



NUI MAYNOOTH
Ollscoil na hÉireann Má Nuad

**THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF THE GOOD MAN AGAINST THE NEED
FOR FRIENDSHIP.**

A DISCUSSION CONCERNING THE IMPORTANCE OF FRIENDSHIP FOR THE
GOOD MAN IN CICERO.

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Summary

Cicero wrote in Book Three of *On Duties*, that the Stoic sage being absolutely good and perfect was the only one that could be truly happy. For his happiness was based in his virtue and as he had perfect virtue, he had perfect and lasting happiness. Yet the Peripatetics saw that happiness was not a self-sufficient idea and was instead an amalgamation of external goods. Virtue for them was a factor that contributed to happiness, for the Stoics it was essential for happiness. It would appear on initial observation that the life of the Stoic sage was a solitary one, aloof from the rest of humanity. Yet the Stoics maintained that this was the best and happiest form of life, a life lived in accordance with Nature. However, the Peripatetics maintained that nature loves nothing solitary and man is not a solitary animal. In order for him to fulfill his natural end and achieve *eudaimonia* he would naturally be drawn towards the company of others.

Cicero highlights the tension between Stoic idealism and Peripatetic pragmatism in his discussion on happiness. When he essentially asks in Book Five of the *Tusculan Disputations*. Is virtue on its own, self-sufficient for happiness? Or is happiness the sum total of external goods when joined together? Friendship was a factor in this discussion, as for Cicero, friendship is closely tied to human nature and is an important source of happiness. Both the Stoics and the Peripatetics would agree that friendship was naturally part of human nature, but both would say it played different roles in relation to the achievement of happiness. Therefore, a discussion on the nature of friendship found in the Cicero's *On Friendship* will take place in this thesis and, will see, if in Cicero's own voice friendship was a natural constituent of happiness and therefore was something that was necessarily part of a life in accordance with nature.

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PREFACE

Friendship is such an important part of what it is to be human. For in it we as a species have found a mode in which happiness may be maintained and sustained. This is nothing new and is much the same as in ancient thought and ancient societies, where friendship was deemed one of the best things in life. For friendship is something which, according to the ancients, everyone agrees is worthwhile in life. It should be valued amongst all the riches in the world. But Cicero would argue through Laelius in *Laelius on Friendship* that hardly anyone gives it any accord or real thought. Friendship is the way in which we are confronted with morality. It fully engages our conscience in our dealings with others because as Aristotle wrote a friend is another self.

Friendship has its origins in natural affection for others and this is how I came to be interested in it as a subject. Seeing my brother one day, in a state of distress and anguish I was moved to ask him why he was in such a state. He replied that his best friend's father had just passed away and he was feeling the pain of his friend. Such a display of empathy towards his friend moved me. I had a great deal of interest in ancient philosophy, particularly in ancient ethics. Having read both Plato- *Lysis* and Aristotle- *Nicomachean Ethics*, I was already familiar with what these Greeks had to say about friendship and turning to Rome I found Seneca. His Moral Letters were a revelation and I quickly read through them and found that they provided me with a good basis for daily contemplations, eager to read more philosophy from Rome and looking in the library I came across Cicero- *On the Good Life*, trans. by Michael Grant in the library. This short book contained Cicero's account of friendship. I read it enthusiastically and was profoundly moved by its content. Cicero's great love and affection for Atticus, to whom he dedicates the account of friendship, is made clearly throughout. This is summed up perfectly in the closing paragraph of the book where Laelius beautifully writes of his friend being more precious to him than anything the world could offer. One can read in these words how Cicero thought about his own friendship with Atticus. The message and advice contained in *Laelius on Friendship*, has endured throughout the ages and is still relevant in today's world as friendship endures.

My thanks and appreciation to all of my colleagues and friends in the Departments of both Philosophy and Ancient Classics at N.U.I Maynooth for all of the encouragement, kindness and helpful advice throughout the years. In acknowledgement of the thanks due to Dr. Cyril McDonnell and Dr(des.) Susan Gottlober and Dr. William Desmond for their constant patience, advice, good will and friendship during the many days we spent together. You have my gratitude. Also I wish to acknowledge the great debt owed by myself to Professor Thomas Kelly (R.I.P). Professor Kelly was an inspiration to me in my first year of coming to Maynooth. In his lectures he illuminated our minds with his tales and his keen insight into the thoughts of the great masters of our discipline. Taken far too soon from us all yet he lives on in my memory.

Lastly, I wish to extend profound thanks my supervisor Dr. Amos Edelheit for everything that he has done to see that this project is guided to a sound and rational conclusion. I owe Dr. Edelheit a great deal of thanks for many things. In his scrutiny of my writing and conscientious application to the work at hand he was tireless. His constant encouragement and gracious suggestions were always welcome and often needed, and in our almost daily discussions of Cicero and in our reading of Latin together I was afforded another chance to be inspired and I was.

INTRODUCTION

In ancient Greek and Roman civilizations, friendship was regarded as an integral part of a good society and a good life: a good society, because it was an essential component of participative civic politics; and a good life, because in it both wisdom and happiness were nurtured. This period provides us with texts on friendship which, to this day, are arguably the most profound on the subject.¹ Amongst their authors are Plato, Aristotle and Cicero, who were engaged in some of the most important and influential philosophical discussions concerning friendship. In this thesis I shall discuss the role of friendship according to the Stoics as these ideas are reflected in the philosophical writings of Cicero. Special attention will be given to the question of the self-sufficiency of the good man against the natural need of friendship.

Friendship was, according to Cicero, a fundamental part of man's nature, since humans were regarded as being primarily naturally social animals. Friendship, then, was not only natural but also essential to happiness in one's life. Yet, there were those who, on the one hand, would argue that happiness consisted of having virtue which was totally self-sufficient and in need of nothing else other than itself; whereas on the other hand, others would naturally see happiness as an amalgamation of various external goods, virtue being only one of them within the whole scope of man's life. For Cicero, the question concerning the self-sufficiency of happiness was of interest not only philosophically but also socially, owing to the unstable and bloody times in which he wrote his philosophical works: when stability is not to be found in the world, man must retreat inwards to himself. He shall seek stability in his reason which is fully self-sufficient and so find happiness in the tranquillity of

¹ Friendship, *In our time*, M. Bragg, BBC Radio 4, accessed from internet 4/04/09.

peace of mind. But for Cicero this philosophical idea of happiness was simply not enough because as a Roman and as a politician, it was in active service to both his fellow Romans and his fatherland which should have afforded him all the happiness that he sought.² Yet it was to philosophy that Cicero turned at times of great grief in his life, when both his state and his countrymen tore each other apart in a bloody civil war.

Cicero is of particular interest as he has been, unfairly, much maligned as a philosopher, regarded, on many occasions by modern scholars as a mere doxographer.³ Against such assessment, Cicero seems to be defending himself by arguing that, although his Greek sources have been useful for his books, the way in which those philosophies were both presented and discussed was his own. He is a gracious writer and Powell mentions that one should not:

underestimate the factor of popularization for a Roman audience, catered for as much by the dialogue form with its Roman characters and settings as by the attempts to ‘teach philosophy to speak Latin, for the benefit of readers who knowledge of philosophical Greek might not have been extensive.’⁴

²Cicero, *Laelius de Amicitia & Somnium Scipionis (Laelius on Friendship and The dream of Scipio)*, ed. and trans. J.Powell (Warminster: Aris&Philips Ltd., 1990), pp. 21-23 (from the introduction). The translations of the works of Cicero that I am using in this thesis come almost entirely from the Loeb Classical Library: *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*, ed. and trans. by H. Rackham (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1914), *Tusculanae Disputationes*, ed. and trans. by J.E King (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1927), *De Natura Deorum*, ed. and trans. by H. Rackham (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1933), *De Officiis*, ed. and trans. by W. Miller (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1913), *De Academica*, ed and trans. by H. Rackham (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1933), *De Legibus*, ed. and trans. by C.W.Keyes (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1928), Plutarch: ‘The Life of Cicero’ in *Parallel Lives Vol. 8*. ed. and trans. by B.Perrin (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1914). *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, Vols. 1 & 3. henceforth referred to as S.V.F., by I.Von Arnim (Stuttgartiae: In Aedibus B.G Teubneri, 1903-5). Elsewhere where other works of Cicero are used, reference and full detail is given in the footnotes.

³ Cicero, *Ep. ad Atticum*, 12.52.3: ‘*De lingua latina secure es animi. Dices: ‘Qui talia conscribes ἀπόγραφα sunt, minore labore fiunt; verba tantum adfero, quibus abundo.’* ed and trans. by E.O. Winstedt (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1912). Cicero appears to label himself a mere copier of Greek philosophy. A case of false modesty perhaps. In *On Duties*, 1.6, he declares that although he will draw inspiration from the ‘sources’ previously mentioned (the Peripatetics and the Stoics whom he chooses to follow in this book) he will work with them and judge them as he sees fit to suit his own purpose. This would incline one to believe that it might be false modesty that has Cicero call himself a mere doxographer and the truth is that he in fact will offer the reader a book on philosophical thought, which would be considered original in both its content, method and formulation. Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1.6: ‘*e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo videbitur, haurimus.*’ See also, *Cicero the Philosopher* ed. By J.Powell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.9. and A.E. Douglas, ‘Form and Content in the Tusculan Disputations’ in *Cicero the Philosopher*, n.11, p.203.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p.9. also see Powell, ‘Cicero’s translations from Greek’, in *Cicero the Philosopher*, pp.290-291.

Cicero writes with a sympathetic patriotic flavour for his Roman audience, evidenced by his understanding of Roman society and its social decorum, and in its private obligations and public expectations and also by giving Roman examples when philosophizing about Roman issues. Cicero himself asked, if the Greeks are given Greek exemplars then why should the Romans not have Roman examples?⁵ To illustrate this point Cicero writes in *On Duties* about the problems facing the Roman people concerning war, and indeed what makes war just⁶; in *On Friendship* he argues just how far duties toward a friend will extend⁷, and also which is more important, duty towards a country or towards a friend?⁸

Cicero's philosophical works are thus not merely summaries and translations from the Greek sources, and this will require looking at them from two points of view: the first being linguistically, and this is in reference to the fact that he is writing philosophy in Latin, hitherto never done before in Roman literature.⁹ These works included translations from the Greek of some key philosophical concepts. By doing so, Cicero created a new corpus of philosophical language and by default a new readership.¹⁰ The second is that in writing philosophy in his native language he was able to offer to Roman readers a collection of philosophical books tailor made for them.¹¹ By introducing Roman standards in his works he was writing philosophy in a very Roman way, ever mindful of his audience, taking into account how the Romans saw the world both politically and socially.¹² Placing emphasis on

⁵ Cicero, *De Finibus*, 1.6: 'Quodsi Graeci leguntur a Graecis, iisdem de rebus alia ratione compositis, quid est cur nostri a nostris non legantur?'

⁶ Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1. 34-40.

⁷ Cicero, *De Amicitia*, 36-48.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 56-61.

⁹ Powell, *Cicero the Philosopher*, pp.30-31.

¹⁰ See Powell, 'Cicero's translations from Greek', in *Cicero the Philosopher*, pp.288-300.

¹¹ J.Powell, 'Cicero', in *Greek and Roman Philosophy 100BC to 200AD*, Vol 2. ed. by R.W.Sharple and R. Sorabji (London: University of London, 2007), p. 56.

¹² Cicero, *De Finibus*, 1.7.

practicality over theory would be a good way to describe this *Ciceronian* philosophy. As a self-professed Academic Sceptic Cicero is using whatever philosophical school he wishes when writing his works. Cicero's own background in oratory was manifested in his understanding of language. He was also the first to fully expound and give hardened philosophical investigation into the main schools of Hellenistic thought. In Cicero we find the Roman embodiment of the best form of life, the ideal combination between the best and most choiceworthy of lives, namely the man engaged in living the contemplative life, and the man fully at ease in the political one.¹³ It is this balanced approach to life that has made Cicero according to my understanding, a man for all seasons.¹⁴

Cicero, just like most learned men of his time, mastered the Greek language from an early age;¹⁵ he saw it as his Roman civic duty to give the Romans a philosophy in their own language,¹⁶ mainly for the the purpose of education.¹⁷ He was heavily influenced by two great Stoic philosophers: Panaetius and Posidonius; the latter he knew personally, and both of these men had a very different outlook from that of the early Stoics. While the early Stoics considered the sage to be the highest achievement of the rational being, both Panaetius and Posidonius saw that this was merely an ideal and not attainable in the world they inhabited. They stressed, therefore, the importance not of outright imitation but of the nearest and best way to get close to the idea of the sage in real life. As I shall try to show in this thesis, this 'humane Stoicism' was brought to bear in Cicero's writings, for example, in *On Duties*, *On Friendship* and also the *Tusculan Disputations*. However, Cicero didn't allow himself to fully side with either the Peripatetics or the Stoics. The reason for this is his firm allegiance to the

¹³ Aristotle, *Politics*, 7.1325a17-1325b37.

¹⁴ J. Powell, *Cicero the Philosopher* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.40.

¹⁵ Plutarch, *The Life of Cicero*, 4.3-4.

¹⁶ Cicero, *Academica*, 1.9-13.

¹⁷ Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1.6 ; *De Finibus*, 1.10; *De Divinatione*, 2.1-7.

Academic Sceptic School, whose bywords were both *probabile* and *veri simile*.¹⁸ These concepts, coming from Philo of Larissa, were used by the Academic Sceptics and referred to their method not to accept any doctrine as the truth, so long we are not presented with a criterion for this truth. Thus, they would only agree up to a certain point, but never commit themselves to any particular dogma or doctrine, unlike other Hellenistic philosophical schools. And so, at the outset of Book Five of the *Tusculan Disputations*, Cicero reminds the reader of his intention, saying that he will conceal his own opinion, follow much in the same manner of the Academic Sceptics, and urged his readers to look for the most probable solution:

I have chosen particularly to follow that one [school] which I think agreeable to the practice of Socrates, in trying to conceal my own private opinion, to relieve others from deception and in every discussion to look for the most probable solution.¹⁹

When reading Cicero the reader must at all times be aware of this element in his philosophical writings and not expect him to fully support one position over the other.

As we shall see in this thesis, Cicero is using, on the one hand, the views of the Peripatetics in moral issues and argues against the Stoic position; and on the other hand he is employing Stoic notions in his arguments against the Peripatetics position. This thesis is focused primarily on the question what role friendship and self-sufficiency play in the debate concerning happiness, as discussed in the philosophical writings of Cicero. The work itself will consist of two parts: the first being concerned with Cicero's account of the Stoic and the Peripatetic position with regard to virtue and in relation to the happy life. The differences

¹⁸ For a further discussion on this see J. Glucker's article on 'Probabile, Veri Simile, and Related Terms' in *Cicero the Philosopher*, pp. 115-143.

¹⁹ Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 5.11: *E quibus nos id potissimum consecuti sumus, quo Socratem usum arbitrabamur, ut nostrum ipsi sententiam tegeremus, errore alios levaremus et in omni disputatione quid esset simillimum veri quaereremus*. Powell gives details of reference towards this fact in Cicero's other writings. See, Powell, *Cicero the Philosopher*, p. 40.

between the sage and the rest of humanity according to the early Stoics, and how in later years the theories of the early school were modified and altered by the members of the middle school of the Stoics, will be also discussed. Since the Stoic philosophical system was essentially a unity of physics, logic and ethics, all of these areas were important and none were deemed obsolete. Thus, Physics (i.e., the structure of physical reality or nature) and logic (i.e., the structure of our mind and the way we think, using concepts, etc. were) closely tied with ethics (i.e., the way we should act in the world), and the discussion of happiness will inevitably include aspects of these areas.

The second part of the thesis will begin with a discussion concerning the modification and redesign of the theories of the early Stoics by Panaetius and Posidonius. I shall examine here the division of both human nature and the universal nature, which led to a focus on individual accountability and responsibility. The result of this, I would contend, was the gradual marginalisation of the ideal sage, and the embrace of a more pragmatic approach in ethics. Nothing defines this better than the theory of *oikeiosis*, which, already given a brief explanation in the first part, will be discussed in further detail in the second part. *Oikeiosis* was understood by the Stoics as a natural aspect of human evolution. Friendship was part of this evolution and so part of a life deemed in accordance with nature and not separate from it. The second part will then conclude with a discussion of friendship which incorporated the theory of *oikeiosis* and would appear to show that self-sufficiency in theory was an admirable idea, but it was to become less and less important in Stoic philosophical understanding throughout the years, finally superseded by a more practical approach that was defined by *oikeiosis*. In the course of my own research I have found that as a subject in its own right the Stoic theory of *oikeiosis* has been surprisingly very little written about it. From the literature that I have read and researched not one has specifically dealt with *oikeiosis* within the context of friendship solely.

Cicero while writing about the phenomenon of *oikeiosis* in book 3 of *On Ends*, describes it as the way in which the individual appropriates various externals to itself. In this way the image of the concentric circles comes into mind. Placing The individual at the center with the various external appropriations forming other circles that lead out from the individual at the center. In the modern context G. Striker offers a general account of *oikeiosis* in chapter thirteen of *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics*²⁰, this general account gives a very good if not thoroughly inventive overview of the theory. She also has written a very good paper on specifically the influence of Greek philosophy on Cicero entitled ‘Cicero and Greek Philosophy’ in the *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*.²¹ *Oikeiosis* is an extremely difficult term to define in English and Pembroke has certainly pointed this fact out in his essay on *oikeiosis* in A.A.Longs’ *Problems in Stoicism*.²² C.O. Brink also points out the relative similarity in the Peripatetic term of *oikeiotes* and the Stoic term *oikeiosis* under Theophrastus and Zeno.²³ Brink is attempting to show that there was not so much difference between the two terms and how the Stoic term rose out of and evolved from the Peripatetic one. Mary Whitlock Blundell however, goes another route and gives an insightful explanation of the term by splitting it into two parts, namely the personal(towards ourselves) and the social(towards others) in her essay ‘Parental Nature and Stoic *oikeiosis*’, in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Volume X*,²⁴ an idea given further thought and explanation by Gretchen Reydam-Schils in a chapter from her investigation into the Roman Stoics, under the title *Roman Stoics: Self, Responsibility and Affection*.²⁵ The chapter entitled ‘From Self-

²⁰ G. Striker, *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,1996)

²¹ G.Striker, ‘Cicero and Greek Philosophy’ in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 97. Greece in Rome: Influence, integration and Resistance* (The Dept. of Classics Harvard, Harvard University, 1995)

²² *Problems in Stoicism*, ed. by A .A. Long, (Essex, University of London, 1971).

²³ C.O.Brink, ‘Oikeiosis and Oikeiotes, Theophrastus and Zeno on Nature in moral theory’, in *Phronesis I*, (1956).

²⁴ M. Blundell, ‘Parental Nature and Stoic *oikeiosis*’, in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Volume X* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990).

²⁵ G. Reydam-Schils, *Roman Stoics: Self, Responsibility and Affection*, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005).

sufficiency to human bonding' moves away from distinguishing between the philosophical schools understanding on the terms, ala. C.O.Brink and instead concentrates in how it was understood in a specifically Roman context. It is a different account in the sense that it deals with the Roman reception of *oikeiosis*. Roman social and cultural patterns of behaviour were different from that of the Greeks and any philosophical concepts that were to be offered to the Romans had to be romanticised. Reydams-Schils gives a very good and thorough investigation into this evolution.

The Danish scholar Troels Engberg-Pedersen presents a work on the development of Stoic moral philosophy in his book.: *The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis: Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy*.²⁶ He proceeds in the book to present four different perspectives on the development of *oikeiosis* and its important place within the nexus of Stoic ethical philosophy. While he is not willing to fully accept the views of both G. Striker and A.A.Long in concern to *oikeiosis* and at times can be muddled in his arguments. Pedersen provides a very thorough account of the development of *oikeiosis* and its importance in Stoic ethical philosophy. Malcolm Schofield writes about *oikeiosis* in his essay concerning 'Two Stoic approaches to Justice' in *Justice and Generosity, Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy*.²⁷ Schofield aligns his understanding of *oikeiosis* with that of the Stoic understanding of Justice. Laws binded the universe together and as humans had within them the vestige of divinity, that humans and divinity shared reason, so too did humanity share a common bond with one another. This bond, formed and maintained in reason, was manifest in order that flourished in and under laws. Thus turning the mindset from one that looked inwards, found within the individual *polis*, of ancient Greece and

²⁶ T. E. Pedersen: *The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis: Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy. Studies in Hellenistic Civilisation, 2.* (Aarhus, Aarhus University Press, 1990).

