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Re-mapping the Irish civil war: the role of the National Army

by

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Abstract

The discourse on the Irish civil war has seen significant growth over the past two decades; the pioneering work of Michael Hopkinson in *Green against green* (1988) has been followed by a series of articles, books and theses on various aspects of the Irish civil war. However, the overall emphasis upon the IRA has been disproportionate when compared to the dearth of work done on the Irish military tradition in the National Army during the Revolutionary period. The consensus understanding of the Irish civil war, in that such a consensus exists, is that of a binary divide that occurred within the Irish revolutionary movement after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the creation of a new Irish Free State. In the Irish context, the sides involved in the Irish civil war are often broken down into pro- and anti-Treaty factions which ostensibly divided over the issue of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 and the type of state to be created; Republic vs. Free State. This popular narrative, with some variations, is largely accepted within the historical discourse on the Irish civil war. Hopkinson is one of very few academics to attempt to widen this aspect of the discourse, and even his research stops short of redefining the historical understanding of the Irish civil war. Instead of viewing the conflict as between two large amorphous factions, this thesis posits that the conflict should be viewed as one faction, the pro-Treaty forces attempting to create a new state, with the pro-Treaty National Army being utilised to achieve this outcome.

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Abbreviations

BMH	Bureau of Military History
CS	Chief of Staff (IRA)
DED	District Electoral District
DMP	Dublin Metropolitan Police
GHQ	General Headquarters
GOC	General Officer Commanding
HGIS	Historical Geographic Information Systems
IRA	Irish Republican Army
MAI	Military Archives of Ireland
MSPC	Military Service Pension Collection
OIRA	'Old' IRA
TD	Teachta Dála
TNA	The National Archives, UK
UCDA	University College Dublin, Archives
WO	War Office (British)

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Introduction

> The elements originally constituting the nucleus of the present army [Defence Forces] were drawn from a revolutionary military organisation which had no sooner emerged from successful guerrilla strife with an external enemy than it was rent in twain on internal issues… The evolution of an Army cannot be artificially forced. It is the process of learning wisdom from experience — often from folly — but that great and satisfying progress has been made will not be denied by any whose memory of the Army in 1923 enables him to contrast that hurriedly-constructed instrument with the Forces as they can be seen and judged today.[1]
>
> Memorandum of the development of the Irish Defence Forces, 1927

The creation of this 'hurriedly-constructed instrument' is the subject of this thesis, namely the formation of the National Army in 1922. The consensus understanding of the Irish civil war, as much as one exists, is that a divide occurred within the Irish revolutionary movement after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. This narrative of an inevitable divide in revolutionary movements once the colonial power has been 'vanquished' is a common trope elsewhere but is simplistic and fails to account for the complexities within these types of movements.[2] In the Irish context, the sides involved in the Irish civil war are often broken down into pro- and anti-Treaty factions which ostensibly divided over the issue of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 and the type of state to be created: Republic vs. Free State. This division is frequently cited and has a wider cultural resonance in Irish society right up to the present. The National Army is largely overlooked in modern studies of both the Irish Defence Forces or the IRA.[3] Its brief two year existence helped lay the foundation of a new Irish state, but its broader legacy has been shrouded in generalities and controversy. Basic questions such as how many men

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[1] Memorandum on the development of the Forces in the period, 1923-7, p. 1. (MA/HS/A/0876).

[2] See for example the historiography on the Finnish civil war. Hannu Immonen, 'From February Revolution to Civil War: Finnish Historians and the Year 1917' in *Journal of Modern Russian History and Historiography,* vol. 9, no.1 (2016) pp 89-105 ; Tuomas Tepora and Aapo Roselius (eds) *The Finnish civil war 1918: history, memory, legacy* (Leiden, 2014).

[3] There is only one text on the Irish Army: J.P. Duggan's, *A history of the Irish Army* (Dublin, 1991) of which only two chapters are devoted to the Civil war period. In comparison there are multiple texts of different aspects of the Irish War of Independence and the IRA during the Revolutionary period; Charles Townshend, *The British campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921: the development of political and military policies* (Oxford, 1975), Charles Townshend, *Political violence in Ireland: government and resistance since 1848* (Oxford, 1983), David Fitzpatrick (ed.), *Revolution? Ireland 1917-1923* (Dublin, 1990), J. Augusteijn, *From public defiance to guerrilla warfare: the experience of ordinary volunteers in the Irish war of independence, 1916-1921* (Dublin, 1996), Peter Hart's, *The IRA and its enemies* (Oxford, 1998), Michael Hopkinson, *The Irish war of independence* (Dublin, 2002), David Fitzpatrick's (ed.), *Terror in Ireland, 1916-1923* (Dublin, 2012) are just a small sample of texts on these topics.

were recruited during the initial period of the civil war, where these men came from and how many were killed all remain unanswered, despite over thirty years of expanding scholarship since the publication of Michael Hopkinson's pivotal work, *Green against green* (1988). While the Irish civil war is often described in manichean terms as a binary divide between pro- and anti-Treatyites, this is a very simplified view of a complex and unclear situation.

The transition between pro-Treaty IRA, National Army and later Defence Forces is not a straightforward process and involved a number of complex organisational changes and decisions. There is also the wider question of authority and remit, as the National Army at its height was providing a role more akin to multiple government departments than a military, being in charge of customs, political policing and infrastructure maintenance. The opaque history of this organisation, which has often been described instead of analysed, is partly a feature of the paucity of archival records on the National Army prior to the 2010s. Peter Hart noted that the Irish Revolution 'may be the best-documented revolution in the world'.[4] However, the caveat is that this is more true of the IRA than any other organisation.[5] Starting in 2010, the Military Archives of Ireland have embarked upon an ambitious digitisation programme. Of particular value to this thesis is the Military Service Pensions Collection (MSPC) and the digitised Irish Army census 1922, the largest and so far only 'census' taken of the National Army during the Irish civil war. By combining elements of the MSPC, in particular the IRA nominal rolls, with the full transcription of the Irish Army census undertaken for this thesis, it is now possible to re-examine the role of the National Army during the first critical months of the civil war in 1922. The type of material that has been released is substantively different to previous biographies, memoirs and oral history accounts such as the Bureau of Military History (BMH). Much of pension correspondence is administrative in nature, with extensive information as to the composition of IRA units both structurally and numerically being sought by the Army Pension Board. The military census is unusual in that it remains the only census taken during a civil war in

[4] Peter Hart, *The IRA at war, 1916-1923* (Oxford, 2003), p. 7.

[5] Throughout this study, the term Irish Revolution has been retired in favour of Irish revolutionary period as the experiences of the First World War and other pre-1916 events had an impact upon society beyond the 1916 Rising and the ensuing Irish war of independence. However, this is not meant as an endorsement of the 'Decade of Centenaries, 1912-23' which is a timeline created by the Irish government in 2011 and was designed as a catch-all term to create a more orderly commemorative programme.

the modern era that has been released to the general public. The ability to utilise these transcripts means that it is possible to make definitive findings as to the composition of the National Army during 1922, in particular the numbers recruited, individual areas of enlistment and next-of-kin information. Unlike county studies of the IRA, which are by design a sampling of a larger organisation, the release of this type of comprehensive statistical information from the Military Archives allows for a thorough re-evaluation of the National Army during the most intensive period of the civil war.

The role played by Cumman na nGaedheal and other political actors in the development of the Irish Free State and in particular the facilitation of the first peaceful transfer of power in 1932 has been the subject of renewed study in the past decade.[6] The corresponding role played by military organisations remains dominated by scholarship on the 'vanquished' of the civil war, namely the anti-Treaty IRA and its successor groups that continued to operate after the conflict. The political dimension of the civil war divide, while important *after* the conflict has been largely overstated in the discourse on the war itself to date. The caricatured narrative of Dev versus Collins reduces the civil war to duelling personality cults, each sustained by propagandists in the decades after the conflict.[7] While the publication of *Politics and Irish Life* by David Fitzpatrick in 1979 led to a fundamental shift in how studies of the IRA and the Irish Revolution were undertaken, similar changes have yet to occur for studies of the National Army and the Irish civil war. This is partly due to the ubiquitous nature of the 'county' study and its relatively adaptive nature as an analytical lens to examine the IRA in a given locale.

There is also a broader tendency identified by Keith Jeffery, who posited that there were two parallel military traditions: military and paramilitary formed during the Revolutionary period. Jeffery's view is that post-civil war, the paramilitary tradition gained dominance as the Irish state rapidly demobilised the new Irish military apparatus

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[6] See Ciara Meehan, *The Cosgrave party: a history of Cumann na nGaedheal, 1923-33* (Dublin, 2010) : Mel Farrell, *Party Politics in a New Democracy: the Irish Free State, 1922-37* (London, 2017).

[7] See Dorothy McArdle, *The Irish Republic* (Dublin, 1937) and P.S. O'Hegarty, *The victory of Sinn Féin* (Dublin, 1924) each a classic example of the differing interpretations of the conflict.

during the 1920s.[8] The differences between the military and paramilitary traditions are often unclear within the Irish historiography on the Revolutionary period. The military service of Irishmen in the National Army is demonstrably different from military service in the IRA. This difference between the two organisations is an example of the differences between the military and paramilitary traditions in Ireland. The argument that military service in the National Army is part of a military tradition separate to the paramilitary tradition, challenges a fundamental narrative of the modern Irish Defence Forces: that they are the successor of the Irish Volunteers and the IRA. It is a bold claim, one that has been made since the foundation of the modern Irish Defence Forces in 1924.[9] It is understandable why such a claim is repeated, it delegitimises the anti-Treaty (later Provisional) IRA and creates a clear narrative that leads from the Easter Rising 1916 to the Irish War of Independence and ends with the creation of the Irish Defence Forces in 1924, neglecting until recently the Irish civil war and the National Army. However, by linking the official Irish military to distinctly paramilitary organisations such as the Irish Volunteers and IRA, this blurs the line between Ireland's military and paramilitary traditions.

The relationship between a separate *Irish* military tradition, as identified by Jeffery and the long-standing British military tradition is one that has been raised since the civil war by the opponents of the pro-Treaty position. The hiring of ex-servicemen into the National Army has been posited as both evidence of 'foreign' influences and as an explanation for its success during the civil war. The wider issue of ex-servicemen and their impact, if any, is a key question that is examined in this study as it has remained a consistent issue within the limited study of the pro-Treaty military to date. On the larger question of similarities between the British and Irish armies, apart from obvious continuities such as equipment and uniform design, the most important divergence is that of influence. The British Army has retained political power and clout, typically via well-placed veterans in key civil service and political roles throughout the upper echelons of British society. Even during periods of large-scale military demobilisation, the British military has never lost its political authority. In contrast the Irish military has

[8] Keith Jeffery, 'The British Army and the Irish state since 1922' in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery (eds) *A military history of Ireland* (Cambridge, 1997), pp 431-458.

[9] J. P. Duggan, *A history of the Irish Army* (Dublin, 1991), p. 113.

been prevented from exercising any political sway since 1924 and in subsequent decades, the apolitical nature of the Irish Army has been a consistent feature of the organisation.[10] Therefore, it could be argued that an Irish military tradition, roughly analogous to that of the British military establishment, only truly existed with any degree of agency during the period 1922-4, when it *de facto* operated as a physical embodiment of the new state. This does not detract from Jeffery's larger point that the paramilitary tradition, with its long-standing links to nationalism and republicanism has become dominant but it is notable that this decline was not gradual or surprising as it has its origins in the denouement of military supremacy at the end of the civil war. The ascendancy of the paramilitary tradition is best shown in the differing commemorative practices that emerged post-civil war, with the anti-Treaty IRA losses being seamlessly added to a larger panoply of nationalist martyrs, while the National Army dead remained 'politically inconvenient' and largely adrift from any political movement.

[10] For an account of how the political stature of the military was diminished see, Theo Farrell, '"The Model Army": Military Imitation and The Enfeeblement of the Army in Post-Revolutionary Ireland, 1922 - 42' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, viii (1997), pp 111–127.

Existing Literature on the Irish civil war

The discourse on the Irish civil war has seen significant growth over the past two decades, the pioneering work of Michael Hopkinson in *Green against green* (1988) has been followed by a series of articles, books and theses on various aspects of the Irish civil war. The earlier non-academic texts on the Irish civil war provided limited analysis and added little to the overall discourse on the Irish revolutionary period.[11] Hopkinson's text on the Irish civil war and its far-reaching attempts to detail the minute details of the conflict still shape the current discourse on the Irish civil war. Hopkinson's particular emphasis upon the newly constituted National Army as the embodiment of the fledging Irish state is of particular note as this widened the debate on the role of the military in the founding of the Irish state in 1922.

Hopkinson's research on the Irish civil war was followed by a number of texts examining different aspects of the Irish civil war: Tom Garvin's *1922: the birth of Irish democracy* (1996),[12] Eunan O'Halpin's *Defending Ireland* (1999),[13] John M. Regan's *The Irish counter-revolution* (1999),[14] Anne Dolan's *Commemorating the Irish civil war* (2003),[15] Bill Kissane's *The politics of the Irish civil war* (2005)[16], Gemma Clark's *Everyday violence in the Irish civil war* (2014)[17] and Gavin M. Foster's *Irish civil war* (2015).[18] Although each of these texts examines an aspect of the Irish civil war: O'Halpin's *Defending Ireland* and Regan's *Irish counter-revolution* span a larger timeframe and devote a chapter or two to the Irish civil war. O'Halpin emphasises the role of the military and security forces in upholding the Irish state, following on from his chapter, 'The army in independent Ireland' in *A military history of Ireland* (1997)

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[11] See Timothy Mawe, 'A comparative survey of the historical debates surrounding Ireland, World War 1 and the Irish civil war' in *History Studies* vol. 13 (2012), pp 7-9.

[12] Tom Garvin, *1922: the birth of Irish democracy* (Dublin, 1996).

[13] Eunan O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland: the Irish state and its enemies since 1922* (Oxford, 1999).

[14] John M. Regan, *The Irish counter-revolution: treatyite politics and settlement in independent Ireland, 1921-36* (Dublin, 1999).

[15] Anne Dolan, *Commemorating the Irish civil war: history and memory, 1923 - 2000* (Cambridge, 2003).

[16] Bill Kissane, *The politics of the Irish civil war* (Oxford, 2005).

[17] Gemma Clark, *Everyday violence in the Irish civil war* (Cambridge, 2014).

[18] Gavin M. Foster, *The Irish civil war: politics, class and conflict* (London, 2015).

edited by Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery.[19] It is important to note that all of these works, except for Foster's monograph, were published before the large release of digitised documents from the Military Archives of Ireland.

John M. Regan's text examines the entire Free State period and explores the pro-Treaty factions' role in the foundation of the modern Irish state and the perceived lack of democratic norms during the Irish civil war period. Tom Garvin's text on the democratic system established by the Irish Free State provides some interesting commentary. However the text is a mixture of political science and historical research and its conclusions are weighted in favour of the pro-Treaty position. Garvin's argument about a lack of democratic accountability between Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Army is further expanded upon in Arthur Mitchell's text on parliamentary democracy.[20] The origins and impact of civil war politics is examined by Michael Gallagher's successive texts on Irish political trends and electoral systems.[21] Bill Kissane's article on the legislative measures taken by the Irish Free State government provides a concise overview of the legal response by the nascent Irish government to the Irish civil war, in particular the legacy of the National Army upon the Free State after it had been re-organised.[22] In *The politics of the Irish civil war*, Kissane attempts to place the Irish civil war within the larger post-colonial narrative and comparative conflicts such as the Finnish civil war.[23]

Anne Dolan's text on commemoration in post-civil war Ireland and the attempts by the state to control the type of commemorative activity provides a good commentary on post-civil war attitudes to remembrance and the process of hagiography that was

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[19] Eunan O'Halpin 'The army in independent Ireland' in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery (eds) *A military history of Ireland* (Cambridge, 1997), pp 407-430. Theo Farrell's article, 'The model army' is a complementary analysis of the same period except Farrell's conclusions are less tempered and more critical of the civilian authorities.

[20] Arthur Mitchell, *Revolutionary government in Ireland: Dáil Éireann, 1919 - 22* (Dublin, 1995).

[21] Michael Gallagher, and Paul Mitchell, *The politics of electoral systems* (Oxford, 2005) ; J. Coakley and Michael Gallagher, *Politics in the Republic of Ireland* (London, 1999).

[22] Bill Kissane, 'Defending democracy? The legislative response to political extremism in the Irish Free State, 1922 - 39 in *Irish Historical Studies* vol. 34, no. 134 (Nov. 2004), pp 156-174.

[23] The results of this are mixed and a good critique of Kissane's argument can be found in Anne Dolan's review in *History*, (review no. 502), (March 2006).

used by the Free State government with respect to Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith.[24] In a similar vein, Gavin M. Foster's recent text examining the societal effect of the civil war adds an interesting dimension to discourse on the Irish civil war. Foster focuses the majority of his text on the anti-Treaty forces and what happened to them in the post-Civil war 1920s, which is understandable as his text sets out to understand the impact of the civil war upon the 'losing side'.[25] Gemma Clarke and Brian Hughes's recent texts on political violence and its impact on the general populace provides a new perspective on the period by focusing on the routine effects of violence that are not per se *political*.[26] The grey spaces created by upheaval and conflict are often overlooked in favour of broad narratives, Clarke's study of three counties during the period 1922-3 is illustrative of the breakdown in normative behaviours during this period. A critique of this approach is the size of the case-studies and the regional areas studied.[27] Despite this, the research adds significant context to the current discourse on the Irish revolutionary period. Hughes' research, which focuses upon former servants of the British Crown, provides much needed accounts of the revolutionary period from a day to day perspective as opposed to controversial events that receive more attention from the wider public and the academy.[28]

Along with historical texts on the Irish civil war, there are memoirs and biographies that provide interesting personal perspectives into the conflict,[29] prior to the release of military records much of the discourse on the Irish civil war shaped by earlier

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[24] Anne Dolan, *Commemorating the Irish civil war* (Cambridge, 2003), pp 6 -56.

[25] Gavin M. Foster, *The Irish civil war: politics, class and conflict* (London, 2015), p. 20.

[26] See Gemma Clark's *Everyday violence in the Irish civil war* (Cambridge, 2014) ; Brian Hughes, *Defying the IRA? Intimidation, coercion and communities in Ireland* (Liverpool, 2016).

[27] 'Revolutionary Ireland, 1912 - 1923' is a new series launched by Four Courts Press. Each book in the series focuses upon a county during the revolutionary period. Michael Farry's, *Sligo: the Irish Revolution, 1912 - 1923* (Dublin, 2012) was the first in the series and was followed by texts on Tyrone (2014) and Waterford (2015). Subsequent texts have been published in the years to date, with Leitrim (2020) being the most recent.

[28] See Brian Hughes, 'Defying the I.R.A.: Intimidation, coercion and communities in Ireland, 1917 - 1922' (Ph.D thesis, Trinity College, Dublin, 2013), pp 5-13. Hughes' doctoral thesis provides a concise overview of the scholarship on Irish political violence in the period 1917 - 1922, including some of the issues raised by Peter Hart in his scholarship.

[29] See Ernie O'Malley, *On another man's wound* (Dublin, 2002, 1st ed. 1936) ; Ernie O'Malley, *The singing flame* (Dublin, 1997, 1st ed. 1978) ; Tom Barry, *Guerrilla Days in Ireland* (Dublin, 1981, 1st ed. 1949) ; Dan Breen, *My struggle for Irish freedom* (Dublin, 1981, 1st ed. 1924) ; Peadar O'Donnell, *The gates flew open: an Irish civil war prison diary* (Dublin, 1981, 1st ed.).

biographies of Collins and de Velera.[30] Later biographies of pro and anti-Treaty figures include: M. Ryan's *Tom Barry* (2005),[31] Richard English's *Ernie O'Malley* (1999),[32] M. G. Valiulus' *Portrait of a Revolutionary* (1992),[33] Fearghal McGarry's *Eoin O'Duffy* (2005),[34] and Sean Boyne's *Emmet Dalton* (2014).[35] The biographies of the three National Army generals are interesting as each man had a considerable impact upon the Irish civil war and the effectiveness of the newly formed National Army. This is contrasted with the biographies of two senior anti-Treaty IRA figures, Ernie O'Malley and Tom Barry who were active during the Irish civil war.[36] In particular O'Malley as the onetime Director of Operations for the anti-Treaty IRA faction at the Four Courts garrison. It is not surprising that many of the memoirs and biographies are of officers and senior commanders as opposed to ordinary soldiers and NCOs; this reinforces a hierarchical approach to the historiography with a large emphasis upon personality, especially that of prominent leaders. However it can be argued that the Bureau of Military History (BMH) a repository of the views and experiences of approximately 1,700 members of the Irish Volunteers/IRA attempts to balance the views of the commanding officers with those of regular officers and volunteers. Although the BMH is a useful resource, it largely is concerned with the period, 1916 - 1921 and there are only a small number of witness accounts that detail events during the Irish civil war. While Ernie O'Malley's interviews provide additional context from anti-Treaty IRA members on the Irish civil war, no National Army equivalent exists.[37] In addition, the time delay between the recording of the witness accounts and the events described

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[30] Timothy Mawe, 'A comparative survey of the historical debates surrounding Ireland, World War 1 and the Irish civil war' in *History Studies* vol. 13 (2012), p. 7.

[31] Meda Ryan, *Tom Barry: IRA freedom fighter* (Dublin, 2005).

[32] Richard English, *Ernie O'Malley: IRA Intellectual* (Dublin, 1999).

[33] M.G. Valiulus, *Portrait of a Revolutionary: General Richard Mulcahy and the founding of the Irish Free State* (Dublin, 1992).

[34] Fearghal McGarry, *Eoin O'Duffy: a self made hero* (Oxford, 2005).

[35] Sean Boyne, *Emmet Dalton: Somme soldier, Irish general, film pioneer* (Dublin, 2014).

[36] E. O'Malley's, *On another man's wound* (2002) and *The singing flame* (1997) and an edited collection by C.K.H. O'Malley and Anne Dolan *No Surrender Here! the civil war papers of Ernie O'Malley, 1922 - 1924* (Dublin, 2007). The edited collection provides an in-depth biographical and contextual discussion of O'Malley's actions and role during the Irish civil war.

[37] A selection of Ernie O'Malley's interviews, entitled 'The men will talk to me' have been transcribed and published for the following areas: Kerry, Galway, Mayo, Clare, West Cork and recently the Northern Divisions.

presents an issue of accuracy and selective memories. This is not uncommon with oral sources and as such these recollections need to be viewed within this context.[38] Lastly, the discourse on the Irish civil war has also been aided by a number of compendiums of casualties. Starting with the National Graves Association's publication *The Last Post* (1932) and its associated republications, the existence of these 'lists of the fallen' have benefited researchers examining republican, Free State, and police casualties throughout the entire period.[39]

In addition to general texts on the Irish civil war, there are specific articles and theses that examine the Free State period that can be collated under the rubric of 'civil-military' relations. These studies include articles on sexual health within the National Army,[40] the Army mutiny,[41] and specific government policies carried out by the National Army.[42] The articles on venereal disease in the Irish Free State by Philip Howell and Susannah Riordan differ in their interpretation, but together add to the discourse on the National Army during the Free State period. Each article utilises testimony from the Irish Army Enquiry into the rates of venereal disease in the National Army and explores the public health debates around prostitution and sexually transmitted disease, brought under public and political scrutiny by the high rates of venereal disease within the National Army at this time. While it is unconventional in its approach to the military, it is an insight into the policy of public health and in particular the role of the National Army at this time with regard to public health. In addition these articles provide context to political issues surrounding the National Army, in particular the perceived animus of Minister for Home Affairs, Kevin O'Higgins, towards the

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[38] For a recent discussion of the BMH sources see D. Ferriter, *A Nation and Not a Rabble: the Irish Revolution 1913-23* (London, 2016), pp 17-27.

[39] Recent examples include: James Langton's *The forgotten fallen* (Dublin, 2019), a National Army equivalent to *The Last Post*. For RIC casualties see, Richard Abbott's, *Police casualties in Ireland, 1919-1922* (Dublin, 2000).

[40] Philip Howell, 'Venereal disease and the politics of prostitution in the Irish Free State' in *Irish Historical Studies* vol. 33, no. 131 (May, 2003), pp 320-341 ; Susannah Riordan, 'Venereal disease in the Irish Free State: the politics of public health' in *Irish Historical Studies* vol. 35, no. 139 (May, 2007), pp 345-364.

[41] M.G. Valiulus, 'The Irish Army Mutiny of 1924' (Ph.D thesis, Loyola University of Chicago, 1977) ; M.G. Valiulus, 'The 'Army Mutiny' of 1924 and the assertion of civilian authority in independent Ireland in *Irish Historical Studies* vol. 23, no. 92 (Nov. 1983), pp 354-366.

[42] Breen Timothy Murphy, 'The government policy of executions during the Irish civil war, 1922 - 23' (Ph.D thesis, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, 2010) ; Anne Marie McInerney, 'Internment of the anti-treaty I.R.A. in the free state 1922-1924' (Ph.D thesis, Trinity College Dublin, 2015).

military and his attempts to use the issue of venereal disease for political gain over it.[43] Although this study has not been followed by any recent research, these two articles provide an insight into civil-military relations through the prism of public health. Maryann Valiulis' article on the Army Mutiny of 1924 and the control exhibited by civilian authorities over the military during this period, illuminates the inner workings of the Army command during this period and the power wielded by military authorities. It is important to note that at this time the Irish military was far more powerful than at any other time in its history, therefore the assertion of civilian authority over the military was important for Ireland's emerging democracy. Many of the points outlined by Valiulis' article are explored in greater detail in Arthur Mitchell's *Revolutionary government* (1995) and Tom Garvin's *1922* (1996) when discussing civil-military relations, particularly the relationship between the military and Dáil Éireann.[44] Lastly, the subject of ex-servicemen has often been an addendum to the wider discourse on the National Army due in part to the consistent references to large numbers of ex-servicemen joining the National Army during the civil war. The scholarship of Jane Leonard and Paul Taylor on the experiences of ex-British military servicemen returning from the First World War, adds much more contextual background to these ex-servicemen and their interactions with the Irish revolutionary movement and the Free State in the case of Taylor.[45] This is complemented by Steven O'Connor's recent study of ex-servicemen who served in the IRA,[46] which has raised the possibility that some number of ex-servicemen in the National Army had prior service in the IRA as well, which questions some of the previous orthodoxy regarding ex-servicemen and their relationship with the revolutionary movement.

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[43] Philip Howell, 'Venereal disease and the politics of prostitution in the Irish Free State' in *Irish Historical Studies* vol. 33, no. 131 (May, 2003), p. 332.

[44] Tom Garvin, *1922: the birth of Irish democracy* (Dublin, 1996), pp 54-55 ; Arthur Mitchell, *Revolutionary government* (Dublin, 1995), pp 316-318.

[45] J. Leonard, 'Getting them at last: the IRA and ex-servicemen' in David Fitzpatrick (ed.) *Revolution? Ireland, 1917 - 1923* (Dublin, 1990) ; J. Leonard, 'Facing the finger of scorn: veterans' memories of Ireland after the Great War' in Martin Evans and Ken Lunn (eds), *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford, 1997) ; Paul Taylor *Heroes or traitors? Experiences of Southern Irish soldiers returning from the Great War, 1919 - 1939* (Liverpool, 2015).

[46] Steven O'Connor, ''It's up to you to fight for your country': Ireland's Great War veterans in the War of Independence, 1919-21' in David Swift and Oliver Wilkinson (eds) *Veterans of the First World War: ex-servicemen and ex-servicewomen in post-war Britain and Ireland* (Oxford, 2019).

Chapter Structure

This study is thematic as opposed to chronological, although predominantly situated in 1922, there are events from 1921 and 1923 that are referred to in detail where appropriate. Chapter one examines the foundation of the National Army from pro-Treaty IRA units and in particular the structural advantages inherent in the General Headquarters (GHQ) based in Dublin. Due to the release of the IRA nominal rolls collection, it was possible to create visualisations of IRA brigade and divisional areas, which helped contextualise the divides within the IRA across the state. As the interregnum from the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty to the eventual outbreak of fighting was a period of flux, with changing allegiances and constant attempts at a negotiated settlement, it was necessary to examine both regional and 'national' events. However, the emphasis remained at a leadership level, as the pro-Treaty IRA was largely a GHQ led affair as opposed to the more diffuse (yet numerous) anti-Treaty IRA movement. As the sources available for this time period are limited, this chapter relies upon a selection of material from the Mulcahy Papers collection at UCD Archives, in addition to material drawn from the Military Archives of Ireland. The issues of *An t-Óglách* proved particularly useful as they provide extensive information regarding the re-organisation of the IRA after the Truce was declared on 11 July 1921.

Chapter two focuses upon the first five months of the civil war, July-November 1922. This period saw the National Army expand across the territory of the Irish Free State and largely saw the end to conventional operations within the civil war and the beginnings of the guerrilla stage where the anti-Treaty IRA returned to tactics of the Irish war of Independence.[47] Using the newly transcribed returns from the Irish Army census, it is now possible to examine the geographic trends of recruitment occurring throughout this period. Section one of this chapter explores the background to mass mobilisation and the process of developing structures for a distinctly separate pro-Treaty military. This section charts the development of distinct structures and the type of

[47] Two examples of periodisation of the civil war into conventional / guerrilla phases of the civil war are Paul V. Walsh, 'The Irish Civil War, 1922 - 1923: A military study of the conventional phase, 28 June - 11 August, 1922' delivered at NYMAS at the CUNY graduate centre on 11 December 1998 available at http://bobrowen.com/nymas/irishcivilwar.html#N_38_ (Accessed 23 Sep 2019) and B.T. Murphy, 'The government policy of executions during the Irish civil war, 1922 - 23' (Ph.D thesis, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, 2010), pp 56-61.

recruitment being set out by the National Army. Section two of this chapter is a monthly examination of the recruitment totals during the period July-November. The key months are July and August when over 10,000 men were attested within the military, this two -month timeline also coincides with the largest expansion of the National Army across the state, in particular the ending of the so-called 'Munster Republic' with the seaborne landings at Kerry and Cork. Section three of this chapter utilises two case-studies of sentiment, pro- and anti-Treaty using the electoral returns for the June 1922 general election and an internal National Army list of pro-Treaty IRA officers within the brigades and divisions.

Chapter three analyses National Army military casualties in the period July-November 1922. For this chapter a database of all known National Army casualties was collated from a variety of sources.[48] This chapter is divided in three sections, each examining a different component of the casualties. Section one is an overview of contemporary records detailing National Army casualties and attempts by the military to determine the level of casualties in the early stages of the Irish civil war. Section two is a study of the training processes for soldiers under the Curragh Reserve system and the casualty rates amongst soldiers with previous military experience. The third section is a time series analysis of the casualties, from this the daily death rate can be directly compared to the daily recruitment rate. In addition, the highest single days for casualties are examined in detail and examined in conjunction with recruitment data to ascertain if any links are apparent between the rate of killings and the intake of new recruits. The fourth section is a social study of the National Army using the casualties as a case study, examining the marital status, age and prior occupations of casualties.

Chapter four is an examination of ex-British military personnel in the National Army and their impact. As specific military records detailing the backgrounds of every soldier who joined the National Army are unavailable, or in many cases were never created, examining ex-servicemen relies upon small samples that have been constructed using records found in the Military Archives of Ireland. These samples were collated into a database of known ex-servicemen who served in the National Army during the

[48] Note: The details on how this database was collated, including the criteria for adding persons to the database is outlined in the Methodology chapter of this thesis.

entirety of the civil war period 1922-3. This chapter is divided into three distinct elements, first is an interrogation of the existing literature on the subject of ex-servicemen enlisting into the National Army and a series of headline claims that have been repeated throughout the discourse. Second is an overview of the existing contemporary record on ex-servicemen in the National Army, the attempts to hire ex-servicemen as military instructors in July-August 1922 and the claims of Liam Tobin and the 'Old' IRA faction of the National Army on the supposed preferential treatment of ex-servicemen in the military. The final section examines the database of ex-servicemen and attempts to ascertain some baseline statistics as to their previous service, including prior rank, units served in and years of service, where this is known. This is then contextualised using Steven O'Connor's research into ex-servicemen serving in the IRA, in order to see if any trends identified by O'Connor have continued into the National Army.

A note on terminology

The Irish National Army was the first 'national' army established under the constitutional auspices of the modern Irish state. Unlike organisations such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Irish Volunteers, Irish Republican Brotherhood and United Irishmen, this military was established as a full-time and professional entity. The formal name of the military is somewhat confusing as it exists in both the English and Irish language. The formal name of the Irish Army in the Irish language is Óglaigh na hÉireann and the English translation used was National Army/National Forces. This was complicated by the fact that the IRA also utilised the term Óglaigh na hÉireann therefore the National Army is often called the Free State Army after the legal name for Ireland at the time, the Irish Free State. This is reflected in the phraseology utilised in contemporaneous legal and military documents of the time which often used the terms, 'National Forces', 'Free State Army' and 'National Army' sometimes within the same document. This confusion was further compounded by the Anti-Treaty forces calling Irish Army personnel 'Free Staters' or 'Staters' as a derogative shorthand. For the purposes of this thesis, the term National Army will be utilised with the understanding that this refers to the national military in existence from 1922 to 1924. Similarly, the term anti-Treaty IRA is deployed throughout this thesis, as the pro-Treaty forces often referred to these forces as 'Irregulars' as a way of delegitimising the actions of this movement.

A second point is the lack of capitals for terms such as the 'Irish civil war' and 'Irish war of independence' and the 'Irish Army census'. This is based upon the conventions on capitalisations set out in T. W. Moody's rules for contributors to *Irish Historical Studies* which denote that capitals are to be used sparingly. Therefore, as these terms are repeated with some frequency in the thesis, it was decided to capitalise the first word only to avoid a distracting and unnecessary capitalisation mid-sentence.

Methodology

This thesis encompasses historical research and the digital humanities methodologies, therefore the digital components of the thesis: Historical GIS, geocomputation and statistical analysis are integral parts of the methodology underpinning different chapters of this thesis. As the methodology draws upon a number of different disciplines, the relevant methodologies will each be contextualised within the scope of this thesis. Irish civil war historiography is a relatively discursive subfield of the overall Irish historiography of the Irish revolutionary period. Digital Humanities scholarship on this subfield has been minimal, two recent examples include: John Lennon and Michael F. Johnson's chapter, 'A digital exploration of hunger strikes in British Prisons, 1913 - 1940' in Charles Travis and Alexander von Lünen (eds) *The digital arts and humanities* (2016)[1] and Ian N. Gregory et al.'s *Troubled Geographies* (2013).[2]

Lennon and Johnson's chapter is an examination of the central register of hunger strikes recorded by the Home Office between 1913 and 1940. The register book was scanned and each table was recreated digitally and then modelled using open source tools such as Google charts, Timeline JS and CartoDB. Although the visualisations are rudimentary and at times the graphs are difficult to decipher, the result is an interesting attempt to merge digital tools and historical analysis. This work replicates similar research completed to higher methodological standards, and is one of the first attempts to apply DH methodology to a project that is relevant to the Irish revolutionary period, albeit peripherally as the timeframe of the chapter is far beyond the Irish revolutionary period. Ian N. Gregory et al.'s text, *Troubled Geographies* (2013) is an in-depth spatial history of religion and society in Ireland. Of particular note are the chapters on the partition of Ireland and the Irish civil war. The focus upon the religious breakdown and the creation of maps that utilise parish boundaries allows for a more granular analysis of different religions in Ireland at this time. Although the data utilised has been employed in similar Irish studies, the perspective of geographers and the emphasis upon proximity leads to different conclusions and is beneficial when examining sources that are

[1] John Lennon and Michael F. Johnson, 'A digital exploration of hunger strikes in British Prisons, 1913 - 1940' in Charles Travis and Alexander von Lünen (eds) *The digital arts and humanities: neogeography, social media and big data integrations and applications* (Dublin, 2016), pp 77-93.

[2] Ian N. Gregory, Niall A. Cunningham, Paul S. Ell, Christopher D. Lloyd and Ian G. Shuttleworth, *Troubled geographies: a spatial history of religion and society in Ireland* (Indiana, 2013).

incomplete.[3] The Historical GIS (HGIS) methods utilised in *Troubled Geographies* are explored in two prior publications: *Past time, past place* (2002) and *Placing history* (2008) edited by Anne K. Knowles.[4] In *Past time, past place* (2002), Knowles posits that "geography is the study of spatial differentiation, history the study of temporal differentiation" and HGIS provided a nexus where these studies could combine, using GIS tools to study the changes in space and time.[5] Gregory's analysis of religion and population is an example of this interdisciplinary approach where the analysis is a study of time and place simultaneously.[6]

Anne K. Knowles and Ian N. Gregory's scholarship on historical GIS and the new research approaches outlined will underpin a number of the chapters in the thesis as the sources utilised for this study are both geographic and temporal in nature. This thesis will utilise large-scale datasets that require a solid technical grounding in the discipline of Historical GIS and the usage of statistical packages in the R programming language. This requirement is highlighted in Ian N. Gregory's chapter, 'A map is just a bad graph: why spatial statistics are important in historical GIS' in *Placing history* (2008).[7] In this chapter, Gregory defines spatial statistics as the process which "allow[s] the researcher to go beyond mapping to manipulate, explore, describe and confirm spatial patterns within and between datasets".[8] Gregory's definition clearly delineates between basic mapping and spatial analysis. The aforementioned examples of the Irish Famine and infant mortality rates in England and Wales in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are indicative of the types of spatial analysis that are possible utilising a more rigorous approach involving historical GIS tools such as ArcGIS or QGIS. Gregory's critique of earlier applications of these types of methods to historical research, in

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[3] Ian N. Gregory, et al *Troubled geographies* (Indiana, 2013), pp 84 - 87.
Note: In addition to utilising census returns, the text utilises the *Database of Irish Historical Statistics* collection currently accessible via the UK Data Service at Essex University.

[4] Anne K. Knowles (ed.), *Placing time, past place: GIS for history* (California, 2002) ; Anne K. Knowles and Amy Hillier (eds), *Placing history: how maps, spatial data and GIS are changing historical scholarship* (California, 2008).

[5] Anne K. Knowles, 'Introducing historical GIS' in eadem, *Placing time* (California, 2002), p. xii.

[6] It should be noted that Ian N. Gregory was a contributor to both *Placing time, past place* (California, 2002), pp 117-130 and *Placing history* (California, 2008), pp 123-149.

[7] Ian N. Gregory, 'A map is just a bad graph: why spatial statistics are important in historical GIS' in Anne K. Knowles and Amy Hillier (eds), *Placing history: how maps, spatial data and GIS are changing historical scholarship* (California, 2008), pp 123 - 149.

[8] Ibid., p. 125.

particular the 1970s experimentation with cliometrics and 'quantitative' historical research are precedents that serve as a warning that positivism within statistical analysis can lead to deeply flawed and unreproducible results and should therefore be factored into the overall analytical framework.

In addition to spatial statistics as defined by Gregory, there is another Historical GIS approach utilised by Anne K. Knowles in her analysis of the Battle of Gettysburg and the role played by Robert E. Lee in her chapter, 'What could Robert E. Lee see at Gettysburg' in *Placing history* (2008).[9] In this case, Knowles deals with the questions raised by Robert E. Lee's decisions at the Battle of Gettysburg. By focusing upon the geographic landscape and modelling the height and dimensions of the battle, Knowles was able to recreate a 2D representation of the Battle of Gettysburg showing Robert E. Lee's line of sight. This discursive approach to the Battle of Gettysburg and Lee's decision-making process added significant context to this element of American Civil War history. In a similar approach, a geographic representation of where National Army personnel were stationed during the Irish civil war and their home addresses will add context to the discourse on the origins of National Army soldiers. In many ways this approach to historical queries is a twenty-first century version of the famous Charles Minard map of Napoleon's campaign against Russia. Although there are significant differences between the approaches, the finalised image with its rich layers of detail adds to the historical record in a succinct and substantive manner. However, this approach is not a replacement of traditional historical research and Knowles's maps of Lee's line of sight at the Battle of Gettysburg would not have been possible without the current large body of research on the subject of the American Civil War. The underlying historiography was not bypassed; instead it was utilised as part of the study. This hybridisation between history and geography is a theme that Knowles has returned to repeatedly in her recent published scholarship.[10]

A separate but linked new methodological approach is geocomputation. It is similar to HGIS in that there is a utilisation of computer-assisted research. However the approach

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[9] Anne K. Knowles et al, 'What could Robert E. Lee see at Gettysburg?' in Anne K. Knowles and Amy Hillier (eds), *Placing history: how maps, spatial data and GIS are changing historical scholarship* (California, 2008), pp 235 - 265.

[10] Anne K. Knowles, *Mastering iron: the struggle to modernize an American industry, 1800 – 1868* (Chicago, 2013) ; Anne K. Knowles, Tim Cole and Alberto Giordano (eds) *Geographies of the Holocaust* (Indiana, 2015).

is more rooted in the statistics and utilised statistical programming languages such as R as opposed to a GIS package such as ArcGIS or QGIS, although this was more apparent in the 1990s when the term was first coined. At present to quote, Chris Brunsdon and Alex Singleton "over time, the boundaries between the application of GIS and geocomputation have blurred. This in part has been a result of a loosening of the definition of what a GIS is, and the increasingly expansive capabilities of traditional GIS software."[11] For this thesis, the scholarship of Chris Brunsdon and in particular his 'practical' primer on geocomputation and the utilisation of practical approaches to geospatial approaches have influenced the majority of spatial analyses undertaken.[12] The benefits of utilising geocomputation is the ability to create individualised code segments that can be tailored for the specific research question. This is not possible in a software package such as SPSS where the tools are fixed and there is no flexibility to add new packages or edit internal processes. Geocomputation can be viewed as a manifestation of spatial statistics as outlined by Gregory and his contention that in order to utilise historical GIS software and analyses effectively, a concise knowledge of the underlying statistical framework will be followed in all the statistical tests undertaken within this thesis.

There are specific statistical tests and theories of correlation that can help correct common mistakes in statistical analysis and prevent causation bias. *Making history count* (2002)[13] by Charles H. Feinstein and Mark Thomas is an excellent text for historians interested in utilising quantitive methods. Feinstein and Thomas list a large variety of statistical tests and how each may be applied to different types of datasets, as both authors have a background in economic history, the case studies are all economic. However the example of Irish emigration data and the analysis undertaken of Irish emigration rates over time, provides an example of utilising statistical theory for oftentimes incomplete and partial Irish historical data. Feinstein and Thomas are not

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[11] Chris Brunsdon and Alex Singleton, *Geocomputation: a practical primer* (London, 2015), p. xiii

[12] See Chris Brunsdon, Jonathan Corcoran and Gary Higgs, 'Visualising space and time in crime patterns: a comparison of methods' in *Computers, Environment and Urban Systems* vol. 31, no. 1 (2007) pp 52-75. In addition to this article, a recent text by Chris Brunsdon and Lex Comber, *An introduction to R for spatial analysis and mapping* (California, 2015) sets out a learning framework for researchers new to using the programming language R for spatial analysis.

[13] Charles H. Feinstein and Mark Thomas, *Making history count: a primer in quantitative methods for historians* (Cambridge, 2002).

advocating a specific program or programming language to utilise. However, using these texts in conjunction with practical primers such as Chris Brunsdon's *Geocomputation* and John Chambers *Software for data analysis: programming with R* gives historians a solid methodological and theoretical grounding for applying statistical analyses. This approach is complemented by two recent texts, Taylor Arnold and Lauren Tilton's *Humanities data and R* (2015) and Lincoln Mullen's *Computational historical thinking* (2017) which both focus solely upon the statistical programming language R and its application to historical research.[14]

Within the broader Irish historiography, the methodological approach as outlined by Feinstein and Thomas is largely non-existent, and this draws into question the emphasis upon statistical tables drawn up without a solid methodological or cliometric framework. This over-utilisation of simplified narratives is critiqued by Knowles who notes that, "historians seek causal explanations by establishing the temporal sequence of events. Geographers find causation in the spatial proximity or distance of conditions."[15] It can be argued that this thesis is attempting to bridge these two approaches to the study of the Irish civil war, and through the medium of digital humanities these seemingly conflicted views can be reconciled. This is partly possible due to the significant geographic component within the two main sources utilised throughout this thesis: the Irish Army census and the Military Service Pensions Collection (MSPC). The quantitative nature of the source material naturally lends itself to historical GIS methods. However the context provided by the discourse on the Irish civil war placed this analysis within the overarching Irish revolutionary period historiography.

An early critique of quantitative historical research was the lack of reproducibility, often due to the scarcity of personal computers and knowledge of the technology. This critique is still utilised on occasion against modern techniques that are often built specifically to be reproducible. When using the programming language R, there is a corresponding website called RPubs where a user can save and create an html page with

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[14] Taylor Arnold and Lauren Tilton, *Humanities data in R: exploring networks, geospatial data, images, and text* (New York, 2015) ; Lincoln Mullen, *Computational historical thinking: with applications in R* (2017) (http://dh-r.lincolnmullen.com). - Note this book is being published online and is a work in progress.

[15] Anne K. Knowles, 'GIS and History' in eadem, *Placing history* (2008), p. 3.

the R code embedded so that third party users can take this code and the source material and rerun the analysis and replicate the outcomes. One of the reasons for choosing the R programming language for this thesis is the ability to share the analytical process of creating maps and statistical analysis via RPubs, in addition to the program being open source. The concept of reproducible research methods is analogous to using referencing and citation. Historians cite material used in research so that it can be utilised by fellow academics and as a way of ensuring that the findings can be confirmed by the wider academy. Utilising proprietary software and not documenting the process of curating the data to be analysed is equivalent to a historian utilising a private source that no other researcher can verify such as private papers, tapes or notes. Chris Brunsdon's recent article, 'Quantitative methods 1: reproducible research and quantitative geography' provides a framework for employing a fully reproducible analytical approach.[16] Although this paper specifically applies to geographical analysis, this thesis's emphasis upon GIS and geocomputation as key elements of the analysis, mean that a fully reproducible framework involving the release of all code and data associated with the thesis, where possible will be utilised.

A key aspect of this thesis will be the visualisations created from the datasets compiled for this study. Data visualisation is not a standalone methodological approach, without sufficient historical context, the images and graphics created can be misleading or lead to distorted understandings of the period. Historical data from the Irish revolutionary period has been visualised in a number of different ways ranging from simple graphs to more complicated graphics and maps. However, many of these are lacking sufficient context and the data represented can be misleading for readers without sufficient contextual knowledge. Michael Friendly has published extensively on the history of data visualisation[17] and has recently created a package for the statistical programming language R called *HistData*.[18] This package is a collection of historical datasets that

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[16] Chris Brunsdon, 'Quantitative methods 1: reproducible research and quantitative geography' in *Progress in Human Geography* vol. 40, no. 5 (2016), pp 687 - 696.

[17] Michael Friendly, Forrest W. Young and Pedro M. Valero-Mora, *Discrete data analysis with R: visualisation and modelling techniques for categorical and count data* (Boca Raton, 2016) ; Michael Friendly, 'A brief history of data visualisation' in Anthony Unwin, Chun-houh Chen and Wolfgang K. Härdle (eds) *Handbook of data visualisation* (Berlin, 2008), pp 15-56 ; Michael Friendly, *Visualising categorical data* (Cary, 2000) ; Michael Friendly, *SAS Systems for statistical graphics* (Cary, 1991).

