

Introduction

In the biblical accounts of creation (*Gen.* 1:1 -2:4a and *Gen.* 2:4bff), it is enough for God to will something to be created for this to happen. The second account may refer to God as a potter or builder, but it still differs significantly from Plato's *Timaeus*, where the world is generated by the Demiurge (Greek = Craftsman) who has to literally toil at the task of ordering the cosmos; an image which was something of an embarrassment for generations of later Platonists. As the Epicurean of *ND* I. 19 mockingly states: "What power of mental vision allowed your master Plato to envisage the vast and elaborate architectural process adopted by God in constructing the world? What method of engineering was employed? What iron tools and levers and cranes?" (trans. LCL modified).

Indeed, if God is truly a Craftsman, He must be provided with tools with which to construct the world. These "tools" are not more than mere stylistic devices. Although used for the purposes of exposition, they tend to have an insulating function by effectively separating the first principle from matter. Plato describes the Demiurge sorting out the elements with the aid of a winnowing-fan, an image that probably suggested itself to him from the sieve posited by Democritus, the atomist. The second century A.D. Platonist, Maximus of Tyre developed a still more elaborate image:

As to the nature of this divine craft, I am unable to describe it to you explicitly, but you will be able to understand its effects from an image of the kind I shall now give you. You have surely before now seen ships being hauled up out of the sea and stones of enormous bulk being moved by all sorts of twistings and rotations of machinery as each component transmits its impetus to the next and one component receives the movement from another, the whole machine is set in motion. It is the whole machine that is responsible for achieving the task, but by means of the collaboration of its individual parts. (*Oration* 13, trans. Trapp)

Maximus' vision here goes beyond mere imagery. He seeks to expound the causality of the Demiurge in terms of its relation to limiting factors, such as Necessity and Providence. As he elaborates: "Call the mechanic God, the machines human

powers of reasoning and the mechanic's technical knowledge the prophetic art which draws us to follow the guidance of Fate" (13.4.81-2). Maximus' point is that God only operates the machinery; and rather than being omnipotent as the Judaeo-Christian God is often perceived as being, He is severely limited by what the machinery can actually accomplish.

The Divine Architect

The Demiurge posited by the first century exegete, Philo Judaeus is upwardly-mobile with a promotion from craftsman to architect. Such an elevation involves more than social prejudice, however. While Plato had posited three principles: God (the Demiurge), the Ideas and matter from which everything else has its being, by Philo's time the Ideas or intelligible archetypes according to which sensible reality is ordered had become regarded as merely the thoughts of God. This leads Philo to introduce his famous comparison of the Demiurge with a king founding a city at *Opif.* 17. Once the king has decided upon construction, the architect mentally draws up the plans. The means by which he replicates this mental conception in the material realm echoes what the Demiurge accomplishes.¹ The Logos, then, contains the noetic realm, as the mind of the Demiurge, but it is not true to state that it has a physical place.² This is the world of Ideas as God is actually engaged in creation, but as Philo considers God as continually engaging in the process of creation, no fine distinction need be made concerning this point.³

Philo blurs the distinction between the king and the architect as an attempt to preserve God's transcendence. Another reason may be that he did not wish to open speculation concerning an ontological chain of demiurgic intermediaries. It indicates that the function of Demiurge does not exhaust God's being – it is only one of his roles. The Demiurge for Philo is subsumed into the Judaic god and the Logos-Cutter which He employs to carry out his demiurgic function is a subordinate entity, allowing Philo to resolve the supposed contradictions between both generative models. Secondly, Philo presents the architect as envisaging the future city mentally, when in point of fact he would use written plans - however this would not suit Philo's contention that the intelligible realm does not occupy physical space.

