



NUI MAYNOOTH

Ollscoil na hÉireann Má Nuad

Perceptions versus reality? Newspaper coverage on the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879

By

Luke Diver B.A.

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Supervisor of Research:

Dr David Murphy

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Authors Note

Throughout the primary sources used for the thesis there are many different names and place spellings that contrast greatly from modern spelling. Normally the use of [sic] would be used, but due to the variations of nineteenth century spellings, I have removed [sic] from the majority of the thesis as not to hamper the flow of the work.

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
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
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
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Map of Zululand with the adjoining frontiers



near which
PRINCE LOUIS NAPOLEON,
Prince Imperial of France, was killed
1st June 1879.



'Isandula'

Tho' Isandula's fight was lost
Against sheer numbers as we see,
Twill rank as Britain's annals first
South Africa's Thermopylae

Irish Times, 17 May, 1879 by E.D

Chapter One: Introduction

'That the Zulu War will be a brief one it would be hazardous to predict'

Illustrated London News: 1 March, 1879

On the eleventh of January, 1879, British forces under the command of Lord Chelmsford, invaded Zululand one of the last independent nations in Africa. The Zulu people united together under the power of Shaka since the 1820's had increased in strength, fighting for their place within their country against natives and white settlers. Over sixty years of autonomy was going to be severely threatened by the invasion of the greatest power in the nineteenth century. The Zulu King Cetshwayo called up all able-bodied men to defend their way of life and 'wash their spears'.

The British colonial policy in South Africa was under the guidance of Sir Bartle Frere, the British High Commissioner for South Africa, who conveyed to the British government and the people that war, was inevitable between the Zulu, for the protection of the white settlers in Natal and surrounding areas. However, the true reason was to extend British power across the east coast of South Africa, and to obtain manual labour from the Zulu, a highly valuable human resource in their expansionist policy. The Zulu military system was feared by all the colonists in the regions surrounding Zululand, with numbers comprising of thirty thousand strong warriors. Frere issued an ultimatum to Cetshwayo to demobilise his army and desist in his barbaric oppression of his people. Cetshwayo attempted to negotiate with the British, but Frere was set on war and military preparations began. On the eleventh of December, 1878, Zulu representatives assembled to hear that if they did not comply within thirty days to the British demands a state of war would exist between them¹. Of course these demands totally disregarded Zulu culture leading inevitably to war. Without sanction from parliament, the British invasion began with eight months of intense, hard

¹ There were nine demands made to the Zulu King. The main components were contradictory to Zulu custom and would never have been agreed upon. Like point four which demanded that the Zulu army should be disbanded and only brought together with the consent of the British. Point 5 would give the right to marry without the king's permission. Point Six wanted an administration reform followed by point seven that insisted on a British Resident at the Zulu capital. Taken from *Narrative of the field operations connected with the Zulu War of 1879* (London, 1880) p 16.

fighting to break the 'Old Zulu Order'. Both sides incurred heavy losses in men and material, causing universal embarrassment for the British, and the collapse of the young Zulu nation before the might of Empire.

The main focus of this thesis is to research what the Irish and British public knew and understood about the Anglo-Zulu War through three famous and popular newspapers- *The London Times*, *the Irish Times* and the *Illustrated London News*. This is a topic that needs research, and the purpose of the thesis is to help add to the abundant literature covering other features of the war. To study the whole war in this thesis would be impossible, so three incidents will be researched- the battles of Isandlwana and Ntombe River and the death of Louis Bonaparte, the Prince Imperial. The reasons for this selection are arguably the most controversial of the war and it will be of great importance to see how these incidents were handled in contemporary newspapers. The main question that will arise is how these events were reported and how they were perceived by the public? The method of attempting this is to give short summaries of the incidents along with contemporary and modern critique, and see how they related to the themes and questions raised in the newspapers. To understand what was being written on the Zulu War in the papers may illustrate an important aspect of British and Irish society and their perceptions of war during the age of Imperialism. It will be great importance to note contrasts that emerge from the British and Irish papers, to really give a sense of how some social classes in Ireland viewed themselves within the empire and did the early British defeats reignite passion for their parent nation? All of these points are of importance to the success of the thesis to coincide with the public perceptions that were created by newspapers that may have been also been altered for the benefit of political, cultural and social idealism within the British Empire?

This thesis will break down into five chapters, which include the introduction, the conclusion and chapters on the three incidents mentioned above. The research will follow in chronological order to illustrate the growth in public interest over the months. It is important to detail what information the papers were receiving, either from war correspondents, letters from soldiers, battle accounts from officers, and eye-witness accounts.

The second chapter will cover the battle of Isandlwana, with the main focus on who was to blame for the worse British defeat by indigenous warriors in their history? The chapter will discuss some of the major issues expressed by modern historians using several



The Zulu War in South Africa : Cetewayo, the Zulu King
Drawn from the life in June, 1877, by the late Mr Edward Tilt, during his visit to Zulu-Land

primary accounts of the battle to give an idea of how the battle was viewed and understood and to act as a background to the main elements expressed in the newspapers. From the information provided by the newspapers several issues will need to be examined to determine if the reader had a proper and accurate understanding of the battle. Several questions needed to be answered. Who was to blame for the defeat? Was the saving of the Colours viewed as an act of heroism or cowardice? Did the public immediately demand revenge for the defeat or did they decide that the British invasion was wrong? And finally did the government attempt to shift the blame to the field commanders in South Africa by exclaiming that the war was not sanctioned by them? It is important to state here, that due to lack of space within the thesis, the actions of Chelmsford who was absent from the battlefields are omitted.

The third chapter will focus on the battle of Ntombe River which though was a much smaller conflict in comparisons to the defeat at Isandlwana, portrayed many of the same issues already noted. Did the public blame the commander for the destruction of the small convoy? Did the apparent cowardice of an officer fleeing the field, affect the opinions of the public, when contrasting the two officers that tried to save the Queens Colours at Isandlwana? Did the British public question the effectiveness of the British forces, and their commanders following this defeat? Were the Zulu now beginning to be respected for their methods and bravery during the fighting?

The fourth chapter will be based on the death of Prince Louis Bonaparte the heir to the Imperial throne of France. Like the previous two chapters, this chapter will look at the background to the death of the Prince and discover how the heir of Napoleon Bonaparte was fighting for the British in a private war. This chapter will differ somewhat as it is based on the death of one man so focus will entirely be placed on who was to blame for the death of the Prince? Newspaper coverage reporting on the death of Louis was immense so within the confines of the thesis, the research will be based around the incident and not the funeral and political aftermath. The newspapers will be researched to find how they perceived the death and who did they consider was to blame- the Prince himself, Lieutenant Carey, Captain Harrison, Chelmsford, or the government?

The fifth and final chapter will attempt to connect all the incidents together to determine how much the public knew and understood about the war? It will be useful to illustrate any differences in the reporting between the three newspapers and to discover

which reader was better informed. To contrast between the Irish and British papers will also be of importance. Was the Irish paper more outspoken than their English counterparts?

Literature Review-Primary Sources

The main focus of the thesis will be based on several newspapers that were in circulation at the time of the war. The major papers that will be studied are *The London Times*, the *Illustrated London News* in Britain, and *The Times* in Ireland for the Irish perspective. Both *The London Times* in Britain and Ireland are provided by the National University of Maynooth. In regards to the *Illustrated London News*, Trinity College Dublin Library was able to provide the primary material needed. In order to enhance the perspective of the thesis, firsthand accounts on battles and incidents will be looked at. The following selected primary sources are from the Isandlwana court of inquiry from participants of the battle by Lieutenant W.F.B Cochrane of the 32nd Regiment, Captain Essex of the 75th Regiment, Captain Gardner of the 14th Hussars, Lieutenant Curling of the Royal Artillery, Captain Nourse of the Natal Native Contingent which are all available in the National Army Museum in London. Also available from the same source is an account by Lieutenant Raw of the Mounted Native Contingent. For the battle of Ntombe, primary accounts will also come from the same museum, from Sergeant Booth, 80th Regiment, Major Charles Tucker, Private Deacon, 80th Regiment and Lieutenant Harward, 80th Regiment. For the death of the Prince Imperial, reports from Carey which are contained in the War Office Archives will be studied, with also accounts from Surgeon-Major Scott who examined the body of the Prince which is contained in the National Army Museum.


A contemporary book written by C.L Norris-Newman, *In Zululand with the British throughout the war of 1879*, gives an insight to the only journalist that was attached to the central column during the Isandlwana defeat. It gives first-hand accounts on many of the issues of the war, and in regards to the death of the Prince Imperial, the book includes some of the investigations into his death, which will prove invaluable to the thesis. Another book by F.E. Colenso and E. Durnford named *The history of the Zulu War and its origin*, with its main focus on blaming the defeat of Isandlwana on Commander-in-Chief Lord Chelmsford. To understand the opinion of the Home Government requires the published account by the War Office the, *Narrative of the field operations connected with the Zulu War of 1879*, providing many facts, opinions and figures on the war. The published memoirs of Evelyn

Wood *From Midshipman to Field Marshall*, focuses on his personal experience on key aspects of the war, mentioning other events such as the death of the Prince Imperial and the battles he was involved with in great detail.

Secondary Sources

The main text in regards the Anglo-Zulu War is the *Washing of the Spears* by Donald R. Morris which was first published in 1966. The book accounts for the rise of the Zulu nation, giving an extensive history of the tribes' early beginnings, the great military and economic growth under King Shaka who revolutionised the Zulu system, to the king who had to witness his kingdom fall under British aggression. The book covers most aspects of the war, but due to the age of the work some doubts emerged after archaeological digs during the 1990's on the Isandlwana battlefield that cast misgivings over his earlier assumptions. There is little emphasis in the book on the deployment of troops as a cause of the defeat and jamming of rifles. The author based the defeat on the lack of ammunition to the front line troops, but only holds true to Durnford troops when holding back the left horn of the Zulu attack. Saul David's *Zulu*, follows the same line as Morris, with a history of the war. However the great asset of the work is the portrayal of the aftermath of Isandlwana and Rorkes Drift, with the apparent 'cover up' that was initiated by the Commander-in-Chief Lord Chelmsford and his staff which is somewhat lacking in Morris's account. The book is very useful for further reading and research, with the inclusion of a very extensive bibliography, having primary sources covering a wide spectrum of the war and a wide range of secondary reading.

Ian Knight's *Brave men's blood* is a general work on the war with many illustrations and photographs, which help to convey a contemporary view of what the public may have been reading in the newspapers during and after the war. The text is not as comprehensive as other works but the main issues are covered in the war which establishes itself as a useful secondary source. The author offers a critique on some of the main works that have been published since the war and also on the important primary/contemporary sources which is of great benefit to the reader. Also from the same author is the *National Army Museum book of the Zulu War*, with the main focus on the use of primary sources that are available



Zulus And Kaffirs of South Africa

from the museum. The text is heavily filled with primary sources throughout, which gives an excellent view point from the regular British soldier to the officers and commanders on the field. The sources that have been used are offered with the direct reference number to the archives within the museum, which is extremely helpful to anyone carrying out studies on the subject.

Another useful work is *The Illustrated Guide to the Anglo-Zulu War* by John Laband and Paul Thompson which not only provides a narrative on events, but gives an excellent list on the battle combatants and list of casualties and deaths on both sides. The maps included in the text are very useful to the reader as it provides detailed disposition on the main aspects of the battles. The book also focuses on sometimes neglected aspects of the war, such as colonial defences of the areas surrounding Zululand, detailed diagrams of all the fortifications built in and around the Zulu countryside and a short chapter on war correspondents. The thesis will benefit from this work as it provides a very modern critique on the war and tries to cover most aspects of the war, if not in great detail. *Great Zulu Battles, 1836-1906*, by Ian Knight that has a useful exploration of the battle of Isandlwana and gives insight into the British and Zulu mindset throughout that fateful day.

Ian Knight's *With is Face to the Foe* recollects the life and death of the Louis Napoleon, the Prince Imperial of France. Aspects of the work that are most useful for the study, is the circumstances that led the Prince to be in Zululand and the controversies over his death. The book uses a wide range of primary sources, from letters, memoirs to newspaper articles. The information and reaction described by the author at the time of the Prince's death, gives an excellent overview of many of the army's opinion and the public in regards to the court-martial of Lieutenant Carey who misbehaved in face of the enemy. A book of great resource for the study is *The Colonial Wars Source Book*, by Philip J. Haythornthwaite. The work gives an overview of British imperial politics and policies, warfare rhetoric, tactics, weaponry, and the make-up of the British army of regiments, cavalry, artillery and commanders. This is essential in understanding the war of 1879, from the battles to the overall political structure behind the scenes. Over the course of researching for the thesis, one work by Rupert Furneaux *The Zulu War-Isandlwana and Rorkes Drift*, was avoided as the work is outdated with too many inaccuracies appearing throughout.