[18] Michael Friendly, *HistData* (CRAN, 2017) (https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/HistData/index.html).

were originally visualised by hand examples include the aforementioned Charles Minard map of the Russian campaign by Napoleon and Florence Nightingale's datasets of disease during the Crimean War. This recreation of historical visualisations using R is a useful way of examining the flaws and methodological issues when attempting to graph historical datasets. In the case of Minard, the digital reproduction of the original map augments the original and is useful template for sophisticated graphic maps of a conflict. An example of this within the discourse are the often misleading maps of the election results for Irish general elections held in 1922 and 1923. In each election a third of first preference votes went for parties that were unaffiliated during the Irish civil war. However, the maps utilised to display this has overrepresented the civil war divide geographically and failed to account for the more nuanced political choices made by the electorate during and immediately after the Irish civil war.[19] As this thesis is attempting to widen the current understanding of the Irish civil war away from a manichean analysis of a binary divide, the creation of more nuanced maps utilising density and geographic area will help illustrate the more complex nature of the conflict and its aftermath.

The central research statement of this thesis remains a historical query. However, in order to answer this research statement a multitude of methodologies are required. Sharon Webb in her doctoral dissertation sets out a good framework for attempting to "present history research and the digital humanities methodology as one single research entity".[20] The structure of her doctorate thesis is one which this thesis will utilise as a template, in particular Webb's concept that digital humanities is not 'adjacent or secondary' but rather integral to the project.[21] In a similar manner, this thesis is also reliant upon digital methods from large-scale databases to computational programs, encompassing both the material being presented digitally and the digital methods for interpreting this type of material. However, rather than utilising these methods in an unstructured framework, the theory of microanalysis as outlined by Matthew Jockers is

[19] An attempt to re-balance this was a recent graphic of the 1922 general election, which utilised colour coded shapes to show the distribution of votes — Ian Gregory et al, *Troubled Geographies* (Indiana, 2013), p. 92.

[20] Sharon Webb, 'A study of associational culture and the development of Irish nationalism, 1780-1830, with the construction of a software information environment' (Ph.D thesis, National University of Ireland, Maynooth 2011) p. 15.

[21] Ibid.

one which fits within the broader confines of this thesis's research statement, and the concepts underpinning his analytical technique will shape the type of methods utilised in this thesis.

Matthew Jockers' text, *Macroanalysis* (2013) explores statistical methods of computational text analysis: macroanalysis. While his approach is specifically aimed at studies in literature, there are strands of thought and technique which may be adopted in the inspection of documents related to the study of Irish history, as this thesis proposes. Jockers in *Macroanalysis* makes an analogy between macroanalysis and macroeconomics; macroeconomics being the study of an entire economy, and in this example macroanalysis being the study of an entire corpus.[22] Macroanalysis in the context of this project is a hybrid of traditional close reading of the current discourse on a specific subject, and a statistical approach of the entire civil war period utilising newly released digital sources from the Military Archives of Ireland. In this way, a macroanalysis of the Irish civil war will engage with the current historical and cultural discourse, while also applying a statistical analysis that will reveal details and trends about the conflict that are not apparent from discursive studies on particular aspects or events that occurred during the Irish civil war. Therefore, the computational methodologies and the quantitative analysis that will underpin much of the case-study research is an attempt to create a broader understanding, but one that is still utilising the micro-studies or in this case the discursive studies of aspects of the Irish civil war. Jockers in a recent article describes an example of his macroanalysis approach to the subject of Ireland's place in the nineteenth century novel utilising layers of computational analysis.[23] In a similar manner, the methodological framework of this thesis will also utilise layers of computational analysis encompassing GIS, geocomputation and statistical analysis. There is no singular computational method that defines this research project. However, the methodological framework set out by Jockers of utilising layers of computational analysis to attempt to ascertain larger trends and answer larger questions will be the underpinning concept. Regarding the case studies in each chapter, a hybrid approach of computational analysis involving different

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[22] Matthew Jockers, *Macroanalysis: digital methods and literary theory* (Illinois, 2013), pp 24-5.

[23] Matthew Jockers, 'Computing Ireland's place in the nineteenth century novel: a macroanalysis in *Breac: A Digital Journal of Irish Studies* (Oct. 2015).

types of methodologies and rigorous engagement with the wider historiography will be utilised. These questions taken together attempt to answer the central research statement posited in the introduction.

The following section of this chapter will outline the creation of four distinct digital resources utilised throughout this thesis:

1. Irish Army census dataset
2. IRA and National Army brigade and divisional maps
3. Database of National Army casualties
4. Database of ex-British servicemen in the National Army

In addition to these four resources, a number of tables and statistics were reproduced from primary material held as part of the Mulcahy Papers at University College Dublin, Archives (UCDA) and the Military Archives of Ireland (MAI). These are cited throughout the thesis and are a direct transcription of the information from the primary source, as opposed to wholly new digital resource. All the resources created for this thesis were processed using the RStudio integrated development environment (IDE) for the R programming language. The individual code utilised for each chapter has been uploaded to the RPubs website and is labelled accordingly, in addition the code for each chapter is available at the following link.[24]

[24] Each chapter of this thesis has a separate RPubs file available at the following link: (https://rpubs.com/jackakav_phd) (Accessed 18 Nov. 2020).

Creating the Irish Army census database

The Irish Army census was taken on 12/13 November 1922 and detailed all personnel within the National Army on that date and their geographic location throughout the country in a variety of barracks and posts. The census has fourteen specific columns of information per soldier, along with general information regarding the location of the barracks, and the division and command this post falls within. For example, Beggars Bush Barracks in Dublin city, is within the Second Eastern Division, Eastern Command of the National Army. As the census is the only large-scale data source on the composition of the military, including recruitment data, it was decided to transcribe the entire census into a dataset that could be analysed using digital tools, in this case the programming language R. During the process of releasing the census to the general public a number of decisions regarding normalisation and naming conventions of files were made by the Military Archives, this meant that in practice that methodology for the census transcription had to account for these idiosyncrasies.[25] The census is currently available via two interlinked features on the census website: Index and Map. Index is simple search field which allows for a parsing of the partial transcripts created by the Military Archives. Three fields were fully transcribed and searchable: Forename, Surname and Age.[26] There is also an additional county field that was added to the transcripts. This particular addition means that rather than reflecting the actual distribution of the census by barracks and posts; instead these were amalgamated into large amorphous 'county' results. Map is linked to a Google Maps feature that shows a series of pins showing the location of barracks and posts across Ireland. As this feature includes a number of extant locations, due to buildings being demolished or repurposed, the usefulness of this feature is limited. However, the result is that the census is available in two distinct formats: a series of individual PDF files that are downloadable from the Index and grouped PDF files for each barracks and posts that are downloadable via the Map. The transcriptions for this thesis utilised the Index feature, as it contained three already transcribed fields. The grouped PDF files of barracks and posts were

[25] For a full overview of the digitisation process of the Irish Army census and accessing the data see — J. Kavanagh, 'Using the digitised Irish Army Census 1922, with a sample of January recruitment' in *Archivium Hibernicum* vol. 74 (2019), pp 406-10.

[26] *Irish Army census 1922* (http://census.militaryarchives.ie) (Accessed 31 Aug. 2020).

utilised throughout the process to make sure that all the relevant pages were transcribed per barracks.

The initial process of transcribing the census using the Index was relatively straightforward as each census page contained a series of columns and rows that were easily reproduced in a spreadsheet. During the transcription process, three problems were discovered that led to changes in the eventual transcription process. The first was removals of individual soldiers by census enumerators in 1922, typically these soldiers were marked as 'cancelled' or 'duplicates'. In total, 1,395 names were marked this way throughout the census. As these edits were made by census enumerators during the actual census process, it was decided to remove these entries from the transcripts, as these men were not counted in 1922 and retaining them would be changing the historical count. A separate spreadsheet was kept listing the regimental number, forename, surname, age and details of the barracks/post for the soldiers who were removed by the census enumerators. The second was an additional group of soldiers who were listed under a miscellaneous category marked as '-', that was discovered in the location search of the Index. There were in total, 1,642 soldiers added to barracks and posts from this category out of a total of 1,728.[27] It is not clear why these men were not included by county, as the barracks/post associated with the census forms is clearly listed on the original documents. The final problem was the small number of missed entries from the initial partial transcription that had to be added to the transcripts.

During the actual transcription process, the scanned PDF files for each post and barracks were downloaded and grouped by county, as this was how the data was normalised by the Military Archive. For each county, a spreadsheet record was kept as a form of lookup table, listing all the removals and additions outlined above. This meant that every name that was removed or added to a specific barrack/post could be checked with ease throughout the process.[28] In Table 0.1, an overview of all the changes per

[27] The '-' category technically lists 5,321 entries, however, the majority of these are blank census rules forms, only 1,728 individuals are listed in this category, and are distributed across the twenty-six counties, with a small number left uncategorised as the file listed two geographic areas. There are 87 men marked as 'cancelled' or 'duplicate' which were added to the number of removed soldiers, which resulted in a total of 1,642 being re-distributed.

[28] A copy of this lookup table in a variety of file types is available at the following link — (https://www.dropbox.com/sh/j5a3f0dafg7fs19/AABnuTs4ABWntcaKIYiL8wxpa?dl=0) (Accessed 18 Nov. 2020).

county is available listing the original total available from the archives website and the resulting total after the full transcription and reorganisation process was completed.

Table 0.1 Overview of Irish Army census totals by County

County	Original Listing	Removed by census enumerators	Missed from initial transcript	Added from '-'	New Total
CARLOW	314	6	0	0	308
CAVAN	363	0	0	0	363
CLARE	892	17	0	10	885
CORK	4,572	147	2	261	4,688
DONEGAL	960	1	1	0	960
DUBLIN	3,849	324	0	561	4,086
GALWAY	759	4	0	15	770
KERRY	1,928	75	1	400	2,254
KILDARE	3,618	50	1	14	3,583
KILKENNY	738	9	0	32	761
LAOIS	406	21	0	0	385
LEITRIM	190	0	0	0	190
LIMERICK	1,438	75	4	21	1,388
LONGFORD	572	22	0	10	560
LOUTH	1,175	70	2	30	1,137
MAYO	1,190	244	0	10	956
MEATH	1,301	22	0	0	1,279
MONAGHAN	398	6	0	0	392
OFFALY	563	27	1	0	537
ROSCOMMON	149	1	0	0	148
SLIGO	714	20	0	10	704
TIPPERARY	2,121	116	2	110	2,117
WATERFORD	561	8	0	122	675
WESTMEATH	1,297	43	0	0	1,254
WEXFORD	677	6	0	0	671
WICKLOW	463	81	0	0	382

County	Original Listing	Removed by census enumerators	Missed from initial transcript	Added from '-'	New Total
—	1,729			36	36
TOTAL	32,937	1,395	14	1,642	31,469

The transcription process where possible followed the principle of a 'diplomatic' transcription, which meant that abbreviations, spelling errors and insertions on the page were preserved in the digital transcript, where possible. A copy of the completed transcripts was then utilised for the purposes of analysis which normalised a number of key fields in order to facilitate the creation of statistical data. After the transcription process was completed, the data needed to be normalised, in order to facilitate effective statistical analysis. As this data was being processed using the R programming language, a process known as 'tidy' data, developed by statistician Hadley Wickham in 2014 was employed. Wickham set out the following rules for tidy data:

1. Each variable forms a column
2. Each observation forms a row
3. Each type of observational unit forms a table[29]

Wickham drew upon earlier theories of data normalisation set out by E. F. Codd, which were designed for relationship databases.[30] He also noted that these rules meant that datasets often required extensive edits when adapting a pre-existing dataset. In the case of the census dataset, where possible additional columns were created in order to tidy the data. Although in specific cases, observations were normalised across the dataset. Superficially the Irish Army census conformed to the basic tenets of tidy data as it was structured around columns and rows. However, as many of the rows were left blank by census enumerators, it was necessary to create NA fields for missing data. As the census captured fourteen different fields of information on each soldier, many of the fields are left blank; therefore NAs were placed in the relevant rows. In addition to missing data, at times multiple observations are included in a single row, this prompted the creation of

[29] Hadley Wickham, 'Tidy Data' in *Journal of Statistical Software*, vol. 59, no. 10 (Aug. 2014), p. 4.

[30] Wickham notes that 'tidy' data is basically E.F. Codd's 3rd normal form adapted for statistical data as opposed to relational databases. — Wickham, 'Tidy Data', p. 5.

separate columns, such as county totals and partial date columns. The criteria for both the normalisation and the creation of new fields were as follows:

- all dates were changed to a standard format (YYYY-MM-DD)
- for partial dates a new column of the month was created e.g. January, February, March etc., etc.
- a Curragh Training column was creating using the V.R./Vol. R. /R. listings in the Regimental Number column
- an Age Ranges column was created that grouped the ages into new categories under-20, 20-9, 30-9, 40-9, 50-9, 60-9
- abbreviations such as Pte (Private) or R.C. were written out fully where possible
- additional columns for type of rank were created specifying whether the soldier was an Officer, NCO or Enlisted man
- three additional county columns were created for the three geographic attributes listed on the census: home address, place of attestation and next-of-kin home address
- barracks listing were normalised as part of the generation of county totals for the place of attestation, ie. all variants of Beggars Bush, B.B. Bks, Bush Dublin were standardised to Beggars Bush Barracks, Dublin
- instead of writing out every unit, corps and other repeated details, census enumerators often utilised the abbreviation "do" to signify the same information was repeated, these were written out fully
- any obviously incorrect addresses have been fixed to reflect the actual county, i.e. Bray being in Wicklow not Dublin, Gough Barracks is in Kildare not Dublin. Although the original record lists an incorrect address, this correction was necessary for the creation of accurate statistical results

The majority of these changes were implemented manually, with the exception of county totals which were created by a code sequence developed by Martin Charlton of the National Centre for Geocomputation, Maynooth University.[31] This process also required manual supervision for addresses that were either not clearly within a specific county or addresses without sufficient data for a simple county match. In each case, the dataset was loaded in the R programming environment and tests were carried out in order to see if the normalisation process had resulted in sufficiently tidy data.

[31] The R code loop designed by Martin Charlton is reproduced fully, with appropriate credit in the RPubs page outlining the code utilised for chapter two of this thesis available at the following link: (https://rpubs.com/jackakav_phd/659316) (Accessed 18 Nov. 2020).

Mapping the IRA and National Army

A second digital resource created for this project, were IRA brigade and divisional maps using the IRA 'nominal' rolls released as part of the Military Service Pensions Collection (MSPC) project. As the National Army in its initial iteration mirrored IRA structures in many cases, the creation of IRA brigades and divisions formed the basis of later National Army divisional structures. The nominal rolls consist of approximately 600 files containing lists of men who served in the IRA across the island of Ireland. The nominal rolls were created by brigade committees drawn from surviving veterans of the IRA under the auspices of the Military Service Pension Act, 1934.[32] Each nominal roll is divided between two specific dates: 11 July 1921 and 1 July 1922. These are referred to as 'critical' dates. The first date is the day the 'Truce' was declared that ended the War of Independence and the second date is in the immediate aftermath of the Battle for Dublin and the shelling of the Four Courts on 28 June 1922. In addition to biographical information available about each IRA volunteer, these brigade committees often supplied detailed maps of battalion and brigade areas to the Army Pension Board. The military structure of the IRA was largely heterodox for much of the War of Independence. However, three distinct elements existed for most units: companies, battalions and brigades. Examining the IRA companies listed per nominal roll, it was discovered that descriptions of these units corresponded directly to townlands and in some rare cases entire district electoral divisions. As part of the MSPC project, all the nominal rolls have been digitised and are freely available for download from the website of the Military Archives.

Initially all the scanned PDF files were downloaded and grouped by division following the classification set out by the Military Archives. One immediate issue was that this process of normalisation presupposed that all IRA divisions had been formed by 11 July 1921, which was not the case as many were formed after the Truce period during the wider reorganisation of the IRA between 1921-22. This is clearly outlined in the notes for each division General Headquarters (GHQ) file. This meant that many of the units listed within specific divisions were actually distinct brigades and battalions during the

[32] *IRA Nominal Rolls, MSPC* (http://www.militaryarchives.ie/collections/online-collections/military-service-pensions-collection-1916-1923/search-the-collection/nominal-rolls) (Accessed 2 Sept. 2020).

first critical date. In order to re-categorise the records that adhered to the realities of the IRA organisation structure on 11 July 1921, a duplicate of the records was made and a different units were separated out from divisional structures. This disambiguation process is shown in Table 0.2, which shows the MSPC division grouping compared to the actual divisions that were active on 11 July 1921. Only ten IRA divisions were in existence on the first critical date, the remaining six were formed post-July 1921, with the final division the Second Eastern being formed in March 1922.[33]

Table 0.2 MSPC Divisions & Brigades on First Critical Date

MSPC Division Grouping	**Active on 11 July 1921**	
Division	**Division**	**Brigade**
1st Northern	1st Northern	
1st Southern	1st Southern	
1st Eastern	1st Eastern	
1st Western	NA	GALWAY NO. 1
		MAYO SOUTH
		MID CLARE
		NORTH GALWAY
		GALWAY SOUTH-EAST
		GALWAY SOUTH-WEST
		SOUTH ROSCOMMON
		WEST CLARE
1st Midland	NA	ATHLONE
		FERMANAGH
		INNY
		LONGFORD
		NORTH LEITRIM
		SOUTH LEITRIM
		WEST CAVAN
2nd Northern	2nd Northern	

[33] *An t-Óglách*, 31 Mar. 1922.

MSPC Division Grouping	Active on 11 July 1921	
Division	**Division**	**Brigade**
2nd Southern	2nd Southern	
2nd Eastern	2nd Eastern	
2nd Western	NA	MAYO EAST
		NORTH ROSCOMMON
		SLIGO NO. 1
3rd Northern	3rd Northern	
3rd Southern	3rd Southern	
3rd Eastern	NA	CARLOW
		NORTH WEXFORD
		SOUTH WEXFORD
3rd Western	NA	NA
4th Northern	4th Northern	
4th Western	NA	EAST CONNEMARA
		WEST CONNEMARA
		NORTH MAYO
		WEST MAYO
5th Northern	5th Northern	

In preparation for creating the divisional and brigade area maps, a generalised 20-meter ESRI shapefile of the townlands and electoral divisions for the Republic of Ireland was downloaded from the Central Statistics Office of Ireland (CSO). A ‘match’ file was created by placing the boundaries of the townlands within that of electoral divisions. This created a new lookup table that showed every townland within each corresponding electoral division. This reflects the reality that nearly all electoral divisions are created by grouping together townlands. The exceptions to this are Cork, Dublin, Limerick and Galway city electoral divisions which have no corresponding townlands. As IRA brigades were formed of groups of companies and battalions, the first units to be linked were companies, followed by battalions which in turn were grouped into brigades. Divisions were created from a number of disparate brigades, only divisions that actually existed on 11 July 1921 were created. Initially it was hoped to include the IRA brigades

and divisions from the counties in what is now Northern Ireland along with those within the Free State territory to create an all-island study. However, the scale of administrative changes between both jurisdictions means that no contemporaneous electoral divisions shapefile exists for both jurisdictions that are approximate for Ireland circa 1917-1921. As the methodology for creating IRA brigades and divisions, relied upon linking electoral divisions and townlands for the Republic of Ireland, attempts to recreate this process in Northern Ireland using the newly created Small Areas boundaries and baronies proved unsuccessful. As the focus of this study was upon the National Army which operated within the Free State area, the priority was upon creating map projections for this jurisdiction.

The methodology for linking IRA units to townlands and electoral divisions relied upon two processes, first was a criteria developed for linking specific boundaries to IRA units and second was a live map that was created in the programming language R that generated an Open Street map with the boundaries of the townlands and electoral divisions overlaid upon it.[34] The criteria for linking IRA units to townlands/electoral divisions was as follows:

- companies were typically linked to a specific townland, or in the case of a village/ town, the townlands that overlapped the village/town boundaries
- battalions were often listed by electoral division, in this case the entire ED was selected to represent the battalion area
- in the case of maps being provided for specific IRA brigades these were utilised and reproduced where possible, e.g. West Mayo Brigade Area
- overall the linking process followed a conservative approach, typically only linking a specific townland within an electoral division, although it is likely that IRA brigade operated across a much larger swathe of territory that what has been listed as brigade 'areas'

In addition to the lookup table created for map projections, which is by its nature quite technical and designed for use with a GIS programme, a separate lookup table that listed the archival sources utilised and noted any additional information such as maps

[34] This process is outlined in detail at the following link, including examples of townlands and electoral divisions being overlaid upon an Open Street Maps base-map. (https://rpubs.com/jackakav_phd/697037) (Accessed 28 Nov. 2020).

provided by brigade committees were created during the linking process.[35] Table 0.3, gives an overview of how the 1st Battalion of the West Limerick Brigade was linked to specific townlands and associated electoral divisions.

Table 0.3 Lookup Table — 1st Battalion, West Limerick Brigade (11 July 1921)

MSPC Listed Geographic Area	Electoral Division (ED)	Townland (TD)	Company	MSPC Record	Notes
Monegay	Monegay		A	MSPC/RO/118	
Newcastlewest	Newcastlewest Rural		B	MSPC/RO/118	Newcastlewest - town over multiple EDs
Newcastlewest	Newcastlewest Urban		B	MSPC/RO/118	Newcastlewest - town over multiple EDs
Killoughteen	Newcastle Urban	Gortboy	B	MSPC/RO/119	Killoughteen - village listed over 1 TD
Ardagh	Ardagh	Ardagh	C	MSPC/RO/118	
Kilcolman	Dunmoylan East	Kilcolman	D	MSPC/RO/118	
Carrigerry	Glensharrold	Carrigkerry	E	MSPC/RO/118	
Monegay	Newcastle Urban	Gortboy	F	MSPC/RO/118	

In the example set out in Table 0.3, Company A is linked to an entire electoral division, Company B is based in Newcastlewest which is split over multiple electoral divisions, Companies C - F are linked to a specific townland. Due to the uneven nature of the nominal rolls, the smallest area where possible is chosen so as not to overestimate the size of the battalions and brigades geographically. The methodology outlined in Table 0.3 was later employed for the creation of anti-Treaty brigades in Sligo and National Army divisions. The specific R packages utilised for creating the maps were ‘sf’, ‘tmap’ and ‘tidyverse’. Examples of how the code and download links to the lookup tables are available at the following link.[36] As this thesis is primarily a *historical* enquiry, which

[35] The lookup tables for the IRA and National Army visualisations is available at the following link: (https://www.dropbox.com/sh/t1fj9pp6vtot95b/AABNFLVhV7wejMubwXFXkHdIa?dl=0) (Accessed 18 Nov. 2020).

[36] The process of creating maps using the lookup tables is outlined in the RPubs page for chapter one of this thesis available at the following link: (https://rpubs.com/jackakav_phd/657712) (Accessed 18 Nov. 2020).

utilised geographical processes, the intent differs to that of historical geographers like Anne Kelly Knowles, who deploys historical data and processes to answer broadly geographical questions. Therefore, the process of creating IRA brigade maps was for visualisation purposes and in order to fully examine the structures of this organisation, as opposed to a granular topological study. It is also the first time this has been attempted on a macro-scale, apart from small-scale maps, typically hand-drawn of IRA brigade areas.[37] It is for this reason that a modern shapefile of townlands and linked electoral divisions was repurposed for mapping purposes as this process can be reproduced with relative ease by other researchers and allows for the creation of simple but effective visualisations, without a long-standing background in GIS and programming generally.

[37] There are two relevant examples of these that were examined prior the creation of the IRA brigade and divisional maps. First is in Peter Hart's doctoral thesis, where Hart reproduced a number of hand-drawn maps of county Cork and Ireland — Peter Hart, 'The IRA and its enemies: violence and community in county Cork, 1917-1923' (PhD thesis, Trinity College Dublin, 1992), pp 442-48. The second is included in Michael Hopkinson's study of the Irish civil war, *Green against green: the Irish civil war* (Dublin, 2nd ed. 2004), p. xv. — This consists of a map of IRA divisions based upon their pro- and anti-Treaty affiliations, however, this map appears to have been largely county based and no methodology was provided as to how it was created.

Database of National Army Casualties

July - November 1922 saw the largest mobilisation of National Army troops across the state and culminated with the military maintaining tenuous control of all major towns and cities across the Free State. During this period of four and a half months, the National Army suffered consistent losses across the entire state. The details of how these men were killed, where they died and their social backgrounds have not yet been studied as part of the discourse on the Irish civil war.[38] In order to examine this period of the civil war and its effect upon the National Army as an organisation, a dataset of National Army casualties was curated from MSPC records, census records, grave registers, newspaper accounts and James Langton's *The forgotten fallen* (2019). To ensure that the largest numbers of casualties were included and could be contextualised with contemporaneous recruitment data, the following criteria was utilised for each listed casualty:

- Died between 1 July 1922 - 13 November 1922.[39]
- There is no specific requirement for the death to have been during an active combat scenario. i.e. accidental shootings, vehicular accidents, illness and explosions are included.

The inclusion of deaths outside of 'active combat' was due to significant numbers of pensions being awarded to dependents of servicemen who died during accidents, who were certified by the Army Pension Board as having died during 'active service'.[40] Although there may be casualties that have not yet been discovered, due to scheduled releases of MSPC records in the future, it is likely to be a small number, as 65 casualties included in the dataset are not currently listed on the MSPC database. Unlike a census or historical file reproduced from an archive, this dataset had to be created from a variety of sources and this reduced the number of fields of information that were

[38] Note: Samples of National Army servicemen were included in Peter Hart's study of the social structure of the IRA. One major limitation of Hart's study is the lack of specifics as to how his samples were collated, although the sample is dated 1922, there are marked differences in the types of recruits that were entered the military pre- and post- June 1922. — Peter Hart, 'The social structure of the Irish Republican Army, 1916-1923' in *The Historical Journal* vol. 42, no. 1 (1999), pp 223-25.

[39] Note: In the event of a conflict between two dates listed in the records, e.g. 12 or 13 July, a month only date was utilised.

[40] As noted by Marie Coleman in her study of the Military Service Pension Collection, the term 'active service' was never effectively defined for the Military Service Pensions that were awarded from 1923, which in effect meant that criteria included a significant number of able bodied men. — Marie Coleman, 'Military Service Pensions for veterans of the Irish Revolution, 1916-1923' in *War in History* vol. 20, no. 2 (April, 2013), pp 210-13.

uniform across all source material. This meant that a number of fields remain blank and are marked as NA across the dataset, in particular for those soldiers without a MSPC record. As the geographic locations of National Army casualties are known at the intra-county level, it was decided to link casualties, where possible to electoral divisions. This process involved a similar procedure to the process developed for the linking of electoral divisions and townlands to IRA companies and battalion. This allows for an effective regional analysis of casualties that accounts for the presence of significant population centres. In addition to the casualties dataset, a separate lookup table was created which outlined all the sources utilised.[41]

[41] The casualties database and lookup table are both available at the following link: (https://www.dropbox.com/sh/p8gggpxq66cvjit/AAABWacJjxub0oE8jL5iGSZ1a?dl=0) (Accessed 18 Nov. 2020).

Database of ex-British servicemen in the National Army

The database of ex-British servicemen in the National Army utilised three distinct sources all drawn from the Military Archives of Ireland:

- a list of ex-British servicemen in the Commands and Services of the National Army[42]
- a register of soldiers at the Curragh Camp[43]
- a handwritten list of National Army officers[44]

This was then supplemented by an additional sample of MSPC records of ex-servicemen, including casualties identified from the earlier casualties database. In all cases, there are personnel who are *not* listed as ex-servicemen present on the records, therefore while these accounts pertain to ex-servicemen, in the case of the MSPC records this is a distinct minority of the overall collection.[45] There are few points of similarity between the three lists drawn up by the military: the register resembles a school or census record with the same entry fields for each soldier,[46] the list of officers in the 'Commands and Services' is a collection of memorandums, typed lists and original handwritten notes with numerous duplicates. In addition, this list was badly damaged and is only available via CD-ROM to the general public. This indicates that the current file is likely missing elements of the original, which means that this file in itself needs to be treated as a sample and not a complete record. The origin of the final archives list is unclear and since ex-servicemen are only a minority of entries, this may have been a supplemented component of the 'Commands and Services' collection since there are a small number of overlapping entries. The MSPC sample lists those who are either identified in the pensions records by the individual as an ex-serviceman or by next-of-kin in the case of deceased soldiers. All records report the full name of the

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[42] 'List of ex-British service personnel serving as Officers in the National Army (1923)' MA — note currently uncatalogued. Available on request at the MAI via CD-ROM due to damage of the original documentation.

[43] All entries appear to relate to men who enlisted between 1922 and 1923 from Northern Ireland — (MA/HS/A/0899).

[44] This appears to be a short alphabetical listing of officers, it is not clear why this list was created, only a small number are listed as ex-servicemen — (MA/HS/A/0924).

[45] For example, a total of 850 names are listed in the register of soldiers at the Curragh Camp, only 146 are listed as ex-servicemen — (MA/HS/A/0899).

[46] Note: The fields listed are often left blank and at times the enumerator writes information in the wrong field type. As a result the register is often irregular and contains edits and numerous notations, (MA/HS/A/0899).

individual soldier and, in nearly every case, the date of attestation. Details of prior military service in the British military varied depending on the record, some soldiers were listed with full years of service, specific units they were attached to and prior rank. Others were simply marked as 'BA' or 'Britisher' in the record.

Each name listed on the database was cross-referenced against the Irish Army census, Dublin Guard nominal roll and British Army service and pension records. Only a small minority of personnel were successfully cross-referenced against these supplementary resources and as a result the findings of this database are quite modest. However, this reflects the paucity of information available on this subtype of soldier serving with the National Army.[47] As the majority of the database is drawn from lists curated by the military, as opposed to a database collated by the author, there is no specific criteria, as the data covers the entirety of the civil war period. The only cut-off date applied was that the small number of ex-servicemen found in the MSPC records had to have served after the civil war.

[47] The lookup table for this database is available at the following link, the majority of the entries refer to the specific archival record using the archival reference code: (https://www.dropbox.com/sh/qaq2qtutd21z8tr/AADcilhhj2f50Ix7xEFcyAZua?dl=0) (Accessed 18 Nov. 2020).

Chapter 1. Foundation of the National Army

The initial structures of the National Army have been examined to varying degrees of specificity in the wider discourse on the Irish revolutionary period. Michael Hopkinson's pioneering work, *Green against green*, established the broad outlines of the conflict and remains influential. Hopkinson's description of the origins of the National Army is somewhat truncated:

> The [National] army consisted of units almost entirely from outside Munster and the west, and of new recruits. Not only did the majority of the IRA go anti-Treaty, but many retired from the army. Only those agreeing to support the Treaty were admitted to the new army. Its first regular unit consisted of reliable Dublin men who took over Beggars' Bush barracks in March after being earlier installed in Celbridge barracks. Meanwhile the anti-Treaty IRA followed a policy of infiltrating the new army in the period up to the Army Convention.[1]

This description covers a period of approximately three months and consists of a number of speculative claims that can be challenged by the information now available from the Irish Army census, MPSC and other documentary sources released since the 1980s. It is possible that the occlusion of specifics with regard to the National Army is a feature of the sources available at the time of Hopkinson's writing, but it also illustrates that generalised statements about the creation of the National Army are common within the discourse on the Irish civil war. Hopkinson's study was followed by a number of texts that examined the National Army and the military more generally throughout the 1990s. J. P. Duggan's *A history of the Irish Army* (1991), which set out the history of the Irish Army from the Irish Volunteers through to the modern Irish Defence Forces, remains the only history of the modern Irish military. Duggan's work is of limited value to this thesis, as its broad remit means that it has limited focus upon the creation of the National Army during the civil war period.[2] Maryann Valiulis' biography of Richard Mulcahy, *Portrait of a Revolutionary* (1992) examines the Irish war of Independence and civil war period in detail and focuses upon the role played by Mulcahy as IRA chief of staff, Minister for Defence, National Army chief of staff and later Commander in Chief. There has often been undue focus upon individuals and singular events, which

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[1] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, p. 61.

[2] J.P. Duggan *A history of the Irish army* (Dublin, 1991), pp 69 - 137 — Duggan only devotes 68 pages out of 354 to the war of independence / civil war period and devotes considerable time to the Second World War and later U.N. service.

has often led to limited analysis of the structures being created within the National Army during this period. Mulcahy's impact upon the nascent Free State military is considerable. However, the tendency to highlight single individuals is a feature of the descriptions of the National Army throughout the discourse on the Irish civil war:

> Mulcahy's job was to direct the [National] army from headquarters. Not only did he work very closely with Collins on issues of strategy and tactics, he also worked with the GHQ staff to oversee the development of the army which was rapidly coming into being. Starting with a nucleus of about 4,000 men, GHQ began to raise, train and equip a professional army. The national army would be quite different from the guerrilla units of the IRA.[3]

Although Valiulis is correct that the eventual structure of the National Army set out formally in July 1922 was very distinct from the original IRA, the process was not as straightforward as this narrative suggests. The National Army is explored to varying degrees in scholarship published by Theo Farrell, Patrick Long and Eunan O'Halpin on the development of the Irish military in the post-civil period in the late 1990s.[4] O'Halpin and Farrell focus largely on the military as it was constituted within the Irish Free State and during the inter-war period. There are brief references to the development of the military in 1922 but these are largely passing references, similar to Hopkinson and Valiulis:

> After the Anglo-Irish truce of July 1921, the IRA grew rapidly in size and unmanageability. As the political split within the separatist leadership developed over the terms of the Anglo-Irish treaty of December 1921, the IRA also split into anti- and pro-treaty factions. The pro-treaty men, whose first loyalty was to Collins, gravitated towards the new national army which he created for the provisional government early in 1922. The anti-treaty IRA began to mount attacks on departing British troops and police, to intervene in local disputes, and to defy the authority of the provisional government. These actions were a threat to the entire Anglo-Irish settlement, and they were to result in civil war.[5]

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[3] Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, p. 160. - It is not clear where this figure of 4,000 men is taken from.

[4] Theo Farrell, 'The model army': Military imitation and the enfeeblement of the Army in post-Revolutionary Ireland, 1922 - 42 in *Irish Studies in International Affairs* vol. 8 (1997), pp 111 - 127 ; Patrick Long, 'Organisation and development of the pro-Treaty forces, 1922 - 1924' in *The Irish Sword* vol. 20, no. 82 (1997), pp 308 -320 ; Eunan O'Halpin, 'The army in independent Ireland' in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffrey (eds) *A military history of Ireland* (Cambridge, 1997), pp 407-430.

[5] O'Halpin, 'The army in independent Ireland', p. 408.

Two articles published in 1997: Theo Farrell's, 'The Model Army' and Patrick Long's 'Organisation and development of the pro-Treaty forces' each attempted to chart the development of the National Army during the period 1922-4. Farrell makes a number of errors throughout his article, starting with the genesis of the National Army:

> When the IRA was being reconstituted as the 'new army' of the Irish state in late 1921, Mulcahy demanded complete control over senior staff appointments.[6]

This short exposition of the military situation in 1921 is a misunderstanding of the poor relations between Cathal Brugha as Minister for Defence and Richard Mulcahy, then Chief of Staff of the IRA. The demand for 'complete control' was actually about the role of politicians in the appointment of senior members of the IRA General Headquarters (GHQ) staff. This is outlined in Arthur Mitchell's *Revolutionary government* (1995).[7] Although the implications for civil-military relations can be viewed as a concern in this example, the case being made by Farrell is incorrect as the military leadership wished to prevent the imposition of political actors as opposed to influencing the political process. The issue of civil-military relations would become acute in 1923 and 1924 during the demobilisation process of the National Army. Farrell's declaration that a 'new army' was created in December 1921 is not supported by the available evidence. The divides within the IRA did not become overt until early January; the formal military split occurred after the Army Convention in March 1922 and the creation of a separate anti-Treaty GHQ. Throughout the article Farrell makes numerous references to a 'model' army. Despite these references, no timeline or distinct narrative of how the National Army was constituted was provided by Farrell. Long's article published i*n The Irish Sword*, a publication of the Military History Society of Ireland, is the most comprehensive in its attempts to describe the creation of the National Army from the pro-Treaty elements of the IRA. Long's summation of the months January - March 1922 provides a brief but succinct overview of the events, the clarity of this narrative is somewhat offset by a lack of substantive footnotes.[8] Long focuses upon individuals

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[6] Farrell, 'The model army' p. 118.

[7] Arthur Mitchell, *Revolutionary government in Ireland: Dáil Éireann, 1919 - 1922* (Dublin, 1995), pp 316-9.

[8] Long very briefly summarises the six months between January - June 1922, instead focusing upon the development of the National Army after the outbreak of the civil war — Long, 'Organisation and development of the pro-Treaty forces', pp 308-310.

such as Michael Collins, Richard Mulcahy and Eoin O'Duffy throughout the article as the progenitors of the National Army but also expands upon the structures being established in the days after the shelling of the Four Courts. His emphasis upon the political as opposed to military sources is a feature of scholarship in the 1990s, prior to the large-scale digitisation and releases of material from the Military Archives of Ireland.

Since the 1990s there have been passing references to the structure of the National Army, typically in the context of a discursive study of an event or action during the Irish civil war. A recent example is a doctoral thesis by Breen Murphy on the execution policy of the Irish Free State.[9] Breen Murphy's thesis examines military structures in the context of the government's security policy and the use of military tribunals, etc., etc. What it lacks is a clear overview of the previous structures of the IRA and how these relate to the National Army. The two IRA factions in the initial months of 1922 utilised similar nomenclature, divisional structures and maintained an uneasy *modus vivendi* until the outbreak of civil war in late June 1922.

[9] Breen Timothy Murphy, 'The government policy of executions during the Irish civil war, 1922 - 23' (Ph.D thesis, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, 2010).

Structure of the IRA

In the six months between the signing of the Treaty and the start of the Irish civil war in June, the IRA descended into factionalism. During this time period the pro-Treaty IRA began to professionalise the military structures that would later be utilised in their successful campaign against the anti-Treaty IRA. In order to interrogate and study the transformation of pro-Treaty forces into the National Army, it is necessary to outline the structures of the IRA prior to the Anglo-Irish Treaty. The origins of the IRA began with the Irish Volunteers and the initial structure of the IRA during the War of Independence utilised a system of brigades, subdivided into battalions and companies. Brigades were formed throughout the Irish War of Independence and eventually reached a total of seventy-four.[10] The IRA maintained an overall command structure called General Headquarters (GHQ). This organisation was separate to the brigades and consisted of sixteen positions, elected by a convention.[11] This reflected the *esprit de corps* of the Irish Volunteers and a form of direct democracy was utilised throughout the brigades with battalions and companies electing officers within each organisational unit. In early 1921, Richard Mulcahy, then IRA Chief of Staff, promulgated the concept of divisions that would incorporate multiple brigades into new organisational structures. These divisions were created for two specific reasons: to streamline communications between brigades and GHQ and allow for decentralised structures in case GHQ was incapacitated by the British forces.[12] At this time, the number of brigades was over sixty and the reduction to a smaller number of divisions meant that communication was more streamlined and that local activities would be better coordinated at the divisional level. This appears to have been the concept when the first IRA division, the First Southern was created. The First Southern encompassed eleven brigades and stretched from western Limerick to Waterford, including all of counties Cork, Kerry and Waterford.[13]

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[10] The figure of seventy-four is taken from the number of brigades represented at the Army Convention in March 1922. Peter Hart refers to 'fifty-odd brigades' who number changed every year — Hart, 'Social structure of the IRA', p. 209.

[11] Valiulis provides a brief overview of the 1917 Irish Volunteers convention and the election of the national executive, this executive subsequently selected a General Headquarters staff in 1918. Therefore the GHQ should be viewed as a body elected by proxy. — Valiulis, *Portrait of a revolutionary*, pp 26-9.

[12] E. O'Malley, *On another man's wound* (Dublin, 2002), p. 145 ; M. Hopkinson, *The Irish war of Independence* (Dublin, 2002), pp 175-6 ; Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, pp 71-3.

[13] For the full geographic extent of division see — 1st Southern Division GHQ (MA/MSPC/RO/26).

The process of 'divisionalisation' took many months to complete and only nine divisions were fully constituted when a 'truce' was declared between the IRA and the British forces on 11 July 1921.[14] The divisional and brigade areas in addition to the number of personnel within each are listed as part of the MSPC IRA nominal rolls collection. The IRA nominal rolls,[15] collated as part of the MSPC in the 1930s, attempted to outline the different structures of the IRA on two specific dates: 11 July 1921, the day of the Truce, and 1 July 1922, three days after the shelling of the Four Courts in Dublin city. The first date of 11 July 1921 gives an account of the structure and numerical size of the IRA, albeit with caveats as to the exact numbers of men listed and the differences between 'active service' and being listed on a nominal roll.[16] It should be noted that many of the persons listed on nominal rolls were not active in any significant way and as such these rolls are a maximum indicative strength. While there are issues with the numerical totals provided, the geographic attributes of the companies and battalions are clearly set out. Unlike earlier scholarship which emphasised the social backgrounds of members[17] or concentrated upon a single geographic area when examining the IRA,[18] this section is focused upon the unit and organisational structure of the IRA and how this developed in the pre-civil war period. Using the IRA nominal rolls it is now possible to create company, battalion, brigade and divisional maps of the IRA. This process is outlined in detail in the methodology section of this thesis.[19] The map projections created allow for an analysis of the geographic boundaries employed by the IRA and can be utilised to show the evolution of brigade areas into larger divisional areas.

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[14] Valiulis states that only nine divisions were in effect by the time of the Truce — Valiulis, *Portrait of a revolutionary*, p. 71. — The IRA nominal rolls give indicative dates for the formation of the subsequent divisions in each of the 'GHQ' RO files.

[15] Note: The MSPC Nominal Rolls were collated over a decade after the events of the Irish war of Independence and Irish civil war. As there are numerous totals given for each unit by different referees, it can be difficult to ascertain which was the accurate total. However, the structural differences within the IRA are clearly set out and are largely uniform between the different referees.

[16] Hart, 'The social structure of the IRA', pp 209-210.

[17] See Hart, *The IRA at war, 1916-1923* (Oxford, 2005); Joost Augusteijn, *From public defender to guerrilla warfare* (Dublin, 1996).

[18] The origins of the now ubiquitous 'county' study of the Irish revolutionary period has its origins in David Fitzpatrick's groundbreaking study, *Politics and Irish life* (Cork, 1998) — a study of the Irish revolution in County Clare.

[19] See the companion webpage for this chapter here: (https://rpubs.com/jackakav_phd/697037) (Accessed 22 Feb. 2020).

The IRA utilised the truce period to re-organise and train IRA volunteers. Country wide training camps were established where officers were expected to learn the basics of map-reading, military tactics, etc. Ernie O'Malley writes extensively about his role in a training camp during the Truce period in Tipperary.[20] The base structure of the IRA was set out in a series of articles published in the Army Journal *An t-Óglách*, in September and October 1921, starting with a 9 September article on the organisation and structure of Companies:

1. The tactical unit of the Irish Volunteers shall be called a Company. Its composition shall be as follows:
   (a) Three officers — The Captain, the Right Half Company Commander (First Lieutenant), the Left Half Company Commander (Second Lieutenant)
   (b) An Adjutant ranks as Section Commander.
   (c) A Quarter-master ranking as Section Commander.
   (d) Four sections number 1 - 4 each composed of 15 or more (but not exceeding 20 men) Each section shall include 2 squad leaders and one Section Commander. Sections 1 and 2 shall be the Right Half Company, Sections 3 and 4 the Left Half Company.

2. In each Company men will be detailed for Special Services as follows —
   Engineering — 12 men
   Scouting and Dispatch Riding — 8 men
   Signalling — 8 men
   Transport and Supply — 5 men
   First Aid — 8 men[21]

This was followed by an article published on 16 September on the role and responsibility of Company level officers.[22] This pattern was repeated for battalions and brigades and each organisational listing was followed by an article on the duties of the officers for each subsequent organisational unit.

The organisational structure of the Battalion was set out in an article published 30 September. Of note is the following:

1. The Battalion shall normally comprise of 4 or more (but not exceeding 7) Companies. (This rule is not rigid, but any departure from it whether allowed as a temporary arrangement or made because of special conditions, can only be allowed with the sanction of General Headquarters).

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[20] E. O'Malley, *The singing flame* (Dublin, 1997), pp 19-20.

[21] *An t-Óglách* 9 Sep. 1921.

[22] *An t-Óglách* 16 Sep. 1921.

2. The Battalion Staff shall consist of:- The Commandant, the Vice-Commandant, the Adjutant, and the Quartermaster.
3. The Battalions Chiefs of Special Services are as follows:-
   (a) Chief of Engineering (ranks as Lieutenant)
   (b) Chief of Scouting and Despatch Riding (ranks as Lieutenant)
   (c) Chief of Medical Service (ranks as Lieutenant)
   (d) Chief of Signalling (ranks as Lieutenant)
   (e) Chief of Transport and Supply (ranks as Lieutenant)[23]

The final in the series of articles on general organisation was on the Brigades published 7 October 1921:

1. The Brigade shall normally consist of 3 or more (but not more than 6) Battalions. Any departure from this formation whether allowed as a temporary arrangement or made because of special conditions, can only be allowed with the sanction of General Headquarters.
2. The Brigade Staff shall consist of the Commandant, and the Vice-Commandant, the Adjutant and the Quartermaster.
3. The Brigade Chiefs of Special Services are as follows:-
   (a) Chief of Engineering — Ranking as Captain
   (b) Chief of Scouting and Despatch Riding — Ranking as Captain
   (c) Chief of Medical Service — Ranking as Captain
   (d) Chief of Signalling — Ranking as Captain
   (e) Chief of Transport and Supply — Ranking as Captain
   (f) Chief of Intelligence Service — Ranking as Captain[24]

From these general guidelines, the averages for each organisational level of the IRA can be calculated (Table 1.1). The purpose of publishing these guidelines is not made explicit in the issues, although during this period the IRA went through a period of re-organisation with a number of brigades being reconstituted and amalgamated in the Truce period. It may be that these were published so that IRA organisers across the country could use these guidelines as part of the general IRA reorganisation. The scale of the changes between the IRA nominal rolls in July 1921 and July 1922 is extensive and there is limited context provided by the Army Pension Board as to what units were pro- or anti-Treaty by July 1922.[25] As with many orders issued either by GHQ directly

[23] *An t-Óglách* 30 Sep. 1921.

[24] *An t-Óglách 7* Oct. 1921.

[25] An example of this are the records of the Second Eastern Division, a pro-Treaty division formed after the Army Convention in March 1922. The nominal rolls for 11 July 1921 list the unit strength of the Dublin Brigade, prior to reorganisation. The MSPC note that the Second Eastern was also known as the Dublin Brigade, this is incorrect as the pro-Treaty Second Eastern continued to exist as late as November 1922 while the Dublin Brigade would continue in various configurations and strengths in the post-civil war era — see Brian Hanley, *The IRA, 1926-36* (Dublin, 2002), pp 11-13.

or published in the army journal, the reality in the localities was often different to the ideal circumstances set out in military orders. The guidelines set size ranges for every organisational unit of the IRA. Despite this, many units of the IRA had a nominal strength far in excess of this and others were below the minimal threshold.[26] As an example of the structural changes that took place between 11 July 1921 and 1 July 1922, all IRA brigades over the limit of six battalions at the time of the Truce were selected and the changes, if any, that occurred have been listed (Table 1.2).

