

**WHEN IDENTITY BOUNDARIES ARE BREACHED:  
EXAMINING THE SCANDAL OF THE 1998 WINTER OLYMPICS**

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**ABSTRACT**

We analyze media portrayals of the identity of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) regarding the 1998 Salt Lake City bribery scandal. Analyzing press accounts, supplemented by archival documents and interviews, we found that prior to the scandal, the IOC partitioned its hybrid identity elements, buffering ideology of Olympism from the economics of the Olympic Games. The scandal ruptured the identity boundary, mixing ideology and economics in the wake of the scandal, confounding and tainting organizational identity. With the scandal juxtaposing identity elements, calls for IOC reform advocated identity reconstruction that would again partition identity elements. Our findings attest to the critical role of boundary management in identity construction within a hybrid organization.

*Keywords:* organizational identity, multiple identities, boundaries, institutions

In 1998, a bribery scandal visibly rocked the image of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the “supreme authority of the Olympic Movement” (IOC, 1992: 17). With its stated goal of “building a peaceful and better world by educating youth through sport practiced without discrimination of any kind,” the IOC is the institutional carrier of the ideology of Olympism. In addition, the IOC is also responsible for staging the Olympic Games, which are themselves among “the most visible rituals dramatizing the world polity” (Boli & Thomas, 1997: 183), and, over the last two decades, have become increasingly lucrative ventures for both the cities and corporations that sponsor them. It is in the Olympic Games that IOC joins these two potentially conflictual elements of its hybrid identity (Albert & Whetten, 1985), wedding the symbolic to the instrumental through “the business of manufacturing heroes and retaining dreams” (The Wall Street Journal, 1/6/99). The scandal cleaved this conjoined identity. Charges of corruption were leveled against members of the Salt Lake City committee and the IOC over the bidding process for the 2002 Winter Games:

... a scandal arose in which organizers were accused of bribing members of the I.O.C. to swing their votes Salt Lake city’s way through \$1 million in offers of cash, scholarships for members’ children, jobs and other favors.

A series of investigations followed, including one by the state that found ethical standards, but not criminal statutes, were breached. That seemed to send the scandal away. But the Justice Department stepped in, charging two senior officials involved in Salt Lake City’s bid, Thomas K. Welch and David R. Johnson, with 15 felony counts of bribery, fraud and conspiracy. Ten members of the I.O.C. caught up in the scandal either resigned or were expelled (Janofsky, 2/9/02: 1).

The scandal juxtaposed the lofty ideology and the fraudulent business practice, creating a nearly irreconcilable image of seemingly corrupt Olympism. The revelation of untoward behavior cast a pall on IOC’s credibility, an organization whose charter is founded on “respect for universal fundamental ethical principles” (IOC, 1992: 9). As much as the bribery charges tainted the ideological luster, the valorized ideology became a burden for the management of the

business of the Olympics. The shady business practices were particularly damaging to the IOC image because of its principles of ethics, “fair play,” and excellence that were seemingly violated or abused.

Focusing on the event of the scandal, we examine the IOC’s identity and, in particular, its compartmentalization of two potentially conflicting elements: the normative ideology of Olympism and utilitarian economics of producing the Olympic Games. Through analyses of IOC documents, interviews with IOC consultants, and media accounts of the scandal, we examine the how the identity boundary separating the normative-utilitarian distinctions elements ruptured and impacted the perceived legitimacy of the IOC. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of repair strategies for identity restoration in hybridized organizations confronting crises.

Our inquiry links the identity literature to the institutional literature through an explicit consideration of how boundaries function to segment and buffer dualistic elements of an organization’s identity, and how boundary failures threaten the legitimacy of a claimed identity. By examining identity threats that are organizationally agentic, we complement extant work on threats proffered by external third parties (e.g., Elsbach & Kramer, 1996). And, in contrast to work that takes the perspective of organizational members (e.g., Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach & Kramer, 1996), we focus on organizational outsiders, or public audience, who can give or withhold endorsement and thus legitimation (Suchman, 1995). And finally, building on empirical studies that have examined identity dynamics within organizations (e.g., Glynn, 2000; Golden-Biddle & Rao, 1997), we illuminate how hybrid organizations manage the tension between identity elements. We begin with a review of the literatures that focus on identity and legitimacy. We follow this with an analysis of the specialized identity of the IOC and then examine media portrayals of the tarnished IOC identity and, ultimately, its repair. We conclude

with implications for theorizing organizational identity and the management of organizational identities under disrepair.

### **IDENTITY BOUNDARIES AND SEGREGATED LOGICS**

The answer to the central question of identity—“Who are we?”—for many, if not most, organizations (Albert & Whetten, 1985) is one of multiplicity, as organizations often contain different conceptualizations of “who are we” as a collective (Pratt & Foreman, 2000). Although theoretical and empirical inquiries have demonstrated how hybrid identities function to affect individual and organizational outcomes (e.g., Albert & Whetten, 1985; Glynn, 2000; Golden-Biddle & Rao, 1997; Pratt & Foreman, 2000), little is known about how hybrid identities are patterned intra-organizationally or to what effect. Given that the demarcation of identity boundaries is fundamental to hybridization, we address this issue by focusing on the patterns of connectedness and demarcation *between* identity elements *within* an organization.

From the sociological literature, we take note of how boundaries are essential in the construction and legitimation of organizational identity. Boundaries are endemic to classification systems; “in part because it captures a fundamental social process, that of relationality” (Lamont & Molnar, 2002: 169). Boundaries define, sort, and classify so as to render things comprehensible and thus legitimate (Douglas, 1986; Suchman, 1995). For instance, Lamont (1992) documents how socioeconomic distinctions are predicated upon symbolic boundaries, i.e., “conceptual distinctions made to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space ... whose efficacy lies in shared taken-for-granted definitions of reality” (Lamont & Molnar, 2002: 168). Relatedly, Quadagno and Fobes (1995) show how symbolic and structural boundaries function in gender identification and distinction among US Job Corps members. DiMaggio's prolific work (DiMaggio, 1982) on arts institutions speaks to how status categories

distinguish and demarcate elites. Boundaries delineate the contours of a collective identity (e.g., Gamson, 1992; Melucci, 1996) and the rules of engagement. Extending this work, we theorize that boundaries should play a similar role within an organization, partitioning the multiplicity of hybrid organizational identities.

The notion of multiple organizational identities was first given voice by Albert and Whetten (1985: 270). In their influential work, they defined hybrid organizational identities as those that contain elements that are potentially conflictual. This patterning of identity elements can be holographic, with each organizational unit reflecting the plurality of identity elements (Albert & Whetten, 1985). Golden-Biddle and Rao (1997), in their study of a non-profit organization, demonstrate that such identity conflict is resolved within holographic organizations by individual members as they seek to resolve inherent tensions between claimed—and conflictual—identity elements. Boundaries in holographic organizations, then, can be perceived and managed by individuals.

Alternatively, the patterning of different identities may be specialized or ideographic in that “each internal [organizational] unit exhibits only one identity” (Albert & Whetten, 1985: 271). Essentially, this is a strategy of compartmentalization, whereby “the organization and its members choose to preserve all current identities but do not seek to attain any synergy among them” (Pratt & Foreman, 2000: 26). Glynn (2000) demonstrated how a musicians' strike at an orchestra revealed a latent contest over the identity of the organization. She found that claims of the orchestra's identity were championed by different groups in ways that were consistent with the legitimating values of their profession: musicians enacted artistic norms while administrators espoused fiscal guardianship. In the ideographic organization, boundaries drawn between identity elements can contest “not simply...alternative budget proposals, but...the very soul of

the institution” (Albert & Whetten, 1985: 272). In other words, incomplete integration between identity elements marks ideographic organizations. Undergirding normative-utilitarian hybrids are “two logical systems of management:” “In a normative organization, the principle for determining what ought to be retained is tradition. In a utilitarian organization, the principle is cost-effectiveness” (Albert & Whetten, 1985: 287). Moreover, the “loosely coupled (Weick, 1976) ideographic structure ... [acts] ... as a set of boundaries, keeping apart what might be conflicting points of view, philosophies of education, rules of procedure, and priorities” (Albert & Whetten, 1985: 286). In the parlance of institutional theorists, such identity elements are bounded by different systems of meaning, cultural values, and institutional logics, all of which lend meaning and thus legitimacy to the collective (Suchman, 1995), but function to separate different aspects from contaminating the other.