Journal Articles

The following articles can be seen as essential to the thesis; firstly due to the fact that they are all modern work dated in this century, and secondly they each take aspects that are not wholly covered in other secondary readings. The key article is *the Reconstructing the past using the British Parliamentary Papers*, which helped give the idea for the thesis now been undertaken. The prominence of the work is based on the Irish University Press of the British Parliament papers, and how certain aspects of the war were seen through the eyes of the parliament. The author gives information on the parliamentary papers and gives the references to each source that was used within the archives; making further study more accessible. While that information is invaluable, the work also gives a short critique on some of the main secondary sources that include some mention to the parliamentary papers. It also gives insight and advice on how one should carry out work on the parliamentary papers, and how they can be used for full efficiency to benefit their work. Another article that is essential to the thesis is *Heroism, Heroics and the making of Heroes: The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879*. This theme of the work is the idea of the 'hero', which was instilled into the mindset of the public and army during the nineteenth century. The aspects that directly influence the thesis are the propaganda and censorship that was used to cover up the disaster of Isandlwana with the author illustrating some issues throughout the work on how some aspects of the battles were changed for the benefit of the public, so as not to lose faith in the ability of the British soldier. The article will be used to run in conjunction with the thesis work, as it follows the same line of what reality of the war was changed to suit the government, army and the public.

The last two articles are of less significance to the thesis, but are still useful in providing a different outlook. The first is *The subjugation of the Zulus and Sioux: a comparative study*, which offers an interesting look of the Zulu Empire and the war itself in a broader context and contrasted to another native power. The text looks at many aspects of the white encroachment on both the Sioux and the Zulu, and how it led to their demise. The article is useful in the sense that it further enhances the idea of imperialism by the west and provides a useful background to the rhetoric and means by which the white population would use to conquer new indigenous lands. The remaining article *The reign of King Cetshwayo Ka Mpande 1872-9*, with the basis of the text on the ruling of the king on social and political matters. However, the text is useful in regards the misconceptions that were

created about the Zulu King by the whites and the British, seeing him as savage and barbaric, to give more of a reason in which to bring the sovereign under British rule.

Chapter Two: Battle of Isandlwana

'A warning to self-willed Statesmen not to allow themselves to be carried away by ambitious projects which are more distinguished by romance than reason'

Illustrated London News: 8 March, 1879

On the 20th of January, the Commander-in-Chief of her Majesty's forces in South Africa Lord Chelmsford² moved up the centre column from Rorkes Drift, some eight miles, to the plains shadowed by Isandlwana Hill³. The column would set up camp in front of the hill for the next few days until a new site was chosen further along the road towards the Zulu capital, Ulundi. The camp was left to its own devices with some reconnaissance patrols ordered and some movement of transport coming from Rorkes Drift. During the time of their stay in the camp, no order was giving to make any makeshift defences or laagering due to Chelmsford's reasoning that it was only a temporary camp and the land was too poor for entrenchment. That decision was in direct violation of army regulations that were in place that ordered that laagering should always occur or at least some defensives measures capable of deterring an attack. For the time being, Chelmsford was planning their next camp some twelve miles away, he sent out parties of men for reconnaissance to see if any of the enemy was present. Chelmsford was eager to hear news of Zulus for he wished to give battle and defeat them cleanly in a single encounter. The first main sighting of large amounts of Zulus came from Major Dartnell while on patrol on the 21st in near darkness. A request was received by Chelmsford at around 2 a.m. for reinforcements to support the major who believed he had stumbled on the location of the main Zulu Army. It was agreed upon to strike half the camp and set out to encounter the Zulu in force and move to the next camp.

At dawn Chelmsford moved out of the camp, with six companies of the 2/24th, four seven-pounder guns, some mounted infantry and Natal Native Pioneers. The camp was left

²Frederic Augustus Thesiger was born in 1827. He saw action in the Crimea and the Sepoy Rebellion in India before commanding British troops during the Cape Frontier War in South Africa, which led to his eventual promotion to command the Queen's army into Zululand.

³Isandlwana was named so by the Zulu meaning 'something like a small hut' which it resembled the part of the cow's stomach. For the 24th regiment it reminded them of the sphinx which was the symbol on their regimental badge.

under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, commander of the 1/24th with orders to defend the camp and a further order for Colonel Durnford to move up with his second column to reinforce the camp⁴. Chelmsford left behind a camp of some 67 officers and 1,707 men consisting of five companies of the 1/24th, one company of the 2/24th, four companies of the 3rd NNC, over a hundred mounted men made up from detachments and two seven-pounders. Under Durnford's column there was the Natal Native Horse along with three 9-nine pounder rockets with 250 men. The Commander-in-Chief had the confidence that the men he left behind would be able to deter a Zulu attack with the '...materials for a hasty entrenchment...' at hand to complete '...a successful resistance'⁵. As Ian Knight points out, Chelmsford confidence in his men that he left behind, coincided with the decision to appoint Pulleine as camp commander. Pulleine had some experience in the Cape Frontier campaign but he was a man 'whose expertise lay as an effective administrator rather than a front-line commander'⁶. Chelmsford would have his mind on other issues so he wanted to leave the camp in capable hands keeping the camp well provisioned with constant supply of transport wagons. Chelmsford main message to Pulleine was to insure the safety of the camp by remaining in a defensive posture. As Chelmsford marched off in the direction of Dartnell, the men that were left behind in the camp were left highly disappointed in the belief that they were missing out in the first encounter with the Zulu. Between reveille and the arrival of Durnford's column at 10.30 a.m. some sightings of Zulus were reported throughout the morning, in different directions some miles from the camp but no precautions were taking other than to draw back in the troops to the camp⁷.

By orders from Chelmsford, Durnford and his men moved up to the camp from Rorkes Drift with perhaps the expectation of fresh orders to be given upon his arrival. Further orders were never issued to Durnford, thus beginning the series of events that would lead to the most controversial part of the battle. With his arrival in the camp who was in charge, Durnford or Pulleine? The question of command is a complicated issue. When Durnford rode into the camp he was under the order to simply reinforce the camp with no further mention of any other necessities. With no more conclusive orders by Chelmsford,

⁴The 24th Regiment also had served under Lord Chelmsford during the Cape Frontier War of 1878. The regiment acquitted themselves well and became a hardened fighting unit in harsh African conditions.

⁵*Irish Times*, 3 March, 1879.

⁶ Ian Knight, *The National Army Museum book of the Zulu War* (London, 2004) p, 89.

⁷ Pulleine sent a message to Chelmsford of these movements stating 'that the Zulus are advancing in force from left front of the camp'. Due to lack of details and urgency the warning would go unheeded until it was too late.



LIEUTENANT-COLONEL H. B. PULLEINE.



CAPTAIN WILLIAM ECCLES MOSTYN.



LIEUTENANT HENRY JULIAN DYER.



LIEUTENANT T. L. G. GRIFFITH.



LIEUTENANT E. H. DYSON.



LIEUTENANT C. W. CAYE.



LIEUTENANT E. O. ANSTEY.

The Zulu War: Officers of the 24th Regiment killed at Isandula.

who may have believed that due to the fact that Durnford was senior to Pulleine that he should take upon Pulleines original order to defend the camp. However Durnford did not feel bound to the orders given to Pulleine as it was not addressed to him personally, but he was senior to in the camp and still regarded all the troops under his disposal. On hearing reports from sentries of the Zulu movements, and of one report of the Zulus marching in the direction of Chelmsford, he took initiative of taking his men out of the camp to intercept the Zulus for perhaps the reason of showing how useful he was to Chelmsford and for personal reasons⁸.

Before Durnford set off, Lieutenant William Cochrane of the 32nd Regiment was close at hand to hear the conversation that was between Pulleine and Durnford:

...Colonel Pulleine gave over to Colonel Durnford a verbal state of troops in camp at the time, and stated the orders had received...to defend the camp; these words were repeated two or three times during the conversation...Before leaving, he asked Colonel Pulleine to give him two companies of the 24th Regiment. Colonel Pulleine said that his orders he had received he could not do it, but agreed with Colonel Durnford to send him help if he got into difficulties.⁹

Durnford's actions and his apparent disobeying of orders was the scapegoat that would be needed after the battle of Isandlwana for Chelmsford, to shoulder the blame on the senior officer for not remaining in the camp. This line of argument is taken up by the author Saul David, who mentions that Colonel Crealock, Chelmsford's Secretary, insisted that he had ordered Durnford to take command of the camp, and in essence disobeying the order to remain defensive. Despite the fact that he was lying about this to cover the reputation of himself and his commander. It was the answer that Chelmsford had looked for to wash his hands clean of responsibility of the disaster and blame the man who could no longer answer for himself. While Crealock himself grasped the opportunity with both hands to rid the plague of responsibility on the command there is little evidence that Chelmsford was a part of the conspiracy other than 'simply grasped the proffered lifeline'¹⁰.

Durnford's main plan was to prevent Chelmsford column being attacked in the rear, by cutting off the Zulu attack by encircling them in conjunction with Stepstone's men. As

⁸There was a belief that Durnford wanted to wash away the stain that was already on his career, after the debacle of Bushman's Pass, where he himself got badly injured and several colonists killed for a mission against a tribe in 1873. If he could succeed in having a successful campaign, the colonists and the Natal Press may have forgiven his previous actions.

⁹*The National Army Museum*, Lieutenant William Cochrane, 32nd Regiment (Isandlwana court of inquiry, BBP C 2260)

¹⁰ Saul David, *Zulu: the heroism and tragedy of the Zulu War of 1879* (London, 2004) p 208.

Stepstone's mounted men, patrolled the ridges, they came across a group of Zulus herding cattle and galloped after them in a north-east direction towards Ngwebeni. Just as the soldiers appeared over the ridge they looked down into the valley, and as Lieutenant Raw recalls 'the whole army shewing[sic] itself from behind the hill in front where they had evidently been waiting'¹¹. Raw had stumbled across the main Zulu army numbering some 25,000 that had eluded Chelmsford for two days¹². The moment the Zulus saw the mounted men, they rose up and gave chase, thus beginning the fateful battle of Isandlwana.

Pulleine received the message of the Zulu advance at about 12.15 hrs, and ordered the camp to form up and began to deploy them across the sphere of the camp, with the artillery pushed forward under Major Smith to a rocky outlet giving a good advantage of view. Before Durnford had left, Pulleine had promised him to send aid if he got into trouble, and with this in mind while Durnford was holding back the left horn, it left Pulleine with less mind to concentrate on the camp and more on supporting his senior commander. It resulted in him pushing his men out a few hundred yards from the camp, in long open skirmish order, thus throwing away the advantage of concentrated fire-power delivered from a tight-all round formation¹³. Coinciding with the men pushed so far out; there is a strong belief that the reason for defeat was the difficulty to resupply ammunition to the front-line troops, with gaps appearing in the line of fire as their bullets began to run out. As Ian Knight points out that this may hold truth in Durnford's men far from the camp but not for the infantry line. He goes on to say that due to recent archaeological work, and testament from survivors, that they were indeed supported well by incoming ammunition, and the lack of it was not an issue¹⁴.

Despite the men of the 24th Regiment being 'old and steady shots', and were secure for the time being, the climax of the battle had been reached on the right side of the camp with Durnford. Durnford were holding back the Zulu left horn, and while beating them back with some heavy losses to the Zulu, lack of ammunition and a danger of being outflanked and cut off from the camp, the order was giving to abandon their defensive position in the

¹¹ *The National Army Museum*, Lieutenant Charles Raw, Mounted Native Contingent, (6807-386-14).

¹² The battle was the largest known gathering of the Zulu army in the history of their kingdom. The regiments present were as follows: right horn- iSangqu, iMbube, uDududu and uNokhenke; the centre- uMcijo, and uMxhapho; the left horn; uMbonambi, iNgobamakhosi, and uVe; reserve- uDloko, uThulwana, iNdlondlo and iNdluyengwe.

¹³ John Laband and Paul Thompson, *The illustrated guide to the Anglo-Zulu War* (Natal, 2000) p, 104.

¹⁴ Knight, *The National Army Museum book of the Zulu War*, p, 99.



LIEUTENANT-COLONEL DURNFORD, R.E.



MAJOR FRANCIS WHITE.



CAPTAIN R. YOUNGHUSAND.



CAPTAIN G. V. WARDELL.




CAPTAIN W. DEGACHER.



LIEUTENANT F. GODWIN-AUSTEN.



LIEUTENANT TEIGNMOUTH MELVILL.



THE HON. S. W. P. VEREKER, NATAL CONTINGENT.



LIEUTENANT J. P. DALY.

The Zulu War: Officers killed at Isanhlwana, January 22.

donga and ride back to the camp. Just at that moment the Natal Native Contingent broke and fled from their position exposing the flanks of Lieutenant Pope of G Company who was sent out to cover Durnford, leaving him no chance to turn back towards the hill¹⁵. At this time Pulleine realising the danger the camp was in, he ordered the bugle to sound 'retire' so he could form up a concentrated formation. But as the men retreated back steadily, with some more than others, wide gaps began to emerge in the line and the Zulu pressed forward this advantage. The British position and the chance of an organised defence collapsed with the pace of the Zulu rush. As Captain Essex recalls


...Few of the men...had time to fix bayonets before the enemy was among them using their assegais with fearful effect. I heard officers calling their men to be steady; but the retreat became in a few seconds general...towards the direction of Rorkes Drift. However...the enemy arrived and the large circle had closed in on us¹⁶.

Escape for the majority of the men was ended as the horns of the buffalo closed in on the camp. The companies of the 24th that remained with their officers in the last desperate act of survival, while Durnford and some of his men tried to keep some escape route open by holding back the left horn. Durnford fell while doing his duty, while Pulleine who was probably among the men at the wagon park died making a last stand. While company after company fell to the Zulu hordes, one group of the 24th managed to survive the longest by deploying a firing retreat back to perhaps Rorkes Drift. However along the way more and more men dropped to the Zulu throughout the broken ground, thus leaving a handful on the banks looking down the Manzimnyama Valley, where progress ceased. The party were overrun and the last organised defence collapsed.

