



**NUI MAYNOOTH**

Ollscoil na hÉireann Má Nuad

**ADAPTING TO DOMINATION:**

**The Athenian reaction to the hegemony of the Macedonian Kings, Philip II and Alexander III, 338-323 B.C.E.**

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## Table of contents:

Abstract	ii
Acknowledgements	iii
Abbreviations	iv
Introduction	1
Chapter One : Philip and Athens: The function of the League of Corinth in the aftermath of the battle of Chaeronea 338/337BCE	3
1.1 – The arrangement after Chaeronea	3
1.2 – The League of Corinth	5
Chapter Two: Athenian sovereignty and self-determination under the League	14
2.1 – Defence of the constitution	15
2.2 – Coinage	19
2.3 – The <i>ephebeia</i>	26
2.4 – The Fleet	30
Chapter Three: Athenian economy and the wider Greek world	35
3.1 – Food supply	36
3.2 – Honours for trade	41
3.3 – Local food production	46
3.4 – Timber	49
3.5 – Piracy	51
3.6 – Commerce	53
3.7 – Metics	54
Conclusion	59
Bibliography	63

## Abstract

The dating of the end of the classical period and the demise of the influence of Athens on the politics of the era is generally considered to arise from the events following the death of Alexander the Great in 323.<sup>1</sup> However, the Macedonian impact on Athens was firmly established when Philip defeated the Greeks at the battle of Chaeronea in 338. Despite this, the Athenians attempted to regain their former status in the Greek world for another fifteen years. The treaty formed from the League of Corinth created a political hiatus that allowed Athens to adapt to a new era of Macedonian rule. The political and economic status of Athens at the time of the battle of Chaeronea was to prove vital to the recovery of the *polis* and enable the Athenians to adapt to Macedonian domination. The reaction of Philip to the Athenians after Chaeronea was also crucial to this endeavour. The terms of the League of Corinth treaty defined the relationship of Athens with the Macedonian rulers and it was only on Alexander's death that the terms no longer applied on either side.

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<sup>11</sup> All dates are BCE.

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## Abbreviations

The ancient sources where abbreviated are given as follows:

Aesch.	Aeschines
Arist.	Aristotle
Curt.	Quintus Curtius Rufus
Dem.	Demosthenes
Din.	Dinarchus
Diod. Sic.	Diodorus Siculus
Hyp.	Hyperides
Isoc.	Isocrates
Lyc.	Lycurgus
Paus	Pausanias
Plut.	Plutarch
Polyb.	Polybius
Thucy.	Thucydides
Xen.	Xenophon

## Introduction

Philip's victory at Chaeronea in 338 and his military endeavours throughout Central Greece clearly demonstrated the ingenuity of his leadership and the capability of his army. Isocrates remarked that after the battle of Chaeronea Philip's renown was so heightened that a campaign into Persia would be an easy accomplishment in comparison.<sup>1</sup> Following the battle of Chaeronea and confined to the conditions of the League of Corinth, it is generally accepted that Athens had a relatively peaceful fifteen-year period. This was certainly so when compared to the turmoil of the Peloponnesian war and its aftermath. A Pan-Hellenic peace may have seemed unattainable in the inter-state reshuffling of alliances in the years following 404. The battle of Chaeronea was not only a victory for Philip and his Macedonian army but it also brought dissolution to the territorial warfare of the Greek states. During the 340s many of these conflicts were between *poleis* with a pro-Philip or pro-Athenian stance.<sup>2</sup> Philip called to order the central Greek *poleis* in organising the League of Corinth and in doing so he confirmed his authority over them. The prestige Philip gained by conquering the great *polis* of Athens would have given essential motivation to his own army in the event of an Asian campaign.

The League of Corinth was formed just months after the battle of Chaeronea and established some stability in the turmoil of post-Chaeronea Athens. In practical terms it alleviated the need for proposed emergency measures that may have undermined the democratic institution. The terms of the League required Athens to aid the distant campaign in Asia, which had been planned by Philip and carried out by Alexander. In

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<sup>1</sup> Isoc., *Epistle 3, To Philip*, 2.5.

<sup>2</sup> Rhodes 2009: 352-353.

reacting to the campaign the Athenians adapted to a new form of warfare. The circumstances of Macedonian domination necessitated a revision of internal defence, encouraging trade and an appreciation of the concerns of metics. The most positive aspect for the Athenians was their freedom from Macedonian garrisons and the non-imposition on internal affairs from the Macedonian kings. This enabled the Athenians to develop the aspects of sovereignty which were once emblems of their former glory and, although dominated by Macedon, enabled the Athenians to sustain their economy in the wider Greek world.

This assessment of an important era in Athenian development aims to unravel the methods that the Athenians employed to adapt to Macedonian domination. Philip's lenient treatment of the Athenians after the battle of Chaeronea is worthy of review. Philip's approach was also acknowledged by Alexander who needed stability in Greece in order to focus on his campaign into Asia. The distant campaign and *laissez faire* attitude of the Macedonian kings enabled the Athenians to develop institutional devices that ensured their survival in a territorially changed world. As Philip had to adapt his approach to the Greeks by ensuring the League was devised on traditional democratic principles, so too Athens adapted their approach to foreign traders.

The real challenge for the Athenians in this period was to establish trading links and portray Athens as a leading *polis* worthy of reciprocal benefaction from foreign traders. This challenge had to be met within the confines of the terms of the League of Corinth. The territorial adjustments made by Philip, and Alexander in Asia, complicated this task. The extent to which the Macedonian kings interacted with the Athenians was crucial to their fifteen years of success that followed the battle of Chaeronea.

## Chapter one.

### Philip and Athens: The function of the League of Corinth in the aftermath of the battle of Chaeronea 338/337 B.C.E.

#### 1.1. The arrangement after Chaeronea.

Philip's conquest of the Greek states at Chaeronea was sealed by his issuing of the terms of settlement with the Greek *poleis* individually. The Athenians expected devastation after Chaeronea considering Philip's revenge on the cities of the Chalcidian league. A version of these events was told to the Athenians by Demosthenes, 'I pass over Olynthus and Methone and Apollonia and the two and thirty cities in or near Thrace, all of which Philip has destroyed so ruthlessly that a traveller would find it hard to say whether they had ever been inhabited'.<sup>3</sup> However, the Athenians were treated with unexpected leniency by Philip, which was in complete contrast to the punishment meted out to Thebes.<sup>4</sup> Athens was to keep its democratic constitution in place, no Macedonian garrison was to be placed in the *polis* and the border town of Oropus was restored to Athens from Theban hands.<sup>5</sup> Oropus was of strategic importance; as a coastal town it made the fertile land of Euboea accessible, but for the Athenians it also had great religious significance.<sup>6</sup> In giving a Boeotian town to Athens, Philip further subdued the Thebans and at the same time defined the boundary of Attica. The significance of Oropus is seen in its removal from Athenian hands in the later wars of the *diadochoi*, as a statement of Macedonian authority.<sup>7</sup> Athens

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<sup>3</sup> Dem., *Third Philippic*, 9.26 most likely an exaggeration but this is an account that the Athenians would be reacting to; Dem., *On the Crown*, 18.213; Diod. Sic., *Library*, 16.52.9, 53.1-3.

<sup>4</sup> Worthington 2008: 154; Justin, *Philippic*, 9.4.6-9; Demades, *On the Twelve Years*, 1.9.

<sup>5</sup> Aesch., *Against Ctesiphon*, 3.85; Dem., *On the Crown*, 18.99; Diod. Sic., *Library*, 15.76.1; Demades, *On the Twelve Years*, 1.9; Plut., *Demosthenes*, 5.1

<sup>6</sup> Paus., *Description of Greece*, 1.34.1-5.

<sup>7</sup> Diod. Sic., *Library*, 18.56.6.



also maintained control of her islands to which Philip added Samos.<sup>8</sup> This strategically important island was also used as a means of enforcing authority when Alexander announced it be returned to the Samians under his exiles' decree. Philip also allowed the Athenians to retain administrative control of Delos, an island of great importance to Athens, not least as an emblem of her past glory.<sup>9</sup>

Perhaps this arrangement with Athens was an acknowledgement by Philip of pro-Macedonian sentiment among some Athenians such as that expressed by Aeschines and Isocrates. Although in his flattering letter to Philip, Isocrates gave him a clear reminder of Athenian greatness with his words, 'our power is equivalent to yours, and you should seek in every means to win us over'.<sup>10</sup> Philip's action is portrayed by Polybius as noble restraint and his treatment of Athens as a convenient opportunity to express his good character. Polybius reported that after Chaeronea Philip returned Athenian captives without ransom, some with a gift of clothes, and paid honour to the Athenian dead.<sup>11</sup> Although this is an indication that Philip had respect for Athenian culture, it is far more probable that his actions were motivated by military strategy rather than sentiment, particularly at such a crucial stage of his planning with regard to Persia.<sup>12</sup> Philip's benefaction towards Athens served to establish his role as conqueror of the Greek states just as effectively as he did with the *poleis* he punished with the awareness that what is given can also be taken away.

The reason for Philip's clemency toward Athens remains a matter of debate although most

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<sup>8</sup> Diod. Sic., *Library*, 18.56.7.

<sup>9</sup> Arist., *Athenian Constitution*, 61.6; 62.2; Diod. Sic., *Library*, 18.56.7; Paus., *Description of Greece*, 1.34.1.

<sup>10</sup> Isoc., *Epistle 2, To Philip* 1.20.

<sup>11</sup> Polyb., *Histories*, 5.10.

<sup>12</sup> Sealey 1993: 198-199.

scholars agree that the Athenian knowledge of sea-warfare, and its strong harbours, would have been vital components for Philip if he undertook a campaign against Asia. If Athenian thalassocracy was Philip's reason for leniency toward Athens, this would suggest that his intention throughout his campaign into central Greece was to have strategic access into Asia with the aid of the Athenian fleet.<sup>13</sup> However, Philip's territorial claim across the Northern Aegean had given him access to many *poleis* with seafaring expertise and Macedonia had sufficient naval power of her own to have gained that control in the North.<sup>14</sup> It may also have been evident to Philip that Athens had demonstrated a capacity equal to his in manipulating allied states. The Athenians had remained a powerful force in the face of adversity in the past, particularly at the end of the Peloponnesian war when their navy had suffered but recuperated. Athens would be a crucially beneficial subject-ally, albeit necessarily restrained. The form of this restraint would come with the creation of the League of Corinth just a few months after Philip's victory over the Greek states at Chaeronea.<sup>15</sup>

## **1.2. The League of Corinth.**

The League of Corinth established two parties in the contract: Philip and the Greek States.<sup>16</sup> Both sides undertook oaths to seal the terms of the treaty.<sup>17</sup> This treaty overrode all previous interstate councils and leagues. The most pertinent to Athens was the final dissolution of the Second Athenian Confederacy, which had been weakening since 355.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Worthington 2008: 156 suggests that as Philip wished to justify an Asian campaign by claiming revenge for Persian war atrocities against Athens, in such case harming Athens would have been a contradiction.

<sup>14</sup> Hammond 1989: 128, 184-185; Polyaeus, *Strategem*, 4.2.22; Dem., *First Philippic*, 4.22; Arrian, *Campaigns*, 2.20.

<sup>15</sup> Diod. Sic., *History*, 16.89.2-3;

<sup>16</sup> Hammond & Griffiths 1979: 625.

<sup>17</sup> Tod 1948: 177; Rhodes & Osborne 2004: 76; Hammond & Griffiths 1979: 625, n.7 this establishes the Greek side of the agreement.

<sup>18</sup> Paus., *Description of Greece*, 1.25.3; Rhodes 2009: 276-278; Ryder 2003: 75.

The League of Corinth was unlike previous bicameral treaties in that Philip devised all the conditions and membership was not voluntary. Refusal to join the League would have meant political alienation at a volatile time for Greece. The concept of legitimising alliances and the conditions of such a treaty were not unprecedented in the Greek world. Considerable similarities lay with the conditions stipulated by the Second Athenian Confederacy. Recurring themes within the treaties highlight common concerns of the period. The wording of the terms of the Second Athenian Confederacy invited membership from both barbarians and Greeks who were not allied with the Great King.<sup>19</sup> This confederacy was a reaction to the King's Peace, which, like Philip's league, had a non-Greek authority guaranteeing peace in Greece.

Inclusion into the Second Athenian Confederacy could have been an opportunity for Macedonian participation in Greek, and particularly Athenian, affairs. By not responding to the Confederacy, which had Athens as *hegemon*, Philip highlighted one motive in his creation of the League of Corinth in that he desired to be uncontested *hegemon* and establish Macedonian right of succession. This was also evident in his approach to the Peace of Philocrates in 346, where Philip did not desire other *poleis* to join, as he was not ready at that point in time for a larger undertaking in central Greece.<sup>20</sup> The martial superiority he displayed at Chaeronea led the way for a peace treaty completely on Philip's terms but the treaty was not devoid of benefits to the Greek *poleis* involved.

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<sup>19</sup> Tod 1948: 123; Rhodes & Osborne 2004: 22.

<sup>20</sup> Perlman 1985: 166-167.

The terms of the League of Corinth were crafted in such a way that no Greek state was to interfere in the policies of another, nor to cause internal unrest that might lead to a change in constitution, nor to ally with a foreign power that might harm another Greek state,

... and I shall neither break the agreement with Philip (?) nor take up arms for harm against any of those who abide by the oaths (?) neither by land nor by sea; nor shall I take any city or guard-post nor harbour, for war, of any of those participating in the peace, by any craft or contrivance; nor shall I overthrow the kingdom of Philip or his descendants, nor the constitutions existing in each state when they swore the oaths concerning the peace; nor shall I myself do anything contrary to these agreements, nor shall I allow anyone else as far as possible.

If any one does commit any breach of treaty concerning the agreements, I shall go in support as called on by those who are wronged (?), and I shall make war against the one who transgresses the common peace (?) as decided by the common council and called on by the *hegemon*; and I shall not abandon...<sup>21</sup>

Macedonia was not a member of the League and was not bound by its regulations. As *hegemon*, Philip was not aiming to create a new body of Macedonian citizens among the *poleis* of the League. Instead, with each state tied into its own political system and without external interference, the discrete constitution of each *polis* was suspended under the conditions of the league. In Athens a strong sense of patriotism was evident in the speeches of this period.<sup>22</sup> This would be an expected reaction in adapting to the domination of a foreign monarch as democratic values were highlighted. Glorifying Athenian democratic values also created a distinction between Athens and other member

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<sup>21</sup> Rhodes & Osborne 2004: 76; Tod 1948: 177.