Logics are predicated upon a set of beliefs about what is appropriate. Haveman and Rao (1997: 1606) point out that organizations are one of the most important carriers of institutions, which are a bundle “of norms, beliefs, values, rules and taken-for-granted assumptions about the way the world works.” And, while a single institutional logic may characterize a non-hybridized organizational identity, multiple logics, by definition, characterize a hybridized organizational identity (Albert & Whetten, 1985). When identity boundaries rupture, confusion about the identity and its logical basis ensues. As a result, audiences may feel frustrated as the “rules of the game” no longer apply; understandability and, in turn, legitimacy is problematized. Albert and Whetten (1985: 279) illustrate such a failure of boundary demarcation:

Faced with retrenchment, a church, for example, may hire financial experts who may become so important that the financial criteria they espouse, such as cost effectiveness, may come to directly challenge other principles of decision making and the identity of the organization in the process.

The general need for organizational boundary demarcation between conflictual identity elements is evident in the research of Elsbach and Sutton (1992) in which they investigate the legitimacy of two social movement organizations. They demonstrated that the decoupling of illegitimate actions from legitimate structures enabled organizations to shift attention away from controversies and towards socially desirable goals; claims of normative practices protected organizational legitimacy from illegitimate acts performed by activists. Similarly, in Elsbach's study (1994) of controversies in the California cattle industry, organizational signals of normative appropriateness secured legitimacy more effectively than those signaling efficiency. These empirical results offer support to Meyer and Rowan's proposal (1977) that legitimacy follows from organizations' adopting socially sanctioned visible practices while decoupling these from less acceptable activities. Further, Scott (1987) notes that, by using socially accepted procedures to carry out controversial activities, organizations can maintain the veneer of legitimacy. Taken together, researchers in this line of inquiry offer ample testimony to the criticality of boundary management in hybrid organizations. Boundaries are important markers partitioning the legitimate from illegitimate in order to maintain normative appropriateness. By implication, then, a boundary rupture that allows one element to bleed into the other, would create a crisis of identity, particular for an organization whose central identity claim is one of moral or cultural authority.

This is the issue we seek to investigate. In particular, we study how legitimacy is affected by identity boundaries that shift under the weight of a scandalized image. Our primary research questions are as follows: How are identity boundaries in an ideographic organization maintained and contested when an image is scandalized? How are such boundaries reconstructed and re-established to repair a tarnished identity—are they constructed to be consistent with one logic



(ideology and tradition?) or another (economic effectiveness)? Are the hybrid elements maintained as distinct and separable? The IOC provides an ideal site for examining the dynamics of identity compartmentalization and change, as it encompasses visible and segregated elements of a dualistic identity and each element's different institutional logics: normative ideology and economic utilitarianism. We examine these next, through an analysis of IOC archival materials, public statements, and media accounts.

### **THE DEMARCATED IDENTITY OF THE IOC**

#### **The IOC Normative Identity: “*Citius, Altius, Fortius.*”**

The ideology of the IOC is perhaps nowhere as evident as in the organization's own statement about its role and authority, which is published in “The Olympic Movement,” which is reprinted in Appendix A. Its ideological claims are lofty. For instance, the IOC acts “in the endeavor to place sport at the service of humanity” and towards “ensuring that in sports the spirit of fair play prevails and violence is banned.” Furthermore, the IOC officially “opposes any political or commercial abuse of sport and athletes.” According to the Olympic Charter, “The Olympic motto of the Olympic Movement ‘*Citius, Altius, Fortius*’ expresses the message which the IOC addresses to all who belong to the Olympic Movement, inviting them to excel in accordance with the Olympic spirit.” Roughly translated from the Latin, the universally accepted meaning is “Swifter, Higher, Stronger,” setting superior aspirations for athleticism and Olympism. The pairing of sport with ideology is a recurrent theme in much of the official IOC verbiage. As articulated in the Olympic Charter (Fundamental Principle #3), “The goal of Olympism is to place everywhere sport at the service of the harmonious development of man, with a view to encouraging the establishment of a peaceful society concerned with the

preservation of human dignity.” Fundamental Principle #4 explicitly entrusts this goal to the IOC.

The purpose of these official statements is to protect (or buffer) the core ideology from any potential threat of corruption. This is accomplished through language and symbolic action. In the words of the “father of modern Olympism,” Baron Pierre de Coubertin, “The important thing in the Olympic Games is not winning but taking part. Just as in life, the aim is not to conquer but to struggle well.” More recently, the sixth President of the IOC (1972-80), Lord Killanin similarly claimed the universality of the IOC identity: “The Olympic Movement is not only the allocation and ruling of the Olympic Games. It is something throughout the world, which exists for 24 hours a day for every day of the year. It is something that can be good to all!” (The Olympic Movement: 27). The expressive, even aesthetic appeal of the normative ideology is clear in another quote attributed to de Coubertin:

Sport must be envisaged as a generator of art and an opportunity for art. It generates beauty because it creates the athlete who is a living sculpture. It is an opportunity for beauty because of the buildings created for it and the spectacles and festivals to which it gives rise. (The Olympic Movement: 95).

The identity of the IOC, particularly as reflected in its role and mission seemed to resonate with “broadly accepted norms, values, and belief systems that constitute the master principles of society, such as truth, equality and justice” (Haveman & Rao, 1997: 1613-1614). This ideological identity claim is seemingly consistent with, and predicated upon, general or master rules of society (Swidler, 1986), i.e., serving humanity, fostering peace and brotherhood, ensuring fair and equitable play on the field, and promoting equality and environmentalism.

The congruence of the IOC identity with societal culture is articulated openly in this quote from IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch: “Since its very earliest history, Olympism has been linked to culture, both ancient Olympism, a reflection of the Greek civilization, and

modern Olympism, which has taken on global dimensions. We will agree that the exact definition of Olympism is the marriage of sport and culture.” (The Olympic Movement: 91). Thus, the normative ideology, with its basis in tradition (Albert & Whetten, 1985), is readily apparent. The institutional logic underlying the ideological element of the IOC identity is humanism and civilization; its legitimacy—or audience endorsement and support—is derived from its claim of alignment with broad societal principles.

### **The IOC Utilitarian Identity: Ideology for Sale.**

The Olympic Charter contains a small, two-point section on “IOC Resources” which states the following:

1. The IOC may accept gifts and bequests and seek all other resources enabling it to fulfill its tasks. It collects revenues from the exploitation of rights, including television rights, as well as from the celebration of the Olympic Games.
2. The IOC may grant part of the revenues derived from the exploitation of television rights to the IFs [The International Federations], NOCs [National Olympic Committees] including Olympic Solidarity and the OCOGs [the local/city Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games].

In a 112-page manuscript on “The Olympic Movement,” a scant six pages (pp. 34-39), or 5%, are devoted to the topic of “Resources and Marketing.” Ideology is used to frame and justify the commercial aspects of the Games: “Take away sponsorship and commercialism from sport today and what is left? A large, sophisticated, finely-tuned engine developed over a period of 100 years -- with no fuel” (Richard W. Pound, Q.C. (IOC member), Olympic Movement: 37). The need for marketing and commercialism is claimed generically in the name of “sport” (and not the Olympics specifically), thus invoking “industry” (sports) norms to legitimate IOC commercial activity. And, while ideology may justify the consumerism attending the Olympics, identity partitioning is also evident. The Olympic Movement tome points out:

The Olympic Games remain unique among major sporting events, as no advertising is allowed in the sporting stadia and no sponsor advertising appears on the participants. The

IOC policy of offering structured and exclusive global marketing programmes fosters the marketing partnerships and helps guard against excessive commercialization (The Olympic Movement: 37).

And, in another publication, the issue of “excessive commercialization” is tackled head-on. In the IOC publication, the question is asked—“Why do the Olympic Movement and the Olympic Games need sponsors?”—and answered as follows:

Sponsor involvement with the Olympic Movement and the Olympic Games is not just monetary. Because of the complexity of staging the world's largest sporting event, corporations' product, personnel and service support is as important as their financial support. The Olympic Games could not be staged without the non-financial support that sponsors provide (Supporting the dream: Financing the Olympic Movement).