²⁷ M. Schofield, 'Two Stoic approaches to Justice' in *Justice and Generosity, Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy in Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum*, ed. by A.Laks and M.Schofield (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995).

instead looked outward to a common fellowship of man, the world city or *cosmopolis*. Schofield argues quiet coherently and effectively that the very foundation of this fellowship is the notion of Oikeiosis. I have followed the arguments of Schofield in my own research and along with input from both Reydams-Schils and Pembroke have attempted to show that Oikeiosis was at the heart of Stoic concepts of friendship. Because it allowed for friendship to occur naturally. In accordance with Schofield's argument fellowship was a natural product of oikeiosis and therefore plays a central part in its development and also the development of Stoic ethical philosophy.

In my own approach in this thesis I shall follow Japp Mansfeld's remark found in his introductory essay on the use of sources, in the *Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*.²⁸ I shall thus focus on the original sources, in this case, Cicero's philosophical dialogues and whenever possible and relevant, Cicero's sources. Modern scholarly literature will be used where necessary, in order to ameliorate our understanding of Cicero's arguments and explore in further detail different philosophical implications found in them. One of the reasons for following Mansfeld is that he gives an excellent historical example of the later writers and interpreters of Platonic philosophy, who took the criticisms of the other schools of thought and incorporated them into the new and 'updated' commentaries and translations of the Platonic texts. By doing so, they hoped that all criticism of the school would be muted and the 'original' philosophy of Plato would be presented as a flawless system. Unaware of all this, the philosophy student would be given an inaccurate version of the original philosophical system, now protected from all criticism due to the critical incorporation of the other school of thought by way of different branches of the Platonic tree, which left little space to study the original works by any of the other schools of thought.²⁹ In the light of this

²⁸ J. Mansfeld, 'Sources' in *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* ed. by K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, & M. Schofield (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 3-31.

²⁹ *Ibid*, p.4.

historical example I have decided to remain as close as possible to the sources, and as Mansfeld says:

From a historical point of view the information provided by the original work of a philosopher is to be preferred to a later rendering, rehash, or reinterpretation, however competent or philosophically interesting, much work has been done to ferret out the lost original sources of the derivative sources for Hellenistic philosophy which we still have.³⁰

If there are certain parts in this thesis that are repetitive, then this is in following the method of Cicero, who himself has been accused and who was aware of it, and also according to Powell, a certain degree of repetition in argument is acceptable since:

In dealing with what is often rather difficult and (to the original audience) unfamiliar subject matter, it was necessary to ensure clarity of presentation, and every teacher knows that for that purpose it is sometimes necessary to say things a number of ways in varied phrasing.³¹

I hope that this thesis will show and thus, demonstrate that friendship is a natural and integral part of man's happiness. It is born of the good, nurtured in goodness and can only, when properly practiced be the key element in the achievement of happiness.

Literature Review

When engaging with the question above, it became clear to me that while there was a vast amount of general literature available on the subject of friendship in Greek and Roman thought. There was hardly any literature available on the specific subject of friendship as written of and explicated by Marcus Tullius Cicero and also the subject of self-sufficiency

³⁰ *Ibid*, pp.13.

³¹ J.Powell, 'Introduction' in *Cicero the Philosopher*, p. 10.

and happiness in relation to how the Stoics viewed it. The subject of *oikeiosis* also has been written about, but yet never really in a specific way since Cicero himself made it the focal point of his argument in both his philosophical works dealing with *On Duties* and also *On Friendship*.

David Konstan in *Friendship in the Classical World*³² attempts to give the reader an insight into how friendship was perceived in the Classical World. This was the first book of its kind to give a fully comprehensive study of the subject in the Ancient World. It follows the format of a general survey of the subject and paces itself through the case studies in chronological order, namely friendship in the Archaic, Greek, Hellenistic, Roman and finally the Christian world. General themes are discussed and the themes are put into case studies, namely, *phila*, Roman friendship, Cicero and Friendship, Friendship amongst women, Christian *agape*. While Konstan attempts to give a new and up-to-date study of the subject. For example, offering a new insight into the term *philia* so that it is not an all encompassing term with a wide reach as once thought and also suggesting that friendship in the ancient world was based not on obligatory social responsibility but rather on the premise that it was a very personal relationship that was based on generosity and affection. He labours his points however, and in a sense comes across as a scientist, who, having developed his theories sets out to prove them in the real world. Happy to make his theories fit where he wishes. He begins with an anthropological account and understanding of friendship to start his narrative and put his case studies in some perspective, then later in the book he appears to dismiss this anthropological definition and indeed asks the reader if much of the anthropological definitions are in fact relevant to a discussion aimed at friendship in the classical world. The end result is a book that while interesting in a general sense, should only be left for that understanding.

³²D. Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

In offering a study of the influence of Greek philosophy on the Romans, Miriam .T. Griffin and Jonathan Barnes present, *Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society*.³³ This is a scholarly collection of papers and features amongst them a paper by David Sedley on the *Philosophical Allegiance in the Greco-Roman World*. In this paper Sedley argues, convincingly, that what gives philosophical schools in the Hellenistic period an identity is less to do with searching for the truth and more to do with the almost religious zeal attached to following the schools founder as the ultimate and final authority in all matters. He says this phenomenon was found all over the schools of the Hellenistic period. The Epicureans provide the prime example for Sedley in this article. However, Ivor Ludlum in his article on the myth of the Stoic school, ‘Two Long Running Stoic Myths: A Centralized Orthodox Stoic School and Stoic Scholarchs’³⁴ refutes this claim. He argues that there was in fact no Stoic school per se and that the Stoics didn’t see their foundering fathers as having the ultimate authority in all matters. Cicero, himself, mentions at the beginning of *De Natura Deorum* that he is no follower of Pythagoras, in that he would not be one to go blindly along with the teachings of the founder as being sacrosanct. Another book dealing with the subject of philosophy in Rome is Mark Morford’s *The Roman Philosophers: from the Time of Cato the Censor to The Death of Marcus Aurelius*.³⁵ Morford attempts to bring the subject of philosophy in Rome up to date. He draws very much from the influence of the *Philosophia Togata* by Griffin and Barnes and gives his first chapter this title. Aiming perhaps to show that philosophy in Rome is still considered by many to be a Greek creation draped in the dress of the Roman elite. While Griffin and Barnes book took a philosophical approach in both content and context, Morford being a Classist and best known as a writer/commentator

³³ *Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society* ed. by M. T. Griffin and J. Barnes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

³⁴ Ivor Ludlum, ‘Two Long Running Stoic Myths: A Centralized Orthodox Stoic School and Stoic Scholarchs’, in *Elenchos*, (Anno XXIV-2003), No.1.

³⁵ Mark Morford, *The Roman Philosophers: from the time of Cato the Censor to the death of Marcus Aurelius*. (London and New York: Routledge, 2002).

on Roman literature attempts to look at the history of ideas in the historical context, rather than the particular Roman context into which philosophy was contemplated, constructed and written in.

Dealing specifically with Cicero and philosophy, one of the most comprehensive and important books to come out in the last thirteen years has been Jonathan Powell. (ed.) *Cicero the Philosopher*.³⁶ This book, much like *Philosophia Togata*, takes twelve papers from renowned Cicero scholars, among them, J. Glucker, R. M. Wright, A. E. Douglas and R.W Sharples and A. A. Long. Powell has assembled what is quintessentially a group of scholarly papers dealing solely with Cicero as a philosopher and nothing else. The papers collected in this book deal with all aspects of the Ciceronian philosophical corpus. R. M. Wright deals with the issue of self love and love of humanity in Book Three of *De Finibus*, while J. Glucker deals with the problem of *Veri Simile, Probabile* and related themes in Cicero. Powell's excellent introduction gives a very good synopsis of the level of interest in the philosophical works of Cicero. Glucker continues his investigation into the Ciceronian philosophical connection in his book *Antiochus and the Late Academy*³⁷ which is important for any serious understanding for the philosophical background of Cicero. Glucker gives a lengthy and in depth discussion over to the *Sosus affair*, concerning Philo of Larissa and the argument that eventually turned Antiochus away from the New Academy and towards the Stoics and Peripatetics. This would have a profound effect on the young Cicero in his philosophical writings in his later years. J. Glucker continues his investigation into the philosophical legacy of Cicero by attempting to give an account of Cicero's apparent

³⁶ *Cicero the Philosopher*, ed. by J. Powell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

³⁷ J. Glucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy (Hypomnemata LVI)*. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1978).

eclecticism in John Dillon and Anthony. A. Long, (eds.) *The Question of "Eclecticism": Studies in Later Greek Philosophy*.³⁸

Michael Pakaluk's *Otherselves, Philosophers on Friendship*³⁹, gives anyone interested in the subject of friendship in philosophy a good collection of sources throughout history. It is arranged in chronological order, beginning with Plato *Lysis* and ends with Elizabeth Tefler on *Friendship*. This general introduction, due to its content is a good and worthy book for anyone interested in the issue of friendship in philosophy. Though it gives a very brief introductory background at the beginning of all the text's included, it is mainly a good source book for the primary sources rather than any secondary commentary. Mark Vernon in *The Philosophy of Friendship*⁴⁰ and also in *The Meaning of Friendship*⁴¹, offer the interested reader some interesting thoughts on the subject of friendship. Vernon's book, organised into various theme of friendship covering Plato/Aristotle (Friends and Work/Friends and Lovers) to Nietzsche (Faking it) offer some thoughtful and engaging contemplations on the subject of friendship, also in *The Meaning of Friendship* the revised and updated version of the *Philosophy of Friendship*, Vernon offers some new insights into the issues surrounding the influence of social networking sites on traditional notions of friendship.

*The Dream of Reason: A history of Philosophy from the Greeks to the Renaissance*⁴² edited by Anthony Gottlieb offers to the reader in and among this general history of philosophy a section on Cicero's influence on philosophy and later thinkers and this is a point

³⁸ *The Question of "Eclecticism": Studies in Later Greek Philosophy*. ed. by J. Dillon, and A. A. Long. (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1988).

³⁹ *Otherselves, Philosophers on Friendship*, M. Pakaluk, ed. (Hackett Publishing Company, 1991).

⁴⁰ M. Vernon *The Philosophy of Friendship* (Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

⁴¹ M. Vernon, *The Meaning of Friendship* (Oxford: Palgrave Macmillian, 2010).

⁴² *The Dream of Reason: A history of Philosophy from the Greeks to the Renaissance*. ed. by A. Gottlieb (London: Allen Lane/The Penguin Press, 2000).

maintained and given further reflection by Raymond Phal in *On Friendship*.⁴³ Phal is a sociologist and offers a sociological insight rather than a philosophical insight into the subject. Eoin Cassidy in ‘The Significance of Friendship: Reconciling the Classical Ideals of Friendship and Self-Sufficiency’ in *Amor amicitiae: On the Love that is Friendship: Essays in Medieval Thought and Beyond in Honour of the Rev. Professor James McEvoy*⁴⁴ gives another general account of friendship in the ancient world. In a tribute that is fitting to the life and philosophical legacy of Dr James McEvoy. By far the best translation of Cicero, *Laelius de Amicitia*, is provided by J. Powell in, *Cicero: Laelius de Amicitia & Somnium Scipionis*.⁴⁵ This updated translation offers a fine introduction, along with the text itself in Latin and English, but also an excellent commentary afterwards. The only other translation of note is the Loeb version: *De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione*.⁴⁶ This version in following the same style as the rest of the Loeb Classics offers the complete texts in the original Latin and also translated into English with footnote commentaries. Another one of Cicero’s works is presented by Aris and Philips, *Cicero: Tusculan Disputations II & V with a summary of III & IV*.⁴⁷ Again following the same method and style as before as in the *De Amicitia*, this book is an excellent and essential copy for anyone interested in Cicero and his ethical writings. Douglas’ introduction and complementary notes/commentary are indeed excellent and extremely helpful. In a collection in honour of Miriam Griffin titled *The Philosophy and*

⁴³ R. Phal, *On Friendship*, (Cambridge: Polity, 2000).

⁴⁴ E. Cassidy, ‘The Significance of Friendship: Reconciling the Classical Ideals of Friendship and Self-Sufficiency’ in *Amor amicitiae: On the Love that is Friendship: Essays in Medieval Thought and Beyond in Honour of the Rev. Professor James McEvoy*, T.A.F. Kelly and P.W. Rosemann eds. (Ma: Peeters Leuven-Paris-Dudley, 2004).

⁴⁵ *Cicero, Laelius de Amicitia & Somnium Scipionis*, trans. and ed. by J. Powell, (Warminster: Aris and Philips Ltd., 1991).

⁴⁶ Cicero, *De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione*. trans. and ed. by W.A. Falconer, (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1946).

⁴⁷ Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputations II & V with a summary of III & IV*, trans. and ed. by A.E Douglas, (Warminster: Aris&Philips Ltd., 1990).

*Power in the Graeco-Roman World: Essays in Honour of Miriam Griffin.*⁴⁸ Another fine collection of works from internationally renowned scholars is brought together.

Their essays range from Socrates to late antiquity, with a particular focus on Cicero. Subjects covered include the Stoics and Cynics, Roman law, the formulation of imperial power, Jews and Christians, "performance philosophy," Augustine, late Platonism, and women philosophers. Primarily it asks what was if any the connection between the utilization of power in the Greco Roman world and philosophical activity. John Harris, contributes a paper on Cicero entitled, '*Cicero and the defining of the Ius Civile*', hoping to see if there was an evolution between philosophical speculation and also civil law. Harris affirms that for her Cicero's early experiences in tribunical law in his early life, led directly to their influencing him in his theoretical outlining of the constitutional law in *De Legibus*. In *Greek and Roman Philosophy 100BC to 200AD* vol 2, edited by Raymond Sharples and Richard Sorabji.⁴⁹ Another collection of papers is brought together. This volume follows on the first volume which dealt with the commentators of both Plato and Aristotle 100 B.C-600 A.D. This volume contains thirty five articles and deal with all aspects of philosophical interest and thought in the period 100BC to 200AD with focus on the growing influence of Rome in Greece. Contributing scholars that include John Sellers, and Jonathan Powell and while Seller's writes about Stoic practical philosophy as a way of life. Powell's article pertains to Cicero's philosophical development and the influence of the late Academy on him. Anthony A. Long's book '*From Epicurus to Epictetus, Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy*'⁵⁰ also contains eighteen essays that cover an assortment of topics across the philosophical spectrum, ethics, physics, cosmology, epistemology with a focus on the various individuals

⁴⁸ *Philosophy and Power in the Graeco-Roman World: Essays in Honour of Miriam Griffin.* ed. by M. T. Griffin, G. Clarke & T. Rakjak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

⁴⁹ *Greek and Roman Philosophy 100BC to 200AD*, Vol 2. R.W. Sharples, and R. Sorabji, eds. (London: University of London, 2008).

⁵⁰ A. A. Long, '*From Epicurus to Epictetus, Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

who have contributed to the discussion in the ancient world. In taking their distinctive contributions and methodologies into account, an original approach, Professor Long discusses Cicero's attitude towards Plato and Aristotle and also his idea of Politics in *De Officiis*.

On *Oikeiosis*, while there has been surprisingly little written on the subject of *oikeiosis*, the literature that has been most useful and has presented itself to me have been. Gisela Striker in chapter thirteen of *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics*⁵¹, writes about the role of *oikeiosis* in Stoic Ethics. She also provides an interesting paper on the influence of Greek Philosophy on Cicero entitled 'Cicero and Greek Philosophy' in *the Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*.⁵² Charles Oscar Brink in 'Oikeiosis and Oikeiotes, Theophrastus and Zeno on Nature in moral theory'⁵³, offers a very good investigation into the interpretation of both *Oikeiosis* and *Oikeiotes* by the Peripatetics and the Stoics under Theophrastus and Zeno. While Striker's book is a general account of the role played by *oikeiosis* in Stoic ethical philosophy Brink's paper is far more specific in its context and content. Mary Whitlock Blundell gives an account of *oikeiosis* dealing with the two strands of it, namely the personal(towards ourselves) and the social(towards others) aspects in her essay 'Parental Nature and Stoic *oikeiosis*', in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Volume X*,⁵⁴ and Gretchen Reydam-Schils also contributes to the subject with a paper on 'Human Bonding and *oikeiosis*' in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy volume XXII*⁵⁵ this particular paper is in part an early version of a chapter that appeared in her book, *Roman Stoics: Self,*

⁵¹ G. Striker, *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

⁵² G.Striker, 'Cicero and Greek Philosophy' in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 97. Greece in Rome: Influence, integration and Resistance* (Harvard: The Dept. of Classics, Harvard University, 1995).

⁵³ C.O.Brink, 'Oikeiosis and Oikeiotes, Theophrastus and Zeno on Nature in moral theory', in *Phronesis I*, (1956).

⁵⁴ M. Blundell, 'Parental Nature and Stoic *oikeiosis*', in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Volume X* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

⁵⁵ G. Reydam-Schils, 'Human Bonding and *oikeiosis*' in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy volume XXII*, ed. D.Sedley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Responsibility and Affection.⁵⁶ That chapter later renamed ‘From Self-sufficiency to human bonding’ provided an in-depth and lengthy study of the Stoic theory of *oikeiosis* in relation to Stoic concepts of friends and the general world around them. Malcolm Schofield also writes about *oikeiosis* in chapter seven of *Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum*⁵⁷ in ‘Two Stoic approaches to Justice’ in *Justice and Generosity, Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy*. Schofield also contributes a chapter that explores the concept of *oikeiosis* in *Stoics Ethics, the Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*.⁵⁸ In this general account he offers a discussion of *oikeiosis* within the context of a explanation of Stoic Ethics. S.G.Pembroke writes about *oikeiosis* in *Problems in Stoicism*.⁵⁹ Giving a very good account on the difficulties of fully explaining what it means. Translations do not quiet give a clear picture on this most difficult of terms and at best can only render a general and broad definition. Lastly, Troels Engberg-Pedersen presents : *The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis: Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy*.⁶⁰ Pedersen provides a very thorough account of the development of *oikeiosis* and its importance in Stoic ethical philosophy. Pedersen’s book takes to highlight *oikeiosis* under four different perspectives and at times takes umbrage with both Gisela Striker and also Anthony Long in their accounts and understanding of *oikeiosis*. While he (Pedersen) can be obscure and muddled in his arguments his book does provide a very interesting piece of research into what is arguably one of the most interesting and undeveloped areas of research concerning Stoic philosophy.

⁵⁶ G. Reydam-Schils, *Roman Stoics: Self, Responsibility and Affection* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

⁵⁷ M. Schofield, ‘Two Stoic approaches to Justice’ in *Justice and Generosity, Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy in Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum*, ed. by A.Laks and M.Schofield. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 1995).

⁵⁸ *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, ed. by B. Inwood, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)

⁵⁹ *Problems in Stoicism*, ed. by A .A. Long (Essex: The Athlone Press, 1971).

⁶⁰ T. E. Pedersen: *The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis: Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy. Studies in Hellenistic Civilisation*, 2. (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1990).

CHAPTER ONE

THE SELF-SUFFICIENT SAGE: BETWEEN THE ACADEMIC SCEPTICS AND THE STOICS

The focus of this chapter shall be primarily the Stoic concept of ‘self-sufficiency’, within the context of Cicero’s moral writings. In particular, how the Stoics placed less emphasis on self-sufficiency, and imitation of the sage as a fundamental element for happiness in later years and instead elevated the importance of the role of society in the achievement happiness. Happiness was closely related to the idea of goodness and both the Stoics and the Peripatetics had their own ideas of how this might be achieved. Where both had a role and position for virtue in this achievement of happiness, both did differ on where exactly that position was.

Cicero raises this question specifically in Book Five of the *Tusculan Disputations*, where he discusses the particular question of whether virtue itself is self-sufficient for happiness.⁶¹ Self-sufficiency was a concept that was closely tied to the Stoic concept of the sage and in book three of *On Duties* Cicero raises this essential point concerning the Stoic sage when he states that for them, absolute good is perfect and is only attainable by the wise man.⁶² To the Stoics moral goodness is the exclusive property of the sage and it can never be separated from virtue, as virtue is the only good, and those who are not considered wise cannot be said to have perfect moral goodness, only an appearance of it. The life of the Stoic sage would thus, upon initial observation, imply a solitary life, separated from other men; but

⁶¹ ἀντάρκη εἶναί πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν according to Zeno and Chrysippus. 8.127. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers*, ed and trans. by R.D. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library, 2 Vols. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1972).