<sup>22</sup> Lyc., *Against Leocrates*, 1.83, 102-7; Dem., *Against Leptines*, 20.161; *On the Crown*, 18.205 in most of his speeches Demosthenes appealed to the glory of Athens.

states of the League. The motivation for Philip to enforce this aspect of the treaty does not seem to be purely to protect the constitutions of the Greek *poleis*. Instead, Philip's treaty would keep the *poleis* of the League from inter-state conflict and, in turn, effectively protect Macedonia from an offensive retaliation from central Greece. Philip could then attend to bigger business. For Philip, with an eye on an Asian campaign, this was a corralling of Greek states, giving them a sense of a common bond but in effect stifling their relationship with each other. This structure also determined Philip as *hegemon* and the representative of the Greeks when he declared war against Persia.<sup>23</sup>

Throughout Philip's advancement into central Greece, peace negotiations and diplomatic gestures were continually offered to the Greek *poleis* as an alternative to battle. This allowed for Philip's military advances to be deemed as defensive warfare. This was notable in his championing of Apollo in the Third Sacred War<sup>24</sup> and in his declared motivation for war against Persia. As leader of the Greeks, Philip's campaign against the Persian king was presented as retaliation for the Persian destruction of Greek temples under Xerxes' command.<sup>25</sup> The Athenians could only respond with enthusiasm to such a campaign. The declaration of a war of vengeance also served to justify to the Greeks the presence of Macedonian garrisons, set up after the battle of Chaeronea, in Thebes, Corinth, Chalcis and Ambracia. These garrisons had seemed to be a contradiction to the terms of the League, which expressed autonomy for the member *poleis* but with Philip as champion of the Greek cause, they could be seen as a protective force rather than a feature of foreign dominance.

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<sup>23</sup> Worthington 2008: 160; Diod. Sic., *Library*, 16.89.2.

<sup>24</sup> Hammond 1989: 114-115; Justin, *Philippic*, 8.2.3.

<sup>25</sup> Hammond 1986: 572; Polybius, *Histories*, 5.10.8.

The terms of the treaty were probably not fully established at the outset. Plutarch's account stated that the Athenians held reservations over joining the League when it was clear that the members of the League would be called upon to supply manpower and ships.<sup>26</sup> This suggested that the war contribution was not manageable for Athens. The extent of the demands made on the individual states of the League is still debated, particularly regarding manpower. Evidence suggests that surplus manpower was a problem within Athens. Isocrates reported on the availability of exiles and mercenaries in Greece.<sup>27</sup> After the battle of Chaeronea there would have been an abundance of such troops for hire. The treaty requirement to supply troops to Asia may have been a solution to this problem within Athens of employing a redundant, non-citizen portion of the population as well as a means of keeping Philip and Alexander placated.

The Greek *poleis* entered the contract with Philip with a guarantee that they remain autonomous and would maintain their political constitutions under an oath to keep the peace. This emphasis on peace and co-operation could have been an early step toward Pan-Hellenic political unity. A common culture and language was long established. Corinth would have been a territorially strategic centre of government. However, for Philip, the League of Corinth was not a means of creating a politically unified Greece, which would have been extremely difficult to sustain under a monarchy. The demand on resources and manpower would have diverted from Philip's plans toward a campaign into Asia. The exposure to democratic ideology had the potential to cause instability within the Macedonian army and lead to the overthrow of an autocrat such as Philip. Instead, adequately protected by the terms of the League of Corinth, Philip and his descendants were to continue as Macedonian kings consistent with Macedonian laws.

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<sup>26</sup> Plut., *Phocion*, 16.3-4; Diod. Sic., *Library*, 16.89.3; Tod 1948: 183; Justin, *Philippic*, 9.5.4.

<sup>27</sup> Isoc., *To Philip*, 5.96.

The emphasis on the democratic constitution of many of the participating *poleis* in the treaty<sup>28</sup> served as a firm reminder to Philip not to enforce Macedonian monarchy on League members. However, it also served to highlight Philip's unique status within the League as a hereditary monarch. This was to Philip's benefit as it reinforced his authority as a monarch, particularly to his own army.<sup>29</sup> Although Philip seemed to have held respect for Athenian culture, developed in a democracy, his motivation would have been to maintain the Macedonian monarchic institution. Macedonian royal succession was not one of primogeniture but was dependent on the survival of the strongest among those who held claim to the title. The evidence of this was seen in the upheaval that followed the death of Philip.<sup>30</sup> Without a successor to make claim to the title, Alexander's death heralded even more confusion as the *diadochoi* fought for their claim to the royal title. Rule by force would be the natural condition of Macedonian monarchy. The incompatibility of monarchy and democracy was highlighted by Demosthenes when he stated that a patriotic Athenian would condemn the imposition of Macedonian rule because of, 'those outrages and indignities, which a commonwealth in subjection is compelled to endure, as more dreadful than death'.<sup>31</sup>

Although under the leadership of a monarch, the League was structured on principles that upheld the traditions of democratic institutions. This is apparent in such factors as the election process for *hegemon* of the council, the *synedrion* or council of representatives, the justification for war, the seal of an oath and proportional equality, which was presumably devised by the size and resources of the *poleis*.<sup>32</sup> The previous alliances of

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<sup>28</sup> Tod 1948: 177, commentary.

<sup>29</sup> Diod. Sic., *Library*, 16.36.2 an indication of how dependent Philip was on the morale of his troops.

<sup>30</sup> Diod. Sic., *Library*, 17.2.3-6.

<sup>31</sup> Dem., *On the Crown*, 18.205.

<sup>32</sup> Tod 1948: 177; Hammond & Griffiths 1979: 383-392 on how alien these concepts were to the Macedonian court; Dem., *On the Crown*, 18.106 on the use of proportional contribution in trierarch reforms in 340; Aesch., *Against Ctesiphon*, 3.142-3 on division of contribution by Thebes and Athens for

Greek *poleis* had been successful in their formation because all *poleis* had long recognised the necessity of being part of a larger body in terms of economic benefit and military protection. This would have been a major incentive for joining the League to establish some security in dealing with the might of Philip and his army. The benefit to Philip in appealing to Greek traditions was that he could claim to be on equal and amenable terms with the League members.<sup>33</sup>

In a further manipulation of the Greek *poleis*, Philip did not use the title of king (*basileus*) in his dealings with central Greece. The ramifications of this decision may have been to endanger his authority as a monarch in the eyes of his Macedonian army. This raises the question as to whether Philip had any choice other than to appeal to Greek democratic tradition in his approach to central Greece. In dealing with other kingships, Philip arranged marriage alliances as a means of asserting his control and this had the additional benefit of securing Macedonian traditions and dynastic succession. As Philip was *hegemon* elect but not a league member, he avoided the position of a constitutional monarch, which was his role in the Thessalian League.<sup>34</sup> Philip's rejection of his royal title and his acknowledgement of democratic principles perhaps gave him the necessary respect to avoid being viewed as barbarian, thereby distinguishing his form of rule from that of the Persian King. This was further aided by his taking the Phocian votes on the Delphic Amphictyony, which was a carefully guarded Greek-only institution.<sup>35</sup>

Although it is reported that the Macedonians spoke a form of Greek dialect<sup>36</sup> and had over time courted many notable Athenians, such as the playwright Euripides, the idea of the

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the battle of Chaeronea; Plut., *Demosthenes*, 17.3 shows that equal divisions in war were desirable but not always achieved.

<sup>33</sup> Perlman 1985 offers a thorough assessment of this diplomatic tradition.

<sup>34</sup> Dem., *On the Crown*, 18.152.

<sup>35</sup> Hammond & Griffiths 1979: 451-454; Diod. Sic., *Library*, 16.60.1.

<sup>36</sup> Plut., *Eumenes*, 14.11; Rhodes 2009: 334.



Macedonians as non-Greek was to remain a contentious issue.<sup>37</sup> Hammond suggests that this was only relieved when the Macedonians were contrasted with the Romans in the age of the *diadochoi*.<sup>38</sup> Despite the cultural barriers between Macedonian and Greek, the League established the Macedonian King as *hegemon* of the Greeks in perpetuity. The granting of *hegemon* was by election of the League members, and the League representatives did elect Philip and, in turn, Alexander to this position.<sup>39</sup> In a similar manner, Philip had achieved the position of *tagus* of the Thessalian League, in perpetuity, in 352.<sup>40</sup> This position was granted in response to Philip's skilful diplomatic manipulation.<sup>41</sup> It is also a consideration that perhaps many Greek states were aware of Philip's designs for a campaign in Asia and, fearful of Persian retaliation, the co-operation of the League to keep Philip and his formidable army at the head seemed the safest option for Greece.

An advantage for Philip in forming the League lay with the diversity of opinion among the member *poleis*. Full cooperation among members may have been disrupted by past conflicts and political alliances, especially those such as Athens who had held a dominant position in Greece in the past. Members were unlikely to reach a consensus on all matters concerning Philip's actions. The regularity of the meetings of the League is unknown although it is probable that they were left to consider such details themselves. However, the intervals between their congresses would have had little effect on the immediacy of a monarch's sole decisions while on campaign. Leaving the League or reneging on any part of the contract meant alienation from the protection of this federal state. Thus the

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<sup>37</sup> Dem., *On the Crown*, 18.185; Din., *Against Demosthenes*, 1.24.

<sup>38</sup> Hammond 1989: 19-20.

<sup>39</sup> Diod. Sic., *Library*, 16.89.3; Arrian, *Campaigns*, 1.1.1-3; Justin, *Philippic*, 11.2.4-6, 3.1-2; Plut., *Alexander*, 14.1-5.

<sup>40</sup> Worthington 2008: 65; Diod. Sic., *Library*, 17.4.1.

<sup>41</sup> Ryder 1994: 247-248.

League members enforced the regulations of the treaty without the need for Philip to oversee details. The treaty of the League of Corinth was to remain central to the relationship between Athens, Philip and Alexander. It was only on the death of Alexander that the regulations of the treaty were abandoned.

The League of Corinth was greatly to Philip's benefit. Worthington argued that the League of Corinth saw Philip create the first national state in the history of Europe.<sup>42</sup> Of all the *poleis* involved, Athens appeared to be the most affected by its conditions. The new structure under Philip was a demotion for Athens from a long-established dominance in previous Greek alliances. Island states that had previously been under domination by Athens, Thebes and Sparta over time, may have anticipated a new freedom under Philip.<sup>43</sup> Pausanias considered this demotion to be the reality behind the leniency shown to Athens in that they had in fact received the worst of all penalties in the loss of the Athenian 'maritime empire'.<sup>44</sup> The difference now was that Athens no longer held *hegemony* or indeed any stronger position than the other League member states.

Despite the loss of prestige, Athens experienced a successful fifteen year period aided by the regulation of Greek affairs under the League of Corinth. The distraction of the conquest of the northern Aegean and the Asian campaign for Philip and Alexander facilitated the Athenians' attempt to regain the status they had enjoyed in the past. The territories left under Athenian control by Philip, aided this pursuit. The following chapter offers an assessment of the Athenian internal response to Philip's terms and will give some insight into how far Macedonian autocracy impacted on the *polis*.

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<sup>42</sup> Worthington 2008: 163.

<sup>43</sup> Ryder 2003: 76.

<sup>44</sup> Paus., *Description of Greece*, 1.25.3.

## Chapter two:

### Athenian sovereignty and self-determination under the League:

The benefit of the League of Corinth for Philip was evident. For Athens the egalitarian nature of the League had obvious limitations for the formerly great empire. Athens was humbled, as Pausanias rightly stated.<sup>45</sup> However, Athens entered the treaty with Philip in a position of economic stability, the theoric and stratiotic funds were healthy and the fleet was in good condition. As the dust settled on Chaeronea there was a sense of continuity with no suggestion of the conventions of Athenian life being interrupted. As the city walls were reinforced after Chaeronea, the Athenian citizens anticipated the next festival of Dionysia.<sup>46</sup> With the formation of the League of Corinth stability was restored within Athens and the normal practices of the *polis* resumed. Philip's *laissez faire* attitude to Athenian affairs gave them considerable freedom to pursue their sovereignty. This was realised in coinage, civic defence and the development of the fleet.

The timing of the imposition of the League of Corinth treaty was of further benefit to Athens in that it curtailed some of the emergency measures that were proposed in the post-Chaeronea turmoil. Measures such as the manumission of slaves to aid in war would have had long term detrimental implications for the city.<sup>47</sup> The measures that were enforced were to favour Athens in the following years. These included strengthening the city's walls and instituting laws to increase available manpower.<sup>48</sup> Further internal adjustments were developed as Athens adapted to the Macedonian requirements of the

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<sup>45</sup> Paus., *Description of Greece*, 1.25.3.

<sup>46</sup> Aesch., *Against Ctesiphon*, 3.34.

<sup>47</sup> Dem., *Against Aristogiton*, 26.11; Lyc., *Against Leocrates*, 1.36-37, 41; Hyp., Fr. 18, 28, 29; Plut., *Moralia*, X, 849a.

<sup>48</sup> Dem., *On the Crown*, 18.248.

League treaty, such as the reforms to the *ephebeia* institution. This particular reform aided *polis* defence, had economic advantages and reinforced the value of Athenian citizenship. In this way the terms of the League aided Athenian economic recovery and the pursuit of self-determination for the *polis*. To an extent Athens maintained the emblems of empire and could strive for some of her former authority within the League. A consequence of these pursuits was a renewed vigour for democratic values.

## **2.1. Defence of the constitution**

One of the most important considerations for democratic Athens was to adapt to the domination of a foreign monarch. The Athenian law of Eukrates against tyranny in 337/6 may provide some insight into the Athenian reaction to a new order with Philip as leader of the Greeks. It is probable that Eukrates was one of the anti-Macedonian orators who received a death sentence in 322.<sup>49</sup> The timing of the legislation coincided with the formation of the League of Corinth treaty and was a possible reaction to the treaty itself or to the political status of Athens in the aftermath of Chaeronea. The terms of the League of Corinth protected each member *poleis* from constitutional overthrow and this law may simply have been a way of reiterating and emphasising this important concern. It could also be read as an Athenian response to Philip himself, a warning not to broach further into the Athenian political arena.<sup>50</sup> This was probably a very real threat as Alexander was later accused of overthrowing a democracy and installing a tyrant in Pellene.<sup>51</sup> Alexander also reorganised the constitutions of the towns of Asia Minor that were subject to Persian

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<sup>49</sup> Merrit 1952: 356-7; Rhodes & Osborne 2004: 79.

<sup>50</sup> Ostwald 1955: 123; Wallace 1985: 179-184 a summary of the various arguments.

<sup>51</sup> Dem., *On the Treaty with Alexander*, 17.10.

taxation.<sup>52</sup> Although these towns were probably outside the bounds of the League, the exercise showed that constitutional amendment was part of the Alexander's strategy.