Table 1.1 Average and maximum sizes of IRA companies, battalions and brigades

	Company Size (Avg. 18 men per Section.)	Company Size (Max 20 men per Section.)	Battalion Size (Avg. 5 Coys.)	Battalion Size (Max 7 Coys.)	Brigade Size (Avg. 4 Batts.)	Brigade Size (Max 6 Battns.)
Men	72	80	360	560	1440	2400
Officers	5	5	9	9	10	10
Total	77	85	369	569	1450	2410

[26] Note: This refers to all organisational units, except for divisions. This may have been a deliberate choice to occlude this information as the divisions were being constructed with the direct oversight of GHQ.

Table 1.2 Sample of IRA brigades with over six battalions[27]

Division	Brigade	No. of Battalions	Result by 1 July 1922	No. of Men (11 July 1921)	No. of Men (1 July 1922)
2nd Southern	Kilkenny	9	No change	3086	2151
3rd Southern	North Tipperary	7	No change	2060	1816
2nd Southern	South Tipperary	8	No change	3350	2792
N/A	Dublin	7	Divided into two brigades	5567	N/A
N/A	North Mayo	7	Battalions reorganised but remained at 7	3374	2157
N/A	Sligo No. 1	10	Divided into three brigades	4228	N/A
1st Southern	Cork No. 1	9	increased to 10 battalions	7210	4944
1st Southern	Cork No. 3	7	Battalions reorganised but remained at 7	5661	2445

As listed in Table 1.2, the majority of brigades that exceeded the recommended unit sizes were in the Southern Divisions. In addition to the western brigades of North Mayo and Sligo, Dublin was the only brigade from the eastern seaboard that exceeded six battalions. At the time of the first critical date, North Mayo, Sligo and Dublin had yet to be added to divisional areas and in the cases of Dublin and Sligo, brigades were re-organised into entirely new brigades post-divisionalisation. The re-organisation of Dublin into two brigades followed a largely city and county divide, unfortunately the IRA nominal rolls provide minimal geographic boundaries within Dublin city. As a result of this, a visualisation of this process would provide little additional context. In contrast, the reorganisation of the Sligo brigade is clearly set out in the IRA nominal roll, every battalion and company that changed is listed and the new unit designations are clearly stated. In addition, the reconstituted brigades that were formed from the Sligo Brigade formed three out of the five brigades of the Third Western division.

[27] Note: All of these totals are taken from the notes created by the Military Archives for each brigade and divisional strengths on the two key dates: 11 July 1921 and 1 July 1922. (https://www.militaryarchives.ie/en/collections/online-collections/military-service-pensions-collection-1916-1923/search-the-collection/organisation-and-membership/ira-membership-series) (Accessed 4 Mar. 2021).

Therefore, the example of Sligo is a microcosm of both brigade reorganisation and the wider process of creating divisions from brigades in the post-Truce period.

Sligo Brigade[28]

The geographic size of the Sligo Brigade in July 1921 was extensive, encompassing all of county Sligo, half of county Leitrim and elements of counties Donegal and Roscommon (Map. 1.1). Table 1.3 provides an overview of the ten battalions of the Sligo brigade and their subsequent reorganisation into three new brigades: South Sligo, North Sligo and Arigna, all of which formed part of the new Third Western division created between October and November 1922.[29] In addition to the ten listed battalions, the new brigades consisted of new battalion configurations and amalgamations of battalions from other brigades. However, for the purposes of this example, the emphasis is upon the original Sligo Brigade. The sizes of the ten battalions are listed pre- and post-reorganisation, as noted in Table 1, and the average size of a Battalion was 369 officers and men. The maximum size permitted under the general organisation guidelines was 569 officers and men. Of the ten battalions, three exceeded the maximum size: 3rd Battalion (605), 5th Battalion (638) and 6th Battalion (826).

[28] Note: The Sligo Brigade is also referred to as the Sligo No. 1 Brigade, however, this naming convention is also utilised for the newly formed brigades after the Truce period. Therefore to prevent confusion, 'Sligo Brigade' is utilised to refer to the brigade as annotated by the nominal rolls on 11 July 1921.

[29] Note: The new brigades utilise three different naming conventions throughout the nominal rolls, the geographic attribute name was chosen for clarity and to prevent confusion. Alternative names for these brigades are as follows: South Sligo (Sligo No. 2 or 4th Brigade), North Sligo (Sligo No. 1 or 1st Brigade) and Arigna (2nd Brigade).

Map 1.1 Geographic boundaries of Sligo Brigade, IRA 11 July 1921



Map 1.2 Battalions within the Sligo No. 1 Brigade 11 July 1921



Map 1.3 Battalions within the South Sligo Brigade 1922



Map 1.4 Battalions within the North Sligo Brigade 1922



Map 1.5 Battalions within the Arigna Brigade 1922



Table 1.3 Sligo No. 1 Brigade re-organisation from 1921 to 1922[30]

Brigade (1921)	Battalion (1921)	Battalion Size (1921)	Brigade (1922)	Battalion (1922)	Division (1922)
Sligo	1st Battalion	310	North Sligo	1st Battalion	3rd Western
Sligo	2nd Battalion	259	North Sligo	2nd Battalion	3rd Western
Sligo	3rd Battalion	605	South Sligo	3rd Battalion	3rd Western
Sligo	4th Battalion	461	South Sligo	4th Battalion	3rd Western
Sligo	5th Battalion	638	Arigna	2nd Battalion	3rd Western
Sligo	6th Battalion	826	South Sligo	1st Battalion	3rd Western
Sligo	7th Battalion	335	South Sligo	2nd Battalion	3rd Western
Sligo	8th Battalion	350	Arigna	1st Battalion	3rd Western
Sligo	9th Battalion	266	North Sligo	4th Battalion & 5th Battalion	3rd Western
Sligo	10 Battalion	167	North Sligo	3rd Battalion	3rd Western

As the map projections are drawn from the geographic boundaries of each of the companies, the battalions often appear disjoined (Map 1.2). It is likely that the battalions operated across the entire brigade area as shown in Map. 1.1. For the purposes of this graphic, battalions are represented by the geographic parameters of the companies as set out in the nominal rolls. It should also be noted that these maps are representative of the battalion and company geographic areas where companies were formed. Operations occurred throughout different areas and active service units drawn from multiple battalions would operate throughout the entire brigade area. Occasionally, the brigade committees would supply maps, hand-drawn or Ordnance Survey with annotations, which outlined the battalion area. In the case of the Sligo Brigade, no maps were provided for the brigade area.[31] The apportionment of battalions into different brigade areas is represented in Maps. 1.3-1.5. The breakdown between the North and South Sligo Brigades follow a largely geographic division within the county Sligo, with elements of North Leitrim and South Donegal being included in North Sligo and

[30] The information on this table is drawn from the following series of MSPC records — (MA/MSPC/RO/275-285). - Note: the figures utilised for Battalion strengths are indicative only and these are the totals provided by the MSPC, the internal records often record a range of differing figures. However, for this analysis, the average created by the MSPC functions as an average.

[31] Sligo 1 Brigade GHQ (MA/MSPC/RO/275).

elements of the reorganised Mayo brigades being transferred to the South Sligo brigade.[32]

Each of the brigade areas shown in the map visualisations formed part of the Third Western division formed in late 1921.[33] The division consisted of a total of five brigades, including a total of twenty battalion areas. The process of creating the division occurs during the timeframe of the publication of brigade, battalion and company organisational charts in *An t-Óglách*. It is likely that the size limits and redistribution of battalions and brigades occurred as a consequence of these orders issued in the army journal. This example of divisionalisation provides a useful insight into the geographic and boundary considerations of the IRA leadership during the period of reorganisation between July and December 1921. The basic structures of the battalions did not change in the example of Sligo and many were simply transferred entirely into brigades. In the one example of a battalion being divided during the reorganisation process, the company structure remained unchanged and the geographic boundaries remained constant. This process would be replicated on a larger scale during the changes to divisional structures implemented by the National Army leadership prior to and during the Irish civil war.

[32] Note: The transfer of Mayo battalions are not shown as these visualisations are focused upon the reorganisation of the Sligo Brigade.

[33] 3rd Western Division GHQ (MA/MSPC/RO/297). — correspondence between the Army Pensions Board and the members of the brigade committees set out that the Third Western Division was formed post-Truce between October and November 1921.

IRA Divides

The Dáil Éireann debates which took place between December 1921 and January 1922 over the issue of ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, also known as the Treaty debates, are significant developments that foreshadowed the creation of the National Army. The positions of Sinn Féin members on the Anglo-Irish Treaty and what this would mean for the new Irish Free State were often repeated during the Irish civil war as a point of justification. Questions about the IRA and how it would function after the Treaty was ratified were largely cursory during the Treaty debates. There were references to Army unity and some ambiguous references to the IRA remaining the 'Army of the Republic', but overall it remained unclear as to whether the IRA would obey decisions made by Dáil Éireann.[34] Although some members of Dáil Éireann were simultaneously members of the Dáil and the IRA, the dual membership of pro-Treaty T.D.s had little effect upon the IRA's collective response to the Treaty, which was overwhelmingly negative outside of GHQ. As a consequence of the successful Dáil ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, a Provisional Government was established. This led to a situation in which there were in theory two governments: one based in Dáil Éireann and a second, a new Provisional Government made up of pro-Treaty T.D.s.[35] This dual government led to a reordering of positions, Richard Mulcahy replaced Cathal Brugha as the Minister for Defence.[36] Mulcahy was no longer Chief of Staff of the IRA, his role was filled by Eoin O'Duffy. Mulcahy was now dealing with the IRA as a political representative while maintaining his extensive links with the leadership and membership of the IRA. Despite calls for the military to remain unified after the successful vote in favour of the Treaty in January 1922, the immediate response of senior commanders to the vote was a rapid call for an IRA Convention.[37] This opposition was initially expressed in a letter sent to Richard

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[34] There are different accounts given that the army would split or would go along with a Dáil vote on the Treaty in Arthur Mitchell's *Revolutionary government* (1995), p. 326.

[35] Note: The membership of these bodies largely overlapped and after the elections in June 1922, the 2nd Dáil was replaced by the 3rd Dáil and the Irish Free State's legal status was formally ratified after the passing of the Irish Free State Constitution Act, 1922 in December 1922. See B.T. Murphy, 'The government's executions policy during the Irish civil war 1922-1923' (Ph.D thesis, NUI Maynooth, 2010), pp 29-30 — provides a succinct overview of dual government.

[36] Valiulis, *Portrait of a revolutionary*, p. 123.

[37] See letter to the Minister for Defence dated January 11th 1922 - *Dáil Éireann deb., vol. S2, no. 4* (26 April 1922) - Appendices to Report - Dept. of Defence. — Appendix A reproduces all the correspondence between IRA commanders opposed to the Treaty and Minister for Defence (Mulcahy) on the question of the IRA convention.

Mulcahy on 11 January 1922. This letter set out concerns about the nature of the 'Republic' and contended that this was against the oath sworn by all IRA members to uphold the Republic declared in 1916 and later ratified in 1919. This led to a subsequent meeting between the Minister for Defence and IRA officers, a timeline of these events was later printed and circulated in *An t-Óglách* the official Army journal.[38]

The list of IRA divisions opposed to the Anglo-Irish Treaty in January is listed in Table 1.4. This was drawn from the signatories of the 11 January letter to Richard Mulcahy and represents the views of the signatories.[39] The wider divisions often held a plethora of views on the Treaty, although in many cases the divisions had a majority anti-Treaty position as shown by voting intentions of the brigade and divisional representatives sent to the Army Convention in March 1922.[40] In addition to the six divisions, the brigade commandants of the Dublin No. 1 Brigade and the South Dublin Brigade, Oscar Traynor and Andrew McDonnell were signatories of the letter.[41] The number of available men per division is drawn from the size of divisions or brigades that constituted that division on 11 July 1921. Only the three Southern divisions had been formed prior to the Truce in 1921. The Dublin brigade was divided into two during the Truce period and clear figures of each unit strength are not available for this time period. Therefore, the unified Dublin Brigade total was utilised for Table 1.4.

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[38] *An t-Óglách* 31 Mar. 1922.

[39] Technically, Ernie O'Malley did not sign the letter, but this was due to him not being able to sign it in time. — *Dáil Éireann deb., vol. S2, no. 4* (26 April 1922) - Appendix A to Report - Dept. of Defence.

[40] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, pp 67-8.

[41] Letter to the Minister for Defence dated 11 January 1922 - *Dáil Éireann deb., vol. S2, no. 4* (26 April 1922) - Appendix A to Report - Dept. of Defence.

Table 1.4 Anti-Treaty IRA Divisions and Brigades — 11 January 1922[42]

Signatory to Letter	Division	Numerical Size (Nominal Roll 1921)
Liam Lynch	First Southern	34,623
E. O'Malley	Second Southern	12,388
M. McCormack	Third Southern	6,220
Thos. Maguire	Second Western	3,983
Wm. Pilkington	Third Western	9,697
M. Mac Giollarnáth	Fourth Western	8,559
Oscar Traynor & Andrew McDonnell	Dublin Brigades	5,464
	Total Strength	80,934

The number of men listed on the nominal rolls is far greater than those who actually participated in activities during the War of Independence. Despite this, the representative size of the opposition as shown by these indicative figures and the gross imbalance between each of the divisions are illustrative of issues facing the Provisional Government and pro-Treaty IRA in general. By January 1922 there were thirteen IRA divisions: five 'Northern', four 'Western', three 'Southern' and a single 'Eastern' and 'Midland'. The total listed size of the IRA on 11 July 1921 as per the nominal rolls was 115,446. Therefore, the 80,934 as represented by the six divisional commandants and two Dublin brigade commanders was a significant majority opposed to the Treaty. In contrast to the IRA divisions, the majority of the General Headquarters (GHQ) staff had taken a pro-Treaty position, only four members of GHQ signed the letter: Rory O'Connor (Engineering), Liam Mellows (Purchases), Sean Russell (Munitions) and Jim O'Donovan (Chemicals). Although O'Connor and Mellows were influential figures and Mellows was also a sitting Teachta Dála (T.D.) within Dáil Éireann, these four members of GHQ were not key members of the general staff. The pro-Treaty forces were not readily apparent in early January 1922, as there is not a single letter outlining the pro-Treaty affiliation of divisional commandants. However, the following divisional commandants were known to have taken a pro-Treaty stance: Michael Brennan, Joseph

[42] The figures for divisional strengths are drawn from the following MSPC record — Establishment of the IRA (MA/MSPC/RO/609).

Sweeney, Dan Hogan and Sean MacEoin.[43] Therefore, a nominal number of pro-Treaty divisions and IRA personnel can be collated (Table 1.5).

Table 1.5 Pro-Treaty IRA divisions — January 1922[44]

Commandant	Division	Numerical Size (Nominal Roll 1921)
Michael Brennan	First Western	8,892
Joseph Sweeney	First Northern	4,838
Dan Hogan	Fifth Northern	2,442
Sean MacEoin	Midland	3,955
	Total Strength	20,127

As noted earlier, the totals listed are indicative and often inflated as many of the men listed on the rolls were in prison, dead or not active. However, the seemingly strong anti-Treaty bias within the divisions is noteworthy. In addition to the divisional commandants noted above, GHQ did command one unit, the Dublin Guard in early January 1922.[45] This unit was formed via a merger of the Active Service Unit (ASU) of the Dublin Brigade and 'The Squad', an intelligence unit created by Michael Collins. The recruitment into the Dublin Guard from the period February - April 1922 was annotated on a nominal roll.[46] This unit would frequently be referred to within internal GHQ correspondence regarding the future strength and position of pro-Treaty forces based in Dublin city in the interregnum between the ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the shelling of the Four Courts.

Throughout February 1922, the tensions between the varied IRA factions increased as shown by the following extracts for February from a report entitled 'Chronology of events 2 January - 30 June 1922': On 8 February, 'border' troubles began, on 14

[43] Note: All of these men later served as Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces.

[44] Establishment of the IRA (MA/MSPC/RO/609).

[45] Note: Throughout much of the official correspondence this unit is often referred to as the 'Guard', 'GHQ Guard', 'Guards Brigade' and other versions therein. For the sake of clarity, the term Dublin Guard is utilised throughout this thesis.

[46] The 'Dublin Guard Nominal Roll, February - April 1922' is currently uncatalogued but is available on request at the Military Archives of Ireland.

February, Kilkenny was reinforced from Dublin, on 16 February, the South Tipperary Brigade began to impose levies, on 17 February *An t-Óglách* forbid the imposition of levies without GHQ approval, on 28 February, the South Tipperary Brigade began to hold up trains in their brigade area.[47] This chronology outlines key military events and responses taken by the pro-Treaty GHQ during this period. The imposition of levies by the South Tipperary Brigade necessitated a response banning all levies by IRA units.[48] This was published in the Army Journal *An t-Óglách*. However, this obviously had little effect, as the brigade had escalated to holding up trains by 28 February. Beyond the Treaty, other divisive issues included British military evacuation from the Irish Free State and the continuing conflict with the Unionist government based in Northern Ireland. The precise character of the British withdrawal caused considerable problems for the pro-Treaty GHQ. The ignorance of local British authorities regarding the position taken by local IRA units on the subject of the Anglo-Irish Treaty resulted in many barracks and posts being handed over to anti-Treaty IRA units wholesale. This issue was then compounded by Mulcahy's decision to allow local units of the IRA to occupy local military installations.[49]

This settlement was largely a practical one, as there were insufficient numbers of men to occupy all the posts being evacuated by British forces. However, these units were able to access surplus British military equipment, weapons and ammunition. This had the effect of weakening the position of the Provisional Government just as the British Army were attempting to evacuate all of its soldiers from Irish Free State territory. This process had started with the handover of Dublin Castle on 16 January 1922 and by the end of February was progressing at an accelerated rate.[50] The handover of barracks to pro-Treaty IRA units will be covered in a subsequent chapter on National Army recruitment. The handing over of barracks to differing elements of the IRA eventually led to the so-called 'Limerick crisis' which developed over the occupation of

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[47] Chronology of events 2 January - 30 June 1922 (MA/HS/A/0927).

[48] Note: The wider issue of IRA levies had been outstanding matter throughout the Truce period, so this can viewed as a definitive response to this practice. For an account of IRA levies see Brian Hughes, *Defying the IRA?* (Liverpool, 2016), pp 92-95.

[49] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, pp 58-60; Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, pp 127-8.

[50] For a full account of the British evacuation see Anthony Kinsella, '"Goodbye Dublin": The British military evacuation 1922' in *Dublin Historical Record* vol. 51, no. 1 (Spring, 1998), pp 4-24.

different barracks in Limerick city as the British military evacuated.[51] This crisis eventually resulted in the pro-Treaty forces pulling out of Limerick city and handing over all the barracks to local anti-Treaty forces under the Second Southern Division. This result is indicative of the weakness of the Provisional Government's position outside of the Dublin region and how it was unable to dictate policy.

In March 1922 the planned IRA convention, the first to be convened since 1917, was proscribed by the Provisional Government. It was apparent that a majority of the IRA were going to reject the Treaty and that the Convention delegates would vote for a wholly independent organisation opposed to the authority of the Provisional Government and Dáil Éireann.[52] Although it may seem unusual that a military theoretically under the control of a civilian legislature would want to decide an independent policy on the establishment of a new Irish state, this is an intrinsic part of the ethos of the Irish Volunteers discussed above.[53] While this ethos was useful when fighting the British state, as it allowed for a decentralised system that could react to rapidly changing events, in peacetime it was hostile to the traditional command and control structure of a regular standing army. Despite the proscribing of the IRA convention, it was held in Dublin on 26 March 1922. fifty-two out of seventy-three IRA brigades had sent delegates to the convention, representing a majority of the IRA.[54] The IRA convention was unsurprisingly unanimous in its condemnation of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Despite this, the process of agreeing a collective strategy against the Treaty failed. While there was universal agreement that the Anglo-Irish Treaty should be rejected, there was little agreement on an alternative. The efforts of the convention were focused primarily on the creation of a new GHQ and Army Council, later known as the Army Executive.[55] In the aftermath of the IRA Convention, the anti-Treaty IRA had a

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[51] For an anti-Treaty account of the Limerick crisis, see O'Malley, *The singing flame*, pp 55-61. A more neutral account of the Limerick crisis is covered in Hopkinson, *Green against green*, pp 62-5.

[52] Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, pp 134-5 ; Hopkinson, *Green against green*, pp 66-7.

[53] Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, p. 46.

[54] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, pp 67-8 - Hopkinson unfortunately does not name the specific brigades, but since the 1st and 2nd Southern Divisions were present, those two divisions alone contained a significant proportion of the IRA.

[55] Note: The terminology around the Army Convention and the anti-Treaty GHQ is complicated as different phrases are utilised. It appears that during the Convention proceedings a new Army Council consisting of fifteen individuals was created and within this was a small group of five men called the Army Executive. Despite these distinctions, the phrase Army Executive is used post-Convention to describe the forces occupying the Four Courts under Rory O'Connor and others.

distinct and separate command structure albeit mostly on paper, the new organisation lacked staff, resources and equipment. In structural terms, the distribution of forces within the IRA was highly imbalanced, a fact which is often overlooked within the literature. The anti-Treaty IRA consisted of brigades and localised autonomous divisions across the country which were resistant to a centralised leadership. The pro-Treaty IRA by contrast retained the majority of GHQ and significant numbers of men within the Dublin Brigades and three key regional divisions: First Western, Midlands and First Northern. This allowed the pro-Treaty GHQ to create sub departments and specialised services, while the divisionalisation process initiated in 1921 had led to expanded divisional areas and unchecked local particularism. When the British withdrawal started in January 1922, the GHQ was able to expand.

Pro-Treaty IRA divergence

For much of January - March 1922, the Provisional Government and the pro-Treaty IRA leadership were reactive. Anti-Treaty activities were responded to instead of being anticipated, the Limerick 'crisis' being a prime example, and the result was that the anti-Treaty IRA were able to declare victory of a sort. Despite this, the retention of *An t-Óglách* meant that the pro-Treaty elements of GHQ controlled a key communications organ that could be utilised to inform the rank and file of the IRA on current events.[56] The issues of *An t-Óglách* published between January - April 1922 are witness to the attempts by the GHQ under Eoin O'Duffy and Richard Mulcahy to present a united front to the readership, i.e. the rank and file of the IRA who subscribed to the publication. After the Army Convention, which was held on 26 March 1922, the tone of the publication became increasingly polemic. Editorials frequently accused the 'Sectional Convention' of wanting to create a military dictatorship. Rory O'Connor and his various statements about dictatorship are all reproduced, presumably as evidence of 'dictatorial' tendencies.[57] One immediate change taken by the pro-Treaty GHQ in the aftermath of the Army Convention was the creation of the Second Eastern Division.[58] The Second Eastern was the sixteenth and final IRA division created, it was also the first pro-Treaty IRA division created. The Second Eastern consisted of the two Dublin Brigades, a result of the re-organisation noted in an earlier section on IRA structures. The anti-Treaty IRA never replicated the Second Eastern, choosing to retain the pre-existing Dublin Brigade under the command of Oscar Traynor. It is unclear if the anti-Treaty GHQ, with its strong representatives from the First and Second Southern divisions, ever considered creating a new Eastern or Dublin based division.[59]

The first example of specialised corps being outlined was Staff Routine Order No. 8, issued by the QMGs Dept and reprinted in full in the 27 May issue of *An t-Óglách*. The

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[56] Rory O'Connor in February 1922, sent a letter to Richard Mulcahy protesting that the February issue of *An t-Óglách* had been published without consulting him or any other members of GHQ who were opposed to the Treaty. This shows the limits of the anti-Treaty position when it came to the infrastructure of the military. — Letter from Rory O'Connor to Richard Mulcahy, 23 February 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/191).

[57] *An t-Óglách*, 31 Mar. 1922.

[58] Ibid.

[59] During the civil war period, Ernie O'Malley was placed in command of a vast area called the 'Eastern and Northern command', however, this command area largely existed in theory — O'Malley, *The singing flame*, p. 169.

order, dated 15 May, set out the creation of a four specialised Corps within the QMGs Department:

- Army Ordnance Corps
- Army Supply Corps
- Army Transport Corps
- Army Pay Corps

Each corps had a HQ based at Portobello barracks and the entire country was divided into six districts with a HQ for each district:

- Eastern district Headquarters – Wellington Barracks
- South Eastern district - Kilkenny
- South Western district - Ennis
- Mid Western district - Athlone
- Southern district - (not yet fixed)
- Northern district - (not yet fixed)[60]

The concept of district commands would be revisited in the immediate aftermath of the shelling of the Four Courts as part of General Order No. 1.[61] The entire structure outlined in Staff Routine Order No. 8 was something that the anti-Treaty GHQ had no ability to create as it lacked the sufficient equipment, personnel and funds to carry out the type of functions being required of the QMGs Department. The named district HQs all corresponded to pro-Treaty divisional areas, Wellington Barracks was under the control of the Second Eastern Division. Ennis and Athlone were under the control of the First Western and Midlands Division respectively. Kilkenny was within territory of the Second Southern Division, but the Kilkenny Brigade remained a largely pro-Treaty redoubt.[62] The absence of Southern and Northern District HQs for each of the newly established Corps is indicative of the geographic limitations of the pro-Treaty GHQ at this time. The absence of a Northern HQ was reflective of the partitioned nature of the island, wherein the three IRA divisions based entirely in the territory of Northern Ireland were focused largely upon the conflict against the Unionist government. The

[60] *An t-Óglách,* 27 May 1922.

[61] General Order No. 1, July 5th 1922 (MA/CW/OPS/01/01/02).

[62] *An t-Óglách*, 25 Apr. 1922. — the leadership of the Kilkenny Brigade are listed as remaining 'loyal' to GHQ in a long article that outlines the disposition of the IRA by division and brigade on the question of 'loyalty' to GHQ or the Army Executive.

lack of a Southern HQ reflected the anti-Treaty position of the First and Second Southern and the inability of the pro-Treaty GHQ to control those divisional areas.

Along with the creation of specific corps and a general restructuring of the GHQ into a more recognisably *military* as opposed to *paramilitary* entity, the sizes of military units were being streamlined as detailed in a memorandum entitled 'Suggested Regular Army Strength', which set out a new structure for the military building upon the pre-existing IRA divisions and specialised corps established on 18 May under the QMGs Routine Order No. 8.[63] The memorandum was part of undated minutes of a Defence Council meeting.[64] The memorandum was a catch-call document including a mixture of proposed unit reforms, reorganised divisional areas, equipment estimates, pay scales and armaments estimates. This document lays out a foundation for the National Army that is radically different from the IRA and the Irish Volunteers and it would appear from the Defence Council minutes that this proposal was setting out how the new pro-Treaty military was to be established. It should be noted that this document conceives of a military that is *not* fighting a civil war, and as a result of this, it should be viewed as a proposal for a peacetime military force. The base structure of the National Army is set out as follows:

> **Company** to consist of 105 (all ranks) i.e. Captain, 1st Lieutenant, 2nd Lieutenant, Adjutant, Quartermaster, 4 Sergeants and 8 Corporals and 88 men.
> **Battalion** to consist of 3 to 5 Coys. as above and superannuries The Commandant, Vice Commandant, Adjutant, Quartermaster, Assistant Quartermaster.
> **Companies** - 100 rifles and 200 rounds per rifle, 1 Webley revolver for each officer and NCO.[65]

This new organisational system for the military drew upon the previous organisational charts published in *An t-Óglách* between September and October 1921. Table 1.6 outlines the different sizes of the battalions using the criteria set out in the memorandum.

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[63] 'Suggested Regular Army Strength' (MA/CW/OPS/01/01/21) - note a copy of this report is also part of the Mulcahy Papers P7/B/40, attached to an undated Defence Council agenda. It is not possible to specifically date this agenda, from the content it is more likely in late May or early June 1922.

[64] Defence Council Agenda n.d. (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/40).

[65] Suggested Regular Army Strength (MA/CW/OPS/01/01/21) - Note the original emphasis has been retained.

Table 1.6 National Army Company and Battalions Organisation[66]

	Company	Battalion (3 Coys.)	Battalion (4 Coys.)	Battalion (5 Coys.)
Men	88	315	420	525
Officers	17	5	5	5
Total	105	320	425	530

The differences between this new design and the previous IRA structure are shown in Table 1.7. For this comparison the average size of companies and battalions from both organisational schemas are utilised. In the case of the IRA, the average was five companies per battalion and in the case of the proposed National Army this was four companies per battalion.

Table 1.7 Comparison between IRA and National Army structures

	Company (IRA)	Company (NA)	Battalion (IRA)	Battalion (NA)
Men	72	88	360	420
Officers, NCOs	3	17	9	5
Total	75	105	369	425

In addition, this memorandum appears to be avoiding a reimagined brigade or regimental system for the National Army. Instead the memorandum reconstitutes a selection of the pre-existing IRA divisions within the National Army with proposed troop numbers drawn in some cases from specific IRA brigades. In addition to this, the specialised corps of the National Army are set out in general terms and expanded beyond the QMGs Department (Table 1.8).[67]

[66] Note: Throughout the memorandum the average battalion listed is 400 men, presumably this is rounding to the nearest hundred for the purposes of the general scheme for reorganisation by divisional area.

[67] Suggested Regular Army Strength (MA/CW/OPS/01/01/21).

Table 1.8 Army estimates per Division & Corps, National Army - June 1922[68]

		brought Forward	800 men.
1st N.D. H.Q. Ballybofey	2 Bns. of 400 men each.		800 men.
5th N.D. H.Q. Clones	2 Bns. of 400 men each.		800 men.
1st E.D. H.Q. Trim	3 Bns. of 400 men each.	(including men now in Galway)	1200 men.
2nd E.D. H.Q. Wellington	4 Bns. of 400 men each.	(Accounting for transfer for 400 men from Guard)	1600 men.
3rd E.D. H.Q. Enniscorthy	2 Bns. of 400 men each.	(500 from Carlow)	800 men.
Midland H.Q. Boyle	6 Bns. of 400 men each.	(including 2nd & 3rd Western & part of 4th Western)	2400 men.
1st Western H.Q. Ennis	4 Bns. of 400 men each.	(including East & West Connemara)	1600 men.
1st Southern H.Q. Cork or Charleville	4 Bns. of 400 men each.	(not including West Limerick or Waterford)	1600 men.
2nd Southern H.Q. Kilkenny	3 Bns. of 400 men each.	(Kilkenny. Mid Tipp. South Tipp. & Waterford Bdes)	1200 men.
3rd Southern H.Q. Birr	2 Bns. of 400 men each.		800 men.
4th Southern H.Q. Limerick	5 Bns. of 400 men each.	(E. Limerick, Mid Limerick, W. Limerick & Limerick City)	1200 men.
		Total Infantry or Line Men	14,800 men.
Quartermaster General (Transport, Ordnance, Pay, Records and Supply Departments)	2 Bns. of 500 men each.		1000
Engineering	1 Bns. of 500 men each.		500
Signalling, Wireless etc	1 Bns. of 500 men each.		500

[68] Note: This table is a diplomatic transcript of the original memorandum, where possible the style has been retained.

Red Cross	1 Bns. of 500 men each.		500
Armoured Car Corps (including Lancia.)	1 Bns. of 400 men each.		400
Machine Gun Corps	1 Bns. of 400 men each.		400
Artillery (50 Pieces)	1 Bns. of 400 men each.		400
Administrative Staffs, Training, Air Service and Barrack Staffs			700
Drawn from 2nd Eastern Division, 3rd and 4th Northern Divisions			800
		Total (Rough)	20,000 men.

It is not clear if the numbers listed within the divisions are maximum set strengths or the number of men available within each division that the Provisional Government could mobilise. It is likely that at least some of these figures are of men who would support the Provisional Government from each division. The Second Eastern division is one of the few divisions where the numbers of men who chose pro- or anti-Treaty positions are available. This is outlined in the 25 April edition of *An t-Óglách* (Table 1.9).

Table 1.9 Pro-Treaty position of the Second Eastern Division - April 1922[69]

Division	Brigade	Battalion	Total Strength	No. of men 'loyal to GHQ'	%
Second Eastern	No. 1 (Dublin)	No. 1	750	250	33%
Second Eastern	No. 1 (Dublin)	No. 2	500	400	80%
Second Eastern	No. 1 (Dublin)	No. 3	1,200	900	75%
Second Eastern	No. 1 (Dublin)	No. 4	350	250	71%
Second Eastern	No. 1 (Dublin)	No. 5	350	100	29%
Second Eastern	No. 2 (Dublin)	No. 1	400	250	63%
Second Eastern	No. 2 (Dublin)	No. 2	380	100	26%
Second Eastern	No. 2 (Dublin)	No. 3	350	150	43%
Second Eastern	No. 2 (Dublin)	No. 4 & 5	750	650	87%
		Total	5,030	3,050	61%

The issue of pre-Truce figures for the total strengths of battalions needs to be considered when examining the disposition of pro- and anti-Treaty sentiment within the Second Eastern division. As shown earlier, these are often inflated and consist of men who were not active for any substantial length of time. In addition, there were retirements from the IRA during the period prior to the Truce and many IRA personnel took a neutral position for the January - June period, prior to choosing a side after the shelling of the Four Courts. The total number of men from the battalions who supported GHQ and by default the pro-Treaty position is 3,050. As the total number assigned to the Second Eastern division in the 'Suggested Regular Army Strength' memorandum is 1,600, this leaves 1,450 men. However, the time delay between the creation of these totals in April and the memorandum in June means that some number of IRA men either retired from the IRA, as noted in the April article, or were reassigned to the new special services being expanded at this time.[70] As the Second Eastern was based in Dublin and in close proximity to GHQ, it is likely that this unit would be one of the first utilised for any expansion of the special services such as Signalling, Wireless etc. An example of this

[69] *An t-Óglách*, 25 April 1922. — Note: this is not inclusive of officers, only of men from each battalion, where listed.

[70] *An t-Óglách*, 25 April 1922.

was the recruitment from the constituent brigades of the Second Eastern into the Dublin Guard (Table 1.8). The total strength of the Dublin Guard approximately relates to the numbers set out for the Guard in the 'Suggested Regular Army Strength' memorandum:[71]

G.H.Q. Guard.

Guard to consist of two Battalions of 400 men each.

Dispositions.	Portobello (Guard H.Q.)	350 men)	
	Beggars' Bush (G.H.Q.)	100 men)	
	Curragh Guard.	200 men)	800 men.
	Provisional Govt.)		
	Baldonnell Aerodrome)	150 men)	
	Mountjoy.)[72]		

The Guard was stationed at all the key areas of the Provisional Government and pro-Treaty GHQ, the modest numbers of men assigned to each post are indicative of the small numbers of men actually under the direct control of the GHQ in this period.

Table 1.10 Dublin Guard Recruitment[73]

Month Attested	No.
February	245
March	455
April	411
No date provided	31
Total	1142

[71] Note: The memorandum calls for a reduction of the size of the Guard to approximately 800 men, as it was over 1,100 in April 1922, it is likely that the number increased during the April - June period. — Suggested Regular Army Strength (MA/CW/OPS/01/01/21).

[72] Suggested Regular Army Strength (MA/CW/OPS/01/01/21) - Note the original emphasis has been retained and the transcript is accurate to how it was typed on the memorandum. This file is duplicated in the UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/40 collection, it is part of the minutes of an undated Defence Council meeting held sometime in May or June 1922, there are references to particular issues that may place it within June.

[73] These figures are from the Dublin Guard Nominal Roll February - April 1922. This file is currently uncatalogued within the Military Archives but is available upon request.

The expansion of the QMG's department and the creation of specialised corps set out in Table 1.8 are all listed as having expanded battalion strengths of 500 men. It is not clear why these are expanded. However, the memorandum clearly differentiates between 'line' infantry i.e. divisions and specialised corps. It is possible that the expanded battalions being utilised in these administrative and largely technical roles were to operate under different structures from the 'line' infantry. The continuing usage of 'districts' by the specialised corps within the QMGs department, post-July 1922, would suggested this part of the military retained a separate structure to the divisions and their constituent companies and battalions.

In addition to the numbers of men assigned to the divisions, the scheme proposed in Table 1.8 involved streamlined divisions, consisting of evenly weighted battalions. Ten out of a total of sixteen IRA divisions were listed with specific troop numbers, the Northern Divisions fighting the Unionist government were being left out of a formal command structure and the Western Divisions were to be grouped under the Midland Division with the except of the First Western. As the majority of the Second, Third and Fourth Western divisions had taken an anti-Treaty stance, this structure is proposing redistributing the pro-Treaty IRA men from these areas.

Map 1.6 First Southern Division, IRA (11 July 1921)



Map 1.7 First Southern Division, National Army (June 1922)



Map 1.8 Second Southern Division, IRA (11 July 1921)



Map 1.9 Second Southern Division, National Army (June 1922)



Map 1.10 Fourth Southern Division, National Army (June 1922)



The structural changes outlined in the memorandum can be visualised using the IRA divisional maps created for this thesis. This is the first time where the administrative changes between pro- and anti-Treaty IRA divisions can be represented visually. For this chapter, the changes to the two largest IRA divisions had been visualised, using the IRA nominal rolls and the June memorandum (Maps. 1.6-1.10). Map 1.6 shows the boundaries of the First Southern Division as it was constituted on 11 July 1921, under the command of Liam Lynch. This was the largest division in both numerical size and geographic area, it was also led by overwhelmingly anti-Treaty figures. Map 1.7 provides an overview into the proposed changes for the National Army, the consolidation to two counties as opposed to four was logical and followed the earlier concept of smaller and more cohesive battalions. Map 1.8 outlines the boundaries of the Second Southern Division led by Ernie O'Malley, another key figure in the wider anti-Treaty IRA faction. This division also spread across numerous counties. The division of county Limerick between the two divisions of First and Second Southern was unusual as typically, brigades were all grouped into a single unit were possible. The examples of this in Meath and Donegal for the First Eastern and Northern Divisions both followed this pattern, combining four brigades within each county into a distinct division. Map 1.9 highlights the earlier trend seen in Map 1.7 with the proposed National Army Second Southern Division encompassing a much smaller area and being focused around Kilkenny. In both cases, the National Army re-organisations of both divisions removed the brigades from Limerick from the new structures and instead a new Fourth Southern Division was proposed for Limerick county (Map 1.10).

It should be noted that the duplication of divisions, brigades and GHQs can be overstated, these were not mirrored entities possessing the same numerical strengths and material. The anti-Treaty IRA was largely beset by internal challenges, rivalries and a lack of coherent approach to the conflict. A long discursive transcript of these issues was provided by Ernie O'Malley on the subject of the anti-Treaty GHQs based at the Four Courts.[74] The pro-Treaty process of duplication appears to have been made simpler by the decision to create new divisions when it seemed more appropriate. This was further supplemented by the broadening of district commands from the specialised corps

[74] Interview with Ernie O'Malley by Army Pension Board – Establishment of the IRA (MA/MSPC/RO/609).

to the entire military after the start of the civil war in late June 1922. These visualisations do provide an insight into how the *professionalisation* process of the military was being planned with an eye to re-organising key divisions that had become unwieldy.

Developing a 'new' army from the IRA was not a simple task and this process has been largely reduced to summaries of events. The uncertainty surrounding the decisions of specific IRA units to take a pro- or anti-Treaty position has often been accepted without comment or interrogation, in particular the decisions of divisional leadership and the often unclear views of the constituent brigades within each divisional area. This is a feature of the available primary material on this process. The development of the National Army *after* the shelling of the Four Courts and the start of the civil war is supported by a large body of primary material.

The structures of the IRA, in particular the geographic structures, are now accessible using the IRA nominal rolls and GIS tools. Despite the caveat that these spatial units are often administrative as shown by the Brigade Activity Reports recently released by the Military Archives, meaning that the structures being represented geographically are the administrative boundaries of the brigades and divisions, as shown by Eunan O'Halpin's recent essay in the *Guide to the Military Service Pensions Collection* units often operated outside of their brigade areas, so these structures are not accurate for all IRA operations carried out by a named Brigade.[75] The basic structures of brigades and, more importantly, divisions can now be parsed using GIS tools as shown in the visualisations for this chapter. The type of re-organisation that occurred within the IRA brigades as shown by the example of the Sligo Brigade were replicated in the internal pro-Treaty GHQ records of re-ordered divisions.[76] The emphasis upon organisational units such as battalions and brigades as building blocks for new administrative areas is instructive, as it provides an insight into how the military leadership were proceeding in the development of an eventual separate military organisation. The concept of a separate

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[75] For an explanation of how IRA operations often crossed between brigade and divisional areas see Eunan O'Halpin, 'The Brigade Activity Reports in context' in *Guide to the Military Service (1916-1923) Pensions Collection: The Brigade Activity Reports* (Dublin, 2018), pp 32-3.

[76] This begins with the planned changes to the First and Second Southern and later extends to the number of listed divisions in a document listing pro-Treaty IRA officers — (MA/HS/A/0859).

military that can be identified as *distinct* from the Truce period IRA can be dated from March 1922. However, this separation did not create two distinct military organisations. Command and control of the IRA was often ad-hoc and the numbers of men available for fighting were often unknown to the commanders and military leadership.

The nominal rolls present a wealth of information about the IRA structures and wider membership of each unit and local leadership. However, these are 'nominal' in the sense that it is not the true size of the units in question. It is to be expected from testimonials given in the mid 1930s about events and persons in the late 1910s and early 1920s. Unlike a census, the nominal rolls are based upon recollections that were given over a period of time about past events, hence, the creation of 'critical dates' and the ensuing confusion that this causes when attempting to parse the information gathered as much of it does not fit within these time strictures. For example, the divisions that were created in the interim period between 11 July 1921 and 1 July 1922. A surprising point that has not been highlighted in the literature on the development of the National Army was the creation of a *pro-Treaty* IRA division in the case of the Second Eastern. The role played by the Dublin Guard in securing Dublin barracks and Dublin Castle after the British withdrawal has been noted throughout the literature, often to the occlusion of other units such as the Second Eastern division. The development of a pro-Treaty division immediately after the Army Convention in March 1922 would suggest that the pro-Treaty GHQ were preparing to consolidate their position using new units if necessary. This is further emphasised in the planned reorganisation of divisions set out in the June memorandum and the eventual creation of the Fourth Southern division, which is listed on the Irish Army census in November 1922.

Chapter 2. Expansion and Mobilisation within the National Army

Initial military structures and the 'Call to Arms'

In the immediate aftermath of the attack on the Four Courts, in early July 1922, the National Army expanded, both in numerical size and structurally, in response to the outbreak of civil war. The plans of the General Staff in June for a smaller and more professionalised military would be sidelined in favour of an extensive recruitment drive and the creation of new superstructures within the military organisation.[1] The position of the Provisional Government at this juncture in the conflict remained precarious, despite their victory in Dublin city over the anti-Treaty IRA. The National Army, with its core based around the General Headquarters (GHQ), together with elements of the Second Eastern Division, First Northern, Western and Midlands Division, was now opposed by large numbers of anti-Treaty IRA personnel concentrated throughout Munster and parts of Connaught. A previously amorphous pro-Treaty IRA organisation would soon be restructured into a distinct military organisation with the issuing of General Order No. 1 on 5 July 1922. It should be noted that, prior to this order, the pro-Treaty IRA had existed in liminal space wherein the IRA, as an organisation still existed. However, there were now two GHQs and the existence of the Second Dáil Éireann, which had remained in session until June 1922, further complicated the position of the pro-Treaty IRA.[2] The issuing of this General Order set out for practical purposes a separate military organisation, which still retained the title 'Óglaigh na hÉireann', but was fundamentally different from the pre-split IRA. The legal status of the National Army would only be clarified after the sitting of the Third Dáil in September 1922, along with the passage of the Irish Free State Constitution Act, 1922.[3]

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[1] General Order No. 5, n.d. (MA/CW/OPS/01/01/02) — clearly stated that 'where possible that the old Company, Battalion etc. organisation should be clearly retained'. This fundamentally reversed the planned changes at the Company and Battalion level of the military organisation proposed in June 1922. The memorandum is extensively covered in chapter one of this thesis.

[2] For more on the Second Dáil and its political legacy in the immediate aftermath of civil war, see Tom Garvin, *1922: the birth of Irish democracy* (Dublin, 1996), p. 133; 176 ; 179.

[3] The passing of the Irish Free State Constitution Act, 1922 placed the National Army on a constitutional basis in as far as the establishment of a Free State military is mentioned in the Anglo-Irish treaty, included as part of the constitutional act. Article 46 of the constitution act being considered the constitutional basis of the National Army and later the Defence Forces. — 1922/1 [I.F.S.] (5 Dec. 1922) ; 1923/30 [I.F.S.] (3 Aug. 1923).

General Order No. 1 established a new layer of military bureaucracy: command districts, which are analogous to military districts and were to function as such during the civil war, with specific General Officer Commanding (GOCs) having substantial independence as to how these areas operated.[4] The issuing of this order formally moved the military structure away from the smaller battalion-centred organisation as set out in the 'Suggested Regular Army Strength' memorandum in June 1922. After the subsequent reorganisations of the military in 1923 and 1924, the eventual structure of the military largely reflected the June 1922 memorandum, in particular, the removal of brigades and non-adoption of regiments, instead focusing on battalions as the main unit structure for the Defence Forces.[5] Under General Order No. 1,[6] the military was restructured into three district commands: Eastern, Western and Southern. Each command encompassed a number of divisions and brigades (Table 2.1).

Table 2.1. District Commands and dependent brigades and divisions – General Order No. 1[7]

Eastern District Command	Western District Command	Southern District Command
2nd Northern Division	1st Northern Division	1st Southern Division
3rd Northern Division	2nd Western Division	2nd Southern Division
4th Northern Division	3rd Western Division	3rd Southern Division
5th Northern Division	4th Western Division	1st Western Division
1st Eastern Division		
2nd Eastern Division		
Carlow Brigade		
North Wexford Brigade		
South Wexford Brigade		

[4] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, p. 61.

[5] David Murphy, *Irish brigades, 1685-2006: a gazetteer of Irish military service, past and present* (Dublin, 2005), pp 274-6.

[6] Note: The re-ordering of the General Orders was a telling change from the previous IRA general orders issued in the period 1919-1921.

[7] General Order No. 1, 5 July 1922 (MA/CW/OPS/01/01/02).

Each of these command districts were assigned a GOC on the same date, 5 July 1922: Eoin O'Duffy (Eastern), J.J. 'Ginger' O'Connell (Southern) and Sean Mac Eoin (Western). It is clear from this general order that these structures were largely administrative, as shown by the placement of the Northern Divisions within the Eastern District Command. The Northern Divisions based in Northern Ireland (Second, Third and Fourth) were engaged in active operations against the Unionist government; therefore it is unclear to what extent Eoin O'Duffy was able to command operations in a separate jurisdiction. Although the Northern Divisions were still supported by the National Army during this period, this would end after Collins's assassination in August 1922. The absence of the Sean Mac Eoin's Midlands Division indicates either a transition away from this divisional structure or an administrative oversight. In a similar vein, the absence of the Third Eastern Division but the listing of its constituent brigades may indicate that there were issues with the leadership of this division vis-à-vis the divisional commander's position regarding the Anglo-Irish treaty. In addition to divisions and brigades, the specialised corps established in May 1922 were absent from this order. As these corps had a separate district organisation, it is unclear how these systems were to interact in the subsequent months of the civil war. This meant that the National Army at the outset of the civil war was bifurcated by two overlapping organisational structures: a divisional command structure and a corps district structure. However, it was clear that the divisional command structure was given precedence, as shown by a memo issued by the Minister for Defence to the Adjutant General outlining a twice-daily report on the military situation that would be delivered to the Provisional Government on the following topics: successful operations, unsuccessful operations, notes on disturbed areas and indications of disturbed areas. Each report would deal with each command area in the order they were listed in General Order No. 1.[8]

Concurrent with the military restructuring of the pro-Treaty forces into the National Army, the Provisional Government on 3 July gave its assent at Cabinet level to a significant increase in the total size of the military.[9] This increase is referred to as the

[8] Memo to Adjutant General from Minister for Defence, 5 July 1922 (MA/CW/OPS/01/01/03).

