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To Whom the Spoils?

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Abstract

When society changes as a result of cultural, economic, and/or political upheaval, the foundation of each individual's identity, preferences, place and status, which were formed in reference to the society as it was but no longer is, are undermined, and success in what was can be turned into failure in what is.   To understand the individual's responses, I examine a model of a goal-oriented, socially embedded agent, then consider possible responses to societal change using the model as a lens through which to understand the world racked by convulsive change.

Key words: Society, the individual, identity, convulsive change

JEL category: Z1

To Whom the Spoils?

I Introduction

Although less than two decades old, the twenty-first century has been characterized by economic, political and cultural upheaval. The distribution of income and wealth within and between countries and regions has become more unequal, economic growth has declined, the distribution of the benefits from that slower growth has become more skewed toward the very upper tail of the wealth and income distributions, wages have stagnated if not fallen in real terms, globalization has led to jobs migrating from the developed West to the Global South, jobs globally have been lost to automation, and free trade has delivered its promised benefits to some rather than to all. In the civic arena, trust of and respect for "the elite," whether they are political or business leaders, academics, journalists or other experts has diminished. Faith in the democratic process has weakened while faith in autocratic leaders free of the checks and balances of democracy has risen. Culturally, in some countries, traditional mores and values have been displaced by progressive mores and values, in other countries the opposite has occurred. Reaction to this economic, political, and cultural tumult has been reflected in the recent presidential election in the United States, in the referendum on European Union membership in the United Kingdom, in the referendum on political reform in Italy, in the public debates in anticipation of the presidential elections in France, and in the rise of autocrats in Russia, Turkey, the Philippines, Venezuela and elsewhere.   In each country there has been a cry by those who feel economically, politically and/or culturally, that is, socially,

marginalized that they have had enough. They demand change, specifically a restoration of what they see as their central position in the economy, in politics, and in culture, that is, in society, and their fair share of the economic, political, and cultural, that is the societal benefits that this centrality implies.

Contrary to Margaret Thatcher's dictum that "there is no society," society and the wrenching effects of societal change are critical because humans are a social beings, existing in and formed by society. The nature of this societal link is essential to defining who a person is since identity, preferences, place and status are defined in reference to society. Who one is and is not, as opposed to what one is or is not, is socially interpreted, and one's behavior, as well as others' behavior in response, depends on these social interpretations (Arrow 1994). If we accept that an individual is malleable and is formed by society and social interaction, the only way to understand the individual and individual choices is to understand the society in which the individual lives and the society in which the individual was formed. When society changes, so must the individual.

In this paper I examine societal linkages in the context of convulsive societal change. When society changes so do the societal links that bind the individual to society, some strengthening, some weakening.   To do this I build on a model of a goal-oriented, socially-embedded agent who is formed by and makes choices in a social setting.   Using this model, I examine how individuals respond to societal change using the recent referendum in the UK and the presidential election in the US for context, examining specifically the role hope and despair play in enabling or dis-enabling an individual in navigating change.   I conclude by asking how the

costs and benefits of change should be distributed, and society's role in guiding this distribution.

II Social Structure, Expectations and Goals[1]

In standard economic analysis an individual is modeled as an atomistic actor who interacts with and obeys the rules of the market rather than of society. The individual makes decisions given preferences, which are defined absolutely. Granovetter (1985, p.487) suggests to the contrary that "[A]ctors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, …. Their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations." In a step toward returning society to its central position in the decisions taken by economic actors, preferences can be defined over individual identities (Akerlof and Kranton 2000) which have a social aspect, or preferences can be socially referenced, so that how one's consumption of goods, services or leisure or how one's wealth, income or employment status, or how one's support of one's family compares to others' determines how satisfied one is. This preference structure can be adapted so social references, such as comparisons of income with one's neighbors, are replaced by personal goals or social goals which society deems important to obtain, such as a personal or social identity, as in Brekke, et al. (2003), Shayo (2009), or Eguia (2013) or aspirations as in Dalton, Ghosal and Mani (2014).