The Logos-Cutter

Allotting tools to the Demiurge goes beyond producing a comprehensible image of world-generation or explaining the mechanism of causality. It helps to insulate the Demiurge from the recalcitrance of matter, thereby reducing his responsibility for the element of disorder in the world. Such "tools" differ from the machine of Maximus in that they are philosophical entities in their own right, or "hypostases", aspects of the Godhead that enjoy an independent existence. Philo posits the Logos (Word)-Cutter. The image of the Logos as a tool is one of the predominant images presented by Philo in order to cast light on its functioning in the creation of the world. Additionally, the Logos can also be presented as a mediating entity. The image of the

Logos as a cutter might well have suggested itself to Philo from the flaming sword of the Cherubim at *Gen.* 3:24, once Philo had equated this with the Logos (a concept that preceded Philo). This notion can be paralleled in Gnosticism, with examples found in the Nag Hammadi texts. According to *The Testimony of Truth* 9.3, it is the Word (*logos*) which separates us from the error of the angels, where it is associated with the incarnate Son of Man. In *The Teaching of Silvanus*, the Logos is also regarded as a cutting-agent, and identification with the incarnate Christ is made explicit. *The Gospel of Truth* compares the Logos to a drawn sword. However, just as in *The Teaching of Silvanus*, this cutting-action has a *soteriological*, rather than a *demiurgic* significance, evoking the Johannine conception of Incarnation with the Word condemning some and saving others.

This portrayal of the Logos as a saw or sword may either be influenced in some way (directly or indirectly) by Philo, or indicate a current in Judaeo-Christian philosophical thought, which Philo himself adopted. As Hay claims, it seems likely that the conception of the Logos in a *cosmological* sense originated with Philo, although he may have drawn upon the Jewish tradition's view of the divine word as a sword used for protection of the faithful and punishment of the wicked.⁴ The Logos-Cutter can be viewed as a Jewish response within the current of Greek philosophy, which attempted to explain the imposition of order upon a disordered universe, using figures such as Hermes or Osiris as a personification of divine wisdom. As a divine mediator, the Logos appears at *Poimandres* 10 -11 and at Plutarch's *De Iside et Osiride* (53 – 54, 372E – 373C). Eudorus (of Alexandria) may also have expressed the combination of the monad (indivisible first principle) and dyad (divisible secondary principle) as the thought or *Logos* of a supreme One.⁵ Tobin suggests that the Logos in Philo may reflect an element from the early stages of Alexandrian Middle Platonism, ignored by subsequent thinkers.⁶

A useful source for Philo's doctrine of the Logos-Cutter is his commentary *Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres* ("Who is the Heir of Divine Things?"), an exegesis of *Gen.* 15:2-18, concerning Abraham's sacrifice of the heifer, ram and birds. Although the concept of the Logos-Cutter is only fully developed in *Heres*, at *Fug. et. Inv.* 194-196, it is mentioned as a Divider. In an interesting philosophical insight, Philo portrays Yahweh as the inventor of Platonic *diairesis* (philosophical investigation, division) by which he differentiates the various levels of the created realm. At *Heres* 132, Philo refers to Abraham's division of his sacrifice as symbolic of the Logos' division of our consciousness into rational and irrational soul, true and false speech and cognitive and non-cognitive impressions. At *Heres* 133, Philo signals the link between *diairesis* and demiurgy:

The subject of division into equal parts and of opposites is a wide one and discussion of it is essential. We will neither omit nor protract it, but abridge it as far as possible and content ourselves with the vital points only. Just as the great Artificer divid-

ed our soul and limbs in the middle, so too when he wrought the world, did he deal with the being of all that is.⁷

This notion of the Logos engaged in division is central to Philo's notion of world-creation. It is hardly surprising that it is the Logos which is engaged in this sort of activity, as the human mind, which Philo also describes as a Logos, is occupied with much the same function on a smaller scale, when it is engaged in *diairesis*.⁸ *Heres* 134 continues this concept of a creative division on the part of the Logos, based around the four main elements.

This He took and began to divide as follows. First He made two sections, heavy and light, thus distinguishing the element of dense from that of rare particles. Then again He divides each of these two, the rare into air and fire, the dense into water and land and these four he laid down as first foundations to be the sensible elements of the sensible world.

The first task of the Logos-Cutter is division based on the elements. The activity of the Logos here parallels very closely the ordering through differentiation engaged in by the Demiurge of the *Timaeus*.⁹ It is interesting that in spite of a certain adoption of Stoic elements, a great deal of Philo's exposition of the Logos-Cutter is expressed in terms generic to all the schools. Certainly Stoic, however, is the division of fire into two kinds at § 136; the useful variety and what amounts to the Stoic *pyr technikon* (fire as the basic substrate which survives the end of each world-order), set aside to preserve the heavens.¹⁰

At *Heres* 140, Philo makes it quite clear that God is the true Demiurge and the Logos is merely the means or tool by which He creates, rather than some kind of independently operating agent.