[9] Long, 'Organisation and development of the pro-Treaty forces' , p. 311.

'Volunteer/Voluntary Levy' in military correspondence.[10] This levy was initially for 20,000 men to be recruited on short term, typically six-month contracts and were known formally as the Volunteer Reserve.[11] The public proclamation by the Provisional Government was published in national and regional newspapers between 7–8 July. Earlier studies of this period make limited references to this proclamation and focus upon the overall aim, which was to publicly call for recruitment in the military.[12] Upon examining the actual text, it is clear there are a number of nuanced positions being promulgated:

> MEN OF IRELAND. The valour and patriotism of our National Army has broken the conspiracy to override the will of the nation and subject the people to a despotism based on brigandage and ruthlessly regardless of the peoples inalienable right to life, liberty, and security. The spontaneous and eager offers of Army service made by the citizens last week were declined by the Government because it was confident of the ability of the Army single-handed to meet and defeat any attacks made upon it in the way of open warfare, and it desired to teach the caluminators of the Army that needed lesson. The Army proved itself equal to its great task, and is justly honoured as the defender of the people. Events have shown, however, that, while the present active strength of the Army has been sufficient to deal adequately with the recent situation, there is a possibility of continued sporadic action which makes an increase in the Army establishment vitally necessary. The Government have, therefore, issued instructions to the General Headquarters Staff of the Volunteer organisation to place its entire establishment on an active service basis. The Headquarters Staff is directing the officers commanding the local units to appeal to all members to accept service for six months. All other citizens who desire to join the national ranks will also be recruited through the Irish Volunteer organisation. Application for service should be made through the local Volunteer commander.[13]

This proclamation was the second public address from the Provisional Government to the general populace since the outbreak of fighting at the Four Courts on 28 June

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[10] This is particularly evident in the attestation form for the Voluntary Levy — Form V.R. 1 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/50).

[11] These attestation forms contain a declaration that the subject is joining the Volunteer Reserve for a time limited period — Form V.R. 2 ; Form V.R. 4 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/50). Subsequently, the term 'Curragh Reserve' is used a shorthand.

[12] Valiulis characterised the proclamation as a 'call to arms in the guise of victory statement' — Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, p. 159.

[13] *Irish Times,* 8 July 1922. — Note this proclamation was also published in the *Irish Independent, Freeman's Journal, Connaught Tribune* and other regional newspapers.

1922.[14] As this was published two weeks later on 8 July, the Provisional Government utilised this announcement to set out a number of objectives, beyond the obvious call for additional recruitment. These can be characterised as a delegitimisation of *military* opposition to the Anglo-Irish treaty, as demonstrated by the reference to a 'conspiracy to override the will of the nation',[15] emphasising that the National Army forces were capable of defending the government, without the assistance of the British military. The simultaneous appeal for men to join the military, while downplaying the type of service and conflict that lay ahead, underlines the relatively precarious position of the Provisional Government.

While these objectives make sense as a means of boosting morale, in reality the National Army had suffered relatively high casualties during the attack on the Four Courts and many of the troops available were largely untrained and lacked experience.[16] British aid in the form of heavy artillery was essential in defeating the Four Courts garrison and additional recruits would be needed for an extensive campaign across veteran anti-Treaty IRA units across the country.[17] The difference between public statements and reality of the civil war would persist throughout the conflict, often to the embarrassment of government figures when confronted in Dáil Éireann debates with contradictory evidence.[18] This was further exacerbated by the extensive censorship that was implemented by the government that strictly controlled that type of news coverage that was reported in newspapers.[19] The position of the Provisional Government in the immediate aftermath of the attack on the Four Courts is best summed up by Hopkinson

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[14] The first address was a proclamation thanking the troops for the 'courage, forbearance and faithful devotion to duty' shown to the Provisional Government — *Irish Independent*, 1 July 1922.

[15] *Irish Times,* 8 July 1922.

[16] Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, p. 156.

[17] The British Cabinet loaned heavy artillery and ammunition for the shelling of the Four Courts. They also offered more effective weaponry which was not accepted by the Provisional Government after the largely ineffectual initial bombardment of the Four Courts. — Hopkinson, *Green against green*, p. 120.

[18] Kevin O'Higgins in particular is an example of this, publicly defensive of the military during the civil war but privately extremely critical and long-term a substantial influence on the reduction of the Army generally — O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, pp 29-30.

[19] See Kevin Hora, 'Official propaganda in the Irish Free State' (Ph.D thesis, Trinity College Dublin, 2011), pp 159-164 — for an overview of how National Army propaganda and censorship operated during the civil war.

in his overview of the military situation for both the pro- and anti-Treaty factions of the IRA:

> For the first weeks of the war, the anti-Treaty side had an advantage in numbers outside Dublin and were much better armed than they had been during the Anglo-Irish War. A Provisional Government source at the time estimated Republican IRA numbers as 12,900, with 6,780 rifles. As men were not attested and as it was extremely difficult to differentiate between active and purely nominal membership, these figures must be treated with extreme caution.[20]

Notwithstanding the necessary scepticism of any troop totals estimated during this period, it was clear that the Provisional Government faced a real and credible threat from a sizeable armed organisation across the country. Hopkinson further highlights the geographic weaknesses of the pro-Treaty position in general:

> The number of Provisional Government troops at the beginning of the conflict is also uncertain: while 9,700 were said to have taken the oath to the government at the time of the Four Courts attack, General Sean MacMahon, the Adjutant-General, thought their numbers amounted to approximately 8,000. Provisional Government units were heavily concentrated in Dublin; they were ill-equipped to carry the war to the provinces and large areas of the country had few, if any, pro-Treaty forces.[21]

This situation highlighted the need for an additional 20,000 soldiers, as calculated under the Volunteer Levy. The levy was calculated estimating the total number of men aged 18–35 within each county of the Irish Free State and setting a quota of how many would be recruited per area. The Volunteer Levy appears to have been designed to proportionally represent approximately sixteen percent of the male population of every county aged between 18–30. Two exceptions being Leitrim and Mayo: Leitrim being assigned a quota of twenty-four percent and Mayo being assigned sixty-five percent (Table 2.2).

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[20] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, p. 127.

[21] Ibid, p. 127.

Table 2.2 Volunteer Levy – Estimates per County[22]

COUNTY	Approx. MALES Between 18-30	Approx. Number of levy.	Percentage
Donegal.	7,000	1,100	16%
Monaghan.	3,000	500	17%
Cavan.	4,000	600	15%
Longford.	2,000	300	15%
Westmeath.	2,500	400	16%
Meath.	2,500	400	16%
Louth.	2,500	400	16%
Dublin.	6,000	1,000	17%
Kildare.	5,000	500	10%
Offaly.	2,000	200	10%
Leix.	2,000	200	10%
Wicklow.	2,500	400	16%
Wexford.	4,000	600	15%
Carlow.	1,500	250	17%
Kilkenny.	5,000	500	10%
Tipperary.	6,000	1,000	17%
Waterford.	5,500	600	11%
Cork.	16,000	2,600	16%
Kerry.	6,500	1,100	17%
Limerick.	6,000	1,000	17%
Clare.	4,500	700	16%
Galway.	7,500	1,200	16%
Mayo.	2,000	1,300	65%
Sligo.	2,500	400	16%
Leitrim	2,500	600	24%
Roscommon.	4,000	600	15%

[22] Country Outline of Volunteer Levy, n.d. (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/50). — Note the total listed for the levy is incorrect, the total should be 18,450, it is likely this is a typo. The original county listings and separation of Dublin city have been retained from the original document. The percentage column has been added to give a proportional aspect to the numerical totals.

COUNTY	Approx. MALES Between 18-30	Approx. Number of levy.	Percentage
TOTALS	114,500	18,400	16%
Dublin City.	12,000	2,000	17%

As the Mayo quota is not explained in any of the records about the Volunteer Levy, it is highly unlikely that this quota was ever going to be achieved as the Mayo based IRA brigades took a largely anti-Treaty position.[23] It is unclear how the National Army intended to recruit within anti-Treaty areas such as Cork, Kerry and Mayo in early July, when the National Army organisation in those areas was weak and largely ineffective. The absence of recruitment quotas for the six counties of Northern Ireland is also telling, it would appear that the reality of partition was being acknowledged for the purposes of recruitment early on.[24] Despite this, substantive numbers of men were recruited from the six counties, collectively, throughout the period July – November 1922.

As part of the plans for the Volunteer Levy, a list of 'concentration' points were outlined across Free State territory. This may have been simply references to specific barracks/ posts wherein recruits were organised or these may have, alternatively, functioned as larger catchment areas as shown by Points 1–4:

[23] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, pp 58-9 ; 159.

[24] Note: The later recruitment of men from the Northern Divisions of the IRA is largely a result of the failure of the campaign against the Unionist government, this is outlined in a memorandum from the O/C of the Third Northern Division to the Chief of Staff — Letter from Seamus Woods, O/C Third Northern Division to Chief of Staff, 28 July 1922 ; Memorandum from O/C Third Northern Division, 27 July 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/1).

Concentration Points[25]

1. Gormanstown. Co. Dublin
   Meath & (Westmeath R.)
   Louth
   Monaghan
2. Curragh. Kildare
   Wicklow
   Leix
   Offaly
   N. Tipperary.
3. Finner.
   Donegal – Sligo – Leitrim – Mayo.
4. Kilkenny.
   South Tipperary. Kilkenny. Wexford. Carlow. Waterford.
5. Dublin.
6. Athlone.
   Cavan. Longford. Athlone. (Westmeath)
7. Limerick.
   Galway. Clare. Limerick.
8. Mullingar
9. Birr
10. Dundalk
11. Collinstown
12. Baldonnell
13. Templemore
14. Renmore

The first seven points collectively covered a considerable catchment area: twenty-three counties are represented, only Cork, Kerry and Roscommon are not listed. The omission of these counties accurately reflects the difficulties in National Army recruitment within the territories of the First Southern Division (Cork and Kerry) and Third Western Division of the IRA (Sligo/Roscommon/East Mayo).

The broader question of the composition of the National Army, both geographic and ideological, is one that has dominated any discussion of National Army recruitment, in the context of the very limited body of scholarship where this topic has been discussed. Long in his article outlining the development of the pro-Treaty forces during 1922, attempts to differentiate between different types of soldiers within the National Army

[25] Concentration Points (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/50). — Note the first seven of these points are typed and the later seven are handwritten, it is possible that these were included later as the recruits increased as they overlap with the original typed seven. e.g. Points 1 and 6 overlap with Point 8 (Mullingar).

after the introduction of the Volunteer Levy. Long divides the internal composition of the National Army into three categories: 'the regular army, *Truce volunteers* and the new Reserve'.[26] There are issues with this characterisation, beginning with the distinction between 'regulars' and 'Truce volunteers'. There are no distinct definitions for each of these terms and it is clear from military correspondence that only two of these groups were recognised within the military: regulars and reserves. There is no record of a firm distinction being made between 'truce' volunteers, i.e. those who joined after 11 July 1921 and regulars; instead the military distinguishes between service pre- and post-28 June 1922. All men in service prior to this date are considered 'regulars' and all others are 'reserves'.[27] In addition to the aforementioned categories, Long's article focuses upon the role of ex-British Army servicemen and how they were recruited into the National Army. As with other accounts of this subject, there is a degree of overstatement as to the role of military trainers within the larger question of ex-servicemen recruitment.[28] The emphasis upon ex-servicemen has obscured the large number of enlistments from within the wider civilian population and how recruitment occurred within IRA divisional and brigade areas. Although civilian recruits were accepted, the original emphasis for IRA commandants to recruit locally shows that the recruitment was restricted in part, as shown the following extract from a circular sent by then Chief of Staff, Eoin O'Duffy on 5 July:

> In view of the fact that the strength of the Army on Active Service is not considered adequate to deal with the present critical state of the Country, it has been decided to give you authority to increase the strength of your Brigade to _____. If you find that it is not possible to obtain the required number of men from amongst Volunteers not already on active service, you can use your discretion and enroll Irishmen whose National outlook corresponds with that of the remainder of your Unit.[29]

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[26] Long, 'Organisation and development of the pro-Treaty forces', p. 311. — emphasis from original.

[27] Draft Circular, Volunteer Reserve (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/50) — this document is a part explanation of an earlier request for information regarding the composition of IRA units and more importantly sets out the parameters of the Volunteer Reserve for senior military commanders. Unfortunately no list of receivers was found, so it unclear which officers received this letter, but from the content, divisional and brigade commandants are the most likely recipients.

[28] A good example of this is the literal interpretation of exchanges in a Dáil Éireann debate regarding the number of ex-British servicemen serving in the National Army utilised by Paul Taylor in his recent monograph — *Heroes or traitors?*, p. 15, fn. 65. — This is further explored in chapter four on ex-servicemen in the National Army.

[29] Letter from Chief of Staff Eoin O'Duffy to Brigade Commandants, 5 July 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/50).

An example of the problems caused by a lack of clarity around the nature of localised recruiting was illustrated in a notice placed in the *Freeman's Journal* on 13 July, concerning Volunteer Reservists:

> On completion of a short period of Training Volunteer Reservists will return to the Brigade Area or elsewhere as the circumstances may require and remain on active service footing until the completion of their Six Months' term of service. They will then return to their civilian occupations, being allowed to retain their Uniform, Arms and Kit.[30]

The main issue raised by the Provisional Government with this notice was the suggestion that upon returning civilian life, members of the Volunteer Reserve would be entitled to retain arms, a proposal that the government wanted withdrawn.[31] The officer responsible for this notice, Brigadier Neil McNeill commander of the Second Brigade, Second Eastern Division, stated that he issued the order under the mistaken impression that his commanding officer Comdt. General Tom Ennis had given a directive regarding this.[32] The response of Ennis is indicative of some of the confusion surrounding the different types of recruits being attested. In addition, Ennis had put himself into a difficult position with his superiors, after publishing military orders in the *Evening Herald* and *Irish Independent* regarding the opening hours of 'licensed premises' with the threat of closure upon the violation of this military order.[33] The letter from Ennis to McNeill, dictated via an Adjutant, is ambivalent as to whether a direct order was given:

> His [Ennis] recollection was that it was a suggestion was casually mentioned to you [McNeill] and other Officers that was meant to apply only to War Service Volunteer called up for service and not the Volunteer Reservists.[34]

It would appear that McNeill's explanation, in which he had assumed that this suggestion from Ennis was in fact an order, appeared to have been accepted.[35] Collins in

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[30] *Freeman's Journal*, 13 July 1922.

[31] C3. Letter from Acting Chairman of the Provisional Government to Commander in Chief, 25 July 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/8).

[32] Letter to Maj. General Dalton from Brig. McNeill, 2 August 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/47).

[33] *Evening Herald*, 28 July 1922.

[34] Letter from A/Col. (on behalf of Ennis) to MacNeill O/C 2nd Brigade, 2nd Eastern Division, 5 August 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/47).

[35] C. 466/3, 21 August 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/47). — Diarmuid O'Hegarty, Director of Organisation for the National Army recommends that McNeill's explanation be accepted.

a letter to Mulcahy on this subject noted that going forward a specific General Order was required to prevent a reoccurrence of such instances in future.[36] This incident highlights the extent to which the particulars of army recruitment and terms of service was often unclear to senior officers, with local divisional commandants (Ennis) making decisions without consulting military leadership (GHQ). The relatively frequent publishing of public notices in newspapers by senior officers, often outlining specific policies, without prior approval led to difficulties for both the civilian government and the higher echelons of the military leadership. This is reflected by the often unclear reporting on the early days of recruiting into the National Army in July 1922.

The process of mass mobilisation is captured by the census returns, in three distinct data attributes: the home address of the soldier, the next-of-kin home address and the place of attestation. Each of these has been tabulated by county for the purposes of analysis and facilitates an in-depth geographical analysis of recruitment distribution across the island of Ireland. In order to contextualise these results, newspaper accounts of recruitment and internal military decisions as to the structure of the National Army have been examined alongside the recruitment data for a given month. It should be noted that newspaper accounts of recruitment in July are largely based on events occurring in Dublin, this is somewhat rectified for the returns for August with some reporting on recruitment in areas that had been newly reclaimed from anti-Treaty IRA forces. However, the overall newspaper coverage is Dublin-centric, which is hardly surprising as it was the capital city, headquarters of the military and seat of the Provisional Government. It does mean that much of the coverage outside of Dublin is somewhat truncated and lacks sufficient clarity, as will be demonstrated by the examples outlined in the following section on monthly recruitment.

[36] CGS 18., 28 July 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/1).

Map 2.1 National Army recruitment in July 1922



Monthly Recruitment – Geographic patterns and structural changes

July

Recruitment into the National Army during July 1922 is the largest recorded of the five months examined, totalling 6,055. Throughout this period, 1–31 July, the military expanded significantly in size and the initial structures set out in General Order No. 1 were amended and increased. Map 2.1 outlines the July recruitment figures across the island of Ireland. Recruitment is present from the western seaboard of Ireland, despite the significant anti-Treaty presence in these counties. However, this is concentrated in counties in Connaught outside of Ulster and not in newly established 'border' counties such as Sligo, Leitrim and Fermanagh. Donegal is the sole outlier from this category wherein there is substantial recruitment, explained in part by the pro-Treaty position of the First Northern Division under Joseph Sweeney. Dublin and the eastern seaboard are largely solid areas for recruitment and this is broadly explained by the general pro-Treaty position of these areas. It is important to note that July recruitment consists of two strands: enrolment in pre-existing IRA brigades/divisions and civilian recruitment into the Volunteer Reserve. Therefore the position of IRA units on the question of the Anglo-Irish treaty is an important factor to consider when examining results of a geographical analysis. Recruitment from Belfast, County Antrim is on a par with recruitment from within the Free State territory, in particular recruiting from midlands counties such as Offaly and Laois. The remaining five counties of Northern Ireland produced few recruits in July 1922. In addition, there were no attestations within the territory of Northern Ireland during the month of July 1922. This meant that those soldiers who listed their home addresses and next-of-kin addresses from within Northern Ireland had to travel a significant distance to attest into the National Army. It is possible that a proportion of these recruits from Belfast were IRA personnel from the Second and Third Northern Divisions. However, as there has yet to be any large-scale comparative analysis of IRA personnel lists and the Irish Army census, it is difficult to ascertain specific numbers of direct transfers for the July period. In addition, there remained a small and consistent recruitment of soldiers with addresses outside Ireland,

primarily Scotland and England. The Scottish recruitment is likely transfers from the IRA brigades based in Glasgow (Table 2.3).[37]

Table 2.3. National Army recruitment outside of Ireland (July 1922)

Country	Home Address	Next of Kin Address
England	13	27
Scotland	88	96
Wales	1	2
USA	1	7
Total	103	132

As outlined in Table 2.3, the numbers of recruits with home addresses outside of Ireland is very low, 103 for July with an additional 132 soldiers listed non-Irish addresses for their next of kin. The overwhelming majority of recruitment occurred on the island of Ireland. The attestations during July are much more concentrated than the distribution of home addresses, partly due to the centralised nature of the National Army superstructure in divisional areas of known pro-Treaty support. This explains why attestations are predominately clustered in Dublin (Second Eastern), Kildare (First Eastern), Limerick (First Western), Donegal (First Northern) and Westmeath (First Eastern). As noted earlier, the concentration points for the Volunteer Reserve appear to have been largely holding areas for soldiers en route to attestation centres. Creating county totals was relatively straightforward, analysis at a more localised level is hampered by the often unclear annotations in the census, including the lack of specificity regarding cities and towns that share the same name as the county, e.g. Limerick, Dublin, Cork, Kilkenny, etc., etc. However, it is possible to compare a small example of specific recruitment posts within Dublin city against the July census returns for these specific depots using information gathered from newspaper notices and articles from July 1922. This provides some context to how the attestation process worked in practice as opposed to using the concentration points for the Volunteer Reserve as a baseline for attestation centres.

[37] There is a reference to 'steamers specially charted to convey Glasgow Irishmen to Dublin' — *Irish Independent*, 8 July 1922.

On 7 July, a small notice appeared in the *Freeman's Journal* specifying that recruitment for the Volunteer Reserve had opened at 12 noon and listed the following recruiting depots in Dublin each with a corresponding battalion reference:

> 1st Battalion – King's Inn, Henrietta Street
> 2nd Battalion – Amiens Street Station
> 3rd Battalion – 23 Great Brunswick Street (Old Recruiting Office)
> 4th Battalion – Kilmainham Police Station
> 5th Battalion – Swords Police Station[38]

A second article published on 8 July in the *Irish Independent* specified that recruitment 'in the city is confined to the city alone' and the 'comprises the Dublin Guards and Dublin Division'.[39] This article subsequently outlines how the process of 'enrolment' actually functioned in practice:

> No applicant was actually enrolled yesterday [7 July], but only particulars were taken and each applicant was informed that he would receive notice in due course whether he was enrolled or not. The following are the numbers of those interviewed at the various city centres :—
> Brunswick St. 350 Kilmainham 350
> King's Inns 200 Amien St. 400 (roughly.)
> The figures for Swords are not available.[40]

These five locations in Dublin city were not in fact recruitment centres but areas wherein the details of *prospective* soldiers were taken prior to formal recruitment processes. This is reflected in the small numbers of soldiers who were attested in Dublin that listed these five locations as places of attestation (Table 2.4):

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[38] *Freeman's Journal*, 7 July 1922.

[39] *Irish Independent*, 8 July 1922. — Note: There is no 'Dublin' Division, it is likely this is a reference to the Second Eastern Division of the National Army as this unit was based within the environs of Dublin city.

[40] Ibid.

Table 2.4 Dublin Attestations – July 1922

Recruiting Depot	No. of Recruits (July)
King's Inn	32
Amiens Street Station	2
Great Brunswick Street	11
Kilmainham	4
Swords	5
Total	54

A figure of 1,300 was listed for four of the five locations by 7 July. However, this was for expressions of interest as opposed to actual recruitment. A similar figure is outlined in a later newspaper article published in the *Irish Independent* on 20 July:

> There was yesterday [19 July] a repetition of the busy scenes associated with the opening days of recruiting for the National forces when the offices at the Municipal Buildings were again opened for applications for the Reserve… At 2 p.m. about 800 had been enrolled and the Staff was reluctantly obliged to announce that no further recruits could be accepted for the present, the number enrolled to date being far in excess of the quota asked for.[41]

The 'quota' being referred to is presumably the Volunteer Levy quota for Dublin city which was set at 2,000 (Table 2.2.). As there are rough estimates of applications given for two specific dates: 1,300 on 8 July and 800 for 19 July, a time-series analysis of recruitment for Dublin, showing the number of attestations over the month provides an interesting context to actual recruitment as opposed to expressions of interest (Table 2.5).

[41] *Irish Independent,* 20 July 1922.

Table 2.5 National Army Attestations (July)[42]

Bi-weekly Attestations	No. of Apps (Dublin)	No. of Attests (Dublin)	% of Total Attests (Dublin)	Cumulative Totals (Dublin)	No. of Attests (National)	Cumulative Totals (National)
Saturday 1 July 1922		128	16%		792	
Tuesday 4 July 1922		44	13%	172	335	1,127
Friday 7 July 1922	1,300	69	18%	241	386	1,513
Monday 10 July 1922		112	14%	353	806	2,319
Thursday 13 July 1922		309	35%	662	885	3,204
Sunday 16 July 1922		190	25%	852	746	3,950
Wednesday 19 July 1922	800	257	35%	1,109	728	4,678
Saturday 22 July 1922		62	14%	1,171	449	5,127
Tuesday 25 July 1922		62	17%	1,233	360	5,487
Friday 28 July 1922		48	14%	1,281	341	5,828
Monday 31 July 1922		26	24%	1,307	110	5,938
Total		1,307	22%		5,938	

As shown by Table 2.5, there is a substantial time delay between the number of applicants and the number of attestations. The number of applicants is listed as 1,300 on 7 July, the number of attestations by this same date is 241 in Dublin and 1,513 nationally. There is a similar pattern on 19 July: 800 applicants and 1,109 attestations in Dublin and 4,678 nationally. As the total number of attestations in Dublin (city and county) within the timeframe 1–31 July never went beyond 1,307, one possible explanation is the time lag caused by training at the Curragh Camp complex prior to formal attestation at a military barracks or post.[43] However, this figure represents sixty-five percent of the levy quota assigned to Dublin, which meant that the earlier Volunteer Levy estimates severely underestimated the numbers who would be available and willing to join the military. In general terms the attestations for July show that both the national and Dublin trend increased dramatically after the 'Call to Arms' on 7 July. The

[42] Note: As this is a time series analysis, the small number of soldiers' (117) who listed 'July' as their attestation date are not included in this table.

[43] The training regime is outlined in detail in chapter three of this thesis.

rate of attestations in Dublin reaches thirty-five percent of national recruitment twice during the period 13–19 July. Emphasising the importance of Dublin to the supply of new soldiers into the National Army. The total figure given for recruitment for July, 6,055, has been broadly supported by Hopkinson in *Green against green*:

> An appeal for recruits was immediately made at the start of the war and on 3 July permission was granted by the Provisional Government cabinet for the raising of an extra 20,000 men to serve for six months. By 17 July the strength of the army was said to be around 15,000, which implied that 5,000, at least, had joined since the Four Courts attack.[44]

The structural changes occurring within the military between 5–12 July are important in the context of the number of attestations taking place across the state. By 5 July, 1,127 men had been attested, rising to 3,204 by 12 July but mainly concentrated in pro-Treaty areas of the country, as shown in earlier visualisations of recruitment (Map 2.1). Hopkinson and Long both concur that the creation of the 'War Council' on 12 July by the Provisional Government served as the origin point of the National Army structures developed for the civil war.[45] While the War Council does set out new structures, it merely expands upon the earlier structures set out in General Order No. 1, issued on 5 July.[46] The rate of rapid mobilisation meant that the original command structure, outlined in General Order No. 1, was no longer suited to the task of managing such large cohorts of recruits joining the military, while the expansion of National Army operations into anti-Treaty areas meant that additional command areas were required in newly acquired territory. As noted by Hopkinson, the 'War Council' of Mulcahy, Collins and O'Duffy was never to meet again and the war planning remained the responsibility of the General Staff.[47] As part of the establishment of the War Council, the district commands were restructured from three to five (Table 2.6).[48]

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[44] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, p. 136.

[45] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, p. 136 ; Long, 'The organisation and development of the pro-Treaty forces', p. 313.

[46] Note: It is unclear why General Order No. 1 was overlooked, it may be that the records were unavailable to researchers prior to the re-cataloguing process within the Military Archives of Ireland.

[47] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, p. 136.

[48] Note: Paul V. Walsh in his paper delivered at NYMAS lists what he calls 'regional' commands starting with General Order No. 1 in addition to the later expanded commands with specific divisions and brigades attached.

Table 2.6 District Commands – War Council, 12 July 1922[49]

Eastern Command	Western Command	Curragh Command	South-Western Command	South-Eastern Command
4th Northern Division	2nd Western Division	3rd Southern Division	Clare	Kilkenny
5th Northern Division	3rd Western Division		Limerick	Waterford
1st Eastern Division	4th Western Division		Kerry	South Tipperary
2nd Eastern Division			Cork	Mid-Tipperary
Carlow Brigade				
North Wexford Brigade				
South Wexford Brigade				

Each of these five commands were assigned to the following officers: Emmet Dalton (Eastern), Sean McKeon (Western), Eoin O'Duffy (South-Western), John T. Prout (South-Eastern) and J.J. 'Ginger' O'Connell (Curragh).[50] Hopkinson provides a general overview of the distribution of divisions within the new commands. However, there is a certain ambiguity regarding the South-Eastern and South-Western Commands, as it would appear that he may be referring to counties for the South-Western Command and IRA brigades for the South-Eastern Command. In this iteration of command structures, IRA divisions and units within Northern Ireland are removed from the National Army, with the exception of the Fourth and Fifth Northern which both had a significant presence within the Free State territory. Not listed in this military reorganisation is the First Northern Division and Midlands Division. The Curragh Command now encompassed the territory of the old Third Southern Division of the IRA, in addition to the Curragh complex: a series of barracks based in county Kildare that was designated as the main centre for the training of reserves for the National Army. Subsequent expansions of the National Army commands can be ascertained from the agendas of the General Staff meetings, these meetings were held regularly from 20 July onwards as shown by the agendas which can be found in the Mulcahy Papers.[51] Regarding the format of each agenda, these are typically a page in length and are divided into

[49] This table contains information from Hopkinson, *Green against green*, p. 136.

[50] Ibid.

[51] The minutes of these meetings are unfortunately not available, handwritten notes appear on each agenda and often subsequent agendas refer to previous meetings giving a *précis* of what was discussed during these meetings.

numbered items, with the first four remaining constant across all the agendas available from July – August:

1. Military Situation
2. Commands
3. Adjutant General's Department
4. Quartermaster General's Department (QMG)

The QMG's department, as was noted in chapter one, was the department in charge of a number of newly established corps set out in the 27 May order which was published in *An t-Óglách*.[52] Prisoners and Medical Services were under the administration of the Adjutant General's department during this period, as shown by the agendas of the General Staff.[53] Starting on 20 July 1922, the number of commands increased to six: Eastern, South-Western, First Northern, Western, Second Southern and Curragh.[54] The addition of the First Northern to a full command is indicative of the importance of First Northern Division, under Joseph Sweeney, as one of the few pro-Treaty units based in the North-West of the Free State. The South-Eastern Command appears to be referred to as the Second Southern within the General Staff. It is unclear why there are two names for this command, but usage of Second Southern refers to the overlap between this new National Army command area and the previous IRA divisional area. In a subsequent General Staff meeting, held on 25 July, the list of commands remains at six. The Curragh Command has two points attached for discussion: "Alteration of 3rd Southern Area" and "Question of Curragh itself".[55]

The queries surrounding the Curragh appears to have been resolved by 2 August, when a new Third Southern Command is mentioned as being rearranged during the minutes of the General Staff meeting on this date.[56] This agenda also mentions that J. J. O'Connell has moved on from command of the Curragh Command.[57] On 9 August, the Curragh

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[52] *An t-Óglách* 27 May 1921.

[53] Agenda, Meeting of the General Staff, 4pm, 20 July 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/40).

[54] Ibid.

[55] Agenda, Meeting of the General Staff, noon, 25 July 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/40).

[56] Agenda, Meeting of the General Staff, 6pm, 2 Aug 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/40).

[57] Ibid.

Command was no longer listed and was replaced by the Third Southern Command.[58] This reflects the position of the Curragh complex as a recruiting area, as opposed to an active combat area and it would appear that the parts of the Curragh Command that were part of the old IRA Third Southern division were duplicated in the National Army Third Southern Command area. Two additional items listed on the agenda for the General Staff meeting of 9 August are the proposed readjustment of the South-Western Command area and the organisation of the Commands within the Quartermaster General's department.[59] The first was a logical decision, as the South-Western Command had expanded in tandem with National Army expansion across large parts of Munster, while the second would appear to refer to the QMG command areas which, as noted earlier, were often quite different and overlapped with the infantry command areas. As per QMG's department Regulation No. 45, the previously established districts for the specialised corps under the QMG's department remained constant from their creation in May during the entire period of July – August 1922, with the exception of the Northern District which appears to have been depreciated.[60]

[58] Agenda, Meeting of the General Staff, 6pm, 9 Aug 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/40).

[59] Ibid.

[60] Regulation No. 45, Quartermaster General's Department, 15 Aug 1922 (MA/CW/OPS/01/01/01).

Map 2.2 National Army recruitment in August 1922



August Recruitment

The total number of soldiers recruited during August 1922 was 4,811. A slight reduction from the July figure, but still a substantial increase in the total size of the military. The geographic backgrounds and attestations of the August recruits are outlined in Map 2.2. The most striking difference in the recruitment patterns from July to August is the increase in recruits coming from Cork and other areas in Munster. The reduction in numbers from the midlands and Eastern seaboard may indicate that the initial wave of recruitment from these areas had slowed by August. One possible reason for this may have been the increasing military casualties during this time period, a further analysis examining the military casualty rate in conjunction with recruitment is outlined in a later chapter. Irrespective of this, the overall pattern of recruitment had significantly shifted geographically. Recruitment from Northern Ireland was low, with the exception of county Tyrone which appears to have had a spike in recruitment. Similar to the previous increase in Belfast in July, this may be indicative of IRA personnel leaving the Tyrone brigade of the IRA to join the National Army, although this is difficult to verify exactly, there are reports that men from Northern-based units were being trained to some degree at the Curragh Camp during August 1922. In contrast to July, where there were no attestations in Northern Ireland, there were small numbers recorded in August. This means that small numbers of soldiers were reporting that they joined the National Army while in Northern Ireland. This raises questions about the jurisdiction of the National Army, while being technically restricted to, the territory of the Irish Free State, the initial structures of the National Army did encompass Northern IRA divisions based in the jurisdiction of Northern Ireland. The military leadership appears to have been wary of allowing the 'six county' units to mingle with the other Reservists in the Curragh, as shown by the decision to house the men 'at Hare Camp, which is on the extreme Western side of the Curragh'.[61] This policy of separation would eventually end after Collins's assassination in late August. Many of those northern recruits in training joined the National Army or were arrested, either by the B Specials in Northern Ireland or the National Army authorities in the Free State for taking the anti-Treaty position. A staff memorandum, dated 31 August, clearly sets out the change in policy subsequent to Collins death on 22 August:

[61] CGS 28., 4 August 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/1).

> No man should be taken on in the Army from the Six-County area except through the proper channels which have been arranged, namely, through the O/C's commanding the Northern Divisions.[62]

There are further references within the same memorandum to 'civil' appointments and that these were only undertaken while referring to the 'divisional commandants'. This is likely in reference to civil posts within the military and possibly the Civic Guards, meaning that prior to this memorandum it is likely that much of the recruitment between July-August contained a proportion of soldiers who had attested without prior approval from the Northern divisional commandants.

The rate of recruitment from outside of Ireland in August remained largely concentrated in England and Scotland (Table 2.7). Crucially the overall rate of non-Irish enlistment fell from 103 to 56 between July-August, as measured by the home addresses of the recruits. The next-of-kin addresses remained higher, but a similar reduction is apparent, from 132 to 88.

Table 2.7 National Army recruitment outside of Ireland (August 1922)

Country	Home Address	Next of Kin Address
Australia	0	1
Canada	0	1
England	28	39
Scotland	26	32
Turkey	0	1
Wales	1	1
USA	1	13
Total	56	88

The attestations of the August recruits are concentrated within Dublin, Kildare, Cork, Limerick and Donegal, broadly similar to July with the exception of the large increase in Cork recruitment, albeit from a very low baseline. Dublin and Kildare were becoming

[62] Miscellaneous Staff Memo. No. 3, 31 Aug. 1922 (MA/CW/OPS/01/03).

more dominant due to the number of military installations in Dublin city and the Curragh Camp complex in Kildare. The large increase in recruitment is examined, in detail, using a time-series analysis, focusing upon recruitment in Cork (city and county) and comparing it to the national recruitment figures for August (Table 2.8).[63]

Table 2.8 Bi-Weekly Attestations – Cork and National (August 1922)

Bi-weekly Attestations	No. of Attests (Cork)	Cork Recruits as a % of total Aug recruits	Cumulative Totals (Cork)	No. of Attests (National)	Cumulative Totals (National)
Tuesday 1 August 1922	144	17%		861	
Friday 4 August 1922	5	1%	149	750	1,611
Monday 7 August 1922	203	34%	352	591	2,202
Thursday 10 August 1922	121	26%	473	458	2,660
Sunday 13 August 1922	88	19%	561	455	3,115
Wednesday 16 August 1922	132	32%	693	408	3,523
Saturday 19 August 1922	142	43%	835	334	3,857
Tuesday 22 August 1922	82	27%	917	302	4,159
Friday 25 August 1922	68	23%	985	291	4,450
Monday 28 August 1922	26	12%	1,011	223	4,673
Thursday 31 August 1922	3	6%	1,014	54	4,727
Total	1,014	21%		4,727	

Unlike recruitment in Dublin city, the newspaper records provide limited information as to specific recruitment depots and places of attestation in Cork. However, an intelligence report from 19 July provides some interesting insights into the perceived weaknesses of the anti-treaty position in Cork city. In this report, there are two references to potential recruits: the first refers to the possibility of ambiguous anti-Treaty support amongst the 'fighting men':

[63] Note: Similar to issues with separating Dublin city and county totals, the attestations forms rarely make a clear distinction between city and county, it is clear when smaller towns and urban centres are listed in county Cork but city based locations are more complicated. Therefore, a generalised city and county total is utilised.

> There are many with them [anti-Treaty IRA] who will fight only half-heartedly; with such men it is a case of "bread and butter". Many of these would have joined the National Army had they the opportunity to do so.[64]

The second are references made to 'ex-servicemen' wishing to fight the 'Irregulars'.[65] It is not known whether any of these persons joined the National Army after the evacuation of Cork city by the anti-Treaty forces, but there were those living within the city who were sympathetic to the pro-Treatyites and awaiting the arrival of the National Army. The subject of ex-servicemen within the National Army was raised by the anti-Treaty *Cork Examiner* in an article published on 7 August, a few days prior to the seaborne landings at Cork:

> The Free State recruiting authorities are enlisting British soldiers in large numbers. From a reliable source it is learnt that Belfast refugees who have joined the Free State Army are showing a marked bitterness to the Irish Republican prisoners.[66]

This reveals an interesting view of recruitment from the anti-Treaty perspective on the influx of both ex-British servicemen and Belfast 'refugees'. The reference to marked bitterness may be veiled references to ill-treatment towards anti-Treaty IRA prisoners within the internment camps.[67] However, the emphasis upon Belfast and those from the new state of Northern Ireland show an awareness that recruitment was occurring on an all-island basis and this is reflected in the August recruitment totals, albeit in Tyrone rather than Belfast. The *Cork Examiner* being an anti-Treaty publication was largely publishing propaganda style articles attacking the new Free State. Unfortunately, once the National Army had entered Cork, the printing presses for both the *Cork Examiner* and *Cork Echo* were damaged by departing anti-Treaty forces.[68] As a consequence, for contemporary accounts of activities in Cork city we are reliant upon correspondents from Britain and other areas of Ireland. Despite this, comparisons of key dates show

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[64] Report on situation in Cork by M. O'Connell, 19 July 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/40). — emphasis retained from the original.

[65] Ibid.

[66] *Cork Examiner*, 7 Aug. 1922. — Note: This article has a small preamble which states: 'Passed by the Censor.' It is important to note that press censorship was not applied solely by the pro-Treaty forces.

[67] There are multiple accounts of IRA prisoners being ill-treated by Free State forces both civilian and military — O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, pp 12-4.

[68] *Irish Examiner*, 3 Mar. 2019. — This lists the number of times that the *Examiner* was unable to get to print: 1972 and 1922.

that the increase in attestations in Cork is very closely correlated to the initial sea landings at Passage West on 8 August and the subsequent push into the major urban centres in county Cork.[69] Between 7–16 August, over 500 men were attested into the National Army from Cork. By 19 August, attestations in Cork were forty-six percent of the total recruited nationally (Table 2.8). In addition to Cork, there were also substantial increases in recruitment along the Western coastline, particularly in Galway and Mayo (Map 2.2).

An t-Óglach provides some insights, albeit in a highly partisan manner, into the general situation across the country, beginning, with a report of a 'spontaneous Volunteer Civilian Guard' formed by locals in county Mayo which had requested 'arms'.[70] Although the forming of this 'guard' or militia, appears to have occurred sometime after the anti-Treaty withdrawal due to the successful sea landings at Westport,[71] the arming of civilian militias appears to have been an odd *volte-face*, as the concept of arming ex-Reservists upon completion of military service had led to a lengthy internal investigation within the military in July 1922. As the article published on 5 August in *An t-Óglach*, concluded with a call for a replication of the Mayo 'militia',[72] it is possible that some elements of these local groups were later recruited into the National Army after the anti-Treaty forces retreated from urban centres across parts of Connaught and Munster.[73] The pro-Treaty *Limerick War News*, published by the military authorities based in the South-Western Command at Limerick city, provides a more detailed account of events occurring within Munster, while also reflecting upon the national position of the military. In an issue published on 2 August, a list of counties and the position of the National Army within each is outlined:

> At present the National Forces are supreme in the whole of the twelve counties of Leinster, in Monaghan and Cavan and in Roscommon, Leitrim and Clare.

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[69] B.T. Murphy, 'The government policy of executions during the Irish civil war, 1922 - 23' (Ph.D thesis, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, 2010), p. 57.

[70] *An t-Óglách*, 5 Aug. 1922.

[71] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, p. 160-1.

[72] *Tuam Herald*, 12 Aug. 1922 — there is an explicit call to arms for men to join the military in an article published on 12 August, in addition there is a proposal to form a 'defence force for the policing of their district'. This may be a response to the earlier article in *An t-Óglách*.

[73] *An t-Óglách*, 5 Aug. 1922.

> They have still opposition to deal with in Donegal and Sligo; and some harder work in Galway, Limerick and Tipperary while Waterford, Cork, Kerry and Mayo are in subjection to the irregulars.[74]

Although the 'supremacy' of the National Army can be questioned in many of the counties cited, this is likely referring to the removal of anti-Treaty IRA occupations from specific posts and barracks. Throughout the issues of the *Limerick War News* there are numerous references to sniping within the city, long after the withdrawal of the anti-Treaty forces from barracks in Limerick.[75] This removal of fixed positions of anti-Treaty forces often led these forces to resort to more informal methods of warfare such as ambushes and sniping attacks. Therefore, any declaration of 'supremacy' should be viewed solely within the context of the occupation of specific barracks and posts. The same logic applies to counties in 'subjection' to the 'Irregulars', as is outlined in the *Limerick War News* immediately after the listing of counties and their disposition:

> The term "subjection" is used advisedly, for in these counties the people are overwhelmingly in favour of the Treaty and the irregulars rule there by no other authority than that of armed force. The election results showed this clearly.[76]

This question of recruitment within pro- and anti-Treaty electoral areas is examined in a later section of this chapter. However, it is important to note that the results of the June general election were utilised as part of the official propaganda of the Free State against the anti-Treaty IRA. In tandem with increased recruitment, the large swathes of territory now under the control of the National Army meant that the command structure needed to be amended to accommodate this. One of the largest command districts was the South-Western Command, which encompassed a large proportion of Munster and after the successful seaborne landings, was too large to manage within one command structure. Mulcahy, in his new role as Commander in Chief, outlined in a staff note to Eoin O'Duffy, GOC of the South-Western Command, a plan to divide the command area into two sections: Limerick and Cork on 31 August 1922.[77] The result of this was that the number of commands increased from five to eight. However, the exact timing of

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[74] *Limerick War News*, 2 Aug. 1922.

[75] This is shown in the issue from July immediately after the final anti-Treaty forces were removed from Limerick city — *Limerick War News*, 21 July 1922.

[76] *Limerick War News*, 2 Aug. 1922.

[77] Miscellaneous Staff Memo. No. 2, 31 Aug. 1922 (MA/CW/OPS/01/01/03).

this change is difficult to ascertain, it can be assumed that this command district change occurred prior to the holding of the census as these eight commands are listed. There are no listed changes to the command structures for September-November, as the next iteration of changes at the command level occurred between December 1922 and February 1923.[78]

[78] Long, 'Organisation and development of the pro-Treaty forces', pp 316-7.

Map 2.3 National Army recruitment in September 1922



Map 2.4 National Army recruitment in October 1922



Map 2.5 National Army recruitment in November 1922



September – November Recruitment

Recruitment between September – October remained roughly the same, at just over 3,000 recruits per month. November recruitment is truncated due to the holding of the census on 12 November. Despite this 899 persons are listed as having been attested during November. The discourse on the civil war tends to view the period after August 1922 as the beginning of the guerrilla or 'unconventional' stage of the conflict and corresponding increase in extrajudicial activities such as targeted assassinations of Free State government officials and the retaliatory execution policy of the Provisional Government.[79] Although the National Army was theoretically in control of most of the territory of the Free State, this is only true when the focus is upon the garrisoning of barracks and posts across the state.[80] Significant numbers of anti-Treaty personnel were still active across much of the state and capable of causing significant damage to both state infrastructure and the reputation of the new state.[81] The distinction between 'conventional' and 'guerrilla' stages of the civil war place a significant degree of agency upon an amorphous and localised anti-Treaty IRA structure and implies that this movement was capable of making a clear decision to abandon 'conventional' tactics. There is evidence in certain areas of the country during the July-August period that 'conventional tactics' were never applied and guerrilla tactics, such as small-scale ambushes, assassinations and raids were mainly utilised. The local particularism of anti-Treaty IRA units often determined the tactics deployed, in addition to the uneven distribution of heavy weapons, armoured vehicles and ammunition amongst different anti-Treaty areas.[82] Therefore, the recruitment during the period of September-

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[79] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, p. 172 — Hopkinson is vague as to what dates constitute the beginning of the 'guerrilla phase', but places this somewhere between 22 August and the first week of September.

[80] Note: By early September 1922, the National Army was in control of the majority of barracks across the state. This is listed in detail in a series of minute sheets compiled as part of a report on which faction controlled barracks and posts across the state — List of barracks, posts and villages occupied by Anti-State Forces and later by National Army forces, 1922-3 (MA/CW/OPS/01/01/28).

[81] Valiulis emphasises the 'National' reputation issue via Mulcahy's awareness that the IRA did not need to succeed outright, but merely destabilise the new Free State sufficiently — Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, p. 173.

[82] At the opening stages of the Irish civil war, the anti-Treaty IRA collectively had a large quantity of arms, especially after the raid of the *Upnor* in Cork. However, the British government's consistent equipping of the National Army during the civil war meant that this initial advantage was eroded over time. — Hopkinson, *Green against green*, pp 73-4.

November, while smaller in scale, is not indicative of a reduction in activity across the state or a lessening in the violence caused by the conflict.