To bring society more directly into our analysis, the individual can, as Arrow (1994) suggests, be characterized by a preference ordering over a set of goals

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[1] This analysis is developed in a series of papers by Pecchenino (2011, 2015) based on a model proposed in Jeitschko, O'Connell and Pecchenino (2008).

which society construes as important. Actions must be taken and resources must be dedicated to move toward or achieve those goals. Society, externally, as well as the individual, internally, measures and validates goal achievement that determines his satisfaction. Society, however, is not static. Thus, the society in which one is formed is not necessarily the society in which one finds oneself upon attaining one's majority, or in mid-life or in old age. As society changes so do societally approved goals. Societal change can change the goals, the preference ordering over goals, the actions and resources required to move toward or attain those goals, and the value of goal achievement.

Building on the model proposed by Jeitschko, O'Connell and Pecchenino (2008), further developed by Pecchenino (2011, 2015), and presented here in its entirety, suppose individuals plan to achieve a goal or set of goals all of which are socially construed as important and goal achievement is measured relative to the social ideal for that goal. The individual agent has a single preference ordering defined over N distinct goals. Individual goals can be multifaceted or unidimensional. As society believes these goals to be important, their social importance determines their place in the preference ranking. This place can change as society changes. Goal achievement may require gaining access to, maintaining or improving one's place in society. Since society is not monolithic, gaining access to, maintaining or improving one's standing in one social grouping may conflict with gaining access to, maintaining and improving one's standing in another social grouping. The agent must balance these competing forces, or by pursuing one goal abandon another. While goal achievement requires individual effort, it also requires social recognition and approval, actual or perceived, as well as individual

perceptions of worthiness. Further, the society in which one lives is not static and evolves. This means that what is socially important or what affords one high social status can change over time, either gradually or suddenly. These societal changes affect the ordering over goals, the goals themselves and the ease or difficulty of achieving or approaching them.

Let

$$\Gamma(g^1 - g^{1*}, ..., g^N - g^{N*}) \tag{1}$$

represent an individual's preference ordering over goals. His personal and social well-being is a function of his $n=1, ..., N$ goals, g^n, relative to its socially determined ideal (bliss point), g^{n*}, that is, $g^n - g^{n*}$, for all n. Assume $\Gamma_n(..., g^n - g^{n*}, ...) > 0$ (<0) for $g^n - g^{n*} < 0$ (>0), for all $n = 1,...,N$ and that $\Gamma_{nn} \leq 0$ for all $n = 1,...,N$. The sign of $\mathbf{\Gamma}_{nm}$ $n \neq m$ is positive if the n and m goals are complements, negative if they are substitutes, and zero if they are independent. Note, since society and what society interprets as important changes, the socially determined ideals, the g^{n*}, will also change as will the value of goal achievement.

Assume one's goals and the effort, the individual's interrelated resources – emotional, psychological, spiritual, intellectual, physical and economic – expended, required to attain them are related as follows

$$g^n - g^{n*} = \hat{e}^n - e^{n*}(v^n) \tag{2}$$

where

$$\hat{e}^n = e^n + \sum_{m \neq n} \beta^{mn} e^m \tag{3}$$

where $\hat{e}^n$ is the effort the individual puts into the nth goal, which is the sum of his effort dedicated to the nth goal, e^n, and any spillover from effort dedicated to the

other goals, $\beta^{mn}e^m$, for all m, where $\beta^{mn} < 1$. $e^{n*}(v^n)$ represents the individual's belief of the social belief (Orléan 2004) of the effort required to attain the social ideal, a construct that depends on the society in which the individual lives both narrowly and broadly defined, where v^n is a vector of conditioning variables – focal points upon which beliefs about goal n are conditioned. Among these conditioning variables could be the individual's emotional state (Pfister and Böhm 2008), social structures (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993), the moral strictures of the society of which the individual is part (Kaplow and Shavell 2007), the individual's circumstances that are determined in part by the individual's (relative) wealth or poverty (Dalton, Ghosal and Mani 2014), the neighborhood in which he lives (Ellen and Turner 1997; Atkinson and Kintrea 2004)), the acute (Buckert, et al. 2014) or chronic stress the individual is under, or one's religion, race or creed. Goals and the ordering thereof, the value of individual resources, conditioning variables and the social beliefs implied depend on context. Finally, achievement of or movement toward one's social goal ideals, regardless of effort expended, depends on social recognition and approval thereof, which is not necessarily fixed. Assume, similar to Eguia (2013) that for each social ideal there is a minimum distance requirement that ensures social inclusion, d^n, where d^n is determined by societal expectations, which may not be fixed, and individual perceptions thereof. If $|g^n(e) - g^{n*}| > d^n$, then, even dedicating all his resources to goal n will not allow him to achieve social inclusion in that social sphere.