While the battle was over within the camp, the men who managed to escape the carnage were fleeing back towards Rorkes Drift. Many were cut down by the closing horns and escape was almost impossible without the aid of a horse. Perhaps the most iconic imagery of the battle and the war is the famous attempt to save the Queens Colours by Lieutenant Melville and aided by Lieutenant Coghill. The colours were the pride of any regiment and if they had fallen into the enemy's hands it would be viewed as a disgrace. The story goes that as the camp was falling Pulleine gave the colours to Melville in order to save

¹⁵ The reliance placed on the NNC to hold the flank was a disastrous decision. The men were made up of natives that were only distinguished from the Zulu with a red rag tied to their head. One in ten were only given an outdated firearm with only five rounds of ammunition while the rest were armed with shields and spears. With little training morale was evidently low and would never have been able to hold back the horn of the buffalo.

¹⁶ *The National Army Museum*, Captain Edward Essex, 75th Regiment (6807-386-8, Isandlwana court of inquiry, BBP C 2260).



The Zulu War: Dabulamanzi, brother of King Cetewayo, commander of the Zulu Army at Isanhlwana.

them and sent Coghill to aid him in his mission. Other views were that Melville took the colour in order to rally any surviving men to him, but at this stage defence was over and then decided to leave the camp. However more cynical views, is that it gave him the excuse to leave the camp, with no evidence to suggest he was ordered to take the colour but that was not a popular opinion among officers of the 24th Regiment after the battle¹⁷. Coghill himself did not even leave with Melville with the colour, as he may have left sometime before and by chance they met up along the Buffalo River. They plunged their horses into the river but only Coghill managed to get out with his horse as the current was too strong for Melville to withstand. Despite the fact that Coghill may have fled the camp, he showed true courage by going back to aid Melville, even though he had a good chance of escape. He managed to help Melville out of the river but the colours were lost in the current and both horses were now dead. They climbed up a slope along the bank, and due to sheer exhaustion then turned around with a large rock to their backs, and died making their last stand.

The story of the two officers attempting to save the Queens Colours reached heroic levels which gave the public some comfort in realising that despite defeat, the regiment and the empire never lost its honour and prestige due to the Lieutenants¹⁸. Michael Lieven notes the public needed these heroes for reassuring the greatness of the British army, 'in their attempt to save the colour, the mystical soul of the battalion that bore the legend of its history, and their 'ride to glory' became a powerful symbol of self-sacrifice'¹⁹. While the media, the public and the officers of the regiment took solace in the sacrifice of Melville and Coghill not all were as happy in the actions of the two, but such opinions would have never been able to surface in the papers. Sir Garnet Wolseley, future Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in Zululand, noted in his journal,

I am very sorry that both these officers were not killed with their men at Isandhlana instead of where they were. I don't like the idea of officers escaping on horseback when their men on foot are killed...Heroes have been made of men like Mellville [sic] and Coghill who taking advantage of their horses, bolted from the scene of the

¹⁷ David, *Zulu: the heroism and tragedy of the Zulu War of 1879*, p 143.

¹⁸ Queen Victoria was so moved by the honour Melville and Coghill she believed that was displayed for her country and colour that she mentioned that if both of the officers had lived they would have won the Victoria Cross, called the Memorandum Procedure. Thankfully for the families of the two Lieutenants, the VC's were granted posthumously by Edward VII, in 1907.

¹⁹ Michael Lieven, 'Heroism, heroics and the making of heroes: the Anglo- Zulu War of 1879' in *Albion: A Quarterly Journal concerned with British studies*, xxx, no. 3 (autumn, 1998) p 420.

actions to save their lives...It is monstrous making heroes of those who saved or attempted to save their lives by bolting²⁰.

The battle of Isandlwana had smashed Lord Chelmsford invasion plan, which had only begun two weeks earlier. The total dead of the British army was nearly 1800, with fifty-two officers dead; 739 white troops; sixty-seven NCO's of the NNC and 471 black troops, with only fifty-five Europeans surviving. To show the true magnitude of the effect it would have on the army and the public, the following excerpt from Sir M. Hicks-Beach when addressing the Parliament illustrates there were less fatalities lack of deaths even in higher profiled battles. He says...

Our encounter with the Zulus are out of all proportion to the British forces engaged and to the average casualties in war. Our killed at Isandhlwana eclipsed the best-remembered figures of the Crimean War- twenty-six British officers and 327 men killed at the Alma and 462 English and French, killed at Inkerman. The proportions at Balaklava, where 472 fell out of a total of 670 engaged, came nearest to those of the early results of this war with the Zulus²¹.


The Zulu losses numbered some 2,000 dead, with many seriously wounded, dying later from their injuries. The death toll was very high for the civilian army and it had a great morale effect on the army, as it would take months to fully mobilise again. When King Cetshwayo heard of the losses of so many of his men, he exclaimed 'a spear has been trust into the belly of the nation...there are not enough tears to mourn for the dead'. Despite the fact the British Government did not want a war with the Zulu King; revenge was on the agenda, with reinforcements sent to Chelmsford to pursue this goal. As the author Ian Knight plainly puts it 'Isandlwana would prove to be both the Zulu Kingdom's greatest victory, and the moment at which its destruction became assured'²².

So from reading the newspapers the *Irish Times*, *London Times* and the *Illustrated London News*, what did the public actually understand and know about the battle of Isandlwana, and did any of the opinions displayed in the papers conflict reality? With regards the secondary reading, there are many different hypothesis on why the British were defeated. From the examples given above, we see many of the reasons that would coincide with the defeat such as the shortage of ammunition; the question of command between

²⁰ *The National Army Museum*, General Sir Garnet Wolseley, Commander-in Chief, Southern Africa (6807-386-21).

²¹ D.C.F Moodie and the Leonaur Editors, *Zulu 1879: The Anglo Zulu of 1879 from contemporary sources: First hand accounts, interviews, despatches, official documents and newspaper reports* (Leonaaur, 2006) pp, 45-46.

²² Knight, *Great Zulu Battles: 1838-1906*, p 125.



The Zulu War: Retreat of fugitives from Isanhlwana across the Buffalo River.
From a sketch by Lieutenant W.W. Lloyd, 24th Regiment, and Lieutenant Smith-Dorrien, 95th Regiment.

Pulleine and Durnford; Lord Chelmsford for not giving clear orders to Durnford and splitting his men up in enemy country; Durnford's actions during the battle; Pulleines deployment of the troops? But from the information given to the readers of the papers about to be analysed, did they have these assumptions, and more importantly who did they seem to hold the defeat accountable?

The disaster that befell the Lord Chelmsford's central column was a huge talking point for the newspapers across the British Isles, Europe and the world, and the *Irish Times* was no exception. The paper provided a vast amount of detail to the public such as the order of battle from participants' narratives, parliament debates, messages from the Queen to her subjects in Zululand, reasons for the fall of the camp, and the most debated topic of all, as to who was to blame for the defeat at Isandlwana?

The first few reports of the battle took the form of publishing accounts sent from South Africa from correspondents like Charles Norris-Newman of the *Evening Standard* and narratives from participants. The reasons for the British defeat when first reported were due to many reasons such as no laager, lack of ammunition, a badly chosen area for defence, neglect and even due to a sheer blunder. However despite the reasons that the public perceived that contributed to the defeat, the papers were also able to give a version that the defence was remarkable in a sense of being able to hold back the Zulu charge 'in the open, and with no protection or cover to keep off...the large numbers of Kaffirs that must of attacked them'²³. This is clearly an attempt for solace following a disastrous defeat and believing that the British soldier was still able to fight his best and in a way continue the myth of the great British 'last stands' that are widespread in their annals. The same report also tries to diminish the victory of the Zulu and their skill by suggesting that it was sheer luck that contributed to their victory. It reads that the 'impression in Natal is that the engagement on the part of the Zulu is not attributable to generalship, but the army of invasion was making for Natal and accidentally came across the rear guard of Colonel Glyn's column'²⁴. The reader can take two bits of information from this short line that it was a sheer bad luck that the British were caught out by the Zulu in their rear, but perhaps more importantly the reader can see that it is suggesting that the Zulus were preparing to invade Natal, giving further precedent for war.

²³ *Irish Times*, 25 February, 1879.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

While the early reports of the battle were giving the narrative of the battle with some analysis of what the writers thought what caused the defeat, it was still very broad and no blame was on any of the officers. However, on March 1st, the paper ran a piece from the war correspondent Charles Norris-Newman, who sent back his report on the action, which gives the reader much to think about when considering the reason for defeat and who was to blame? He notes that the day he left the camp of Isandlwana, there were no precautions made of any sort to deter a Zulu attack. He mentions despite the fact that 'clear and distinct orders given and published in an official book *Regulations for the Field Forces in South Africa*, not a single step was taken in another way to defend our new position...it is to this error of judgement that I cannot help attributing that awful results that awaited'²⁵. The reader would realise that Chelmsford at this time was still in the camp at this stage and should have ordered the wagons to be positioned to form a laager which was standard army regulations. This is a direct criticism of the higher command who failed to defend the camp showing contempt for the Zulus. The report that Norris-Newman provides also appears in his book on the war in 1880, but he is far more critical in his opinion of the actions of the British command. He writes 'the column itself was hardly strong enough to advance through the country, protect its camp, &c, keep open its rear...we were proceeding with too much confidence'²⁶. He may not have written this at the time as he may not have conceived such opinions until the writing of the book, but it could be more probable that he could not include such thoughts into a conservative newspaper like the *Irish Times*, without causing grief and annoyance especially when the court of enquiry with its findings on the battle had yet to reach the public sphere.

'There falls to our lot the most painful and perhaps the most ungrateful duty that can fall to the lot of the public journal, the duty of saying in plain and unmistakable language that Lord Chelmsford has failed as our commander-in-Chief in South Africa, and that he ought to be instantly recalled. It cannot be said that we have judged rashly and inconsiderately'²⁷. The papers printed the British government debates on the issues surrounding the battle and on Chelmsford, which showed a vigorous back lash against the commander and the High Commissioner of South Africa Sir Bartle Frere. The government

²⁵ Ibid, 1 March, 1879.

²⁶ Charles Norris-Newman, *In Zululand with the British Army: The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 through the first-hand experiences of a special correspondent* (London, 1880) p, 63.

²⁷ *Irish Times*, 7 March, 1879.

were also to shoulder much of the blame for the disaster. The information that can be found from the newspapers on the Parliamentary debates is too much for a detailed analysis at this point, but it is something that will be looked at again in greater detail. However a brief summary of them will be of benefit to the thesis.

Over the following weeks, the main topics of debate in the House of Lords, the House of Commons, in relation to the Zulu War were included in the *Irish Times*. The government would have to react quickly to the growing criticism from the shadow government, the press and the public. During this time the government under Sir Benjamin Disraeli, had more pressing problems in Afghanistan with major European consequences at hand²⁸. But the public demand for retribution after Isandlwana left him no choice but to invest more time and money to settle the war. The war was initiated by Frere to persuade many to see sense in beginning conflict, but the war was still not sanctioned by the government. This was an opportunity for the government to direct criticism on the actions of Frere and Chelmsford in causing an unjust war that the government did not sanction. The *Irish Times* would illustrate the amount of blame that was shifted onto the High Commissioner and the Commander-in-Chief from the government and also raises that question for the modern reader; If the government had placed so much blame on Chelmsford and Frere, why did the battle lead to the fall of Disraeli from government in 1880? These are questions which will be hopefully answered some other time in greater detail.

The Irish Times, as expected had no sharp criticism of the actions of Lieutenants Melville and Coghill, but of praise of their gallant deed. As pointed out in the chapter General Wolseley was less concerned about the saving of the colours and more of the sight of two officers' abandoning their men. Such thoughts would never appear in the papers, as the public needed reassurance from the defeat that the British gentleman died a *hero's* death for the honour and prestige of the empire. The Queen like the public was so affected by the apparent unselfishness of the two officers that she ordered that they would have been awarded the Victoria Cross had they survived. After an article given in the paper that praised the conduct of the two officers, a letter was received the next day from Irish man J.J

²⁸ During this time tension was high between Britain and Russia, after the British victory in Afghanistan in 1878. After Isandlwana, in the opinion of Disraeli, the process of sending more reinforcements to South Africa may be a huge liability that could hamper their military position with Russia and Europe.

Coghill, the father of Lieutenant Coghill. He writes ‘thanking you very gratefully for the warm terms of praise you have bestowed upon my son’s conduct at Isandula’²⁹. With sentiments appearing in the *Irish Times* it would be clear that no criticism would ever exist in the papers of the day.

The *London Times* was able to produce a vast amount of information, debates, concerns and intellectual questions for the reasoning of the defeat³⁰. In this case while *The Irish Times*, continued to rewrite much of the same material in many of their articles, *The London Times* was able to grasp more pressing issues of the war and this is reflected by the immense interest the public had on the battle with the amount of letters sent to the editors of the paper. Besides the question of the battle, *The London Times* went back in time before the outbreak of the hostilities, with a look at the Parliamentary Blue-books, which would give a vast amount of information on the war. The inclusion of the information of the Blue-books may suggest that the readers of the London paper were much more knowledgeable on the pressing issues than the readers of the Irish paper, which included little mention of the books. The paper included much the same accounts and despatches from the war correspondents and Chelmsford, but it had one extra despatch from Chelmsford’s Acting Military Secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel Crealock. This segment from him is the most direct indication of who was to blame in all other despatches and narratives that laced the papers from Ireland and London. While the other despatches may have said that Durnford was ordered to the camp, and also the camp should have stayed defensive contrary to the actions by Durnford, Crealock explains straight away that...