Thus God sharpened the edge of His all-cutting Word, and divided universal being, which before was without form or quality, and the four elements of the world which were formed by segregation from it, and the animals and plants which were framed with them as materials.

The Being which God divides here is *ousia* or the Stoic conception of matter, although God is envisaged as ordering, rather than creating. The continual division of matter by the Logos can be viewed as Philo's version of the continual geometry engaged in by the Demiurge at Plutarch's *Quaest. Conviv.* 1002E, stressed at *Heres* 235 (quoted below), where the Logos is said to never cease to cleave matter. The passage describes the Logos as dividing matter into an infinity of infinities; for Philo, there was no such thing as an atom in the philosophical sense- it was always possi-

ble, even if only for the Logos, to subdivide matter eternally.

The Greek *oudepote* here, I would suggest, could be taken as “at no point” as well as “never”; the Logos never ceases to divide matter in the temporal sense, but equally in its continual care for the phenomenal realm, it is capable of infinite division, or at least to a point beyond that which can be comprehended by the human mind.

This notion of the Logos as a tool is echoed in a similar passage at §167: “these tables too were cut by the Divine Legislator and by Him only.” This notion of cutting suggests that the thought of God can be equated with the Logos-Cutter. The passage helps to reinforce the notion of the Logos-Cutter as an instrument of the Demiurge, since the identification of a legislator with a Demiurge is an old one, as both can be regarded as imposing order upon disorder. Although Philo’s image of the Logos-Cutter appears to be a unique contribution, *Heres* 146 reveals how much he owes to the Demiurge of the *Timaeus*:

In the light of this preliminary sketch observe how God in “dividing in the middle” actually did divide equally according to all forms of equality, when he created the universe. First, as to equality of number, he made the light parts equal in number to the heavy parts, earth and water, which are heavy being two, and fire and air, which are naturally light being two also. Again by this division we have one and one in the driest and the wettest, that is earth and water, and in the coldest and the hottest, that is air and fire. In the same way, we have one and one in darkness and light, in day and night, in winter and summer, in spring and autumn, and in the other examples of the same nature.

This activity is similar to the separating action of the Receptacle. The stress on division based on equality (i.e. rational principles) echoes the mixing together of the Same and the Different – Philo points to the rationality visible in the cosmos, as evidence that it must have been created by a rational principle. This is echoed in the description of the equitable construction of the heavens at *Heres* 147:

For equality of the magnitude, he gave us the parallel circles in heaven, those of the equinox in spring and autumn, and those of the solstice in summer and winter, while on earth there are the zones two of which are equal to each other, namely those which adjoin the poles, frigid and therefore uninhabited, and two which are bordered by the last named and torrid zone, these two habitable, as we are told, because of their temperate climate, one of them on the south side and the other on the north.

The description here is very similar to the construction of the heavens and the insertion of the World-Soul at *Timaeus* 35. Although Philo dispenses with the World-Soul, which becomes largely replaced by the Logos, he is prepared to adopt the imagery of the *Timaeus* for his own purposes.¹¹ Dillon suggests that Philo may be using a Stoic handbook in delineating his concept of the Logos.¹² In this context, he cites the presentation of Antiochus of Ascalon in Cicero’s *Academica Posteriora*, where mention is made of an infinite “cutting” and “dividing” of matter.¹³ However, Cicero does not go into details of how this division contributes to the organisation of matter.