Substituting the relationship of effort to goal achievement into the individual's utility function, the individual's task is to allocate his resources

$$e = \sum_n e^n \, , \quad e^n \geq 0 \tag{4}$$

to devise a plan to achieve/move toward his desired goals. Since an individual's total resources are a function of his emotional, psychological, spiritual, intellectual, physical and economic resources, they are not fixed, and can be enhanced or diminished by societal change.

The agent thus optimizes

$$\Gamma\left(e^1 + \sum_{m \neq 1} \beta^{m1} e^m - e^{1*}(v^1), \ldots, e^N + \sum_{m \neq N} \beta^{mN} e^m - e^{N*}(v^N)\right) \tag{5}$$

subject to his resource constraint (4), nonnegativity, and minimum distance constraints. The first-order conditions of the agent's problem are

$$\Gamma_n + \sum_{m \neq n} \Gamma_m \beta^{mn} - \lambda + \mu^n + \omega^n = 0 \, , n = 1, \ldots, N \tag{6}$$

where λ is the marginal disutility of effort, μ^n is the multiplier on the nonnegativity constraint, and ω^n is the multiplier on the minimum distance constraint. The multiplier $\mu^n > 0$ if the optimal choice of $e^n \leq 0$: all effort is put into the individual's other goals since the marginal disutility of effort exceeds the marginal utility of effort invested in that goal either directly or indirectly. The multiplier $\omega^n > 0$ if $|g^n(e) - g^{n*}| > d^n$. Failure to get close enough to one's goal ideals is self and/or societally assessed: the individual's resources, however deployed, are not individually or societally perceived to be adequate to the task. This could be as a result of personal failure, or it could be a result of societal (economic, political, or cultural) change that, in effect, moves the goal posts, the g^{n*} increase and with it the effort required to achieve it even if the required

closeness to the goal required for social inclusion does not, although it too may change and the necessary closeness could also increase.

In this model individuals' utility is defined over goals. There is an interplay between the individual and society that determines the cost of achieving his goals, the resources he has to do so, and the recognition of success or failure. The utility function does not conform to expected utility assumptions since probabilities, whether exogenous, affected by own actions or conditioned by social forces, are embedded in the effort required for attainment of one's goal ideal, an ideal not fixed nor static since its achievement is socially mediated. Further, utility is neither separable across goals with different, perhaps time varying, probabilities of achievement nor across time. Here the perception of time and the definition of the time horizon can also be socially mediated and vary from the eschaton to an irrelevance. Given this structure it is possible to analyze the interactions across goals, plans to achieve those goals as a result of changes societal change (see Jeitschko, O'Connell and Pecchenino, 2008, for derivations).

III When the World Changes

Given the interplay between the individual and society, individuals confronted with any change that affects the goals society construes as important or the cost of achieving them have two options. They can respond to those changes and do their best to adjust their behavior so that their now individually utility maximizing goals can be approached or achieved, noting that these may not be the goals that they were previously pursuing and taking into account the current costs of doing so as well as their available resources may be higher or lower. Or,

they can reject the societal changes and attempt to change society and thereby the goals it construes as important.

To ground the discussion, consider first the following examples of economic, political and/or cultural change, and second consider individual and group reactions thereto filtered through the lens of the model.