I sent a written order to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford R.E., commander of No.2 Column, to the following effect (I copied the it in my note-book, which was afterwards lost)-move up to Isandlana Camp...take command of it...Such instructions would, I consider...be binding on Colonel Durnford on his assuming command of the camp³¹.

This despatch can be seen as a hugely important moment for the reader to understand the battle, as it clearly suggests that Durnford was the person in charge and did not follow the written orders. While it is known today it was an attempt from Crealock to deflect the

²⁹ *Irish Times*, 8 April, 1879


³⁰ Despite *The London Times* taking great interest in the cause of death, early on one of their writers had a different opinion on searching for the truth. It reads ‘If men have fought bravely and have done their best, it would not be wise...to deal harshly with errors which were assuredly involuntary, as well as irreparable. *The London Times*, 3 March, 1879.

³¹ *The London Times*, 17 March, 1879.




AN OBSTINATE ANIMAL.

ONE OF THE 60th RIFLES LEAVING GRAVEREND



THE 17th LANCER'S SLINGING THEIR HORSES ON BOARD.

THE LAST ON BOARD



The Zulu War: Sketches at the Victoria docks on the departure of the 17th Lancers.

blame from his commander, the public at the time would have to make up their own mind. However before the statement released by Crealock, much of the public did not resent Chelmsford or request for his recall as much as the paper wrote or what parliament was saying. Two letters to the editor on the same day provided the strongest defence of Chelmsford that is to be seen in any of the papers. The first letter was from Alfred H. Thesiger, who was Chelmsford brother yet he warns us that 'I am not blinded by relationship or affection in complaining of the cruel injustice...by attacks of anonymous and irresponsible writers'³². He goes on by not defending the actions of his brother on the day of the battle, but reasonably suggests for writers to stop encouraging the public against him 'before his case has been heard'. While clearly he would have bias towards his brother, it was reasonable to suggest stop criticising him until more information was released on the disaster to the public.

However, while one would expect some defence from their family, the next letter from a man who served under Chelmsford before sets about eradicating any wrong-doing the general may have done in a convincing manner. The writer is correct in saying that the camp was merely a halting area for the column, and 'Lord Chelmsford...was justified in not entrenching his camp' for his reasoning 'Have we an instance on record of any invading army entrenching itself?' He goes on to say Pulleine and Durnford were giving orders to remain on the defensive, yet from the first sighting of the Zulus until the first initial attack 'no attempts were made...to strike the tents, to throw up hasty shelter trenches, to laager the wagons or even to warn the General of an impending attack...Colonel Durnford and Pulleine acted in defiance of the *Field Exercises and Evolutions of the Army*'³³. It is clear from the letter that the writer wishes to deflect the responsibility from Chelmsford to Durnford and Pulleine, for failing to comply with normal army regulations. The two letters mentioned are from people with some personal links to Chelmsford, and it further illustrates that *The London Times* readers had much more information on the key debates³⁴, unlike the *Irish Times*, which had few publications of criticism other than from the British government

³² Ibid, 11 March, 1879.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ While the public were searching for answers, one officer pleaded with the public to withhold their judgements until the Court of Inquiry was released. From information he received from another paper he says 'I would deprecate all criticism of the gallant dead until the report of the Court of Inquiry has been published' and 'that Colonel Durnford at the last desired his natives to save themselves, he himself remaining like a hero with our own troops till he fell'. *The London Times*, 14 March, 1879.

creating little public opinion. To further augment how the paper was more informative to the reader than their Irish counterpart, was the other topics of debates that emerged from the battle including the shortcomings of modern weaponry, with some interactive debates from the public.

In contrast to the *Irish Times* and *The London Times*, the *Illustrated London News*, which was a weekly paper; had the benefit of excellent drawings included with the text. While the news was not as comprehensive as the other papers, it still managed to make within its content interesting observations on the battle of Isandlwana and the war in general. The news of the disaster of Isandlwana first came to the reader's attention in the *Illustrated London News*, on the 15th of February. Previous to that date, there was little information on the possibility of war, with the previous week's attention on the details of the ultimatum of war presented to the Zulu King for fear 'of the larger military force maintained by Cetwayo'³⁵. A state of war had existed in early January, but the report was only given in mid-February, which may convey the public's lack of interest to just another colonial adventure and perhaps as it was not being sanctioned by the government. Public interest would increase dramatically, when news reached England of a 'British Reserve'. The first report of the battle comes from Lord Chelmsford that was sent to the War Office, dated the 10th of February. The information is short, and only some reasoning was given for defeat, with merits some truth 'that the troops were enticed away from the camp'³⁶, perhaps referring to Durnford.

As expected, information is scarce during the early reports, but it is worth noting a list of the dead was published with Colonel Durnford the first mentioned, suggesting that he was in charge of the ill-fated camp with blame resting on him. With the papers issued on the first of March, the information carried to the reader was more comprehensive. The key wording in this section was 'Colonel Durnfords Column' which may coincide with the previous week of him 'detaching a portion of his forces from the sheltered encampment'³⁷ to face the Zulu army. An intelligent reader may grasp that the immediate information being provided suggests that the column was in fact Durnford's, meaning that blame was resting on his shoulders. On the same issue there is a detailed account of the action from a survivor

³⁵ *Illustrated London News*, 8 February, 1879.

³⁶ *Ibid*, 15 February, 1879.

³⁷ *Ibid*, 22 February, 1879.

that in essence it provides a good early visual of the battle. It even goes as far as blaming the cause of disaster on 'the disadvantage of the wagons not being packed in laager'³⁸ but no question on who should have ordered this.

On the 8th of March, Lord Chelmsford sent another despatch of the details and his views on the battle. There is some suggestion that he was blaming Durnford while he was writing the despatch. He mentions that Pulleine received instructions to defend the camp, while Durnford was requesting two companies to join his men in searching the plains for Zulus. Pulleine refused as it was contrary to orders giving, yet Durnford still proceeded with his men. He writes...

Had the force in question but taken up a defensive position in the camp and utilised there the materials for a hasty entrenchment...I feel absolutely confident that the whole Zulu army would not have been able to dislodge them...however...eagerness to close the enemy, allowed themselves to be drawn away from the line of defence³⁹.

The reader can take two points from this reading. First that Durnford should of taking up a defensive position, thus was the reason for defeat but also it shows Chelmsford trying to wash his hands from responsibility to the disaster, by claiming that the resources for defensive measures such as laagering were provided and should have been used⁴⁰. The *Illustrated London News*, in light of the Isandlwana disaster, gave the case of not laagering was a reason for the defeat, and ran a section of their paper to the benefits of this defensive structure. They give a detailed description of how the laager would be formed and reinforced by troops. They follow on with that the British could not hold against the masses of Zulus as it stood so 'we believe it to be absolutely impossible for the same enemy in equal numbers to force a position of such strength'⁴¹ if the laager had been in place.

While the essence of the chapter is on the battle itself, the *Illustrated London News*, did have one aspect that is important to note as it goes much further than criticising the government or commanders but the actual ideas that formed the backbone of the empire, which lacked in the other two papers. It begins on the 8th of March the *Illustrated London News*, gave an unrelenting attack on the conduct of Sir Bartle Frere for provoking a war that

³⁸ Ibid, 1 March, 1879.

³⁹ Ibid, 8 March, 1879.

⁴⁰ Despite the disaster, there was still time for making jokes at the expense of Lord Chelmsford. This paper writes, 'the famous despatch of Julius Caesar has often been quoted, 'I came, I saw, I won a victory', but Lord Chelmsford might run like this, 'I went, I did not see, I suffered a defeat'- *Illustrated London News*, 8 March, 1879.

⁴¹ *Illustrated London News*, 5 April, 1879.



The Zulu War : The field of Isandhlwana revisited.
Facsimile of a sketch by our Special Artist, Mr. Melton Prior.

no reason yet 'can be held to demonstrate the necessity of immediate invasion'. The writer is hugely critical, by suggesting that due to the High Commissioners actions coinciding with the defeat at Isandlwana, has left Natal open to invasion from the Zulus and also the knock on effect of the Boers of the Transvaal who are intent on 'reasserting their claims to independence'. It then goes onto asking questions that one would hear in the twentieth century and present day of the West interference with other cultures of the world. The questions asked to the reader are as follows:

Can we hammer civilisation into savage minds by sheer force? Have we any proof that such policy has been largely successful? Will the conquest of Zululand which is almost certain to be achieved be followed by results of which modern civilisation can boast? Are we to fight our way through Africa or shall we win it?⁴²

This can be viewed as a direct criticism to jingoism that formed the idealism of the British Empire. It seems that the writer sees the conquest on the 'savage minds' as outdated and modern policy is needed to embrace new people into the sphere of the empire. It has some similar traits to General Gordon of Khartoum a few years later, who believed that justice, loyalty and the development of the community spirit should be given to the Sudan without the oppression of the parent state.

However while the writer preaches his views on the war, the paper itself is hardly allowing the dust to settle with drawings of the commanders and officers of the British dead at Isandlwana on the front cover of the news which would certainly incite the public to demand a revengeful conclusion to the war. Drawings made in the paper shows the excitement of the reinforcements making their trip to Zululand with sup-captions reading 'good bye Bill. I wouldn't be out of this for fifty pounds'⁴³. The drawings are pure jingoism, and it illustrates that the soldiers are going to go out to Africa, with all necessary weapons and logistics, with no possibility of negotiations until revenge is complete. Coinciding with the pursuit of revenge instilled into the soldiers' minds, the paper also shows a contrasting view to the war, one far from the heroics of the empire.

In viewing the three papers one can see that the disaster of Isandlwana had a huge effect on the public and on the government, where all thoughts of the superiority of the white men over the 'savages', was questioned after the defeat. The three papers took up the issues and debates from the government and the people, but all in their own way. The

⁴² Ibid, 8 March, 1879.

⁴³ Ibid.

Irish Times took a rather tame look at the battle with little independent view on the battle, other than repeating what was coming in from the despatches and reporting on parliament debates. *The London Times* went one step further by including letters from the public, which began a debate on many issues of the battle especially over the question of command. However the *Illustrated London News*, while in some cases the reports were bland and differed little from the other papers in what was included, their writers in one case was the most modern and forward thinking of them all, by representing an idea that would really take hold in the twentieth century, that one cannot force Western ideologies of an empire onto people seen as inferior.

Chapter Three: Battle of Ntombe River

'The severe warning given by the disaster at Isandula does not seem

to have sufficiently impressed on our officers'

Irish Times: 12 April, 1879.

Following the huge setback to Lord Chelmsford's central column after the defeat of Isandlwana, the momentum of the war began to reverse in favour for the commander-in-chief of the British forces. While he set about devising his new tactical invasion of Zululand before reinforcements arrived from throughout the Empire, the other columns were fairing well, despite isolation. The columns were expecting the whole Zulu army to attack them at any time and preparations for defence, scouting and offensive actions continued. The left column under the command of Colonel Evelyn Wood was encouraging skirmish attacks along the range of the camps frontier, whilst achieving sufficient diplomatic success. He accepted the surrender of prominent Zulu leaders and 1,300 followers, including women and children. However these incidents were not a common occurrence and fresh attacks by the Zulu were deployed across the countryside, with a significant attack at a white farm in the Luneburg District⁴⁴. In a bid to offer protection to the region, Wood ordered five companies of the 80th Regiment (Staffordshire Volunteers) under Major Charles Tucker to garrison Luneburg on the 15th of February.

Supplies for the upkeep of the garrison and troops were being received from the district of Derby to the north of Luneburg. For these supplies to meet their destination safely, a detachment of one-company of the 80th Regiment under the command of Irishman Captain David Moriarty was sent out to protect the final arrival through Zulu countryside⁴⁵. On the 9th of March, Moriarty had managed to gather the supply wagons together, consisting of 90,000 rounds of ammunition and other goods, and had reached the Ntombe River some five miles distance from Luneburg. However, the river was swollen and it was only possible for a few wagons to cross. After Lieutenant H.H. Harward and Sergeant Booth

⁴⁴ The German settlement was vulnerable to attack from the chiefs Mbilini and Manyanyoba, which was shown during the Zulu onslaught on the farms on the 10th and 11th of February, 1879, killing many black workers.

⁴⁵ Captain Moriarty...*was a fine specimen in manners and appearance of an Irish soldier and gentleman and his not inglorious end has given rise to a widespread feeling of general regret*, *Irish Times*, 11 Apr, 1879.

had crossed the river with thirty four men, it left the remaining men and wagons with Captain Moriarty on the north side who then constructed a 'V' shape laager resting on the bank. The defences would prove to be extremely inadequate for deterring a Zulu attack and would illustrate that lessons were not learnt of the importance of strong defensive perimeters as seen at Rorkes Drift. Major Tucker concerned about the convoy's slow progress rode out to the camp urging Moriarty to come as quickly as he could. He voiced concern over the poor defences that were weakly constructed but it was too late to make any changes and Tucker rode back to Luneburg.