⁶² Cicero, *De Officiis*, 3.3.15.

a life deemed the best, for the Stoics, as it was lived in accordance with Nature.⁶³ Yet, in another part of the same book, Cicero turns the argument and demonstrates his knowledge of the ethical maxim of the Peripatetics, namely, that nature loves nothing solitary, and it strives for some support; and man's best support is his dear friend: 'Human nature abhors solitude, and as always, as it were, leans towards some prop, and the closer the friend, the more pleasant this is'.⁶⁴ From the quote above it would appear that there was a contension in thought between the Peripatetics and the Stoics in regards to the natural tendency towards friendship, on the one hand, and the philosophical notion of the good as being a fully self-sufficient ideal on the other. But while the 'good' was a fundamental ingredient of the good life however, both these schools of thought did differ in what exactly constituted living a good life. The good life according to the Stoics is a life lived in agreement with nature.⁶⁵ The natural end was the achievement of a life in accordance with reason and thus, for the Stoics, in accordance with nature, this was most worthy of choice, itself complete and ultimately self-sufficient. For the Peripatetics, however, it was a life that was not self-sufficient but fully accepted the role that external goods played in the achievement of *eudaimonia*, translated often as 'happiness'; however, a better understanding might render it as 'living well', in an ethically fulfilled and reasoned life.⁶⁶ The natural end or *telos* was the designated goal, understood as, that for the sake of which everything else was done and what was itself done for the sake of nothing else. Happiness then was either an amalgamation of external goods and the utilization of them in order to achieve *eudaimonia* or the life lived in agreement with reason and thus, for the Stoics, in agreement with nature, and was most worthy of choice.

⁶³ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers*, 7.87.

⁶⁴ Cicero, *De Amicitia*, 88: 'Sic natura solitarium nihil amat, semperque ad aliquod tampus adminiculum adnititur, quod in amicissimo quoque dulcissimum est.'

⁶⁵ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers*, 7.87.

⁶⁶ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1097a15-1098b8. trans. by W.D.Ross revised by J.O. Urmson, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Vol. 2. Ed. by J.Barnes (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984).

However, Cicero appears to be asking not so much if happiness as a way of life is based solely on virtue, but rather is there a difference between the Peripatetics and the Stoics idea of living well, and if so, then which life is the most applicable and beneficial to humanity. According to most philosophers, most humans are innately imperfect beings. It would take many years of fine education and wise guidance to sculpt, as it were, this imperfect reality into perfection. One might attempt to explain this further, by taking as examples both Aristotle's understanding that through the practical use of virtues eventually good habits would form, which would in time become second nature, and likewise the Stoic process of movement from the initial idea of self-preservation, towards assent to rational consent.⁶⁷ These examples are given, merely to point out that both the Stoics and the Peripatetics understood that the way to happiness took different paths. The idea was this: amongst humanity there were the few and there were the many. The few were called the wise, sages and magnanimous. The many called, the herd, the mass/majority, the ignorant and the mad. The highest life extolled by Aristotle was that life of contemplation, the philosophical life aimed at the impersonation of that life thought godly.⁶⁸ For the Stoics, the sage was very much in this mould, for he was a human elevated amongst the many and set as an example for them. The Stoic sage was the *epitome* of the unity of divinity and humanity. Cicero describes him as:

He is the wise man of whom we are in quest, he is the happy man who can think no human occurrence insupportable to the point of dispiriting him, or unduly delightful to the point of rousing him to ecstasy. For what can seem of moment

⁶⁷ The Stoic theory of *oikeiosis* places the main focus of concern on all life towards its own self preservation and that with maturity. This focus of concern will be overtaken by the awaking of the rational mind towards its natural function, to follow a life lived in accordance with the laws of nature.

⁶⁸ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177a11-1178a8. Happiness being manifested in the action which achieves it, this action that Aristotle speaks of is *theoria*. This activity, when engaged, will elevate man's life to approximately that of a deity. As man is only a man and not a god he must also engage with a life amongst others of the human race, even if this life, while affording him both space and time to live a life filled with moral action, by and large the happiness from such a life will only be a kin to a second-grade form of happiness.

in human occurrences to a man who keeps all eternity before his eyes and knows the vastness of the universe?⁶⁹

And so it was understood that while many might have foolishly wished to aspire to such heights as those inhabited by either Aristotle's magnanimous or good man⁷⁰ or the Stoic sage, few would ever truly realise this as their end. The majority instead were doomed to lead lives foolishly content with a sort of secondary understanding.⁷¹

Cicero, however, favourably disposed as he was toward Stoic ethics, is highly critical of the Stoic notion of an austere and aloof sage; whose happiness is dependent on nothing external, and is manifested in his reason and thus, his virtue alone. However in giving reference to Aristotle when writing on the naturalness of social inter-relationships Cicero argues that nature loves nothing solitary, thus, happiness is not found in solitude and this, would put the early Stoics at odds with the Peripatetics. Cicero states this position clearly in *On Friendship* writing that 'Friendship was given by nature as a helper in virtue, not an accomplice in crime, so that, because virtue cannot reach the greatest heights in solitude, it should reach them when joined and allied to another'.⁷² For if nature loves nothing solitary, then how can self-sufficiency be called natural. If one admits to the inclusion of external goods for the benefit of happiness, then surely it is not self-sufficient, however in following this line of reasoning, Cicero warns that if virtue is merely only one of many parts of the happy life, needing other parts to make it fully whole, then it must also contest it's position with external influences, and thus be subject to the whims of fortune. As Cicero writes:

⁶⁹Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 4.37: *Is est sapiens, quem quaerimus, is est beatus, cui nihil humanarum rerum aut intolerabile ad demittendum animum aut nimis laetabile ad efferendum videri potest. Quid enim videatur ei magnum in rebus humanis, cui aeternitas omnis totiusque mundi nota sit magnitudo?*

⁷⁰Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1123b-1124a.

⁷¹Cicero, *De Officiis*, 2.13-15.

⁷²Cicero, *De Amicitia*, 83: '*Virtutum amicitia adiutrix a natura data est, non vitiorum comes; ut quoniam solitaria non posset virtus ad ea quae summa sunt pervenire, coniuncta et consociata cum alterperveniret.*'

But if on the other hand virtue lies at the mercy of the manifold and uncertain accidents and is the handmade of fortune, and has insufficient strength to maintain herself alone, I fear that it seems to follow that in hoping to secure a happy life we must not place our confidence in virtue as much as to offer up prayers to heaven.⁷³

Is self-sufficiency an alien concept and totally impractical when placed into the context of the natural constitution of humanity? Where did the ideal of self-sufficiency come from? In the world of and after Alexander the Great there was a great shift in the philosophical gaze from the focus on the individual within the *polis*, to the focus on the individual within the *cosmos*.⁷⁴ The political structure of the world in general was ever changing, the empires in the West were rising, as that of Alexander was diminishing. Thus, this change in focus necessitated a reappraisal of ethical speculation. The pathways to the natural end took new directions. Whereas for Aristotle the natural end was found in the cultivation of the virtues through active citizenship in the *polis*, to the Epicureans it was the achievement of pleasure and maintenance of tranquillity, and for the Stoics it was a life in accordance with nature, itself being equated with a happiness that was self-sufficient, tranquil and free from emotional disturbance. All of these philosophical schools saw happiness in tranquillity of the mind that would be nurtured to maintain a consistent level of tranquillity undisturbed by the changeable winds of fortune. In other words, rejecting totally or regulating the influence of external factors (the changeable and often precarious state of daily life for many humans) and nurturing inner fortitude (the strength of determined *will* that shall prevail through all struggles).⁷⁵

⁷³ Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 5. 2-3: *Sin autem virtus subjecta sub varios incertosque casus famula fortunae est nec tantarum virium est, ut se ipse tueatur, vereor ne non tam virtutis fiducia nitendum nobis ad spem beate vivendi quam vota facienda videantur.*

⁷⁴ T. R. Martin, *Ancient Greece from Prehistoric to Hellenistic times*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), in particular the chapter on the Hellenistic Age, pp. 198-223.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 213-215.

Stoicism itself flourished in the world after Alexander the Great, and education in the Hellenistic period turned Stoic philosophy into a standard component. But just why would this be so and what made it so attractive? Stoicism espoused the philosophical idea of the union of human reason with that of the divine (in the Stoic sense, not the Judeo-Christian sense) and promoted a life of rational consistency. For the Epicureans, however, the end of all actions was to be free from both fear and pain. The pleasurable life was one that promoted happiness and distanced itself from aversion. By always seeking to maintain a pleasurable existence, humans would live a happy life. This did call for the subject to often remove himself from the everyday business of city life, as the life in the city for those in it was often filled with opportunities for sadness, pain and fear. Living a life free from pain and amongst friends was the best kind of life to live for the Epicureans.⁷⁶ The important point for us to see here is that if the world around was always changing, and nothing was certain, then in order to never be susceptible to the misery that surely comes with instability one must either reject society at large, or turn into himself and fashion himself in the mould of the perfect state, or be a God and so strive for a fully self-sufficient life.⁷⁷

Cicero was vastly effected by the turmoil of politics in the late Republic and with its demise the whole world changed for him. With the Republic now demolished, a new political state, one of dictators, and soon, emperors, was being constructed in its place. Men like Cicero needed to seek a stability, and thus, happiness within, when all around there was instability. For if happiness could be taken away at a whim by the vicissitudes of fortune, then man needed to look into himself and in particular to that power which could never be taken away and which was his alone, in order to find stability. In this stability, both tranquillity and later happiness would inevitably flourish. This understanding was not new

⁷⁶ Cicero, *De Finibus*, 1.66-70.

⁷⁷ W.Desmond, *The Greek Praise Of Poverty: Origins Of Ancient Cynicism*, (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), pp.38-41; also see W. Desmond, *Cynics(Ancient Philosophies)*, (Stocksfield: University of California Press, 2008), pp. 172-177.

and could trace its origins back to the Greek philosophical tradition.⁷⁸ Although, Cicero admired the Stoics and the notion of the sage⁷⁹, he did see that this ideal was difficult to reconcile with the practicalities of human nature. Both Panaetius and his student Posidonius, two philosophers from the ‘middle period’ of Stoicism, would help to manifest this reconciliation.⁸⁰ These modified the harsh rigidity of the early Stoa and in the process made it appealing to the majority of educated Romans.

It was primarily Panaetius that modified the forbidding doctrine of the early Stoics and replaced it with a version that was agreeable to both Cicero and the Romans in general. He introduced the acceptable idea of the imperfect progression towards perfection. According to Sandbach, Panaetius was not concerned with the ideal sage, but with the actuality of human life in all its variety. In rethinking and refashioning his philosophy he also took into regard the views of both Plato and Aristotle.⁸¹ Panaetius also wrote about the problems that arise from the exercise of practical duty with that of the obligations of virtue.⁸² Cicero develops this point in *On Duties*, based primarily on a work concerning the same subject by Panaetius, highlighting the tension between what is moral and what is expedient.⁸³ Panaetius’ ‘humane’ form of Stoicism was favoured by Cicero, as his own teacher Posidonius of

⁷⁸ Aristotle wrote of the self-sufficient man in Book Four of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, The Cynics openly aspired to be fully self-sufficient, and the Stoics influenced by and following in the footsteps of the Cynics argued that the sage was ideally, a totally self-sufficient entity. Self-Sufficiency it was thought, was the way in which man could maintain tranquility and stability, much like a perfect city state.

⁷⁹ The sage being the ideal man is free from passion and autonomous. He is independent from chance, and was the physical manifestation of harmonious reason. See, Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.75-76.

⁸⁰ Sandbach writes that Panaetius and Posidonius of Rhodes both had an enormous philosophical influence on Cicero. Panaetius being a friend of Scipio Africanus and the teacher of Posidonius, whom Cicero knew personally. See, F.H. Sandbach, *The Stoics* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1975), pp.17-18. According to Sandbach, Cicero is indispensable not only because of his warm writing style but also because he provides the earliest evidence about the Stoics. Citing two major Philosophical works of Cicero as evidence for this. Sandbach writes that *De Officiis* was based largely on a work by Panaetius, and *De Natura Deorum* was based on Posidonius. This is also given credence by Cicero himself in the Book One of *De Officiis*, and also in Book One of *De Natura Deorum*.

⁸¹ Sandbach, *The Stoics*, p. 16.

⁸² The work of Panaetius called *Περὶ Καθήκοντος* was the main source for Cicero in the first two books of *De Officiis*. Cicero is continuing the argument set up by Panaetius. In his letter to Atticus he explains this further. See Cicero, *Ep. ad Atticum*, 16.11, explaining the issues concerning the practical dispensation and application of the virtues with the obligations of social and political duty.

⁸³ Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1. 9-10 & 1. 3-7.

Rhodes was also the pupil of Panaetius. Posidonius continued much in the same way as Panaetius, by modifying the doctrines of the early Stoa. Posidonius maintained that the passions must be controlled by reason, for the passions were a part of human nature, and therefore, natural and not merely ‘mental disturbances’ as the earlier Stoics had speculated.⁸⁴ Panaetius and Posidonius attempted to move the focus of Stoicism away from the more austere ideas of the early Stoa by adopting, in turn, a more realistic and pragmatic approach. Panaetius argued that reason was the mark of a man and, according to Sandbach, he believed that man was the only animal with a sense of order and propriety, which made him fully appreciate beauty and order in the world. Posidonius recognised that the passions had their cause in the irrational part of the psyche and as such could not be merely reasoned away, as though of by the earlier Stoics. Instead, he proposed another way to deal with them.

Human rational was different from the one shared by the animals and as such was, for him, related to the Universal rational. Unhappiness for mankind then, came from not following the rational life, or the god inside him, but instead following the dictates of the irrational elements within. Therefore and with that in mind, Sandbach writes, Posidonius saw that the original maxim of Zeno on the natural end for man necessarily had to be altered. He said that mankind must co-operate with nature and the natural order and not just follow it. He placed high regard in the aspect of rational choice and also that this would allow for the regulation of the irrational, for it was human to be irrational, and not the total disregard or extermination of it.⁸⁵ The reformulated *telos* that Posidonius proposed now stated that the natural end was not just to live in agreement with nature, but rather to live ‘in contemplation of the truth and order of the universe, cooperating so far as possible in bringing it about, and in no way being led by the irrational of the *psyche*’.⁸⁶ By living life in this way one might

⁸⁴ See, Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.35 for an account of the Stoic rendering of emotion as a mental disturbance.

⁸⁵ Sandbach, *The Stoics*, p.136-137.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p.137.

hope to come closer to living the life of the sage. While altering the original maxim of Zeno, Posidonius still stressed the harmonization of one's nature with that of the universe was keeping with the dictum of Zeno. Virtue, was still thought of as being essentially part of reason, and thus part of nature and sufficient for happiness.⁸⁷

In the *Tusculan Disputations* Cicero takes up the argument about virtue being fully self-sufficient for happiness. It is just one of the part of the larger discussion that will take place in his villa at Tusculum. At the beginning of the book he explains that he is going to set out and deal in full with issues that may prove a hindrance to man's achievement of happiness, i.e., fear, death, pains, and emotional disturbances.⁸⁸ Book Five in particular has Cicero discussing the question of virtue being sufficient for the happy life, an enquiry which Cicero describes as: 'The topic which brings the greatest glory to philosophy since it teaches that virtue is sufficient of itself for the attainment of happiness'.⁸⁹ By dedicating the contents of Book Five of the *Tusculan Disputations* to resolving the position of virtue as the giver and the maintainer of happiness, Cicero is highlighting the argument, that moral goodness is in itself the only requisite for a happy life.⁹⁰ For as life's misfortunes may come to pass the man who remains tranquil, circumspect and lets the pursuit of virtue be his guide, will suffer these misfortunes gladly, as the strength of soul given by virtue can overcome any of the hazards of fortune. Book Five opens with an explanation of the circumstances which have led to the past five days of discussions.⁹¹ While mentioning that he was being inflicted with agony Cicero is

⁸⁷ Cicero, *De Academica*, 1.35: *Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat qui ut Theophrastus nervos virtutis inciderit, sed contra qui omnia quae ad beatam vitam pertinerent in una virtute poneret nec quidquam aliud numeraret in bonis, idque appellaret honestum, quod esset simplex quoddam et solum unum bonum.*

⁸⁸ The *Tusculan Disputations* deal primarily with the means essential to and concerning a happy life.

⁸⁹ Cicero, *De Divinatione*, 2.2: *Eum locum complexus est qui totam philosophiam maxime illustrat docet ad beate vivendum virtutem se ipsa contentam*. This is discussed by A.E. Douglas, in his paper 'Form and Content in the Tusculan Disputations', in *Cicero the Philosopher*, p. 212.

⁹⁰ In comparison to Aristotle's account of what is needed for a happy life in Book One of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, namely the inclusion of external goods and factors. See, Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1099b9-1100a9.

⁹¹ Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 5.1: *Quod etsi difficile est probatu propter tam varia et tam multa tormenta fortunae, tale tamen est ut elaborandum sit quo facilius probetur*.

referring to the extremely difficult days in which the discussions at Tusculum were written. Both privately and publically Cicero was in distress and turned to philosophy.⁹² With the death of his beloved daughter Tullia and the dictatorship of Caesar, he is attempting to console himself, attempting to give a philosophical explanation of how all of the unhappiness that *fortuna* throws at a man and a country ought to be overcome. It is no mistake that he chose to write on these topics straight after giving an exposition of various philosophical views of ethics in *On Ends*. *On Ends* was highly theoretical and expressed in both clear and definite terms the broad philosophical principles on which human conduct should rest.⁹³ Cicero though was certainly not the first one to write on this, as the whole subject of moral philosophy was, according to him, developed by Socrates.⁹⁴

Socrates related philosophy to both the human condition and ethics, thus formulating the idea of *humanitas*, a threefold division of human nature, in which, when something is described as human, then nothing humane is alien to it.⁹⁵ For Cicero, much like Socrates, the

⁹² The Tusculan Disputations were written in or around July of the year 45 B.C. Cicero was in extreme distress at the time of its composition, he had been engaged in endless quarreling with his wife Tarentia, his beloved daughter Tullia had died in February of that year due to complications from childbirth and his beloved republic was in its death throes with the ascension of Julius Caesar. Feeling both useless and unable to do anything in either the Senate or the law courts, he retired to his country villa in Tusculum and looked to philosophy for consolation. In this period he wrote at an astounding pace, for almost all of his philosophical works were constructed within this year and the next. See, J.E. King, 'Introduction' to the *Tusculan Disputations*, (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1927), pp. xi-xiii; also, Cicero, *De Academica*, 1.10: '*Nunc vero et fortane gravissimo percussus vulnere et administratione rei publicae liberatus doloris medicinam a philosophia peto et otio oblectationem hanc honestissimi mami iudico.*' The Academics were written in or around May 45 B.C. and here Cicero writes of the effect of the death of Tullia, his ejection from the governing of Italy and also the consolation which he found in Philosophy. Also see Plutarch, The life of Cicero, in *The Parallel Lives*, Vol. 8. trans. and ed. by B.Perrin (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1914), p. 189; MacKendrick, *The Philosophical Books of Cicero*, (London: Duckworth, 1989) pp.106-113 for an account of the ten surviving fragments of the lost *Consolatio* that Cicero wrote after the death of Tullia.

⁹³ M. Grant, *Cicero, On the Good Life. Discussions at Tusculum*, (London: Penguin Classics, 1971), p.50.

⁹⁴ Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 5. 10-11: *Socrates autem primus philosophiam devocavit e caelo ei in urbem collocavit et in domum etiam introduxit et coegit de vita et moribus bonis et malis quaerere.* Cicero in this statement appears to be in agreement with the Greek writer Xenophon writing in the 3rd Century B.C. See Xenophon, 'Memoirs of Socrates' in *Conversations of Socrates* 1.1.6., ed. and trans. by H. Tredennick & R. Waterfield, (London: Penguin Classics, 1990), p.71.