The total number of recruits for September was 3,428 a decrease of fifty percent on the peak recorded in July. The distribution of recruitment is more evenly spread across the state, however, recruitment from Leinster and Munster is still significantly higher than Connaught (Map 2.3). Recruitment from the six-counties also decreased quite rapidly from the steady levels recorded during July-August. This shows that the earlier staff memo from 31 August which called for a halt to enlistment from the six-county area was having an effect. The largest areas of recruitment by home address for September were Cork and Dublin, which is to be expected as these were the largest population centres in the new state. There is limited newspaper coverage of recruitment during September, as opposed to the relatively good coverage provided during July-August. Of note was a notice issued in the *Limerick War News* about the formation of a 'Comrades Battalion' from Limerick city.[83] This was the latest in a series of articles encouraging citizens of Limerick to join the National Army and the Fianna.[84] As the total number recruited from Limerick (city and county) was 142 for September, it is not clear if these public calls were being responded to at this stage in the civil war.[85] There is only one explicit notice for the Volunteer Reserve, a small article published on 19 September in the *Evening Herald*.[86] Unlike earlier recruitment articles, it merely reproduced the attestation form and informed readers where the relevant office was located. The editorialising which featured in the coverage of earlier recruitment in July was absent from this notice, perhaps reflecting a sense of fatigue at the length of the conflict after three months of activity. It should also be noted that, due to military censorship, there may have been an interest in reducing the numbers of men attempting to attest into the National Army, as over 10,000 are listed as having attested during July-August.

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[83] *Limerick War News*, Sept. 1922.

[84] *Limerick War News*, 31 July 1922 ; 1, 16 and 17 August 1922 — each of these issues contains a small advertisement encouraging 'boys' to join the Fianna Éireann.

[85] Note: This figure is drawn from the Irish Army census totals for September.

[86] *Evening Herald*, 19 Sept. 1922.

The number of non-Irish recruits dropped further for September, it appears that the earlier steady rate of recruitment from Scotland had tapered off and recruits with either English home addresses or next of kin in England were the majority of non-Irish addresses, 20 and 38 respectively (Table 2.9).

Table 2.9 National Army recruitment outside of Ireland (September 1922)

Country	Home Address	Next of Kin Address
England	20	38
Scotland	13	19
Wales	2	3
USA	1	2
Total	36	62

The largest county for attestations was Kildare, reflecting the number of barracks within the Curragh Camp complex. However, the imbalance between attestations in Kildare and the rest of the country also indicates that men interested in joining the National Army were being sent *en masse* to Kildare. This is particularly evident from 7–16 September, when twenty-five to thirty percent of the total attestations occurred at Kildare (Table 2.10).

Table 2.10 Bi-Weekly Attestations – Kildare and National (September 1922)

Bi-weekly Attestations	No. of Attests (Kildare)	Kildare Recruits as a % of total Sept recruits	Cumulative Totals (Kildare)	No. of Attests (National)	Cumulative Totals (National)
Friday 1 September 1922	22	8%		287	
Monday 4 September 1922	14	5%	36	308	595
Thursday 7 September 1922	137	29%	173	470	1065
Sunday 10 September 1922	96	24%	269	405	1470
Wednesday 13 September 1922	77	26%	346	294	1764
Saturday 16 September 1922	123	32%	469	379	2143
Tuesday 19 September 1922	29	13%	498	216	2359
Friday 22 September 1922	9	4%	507	235	2594
Monday 25 September 1922	95	24%	602	402	2996
Thursday 28 September 1922	141	38%	743	376	3372
Total	743	22%		3,372	

This represents a significant departure from the initial ‘concentration points’ outlined in July 1922, wherein specific areas would be utilised across the state. However, it would appear to have been inevitable once the Reserve training was established at the Curragh Camp, together with the ensuing transfers of soldiers’ for training to this facility.

The total number of recruits for October was 3,263, continuing the trend of lower attestations from September. Similar patterns are discernible in the geographic distribution within the larger population centres: Cork and Dublin provide the vast majority of recruits. Attestations were again concentrated in Kildare, further emphasising the role of the Curragh Camp complex in the recruitment process (Map 2.4). Despite the earlier freeze on recruitment from Northern Ireland, it is worth noting that there were still significant numbers being recruited from Antrim. Total recruitment from Antrim and Down was larger than the entire border region and Antrim, in particular, is on par with Tipperary and Limerick. However, the population centre of Belfast is partly an explanation for this. Recruitment outside of Ireland remained at a

low level, with only 43 persons listing non-Irish home addresses and 67 with next-of-kin addresses outside of Ireland (Table 2.11).

Table 2.11 National Army recruitment outside of Ireland (October 1922)

Country	Home Address	Next of Kin Address
Australia	0	1
England	17	30
Scotland	25	27
Wales	1	3
USA	0	6
Total	43	67

As noted earlier, there were relatively few newspaper reports on recruitment during September-October, except for the National Army publications such as the *Limerick War News*. Despite this, references to recruitment were made in passing within the discourse on the Irish civil war. Patrick Long's article on the development of the National Army, does mention that recruitment was suspended on 10 October, although, unfortunately, Long provides no reference for this claim.[87] However, if this was indeed, the case, it would appear to have been ignored as recruitment continued through the period 10 October - 12 November unabated. There is also no record of this military order being published in the newspaper archives, or any of the internal military publications: *Limerick War News* or *An t-Óglách*. However, there was some precedent for the implementation of military orders to be delayed, at times orders were followed only after repeated prompting from GHQ. An early example of this is the repeated attempts to ascertain the exact numbers of persons actively available in IRA units across the state.[88] An alternative view is that this was ignored within localised command districts and recruitment continued regardless. It is more likely that the order was implemented slowly, as attestations were concentrated in Kildare, which was under the command of General Staff officers and the commanding officer of the Curragh Camp

[87] Long, 'Organisation and development of the pro-Treaty forces', p. 316.

[88] The issue of accurate figures within pro-Treaty IRA units appear frequently in the initial months of the civil war, most notably in the correspondence between Collins, Mulcahy and regional commanders — J. Kavanagh, 'Using the digitised 'Irish Army Census' pp 398-400.

complex remained in constant contact with the Commander in Chief and Chief of the General Staff. Examining attestations for October using a time-series analysis shows that, after 10 October, attestations into the military increased nationally (Table 2.12). An example of the disconnect between GHQ and the regional command districts was the South-Western Command. A week prior to the suspension on 3 October, an appeal for recruits by the 'County Limerick Farmers Association' was published in the *Limerick War News*, which read: 'We urgently appeal to the young farmers of military age to join up immediately for the duration of the fight.'[89] The bottom page of the article had a small two-line notice for the 'Comrades Battalion' whose establishment had been publicly listed in a September issue. Although this might have been a regional exercise in local recruitment appeals, the continuation of recruitment advertisements in the *Limerick War News* in three issues published on 3, 5 and 7 October respectively, strongly suggests that communication between GHQ and regional command was often unclear.[90]

[89] *Limerick War News*, 3 Oct. 1922.

[90] *Limerick War News*, 3, 5, 7 Oct. 1922. — Each of these publication contains a small two line advertisement for the 'Comrades Battalion'.

Table 2.12 Bi-Weekly Attestations – Kildare and National (October 1922)[91]

Bi-weekly Attestations	No. of Attests (Kildare)	Kildare Recruits as a % of total Oct recruits	Cumulative Totals (Kildare)	No. of Attests (National)	Cumulative Totals (National)
Sunday 1 October 1922	9	3%		268	
Wednesday 4 October 1922	56	25%	65	224	492
Saturday 7 October 1922	153	35%	218	433	925
Tuesday 10 October 1922	14	7%	232	199	1,124
Friday 13 October 1922	218	45%	450	489	1,613
Monday 16 October 1922	13	5%	463	287	1,900
Thursday 19 October 1922	1	0%	464	201	2,101
Sunday 22 October 1922	152	38%	616	398	2,499
Wednesday 25 October 1922	21	9%	637	232	2,731
Saturday 28 October 1922	22	7%	659	315	3,046
Tuesday 31 October 1922	119	62%	778	191	3,237
Total	778	24%		3,237	

The final 'month' of recruitment is from the first twelve days of November. The total number of soldiers listed on the census who were attested in November was 866. A small number of November recruits listed their date of attestation as *after* 12 November (Table 2.13). It is unclear why this occurred and no explanation was provided by the census enumerator. It is possible that the later date was when the official attestation forms were to be signed but this has yet to be confirmed. Irrespective the recruitment during November underlines two trends that were evident within the recruitment data from July-October; first is the importance of urban centres and second is the distinct lack of recruitment along the border region (Map 2.5). These findings are caveated by the small size of the recruits listed for November due to the census being held on the night of 12 November. This applies equally to the small number of addresses from outside of Ireland listed for November (Table 2.14).

[91] Note: This table only contains attestations that include a day/month record. An additional twenty-six soldiers listed 'October' as their month of attestation and are not included on this time series analysis.

Table 2.13 Weekly Recruitment (November 1922)

Date	No. of Recruits
01/11/1922	683
08/11/1922	160
15/11/1922	16
22/11/1922	6
29/11/1922	1
Total	866

Table 2.14 National Army recruitment outside of Ireland (November 1922)

Country	Home Address	Next of Kin Address
England	3	6
Scotland	5	6
Total	8	12

The overall picture of non-Irish recruitment is varied during the period July-November. The relatively consistent figures from Scotland in July-August appear to be from IRA units based in Scotland and it is possible that the numbers from England reflect similar areas with IRA sympathies and/or units. The recruitment from outside of Ireland does not automatically imply that these men were ex-British Army servicemen and it would be a mistake to categorise this group that way, as there was a significant population of ex-servicemen living within the Free State at this time.

Map 2.6 Turnout in the June 1922 general election



Map 2.7 Pro- and Anti-Treaty votes in Cork Constituencies June 1922



Map 2.8 Pro- and Anti-Treaty votes in East Mayo—Sligo Constituency June 1922



Case Studies of pro- and anti-Treaty sentiment within the IRA

Prevailing pro- and anti-Treaty sentiment throughout the civil war is key to understanding recruitment patterns within the National Army. This has already been alluded to within previous sections of this chapter, one example of this was the relatively consistent recruitment from 'known' pro-Treaty areas such as Donegal. In this example, Donegal is designated a pro-Treaty area because of the pro-Treaty disposition of the local IRA division, the First Northern which was based largely in county Donegal. Measuring pro- and anti-Treaty sentiment does not always follow the premise that the local IRA unit determines the response from the local populace. Electoral results, such as those referred to in the *Limerick War News*, are also indicative of localised sympathies regarding the Treaty. This is subject to a number of significant caveats, first being the 'Pact', an agreement drawn up between Michael Collins and Éamon de Valera designed to present a combined slate of candidates who would govern as a *de facto* coalition government.[92] This proposed 'coalition' was actively resisted by the British government, in particular, the attempts to reduce the influence of the 'Treaty' on the new constitution.[93] As the election was held during a period when 'normal' electoral contests had not been in practice since at least 1918, the results need to be viewed in the context of occasional intimidation of non-Pact candidates and in some cases physical violence.[94] The issue of non-voting constituencies, or 'uncontested' seats, has led to a situation wherein eight out of twenty-eight constituencies recorded no votes (Map. 2.6). This removes substantial areas throughout the state from any examination of voting intention. In spite of these issues and an outdated electoral register,[95] there are still constituencies around the country where vote totals are available for pro- and anti-Treaty candidates.[96] Therefore providing the basis of a case study of pro-Treaty support as measured by recruitment totals against the local IRA divisions' anti-Treaty position.

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[92] Michael Gallagher, 'The 'Pact' general election of 1922' in *Irish Historical Studies* vol. 22, no. 84 (Sep. 1979), pp 404-5.

[93] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, pp 98-100. — Of particular irritation for the British government was the proposed removal of the oath of allegiance and the ability to appoint ministers who disagreed with the Anglo-Irish treaty.

[94] Gallagher, 'The 'Pact' general election of 1922', pp 410-1 — Of note was an attack on Darrell Figgis, where a group of men forcible cut off his beard. It would appear that his pro-Treaty support and ambivalence about the 'Pact' may have been a factor in this assault.

[95] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, p. 110.

[96] Brian M. Walker (ed.), *Parliamentary election results in Ireland: 1918-92* (Dublin, 1992), pp 104-8.

The first example utilised in this case study is Cork and the First Southern Division. The role of the First Southern Division during the Irish civil war and more importantly the first six months of 1922 have already been emphasised throughout the first chapter of this thesis. However, there is an implicit correlation between the staunchly anti-Treaty position of this division and the anti-Treaty sentiment of Cork. This is understandable, as the majority of senior officers within the First Southern Division were from county Cork and the division was extremely large, roughly a quarter of the total size of the IRA.[97] However, this remained a relatively untested theory due to the lack of sufficient quantitative data on National Army recruitment from Cork and Munster, in general until the release and transcription of the Irish Army census. As shown in the previous section, recruitment from Cork spiked during August and continued at near equal levels to Dublin during the period September – November, as measured by the census. However, the level of recruitment was far higher than areas such as Mayo which were also occupied after successful seaborne landings. One possible explanation for this marked difference may be the levels of pro-Treaty support within county Cork as shown by the electoral results.

In the three Cork constituencies, the pro-Treaty SF candidates contested two, leaving East-Cork – North-East Cork to the anti-Treaty SF candidates who were competing against the Farmers Party and Labour. The distribution of votes shows that in the areas where pro- and anti-Treaty SF candidates were in competition, the pro-Treaty wing of the party outpolled the anti-Treaty wing by a considerable margin (Table 2.15). The total vote for each grouping is somewhat misleading as the anti-Treaty SF was the only party to contest every constituency. Therefore, the total for this grouping is inflated, as the other parties only competed in a selection of constituencies. Unfortunately, the information provided by the Irish Army census has only been tabulated by county including named cities, so a comparison of recruitment by electoral division is not possible. Despite this, the total numbers of persons recruited from Cork show that a considerable number were recruited during the period July-November 1922 (Table 2.16).

[97] Establishment of the IRA, 11 July 1921 & 1 July 1922 (MA/MSPC/RO/609).

Table 2.15 Recorded votes in Cork Constituencies (June 1922)[98]

Constituncies	pro-Treaty SF Votes	anti-Treaty SF Votes	Labour Votes	Farmers Party Votes	Independents
Cork City	11,388	5,812	6,386	N/A	6,311
East Cork - N.E. Cork	N/A	11,796	6,989	5,029	N/A
N., S. & W. Cork	25,070	12,623	10,737	6,372	N/A
Total	36,458	30,231	24,112	11,401	6,311

Table 2.16 Numbers of recruits from Cork (July-Nov. 1922)[99]

Date	No. of Recruits (Home Address)	No. of Recruits (NOK Address)
July	32	33
August	1,024	959
September	570	556
October	534	516
November	81	78
Total	2,241	2,142

The garrisoning of National Army personnel across county Cork made physical attestation into the military easier, as travel outside of the county was not required. It may be that the additional level of recorded support for the Anglo-Irish treaty amongst the wider populace played a role. In Map 2.6, the election results are shown by the number of votes as opposed to the number of seats won. This was done specifically to avoid the ambiguous results that were caused by either the 'uncontested' electoral results and the 'pact' candidates who were elected. There is also a significant geographic disparity between the three Cork constituencies (Map 2.7): the sprawling North, South and West Cork constituency covered two thirds of the county area, in contrast the Cork city and East Cork-North-East Cork constituencies were smaller and

[98] All of these vote totals have been taken from Walker, *Parliamentary elections in Ireland*, pp 104-8.

[99] Note: All these totals are inclusive of men who listed specific dates and a month e.g. 'July'.

more defined. It is unclear if these were divided by population and if so, how accurate this process was due to the outdated nature of the electoral register at the time of the election.[100] The actual level of support for the Anglo-Irish treaty in Cork, as shown by the general election, meant that the National Army could rely upon a number of persons who were of a broadly pro-Treaty position within the county and who might be persuaded to join the military. This is bolstered by the fact that the Farmers Party and Labour were nominally 'pro-Treaty' parties, in that they nominally favoured the settlement, even if this was not an explicit platform commitment.

The results of this study of Cork constituencies and recruitment totals show that, despite the strongly anti-Treaty position of the First Southern Division, which is examined in the following case study, the large level of recruitment during August and the steady numbers recorded for September – November indicates that the pro-Treaty voting intentions may have been a much better measure for why the general populace of this county strongly opted to join National Army. Notwithstanding economic reasons such as poverty and large-scale unemployment. In order to fully test this concept of electoral votes and recruitment intentions, the constituency with the largest share of the vote going to anti-Treaty candidates, East Mayo-Sligo, was examined by both constituency vote totals and recruitment figures from both Sligo and Mayo. Unlike Cork, the county of Sligo fitted within one constituency and crossed into eastern Mayo to form the East Mayo-Sligo electoral area (Map 2.8). The local division during 1922 was the Third Western Division, which consisted of the former Sligo Brigade post-reorganisation, the East Mayo Brigade and elements of the North Roscommon Brigade. This division was largely anti-Treaty during the initial stages of 1922 and alongside the Second and Fourth Western divisions remained a bastion of largely anti-Treaty support within Connaught.[101] Although smaller collectively than the First Southern Division, the degree of conflict within the Western counties during the civil war was significant and remained a source of concern for National Army authorities throughout the latter stages

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[100] Éamon de Valera called for a postponement of the general election due to concerns around the electoral register — Hopkinson, *Green against green*, p. 100.

[101] This is best illustrated by the letter sent in January 1922 to Mulcahy outlining the position of IRA divisional commandants on the Anglo-Irish treaty: three of the four Western Divisions commandants signed the letter expressing opposition to the Treaty settlement — Letter to the Minister for Defence dated January 11th 1922 - *Dáil Éireann deb., vol. S2, no. 4* (26 April 1922) - Appendices to Report - Dept. of Defence.

of the civil war.[102] Unlike the Cork constituency, the votes from East Mayo-Sligo were majority anti-Treaty (Table 2.17).

Table 2.17 Recorded votes in East-Mayo Sligo Constituency (June 1922)[103]

Constituency	pro-Treaty SF Votes	anti-Treaty SF Votes	Labour Votes	Farmers Party Votes	Independents
East Mayo-Sligo	10,193	19,457	N/A	N/A	4,849
Total	10,193	19,457	0	0	4,849

Neither the Farmers Party nor Labour contested this constituency; instead independent candidates received just under 5,000 votes. Even combining the pro-Treaty SF vote totals with independents, the anti-Treaty SF vote share remains higher. This indicates the level of anti-Treaty sentiment within this area and this is reflected in the IRA divisions in proximity to this constituency. The recruitment totals for Sligo and Mayo show that recruitment for the National Army remained low, in particular recruitment from Sligo was one of the lowest rates recorded (Table 2.18). As a point of comparison, the overseas recruitment from Scotland during the same period is higher than Sligo. The recruitment totals from Mayo represent the entire county, which is an imperfect indicator as two thirds of Mayo was represented in different constituencies (Map 2.9). However, it has, nonetheless been included to provide additional context to the electoral result.

[102] As late as January 1923, the anti-treaty forces in Sligo were able to completely destroy the main railway station in Sligo town. — Michael Farry, 'Sligo 1921-23: the aftermath of revolution' (PhD Thesis, Trinity College Dublin, 1998), p. 162.

[103] Walker, *Parliamentary elections in Ireland*, pp 104-8.

Table 2.18 Numbers of recruits from Sligo-Mayo and Scotland (July-Nov. 1922)

Month	No. of Sligo Recruits (Home Address)	No. of Sligo Recruits (NOK Address)	No. of Mayo Recruits (Home Address)	No. of Mayo Recruits (NOK Address)	No. of Scotland Recruits (Home Address)	No. of Scotland Recruits (NOK Address)
July	62	63	176	174	88	96
August	40	39	185	183	26	32
September	37	36	34	30	13	19
October	6	6	75	77	25	27
November	1	1	26	28	5	6
Total	146	145	496	492	157	180

The expected result of this low level of recruitment from county Sligo is reflective of the anti-Treaty attitude of both the populace and the local anti-Treaty IRA. Therefore, it is not simply the position of the local IRA brigade and/or division on the Anglo-Irish treaty that is the deciding factor. The local sentiment of the population also has a significant impact upon the recruitment in a given area. As the newspaper reports on recruitment figures are largely concentrated in Dublin city, this form of analysis combining electoral results and recruitment totals provides a wider context to recruitment outside of Dublin and in areas where local newspapers were sparser in their coverage of recruitment.

Another example of pro-Treaty sentiment within the IRA as opposed to the general populace, is drawn from an internal military report entitled, ‘List of pro-Treaty officers subsequent to the Split’. ‘After April’ has been written across the top of the first page of the report. Therefore, the report was drawn up somewhere within the timeframe April – July 1922.[104] This report provides some additional contextual knowledge of the internal workings of the divisions and the degree of pro-Treaty sentiment amongst a sample of the officers corps in July 1922.[105] As this report is a list of pro-Treaty officers across the

[104] Note: There are indications that at least elements of this report were written post-June 1922, in particular the listing of the South Western Command area, which was only established in July 1922, with Eoin O’Duffy appointed as general officer commanding (GOC).

[105] List of pro-Treaty officers subsequent to the Split (MA/HS/A/0859).

entirety of the military structures, there are numerous blank spaces for brigade, battalion and company officers. For example, in the First Southern, the divisional commandant was Denis Galvin, a pro-Treaty IRA officer appointed to replace Liam Lynch. However, as the majority of the First Southern was anti-Treaty, there are only a small number of pro-Treaty officers listed throughout all the brigades, battalions and companies. The report, in total, lists 410 officers across seven divisions and three independent brigades (Table 2.19). As with similar reports that outline the structures of the National Army, there are unusual omissions: there are no references to the Second, Third and Fourth Western Divisions, Midlands Division, Third Southern Division while the Third Eastern Division is listed by constituent brigades.[106] It is not explained why these are not part of the overall report and it is possible that they were created and were lost and/or destroyed prior to cataloguing.

Table 2.19 pro-Treaty IRA officers in the Divisions and Brigades – July 1922[107]

Division	Brigade	No. of Officers (Battalions)	No. of Officers (Brigades)	No. of Officers (Division)	Total
First Southern	(8 Brigades)	36	26	1	63
First Western	(7 Brigades)	31	33	8	72
First Northern	(5 Brigades)	17	16	4	37
First Eastern	(8 Brigades)	56	36	9	101
Fifth Northern	(3 Brigades)	10	14	8	32
Second Southern	(4 Brigades)	33	18	4	55
Second Eastern	(2 Brigades)	8	10	4	22
	Carlow	6	5		11
	Wexford North	4	4		8
	Wexford South	4	5		9
Total					410

[106] Note: The decision to list the constituent brigades but ignore the divisional structure is unusual for the Third Eastern, particularly since the division had already been established by July 1922 — Third Eastern Division GHQ (MA/MSPC/RO/545).

[107] Note: This table is drawn from the list of pro-Treaty officers and lists the officers by brigades and divisional staff where appropriate. The divisions each consist of a number of listed brigades, three additional brigades are listed separate from a divisional grouping: Carlow, N. Wexford and S. Wexford.

Attempting to analyse brigade officers across multiple units is complicated by the lack of consistency between the officer types listed per brigade. Taking the First Western Division as an example, there are seven brigades, each listing variants of officer types per brigade. The IRA brigade staff structure, as set out in *An t-Óglách*, is as follows:

1. The Brigade Staff shall consist of the Commandant and the Vice-Commandant, the Adjutant and the Quartermaster.
2. The Brigade Chiefs of Special Services are as follows: –
   (a) Chief of Engineering – Ranking as Captain
   (b) Chief of Scouting and Despatch Riding – Ranking as Captain
   (c) Chief of Medical Service – Ranking as Captain
   (d) Chief of Signalling – Ranking as Captain
   (e) Chief of Transport and Supply – Ranking as Captain
   (f) Chief of Intelligence Service – Ranking as Captain[108]

The total number of officers attached to the brigade staff is ten, as set out in *An t-Óglách*. In the First Western Division, across the seven brigades, the number of brigade staff averages at five per brigade (Table 2.20). The first four officers: Brigade Commandant, Vice Commandant, Adjutant and Quartermaster are listed for each brigade. However, the fifth officer type alternates between Intelligence Officer and Director of Transport. As it is unclear from this list whether the full listing of ten brigade staff was still being utilised across the brigades, this would mean that, on average, fifty percent of the brigade officer corps were listed as pro-Treaty officers or had been appointed to these posts to replace anti-Treaty IRA officers. While this is high, it should be noted that this is occurring within a strongly pro-Treaty division, in to contrast the percentage of pro-Treaty officers listed in the First Southern Division which is markedly reduced across the constituent brigades (Table 2.21). In the majority of Cork brigades, there are no pro-Treaty officers listed and in the Kerry Brigades, a number of assistant officers are listed for Kerry No. 2, meaning while there are technically ten officers listed only seven are officer types that correspond to the official list of brigade staff officers. This low level of pro-Treaty sentiment in the First Southern Division is reflective of the general anti-Treaty position of this division. The list of pro-Treaty officers, while limited to the actual divisions listed is a useful indicator of the issues facing the National Army in July 1922 as the uneven levels of support for the pro-Treaty position within the all levels of the military show that the need for additional

[108] *An t-Óglách 7* Oct. 1921.

forces was necessary. This is of particular importance, as both the First Western and Southern divisions were significantly larger in terms of enlisted men than their Eastern and Northern counterparts.

Table 2.20 No. of Brigade Staff officers listed per Brigade, First Western Division[109]

Brigade Staff	% of total Brigade Staff	Brigade	Division
5	50%	South East Galway	First Western
4	40%	South West Galway	First Western
5	50%	Clare East	First Western
5	50%	Mid Clare	First Western
5	50%	Clare West	First Western
5	50%	East Connemara	First Western
4	40%	West Connemara	First Western

Table 2.21 No. of Brigade Staff officers listed per Brigade, First Southern Division[110]

Brigade Staff	% of total Brigade Staff	Brigade	Division
1	10%	Cork No. 1	First Southern
0	0%	Cork No. 2	First Southern
0	0%	Cork No. 3	First Southern
4	40%	Cork No. 4	First Southern
0	0%	Cork No. 5	First Southern
4	40%	Kerry No. 1	First Southern
10	70%	Kerry No. 2	First Southern
7	70%	Kerry No. 3	First Southern

These two examples of pro-Treaty officers within the First Western and Southern Divisions provides an insight into the inner dynamics within divisional structures, which are, at best, often opaque and disorganised. The emphasis upon brigade staff was

[109] Note: This figures are drawn from the report — List of pro-Treaty officers subsequent to the Split (MA/HS/A/0859).

[110] Ibid.

an attempt to bypass the artificial nature of the divisional structures, which were largely added post-facto to the existing IRA brigade structures, as outlined in chapter one. It was largely accepted, often uncritically that the First Southern Division was a broadly anti-Treaty division; this is borne out by the brigade analysis for the Cork brigades, but this is not the case for the Kerry brigades, which retained a significant number of pro-Treaty officers. However, the higher number of pro-Treaty officers within the Kerry brigades did not reflect a pro-Treaty attitude within that county. In fact, the level of anti-Treaty activity in county Kerry increased in the latter half of 1922, eventually culminating in a series of controversial reprisals undertaken by the National Army against anti-Treaty IRA prisoners in early 1923.[111]

It is also important to note that pro-Treaty officers were not always able to bring their battalions and brigades 'with them' into the National Army. Although there are examples of this, such as Tom Ennis in Dublin for the pro-Treaty faction and conversely, Frank Carty in Sligo, there are variants to this relationship and the elasticity of personal decision-making regarding the Anglo-Irish treaty cannot be understated. The multifarious scope of the anti-Treaty movement stretching across the IRA, Sinn Féin and the general public means that there were degrees of belief and attitude when it came to a willingness to fight against the Anglo-Irish treaty. This is not a degradation of the findings of this study, it is important to note that there was a substantially higher number of pro-Treaty officers within the three Kerry brigades, as opposed to the Cork brigades. Even if significant numbers of the rank and file members of the IRA in those brigades remained anti-Treaty, the movement of the upper echelons may be indicative of either a stronger loyalty to the centralised GHQ based in Dublin, or a counter to the Cork-based leadership of the First Southern Division and a resumption of traditional county rivalries. It might also be a combination of these factors depending of the officer involved. In contrast to the levels of support for the pro-Treaty within the Kerry brigades, there was the relatively split nature of the First Western Division, with on average fifty percent of the officers being listed as pro-Treaty across all the brigades. This points to the uneven nature of the level of support for the Treaty and how it developed within specific elements of the IRA. Although the First Western Division

[111] For a full account of the killings of anti-Treaty IRA prisoners in Kerry see - B.T. Murphy, 'The government's execution policy during the Irish civil war, 1922-23' (PhD thesis, NUI Maynooth, 2010), pp 218-224.

only contained fifty percent support, the divisional staff were strongly pro-Treaty and followed the National Army GHQ. In the case of the First Southern Division, because of the great difficulties facing the National Army in getting to Cork and Kerry by land, pro-Treaty officers were isolated in ways that their anti-Treaty counterparts in the First Western were not, since these officers could link up with the majority of western divisions of the IRA which were anti-Treaty. This was more difficult for First Southern Division, pro-Treaty supporters within the officer corps.

The mass recruitment into the National Army and the resulting five months of consistent growth in both size and geographic area had a profound effect upon the development of the military and new Irish state. The chaotic nature of the recruitment was outlined in the early period when the command structures were changed multiple times within a single month, followed by the complicated nature of recruitment into the Volunteer Reserve, bifurcated between civilian attestations and local pro-Treaty IRA recruitment. The formal creation of a separate military structure on 5 July 1922 is an important milestone and one that has been omitted for unknown reasons from the historiography of the National Army. The sheer scale of increased recruitment between July-August, resulting in nearly 10,000 men attesting into the military is difficult to contextualise as it is clear that the internal military procedures were not sufficient for this type of mass mobilisation. It is also important to note that the census rolls from July-November only list those who were still in the military on 12 November 1922.

Map 2.9 Levy Quota vs. Actual numbers recruited per county





The workings of the Volunteer Reserve had never been interrogated in detail and apart from references to the ‘Call to Arms’ the exact text utilised in this proclamation remained under studied. The sophisticated nature of the Volunteer Reserve plan and the detail with which it was organised, in particular the set ‘levy’ per county were all missing from the discourse and are key to contextualising the planned recruitment and the actual results. It is clear that that the levy was supposed to reflect to a certain degree an average percentage of the military-aged male population between 18–30. However, in practice the number of recruits per county ranged from exceeding the quota to barely reaching ten percent of the set figure (Map. 2.9). The failure to recruit a balanced levy quota underlines the issues around recruiting within an area that has chosen the opposing side during the conflict. This is particularly evident when examining the levy totals for Leitrim, Sligo and Roscommon, each failing to meet the quota by a substantial margin. Leitrim having the lowest level of support of all the geographic areas listed as measured by the number of men enlisted.

The ability to examine the scale of recruitment across three distinct geographic attributes allowed for a study of recruitment which, in turn, that allowed for nuanced analysis of attestations in Cork and Dublin and for comparative analyses with electoral returns. This facilitated a further investigation of the pro- and anti-Treaty sentiment within the IRA divisions. The electoral and recruitment statistics can be utilised for similar studies of sentiment analysis and eventually could form the part of a linking study between the IRA as noted by the nominal rolls and the National Army as annotated via the Irish Army census.

Chapter 3. National Army casualties, July-November 1922

Estimates of National Army casualties

The violent legacy of the Irish civil war remains highly politicised. The Provisional Government's execution policy and high-profile reprisals at Ballyseedy, Countess Bridge and the killings on Benbulben mountaintop are representative of the public perception of the civil war. These 'extrajudicial' killings have become emblematic in the public memory and perception of the civil war period, despite the relative infrequency of these events and the specific circumstances that led to these killings.[1] It is notable that some of the larger estimates for the Irish civil war, include killings in Northern Ireland during this timeframe. As stated previously, despite partition, the Irish civil war did impact upon Northern Ireland with thousands of men joining the National Army and the close cooperation between the Northern IRA divisions and the National Army GHQ in operations against the Unionist government. Of the three major categories of casualties: National Army, anti-Treaty IRA and civilians, National Army casualties and civilian deaths remain areas in need of further study.[2] Anti-treaty IRA casualties have been covered extensively, starting with the publication of Dorothy Macardle's *Tragedies of Kerry* (1924) and the first edition of National Graves Association's (NGA) listing of 'Republican dead', *The Last Post* (1932), a compendium of the 'Republican' dead during the period 1916-23.[3] Both of these texts clearly set out to provide a hagiographic account of the IRA deaths during the revolutionary period and explicitly link these deaths to earlier nationalist movements. Neither of these texts are completely accurate. However, the absence of a similar compendium for the National Army until 2019 is an illustration of the differences in how the civil war was commemorated during the twentieth century.

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[1] Note: The term 'extra-judicial' is utilised as these reprisal killings were not treated as crimes per se by the Free State government and all members of the National Army were indemnified under a general amnesty declared in 1924. The utilisation of this phrase is not in any sense an endorsement or diminishment of the illegality of these actions.

[2] The recent release of Eunan O'Halpin and Daithí O Corráin's, *The dead of the Irish Revolution* (New Haven, 2020) will add considerably to any statistical studies of the period 1916-1921.

[3] Note: Despite being called the 'National' Graves Association, the NGA is a private Republican group founded to commemorative deceased Republicans, typically marking headstones and erecting plaques. It was joined by a second NGA based in Belfast. The two organisations are typically differentiated by the followed suffixes: (Dublin) for the original entity founded in 1926 and (Belfast) for the 1930s organisation. Despite the naming conventions, the NGA (Dublin) remains an all-Ireland organisation and currently maintains grave markers across the island.

In her study of civil war commemorative practices during the twentieth century, Anne Dolan examines how the Republican movement was able to place the 'Republican' losses during the civil war within a larger 'pantheon' of nationalist and republican martyrdom.[4] Commemorating the National Army casualties was a more complicated process due in part to the frosty civil-military relations in the aftermath of the abortive 'mutiny' and the massive demobilisation of the military.[5] There was also a difficulty in placing Free State losses within the Revolutionary context, as the paramilitary tradition of the anti-Treaty IRA as suggested by Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffrey in *A military history of Ireland* (1997), eclipsed the National Army and its successors to become the dominant 'military' tradition within the new state.[6] This is despite the victory of the pro-Treaty forces and the establishment of a new state. This contradiction is partly explained by the political dominance of the civil war 'losers' in the form of the Fianna Fáil party from 1932 to 2011. Dolan showed that attempts by ex-National Army servicemen to commemorate fallen comrades were often discouraged. When they did occur, such as the 1925 commemoration of four soldiers killed in an ambush at Ferrycarrig, Wexford. The ceremony was to be 'strictly religious' and the initial invitation for W. T. Cosgrave to attend was rescinded after pressure was applied from Richard Mulcahy.[7] Instead, the government focused upon 'state-building' monuments such as the Cenotaph on the grounds on Leinster House and the military monument at Béal na Bláith. The Cenotaph unveiled in 1923, was framed as a memorial explicitly to Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith as founders of the new 'Free State'. The later addition of Kevin O'Higgins after his assassination in 1927, speaks to the overt political nature of this monument to the Cumann na nGaedheal government.[8] The military monument to Michael Collins at Béal na Bláith was framed by Dolan as a response to the leaders of the 1924 Irish Army 'mutiny', as 'they had challenged its [Free State Government's] nationalism. This cross

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[4] Dolan, *Commemorating the Irish civil war*, p. 3.

[5] For an account of the 'mutiny' see M.G. Valiulis, 'The 'Army Mutiny' of 1924 and the assertion of civilian authority in independent Ireland' in *Irish Historical Studies*, vol. 23, no. 92 (Nov. 1983), pp 358-363.

[6] Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffrey, 'An Irish military tradition?' in idem *A military history of Ireland* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 25.

[7] Despite the professed 'non-political' nature of the commemoration ceremony, two of the four speakers were candidates for the upcoming Senate elections — Dolan, *Commemorating the Irish civil war*, pp 121-23.

[8] Ibid, pp 35-6.

was the government's response'.[9] In both cases, the monuments were evocative of Republican commemorative tradition, each designed for public rallies, orations, and other pageantry.

These similarities, were largely superficial as the focus of the Free State commemorative events and monuments was largely to help the electoral fortunes of the pro-Treaty political party. The unveiling of the Cenotaph in 1923 was timed to precede the forthcoming election and the 1927 ceremony symbolically 'elevating' O'Higgins was also timed to occur within weeks of the second general election of 1927. Conversely the Republican commemorations transcended political parties, the political fortunes and enmity between 'Republican' parties were irrelevant to Republican commemoration. Due to the often fractious nature of twentieth century Irish republicanism, this flexibility was an asset that allowed the numerous splits within the wider movement to have limited effect upon individual commemorative events and the consistent marking of Republican grave sites by the NGA. The failure of the wider pro-Treaty 'movement' to create such organisations during the initial decade after the civil war, meant that later efforts such as the 'Collins Memorial Fund' established in 1956, were largely unable to counter the mythos created by the Republican movement.[10] Even the name of this group is telling in its continued emphasis on the 'great' man. While perversely the strength of Republican commemoration has been its focus upon largely unknown individuals and the concept of 'shared sacrifice', which manages to appear inclusive, despite the clear hierarchy within the wider Republican movement, with its focus on leaders of previous rebellions: Tone, Pearse, et al.

The total number of National Army casualties is not yet known and it is unlikely to be collated until the final release of the Military Service Pensions Collection (MSPC) records pertaining to National Army dependents pensions. This equally applies to the number of anti-Treaty IRA casualties. However, it is likely that the numbers missing from *The Last Post* are smaller due to the focus on the 'Republican' dead over the past century. An all-Ireland study of National Army casualties was missing from the discourse until the publication of James Langton's *The Forgotten Fallen* (2019). Padraic

[9] Dolan, *Commemorating the Irish civil war*, pp 59-60.

[10] Ibid, pp 81-3.

O'Farrell's, *Who's who in the Irish war of independence and civil war* (1997) deserves a mention due to the lists of casualties that are included within this text. However, the emphasis is upon the 'who's who' model, which is more akin to a biographical listing of important individuals during the entire period. A significant number of those listed in O'Farrell's text survived the entire Revolutionary period. One key aspect of the *Who's who* model that Langton replicates is the use of an alphabetical listing as opposed to a chronological listing. It is not clear why Langton followed this model, as similar texts like *The Last Post* and Richard Abbott's *Police Casualties* (2000), utilised a chronology. Langton created profiles of each soldier, detailing where possible their full name, address, age, rank, and place of death and/or wounding. In addition, Langton attempted to provide an account of how each soldier died — whether it was during an operation, ambush or accident. Langton lists a total of 777 deaths between 1922-3.[11] This total largely conforms to earlier estimates made throughout the discourse on the civil war. Michael Hopkinson in *Green against green* includes two estimates of National Army casualties: a figure of 540 from Richard Mulcahy and a general government estimate of 800. Each of these utilises a different timeline: Mulcahy's estimate is from December 1921 - April 1924 while the government estimate is between January 1922 and April 1924.[12] It is not clear if either of these estimates make a distinction between men who were killed in accidents or solely of servicemen who died in 'active' operations i.e. killed by gunshot or explosions.[13] Anne Dolan, who, in her study of post-civil war commemorative practice, provides a précis of all the estimates (circa 2003) in the introduction to her monograph; 540 / 800 as per Hopkinson, 1,500 - 2,000 total (inc. civilians & anti-Treaty) estimated by Commandant Peter Young and an alternative estimate of 927.[14] Langton would appear to have started from February 1922 and ended in August 1923.

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[11] Langton, *The forgotten fallen*, pp 6-7.

[12] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, pp 272-3.

[13] Note: The definition of 'active service' is one that occurs frequently throughout the MSPC records, it would appear that the Department of Defence would pay for dependent pensions in cases where the death was accidental, if it was verified that the soldier had died during the active service. However, it is not clear how widespread this was due the partial release thus far of pension records.

[14] Dolan, *Commemorating the Irish civil war*, p. 6. — Note: The alternative estimate is not explained, merely stated. It is not clear who compiled that figure or where it came from.

The different timelines for each of these estimates and the lack of an effective chronology within Langton's text means that the number of pro- and/or anti-Treaty sentiments of IRA volunteers who died prior to the attack on the Four Courts in June 1922 is difficult to ascertain. As the National Army's first official combat operation against the anti-Treaty IRA began with the shelling of the Four Courts on 28 June 1922, a more logical timeline would begin with the date of 1 July 1922. By starting immediately after the attack on the Four Courts, the previously discussed ambiguity regarding affiliation is removed and it means that soldiers who subsequently died of wounds received at the Four Courts in late June can be included within July death totals. The differing timelines are an example of how difficult it is to place these deaths within the wider Irish revolutionary period. Should they remain part of the earlier IRA paramilitary tradition albeit with a distinctly pro-Treaty emphasis? This presumably was Mulcahy's intent by starting from December 1921. Provisional Government estimates appear to follow a more logical timeline. They begin in January 1922 with the creation of the Provisional Government and after ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Neither timeline is suitable for a study of civil war deaths, as both start during a period of intense ambiguity regarding individual soldier's affiliations and position on the Treaty itself. Langton includes all possible deaths within his text as the purpose of his text was to gather as much information as possible on these casualties and present it alphabetically.

The Free State government remained largely uninterested in National Army casualties as a matter of commemorative policy. During the initial stages of the civil war, the military leadership set out to gather information on casualties, killed and wounded and report these matters to the Provisional Government. On 27 July, Michael Collins wrote to Richard Mulcahy outlining the need for a general report on the 'military situation' to be delivered to the Provisional Government. The fighting had continued across the country in the four weeks after the Battle of Dublin. From early July, the National Army were recruiting thousands of soldiers under the auspices of the 'Call to Arms' and Voluntary Levy. However, communication with the Provisional Government about the military situation was intermittent, as noted by Valiulis:

> Collins, with Mulcahy's help, undertook to keep the government informed….The cabinet had to wait for reports, however. The first weeks of the civil war were extremely hectic for both Collins and Mulcahy and they had little time to spare for anything not directly relevant to the actual fighting….The cabinet was to be increasingly frustrated by its lack of knowledge about the army and the military situation. At first, Collins' stature prevented any serious problem.[15]

The continuation of this policy of making the cabinet 'wait' by the military leadership post-Collins would have profound consequences for civil-military relations in 1923-4. It is therefore of interest that the first report to be given to the government was quite specific in what was being outlined for the civilian leadership. Although the cabinet had to 'wait' until early August, the information being provided to them was quite extensive. The following agenda items were prepared on 27 July for the Provisional Government for the first report on the military situation:

1. It is necessary to have a Report prepared for GOVERNMENT on the MILITARY SITUATION as follows:

    a) Our entire strength in OFFICERS. MEN and EQUIPMENT, with a general note on the Distribution
    b) Report of CASUALTIES INCURRED by us.
    c) PRISONERS taken by us and disposal of the person. NUMBER RELEASED, MEDICAL CONDITION, etc.,
    d) An appreciation to some extent of the decision we have to deal with yet, with an estimate of the time we are likely to take.[16]

The priority was getting accurate figures for the entire 'strength' of the military and equipment available, which is to be expected in the initial weeks of a conflict. However, the emphasis upon casualties at this early stage of the civil war, highlights that both the Provisional Government and military leadership were aware that this was an area that requiring specific consideration. The numbers of anti-Treaty IRA personnel killed is not requested, only the captured are catalogued. There is no mention of civilian casualties, wounded or killed. On 4 August, a report was compiled that attempted to conform to the outline of the report. However, Mulcahy makes it clear from the outset that all the figures included in the 'statements' would 'act as a baseline from which a more correct

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[15] Valiulis, *Portrait of a revolutionary*, p. 163.

[16] C.G.S. 17 Memorandum from Michael Collins to Richard Mulcahy (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/1). — Note: The emphasis is kept for the original document.

statement may be developed'.[17] Each subheading of the 27 July letter was reconstituted as a numbered statement in Mulcahy's report of 4 August. Therefore statements 1 - 4 were related to the distribution of men and material, statement 5 was a list casualties, wounded and dead and statement 6 referred to the numbers currently in prisons. Each of these estimates were time-stamped, typically for the end of July or early August. Statement 5 is reproduced in Table 3.1 to give an indication of how the National Army were recording casualties in this early period.[18]

Table 3.1 Statement (5) of minimum to National troops up to 31/7/22[19]

Area	Dead	Wounded	
Dublin	16	122	8th July
Tirconnell	1	1	13th July
(Snipers)	2	-	10th July
Waterford	2	1	22nd July
Ambushes	2	1	18th & 19th July
Limerick	6	20	24th July
Waterford (Ambush)	1	-	24th July
Killurin 'Bush	2	7	25th July
Galway & Tirconnell	4	-	28th July
Bruree	15	-	31st July
Mayo	2	-	31st July
Leix	3	5	31st July
Dundrum	1	-	1st August
Tipperary	4	3	1st August
Total	59	160	National Army.

[17] Report from Richard Mulcahy to Michael Collins, 4 August 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/143).

[18] Note: Throughout this chapter, casualties is meant to refer to soldiers who died, not wounded personnel, except where this is explicitly stated.

[19] Statement 5. Report from Richard Mulcahy to Michael Collins, 4 August 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/143) — Note this spelling and emphasis are kept from the original document. A duplicate of this report, however, near illegible exists in P7/B/43.

On a point of clarification, the total dead is 61, not 59. It is not clear why this numerical error was made, but, for accuracy it was decided to reproduce the document as it was written. The first issue that is raised by this report is the haphazard manner in which information is outlined; the dates are out of order and the 'area' is often unclear as ambushes and sniper attacks could have occurred in any town or area in the Free State territory. It is clear that in August, the leadership of the National Army were largely unsure of where casualties occurred as none were linked to a specific command, division or brigade area. The Dublin and Bruree (East Limerick) figures were the highest, reflecting the two most violent incidents that occurred in that period; the shelling of the Four Courts and the ensuing Battle of Dublin and the fighting in the South-Western command area in the 'triangle' of Bruff-Bruree-Kilmallock in County Limerick.[20] Unfortunately, after this report in August 1922, it appears that the tabulation of casualties was no longer a key focus for the Defence Council of the National Army; there are no known copies that exists of similar reports.[21]

In order to examine aspects of military casualties, beyond a simple listing of deaths in a given month, it was necessary to collate a sample of casualties from available sources.[22] To remove any ambiguity regarding the affiliation of casualties that occurred prior to the outbreak of the civil war, a set timeline was developed so that all the casualties included would be men who died serving in the National Army and not in the pro-Treaty IRA. Therefore, all casualties had to occur after 1 July 1922. Although a small number of casualties from the attack on the Four Courts are discounted, the majority of those who died during that operation are included as the attack started on 28 June 1922. The cut-off date chosen was that of 13 November 1922, the day the Irish Army census was taken. This was chosen for two reasons. First, it facilitated a comparative analysis of casualties and recruitment totals drawn from the census rolls. Second, this period includes all the major 'conventional' military aspects of the civil war: the Battle of Dublin, the occupation of Limerick and the seaborne landings in Mayo, Kerry and Cork. Additionally, from 17 November, the 'official' execution policy began, which expanded

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[20] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, p. 150.

[21] Note: This is not to suggest that individual reports of small scale casualties were not reported to Richard Mulcahy, merely that the large-scale reports such as Statement 5 are not available.

[22] For the full details on how this sample was collated please see the Methodology chapter of this thesis.

the role of the military into more disparate areas of 'justice' as civilians were able to be tried in military courts martial from that point forward. In addition to the timeframe, no other limitations were placed upon casualties and therefore all causes of death are included. In his study of the civil war and the broader 'Treatyite' movement, John M. Regan observed that the key intelligence unit of the state reported more casualties from either accidents or friendly fire than from action against enemy forces:

> Of the casualties to the [Criminal Investigations Division] CID in 1922-3, four were a result of incidents with the [anti-Treaty] IRA. nine with National forces, four self-inflicted and five from various accidents including being thrown from a CID car. Two members of the force were killed.[23]

Regan does not distinguish between deaths and injuries, but 18 casualties (undefined) out of a total strength of 70 is high.[24] The two CID deaths listed by Regan were included within the sample of National Army casualties due to the quasi-military nature of the CID, as it contained a mixture of serving military officers such as Liam Tobin and Charlie Dalton along with civilian policemen.[25] In the report delivered to the Provisional Government on 4 August, the cause of death is not described. It merely indicated whether the soldiers were wounded or had died. Therefore, questions remain as to how exactly soldiers were killed and if the CID record was simply an aberration or part of a larger pattern within all military casualties.