Plutarch gives a sense of the turbulence within Athens in reaction to the defeat at Chaeronea, as the divided people sought to elect a general, 'the best citizens were filled with fear' and appealed to the people with 'entreaties and tears'.<sup>53</sup> It may have been the case that the polarity between the pro and anti-Macedonian camps within Athens had caused a movement toward internal constitutional change, which would have contravened the terms of the treaty. In Eukrates' law a specific restraint was placed on the activity of the *Areopagus* if the constitution was overthrown,

And it shall not be permitted to any of the councillors of the Council of the Areopagus, if the people or the democracy at Athens is overthrown, to go up to the Areopagus or to sit together in the meeting or to deliberate about anything at all; and if when the people or the democracy at Athens has been overthrown any of the councillors of the Areopagus does go up to the Areopagus or sit together in the meeting (*synedrion*) or deliberate about anything, he shall be without rights (*atimos*), both himself and his descendants, and his property shall be made public and the tithe given to the Goddess.<sup>54</sup>

This would indicate that the defenders of democracy were alarmed by a strong pro-Macedonian influence in the council of the *Areopagus*.

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<sup>52</sup> Arrian, *Campaigns*, 1.18 the English translation here is 'Macedonian King' although ὁ Μακεδὼν may have referred to Antipater.

<sup>53</sup> Plut., *Phocion*, 16.3.

<sup>54</sup> Rhodes & Osborne 2004: 79.

The specific attention given to the *Areopagus* suggests that another likely reason for the law lay in the emergency proposals after the battle of Chaeronea. At that time the *Areopagus*, by temporary decree, took sole authority to sentence to death anyone caught fleeing the city.<sup>55</sup> The crime of betrayal (*prodosia*), which applied to those fleeing at a time of crisis, was considered an offence toward the community. The sentencing by the *Areopagus* contravened the role of the *Heliaea*, the judicial court of the *Ekklesia* which was the legal enforcer of penalties for offences against the state.<sup>56</sup> The *Areopagus* also over-rode the legal process of *eisangelia*, which involved reporting such a crime to the *Ekklesia* and then instigating proceedings. This was generally employed for serious offences against the state.<sup>57</sup> A new role for the *Areopagus* in the fourth century was the *apophasis* procedure, which entitled the council to carry out an investigation either on their initiative or by request of the *Ekklesia*.<sup>58</sup> It was primarily carried out for offences against the *polis* and again the *apophasis* reverted back to the *Ekklesia*.<sup>59</sup> The authority that the *Areopagus* held in the mid fourth century enabled it to hold trials for serious offences but these were restricted to acts against the person such as homicide, wounding, poisoning or arson. The political constitution of the 330s stated that, ‘these are the only charges tried by the council of the *Areopagus*’.<sup>60</sup> The law of Eukrates itself was concerned with *prodosia* and the approval of the law was passed by the *nomothetai*, a body comprised of current jurors who were allotted annual positions from the citizen population.<sup>61</sup> The enforcement of the law of Eukrates evidently lay in the hands of the

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<sup>55</sup> Lyc., *Against Leocrates*, 1.52; Dinarchus, *Against Demosthenes*, 1.62-63; Aesch., *Against Ctesiphon*, 3.252.

<sup>56</sup> Dem., *Against Macartatus*, 43.75; MacDowell 1978: 30, 183.

<sup>57</sup> Hyp., *In Defence of Euxenippus*, 4.7-8, 29; Dem., *Against Timotheus*, 49.67; MacDowell 1978: 183-186.

<sup>58</sup> Din., *Against Demosthenes*, 1.1-4, 50-51; Rhodes 2009: 379 for examples of *apophasis* from the mid-340s.

<sup>59</sup> MacDowell 1978: 190-191.

<sup>60</sup> Arist., *Athenian Constitution*, 57.3.

<sup>61</sup> MacDowell 1978: 40, 48-49.

people as was appropriate for an act against the state. In over-riding the legal process on an offence against the community the sole authority of the *Areopagus* after Chaeronea must be considered extraordinary and reactionary. Authority given by temporary decree would have necessitated a law putting the *Areopagus* back in its original role and making it accountable to the *Ekklesia*. Accountability to the people was the core value of the democratic institution.

The wording of the law of Eukrates could also indicate an awareness of a potential oligarchy forming. The phrase ‘if the people or the democracy at Athens is overthrown’ occurs three times in this law. This is distinct from the term tyranny.<sup>62</sup> If a tyranny were formed it is unlikely that there would still be an *Areopagus*, or any democratic institution, still in place. The law of Eukrates forbade the meeting of the *Areopagus* in the event of an overthrow, which would indicate an oligarchy rather than a tyranny. Dinarchus accused Demosthenes of proposing the decree that gave the *Areopagus* council exceptional powers and he suggested that they were acting as an oligarchy.<sup>63</sup> Lycurgus later defended the *Areopagus* from jeers when he alluded to this period.<sup>64</sup> The threat of an oligarchy rather than a tyranny became a more realistic fear after the restoration of democracy in 403/2.<sup>65</sup> The necessity for a specific law against tyranny or oligarchy highlighted the danger the Athenians saw in an overly powerful council in a time of political upheaval. The terms of the League denied a change in constitution for the *poleis* involved but if there were a pro-Philip *Areopagus* the advent of an oligarchy was a possibility.<sup>66</sup> The law of Eukrates was written on a *stele* at the top of which was a relief depicting the new cult of Demokratia, which evidence suggests was reinvigorated in this

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<sup>62</sup> MacDowell 1978; 175-176.

<sup>63</sup> Din., *Against Demosthenes*, 1.62.

<sup>64</sup> Lyc., *Against Leocrates*, 1.52.

<sup>65</sup> MacDowell 1978: 175.

<sup>66</sup> Rhodes & Osborne 2004: 79, commentary.

period.<sup>67</sup> This would indicate that the law was a reaction to the unprecedented situation the *polis* now found itself in, under the control of a foreign ruler. Whatever the situation was that called for Eukrates' law, it is evident that it inspired a renewed focus on democratic values in Athens.

## 2.2. Coinage

One of the possible motives for Philip's leniency toward Athens after Chaeronea lay in his recognition of the potential revenue from the Laurium silver mines. Laurium was the most important source of silver in Central Greece.<sup>68</sup> Under Philip's terms, Athens was permitted to keep the right to coin silver.<sup>69</sup> The productivity of the mines was at its height when Athens was under the financial control of Lycurgus from 336.<sup>70</sup> Philip would not have been oblivious to the strength and stability of the Athenian silver currency during his reign. Although the production of Athenian coinage had suffered a decline after the Peloponnesian war, by the time Philip came to power it was once again in popular use throughout Greece and its use had extended as far as Sicily and Egypt.<sup>71</sup> A steady pattern of distribution remained until Alexander adopted the Attic weight standard for his universal currency. The popularity of the Athenian currency after the League of Corinth remained strong. This was partly due to the renown of the Attic standard for reliability of weight and consistency of supply but also to Philip's *laissez faire* standpoint. Coinage was a symbol of empire, which Athens had long recognised and which now allowed for the continued importance of Athens to the Greek world even after her loss of hegemony.

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<sup>67</sup> Wallace 1985: 184; Raubitschek 1962: 238-243; Rhodes 2009: 380.

<sup>68</sup> Xen., *Ways and Means*, 1.5.

<sup>69</sup> Seltman 1933: 193 Ambracia in contrast stopped issuing silver coinage after Philip imposed a garrison in 338.

<sup>70</sup> Mitchell 1940: 97-98; Hyp., *In Defence of Euxenippus*, 4.36.

<sup>71</sup> Strauss 1984: 425.



The importance of coinage as a stamp of authority is expressed in the late fifth and early fourth century laws. In the past Athens had asserted her control over tributary states by enforcing minting laws. Prohibitions on minting silver to other than the Attic standard are noted in a decree of 432. The implications of such demands go beyond economic measures and become a means of enforcing Athenian authority.<sup>72</sup> In 415 silver minting was forbidden outside of Attica.<sup>73</sup> There were no restrictions on other *poleis* for the issuing of gold coins. Athens did not mine for gold, and electrum coinage, adapted to be compatible with the Attic silver weight standard, was welcome in the *polis*. Philip, in contrast, had a tendency to adopt whatever standard was in place when he conquered a territory, preferring iconography as a means of enforcing his authority. In his role as *archon* of the Amphictyonic council, Philip issued coins inscribed ‘of the Amphictyons’ using the Pheidonian standard of central Greece.<sup>74</sup> In his northern territories Philip used the Thracian standard for his silver coins and the Attic for his gold. Alexander in turn recognised the potential for propaganda in coinage and also the capability of the Laurium mines. He chose to mint both gold and silver to the Attic standard. This move saw the demise of other Greek standards and gave Athens a monopoly on the production of silver coinage in central Greece.<sup>75</sup>

The production of the Athenian currency was further aided by Philip’s unexpected leniency after Chaeronea, which curtailed the initiation of many extraordinary measures. Subsequently the terms of the League rendered many emergency measures unnecessary. One such measure was that proposed by Hyperides for the manumission and arming of ‘one hundred and fifty thousand’ slaves.<sup>76</sup> The diversion of slave labour from the silver

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<sup>72</sup> Austin & Vidal-Naquet 1977: 326-327.

<sup>73</sup> Seltman 1933: 110-112.

<sup>74</sup> Seltman 1933: 202-203.

<sup>75</sup> Seltman 1933: 205.

<sup>76</sup> Hyp., *Against Aristogeiton*, Fr. 29.

mines would have resulted in a similar financial catastrophe to that in 413 when runaway slaves from the Laurium mines had put a halt to operations that saw silver reserves depleted by 407.<sup>77</sup> The emancipation of slaves for the purpose of revolution was addressed in the League terms as a violation.<sup>78</sup> This would suggest that Hyperides' proposal had been seriously considered by the *polis* in response to the crisis after Chaeronea. In the past, the credibility of the Athenian empire had been at stake when the coinage was devalued. Aristophanes *Frogs* of 405 bemoaned the poor substitute of copper that proclaimed the end of Empire.<sup>79</sup> The restoration of the mines saw Athenian recovery, once again depicted in Aristophanes *Ecclesiazusae* of 392, as silver coinage was starting to replace the copper.<sup>80</sup> An inscription of 375/4 showed that measures were taken to ensure counterfeit coins were not circulated in Athens<sup>81</sup> and is evidence of the abundance of copper coins still in circulation at that time. In 354/3 there was a severe penalty imposed for distributing counterfeit coins in Athens.<sup>82</sup> The unhindered continuation of production in the mines under the hegemony of Philip and Alexander averted the potential for such problems to arise.

At the time of the formation of the League of Corinth, the Athenian silver mines were functional and an important enterprise for the *polis*. The recovery of the high standard in Athenian coinage was in place from the years 350-340 and heavy investment was made in silver mining.<sup>83</sup> The mines were leased by the state under strict regulations.<sup>84</sup> Demosthenes stated, in his speech of 328, that the *antidosia* law held exemptions for those

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<sup>77</sup> Seltman 1933: 137; Thucy., *Hist.*, 7.27.3-5; Xen., *Ways and Means*, 4.25.

<sup>78</sup> Dem., *On the Treaty with Alexander*, 17.15.

<sup>79</sup> Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 718-733.

<sup>80</sup> Aristophanes, *Ecclesiazusae*, 815-822.

<sup>81</sup> Austin & Vidal-Naquet 1977: 328-330.

<sup>82</sup> Dem., *Against Leptines*, 20.167; *Against Timocrates*, 24. 212-214; McDowell 1978: 158.

<sup>83</sup> Crosby 1941: 26-30.

<sup>84</sup> Arist., *Athenian Constitution*, 47.2; Hyp., *In Defence of Euxenippus*, 4.34-36.

involved in the mining business.<sup>85</sup> These businesses were not included in an *antidosis* challenge. This was an innovation of the period, possibly to encourage investors.<sup>86</sup> Although the reason for this exemption was not explained by Demosthenes, it does enlighten us to the exceptional status placed on mining operations. The leasing and working of the silver mines may have been considered a service to the state for mining its most precious resource. Also, the working of state mines involved competition for contracts and therefore rents were probably high. This may have been considered sufficient expenditure for the lessee to avoid being called for a liturgy. There are suggestions in the ancient sources of mining being less stable and therefore less lucrative than farming. A speech from Demosthenes argued over the fluctuation in wealth from mining but it must be seen as oratorical manipulation as farming was obviously just as prone to instability from drought or the disruption of war.<sup>87</sup> However the comparison Demosthenes makes between the two enterprises of farming and mining does show where the wealth of Athens lay. Such laws as the *antidosis* exemption enabled Athens to recover the superiority of the Attic standard and, through consistency of supply and purity of silver, demand was ensured. Xenophon, in c.354 commented on the superiority of Athenian silver as desirable cargo exchange by traders. This was in comparison to that of other *poleis* whose local currency had no circulation in other states.<sup>88</sup> The mines were highly active in the 340s<sup>89</sup> and as the battle of Chaeronea drew near, the financial capability of Athens was evident: The costs of the battle were proportionally divided between Athens and Thebes, with Athens making the greater contribution.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Dem., *Against Phaenippus*, 42.18.

<sup>86</sup> Gabrielson 1994: 89.

<sup>87</sup> Dem., *Against Phaenippus*, 42.21; Xen., *Ways and Means*, 4.4.

<sup>88</sup> Xen., *Ways and Means*, 3.2.

<sup>89</sup> Crosby 1941: 24.

<sup>90</sup> Aesch., *Against Ctesiphon*, 3.142-3.

The reliance the Athenians had on the silver mines is evident. The protection of the mines was aided by Philip's distribution of territory. Philip gave Athens control of Oropus, to the north-west of Attica, which, along with the islands to the east, was strategically useful as protection for the Laurium mining trade. This was an important consideration as it was only as far back as 413 that the mines had been cut off from Athens by the Spartan army seizing Decelea.<sup>91</sup> The island territories also facilitated the movement of Athenian coinage.<sup>92</sup> Coin hoard finds indicate that much of the Athenian silver moved eastward to Asia Minor and Egypt. Philip's coinage was circulating in north and central Greece from his main mint at Pella.<sup>93</sup> Amphipolis also became a major minting centre for Philip as it was close to the gold and silver mines and became favoured by Alexander for his universal coinage. In these hoard finds there is no evidence of Philip's coinage imposing on the circulation of the Athenian currency.<sup>94</sup> The situation changed dramatically and with great benefit for Athens when the Attic standard was adopted by Alexander over the Thracian weight standard. As Alexander moved into Asia the Attic standard gained a wider circulation and expanded inter-*poleis* trade. The silver mines of Laurium, the largest in central Greece, flourished as a consequence.