⁹⁵ P. MacKendrick, *The Philosophical works of Cicero*, (London: Duckworth, 1989), p.11. See also A.O. Lovejoy & G. Boas, *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity*, (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1935), appendix, pp. 447-456. Powell has also translated '*Humanitas*' as meaning civilised, and associated it with the person being able to feel empathy towards a friend. The opposite would be *inhumanum*. See, J. Powell, commentary in *De Amicitia*, p.80.

most important philosophical question that one might endeavour to answer, was to be found in the area morality and ethical behaviour. Why so? Because according to Cicero, philosophy was born from a desire to achieve happiness:

For since this [the question as to whether or not virtue is sufficient for a happy life] gave the motive by which those who first devoted themselves entirely in the quest for the best condition of life, assuredly it was in the hope of a happy life that they bestowed such a wealth of care and toil on its pursuit.⁹⁶

It was part of the noble effort to pursue a course that was fully engaged in the achievement of a happy end. By the labours of the earlier philosophers, virtue has become tied to the happy life, in that it is either essential to it, as the Stoics would admit or an essential element in it, as the Peripatetics would argue. However, when stating the Peripatetic position, Cicero also warns that if virtue is merely only one of many parts of the happy life, needing other parts to complete it, then it must also contest its position with external influences and be subjected to the whims of fortune. Although for the Stoics, this was plainly not the case, in reaction to the frailty of leaving happiness subject to fortune, they pointed out that the happy man being is a tranquil man because his tranquillity arises from his virtue. The unhappy man, however, is suffering from mental anguish and his anguish arises not from virtue but from a lack of it, Book Three of the *Tusculan Disputations*, is given over to a discussion of this. In Book Five of the *Tusculan Disputations*, Cicero seemingly aligns himself with the Stoic position by maintaining that virtue is self-sufficient and it must be, for it is honourable, and the honourable is the only good; however in using both Aristus (the brother of Antiochus and a friend of Cicero) and Antiochus to dispute this and argue that happiness admits other goods, Cicero is plainly giving an account of the Peripatetic viewpoint:

⁹⁶ Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 5.2: *Nam cum ea causa impulerit eos, qui primi se ad philosophiae studium contulerunt, ut omnibus rebus posthabitis totos se in optimo vitae statu exquirendo collocarent, profecto spe beate vivendi tantam in eo studio curam operamque posuerunt.*

For he (Antiochus) thinks the happy life lies in virtue even if there should be some good besides virtue...The arguments used and Antiochus has also stated them continually in a number of passages in his works, were that virtue alone is of itself able to render life happy and yet not supremely happy.⁹⁷

The above is plainly the view of the Peripatetics as they would state that even the most virtuous of men can at times of difficulties suffer the whims of fortune. Virtue can make a man happy, but by not admitting external goods he might not be supremely happy. They understood that man being subject as he is to both fortune and nature must be comfortable with unhappiness. Aristotle gave the example of Priam in reference to this issue⁹⁸ and Cicero also gives an example and quotes the Peripatetic Theophrastus, writing about the good man:

Can I therefore, if I have granted him (Theophrastus) that bodily pains are counted evils, that shipwreck of fortune is counted evil, be angry with him when he says that not all good men are happy, since the things which he reckons as evil can come upon all good men?⁹⁹

Thus, in accordance with the argument of Theophrastus, it might be said that even the good man, when affected by such pains, ills and diseases, will be unhappy. However, Cicero rebukes this by repeating the Stoic understanding, that there are no degrees of happiness: 'For I do not understand, for one thing, what the man who is happy wants in order to be happier for if anything is to be missing, he is not so much as happy.'¹⁰⁰ Cicero at this point reiterates the view of Theophrastus, who argued that chance and not sagacity is the ruler of human

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.21-22: *Putat enim, etiam si sit bonum aliquod praeter virtutem[...]Dicebantur haec, quae scriptitavit etiam Antiochus locis pluribus, virtutem ipsam per se beatam vitam efficere posse neque tamen beatissimam.*

⁹⁸ Aristotle, *Nicomachaen Ethics*, 1100a5-9.

⁹⁹ Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 5. 24-25: *Possum igitur, cui concesserim in malis esse dolores corporis, in malis naufragia fortunae, huic suscensere dicenti non omnes bonos esse beatos, cum in omnes bonos es, quae ille in malis numerat, cadere possint?*

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.23: *'Nam et qui beatus est non intelligo quid requirat, ut sit beatior- sit est enim quod desit ne beatus quidem est.'* If the happy life has the highest/perfect good then it must be perfectly happy. Otherwise it cannot be said to be the perfectly happy life.

life.¹⁰¹ This is the consistent view of the Peripatetics that fortune directly affects the daily lives of humans, controlling both bodily and external goods.¹⁰² However this comprehension of happiness which is subject to fortune is therefore precariously subject to external control and factors, and can never provide a firm and stable foundation for happiness. However, while this apparent inconsistency can fool the mind of the inexperienced it cannot do the same to the mind of the accurately trained. And while it might seem to be logically sound, Cicero rebukes those who think so while writing that happiness is not found without but within, and happiness is the possession of goodness.¹⁰³ Therefore, whoever is happy can also be said to be good, as he possesses that which makes him happy. If this were not the case, then one who was completely servile to the whims of fortune would find himself in a very unreliable position indeed. Happiness comes from virtue within the body; based in man's rationality. It is not subject to external forces and it is stable when it is nurtured by reason. When the Stoic sage can be said to be happy, it is because he has nurtured his reason absolutely in accordance with nature. The Peripatetic good man however, seeks happiness through the amalgamation of external factors and is able to label virtue as one amongst many factors needed for happiness. Therefore, the Peripatetics are admitting that fortune and not reason is the guiding light for happiness, proving Theophrastus right.

However, the Stoic sage will, according to both Cicero and the Stoics, despise fortune, and instead seek happiness within his soul. Men must look for philosophy in order to perfect their lives, since philosophy leads to perfection. The notion of the soul trained in

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 5.25: *'Vexatur idem Theophrastus et libris et scholis omnium philosophorum, quod in Callisthene suo laudrit illam sententiam 'vitam regit fortuna, non sapientia.'* Also quoted by Plutarch in *De Fortuna*, in *Moralia Vol. 2* as *'τὸ Χη τὰ θνητῶν πράγματα 'οὐκ εὐβουλία.'* ed and trans. F.C. Babbitt, (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1928).

¹⁰² Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 5.25: *Si enim tot sunt in corpora bona, tot extra corpus in casu atque fortuna, none consentaneum est plus fortunam, quae domina rerum sit et externarum et ad corpus pertinentium, quam consilium valere?*

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 5.28: *Quos dicam bonos perspicuum est; omnibus enim virtutibus instructos et ornatos tum sapientes, tum viros bonos dicimus. Videmus qui dicendi sint beati. Equidem eos existimo, qui sint in bonis, nullo adiuncto malo, neque ulla huic verbo, cum beatum dicimus, subiecta notio est nisi secretis malis omnibus cumulate bonorum complexio.*

philosophy is the notion of the perfection of the mind through reason.¹⁰⁴ This in turn will lead to having completeness in reason and so attaining virtue. The sage will be both happy and good, happy, as he has attained perfection in rationality and also good, as his happiness is maintained by virtue, and virtue is good. It appears that Cicero, the Stoics and the Peripatetics might agree on this point.¹⁰⁵ However, the fundamental question remains: is virtue alone self-sufficient for the happy life? Stoic ethics assimilated with their understanding of physics, understood that human nature was just one part of a whole system in which both the human and the divine mind, identified with *logos* or nature, were united together by reason, hence the maxim of Zeno concerning the natural end is a life lived in agreement with nature.¹⁰⁶ In the sage, then, is the man who lived a life with a perfect balance of the two, a man of absolute reason and harmony. His reason unified and harmonized with that of the divine made him wise, made him virtuous and thus, made him supremely and absolutely happy. But, this idea of happiness lay in the negation and disregard of all external factors; happiness becomes a personal matter to be nurtured inwardly by virtue in the soul and protected by reason. Because of this belief the majority of humanity would live lives in accordance with fleeting delusions of happiness, placing faith in a second rate knowledge, more akin to opinion than anything resembling knowledge and being slaves to external control, factors and more importantly for the Stoics, *'fortuna'*. This situation and clear difference between the ignorant majority and the wise minority was described by Cicero in Book Three of *On Duties*, when he describes the differences between how both view duty:

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.39: *'Hic igitur si est excultus et si eius acies ita curate est, ut ne caecaretur erroribus, fit perfecta mens, id est absoluta ratio, quod est idem virtus.'* This is keeping with the Stoic idea of the absolute perfection of reason, thus, virtue, being labelled the good.

¹⁰⁵ Cicero states his agreement with the opinion of the Peripatetics. This might echo back to Antiochus of Ascalon, who believed that the three schools, The Academics, the Peripatetics and the Stoics were all homogeneous in essential principles of philosophical ethical speculation. See Book Four of *De Finibus*. Also J. Glucker, 'The Sosus Affair' in *Antiochus and the late Academy*, (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978).

¹⁰⁶ Diogenes Laertius, 7.84-20 (S.V.F 1.178):

‘Διόπερ πρῶτος ὁ Ζήνων ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως τέλος εἶπε τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν: ἄγει γὰρ πρὸς ταύτην ἡμᾶς ἡ φύσις.’

That duty which those same Stoics call 'right' is perfect and absolute and 'satisfies all the numbers' as that same school says, and is attainable by none except the wise man. On the other hand, when some act is performed in which we see mean duties manifested that is generally regarded as fully perfect, for the reason that the common crowd does not, as a rule, comprehend how far it falls short of real perfection; but, as far as their comprehension does go, they think there is no deficiency.¹⁰⁷

Here it is apparent that not only is the sage the ideal kind of man but actually more akin to a divinity than anything earthly.¹⁰⁸ However, in placing the sage on a point higher than most of the rest of humanity could ever reach, it would seem that the early Stoics were being far too idealistic than realistic. How could the Stoics make human happiness possible when if their criterion for it is based in absolute reason that only a few or only someone seemingly divine could achieve it? This question is something which Panaetius appeared to have understood and caused the first to movement away from orthodoxy in Stoicism¹⁰⁹ by emphasising and promoting the practical over the ideal. For Panaetius all men should have their own ideal suited to their capacity, rather than an imaginary impossible idea which they should meekly and strive towards in maddening dejection.¹¹⁰

Panaetius while infusing Stoic philosophy with elements of Peripatetic philosophy made a significant movement away from the early Stoic maxim for happiness by arguing that virtue was not wholly self-sufficient for happiness, but rather, things such as health, finances

¹⁰⁷ Cicero, *De Officiis*, 3.14-15: *Illud autem officium, quod rectum idem appellant, perfectum atque absolutum est et, ut idem dicunt, omnes numeros habet nec praeter sapientem cadere in quemquam potest. Cum autem aliquid actum est, in quo media officia compareant, id cumulate videtur esse perfectum, propterea quod vulgus quid absit a perfecto, non fere intellegit; quatenus autem intellegit, nihil putat praetermissum.*

¹⁰⁸ Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 4.38; *De Finibus*, 3.73-75.

¹⁰⁹ Although orthodoxy in Stoicism has been a generally accepted idea, I.Ludlam, however, would dispute this popular claim and argue against that there was any kind of orthodoxy in Stoicism. See, I.Ludlam, Two Long Running Stoic Myths: A Centralized Orthodox Stoic School and Stoic Scholarchs, in *Elenchos*, (Anno XXIV-2003, No.1), pp.35-55.

¹¹⁰ Sandbach, *The Stoics*, pp. 28-69.

and strength would play a significant role in the happiness that one might hope to achieve.¹¹¹ By giving this example it is only clearly to show that the admittance of other goods into the pantheon of happiness by Panaetius was a pragmatic movement by the Stoics away from the ideal maxim of the ‘early’ school, and focused now on the practical reality. The influence of Panaetius on Cicero cannot be underestimated.¹¹² His thoughts on justice and courage had a lot of influence on Cicero as a Roman political figure.¹¹³ His positive stance on both justice and bravery suited those who wanted to be active in political life. This pragmatic approach placed a large amount of onus on choice. Correct action was based on circumstances. A change of circumstances may require a change of duty¹¹⁴, which itself might sound like an appeal to Cicero’s own Academic Sceptic preference of the probable: a change from one position to another, as circumstances may require, would involve an act of decision and as such an act of choice. But choice implies selection and when the Stoics spoke of choice and selection in regard to ethics they divided the selection, external goods, into what was valued for a natural, and thus, an ethical life.¹¹⁵

But while external goods could now be selected, when it came to virtue, there was no question of selection or rejection. Virtue was on a level of its own and did not come into the equation of choice, for it was, equal to being absolutely happy and good considered to be the natural end of man.¹¹⁶ This onus on choice would place the person into a state of knowing what is right to do in any given circumstance because he would have absolute clarity in understanding what is right. Sandbach gives the analogy of the king and courtiers to explain

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp.123-129; also, Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*, 7.128:

‘όμεντοι Παναίτιος καὶ Ποσειδώνιος οὐκ αὐτάρκη λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ χρειαὶ εἶναι φασι καὶ ὑγείας καὶ χορηγίας καὶ ἰσχύος.’

¹¹² Cicero, *De Legibus* 3.74; *Tusculanae Disputationes* 1.41-42. Also Panaetius’s book *De Providentia* was a source for Cicero’s book , *De Divinatione*, 2.87-99; *Ep ad. Atticum* 16.11.4. Cicero states that the first two books of *De Officiis* are based on Panaetius, see n. 56.

¹¹³ Sandbach, *The Stoics*, p. 124.

¹¹⁴ Cicero *De Officiis*, 1.31-33.

¹¹⁵ Cicero, *De Academica*, 1.36-37.

¹¹⁶ τὸ καλόν also described as the *honestum*, the highest good, which for the Stoics was the natural end of man, his *telos*.

the position of virtue in relation to the other things called, ‘preferred’ and ‘indifferent’.¹¹⁷ The Stoics viewed all external objects this way. For them virtue itself is exercised by the pursuit to obtain that which had value, called ‘preferred’ and by contrast, the avoidance of those things thought the contrary. Having good intent in this pursuit was enough as it was recognised that extraneous factors outside of man’s control may hinder his achievement of those things. A man’s success in selection was measured by his mental attitude to the external world, all things belonging to the external world will have differences in value, but they are not things that, essentially, will contribute anything to his excellence or his happiness. The morally good, virtuous, was to be accepted, the morally bad, vicious, to be shunned. Indifferent things were to be chosen or rejected. It is clear from this that the differences between the Stoics and the Peripatetics in ethical understanding are not merely verbal as Cicero clearly points out in Book Four of *On Ends*.¹¹⁸ Cicero, through Cato, elucidates the reader on this issue:

Carneades never ceased to contend that on the whole so-called ‘problem of good and evil’ there was no disagreement as to the facts between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, but only as to terms. For my part, however, nothing seems to me more manifest than that there is more of a real than a verbal difference of opinion between those philosophers on these points [...]The Peripatetics say that all the things which under their system are called goods contribute to happiness; whereas our school does not believe that total happiness comprises everything that deserves to have a certain amount of value attached to it.¹¹⁹

According to the Stoics happiness does not admit of degrees nor does the acquisition of externals goods make a man happier, for the Peripatetics it simply does.¹²⁰ Virtue alone

¹¹⁷ Sandbach, *The Stoics*, p. 46.

¹¹⁸ Cicero, *De Finibus*, 4.56-77.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.41: *Propterea quod pugnare non destitit in omni hac quaestione quae de bonis et malis appelletur non esse rerum Stoicis cum Peripateticis controversiam sed nominum. Mihi autem nihil tam perspicuum videtur quam has sententias eorum philosophorum re inter se magis quam verbis dissidere [...] quippe cum Peripatetici omnia quae ipsi bona appellant pertinere dicant ad beate vivendum, nostri non ex omni quod aestimatione aliqua dignum sit compleri vitam beatam putent.*

¹²⁰ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers*, 7.127.

can guide man to happiness, regardless of outside factors. What use then, of the indifferent? What part, if any, did the idea of things called indifferent play in man's happiness? With regard to the things called indifferent one might look at them in a rather confused way, for if the reader were to understand the Stoics correctly, then these 'things indifferent' would play no part in man's excellence or happiness. Why then would the Stoics have considered them, let alone have given them a place in their moral philosophy? Cicero allows Cato to explain:

Hereafter an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task would be found for wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that pertain to the conduct of life and no choice need be exercised among them.¹²¹

Indifferent things, then, contribute nothing to happiness and are labelled in two ways: either positive or negative. The positive are placed in the same natural order of goodness, though placed below it. When choosing amongst these indifferences one must use one's reason. Rationality was everything to the Stoics and the indifferent act as a way of affording the person to utilize one's reason and ultimately one's virtue. An appropriate action is one that is chosen from among the indifferent and in accordance with nature. Since nature endowed man with reason, therefore, a life lived in accordance with nature is a rational life. Physics orders the universe and order is rational, therefore, the universe is rational. The *logos* is the guiding force in the universe and it was understood that both men and gods shared the same *logos*. Therefore, through the activity of reason, thought of as virtue, man naturally harmonizes his nature with that of the universe to achieve happiness.¹²² Stoic physics aids man to

¹²¹ Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.50: *Dienceps explicatur differentia rerum: quam si non ullam esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone, neque ullum sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent nihil omnino interesset neque ullum dilectum adhiberi oporteret.* See also Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers*, 7.101.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 3.20.

comprehend his place in the universe, and so helps him when it comes to choosing from among the different options, what is appropriate for right action. Cato explains this as:

Now an appropriate act is an act so preformed that a reasonable account can be rendered of its performance; and this proves that an appropriate act is an intermediate thing, to be reckoned neither as a good nor as the opposite. And since those things which are neither to be counted among virtues nor vices nevertheless contain a factor which can be useful, their element of utility is worth preserving.¹²³

Any action that was deemed to be appropriate was thus also deemed to be fitting to one's nature¹²⁴ and so the rational man would always naturally choose appropriate action over inappropriate ones.¹²⁵ Virtue added both stability and purity to practice. The path to happiness was a continuous correction of mistaken beliefs, called mistaken because beliefs were false and often based on emotive responses and they had to be judged and therefore, necessarily rejected. However, emotions themselves were not thought of as a disease i.e. by Panaetius and Posidonius, but merely as a natural part of man's nature. Emotive responses always had to be appropriate to the given circumstance or situation re. Panaetius¹²⁶ and be subject to mental assent.

The Stoics, in their apparent negation of external goods having anything to do with happiness and their elevation of mind as the seat of all happiness would seem to actually be going against nature as Cicero himself argues. Cicero rebukes the Stoics arguing that in the negation of external goods and the elevation of mind the Stoics show disregard for the real things that are according to nature i.e., health, self-preservation, security for external goods.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 3.58: *Est autem officium quod ita factum est ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit; ex quo intellegitur officium medium quiddam esse quod neque in bonis ponatur neque contrariis. Quoniamque in iis rebus quae neque in virtutibus sunt neque in vitiis, est tamen quiddam quod usui possit esse, tollendum id non est.*

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.20.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.71.

¹²⁶ Sandbach, *The Stoics*, pp. 28-69.

Virtue as being self-sufficient for happiness would seem impractical then, as man is naturally not whole self-sufficient. Man has needs external to his own nature, required not only for his bodily sustenance and also his rational one. Cicero would justify his rebuke to the Stoic Cato; by pointing out that wisdom's task is to aim at perfecting the whole of man and not just a part of it:

The latter case [the case of a statue not begun by Pheidias, but completed by him] resembles the work of wisdom. She did not create man herself, but took him over in the rough from nature; her business is to finish the statue that nature began, keeping her eyes on Nature meanwhile.¹²⁷

It is natural therefore, according to Cicero, that wisdom's task is to perfect the whole of man and not just one part of it. Although even if absolute perfection is manifested in the most noblest part of man, that perfection must not be at the expense of the lower parts of his being. This is, for Cicero, exactly what nature does in all things and so a life lived in agreement with nature must include perfection of the whole being and not just one part of it, thus the harmonization of body and mind into a unity. The Stoic argument then would appear to be somewhat inconsistent. For by making virtue self-sufficient for happiness it would appear that they dismiss those things that are given by nature to man to only enhance and never hinder his life. It might appear that while it is an exercise of virtue to choose or select those things that are necessary to make one happy, it is still a virtue to view these things as unnecessary for happiness; thus, making it an absolute impossibility. Cicero carries on with his refutation by arguing that by placing virtue as fully self-sufficient for happiness, the Stoics are following in the mistaken footsteps of a long line of philosophers such as Pyrrho, and Aristo, and are again both inconsistent and contradictory:

¹²⁷ Cicero, *De Finibus.*, 4.34-35: *Huic similis est sapientia; non enim ipsa genuit hominem sed accepit a natura inchoatum; hanc ergo intuens debet institutum illud quasi signum absolvere.*

In making the primary objects ‘preferred’, so as to admit a certain principle of choice among things, they seem to be following nature, but in refusing to allow them to have anything to do with happiness, they again abandon nature.¹²⁸

Cicero writes that Zeno was wrong to make virtue solely self-sufficient and responsible for happiness and place no value in external goods. In following Cicero’s refutation, it seems contradictory to create or offer selection, when there is no difference between any of the goods to be selected, by labelling them ‘indifferent’, at the end of the day; Cicero, continuing the argument, points out to Cato that external goods influence our desires and motivate moral conduct and in this way they are natural. A life in agreement with nature does involve admitting external goods for happiness. Cicero asks, why abandon those schools who also admitted this? However, for the Stoics this is precisely the problem, for in accepting that external goods/factors play a part in man’s happiness it is giving credence for fortune to have a hand in human affairs. The sage will never allow this to happen. For his *logos* is the same as that of the universe and his happiness will depend on that alone, and not on fortune.