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[23] Regan, *The Irish counter-revolution*, p. 400.

[24] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, pp 12-3 — Note: A figure of 70 men is given prior to the absorption of two 'plainclothes' groups: Protective Officer Corps and Civilian Defence Force, after which an amalgamated force CID totalled 350.

[25] For a full account of the CID, including allegations of torture against anti-Treaty IRA prisoners see O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, pp 11-15.

Monthly totals and causes of death

The sample of casualties contains 408 men who died between July-November 1922. A monthly breakdown of casualties was tabulated, which was contextualised with recruitment data taken from the Irish Army census (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2 Timeline of casualties and recruitment, July - November 1922[26]

Month	No. of Recruits	No. of Casualties	% of Recruits
July 1922	6,055	95	2%
Aug 1922	4,811	110	2%
Sept 1922	3,428	100	3%
Oct 1922	3,263	82	3%
Nov 1922	865	21	2%
Total	18,422	408	2%

The total of 95 deaths listed for July is higher than the Mulcahy report total of 61. The higher number likely reflects men who were listed as injured, subsequently died and the updated figures had not yet been reported to GHQ at that time of this report. The numbers of deaths from July to September remain stable at an average of 100 per month, followed by a reduction in October. The November total only lists deaths within the first thirteen days of that month and should be viewed as partial. The recruitment intake during this period is significantly higher and may explain why casualties during this period remained a relatively low priority. The ratio between casualties and recruits in July was roughly 1:60 and for the entire month of October, the ratio was 1:40. In short, the National Army could have absorbed significantly higher losses and still have managed to continue operations. This is not meant to detract from the significance of these losses to the military as an institution and its effect upon individual soldiers.

[26] Note: This table is created from the Irish Army census data and the process for creating these totals has been outlined in the following companion website, which shows all the R code for the tables and maps in this chapter. (https://rpubs.com/jackakav_phd/661103) (Accessed 16 Sep. 2020).

Comparisons with either the First World War or the contemporaneous Finnish civil war are statistically irrelevant due to the differences in scale.[27]

If compared to the casualties sustained by the IRA during the war of independence, National Army losses between July and November are equivalent to two and half years of IRA fatalities.[28] This would have had an impact upon morale and discipline within the military. Regan lists numerous examples of pro-Treaty politicians and military officials, who recounted that summary executions were occurring in response to killings of National Army personnel.[29] This indicates that at a more localised level, prisoners were being shot with some degree of cognisance and support from military officers. However, the most draconian measures such as the eventual 'official' execution policy, were pushed by the civilian government as opposed to the military leadership.[30]

In order to see if the high rates of non-combat deaths within the CID during the Irish civil war were prevalent in the National Army, all the causes of death were collated and tabulated (Table 3.3).

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[27] Even trying to compare estimated losses within the 'Irish divisions' of the British Army fails due to the differences in scale, with an estimated 27,405 Irish-born losses from just a single division, the 16th (Irish) — Fitzpatrick, 'Militarism in Ireland, 1900-1922' in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery (eds) *A military history of Ireland* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 392 ; Estimates for total casualties during the Finnish civil war consisted of 36,000 deaths in six months, a rate of killing dwarfing any estimates for total deaths due to revolutionary violence in Ireland from 1916-23 — Pertti Haapala and Marko Tikka, 'Revolution, civil war, and terror in Finland in 1918' in Robert Gerwarth and John Horne (eds), *War in peace: paramilitary violence in Europe after the Great War* (Oxford, 2012), p. 72.

[28] Hopkinson provides the following IRA casualty figures for each year of the Irish war of independence: 1919 (32), 1920 (228), 1921 (182) a total of 442 IRA deaths — Hopkinson, *The Irish war of independence* (2002), pp 201-2.

[29] Regan, *The Irish counter-revolution*, pp 104-6.

[30] Ibid, p. 106 ; 109.

Table 3.3 National Army casualties — Cause of Death (July-November 1922)[31]

Cause of Death	No.	%
Gunshot	242	59%
Accidental shootings	69	17%
KIA	31	8%
Explosion	22	5%
Illness/Natural Causes	14	3%
Accidental death	7	2%
Motor Accident	8	2%
Accidental explosion	3	1%
Drowned	2	0%
Fractured Skull	2	0%
Executed	1	0%
Leg Fracture	1	0%
NA	6	1%
Total	408	

The majority of deaths were by gunshot during combat operations, followed by accidental shootings. Between accidental shootings, explosions, motor accidents and non-defined accidents, nearly one in five of the total casualties were killed by fellow soldiers or by themselves. This meant that the rate of accidental deaths with the CID was approximate to the military as a whole. The number of soldiers killed by explosions indicates the relative success of land mines and grenade attacks by anti-Treaty forces. The high rate of accidental deaths varying in cause, raises questions about the combat readiness of the soldiers as well as to general discipline in the military, because of the increase in the number of accidental shootings between July and November, during which the military transitioned from field operations to garrisoning duties (Table 3.4).

[31] Note: In some cases terms such as killed in action (KIA) or accidental death were utilised without providing a specific cause as to how exactly these soldiers died.

Table 3.4 National Army accidental deaths by Month

Year	Accidental shootings	Accidental explosions	Accidental deaths (undefined)	Motor accidents	Total Accidents per month
July 1922	12	1	3	1	17
Aug 1922	13	2	2	1	18
Sept 1922	23	0	1	4	27
Oct 1922	20	0	1	2	23
Nov 1922	1	0	0	0	1
Total	69	3	7	8	86

As accidental shootings are the highest single category and increase after July 1922, it is clear that other types of accidents remained the exception, while shooting accidents were becoming somewhat routine. The conduct of National Army troops during the civil war was a mixed affair, with well-documented abuses of prisoners and ambiguous killings of anti-Treaty IRA personnel, many of which remain controversial. However, these actions were external, as they were against anti-Treaty IRA personnel and occasionally civilians. The question of internal discipline within the National Army and relations between soldiers is a subject that has yet to be examined in detail. In a recent article on internal discipline within the IRA during the war of independence, Brian Hughes observed that there was a marked divergence between general orders issued by GHQ regarding military discipline and the actual punishments given out by local IRA brigades.[32] He cites a few examples of men being asked to work on IRA officers' land as free labour in lieu of a substantive punishment. In other cases demotions in rank were reversed due to pressure within IRA units.[33] Hughes describes the circumstances of a rare execution of an IRA volunteer, who was in the Monaghan Brigade, under the command of Eoin O'Duffy.[34] This reticence to punish a 'brother' Volunteer within the pre-split IRA appears to have continued within the upper echelons of the National Army. It could be argued that this impulse to 'protect' a fellow officer, led Richard Mulcahy to

[32] Brian Hughes, ''Make the terror behind greater than the terror in front'? Internal discipline, forced participation and the IRA, 1919-21' in *Irish Historical Studies* vol. 42, no. 161 (2018), p. 70.

[33] Ibid, pp 78-9.

[34] Brian Hughes, 'Make the terror behind greater than the terror in front', pp 73-4.

interfere with the proposed charges against Paddy O'Daly as a result of the Kenmare 'incident'.[35] Although the circumstances of how this case was dismissed is more complicated than a simple cover-up. The elite nature of the relationships between O'Daly, Mulcahy, and other former officers of the IRA's Dublin Brigade, suggest that this case and prior obfuscation about O'Daly's activities were reflective of a protective clique around senior officers who shared a common background in IRA GHQ and the Dublin Brigade. This appears to have been limited to O'Daly, as the other officers who participated in the Kenmare 'incident' were scheduled for courts martial and there is no record of any attempt to prevent these men from being prosecuted.[36] In contrast to O'Daly, this indicates that experiences of ordinary soldiers, junior officers or those without ties to GHQ, who were subject to military discipline faced a more thorough judicial system than what had existed within the IRA.

The creation of an effective system for military discipline within the National Army appears to have been a priority for the military leadership within weeks of the outbreak of the civil war. Unlike the previous IRA procedures, there would be a centralised justice apparatus based within the office of the adjutant general, Gearóid O'Sullivan. Cahir Davitt, a barrister and former judge of the Dáil Courts was appointed as the inaugural Judge-Advocate General of the National Army in August 1922. In his witness statement to the Bureau of Military History, Davitt admitted he had no knowledge of military law or the effective procedures for a military courts martial. His limited knowledge was supplemented with the appointment of a deputy, George Hodnett who had previous experience as a British Army officer.[37] Although the swift appointment of Davitt speaks to a sense of urgency, the choice of an ostensibly civilian judge to preside over military justice was and remains unusual. Davitt describes how he drafted the first regulations regarding military discipline, using a British Army Manual of Military Law

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[35] For a modern re-evaluation of the Kenmare 'incident', see Linda Connolly, 'Sexual violence during the Irish civil war: a forgotten war crime?' in *Women's History Review* vol. 30, no. 1 (Mar. 2021), pp 126-143.

[36] When the case was ultimately not taken to either a civilian or military trial, the other officers, named by Regan as Captains Ed Flood and Jim Clark appear to have *not* been charged and there is no specific mention of them by Davitt, merely that no prosecution went ahead. A development which surprised him greatly — Regan, *The Irish counter-revolution*, p. 173 ; Cahir Davitt statement (MAI, BMH, W.S. 1751).

[37] Cahir Davitt statement (MAI, BMH, W.S. 1751).

as a template.[38] These regulations were eventually promulgated on 1 November 1922. This meant that from 1 July until the publication of these regulations, the military had been utilising an ad hoc system of military law for courts martial and other areas of military discipline. In at least one military command, South Western, basic legal paperwork for courts martial proceedings had been drafted by a civilian, Kingsmill Moore, while he served as a special war correspondent for the *Irish Times*.[39] Moore had been requested by W.R.E. Murphy, a National Army general serving under Eoin O'Duffy to draft templates of 'charge-sheets and Court-martial proceedings in such a way that Officers without any knowledge of military law or procedure could conduct a trial with some degree of formality.'[40]

Davitt outlined in his statement that numerous courts martial reports from Limerick, then part of the South-Western Command area, were awaiting his review upon his appointment. In his statement, Davitt could only recall two cases: the first involved a humorous typo on the charge sheet and the second, authorised by GOC of the South-Western Command Eoin Duffy, involved a civilian tried in a military court and given an absurd sentence. In the latter case, the crime was stealing a pair of trousers belonging to assistant Adjutant-General James Hogan. The accused was sentenced to three years' penal servitude and twelve lashes of the 'cat.[41] Davitt outlined how he immediately set out to exonerate this person both for the illegality (at that time) of trying a civilian in a military court and the extreme nature of the punishment for a minor crime. Upon further investigation, he found that neither sentence had been carried out.[42] While the absurdity of this case owes more to O'Duffy's propensity for 'stern measures', it also provides some insight into the chaotic nature of military justice that was operating in the early stages of the Irish civil war. It was under this highly localised system of military justice that accidental shootings came to be investigated.

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[38] Cahir Davitt statement (MAI, BMH, W.S. 1751). — Davitt mentions that he also studied French and U.S. military codes of justice, but the main source was the British Army manual, along with some original concepts of his own.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Cahir Davitt statement (MAI, BMH, W.S. 1751) — It is not clear from Davitt whether this was a common occurrence and the name of the individual is unfortunately not listed in his statement.

[42] Ibid.

The first recorded cases of an accidental shooting occurred on 5 July 1922. Sergeant John Joseph Fitzsimons of the Second Eastern Division was shot on Francis Street, Dublin. His death certificate states that he was killed by an accidental discharge of his revolver.[43] A pension application submitted by the father of the deceased, stated that his son was killed in an ambush. Attempts to clarify whether the death was accidental or not by the military authorities are not apparent from the pension records. Instead, Fitzsimons' death was certified as occurring on 'active service' and a gratuity of £75 was awarded to his father Patrick Fitzsimons.[44] Gratuity payments were often utilised in lieu of a full pension, as demonstrating a high level of dependency upon a deceased serviceman was very difficult. This was followed by a second accidental shooting involving friendly fire that occurred on either 5 or 7 July. Sergeant James McNamee of the First Western Division was killed while riding in the back of a recently captured motor car.[45] A National Army patrol, not realising that the car had been taken by friendly forces opened fire, killing McNamee. The pension file contains no ambiguity or contradictions and it appeared to have been a genuine accident. John McNamee, the father of the deceased was awarded a pension, but died in 1924 prior to receiving it.[46] In the case of both Fitzsimons and McNamee, both men had previous military experience; Fitzsimons had served in the IRA's Dublin Brigade, while McNamee had served in the Labour Corps of the British Army. This means that inexperience was not likely to have been a factor in either man being killed, although carelessness was a possible factor for Fitzsimons.

A different type of killing involved shootings within barracks, which were markedly different to self-inflected shootings and friendly fire during combat. An early example of this type of killing happened on 30 July 1922: Private Deehan was shot by a Private King at Athlone barracks. An eyewitness account from a Lieutenant Hynes stated that 'two stood joking for about 3 minutes' and then 'Deehan said something to the sentry

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[43] Death Certificate: John Fitzsimons (https://civilrecords.irishgenealogy.ie/churchrecords/images/deaths_returns/deaths_1922/05069/4389867.pdf) (Accessed 3 Aug. 2020).

[44] P.B. 69 Recommendation of Army Pensions Board, 21 Aug. 1924 (MAI/MSPC/WF334JohnJosephFitzsimons).

[45] Proceedings of Court of Enquiry, 29 Nov. 1923 (MAI/MSPC/W2D106JamesMcNamee).

[46] Ref. No.2/D/106, A.P. 21 Claim for Dependent's Allowance or Gratuity (MAI/MSPC/WFA42JamesMcNamee).

and the sentry pointed his rifle at Deehan and fired one shot'.[47] Upon being questioned as to why he shot Deehan, King stated that it was an accident.[48] What prompted him to fire is unclear, his claim of an accident was undermined by Hynes statement which estimated the distance between the soldiers at 'about 2 feet', effectively point-blank range.[49] On the basis of these witness statements, King was charged with and found guilty of murder and manslaughter. His sentence was not included on file, but it is likely that he was given a penal sentence, as his name does not appear on any lists of executed soldiers. John Deehan, the father of the deceased, received an initial gratuity payment of £15 which was later increased to £60 upon appeal.[50] Despite the findings of the court martial, the death is listed as an accident on numerous documentation, including the death certificate.[51] However, there was a considerable time delay between the killing of Deehan on 30 July 1922 and the subsequent courts martial on 16 July 1923. This case is quite unambiguous due to the account of the junior officer who witnessed the event and the seemingly unprovoked nature of the killing. A less straightforward example of a shooting incident within a barracks was the case of Lieutenant Christopher McCann. McCann was shot in Banagher Barracks, Offaly on 8 August 1922 by a Private McGrath. The incident was described as 'soldiers tricking with rifles' in a letter written to the O/C of the Third Southern Division and certified as an accident.[52] Similar to the Deehan case, witness statements were included, yet in this example the only witness statement is that of the soldier who shot McCann. The account is interesting in that it sets out the context for the shooting and suggests that an element of hazing may have been an unspoken aspect of barracks life and interpersonal relations between junior officers and ordinary soldiers. The relevant section of his witness statement has been reproduced in full:

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[47] Court of Inquiry, 2nd Witness, Lieut. Hynes Statement (MAI/MSPC/WCL_1329PATRICKDEEHAN).

[48] Court of Inquiry, 3rd Witness, Sgt. Ed. Kennedy Statement (MAI/MSPC/WCL_1329PATRICKDEEHAN).

[49] Court of Inquiry, 2nd Witness, Lieut. Hynes Statement (MAI/MSPC/WCL_1329PATRICKDEEHAN).

[50] Recommendation of the Army Pensions Board, 14 Mar. 1924 ; Recommendation of the Army Pensions Board, 8 Aug. 1924 (MAI/MSPC/WF24PatrickDeehan).

[51] Death Certificate: Patrick Deehan (https://civilrecords.irishgenealogy.ie/churchrecords/images/deaths_returns/deaths_1922/05068/4389167.pdf) (Accessed 3 June 2020).

[52] Letter to O/C 3rd Southern Division, 9 Aug. 1922 (MAI/MSPC/C2_13 Christopher McCann).

> I was on Guard in Banagher Barracks, on Tuesday 8/8/22. I was standing at Barrack door. Lieut McCann was sitting behind me. There was young lad sitting on his knee, I had my bayonet in its scabbard. Lieut McCann said "You ought to put that bayonet on the rifle, you would look more like a guard". I said "All-right" and I put the bayonet on. He said "Show me that here, and I will show you how a sentry should walk up and down." He took the rifle and bayonet from me, and walked up and down once in front of Barracks. He ordered arms and stood at ease. I was standing at the door and Lieut McCann brought the rifle to the ready and stood looking at me. I said "change it" or words to that effect, and he lunged at me with the rifle and bayonet. I stepped back into hall, Lt. McCann came to the door and stood facing me again. He started jabbing at me. The door was open and I stepped behind it, and shut it over. He struck the door with the butt of the rifle. I lifted up a chair and Lieut. McCann stuck the bayonet in it. I dropped the chair and kept going back into a corner of a room off the hall. Lieut McCann followed me. He stood covering me for a few minutes and I picked up a rifle which was in the room. I faced Lieut McCann and he said "it is no use to you". I took off safety catch, opened the rifle bolt and shoved it forward again. I pulled the trigger and Lieut McCann fell.[53]

It seems that the initial exchange between the two soldiers and McCann regarding how to present arms, was playful, indicating that some level of horseplay was relatively normal within the barracks. The description of McCann with 'a young lad on his knee', suggests that within posts, a certain informality reigned.[54] McGrath's eventual reasons for shooting McCann, were essentially a plea of self-defence. Despite this statement which would suggest that this death was not an 'accident', the death was certified as such by the military during the processing of the pension application sent by the mother of the deceased, Ellen McCann. Her application for a dependent's pension for her son Christopher McCann was refused. The reason for this was due to financial circumstances as opposed to the circumstances of Christopher McCann's death. In the report from the DMP as to her circumstance, it was commented that the 'applicant has a very industrious family and seem to be very comfortable'.[55] As dependent pensions were on the basis of means, any report that specified that the applicant was 'comfortable' typically resulted in a refused award. There are no courts martial records included with McCann's file. What happened to McGrath and whether he even faced a trial is unclear. As Private King was only tried in July 1923 for a killing a year earlier, it

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[53] Pte. B. McGrath, Witness Statement, 9 Aug. 1922 (MAI/MSPC/C2_13 Christopher McCann).

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ref. No.2/D/382, A.P. 16 Claim for Dependent's Allowance or Gratuity (MAI/MSPC/2D382Christopher McCann).

is foreseeable that significant delays occurred before McGrath's case was even reviewed.

In the cases of Deehan and McCann the shootings were deliberate, there were no mechanical or technical faults, and the soldiers involved both were reported to have readied weapons and then fired. While the reasoning in the case of McCann was relatively straightforward, the killing of Deehan appeared to have been completely random. Although the military justice system was at the time embryonic, a similar procedure was utilised; the soldiers were arrested and placed under guard pending a military enquiry. There is no evidence of the prevarication that was displayed during the proposed courts martial of O'Daly and nothing to indicate preferential treatment. Although cases were handled by local officers within the two barracks in question — Athlone and Banagher — the similarity of procedure indicates that the flexibility and discretion given to local IRA commanders during the Irish war of independence was not being utilised to the same effect. Additionally, while discipline was an issue for the National Army, there were procedures in place that were consistent across command areas. The one similarity regarding punishments carried out by IRA and National Army was a reluctance to execute their own.

A key component of military discipline involves effective punishments, including the death penalty for specific offences and crimes. During the First World War, the British Army executed 312 soldiers out of 5.7 million who served cumulatively throughout the war.[56] Transversely, this suggests that the reluctance of the IRA to execute 'one of their own' during the war of independence was shared by professional armies during one of the largest conflicts of the century. From November 1922, the National Army were tasked with carrying out an official policy of executing anti-Treaty IRA prisoners under a wider government programme of reprisals. This complicates the traditional usage of the death penalty for military discipline as the execution of anti-Treaty IRA prisoners was designed to effect change within an external organisation. It was not designed to augment or rectify issues of military discipline within the National Army and as a

[56] Timothy Bowman, *The Irish Regiments in the Great War* (Manchester, 2003), p. 2.

policy, it was pushed by civilian politicians as opposed to military leaders.[57] This expansion of the role of the military into areas of justice and reprisals meant that the traditional usage of the death penalty within militaries for internal discipline has been overlooked. This is further complicated by the 'unofficial' reprisals that occurred sporadically across the state during the initial months of the civil war, and there is an argument that the government's official policy was merely a legalisation of actions that had been occurring anyway. As the civil war executions have been conflated between official and unofficial actions, it is useful to categorise these killings into three distinct types: political executions as part of the government policy of reprisals, extrajudicial killings like Ballyseedy and Countess Bridge, and discipline executions within the National Army.

As part of the sample of National Army casualties, deaths outside of active combat and accidents were included in order to present a full picture of the types of military deaths that occurred during this period (Table 3.3). The total number of twenty-three non-combat/accidental deaths is small. Of the twenty-three men, six had no known cause of death listed, fourteen died from natural causes or illness, two drowned, and there was one execution. The execution was of a Private John Bernard Winsley, on 1 September 1922 at Cork Male Prison. It is not clear why Winsley was executed, although serious crimes such as treason or murder, would warrant this punishment.[58] Winsley's death predates the first official executions by nearly two months. The *Cork Examiner* contains a single reference to his death, without stating how he died, but noted that his death was 'deeply regretted by his sorrowing wife and sister and a large circle of friends'.[59] In *The Forgotten Fallen,* Langton lists Winsley as an ex-British serviceman, although he does not provide a citation or footnotes for this claim. A refused widow's pension was found in the British military records and is listed for a Bernard John Winsley, who is likely the

[57] An argument is made by B.T. Murphy and is supported by Mulcahy's statements to Dáil Éireann that by creating a legally sanctioned system of executions that 'unofficial' killings would decrease. However, as a number of extra-judicial killings occurred after the passage of the Public Safety Act, this would appear to have failed as a policy. — B.T. Murphy, 'The government's execution policy', pp 85-7.

[58] Winsley's execution is prior to the passing of more draconian measures such as the Public Safety Act. After September 1922, executions for relatively minor infractions became more widespread, an infamous example being the legally dubious execution of Erskine Childers for possession of an automatic pistol.

[59] *Cork Examiner* 2 Sept. 1922.

same man.[60] The pension was refused by the British military authorities on the grounds that he 'did not die as result of wounds or injuries'.[61] As he had been executed by a 'foreign' military in a newly formed dominion, it is clear that British pension authorities considered this to be outside the remit of the pension acts. The death certificate for Winsley is unequivocal and states that the cause of death was by 'execution' and that he had been a 'Private in the National Army'. There are no indications that this was written in error as Winsley's details were provided by a Colonel Commandant Byrne from the National Army.[62] Winsley is so far the only example of an internal and non-political execution undertaken by the National Army, as the six ex-National Army servicemen executed under the official reprisals had all deserted to join the anti-Treaty IRA. The lack of public notice and the clearly stated cause of death on the death certificate both imply that there may be other cases that have yet to be discovered in either the archival records or further studies of the death certificates.[63]

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[60] 13/W/694, Bernard John, Winsley. The National Archives (TNA) UK: WWI Pension Ledgers and Index Cards, 1914-1923.

[61] 621/13/W, Bernard John, Winsley. TNA, UK: WWI Pension Ledgers and Index Cards, 1914-1923.

[62] Death Certificate: John Bernard Winsley (https://civilrecords.irishgenealogy.ie/churchrecords/images/deaths_returns/deaths_1922/05066/4388498.pdf) (Accessed 4 June 2020).

[63] Note: The manner in which the GRO has organised and released death certificates, means that the researcher needs to know the name of the deceased in order to complete an effective search. It is not possible to search for specific causes of death.

Prior military experience and training

One question that arises from examining the causes of death is that of prior military experience and the overall military preparedness of the National Army. The 'character' of the National Army has been generally rated as poor in previous studies of the civil war. Hopkinson links the issue of training to the problems with discipline.[64] Valiulis' frequently references that Collins and Mulcahy worked to 'restrain' the army during provocations, in particular, the increases in guerrilla tactics.[65] Eunan O'Halpin is characteristically blunt, noting that despite the 'deficiencies of organisation, of training, of equipment, of leadership and of morale, the army operated as a national military force under the control of a civilian government'.[66] While these histories are correct in emphasising serious problems within the National Army, no coherent analysis of these issues is offered. Instead, critiques of the military by former senior officers are utilised to explain these deficiencies. Such critiques include Richard Mulcahy's statement that many of the men recruited into the military included 'members of the criminal element', and Sean MacMahon, chief of staff of the National Army from August 1922 to April 1924, said that most soldiers 'learned the basics of a rifle' on the way to an engagement, while Diarmuid MacManus emphasised that the military knowledge of officers was 'absurdly nil'.[67] There is an element of truth in these statements and it was likely that at different stages of the conflict, poor quality soldiers were recruited and weapons training was ad hoc in the early weeks of fighting. Assessing the military knowledge of junior officers is difficult, as senior officers themselves lacked adequate *military* training of any degree, with notable exceptions. The majority of senior military leadership of the National Army were IRA veterans, few of whom had previous military experience: J.J. 'Ginger' O'Connell, Emmet Dalton, W. R. E. Murphy and John T. Prout are obvious exceptions. The Officer Training Corps was only established in 1923, which meant that essentially MacManus's statement is true, and in 1922, encompassed *all* officers — not merely junior officers. In addition to the content of these statements — generalisations and to a certain degree, hearsay — is the context of circumstances under

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[64] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, p. 137.

[65] Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, pp 164-7.

[66] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p. 27.

[67] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, pp 136-137

which these statements were made, which was in testimony before the Army Enquiry committee in 1924.

A pervasive anti-militarism, of all hues, was to be expected after nearly five years of societal conflict and the disintegration of basic state functions in many parts of the country. Added to this the parallel traumas of partition and large-scale destruction of infrastructure, left the Free State in dire economic circumstances. It was within this context that the Army Enquiry committee was established after the events of the 'mutiny' in March 1924. In a kafkaesque decision, the Army Enquiry was empowered to investigate the conduct of the National Army during the civil war and post-war demobilisation, the sole *exception* being the exact circumstances of the army 'mutiny' and no testimony from the officers involved such as Liam Tobin and Charlie Dalton were brought before the committee.[68] This in part reflects the confused nature of civil-military relations after the civil war, as specific members of the Free State government had, to a certain degree, been colluding with the 'mutineers'. While the actions of the military leadership in arresting the 'mutineers' prior to any acts of insurrection, basically safeguarded the state by ensuring the primacy of civilian authority over the military.[69] The fact that civilian politicians had been undermining this, was an inconvenient fact of the case. While this committee and its remit requires a separate study to fully investigate the contextual and political aspects of its approach to the military, it must be noted that the committee's investigation was not in any way an impartial or apolitical. Instead, it was dominated by anti-military figures such as Kevin O'Higgins. This context means that critical statements as to the 'character' of the National Army, while true in some cases needs to be considered as a defence by the senior leadership of their role during the civil war as opposed to a wholly accurate portrayal of the military during the conflict.

A key aspect of this portrayal of a chaotic military is training or, lack thereof. Although Hopkinson declared that 'training at the Curragh remained unrealised' throughout 1922,

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[68] Valiulis, *Portrait of a Revolutionary*, p. 221.

[69] For a full account of the Irish army 'mutiny' see M.G. Valiulis, 'The 'Army Mutiny' of 1924 and the assertion of civilian authority in Independent Ireland' in *Irish Historical Studies* vol. 23, no. 92 (Nov., 1983), pp 354-86.

archival records indicate that this was not the case. Extensive statistical reports were generated by the Curragh training depot, which show the growing numbers of men undergoing training and the numbers available for service. These records were cited by Patrick Long in his study of the organisation of pro-Treaty forces, although Long primarily focused on the administrative aspects of the training regime as opposed to the actual numbers of men in training.[70] It is not clear why these records have been under-utilised as they provide a distinctive statistical record of how many soldiers underwent basic training, which runs counter to the narrative of a thoroughly untrained military. This is not to suggest that the quality of training was of the highest standard, but it is suggestive of a higher calibre of training than that of the average training received by IRA units, and included professional instructors, often ex-British Army NCOs who were employed to oversee the training.[71] The parameters of this training regime were set out in a lengthy memorandum on 6 July. The memorandum detailed the basic administration for dealing with recruits arriving at the Curragh:

> Administration. On arrival at the Curragh, Volunteers will be medically examined, and if certified fit for service, will be passed on to the Camp Adjutant. The Camp Adjutant will sort them into various arms of the service for which they are most suitable; allot each a number; make out a nominal roll with particulars, in triplicate, forwarding copies of same to the Pay Department and Camp Quartermaster.[72]

Although this is an ideal scenario, the reports from the Curragh broadly outlined much of what was set out in the memorandum, in particular the sorting of recruits into specific 'arms' of the service and the allotment of service numbers, which are evident on the Irish Army census itself.[73] The reports listed specific numbers of men, the type of training they had received and readiness measured in weeks. Remarks from training officers often were typed at the bottom of these forms. The first report dated 26 July 1922 contains a short summary of the current disposition of the reserves:

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[70] Long, 'Organisation and development of the pro-Treaty forces', pp 311-2.

[71] These ex-British Army instructors would later receive an infamous reputation during the crisis caused by demobilisation, as many of these instructors were kept on as trainers. However, in the case of military instructors recruited by Emmet Dalton to work at the Curragh Camp, these men were hired as civilian contractors and not as attested soldiers of the National Army — (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/50).

[72] Irish Republican Army Reserve, Organisation, 6 July 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/50).

[73] In the instructions for enumerating the Irish Army census, specific emphasis was placed upon previous service in the Curragh and the arms of service, in addition to the biographical and location information listed — J. Kavanagh, 'The digitised Irish Army 'Census'', pp 408-9.

> The numbers now available, Infantry, are those who have fired a musketry course. Remainder are those with previous experience. As rifles become more available the number in 3 weeks may be twice that given. Those available include men employed on Barracks duties.[74]

Each report was prefaced with the following preamble, but due to the 26 July report being the first iteration, only the present strength is recorded:

> Strength on previous return: ____-___
> Additional Men received since last return: ___-__
> Total: __-__
> Discharges and drafts as per attached: ___-__
> Present Strength: __2436__ [75]

The rest of the report is in tabular form and shows the current number of troops ready for deployment and the subsequent numbers that will be ready in weekly intervals (Table 3.5).

[74] Notes from Colonel J.J. Hunt, V.R. 2 Curragh Reserve, 26 July 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/50) — the emphasis is retained from the original. The lack of rifles was to remain a consistent issue cited in these training reports to the Chief of the General Staff.

[75] V.R. 2 Curragh Reserve, 26 July 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/50).

Table 3.5 V.R. 2 Curragh Reserve Report — 26 July 1922[76]

26 July	Number ready for drafts	Ready in 1 weeks	Ready in 2 weeks	Ready in 3 weeks	Others	Total
Infantry	321	—	—	100	—	421
Artillery	6	6	6	18		36
Machine Gunners	6	6	6	12		30
Snipers	—					
illegible	—					
Scouts	—					
Army Medical Corps	—					
Transport	—					
Quartermaster	—					
Driver (Artillery)	6	—	—	—	—	6
Driver (Motor)	6	—	—	—	—	6
Total	345	12	12	130		499

Despite the weekly intervals set out in Table 3.5, it appears that reports were sent on a biweekly basis for the first few weeks, as a second report was sent on 29 July which recorded an additional 181 men received since the previous return.[77] The tabular returns showed a marked increase in the number of men available in two and three weeks (Table 3.6). As cited by Colonel Hunt on the first return, additional rifles meant that increased numbers of Infantry would be available for service. The diversification of training remained low, with only 6 Drivers ready for immediate deployment and similar numbers available for Artillery and Machine Gun units. However, it was clear that additional training in other areas such as Transport, Medical Corps, Scouts and Quartermaster duties were all planned.

[76] This table is a reproduction of the V.R.2 form for 26 July 1922 — V.R. 2 Curragh Reserve, 26 July 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/50).

[77] This means that an additional 181 had arrived at the Curragh Camp within three days of the previous return — V.R. 2 Curragh Reserve, 29 July 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/50).

Table 3.6 V.R. 2 Curragh Reserve Report — 29 July 1922[78]

29 July	Number ready for drafts	Ready in 1 weeks	Ready in 2 weeks	Ready in 3 weeks	Others	Total
Infantry	—	—	300	300	—	600
Artillery	6	6	6	12		30
Machine Gunners	6	6	6	12		30
Snipers	—					
illegible	—					
Scouts						
Army Medical Corps						
Transport						
Quartermaster						
Driver (Motor)						0
Driver (Artillery)	6					6
Total	18	12	312	324		666

As there are an uneven number of training reports per month from July-November, a monthly average of the reports issued for each month was created (Table 3.7).

Table 3.7 Average number of soldiers in training per month — July-Nov. 1922[79]

Month	No. in Training (Avg. Monthly)
July 1922	2,460
Aug 1922	2,118
Sept 1922	2,450
Oct 1922	2,789
Nov 1922	2,974

[78] V.R. 2 Curragh Reserve, 29 July 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/50).

[79] Note: This table contains training figures from twenty-two V.R. 2 Curragh Reserve reports issued between 26 July and 13 November 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/50).

While these totals indicate that the training regime remained constant throughout the initial months of the civil war, additional context is required as to what percentage of the total military received training. Unfortunately, due to limitations of military administration, it is not currently possible to ascertain how many National Army casualties received training at the Curragh. This is primarily due to partial attestation records for servicemen and the lack of standardised service numbers. During the enumeration of the Irish Army census, this aspect of military record keeping was rectified and prior service at the Curragh became listed along with regimental numbers for each soldier.[80] This means that the total number of men listed on the census who received training at the Curragh can be tabulated per month. This includes the first six months of 'recruitment' data listed on the Irish Army census. The pro-Treaty forces that were listed on the census as having 'attested' into the National Army between January and June 1922, did not formally join a separate organisation. Instead, these servicemen were listing their pro-Treaty IRA affiliation. While this automatically means that a significant number of National Army servicemen were IRA veterans, it also indicates that by 1922, there was a clear distinction being made between IRA service during the war of independence and the so-called 'Trucileers' (those who joined after the Truce was declared between the IRA and the Crown forces). As the census forms do not list a category for prior military service, it is currently not possible to ascertain the specific years of prior military service for men listed on the census rolls. For the sample of National Army casualties, this information is available from the pension applications of next of kin, as often the years of service were utilised as part of military service pensions, which were awarded on the basis of time served. There are also a small number of servicemen whose attestation details that were recorded as part of the pension process. However, the same caveats apply for 'attestations' pre-July 1922, as this merely indicates that these men were part of a pro-Treaty IRA unit at that time. One exception to this was casualties that were listed on the Dublin Guard nominal roll, which was a wholly pro-Treaty unit established in January 1922. This unit was established under the direct control of the pro-Treaty GHQ and is often considered the unofficial 'first unit' of the National Army. As this unit is different from the pre-split

[80] J. Kavanagh, 'The digitised Irish Army 'Census'', p. 408.

IRA, it cannot be assumed that all those who were listed on the nominal roll were former IRA members.

From the Irish Army census rolls, it is possible to compare the rates of training received by recruits as a percentage of the monthly intake. For example, in January 1922, 56 men were listed on the Irish Army census as having 'attested' in that month. Nineteen of these soldiers were listed as having served at the Curragh according to the census records. Therefore, the rate of training received by the January intake was thirty-four percent. As training records are not available for the casualty rates, it is not possible to know how many men who were killed had received training at the Curragh. However, by including the casualties date of attestation, it is possible to see what the overall trend for recruitment intake per month was regarding training (Table 3.8).[81]

[81] Note: Monthly recruitment only applies to July-November 1922, the earlier six month period is better understood as a listing of pro-Treaty forces that were under the nominal control of GHQ and the Provisional Government.

Table 3.8 Percentages of servicemen who received Curragh training[82]

Month (1922)	No. of Attestations (NA Sample)	No. of Attestations (Census)	No. of Servicemen with service at the Curragh (Census)	% of Attestations who received training (Census)
January 1922	3	56	19	34%
February 1922	13	1,248	328	26%
March 1922	18	2,395	793	33%
April 1922	22	3,136	1,105	35%
May 1922	14	3,406	1,370	40%
June 1922	2	1,279	522	41%
subtotal	72	11,520	4,137	36%
July 1922	11	6,055	3,382	56%
August 1922	11	4,811	2,503	52%
September 1922	4	3,428	1,982	58%
October 1922	0	3,263	1,862	57%
November 1922	0	865	449	52%
subtotal	26	18,422	10,178	55%
Total	**98**	**29,942**	**14,315**	48%

In order to illustrate the differences between pro-Treaty forces and later recruits under the Volunteer Levy scheme, Table 3.8 has been divided into two subsections divided between January-June and July-November. From these figures a sharp distinction can be drawn between the pro-Treaty IRA forces and Levy recruits, with just over thirty-six percent of the former group receiving training and fifty-five percent of the Volunteer Levy intake receiving training. One possible explanation is that prior service with the IRA was considered sufficient 'training' and therefore the Curragh training system was predominately utilised for Levy recruits. Another consideration is that soldiers were rotated to and from the Curragh from the January-June group of pro-Treaty forces, as they were already on active service from the outbreak of the civil war. As the majority of casualty attestations occurred pre-July of 1922, it is likely that the rate of training

[82] Note: The attestations from the National Army sample are included only as a comparative to the census attestations, these men do no provide evidence of Curragh training.

was similar to the figures recorded by the census.[83] This suggests that overall casualties were less likely to have received training at the Curragh training depot, which is somewhat supported by the prior military service information available from the sample of casualties, with a significant minority of servicemen having previous experience in the IRA or Crown forces (Table 3.9).[84]

Table 3.9 Previous military/paramilitary experience of National Army casualties

Former military service	No.	Former paramilitary service	No.
British Army	68	IRA	128
British Navy	2		
Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC)	4		
Canadian Forces	1		
TOTAL	75		128

The relatively high number of casualties with ex-British military service indicates that a number of casualties did not require any training prior to deployment, as the majority of these men would have had experience during the First World War. RIC personnel were trained using carbines and would also have had experience with firearms. The amount of actual military experience within IRA units is difficult to quantify; as summarised earlier from the census returns for January-June, over 11,000 men were attached to various pro-Treaty IRA units. When these men joined the IRA cannot be ascertained from the census returns. There is a vast gulf between serving as a lookout or providing a safe house and being part of an Active Service Unit (ASU). Due to the high rates of accidental deaths, there are questions as to whether a proportion of casualties who had formerly been in the IRA were in the latter category, or were former ASU members who joined the National Army and were killed during operations. By comparing the cause of death against prior military service, there are indications that the military leadership's

[83] Note: As only 98 out of 408 servicemen on the casualty sample had any attestation information available, this is at best an early finding and subject to further change if more attestation details are found in the Military Archives.

[84] Note: Fourteen men had joined service in the IRA and one branch of the British military/police: British Army (10), British Navy (2) and RIC (2).

policy of utilising experienced units such as the Dublin Guard during most of the initial combat operations of the civil war, was extended to all those with experience of some kind. As the majority of casualties that had prior military/paramilitary experience, died during combat operations (Table 3.10).

Table 3.10 Causes of Death of National Army casualties with prior military/ paramilitary service

Cause of Death	Previous IRA	Previous British Army	Previous British Navy	Previous RIC	Previous Canadian Army	TOTAL
Combat						
Gunshot	97	51	2	1	0	151
KIA	2	4	0	0	0	6
Explosions	7	3	0	0	0	10
Fractured Skull	2	0	0	0	0	2
Accidents						
Shootings	12	7	0	1	1	21
Explosions	0	0	0	0	0	0
Motor Accidents	4	1	0	2	0	7
Other						
Natural Causes	4	0	0	0	0	4
Executed	0	1	0	0	0	1
TOTAL	128	66	2	4	1	202

Map 3.1 National Army casualties in July 1922



Map 3.2 National Army casualties in August 1922





Map 3.3 National Army casualties in September 1922



Map 3.4 National Army casualties in October 1922



Geography of National Army casualties

The geographic distribution of National Army casualties across the Free State has yet to be examined in the discourse of the civil war and this is in part due to the lack of accurate figures and locations of deaths.[85] Two geographic attributes were collated as part of the sample of National Army casualties: home addresses and place of death/ wounding. Each of these was utilised to create a series of county maps showing the home county of casualties and the corresponding county where each soldier died. This type of analysis has not yet been attempted in a comprehensive manner; yet it would allow for a macro analysis of casualty trends across the state and highlight counties that produced higher casualties in the initial period of the civil war. The county totals provide a broad overview of losses across the Free State between July and November 1922, showing the place of death/wounding for each soldier and their listed home county (Maps 3.1–3.4). The geographic distribution of deaths for July 1922, shows that although the National Army was still largely concentrated in-known pro-Treaty areas, casualties can be seen across most of the western seaboard and elements of upper Munster, particularly Limerick, Clare and Tipperary (Map 3.1). In Leinster, sans Dublin, the rate of casualties is extremely low and is reflective of the pro-Treaty disposition of those counties and the substantial pro-Treaty IRA divisions that formed the nucleus of the National Army. Although the map of casualties by county largely substantiates the estimates provided to the Provisional Government by Richard Mulcahy, there are two counties where the casualties are higher than the average: Clare and Sligo. Neither county was highlighted by Mulcahy, yet both counties contained substantial numbers of anti-Treaty IRA personnel and sympathisers. The lack of casualties in county Kerry and the low number of deaths in Cork are reflective of the absence of the National Army from large parts of both counties. In addition to the county of death/wounding, the home addresses, where this is known for each soldier was included as a comparative. The home addresses are all island, as highlighted in the previous chapter on recruitment, and the National Army contained recruits from every county on the island and the constituent countries of the UK.[86] The home addresses are not reflective of recruitment

[85] Peter Hart does provide some limited numbers of National Army casualties in Cork during the period 1922-3, however, his hand-drawn maps are often unclear as to exactly where deaths are occurring and are limited to county Cork as opposed to the entire Free State — Peter Hart, 'The IRA and its enemies: violence and community in county Cork, 1917-1923' (Ph.D thesis, Trinity College Dublin, 1992), p 150.

[86] Note: There are eight deceased servicemen from the UK: England (4), Scotland (3) and Wales (1).

patterns, although the concentration of Dublin-based soldiers dying throughout the state is a pattern that is replicated throughout this dataset.

The National Army losses for August reflect the operations undertaken in Cork and Kerry, with an increase in the number of losses in Tipperary and Mayo (Map 3.2). The high casualties for Limerick and Dublin were reduced, however, the overall number of deceased servicemen increased slightly from 97 to 110. The soldiers' home counties are more widespread for August and there is an overall increase in the distribution from Northern Ireland. However, even though the National Army had operationally extended across large swathes of the Free State, and entire regions have little to no listed casualties. This indicates that the intensity of the conflict from the perspective of the National Army was in southern Munster during August 1922. By September, the majority of National Army losses remained concentrated in Munster, specifically in Cork and Kerry (Map 3.3). Mayo remained an outlier on the western seaboard, reporting the highest casualties in Connaught. This is indicative of two factors: concentrated anti-Treaty forces and the success of the National Army's initial efforts to expand the territory under the relative control of the Provisional Government.[87] The soldiers' home counties were beginning to reflect the massive recruitment drive between July and August and could be evidence of a more localised aspect to the fighting in Munster, as the number of soldiers with home address in Cork (10) were approaching the numbers from Dublin (16). The casualties for October, although lower than the totals for the period between July and September, were more evenly distributed across the state. Cork remained the county with the single highest number of deaths (Map 3.4). Kildare and Dublin recorded increased casualties, followed by Waterford and Tipperary. Despite this increased distribution, the previously consistent rate of casualties in Mayo appeared to be reducing in scale. The home addresses for the soldiers continued the earlier trend from October; while Dublin remained a plurality of all home addresses. As the casualties for November only reflects thirteen days, any map projections would be distorted by the partial nature of the figures provided.

[87] As noted by Hopkinson, much of the local 'control' wielded by the National Army in large parts of Connaught was tenuous, a prime example of this was the ongoing efforts of anti-Treaty IRA figures, Michael Kilroy in Mayo and Frank Carty in Sligo who managed to occupy towns (briefly) during the period, September-December 1922. — Hopkinson, *Green against green*, pp 212-17.

In addition to the county totals, a time-series analysis was generated to provide a daily rate of casualties (Fig. 3.1). From this, three distinct 'peak' days are recorded in August, September and October, where the daily number of casualties reached ten or more men. Each of these 'peaks' were individually examined in order to ascertain which counties have the most deaths over the three days in question (Table 3.11).

Fig. 3.1 Time Series National Army Casualties (July-November 1922)



Table 3.11 Daily casualty 'peaks' August-October 1922

County of Death	8 August 1922	16 September 1922	22 October 1922
Cork	8	7	3
Dublin	1	0	0
Kerry	0	1	0
Kildare	0	0	1
Leitrim	0	1	0
Limerick	0	1	0
Mayo	0	7	0
Offaly	1	0	0
Tipperary	0	0	1
Waterford	0	0	2
Wexford	0	0	4
TOTAL	10	17	11

County Cork has the highest number of casualties across all three dates, which is indicative of the First Southern Division's strength as well as the anti-Treaty position that was generally taken in Cork during this period. Counties Mayo and Wexford are the next largest counties for casualties during the three 'peak' dates. All three of these counties had a notable anti-Treaty IRA presence during the entirety of the civil war. Although the county-level analysis shows the distribution across the Free State in a generalised way, it is also possible to illustrate this distribution by district electoral divisions (DEDs). By using the peak dates identified by the time series analysis and by focusing upon DEDs instead of counties, it is possible to examine the high rates of death within specific counties.

Map 3.5 National Army casualties by electoral division (July-Nov 1922)



Map 3.6 National Army casualties by electoral division in county Cork (August 1922)



Map 3.7 National Army casualties by electoral division in county Mayo (September 1922)



Map 3.8 National Army casualties by electoral division in county Cork (September 1922)



Due to the specificity of an electoral division map, which consists of 3,409 individual DEDs, it can be difficult to visualise the entire country as the resulting highlights the concentrated nature of the casualties within counties (Map 3.5). Although the intra-county nature of the deaths is immediate, with large sections of the country recording no National Army casualties at all during the entire July to November period in 1922. While comparative statistics are not available for anti-Treaty IRA losses at a similar scale, it can be speculated that there is a high correlation between the areas of high National Army deaths and anti-Treaty IRA deaths. However, in this case it is likely that Dublin would be slightly overrepresented due to the executions that took place at military installations in Dublin city. The DED analyses (Maps 3.6–3.8) focus upon specific counties detected during the time series analysis which identified 'peak' dates in August and September (Fig. 3.1). As the counties involved needed to have deaths higher than the average of three casualties per day, the 'peak' date of 22 October was excluded. The eleven deaths recorded on this date were distributed across several counties: Wexford (4), Cork (3), Waterford (2), Tipperary and Kildare each reported one casualty each. The deaths in Wexford were all caused by a single ambush at Ferrycarrig Bridge. Though technically above the daily average, there was only a single event with discernible patterns within the county. A DED analysis is therefore superfluous as there is no distribution throughout the county.