On the morning of the 12th of March at 3.30 a shot was heard coming from the direction of the north bank by the men in the camp. Lieutenant Harward at the south bank ordered his men to stand to, and sent a messenger to the other side of the bank to await instructions from Moriarty. The Captain was certain that there would be no attack and went back to sleep neglecting to order his men to remain on guard. At around five in the morning under cover of mist, the Zulu commander Mbilini led a force of between 800 and 4,000 men and lay undetected by sentries some seventy yards outside the camp⁴⁶. The Zulus fired a volley with their rifles and then rushed the camp with their spears. The British forces could barely offer any resistance to the attack as many stumbled out of bed to face the enemy. The soldiers were quickly overrun and many tried to escape to the south bank by swimming the river, which was still being held by Harward's men who provided covering fire to the retreating men. In Booth's report,

...we at once opened fire, and kept the fire up for about ten minutes or ¼ of an hour; the kaffirs were then in the river, in great numbers coming towards us, and at the same time assegaiing the men from the other side...we commenced firing and retiring, having received the order from Mr Harward...⁴⁷

Lieutenant Harward believed that he did the best to '...endeavoured to rally my men, but they were too scattered and finding re-formation impossible, I mounted my horse and galloped to Luneburg at utmost speed...'⁴⁸. This left Sergeant Booth to rally the surviving men and provide a slow retreat towards a deserted farm some three miles away from Luneburg. The Zulus finally gave up chase and returned to the other warriors already

⁴⁶ Many different reports of the numbers involved from the different participants. It seems more likely that 800 Zulus were engaged in action due to reports from spies of Wood. Numbers perhaps exaggerated by Tucker and Harward to further note the fact that nothing could be done to repel such an attack, which could help Harward in his defence of abandonment.

⁴⁷ *The National Army Museum, London, Sergeant Anthony Booth, 80th Reg (6807-386-9)*

⁴⁸ *The National Army Museum, London, Lieutenant Henry Harward, 80th Reg (6807-386-9)*

plundering the camp. Harward had reached the garrison of Luneburg at 6.30am to report to Major Tucker that the camp was in enemy hands and the Major ordered the men to march to Ntombe River. On arrival to the camp, Major Tucker noted

...I found the laager completely wrecked, the cattle being taken and the contents of the wagons strewn about the place, and from the bank of the river we could see the dead bodies of our men lying about on the opposite side...I fear most have of them have been drowned or assegaid in the river...⁴⁹

By the time the arrival of Tucker with 150 men, the Zulus were retreating from the vicinity back to their strongholds in the hills for fear of reprisals. From the men that accompanied the escort, numbering 106; sixty two were dead including the captain along with seventeen civilian drivers⁵⁰. Sergeant Booth who rallied the men under great discipline received the Victoria Cross for his bravery in action the following year and was promoted to Colour-Sergeant. However doubt was cast on the actions of Lieutenant Harward, who galloped on horseback to Luneburg while deserting his men to their fate. The desertion by Harward was received with great distain in the army and followed up with a court martial, but he was found not guilty which astonished the military hierarchy⁵¹. The case had some similarities to the apparent saving of the colours at Isandlwana by Lieutenants Melvill and Coghill according to General Wolsey after hearing the verdict of not guilty. He remarked 'the more helpless the position in which an officer finds his men, the more it is his bounden duty to stay and share their fortune, whether for good or ill'⁵². The lieutenant may have escaped conviction but his military career was all but over and resigned his commission in 1880⁵³.

The subsequent news articles read by the public offered quite accurate reports on the battle with official reports published by the *Irish Times* and *The London Times* by Lieutenant Harward and Major Tucker. So in that sense the public were receiving the same information as the War Office. However, as expected from the age of slow mail and

⁴⁹ *The National Army Museum, London*, Major Charles Tucker, 80th Reg (6807-386-9)

⁵⁰ On the 22nd of April, the full lists of dead and missing men were included in *Irish Times*, with their fellow Irishman Captain Moriarty mentioned first.

⁵¹ Ian Knight, *Brave men's blood: the epic of the Zulu War, 1879* (London, 1990) p 126.

⁵² *The National Army Museum, London*, General Sir Garnet Wolseley, Commander-in-Chief, southern Africa (6807-386-21)

⁵³ Harward was tried on the 20th of February 1880 in Pietermaritzburg. The first charge was 'having misbehaved before the enemy, in shamefully abandoning a party of his regiment under his command...and in riding off at speed from his men. The second charge '...neglected to take proper precautions for the safety of a party of a regiment under his command when attacked'. The court, while not disputing the evidence, they found that the defendant was not guilty of cowardice. Taken from *Narrative of the field operations connected with the Zulu War of 1879* (London, 1880) p. 71.

transport the reports of the battle were inadequate for some time. *The London Times* first report on the battle mentions that the wagons were 'properly laagered, and judging by the result of Rorkes Drift...should of been able to hold his own against the enemy'⁵⁴. The following inclusions of the Ntombe disaster were formatted on the basic line of including the main elements of the battle, with descriptions of the engagement by Harward, Tucker and a short note from Lord Chelmsford. Yet there was no questioning of the actions by the reporters of *The London Times*, in regards the desertion of the troops by Harward with a sheer lack of investigation into his conduct in front of the enemy.

One would expect some criticism of the actions of Harward or even Moriarty in failing to provide adequate defence but it seals the faith of public knowledge on the incident when the report of the battle by Chelmsford was made public. The despatch from Chelmsford to the Secretary for War on the incident published in *The Times London*, signals that '...Lieutenant Harward appears to have done his utmost to assist his comrades in their struggle as soon as he was aware of what was occurring'⁵⁵. The author Saul David explains that the cause of the disaster was the combination of bad luck; horrible weather and the inadequate precautions and defences and these errors were Moriarty's responsibility. But with the captain dead, the obvious scapegoat was Harward⁵⁶. From reading *The London Times*, the public would not have the opportunity to realise this as the reports only suggested the positive actions of the participants. However, one report shows a writer who looked beyond the incident itself and focuses on the extent of the action in the grander scheme of things. The writer believes that it is 'utterly reckless' to send a small infantry column on escort duty against a faster moving opponent but also that alongside the battle of Isandlwana, it 'shows how inadequate to South African warfare is the straitlaced and red-tape system of European military education'⁵⁷. This is a rare glimpse from the newspaper of criticism towards the action at Ntombe albeit not blaming the men involved but the whole caste of the British military⁵⁸.

⁵⁴*The London Times*, 9 April, 1879.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 22 April, 1879.

⁵⁶ Saul David, *Zulu: the heroism and tragedy of the Zulu War of 1879* (Oxford, 2005) p 248.

⁵⁷ *The London Times*, 22 April, 1879.

⁵⁸ It is interesting to note a change in respect for the Zulu after the battle of Ntombe. One writer of *The London Times* believed the Zulu was worthy of their respect as a brave adversary. He writes 'we have ample proof of the gallantry of the Zulus...We commenced the campaign by despising them; they have shown themselves to be foemen well worthy of our steel'. *The London Times*, 9 April, 1879.

The *Irish times*, much like its British counterpart, had published the same information such as the official battle accounts by Harward and Tucker, while the information on the battle varies little. Yet the *Irish Times*, unlike the *London Times*, was very critical of the engagement. The Irish paper dissects the battle reports and sources and focuses on the problems of the defences, the lack of precaution and is critical towards the Moriarty. A report from the paper begins with a critical narrative of the actions of Captain Moriarty which is missing from *The London Times* discussed before. It reads correctly that Tucker had notified Moriarty of the need for adequate defensive measures, yet 'it is passing strange again that Captain Moriarty should have wholly ignored these instructions of his superior officer'⁵⁹. The same news reports that even though Harward had roused his side of the camp after the first was heard before the onslaught the camp was 'taken completely by surprise...and for these mistakes...Captain Moriarty had paid the penalty with his own life'⁶⁰. It is an interesting comparison between the English and Irish papers of what was discussed on the more pressing issues of the battle. *The London Times* only reported the disaster that occurred with no proper analysis of the events, while totalling omitting the behaviour of Harward. While the actions of Harward are missing from the Irish papers text, the articles go a significant way to informing the Irish public of a more accurate picture and descriptive analysis, so the reader would be better informed of events than the readers of *The London Times* across the Irish Sea.

While there are numerous disparities between the papers already mentioned, the *Illustrated London News*, can be seen as contributing little to the public knowledge on Ntombe. Their sketch of the battle which made front page news is the only real contribution which offered a means in which to grasp the main issues of the conflict, in that it captures the public imagination instantly with its dramatic imagery. However one must be critical in viewing the image and contrasting it with actual reality. The sketch takes the format of central images in the Victorian Empire and the idea of what makes up the ideal British man. The author Michael Lieven explains that the main scenes of a British war are the portrayal of the 'indomitable British infantrymen' and the idea of the 'last stand' which was expected by the public in their army⁶¹. The picture of the battle mirrors those aspects mentioned, in a

⁵⁹ *Irish Times*, 21 April, 1879.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Michael Lieven, 'Heroism, heroics and the making of heroes: the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879' in *Albion: A Quarterly Journal concerned with British studies*, xxx, no. 3 (1998) p. 421.



The Zulu War: Attack on an escort of the 80th Regiment at the Intombi River.
From a sketch by Lieutenant Beverley W.R. Ussher, 80th Regiment.

bid to lessen the damage to national pride and to augment the action to the level of heroic stature in the eyes of the public. In comparison, the battle was far removed from the epic proportions of Isandlwana. The image grossly exaggerates the number of men involved, and even small details of the British men in full uniform, gives the impression that they were not caught off guard, and were prepared for action. Lieutenant Beverly Ussher who drew the sketch also provided a report of the battle. In his report he writes... 'the Zulus...rushed by thousands on our men, and in a few minutes surrounded the camp'⁶².

The first problem of this account is that the man in question was not present at the battle, but was part of Tucker's reinforcements, and obviously gathered the information from survivors which could be construed to be inaccurate after the trauma of battle. The second problem is while there are inaccuracies in the account, he also fails to place blame, question or even announce any of the actions of Lieutenant Harward. Ussher omits that Harward reported the disaster to Luneburg, and simply 'the news was brought into camp...and proceeded to the scene of the attack'⁶³. The reason he may have left the information out about Harward may have well been to protect the honour of the regiment or simply perhaps to help out a fellow Lieutenant in the same regiment. For the *Illustrated London News* readers, this was the most detailed, if inaccurate, report of the battle that was published, with no analysis of the action made by the writers or editors. The paper offered little knowledge or accurate reporting on the engagement, and left the actions of Harward unwritten which compromised the public's knowledge and therefore altered the reality of the ensuing war.

The *Illustrated London News*, like *The London Times* and the *Irish Times*, had one thing in common: the absolute neglect of coverage towards the actions of Harward, with no critical analysis or raising questions of the possibility of desertion? One could understand following the defeat of Isandlwana, the military commanders or the press would not want to further embarrass the British army and the prestige of the Empire in the eyes of the public by suggesting the possibility of Harward's cowardice. If the incident was made public or the battle dissected more critically, the readers would have seen a different aspect of the Zulu War, one that did not match the apparent heroism of Melville and Coghill in attempting to save the Queen's Colours. To the British public, they saw the actions of Melville and Coghill

⁶² *Illustrated London News*, 10 May, 1879.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

as military 'heroes', in which they would act as examples in teaching the young the qualities they must develop and reinforce the idea of the British gentlemen hero and courage⁶⁴ Lieutenant Harward certainly did not live up to the standards that the British public expected from their soldiers on the fateful day at Ntombe.

The *Irish Times*, was the closest that any of the newspapers came to grasping the reality of the action for the public. As their analysis of the camp and the actions of Moriarty are judged and quite accurate, they still fail to question anything of the exploits of Harward. Perhaps, however, it is not the fault of the editors or the writers for failing to capitalise on the issue of desertion? The only two main reports of the battle are from Tucker and Harward, and even the telegraph from Lord Chelmsford published in the paper offered no criticism to Harward. What is also evident is that there is little or no input from the public in submitting letters to editors, which may be due to the fact they did not realise the reality of Harward's actions during the course of the battle or it did not simply interest the public to the extent of Isandlwana and Rorkes Drift. If the truth was realised, the public may have turned against Harward, who may be seen to have put great stain on his Britain's honour especially after witnessing the selfless defence of the 24th Regiment two months earlier.

The *Irish Times*, as mentioned came close to critical scrutiny of the Captain and Lieutenant of the convoy. An interesting line from the paper reads '...though it maybe evil to speak ill of the dead...still worse though it may seem to speak evil of the living'⁶⁵. Perhaps the writer was touching on the subject of Harward? However with that line it sums up that the reality of the battle and the desertion of Harward would never come to the public forum in the newspapers mentioned and a different perception of the battle would be created. Even if the editor of the *Irish Times* knew full well there were questions to be answered on Harward's behaviour on that day in March⁶⁶.

⁶⁴Michael Lieven, 'Heroism, heroics and the making of heroes: the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879' (1998) p 419.

⁶⁵*Irish Times*, 21 April, 1879.

⁶⁶While there were no questions asked on Harward's behaviour in front of the enemy in the papers, and his public reputation held somewhat intact. The soldiers career would be soon over with General Wolsey writing a letter to be read out to every regiment in the British army, on the conduct of officers in battle with relation to Harward after hearing the verdict of 'not guilty' at the court martial. He writes that 'it is the faith of the British soldier in his officers that we owe most of the gallant deeds recorded in our military annals; and is because the verdict of this Court-Martial strikes at the root of this faith, that I feel necessary to mark officially my emphatic dissent from the theory upon which the verdict has been founded'. . Taken from *Narrative of the field operations connected with the Zulu War of 1879* (London, 1880) p 71.