This pronouncement of theirs is not wide of the mark. Judge that the master art of God by which He wrought all things is one that admits of no heightening or lowering of intensity but always remains the same and that through its transcendent excellence it has wrought in perfection each theory that is, every number and every form that tends to perfectness being used to the full by the Maker. (*Heres* 156)

Just like his Platonic predecessor, the Philonic Demiurge constructs the world based on significant numbers, which reveals the perfection of the cosmos. It is this that allows Philo to explain in philosophical terms creation in six/seven days – obviously there is no reason why an omnipotent deity should require a week to create the cosmos, since he would be capable, as Philo asserts, of creating it simultaneously – however, the importance of six and seven underline the perfection of what was created (both are philosophically important numbers in Greek thought, while seven is important in Judaism as it represents a complete whole). This perfection of the created world is evoked by the menorah.¹⁴

At *Heres* 157, it is evident the cosmos as a whole is good:

For He judged equally about the little and the great to use Moses’ words (*Deut.* 1.17) when He generated and sliced each thing nor was He led by the insignificance of the material to diminish, or by its splendour to increase, the art which He applied.

There can be no question of the recalcitrance of matter as an explanation of the existence of evil in the created realm: Philo’s God, like the Platonic Demiurge, made the best kind of world possible, but unlike him, was in no way limited by the materials which He used. The prejudicial Platonic view of matter does come across at *Heres* 158, although not as a limitation on God’s bounty. Rather, matter is not responsible for the beauty of the cosmos, which must be attributed to the superior science of the Demiurge.¹⁵ At *Heres* 163, Philo indicates that in spite of what humans might think there is no dichotomy between an inferior or superior part of creation:

But with God no kind of material is held in honour and therefore he bestowed upon them all the same art and in equal measure. And so in the holy Scriptures we read, “God saw all things which He had made and behold, they were very good” (*Gen.i.3*) and things which receive the same praise must be of equal honour in the eyes of the praiser.

This passage seems to indicate the existence of different types of matter. Here Philo is influenced by the Septuagint account; in which man is created from a mixture of materials, such as mud and *pneuma* (breath). The passage echoes Plotinus’ comment at *Enn.* 3.2.11.6 that a craftsman could not make an animal only with eyes, even if these are its finest feature. The beauty of the cosmos lies in its instantiation of all possibilities, and even though some of these possibilities may appear better than others, God has applied the same skill in creating everything.

This point is picked up at *De Prov.* 59 when Philo states that the creation of reptiles has not come into being by a direct act of Providence but as an attendant circumstance. Philo adopts the response used also by Christian thinkers in explaining why God has created wild animals (they encourage bravery) at *De Prov.* 56-58. Philo’s response is more systematic, however. Worms and lice cannot be blamed on the Demiurge, but occur for scientific reasons (putrefaction in food and perspiration).¹⁶ Just as Plato asserts that only what is good can be attributed to God, Providence is only responsible for that which is created “out of its proper substance by a seminal and primary process of nature”. Philo also adopts the Stoic approach that apparent evils, upon closer inspection, turn out to be beneficial, when he points out the utility of many venomous animals in medicinal processes at *De Prov.* 60f.

The Logos goes on to allocate various portions to humanity at *Heres* 180:

Further, nature abounds in things which bear some shape or stamp and others which do not, even as it is with coins, and you may note how the indivisible severer divides them all into equal parts and awards those that are approved by their stamp to the lover of instruction, but those that have no stamp or mark to the man of ignorance.

It appears that Philo is advancing a proto-Gnostic viewpoint here, in his view of a Demiurge who distributes two different qualities of goods to two different classes of humanity. I think, however, that Philo is drawing a very Platonic distinction. The image of the stamp is similar to his use of the seal at *Opif.*, and refers to those elements of the phenomenal realm which are made after the image of the Logos (in Platonic terms, an instantiation of a Form). Therefore it seems that the Logos distributes to men of ignorance that which is purely material.

Philo seems to have a Stoicized reading of the *Timaeus* in mind at *Heres*

187-188, where he refers to the Logos as a bond holding together creation, though he uses the terms *kolla* (glue, cement) and *desmos* (bond,ligature), rather than the more Stoic *hexis* (cohesion):

And a unit admits neither of addition nor subtraction, being the image of God who is alone in His unity and has fullness. Other things are in themselves without coherence and if they be condensed, it is because they are held tight by the divine Word, which is a glue and bond, filling up all things with His being. He who fastens and weaves together each separate thing is a literal truth full of his own self, and needs nothing else at all.

