 94, 95, 97t  
 Philippides 253–4  
 Philo 84n70  
 Philocrates, Peace of 181–6, 192n22,  
     n28, n36  
*philoi* 30–1, 34  
*philotimia* 79  
 Phlius 170–1, 172–3  
 Phocis 181, 183, 192n22  
 Phoibias 151, 157n14  
 Phokaia 140  
*phronēsis* 35  
 Phrygia 80  
 Phrynon 153, 158n25  
 Piraeus 248  
 Pisistratids 234–5  
 Pisistratus 234–5  
 Pittacus 150–1, 152–3, 155, 158n25,  
     159n37  
 Plancus 100n56  
 Plataea 175n36  
 Plato 28, 34, 38n2, n4, 39n12, 42n49, 74,  
     84n56, 255, 266–7; *Republic* 32, 38n4;  
     slavery 267n4, *see also* Socrates  
 Plautus 198, 201n6  
 Pliny the Elder 106, 213n57  
*Ploutoi* (Kratinos) 49, 53, 64n35  
 Plutarch 16, 36, 75–7, 155, 158n29, n35,  
     236, 238, 246n69; Lacedaemonians  
     162; Macedon 186  
 Polanyi, K. 265  
*poleis* 32, 66, 67, 70, 72, 77–8, 82, 84n47,  
     156, 179, 180–1, 185, 187–90, 190n5,  
     192–3n43, 235, 267, 268n21; elites  
     235; *homopoliteia* 72; later Hellenism 82;  
     Macedon 179–81, 185, 187–90, 190n4  
*polemos* (enmity) 4, 30, 31, 36, 42n49,  
     67–8, 74, 77, 79, 81  
*polis* 28, 32–3, 36, 67–8, 69, 84n46;  
     arbitration 156; Dionysius 77; *homonoia*  
     71; Kynaiitha 75; panhellenism 255;  
     Xenophon 263  
*politeia* 68, 69, 71  
*Politics* (Aristotle) 28, 31–3, 35, 40n17, 150  
 Polyaeus 158n24, 177n77  
 Polybius 67, 75, 180, 186, 191n11, 199  
 Polycrates 157n14  
 Pompeians 92–3  
 Pompeius, Q. 200  
 Pompey 88, 89–92, 95, 96, 98n13,  
     99n18, n35, n37, 100n39, 101n62,  
     108–9, 206, 214n74  
 Popilius Laenas, M. 200  
 porcupines, parable of 39n7

- Poroi* (Xenophon) 8, 256, 257, 261–7,  
 269n44–6, n49, 270n56  
 Poseidon 225–7, 229n45, 237  
*praotes* 75  
 Priam 25n15  
 Price, Jonathan 202, 203, 204, 211n3, n8,  
 212n26  
 Priene 81–2  
*proboulos* 46, 53–4, 60  
*prohairesis* 68  
*Pro Sestio* (Cicero) 109  
 proto-racism 267n4, 268n17  
*proxenia* 154  
 Proxenus 259  
 Prudentius 300n6  
 Pruitt, D. G. 11n8, 159n39  
 Prussians, understanding of war 36  
 Punic war 109  
 punishment, in Augustine 9, 271–84  
 purgative benefits of war 36  
 Pylos 44, 45, 54, 60  
 Pythagoreans 77  
 Pytho of Byzantium 184
- Quadi 120  
 quiet: *hesychia* 77; *quies* 87
- Raaflaub, Kurt 2, 148, 192n40, 229n18, 231  
 ‘Rain Miracle’ 120  
 Ratté, C. 145n30, n32, n37, 147n48, n50,  
 233–4  
*Reconciliation Agreement* (Athens) 248–52  
 religious acculturation 133, 140, 142,  
 143–4  
 repentance 271, 272, 278, 282, 283  
*Republic* (Plato) 32, 38n4  
*Res Gestae* (Augustus) 105, 113n16  
*res publica* 80, 87, 88, 91, 94–6  
*The Revelation of John* 210  
 Rhodes, P. J. 15, 16, 238, 250  
 Richardson, John 6–7, 201n2, n15  
 Richer, N. 160  
 Rimini, council of 289, 293, 294, 302n52  
 Risse-Kappen, T. 11n10  
 Rives, J. B. 212n17  
 Robinson, E. 11n9  
 Romanus Hispo 104  
 Romans 1, 4–7, 74; and Christians 115,  
 117–18, 120–1, 123; civil conflicts  
 86–101; civil wars 78, 79, 80, 86–7,  
 88–9; *deditio* 6, 195–201; fall of  
 Jerusalem 7, 117, 202–14; imperialism  
 102–14; *pax* 4, 80, 87–101  
 Romulus 86
- Roochnik, D. 42–3n55  
 Rood, T. 268n23, 289n27, n28, n37  
 Root, M. C. 232, 239–40  
 Rosato, S. 11n10  
 Rosenstein, N. 113n9  
 Roth, J. P. 213n32, n33, n40  
 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 27  
 Rubin, J. Z. 159n39  
 Ruffell, Ian 4, 62n2, 63n7, n19, n21,  
 64n26–7  
 Russett, B. 11n9  
 Ryder, T. T. B. 38n2–3, 183, 192n27
- Sabines 197–8  
 Sacred War 184  
 Sagalassos 78–9  
 Salamis 16–17, 149, 152, 155  
 Salmon, J. B. 151  
 Samos 64n38, 157n14, 158n33, 176n42, 233  
 Sardis 139, 139f, 140, 141–2, 141f,  
 145n32, 146n44  
 Sargon, King 134, 144n3, n6  
 Scepis 164  
 schism 121, 122, 125, 274, 276, 277, 289,  
 293, 301n48  
 Schmidt, E. F. 240  
*scholia* 42n53  
 Schopenhauer, Arthur 39n7  
 Scipio, Metellus 92  
 Scott, J. C. 114n30  
 Scribonius Libo, L. 95  
 Segeda 199  
 Sempronius Gracchus, Ti. (consul 177 bc)  
 105, 199  
 Seneca the Elder 104  
 Sermon on the Mount 116  
 Sestos 257, 268n18  
 Seven Sages 15, 150, 155, 158n35  
 Sextus Pompeius 105  
 Shackleton, Bailey 105, 106  
 ‘shaking-off of burdens’ 25n3  
 Shalmaneser III 135f  
 shalom 115  
 Shannon, M. 158n27  
 Shaw, Brent 283n10  
 Sherwin-White, A. N. 110  
 Shipley, G. 105, 233  
 Siceliots 220–1, 222, 227  
 Sicilian Expedition 46, 54, 63n24, 219–21  
 Sicilian ‘Slave War’, first 75  
 Sicily, Hermocrates’ speech 219–21  
 Sigeion 152–4, 155, 157–8n22, 159n37  
 Sikyon 76–7  
 Simma, B. 174n6