The continuation of Athenian coinage would have aided Alexander's demands under the League terms for soldiers and supplies for the campaign into Asia. In comparison to other *poleis*, Athens had the capability to hire greater numbers of mercenaries through sufficient silver supplies.<sup>95</sup> Many *poleis* were limited in manpower resources because of a lack of coinage.<sup>96</sup> The upkeep of the large Macedonian army may have depleted Philip's

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<sup>91</sup> Meiggs 1972: 351; Thucy., *History*, 7.27; 6.91.

<sup>92</sup> Arist., *Economics*, 2.1350a shows that silver was shipped and the problems involved, in this case it was bad weather.

<sup>93</sup> Strauss 1984: 425.

<sup>94</sup> Strauss 1984: 426.

<sup>95</sup> Dem., *First Olynthiac*, 1.19-20.

<sup>96</sup> Davies 1993: 203 Davies uses a comparison between Thebes and Athens to make this point.

reserves, an indication of which is given by Arrian who stated that Alexander inherited from his father ‘a few gold and silver cups and less than 60 talents’.<sup>97</sup> However the output of the northern mines would have had the capacity to keep up with demand and therefore this may have been a solitary episode in Philip’s fiscal circumstance rather than a statement of the general condition. These factors indicate the recurring problem of coin circulation and supply.<sup>98</sup>

Alexander also inherited the leadership of Philip’s professional Macedonian army. This force was supplemented by mercenaries who were plentiful throughout the Greek and barbarian territories after years of warfare. This form of soldiering would have become a career for many of those dispossessed or unable to sustain a living after the destruction of war on their *poleis*. Isocrates made it clear that such manpower was readily available and highlighted the problem of the expense to the state of hiring mercenaries.<sup>99</sup> There was also the consideration of the demands of feeding and maintaining troops for an unpredictable period of time while on campaign. In Athens this may have become a *liturgy* obligation, possibly in the form of a *proeisphora* with a special commission set up for dealing with mercenaries.<sup>100</sup>

Under these conditions it is likely that Greek mercenaries were dispatched to Alexander’s Asian campaign and were supplied with armour before they left Athens.<sup>101</sup> For Athens this system would have had the benefit of fulfilling the League obligation to supply troops

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<sup>97</sup> Curt., *History*, 10.2.24; Arrian, *Campaigns*, 9.6; 1.20 Alexander disbanded his fleet partly due to lack of finances; Plut., *Alexander*, 15.1-4 property was at Alexander’s disposal but coinage was in short supply.

<sup>98</sup> Dem., *First Olynthiac*, 1.22.

<sup>99</sup> Isoc., *On the Peace*, 44, 46-8.

<sup>100</sup> Aesch., *Against Timarchus*, 1.113; Develin 1989:7 the role of the *exetastes* from 348/7 was to inspect mercenaries.

<sup>101</sup> McKechnie 1994: 305; Whitehead 1991: 113 an alternative view, he argues mercenaries were employed already armed. I would be more inclined toward McKechnie’s viewpoint that the hiring *polis* covered the cost; Sekunda 1992: 353-4; Hammond 1981: 33 points out that the hoplite infantry had distinctly different armour to the Macedonian. The hoplite armour was heavier and less flexible and therefore hoplites would not have been employed in Alexander’s front line.

to Asia and utilising surplus manpower in the *polis*.<sup>102</sup> Aeschines established that mercenary soldiers were commonly dispatched when aid was required. In his attack on the actions of Demosthenes, Aeschines asserted that Philip conquered the Greeks with ease at Chaeronea because Demosthenes had dispatched ten thousand mercenaries to aid the Amphissians.<sup>103</sup> A speech of Demosthenes showed the common use of mercenaries as the bulk of the Athenian army and he suggested a smaller body of citizen soldiers should be employed as overseers.<sup>104</sup> Plutarch described how the Greek states, when rallying against Philip, organised ‘a mercenary force of fifteen thousand foot and two thousand horse, apart from the citizen soldiery, and readily contributed money to pay them’.<sup>105</sup> Arrian and Diodorus made a clear distinction in their works between the Macedonian army, mercenaries and Greek allies and it is likely that most of the mercenary soldiers in Philip’s Macedonian army were barbarians.<sup>106</sup> This would allow for Greek mercenaries, including those sent from Athens, to be part of Arrian’s classification of allied troops. The large quota of mercenaries in the allied army was a major reason why the returning exiles created such a crisis for the *polis* under Alexander’s exiles decree of 324.<sup>107</sup> Alexander saw this as a way of eliminating the problem of itinerant demobilised mercenaries but for the receiving *poleis* it was an untenable population crisis.

The payment methods devised between Athens and the Macedonian king for the supply of troops is still open to scholarly debate. The responsibility of paying and maintaining these troops while on campaign lay with Alexander.<sup>108</sup> Arrian reported that payment was not a problem for Alexander as his treasury grew through plunder of Persian treasure. He

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<sup>102</sup> Isoc., *Philip*, 120-1 inclined toward rhetorical exaggeration but with a foundation of truth.

<sup>103</sup> Aesch., *Against Ctesiphon*, 146-147.

<sup>104</sup> Dem., *First Philippic*, 4.21, 4.24-5.

<sup>105</sup> Plut., *Demosthenes*, 17.3.

<sup>106</sup> Griffith 1935: 305; Hammond 1981: 29-30.

<sup>107</sup> Diod. Sic., *Library*, 18.8.2-7.

<sup>108</sup> Diod. Sic., *Library*, 17.74.3-4.

dismissed the troops of the League in Ecbatana with generous pay.<sup>109</sup> His ability to continue to pay those who wished to continue as mercenaries in his army was confirmed by ‘the considerable number thus voluntarily enlisted’.<sup>110</sup> The method of payment of troops at start of the Asian campaign is not clear. Although is it not entirely satisfactory to impose on the *modus operandi* of Alexander the methods of the armies in the third century, one aspect may be pertinent: Inscription records show that if troops were requested from allies they were to be maintained by the sender for 30 days after which time the receiver would take over.<sup>111</sup> This would seem to be a feasible method given the unprecedented nature of Alexander’s campaign across Asia.<sup>112</sup> The Attic standard made universal by Alexander would have facilitated this method of maintaining allied troops on his Asian campaign if the troops were dispatched with a maintenance payment and armour.

### **2.3 The *ephebeia*.**

Philip’s non-intervention on the right of the *polis* to defend itself, another crucial aspect of autonomy, aided the recovery of Athenian sovereignty. Without the imposition of Macedonian garrisons, the Athenians were able to revitalise the *ephebeia* programme. This was an institution that not only created a prepared internal army but emphasised the importance of Athenian citizenship and was to have a considerable influence on economic stability.

The sending of mercenaries to serve under Alexander may explain one reason for the *ephebeia* reforms. These reforms were not a direct response to the battle of Chaeronea

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<sup>109</sup> Arrian, *Campaigns*, 3.19.

<sup>110</sup> Arrian, *Campaigns*, 3.20.

<sup>111</sup> Griffith 1935: 302; Gabrielson 1994: 113 argues that a similar system of a monetary advance for one month’s pay was given to oarsmen in the 360s.

<sup>112</sup> Griffith 1935: 297-300 on the difficulties of determining how Alexander’s troops were paid.

but were more likely a reaction to the troop deployment requirements in 335 on Alexander's campaign.<sup>113</sup> The reforms were probably encouraged by the shock felt after Alexander's destruction of Thebes in 335.<sup>114</sup> The enforcement of the institution during Alexander's lifetime suggests it was a specific reaction to his demands on the *polis*. The relative peace Athens experienced under the League of Corinth treaty enabled this institution to be successfully revived, a condition that was not possible in the political upheaval of the years preceding Chaeronea or those following the death of Alexander.<sup>115</sup>

The Athenian *ephebeia* was revitalised under Epikrates and was an obligation to the state for Athenian males aged 18 to 20 as a compulsory full-time requirement for the military training of Athenian youths.<sup>116</sup> This became more than the 'rite of passage' entry into manhood and registration of citizenship of the *ephebeia* of previous years. Entry into the institution became compulsory and the regulations regarding entry were strictly on dual Athenian parentage and established by membership of a phratry.<sup>117</sup> This enforced the exclusivity of citizenship just as firmly as the dual parentage laws of 451/50 under Pericles. After the death of Alexander the *ephebeia* became a privileged institution for the wealthy and eventually became voluntary.<sup>118</sup>

As the institution had long been a part of the Athenian education system, it may not have been seen as a threat to the Macedonians, despite the new military focus. The adaptation of the *ephebeia* as a military-focused obligation may even have been viewed as beneficial to Alexander who required skilled troops. The candidates were trained in hoplite warfare and ensured a capable army, which was a necessity to both the Macedonians and the

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<sup>113</sup> Arist., *Athenian Constitution*, 93 translator's notes conform to common opinion of the date 335/4.

<sup>114</sup> Polyb., *Histories*, 9.28.8; 34.1; Aesch., *Against Ctesiphon*, 3.133; Din., *Against Demosthenes*, 1.18.

<sup>115</sup> Oliver 2007: 175-176.

<sup>116</sup> Arist., *Athenian Constitution*, 42.1-2; Lyc., *Against Leocrates*, 1.76.

<sup>117</sup> Arist., *Athenian Constitution*, 42.1-2.

<sup>118</sup> Chaniotis 2005: 48-49 Antipater in 322 placed a property restriction on citizen rights; Rhodes 1993: 495.



Athenians. If Athens was to supply Alexander with troops, it was imperative that the Athenian forces were capable while on campaign in Asia. The ephebic oath, devised just before Macedonian hegemony, was still pertinent to warfare under a foreign ruler and retained its patriotic ethic,

I will not bring dishonour on my sacred arms nor will I abandon my comrade wherever I shall be stationed. I will defend the rights of gods and men and will not leave my country smaller, when I die, but greater and better, so far as I am able by myself and with the help of all. I will respect the rulers of the time duly and the existing ordinances duly and all others which may be established in the future. And if anyone seeks to destroy the ordinances I will oppose him so far as I am able by myself and with the help of all. I will honour the cults of my fathers.<sup>119</sup>

The large percentage of Greek mercenaries fighting abroad on behalf of Athens allowed an internal force of trained citizen soldiers to ensure the vital requirements of the *polis* would be met. These requirements were primarily to ensure the harvest was safely cultivated along with the protection of attic borders and harbours.<sup>120</sup> The first year recruits were assigned guard duty at posts (*phylakteria*) in Munychia and Acte, which flanked the main harbour in the Piraeus. The second year recruits, who were presumably more capable as protectors of the *polis*, patrolled the rural areas from inland and coastal fortress bases.<sup>121</sup> Demades was in charge of the military fund between 334 and 330. While reflecting on his career he declared that he had ‘fortified Attica, encircling his boundaries, not with stone but with the safety of the city’.<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> Lyc., *Against Leocrates*, 1.76-77; Rhodes & Osborne 2004: 88; Tod 1948: 204.

<sup>120</sup> Cf. Chapter 2.3.

<sup>121</sup> Arist., *Athenian Constitution*, 42.3-4; Rhodes 1993: 508.

<sup>122</sup> Demades, *On the Twelve Years*, 1.2.

With this reinvigorated institution Athens had a highly trained home guard made up of citizen soldiers, with a loyalty to their city, an attribute not expected of the mercenary soldier. The efficiency of the training of the *epheboi* was realised after the death of Alexander when they showed superiority in their efforts against Antipater during the Lamian war. The League terms effectively created within Athens a prepared home guard to protect their *polis* and its democratic constitution whatever the outcome of the Macedonian campaign against the Great King.

The Athenians had to adapt to the Macedonian means of warfare. The Greek *poleis* had always conducted their campaigns, which tended to be short, around harvests and seasons suitable for sailing. This was aided by adherence to appropriately timed religious festivals. With the arrival of the Macedonian army into central Greece, warfare was no longer between citizen militia who played by the same rules. Demosthenes condemned Philip's methods of warfare in a comparison with Greek military traditions. He asserted that Philip did not comply with conventional Greek warfare in that he marched where he pleased without having to give consideration to alliances between neighbouring *poleis*. Philip would employ distance tactics with siege engines if he was not met in direct confrontation by a *polis*. Possibly the greatest complaint Demosthenes held against Philip was that he did not acknowledge a campaign season, which traditionally allowed the *poleis* to temporarily withdraw and recuperate.<sup>123</sup> In adapting to the unprecedented military operation of Alexander, the Athenians developed the *ephebeia* institution and in doing so created a system that protected the *polis* and as a consequence was advantageous to the economic function of the *polis*.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> Dem., *Third Philippic*, 47-50.

<sup>124</sup> Cf. Chapter 2.3.

## 2.4. The Fleet.

The terms of the League changed the demands of war on the Athenian *polis*. The distant warfare of Alexander's Asian campaign was to a great extent an external problem to the Athenians. The League terms called for troops and ships to be dispatched as Philip required. Plutarch specified these demands as being for 'triremes and horsemen'.<sup>125</sup> The foot soldier may have been less of a demand in that, as already argued, a large quota was probably mercenary. However, to supply cavalry was to take from the upper echelons of the Athenian army. The Macedonian army was heavily supported by cavalry units<sup>126</sup> and the demands for hoplites from League states may have been a greater requirement for the Asian campaign. Movement of cavalry required the use of larger ships such as the quinqueremes. These super-galleys had the capacity to carry horses, a convenience that enabled the movement of livestock to mobilise a cavalry unit. Ships of various kinds were sent in convoy.<sup>127</sup> This overcame the problem with the quinqueremes in that they were not able to negotiate some of the smaller harbours, which was a necessity for supplies to feed a large crew.

The role of the Athenian fleet was not significant under Alexander's Asian venture. There were only 20 Athenian triremes in Alexander's League fleet of 160 triremes.<sup>128</sup> Alexander disbanded the entire fleet early into his campaign. According to Arrian this decision was because the combined naval force of Macedonian and Greek allies was no match for the Persian fleet.<sup>129</sup> Alexander utilised an assembled fleet for his siege of Tyre but no Athenian vessels were employed for this major attack, which was executed from offshore

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<sup>125</sup> Plut., *Phocion*, 16.5.

<sup>126</sup> Rhodes 2009: 402.

<sup>127</sup> Dem., *First Philippic*, 4.16; Dem., *On the Crown*, 18.73; Rhodes & Osborne 2004: 100 a 'horse-transporting vessel' was sent on the expedition to the Adriatic.

<sup>128</sup> Hammond 1986: 603; Arrian, *Campaigns*, 1.20, n. 60.