This echoes the portrayal of the Logos at *De Plantatione* 7-10, as a bond holding together opposites. There is an interesting parallel in the pseudo-Aristotelian *De mundo*, where Nature is regarded as responsible for the harmony of opposites.^{xvii} As in Philo, Heraclitus is regarded as the originator of this concept. Although no exact parallel of the Philonic Logos-Cutter (in a demiurgic sense) prior to Philo can be found, Heraclitus does mention a spiritual principle bounded by fire which he calls logos, and which contributes to world-order by combining opposites rather like Philo’s Logos at *Heres* 199:

And the mixture thus harmoniously compounded proves to be that most venerable and perfect work, a work in very truth holy, even the world, which he holds under the symbol of the incense offering, gives thanks to its Maker, so that while in outward speech it is the compound formed by the perfumer’s art which is burnt as incense, in real fact it is the whole world, wrought by divine wisdom, which in fact is offered and consumed morning and evening in the sacrificial fire.

This image of a cosmic mixture produced by the Demiurge could easily be inspired by Plato. However, Philo stresses that this mixture is harmonious, which is clearly not the case in the *Timaeus*, compounded as it is of the passive and the recalcitrant (Sameness and Different). Indeed, at *Heres* 214 and *QG.* III 5, Philo points out that Heraclitus’ cosmology shares similarities with that of Moses. In the Hermetic tradition there is also a Logos-Cutter of sorts; Poimandres, who produces the cosmos through differentiation, and Hermes who is a combined Truth and Logos figure. Philo’s mention of Heraclitus does not indicate that he was father of a doctrine involving the Logos-Cutter. One can only conclude that the Logos-Cutter is an original contribution of Philo’s or he acquired it from a Hellenistic Jewish source (as there does not appear to be any exact counterpart to this before him in the Greek philosophical tradition).

The division of the Logos-cutter should not be viewed as a crude creational mechanism. As Radice has shown, the Logos engages in a very complex process.¹⁸ 1) It engages in actual division (*Heres* 133 – 140). 2) It engages in a secondary, equalising division (*Heres* 141 – 200). 3) Mediation (*Heres* 201- 206) is followed by 4) the placing of the divided components (*Heres* 207 -229) and finally 5) the non-division of noetic reality (*Heres* 230 -236). This creation is part of a whole sequence of the ordered and proportional construction of subordinate structures. For example, the heavy cosmic substance becomes separated into earth (dry) and water (wet), while the light forms air (cold) and fire (hot). Earth is divided into continents and islands, while water is drinkable and undrinkable. This reveals not just a continual division of cosmic substance, but a logical division that itself is responsible for cosmic structure.¹⁹

In this sense, the Logos is a mediator, not just between the First Principle and the rest of creation, but an equaliser in terms of size (§§ 147 -150; night and day, the equinoxes, both poles etc.) as well as in terms of proportion (§§ 152f; between the four elements in the cosmos or between the four constituent factors (dry, wet, cold and hot) in Man). This can, naturally, be viewed as a development of the notion of creation as a transition from disorder to order expressed at *Tim.* 30A (cf. *Her.* 133) and unity based upon the harmony of proportions reflected at *Tim.* 31 A – 32 A. To a great extent this notion of division is also echoed at *Sophist* 253 D-E.

This structured approach to creation by division is a metaphysical necessity in Philo's scheme. Although Philo does not recognise an atom, in the sense of a particle which cannot be further divided, he does recognise the absurdity of an infinite division on the part of the Logos. For this reason intellects and noetic reality are not divided by the Logos.²⁰ Philo finds biblical justification for this approach in the comment on Abraham's sacrifice at *Gen.* 15:10: "but the birds he did not divide". This is what Philo means when he states that the Logos "never ceases to divide, for when it has gone through all sensible objects down to the atoms and what are called indivisibles, it begins from them again to divide those things contemplated by reason into inexpressible and indescribable parts." (*Heres* 26). By things contemplated by reason, Philo is not referring to the noetic realm, rather sub-atomic particles which although they may not be humanly divisible can still be reduced by the Logos.