A second question—“Are the Olympic Games too commercial?”—is addressed, like many business issues, by offering factual evidence and appeals to rationality. The IOC invites the reader to consider several “facts...before forming an opinion on the issue.” These include the fact that “During all coverage of the Olympic Games, the IOC does not allow broadcasters to show any advertising over the sporting images; the overall number of Olympic sponsors has been significantly reduced. For example, at the 1984 Sarajevo Olympic Winter Games there were 447 international and domestic sponsors. The 1998 Nagano Olympic Winter Games have 37 Worldwide and domestic sponsors,” and that “[d]ue to increasing pressure on their spending, governments are unable to adopt the supporting role that corporations can play. Therefore, the Olympic Movement has to generate revenue through commercial means, or the Olympic Games could perish.” In contrast, then, to the ideological identity, with its appeals to human emotions, aspirations, unlimited potential, and optimistic visions of desired future states, the utilitarian identity speaks to realism as well as the consequences of organizational actions.

Perhaps the partitioning is nowhere as evident as in the separation of publications by the IOC: one set articulates the principles of Olympism, while the other stipulates the guidelines for commercialization of Olympic symbols. The former consist of documents entitled The Olympic

Movement and The Olympic Charter; the latter are entitled “Olympic Mark Guidelines,” “Approval Guidelines,” “Ambush Marketing Guidelines,” and the IOC “Olympic Marks and Imagery Usage Handbook,” which is coordinated with Meridian Management, its exclusive marketing and servicing operation for The Olympic Partners (TOP) programme. In these, the IOC often parades research results that attest to the potency of both the Olympic Games and its symbols, which are “intellectual properties”, owned exclusively by the IOC.

In the “Handbook,” TOP corporate sponsors are reminded to “keep in mind the results of extensive research on people's perceptions of the Games” (p. 8). The handbook goes on to report that results from “research conducted for the IOC in July/August 1996 (in nine countries)” shows that “the Olympic Games are seen to hold an unrivaled position as the world's top sporting event by over 90% of the sample.” Moreover, much of the verbiage is directed at management (perhaps even micro-management) of the key ideological symbols, even including lists of “Do's and Don'ts” (Approval Guidelines, Section 7). For instance, the most recognized Olympic image—that of the five interlocked rings—had strict guidelines for its use, including these positioning rules when paired with a corporate logo to create a composite logo:

A composite logo design can position the Sponsor's logo/name and official designation above, below, or next to the Olympic rings in any one of several configurations. However, whichever configuration is used, the minimum distance between the Sponsor's logo/name and the Olympic symbol must always be half the radius of an Olympic ring (when comparably sized to Sponsor logo) (Olympic Mark Guidelines, Edition 05.93, Section 2.5).

The language here, as in the more ideologically oriented publications, attests to uniqueness and excellence in achievement, but the referent playing field is neither track nor field but the competitive marketplace. The logic here is one of managerialism and business strategy. As the governing body of Olympic sports, the IOC has been likened to one of “the world's last great dictatorships,” an image stark in its contrast to the egalitarianism of Olympism:

Traditionally, organisations such as the International Olympic Committee ... have exercised almost absolute power over their sports, at both the professional and amateur level; nationally and internationally. They influence the lives of millions of people worldwide, and control events worth billions of dollars. They are often run by powerful individuals – Juan Antonio Samaranch at the IOC. ... [who] rule[s] with an autocratic, sometimes unforgiving, hand. They have their own rules and systems of regulations, built up apart from the laws of the wider world (Financial Times, 11/6/98: 17).

With the logic of managerialism and its focus on the “bottom line,” the IOC, according to one observer, pushes for hometown victories not for the Olympic glory but for the promise of greater revenues:

As for the Olympics, stellar performances by the home team create higher enthusiasm locally. That leads to better television ratings and thus loftier profits for Samaranch and his buddies. Nothing helps this scenario more than when Americans flaunt their stars and stripes during an Olympics on their home turf by grabbing medal after medal (Moore, The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 6/16/98: 2).

As this reporter notes, the ideology of de Coubertin, which stresses participation over winning (as noted above), has been supplanted by the extortion to “Just win, baby” (Moore, The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 6/16/98: 2). Along with increasing revenues, there has been a corresponding growth in size to the point of “gigantism” (The New York Times, 9/10/2000). In growing the Olympics to better represent the international community, producing the Games comes to resemble “big business.” Because of size constraints, the number of cities able to host the Games becomes limited, and significantly more financial and material resources are required to support the Games.

### **Bounding the hybridized identity**

The boundary markers partitioning the normative identity of the IOC from the utilitarian, economic identity are both symbolic and real. They are evident in the separation of publications, segmented by audiences, such that each IOC identity element aligns with a different but highly institutionalized logic concerning the values, beliefs, and rules of the (Olympics) Game(s).

Symbolically, the ideological identity of the IOC emphasized its cultural alignment with societal

norms of the highest ideals, e.g., peace, justice, beauty, and human achievement. These were advanced in the Olympic symbols, presented as images consonant with this identity. The utilitarian identity of the IOC, in its presentation style and content, took on the features of the business culture with which it aligned, reporting marketing research, operational facts, and outcome scenarios. The symbols were the same, e.g. the Olympic rings, motto, flame, etc., but a utilitarian identity focused on their rigorous management to optimal competitive advantage in contrast to the ideological focus on expressiveness or emotion.

And, while there were instances where one identity bled into the other (Why is there a need for sponsorship? Are the Olympic Games too commercial?), these were answered briefly, succinctly, and in the language of the identity sphere in which they were raised. By and large, the IOC seemed to have been successful in partitioning and legitimizing its dual, and potentially conflicting identity elements up until November, 1998.

### **The 1999 Allegations of Bribery**

In late 1998, documents surfaced that seemed to indicate the Salt Lake City bid committee paid university tuition for the daughter of an IOC member. Allegations and reports of other IOC members receiving cash and in-kind benefits from the Salt Lake committee as well as other bid committees soon followed. Benefits provided by the Salt Lake bid committee specifically to IOC members and their relatives were to have included items ranging from health insurance and employment opportunities to sexual favors and accommodations for leisure activities. Of particular significance, here, is that for what seems to have been the first time in recorded history, one of the IOC's own, Swiss member Marc Hodler, legitimized the allegations. Hodler held a press conference at the IOC's headquarters in Lausanne about the time of the first bribery reports. In that conference, Hodler suggested that the IOC was to blame. At the time, this

octogenarian was both a long standing IOC member and head of the IOC Coordination Commission for the 2002 Salt Lake Games. Coordination Commissions are typically charged with working with local organizers to ensure the successful production of the Games. Thus, Hodler's role positioned him on the boundary between the ideology and the commercialism of the IOC. Because of this, we interpret Hodler's actions as consistent with the boundary rupture. The scandal spotlighted the challenges of managing a hybridized identity. The normative identity of the IOC as an institution was challenged. Evidence suggested that the criteria for selecting the Olympic Games' site were not based on the merits of the location or the organizational effectiveness of the proposed local Olympic committee, but rather on a city's skill at influence peddling to bribe the votes of IOC members.

As allegations and evidence continued to surface into 1999, federal, state, and local authorities within the United States launched investigations. The IOC initiated its own internal investigation, which was accompanied by voluntary and involuntary resignations of IOC members. Simultaneously, local and state authorities associated with the bid committee and the Games resigned. Immediate casualties included the SLOC's president and senior vice-president. Other effects were less direct. The Salt Lake City mayor announced she would not seek re-election, effectively forfeiting her opportunity to host the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. Top Olympic sponsors sat on sponsorship renegotiations. Attempts at wooing new sponsors for either the Salt Lake or subsequent Games stalled. Caustic critics took front stage, including the CEO of long time sponsor John Hancock, David D'Alessandro, who penned a scathing opinion-editorial in The New York Times calling for reforms including the resignation of IOC President Samaranch.