- Simon bar Gioras 208  
 Simonetti, Manlio 296  
 Skultety, S. C. 41n37  
*skytalismo* 76  
 slavery 3, 8, 16, 19; Aristotle 34, 36,  
 39n12, 40n16, 267n4; Athens 20, 22,  
 23, 25n3; Augustine 281, 282; Cicero  
 94; Greeks 267n4; master–slave relation  
 28–9; mines 267; Sicilian ‘Slave War’ 75  
 Smith, Reverend Sydney 202  
 Social War 256, 262  
 Socrates 38n4, 252, 285, 286–7, 291  
 Solon 3, 15–26, 149, 155; as boundary-  
 marker 24; shield simile 19–21, 23;  
 wolf simile 22–3  
 Sophists 223  
 Spartans 6, 36–7, 219; building 236;  
 Decelea 263; *diallaktēs* 149; Greek  
 comedy 45, 47, 51, 54–7, 60, 61–2;  
 oaths of allies 160–77; *Reconciliation  
 Agreement* 251; relations with Macedon  
 179–80, 186; Salamis 152; Thirty Years’  
 Peace 61–2, 65n56, 162, 163–4, 165  
*spondai* 61  
 Spring House Decree 238  
 Squillace, Giuseppe 189  
*stasis* 4, 29, 36; Aristophanes 231;  
 Aristotle 32, 36, 37, 38n2, 41n23,  
 n34, n37, 42n49, 43n56; elites 235–6;  
 Greek comedy 45; later Classical and  
 post-Classical Greek cities 66–85;  
 Solon 19, 20, 24  
 Stein-Hölkeskamp, E. 236  
 Steinbock, B. 228n14  
 stelas 135, 140  
*Stheneboia* (Euripides) 51  
 Sthenelaidas 162  
*Stoa Poikile* 236  
 Stolper, M. W. 242, 247n131  
 Stoppard, Tom 297  
 Strabo 138, 155, 158n25, 176n42  
 Strasburger, H. 229n29, 230n50  
 Stronach, D. B. 239, 240, 244, 247n103,  
 n120, n126, n134  
 Strootman, Rolf 190  
 Stylianou, P. J. 170, 172, 177n73, n87,  
 n90, n93  
 subjugation, *deditio* 195–201  
 Sulla 95, 99n37, 101n65  
 Sulpicius Severus 123, 204, 206  
 Susa 233, 240, 241–2, 247n131  
*sympoliteia* 72  
 syncretism 140  
 Syracusans 220–1  
*Tabula Alcantarensis* 195–201  
 Tacitus 96, 113n15, 138, 204, 206,  
 213n36, 214n74  
 tameness (*hemerotes*) 75  
 Tams, C. J. 174n6  
 Tarquinius Priscus 197–8  
 Tas Kule tomb 140  
 Telekleides, *Amphiktyones* 49  
*Telephos* (Euripides) 50, 57  
*telos* 28, 36  
 Temple Mount 204, 206–7, 209–10,  
 212n13  
 Templum Pacis 102  
 Terence 275  
 Ternessos 78–9, 81  
 Tertullian 104, 118, 119, 120, 127,  
 128n12–13, 298–9  
 Tethys 224, 229n42  
 Thebes 76, 174, 175n36, 176n46, 186,  
 193n46  
 Themistocles 141, 157n7, 236–7  
 Theodoret of Cyrhus 298  
 Theodoros Metochites 151, 157n14  
*Theodosian Code* 122  
 Theodosius I, emperor 122, 275, 276  
 Theodosius II, emperor 122  
 Theognis 15  
 Thériault, G. 73  
 Thermopylai 55, 56  
 Theseus 236, 237  
 Thessaly 68, 181, 183, 184, 218, 219  
 Thetis 224, 227, 229n48  
 third-party intervention 148, 149, 152,  
 156, 159n39  
 Third Sacred War 43n56  
 Thirty Tyrants 8, 69, 244, 246n52, 248–9,  
 251, 253–4  
 Thirty Years’ Peace 61–2, 65n56, 162,  
 163–4, 165  
 Thomas Aquinas 125  
 Thompson, D’Arcy Wentworth 30, 31  
 Thrace 45, 167, 181, 192n32, 194n63  
 Thracians 54, 167, 181, 183, 189, 191n18,  
 257, 261, 268n17  
 Thrasybulus 251, 254  
 Thucydides 2, 7–8, 11n12, 40n18,  
 43n57, 45, 84n49, n58, 163–5,  
 167, 175n16, n18–19, n33, n35–7,  
 176n38–42, n44–53, n57, n59, 236–7,  
 269n37, n39, n47, 270n53; Deceleia  
 54; Megarian Decree 47; Peace of  
 Nicias 64–5n49; *stasis* 67; struggle  
 with Hellenic discourses 217–30  
 Timaeus 155, 229n21