I.G. Kidd explains this further:

The *logos* in the universe is the rational element, and therefore the duty of the logos in man is the rational element, and therefore the duty of the logos in man is the development of his rational part in knowledge, and on knowledge are founded all virtues.¹²⁹

Thus, the rationality of man is displayed in virtue and this is the absolute and supreme good. For according to Kidd: ‘To contradict this would be to contradict their [Stoic] physics or their views on the universe’.¹³⁰ Fundamentally, to choose rightly is in itself the act of virtue. For as

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.43: ‘*Quae cum ‘praeponunt’ ut sit aliqua rerum selectio, naturam videntur sequi; cum autem negant ea quidquam at beatam vitam pertinere, rursus naturam relinquunt’.*

¹²⁹ I.G. Kidd, ‘Stoic intermediates and the end for man’ in *Problems in Stoicism*, ed. by A.A.Long, (Essex, The Athlone Press, 1971), p.158; also see Ludlam, Two Long Running Stoic Myths: A Centralized Orthodox Stoic School and Stoic Scholarchs, pp. 54-55.

¹³⁰ Kidd, ‘Stoic intermediates and the end for man’ in *Problems in Stoicism*, p.158.

we have seen, virtue being connected to reason makes the virtuous act a rational act, which is therefore any act in accordance with nature. The *telos* might be, ‘to live in agreement with nature’, according to Zeno, but as Kidd plainly points out, the Stoics did not hold their founding father’s view as either as divine or as ideas eternally held as if written in stone. Instead, they would often deconstruct and reconstruct ideas which they considered to be wrong and offer a progression of thought in the process.¹³¹ The way in which the original maxim of Zeno on the natural end of man was modified and altered by Chryssipus is a good example of this. He reinterpreted the original maxim so that the natural end was understood to be a life in accordance with nature rather than the Zeno’s original maxim of the end as life in agreement with nature.¹³² The Chief end of appropriate action would be to act with good intent, based in rationality. Cato argues thus in Book Three of *On Ends*:

By the exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake: and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term *homologia* and we with your approval may call ‘conformity’ inasmuch I say as in resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and moral worth itself, which alone is counted as good.¹³³

Cato, at this point, appears to be echoing the words of Diogenes of Babylon, the teacher of Panaetius, who placed a greater emphasis on the selection and rejection of external objects. His subsequent successor, and former student, Antipater of Tharsos continued along this path of placing emphasis on selection. This was essentially undertaken in the face of constant attack from the arguments of opponents, most notably that of Carneades. This reformation of

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p.154.

¹³² Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.21; also see Diogenes Laertius, 7.1.87 for a full explanation of the early Stoics understanding of the end. Cicero uses the Latin word *convenientia* to represent the Greek word ὁμολογία found in the original maxim of Zeno concerning the *telos*, and he also renders the Latin expression *secudum naturam vivere* as a translation of the maxim of Chryssipus in the Greek ἀκολουθῶς τῇ φύσει ζῆν.

¹³³ Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.21: *Atque ita cognitio et ratione collegit ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum; quod cum positum sit in eo quod ὁμολογίαν Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, si placet, cum igitur in eo sit id bonum quo omnia referenda sunt, honeste facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum in bonis dicitur.*

the relationship of *ta kata physin* (τὰ κατὰ φύσιν) and the *telos* happened because of this opposition.¹³⁴ Cicero has Cato fully explain this:

For though if a man were to make it his purpose to take a true aim with a spear or arrow at some mark, his ultimate end, corresponding to the ultimate good as we pronounce it, would be to do all he could to aim straight: the man in this illustration would have to do everything to aim straight, and yet, although he did attain his purpose, his 'ultimate end', so to speak, would be what corresponded to what we call the Chief Good in the conduct of life, whereas the actual hitting of the mark would be in 'our' phrase 'to be chosen' but not 'to be desired'.¹³⁵

All action would imply a plan, and so, a form of rationality behind it. Man owed his superiority over animals to his rationality. This natural superiority also brought with it responsibilities that extended not only to the immediate society that man found himself in, but for the Stoics to mankind as a whole. Law was the principle guiding-force that mankind used to guide and aid its natural responsibilities towards others. As the law on earth was a mirrored reflection of the great law of the universe, the natural law. Cicero, in *On the Laws*, argues that law is thought of as natural because we share rationality with the gods. Thus, law is equated with the natural good will and feelings of affection towards other men exercised in the fellowship of justice.¹³⁶ All earthly law is therefore rooted in nature and is subject to the natural law of the universe which is presided over by god. The Epicureans would differ in this: they posit a god who does not take part in the affairs of man. For the Stoics human beings are all born alike and have a natural tendency and leaning towards developing law, logic and justice. Cicero contends that justice is the motive behind all the virtues, not out of

¹³⁴ Pohlenz, 'Plutarchs Schriften gegen die Stoiker', cited by Kidd, 'Stoic Intermediates and the End for Man', in *Problems in Stoicism*, p.151.

¹³⁵ Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.22: *Ut enim si cui propositum sit collineare hastam aliquot aut sagittam, sicut nos ultimum in bonis dicimus, sic illi facere omnia quae posit ut collineet: huic in eiusmodi similitudine omnia sint facienda ut collineet, et tamen, ut omnia faciat quo propositum assequatur, sit hoc quasi ultimum quale nos summum in vita bonum dicimus, illud autem ut feriat, quasi seligendum, non expetendum.*

¹³⁶ G. Watson, 'The Natural Law and Stoicism' in *Problems in Stoicism*, p. 228.

fear, but out of the close relationship man has with god.¹³⁷ Philosophy for him is the instrument by which all of mankind can recognise and realise that divine element in ourselves, that of rationality (*logos*). By knowing this and by obeying the law, we are engaged in the activity of harmonization which will result in us living our lives in accordance with nature, and in turn, according to the Stoics will make us both happy and good. The highest good then is the expression of the law, and friendship will be the practice of justice. Cicero provides an interesting insight into the etymology of 'law'. He writes that:

Law is the highest reason, implanted in Nature, which commands what ought to be done and forbids the opposite. This reason, when firmly fixed and fully developed in the human mind is law. And so they believe that Law is intelligence, whose natural function it is to command right conduct and forbid wrongdoing. They think that this quality has derived its name in Greek from the idea of granting to every man his own, and in our language I believe it has been named from the idea of choosing. For as they have attributed the idea of fairness to the world law, so we have given it that of selection, though both ideas properly belong to Law.¹³⁸

This is interesting because it seems to imply that obedience to the law is a rational act, and give credence to the statement above before the quotation. Choice, therefore, is in accordance with the laws of nature, and a right choice from among the indifferent was now incorporated in the definitions of the end of life.¹³⁹ But are the Stoics being inconsistent with their idea of having virtue as self-sufficient for happiness? The concepts of 'indifferent' and 'preferred goods' would appear to be a reaction and compromise in respect to the attacks wrought upon the Stoics. Cicero would appear to think so and provides the opinions of Antiochus of

¹³⁷ Cicero, *De Legibus*, 1.42-43.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.18-19 : *Lex est ratio summa insita in natura, quae iubet ea, quae facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria. Eadem ratio cum est in hominis mente confirmata et confecta lex est. Itaque arbitrantur prudentiam esse legem, cuius ea vis sit, ut recte facere iubeat, vetet delinquere; eamque rem illi Graeco putant nomine suum cuique tribuendo appellatam, ego nostro a legend; nam ut illi aequitatis, sic nos dilectus vim in lege ponimus, et proprium tamen utrumque legis est.* Cicero understands the Greek νόμος to be derived from νέμω, 'I dispense/distribute'. Similarly, the Latin word *lex* means selection from 'a legendo'. *Ibid.*, 1.18.

¹³⁹ Reesor, 'The Indifferents in the Old and Middle Stoa', cited by Kidd in, 'Stoic Intermediates and the End for Man', in *Problems in Stoicism*, p. 152.

Ascalon¹⁴⁰ in an attempt to further this point of inconsistency within the Stoic argument in relation to the happy life. Cicero contends in many places that according to Antiochus, while virtue alone can make life happy it cannot make life supremely happy by and in of itself, Cicero writes: ‘The arguments used (and Antiochus has continually stated them in a number of passages in his works), were that virtue alone is of itself able to render life happy and yet not supremely happy’.¹⁴¹

However, if this is the case would then happiness admit to degrees? Would the addition of external goods move one’s feeling of happiness from a normative state to a supreme state of bliss? Cicero attempts to point out by saying that if the addition of external goods is to make happiness complete then would the process of addition make one happier, as the Peripatetics might say:

On the Peripatetic theory that there are three kinds of goods, the more abundantly supplied a man is with bodily or external goods, the happier he is; but it does not follow that we Stoics can accept the same position, and say that the more a man has of those bodily things that are highly valued the happier he is. For the Peripatetics hold that the sum of happiness includes bodily advantages, but we deny this altogether.¹⁴²

Stoic happiness did not admit of degrees and certainly did not admit external goods but then, in making happiness rely solely on being virtuous and seeing everything else as indifferent or preferred, did the Stoics make happiness invulnerable and thus, unattainable? Cicero also

¹⁴⁰ Antiochus of Ascalon took a new approach in regard to ethics and understanding of the highest happiness. He rejected the scepticism of Philo of Larissa and adopted the ideas of the Stoics in relation to epistemological doctrines. His book ‘*Sosus*’ was written in direct opposition to Philo as it took for its foundation the theory of knowledge posited by Aristotle. He also favoured Stoic physics and Stoic ethical theories and argued that the Stoics and the Peripatetics were very much alike only differing in terminology: See J.Glucker, *Antiochus and the late Academy*. See also, Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, 1.16: ‘*Antiocho enim Stoici cum Peripateticis re concinere videntur, verbis discrepare.*’

¹⁴¹ Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 5.21-22: *Dicebantur haec, quae scriptitavit etiam Antiochus locis pluribus, virtutem ipsam per se beatam vitam efficere neque tamen beatissimam.*

¹⁴² Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.43: *Ne illud quidem est consentaneum, ut si cum tria genera bonorum sint, quae sententia est Peripateticorum, eo beatior quisque sit, quo sit corporis aut externis bonis plenior, ut hoc idem approbandum sit nobis, ut qui plura habeat ea quae in corpora magni aestimantur sit beatior. Illi enim corporis commodis compleri vitam beatam putant, nostri nihil minus.*

seems to have this in mind when he addresses this issue;¹⁴³ however, the answer to this is that according to the Stoics this might seem absurd, as only virtue is self-sufficient for happiness and admits to no degrees; happiness is then consistent with man's reason, ever flourishing as he flourishes in reasoned bliss, the so-called life in agreement with nature. Cicero writes openly of the erroneous nature of the philosophies holding that virtue is the sole good, but shows that while the Stoics do follow nature, they then appear to abandon it. He goes further in his refutation to say that essentially Zeno differed from his predecessors in only language rather than anything of real substance.¹⁴⁴ Pupius Piso, Cicero writes, would ridicule the Stoics over this.¹⁴⁵ The Stoics are caught up in their paradoxes, which for Cicero, are plainly truisms and nothing more, and would not hold any kind of weight when put under scrutiny. They look at vices and label all equally abhorrent but for Cicero this is ridiculous as the nature of the object and circumstance that make all the difference when deciding on how to judge and view something. Thus, all vices are not the same, prudence will aid man in understanding this fact:

For the virtue known generally as prudence is an attribute as we hold of all the arts, and every master craftsman in each branch of art ought to possess it. Hence the proof also of the equality of transgression breaks down.¹⁴⁶

For Cicero the Stoics are attempting, albeit badly, to maintain two contrary opinions at once.¹⁴⁷ Wisdom must give equal merit to the lower body just as much as it allows for the precedence of mind over the body. For just as nature works in a system that includes all and excludes nothing, so too then must both mind and body share equal importance. The main point of Antiochus in Book Five of *On Ends*, is that the Stoics do not permit any value to

¹⁴³ Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 5.81: *Sed quid minus probandum quam esse aliquem beatum nec satis beatum? Quod autem satis est, eo quidquid accessit nimium est; et nemo nimium beatus est; igitur nemo beato beatior.*

¹⁴⁴ Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.5, 4.56, 4.72.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.73.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.76: *'Omnibus enim artibus volumus attributam esse eam quae communis appellatur prudentia, quam omnes qui cuique artificio praesunt debent habere. Ita ne hoc quidem modo paria peccata sunt'.*

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.78.

happiness of the body, only as a concept born in the mind. But if the body suffers ills would it not affect the mind? It would appear that even the Stoics who dismiss external evils and pain as an indifferent must admit that it is of concern even to the wise man if his body is racked with pain and he suffers ills however the Stoic position, again, is that even bodily and external goods are not eclipsed by mental goods, and even if they were, they ought to still be included in the list as those preferred in accordance with nature and so:

Man, [Chrysippus] so classified as to make the mind the principle part in him; and yet he so defined man's End as to make it appear, not that he is principally mind, but that he consists of nothing else. But the only case in which it would be correct to place the Chief Good in virtue alone is if there existed a creature consisting solely of pure intellect, with the further proviso that this intellect possessed nothing of its own that was in accordance with nature, as bodily health is. But it is impossible even to imagine a self consistent picture of what such a creature would be like.¹⁴⁸

The instinct of self-preservation must pertain to the whole of man. Not just the seat of reason or the body but to every aspect of his being. For such is the meaning of self-preservation. The Stoics believed that *logos* was found to dwell in all of the universe. It permeated every single part of human nature, physical and rational. The duty of the *logos* was to assist in the perfection of man as a whole. The Stoic notion of self-preservation is important to understand, as the Stoics did place emphasis on social duties. This awareness of one's own constitution is found also in both plants and animals. A being should accept what was beneficial to its constitution and reject what was harmful or obstructionist to its natural development. Labelling the primary concern being self-preservation was not in universal agreement among all of the philosophical schools, for instance it went against to the

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 4.28-29: *Cum autem hominem in eo genere posuisset ut ei tribueret animi excellentiam, summum bonum id constituit, non ut excellere animus sed ut nihil esse praeter animum videre. Uno autem modo in virtute sola summum bonum recte poneretur, si quod esset animal quod totum ex mente constaret, id ipsum tamen sic ut ea mens nihil haberet in se quod esset secundum naturam, ut valetudo est. Sed id ne cogitari quidem potest quale sit ut non repugnet ipsum sibi.*

teachings of the Epicureans who had their own theories on the primary instinct.¹⁴⁹ Nature for the Stoics is endowed with *logos* and this is exhibited in both the structure and the rational or ordered activity of everything that dwells in it. For nature teaches us to take care of our lives during our lifetime. Nature is the best guide to good living. It informs us of our duties. All natural inclinations come from this understanding, that in order to live a good and happy life we must conform to the law of nature. The gods, being truly wise, are active in the governing of the world and they are united in a commonwealth of community and friendship. Human beings share the gift of rationality with the gods and as such human law has been derived from divine law. Human reason is a microcosm of the divine, which rules over the universe with sagacity:

Since we possess wisdom, reason and prudence, the gods must needlessly possess them too in greater perfection, and not possess them merely but also exercise them upon matters of the greatest magnitude and value; but nothing is of greater magnitude and value than the universe; it follows therefore that the universe is governed by the wisdom and providence of the gods.¹⁵⁰

In the sharing of rationality with the divine, man will in turn look to those who also possess rationality with affection. This affection for rationality is thought endowed by nature and Cato Book Three of *On Ends*, attempts to give credence to this fact:

It is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parent's affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the human race in communities.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ Cicero, *De Finibus*, 1.30: *Hoc Epicurus in voluptate point, quod summum bonum esse vult summumque malum dolorem; idque instituit docere sic: omne animal simul atque natum sit voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo bono, dolorem aspernari ut summum malum et quantum posuit a se repellere; idque facere nondum depravatam, ipsa natura incorrupte atque integer iudicante.*

¹⁵⁰ Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, 2.79-80: *Cumque sint in nobis consilium ratio prudential, necesse est deos haec ipsa habere maiora, nec habere solum sed etiam iis uti in maximis et optimis rebus; nihil autem nec maius nec melius mundo; necesse est ergo eum deorum consilio et providentia administrari.*

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 3.62: *Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur; a quo initio profectam commune humani generis societatem persequimur.*

Clearly demonstrated by Cato this affection has its origins in parental affection towards their children. Nature has given both man and woman the means to procreate, and therefore, it is natural to show affection towards offspring. Cato says that in animals this can be seen quite openly. Humanity has been pre-designed to form and live in union and societies. Philanthropy is thus created by nature and a common love for all of humanity is in accordance with natural law.¹⁵² This can be further understood within the context of *oikeiosis*¹⁵³ according to Cicero, referring to the doctrine as understood by Panaetius, in Book One of *On Duties*.¹⁵⁴ While both animals and man share in this, it is reason, which demarcates man from the brutes, orders man's life and gives his relationships with other human beings a purpose: 'nature likewise, by the power of reason, associates man with man in the common bonds of speech and life; she implants in him above all, I may say, a strange tender love for his offspring.'¹⁵⁵ So *Oikeiosis* is understood to be the way in which a Stoic might rationally understand his place in the world. Human beings shared rational existence in the cosmos with the gods, which was understood by most Stoics as a *cosmopolis*. The *cosmopolis* was labelled such a thing as it was the place where both the moral and political organisation and government of mankind and of the universe was enacted. It was the ideal state for the Stoics, as all humans are born with reason and thus, the capability of virtue, they would naturally be citizens of the *cosmopolis*. In *On the Laws*, Cicero writes:

In fact there is no human being of any race who, if he finds a guide, cannot attain virtue...inasmuch as these considerations prove to us that the whole

¹⁵² Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.62-64.

¹⁵³ Paraphrasing Pembroke on *Oikeiosis*, this is an extremely difficult term to translate. It derived from the word *oikeios*, originally understood as the actual physical structure of the house, but has a wider meaning than merely house, more akin to the Irish understanding of clan or household. See S.G. Pembroke, on 'Oikeiosis', in *Problems in Stoicism*, pp. 116-118.

¹⁵⁴ Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1.11.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 1.12: *Eademque natura vi rationis hominem conciliat homini et ad orationis et ad vitae societatem ingeneratque in primis praecipuum quondam amorem in eos, qui procreati sunt.*

human race is bound together in unity, it follows, finally, that knowledge of the principles of right living is what makes men better.¹⁵⁶

Thus, in the *cosmopolis* men are united by virtue and common good will. Posidonius is reported to have compared the Roman Empire with this notion of a *cosmopolis*.¹⁵⁷ Equality and fellowship is advocated within the *cosmopolis*, because as it will have reason as its foundation then it will naturally also have a foundation in morality. The natural law promotes this harmony of equality and Cicero writes in Book Three of *On Duties* that the single law of nature is not to harm anyone.¹⁵⁸ Justice which binds men together in ethical reasoning is akin to friendship. In Book One of *On the Laws* Cicero explains how justice and friendship are natural and both arise out of man's virtue. However, in Book Three of *On Ends*, Cato says that even though friendship is natural, and the wise man will hold his friends' interests as dear as his own, it is still classified by the Stoics as among the things 'preferred': They recommend the cultivation of friendship, classing it among 'things beneficial'.¹⁵⁹ Though it appears that there is still some ambiguity as to what the Stoics mean by this. Friendship would appear natural to man, and according to the Stoics the social duty is natural. Therefore, would man's *oikeiosis* not also include his friends? In Book Three of *On Ends* Cicero develops the notion of two versions or types of *oikeiosis*: the first as already mentioned which is a primary impulse towards self-preservation; and the second which is an impulse towards the social community. For Cicero, adults have two approaches towards bonding: the first from nature which is inherent and is exemplified by animals caring for their young; the other

¹⁵⁶ Cicero, *De Legibus*, 1.30-32: *Nec est quisquam gentis ullis, qui duce nactus ad virtutem pervenire non possit[...]* *Quibus ex rebus cum omne genus hominum sociatum inter se esse intellegatur, illud extremum est, quod recte vivendi ratio meliores efficit.*

¹⁵⁷ M. Grant, *Cicero On the Good Life*, (1971), p.58; E. Bréhler, *The Hellenistic and Roman Age*, trans. by W.Baskin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p.139. See also, E.V. Arnold, 'Roman Stoicism: Being lectures on the history of the Stoic Philosophy with special reference to its development within the Roman Empire' (London: Cambridge University Press, 1911), pp 274-382.