The third and fourth quarters of 1999 brought organizers for the 2000 Sydney Summer Games to their knees over budget and sponsorship shortfalls, threats from Congress to revoke the IOC's nonprofit status in the United States, and revelations of the more pervasive use of Salt Lake type bidding practices by earlier bid committees seeking to host the Games. By the close of 1999 and into 2000, juries handed down indictments on charges of conspiracy to commit bribery, fraud, and racketeering to a variety of actors affiliated with the Salt Lake scandal. Meanwhile, throughout mid to late 1999, the IOC undertook efforts to reform itself and its host city selection procedures. While some critics decried the impact of the IOC's reforms, suggesting efforts were too little too late, other expert observers, investigators, and sponsors seemed to tire of the scandal's details, increasingly at ease with the IOC's measures. In summarizing their take on the scandal, most relevant actors offered prescriptions for managing the scandal in the medium to long term. The Chronology of the IOC bribery scandal, 1998-2000, is presented in Appendix B.

Overall, we emphasize the distinctiveness of the 1999 bribery scandal. We reviewed all articles dealing with 'Olympic scandals' published in the New York Times, Salt Lake Tribune, and Wall Street Journal, from 1980 until the 1999 bribery incident. Those articles typically addressed athlete doping, judging issues associated with athletic competition, and political controversies. We found almost no concern, in terms of scandal, with utilitarian or commercial activities associated with the Olympics. Only two types of commercial incidents surfaced: controversies with ticket sales and organizing committees' difficulties with sponsors. On both fronts, the controversies did not reach scandal proportions and involved only local Olympic organizers. Finally, we found no concern, in terms of scandal, with normative *and* utilitarian identities. A full bibliography of the articles is available from the authors upon request.

While the Salt Lake incident was not the first time the Olympics had been tarnished by scandal or bad press, the incident was unique in that it focused on the normative *and* utilitarian elements of the organization behind the Olympics, the IOC. Indeed, scandals had marked the Olympics themselves since inception. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century alone, the 1936 Berlin Games elicited reactions to the Nazi role in hosting the Games; the 1968 Mexico City Games garnered questions about minorities' use of those Games as a political platform; and both the 1980 Moscow Games and the 1984 Los Angeles Games bore witness to the impact of the Cold War and the boycotts. Moreover, for numerous Games, there were challenges concerning the participation of professional athletes (versus amateurs) and doping, or athletes' use of performance-enhancing drugs.

What unifies previous scandals is their affront upon the Olympics' normative identity. That is, they all raised questions of normative appropriateness, i.e., the degree to which the Olympics, or the Olympic Movement more generally, was aligned with the tenets of its normative identity of encouraging the global promotion of peace through the fair practice of sport. In comparison, what marked the 1999 bribery scandal was that the normative and the utilitarian identities both became suspect and that the IOC as an organization, not the Olympics more generally, was partly to blame for the scandal.

## **RESEARCH METHODS**

### **Data Collection**

To investigate our two fundamental research questions—How are identity boundaries in an ideographic organization maintained and contested when an image is scandalized? How are such boundaries reconstructed and re-established to repair a tarnished identity?—we used a qualitative methodology, which has been shown to be effective in investigating sensitive matters

such as threats to organizational identity and legitimacy (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Glynn, 2000). The primary data sources were press accounts of the IOC scandal appearing in national and local newspapers.

We analyzed 77 articles from three media sources: The Wall Street Journal, for its coverage of business and organizational issues, The New York Times, for its more general and international coverage, and The Salt Lake City Tribune, for its local coverage because of implications of the city's role in the scandal. We selected domestic U.S. newspapers because the scandal occurred in the United States and because bribery scandals are typically of less concern outside of the Western, developed world. We later validated our findings through a comparison with international newspapers' coverage of the scandal, which we discuss later. From electronic media searches, we located the 100 most relevant stories from each newspaper and carefully reviewed them for unique and in-depth content. We eliminated redundancies and superficial coverage; this resulted in a set of about 25 articles from each newspaper for the period from late November 1998 (when news first broke) through September 2000. The distribution of articles over time and by newspaper source is reported in Figure 1.

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Initially, there is a flurry of articles through June 1999, which tapers off until late summer/early fall 2000, a blip coinciding with early press on the Sydney Games. The 77 articles averaged 1,117 words in length; as indexed by length, The New York Times provided the more extensive coverage (mean = 1,405 words) while The Wall Street Journal and The Salt Lake City

Tribune articles were more abbreviated (means = 1,174 and 900, respectively). A full bibliography of the 77 articles is available from the authors upon request.

### **Data Analyses**

Organizational researchers have relied on content analyses to understand many phenomena, including how organizations present structural innovation or change (Arndt & Bigelow, 2000), how corporate annual reports mask negative organizational outcomes (Abrahamson & Park, 1994); how organizations cluster around different value structures (Kabanoff, Waldersee, & Cohen, 1995); and how senior managers communicate and manage crises (D'Aveni & MacMillan, 1990). Similarly, journalism and mass communication research suggests that quantitative and qualitative content analyses of mass media are reliable and valid (Riffe & Freitag, 1997; Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 1998).

Our first step was to generate an appropriate coding scheme to use for content analysis. Iterating between data and theory, we generated key concepts and operationalized them in a coding scheme used by two independent and trained raters to analyze the 77 newspaper articles. We began generating working codes by drawing key concepts from the literature on organizational identity, identity threats, crises, and legitimacy (e.g., Albert & Whetten, 1985; Elsbach, 1994; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). Next, we examined the data for ideas, names, or labels, and concepts that emerged repeatedly or prominently in the articles. These were compared to our theoretically derived codes. We continually modified our coding scheme until we felt we had captured key concepts that were both theoretically and phenomenologically relevant and definitive.

To illustrate: we used the label “Olympic ideals” to code passages referencing the beliefs, values, norms, or principles of the IOC and the Olympic Games; the label “Olympic symbolism” coded references to the Olympic torch, flame, rings, medals, etc.; and the label “Reforms” coded specific measures for addressing and handling the scandal. Conversely, we used the label “operations” to code passages capturing the production of the Olympics. We employed other codes, such as “budget issues” and “changes in sponsorship,” to further operationalize the

utilitarian identity. Examples of passages reflecting the business side, or production and management, of the Olympics follow:

"But no determinations have been made about which categories [of sponsorship] will be controlled by the IOC and which will be national level. Until those decisions are made and companies are signed up, SLOC will have a hard time knowing how much revenue it can count on. The budget currently calls for \$122 million from information-technology companies" (Salt Lake Tribune, 5/14/99).

"Fortunately, for Joklik's successor, most of the sports facilities are completed or are well under construction. Major projects remaining include enclosing the Olympic speedskating oval and constructing the 120-kilometer hill for ski jumping. All sports facilities are expected to be completed by November 2000 so they can be tested in competition long before the Games open on Feb. 8, 2002" (New York Times, 1/9/99).

Table 1 details our codes organized by larger topics or themes along with the total count of the times they appeared and their percentages by newspaper.

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With a coding scheme finalized, we trained independent raters to read the articles and apply these codes. Two raters read each article. In general, there was substantial agreement between the coders; any discrepancies were resolved through meetings and discussion. The final process culminated in a listing of codes and an establishment of agreed-upon criteria for applying the codes.

Next, we imported the hand-coded articles into a qualitative data analysis software package, NVIVO, and electronically coded specific passages from the articles. We found NVIVO particularly useful for two reasons. First, NVIVO allowed us to electronically mimic our hardcopy-coding scheme, permitting us to apply more than one code to the same passage. Thus, if raters found that passages contained multiple meanings, we could code and retrieve these

passages with different codes and thus capture the richness of the text. Second, NVIVO allowed us to do both quantitative and qualitative content analyses, including counts of codes as well as more nuanced analyses with Boolean searches and detailed references back to coded passages' original context.

As an initial check on the appropriateness of the selected press accounts and our coding schemes, we examined the frequency of use of codes. We found that the IOC was indeed the focus of the scandal: References to the IOC organization with regard to the scandal accounted for over 16% of all coded passages (442/2,707). Moreover, the IOC identity was the focal point of reference: References exclusive to the ideological identity (e.g., Olympic symbolism; Olympic Movement; Olympic ideals) were found in 212 passages (8%), while references exclusive to the utilitarian or business identity (e.g., budget issues; corporate sponsorship; management/operations of the Games) were found in 381 passages (14%). Interestingly, however, far more instances referenced perceptions of a hybrid ideological-utilitarian identity; mentions of the conjoined identity were found in 879 passages (32%). Taken together, these three sets of codes referencing the individual elements in isolation (22%) or in conjunction with each other (32%) accounted for more than half (54%) of the entire set of coded passages in the 77 articles (1,472/2,707). Thus, we concluded that identity dynamics were an important aspect of media portrayals of the scandal.