- Tissaphernes 163, 173  
 Titthi 199  
 Titus, emperor 7, 202–3, 204–9,  
     210–11, 212n11, n14, n17, n25, n27  
 Tod, M. N. 148–9, 156  
*tranquillitas* (tranquillity) 87  
 Trigger, B. G. 233, 235, 240  
 triumph 86, 95–6  
 Trojans 223–5  
 Troy 1, 57, 152–3, 155, 224, 226, 236  
*trygōidia* 50, 51  
*tumultus* 88  
 Tuplin, C. 177n69, n81, 267n4, n7  
 tyrants 29, 35, 42n44; *aisymmetes* 150–3;  
     elected 149; Thirty Tyrants 8, 69, 244,  
     246n52, 248–9, 251, 253–4  
 Tyrtaeus 16, 17  
  
 Ulf, Christoph 7–8, 228n2, n5, 229n17,  
     n39–40, n46, 230n49  
 Ur inscription 137  
 utopia, in Greek comedy 44, 49, 51–3, 55,  
     61–2, 62n2, 64n35  
  
 Vaccaei 199  
 Valerius Flaccus, L. 108, 212n12  
 Van Nuffelen, P. 300n8, n17–18, n27  
 van Soesbergen, P. G. 269n28, n33  
 Vassal Treaties of Esarhaddon 134  
 Vatinius, P. 92  
 Vegetius 1, 123  
 Vergil 43n57, 102  
 Vespasian 7, 202, 207–9, 214n66  
 Vibullius Rufus, L. 92  
 victory (and peace), in the Roman  
     republic 86, 88, 90–96  
 Vincentius of Cartennae 125–6  
  
 Viriathus 200  
 Vitruvius 106  
 von Heyking, J. 283n8  
  
 Walbank, F. W. 193n56  
 Waters, M. 239, 242  
 weapon of Aššur 133–4, 135  
 Wendt, F. 70  
 West, M. L. 229n42, n44  
 Wiesehöfer, J. 194n64, 239, 240, 242,  
     247n108  
 Wilber, D. N. 247n101  
 ‘Wild Goat’ style 146n48  
 Williams, Michael Stuart 129n37  
 women 3, 82  
 Woodman, A. J. 212n11  
 Worthington, I. 191n7, 192n29, n36,  
     193n47, n51, 194n63, 253, 254  
  
*xenagoi* 162  
*xenia* 154  
 Xenophanes 218  
 Xenophon 8, 74, 162, 163, 168–9, 170–3,  
     174, 176n52, n62–3, n65, 177n67,  
     n68, n71, n74–5, n79–80, n82–5, n87,  
     n89, n93–4, 188, 251; Eirenic thought  
     255–70  
 Xerxes 242  
  
 Yack, B. 34, 38n2, 41n37, n39, n40  
 Young, Frances 298  
  
 Zampaglione, G. 38n2, 43n58  
 Zela sanctuary 138  
 Zeus 18–19, 45, 52, 218, 224–7,  
     229n43–5, 229–30n43  
 Zocca, Elena 275