<sup>129</sup> Arrian, *Campaigns*, 1.20.

ships.<sup>130</sup> This fleet was also employed to carry provisions to meet Alexander in Egypt.<sup>131</sup> As Alexander's campaign moved inland there was no further need of the Athenian fleet in combat.

The fleet was in good condition and had not suffered any damage in the sea-led campaigns before the battle of Chaeronea. The Athenians renewed the infrastructure that funded the fleet and an imposing fleet was maintained throughout the era of Alexander's campaign. The Athenians still maintained the fleet by liturgy although from 358/7 this was handled by a *syntrierarchy*,<sup>132</sup> which relieved a single contributor but also allowed for a more substantial financial contribution.<sup>133</sup> It still remained that the wealthiest Athenians undertook the *trierarchy*. The law of Periander in 358/7 that reformed the *trierarchy* held that twelve hundred Athenians were liable for *trierarchies*.<sup>134</sup> The reforms of Demosthenes in 340 narrowed the wealth criteria to the 'three hundred richest persons'.<sup>135</sup> The *syntrierarchy* system complicated the original meaning of *trierarch*, which meant one who commands a trireme. This implied that a *trierarch* would sail with his ship for its duration at sea. A *trierarch* was obliged to undertake this liturgy for a period of one year and then be free of obligation for two years.<sup>136</sup> Serving a *trierarchy* in person became a reason for self-praise in the law courts and was seen as patriotic, Appolodoros' plea is an example.<sup>137</sup> Demosthenes suggested that the term 'contributor' was preferred to *trierarch*.<sup>138</sup> Gabrielson argued that a system developed whereby a *trierarch* did not always sail with his ship but put it in the hands of a contractor, who were often

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<sup>130</sup> Arrian, *Campaigns*, 2.20-24; Diod. Sic., *Library*, 17.42.3; Curt., *History*, 4.2-4.

<sup>131</sup> Arrian, *Campaigns*, 2.27, 3.1.

<sup>132</sup> Gabrielson 1994: 182; Dem., *On the Crown*, 18.102-8.

<sup>133</sup> Gabrielson 1994: 194-5.

<sup>134</sup> Dem., *Against Midias*, 21.155.

<sup>135</sup> Gabrielson 1994: 212-3; Aesch., *Against Ctesiphon*, 3.222; Din., *Against Demosthenes*, 1.42; Hyp., Fr. 134.

<sup>136</sup> Gabrielson 1994: 178.

<sup>137</sup> Dem., *Against Polycles*, 50.59-63.

<sup>138</sup> Dem., *On the Crown*, 18.104.

foreigners.<sup>139</sup> An indication that not all *trierarchs* sailed with their ships is evident in speeches.<sup>140</sup> This enabled those who were obliged to fund the *trierarchy* to fulfil their duty but remain in the *polis* and at the heart of political life.

An *eisphora* was imposed on metics from 347/6 to 323/2 for the building of the ship sheds<sup>141</sup> and reforms relieved the *syntrierarchy* of the supply of equipment and crews, as this became a state responsibility.<sup>142</sup> The detailed naval records of the 330s and 320s show the importance to the state of the upkeep of the fleet in this period.<sup>143</sup> The council of the *boule* was obliged to keep the fleet size maintained by the construction of ships as decided by the *demos*.<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> Gabrielson 1994: 96-98.

<sup>140</sup> Dem., *Against Midias*, 21.163-167; *On the Trierarchic Crown*, 51.11.

<sup>141</sup> Rhodes 1993: 547.

<sup>142</sup> Dem., *Against Midias*, 21.154-155.

<sup>143</sup> Gabrielson 1994: 143-144.

<sup>144</sup> Arist., *Athenian Constitution*, 46.1; Gabrielson 1994: 134.

Year	Triremes	Quadriremes	Quinqueremes	Triaconters
432	300			
404	12			
387	60			
378	100			
356	283			
352	349			
330	392	18		
323	315	50	7	9

Fig. 1. Source: Gabrielson 1994: 127-128 figures derived using arithmos (sum total) formula; Rhodes 1993: 546.

This chart shows the trireme figures were within the norms of the fleet size in times of prosperity; however the speed of recovery from the post-Peloponnesian war was exceptional. Gabrielson argues that ‘the 340s, 330s and 320s saw an unprecedented boost in the total number of ships’. This being ‘strongly corroborated by the increase in the number of ship-sheds’.<sup>145</sup> Lycurgus recognised the essential role of the fleet and it is reported he organised the maintenance of 400 triremes in readiness for battle.<sup>146</sup> Demosthenes’ *trierarchic* reforms of 340 appear to have continued as the best method of funding the Athenian fleet. The *syntrierarchy* system remained in place and sustained an impressive fleet until 323/2.<sup>147</sup>

The Athenians successfully adapted to a new regime and in doing so showed where their military superiority lay. The presence of larger ships is an indicator of the demands of a

<sup>145</sup> Gabrielson 1994: 131.

<sup>146</sup> Plut., *Moralia*, X, 852c; Hyp., Fr. 139.

<sup>147</sup> Gabrielson 1994: 175.

new era. The terms of the League did not impact on the attention the Athenians gave to establishing a strong fleet. This rise and continuity of ship numbers does suggest that the Athenians were alert to, and prepared for, the necessity to employ a large naval exercise throughout the reign of Philip and Alexander.

The continuation of Athenian coinage, the reforms of the *ephebeia* and the strong focus placed on sustaining the fleet were major factors in the rise of Athenian economic strength in this period. The importance of these aspects to economic survival is evident in that they were all under the control of the state rather than left to private enterprise. Athens maintained control of her sovereignty within the restrictions of the demands of the Macedonian rulers but, as all *poleis* required interaction to fully function economically, the Athenians needed to interact with the wider Greek world. This necessitated a review of foreign policies in light of Philip's territorial adjustments, which challenged the traditional trading practices in Athens. The following chapter analyses the Athenian approach toward the economic situation beyond the *polis*.

## Chapter three:

### The Athenian economy and the wider Greek world.

The most significant economic change for Athens was brought about by the Macedonian domination of the northern Aegean and the Hellespont, which enabled access to the grain supply of the Bosphorus region. The supply of grain remained as always, of upmost importance to the Athenians and they continued to rely on foreign imports. Demosthenes' speech of 355 indicated that Athenian grain imports were high and mainly came from the Pontus, 'now from the Bosphorus there come to Athens four hundred thousand bushels', which he stated amounted to 'equal to the whole amount of all other places of export'.<sup>148</sup> Although his figures are subject to criticism, his speech does show that Black Sea grain and other foreign importers were necessary for the survival of the *polis*. Interruptions to grain shipments by blockades on access to the Hellespont had severely affected Athens. In 405 Athens was suppressed by the Spartan's cutting them off from the Hellespont<sup>149</sup> and again in 376 another Spartan blockade was attempted.<sup>150</sup> In 340 Athens had to intervene in Philip's attempt to capture Byzantium as grain ships destined for the Piraeus were seized. This conflict ended the Peace of Philocrates, which had been devised in 346 as a political compromise between Athens and Philip.<sup>151</sup> In 331 during Agis of Sparta's revolt, once again grain ships were held until demands were met.<sup>152</sup> Demosthenes' hypothetical speech showed the insecurity for the *polis* if this crucial trading territory was

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<sup>148</sup> Garnsey 1988: 96-98; Dem., *Against Leptines*, 20.31.

<sup>149</sup> Xen., *Hellenica*, 2.1.17.

<sup>150</sup> Diod. Sic., *Library*, 15. 34.3-35; Rhodes 2009: 268-267.

<sup>151</sup> Dem., *On the Crown*, 18.71-78, 87; 17.20; Theopompos, FGrHist., F 292; Diod. Sic., *History*, 16.76-7; Plut., *Phocion*, 14; Philoc., FGrHist., 328 FF 55, 162; Engen 2010: 63; Rhodes 2009: 347-351 an analysis of the Peace of Philocrates.

<sup>152</sup> Dem., *On the Treaty with Alexander*, 17.19.



lost in his assertion that if Philip controlled Byzantine trade he would control all of Greece.<sup>153</sup> The demands of war were aided by ransoming grain. In an age that came to be dominated historically by the campaigns of Alexander, the priority for the Athenians became, more than ever, to be concerned with food supply and economic stability.

### **3.1. Food supply.**

Securing grain supplies was the true test of Athenian survival after Chaeronea. Athenian imperialism was at an end with the domination of Philip. The new political landscape created by the conquests of Philip and Alexander impacted on the traditional routes to acquiring grain. The Athenians, ever dependent on creating accessible trade routes, had in the past set up cleruchies in pertinent outposts. In the years 365/4, 361/0 and 352/1 cleruchies were established on Samos.<sup>154</sup> By the year 354/3 Athens had lost control of cleruchies bordering Macedonia when the Athenian outpost of Methone was taken by Philip. The loss of Amphipolis to Philip denied the Athenians access to the grain supplies of Thrace. In 353/2 and in 344/3 the Athenians established cleruchies further east in the Thracian Chersonese. This placed the Athenians in an important strategic position for involvement in Bosporan trading activity. Although the fate of the Chersonese cleruchies is not certain, Demosthenes claimed his administration secured the Chersonese as a route for safe passage of grain supplies.<sup>155</sup>

Demosthenes also reported on the Bosporan King Leukon having opened a new corn depot at Theudosia (modern Kaffa, Crimea) to supply grain to Athens with the same exemptions as from the Bosphorus.<sup>156</sup> A decree of c.367 showed honours were granted to

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<sup>153</sup> Dem., *On the Crown*, 18.240-241; Polyb., *Histories*, 4.38-39, 4.43-44.

<sup>154</sup> Garnsey 1988: 145.

<sup>155</sup> Dem., *On the Crown*, 18.302 a speech of 330 but probably refers to Demosthenes' role as *sitones* in 340, see Dem., *On the Crown*, 18.248; Engen 2010: 63; Oliver 2007: 44.

<sup>156</sup> Dem., *Against Leptines*, 20.33; Strabo, *Geography*, 7.4.6.

Strato the King of Sidon for enabling Greek ambassadors' safe journey into the non-Hellenised area of inland Asia. The honours were expressed as privileges being granted to Sidonian merchants trading in Athens.<sup>157</sup> In the period after the battle of Chaeronea imports from the south east and even from the west are evident.<sup>158</sup> Grain was also sourced around the 330s from Egypt and Sicily.<sup>159</sup> This would be consistent with the Athenian currency distribution.<sup>160</sup>

The benefits of seeking to secure a stable grain supply from the west lay not in better climate conditions but in moving away from the areas dominated by the Macedonians.<sup>161</sup> The expedition to the Adriatic in 325/4 is often highlighted as an anti-piracy exercise to secure grain routes. Just as importantly the expedition was to set up a cleruchy with the aim to export a consistent supply of grain to Athens. The decree announcing the expedition stated 'in order that the people may for all future time have their own commerce and transport in grain'.<sup>162</sup> As Alexander looked toward the east, so Athens looked to the west.

The League of Corinth Treaty allowed Athens control of some crucial Greek territory, which facilitated trade. Philip's agenda in giving Athens the island territories may have been to accommodate the sending of soldiers and warships to aid his campaign. The islands were stepping stones to Asia Minor, useful for the dispatch and provisions for troops and triremes to the Macedonian campaign, but the Athenians also relied on their islands for grain production and to facilitate trading routes.<sup>163</sup> Under Athenian law the

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<sup>157</sup> Tod 1948: 139; Rhodes & Osborne 2004: 21 dates this decree c.378-376 and explains dating controversy; Austin & Vidal-Naquet 1977: 273-274.

<sup>158</sup> Garnsey 1988: 150.

<sup>159</sup> Garnsey 1988: 151; Dem., *Against Zenothemis*, 32.18-20; *Against Dionysodorus*, 56. 5-6.

<sup>160</sup> Cf. Chapter 2.2.

<sup>161</sup> Oliver 2007: 44 notes that this aspect was also aided by the strong fleet and developed harbour.

<sup>162</sup> Rhodes & Osborne: 2004: 100.

<sup>163</sup> Dem., *On the Crown*, 18.77.

island cleruchies were compelled by law to import grain only to Athens,<sup>164</sup> which presumably restricted the use of the islands as trading posts for other Greek *poleis*. However, the island settlements strengthened the Athenian trading options with foreign importers in the east. This was an essential trading link as Athens was no longer reliant on tribute from the *poleis* of the Delian League or from the subsequent Second Athenian Confederacy. It was also beneficial for Alexander to have the islands under Athenian control as the success of his campaign along the coast of Asia Minor would have been compromised if the islands were not in the hands of a League ally. This became evident when a Persian fleet harboured for provisions at Samos and created conflict between Alexander and the Athenians. Alexander took the episode as an opportunity to suggest a serious breach of the League terms by the Athenians.<sup>165</sup>

After Chaeronea and the demise of the Second Athenian Confederacy, an important means of revenue for Athens came from harbour taxes. The terms of the League of Corinth protected the use of harbours.<sup>166</sup> Thucydides reported on the financial difficulty experienced in Athens after the devastation of the Decelean war, 'it was about this time that they imposed upon their subjects a tax of five per cent on all imports and exports by sea, thinking this would bring in more money'.<sup>167</sup> This emergency proposal was extreme in comparison to the 1% harbour tax of the fifth century, which was sufficient when combined with payments from tributary *poleis*.<sup>168</sup> In the 330s a more reasonable 2% tax was levied on trade in the Piraeus.<sup>169</sup> This would comply with the desire of the Athenians to encourage trade in the longer term rather than a short term revenue boost.

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<sup>164</sup> Dem., *Against Phormio*, 34.37.

<sup>165</sup> Arrian, *Campaigns*, 1.19.

<sup>166</sup> Dem., *On the Treaty with Alexander*, 17.26-28.

<sup>167</sup> Thucy., *History*, 7.28.

<sup>168</sup> Ps-Xen., *Constitution of Athenians*, 1.17.

<sup>169</sup> Lyc., *Against Leocrates*, 1.19.

Other harbours in territories allocated to Athens by Philip enhanced trade in the east and to the south. Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros had always had strategic use as trade routes from the Black Sea. The harbour at Oropus, which became part of Attica after Chaeronea, facilitated the traditional trade route from Skyros to Euboea.<sup>170</sup> Delos could have been a serious opponent to the harbour at Piraeus if Philip had not allocated its administration to Athens. Although the harbour at Delos was not as large or as accessible as that in Piraeus, it was in a strategic position for trade with Egypt or Rhodes. The Lycurgan administration in Athens organised developments to the harbour at Piraeus and it became an important facility for housing the fleet and accommodating trade.<sup>171</sup> Adhering to the terms of Macedonian rule the Piraeus developed to become an important trade centre for central Greece. The grain from the harbour of Piraeus was probably traded in the south as Salamis appears to have remained under Athenian dominion<sup>172</sup>until 318 when the island came under Macedonian control.<sup>173</sup>

The distribution of grain on the Greek mainland was aided by the demise of major warfare between *poleis*, stipulated under the League conditions,

nor take up arms for harm against any of those who abide by the oaths neither by land nor by sea; nor shall I take any city or guard-post nor harbour, for war, of any of those participating in the peace.