Our analyses unfold as follows. First, we present a media analysis of the IOC identity pre-scandal, circa 1999. Next, we report our analyses of media perceptions of the identity elements of the IOC during and directly after the scandal. We then move onto reporting on the IOC's handling of the scandal and the post-scandal calls for reform and identity repair. We close

with a brief review of the media's treatment of the IOC during the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Games.

## ANALYSES

### **Media Portrayals of the IOC Identity, pre-scandal: June-November 1998**

We began by establishing the media portrayal of the IOC identity in the six months prior to the scandal, June through November 1998. We searched for articles mentioning the IOC in our three focal newspapers. This yielded 88 articles, distributed as follows: The Wall Street Journal (4), The New York Times (13), and the Salt Lake Tribune (71).

Pre-scandal media attention focused on funding, budget, and staffing issues for the Sydney and Salt Lake Games, minor changes in Olympic sponsorships, various cities' efforts to win the right to host the Games, and athletes' use of performance enhancing drugs and international sports federations' responses to the issue. While we are still coding and analyzing this data set [which we consider to be a baseline or control] we generally found the media's pre-scandal treatment of the IOC represented both its business and ideological identity elements. For example, articles regarding budget issues and bid city selection procedures evoked an image of the Olympics as a business operated by the IOC and its national and local counterparts. Such articles detailed the operational and managerial challenges associated with implementing the Games. By contrast, articles on doping in sports presented the IOC as a likely arbitrator in mediating drug related controversies, suggesting that the IOC might act to determine the registry of prohibited substances or preside over athletes' alleged drug abuses. In this later group of articles, the implication was that by virtue of its integrity and idealism, the IOC was best suited to develop, implement, and regulate a global anti-doping policy. The media's presentation of the IOC in these articles emphasized its ideological elements. Overall, we observed a separation by

articles in their focus, with some emphasizing ideological or utilitarian elements, but not both. This changed, however, in November 1998.

### **Boundary Alteration And Refracted Identity: Media Portrayals Of The IOC Scandal**

Our analysis of the 77 articles covering the IOC scandal revealed a partition between perceptions and endorsement of the identity elements of the IOC organization that had not been evident in the previous months prior. Table 2 presents illustrative excerpts from the newspaper accounts that speak to these dynamics.

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Media portrayals of the ideological identity in the context of the scandal tended to be consistent with claims by the IOC itself. For instance, in the 381 accounts that addressed the IOC ideological identity, we found recurrent themes consonant with the master rules of society (Swidler, 1995), articulating values of peace, justice, and integrity, and extolling the virtues of human achievement. And, when the IOC seemed to lose sight of these during the scandal publicity, a journalist admonished the organization to “worry about losing the magic of the Olympics” (The New York Times, 1/24/99). Thus, there was the invocation of the institutional logic that was so aligned with this identity.

Similarly, passages referencing the utilitarian or business identity of the IOC with regard to the scandal were also singularly focused on this element and its attending logic. For instance, the same journalist who reminded the IOC about need for magic (above) was equally clear in communicating the effectiveness of their business acumen: “In the past, the winner was the city willing to lose the most money ... Now the Games are seen as having a beneficial economic



impact” (The New York Times, 1/24/99). Again, across the 212 passages that exclusively reference the IOC business identity, there was evidence of alignment with the logic of managerialism, and concerns for revenue, costs, profitability, corporate sponsorship and economic impact.

However, the 879 passages that referenced the conjoined, hybridized identity presented by the scandal, struck an entirely different note. In these, journalists had a cynical tone, seemingly perturbed and confused over the uncertainty of the image that a dualistic IOC presented. One author expressed his disgust: “[The Olympics] have no meaning. It’s a false dream. They build the illusion of brotherhood, but it’s just a commercial venture. It’s a bunch of old people misusing old-fashioned dreams for their own purposes” (The New York Times, 9/10/00). The jarring juxtaposition of contradictory identities—Olympic glory counterposed against unseemly unethical behavior—seemed to frustrate, confuse and even anger.

All of us depend on a public that believes the Olympic Games are higher, purer and more noble than any other sporting event in the world. Though it doesn't happen very often, the interests of the poorest athlete and the richest corporation are exactly the same here: we all want the Olympic Games to stand for an integrity that can't be bought. They have no value to any of us if they don't” (NYT, 5/17/00).

The lack of boundaries created a blur of meaning and problematized making sense of the IOC; the conflict between identity elements in the IOC identity, latent and partitioned for so long, was now transparent. A de-compartmentalized hybrid identity produced antithetical images and a contestation in logics; audiences were hard pressed to understand or endorse the hybridized IOC or its constitutive identity elements. One journalist summed it up:

The success of instituting a speedy cleanup...would be based on the assumption that the current scandal is an aberration; that it was caused by the unfortunate confluence of a new breed of overreaching local booster with I.O.C. members who do not fully understand the ideals of "Olympism," a 19th-century "movement" that combined the fair play of sports with the passion of religion.

There is evidence, though, that the problem is deeper, older and more profound than what has been presented as a shabby case of some Sydney and Salt Lake City payoffs for I.O.C. votes. The evidence paints a picture of an Olympic culture of moral relativism, if not systemic corruption, that has enabled the sporting spectacular to survive and prosper. (New York Times, 2/21/99)

And another writer invoked the metaphor of governments to sort out this confusion of logics:

It seems to be the way the world works: every government that forgets about the people who give it power and, instead, concentrates on keeping its secrets, keeping its perks, maintaining its rituals and preserving its own hide, eventually implodes. It happened to Louis XVI, and it happened to the Soviet Communist Party. Now, it's happening to the International Olympic Committee. Day by day, the I.O.C. proves itself to be more and more incapable of rising above the corruption scandal surrounding it and further and further from the honesty and openness that the Olympic Games represent” (New York Times, 5/17/00).

Thus, it seemed that the boundary collapse in partitioning the IOC identity elements created a crisis of sensemaking that attenuated the legitimacy, credibility, and integrity of the organization as a whole.

### **Identity Repair in the Aftermath Of The Scandal: Legitimizing a de-legitimated Identity**

In the aftermath of the bribery scandal, IOC insiders and outsiders offered reforms for handling the scandal and re-establishing the Olympics’ credibility. We coded and analyzed all the passages referencing IOC reform; summary excerpts are illustrated in Table 3. In doing so, we noted that the proposed reforms revolved around one of the two distinct identity dimensions—ideology *or* business. There was not a single proponent in the media advocating a reform that constructed a hybrid identity for the IOC. That is, observers invoked one of the IOC identity dimensions in their more general discussions of reforms. We found that observers relied upon the identity dimensions to frame their prescriptions for how the organization should manage the scandal.

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***Ideological prescriptions.*** Pleas to return fully to the Olympic ideals and reinstate the IOC’s normative identity came from IOC insiders, members of the Olympic Family at the national (e.g. USOC) and local levels (e.g. SLOC), as well as some sponsors. For example, former member of the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG) Charlie Battle chastised the IOC for having become too big and businesslike, urging them to aim for recovering the spirit of the Olympics in their efforts to handle the scandal. Similarly, former SLOC member Welch advocated that the Olympics must remain about athletics and “not dollars and cents” (Salt Lake Tribune, 4/18/99).

Ironically, some of these approaches called for the sponsors themselves to “come in and save the Olympic ideal the IOC has tarnished” (The Wall Street Journal, 9/29/00). There was a separation of the IOC from Olympism; it seemed that the scandal and ensuing crisis of legitimacy created an impression that the IOC might lack the “supreme authority” to enact this philosophy. We found such examples consistent with the position taken early by TOP sponsor John Hancock, and articulated by CEO David D’Alessandro. D’Alessandro at one point removed the Olympic rings from his company’s stationary and authored a scathing opinion-editorial criticizing the IOC. We believe Hancock and D’Alessandro’s messages to be implicit calls for a return to a more ideological IOC. We found such examples particularly interesting as some observers only associated sponsors and changes in sponsorship more generally with the business or utilitarian identity.