Chapter Four: The Prince Imperial

'Terrible, horrible news has fallen us like a thunderclap. The Prince Imperial is dead'

The London Times: 21 June, 1879.

The early months of the Anglo-Zulu War, witnessed the British columns facing unparalleled, embarrassing defeats at Isandlwana, with further losses at Ntombe and Hlobane. The defeat at Isandlwana and the heroism at Rorke's Drift which rescued the image of the redcoat was immediately overshadowed by an incident in a remote donga with the death of three men. Two were troopers while the other man was heir to arguably the greatest family in military history in the nineteenth century-the Bonaparte's.

In March 1856, the Empress Eugenie husband to Napoleon III of France gave birth to the future of the Bonaparte's Imperial Dynasty- Louis Napoleon. From his birth he was surrounded by the past glories of his great-uncle and of France, and was introduced into the army at the age of nine months, becoming a member of the 1st Imperial Guard Regiment. In his teenage years he became an excellent horseman and swordsman while following his father as an observer to the battlefields of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. The defeat of the Second Empire of Napoleon led to the family's exile in England with the future of Imperial France almost destroyed. The family were welcomed enthusiastically by England, despite Queen Victoria viewing the situation as a political embarrassment which greatly annoyed many French. Louis joined the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich with the support of the Duke of Cambridge, and excelled in class and accepted an invitation to join the Royal Artillery at the age of eighteen⁶⁷. When his father died he took the title Napoleon the IV and waited for his recall back to France to reclaim the family throne. However his involvement with the British Army was seen as scandalous to many French people.

Following the defeat at Isandlwana, soldiers were being dispatched to Zululand to reinforce the already depleted forces of the centre column. Louis in a bid to see action made public his reasons for his decision to volunteer saying it was to show his gratitude to Queen but according to the author Morris he had more pressing reasons. Gaining his first military

⁶⁷ Louis was in the top ten of his class and at first was awarded a place in the Royal Engineers. However due to the family tradition of becoming a gunner like Napoleon Bonaparte himself, he joined the Royal Artillery.



The late Prince Imperial.

experience would put further precedent to the French throne and make his claim legitimate and also the Zulus were the perfect adversary which would not cause outrage in comparison to fighting a continental power for the English⁶⁸. In order to calm any problems and distress with his party⁶⁹ in France he would be sent as an observer with no meaningful military role. The Duke of Cambridge wrote a letter to the already burdened Lord Chelmsford with the information pertaining the Prince's role in the army in Zululand. It reads,

...the Prince Imperial who is going out on his own account to see as much as he can of the coming campaign in Zululand. He is extremely anxious to go out and wanted to be employed in our army...if you show him kindness and tender him a position to see as much as he can with the columns in the Field I hope you will do so. He is a fine young fellow, full of spirit and pluck...My only anxiety on his conduct would be, that he is too plucky and go ahead⁷⁰. The final words in the letter would prove to be fatefully correct⁷¹.

Louis was permitted to join the forces in Zululand only as an unofficial spectator. He made himself useful in the camp by performing a variety of tasks that were needed with enthusiasm. He also joined many of the scouting missions that were being made by the Second Division, in preparation of locating a new camp site closer to the target of the Zulu capital. Louis 'plucky and go ahead' nature was illustrated early on in his campaign, when on patrol with Colonel Buller, he rode ahead to give chase to some lone Zulus in the surrounding hills without support or knowledge of the ground ahead. Despite Louis returning unharmed after an unsuccessful foray, Buller was outraged by the actions of the young French prince, and wrote a letter of complaint to Lord Chelmsford. The commander-in-chief agreed and ordered the senior officer Colonel Harrison, who was responsible for identifying suitable routes for transport, to keep Louis in the camp at all times unless strong

⁶⁸ Donald R. Morris, *The washing of the spears: the rise and fall of the great Zulu nation* (London, 1966) p 518

⁶⁹ After the Prince's death there was great uncertainty over the future of the Imperialists Party in France which had its power uprooted after the Franco-Prussian War. With Louis' death 'the possibility of a return of the Empire must appear more and more shadowy...the Republic may thus gain in stability by the partial disappearance of one competitor'. *The London Times*, 20 June, 1879.

⁷⁰ Letter taken from Morris, *The washing of the spears*, pp 516-517.

⁷¹ Before the Prince's departure to Zululand he was obliged to write his last will and testament. Some of the lines wrote down are as follows which showed his loyalty with the Imperial name for which he was born into. 'I need not recommend to my mother to neglect nothing to defend the memory of my great uncle and father. I beg her to remember that as long as a Bonaparte lives the Imperial cause will be represented. The duties of our house towards the country will not be extinct with my life. When I die the task of continuing the work of Napoleon III will fall to the eldest son of Prince Napoleon, and I hope my beloved mother, by supporting him with all her power, will give to us who shall be no more this crowning proof of affection'. Taken from Ian Knights, *With his face to the foe: the life and death of Louis Napoleon, The Prince Imperial, Zululand 1879* (Kent, 2001) p 112.

escort was provided. Louis himself saw these orders but the concerns for his safety by the higher command but he remained unheeded.

On the first day of June, Louis in his usual eager manner, asked Colonel Harrison to allow him to complete the topographical sketches that he had begun on the new campsite and the regions beyond. According to Ian Knight, the patrol was hardly needed on the justification of military grounds, but on the excuse that Louis was bored with camp life and wished to make himself useful and active for others.⁷² Harrison saw no danger in sending the prince out, as the area that he would visit had been already been searched for Zulus, and was in seeing distant of the original camp site, with mounted men scouting the surrounding areas. Lieutenant Carey, who had formed a strong bond with the prince, volunteered to accompany the escort and to supervise and give guidance on the young man's sketches. However Harrison failed to appoint someone to command the escort, and this would lead to debate after the death of the prince, of who was actually was in command during the time the patrol was away from the camp?

The men who formed the small escort were Carey, Sergeant Willis, Corporal Grubb and troopers Cochrane, Le Tocq, Abel, Rogers and a Zulu guide. During the journey, there was an opportunity to add further troops to the patrol, but Louis declined believing that the patrol was strong enough. They rode for some hours until arriving at an abandoned kraal, where the prince dismounted to continue the maps he had begun and drink coffee with the men. Carey decided that the area was a poor choice, due to the fact there was decent cover surrounding the area that would allow a swift ambush. Louis overruled him. After some time, a lone Zulu was spotted in the nearby hills and this persuaded Louis to order the men to saddle up and mount. However the horses were off grazing and it took ten minutes to assemble. While the men had been relaxing in the area other Zulus who were aware of their position had crept around the kraal in a bid to surround them. While there would be a debate of who was in charge of the patrol, responsibility would fall on Carey for not ordering or at least suggesting that a picket should have be in place. A man of his experience and usual vigilance would not be excused for his indecision which proved fateful.

Just as the prince and Carey issued the order to mount, shots rang out and...

⁷² Ian Knight, *With his face to the foe: the life and death of Louis Napoleon, The Prince Imperial, Zululand 1879* (Kent, 2001) p 186.

I saw the black faces of Zulus about twenty yards off, rushing towards us...I thought that all were mounted...I judged better to clear the long grass before making a stand. Knowing from experience the bad shooting of the Zulus, I did not expect anyone was injured...a man said to me 'I fear the Prince is killed, Sir.' I paused looked back, and, seeing the Prince's horse galloping on the other side of the donga, asked if it was any use returning⁷³.

The prince unable to mount his horse met his end making a brave stand with his face to the enemy. He received seventeen assegai wounds in the cause of British imperialism. Abel and Rogers were also killed and disembowelled as Carey and the men fled from the scene. The men galloped for miles until meeting Buller's patrol in the vicinity. After telling the unbelievable truth that the prince was dead, Buller replied, 'You ought to be shot and I hope you will be. I could shoot you myself'⁷⁴. When news reached the camp, it was first thought as a joke but the seriousness soon dawned on the men. The war had been plagued with bad luck since Isandlwana, and as soon as the new invasion was gaining momentum, a single death occurred causing important political ramifications. Chelmsford, who had suffered so much in the campaign, 'is awfully cut up about it as he will be blamed for letting him go with so small an escort'⁷⁵.

Due to the failing light, it was thought advisable to wait until reveille next morning before beginning the search for the body, so as not to lose any more lives. While the camp settled down for the night, Carey wrote a letter to his wife, deeply depressed and shocked at the day's ordeal. However the content of the letter, would soon back-fire and disgrace him for life. He writes...

I am a ruined man, I fear, though from my letter which will be in the papers you will see I could not do anything else. Still the loss of the Prince is a fearful thing...Our camp was bad, but then, I have been so laughed at for taking a squadron with that I have grown reckless and would have gone with two men...As regards leaving the Prince, I am innocent...I shall be blamed but honestly between you and me, I can only be blamed for the camp...¹⁰.

The following day, Chelmsford sent out a recovering party to retrieve the young prince. The party found the body of the prince and the two other men badly mutilated⁷⁶. Chelmsford

⁷³ *Illustrated London News*, 5 July, 1879.


⁷⁴ Saul David, *Zulu: the heroism and tragedy of the Zulu War of 1879* (London, 2004) p 326.

⁷⁵ Morris, *The washing of the spears*, p 531.

⁷⁶ The custom of a Zulu warrior was if he killed he was permitted to slit the victims' stomach to allow their soul escape. The Zulu would wear the clothing of the slain until he was purified by special rituals. This was seen terribly at the battle of Isandlwana with severe mutilation on the corpses that would shock the Victorian public which further reinforced their 'civilised' ideology. With the Zulu 'washing his spear' proving himself in battle he would be finally granted permission from the king to marry.



In his fourth year, a Grenadier of the Guard.



At the age of two and half,
on a toy horse.



Aged eighteen, a cadet of Woolwich.

had also sent his staff surgeon, Surgeon-Major Scott to inspect the body, and the following lines are from his report at the scene. He explained...

He was lying on his back, with his left arm across him, in the position of self defence. I counted eighteen assegai wounds all in front...There were no bullet wounds on the body...There was a patch of blood, underneath the head and the neck, which appeared to me to be caused by wounds received on the side of the neck, and also a wound through the right eye-ball. The prince's body was entirely stripped⁷⁷.

After that fateful Sunday, Carey tried to continue his duties but due to the continuing pressure from his colleagues who placed the blame on him, he requested an inquest to exonerate himself. His request was accepted. Carey was tried by general court martial. The court charged him with deserting the Prince and misbehaving in front of the enemy, and despite his good defence he was found guilty and sent home. To his surprise when he arrived home, he was received by the public with great enthusiasm who saw him as a hero. The Queen and several royal members were disgusted by Carey abandoning Louis to his fate, yet surprisingly they were in the minority.

The main question to be asked at this point in the eyes of the public and the media was who was to blame for the death of the Prince Imperial of France? Scholarly research into the event over the years have made several attempts to understand who was responsible for the incident, with the blame being firmly rested on the shoulders of Carey, but noted discrepancies against Louis himself, Harrison and even Lord Chelmsford. Author Saul David, believes that the flight of Carey and his men from the kraal was poor judgement and should have attempted to rally his men and head back to the Prince⁷⁸. On the question of rallying the men, Ian Knight says that the attempt to rally would have been useless to those who had fallen, and would have probably caused the death of the rest of the patrol needlessly⁷⁹. Yet as Knight explains that 'the appearance of courage was sometimes more important than courage itself'⁸⁰, which holds much truth as the pride that the British soldier took in demonstrating bravery and honour in the face of the enemy, disregarding their own safety. Carey's court martial was overturned due to lack of evidence and he was allowed to return to the army. However due to his persistence in trying to rid himself of the guilt in the eyes of the prince's mother, he kept writing letters to persuade her to hold an audience

⁷⁷The National Army Museum, Surgeon-Major F.B Scott, Army Medical Staff (6807-386-11-6312/180).

⁷⁸David, *Zulu: the heroism and tragedy of the Zulu War of 1879*, p 325.

⁷⁹Knight, *With his face to the foe*, p 261.

⁸⁰Ibid, p 207.

with him. Being tired of the insensitivity of Carey, she published the letter that he wrote to his wife on the night the Prince died. It showed that Carey was guilty of cowardice which disgraced him. He died a lonely man, obscure within his own regiment in 1883. The death of the Prince was a sad, tragic event, yet it did nothing to hamper the increasing momentum of British victories. Despite its huge media attention, it was as Charles Newman who plainly places the death in history; 'the death of the Prince Imperial...can only be regarded as a minor episode of the campaign, especially from a military point of view'⁸¹.

After the defeat at Isandlwana, the war took on national interest, with many correspondents sent to report on the conflict to satisfy the demands of public curiosity. Within the camp that Louis had been attached, there were numerous war correspondents from *The London Times*, *Standard*, *Illustrated London News* and the French paper *Le Figaro*. These writers could never have imagined the story that was about to break and yet they were granted the biggest media story of the year⁸². While it would be of immense interest to see how the death of the Prince was portrayed in the French press, unfortunately space and time will not allow such a venture at this present time. The night the body was brought back into the camp, the *Illustrated London News* artist Melton Prior, was busy by candle-light drawing the first images of the death of Louis.