Local grain production benefitted from relative stability in Attica as the region was unaffected by Alexander's distant campaign. The destruction of war affected the livelihoods of the Attic farmers. The olive industry was particularly vulnerable in warfare

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<sup>170</sup> Oliver 2007: 38; Dem., *On the Crown*, 18.301; Thucy., *History*, 8.96 expresses the importance of Euboea.

<sup>171</sup> Plut., *Moralia*, X, 852c; Hyp., Fr. 118.

<sup>172</sup> Arist., *Athenian Constitution*, 54.8.

<sup>173</sup> Habicht 1997: 51-52.

through the destruction of olive trees, which were slow to regrow. However, Athenian agricultural land was unharmed as the battle of Chaeronea was sufficiently distant from Attica.<sup>174</sup> At meetings of the Assembly the protection of Attica was considered of equal importance as that of grain supply.<sup>175</sup> From the 330s generals were appointed to specific details of internal defence. Their duties included policing with ‘full power to arrest a disobedient man’.<sup>176</sup> The inland borders and sea ports were under the protection of the *Epheboi*, who patrolled from garrisons in Attica.<sup>177</sup> Their duties were carried out under the Ephebic oath, which was sworn on that which was most precious to Athens, ‘the boundaries of my fatherland, wheat, barley, vines, olives, figs’.<sup>178</sup> This structure gave Attic farmers a level of security in an environment that had always been precariously exposed to the front line of inter-*poleis* warfare.

As a large Greek contingent of mercenaries was sent to Asia to fulfil Alexander’s demands, the citizen body could function in the primary occupation of agriculture. Mercenary soldiers would probably not have had ties to the land in Athens. Oropus was in Athenian hands from 337, which extended Attic grain production. In addition the destruction of Thebes under Alexander in 335 saw an expansion of the western border of Attica as Theban land was utilised. Demosthenes and his adversary Dinarchus both remark on this aspect of the fate of Thebes. Demosthenes declared to the Athenians, ‘Poor Thebans...you who till the farms that once were theirs’.<sup>179</sup> Dinarchus lamented that ‘the site of Thebes is being ploughed and sown’.

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<sup>174</sup> Dem., *On the Crown*, 18.230; Arist., *Athenian Constitution*, 60.2 on the seriousness of the crime of damaging the precious commodity of the olive tree; Dem., *First Olynthiac*, 1.27.

<sup>175</sup> Arist., *Athenian Constitution*, 43.4.

<sup>176</sup> Arist., *Athenian Constitution*, 61.1-2 the appointment of generals to specific tasks of hoplite, cavalry and trierarch command show that although defence was still dependent on a militia, a formal army structure was in place; Oliver 2007: 171; Rhodes 1993: 678-679.

<sup>177</sup> Cf. Chapter 2.3.

<sup>178</sup> Lyc., *Against Leocrates*, 1.77; Rhodes & Osborne 2004: 88; Tod 1948: 204.

<sup>179</sup> Dem., *On the Crown*, 18.41.

The food producers of Attica were essential for *polis* survival but they could not fully meet the needs of the Athenian population. Athenian economic policies had always been reactionary and inspired by necessity rather than long-term economic potential. They were amended according to such factors as war or harsh climate.<sup>180</sup> In the fourth century the slow process of amending laws<sup>181</sup> was relieved by the swifter method of proposing decrees. An innovation of the mid-fourth century hastened proposed changes to legislation by a restructure of the process by the *Ekklesia*.<sup>182</sup> As Philip became involved in affairs in central Greece the Athenians showed an awareness of the importance of protecting their food supplies. The attempt by Leptines in 356/5 to remove the perpetuity clause in honorary decrees to foreign suppliers addressed the problem of Athenian grants being exploited by regime changes of foreign suppliers. The foreign benefactors, if no longer enjoying perpetual privileges must earn their honours rather than hold Athens to a long-term obligation.<sup>183</sup> After the battle of Chaeronea, Athenian foreign policy became concerned with procuring a sufficient food supply for the *polis*. These policies were concerned with mercantile law, shipping loans and with a new focus on encouraging foreign traders into Athens.<sup>184</sup>

### **3.2. Honours for trade.**

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<sup>180</sup> Austin & Vidal-Naquet 1977: 112; Engen 2010: 20-27 a reminder that modern economic theories should be applied with caution when discussing the economic condition of ancient Athens.

<sup>181</sup> Dem., *Against Leptines*, 20.88-89 stated that, if challenged, an old law had to be replaced by a new one.

<sup>182</sup> Dem., *Against Leptines*, 20.90-92; MacDowell 1978: 48-49.

<sup>183</sup> Dem., *Against Leptines*, 20.2, 98.

<sup>184</sup> Engen 2010: 4-6, 27 I agree with the view here that all trade is an exchange whether it is in the form of market trade or goods exchanged for honours.

The necessity for consistent grain supplies into the *polis* created a new system of alliances for Athens, this time with foreign merchants.<sup>185</sup> In the fourth century a reciprocal system had developed with conspicuous honours and civic privileges, such as exemptions (*ateleia*) from taxes and liturgies. Confined by the terms of the League, Athens was no longer able to manipulate other states into supplying food and instead they secured long-term crucial supplies, particularly timber and grain<sup>186</sup> by offering such privileges. In return foreign merchants such as the Bosporan Kings, Leukon and Pairisades encouraged trade to Athens and waived export duty on traders dealing with the *polis*.<sup>187</sup> Demosthenes showed in his speech of 327/6 that a Greek presence was firmly established in the ‘barbarian’ Bosporus region. Phormio’s business partner spent the winter there and the mention of harbour officials indicated that a similar administrative system was in place as that employed in Athens.<sup>188</sup> The links to the Black Sea were evidently still strong among old alliances.<sup>189</sup> After 355/4 honours were more frequently given for trade services.<sup>190</sup> This was at the end of the Third Social War, which saw Philip firmly entrenched in Greek affairs.<sup>191</sup> Although the granting of honours had developed before Philip’s ascendancy in the Greek world, eighteen of the twenty three known honours concerning food supply came after 338.<sup>192</sup>

The reliance on foreign imports made Athens vulnerable and the approach to foreign benefactors was crucial. The Athenians placed restrictions on privileges handed out to foreign benefactors, which held a check on how far the foreign trader could engage in

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<sup>185</sup> Oliver 2007: 42 ‘in the 330s and 320s the Athenians awarded individuals explicitly for their actions and wrote them up on *stelai*’.

<sup>186</sup> Engen 2010: 4; Dem., *Against Leptines*, 20.64.

<sup>187</sup> Dem., *Against Phormio*, 34.36; 20.31.

<sup>188</sup> Dem., *Against Phormio*, 34.8; 34.34.

<sup>189</sup> Isoc., *Trapeziticus*, 17.57.

<sup>190</sup> Engen 2010: 62.

<sup>191</sup> Rhodes 2009: 343-347.

<sup>192</sup> Engen 2010: 77, 80.

Athenian affairs. This established Athenian citizenship as the highest honour and a worthwhile pursuit. Philip and Alexander were both awarded Athenian citizenship, which presumably put a greater value on the honour in the eyes of the foreign benefactors.<sup>193</sup> The motivation for this honour may have been to establish the Macedonian kings as worthy adversaries to lessen the impact of defeat after the battle of Chaeronea. Also, in giving the honour of citizenship, the Athenians could claim to be on equal terms with the Macedonian conquerors.

To some extent the honours to foreign merchants were the same as those given to honoured Athenians such as a special seat in the theatre, banquets or the trierarch's gold crown.<sup>194</sup> Privileges came in the form of full or partial citizenship rights such as *enktesis*, which allowed the recipient to own land in Attica.<sup>195</sup> A speech of Demosthenes suggests that the right of inter-marriage was also offered as *enktesis*, in this case in an alliance pact with Thebes.<sup>196</sup> Further privileges were in the form of exemption from liturgies such as *choregia* or *eisphorai*, which relieved the benefactor from costly involvement in a vital part of *polis* revenue creation.<sup>197</sup> Leptine's law challenged such privileges toward foreign benefactors (*euergetai*) or their representatives (*proxenoi*) and sought to abolish *ateleia* to honorands.<sup>198</sup> This imbalance of reciprocity would have been detrimental to Athens as it had the potential to strengthen the role of the foreign benefactor. As Demosthenes pointed out to his Athenian audience, Leukon, and his son Pairisades, continued to grant exemption to Bosphoran traders who exported to Athens despite the Athenians only offering them limited privileges.<sup>199</sup> The significant loss of the one-thirtieth tax on

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<sup>193</sup> Kralli 2000; 115.

<sup>194</sup> Arist., *Rhetoric*, 1361a; Dem., *On the Crown*, 18.91 although the recipients are Athenian it is a list of expected honours.

<sup>195</sup> MacDowell 1978: 78-79.

<sup>196</sup> Dem., *On the Crown*, 18.187.

<sup>197</sup> Oliver 2007: 30-36; Engen 2010: 49.

<sup>198</sup> Austin & Vidal-Naquet 1977: 289-90.

<sup>199</sup> Dem., *Against Leptines*, 20. 31-3; *Against Midias*, 21.31; *Against Phormio*, 34.36.



Bosporan exports showed that the Bosporan kings considered the benefits with Athens to be worthwhile.<sup>200</sup> If the Athenians supported Leptine's law to remove *ateleia* then they would have become precariously dependent on the Bosporan rulers continued benefaction.<sup>201</sup> Without sufficient privileges from Athens, Leukon and his successors could withdraw their benefaction or bestow it as a political weapon thereby giving them control over the Athenians. Although the decrees on both sides offered honours in perpetuity, it would seem that on the part of the benefactor the rules could change regarding Athens. Pairisades' issued a decree announcing tax exemption on exports to Athens in 327. This may indicate a break in the perpetuity clause that saw the necessity for Pairisades to re-establish this scheme.<sup>202</sup> Evidently the Athenians needed to secure a delicate balance to ensure reciprocity with foreign trading allies.

The law of Leptines showed limited concern for the true value of foreign benefactors to Athens and was probably motivated solely by a need for revenue. Demosthenes' appeal of Leptines law was proposed in 355, the era of Philip's involvement in central Greece. It was also the period that saw the demise of the Second Athenian Confederacy. Philip's destruction of Olynthus in 348 may have been significant motivation for Athens to give such honours to Bosporan benefactors as Philip's advance toward the Hellespont was of great concern to the Athenians. An inscription of 347/6 shows that by this time considered attention had been given to the importance of a careful balance of honours with the foreign grain providers.<sup>203</sup> and an awareness of the need for strong economic alliances.

The decree of 347/6 was to acknowledge the continued benefaction of the Bosporan rulers and was set up on a marble *stèle* in the Piraeus. Athenian decrees announcing privileges

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<sup>200</sup> Dem., *Against Leptines* 20.32; Oliver 2007: 30; Engen 2010: 116.

<sup>201</sup> Engen 2010: 6.

<sup>202</sup> Dem., *Against Phormio*, 34.36; Engen 2010: 308.

<sup>203</sup> Tod, 1948: 167; Rhodes & Osborne 2004: 64.

to foreign benefactors were set up in prominent ports.<sup>204</sup> This not only served to encourage others to do the same, but also showed an Athenian presence beyond the boundary of the *astu* where decrees would traditionally have been displayed.<sup>205</sup> The pertinence of displaying inscriptions in the Piraeus, the commercial centre of Athens, was to affirm the commercial agreement made with the *polis* and it probably aided the administrative process for the traders.<sup>206</sup> With hostels, an *agora*<sup>207</sup> and grain officials established in the Piraeus, it would seem that foreign traders were not encouraged to venture further into Athens than the mercantile area. The sources suggest that courts were located in the harbours for various types of litigation.<sup>208</sup> This containment of foreigners to the Piraeus would have aided the protection of Attica and enhanced the reputation of the Piraeus as a thriving port, which, in turn, would encourage more traders.

Macedonian domination forced a new emphasis on the Athenians approach to foreign traders and there was a notable shift in the language used in trade decrees. By the mid fourth century the language once used for military and political services was being applied to foreign trade services.<sup>209</sup> *Philotimia* was expressed in decrees to foreigners from 352/1 up to 337/6.<sup>210</sup> This indicated that the honorand held highly ‘the love of honour’ as a return for their benefaction, It had always been the aspiration of the Athenian citizen to achieve *Philotimia* in a competitive society. As the necessity for foreign trade grew, the term was used to encourage foreign benefactors and entice them with the promise of honours but in the knowledge that they would remain on the outside of Athenian society.<sup>211</sup> The more equivocal epithet *Chresimos*, meaning ‘useful’ first appeared for

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<sup>204</sup> Oliver 2007: 35; Dem., *Against Leptines*, 20.36.

<sup>205</sup> Engen 2010: 63.

<sup>206</sup> Oliver 2007: 35-36.

<sup>207</sup> McDowell 1978: 156.

<sup>208</sup> Rhodes 1993: 646; Paus., *Description of Greece*, 1.28.5.

<sup>209</sup> Engen 2010: 138-139.

<sup>210</sup> Engen 2010: 120.

<sup>211</sup> Engen 2010: 133-134.

trade related services from 337/6.<sup>212</sup> The language used in decrees had connotations for the Athenian democratic institution and was carefully considered. The term *Chrestoi* (good men) was an epithet of the old Athenian aristocracy and therefore it was not lightly used to praise an individual in a democracy. However, after Chaeronea it was applied to foreign traders. This demonstrated that while expression on decrees was treated with caution, in the period after Chaeronea aristocratic terminology had been diverted to use outside of the *polis*. This served to dilute its meaning as an indicator for differences between aristocracy and democracy within Athens. The decree terminology used for foreign benefactors placed egalitarian meaning on terms that were once considered aristocratic and in doing so reinforced democratic values in Athens.

The attention given to the role of foreign benefactors by Athens during the 330s was to continue after the death of Alexander. The *diadochoi* of Alexander relied on a network of benefactors as an entourage of 'friends' to enable control of vast areas and it became the system of administration that defined the Hellenistic age.<sup>213</sup> *Euergetism* came to replace the liturgical system in the Hellenistic age.<sup>214</sup> Benefactors could claim their actions were altruistic and thereby gain greater accolade than the liturgy system which was a duty compelled by law.<sup>215</sup> This concept was aided by the use of the epithet *eunoia* (goodwill) on trade related decrees, a term which indicated altruism as motivation.<sup>216</sup>

### **3.3. Local food production.**

There was a certain amount of self-sufficiency in local grain production. This was not interrupted by Macedonian domination and Philip's territorial arrangement held some

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<sup>212</sup> Engen 2010: 123.