***Business or utilitarian prescriptions.*** Conversely, other observers suggested that the IOC focus on the efficient and effective implementation of the Games themselves in order to recover

from the scandal. This camp included IOC insiders as well as national and local level Olympic Family members. For example, organizing officials in both Salt Lake and Sydney reported that the best way for the Olympics to overcome the bribery scandal was for both sites to put on “a well managed Games” (Salt Lake Tribune, 11/21/99). IOC insiders in some cases, particularly those associated with the organization’s marketing and finance departments, reiterated such claims, noting that the IOC was “an oil tanker” with “a long-term business strategy,” (The Wall Street Journal, 9/29/00). Here the implication is that the best path for handling the scandal was to manage the Games deftly.

### **A Postscript: The IOC Identity during the Salt Lake City Games**

The 2002 Winter Games in Salt Lake City provided a unique opportunity to examine how Olympic participants and observers had come to view the IOC after the bribery scandal. As before, we collected all of the articles published by our three focal newspapers referencing the IOC during the 17-day period of the Games, February 8-24, 2002. From all of the articles, we selected and carefully reviewed those that explicitly and substantively addressed the IOC. We also carefully monitored televised newscasts and radio broadcast of the Games. We found that the majority of the media attention to the IOC during the Games focused on its handling of the pairs figure skating judging controversy, its response to cases of athletes’ doping, and its production and management of the Games, headed by new IOC President Jacques Rogge.

In terms of the pairs skating controversy involving the Russian and Canadian competitors, attention to the IOC centered on its rapid response under Rogge relative to perceptions of how the IOC would have handled the matter under former President Samaranch: “...the International Olympic Committee signaled a fresh willingness to intervene speedily in an attempt to restore credibility to a tarnished competition and salvage its own sullied reputation”

(New York Times, 2/16/02). Moreover, observers noted the IOC's ethical management of the situation. Indeed, the New York Times highlighted "the new transparency of the International Olympic Committee" in reporting the figure skating fallout, suggesting that even more "real reform" should be on the way following IOC's aggressive management of the brouhaha relative to the International Skating Union (New York Times, 2/18/02). We found the media coverage of the IOC during the Salt Lake Games on this point to favor the organization's ideological identity. Indeed, in articles appearing right after the pairs skating but before the final resolution of the judging aberration, observers generally called on the IOC to decide the issue: "The International Olympic Committee should get to the root of it" (New York Times, 2/16/02).

A focus on the IOC's ideological identity was repeated in terms of observers' commentary on the miscellaneous incidents of drug use or doping. A handful of drug test failures surfaced toward the end of the Games, prompting observers to review the IOC's recent anti-doping efforts and historic incidents of doping, particularly those involving athletes from the former Soviet bloc nations. Like the coverage of the IOC vis-à-vis the skating scandal, media attention to the IOC in covering the doping spotlighted the organization's role as a monitoring agent to ensure the purity and fulfillment of Olympic athletic ideals.

Finally, attention to the IOC often settled on its new leader. With regards to both the skating and doping controversies, the media identified Rogge repeatedly as a key explanatory variable in accounting for the more successful IOC responses to and management of scandals:

Credit Jacques Rogge, the new president of the International Olympic Committee with intervening to prevent the pairs figure skating imbroglio from disfiguring the Winter Games in Salt Lake City. He leaned hard on the International Skating Union to remedy the judging distortions that marred the pairs competition, and in so doing protected the integrity of the Games. His openness and decisiveness are a welcome break from past Olympic traditions (New York Times, 2/16/02).

Indeed, Rogge himself reported, “I don’t think this has created damage to the Olympic movement, because it was resolved fast” (New York Times, 2/18/02). Jere Longman, the New York Times’ reporter largely responsible for that newspaper’s coverage, best articulated the media’s take on Rogge’s role and effect:

... by acting quickly and forcefully, the IOC’s new president, Dr. Jacques Rogge, not only helped wipe out the state of the skating furor, but he also presented a public face of the IOC that appears more sensitive to public opinion and to issues that threaten the legitimacy of sporting competition (New York Times, 2/18/02).

Our review of the media coverage of the IOC during the Salt Lake Games suggests that the IOC had somehow managed to salvage its sullied reputation and return to its conjoined organizational identity by 2002. Media coverage of the IOC during the 2002 Winter Games did not neglect the business side of the Olympics or the production and management of the Games. We found evidence of concern with operations and business. What we did not find however was a mixing or a juxtaposition of the ideological and the business identities in the media’s coverage of the IOC. Rather, mention of the functional or operational side of the Olympics was typically discrete and unrelated to mentions of the Olympic ideals, Movement, and symbolism.

## CONCLUSIONS

Our findings attest to the critical role of boundary management in identity construction in an ideographic organization. Using media portrayals of the scandal, we document how the IOC partitioned embedded ideological and utilitarian elements to render the enterprise understandable and thus legitimate (Suchman, 1995). We found that media portrayals segmented the scandalized image of the IOC in ways consonant with those of the organization. Clarity and comprehensibility attended perceptions of singular identity elements—ideology *or* utility—because they resonated with institutionalized logics that encoded sanctioned values, norms,

beliefs, and rules of engagement. The overall effect on the audience, we infer, is that IOC identity could be perceived more readily as monolithic rather than a complex, conflictual multi-dimensional entity. With the boundary rupture precipitated by the scandal, this perception could no longer be sustained; the juxtaposition of conflicting images and confusion of logics elicited proposals for reforms that refocused the IOC on one identity element or the other, but not both together.

The limitations of the study offer opportunities for future research. Obviously, this research investigates but one organization, which might be considered a theoretically strong case. The IOC is in the business of enacting an ideology, that of Olympism. As such, it is a case that renders the identity dynamics more transparent but may also limit the generalizability of findings. Clearly, future research directed at studying other ideographic organizations, as well as other types of organizational identities, is needed. Further, because we were attempting a synthesis of the identity and institutional perspectives on boundary demarcation within an organization, we took a coarse-grained approach to our analysis, investigating prominent codes and their occurrences. A more fine-grained approach, investigating variances in perceptions of identity as articulated by different types of sources (e.g., organizational spokespersons; journalists; public audiences; corporations) and by the content and/or style of their rhetoric, is warranted. For instance, findings in Table 2 suggest that juxtaposed images of conflicting identities elicited stronger and more emotional responses than did more clearly bounded images, i.e., ideological or utilitarian identities. Distilling the relationship between audience comprehensibility and endorsement and identity partitioning is a promising avenue for future work.

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## **APPENDIX A: THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE**

The International Olympic Committee, created by the Paris Congress on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 1894, is the supreme authority of the Olympic Movement. It owns all rights concerning the Olympic symbol, the Olympic flag, the Olympic motto, the Olympic anthem and the Olympic games.

Its role is to lead the promotion of Olympism in accordance with the Olympic Charter. For that purpose, the International Olympic Committee:


- Encourages the coordination, organization and development of sport and sports competitions, and ensures the promotion and application, in liaison with the international and national sports institutions, of measures aimed at strengthening the unity of the Olympic Movement;
- Collaborates with the competent public or private organizations and authorities in the endeavor to place sport at the service of humanity;
- Ensures the regular celebration of the Olympic Games;
- Participates in actions to promote peace, acts to protect the rights of the members of the Olympic Movement and acts against any form of discrimination affecting the Olympic Movement;
- Strongly encourages, by appropriate means, the promotion of women in sport at all levels and in all structures, particularly in the executive bodies of national and international sports organizations with a view to the strict application of the principle of equality of men and women.
- Supports and encourages the promotion of sports ethics;
- Dedicates its efforts to ensuring that in sports the spirit of fair play prevails and violence is banned;
- Leads the fight against doping in sport;
- Takes measures the goal of which is to prevent endangering the health of athletes;
- Opposes any political or commercial abuse of sport and athletes;
- Encourages sports organizations and public authorities to use their best efforts to provide for the social and professional future of athletes;
- Encourages the development of sport for all, which is part of the foundations of high-level sport, which in turn contributes to the development of sport for all;
- Sees to it that the Olympic Games are held in conditions which demonstrate a responsible concern for environmental issues and encourages the Olympic Movement to demonstrate a responsible concern for environmental issues, takes measures to reflect such concern in its activities and educates all those connected with the Olympic Movement as to the importance of sustainable development;
- Supports the International Olympic Academy (IOA);
- Supports other institutions, which devote themselves to Olympic education.