¹⁵⁸ Cicero, *De Officiis*, 3.21-22, 27.

¹⁵⁹ Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.70: 'Amicitiam autem adhibendam esse consent quia sit ex eo genere quae prosunt'.

is found in rationality and this, is anchored in the divine principle. Socialization can be said to be fundamental to human nature, because it is seen to be a part of the natural process of a child's natural development. When the baby is born it will look to form a bond with its parents, even before it has full use of its rational capacities. Parenthood then is part of nature and thus, in accordance with the natural law. The relationship between both parents and their children entails the notion of care for other social beings. The sociability of human beings is weighted in divine reason and will as it is a product of both divine reason and will. It is natural to prefer common advantage to our own. Politics and family life are seen as a duty¹⁶⁰ by Cato in *On Ends*:

The wise man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have children by her. Even the passion of love when pure is not thought incompatible with the character of the Stoic sage.¹⁶¹

Therefore, in conclusion, while the Stoic sage may have a family and enjoy friendships, it will only be up to a point that he will let these affectionate bonds enter into his life. As a man of perfect virtue he will be happy not because of what the world brings to him in the shape of his friends and familial relationships, but by what he brings to it. Virtue alone is self-sufficient for happiness and at times, the Stoic argument has been extremely persuasive. But, Cicero, through his own refutations and also those of the Peripatetics, allows for equally persuasive counter arguments. The philosophical concept of virtue being self-sufficient for happiness would appear to be inconsistent with a reality shared by most of humanity. The Peripatetic one, which admits external goods, would seem far more adequate to the human condition. If indeed, self-sufficiency was solely responsible for man's happiness

¹⁶⁰ Cicero, *De Republica*, 1.12. ed and trans. by C.W.Keyes (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1928).

¹⁶¹ Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.68: *Ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos. Ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur.*

then what use of friendship? The self-sufficient man will be able to self cultivate his own happiness and not be subject to the vicissitudes of fortune that may befall others who appear actively reliant on others. A movement away from the apparent austere maxim of the early Stoics would appear to be much more fitting for humanity. While the Stoics wanted to emphasize social duties, and the *cosmopolis* they were equally comfortable to deny that social interaction could have any importance with a man's happiness. In trusting to the ideal, one might ask if their concept of friendship just an ideal? What kind of friendship would the sage have? Based on mere rationality and lacking in emotion? For ultimately happiness encompasses all of human being not just in the mind.

CHAPTER TWO

HAPPINESS: FROM SELF-SUFFICIENCY IDEALLY TO FRIENDSHIP NATURALLY

At the very beginning of *Laelius On Friendship* Cicero sets out the questions for his enquiry. These questions concern in particular the nature of friendship and also the rules governing its application.¹⁶² These questions are worthy of consideration because the very nature of friendship itself is, by all standards, closely linked with human nature. As we have seen in the last chapter, the Stoics, especially the earlier members of the school, had a particular opinion on human nature. But the members of the middle period and the Roman period appended their ideas to earlier ones. In many ways, Cicero's questions are related to his discussion of *oikeiosis*, because as we shall see, the theory of *oikeiosis* involves the parallel evolution of man's social and rational nature. Self-sufficiency as a key component of happiness was to become less and less important in Stoicism. That is not to say that it was completely pushed aside or regarded as completely redundant. Happiness during the middle period in Stoic philosophy and in particular the Roman period, relied more on social inter-action and less on imitation of the austere and self-sufficient sage. Friends were a cause for concern to the critics of Stoic moral philosophy¹⁶³, purely because of the intransigence of the Stoics ethical outlook. For the Stoics would say that the good man has no need of friends, yet at the same time also say that friendship was counted amongst the virtues, and thus, in accordance with nature.

This seemed on our first reading to be a contradiction. For Cicero, however, the answer to this issue was to be found in the nature of friendship itself and the importance of

¹⁶² Cicero, *De Amicitia*, 16.

¹⁶³ J.S. McClelland. 'From Polis to Cosmopolis' in *A history of Western Political Thought*. (London: Routledge, 1996) pp. 67-87.

the role it played in human affairs. In the first part of this thesis I discussed just how the Stoics of the middle period namely Panaetius and Posidonius, altered the maxims of the earlier Stoics and sculpted a less austere and far more humane version.¹⁶⁴ But why would the Stoics of the middle period have felt the need to adjust the focus of the older Stoa, from looking upward, in a sense, towards the ideal sage, to a more down to earth, and realistic view? A statement from Cicero in *On Duties* concerning the probable views of Panaetius is revealing in this matter:

Now the men we live with are not quiet perfect and ideally wise, but men who do very well, if there be found in them but the semblance of virtue. I therefore think that this is to be taken for granted, that no one should be entirely neglected who shows any trace of virtue.¹⁶⁵

Cicero's statement is very interesting because it would appear to show and demonstrate the acceptance of the mass of humanity by the Stoics as having the possibility of acquiring virtue, and not just being sidelined and being labelled insane. In this, the idealistic view is altered and replaced with an acceptance of a more realistic vista. The early Stoics thought that the wise man was a wholly self-sufficient man, because he was more akin to a divinity than an ordinary human being, as his wisdom was far superior to any around him. He was thought superior in wisdom because the sage has a completely universal understanding of truth, not just the particular version of it that most other human beings have.¹⁶⁶ However, by placing the sage in a position where he is akin to a god, how could the early Stoics portray him as being an actual part of the human race, which they disregarded as the insane majority? An examination of how the Stoics understood the concept of Nature could provide an answer.

¹⁶⁴ Long & Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, Vol. 1, p. 427.

¹⁶⁵ Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1.46: *Quoniam autem vivitur non cum perfectis hominibus planeque sapientibus, sed cum iis, in quibus praeclare agitur si sunt simulacra virtutis, etiam hoc intellegendum puto, neminem omnino esse neglegendum, in quo aliqua significatio virtutis appareat.*

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.14-15.

For rather than just merely having one so called ‘universal human nature’ there were in fact two roles assigned to it as Cicero in *On Duties* was clear to point out:

We must realise also that we are invested by Nature with two characters, as it were: one of these is universal, arising from the fact of our being all alike endowed with reason and with that superiority which lifts us above the brute. From this all morality and propriety are derived, and upon it depends the rational method of ascertaining our duty. The other character is one that is assigned to individuals in particular.¹⁶⁷

The above statement does appear to be a break, of sorts, from the early Stoics in their attitude towards the wise man and the rest of humanity. When attacked and criticised over this, the Stoics, in turn, had to defend their idealistic stance on the matter.¹⁶⁸ However, in following Chrysippus, Panaetius drew a clean distinction between the sage and the *progressives*¹⁶⁹, this would appear to have been a move born from necessity more than anything else. Since, by dividing humanity into two categories, the wise and the foolish, coupled with the fact that their earlier ethical theory was totally intransigent the Stoics were seen as being completely unpractical, a criticism that appears to have necessitated practical compromise. Panaetius was now able to say that all people were born with the ability to be virtuous, and even those who were though ‘bad’ had the ‘likeness’ of virtue in them. Their term for this immoral majority rather than the moral minority was *phauloi*, meaning more inferior than anything particularly wicked¹⁷⁰, when compared to the wise, thought both superior and virtuous. In this

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.107: *Intellegendum etiam est duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis; quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus rationis praestantiaeque eius, qua antecellimus bestiis, a qua omne honestum decorumque trahitur, et ex qua ratio inveniendi officii exquiritur, altera autem, quae proprie singulis est tributa.*

¹⁶⁸ Plutarch, *On Stoic self-contradictions*, in *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, Vol.1, p.423.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p.423. *Prokoptontes* or progressives. Chrysippus did appear to understand that Stoic idealism was something that was just not able to be taken as associated with the majority of humanity. Plutarch writing *On Stoic self-contradictions* writes that for Chrysippus, Stoic theories are not for public consumption and contain no social relevance.

¹⁷⁰ Stobaeus 5.906, in *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, Vol.1, p.363.

categorisation of inferior dwelt the progressives, those who were progressing or evolving, as it were, from inferiority to superiority.

By placing emphasis on the *progressives* the Stoics (Chrysippus, Panaetius) were themselves progressing and navigating a different direction in ethical education, a departure from their predecessors, who placed emphasis on the imitation of the wise man. It was accepted that anyone with the semblance of virtue could be educated in the attainment of moral perfection. Now through both practice and habituation in virtuous behaviour, the individual could morally progress, thus allowing the individual to become perfect in virtue and in character. By both softening their stance of the intransigency of their maxims and in recognising that although people are fallible they still were capable of gaining moral perfection, the Stoics of the middle period managed to make the school one of the most successful and subsequently most popular in the Hellenistic world. Cicero mentions the attitude of Panaetius in relation to this in Book One of *On Duties*, writing that conduct must be in accordance with individual endowments, not in accordance with nature per se:

For we must so act as not to oppose the universal laws of human nature, but, while safeguarding those, to follow the bent of our own particular nature [...] For it is of no avail to fight against one's nature or to aim at what is impossible of attainment.¹⁷¹

By emphasising the shift from the universal nature to a particular one, Cicero is illustrating the movement that actively encouraged the individual to make his own path in the world and to a lesser extent aim at what is too high to achieve, the personification of the sage. Individuals would take responsibility for their own actions and also engage with others around them.

¹⁷¹ Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1.110: *Sic enim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostrum sequamur [...] neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam sequi, quod assequi non queas.*

In *On Duties* Cicero places a great emphasis on the proper functions that are made subject specific to the individual qualities that every person has.¹⁷² Individual responsibility now superseding imitation and Cicero echoes Panaetius in these sentiments and speaks of the roles that one must play in an attempt to distinguish and understand different lifestyles and careers. He refers to everyone having four roles, the first role one is in reference to the universal nature of rationality that is shared by all human beings, and the second one referring to the physical, mental and lastly the temperamental nature of every individual human being. The third and fourth roles will distinguish and clarify : ‘the entirely accidental determinants of personal identity from the career and specializations people choose for themselves’.¹⁷³ Cicero proposes that the latter roles be in agreement with the former ones and thus, sets out a guideline for how all persons should act and shape their lives:

If there is any such thing as propriety at all, it can be nothing more than uniform consistency in the course of our life as a whole and all its individual actions. And this uniform consistency one could not maintain by copying the personal traits of others and eliminating one’s own [...] if we take this into consideration, we shall see that it is each man’s duty to weigh well what are his own peculiar traits of character, to regulate these properly, and not to wish to try how another man’s would suit him [...] Everyone, therefore, should make a proper estimate of his own natural ability and show himself a critical judge of his own merits and defects [...] We shall, therefore, work to the best advantage in that role to which we are best adapted. But if at some time stress of circumstances shall trust us aside into some uncongenial part, we must devote to it all possible thought, practice, and pains, that we may be able to perform it, if not with propriety, at least with as little impropriety as possible [...] To the two above-mentioned characters is added a third, which some chance or some circumstance imposes, and a fourth also which we assume by our own deliberate choice [...] but what role we ourselves may choose to sustain is decided by our own free choice [...] Above all we must decide who and in what manner of men we wish to be and what calling in life we would follow, and this is the most difficult problem in the world.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 1.110-11; 1.14-17.

¹⁷³ Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, Vol 1, p. 428.

¹⁷⁴ Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1.111-117: *Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas cum universae vitae, tum singularum actionum, quam conservare non possis, si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam [...] Quae contemplantes expendere oportebit, quid quisque habeat sui, eaque moderari nec velle experiri, quam se aliena deceant; quod est cuiusque maxime suum [...] Suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur habere prudentiae [...] Ad quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in iis potissimum elaborabimus; sin aliquando necessitas nos ad ea detruserit, quae nostri ingenii non erunt, omnis adhibenda erit cura, meditatio, diligentia, ut ea si non*

This quote is clearly illustrative of the position that Cicero is taking at this point. He contends that individuals have the power to shape their lives, and this contention will also place importance in the role of external circumstances. These four roles described above give a general view of the considerations people will have to think about when they are deciding on the right action to take in the course of their lives. Cicero stresses the importance of personal responsibility in making decisions; this itself reads as marked change in direction from the early Stoics who placed the sage as the focus of imitation. This change in direction brought Stoicism in a sense, down to earth. Panaetius now placed a stress on agreement between man's individual capacities and that of his general nature, unlike Chrysippus' idea of agreement between universal nature and human nature.¹⁷⁵

Thus, it would appear that the idea of self-sufficiency was no longer a viable prerequisite for happiness. In *On Duties*, Cicero begins almost at once to place emphasis on the social aspect of man's nature, what he ought to do, his duty. He describes two types of duties: firstly, the intermediate duties called common or average action (*medium commune officium*), and secondly, the correct, perfect or absolute duties (*perfectum officium rectum*), the latter are only preformed by the sage, the former by humanity:

We distinguish between 'mean' duty, so called, and 'absolute' duty. Absolute duty we may, I presume, call 'right', for the Greeks call it *κατόρθωμα*, while the ordinary duty they call *καθήκον*. And the meaning of those terms they fix thus:

decore, at quam minime indecore facere possimus [...] Ac duabus iis personis, quas supra dixi, tertia adiungitur, quam casus aliqui aut tempus imponit; quarta etiam, quam nobismet ipsi iudicio nostro accommodamus [...] ipsi autem gerere quam personam velimus, a nostra voluntate proficiscitur [...] in primis autem constituendum est, quos nos et quales esse velimus at in quo genere vitae, quae deliberatio est omnium difficillima.

¹⁷⁵ Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1.110-118. Chrysippus in his book *On Ends* appeared to have followed much in the same footsteps of Cleanthes by saying that the natural end was to live in accordance with one's own rational constitution as an individual and also that of the universal nature, god. See also *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, Vol.1, p. 400.

whatever is right they define as ‘absolute’ duty, but ‘mean’ duty, they say, is duty for the performance of which a probable reason may be rendered.¹⁷⁶

Rackham, in his translation notes in *On Ends*, makes a point that Cicero’s rendering of *officium* for the Greek *kathékon* is somewhat problematic. In rendering it as such, what is understood is that the individual will as an adult choose from a selection of natural goods, which as a child he persured instinctively. Cicero labels this as a duty or obligation. However, by putting selection with duty it would appear that Cicero is giving an inaccurate translation of Zeno’s original meaning of the word for ‘appropriate action’. It would appear that by making acts towards self-preservation a duty when they are originally meant as a rational choice and decision, Cicero is giving an inaccurate translation.¹⁷⁷ By stating this at an early stage in the dialogue one can read that man’s social nature is extremely important to the middle Stoics and therefore, draw the conclusion that the idea of self-sufficiency plays a smaller role in the happy life of man. However, Cicero does make the point in *On Duties* and also in *On Friendship*, that virtue is that which unites the two concepts: self-sufficiency and happiness. The essential constituents needed for friendship are found in virtue and this has parallels with his treatment of duty. Laelius in *On Friendship* says that society is the tie that binds¹⁷⁸, and Cicero in *On Duties* argues that society is the thing which links mankind.¹⁷⁹ Further on this

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.8: *Nam et medium quoddam officium dicitur et perfectum. Perfectum officium rectum, opinor, vocemus, quoniam Graeci καθόρθωμα, hoc autem commune officium καθήκον vocant. Atque ea sic definiunt, ut, rectum quod sit, id officium perfectum esse definiant; medium autem officium id esse dicunt, quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis redidit posit.*

¹⁷⁷ See, Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.20, p.238. Notes from the translator. Rackham is merely stating what has been by or large already known to Ciceronian Scholars namely that when attempting to render Greek words and philosophical terms into Latin, Cicero often had to reflect on the fact that he was writing mainly for a Roman readership and so had to take Roman cultural and social considerations into his attempts at rendering. Rackham, with this in mind, is therefore correct in mentioning the problems with the Ciceronian translations here.

¹⁷⁸ Cicero, *De Amicitia*, 20: *Quanta autem vis amicitiae sit, ex hoc intellegi maxime potest, quod ex infinita societate generis humani quam conciliavit ipsa natura, ita contracta res est adducta in angustum, ut omnis caritas aut inter duos aut inter paucos iungeretur.*

¹⁷⁹ Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1.22: *In hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi, communes utilitates in medium afferre mutatione officiorum, dando accipiendo, tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatibus devincire hominum inter homines societatem.*

point, Cicero writes in *On Duties*¹⁸⁰ and in *On Friendship* that both friendship and bonds of human society are in accordance with nature:

For this reason it seems to me that friendship originates in nature, rather than in need: more because of an attachment of the mind, accompanied by the sense of affection, than because of a calculation of the amount of advantage that the association will bring.¹⁸¹

Describing the feeling of attachment and affection that friendship brings, it appears that Cicero is describing the Stoic notion of *oikeiosis*.¹⁸² In Book Three of *On Ends* Cicero through Cato describes *oikeiosis* as the theory which:

Immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment to itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution [...] In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction [...] this leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action [...] the first 'appropriate act' (for so I render the Greek *καθῆκον*) is to preserve oneself in one's natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary.¹⁸³

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.21 : *Nam principio tollit convictum humanum et societatem. Si enim sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet aut violet alterum, disrupti necesse est, eam quae maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis societatem.*

¹⁸¹ Cicero, *De Amicitia*, 27: *Quapropter a natura mihi videtur potius quam ab indigentia orta amicitia, applicatione magis animi cum quodam sensu amandi quam cogitatione quantum illa res utilitatis esset habitura.*

¹⁸² Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.16. When describing *Oikeiosis*, Cicero uses two terms here. He uses the words *conciliari* (present passive infinitive of *conciliō*) – to unite/procure and *commendari* (present passive infinitive of *commendō*) – to recommend/enjoin, to describe the way in which a living creatures primary instinct is towards itself and views the body as its own. *Oikeiosis* has been described at various points as either 'appropriation' or 'affiliation'. It is concerned with human natural development and has its origins in the Greek '*Oikeiousthai*' - to make something familiar and to make something one's own. The Peripatetics have their own quiet similar theories relating to what they call '*Oikeiotes*'- translated as 'natural adaptness'. However, I shall leave at this moment the discussion of *Oikeiosis* pertaining to where the soul recognises the body as appropriate to *itself*, and thus, takes the body to be its own. Forming the notion of the self, and hence also of others. However, this discussion would in all probability deviate from the topic of our present discussion. Therefore, I shall only deal with primarily Cicero through Cato's explanation of social understanding of *oikeiosis*. On these issues see S.G Pembroke 'Oikeiosis', in *Problems in Stoicism*, pp. 114-150; C.O Brink, 'Oikeiosis and Oikeiotes, Theophrastus and Zeno on Nature in moral theory', in *Vol. I, Phronesis 1955-56*, pp. 123-145.

¹⁸³ Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.16-19: *Quorum ratio mihi probatur, simul atque natum sit animal (hinc enim est ordiendum), ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque quae conservantia sunt eius status diligenda [...] Id ita esse sic probant, quod ante quam voluptas aut dolor attigerit, salutaria appetent parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non fieret nisi statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent [...] Ex quo intellegi debet principium ductum esse a se diligendo [...] Primum est officium (id enim*

By understanding *oikeosis* as such the Stoics illustrated their understanding that the first instinct of human nature was that of self-preservation. The idea of self-preservation is the primal instinct given by nature to the child at birth. Consciousness is the awareness of one's own constitution, understanding that one has a duty towards oneself at the beginning, Diogenes Laertius citing Chrysippus writes that:

They say [The Stoics] that an animal has self preservation as the object of its first impulse, since nature from the beginning appropriates it, as Chrysippus says in his *On Ends* book one. The first thing appropriate to every animal, he says, is its own constitution and the consciousness of this. For nature was not likely to alienate the animal itself, or to make it and then neither alienate it nor appropriate it. So it remains to say that in constituting the animal, nature appropriated it to itself. This is why the animal rejects what is harmful and accepts what is appropriate.¹⁸⁴

This view of the first instinct of human nature, was at definite odds with the Epicurean one.¹⁸⁵ For the Stoics life was a constant state of rational evolution. By this one can say that when the child had first learned to accept and appropriate those things necessary to its self-preservation, it would then naturally ascend to become a fully rational being in adulthood. Rational life was strictly the possession of human beings and the exercise of rationality would be considered as an act of virtue. In the harmonization of reason human beings will see rationality in all human beings, the sense of shared rationality amongst human beings will in turn lead to a natural concern towards others. *Oikeosis* would encompass this idea within its definitions.

apello καθήκον) ut se conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat quae secundum naturam sint pellatque contraria.

¹⁸⁴ Diogenes Laertius. 7.85-6 (S.V.F. 3.178), in *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, Vol.1, p. 346.