As already mentioned, the death of the prince, heir to the French Imperial throne, was a media sensation throughout the civilised world. The death was a shock to the French people, and a major embarrassment for the British. The three papers that are the basis for the thesis will be discussed presently, to illustrate how the media handled the affair, and more importantly who they held accountable for such an avoidable incident. The *Illustrated London News* provided the first images to the world of the final moments of Louis's life, yet more importantly to the research it embodied much written accounts and analysis that can now be outlined and discussed. The first reports came in on June 28, nearly a month after the incident, and similar to the other two papers the death of the prince's was met with sincere grief. As expected the first intelligence surrounding the prince's death is vague so more attention is focussed on the views of British, European statesmen and monarchy. The paper is quick to point out that the War Office and Horse Guards had no part to play in

⁸¹ Charles Norris-Newman, *In Zululand with the British Army: The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 through the first-hand experiences of a special correspondent* (London, 1880) p 206.

⁸² The death of the Prince Imperial was the highest ranking press coverage of the year 1879, with the marriage of the Duke of Connaught to Princess Louise of Prussia in second, and in third place the defeat at Isandlwana.

encouraging Louis to go on the expedition, but went 'on his own account'⁸³. This is mentioned again in the next paragraph, which shows clearly to the reader that the paper is trying to distance any thought of conspiracy by the government or the Queen, which was believed by some.

While researching Isandlwana, the same paper questioned the validity of the war by the British and the *Illustrated London News* pushes forward that argument again with the Prince as an example. It reads that 'the tragical [sic] death of the Prince Imperial in an insignificant foray...seems to be read by little profit...such manliness, modesty, gentleness, and high-trained intelligence snatched from this life by the hands of a few barbarians'⁸⁴. The paper is illustrating that the death of the Prince was insignificant in the sense for the cause for which he was involved for. The proud Prince 'was the most inglorious casualty'⁸⁵. The paper took great effort to show how they perceived the Prince, by giving detailed background to Louis and his family. They noted the great rivalry that existed between the two nations, but there was an honour in the fact that Louis represented himself so well in British military tradition. The stories of the grieving Empress would have really touched the nation, and supported by Queen Victoria. The images that are shown in this chapter, give a sense of how the Prince was perceived by the press, with pictures of him in his mother's arms and his final days. He was on the cover of many issues of the paper, and with the continued interest lasting until his funeral, illustrates that the public were certainly gripped by the death of the Prince.

While it is important and interesting to give more insight on how the death of the prince was perceived, the real focus of the following paragraphs is on the opinions of the *Illustrated London News* and their readers on who was to blame? At the beginning of the press coverage and before detailed reports became available, there was the popular opinion that it was just a misfortune of war and purely an accident. Yet the paper was quick to establish that the War Office and Horse Guards could not be held responsible for the death. So who was to blame?

On the fifth of July, the *Illustrated London News*, reported details of the death of the Prince, with accounts from the participants at the court-martial. The evidence was from

⁸³ *Illustrated London News*, 28 June, 1879.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*



In Memoriam - the late Prince Imperial.

Lieutenant Carey, Sergeant Willis, Corporal Grubb, Trooper Cochrane, and Trooper Letocq. The evidence supplied by Carey can be seen as a man trying to shift the responsibility of command to the prince, reinforcing his earlier opinion that the prince was in charge of the patrol. Throughout he mentions in several cases that it was the Prince's decision and idea's that shaped the patrols movement and safety. Carey said that he asked the Prince should they wait for a stronger escort to join them, and Louis replied, 'Oh no; we are quite strong enough'⁸⁶. In another incident Carey says that he suggested to the Prince, that the group should off-saddle in a location but Louis wished to choose the kraal as an area to rest. Before the attack, Carey said he suggested that they should saddle-up and move on but the Prince said to 'wait another ten minutes'⁸⁷. He admits that there were no precautions to placing a guard in the area, but he fails to mention that this was his duty. With the information given that the prince gave orders to the patrol, the reader may assume that precautions were Louis's responsibility, and Carey did his best to prevent any danger occurring.

From the other evidence recorded, they all mentioned that the Prince was giving orders said to the men, yet Corporal Grubbs in answering the question who was leading the retreat, said it was Lieutenant Carey. It shows a similar trait to Lieutenant Harward at Ntombe, that Carey, who neglected the safety of the men, was now leading the retreat. The story hardly portrays the heroics that fill the British annals. The evidence from Letocq further expresses that nothing was done to help the Prince and the other two men left behind. He was asked 'Were any orders given to stop or rally, or try to save the Prince? He answered 'no'⁸⁸. Carey believed that due to the bad shooting of the Zulu's he did not think anyone was injured and continued the retreat for some time. While it was clear from their testimonies that they believed that the Prince was probably killed at the beginning, no one is critical towards their own actions. Yet it was heard from Letocq, that Carey said 'lets us make haste, and go quickly'⁸⁹, which sums up the reality of their escape, as no attempt was made even to recover the body or show some defiant defence at a different position. While it may have been useless to do something, an act of bravery may have made the situation a bit more bearable for Carey and something the army and the public would like to hear.

⁸⁶ *Illustrated London News*, 5 July, 1879.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

The following week, the paper includes the verdict of the court of enquiry on the actions of Carey. The information is accurate so the readers now had the chance to read a full account of the findings of the court compared to the evidence given in the paper the week before. The main findings read 'the court is of the opinion that Lieutenant Carey did not understand the position in which he stood to the Prince' and that 'the court deeply regrets that no effort was made to rally the escort'⁹⁰. While the evidence is against Carey, including testimony given by Harrison, the paper does not condemn the actions of him. Immediately after the information is published on the court findings, the paper goes straight into a short narration of Carey's life in the military and speaks very highly over him. However the position of the *Illustrated London News* is highlighted on the death of the Prince on the thirtieth of August. The paper believes that the acquittal of Carey for the responsibility of the death of the Prince is fair but makes no attempt to establish who was to blame. They publish some words from the Duke of Cambridge, expressing that Chelmsford did all he could for the safety for the Prince, but Harrison, failed to explain the orders to Carey thus leading Carey to misinterpret them. The paper does little to express their opinions on the incident, with more interest in the funeral of the young man than his actual death. They clearly believed that Carey was innocent but no mention is made if Harrison was also innocent. The words expressed by the Duke, puts Harrison in the frame, yet the paper makes no attempt to point any fingers and leaves it entirely up for the reader to decide.

The *Irish Times*, from the beginning of their first reports on the incident reflected the same opinion and material as the *Illustrated London News* published. They released vague reports of the event with more of an emphasis on the great legacy of the Bonaparte family and the effect the death of Louis would have in politics in France and the rest of Europe. Yet a key difference emerges in the Irish paper, as unlike the *Illustrated London News*, it has a more personal element involving the public readers. A poem was written a day after the first announcement of the death of Louis, and it is clear that his death had a strong effect on the Irish public. The poem is rather long so the last few lines are as follows, and which expresses the deep regret the public held while in the process of writing the words. It reads...

⁹⁰ *Illustrated London News*, 12 July, 1879.

And France doth weep, Republic through see be
Whilst Britain mourns him martyr'd in her cause
E'eu thoughtless natures mid their pleasures pause
And eyes regretful tremble feelingly
That he so hopeful and young should die⁹¹

Throughout the paper, there are letters and messages of condolences from European statesmen and monarchy, with church services held in the great cities including Rome. Yet this was not lost on the Irish public. The people of County Cork and Cork Corporation had a meeting to vote whether they should express their condolences to Empress Eugenie for her loss, as 'the feeling in Cork and its neighbourhood is one of widespread regret at the melancholy fate which has befallen the Prince Imperial'⁹². From that it reinforces the idea that the public at large felt great sympathy for the young man and his mother.

With regards to where the blame should be placed, the *Irish Times* did not hide away from revealing information and opinions that may have affected the reader's judgement. Unlike the *Illustrated London News*, the Irish paper released information from French papers and correspondents on the death of the Prince, on who was to blame. The less jingoistic paper, illustrated the opinion of the French with blame resting on Chelmsford and the soldiers that accompanied the Prince. The French 'are daily becoming more trenchant in their criticism of the conduct of Lord Chelmsford in allowing the Prince to expose his life the way he did and especially of his companions of the reconnaissance expedition in leaving him to his fate'⁹³. Another article expresses that the prince died 'whether by the unpardonable negligence of Lord Chelmsford or by the cowardice, unworthy of English soldiers of which those composed the reconnaissance'⁹⁴. It is a strong judgement, yet it can be understood that tensions and grief were running high and criticism would be expected. It seems harsh though to blaming Chelmsford as from the beginning he did not want the extra burden of a royal celebrity to control. The criticism that is expressed on the actions of the 'cowardice' soldiers can be seen as legitimate. The evidence supplied to the media shows that the men did not make a stand and left the French man to his death, even though by that stage nothing could have been done. Yet the French people could have seen it as convenient that

⁹¹ *Irish times*, 21 June, 1879.

⁹² *Ibid*, 28 June, 1879.

⁹³ *Ibid*, 5 July, 1879.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*.



The Empress of the French and the infant Prince Imperial.

the English would leave behind a man of a higher order in life to 'savages' in a remote donga. Suspicions within France believed a conspiracy was at hand resulting in his death.

While the French may have been eager for swift justice towards Carey, the Germans took a different view. The *Irish Times* published a statement from the German Military Press believing that nothing could have been done to save the Prince. Their take on the incident is quite blunt as it reads that if the men stayed behind it would have been 'uselessly dying with him' for the reason 'bearing in mind that this was a case of a foreign spectator in a position of peril which he had voluntarily sought'⁹⁵. They believed that the court-martial of Carey should not be harsh as it should take into consideration that if the Prince had not fallen but others had, prosecution would have not followed. It has to be considered that relations between France and German were extremely poor after the Franco-German War, and it seems the Germans are taking the side of a British man over a member of the Imperial Family for spite. Their assessment of the death is Louis's as he volunteered to join the army and he must be 'prepared to meet a soldier's fate. Rank and position must look for no distinction there'⁹⁶. It is certainly bleak and direct on the matter, yet it does hold some strong truths within their judgement.

The contrasting opinion between these two countries is very interesting. The French grieved by the death of their prince, following the Queens Colours, was perceived as a grave injustice, for which someone needed to be blamed. While the Germans were more direct in their opinion, it may be due to their animosity with the French, or quite simply, the German military hierarchy are men of great tradition from the ideals of Prussia, and death is simply a part of war and one needs to accept that. However, for the Irish there were questions to be asked and answered as the paper believed it was vastly important for the honour of the country. The writer states that while they are expecting information from Chelmsford, they are more eager to hear from Carey as he is said to be an Irishman. The reason he is proposed to be Irish is unclear as Carey was born in Leicestershire and his father was also English. Yet his supposed country of origin was 'anxious for the proof they feel assured...that he did his duty like a soldier...for the hope of a great people'⁹⁷. Throughout the text, there seems to be a sincere fear from the writer, that Carey may have been a coward and let the

⁹⁵ *Irish Times*, 31 July, 1879.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, 28 June, 1879.

country and Empire down. Despite this the writer is professional and does not let any bias interfere within his work. He asks many questions regarding the incident. He speaks of the sheer neglect of the patrol for the choice of area, and not sending any guard to scout the area. The writer is bemused by the fact that the patrol was in utter panic, in which he relates it to a stampede, did nothing to 'attempt to help a fellow officer in distress'⁹⁸. He worries about the effect that this will have on the reputation of the British military and its officers, and the damage to the prestige of the Great Empire and prides on courage?

Another article that appears in the *Irish Times*, shows clear resolution in the fact that Carey should be exonerated from blame for the incident and also supports the writings of *Army and Navy Gazette*, 'for its manly defence of the abused Captain Carey'⁹⁹. The Irish paper clearly supports their fellow Irishman Carey and believes that the case before him is wrong and unjust¹⁰⁰. It signals out that *Army and Navy Gazette* is the only paper that misfortunate officers can rely on to state facts and remain unbiased. The journal 'is capable of keeping a clear head when all others go in to a frenzy, directly a soldier is guilty of error, or imaginary error'¹⁰¹. The support of such a strong journal in Britain, and the main paper in Ireland, would have brought welcome relief to burdened Carey, for which he would exploit. The defence of Carey shows other clear indications that the *Irish Times*, were going to publish opinions that were to show their support for the man, as well as 'their appreciation of his gallantry as an officer'¹⁰². The sheer amount of encouragement expressed in the paper, coinciding with the article that had some doubts and reservations of the action of Carey, illustrates that the *Irish Times*, were entirely within the influence of the British Empire. The writers for the paper shows how many of the ideals of being British and their prestige was being absorbed into Irish culture, with a sincere fear of an Irishman betraying the honour of Ireland and Britain in the face of the world.

The London Times reporting on the death of Louis began in similar fashion with little information on how the death occurred but more on the international grief that was being expressed as well as the political aftermath that would ensue. While reports began to

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid, 16 August, 1879.

¹⁰⁰ Carey was promoted to Captain due to good conduct days before the death of the prince. His promotion was mentioned in dispatches but he did not realise this until he arrived back in England, with the press calling him by his new title.

¹⁰¹ *Irish Times*, 16 August, 1879.