Source: The Olympic Movement, pp. 17, 19 and 21.

## APPENDIX B: CHRONOLOGY OF THE IOC BRIBERY SCANDAL, 1998-2000

Date	Event
11/24/98	Letter from SLOC files made public suggests that the Salt Lake bid committee paid American University tuition for the daughter of an IOC member from Cameroon.
12/8/98	SLOC admits 6 relatives of IOC members are among 13 people to receive nearly \$400,000 from the bid committee.
12/9/98	IOC Member Marc Holder reports, "Salt Lake paid because they lost twice and wanted to win. It helped get votes."
12/10/98	IOC President Samaranch orders an internal investigation to be headed up by Canadian IOC member Dick Pound.
12/14/98	Utah Governor Mike Leavitt requests SLOC ethics panel investigation, which begins 12/18/98.
12/22/98	Former US Senator George Mitchell becomes head of USOC team to investigate selection process for American bid-city.
12/23/98	Department of Justice and FBI launch investigations.
1/99	Details surface regarding the potential payment by the SLOC for sexual favors for IOC members, the potential provision of jobs and health care by the SLOC for IOC members and their relatives, and the potential underreporting by the SLOC of public funds used to pursue the Games.
1/8/99	Frank Joklik and Dave Johnson resign as SLOC president and senior vice-president.
1/12/99	Salt Lake City Mayor Deedee Corradini announces she will not run for another term, meaning that she will not oversee that city's 2002 Olympics.
1/13/99	IOC refuses to sanction Salt Lake City.
1/19/99	Beginning of a series of resignations by IOC members.
1/20/99	Utah launches state investigation.
1/22/99	Senior IOC official Dick Pound acknowledges disappointing conduct of select IOC members and the need for reform while praising Samaranch and advocating stability in speech before International Sports Summit in New York; Sydney Olympic Committee president admits he promised payments to IOC members hours before the vote for the host of the 2000 Games—a vote Sydney won.
1/24/99	IOC executive board expels 6 members and proposes changes to the system of bidding on the Olympics as resignations and investigations continue; calls for Samaranch's resignation denied.
2/4/99	Utah Governor Leavitt begins plans to reorganize SLOC.
2/9/99	SLOC ethics committee blames bid-committee leaders Welch and Johnson but finds no evidence of criminal misconduct.
2/11/99	Mitt Romney becomes SLOC president; IOC holds meetings with its top 11 worldwide sponsors in Manhattan to assure them of its commitment to reform.
2/14/99	David D'Alessandro, CEO of John Hancock, a long-time top Olympic sponsor, authors a scathing NYT editorial criticizing the IOC and calling for reform; John Hancock simultaneously removes the Olympic rings from its stationary and billboards and threatens to withdrawal its televised Olympic broadcasts if reform is not implemented.
2/99	US Senators advocate reforms and threaten removal of IOC nonprofit status.
3/1/99	Mitchell Commission releases report, blaming scandal on corrupt host city selection process.

<b>Date</b>	<b>Event</b>
3/11/99	Former SLOC vice president Johnson alleges that senior IOC members were aware of the bid committee's payments in their efforts to secure the Games.
3/99	Utah officials swap allegations of responsibility.
3/17/99	IOC expels 6 members while bestowing Samaranch with a vote of confidence; [ultimately 10 IOC members either resign or are forced out] Eastman Kodak Co. announces an 8-year renewal of its Olympic sponsorship.
3/19/99	Sydney Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG) reports no new sponsors since the scandal.
4/8/99	SLOC reports scandal-related legal bills through February at \$1.5 million.
4/9/99	IOC forms ethics commission to investigate.
4/16/99	Senate questions American IOC members about slow pace of IOC reforms after Samaranch refuses to testify before its Commerce Committee.
4/18/99	Johnson & Johnson pulls out of its \$30 million sponsorship for the 2002 Winter Games.
5/5/99	Legal attempts made to block opening of Atlanta bid records for 1996 Summer Games.
6/17/99	IOC session opens to the public for the first time ever; members chastise Salt Lake; Turin, Italy triumphs over Sion, Switzerland to win the 2006 Winter Games.
7/19/99	Atlanta Olympic Committee opens some bid records, leaving 8 boxes private.
8/3/99	Salt Lake City businessman pleads guilty to fraudulently accounting for the salary he paid to a senior IOC member's son.
9/1/99	Federal grand juries in two states indict a senior IOC member on felony counts of lying to federal agents and entering the US illegally.
9/11/99	Leaks from Atlanta's 1996 bid documents suggest to House subcommittee that Atlanta employed efforts similar to Salt Lake's tactics to win Games.
10/14/99	Former Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young confesses he spoke with Salt Lake City leaders about additional strategies, such as scholarships for IOC family members, for landing the Games.
11/12/99	USOC transfers investigation of its own role in the bribery scandal to Senate committee; Visa International announces a 4 year renewal of its Olympic sponsorship.
7/21/00	Federal grand jury indicts Salt Lake bid committee leaders Welch and Johnson on charges of conspiracy to commit bribery, fraud, and racketeering; Welch and Johnson become the fourth and fifth people prosecuted in the bribery scandal.
9/3/00	CEO David D'Alessandro recommits John Hancock to the Olympics, lengthening the company's sponsorship through 2004.
9/16-10/1/00	2000 Summer Games, Sydney, Australia

**Figure 1: Sample Articles by Newspaper & Date of Publication (N=77)**

**Table 1: Codes Used to Analyze Data**

	NYT	SLT	WSJ	Total Count
<b>Business Identity</b>				
Budget issues	17%	65%	18%	101
Operations	26%	34%	39%	119
Changes in sponsorship	24%	45%	31%	163
Commercialization	26%	21%	53%	34
Costs	16%	39%	45%	49
Funding	31%	52%	17%	124
<b>Ideological Identity</b>				
Olympic Ideals	54%	16%	30%	82
Olympic Movement	40%	36%	24%	78
Olympic Symbolism	29%	21%	50%	52
Culture of the IOC	29%	28%	43%	82
Value of sponsorship	33%	34%	32%	114
<b>Miscellaneous</b>				
Advertising	28%	9%	63%	43
Ambush marketing	60%	0%	40%	5
Athletes	56%	21%	22%	103
Brand/branding	25%	25%	50%	32
Marketing	20%	36%	44%	64
Negotiations	18%	39%	42%	109
<b>Organizations</b>				
Congress	18%	56%	26%	34
Department of Justice	18%	43%	39%	28
IOC	37%	29%	34%	439
SLOC	5%	84%	10%	129
SOCOG	11%	79%	11%	19
USOC	27%	41%	32%	110
<b>Sponsorship</b>				
Coca-Cola	43%	19%	38%	21
Corporate support	22%	65%	14%	51
Corporations	16%	42%	42%	19
John Hancock	49%	10%	41%	63
Sponsors/sponsorship	30%	39%	31%	142
UPS	55%	9%	36%	11
US West	43%	29%	29%	7
VISA	35%	30%	35%	20
Xerox	20%	0%	80%	5

	<b>NYT</b>	<b>SLT</b>	<b>WSJ</b>	<b>Total Count</b>
<b>The Scandal</b>				
Accountability	70%	10%	20%	10
Allegations	44%	20%	36%	59
Bribery activities	45%	31%	24%	134
Concern	36%	39%	25%	92
Corruption	50%	21%	29%	147
Credibility	33%	60%	7%	30
Dismissal	62%	11%	27%	74
Ethics	54%	14%	32%	50
Exposure	47%	39%	14%	49
Handling the scandal	44%	30%	25%	158
Image	47%	38%	15%	53
Impact	31%	40%	29%	112
Investigation	32%	33%	35%	163
Integrity	52%	24%	24%	21
Involvement	26%	30%	43%	23
Misunderstanding	8%	73%	19%	37
Other damage	38%	25%	37%	73
Perception	25%	33%	42%	12
Publicity	14%	61%	25%	84
Reforms	38%	27%	35%	313
Resignation	57%	18%	25%	95
Responsibility	41%	44%	15%	71
Scandal details	44%	29%	27%	103
Scrutiny	39%	39%	22%	23
Secrecy	49%	24%	27%	45
Suspicious	36%	48%	16%	25
Tarnish	33%	28%	39%	57
Threat	44%	38%	19%	32