¹⁸⁵ Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.33: 'Nec vero ut voluptatem expetat natura movet infantem, sed tamen ut se ipse diligat, ut integrum se salvumque velit'. In the promotion of pleasure as the primary instinct the Epicureans were little more than animals for Cicero and he often wrote about it in such terms. See Cicero, *De Tusculanae Disputationes*, 5.37; *De Amicitia*, 32.

Oikeosis is described as the Stoic notion of the relationship that the self has with itself and it is grounded in the world in which it inhabits.¹⁸⁶ In *On Duties*, Cicero writes of the characteristics that construct the identity of the human being. When describing the virtues he describes temperance as *decorum*.¹⁸⁷ He furthers his description by breaking *decorum* into two parts, one general and the other particular. General *decorum* corresponds with human dignity and shows that human nature is superior to that of the brutes. Particular *decorum* is concerned with the social aspect of man, being able to speak and act well in public. With moral *decorum* nature is evidently assigning man his role in life, to be both self-controlled and also considerate to others. In this way *decorum* prescribes two duties to man: the first is to follow nature and the second is to subject the passions to reason. In doing this Cicero is making it clear that a life in accordance with nature is a rational one, but also one that is considerate of others¹⁸⁸ Reason and society are thus, naturally interconnected. It is natural that humans need others; this is shown initially in children's reaction and affection towards their parents. But *Oikeiosis*, in my understanding, is the Stoic attempt to illustrate the evolution of their ethical view and the reality of daily life, and it is important to understand this process as an evolution. *Oikeiosis* ascends and evolves because human nature does the same thing, as the need of human beings change over time, so too will their *oikeiosis*. In this rational ascendancy man will learn to use his reason to choose amongst the things that nature shall offer him. But in this process of selection man will see that people with whom he has a bond are not amongst the indifferent but amongst the things preferred. This means that friendship or kinship is to be preferred from amongst the classes of the indifferent because

¹⁸⁶ G. Raymond-Schils, *The Roman Stoics, Self, Responsibility, and Affection* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 16-18.

¹⁸⁷ Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1.93-100.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.9-10.

these are more in accordance with nature. Man needs these things so his human nature might develop properly.¹⁸⁹

Cicero has already been speaking of *oikeiosis* when he describes man's duty as duty which is explicitly linked with his service to his society. Man's duty, as understood by Cicero, will entail his acting in accordance with nature, which is any action, that is, orderly, appropriate and temperate, while having an ascetic sense of things both earthly and divine.¹⁹⁰ Man's sense of duty arises out of his social nature and is a natural part of it. The Stoics counted relationships such as the ones that a man forms with those around him and in turn his society at large as part of his rational evolution. The social *oikeiosis* and the *oikeiosis* to one's self are developed parallel to each other. However, in the course of this process of maturity the human being will not lose his capacity for self-preservation, but instead subjugate it to the life of reason.¹⁹¹ *Oikeiosis* is fundamentally important in our discussion of friendship, as this explains man's natural rational evolution which places importance in social affection. It is rational for us to have affection for those in our social circle, and even the sage must admit to these natural social links. This might seem absurd in the light of our discussion about the self-sufficiency of the sage earlier. Yet, as we have seen, the Stoics did alter their philosophical theories in the face of criticism in the years after Zeno, and many of the Stoics did appear to progress from a more intransigent position, e.g., Aristo of Chios¹⁹², to a much more moderate position, e.g., Panaetius, as has already been shown. Human rational development was essentially embedded in human social nature and they saw that duty towards a family, friends and country was absolutely in following a life in accordance with nature:

¹⁸⁹ Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.50-53.

¹⁹⁰ MacKendrick, *The Philosophical works of Cicero*, p. 233.

¹⁹¹ Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.16-21.

¹⁹² According to Diogenes Laertius, Ariston of Chios although a Stoic and colleague of Zeno was more akin to a Cynic than a Stoic and, differed from Zeno in that for Ariston the end of man is to 'a life of perfect indifference to everything which is neither virtue nor vice ; recognizing no distinction whatever in things indifferent, but treating them all alike'. Diogenes Laertius, 7.2. 161-162. He also rejected the idea that any external advantage or plurality in virtue could be rated in the category of preferred or not.

The Wise Man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have children by her. Even the passions of love when pure are not thought incompatible with the character of the Stoic sage.¹⁹³

We see the same explanation in *On Friendship*, where the source of friendship is love and affection found in good will.¹⁹⁴ It is through friendship that man will learn to have a natural sense of equality and fairness towards others.¹⁹⁵ Man is not just a rational being; he has a teleological grounded sense of socialization and a commitment to others.¹⁹⁶ This is essential to the perfection of man's nature. Man will therefore find perfection by being a member of a community of gods and men: 'Again they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members and each one of us is a part of this universe.'¹⁹⁷

Cicero also discusses this issue in *On the Nature of the Gods*¹⁹⁸; friendship is itself found in both affection for and concord with the community at large. For Cicero like the Stoics and Aristotle, one of the defining features of true friendship is total concord between the friends. If concord between friends is a mark of true friendship for Cicero through Laelius then one of the distinguishing features of the inferior sort of friendship is discord between friends. This is easy to see as when differences arise between people engaged in the inferior and common sort of friendship, then one of the fundamental laws pertaining to true friendship

¹⁹³ Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.68: 'Sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque, ut a natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos. Ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur'.

¹⁹⁴ Cicero, *De Amicitia*, 38 & 50 ;and see also *De Officiis*, 1.56; *De Finibus* 3.68-70.

¹⁹⁵ Cicero, *De Amicitia*, 69.

¹⁹⁶ B.Inwood and P. Donini, 'Cosmic Nature and Human Nature', in *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* ed. by K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld & M. Schofield (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 681-683.

¹⁹⁷ Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.64: 'Mundem autem consent regi numine deorum eumque esse quasi commune urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unumque nostrum eius mundi esse partem'.

¹⁹⁸ Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, 2.76: 'Atqui necesse est cum sint di (si modo sunt, ut perfecti sunt) animantis esse, nec solum animantis sed etiam rationis compotes inter seque quasi civili conciliatione et societate coniunctos, unum mundum et communem rem publicam atque urbem aliquam regentis.'

has been broken and thus, the friendship cannot be said to be either true or continue to exist.

Cicero speaking through Laelius says that:

If some change of character or interests takes place, as it often does, or if friends are separated by a political disagreement (I am now talking, as I said just now, not about the friendships of the wise, but about ordinary ones), one will need to be careful to avoid the impression that one has not only ended a friendship, but also a quarrel.¹⁹⁹

Cicero maintains that the good will know why they are friends, whereas the common sort of friendship it will be guided by opinion more than true knowledge. Hence a difference of opinion may well led to quarrelling among the common mass. The friendship of the good, is based on virtue and so is stable and by having concord both parties will never quarrel, for friendship can only exist in virtue.²⁰⁰ So the wise will know why they are friends and also that the affection that they share and give to one another is completely natural. Likewise they will comfort each other in sorrow: ‘ And it is a true saying that, to fulfill the requirements of friendship, one must eat many bags of salt together’.²⁰¹ Oikeiosis, again, gives an insight into this. As the individual matures into adulthood and a rational being as theorized and described in *oikeiosis*, it will be natural that rational beings observe other rational beings as objects of both love and affection.²⁰²

Love and friendship is not only an intimate personal matter but it also a social and political one. For the Stoic system was one of unity and so their theories of friendship

¹⁹⁹ Cicero, *De Amicitia*, 77: *Sin autem aut morum aut studiorum commutatio quaedam, ut fieri solet, facta erit, aut in rei publicae partibus dissensio intercesserit loquor enim iam, ut paulo ante dixi, non de sapientium, sed de communibus amicitiiis, cavendum erit ne non solum amicitiae depositae, sed etiam inimicitiae susceptae videantur.*

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 20.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 67: *Verumque illud est quod dicitur, multos modios salis simul edendos esse ut amicitiae munus expletum sit.* This was the rule of Aristotle concerning testing the reliability of friendship. See, Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.1156.27b. This reminds one of the old saying that the friend in need is a friend indeed. See, Powell, commentary in *De Amicitia*, p. 109.

²⁰² Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.63: *Ex hoc nascitur ut etiam communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum quod homo sit non alienum videri.*

extended into political arena and their political theories thus, were closely aligned with their theories of duty, friendship and also *oikeiosis*. The good man was considered a man who took his duty to his society seriously and by doing so he would create harmony between men. The idea of the law involves being able to distinguish from what is just and what is unjust. This will take wisdom and the ability to be always able to choose what is just and what is true.²⁰³ Hence the good man would be the one who could and would create harmony among men. Justice and law are derived from human nature²⁰⁴ in which the mind is ascendent and thus, in complete accord with the universal law. For the Stoics all the virtues were as one, compiled into a unity of virtues.²⁰⁵ As virtue was located in rationality, and anything that participated in rationality was identified with goodness. Hence, one might say that just as prudence is rooted in rationality, so is justice, and therefore, it is a virtue. J.Harris adds weight to this theory and writes that justice is a virtue because: ‘Justice and law were not matters of opinion but fixed in nature and were worth pursuing as an absolute good’.²⁰⁶ So justice is a natural extension of *oikeiosis*. Cicero, through Cato, explains that this care for others in the community is natural and altruistic behaviour exhibited by all animals in nature and man is not different:

Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature’s operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the voice of nature. Hence it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. From this

²⁰³ Cicero, *De Legibus*, 2.11-12.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.26-27.

²⁰⁵ All humans had a natural tendency towards virtue, having an innate predisposition towards it due to the possession of reason. See Cicero, *De Legibus*, 1.27; *De Republica* 26-27. Some of the earlier Stoics disagreed on the issue of the unity of virtue. Aristo in disagreement with his contemporary Stoics said that there was only one natural excellence, predisposed by the virtues; this would develop over time into a single virtue. Also see Inwood and Donini, pp. 707-719.

²⁰⁶ J. Harris, ‘Cicero and the defining of the *Ius Civile*’, in *Greek and Roman Philosophy 100BC to 200AD*, Vol 2 ed. by R.W. Sharples and R.Sorabji, (London: University of London, 2008), p.56.

impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this is also bestowed by nature.²⁰⁷

In observing how animals live according to nature, man would know what he ought to do, as human beings are also social, and thus naturally altruistic. Rationality itself is consistent and therefore, any action in accordance with rationality will be consistent and thus, good; altruistic behaviour is said to be natural because it is found throughout the natural world, so it is also good. In *On Duties*, Cicero also discusses this issue²⁰⁸, but adding that due to mankind possessing reason, human altruism goes beyond merely rearing of one's young and also includes the care of one's society. For man is not motivated merely out of self-interest (this would go against reason and nature) but rather, also by a natural impulse towards other humans with whom man identified with.²⁰⁹ So one's natural duty is to the care of one's society. there can be no differentiation between the interests of the individual and that of society. Therefore, natural law and justice go hand in hand with rational behaviour, and thus, with wisdom.²¹⁰ This is in contrast to injustice which is the disrupter of union and friendship; Cicero develops these points in *On Duties*:

This then ought to be the chief end of all men, to make the interest of each individual and the whole body politic identical. For, if the individual appropriates to selfish ends what should be devoted to the common good, all human fellowship will be destroyed. And further, if Nature ordains that one man shall desire to promote the interests of a fellow-man, then it follows, in accordance with that same Nature, that there are interests that all men have in common.²¹¹

²⁰⁷ Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.62: *Neque vero haec inter se congruere possent ut natura et procreari vellet et diligere procreatos non curare. Atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspicui potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. Quare ut perspicuum est natura nos a dolore abhorere, sic apparet a natura ipsa ut eos quos genuerimus amemus impelli.*

²⁰⁸ Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1.11-17.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.152-159.

²¹⁰ Cicero, *De Legibus*, 1.42-43.

²¹¹ Cicero, *De Officiis*, 3.26-27: *Ergo unum debet esse omnibus propositum, ut eadem sit utilitas unius cuiusque et universorum; quam si ad se quisque rapiet, dissolvetur omnis humana consortio. Atque etiam, si hoc natura praescribit, ut homo homini, quicumque sit, ob rem ipsam causam, quod is homo sit, consultum velit, necesse est secundum eandem naturam omnium utilitatem esse communem.*

In relation to the above passage, the theory of *oikeiosis* would show that law is a product of reason, and therefore, provides man with moral imperatives. When the Stoics developed their theories about the *cosmopolis*, they were theorising about a universal city of the fair-minded and good, which is itself based in reason and partakes fully of natural law. Cicero, in *On the Nature of the Gods* argues that the only criterion for entry to the *cosmopolis* is wisdom and virtue: ‘For the world is as it were the common dwelling-place for gods and men, or the city that belongs to both; for they alone have use of reason and live by justice and by law’.²¹²

Friendship or fellowship is mentioned as one of the duties for the wise men who dwell in the *cosmopolis*, for in friendship, the wise will act together, undertaking beneficial acts by which all of the virtues will be brought to their natural fulfilment. Thus, the *cosmopolis* is truly united and maintained in virtue.²¹³ By assigning true friendship a place amongst the virtues, for only the wise can truly know it, the Stoics are saying that it is in absolute accordance with nature. It is therefore united with justice and all the other virtues and appears to be the motivating factor in uniting men and gods alike. In *On Friendship* Laelius argues that there are two kinds of friendship: Friendship of the wise, a higher form of friendship, only practiced amongst the wise, and a lower form of friendship, practiced amongst the common mass. Cicero has Laelius describe these type of ‘friendships’ as the incomplete sort on the one hand and true and perfect on the other. Referring to them in passage twenty two of *On Friendship* as: ‘I speak now not of the common or incomplete sort (of friendship) [...] but

²¹² Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, 2.154: ‘*Est enim mundus quasi communis deorum atque hominum domus, ut urbs utrorumque; soli enim ratione utentes iure ac lege vivunt*’. Also, Cicero, *De Legibus*, 1.22-23.

²¹³ M. Schofield, ‘Justice, Oikeiosis and the Cosmic City’ in *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, p. 766.

about the true and perfect friendship that is found among the few who are remembered for it.²¹⁴

In introducing this distinction Cicero is following in the footsteps of Panaetius and he also gives an answer to the question concerning friendship and the self-sufficient sage. He calls this the community of interests:

For friendship is in fact nothing other than a community of views on all matters human and divine, together with goodwill and affection; and I am not sure if the gods have given men any better gift than this, leaving aside wisdom.²¹⁵

This statement appears to echo the Stoic understanding that friendship was maintained by equality, shared beliefs, activities and concord. This was not particularly a Stoic idea per se, Aristotle had written of this in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.²¹⁶ Powell maintains with some logic and justification that this was in a sense an appeal for loyalty in friendship. In the Roman context of Cicero's writing that the notion of loyalty is something that was taken very seriously by the Romans in their particular understanding of friendship. Powell writes that Romans would have taken friendship to mean support in all matters and this was to be outwardly expressed in public, a failure to do so would be taken by the Romans as 'a personal insult'.²¹⁷

Cicero speaking through Laelius, attempts to clarify the reasons why friendship can only exist between good men, as these are the men who are by their very natures unselfish and also completely equal and so fair minded with each other. Yet he does however, much

²¹⁴ Cicero, *De Amicitia*, 22: *Neque ego nunc de vulgari aut de mediocre [...], sed de vera et perfecta loquor, quails eorum qui pauci nominantur fuit.*

²¹⁵ Cicero, *De Amicitia*, 20: *Est enim amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benevolentia et caritate consensio; qua quidem haud scio an excepta sapientia nihil melius homini sit a dis immortalibus datum.*

²¹⁶ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 9.1166a.

²¹⁷ Powell, *De Amicitia*, p.22.

like Aristotle allow for inferior friendships. Yet the notion of there being a true and perfect friendship would have appealed to the Stoics who would see that only the wise (substituted by good) could maintain friendships because in they were both true and perfect and so had stability in virtue. This is contrasted with the lower class or inferior type of friendship that would not last too long after it had served its predetermined purpose of either servicing pleasure or some utility. However, by making the friendship of the wise the highest and best form of friendship, Laelius maintains that the Stoics were again in a sense appealing to the ideal rather than any actual and pragmatic situation. Cicero is highly critical of the intransigent and the idealistic Stoics and uses Laelius to criticise the Stoics, and also give examples of who the Romans deemed both wise and good men, on this fact by saying:

They[Stoics] say that nobody is a good man who is not wise. That may well be true, but their definition of wisdom is such that no human being has ever yet attained it. But we should pay attention to those things which are available in our own experience and in ordinary life, not things that are merely imagined or wished for. I would never say that Gaius Fabricius, Manius Curius or Tiberius Coruncanius, whom our ancestors judged to be wise men, were wise by the standards of the philosophers. Let them[the Stoics] therefore keep for their own use the name of wisdom, invidious and obscure as it is, provided that they grant that those were wise men. Yet they will not even do that; for they say that nobody but a wise man is entitled to be called good.²¹⁸

In stating his intention to not look to something that is either imagined or wished for, Cicero, through Laelius, is again showing the influence of Panaetius on him, and his[Panaetius] departure from the early Stoics by concentrating on real issues concerning morality not look to the ideal sage. Laelius, argues that only the good will know why they are friends, whereas the common sort of friendship it will be guided by opinion more than true knowledge. Hence a difference of opinion may well lead to quarrelling among the common mass:

²¹⁸ Cicero, *De Amicitia*, 18: *Negant enim quemquam esse virum bonum nisi sapientum. Sit ita sane; sed eam sapientiam interpretantur, quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus; nos autem ea quae sunt in usu vitaeque communi, non ea quae finguntur aut optantur spectare debemus. Numquam ego dicam C. Fabricum, M'. Curium, Ti. Coruncanium, quos sapientes nostri maiores iudicabant, ad istorum normam fuisse sapientes. Quare sibi habeant sapientiae nomen et invidiosum et obscurum: concedant ut viri boni fuerint. Ne id quidem facient; negabunt id nisi sapienti posse concedi.*

Since friendship has the effect of(as it were) turning a number of minds into one, how can that happen if even the individual himself does not have a single mind that is always the same, but one that is changeable and inconstant and many-sided? ²¹⁹

This is true for the friendship of the good because the friendship of the good, is based on virtue and so is stable and by having concord both parties will never quarrel, for friendship can only exist in virtue.²²⁰ True friendships may never be changed because based in virtue and following nature, one might see that nature herself does not change.²²¹ The wise man's concern for the well being of his friends and his state is reciprocated for a friend is another self: 'For he who looks at a true friend, sees as it were a reflection of himself'.²²² This notion of the *alter ego* has its origins with Aristotle.²²³ To the Stoics self love is natural for is in accordance with the primary instinct. Through the evolution of *oikeiosis*, the individual sees others and these naturally become the object of love and affection. It is natural for humans to care for one another as due to their sharing of humanity, so humans will naturally care for those that are akin to them.²²⁴ This love and affection will be consummated and maintained friendship.

In following Panaetius, Cicero through Laelius draws a distinction between the friendship of the common man and fellowship of the sage.²²⁵ Cicero appears to follow this line by setting up an opposition between stoic 'idealisms' in regards to friendship, and the

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 92: *Name cum amicitiae vis sit in eo ut unus animus erit idemque semper, sed varius commutabilis multiplex.*

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 20.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 32.

²²² *Ibid.*, 23: *Verum enim amicum qui intuetur, tamquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui.*

²²³ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 9.1166a.