This system of creation is complemented by agricultural imagery at *De Plantatione*.²¹ This is drawn from the notion of God as a cultivator at *Republic* X 597C –D8. The cosmos can be considered like a living creature or farm which requires continual tending on the part of God. However, that this image is not a model for an alternative type of creation, but only an alternative explanation of creation is illustrated by the fact that this creation is still fundamentally one of transition from order to disorder. If the earth is composed of the heavier elements (water and earth) at the centre, and the lighter ones (water and fire) at the exterior, this leads to the question of how these elements do not neutralise one another through their close proximity.²² This is the effect of the mediating presence of the Logos.²³

This reveals the complex nature of Philo's conception of the Logos. It is more

than a mere tool or knife used by God during creation. It is a mediating entity, which functions as a co-Creator and plays an active role in the universe after genesis, although it does not compromise God's unity.²⁴

This is reiterated at *Heres* 236, where Philo indicates that not only is the Father indivisible, but that this characteristic is possessed by the Logos also. It is particularly interesting that Philo should attempt to preserve this sort of "unity in the second degree", since it indicates that the Logos is not based on the Platonic dyad. (Indeed, it is a masculine entity and has more in common with the World-Soul). One of the advantages in numerous metaphysical systems for postulating secondary gods is that it allows postulation of further hypostases, but Philo, as a monotheist, is very keen on preserving a united godhead, even as regards secondary divine entities. In spite of Philo's claim that the Logos is a *secundus deus*, it very clearly is not, in the original Numenian sense of the term. Numenius' Second God is divided by matter, whereas although the Philonic Logos is the sole cause of the division of matter, Philo is at pains to point out that it is not divided by it.

On two occasions, Philo refers to the Logos as an instrument used by God in the creation of the world. At *Leg. All.* III, 31, 96, we are told that God "used it like an instrument when He was making the world" and "when He was fashioning the world, He used it as an instrument, so that the arrangement of all the things He was completing might be faultless". On three occasions, the role of the Logos as an instrument is implied. It is that "through which the world was produced at *Sacr.* 3,8, *Spec.* I, 16, 81) or that "by which" God made the world at *Immut.* 12, 57.²⁵ This is similar to the role played by Wisdom during creation. In *The Wisdom of Solomon*, the author treats wisdom as equivalent to the Logos of God, although he refers to it as "God's daughter". Wisdom is equally "that through which the world came into existence" (*De Fuga* 20 & 109) or "was brought to completion" (*Quod Deterius Potiori Insidiari* 16 & 54). Wisdom additionally is the title given to what seems to be the Philonic equivalent of the Receptacle at *Ebr.* 8, 31, where it is called the "mother and nurse of the all".

The Logos functions in the typical role of a divine mediator, insulating God from the disorder (in Philo's case, evil might be a little too strong) inherent in matter:

When out of that [shapeless and quality less matter] God produced all things, He did so without touching it himself, since it was not lawful for His nature, happy and blessed as it was, to touch indefinite and confused matter but instead He made full use of the incorporeal powers, well denoted by the name of ideas to enable each genus to take its appropriate shape. (*Spec.* I. 329, trans. Wolfson).

This mode of creation is echoed when God calls upon his powers to aid Him in the forming of Man. These incorporeal powers which allow matter to take a shape do not

themselves become enmattered (unlike the Man of the *Poimandres*). Although it may not be lawful for God to act directly upon matter, this does not prevent Him from dispensing benefits directly to mortals (*Leg. All.* III, 178). These incorporeal powers which assist in creation would seem to reflect the influence of the Stoic doctrine of efficient causes rather than the Platonic theory of ideas (though in the *Phaedo* the Ideas have a causal function).

Conclusion

With the emergence of Neoplatonism, such speculations on the tools required by a Craftsman-god ceased to play an important role in philosophical debate, with the alternative image of world-generation propounded by Plotinus of “procession” and “return” to the supreme Principle. For Plotinus, the supreme principle (“the One”) did not require tools to produce anything – it just occurred spontaneously. Neither did he deliberate before generation, since this would imply hesitation. Although Plotinus does posit hypostases before sensible matter is reached, these are not characterised as “tools”. In his view, the One produces a power in an unformed state, which successfully orders itself in response to its contemplation of the One. Unlike the Demiurge, the One does not toil at the task of producing the cosmos, and does not look downwards to what it has produced.