**Table 2. Illustrative Excerpts on Media Portrayals of the IOC Identity**

<b>Ideological Identity (N=381)</b>	<b>Contested Hybrid Identity (N=879)</b>	<b>Business Identity (N=212)</b>
<p>“For the \$10 billion generated during each four-year Olympic cycle is attracted not by archers or runners or skiers or skaters, but by the Olympics' feel-good mythology of fairness, integrity and level playing fields. If that is debunked, the Games' sponsors worry, the 104-year-old modern-day Olympic movement will tumble from its perch on Mount Olympus into the common mire of other sports.” <u>WSJ</u>, 1/6/98</p> <p>“I see the Olympics as the last great demonstration of peace in the world,” Romney said.” <u>NYT</u>, 9/9/99</p> <p>“He [Samaranch] has said that the Olympic movement is more important than the Catholic Church...” <u>NYT</u>, 2/5/99</p> <p>“They [critics] argue that Mr. Samaranch, who was a leading sports official in the Franco regime, became an IOC member in 1966 and then Spanish ambassador to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, is too wedded to the idea of the Olympics as an Old Club rather than a modern corporation. He fondly refers to all those who have anything to do with the Games as “the Olympic Family.”” <u>WSJ</u>, 1/20/99</p> <p>“The I.O.C. needs to worry about losing the magic of the Olympics,” said Charlie Battle, who was in charge of international relations for the Atlanta Olympic organizing committee. “As they have become such big business and have become so obsessed with being big and having the best athletes, they have lost a little of the magic of bringing the whole world together in the interest of peace. They don't think people will pay big money for that. To me, that's all they've got.” <u>NYT</u>, 1/24/99</p>	<p>“Looking out on the world from within the glass walls of Chateau de Vidy, on the serene Swiss shores of Lake Geneva in Lausanne, the members of the International Olympic Committee had come to believe that they had cornered the market on virtue. They are, after all, in the business of manufacturing heroes and retailing dreams.” <u>WSJ</u>, 1/6/99</p> <p>“The Olympics could end as far as I'm concerned,” said Jos Hermens, a distance runner for the Netherlands at the 1972 Munich Games who is now a sports agent. “They have no meaning. It's a false dream. They build the illusion of brotherhood, but it's just a commercial venture. It's a bunch of old people misusing old-fashioned dreams for their own purposes. It's like a cult. These people are addicted to power.” <u>NYT</u>, 9/10/00</p> <p>“The Olympic motto -- “Swifter, Higher, Stronger” -- is now understood to be an auctioneer's chant in a corrupt bidding system that has allowed wealthy cities like Sydney, Australia, (and Nagano, Japan, and Salt Lake City) to grease delegates with lavish presents. I would call them bribes.” <u>NYT</u>, 1/25/99</p> <p>“Having successfully turned the Olympics into a lucrative business marketed on the idea of sports as a kind of universal good, there is an urgency to limit the damage and recover the luster and earning power the Olympics have come to take for granted.” <u>NYT</u>, 2/20/99</p> <p>“Over time, the IOC also became an organization that, while generating billions of dollars in revenue to stage the Games, put itself beyond the meddling reach of outsiders. It insists, for instance, that its members don't represent their countries to the IOC, but rather represent the IOC to the world. At the same time, paradoxically, it acts as a ward of the world. It is incumbent on bid cities to fly members and a guest to their cities for inspection.” <u>WSJ</u>, 1/20/99</p>	<p>“The Olympics have over the last 20 years grown into a huge and quite profitable enterprise, and cities around the world have become aggressive in trying to win the rights to stage them.” <u>NYT</u>, 2/5/99</p> <p>“The rings represented a valuable franchise, like the golden arches of McDonald's.” <u>SLT</u>, 2/17/00</p> <p>“...But the Olympics in America and in Salt Lake operate off the back of corporate America.” <u>SLT</u>, 8/20/99</p> <p>“No matter what happens on the track, in the pool or on the field, there may be no more dramatic comeback in 2000 than the one the International Olympic Committee has made on the sponsorship front.” <u>NYT</u>, 9/3/00</p> <p>“The financial revival that saved the Olympics 15 years ago has mutated into the big money excesses that threaten to cripple the Olympics today.” <u>NYT</u>, 1/24/99</p> <p>“In the past, the winner was the city willing to lose the most money,” Mr. Pound said. “Now the Games are seen as having a beneficial economic impact.” <u>NYT</u>, 1/24/99</p>



**Table 3: Illustrative Excerpts on Media Portrayals of the Prescriptions for Reform/Handling the Scandal  
(Taken from 'Reform' Code, N=313)**

<b>Ideological</b>	<b>Hybrid</b>	<b>Business</b>
<p>“Samaranch told McCain "we share your concern about the need for reform of the International Olympic Committee {IOC} and want to assure you that we are deeply committed to restoring the integrity of the Olympic ideals." <u>SLT</u>, 3/31/99</p> <p>“Mr. Samaranch has sought to use the Sydney Games to exalt glorious athletic accomplishment as an antidote to the past two years of scandals that have tarnished his organization. "These are the athletes' Games," Mr. Samaranch has said over and over here. <u>WSJ</u>, 9/29/00</p> <p>“Our organization was hurt, but not the Olympic Games," Samaranch said. <u>NYT</u>, 9/10/00</p> <p>“At Coca-Cola, the company has chosen to "move forward on all things Olympic," said Deutsch, despite the uncertainty generated by the scandal. "We're making a very specific distinction between the administration of the Games and the Games themselves," Deutsch added. "We'll do everything we can to support our sponsorship and to get the full value from it." <u>NYT</u>, 2/11/99</p> <p>"The I.O.C. needs to worry about losing the magic of the Olympics," said Charlie Battle, who was in charge of international relations for the Atlanta Olympic organizing committee. "As they have become such big business and have become so obsessed with being big and having the best athletes, they have lost a little of the magic of bringing the whole world together in the interest of peace. They don't think people will pay big money for that. To me, that's all they've got." <u>NYT</u>, 1/24/99</p> <p>“The Olympics must be about the athletes and sport, not dollars and cents.” Welch said. <u>SLT</u>, 4/18/99</p> <p>“Lisa Delpy-Neirotti, who studies the IOC's stewardship of the Games as a professor of sport management at George Washington University, says the sponsors keep thinking the scandal will go away. "It isn't going away," Ms. Delpy-Neirotti explains. "At some point, the sponsors will need to come in and save the Olympic ideal the IOC has tarnished." <u>WSJ</u>, 9/29/00</p>	<p>No references were found.</p>	<p>“Sandy Holloway, the chief executive of the Sydney Olympic committee, said he was pleased with the I.O.C.'s decisions today and thought it would allow the Sydney committee "to get on with the job of organizing the 2000 Olympic Games, free from the distractions of the last month." <u>NYT</u>, 1/25/99</p> <p>“Leavitt's [Utah Governor] view is that "the only way to ultimately put it into perspective and completely redeem ourselves is by putting on a well- managed Games. . .This will be part of the history of the Salt Lake Games, but not what people will remember most." <u>SLT</u>, 11/21/99</p> <p>“Said Mark Schurman, Herman Miller's director of corporate communications: "We're confident past issues are being pursued by the appropriate authorities and that new management is focused on the execution of the Games." <u>SLT</u>, 8/20/99</p> <p>"The IOC is, of course, looking beyond," said Michael Payne, the IOC's director of marketing. "We've already signed marketing and broadcast agreements through 2008. My colleagues, back in Lausanne are already deeply involved in planning for the 2006 Winter Games in Turin." <u>SLT</u>, 1/23/00</p> <p>“IOC management, bolstered by \$500 million in sponsorship agreements over the next four years and a multibillion-dollar U.S. broadcast contract with NBC, remains apparently unperturbed by the calls for radical reform. "The IOC is an oil tanker," says IOC Marketing Director Michael Payne, arguing that a quick shift of course is not in order. "There is a long-term business strategy that is not changing. Everybody is bored with the scandal." <u>WSJ</u>, 9/29/00</p>