²²⁴ Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.63: *Ex hoc nascitur ut etiam communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum quod homo sit non alienum videri.*

²²⁵ Sandbach, *The Stoics*, p.17-18. Panaetius was responsible for making Stoicism less idealistic and more realistic and thus, humane.

practical reality of it, by using Roman friendship as the basis for example. Friendship is that aspect that goes hand in hand with virtue, as it is the community of virtues:

For friendship is in fact nothing other than a community of views on all matters human and divine, together with goodwill and affection; and I am not sure that the gods have given men better gifts than this, leaving aside wisdom.²²⁶

Friendship for him is the union of thought and action by virtuous or good men. But this is founded and based in the understanding of *oikeiosis* as natural rational assent and justice which naturally flows from the utility of reason. Cicero has Laelius base his ideal friendship in the fellowship of the good but yet makes a clear distinction between the Greeks and the Romans. In a criticism of the Stoics ‘idealism’ Laelius argues that while there might be too much effort put into defining the good, and while it might be right to do so, it does not offer any assistance in understanding and application to everyday life.²²⁷ Having such an idealistic definition of the good means that there are no practical examples of this in which ordinary men might follow. In this respect, one might see why Cicero distinguishes between the two types of friendship, and one might hear echoes of Panaetius in Cicero’s words.²²⁸ Laelius will give an explanation of the word ‘virtue’ from his Roman perspective, and how it is used, and not just a philosophical definition of the word.²²⁹ It is indeed interesting that, for Cicero, his general exposition of friendship is not unlike that of the Peripatetics. What is meant by this is that when one considers Aristotle’s three definitions of friendship²³⁰, the three types tend to

²²⁶ Cicero, *De Amicitia*, 20: *Est enim amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benevolentia et caritate consensus; qua quidem huad scio an excepta sapientia nihil melius homini sit a dis immortalibus datum.*

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 18.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 18: *Sed hoc primum sentio, nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse. Neque id ad vivum reseco, ut illi qui haec subtilius disserunt, fortasse vere, sed ad communem utilitatem parum: negant enim quemquam esse virum bonum nisi sapientem. Sit ita sane; sed eam sapientiam interpretantur, quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus.*

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, 21: *Iam virtutem ex consuetudine vitae sermonisque nostri interpretemur, nec eam, ut quidam docti, verborum magnificentia metiamur, virosque bonos eos qui habentur numeremus: Paulos, Catones, Galos, Scipiones, Philos. His communis vita contenta est, eos autem omittamus qui omnino nusquam reperiuntur.*

²³⁰ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 8.1156a6-1156b32.

blend into each other, and much the same as in Roman friendships, the lines of definition become blurred. Roman friendships inhabited the gray zone unlike the Stoics who drew a definite defining line between perfect and ordinary friendship. By giving Roman examples, and at times criticising the ‘apparent’ overly idealistic stance of the Stoics,²³¹ is more evidence of Cicero’s alignment with the Peripatetics concerning friendship. Powell cites numerous instances in the dialogue where Cicero through Laelius seems to have a definite Peripatetic ‘flavour’ in the account of friendship,²³² and it would seem that in his understanding of most of the friendships in *On Friendship*, Cicero is speaking about the Peripatetic model which could be in turn a reflection of Cicero’s following of the philosophical method of Panaetius, who merged Peripatetic philosophical understanding with Stoic philosophy.

It would be beneficial at this point to discuss the meaning of the word *amicitia* as Cicero and indeed most Romans of his time would have understood it. In *On Friendship*, when Cicero has Laelius speak of ideal or perfect friendships, he has in mind examples of those friendships which were both pragmatic and humanly attainable. True friendships were based on having high moral standards, and also similar views and common interests, and are given as examples of these friendships in the dialogue. The friendship of Laelius and Scipio, for one example, and his own friendship with Atticus as another: but what he labels common friendship he associates with Roman political life.²³³ High moral standards and similarity of views and interests, a fundamental aspect of friendship of the wise was rarely found in the competitive arena of Roman political life, and so made the ideal form of friendship for

²³¹ Cicero, *De Amicitia*, 48: *Neque enim sunt isti audiendi, qui virtutem duram et quasi ferream esse quondam volunt; quae quidem est cum multis in rebus, tum in amicitia, tenera atque tractabilis, ut et bonis amici quasi diffundatur, et incommodes contrahatur.*

²³² *Ibid.*, p.19. in the introductory notes by the translator.

²³³ Cicero, *De Amicitia*, 64, 77.

Cicero, often impossible to attain.²³⁴ Laelius speaks of this quiet plainly in the text: ‘True friendship as very difficult to find among those who spend their lives in politics and positions of power’.²³⁵ So why would Cicero use the word *amicitia* to describe the common sort of political everyday alliances that most Romans knew and understood to be as anything less than the ideal? Roman politics was a business which placed a high level of importance on one’s public image. Romans expected those they called friends to support them in public debates and in senatorial debates. However what Cicero maintains when he uses the words *amicitia* speaking in the political context is something more akin to collegiality and is a world away from how he would consider his friendship with Atticus.²³⁶ Roman political life was based in the association of the individual with a particular political faction. This faction had interests and so the individuals who were members of a particular faction was expected to engage in relationships and make alliances with those whom might be of some private advantage to them and political advantage to their respective parties. D. Konstan writes that:

The parties to these shifting alliances grounded in private favour were said to be *amici*, which captured the individual nature of such ties and at the same time reduced them to a matter of practical affiliation having nothing to do with real and lasting affection. This, moreover, was taken to be the entire content of Roman *amicitia*.²³⁷

From the above passage it is also clear to see why Cicero would place political friendships on the superficial level. Differences in political affiliations and public interests would naturally push this inferior sort of friendship apart; Friendship born out of a sense of

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.21. in the introduction.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, 64: *Itaque verae amicitiae difficillime reperiuntur in eis qui in honoribus reque publica versantur.*

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.22. Powell writes in his introduction that friends in Roman political circles were expected to fully support, agree and share political aims. According to Powell, the definition of *consensio* as understood as agreement is not to be exclusive to the philosophical context. He also writes that the Roman virtue of *constantia* being understood as both consistency and reliability, was reflected in its practical understanding as consistency in both friendship and enmity.

²³⁷ D. Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.123.

reciprocity²³⁸ was always to be inferior because when the debt was repaid then the friendship based in utility would necessarily and naturally come to an end. But Cicero goes against this notion of friendships being, in a sense, maintained due to a series of reciprocated acts, he writes that in true friendship the reward is the goodwill and affection that will in itself be self-sufficient, an end in itself: 'Friendship is desirable for us not because we are attracted by the thought of recompense, but because the affection contains its own fruits within itself.'²³⁹ Here Cicero through Laelius speaks contra to the Epicureans who would see friendship as a utility for pleasure. Laelius scolds them and saying that by looking only to pleasure 'something so lowly and despised' they can never set their thoughts on the 'noble and divine'.²⁴⁰ Yet he is mindful of the difficulties that are faced when one establishes friendships of worth. He writes that one must put the friendship through trial, testing the characters that one might deem worthy of friendship, as there are no suitable outwardly signs or marks to read who is most suitable to call a friend. Caution is key, and Cicero through Laelius makes the analogy of testing horses to testing potential friends. In good faith, both stability and sincerity are founded and kept, whereas nothing that is untrustworthy is stable.²⁴¹

There is thus a need for consistency in true friendships, for reason is consistent.²⁴² True friendships can never be realised, and thus maintained, until the mind is mature and stable, unlike the friendships formed in youth and to whom friendship is a passing matter, but for the mature however, true friendship is naturally a product of reason.²⁴³ He gives a very vivid image when he speaks of this, by mentioning that just as the youth will cast off the *toga praetexta*, so too will they cast off the childish friendships. This is not to say that all

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.123.

²³⁹ Cicero, *De Amicitia*, 31: *Sic amicitiam non spe mercedis adducti, sed quod omnis eius fructus in ipso amore inest, expetendam putamus.*

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 32.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 63-65.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 79: *Digni autem sunt amicitia quibus in ipsis est causa cur diligentur: rarum genus, et quidem omnia praeclara rara, nec quidquam difficilius quam reperire quod sit omni ex parte in suo genere perfectum.*

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, 74.

childhood friendships would be cast aside merely that it is a natural thing as maturity takes its course. According to the theory of *oikieiosis* the youth naturally matures into rationality this will lead the youth towards others or places where they might feel affiliation. Cicero is therefore correct in saying that the origin of friendship is not found in need but in reason. Good will is formed in the perfection of reason, and so maturity will have to be reached before true friendship can be realised: 'In general one cannot judge friendships until the parties have reached full strength and maturity, both in age and intellect'.²⁴⁴ It is uniformity of interests that keep friendships together while differences will only break it apart. Hence, rational maturity is given importance in his discussion at this point:

Different ways of life entail different interests, and difference of interests pushes friendships apart. Indeed there is no other reason why good men cannot be the friends of bad men, or bad men of good, than that there is the greatest possible difference of interests and way of life between them.²⁴⁵

Interesting to note that Cicero is clearly claiming that differences of interest can drive friendships apart. For while plainly acknowledging that differences do occur in life, and thus, different interests arise for such things. Cicero then reminds the reader that there cannot be plurality in friendship. As said earlier, for Cicero the interests of the individual and the state cannot be separated. However, Cicero is aware of the tensions in doing this, and asks a fundamental question for the discussion: 'Let us first examine, if you will, the question of how far love for a friend ought to be taken'.²⁴⁶ Fundamental because as we have seen, for Cicero friendship was born out of love and it is in affection and affiliation for others that true friendship is born, maintained and also flourishes. So why would this love also appear to call for a compromise? For Cicero in the friendship of the good the prime maxim is harmony and

²⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 74: *Omnino amicitiae corroborates iam confirmatisque et ingeniis at aetatibus iudicandae sunt.*

²⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 74: *Dispaes enim mores disparia studia sequuntur, quorum dissimilitudo dissociat amicitias; nec ob aliam causam ullam boni improbis, improbi bonis amici esse non possunt, nisi quod tanta est inter eos quanta maxima potest esse morum studiorumque distantia.*

²⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 36: *Quamobrem id primum videamus, si placet, quatenus amor in amicitia progredi debeat.*

concord. For Cicero initially there is absolutely no way that loyalty for a friend should ever be manifested in armed insurrection against the state. He has Laelius give two examples of this to illustrate his point and uses examples that Roman readers would be familiar with.²⁴⁷ Interestingly, Konstan argues that this part of the dialogue was influenced more by contemporary events at the time of its construction.²⁴⁸ Laelius is adamant that one should never put the interest of a friend before that of the country.²⁴⁹ Wary as he is however of the situation that he finds himself in, Laelius later appears to rebuke what he has said and softens his hardline approach by offering that there is scope for compromise in this matter. As Powell points out Cicero accordingly gives a Roman tinge to his answer by highlighting that this compromise is acceptable as long as one's reputation is never to be compromised.²⁵⁰ Laelius explains the compromise below:

However, if by some chance it happens that one has to help a friend in some objective that is not quite right, and their life or reputation is at stake, one should depart from the straight course as long as extreme disgrace does not follow. There is a certain extent to which faults can be pardoned on account of friendship. However, one's reputation is certainly not to be neglected.²⁵¹

So it would seem that the interests of the country and of the friend may, in fact, be different at times. Yet in certain aspects the friendship can and would endure. Cicero through Laelius is attempting to walk to fine line between his understanding of the mutual support that friends offer each other and also the political situation that friendships find themselves in. That is not to suggest that he is being inconsistent by offering this compromise, but more likely that he is

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 36-37.

²⁴⁸ Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p. 131.

²⁴⁹ Cicero, *De Amicitia*, 40: *Haec igitur lex in amicitia sancitur, ut neque rogemus res turpes, nec facimus rogati. Turpis enim excusatio est et minime accipienda, cum in ceteris peccatis, tum si quis contra rem publicam se amici causa fecisse fateatur.*

²⁵⁰ See, *Ibid.*, p. 97. For Powell's commentary on the text.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 61: *Ut enim si qua fortuna acciderit ut minus iustae amicorum voluntates adiuvandae sint, in quibus eorum aut caput agatur aut fama, declinandum de via sit, modo ne summa turpitudine sequatur. Est enim quatenus amicitiae dari venia posit. Nec vero neglegenda est fama.*

being pragmatic. But differences of interests do occur and change naturally over the years, as humans live.

As friendship draws men together, it also draws the state together and it also draws the universe together.²⁵² But this can also be said to be utility in the sense that utility is the process by which most men come together, for example, to practice reason or for common security, as Aristotle would have thought. However, for Aristotle friendship based in utility is one of the facets of a lower form of friendship, but even the highest form of friendship for him would have some element of utility, i.e., the need for others, in order to practice the virtues with. So too for Cicero, utility is the aspect that draws people initially together.²⁵³ Though the higher form of friendship -the fellowship of the wise- would only be associated with the wealthy and upper classes of Roman society, in an attempt to render examples of the Stoic ideal in Roman social life. The ordinary man would have to be content with an Aristotelian practical version of friendship. This could explain why Cicero would write that:

What comes from a friend becomes pleasant precisely when it is done with goodwill. And so far from friendships being cultivated because of need, it is those who have least need of the wealth and resources of others, and especially of their virtue (in which the greatest protection lies), who are the kindest and most generous. And yet perhaps it is not an advantage either if friends never lack anything at all.²⁵⁴

However, there might be another, much more practical, explanation. One may think that Cicero is following the rule of thumb of the day, in that the rich were forbidden by

²⁵² *Ibid.*, 24.

²⁵³ Powell argues that the whole paragraph assigned to the description of characteristic qualities of friendship is more or less based on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, 2.1380b34-1381b37. trans. and ed. by W.Rhys Roberts, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Vol. 2. ed. by J. Barnes (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984). This passage deals with human quality and psychology rather than any philosophical analysis, and as in Aristotle so also in Cicero, friends should have natural sympathy for and with each other. See, Powell's commentary in *De Amicitia*, p.109.

²⁵⁴ Cicero, *Laelius De Amicitia*, 51: *Tumque illud fit quod ab amico est profectum iucundum, si cum studio est profectum; tantumque abest ut amicitiae propter indigentiam colantur, ut ei qui opibus et copiis, maximeque virtute (in qua plurimum est praesidi), minime alterius indigeant, liberalissimi sint et beneficentissimi. Atque haud sciam an ne opus sit quidem nihil umquam omnino deesse amicis.*

convention to deal in daily business; that was the way of the common and lower classes.²⁵⁵ The rich were not expected to be found in the market place, haggling over the purchase of products, but in the great halls of government, processing the administration of the state.²⁵⁶ But utility is perfectly fine for beginning a friendship, and it is most natural. So, one wonders, if Cicero really believes that utility is necessarily a bad thing? In many instances in *On Friendship* Cicero gets Laelius to emphasize the mutual benefits in gaining and maintaining friendships, and also mentions that there is both pleasure and profit in the inferior kind of friendship. So if this be the case then what else would the higher form of perfect friendship have to offer? or as Powell suggests and with some justification that Cicero is being somewhat rhetorical.²⁵⁷

In conclusion, when enquiring about the nature of friendship, Cicero was enquiring about the subject at the very core of human nature. The middle Stoics, and later the Roman ones, by altering and reconstructing the maxims of the earlier Stoics were in a sense allowing space for friendship to mature and in such a way for a virtuous life to be envisaged as a practical reality. By placing emphasis on the development of ones own individual nature and the role that both choice and thus, responsibility will play in an individual's life, the Stoics of the middle period were able to place the way to a perfection of virtue within the boundaries of the pragmatic and not just the ideal. Out of this need for pragmatism, *oikeiosis* evolved. Initially being seen as the way in which one feels about ones self within the world, by splitting this theory into two Cicero was able to give an explanation of just how the Stoics saw the individual initially in the world and later the naturalness of social interaction between rational

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 34: *Pestem enim nullam maiorem esse amicitias quam in plerisque pecuniae cupiditatem, in optimis quibusque honoris certamen at gloriae, ex quo inimicitias maximas saepe inter amicissimos exstitisse.* The reason for this quote is that it clearly demonstrates that Cicero distinguishes the lower orders of society, who desire money, from the higher class of men who desire glory and honour. A reflection of the nature of most of the ancient societies, be they Greek or Roman.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 91, in the commentary.

beings. By maintaining *oikeiosis* as a theory which explained rational assentation through maturity and ethical evolution the Stoics were able to explain the naturalness of both affection and socialability that is found in the world. Affection firstly from adults to a child and later, replicated for all rational beings in general. The idea of the *cosmopolis* and also of philanthropy came from this understanding. Friendship was also explained as being natural and also a duty. For friendship is so tied with all that is human, it is natural and necessary.

Though Cicero admires the Stoic stance on the issue, he has been shown to accept the Peripatetic idea, preferring the practical over the ideal, as it were. All that is the best in mankind is found in friendship, and in that sense it is totally natural and necessary if we are to live a life, said to be, in accordance with nature, or even one in agreement with it. Friendship in itself is a virtue for the Stoics, it is the means by which the sage may practice his virtue. By living the virtuous life and practicing friendship, one can be said to be living the good life. However, this would in mean that friendship seen in this light, was initially undertaken for its utility. Something which Cicero staunchly criticises the Epicureans about. But later is happy to admit that friendship while not born in utility does give utility to life as it matures.²⁵⁸ For the Stoics, one must attempt to look rationally at what they understood by friendship. It was in friendship that the *cosmopolis* was established, managed and flourished, there was no utility only a mutual and rational understanding of what was virtuous. Happiness was found not solely within, but owing to the theory of *oikeiosis* very much without in the world around him. Happiness encompassed all of that which made human life human. A rational way of explaining the natural need and affection for others and that we give and in turn receive. Self-sufficiency might have been indeed a good idea, but in reality just cannot work, the theory of *oikeiosis* and the very nature of friendship itself speak plainly and demonstrate this fact.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 51.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has attempted to show that while the early Stoics held to the maxim that virtue alone is self-sufficient for happiness, the members of the middle period did appear to both compromise and alter this maxim naturally.²⁵⁹ Cicero appears to have seen where there were problematic elements in the Stoic position and has demonstrated this, I feel, in his discussions of it. While the Stoic argument has, at times, been persuasive, Cicero, through his own refutations and by citing those arguments of the Peripatetics allows for equally persuasive counter arguments. The Stoic philosophical concept of virtue being self-sufficient for happiness would appear to be idealistic rather than the reality shared by most of humanity, whereas, the Peripatetic one, which admits ‘external goods’ would seem more sympathetic to the human lived experience. There might be distinction between the wise and the rest of humanity in early Stoicism, but through understanding of our human nature, Cicero and Panaetius would say, we can find happiness and perfection. This idea of perfection no longer the sole property of the sage but in everyone who has even the semblance of reason and thus, virtue. This will necessarily allow for the inclusion of external goods i.e health, friends, family, into the pantheon of requirements for the happy life. Wisdom would appear to be the acknowledgement of this, the sage is a human being rather than anything akin to a god.

The view might then be that the sage is considered wise because he knows that virtue must include external objects in order to be complete. As nature created both mind and body, so care and consideration of both would seem to be wisdom in itself, and thus, would set the wise man above the rest. He knows that his happiness comes from the very act of

²⁵⁹ Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.50: *Dienceps explicatur differentia rerum: quam si non ullam esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone, neque ullum sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent nihil omnino interesset neque ullum dilectum adhiberi oporteret.*

harmonization between his human nature and that of the natural world which he inhabits. He can see external factors for what they most truly are, judge them necessarily and in the process either deny them a place in his reasoned happiness or accept them into it. His happiness is not in the promotion of mind over body, but in the understanding that both are a working unit. Through the act of harmonization, he will just his reason, thus his virtue and thus achieve happiness. If happiness is truly a universal concept and as understood by the majority of humanity, then it is something that needs external goods in order to flourish. The Stoics did appear to understand this and adapted the early maxim on happiness to now include external goods. The theory of indifferents was an answer to the criticism that the early maxim was ultimately far too idealistic and aloof, and simply could not be applicable to the vast amount of human beings. This practicality was also expressed in *oikeiosis*, initially understood as the primary instinct and later as the rational maturity in man. It became in later years the way in which one might see that self-sufficient ideas of happiness were moved to one side and replaced with a greater emphasis on the natural social instinct found in man. This is given credence by Cicero's exposition of the importance of *oikeiosis* in Stoic moral philosophy, and the central role it played regarding both friendship and social interaction. *Oikeiosis* is fundamental to human nature and also its rational evolution; as it is the mode of virtuous perfection. Friendship is fastened tightly to human nature because it is completely rational and also virtuous, as in that it is an end in itself. Friendship as Cicero wrote in *Laelius on Friendship*: 'creeps in some way or other in everybody's life, and does not allow any mode of life to be free of it'.²⁶⁰ So in the Stoic sense it is therefore good, natural and necessary. Deemed necessary as it is the medium through which virtue is practiced and it is the emphasis on the practical application of friendship that Cicero is at all times promoting. This of course would appear more in line with the Peripatetic view of friendship. However, it

²⁶⁰ Cicero, *De Amicitia*, 87: *Serpit enim nescioque modo per omnium vitas amicitia, nec ullam aetatis degendae rationem patitur esse expertem sui.*

might also be that Cicero is merely expressing what was expected of Roman friendships, in both political circles and personally intimate ones.

Virtue, in the sense, that it is associated with utter rationality, might be counted as being self-sufficient in the Stoic sense, but it does need some allowance for external goods in order to be maintained, both friendship and also *oikeiosis* are a testament to this. As both are tied to happiness, and are both ways in which virtue is maintained and expressed. So are both an integral part of any life that is in conformity with the natural law and is lived in accordance with nature. Self-sufficiency in theory can be expressed as a perfected idea of the human condition, but in reality just cannot work. Man, is just not self-sufficient in any possible way, neither in his nature nor his biological construction. Therefore, the theory just cannot work in any practical sense because ultimately happiness has to and must encompass all aspects of human nature not just one part of it.

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