<sup>213</sup> Oliver 2007: 228-229.

<sup>214</sup> Oliver 2007: 196-199 an exploration of the demise of the liturgy system in the early Hellenistic period.

<sup>215</sup> Oliver 2007: 215 voluntary *epidoseis* donations as an example of *philotimia*.

<sup>216</sup> Engen 2010: 129.

benefit for local food providers. The allocation of Oropus to Athens under Philip's terms opened up access to the fertile plains of Euboea and as part of Attica it added to the grain yield for Athens.<sup>217</sup> Philip's allocation to the Athenians of some of the larger islands in the Aegean was of great benefit as they were able to grow significant yields of crops. Lemnos in particular produced high quality wheat with a reasonably high yield. Although it is difficult to gauge the productivity of the islands, it can be established that Salamis, Imbros, Skyros and Lemnos produced reasonable quantities of wheat and barley. This is evident from a law of 374/3 that was devised to deal with transporting grain from the islands as a form of tax.<sup>218</sup> This would suggest these islands had consistent supplies that were crucial to Athens. Attica also produced barley and wheat<sup>219</sup> and, as previously commented on, its borders were extended after the destruction of Thebes in 335.

Year 329/8	Attica	Lemnos	Skyros	Imbros	Salamis	Oropus
Med. Of Wheat	39,112	56,750	9,600	44,200		6,900
Med. Of Barley	363,400	248,525	28,800	26,000	24,525	12,000
Total grain	402,512	305,275	38,400	70,200	24,525	18,900

Fig. 2. Grain production in year 329/8 - Source I.G. ii<sup>2</sup> 1672, Eleusis First Fruits inscription.<sup>220</sup>

The table above shows high production levels of barley but this was considered a food for animals or the poor and grew better in a season with higher rainfall.<sup>221</sup> This would indicate that this particular year was not a good one for a beneficially balanced crop, although barley must have been a suitable alternative for all consumers in times of poor

<sup>217</sup> Thucy., *History*, 8.95.2; 7.28; Oliver 2007: 38.

<sup>218</sup> Oliver 2007: 26; Engen 2010: 80.

<sup>219</sup> Mitchell 1940: 49-50; Theophrastos, *Enquiry into plants*, 8.8.2.

<sup>220</sup> Mitchell 1940: 50 the quantities here are taken from Mitchel's assessment and his view is that this was probably a poor year for production overall and these figures may be low; Garnsey 1988: 89-106 for thorough assessment.

<sup>221</sup> Garnsey 1988: 99-103; Bissa 2009: 153-154.

harvest.<sup>222</sup> The fluctuation of yields of barley and wheat in other territories and climates would have ensured a thriving business network of imports into Athens. The food shortages in Athens of the 330s were not necessarily due to climate-related crop failure as their benefactors were able to supply all of Athens' needs when there was a 'universal shortage'.<sup>223</sup> The lack of supply may have been partly due to transportation being disrupted by war. The Bosphorus supply, a region highly suited to grain growth, was subject to such disruption in localised warfare.<sup>224</sup>

Further securities were put in place to secure efficiency in supplies and distribution to Athens in the form of a revision of administrative posts. In the 330s the issue of food supply was a high priority at the assembly meetings.<sup>225</sup> There was a substantial adjustment of the role of the corn officials. The number of grain guardians (*sitophulakes*) was expanded from ten to thirty five to oversee the city and the Piraeus. Their task was to ensure the fair sale of grain from its origin as raw corn through to the miller and bread seller. The bread was subject to a weight standard. In the corn market ten commissioners (*sitonai*) were appointed to ensure the dealers engaged in fair exchange and allocated a 2/3 distribution to the city.<sup>226</sup> The role of the *sitophulakes* was not an innovation of the period but they were the only officials concerned with weight standards and commercial issues to have their roles so significantly enlarged in this period.<sup>227</sup> The trade and distribution of the Athenian food supply was a state concern and, under Macedonian domination in a changing economic landscape, it was vital to impose these strict regulations.

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<sup>222</sup> Dem., *For Phormio*, 34.37.

<sup>223</sup> Dem., *Against Leptines*, 20.32; Garnsey 1988: 154-62 highlights eight grain shortages in Athens between 338/7 and 323/2.

<sup>224</sup> Dem., *Against Phormio*, 34.8.

<sup>225</sup> Arist., *Athenian Constitution*, 43.4.

<sup>226</sup> Arist., *Athenian Constitution*, 51.3-4.

<sup>227</sup> Rhodes 1993: 576-579.

### 3.4. Timber

Another significant and essential import to Athens was in products relating to trireme production. Ship building required skilled workers and was an on-going business as, from the 350s onwards, the maintenance of fleet size was a primary concern for the *polis*.<sup>228</sup> Ship building was an important aspect of self-sufficiency and a large fleet was a symbol of power for the Athenians. A decree of 325/4 to establish a colony in the Adriatic gives an inventory of naval equipment and accounts for losses of worm-eaten oars.<sup>229</sup> It could be assumed then that hulls also suffered such wear and tear.<sup>230</sup> Ships were also lost or damaged at sea. Bissa calculates that for the second half of the fourth century it was necessary to construct eighteen new ships annually.<sup>231</sup> However, pitch and timber were commodities not readily available to the Athenians. Traditionally these supplies came from the extensive forests of Macedonia and Thrace.<sup>232</sup>

The new regime of Macedonian domination created the need for a new source of timber and pitch. Thucydides related how the loss of Amphipolis to Brasidas was devastating to the Athenians as it had cut them off from an important source ‘because it supplied timber for shipbuilding and brought in revenue’.<sup>233</sup> The port at Amphipolis had been an important colony for the Athenians<sup>234</sup> and was central to Macedonia and Thrace, both of which were significant suppliers of timber.<sup>235</sup> Xenophon stated in the 370s that Macedon was where the Athenians got their timber.<sup>236</sup> Demosthenes reiterated this in 336 with his

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<sup>228</sup> Cf. Chapter 2.4.

<sup>229</sup> Rhodes & Osborne 2004: 100; Tod 1948: 200; Bissa 2009: 136, 113-114 on the cost of oars and the specific skill of the oar-maker who probably worked from the source forest.

<sup>230</sup> Gabrielson 1994: 143-145.

<sup>231</sup> Bissa 2009: 108.

<sup>232</sup> Dem., *On the Treaty with Alexander*, 17.28; Gabrielson 1994: 140.

<sup>233</sup> Thucy., *History*, 4.108; Bissa 2009: 123.

<sup>234</sup> Thucy., *History*, 4.102.

<sup>235</sup> Bissa 2009: 124.

<sup>236</sup> Xen., *Hellenika*, 6.1.11.

comment on the abundance of Macedonian timber that had been, ‘cheap for all who want it’.<sup>237</sup> Philip’s domination of the northern Aegean made sourcing timber problematic for the Athenians.

Theophrastos, however, described other areas where timber was sourced,

Again it is only a narrow extent of country which produces wood fit for shipbuilding at all, namely in Europe, the Macedonian region, and certain parts of Thrace and Italy; in Asia, Cilicia, Sinope and Amisus, and also the Mysian Olympus, and Mount Ida; but in these parts it is not abundant. For Syria has Syrian cedar, and they use this for their galleys.<sup>238</sup>

Different locations offered various types of timber considered suitable for triremes, mainly silver-fir, fir, cedar and pine.<sup>239</sup> Alexander’s advance into Asia Minor and Syria may have temporarily disrupted sourcing timber in these areas. However, after the initial conflict, Alexander left his conquered territories to function as before and the local trade continued. Notably, with the Adriatic expedition in mind, quality timber was available in Corsica, Latium and the Italian south.<sup>240</sup> According to Thucydides, Alcibiades recognised the potential in a conquest of Italy which was ‘rich in timber’<sup>241</sup> and in the fifth century Athens had formed a good trading relationship with southern Italy.<sup>242</sup>

There was limited availability in Athens for the supply of items vital for the continuation of ship building. These were copper for ships rams, tin, ruddle and resin for hulls, papyrus and hemp for ropes and sails. Ruddle was sourced and monopolised on the island of Kea

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<sup>237</sup> Dem., *On the Treaty with Alexander*, 17.27-28.

<sup>238</sup> Theophrastos, *Enquiry into Plants*, 4.5.5; Bissa 2009: 111.

<sup>239</sup> Theophrastos, *Enquiry into Plants*, 5.7.1-2; 4.8.4. notes papyrus for ropes from Egypt; Gabrielson 1994: 140.

<sup>240</sup> Theophrastos, *Enquiry into Plants*, 5.8.1.

<sup>241</sup> Thucy., *History*, 6.90.

<sup>242</sup> Ps-Xen., *Constitution of Athenians*, 2.7-8.

to the south of Attica and the materials for sails and ropes came primarily from Egypt.<sup>243</sup> These necessities would have created a continuous trade south of Athens. Trade with Egypt would have been aided by the building of Alexandria, which Alexander founded in 331.<sup>244</sup> This great trade-oriented city was created to facilitate Greek and Egyptian traditions and trade was an essential form of communication between the two cultures.

### 3.5. Piracy

The League of Corinth addressed the issue of piracy, ‘for the compact, of course, provides that all the parties to the peace may sail the seas and that none may hinder them or force a ship of any of them to come to harbour’.<sup>245</sup> These were the common problems of sea-trading.<sup>246</sup> This clause was not unusual, the Peace of Philocrates, as an example, also had an anti-piracy clause. Post-Chaeronea, piracy was, more than ever, a problem to be addressed for the Athenians.<sup>247</sup> Even after the formation of the League the important trade routes to the Black Sea ‘remained vulnerable’.<sup>248</sup> The loss of the northern Athenian cleruchies and the consequential loss of control of the sea in the northern Aegean would have been a major concern for traders from the Bosphorus. The necessity of sending fast ships to protect against pirates as late as 325/4 showed that it was still a significant problem and not one that could be resolved under the League.<sup>249</sup>

In this light, adding the clause against acts of piracy seems futile but Philip may have been addressing Athens in particular with the anti-piracy clause. The Athenian fleet was substantial and triremes were employed to convoy and protect trade ships. The Athenians

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<sup>243</sup> Gabrielson 1994: 139-140; Rhodes & Osborne 2004: 162.

<sup>244</sup> Arrian, *Campaigns*, 3.2; Plut., *Alexander*, 26.4-6; Curt., *History*, 4.8.1-6; Diod. Sic., *History*, 17.52.1-7.

<sup>245</sup> Dem., *On the Treaty with Alexander*, 17.19.

<sup>246</sup> Dem., *On the Peace*, 5.25; Lyc., *Against Leocrates*, 1.18.

<sup>247</sup> Engen 2010: 62.

<sup>248</sup> Oliver 2007: 44.

<sup>249</sup> Tod 1948: 200; Rhodes & Osborne 2004: 100.



still held a dominant presence on the seas.<sup>250</sup> Demosthenes was affronted that Philip would join Athens in policing the seas thereby putting him on an equal status of maritime authority.<sup>251</sup> In the previous century Athenian thalassocracy had enabled Athens to control all inter-*poleis* sea trade and claimed the authority to forbid exports to Athens' enemies.<sup>252</sup> The Athenians were as guilty of piracy as any other Greek state, not least Philip himself of which Demosthenes accused him for financing his wars.<sup>253</sup>

As piracy could not be sufficiently controlled, the role of the Athenian fleet as trade protection is a reasonable assumption.<sup>254</sup> It was customary in peace time for merchant ships to be accompanied by warships and in time of war, when warships were utilised elsewhere, merchant ships were particularly vulnerable.<sup>255</sup> As the large Athenian fleet was not essential to Alexander's campaign, it was available to protect merchant vessels. The deep-based commercial ships, unlike warships, required ballast for outward journeys<sup>256</sup> and were therefore constantly susceptible to pirate raids. Sea protection, honours for trade and appealing conditions in the Piraeus accommodated foreign merchants and facilitated their transactions with Athens. In the era of Macedonian domination the particular focus on drawing traders into Athens had repercussions on the status of the citizen and resident alien (metic) as the commercial and cultural worlds interacted.

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<sup>250</sup> Dem., *On the Treaty with Alexander*, 17.25.

<sup>251</sup> Dem., *Against Halonnesus*, 7.14-15.

<sup>252</sup> Ps-Xen., *Constitution of Athenians*, 2.11-12.

<sup>253</sup> Dem., *First Philippic*, 4.34.

<sup>254</sup> Engen 2010: 65; cf., Chapter 2.4.

<sup>255</sup> Engen 2010: 111.

<sup>256</sup> Dem., *Against Phormio*, 34.27.

### 3.6. Commerce

After the establishment of the League of Corinth there was a particular focus on commercial activity in Athens in recognition of the instability in obtaining food supplies and the importance of encouraging trade.<sup>257</sup> Foreign traders were accommodated in hostels set up for them in the Piraeus and the docks were improved to facilitate merchants.<sup>258</sup> Adaptations within the Athenian constitution toward the logistics of food supplies saw a revision of commercial law. Demosthenes' speeches contain examples of the complexities of commercial contracts.<sup>259</sup> The Athenians themselves were subject to laws concerning grain supplies, which demanded that their grain was delivered only to the Piraeus with severe penalty for law-breakers.<sup>260</sup> In the period of economic uncertainty before Chaeronea, Athens had put in place institutional changes focusing on the needs of merchants, primarily, a specific commercial court (*dikai emporikai*). This was established to facilitate the swift settlement of affairs between traders.<sup>261</sup> Metics, vital to trade, were given equal status in commercial transactions as that of Athenian citizen's and they no longer needed a citizen patron (*prostates*) to represent them in the courts.<sup>262</sup> The courts gave priority to those involved in commercial transactions to speed up weather-dependent trading negotiations.<sup>263</sup> The process was aided by the addition of five new *eisagogeis* magistrates in the 330s that were designated to financial cases.<sup>264</sup> These changes indicated the importance of a swift resolution to trading and financial issues. It was unprecedented

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<sup>257</sup> Engen 2010: 64.

<sup>258</sup> Din., *Against Demosthenes*, 1.96; Engen 2010: 62.

<sup>259</sup> Dem., *Against Dionysodorus*, 56.45; *Against Zenothemis*, 32.1-5; *Against Lacritus*, 35.10-13.

<sup>260</sup> Dem., *Against Zenothemis*, 32.1; *Against Phormio*, 34.37, 50; *Against Lacritus* 35.50-51; *Against Dionysodorus*, 56.6; Lyc., *Against Leocrates*, 26-7.