The Logos-Cutter is a distinctively Philonic concept, effectively combining elements from Platonic and Judaic sources and playing a major role in Philo’s mission to explain Mosaic doctrine in the language of Greek philosophy. Philo stresses that it pervades those areas of the cosmos where it was beneath God’s dignity to go and the Logos is often described in biblical terms - as the sword of the Cherubim or an angel. However, the Logos functions in a similar manner to a Platonic Demiurge, engaging in a complex process of imposing order upon disorder to improve the intelligibility of the cosmos, rather than strictly creating.

Despite speculations in certain Gnostic texts on a saw of God, the hypostases posited by this tradition are not normally regarded as instruments, but as aspects of God or the Church. Indeed Sophia, which one might imagine to be the Wisdom of God, and therefore a counterpart of Philo’s Logos-Cutter, is in fact characterised as an imperfect female entity, whose irrational desire to know the Father triggers a series of events, resulting in the birth of an evil (or in some sects merely ignorant) Demiurge, who then constructs the world. Surprisingly, the Demiurge of the highly mythologized systems of Gnosticism does not usually have tools, while more observations on this point were made in the realm of “serious” or mainstream philosophy. And perhaps that is one of the strongest arguments for viewing the highly evocative imagery of the “tools” of God as produced for serious metaphysical, rather than purely stylistic, reasons.

NOTES

¹*De Opificio Mundi.* 18 “Then taking up the imprints of each object in his own soul like in wax, he carries around the intelligible city as an image in his head. Summoning up the representations by means of his innate power of memory and engraving their features even more distinctly on his mind, he begins as a good builder, to construct the city out of stone and timber, looking at the model and ensuring that the corporeal objects correspond to each of the incorporeal Ideas.” (trans. David Runia, *Philo of Alexandria: On the Creation of the Cosmos According to Moses, Introduction, Translation and Commentary*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001).

²*Opif.* 20.

³*Opif.* 24: “The intelligible cosmos is nothing else than the Logos of God as he is actually engaged in making the cosmos. For the intelligible city is nothing else than the reasoning of the architect as he is actually engaged in the planning of the foundation of the city.” (trans. David Runia).

⁴David M. Hay, “Philo’s Treatise on the Logos-Cutter” in *Studia Philonica II* (Providence: Brown University Press, 1973), 19.

⁵T.H. Tobin, “Was Philo a Middle Platonist? Some Suggestions” in *Studia Philonica Annual V* (Providence: Brown University Press, 1993), 149.

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷Translations, unless otherwise specified, are from F.H. Colson and G.H. Whitaker, eds. & trans., *Philo of Alexandria*, (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1929-1934), volumes I-V.

⁸This parallel is made more explicit at *Heres* 235 “The divine Word separated and apportioned all that is in nature. Our mind deals with all the things material and immaterial which the mental process brings within its grasp, divides them into an infinity of infinities and never (*oude pote*) ceases to cleave them.”

⁹This notion is developed at *Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres* 13.

¹⁰Cf. *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* 1. 120.

¹¹*Heres* 153 propounds the notion that man is a compound generated by an equitable mixture of his components by the Logos.

¹²John Dillon, “Reclaiming the Heritage of Moses, Philo’s Confrontation with Greek Philosophy” in *Studia Philonica VII*, (Providence: Brown University Press, 1995), [hereafter Dillon, *Reclaiming the Heritage*], 118.

¹³“infinite secari atque dividi”. *Ap. Cicero. Acad. Post.* 27.

¹⁴*Heres* 225.

¹⁵*Heres* 158.

¹⁶*De Prov.* 59.

¹⁷Dillon, *Reclaiming the Heritage*, 118.

¹⁸Radice, R. “Platonismo e Creationismo in Filone di Alessandria” (= *Metafisica del platonismo nel suo sviluppo storico nelle filosofie patristica* 7), (Milan: Pubblicazioni delle Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 1989), 67.

¹⁹Ibid., 70 presents a schema detailing the symmetrical structure inherent in this division by the Logos

²⁰Ibid. 75.

²¹De Plantatione, 2 .

²²Plant. 4.

²³Plant. 8 “and it is the eternal Logos of the eternal God, the most solid and the firmest support of the whole” (my translation).

²⁴Cf. *Heres* 234.

²⁵Harold A. Wolfson, *Philo - Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1968), 266.