As noted from the earlier time series analysis, 8 August was one of three 'peaks' where the number of casualties per day was much higher than the average of three per day. Of the ten deaths recorded for 8 August, eight were in Cork, with a single death recorded for Dublin and Offaly. Map. 3.6 shows the deaths in county Cork for the entire month of August in order to contextualise the peak date of 8 August. The casualties during August in Cork were concentrated in the suburbs of Cork city and Passage West — one of the landings sites for the National Army.[88] In addition to the harbour and city environs, the other identifiable clusters occurred in urban areas: Macroom (3) and Clonakilty (2). The remainder of casualties are spread across the entire county. As Cork was the largest county in the Free State and contained the strongest and most active anti-Treaty IRA division (First Southern), it is to be expected that the losses would be higher in this

[88] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, p. 163.

environment. Conversely as the total National Army deaths recorded for Cork during August were twenty, this could be viewed as evidence of a somewhat exaggerated view of the lethality of the First Southern Division in active combat scenarios.[89] There are no accidental deaths of any kind recorded in Cork for August 1922, although nineteen men died from gunshots/KIA and one was killed in an explosion. Despite the large geographic area of counties Kerry and Cork, clusters of casualties were only apparent within urban areas or in areas that were connected the seaborne landings. This means that the earlier pattern as shown in Map 3.1 of high casualties in Limerick and Dublin, which largely occurred within the urban areas, is mirrored in August.

16 September was the second 'peak' date identified from the time series analysis and two counties were identified as having the highest numbers of deaths on that specific date: Mayo and Cork (Maps 3.7 and 3.8). As shown from the county analyses (Maps 3.1-3.4), each county consistently recorded casualties during this period, albeit at different levels, with Mayo reporting the lowest overall deaths. The cause of death for casualties in Mayo during September included nine gunshot/KIA and a single accidental shooting. Despite having three distinct urban areas (Castlebar, Ballina, and Westport), the recorded urban casualties were minor, with a single death at Westport (Map 3.7). Most deaths (six) occurred as a result of the 'battle' of Glenamoy. More accurately described as an ambush, Glenamoy happened four days after the successful 'invasion' of Ballina by anti-Treaty forces, under the command of Michael Kilroy, who succeeded in forcing the surrender of National Army forces in the town, demonstrating the tenuous position of Free State forces in traditional anti-Treaty areas.[90] An account of the ambush, originally published in 1987 in the *North Mayo Historical Journal* by Thomas Langan,[91] observed that the 'the country [Glenamoy] is of an undulating character, intersected with deep valleys and ravines, and altogether an ideal country for an

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[89] Peter Hart created estimates for the numbers of National Army and IRA killed in Cork during this period, however, Hart utilised percentages instead of whole numbers, therefore it is impossible to compare directly his estimates to the dataset — Peter Hart, *The IRA and its enemies* (Oxford, 1998), pp 120-1.

[90] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, p. 212.

[91] This account has been reproduced in full at the following website (http://goldenlangan.com/glenamoy.html) (Accessed 20 Aug. 2020). However, the website is of poor quality, and the account was also republished and expanded upon in Langton's *The forgotten fallen*, pp 82-89.

ambush'.[92] Langan outlines how the National Army troops were ill-prepared for the engagement, while Kilroy effectively utilised machine guns.[93] The anti-Treaty forces also used explosive bullets, which were responsible for the at least four of the six casualties: Captain Healy, Lieutenant Gill, Sergeant Major Crabbe and Private Bray.[94] Kilroy also mined the road during his retreat, resulting in the Red Cross ambulance being forced to take a detour, during which another soldier died en route to hospital. In total, National Army losses were six dead and seventeen captured, who were later released by Kilroy. In contrast to the relatively successful campaigns between July and August, which expanded the territory under the control of the Free State, the Glenamoy ambush marks the beginning of significant losses from guerrilla-style attacks in isolated rural areas. Much of the blame for this operation can be attributed to the poor leadership of the commander of the National Army forces, Brigadier General Neary, who led his men into the ambush without sufficient equipment and support. His decision emphasises the lack of sufficient training amongst the officer corps.

From September to November, Cork had the highest number of National Army casualties. The earlier concentration within urban areas remained consistent with a slight increase within Cork city (3) and Macroom (3) remaining unchanged (Map 3.8). The causes of death for National Army personnel in Cork were substantially different for September; of the twenty-four casualties, sixteen were killed by gunshot/KIA, seven were killed by explosions, two were killed in accident shootings and one was executed. The variance in cause of death reflects a change in tactics towards more guerrilla-style attacks on convoys and the increasing use of land mines, particularly outside of towns. This is particularly evident in the numbers killed at Carrigaphooca outside Macroom, Co. Cork,[95] which involved a land-mine explosion that killed seven National Army troops, including Colonel-Commandant, Tom Kehoe, a former member of 'The Squad', and one of a number of Dublin Guardsmen stationed across the country in senior positions. In this instance, there were no anti-Treaty forces present. Rather, the men were killed whilst attempting move a land mine, and in their failure to realise that there

[92] Langton, *The forgotten fallen*, p. 84.

[93] Ibid., p. 85.

[94] Ibid.

[95] This area is sometimes spelled as 'Carrigaphooka'.

was a secondary device, it was promptly detonated, killing the entire group.[96] While different to the events of Glenamoy as anti-Treaty forces were not present, the result of both engagements was that 16 September became the largest recorded day for casualties during the entire period of July-November 1922.

This section highlights the often hyper-localised nature of the National Army casualties during the period between July and October. County totals provide a very clear overview of the situation for the National Army as regards to losses across the Free State per month. The county of origin drawn from the home addresses of casualties was utilised as a comparative in order to distinguish any patterns of deceased soldiers' origins that may exist. Dublin is listed by 90 soldiers as their place of origin. At least 42 of these soldiers were listed as being members of the Dublin Guard, an elite unit of the National Army used extensively in the seaborne landings in Kerry and Cork. Of the 408 casualties listed, the Dublin Guard is the largest single plurality in terms of named military units that the deceased soldiers were attached to. Additionally, there were significant numbers of men from the Second Eastern Division, a Dublin-based unit fighting in Cork and Kerry from August 1922. It is likely that the remainder of Dublin-based deaths are from this unit.

As this is the first study to map these National Army losses, the analysis provides some new insight regarding areas where the National Army were losing personnel on a regular basis in addition to areas where the numbers of casualties remained negligible throughout the entire period. The 'quiet' areas, depending on the month, encompass half of the territory with the Free State, highlighting the localised nature of the actual *fighting* during the Irish civil war. However, the county totals show that the situation per county, remained volatile during this entire period; Dublin for example, listed proportionally high casualties for July and October, with a relative lull in the intervening months. This inconsistency led to the creation of DED maps, which were able to account for spikes of casualties within counties. This analysis concentrated upon specific counties with higher casualty rates identified from the earlier time series analysis. This resulted in the finding that many of these spikes in casualties were caused by single 'clusters' such as engagements at Glenamoy and Carrigaphoca. Confirming

[96] Langton, *The forgotten fallen*, pp 186-7.

the overall conclusion that the fighting and dying during the Irish civil war remained highly localised.

Social characteristics of National Army casualties

The social backgrounds of the National Army personnel remain largely unknown with the exception of a limited study undertaken by Peter Hart. In 1999, Hart published an article on the social structure of the IRA, as part of this study, Hart utilised small samples of National Army personnel for comparative purposes. Hart focused upon the prior occupation of IRA volunteers and in certain cases their fathers' profession as a proxy for social class. Hart concluded that the National Army was more 'proletarian' than the IRA, in part due to the large numbers of un/semi-skilled workers and the relatively low numbers of farmers' sons and agricultural labourers.[97] Whether it is possible to attribute such a broad label to a diverse and under-studied organisations such as the National Army is very much open to debate, however, Hart is not alone in utilising this type of categorisation of social class. Gavin M. Foster is his study of the 'social' dimension of the Irish civil war, noted that much of the previous scholarship that examines sociological aspects of the conflict has 'proceeded from the tacit assumption that, for all practical purposes, social class can be reduced to a narrow set of retrospectively ascribed and universally applicable socioeconomic variables', which is clearly not the case in social sciences, where the question of what constitutes social class remains contested and subject to frequent revision.[98] While Foster's critique deserves consideration, his countering analysis deliberately 'eschewed' statistical processes for more esoteric and theoretical approaches to the conflict.[99] Foster's approach was based heavily upon a concept of 'social status' and respectability, arguably an even more nebulous approach to the society as these are concepts are often based upon an individual's conception of self.[100] This is not meant to detract from Foster's analysis, merely noting his alternative approach is largely unreproducible using a sample of National Army personnel. Therefore, the model outlined by Hart will be followed for this study of the social backgrounds of National Army casualties, however, the caveats and limitations of this approach will be highlighted where appropriate.

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[97] Hart, 'Social structure of the IRA' pp 224-25.

[98] Gavin M. Foster, *The Irish civil war and society* (London, 2015), p. 16.

[99] Ibid, p. 16.

[100] Foster identifies six authors or 'cultural observers' whose collective insights into Irish society are important to his entire analysis, emphasising the individual and idiosyncratic nature of this type of study — Foster, *Irish civil war and society*, p. 16.

Although the Irish Army census is currently the largest repository of information on the National Army, it is lacking in social and economic data, notably the prior occupation of soldiers was not recorded. While marital status is noted, specifics such as the size of a household was not typically provided. Therefore, the social characteristics available from the census are the age of the soldier and marital status. During the process of creating the database of casualties, the prior occupations and in some cases the occupations of fathers was listed as part of dependent's pension applications. As the age and marital status of deceased soldiers is also available from the database, it is possible to contextualise these findings against the Irish Army census returns in order to ascertain if the casualties database broadly conform to the age and marital profile of the National Army. The ages were grouped in general categories using the breakdown of ages utilised by Peter Hart: under 20, 20-9, 30-9, 40-9 and 50-9. While these age ranges do not conform to typical age ranges utilised in social studies, as they form the basis of Hart's social study of the IRA, it was decided to replicate his approach to facilitate a comparative analysis. Hart's analysis of the ages of IRA veterans was divided between different time periods, therefore only the ages available from 1922-3 were utilised as a point of comparison (Table 3.12).

Table 3.12 Ages of IRA Volunteers (1922-3) (%)[101]

Age	IRA (Officers) %	IRA (Men) %
Sample size:	*335*	*1,409*
Under 20	3	17
20-9	73	75
30-9	20	7
40-9	3	1
50-9	—	0.1

Hart also subdivided his samples between officers and men, this is more complicated for the National Army due to the presence of NCOs. However, the baseline findings of Hart's analysis was that the over seventy percent of both IRA officers and men were aged 20-9. In contrast the National Army was significantly younger, except for officers

[101] Reproduced from Table 4 — Hart, 'Social structure of the IRA', pp 216-7.

which broadly conformed to the findings of Hart's analysis (Table 3.13). This is to be expected since a considerable number of National Army officers were ex-IRA members. However, Hart's findings are based upon samples, while the census recorded a snapshot of the entire military. This means going forward, comparisons using sample IRA units should need to be weighted against the National Army figures, until an equivalent database can be assembled from the IRA nominal rolls, which provided similar data in a comprehensive manner.

Table 3.13 Age ranges of the National Army[102]

Age Ranges	National Army (Officers)	%	National Army (NCOs)	%	National Army (Enlisted Men)	%	TOTAL	%
Under 20	94	4%	388	9%	6,333	26%	6,815	22%
20-9	1,675	76%	2,924	68%	13,693	56%	18,292	59%
30-9	290	13%	676	16%	2,637	11%	3,603	12%
40-9	37	2%	149	3%	857	3%	1,043	3%
50-9	4	0%	23	1%	141	1%	168	1%
60-9	—		—		6	0%	6	0%
NA	92	4%	131	3%	861	4%	1,084	3%
Total	2,192		4,291		24,528		31,011	

Hart does refer to the marital status of IRA and National Army personnel. This is typically presented as a brief aside and is not tabulated, an example of this is his description of the marital status of the IRA as compared to the national rates of marriage:

> The typical volunteer was not only youthful but also unmarried. The two go together of course, but IRA members were unusually unwed even by Irish standards. Of men aged 20-4 in the Irish Free State 4 per cent were married in 1926, rising to 20 percent among those aged 25-9. Out of a sample of 572 IRA prisoners in 1923 whose marital status was known — and whose median age was 25 — less than 5 per cent (27) were married. And, since a higher proportion

[102] Note: A small number of soldiers were listed with an age but no rank and are therefore not included in this tabulation.

> of the population was married in urban areas (32 per cent of those aged 25-9), where most active volunteers lived, the marital gap between them and their peers was probably even greater.[103]

Hart's analysis found very small numbers of married IRA volunteers, based upon a sample taken of IRA men in prison. While large numbers of IRA personnel were imprisoned during the Irish civil war, 572 men is not an effective sample of the over 12,000 who were imprisoned.[104] Therefore, these findings are extremely limited as Hart provides no details of how this sample was created, there is no criteria provided and it is unclear what units are being sampled. When describing the ages and marital status of the National Army, Hart also reverts to a more elliptical overview, 'the novice soldiers were young (their median age was 24 and many were under 20) and unmarried (95 per cent).'[105] Hart also created a sample of 2,106 men taken from the Irish Army census. The details of how this was collated are not provided. Examining the fully transcribed census, revealed that the percentage of unmarried soldiers was just under eighty percent, a significant difference from both of Hart's samples of ages for IRA volunteers and National Army personnel (Table 3.14).

Table 3.14 Marital Status — National Army

Marital Status	Census	%
Single	24,967	79.3%
Married	5,616	17.8%
Widower	58	0.2%
Co-habitation / Common Law Marriage	1	0.0%
NA	827	2.6%
Total	31,469	

[103] Hart, 'Social structure of the IRA', pp 216-7.

[104] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, p. 228; 273.

[105] Hart, 'Social structure of the IRA', p. 225.

In order to fully contextualise the marital status of the National Army, it was decided to examine the largest categories: Single and Married distributed by age and rank (Tables 3.15-16).[106]

Table 3.15 Rank and Age distribution of unmarried soldiers in the National Army

Age Ranges	National Army (Officers)	%	National Army (NCOs)	%	National Army (Enlisted Men)	%
Under 20	93	5%	380	12%	6,261	32%
20-9	1,506	82%	2,387	77%	11,727	59%
30-9	173	9%	265	9%	1,141	6%
40-9	10	1%	29	1%	231	1%
50-9	1	0%	—		32	0%
60-9	—		—		2	0%
NA	49	3%	55	2%	316	2%
Total	1,832		3,116		19,710	

Table 3.16 Rank and Age distribution of married soldiers in the National Army

Age Ranges	National Army (Officers)	%	National Army (NCOs)	%	National Army (Enlisted Men)	%
Under 20	1	0%	1	0%	28	1%
20-9	157	50%	511	47%	1,842	44%
30-9	116	37%	404	38%	1,457	35%
40-9	27	9%	117	11%	603	15%
50-9	3	1%	22	2%	107	3%
60-9	—		—		4	0%
NA	10	3%	21	2%	103	2%
Total	314		1,076		4,144	

[106] Note: Only 58 widowers were listed, therefore it was decided to exclude them from this study as they represented less than one percent of the total military.

As shown in Table 3.15, unmarried soldiers were concentrated in the 20-9 age bracket, which is to be expected for a military that in the aggregate was largely within that age category. A significant number of unmarried enlisted men were also aged under-20, which also reflects the broader trends outlined in Table 3.13. Although it would be expected that the age profile of married soldiers would shift to an older age bracket of 30-9 or 40-9, the plurality of all soldiers fell within the 20-9 range, with 30-9 being the second largest category (Table 3.16). Early marriages were largely non-existent as only 30 marriages were listed for soldiers aged under-20. Although Hart was correct to note the 'youthful' nature of the National Army, the unrepresentative nature of his census sample is clearly demonstrated from the tabulations using the fully transcribed dataset. The rate of married men is just under one-fifth of the military, as opposed to five percent of Hart's sample. This means that the overall demographic profile of the National Army that can be ascertained from the census is a military that has a majority of unmarried personnel and contains a plurality of personnel aged 20-9. As the casualties database contains the details of age and marital status, it is possible to test how representative casualties were in this regard.

Table 3.17 Age range of National Army casualties[107]

Age Ranges	National Army (Officers)	%	National Army (NCOs)	%	National Army (Enlisted Men)	%	TOTAL	%
Under 20	1	2%	7	10%	49	21%	57	15%
20-9	45	69%	47	70%	124	52%	216	58%
30-9	8	12%	4	6%	11	5%	23	6%
40-9	1	2%	—		2	1%	3	1%
50-9	1	2%	—		—		1	0%
NA	9	14%	9	13%	53	22%	71	19%
Total	65		67		239		371	

[107] Note: Missing from this table are thirty-seven National Army casualties where a rank was not listed in the available records.

Table 3.18 Marital status of National Army casualties

Marital Status	Casualties	%
Single	315	77.2%
Married	39	9.6%
Widower	2	0.5%
Co-habitation / Common Law Marriage	1	0.2%
NA	51	12.5%
Total	408	

National Army casualties largely cohere to the findings of the totals taken from the census returns. The majority were aged 20-9, with a significant minority of enlisted men aged under 20. The marital status of casualties broadly follows the trends for the military as recorded by the census, however, a smaller proportion of married men were identified, which may be explained by the higher rate of soldiers where a marital status was not known (Table 3.18). Therefore, the casualties database is generally representative of the military in regard to age and marital status. This is important to establish this prior to any examination of the previous occupations of deceased soldiers, as it is not possible to weight this information against the census returns, since it was not recorded. Of the 408 casualties, over two-thirds had some type of prior occupation listed and just under half of the father's occupations were listed in either the pension applications or were found after cross-referencing the casualties database against Irish census returns for 1901/11. Similarly to the earlier replication of Hart's age ranges, the sub-divisions of occupations utilised by Hart were replicated for the casualties database, in order to facilitate a comparative analysis.[108] Unlike his study of National Army ages, Hart examined National Army occupations using a sample of 4,532 National Army personnel divided into two elements, a 'provincial' sample of 3,842 and a Dublin sample of 690. This has been reproduced for comparative purposes (Table 3.19).

[108] Hart sub-divided the prior occupations of IRA volunteers into nine categories, following a breakdown outlined in Guy Routh's, *Occupation and pay in Great Britain, 1906-I979* (London, I980).

Table 3.19 Occupations of National Army Recruits in 1922 (P. Hart)[109]

	National Army Sample (Provincial) %	*National Army Sample (Dublin) %*
Sample:	*3,842*	*690*
Farmer/son	3	—
Farm Labourer	30	—
Un/semi-skilled	38	70
Skilled	17	18
Shop assist/clerk	6	8
Professional	0.2	0.3
Merchant/son	1	0.3
Student	1	0.6
Other	3	3

Using his sample, Hart characterised the army as follows:

> The first noteworthy feature of the Free State forces… is the near-complete absence of farmers' sons. In this respect, the National Army recruiters did no better than their British predecessors. The other outstanding characteristic of the 'Staters' was how proletarian they were. More than two-thirds had been labourers of one sort or another, on farms, docks, roads, or unemployed. Again, this fits the image and social background of the bulk of Irish recruits for the British army, a comparison anti-treaty republicans were quick to make.[110]

Hart immediately makes two sweeping conclusions, firstly based upon his samples that there was a complete absence of farmers' sons. Secondly, that the large numbers of labourers — un/semi-skilled and skilled — being present was further evidence of the repetition of underlying British patterns of recruitment. This is essentially a causal argument and pre-supposes that Hart's earlier samples of the IRA were truly representative of the IRA in its entirety, which is open to question as the underlying methodological framework and criteria for the sample was never released. As there is another dataset that can be directly compared to Hart's samples of the National Army, it is possible to test the underlying findings of his study. As Hart provided no definition of what 'provincial' entailed, the occupations of National Army casualties were divided

[109] Reproduced from Table 8 — Hart, 'Social structure of the IRA', p. 224.

[110] Hart, 'The social structure of the IRA', pp 224-5.

between Dublin and non-Dublin, using the home county as a divider.[111] Table 3.20 shows the breakdown of previous occupation of National Army casualties, while Table 3.21 shows the breakdown of the father's occupations of deceased National Army personnel.

Table 3.20 Previous occupations of National Army casualties

Occupation	Provincial	%	Dublin	%	Total	%
Farmer/son	17	8.2%	—		17	6.3%
Farm Labourer	52	25.1%	5	7.8%	57	21.0%
Un/semi-skilled	95	45.9%	41	64.1%	136	50.2%
Skilled	28	13.5%	10	15.6%	38	14.0%
Shop assist/ clerk	8	3.9%	4	6.3%	12	4.4%
Professional	6	2.9%	3	4.7%	9	3.3%
Merchant/son	1	0.5%	1	1.6%	2	0.7%
Student	—		—		—	
Total	207		64		271	

Table 3.21 Father's occupation of National Army casualties

Occupation	Provincial	%	Dublin	%	Total	%
Farmer/son	44	29.5%	—		44	23.4%
Farm Labourer	20	13.4%	1	2.6%	21	11.2%
Un/semi-skilled	53	35.6%	22	56.4%	75	39.9%
Skilled	22	14.8%	11	28.2%	33	17.6%
Shop assist/ clerk	2	1.3%	1	2.6%	3	1.6%
Professional	—		2	5.1%	2	1.1%
Merchant/son	8	5.4%	2	5.1%	10	5.3%
Student	—		—		—	
Total	149		39		188	

[111] Note: The non-Irish addresses were all in the constituent countries of the UK: England (4), Scotland (3) and Wales (1).

From both tables it is clear that large numbers of un/semi-skilled workers were present, however, the separation of Dublin into a separate category was largely responsible for this exaggerated result. The numbers of men who fell into this category in the aggregate was only a bare majority of casualties and was a plurality of father's occupations. A significant minority of casualties were farm labourers and the sons of farmers. As shown from the earlier age distribution, for many National Army soldiers, joining the military was their first occupation, since large numbers were aged under-20. Despite Hart's sample showing the contrary, farm labourers and farmers sons are relatively well represented, even in Dublin small numbers are recorded. The numbers of skilled workers are also less for the casualties and their fathers as opposed to Hart's samples. In order to see if the National Army casualties are closer to Hart's samples of the occupations of IRA volunteers, it was decided to compare the casualties occupations to those of IRA volunteers, unfortunately, Hart analysed the IRA in aggregate time periods: 1917-19, 1920-1, 1922-3 so the figures for 1922-3 were utilised for comparative purposes. The subdivision between 'provincial' and Dublin was continued and he also split the samples between officers and men. This has been reproduced in Table 3.22, showing the percentage of occupations of IRA volunteers divided between officers and men.

Table 3.22 % Occupations IRA volunteers by rank 1922-3[112]

Occupation	IRA Officers (Provincial)	IRA Officers (Dublin)	IRA Men (Provincial)	IRA Men (Dublin)
Sample:	150	19	1,089	122
Farmer/son	21	—	13	—
Farm Labourer	8	—	19	—
Un/semi-skilled	9	26	27	37
Skilled	28	21	23	23
Shop assist/clerk	19	32	11	35
Professional	7	11	2	1
Merchant/son	4	5	2	—
Student	—	—	1	2
Other	3	5	3	1

[112] Hart, 'Social structure of the IRA', p. 211 : 215.

Table 3.23 Occupations of National Army casualties — Officers

Occupation	Provincial	%	Dublin	%	Total	%
Farmer/son	8	20.5%	—		8	17.0%
Farm Labourer	8	20.5%	—		8	17.0%
Un/semi-skilled	9	23.1%	5	62.5%	14	29.8%
Skilled	3	7.7%	1	12.5%	4	8.5%
Shop assist/ clerk	5	12.8%	1	12.5%	6	12.8%
Professional	6	15.4%	1		7	14.9%
Merchant/son	—		—		—	
Student	—		—		—	
Total	39		8		47	

Table 3.24 Occupations of National Army casualties — NCOs

Occupation	Provincial	%	Dublin	%	Total	%
Farmer/son	—		—		—	
Farm Labourer	8	27.6%	—		8	17.4%
Un/semi-skilled	15	51.7%	9	52.9%	24	52.2%
Skilled	5	17.2%	4	23.5%	9	19.6%
Shop assist/ clerk	1	3.4%	1	5.9%	2	4.3%
Professional	—		2	11.8%	2	4.3%
Merchant/son	—		1	5.9%	1	2.2%
Student	—		—		—	
Total	29		17		46	

Table 3.25 Occupations of National Army casualties — Enlisted Men

Occupation	Provincial	%	Dublin	%	Total	%
Farmer/son	9	6.5%	—		9	5.1%
Farm Labourer	36	26.1%	5	12.8%	41	23.2%
Un/semi-skilled	70	50.7%	27	69.2%	97	54.8%
Skilled	20	14.5%	5	12.8%	25	14.1%
Shop assist/ clerk	2	1.4%	2	5.1%	4	2.3%
Professional	—		—		—	
Merchant/son	1	0.7%	—		1	0.6%
Student	—		—		—	
Total	138		39		177	

From Hart's analysis, IRA officers were predominantly un/semi-skilled workers or farmers in the provinces and for Dublin there were no farmers or farm labourers recorded, the plurality of these officers were shop assistants or clerks. For IRA men, the provincial sample is divided between all variants of 'skilled' workers and farmers and agricultural labourers. The numbers of Dublin IRA men largely conforms to the trends identified in the officers sample. As the National Army contained NCOs, it was necessary to create a separate table reflecting this component of the military. Tables 3.23-25 show the occupations of National Army casualties by officers, NCOs and enlisted men. These findings largely show that although large numbers of enlisted men had prior employment as industrial workers of varying types, farmers and agricultural labourers were also a significant minority. In addition, the large number of shop assistants and clerks were not replicated in any of the ranks of the National Army casualties. Therefore, it is clear that the National Army casualties provide a different insight into the social composition of the military from Hart's earlier analysis, in particular the contention of the supposedly 'urban' and/or industrial nature of the military. Upon comparing the National Army and IRA occupation samples created by Hart for 1922-3 to the occupations of casualties, it is clear that the prior employment of National Army personnel in agriculture is higher than the IRA at a similar time period.

It is also apparent that Hart's methodological framework is badly in need of revision and should be re-weighted, if possible, against larger qualitative sources as the sizes of the samples are clearly unrepresentative of the organisations being represented. Although the findings regarding the National Army are modest, it is clear that a more conservative approach which weights relevant datasets such as the casualties database against the Irish Army census, provides a clear and concise framework for this type of social analysis in the future.

Chapter 4. Ex-Britishers in the National Army

Ex-servicemen and the National Army

It has been suggested in the historiography of the Irish civil war that a substantial proportion of the National Army were ex-British Army servicemen and that this influx of 'experienced' soldiers played a pivotal role in the eventual successes of the pro-Treaty forces during the civil war. This assertion has been sustained by two observations, oft repeated, that ex-servicemen with technical skills were actively recruited to bolster the National Army and that fifty percent of the National Army were 'ex-Britishers' by the end of the civil war. The composition of the National Army remains largely opaque due to the partial nature of record keeping during the Irish civil war and the transitory nature of service, with the average soldier recruited in 1922 receiving an eighteen-month contract. Even with the release of the Irish Army census, this only provides details of the military as it existed in November 1922, the military increased in size in 1923 and no quantitative sources like the census exist for this additional growth in the military. Due to this ambiguity, speculative claims as to the backgrounds of National Army personnel have been accepted and since there is limited evidence to refute these theories it has proved difficult to effectively examine these claims. By re-examining the historiography and in particular, the specific claims being made and comparing this against a small database of ex-servicemen that has been collated for this chapter it is possible to re-contextualise this aspect of the National Army with new information and expand upon an overly simplified narrative.

One of the earliest academic studies of the National Army was a doctoral thesis by M. G. Valiulus in 1977. Her thesis was focused on the abortive Irish Army 'mutiny' in 1924. As part of this, she examined the pro-Treaty military and wider political movement. Ex-servicemen feature prominently in her initial description of how the National Army is formed during the immediate aftermath of the fighting in June 1922:

> In an intensive recruiting drive, G.H.Q. enlisted masses of the unemployed throughout Ireland including ex-British soldiers, Irishmen who had fought in the English army, especially those with professional skills.[1]

[1] M.G. Valiulus, 'The Irish Army Mutiny of 1924' (Ph.D thesis, Loyola University of Chicago, 1977), p. 106.

This statement implies that ex-servicemen were part of the large buildup of National Army forces during 1922 and that technical skills were considered a factor; however, there is no footnote provided. Valiulus also reproduces evidence from General Sean MacMahon before the Army Enquiry committee, where MacMahon stated that at present (1924), "155 ex-officers from other armies had been retained, 80 of whom had pre-Truce service [IRA service], of the remaining 75, 40 were technical officers with specialised skills".[2] It is important to note that MacMahon is not referring to the National Army in 1922-3 during its largest period of recruitment, and that he is solely referring to the officer corps, rather than the military in its entirety. MacMahon also provides no definition for 'other armies'; however, this remains the sole figure given by a senior military officer as to the numbers of ex-servicemen within the officers corps of the military, albeit the Defence Forces rather than the National Army. In 1988, Michael Hopkinson published *Green against green*, the first full-length academic study of the Irish civil war and this text continued the trend established by Valiulus, in emphasising the importance of ex-servicemen to the National Army:

> Diarmuid MacManus, who held high office in the army, described the military knowledge of average junior officers as 'absurdly nil' and stressed the need to employ ex-British soldiers. In a memorandum to Collins, Mulcahy urged the use of sound men who had served in the British army.[3]

Hopkinson cites a memorandum sent from chief of staff Richard Mulcahy to Michael Collins. However there is no evidence that this was put into practice. In a later chapter on the civil war in Cork, Hopkinson refers to 'ex-servicemen being recruited in County Cork'; however there is no footnote or citation for this and it is unclear where this information comes from.[4] Hopkinson also refers to the testimony given to the Army Enquiry committee, which has already been covered in an earlier chapter of this thesis. The emphasis upon previous military experience and its necessity to the National Army is also cited by J. J. Lee in his survey text, *Ireland, 1912 - 1985* (1989) wherein he states:

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[2] M.G. Valiulus, 'The Irish Army Mutiny of 1924', pp 212-213.

[3] Hopkinson, *Green against green*, p. 136.

[4] Ibid., p. 202.

> During the rapid build up of the national army, Mulcahy had naturally turned to the main reservoir of military experience in the country, ex-British soldiers and officers. These men were often more amenable to the discipline of normal army life than many who had flourished in the less disciplined ranks of the IRA.[5]

All three of these accounts of the National Army all echo an earlier statement in Eoin Neeson's eponymous study of the civil war published in 1966, which refers to ex-servicemen 'being anxious and willing to continue a way of life to which they had grown accustomed'.[6] Neither Lee nor Neeson provide any citations or primary evidence to sustain this argument. However, neither of these studies managed to ascertain if any significant numbers of ex-servicemen had actually been recruited into the military, instead a mixture of assertions and proposed memorandums were utilised to sustain this. Despite this, the narrative that ex-servicemen played a role within the National Army had become accepted and was often referenced in the pioneering 1990s scholarship of Peter Hart, John M. Regan and others who began to re-examine the Irish war of independence and civil war period.

In 2015, *Heroes or traitors?* by Paul Taylor, the first full-length monograph on Irish ex-servicemen during the Irish Free State period was published and expanded the current discourse on ex-servicemen and their experiences. As this includes the foundation of the new state in 1922, the service of ex-servicemen in the National Army is examined by Taylor:

> Upon its formation, many [ex-servicemen] joined the National army, which grew to almost 60,000 men around half of whom were ex-servicemen. They fought on behalf of the new state against anti-Treaty republicans and, in helping to create a disciplined and professional force, they were one of the primary reasons for their defeat.[7]

Taylor utilises a statement made in Dáil Éireann as a citation that 'around half of whom were ex-servicemen'. The statement was made on 16 November 1927 by Captain Bryan Cooper T. D. during a debate on an amendment which would establish a commission to examine the conditions of ex-British servicemen in the Irish Free State.[8] Examining all

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[5] J.J. Lee, *Ireland, 1912 - 1985* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 99.

[6] E. Neeson, *The civil war in Ireland, 1922 - 23* (Cork, 1966), p. 135.

[7] Taylor, *Heroes or traitors?*, p. 15.

[8] *Dáil Éireann deb*., *vol. xi no. 14* (16 Nov. 1927).

the contributions to the debate, it would appear that the issue of ex-servicemen who served in the National Army was raised in a peripheral manner, as the major issues raised over the amendment concerned perceived state discrimination against ex-British soldiers and whether a commission would make any progress in alleviating this alleged discrimination against these servicemen. A longer version of the quote by Cooper adds context that is missing from Taylor's citation:

> Deputy Redmond's next point had reference to the preference given on road work to ex-National Army men. It is, I believe, a fact that 50 per cent. of the members of the National Army were men who served in the British Army. In that sense, that preference is a 50 per cent. preference to ex-British servicemen, and I would sooner have a 50 per cent. preference than no preference at all.[9]

Taylor utilises only part of the quotation, which states that 'fifty percent' of the National Army served in the British Army, however when examining the full exchange it is clear that this statement by Cooper was made in the context of positive discrimination in *favour* of ex-National Army servicemen. Cooper is arguing that this positive discrimination was by default helping ex-British servicemen. This is the only reference in the entire debate to percentages of ex-servicemen in the National Army and it clearly was not the main subject of the Dáil debate. It could be argued that Cooper's usage of this percentage is to further his argument that this benefits ex-serviceman in general, not a comment about the internal demographics of the National Army. Cooper also provides no evidence for this figure at all, he merely states that it is a 'fact' that fifty percent of the National Army were ex-servicemen, which is very much open to debate. Taylor also utilises a claim from the 'Old' IRA (OIRA) that 'fifty percent' of the military were ex-servicemen.[10] The OIRA were a faction within the National Army that were agitating against GHQ and in particular Richard Mulcahy on the question of demobilisation and the changing character of the military. As there are a number of specific elements to the claims made by the OIRA, this is examined in a later section. It is notable that Taylor utilises more *political* sources, namely the OIRA and Cooper as opposed to actual documented evidence. Despite Taylor's extensive scholarship on the subject of ex-servicemen in the Irish Free State, he largely provides an overview of existing scholarship and repeats pre-existing assertions regarding the numbers of ex-servicemen

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[9] *Dáil Éireann deb*., *vol. xi no. 14* (16 Nov. 1927).

[10] Taylor, *Heroes or traitors?*, pp 210-11.

present in the National Army. This is not meant to detract from his scholarship on the experiences of Irish ex-servicemen which is quite detailed and a welcome addition to the discourse on this topic.

It should be noted that this chapter is not attempting to dispute that ex-servicemen were recruited into the National Army, but rather attempting to illustrate in more specific/ granular terms who were these ex-servicemen who joined the National Army, and to provide specific numbers for how many were recruited. Although thousands of Irishmen joined the British Army during the First World War, their experiences and post-war decisions were not uniform. As shown by Tom Burke's micro-study of recruitment into the Royal Dublin Fusiliers: class, geography and age all played a role in recruitment into the British Army.[11] There are substantive differences between a memorandum setting out an aspirational policy goal, and this being translated into real-time recruitment. Although Richard Mulcahy's memo may have been implemented and a number of 'technical specialists' may have been recruited, there are no records available in the archives that show a continuous recruitment of 'technical specialists', with one exception being that of the new Air Corps stationed in Baldonnell Aerodrome, where most of the initial recruits into this new unit were ex-servicemen.[12] A 2006 M.A. thesis by M. J. Whelan attempted to ascertain the impact of ex-British servicemen within the Irish Volunteers and the National Army. Whelan relies upon known individuals with ex-British military service who had an impact upon the National Army: examples include General W. R. E. Murphy, Emmet Dalton and the first recruits into the nascent Irish Air Corps.[13] Whelan's attempt to synthesise the different comments made by historians about ex-British servicemen illustrates many of the issues outlined above; many of the sources refer to brief statements and notes which imply that a large number of ex-servicemen joined the National Army, without any distinct documents outlining large-

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[11] Tom Burke, 'The Royal Dublin Fusiliers in the Great War' in *History Ireland* vol. 13, no. 5 (Sept. - Oct. 2005), pp 31-2.

[12] M.J. Whelan, 'The impact of ex-British soldiers on the Irish Volunteers and Free State Army1913 - 1924' (M.A. thesis, NUI Maynooth, 2006), p. 39.

[13] Note: If the question of ex-British servicemen being actively recruited was confined solely to the Air Corps, then all these arguments would be moot, as a majority of the Air Corps in its initial incarnation were by necessity ex-British servicemen.

scale recruitment of ex-servicemen.[14] However, there are small groups of ex-servicemen who can be catalogued from newspaper records and Whelan was able to identify small numbers of ex-servicemen amongst the National Army casualties.[15]

The topic of ex-servicemen is not restricted to histories of the Irish civil war, in Tom Garvin's *1922: the birth of Irish democracy* (1995) references were made to recently demobilised soldiers from the 'Irish' regiments of the British Army and the process of amalgamating them into the National Army.[16] However, Garvin's source for this is a quote from Mulcahy referring to the amalgamation of disbanded regiments with 'select trustworthy IRA veterans' and how best to do this. In neither case are substantive figures given as to how many, or if any, ex-British military personnel from the regiments were brought into the National Army. In a similar manner to the memorandum on 'technical' specialists, these are generalised orders without a clear missive and there is no evidence if, or how, this process was implemented. Garvin further claims that this 'absorption of ex-British soldiers occurred easily', despite soldiers going into battle with calls of 'Up the Leinsters!' or 'Up the Munsters!'[17] Garvin provides no references to substantiate such a claim, which may be his reason for placing the 'Up the Leinsters!' in quotes as opposed to citing a distinct source. There is clearly an assumption that men demobilised from the 'Irish' regiments would automatically join the National Army, however, the rationale for why these men would do this is not clear, as the reason for the disbandment of these units was the creation of the new Free State. There is also the wider issue of timelines, as Garvin appears to assume that all these men were demobilised at the same time in early 1922, when in fact the demobilisation process took place over 1922, when the civil war had already broken out and men were fighting across the state.

All of the references in the discourse to the recruitment of British Army veterans rely upon the existence of a large population of ex-servicemen living within the Free State.

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[14] Whelan, 'The impact of ex-British soldiers on the Irish Volunteers and Free State Army 1913 - 1924', pp 29-33.

[15] Ibid., p. 38.

[16] Garvin, *1922*, p. 116.

[17] Ibid.

Many of whom had experience with heavy weaponry, aircraft and other new military technology created during the First World War. However, the discourse presupposes that ex-servicemen, can be viewed a single cohesive group, notwithstanding the variety of opinions and social differences within this cohort of the general public. It also assumes and requires significant elements of this group to be comfortable joining an organisation led by former leaders of the IRA. It would appear that this consideration has been overlooked entirely from the earlier statements regarding National Army recruitment, which instead view ex-servicemen as a cluster of professional soldiers willing to fight in a new conflict and for a newly independent Irish state. As many of those who enlisted during the First World War were not professional soldiers and instead came from a variety of backgrounds, it is not readily apparent how many wished to re-enlist for a new conflict as a significant number of veterans returned from the First World War wounded.[18] As the experiences of First World War veterans during the Irish war of independence varied widely, it is difficult to evaluate how the average ex-servicemen viewed either the pro-Treaty settlement or the newly established National Army. Some ex-servicemen suffered from intimidation and in some cases were killed outright by the IRA during the period 1919-21. An early and influential account of these experiences was outlined in an essay by Jane Leonard in *Revolution?* (1990), which has shaped a lot of the discourse on ex-servicemen during this period as a minority group set upon by the IRA and largely 'shunned' by wider society.[19] Although this is an evocative account, it is concentrated in specific geographic areas of the country:

> The two counties with the highest number of murders up to July 1921 were Cork and Dublin, with twenty-five and thirteen respectively… seventy-three occurring in Leinster and Munster but only nine in Connaught and Ulster. With the exception of one murder in Belfast and one in Galway, the Connaught-Ulster killings all took place in Roscommon, Cavan and Monaghan. As in Donegal and

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[18] J. M. Winter, 'Britain's 'Lost Generation' of the First World War in *Population Studies*, vol. 31, no. 3 (Nov. 1977) p. 451. Winter found that twenty-seven percent of all British forces were wounded, the highest numbers were recorded in the British Army with thirty-one percent being wounded during the conflict.

[19] Jane Leonard, 'Getting them at last: The I.R.A. and ex-servicemen' in David Fitzpatrick (ed.), *Revolution? Ireland 1917-1923* (Dublin, 1990), p. 129.

> north east Ulster, no ex-servicemen were killed by the I.R.A. in Wicklow, Carlow, Mayo, Sligo or Leitrim.[20]

In short, the concentration of violence against ex-servicemen was similar to the rates of violence against Crown forces more generally, as Crown forces' losses were highest in Cork and Dublin during the War of Independence.[21] Therefore an ex-servicemen in Connaught, was likely to have had a markedly different experience with a local IRA unit as opposed to an ex-serviceman in Cork or Dublin. This does not mean that these men were left alone, merely that the level of intimidation did not lead to executions. Relations between the IRA and wider civilian population during the War of Independence was a decidedly varied affair, as shown by Brian Hughes's recent study of intimidation by the IRA against supporters of Crown forces and 'loyalists', this ranged from a warning letter to assassination of 'spies'.[22] It would appear that depending on the area, ex-servicemen were viewed as 'loyalists' and were treated as such, although clearly there were sharp regional variances in how this manifested itself during the War of Independence. However, it would be a mistake to view the collective experiences of ex-servicemen as a series of untoward incidents meted out to a helpless population, as shown by Steven O'Connor's recent study of Great War veterans:

> The historiography on these Great War veterans has tended to focus on either republican violence against them, or the economic and social problems they faced. This has given the impression that veterans played a passive role during the Irish War of Independence and they were largely the unfortunate victims of an intensifying war of terror and counter-terror. Yet some Irish veterans had an entirely different experience of the War of Independence, being active participants as members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC).[23]

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[20] Leonard, 'Getting them at last', p. 122. For an updated tabular listing that shows total civilian killings by the IRA, including ex-servicemen per county see Eunan O'Halpin, 'Problematic killing during the war of independence and its aftermath: civilian spies and informers' in James Kelly and Mary Ann Lyons (eds), *Death and dying Ireland, Britain and Europe: historical perspectives* (Dublin, 2013), pp 328-9.

[21] Taylor, *Heroes or traitors?*, pp 76-78. Taylor analysed all the incidents of violence up to and including killings for the IRA, RIC and ex-servicemen. His findings were that although violence did occur in the areas indicated by Leonard, there were equal rates for the other groups involved, therefore people were being killed in a area experiencing a high degree of violent disorder in general, as opposed to specific targeting of a given group.

[22] Brian Hughes, *Defying the IRA* (Liverpool, 2016), pp 4-8.

[23] Steven O'Connor, 'It's up to you now to fight for your country': Ireland's Great War veterans in the War of Independence, 1919-21' in David Swift and Oliver Wilkinson (eds) *Veterans of the First World War: ex-servicemen and ex-servicewomen in post-war Britain and Ireland* (London, 2019), p. 104.

O’Connor’s research involved the creation of two databases of ex-servicemen within the IRA and RIC. O’Connor found that approximately ten percent of new recruitment into the RIC after 1919 consisted of Irish ex-servicemen.[24] He identified 226 IRA men who were veterans of the Great War, of this group 105 were also members of the National Army during the civil war.[25] O’Connor’s findings pertain to the War of Independence and the civil war dimension is not examined, however, his research is one of the few sources to actually list figures for known ex-servicemen within the National Army. One aspect of O’Connor research was his finding that the largest roles assigned to ex-servicemen with the IRA were: Volunteer on active service (30), Instructor (34) and Commander (24).[26] This meant that despite the need for military instructors, ex-servicemen were as likely to be serving as ordinary volunteers or commanding units, like Tom Barry in Cork.

[24] O’Connor, ‘It’s up to you now to fight’, p. 105.

[25] Ibid., p. 105.

[26] Ibid., p. 112.

Military Instructors in the National Army

Although the discourse refers to ex-servicemen in vague and often speculative terms, there are a number of discrete archival records which refer to ex-servicemen within National Army during the Irish civil war. Starting with the issue of military instructors for the training regime being established at the Curragh Camp. It is possible that this correspondence has been the basis of many assumptions regarding the recruitment of ex-servicemen. However, if this is the case, then it has been a significant misunderstanding of the military's position on this question. From July-August 1922, a lengthy correspondence between Michael Collins, Emmet Dalton and W. P. Walker, chairman of the Irish Legion of Ex-Servicemen began over the issue of hiring ex-servicemen as instructors for various specialist services of the National Army.[27] Some of the correspondence alludes to and references small numbers of ex-servicemen being recruited as active service personnel under the 'Call to Arms' issued by the Provisional Government. However, from the outset it was clear the position of the military leadership was that ex-servicemen were to be hired as instructors, starting with a letter from Emmet Dalton, dated 7 July 1922 in response to requests from ex-servicemen to enlist into the National Army:

> I wish to make clear that the reinforcements which we require will be furnished by men who have served in the Irish Volunteers. However, your services will be accepted if you agree to act as an Instructor, in order to train the new Army for Active Service. You will not be an Officer of the I.R.A. and you will obtain no rank other than that which you had in the last Army you served. If you decide to accept this arrangement for a six month's engagement, terminable by a week's notice on either side, you will be rationed, maintained, and quartered as Officers, and receive a personal maintenance allowance of £5.0.0. per week.[28]

Therefore, any instructor would still be able to use their prior rank in the British armed forces. However, these men were not attested into the military and were de facto civilian contractors. In a letter to Michael Collins dated 25 July, Walker makes a number of references to recruitment of ex-servicemen which underlines the complex nature of this group and highlights the danger of assuming this subset of the general population operated as a singular entity:

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[27] This organisation later merged with the British Legion, to form the British Legion Southern Ireland in 1925— Taylor, *Heroes or traitors?*, p. 235.

[28] Letter to ex-servicemen offering contract as Instructor, 7 July 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/50).