<sup>261</sup> Garnsey 1988: 139 various suggestions that this court was established between c.355-c.343; Arist., *Athenian Constitution* 52.2; 59.5; Rhodes 1993: 583; Dem., *Against Apatourios*, 33.1, 23; *Against Theocrines*, 58.10-13 both speeches dated c. 340 see MacDowell 2009: 276, 293.

<sup>262</sup> Austin & Vidal-Naquet 1977: 99-100.

<sup>263</sup> Austin & Vidal-Naquet 1977: 147-148.

<sup>264</sup> Arist., *Athenian Constitution*, 52.2; MacDowell 1978: 233.

in this period that these courts were open to both citizen and non-citizen alike with cases brought before the *thesmothetai*.<sup>265</sup> Although this would appear to show a loosening of the demarcation between citizen and metic,<sup>266</sup> there were still social and political indicators that differentiated the status of metic from that of the citizen.

### 3.7. Metics.

The Athenians had always accommodated foreign visitors to the *polis* as they were an essential part of its economic function.<sup>267</sup> The enfranchisement of metics was another emergency measure proposed in the turmoil after Chaeronea. Lycurgus emphasised the outrageous nature of such an event,

the sight which would most surely have stirred the onlooker and moved him to tears over the sorrows of Athens was to see the people vote that slaves should be released, that aliens should become Athenians and the disfranchised regain their rights.<sup>268</sup>

As with other extreme proposals, this was rejected when it was realised that Philip's approach was not one of destruction. The *polis* depended on specific distinctions between citizen and non-citizen. The breakdown of this distinction is often seen as the cause of the demise of the *polis* in the Hellenistic period.<sup>269</sup> However, this was probably more to do with mass migration to the new cities of the Hellenistic Kings. In the period 338 to 323 there remained clear distinctions of citizen status enhanced by the legalised and controlled

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<sup>265</sup> Dem., *Against Lacritus*, 35.45; Engen 2010: 62; Rhodes 1993:583, 652, 664-5; Garnsey 1988: 139; McDowell 2009: 260; McDowell 1978: 231, 223-224 suggests that public, and perhaps private, cases were held in the same way for metic and citizen with the same magistrates.

<sup>266</sup> McDowell 1978: 234.

<sup>267</sup> Dem., *Against Leptines*, 20.18.

<sup>268</sup> Lyc., *Against Leocrates*, 1.41; Hyp., Fr. 27-28, 18; Dem., *Against Aristogiton II*, 26.11.

<sup>269</sup> Engen 2010: 71.

system of honours. It was only with the rise of private social clubs that a blurring of status was accepted.<sup>270</sup>

The metic tax (*metoikion*) distinguished the metics from citizens and was an important source of revenue but also served as a stamp of metic status. The penalty for defaulting on the *metoikion* was severe because it merged the distinction between metic and citizen.<sup>271</sup> Citizenship was rarely granted and was given to those who could be of benefit to the *polis*, particularly financially. A privilege for a metic would be equality of taxation (*isoteleia*), which no longer required him to pay the *metoikion*.<sup>272</sup> The greater aspiration would probably have been for equal rights (*isopoliteia*) with Athenians giving metics an opportunity for political contribution.<sup>273</sup> Those metics who were *isoteleis* still remained distinct from the status of the Athenian citizen.<sup>274</sup>

In the wake of Philip's destruction in the northern Aegean and Alexander's razing of Thebes, a consistent flow of exiles would have migrated to Athens. As Athens was free of Macedonian garrisons and was functioning economically it would have been a sanctuary for the dispossessed. The problem with these foreign exiles entering Athens was in the allocation of metic status. Those who are just passing through or briefly visiting were *xenos*. A metic was a foreigner who stayed a certain length of time in Athens and became liable for the *metoikion* tax.<sup>275</sup> There was a temporary tax-free period where he was known as *paraepidemos*.<sup>276</sup> The implication here is that the metic had the means to earn a living in Athens in order to be able to contribute to this tax and that the metics had a home *polis* to return to although many stayed for good in Athens. Those exiled by

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<sup>270</sup> Engen 2010: 71.

<sup>271</sup> Whitehead 1977: 76; McDowell 1978: 77; Dem., *Against Aristogiton I*, 25.57.

<sup>272</sup> McDowell 1978: 78; Dem., *Against Leptines*, 20.130.

<sup>273</sup> Austin & Vidal-Naquet 1977: 95 Samians received *isopoliteia* for loyalty in 405.

<sup>274</sup> Whitehead 1977: 11-12.

<sup>275</sup> Whitehead 1977: 9 the tax and residency period may have a link to the monthly mercantile law suits.

<sup>276</sup> Whitehead 1977: 7-9.

war with Philip had nowhere to return to and probably no means to support the *metoikion* payment. The fate of these refugees was because of the political relationship of Athens with Philip and so Athens could hardly refuse them sanctuary. The exiles from Olynthus were offered privileged status by Athens.<sup>277</sup> This was a grant offered to the whole city rather than an individual and relieved them of the obligation to pay *metoikion*.<sup>278</sup> The Theban exiles were only given refuge when permission was granted by Alexander, who had demanded that Thebans be extradited from other *poleis* after he razed Thebes. The destruction of Thebes was a stern reminder to the Athenians as to who was in control and the deference to Alexander as *hegemon* was seen when the Athenians sought his permission to receive exiled Thebans.

Lycurgus, in his policy to boost revenue in Athens, had set up appealing conditions to encourage metics. Further to the commercial adaptations in Athens, under Lycurgus' administration foreigners in Athens were encouraged to observe their own religious cults.<sup>279</sup> Lycurgus extended the right of *enktesis* to foreign merchants, so that they could worship their particular gods. Lycurgus in 333 proposed a decree allowing Kition traders to build a sanctuary to Aphrodite.<sup>280</sup> In classical Athens the right to own land was a privilege of the citizen. The acquisition of Athenian land by foreign traders would have been a notable privilege. The land had a designated purpose and was not for agricultural use or considered a home. This distinction clarified the social division between foreigner and citizen<sup>281</sup> as the foreigner rented a home and did not till the land. Lycurgus' proposal had precedent as the same inscription shows that Egyptians had acquired the same honour

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<sup>277</sup> Tod 1948: 166.

<sup>278</sup> Whitehead 1977: 15-16.

<sup>279</sup> Oliver 2007: 95; Whitehead 1977: 89.

<sup>280</sup> Tod 1948: 189; Rhodes & Osborne 2004: 91.

<sup>281</sup> Whitehead 1977: 70-71.

to build a sanctuary to Isis, probably also facilitated by Lycurgus. In adding this reference to the Egyptians, Lycurgus indicated the unusual nature of the honour.

It is notable that the Kitions were from Cyprus, an island which enabled access to trade in Syria. Egypt and Syria were trading areas of great interest to the Athenians at this time as Alexander moved into Asia Minor. The siting of the decree in the Piraeus acknowledged the status of the Kitions as foreign traders. Alexander recognised the importance of accommodating all religious cults when he founded Alexandria in 331. Like Lycurgus, he, too, created an environment suitable for indigenous Egyptians and 'foreign' Greeks to observe their own religion. The openness toward the establishment of foreign cults remained into the Hellenistic period.<sup>282</sup> This practice was key to the success of the Hellenistic cities which saw migrating Greeks amalgamate the gods of the east with the traditional Olympian gods.

As previously remarked upon, the cult of Demokratia was revived in the 340s and its resurgence in Athens correlated with the domination of Philip. There were many ships named Demokratia and statues and *steles* depicted the image. Rows of seats in the theatre were dedicated to the priests of the cult.<sup>283</sup> The foreign traders from Greek *poleis* worshipped gods familiar to the Athenians, as is evident in the Kition reverence of Aphrodite. The Athenian's obvious display of Demokratia created a contrast that differentiated them. The cult of Demokratia was based in the *agora*<sup>284</sup> but was visible all around the *polis* and on the sea, the foreign cults were confined to the trading areas. In the same year as the decree privileging the Kitions, a statue to Demokratia was erected by the *Boule*. This was at the time Alexander was reorganising the constitutions of the

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<sup>282</sup> Oliver 2007: 95.

<sup>283</sup> Raubitschek 1962: 239.

<sup>284</sup> Raubitschek 1962: 241.

cities of Asia Minor. The link between these two events has been analysed<sup>285</sup>, however it is also likely that the dedication to *Demokratia* was to balance Lycurgus' encouragement of foreign cults.

Economics and citizenship were to become combined in the era of the *diadochoi* when citizenship could be purchased and the concept of the *cosmopolis* emerged. The forerunner for this change came about in the 340s and 330s with the community of Greek merchants who advanced the concept of a cosmopolitan community. This process was aided by the new mercantile laws, the merging of cults and the potential to gain privileges as a metic in the thriving *polis* of Athens.<sup>286</sup>

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<sup>285</sup> Raubitschek 1962: 243.

<sup>286</sup> McDowell 1978; 234.

## Conclusion

The sources from the mid-fourth century offer those who wish to investigate the period a great resource in the literary evidence of the law court speeches. There is also a significant wealth of information in the epigraphical evidence of decrees, not only in their wording but in their physical location. Where archaeological evidence does not exist the works of the orators come to the fore.

Beyond their propaganda, these forms of evidence substantiate the view of a changing Greek world at the time of Philip's involvement in Greek affairs in this period. A study of Athens under Macedonian domination does not give a generalised view of Greece. Athens had more to lose by entering into the treaty of the League of Corinth as the *polis* had dominated Greek affairs both before and after the Peloponnesian War. The ability to recover successfully from the Peloponnesian War added to the prestige of Athens and may have been one factor that accounted for Philip's leniency.

The Peloponnesian War and its aftermath taught the Athenians some harsh lessons, which they drew upon when dealing with the might of the Macedonian kings. The problems that had subdued Athens after the Peloponnesian War lay in the overturn of the constitution and the denial of sovereignty in such areas as minting and civic defence. These were the internal institutions that concerned the Athenians under Macedonian domination. It was only Philip's leniency that made this pursuit of sovereignty possible.

Philip and Alexander stayed on the periphery of the world of the common Athenian. Philip had never stood in Athens and Alexander only once as an envoy. Through the words of the orators the Athenians were presented with a picture of their Macedonian dominators. Philip's advance across the northern Aegean impacted on the Athenians who engaged with him through diplomatic means. When diplomacy failed they prepared for



battle but were unprepared for the might of Philip and his army. The Athenian reaction to Macedonian domination can be best viewed from the aftermath of the battle of Chaeronea. The reports of Philip's destruction on northern *poleis* were reported to the Athenians in the midst of the post-battle turmoil. The panic after the battle of Chaeronea is an indication of how unprepared the Athenians were for defeat. Perhaps they were overconfident about a land battle on their own ground.

Defeated at Chaeronea and with the Macedonian army on their doorstep, the Athenians were not in a position to negotiate with Philip, and he dictated the terms to settle affairs and in doing so enforced his authority. Subjugation of the Athenians seemed complete under Philip's terms. The League of Corinth effectively put an end to the Second Athenian Confederacy. The terms of the League distinguished the member *poleis* both territorially and politically and restrained them from interfering in each other's internal affairs.

After her defeat the priorities for Athens were to re-establish defences and source food supplies. The Athenians made the best of the restrictions placed on them by the Macedonian Kings. The allocation of territory and lessons learned in the past were primary factors in the successful revival of the *polis*. The lost territory in the northern Aegean put a demand on the Athenians resourcefulness in accessing crucial supplies such as timber and grain. The Athenians focused on nurturing foreign trade relations and creating physical and legal structures within Athens to facilitate merchants. The territory allocated to Athens by Philip after Chaeronea limited the Athenian political influence in the Greek world. Philip's intention may have been to use the islands to facilitate the movement of troops to Asia. However, it also enabled the economic development of Athens. The rise of the cult of *Demokratia* and the ephebic oath established that the emphasis on democratic values was not incidental to the adaptation but was a definite response to interaction with foreign traders and the Macedonian rulers.

The political success of Athens under Macedonian domination showed that the *polis* was strengthened by involvement in the League. The enforced focus on internal affairs created by the League terms allowed Athens to recover her former glory with an impressive fleet and economic strength, facilitated by the developed harbour and adapted mercantile laws. The relationship between Athens and the Macedonians was defined by the observance of the League terms. When Alexander dismissed the League troops in Ecbatana, the League could have been dismissed by both parties. The testimony of the benefit of the League to the Athenians lies in the fact that institutional practices such as the *ephebeia* and *syntrierarchy* continued until the death of Alexander.

Just as the Athenians relied on past experience, particularly the effect on the *polis* of the Decelean war, they also had an imprint on the new world after the death of Alexander as the *diadochoi* changed the political landscape. Athenian reactionary policies developed some of the key cultural institutions that defined the Hellenistic age after the death of Alexander. These were such as *euergetism* replacing liturgies, which developed in the network of benefactors to the Hellenistic kings. The new cities built in the various territories of the *diadochoi* required an amalgamation of cultures of the east and west. This served to placate the indigenous people and encourage the Greek settlers. The Athenian extension of *enktesis* honours to foreign traders was the fore-runner of this concept as Athens placed a greater focus on the role of metics in commerce. Alexander also created an environment that encouraged cultural and economic interaction in Alexandria, which benefitted the Athenian economy.

The Hellenistic age is defined by the spread of Greek culture across the non-Greek territories of the *diadochoi*. Alexander's expedition into unknown territory is seen as the beginning of the cultural interaction that made the Hellenistic cities successful. It should

also be acknowledged that Athens under Macedonian domination established the institutional practices that enabled the new regimes after Alexander to flourish.

The full impact of Macedonian rule over Athens cannot be assessed in comparison with an alternative event. There are too many unknowns. What if Philip had treated Athens as he did Thebes? If the League of Corinth had not been devised, would inter-*poleis* warfare have put huge demands on the Athenian economy? How politically and economically strong would Athens have become if Alexander had lived on and fulfilled his ambitions? Even within the League of Corinth there was no assurance for Athens. The outcome of the Macedonian campaign into Asia could not be known. The repercussions of Persian retaliation if Alexander was defeated would reverberate back to the League members as Macedonian allies. Athens could only work toward reaffirming the political strength of the *polis* within the confines of the League terms. This strength was realised with a strong fleet, functioning economy and a trained military force.

In the fifteen year period from the battle of Chaeronea to the death of Alexander, the Athenians drew on their past experience to establish themselves as a leading force in the New Greek world under the League of Corinth. Democratic Athens flourished under the domination of the monarchs, Philip II and Alexander III. In adapting to Macedonian domination they established practices that were to advance the progress of the *diadochoi* of Alexander in a rapidly changing world.

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