Brexit (see Davies 2016, Darvas 2016, Goodwin and Heath 2016, Inglehart and Norris 2016, Kaufmann 2016, Morgan 2016): In 2013 then UK Prime Minister David Cameron promised that if the Conservative Party won the next general election he would call a referendum on the UK's membership in the EU. He wanted to settle the question of EU membership once and for all, thereby silencing the Euro-skeptic wing of the Conservative party, certain that the UK would remain in the EU since, from his perspective, the UK was economically, politically and culturally stronger inside rather than outside. A majority of UK voters saw things differently. For them the referendum was an opportunity to assert, among other things, their identity as a proud British people.   Not European, but British: British by birth, British by inclination, British by right, British by law, British by institution, British by language, British. Many who voted their identity rather than their pocketbooks voted against their immediate economic advantage to reestablish an economic, cultural and political environment in which the UK would again be sovereign. Those voting to leave were, on average, older, less educated, living outside the greater London or other metropolitan areas, English or Welsh rather than Scottish or Northern Irish. They found in the EU and in the UK's membership thereof a focus for their anger

and despair at what they had lost as a result of the financial crisis and the austerity regime that followed, globalization and the deindustrialization of the UK: socially cohesive, generally homogeneous, safe, drug and crime free communities, the ability to own one's on home, lifetime employment in unionized industries (think coal, steel, heavy manufacturing) with good wages, benefits, and secure pensions. Membership in the EU had, first, outsourced UK sovereignty to Brussels, emasculating the UK. Further, the EU had delivered, they averred, (i) an influx of immigrants who were paid generous benefits, stealing British jobs, driving down wages, and refusing to integrate or ascribe to British values, (ii) restrictions on supporting essential British industries, such as autos and steel, (iii) senseless regulation on, for example, electric kettles, toasters and bananas, (iv) the weakening of the NHS, (v) the expansion of rights and protections to the LGBTQ communities, etc. Leaving the EU would allow the British to become sovereign and British again. When the votes were counted, 52 percent of the British people who voted chose Brexit, leaving almost half wondering what had become of their proudly European country.

Trump (see Allin 2016, Crooke 2016, Cramer 2016, Davis and Fields 2016, Davis and Hilsenrath 2016, Hochschild 2016, Inglehart and Norris 2016, Irwin and Katz 2016, Thompson 2016): In the United States, after a long and relatively slow recovery from the financial crisis and worldwide recession, in a generally positive economic environment of steady growth, low unemployment, low inflation and low interest rates, although ever widening income inequality both at the individual and regional level, a populist candidate, who was not closely aligned with the traditional political and economic positions of his own party,

was elected. During his campaign he connected with a part of the US population who felt the American dream was no longer possible for them. Responding to their deep-seated grievances, he promised (i) to expel illegal immigrants and repel new migrants, by building a wall between the US and Mexico for which the Mexican people would pay and by the "extreme vetting" of Muslim migrants to save America (economically, politically and culturally) for Americans, (ii) to defeat ISIS once and for all, (iii) to invalidate trade pacts and mutual defense treaties that, allegedly, benefitted others and imposed unilateral costs on the US benefitting only our feckless allies, (iv) to rebuild the manufacturing base of the economy thereby restoring lost factory jobs with their implied union wages, benefits and pension entitlements, (v) to restore the crumbling infrastructure, (vi) to bring back to the US all firms that have moved their operations overseas and tax them unmercifully should they not agree to do so. He questioned the scientific basis for climate change and promised to revoke US compliance with the Paris Agreement. He defied social convention and political correctness by demeaning women, members of the LGBTQ community, Muslims (US citizens and otherwise), war heroes and veterans, the disabled, the press, Mexicans, African-Americans, Asians and others. He denigrated elites, experts, policy-wonks, the heads of government agencies, and all those not agreeing with him, as being anti-American: not one of us.   He praised foreign autocrats who act independent of a cumbersome democratic process. In short, and in his own words, he promised to make America great again. Those who voted for him were, predominately but not exclusively, white, especially those who live in predominately white areas with very few immigrants, less educated, older, male,

but not necessarily poorer, folk holding what they see as traditional values. Those who did not, and they were the majority, largely clustered on the multiethnic, multicultural, liberal cosmopolitan coasts, wondered what had become of their already great nation.

