the aesthetics of experience, I am proposing that we integrate other histories occluded by the modernist visibility but deeply related to it. The movements of bodies, the irrepressible desire for markers of difference, the paths of pilgrimage are all components of proprioceptive systems that seem to be returning from the repressed. Are they replacing visibility or merely providing new images to circulate on ever more virtual forms of our networked optical world? Stay tuned.

Notes

1 Caroline A. Jones, *Eyesight Alone: Clement Greenberg's Modernism and the Bureaucratization of the Senses* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2005).

2 Clement Greenberg, interview by Lily Leino, April 1969, anthologized in Greenberg, *The Collected Essays and Criticism*, vol. 4, *Modernism with a Vengeance, 1957–1969*, ed. John O'Brian (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1993), 313.

3 With the rupturing hyphen I am alluding to the theory by Deleuze (elaborated with Guattari) of the "Body-without-organs," a utopian figure of pure desire and untrammeled flows of life-energy that the socius (epitomized by the concept of organ-ization) always interrupts, channels, and directs. See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (New York: Viking Press, 1977); and Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. and foreword Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1987).

4 Greenberg, *The Collected Essays and Criticism*, vol. 2, *Arrogant Purpose, 1945–1949*, ed. John O'Brian (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1986), 224.

5 Ibid.

J. M. Mancini

Worlds

In 1982 sociologist Howard Becker observed in *Art Worlds* that "all artistic work, like all human activity, involves the joint activity of a number, often a large number, of people." His observation was in tune with the times: in the quarter century since, historians of art, historians, and sociologists alike have done much to elucidate "the complexity of the cooperative networks through which art happens."[1] Nonetheless, there are still many words that could be said about "worlds." Indeed, once we begin to conceive of the American art world (or, more precisely, the American art world at any given moment in history) as an entity in its own right, we may analyze not only the subsets within that set but also the relationships between one art world and another. We may, for example, analyze large-scale transitions between different historical art worlds in the United States, or explore the almost limitless ways in which they overlapped, intersected with, or paralleled those of other places.

If the recognition that art worlds may be thought of as entities in their own right invites comparison between art worlds separated by time or by place, it also invites comparisons of another sort: between the historical art worlds of the United States and the future ones we might imagine. In other words, once we recognize that there are significant differences between various historical art worlds, we may begin to use our understanding of those differences as the basis for making normative judgments about them, and for using those judgments to help conceptualize what a "good" art world might look like.

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Art worlds, in addition to being subject to historical questions such as why certain institutional arrangements emerged, or why certain patterns of practice became dominant, can be subjected to value judgments. We can (and should) ask not just why things happened in an art world, or in the transition from one to another, but whether the things that happened were good. We can (and should) compare various institutional arrangements with others, both historical and imagined, and consider which were or might be better. And we can (and should) consider the question of what "better" actually means. Does a "good" or "better" art world mean one in which "good" or "better" art is made? That is, are aesthetic outcomes the most important? Or are political or ethical outcomes important too? Of course, as historians, critics, or sociologists of art, we often already make such considerations. But we usually do so within a context in which they are submerged under other concerns.

Perhaps, then, we should think about worlds of art more philosophically and aim not only to analyze and describe them but also to imagine and devise them. For my part, I would propose that a good art world is one that provides for the greatest number of people to develop the greatest capability to exercise artistic creativity. I use philosopher and economist Amartya Sen's term "capability" quite deliberately. Sen's argument is about a much bigger set of issues than just art—it is about how to define, and how to secure, well-being, advantage, and a good quality of life for all people. His position is that both "well-being and advantage" can be approached "in terms of a person's ability to do valuable acts or reach valuable states of being." "Quality of life," in other words, ought to "be assessed in terms of the capability to achieve valuable functionings."[2] It is not Sen's aim to spell out a list of what such functionings are—indeed, one of the key elements of his approach is to admit that different people will develop different lists of valuable acts and states of being. At the same time, however, he does give some examples of the kinds of things people will put on such lists—including seemingly basic functionings having to do with health or nutrition (such as "freedom from malaria") but also "creativity." Sen's close collaborator, Martha Nussbaum, is more explicit; among the capabilities she lists as necessary to a "good human life," Nussbaum includes "being able to use the senses; being able to imagine, to think, and to reason—and to do these things in a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training."[3]

With Sen and Nussbaum in mind, then, I would suggest that the late-nineteenth-century art world—particularly programs such as the 1870 Massachusetts Drawing Act that made the teaching of drawing a fundamental component of the universal, free education of all people—compares favorably in at least some respects to more recent art worlds that lack institutional arrangements that facilitate universal artistic fluency or the exercise of imagination informed and cultivated by such fluency. A good art world is one that foregrounds human capabilities (most important, "being able to create") and that works to cultivate those capabilities by providing the necessary education. As scholars of American art, we could do worse than to advocate on behalf of such a world.

Notes

1 Howard Becker, *Art Worlds* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1982), 1.

2 Amartya Sen, "Capability and Well-Being," in *The Quality of Life*, ed. Sen and Martha Nussbaum (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press), 30, 31.

3 Martha C. Nussbaum, "Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings," in *Women, Culture, and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities*, ed. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995), 83–84.

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