¹⁰² Ibid, 21 August, 1879.

appear from Carey on his explanation on the event that unfolded, it was not until the question of court-martial, that the paper began to surpass the other papers in analysis and opinion. On August 23, the paper released the statement of the court findings of the case against Carey, with words expressing that he was in 'command' of the patrol. *The London Times* immediately begins to dissect the information in a direct and sensible manner. The paper builds up a defence for Carey, not on the grounds of being a scapegoat or unfairly convicted by superiors but on military regulations. It reads that Carey was in command only because he was the senior officer in charge, yet because he did not understand the position he was in during the patrol, 'he would be free from blame both morally and legally'¹⁰³. It goes on to say that Carey was placed in this position due to unclear orders of Harrison in organising the party but also due to Carey ignorance that he was a junior officer to the Prince. Unlike the other papers it is clearly using the evidence to help to generate a coherent appraisal of the situation without being biased to any particular aspect or person.

With regards misbehaviour in front of the enemy, the paper asks the question, Did Captain Carey's conduct reasonably fall within this description? The writer believes that had Carey gathered his patrol after the attack and went back looking for the Prince, it would have resulted in their death. He makes the sensible argument that the idea of the patrol is not to fight, but to remain alive and bring back information. Had Carey returned to the kraal immediately 'he might have surrounded his memory with undying fame; but he would have achieved no useful result'¹⁰⁴. The paper is in full confidence that Carey should not have been found guilty, but unlike the other papers, that conclusion was founded on excellent analysis of the situation coinciding with in-depth military rules and regulations to form a strong argument that some modern historians believe in today. In a letter by Adjutant-General to the General Officer in South Africa, C.H Ellice, shows his opinions on the situation with blame resting more on the shoulders of Harrison who began 'that train of events'¹⁰⁵ for not following strict orders on the duties of Louis. He writes that Chelmsford, gave strict orders that he must be contacted before Louis underwent any expedition to distant regions with a strong escort and accompanied by an officer. Blame begins to be placed on Harrison, for not seeking Chelmsford permission in allowing Louis out of the camp, and also 'his orders to

¹⁰³ *The London Times*, 23 August, 1879.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 27 August, 1879.



The Zulu War : Lord Chelmsford following the body of the Prince Imperial at Itelezi Camp.

Lieutenant Carey were not sufficiently explicit, and he failed to impress upon the Prince the duty of deferring to the military orders of the officer who accompanied him'¹⁰⁶. As mentioned, the actions of Harrison, in the writers' opinion, had a knock-on effect on the conduct of Carey, who believed that Louis held a military superior rank to his own, yet the writer is correct to mention that even though there were defective orders given, Carey in his vast military experience should have guided him to do his duty. The Adjutant-General is unscrupulous in his criticism of Harrison, which was an aspect missing from most reports of the three papers researched, while he is critical of the conduct of Carey, he refrains in giving the opinion that he is wholly to blame for the disaster. This may be due to a clear analysis of the evidence for which he obtained, or perhaps maybe due to the increasing support for Carey in wider public circles, that made him hold his reservations on the issue.

During these debates on the death of Carey, the conservative papers and the wider public sphere held the opinion that Carey should be free of all charge and guilt. Yet, as expected there were some aspects that were in total contrast to the educated debates of the media. The *Irish Times* reported that in England, there were several death threats made on the life of Carey, with even societies formed to deal out their justice on him. The threats were made through several letters posted to him, which was then handed over to Scotland Yard for further investigation. From this evidence, it was clear that a minority held Carey to blame for the incident which may have come from French Bonaparte's living in England wanting to exact revenge for the death of their Prince.

As mentioned, it was clear that the majority of the public were in full support of Carey to his surprise. Yet from the research provided by *The London Times*, he became extremely accustomed to the media spotlight, with several newspaper interviews and speeches that he made to express thanks to the people. However, from the information in the paper, he tries to force the issue of his innocence with constant mention of his hard struggle since June. Several examples are seen with a bid to increase public sympathy. In a letter that he wrote, which was published in *The London Times*, voicing thanks to the public for supporting him, and repeatedly mentioning the hardship that he had been through in his ordeal. He says, 'I felt sorrow, not for anything I had done or left undone, but for the unhappy position in which I found myself placed through no fault of my own...I have done

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

nothing to be ashamed of¹⁰⁷. He believes the confidence of the people helped him to be vindicated and remain honourably to his country and army. The public support helped Carey from the beginning and the increasing support allowed him to attempt his own public relations campaign.

His campaign took the role of mentioning his innocence repeatedly to force the issue into the public mind, and even though he had majority support, it is clear that he needed everyone to believe him. This is illustrated, when he writes 'I regret that there is still some censure resting on me, as the supposed commander of the escort but I assure you, Sir, that I feel it unmerited, though hard to explain away, and I hope yet exculpate myself'¹⁰⁸. He also mentions God many times, suggesting that divinity help the public see that he was innocent. With this in mind, he was a religious man, but focusing on God, may help him seem faithful and truthful in the eyes of the Christian community in England. The sheer amount of media presence led him to believe that the he was free from guilt in the public eyes, yet one person still would not hold an audience with him, the one that he wanted so much. The popularity that he received in the public made him misjudge that the establishment was also of the same opinion. He was wrong. His continuous request to see the Empress, and his tasteless public campaign led to his ultimate downfall.

The press coverage of the death of the Prince Imperial surpassed all other media stories of that year. The three papers, while conveying mostly of the same information, it was *The London Times*, which benefited the readers the most. While all the papers agreed in the conclusion that Carey was innocent, *The London Times* was able to give detailed analysis of the events that led to an educated decision. The paper was able to take advantage of the evidence and decide the outcome in a knowledgeable manner. The *Illustrated London News* main contribution to the death of the prince was the first images produced on the event, but other than that, they offered the basic information *The London Times* and the *Irish Times* contained. The Irish paper was interested in the international opinion of Britain and Europe, yet it exposed fully how incorporated they were with the British and Empire's attitude to bravery and courage. The writers of the paper express fear and anxiety that Carey had let Ireland and the Empire down through cowardice, which illustrates how far Ireland had been integrated into British society.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 29 August, 1879.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

Chapter Five: Conclusion


'We regret to observe that grossly mistaken notions of the past conduct of Cetewayo as King of the Zulus and that much undeserved obloquy has been cast upon him'

Illustrated London News: 13 September, 1879.

Following the first reports on the massive defeat to the British centre column at Isandlwana, this once largely unnoticed war became a media sensation. The huge public demand for more detailed reports on the war coincided with the major newspapers sending out their war correspondents to Zululand. The British and Irish public were gripped by the war, as defeats and victories were being published in the papers. The readers were treated to lavish illustrations and written word honouring Britain's soldiers, including the attempted saving of the Queen's Colours at Isandlwana, the defence of Rorkes Drift, the death of the Prince Imperial and the final battle of Ulundi.

The public had the opportunity, to make their own judgements on many of the key issues surrounding the war. In the majority of the cases the information that they gathered from the papers was identical to the reports received by the War Office and the government. The many letters submitted to the editors, indicated that the war had reached the consciousness of the people. The papers also published debates from the Houses of Parliament, giving the ordinary citizen an inside view of the main issues of the war that concerned their government.

Did the papers subdue the reality of the war and thereby create a false public perception? From the research of this thesis, there is much evidence to suggest that the public's perceptions were altered but no less than expected during the age of imperialism. Examples illustrated throughout the thesis showed how the more controversial issues were never debated in the papers, due to misreporting which led to sheer neglect dissecting factual information to benefit the readers. However the papers could be faulted for not being more proactive in reporting the reality of the war and a huge lack of analysis was evident to suggest that. From the evidence, it can be deducted that the papers did not suppress any information that it received. It published letters, official dispatches, parliament reports, battle accounts but despite this it made the error of not analysing the information



The evacuation of Zululand : The 21st Royal Scots Fusiliers on the march homewards.

sufficiently and in a thorough manner. The papers took the obvious route from the beginning of the war that the British were fighting for the expansion and protection of the Empire, against 'uncivilised' warriors. Fortunately the perceptions found in the newspapers covering the final reports of the war reflected regret and dishonour asking how and why the war was fought. It resulted in the public and the papers finally coming to terms with some reality of the war, with serious questions being asked on the conduct of Frere and Chelmsford.


In each of the topics researched, the papers never maintained a balanced in analysing and reporting. In many examples the writing for the *Illustrated London News*, was bland and predictable with more emphasis on its illustrations which offered great interest to the reader. Yet, surprisingly in some cases the paper displayed the most modern view on society and imperialism. *The London Times* in their analysis contrasted differently to events. The reporting on Isandlwana and the death of the Prince Imperial was much in-depth, with an awareness of many of the key issues. However in contrast the disaster at Ntombe River was met with poor commentary and offering mundane views of the battle. *The Irish Times*, in the majority of cases was the most outspoken of the three papers but failed to respond sufficiently during coverage of Isandlwana and Prince Imperial. Surprisingly, its coverage on the Ntombe River was excellent, and did its best to offer critical views on the battle. *The Irish Times* was a conservative paper like its British counterparts. It did however offer some Irish opinions and views on the war but the writers in most cases were no less critical than the papers in Britain.

The incidents portrayed in the thesis had a unique similarity to each other. In each case there was a question of desertion and cowardice. While it is not surprising that no critical view was made on Melville and Coghill, the papers were very lenient in respect to Harward's desertion. The question of Carey despite the press having the evidence from the court-martial produced a public perception that Carey was innocent. Only through his own actions did Carey reveal his true colours. The majority of the public and press believed that these men were victims of circumstance. But the military hierarchy did criticise these men in direct contrast to what was published in the newspapers. Yet after Isandlwana, bad news or negative journalism was a rare occurrence, overall altering the true reality of this war.

The purpose of this thesis was to see how the Anglo-Zulu War was perceived and viewed in the national media. The question asked from the beginning was did the media

portray an image of the war that hampered the opinions and views of the reader? It did prove that the papers in many cases were incomplete in their analysis and adopted the usual narrative and jingoistic material that was expected from such conservative newspapers. However, the research brought about new questions that would need further study. The analysis from the thesis, in the British mindset, illustrated that the heroics and acts of gallantry were all expected from their soldiers and further acts as a case study into idea of Empire and its preservation throughout Victoria's reign. It is accepted because of the limits to the space allowed within the thesis, that the work is narrow within itself and is a mere introduction. It can be envisaged as a case study into conservative thinking during the age of imperialism and society during the final quarter of the nineteenth-century and that it indicated the sheer volume of enthusiasm the Empire had for war, which was in complete contrast to the conscientious objectors that emerged during the Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899.

What did the thesis portray about Ireland during the time of the Anglo-Zulu War? The research illustrated how far Ireland had become attached to Britain and its Empire, by adopting many of the features such as bravery, prestige, honour, the idea of the hero and the pride of dying for the sacrifice of Empire. Throughout many of the reports it was clear that there was no cultural barrier between Britain and Ireland, with expressed regret when a member of their country dishonoured their 'parent' nation. Considering during these years with the ever growing political movement of Irish Home Rule, the information that was gathered from the *Irish Times* would have indicated that Ireland was in no mood for self-governance and wished to remain a part of the expanding Empire. This is however a narrow interpretation of how Ireland was perceived through analysis of the *Irish Times*. It was the principal paper in Ireland at the time, and for that reason it was selected for research, yet its downfall was its expected pro-unionist instincts and promotion of imperial ideology. As mentioned the thesis can only be regarded as an introduction to some aspects of media and war-reporting during the Anglo-Zulu War so it is clear that much more work is needed to give a complete picture. In the case of Ireland, no nationalists' papers were researched which may have offered different versions on the war and would have contrasted to the image of the Empire which was accepted as the norm. The Anglo-Zulu War through the Irish media portrayed the image that Ireland was going to remain within the Empire and would have an important impact in the two Anglo-Boer Wars that followed. The number of



Our Special Artist's adventures in Zululand.

Irishmen fighting through all stages of the Zulu War and the deployment of the Connaught Rangers at the closing stages of the conflict created a sense of pride among Irish Unionists who saw Ireland's contribution as having a positive effect on British political and foreign policy.

The power and might of the Zulu Empire was brought to an end after the British victory at Ulundi and the capture of the Zulu King, Cetshwayo. The war had lasted eight months costing the lives of many men on both sides with huge economic cost to the British taxpayer. When the war finally came to a close, Cetshwayo the once 'barbaric' and 'despotic' ruler was treated as a celebrity in South Africa and England with even an audience held with Queen Victoria. Just before the end of hostilities Lord Chelmsford was replaced by the iconic General Wolseley and Sir Bartle Frere had to resign his post for his role in the Zulu conflict that produced many failures. However doubt would be cast over the whole war with public discontent over the conflict after realising that some of the media reports were based on misinformation. The Zulu Empire was split into thirteen districts by Lord Wolseley with no further thought and support. The British Army retired leaving the Zulus to their own fate. The country for the next several years was plagued with civil war, resulting in the death of the returned exiled King Cetshwayo by rival tribes. The last Zulu uprising was in 1906. This was their last gamble to unite the split kingdom. It failed disastrously.

The once proud people were placed into poverty surrounded by racial segregation that hampered South Africa's progress for almost a century. The Zulu people could only reflect on their past glories and the once great Zulu Empire through their memories while British monuments and graves scattered the battlefields. As the war correspondents and writers returned home, the once great Zulu Kingdom was left to its own fate in a now white world. The last great independent people in South Africa became a footnote in history for many years.

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