Brexit and the Trump victory can be interpreted in the context of the model as effecting significant societal change. This change will, first, modify if not the actual goals the ordering thereof. Now what society most values may shift away from the cosmopolitan toward the traditional (from London to the North, or from the coasts to the heartland), and in so doing reset the goal ideals, the g^{n*}. Second, the victories change the conditioning variables, the v^n focal points upon which beliefs about goal n are conditioned, making the costs of goal achievement lower for those on the winning side, since society has changed in their favor, although, perhaps, higher for those on the losing side. Among these are the individual's emotional state (improved if one is on the winning side since now there is more reason to hope for a, from the individual's perspective, better future, dis-improved otherwise since there is reason to despair about the now more nationalist less internationalist future), social structures (more traditional/conservative, thereby less cosmopolitan), the moral strictures of the society of which the individual is part (tighter, more prescriptive, more constraining, rather than open laissez-faire approach allowing each individual to live by his own beliefs), the individual's circumstances that are determined in part by the individual's (relative) wealth or poverty (victors expect theirs to improve under the new regime so behave accordingly while losers expect theirs to dis-improve), the neighborhood in which he lives (expected to improve as, for

example, industry returns and migrants leave, expected to dis-improve as industry and migrants leave). Third, the e, the emotional, psychological, spiritual, intellectual, physical and economic resources are affected. So, for example, those on the winning side may feel heartened, hopeful, newly vigorous, again on the side of what is right and good, holding the expectation that their once devalued skills would again be of high and rising value and that their physical assets would appreciate, while those on the losing side may feel despondent, lethargic, their spirit sapped by the turn of events, the value of their skills and physical assets diminished. Fourth, the spillover effects, the β, from pursuing one goal onto the effort required to achieve another goal may change, making complementary or substitutable goals easier or harder to obtain. Finally, the closeness to the goal ideal required for social acceptance, the d, may change, making what had been unachievable achievable and visa versa. Thus, from the perspective of the victors, the anticipated change in status/regime alone leads to a perceived improvement in their position vis-à-vis their ultimate goals, while the opposite may hold true for the losers.

The Brexit and Trump victories were, interestingly, triumphs of the despairing. These victories articulated a demand for societal change, politically, economically and culturally, from those who felt they had not been listened to, ignored, forgotten, demeaned, that is, expelled from society. Their demands, however, were not for re-entry into society as it had become but into society as they believe it should be. Through the EU referendum and the US presidential election, they have won the argument for political change. But political change, however disruptive, will be unlikely to deliver all the desired economic, cultural

or even political changes.   But, change will occur. In the face of these changes, the hopeful will remain determined to attain their utility maximizing goals whatever the challenges no matter whether they found themselves on the winning or losing side of the argument, while the despairing, those on the winning side of the argument who see the promises made them repudiated or those on the losing side who see their world crumble, are apt to struggle to find a way, any way, to their chosen goals.

To see why hope and despair, which are both conditioning variables and a component of an individual's critical emotional resources, resources that can augment or diminish the individual's spiritual, intellectual, psychological and economic resources, may play an outsized role in individuals' responses to societal change, we look to Pecchenino (2011) and Pecchenino (2015). In broad-based reviews of a number of distinct literatures, she finds, first, that most theories of hope have a strong future goal orientation where the future looms large in an individual's decision-making process (Bloch and Ritter 1976, Meyer 2010, Moltmann 1965).   The present, rather than the future, is discounted. Second, for the hopeful, goal attainment depends on an individual's or society's desire and ability to transform what is into what should be or to move toward what should or will be even if that goal is known to be unattainable through human effort: nothing is impossible (Pettit 2004, Moltmann 1985, Bloch 1986). Third, theories of hope address the process of living, the journey one is taking, which suggests that one's preferences and hopes are redefined by the constraints one faces, such as age or disability (Greenstreet and Fiddian 2006, Antonovsky 1987). These theories provide a means of understanding or accepting fortune

