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    Incumbency Advantage in an Electoral Contest


    Pastine, Tuvana (2018) Incumbency Advantage in an Electoral Contest. Economic and Social Review, 49 (4). pp. 419-436. ISSN 0012-9984

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    Abstract

    In a campaign spending contest framework, we investigate the potency of frequently cited sources of incumbency advantage in generating the observed patterns of campaign expenditure and reelection rates. Since one Dollar of extra spending should not change a certain loser to a certain winner, we extend the literature by allowing the electoral benefit of visibility to be stochastic. The model provides an explanation of earlier empirical findings that district variation in the cost of visibility does not influence incumbents’ victory probability. Furthermore, in contrast to previous literature, the model predicts that campaign finance legislation can increase challengers’ expected payoffs.

    Item Type: Article
    Keywords: campaign spending; elections; all-pay auctions;
    Academic Unit: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
    Item ID: 10422
    Depositing User: Tuvana Pastine
    Date Deposited: 16 Jan 2019 14:45
    Journal or Publication Title: Economic and Social Review
    Publisher: ESRI
    Refereed: No
    URI:

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