> I have to refer to my various communications with the Department of Defence, and the replies thereto, between the dates 1st February 1922 and 6th July, on the subject of the enlistment of Irish Ex-Members of the British Army into the Irish Army. Though a number of ex-soldiers appear to have been taken under the recent "Call to Arms", the services of the class of men referred to in my letters, the names of some of whom I submitted, have not been availed of. I am aware that the terms of the request for Volunteers left it open to ex-servicemen to present themselves at the various recruiting centres, but generally the better class men did not present themselves [for recruitment] for the reason they would not be accepted as experienced ex-soldiers. One Branch of the Legion of Irish Ex-Servicemen reports that at the request of the local Commanding Officer, the Secretary enlisted 40 members into the regular Army. If this request was made to one branch, there was not reason why it could not be have been made to the Headquarters and all Branches of the Legion. Another Provincial Branch reports that all the unemployed members, whether pensionable for disabilities or not, were recruited.[29]

It is clear that Walker is making a distinction between different types of recruitment, first he notes that small numbers of ex-servicemen had been recruited in two different local branches of the legion, unfortunately neither is named. Secondly, the 'better class' men, which can be read as the more experienced soldiers, had decided to not join the National Army due to concerns over their potential treatment. This second point largely undermines the arguments of Valiulus, Hopkinson et al., if ex-servicemen with the requisite 'experience' were unwilling to join the military, due to negative perceptions of their potential treatment, what evidence is there to support the assertion that they did so *en masse*. Walker was not an impartial observer, as the chairman of a representative group for ex-servicemen, he would naturally want to maximise opportunities for his members. It was not in his interest or that of his members to raise these concerns about integration of ex-servicemen unless it was a widespread view that required assurances from military leadership. In the response to Walker's letter, dictated by the military secretary to the Commander in Chief, this issue is not addressed at all, instead indicative figures of potential numbers of specialised ex-servicemen are requested:

> The COMMANDER IN CHIEF has consulted the DIRECTOR OF RECRUITING, and I am to say that as a start in the line you mention it is suggested that perhaps the best way of procedure would be to ask you if you could supply the following (the number, of course, is only given for comparative purposes) say :-

[29] Letter from Walker to office of Commander in Chief, 25 July 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/9).

100 Artillery men.
100 Machine Gunners.
100 Motor Drivers.
100 Engineers.
100 Signallers.[30]

Although the phrasing of this request is poor and somewhat confusing, the main request is for specialised ex-servicemen for critical technical areas where the National Army was lacking expertise. It is not clear if these men are required as instructors or for active service. The only reference to the wider recruitment of ex-servicemen was a brief acknowledgement that 'some of the Local Commanders have got most valuable assistance from your Legion, and he [Collins] appreciates your desire to help.'[31] In Patrick Long's study of the development of the pro-Treaty forces this request, he views this as something akin to a procurement order:

> An initial order was placed by GHQ [to Walker] for about 500 artillerymen, machine-gunners, drivers, engineers and signallers, followed by a further list from Emmet Dalton for training instructors, weapons experts, military policemen, armourers, aircraft riggers, fitters and medics, of whom plenty were readily available.[32]

There is no evidence that Walker provided 500 ex-servicemen or even if that many were required. The figures outlined were explicitly marked as 'comparative' and was not an actual quantity that was required. Walker's actual response to the request noted that 'no difficulty is anticipated in securing their services, subject to conditions of enlistment, pay, etc., the details of which could be discussed with your representative.'[33] This meant that all of this was contingent upon agreed terms for contracts. The followup list from Dalton, briefly alluded to by Long, is part of a letter from Dalton to Collins, this letter provides a précis of his meeting with Walker on the subject of hiring ex-servicemen as military instructors. Dalton has refined the earlier list and is more explicit about what is required:

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[30] Letter from office of Commander in Chief to Walker, 25 July 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/9).

[31] Ibid.

[32] Long, 'Organisation and development of the pro-Treaty forces', p. 312.

[33] Letter from Walker to office of Commander in Chief, 27 July 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/9).

1. Training Instructors
2. Artillery
3. Machine Gunners
4. Engineers
5. Lewis Gunners
6. Military Police
7. Motor Drivers
8. Army Medical Corps
9. Armourers
10. Aeroplane Riggers
11. Aeroplane Fitters[34]

Dalton provides no figures required for each of these specialised services, with the exception of a limit on the 'No. 1 class' training staff:

> I informed him [Walker] that No. 1 class - Instructional Staff - would be taken to the number of 20, on the same footing as at present exists at the Curragh, i.e., £5.0.0. per week, plain uniform, no rank; maintained and quartered. For all other services I explained that rates of pay would be the same as that of our own Army; that the Dependents Allowance would also be the same. I advised him that the rate of pay in all classes were provisional and liable to change at any moment.[35]

Dalton delineates between 'No. 1 class' and other services, it is not clear exactly how this distinction is made, although the differing pay rates imply that the prior experience of veterans may be a factor. The distinction between 'our Army' and prior service makes it clear that these men were not being enlisted as normal soldiers and were another class of instructor, paid at a rate that was benchmarked to the regular army pay regulations.[36] On the subject of ex-servicemen being recruited into the military as regular soldiers, Dalton reports that Walker had made a number of suggestions:

> He [Walker] advised me that large numbers of ex Service men who we have taken on under the Recruiting Scheme are unsatisfactory, and quite liable to give dissatisfaction. He further added that we should make some arrangement to refuse men receiving [British] Military disability Pensions, because otherwise the liability would be likely to fall on our shoulders. He informed me that large numbers of first-class Ex Service men have remained intact in Cork and

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[34] Letter from Emmet Dalton to Michael Collins, 4 August 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/9).

[35] Ibid.

[36] Note: There is a difference between pay rates for 'regular' and 'volunteer reserve' soldiers, therefore Dalton is putting the instructors on the same pay rates as regulars and not the recruits from July onwards.

> Southern Ireland. He believes it possible to engage these men under our new scheme.[37]

Walker's position regarding the recruitment of ex-servicemen into the National Army was complicated by two factors, first he advised Dalton that some number of 'unsatisfactory' veterans had joined the military and would cause problems and secondly he suggested that recruitment of veterans with disability pensions be refused enlistment. He then posits that some number of Cork and Munster based ex-servicemen have remained intact and were willing to join the National Army. This reference to supposedly willing and 'first class' ex-servicemen in Cork may explain Hopkinson's reference to British Army veterans being enlisted in Cork by the National Army, although the evidence for this is sparse and relies upon this population actually being 'relatively intact' by the time the National Army are established in Cork during August 1922. Placing this within a wider context, the military leadership is being advised by an influential advocate for the rights of Irish ex-servicemen to avoid recruiting an entire subtype of veteran due to their prior injuries and, furthermore, they have been advised that some number of veterans already recruited were problematic and likely to cause problems. It is not clear if these men were later identified and removed from service but that would have been a likely follow up step for future recruitment going forward. There was an undercurrent of class dynamics in the distinction between 'unsatisfactory' and 'first class' veterans, it can be assumed that the 'first class' veterans were ex-officers, as the rate of pay are delineated this way for different types of instructors. Although the arrangement between Dalton and Walker was straightforward, Dalton required twenty, first-class instructors in the first instance for the Curragh Camp. It very quickly appears to have gone awry, due to a mixture of bureaucratic chaos and unclear orders. By 18 August, Walker had become frustrated at the nature of how the recruitment process was ongoing:

> If the Recruitment of ex-Servicemen is to continue through me, I shall be glad to know whether some definite arrangement can be come to whereby the men will not have to attend on several occasions, only to be told that there is "Nothing Doing". Whilst writing on this subject, I might mention that men are still being recruited in the City through the ordinary channels. One ex-Service man who took part in the Parade on Wednesday is 100 per cent disabled with Locomotor

[37] Letter from Emmet Dalton to Michael Collins, 4 August 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/9).

> Ataxia. Apart from the man's disability, there are several reasons why he should be regarded as not being an acquisition to the National Army.[38]

It would appear that ex-servicemen were being summoned for meetings and examinations as to their suitability and were being told that there was no position for them, Walker contrasts this with an anecdote about a disabled soldier he saw on parade, it is not clear if this man had actually attested into the National Army or had been summoned to a meeting. Also there is another warning from Walker that the recruitment wounded ex-servicemen is to be avoided. Although Walker does not expand upon this, one of the causes of Locomotor Ataxia was contracting syphilis, this may have been a factor in this warning. Irregardless, this illustrates that the process was rather haphazard, despite the seemingly simple arrangement established in late July 1922. Walker further outlines how the agreement entered into with Dalton regarding the status of ex-servicemen was not widely known throughout the military:

> The 16 Instructors who proceeded to the Curragh Camp on Monday morning last, I have to inform you that a message was received by me yesterday afternoon to the effect that the men concerned had been paraded, and were told by an officer holding the rank of Captain, that they would be required to accept service as ordinary N.C.Os, and that the Military Authorities at the Curragh were not aware that any special terms had been arranged.[39]

Walker then proceeds to reiterate the terms of the arrangement with Dalton and how the terms being offered at the Curragh were 'unsatisfactory' and that Walker was responsible for them until they were 'fixed up'.[40] At the Curragh Camp, tests were being administered to the ex-servicemen supplied by Walker in order to ascertain whether these men had sufficient skills to operate as military instructors. The results of these tests are provided in short summary reports, each listing the name of the individual and a short outline of whether they were accepted or not. The tests appear to have all been for suitable Instructional Officers; occasionally references would be made to additional skills of the applicant, not relevant to the National Army such as cavalry.[41] Of the sixteen ex-servicemen candidates who were sent to the Curragh, summary reports of the

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[38] Letter from R. Walker to office of Commander in Chief, 18 August 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/9).

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Reference T.R. 58, 17 August 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/9).

tests are available for twelve men.[42] All were listed as being unsuitable for the position of Instructional Officer. Therefore, it is clear that the military was having difficulties with the quality of the men provided by Walker. In one case a former warder from Mountjoy Prison was interviewed, which led to an officer writing a letter outlining that hiring this individual would lead to serious difficulties.[43] On 22 August, all sixteen men to the Curragh were discharged and paid for their services to date, with the exception of four individuals who were noted as being suitable as NCO instructors and were offered positions as sergeants.[44] It is not clear if these individuals accepted these positions and there is no further correspondence from Walker after this date in the archival record.

By examining the archival record of how the process of recruiting ex-servicemen as military instructors began and ended between July and August 1922, it is clear that the quality of ex-servicemen being recruited into the military was poor according to Walker and that the 'first class' men provided by Walker were deemed unsuitable as military instructors by the relevant military authorities at the Curragh Camp. Upon examining the summary reports from the Curragh there appears to have been a pre-existing population of instructors and military trainers in situ, the status of these men regarding their prior military service is not available from the archival material. However, since Dalton's first communication regarding military instructors was issued on 7 July in a pro-forma style letter, it is possible that some number of ex-servicemen were already employed as instructors at the Curragh prior to the arrangement with Walker. As the majority of ex-servicemen in Ireland were unaffiliated to any specific representative bodies, it is also unclear how many persons Walker actually represented in 1922, as the membership in 1925 was only 2,850, which is a very small proportion of the total ex-servicemen population in Ireland.[45] In a final note on the archival records from the Curragh Camp, there is a handwritten memorandum, undated and unsigned, which highlights the immediate priorities of the military, numbered 1-13. This memorandum

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[42] There are twelve reports, briefly outlined the results of the test and the recommendations of the officer administering the test (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/9).

[43] Handwritten note to GOC from Capt. R.J. Feeley, O/C Engineer Training, 17 August 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/9).

[44] Letter from office of Commander in Chief to Walker, 22 August 1922 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/9).

[45] Taylor, *Heroes or traitors?*, p. 235.

does suggest recruiting ex-servicemen. However, it is unclear how the proposed scheme would work in practice:

> (12) Absorb the best of the disbanded Irish regiments in way that will get over any stigma on us for taking them on or on them — and get them in broken up sufficiently to be able to absorb them.[46]

There are no followup records which outline if any 'absorption' of ex-servicemen from the Irish regiments occurred and this memorandum is plainly contradicted by Dalton's letter on 7 July. It is possible that this was an idea or note to the author that was made during the initial days after the outbreak of fighting. It is very likely that this reference to Irish regiments is the basis of some of the broader contentions made about the recruitment of ex-servicemen into the National Army. None of the records available from the archival record on the question of ex-servicemen substantiate the claims made about the scale of recruitment or their effectiveness. On the contrary it would appear that the numbers who enlisted into the military were small and those who were assessed as trainers were rejected.

[46] Memorandum on Army, n.d. (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/50).

Ex-servicemen and the OIRA

The most prominent discussion of ex-servicemen within the National Army are the claims made by the OIRA faction and the lists of ex-servicemen provided by this group to representatives of the civilian and military leadership. Unlike the earlier attempts to recruit military instructors, this is a more overtly political process and the OIRA is an organisation best remembered for its role in the abortive Irish Army 'mutiny' of 1924. Eunan O'Halpin describes the origins of this group as follows:

> In January 1923, they [OIRA] had agreed to build an organisation, the Irish Republican Army Organization or Old IRA… and would make every effort to get control of the vital sections of the Army, weed out those undesirable persons who were and are holding those positions, and force and reappraisal of what they thought was the government's unduly pro-British policy.[47]

This faction was opposed to both government policy and the general direction of the military. Their focus was largely upon the Army Council and Richard Mulcahy in particular and the references to the government remained a less developed aspect of their collective grievances. Despite the seemingly obvious conflict that arose from meeting with a faction of the military that was hostile to the government and the military chain of command, a series of meetings were held between W. T. Cosgrave and this group. At the first meeting on 25 June 1923, the attendees were as follows: W. T. Cosgrave, Richard Mulcahy, Liam Tobin, Charlie Dalton, Christie O'Malley and Frank Thornton. Tobin operated as the unofficial leader of the group and his contributions mainly consisting of reading a long list of perceived issues with the military and Mulcahy in particular, of note is the following section which deals with the composition of the National Army and the diminished role of ex-IRA men according to Tobin:

> They [OIRA] accepted the Treaty in the same way in which Collins did. That Collins had said to Tobin himself "I swore an Oath to the Republic and I am going to keep that Oath Treaty or no Treaty". Mentioned this alleged expression of Collins' to show the spirit in which they, Tobin etc…, regarding the Treaty. That the Commander in Chief (the present Commander in chief) was, by his actions, undermining the whole of the position from that particular point of view and that, in fact, he was disloyal to Collins' outlook. That the Army was rotten, that the position of the Army at the present time was that there were 40% of the men in it were ex-IRA men. 10% were ordinary civilians who were never

[47] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p. 46. — O'Halpin quotes from a document provided by the OIRA in UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/195.

> anything but hostile to the IRA and the remaining 50% were ex-British soldiers.[48]

Notwithstanding the cumbersome style of the minutes, the message from the OIRA was clear, the military had strayed from the 'ideals' as expressed by Collins to Tobin and that the military contained a minority of ex-IRA men within in it. It would seem that the proportion of ex-IRA within the National Army was the larger issue, not the existence ex-servicemen. The hostility to civilians is evocative of the rhetoric of Rory O'Connor and others in early 1922 with their rejection of politicians and civilian control over the military. The telling references to Collins was a clever way of couching animus against the government and Mulcahy in purely ideological as opposed to personal terms. Cosgrave appeared to have been surprised by the vitriol from Tobin and the group which raised questions as to how this meeting came about and what exactly he did expect, as clearly meeting with this group elevated their profile within the military and opened the door to further acts of military indiscipline.[49]

The existence of a more overtly Republican faction within the National Army is a testament to the ideological ambiguity of the National Army and the unusual decisions made by senior officers to take a position on the Anglo-Irish Treaty, which owed as much to friendship and loyalty as opposed to fealty to ideals. On the specific claims being made regarding the composition of the National Army, it is unclear if any of these men would have had access to recruitment records, as they had served in a number of frontline roles during the Irish civil war, with Tobin and Charlie Dalton both serving in the quasi-civilian intelligence Criminal Investigations Division (CID) based out of Oriel House. From the general tone of Tobin's remarks, this was more of a broader charge against Mulcahy and since claims about recruiting of ex-servicemen had been a feature of anti-Treaty IRA propaganda during the civil war, this appears to follow that type of rhetoric. No evidence appears to have been provided to Cosgrave or Mulcahy, with the latter denouncing the entire situation:

> The C-in-C., [Mulcahy] stated that there might perhaps be added to the reading of the document at that particular moment some word of explanation as to why,

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[48] Minutes of an interview, 25 June 1923 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/195).

[49] Ibid.

> if any of those matters required discussion; he should be brought before the President [Cosgrave] to discuss them. In addition he stated that there were there four persons who apparently had certain things to discuss with the President, and perhaps with others, but that he, personally, was not prepared to discuss anything in that room and in an atmosphere such as was necessarily created by the statements made in the document read by Tobin.[50]

Despite Mulcahy's clear distaste for this type of meeting, subsequent meetings were held with Joseph McGrath, the Minister for Industry and Commerce operating as an unofficial go-between for the OIRA and the civilian government. Although Mulcahy's decision to leave the meeting after Tobin's diatribe shows a clear evolution in behaviour towards military dissent from the events of early 1922 when Mulcahy attempted to bridge divides within the IRA and negotiate with anti-Treaty IRA figures, the continued meetings shows that the concerns of these IRA veterans were being taken seriously. McGrath appears to have been able to convince Mulcahy to attend another meeting on 7 July 1923, at this meeting another long list of specific issues were raised by the OIRA along with two lists of officers. The first of these lists were 'objectionable' persons currently serving as officers and the second list was an approved list of men selected by the OIRA to replace them. This is the clearest example of *quid pro quo* style negotiations regarding internal military affairs since the proposed 'joint' GHQ with the anti-Treaty IRA in May 1922. However, in that process the positions were part of an agreed settlement which involved input from both factions, what the OIRA was demanding was the arbitrary dismissal of thirty-three officers and their immediate replacement with men selected by them. It is not clear exactly how many of the men listed by Tobin et al. were actually ex-servicemen as limited information is provided on each person. The list has been reproduced below in the same manner as it was delivered to Mulcahy (Table 4.1).

[50] Minutes of an interview, 25 June 1923 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/195).

Table 4.1 List of officers marked as 'objectionable' by the OIRA[51]

Major General Murphy	Of the DMP
Comdt. Liston	Records. - ex-British
Major General Prout	G.O.C. Waterford - ex-American. Nothing known about his previous to the Truce. Jerry Ryan should be in his place.
Col. Dunphy	Adjutant, Curragh - ex-British
Cmdt. F. O'Brien	Chief of Staff's Dept. - expelled from the Volunteers on refusing to carry out orders.
Col. Killeen	Limerick Command
Col. Barry O'Brien	"not in the I.R.A."
Col. Moran	ex-British officer - said to have celebrated recently some British victories in some theatre, in our uniform.
Cmdt. Fealy	
Col. Heaslip	ex-British officer.
Col. Bishop	ex-British officer; ~~also a person against whom there was a charge of robbery~~
Capt. Johnson	
Comdt. Brophill	ex-British officer. "was absolutely hostile to us".
Comdt. Whelan	hostile to us.
Capt. Gleeson	Works, - cleared out of this country when there was danger in this country
Lieut. Cassidy	Works - was on Intelligence for Sean McSwiney during the Treaty discussion.
Comdt. Mortall	Intelligence Dept. - an ex-Britisher - has same rank as Frank Saurin.
Col. Joy	Never known to be anywhere.
2 Comdts in Cork - Scott & Kingston	Both ex-British officers.
Capt. Clancy	apparently of Gormanstown - ex-British.
Comdt. Ryan	Training - ditto.
Col. Hunt Capt. Caulfield	of the Artillery
Comdt. McNamara	Ordnance
Col. Hodnett	Legal staff.
some person the name of O'Connor	

[51] Meeting with Joe McGrath, Liam Tobin, Sean O'Connell, Charlie Dalton, Christie O'Malley & Frank Thornton with Richard Mulcahy, 7 July 1923 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/195). — There are a number of typed minutes and copies of letters from this meeting.

2 Lieuts Innes	
Capt. Switzer	
Comdt. Trayers	
Capt. C.I.R. Collins	was not in Army prior to Truce.
Comdt. Bruen	was British Embarkation officer during the war.
some fellow the name of Siren	

Of the thirty-three men, only two are immediately identifiable as having prior military service Generals Murphy and Prout. However, Murphy had already taken up a new role in charge of the DMP, it seems that the OIRA also regarded the ostensibly civilian police forces as areas within which they could have some say over its leadership and appointments. Only eleven individuals were explicitly cited as 'ex-British' and it would appear that in some cases this was an example of settling scores between cliques within the National Army. In addition to this list of 'objectionable' officers, the OIRA were also unhappy about being replaced in the reorganised Dublin Command:

> When Dublin looked like it was going Irregular, a Staff was appointed to run the area. All these officers either volunteered or were sent to different parts of the country to continue the fight. During their absence the Second Eastern Division was squashed and it was handed over to practically an invasion of some Northern Division, and when the Officers from Dublin returned to Dublin they had no position of any description in that Command.[52]

This highlights both the changing nature of the National Army after a large expansion during the civil war and the different roles for officers in a military that was transitioning towards a *peacetime* posture as opposed to an organisation in active combat. While the description of members of the Northern Divisions as being 'invaders' is somewhat hyperbolic, it is indicative of how many of the OIRA concerns were parochial in nature and could best be described as 'turf wars'. The wider question of ex-servicemen is not developed in any significant manner, apart from the list of officers, there is no real development of this question. There are also references to members of the British Secret Service being active throughout the military, it is not clear if the OIRA are referring to active agents or men whom they assume to be ex-British Secret Service within the military writ large:

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[52] Meeting with Joe McGrath, Liam Tobin, Sean O'Connell, Charlie Dalton, Christie O'Malley & Frank Thornton with Richard Mulcahy, 7 July 1923 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/195).

> Sergt. McKenna, Transport, Portobello. Second in Command of the British Secret Service in Ireland. Admitted to a certain person that he was still on the "game". A fellow the name of Connolly. His history previous to the Truce can be provided — his location can also probably be provided.[53]

This information appears to have been provided by Charlie Dalton, but it is not at all clear where this is coming from and this is clearly hearsay to a greater or lesser degree. The genesis of the issue was that of demobilisation and retention within a smaller and more professional military organisation. From July 1923, correspondence continued between dissident officers and Mulcahy, it was clear that the issue was continuing to grow and would eventually lead to a mutiny of sorts in the Curragh Camp in October 1923 and the later Army 'crisis' in March 1924.[54]

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[53] Meeting with Joe McGrath, Liam Tobin, Sean O'Connell, Charlie Dalton, Christie O'Malley & Frank Thornton with Richard Mulcahy, 7 July 1923 (UCDA: Mulcahy Papers P7/B/195).

[54] For a more detailed account of the Irish Army 'mutiny' see M.G. Valiulus, 'The 'Army Mutiny' of 1924 and the assertion of civilian authority in independent Ireland' in *Irish Historical Studies* vol. 23, no. 92 (Nov. 1983), pp 354-366.

Database of known ex-servicemen in the National Army[55]

For this study a database of known and identifiable ex-servicemen was collated. In addition to the limited archival records on the subject of ex-servicemen during the Irish civil war, there are a number of files that refer to ex-servicemen, typically within larger lists of specific soldiers. These files have been transcribed and form the basis of the database of ex-servicemen. In a similar manner to Steven O'Connor's study of ex-servicemen in the IRA and RIC, only those that can be identified have been utilised, this database is not designed to be definitive and is only representative of what is available to date from relevant archival sources.[56]

As noted earlier, General Sean MacMahon in testimony before the Army Enquiry committee provided figures on how many ex-servicemen were in the officer corps of the National Army in 1924. MacMahon noted that 155 officers from 'other armies' had been retained, of this 80 had prior IRA service during the Irish war of independence. This reinforces the findings of Steven O'Connor, that showed that ex-servicemen were represented throughout the IRA albeit in low numbers. It is important to place MacMahon's figures within a more concise context, the size of the military between 1922-4 changed drastically, increasing between November 1922 and March 1923 with a significant reduction by 1924 (Table 4.2). The speed of the demobilisation and the impact this had upon the military, were factors that shaped the post-civil war relationship between the military leadership and the civilian government. It also highlights that the figures given by MacMahon only relate to a small proportion of the military during a period of extreme retrenchment.

[55] Please see the following link for the R code for this chapter (https://rpubs.com/jackakav_phd/685749) (Accessed 1 Dec. 2020).

[56] For full details on how this database was constructed, including the specific archival reference codes and the criteria utilised for identification purposes please see the Methodology chapter of this thesis.

Table 4.2 Strength of the National Army/Defence Forces 1922-4[57]

Year	Officers	Other Ranks	No rank listed	Total	(+/-)
November 1922	2,192	28,819	458	31,469	~
March 1923	3,600	44,576	NA	48,176	+16,707
March 1924	1,241	15,141	NA	16,382	-31,794

As the ranks held by soldiers are included in the database of ex-servicemen in the National Army, it is possible to create a comparative table showing the number of ex-servicemen in the officer corps as a proportion of the total officer corps for the period 1922-4 (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3 Ex-servicemen in the officer corps of the National Army 1922-4

Year	No. of ex-servicemen in Officer Corps	Total Officer Corps	% of Total Officer Corps
November 1922	191	2,192	9%
March 1923	226	3,600	6%
March 1924	155	1,241	12%

From Table 4.3, it is clear that the percentage of ex-servicemen in the officer corps actually increased, despite the rapid reduction in the size of the military between 1923-4. Unfortunately, figures of ex-servicemen amongst the wider population of 'other ranks' are not available from 1924. The database of ex-servicemen in the National Army does provide a breakdown between enlisted men, NCOs and officers. Therefore a tabular breakdown of ex-servicemen across all ranks of the military as a proportion of the strength of the military in November 1922 shows that the overall numbers of ex-servicemen in the 'other' ranks is negligible (Table 4.4).

[57] This table was created by combining the rank totals from the Irish Army census and the totals provided by the 'Memorandum on the development of the forces, 1923-7, p. 6' (MA/HS/A/0876).

Table 4.4 Ex-servicemen in the National Army (Nov. 1922)

Ex-servicemen in National Army (Nov. 1922)	No.	Total Strength of National Army (Nov. 1922)	%
Officers	191	2,192	9%
NCOs	34	4,291	1%
Enlisted men	195	24,528	1%
No rank listed/available	8	458	
Total	428	31,469	1%

This process can be repeated for 1923, however, as only figures for officers and 'other' ranks are listed, the total for NCOs and enlisted men are combined (Table 4.5). Similar to the figures for 1922, the number of ex-servicemen outside of the officer corps is negligible. There are a number of possible explanations for this, first is that there are large numbers of ex-servicemen currently unidentified who were serving as NCOs or enlisted men during this time period. However, even a doubling of the total numbers listed on the database would still result in less than five percent of the National Army having prior military service other than the IRA. Therefore even accounting for a significant *undercount* of possible ex-servicemen, for significant numbers to be present, there would need to be at least an additional 1,500+ ex-servicemen in the military that have to date not been identified.

Table 4.5 Ex-servicemen in the National Army (March 1923)

Ex-servicemen in National Army (March 1923)	No.	Total Strength of National Army (March 1923)	%
Officers	226	3,600	6%
Other Ranks	247	44,576	1%
No rank listed/available	8	NA	
Total	481	48,176	

The concentration on officers is partly a feature of the records available and is likely reflecting the fact that many of the ex-servicemen also had prior service in the IRA. This dual service, identified by O'Connor, is prevalent in the database of ex-servicemen

with significant numbers of soldiers having served in the British military and IRA. While the majority of ex-servicemen are listed as having prior service in the British Army, there are small numbers in Commonwealth, continental and the US Army (Table 4.6).

Table 4.6 Prior military/paramilitary experience

Previous 'foreign' military	No.	Previous IRA/Volunteers	No.
British Army	540	IRA	199
British Navy	14	National Volunteers	1
Royal Air Force	12	Irish Volunteers	3
Royal Irish Constabulary	7		
Canadian Army/Forces	4		
Australian Army	2		
British Indian Army	1		
New Zealand Forces	1		
Royal Marines	1		
US Army	1		
Multiple Armies	6		

The small number of men listed with service in multiple armies, are typically those who served in the British Navy and British Army and one individual with service in the French and Belgian armies. Unfortunately, identifying prior military units proved more difficult due to missing records and a lack of sufficient attributes when attempting cross-referencing.[58] For those soldiers where a prior unit was identified, the majority unsurprisingly listed 'Irish' regiments (Table 4.7).

[58] For example many soldiers were listed by their name, rank and previous service, i.e. John Murphy, Private, British Army.

Table 4.7 Previous British military unit — ex-servicemen in the National Army

Previous military unit	No.	%
Connaught Rangers	20	14%
Multiple units	15	11%
Royal Irish Regiment	14	10%
Royal Munster Fusiliers	14	10%
Leinster Regiment	13	9%
Royal Dublin Fusiliers	10	7%
Irish Guards	7	5%
Royal Engineers	6	4%
Royal Irish Fusiliers	6	4%
Labour Corps	4	3%
Royal Irish Rifles	4	3%
Royal Army Service Corps	3	2%
12 Lancers	2	1%
King’s Liverpool Regiment	2	1%
M.G.C.	2	1%
R.F.A.	2	1%
Royal Fusiliers	2	1%
Royal Garrison Artillery	2	1%
Cheshire Regiment	1	1%
Field Artillery	1	1%
Hussars	1	1%
King’s Shropshire Light Infantry	1	1%
Northumberland Fusiliers	1	1%
Royal Army Ordnance Corps	1	1%
Royal Highlanders	1	1%
Royal Horse Artillery	1	1%
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers	1	1%
Royal Scottish Fusiliers	1	1%
Royal Warwick Regiment	1	1%

Previous military unit	No.	%
South Lancaster Regiment	1	1%
South Wales Borderers	1	1%
Total	141	

The distribution across English, Scottish and English regiments also shows that despite the concentration in 'Irish' regiments, ex-servicemen did come from a wide variety of units in the British Army. It has not been possible to ascertain prior units for the remaining 448 men listed on the database to date, this may improve with further releases of MSPC records. Although it may seem obvious that a significant proportion of ex-servicemen had prior service in the First World War, verifying this has proved difficult as many of the records report prior years of service in number of years as opposed to specific date ranges, i.e. 2 years BA instead of 1914-18. In total eighty-one men were positively identified as having service during the First World War, in addition to three individuals with service during the Second Boer War (1899-1901). It is highly likely that the majority of the men listed on the database served during the First World War or immediately prior to the outbreak of the Irish civil war, however, rather than assume this, it was decided to only list those who could be identified as such numerically. This same caveat applies to prior service during the Irish war of independence for IRA veterans, only specific date ranges were included. (Table 4.8).

Table 4.8 Previous conflicts (British & Irish)

Prior British military conflict	No.	Prior Irish revolutionary conflict	No.
First World War	81	War of Independence	42
Second Boer War	3		
Total	84		42

The years of service is available for a number of ex-servicemen, for both service in the British forces and the IRA. This provides context into how much experience these soldiers would have had prior to joining the National Army (Table 4.9).

Table 4.9 Years of prior service in the British forces and the IRA

Years of Prior Service	British forces	IRA/Irish Volunteers
less than 1 year	3	11
1 year	6	9
2-5 years	164	96
6-10 years	64	1
11-20 years	26	NA
20+ years	10	NA
Total	273	117

In addition to the previous years of experience, the prior rank is available for a minority of the men listed on the database, when this is compared against the rank type held in the National Army, it is clear that although forty-four percent of the ex-servicemen were serving as officers, there were only eight men who had served as former British Army officers serving in the National Army (Table 4.10).

Table 4.10 Comparisons of prior rank in British/Other armies and National Army rank

Prior Rank in the British/Other Armies	No.	%	Rank in National Army	No.	%
Officers	8	1%	Officers	259	44%
NCOs	70	12%	NCOs	58	10%
Enlisted men	113	19%	Enlisted men	261	44%
No rank listed/ available	398	68%	No rank listed/available	11	2%
Total	589			589	

Although home addresses are available for the majority of men listed on the database, there is a significant imbalance between counties due to one of the sources for this database consisting of men from the Second and Third Northern Division of the IRA, therefore any mapping of home counties for ex-servicemen would skew significantly towards Belfast. Steven O'Connor compared the native province of his sample of ex-

servicemen in the IRA against the recruitment trends per province for the British Army, it was decided to utilise this approach as it would lessen the weighting of the database towards county Antrim in particular (Table 4.11).

Table 4.11 Native province of ex-servicemen in the National Army and IRA as compared to Irish population in 1922 and Irish recruits into the British Army 1914-1918[59]

Province	Ex-Servicemen IRA %	Ex-Servicemen National Army %	Irish Population, 1911 %	Army recruits %
Connacht	9	4.5	14	4
Leinster	20	27	26	26
Munster	54	14	24	16
Ulster	8	28	36	54
NA	9	25	—	—

From Table 4.10, just over fifty percent of the sample were from Leinster and Ulster, reflecting the impact of Dublin and Belfast cities upon the sample, compared to the recruitment figures for the British Army, the numbers for Connacht, Leinster and Munster were near equivalent to the figures reported for British Army recruitment. Which means that the ex-servicemen within the National Army broadly corresponded to prior trends of British Army recruitment, which means that the sample is somewhat representative of this population, with the exception of Ulster. Also nearly a quarter of the sample has no listed home address/county, which prevents this from being a definitive finding. The Ulster figures are just under half of those reported for British Army enlistments. Comparing the two groups of ex-servicemen is more complex as there is significant size imbalance as O'Connor only utilised 121 men for his sample, while the database lists 589 men. The key difference being the percentage from Munster, which can be explained by the concentration of the IRA in Munster which would have impacted upon O'Connor samples, while for the National Army, Cork recruitment in particular grew from August 1922, it was starting from a relatively low base within the pro-Treaty IRA forces prior to the outbreak of the civil war.

[59] The comparative figures: ex-servicemen within the IRA, Irish population 1911 and Army recruits are taken from O'Connor, 'It's up to you now to fight', p. 107.

The impact of ex-servicemen within the National Army as shown by this chapter is a problematic subject to quantify. It is probable that some number of ex-servicemen from either the British, US or Commonwealth armies joined the National Army. What is clear is that there is scant quantitative evidence to support the contention of large-scale recruitment. This chapter set out to examine the issue of ex-servicemen being recruited into the National Army, examining the archival records on this subject and a database of known ex-servicemen. Upon examining the available evidence, it is clear that the historiography has significantly over-emphasised the role played by ex-servicemen in the National Army. The distinction between enlisted personnel and the officers corps is rarely stated and this results in an often overarching narrative that views all ex-servicemen as a homogenous group; as shown by the research of Paul Taylor, ex-servicemen were a disparate category which contained a broad selection of Irish society who joined the British Army for a variety of reasons.[60] A frequent claim made about ex-servicemen who joined the National Army is that many were recruited from the 'Irish' regiments of the British Army which were demobilised in 1922; a small number of the veterans discussed in this chapter fall into this category of recruit. A majority of men listed in the database either do not list the necessary information to substantiate this claim or had previous IRA experience prior to joining the National Army. The scale of dual military service was much higher than had been previously cited in the historiography; it is clear that this subtype of recruit with both traditional military service and paramilitary service is one that warrants further study. This in turn undermines one of the key arguments of the Tobin group: namely that the character of the National Army had significantly moved away from its origins as a successor to the IRA. In addition, Tobin's claims against individual officers who were listed as 'ex-British' was examined in detail, and although it is likely that of the eleven individuals explicitly named as ex-servicemen, a number of them were, the overall figures being discussed are a tiny fraction of the officer corps in 1923. It is also clear from examining the rest of the information provided by the OIRA that ex-servicemen were merely used as an issue to evoke tensions and that prestige and status were the primary motivations and a sense that in a professional military, the less disciplined IRA veterans would be quietly removed from key positions.

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[60] Taylor, *Heroes or traitors?*, pp 8-10.

Conclusion

This thesis is the largest statistical study undertaken of the National Army to date. The short-lived nature of the National Army and often elliptical way it has been described in the wider discourse has meant that this organisation has been chronically under-studied. By focusing upon the structures of the organisation rather than personalities, this thesis has expanded the current understanding of how the military was organised. Details of recruitment, casualties and hierarchical structures have all been outlined in detail. All of this has been greatly aided by digital methodologies, in particular the programming language R which has made the parsing of a large and unwieldy resource like the Irish Army census feasible for a doctoral study. Even when it has been studied, much of what has been written about the National Army has been highly specific to a given incident or situation, there is no broad overview of the military structures or even how it operated. The thesis can be divided into two components: firstly, the 'structures' of the military, encompassing its formation from the pro-Treaty IRA, recruitment and command structures and secondly, the internal composition of the military, which was examined via two datasets of casualties and ex-servicemen.

Although David Fitzpatrick in *Politics and Irish life* stated that 'the civil war which pitted column against column, must await examination by some other student of Chaos',[1] the reality of this has tended to be far less evocative than previously acknowledged. While specific units did divide on the question of the Treaty and the ensuing settlement, the conflict was *not* characterised by columns turning on each other in the fashion as described by Fitzpatrick; instead the National Army expanded into a new and largely unrecognisable force compared to the pre-split IRA. This thesis is a study on the process of change. The process of creating a new organisation from amorphous pro-Treaty IRA units have heretofore been understudied and accepted as a natural conclusion, when the reality was that this process was not inevitable, despite being accepted as such for the past century. Considering the lack of any substantive *state*, the military developed surprisingly quickly and expanded into areas not normally under the remit of a military. The later 'civilianisation' of these elements of the military

[1] David Fitzpatrick, *Politics and Irish life: provincial experiences of war and revolution* (Cork, 1998), p. 191.

in 1923-4 is a process that needs to be examined in future studies, as this process is a natural bookend to the expansion of the military in mid-1922. While there is a reasonable amount of chaos occurring during the civil war, what is notable is how well organised the military was in contrast to the mythos that has been created around this period. The training system established at the Curragh Camp in July 1922, began immediately training soldiers, including specialists in artillery and other specialised corps. Recruitment continued unabated despite the increasing cumulative figures for casualties and the structures of the military, often improvised, were flexible enough to be tailored to suit the changing circumstances of the time. While this could be described as 'chaos', this is not quite the image, vividly painted by Kevin O'Higgins of 'eight young men in the City Hall standing amidst the ruins of one administration… with wild men screaming through the keyholes'.[2] As O'Higgins has played a significant role via the Army Enquiry committee in shaping much of the discourse on the military, it is hardly surprisingly that his often polemic recollections of the period have been sustained and have shaped a measure of the consensus view on the National Army.

By starting with the pro-Treaty IRA, this thesis charts the organisational changes of the military, starting with the original plans for a peace-time military during the interregnum between the signing of the Anglo-Irish treaty and the outbreak of civil war in June 1922. By focusing upon structural changes and proposals, the divergence between pro- and anti-Treaty IRAs can be charted more effectively, than a parsing of the ever-changing rhetorical positions of IRA officers during this period. The ability to utilise visualisations of IRA structures, namely brigades and divisions provided useful insights into how the pro-Treaty forces were being reorganised as compared to the pre-existing structures. It is likely in future studies of the civil war that a focus upon divisional and command areas will produce more nuanced results than the 'county' study which has been employed to date, as these structures reflect the true disposition of forces as opposed to artificially dividing up units by county boundaries. While anti-Treaty IRA did attempt to re-organise along similar lines, by retaining a divisional structure, they largely existed on paper. This is an example of the limits of studying both the National Army and anti-Treaty IRA as equal entities, when the reality of the anti-

[2] Dolan, *Commemorating the Irish civil war*, p. 9.

Treaty movement, meant that many IRA brigades operated as individual units. The ability of Liam Lynch as chief of staff of the anti-Treaty IRA to command or advise brigades based in the North-West, an area of intense anti-Treaty activity, was hampered by both geography as it was the further distance from his position in Cork and poor communication lines, which is similar to the command and control issues which were endemic to the pre-split IRA GHQ. However, this problem was magnified by the often coalition-style relationship between anti-Treaty IRA units, as they often made decisions independent of each other throughout the conflict. In contrast, the centralised nature of the National Army and its clearly defined chain of command and superstructure, meant that decisions could be made centrally and then executed with a reasonable chance that these would actually occur in real time. This is especially true of the seaborne landings, which were high risk and difficult to plan, they worked because the underlying structures were able to support this type of activity, coupled with the size of the recruitment, which meant that sufficient numbers of troops could be deployed on such operations.

The recruitment into the National Army marked one of the largest increases of the military in the twentieth century, the second being the mobilisation during the Second World War. Using the census rolls, it was possible to examine this process across the entire island of Ireland and contextualise it against newspaper accounts and contemporary records where possible. However, the centrepiece was the ability to examine recruitment by home county, next-of-kin county and place of attestation. The last of these allows for an analysis of the movement of people to join the military, which in some cases was extensive. The levels of recruitment from newly established Northern Ireland also meant that this study reflected trends across the island, irrespective of partition. While the numbers recruited with addressees outside of Ireland was relatively low, it was higher than some counties within the Free State, specifically anti-Treaty holdouts along the western seaboard. Attempts to link recruitment to broader electoral trends shown by the results of the general election in June 1922, provided some insights into how nominal ‘anti-Treaty’ areas, in fact, contained a substantial pro-Treaty tendency as shown by both recruitment figures and electoral results. The internal listing of pro-Treaty officers within divisions across the state immediately prior to the split within the IRA reveal interesting aspects of how the ‘column versus column’ dynamic

as outlined by Fitzpatrick worked in practice. While pro-Treaty officers were present in unexpected areas such as the ostensibly anti-Treaty Kerry Brigades, their effectiveness and ability to bring men with them only occurred after the National Army had established a presence in the area.[3] Therefore, recruitment followed proximity to the military itself, which was shown by large increases of recruitment from county Cork, predominately viewed as an overwhelming anti-Treaty area due to the strength of the local and largest anti-Treaty IRA division, the First Southern. However, this perception needs to be re-examined in light of the extensive recruitment from this county throughout August into the National Army. It is possible that the size of the county was a factor as the three population centres on the island, Antrim (Belfast), Dublin and Cork all produced large numbers of recruits for the National Army.

The case study of the National Army casualties provides insight on how the nascent organisation managed the initial months of the civil war. The emphasis in the decades post-civil war upon the 'Republican' dead and associated 'martyrdom' of those executed has distorted the picture of casualties during this period. The National Army suffered losses in the first four months of the civil war that were near equivalent to total losses during the Irish war of independence by the IRA. The high numbers of casualties is somewhat masked by the low-level nature of the conflict, with an average of three men being killed a day between July-November 1922. From the outset of the civil war, a significant proportion of the general population supported the Provisional Government and as shown in chapter two, recruitment although a crude measurement of support, remained high during the entire period of the case study (July-November 1922). The frequency of casualties on a near daily basis was an unexpected finding of this study, and it remains consistent throughout the entire period July-November 1922. Although these are small numbers, on average three soldiers killed per day, it accumulates to 408 men by 13 November 1922. This subtle but consistent frequency of casualties appears to have had a limited effect upon the recruitment rate, which remained exceptionally high in comparison: the National Army's recruitment average was 100 men per day, meaning that the casualties had a limited impact upon the military's recruitment policy.

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[3] An example of this is in Niall Harrington's account of the Kerry landings. When the Dublin Guards landed in Fenit, they expected to be met by a local pro-Treaty IRA officer named Eamon Horan, who was supposed to be bringing other pro-Treaty men with him, instead Horan ended up recruiting men once the National Army had arrived. — Harrington, *Kerry landing* (1992), pp 75-6.

More specifically, it seems that the only consistency that arose from the loss of National Army personnel was the increased brutality that was shown to anti-Treaty IRA prisoners in late 1922 and early 1923, which eventually resulted in the Ballyseedy reprisals. Even these events are highly individualised and isolated examples with specific persons playing an outsized role in both the killing of prisoners and the reaction to National Army casualties. It is possible that the earlier period of consistent casualties on a daily basis had placed pressure on National Army commanders that led to singular reprisals in 1923, but this is difficult to gauge due to the distribution of National Army casualties across the Free State. Why were 'extrajudicial' killings concentrated in county Kerry? As anomalous killings began almost immediately upon the arrival of the National Army in August 1922.[4] In contrast, county Mayo had limited numbers of similar killings and had no equivalent to a Ballyseedy type incident, despite consistent casualties throughout the same period. Therefore, although pressure from consistent casualties was an issue, it is one that appears to be highly localised.

This is the first time a social study has utilised National Army casualties as a proxy for the larger military and while some of the findings correspond to the previous samples of the National Army, it also underlines that the prior studies of the National Army were often deeply unrepresentative of the military and lacking basic explanations as to what is being examined. This study by contextualising the age and marital profile of the casualties against the census showed that the sample of deceased National Army personnel was broadly representative of the full military as recorded by the census. As samples had already been created of the National Army and IRA, it meant the findings from the casualties database were compared to those from earlier studies, surprisingly in both cases the numbers of agricultural labourers were higher in the casualties database than either sample of the National Army and IRA created by Peter Hart. Unlike those samples, which are vague when it comes to geographic backgrounds, the casualties database collated every death, irrespective of cause of death, that occurred across the Free State during July-November 1922. Therefore, it is geographically representative of where the National Army operated and suffered losses, including losses that were self-

[4] See Harrington, *Kerry landings*, p. 141, there is an account of the shooting of an anti-Treaty IRA prisoner in August by National Army officers, it would appear this was in retaliation for an earlier killing of a Clare National Army officer by this individual.

inflected and/or accidental. This means that the study of prior occupations is also geographically distributed across the state, as soldiers died across the Free State territory as shown by the accompanying visualisations.

The final chapter of this thesis was an examination of ex-servicemen within the National Army. The supposed 'mass' recruitment of ex-servicemen in the National Army remains one of the few consistent features of the military that has been repeated in the discourse on the Irish revolutionary period. This assertion, along with the extrajudicial killings in Kerry and the military's role in carrying out the Provisional Government's execution policy are arguably the three most common tropes repeated about the National Army. A question raised is how these claims about ex-servicemen have managed to be sustained without any significant findings to substantiate them. It is atypical of the rigorous standards that have defined the scholarship on the Irish revolutionary period and in particular the statistical frameworks pioneered by David Fitzpatrick, which has transformed many of the research methods employed for studies of the IRA.

Due to the limited and often idiosyncratic types of information provided in each source of ex-servicemen it is not possible to create a specific demographic profile of a typical ex-servicemen, key data points required for this type of analysis are missing: age data, civilian employment, educational attainment and marital status are all partial or missing for large proportions of the sources utilised. Therefore the type of demographic analysis that was utilised by military sociologists such as Morris Janovitz is not possible. It should be noted that creating such as profile would likely have been impossible to create even if this type of data had been available. Apart from prior IRA and British/ Commonwealth military experience, there are no other areas of significant cross-over between the samples. This lack of overlap is an example of the difficulty that occurs when attempting to study a group that have been singled out for largely arbitrary analysis. Why would there be significant similarities between these soldiers? As the prior British military service of these soldiers appears to have had no impact upon their roles within the National Army.

Although it cannot be said that ex-servicemen were absent from the National Army, it is also not the case that the presence of significant numbers can be ascertained from the available records. Gavin M. Foster in his study of the societal and cultural aspects of the Irish civil war noted that claims regarding ex-servicemen were repeatedly made by anti-Treaty propagandists to help bolster an image of 'foreign influence' and to remind their readers that British assistance was being given to the Free State forces.[5] This is contrasted with the frequent references by Free State propagandists to the supposedly low social status of anti-Treatyite IRA members.[6] However, both of these claims were by design, fact-free and political in nature. As late as 1973, the Republican journal, *An Poblacht* was publishing articles that pinned the losses of the anti-Treaty IRA to the children of ex-servicemen within the National Army.[7] It is not clear if the repetition can be directly linked to ongoing Republican propaganda on the topic. What is apparent is that this issue has dominated a segment of popular opinion on the composition of the National Army, despite a lack of any sustained evidence to support it.

[5] Foster, *The Irish civil war and society*, p. 52.

[6] Ibid., p. 38.

[7] *An Phoblacht*, 22 Jun. 1973.

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