and misfortune with equanimity. All is never lost. Fourth, hope is not irrational but may rely on an individual's ability to filter, sort and selectively use information (Pettit 2004). Fifth, the hopeful are in and of society. For despair she finds, first, that despair is a social malady. Despair excludes the individual from society, a society from which he has or perceives himself to have been expelled (Steinbock 2007, Nesse 1999). Second, re-entry into that society is or is perceived to be exceedingly difficult or impossible (Frank 1974, Greene 1989). Third, because the despairing believe that they have been expelled from society they do not perceive themselves to be bound by its conventions (Hillbrand and Young 2008). Fourth, social relationships for the despairing become difficult or impossible (Tangney, Steuwig and Mashek 2007, Frank 1974). Fifth, the ability to act, to cope even with the quotidian, atrophies or is lost. Apathy, lethargy, recklessness and suicide are common responses to despair (Steinbock 2007). Sixth, life is without value or meaning. This state of may be temporary or permanent. If temporary, life after emerging from despair has less value. If permanent, a future, any future, cannot be imagined (Nesse 1999).

Now consider what has come to be seen as the quintessential Trump or Brexit voter: middle-aged, working class, white male with traditional values who is not particularly well educated, who lives outside of a major metropolitan area where there are few immigrants, who lives in an area where jobs are routine, employment uncertain and unemployment is high and the economy is not thriving, who has seen what had been his rosy future tarnished and his hopes fade as the local economy has deteriorated (because of regulation, foreign competition, international trade agreements, structural change, whatever). Prior

to the referendum/presidential election said caricature viewed himself as being significantly distant from all of his major goals, $g^n - g^{n*}$ large for all n, as not having adequate resources to effectively reduce this distance nor the wherewithal to enhance his resources (through retraining or relocating to where his resources were more highly valued), e low, and no prospect of getting close enough to any goal given what he perceived as society's preference for the urban, college-educated, cosmopolitan, multicultural, white collar or creative worker over the ordinary working man. If he is a member of the long-term unemployed, he has suffered from many of its associated maladies: poor physical and mental health, social isolation, social exclusion, low self-esteem, low self-efficacy, low self-belief, loss of identity, inability to act, criminal and/or anti-social behavior, alcohol and drug abuse, self-harm, and suicidal ideation (Cooper 2011, Stuckler, et al. 2011, Wanberg 2012, Proudfoot, et al. 1997, Goldsmith, et al. 1996a,b, Brenner 1976, Catalano, et al. 2011, Choudhry, et al. 2012), behaviors that suggest despair: indifference to options taken and the consequences thereof: failure to attain any of his goals. If he personally is not a member of this group, he knows people who are.

After the referendum/presidential election, he saw himself as being closer to his major goals for two reasons: first, he perceived the societal goal ideal to have moved closer to where he was, since society again valued who and what he was, an ordinary working man with traditional values, the bedrock of society, and, second, conditioning variables, consistent with the new political and promised economic and cultural social order, enhanced the value of his resources. Without doing anything beyond casting his ballot, he achieved or came within striking

distance of social inclusion, recognition and acceptance. There were now some

grounds for hope and with them identifiable and achievable paths to his goals.

Arlie Russell Hochschild's *Strangers in Their Own Land* (2016) recounts the five

years she spent getting to know members of the American right in the bayou

country of Louisiana on their own terms. In the penultimate chapter of the book,

the promise of Trump to her "white, middle-aged and older, Christian, married,

blue- and white-collar Louisianans" is explored. She finds that there was a

> "deep story." In that story, strangers step ahead of you in line, making you anxious, resentful and afraid. A president allies with the line cutters, making you feel distrustful, betrayed. A person ahead of you in line insults you as an ignorant redneck, making you feel humiliated and mad. Economically, culturally, demographically, politically, you are suddenly a stranger in your own land. (p. 222)

At a Trump campaign rally Hochschild attends, Trump rails against the EPA,

trade, globalization, illegal immigration, and in favor of a strong military that will

destroy ISIS. He will make America great again. He has a Black Lives Matter

protester forcibly evicted. He further suggests that PC speech and behavior are

yokes not to be borne. Trump made her Louisianan friends feel proud again, no

longer strangers in their own land. He made them proud: to be white Christian

Americans, to hold views reviled in the national press, to be racist, sexist, and

bigoted, to carry guns, to be against abortion but for capital punishment, to sign

up for Trumpcare and still maintain their manliness. Under a Trump presidency

America would again the America where they were "The People". This would be

the case even if they still could not achieve the American dream.

However, the grounds for hope found in the Trump campaign may be tenuous

and despair may replace hope if political rhetoric is not institutionalized in

government programs (the urban, cosmopolitan, multicultural, college educated person rather than the "strangers in their own land" remains the focus of politicians' attention) and if the promised employment opportunities (reopened or employment growth in factories and mines) and community renewal do not quickly materialize. Social exclusion from the society you see as your own may be a greater cause for despair than exclusion from a society from which you are already alienated. The repercussions could be significant.

The urban, college-educated, cosmopolitan, multicultural, white collar or creative worker who worked in the financial, IT or creative sector, probably voted Remain or for Hillary Clinton, yet faces the same societal change. Some of them will see this change as making their path to their ultimate goals more difficult, and find themselves out of sync with the new society making their resources of less value, that is the distance $g^n - g^{n*}$ has increased and e has fallen as a result of the referendum or election. And, perhaps, d^n, has now gotten smaller – one needs to be closer to one's goals to achieve social acceptance: one has to be even better than before. The hopeful among this group are likely to filter out the bad news, revise their paths, and do whatever needs doing to achieve their goals. This may require returning to college to acquire new skills or another degree. It may require reprioritizing so that a complementary or substitutable goal takes precedence given changed conditioning variables (a less tolerant, more conservative society, more nationally than internationally focused economic and social policies, etc.) The hopeful will find a way. Those who will struggle with the new political, economic and cultural milieu are those who had been successful in the old society who have been accused of aiding and abetting the

economic and cultural declines that led to these electoral outcomes: immigrants, legal as well as illegal, recent and second and third generation, LGBTQ community members, all those seen as "not us." They may succumb to despair if they see all they have worked so hard to obtain: relative economic success, a place in the community for themselves and their families, a good cultural and spiritual environment, what they thought of as their home, the expectation of a safe and secure future, become unobtainable.

These effects, essentially the ins being thrown out, and the cultural and social, but here not economic, upheaval that causes, and can be seen in Olga Khazan's 2017 article in *The Atlantic*. For the cosmopolitan, urban, educated, LGBTQ, of recent immigrant heritage individuals she interviews, Trump's election was felt as a physical assault on all they held dear leaving them feeling ill, dispossessed, alien rather than citizen, in despair with all the accompanying symptoms and behaviors, hoping, perhaps in vain and knowing that it is in vain, for Trump to be impeached. They now were the strangers in their own land suffering from cognitive dissonance. They were once proud Americans and now they are Americans who barely recognize their country in the rhetoric and policies of the new presidency, rhetoric and policies that make them ashamed of and apologize for their country. This internal conflict is debilitating, both physically and mentally. Hopelessness and depression have replaced the hopefulness and expectation of a better world that characterized their Obama years. Those who had felt accepted and protected by both law and cultural enlightenment feel fearful. A Tea Party of the left is mooted.

"You have a disaffected mass of people," [Matthew Wright of American

University is quoted as saying]. "The question is whether that will get translated into anger that will turn into political change, or if people will disengage."

…"The Resistance" can become a new identity, like the Tea Party, which helps Trump-haters reconcile their American pride with their disgust at American leadership."

But the fear remains that the damage of the Trump presidency will be extensive, deep and long lasting whatever the liberal response.

The joyful hopefulness of Hochschild's Louisianans, is negatively mirrored by the despair of Khazan's cosmopolitan liberals. The tables have been turned. Society has been thrown asunder.

IV Conclusion

Societies are never static, and in this constant state of flux individuals attempt to achieve their goals, all of which society interprets as important. As society changes, so to do societal goals and individuals' means of achieving them. Societal change is never without cost. It is also never without benefits. The question is, then, to whom the spoils? While previously marginalized groups should be compensated for past societal ills, the ills that instigated the change, other groups should not be marginalized or penalized. Instead government actions and private sector initiatives should work to ensure that social marginalization in all spheres, economic, political and cultural, is minimized, that societal failures are acknowledged and amends made, and that all broken social relationships are repaired. That is, we should create a world where to the victors the spoils and all are victorious.

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