MURAL - Maynooth University Research Archive Library



    How do creditors respond to disclosure quality? Evidence from corporate dividend payouts


    Byrne, Julie and O'Connor, Thomas (2017) How do creditors respond to disclosure quality? Evidence from corporate dividend payouts. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 49. pp. 154-172. ISSN 1042-4431

    [img]
    Preview
    Download (2MB) | Preview


    Share your research

    Twitter Facebook LinkedIn GooglePlus Email more...



    Add this article to your Mendeley library


    Abstract

    Using a sample of 17,544 firms from 28 countries we explore how creditors influence dividend payouts in various disclosure regimes. Poorly-protected creditors do not restrict the practice by firms in opaque regimes of using large dividend payouts to build reputation capital, and place few restrictions on dividend payouts in transparent regimes. In intermediate disclosure regimes creditors place large restrictions on dividend payouts. Dividend payouts are always largest in transparent regimes. Our findings say that the disclosure standards versions of the outcome and substitution agency models of dividends are not mutually-exclusive, and are as effective under weak as they are under strong creditor rights.

    Item Type: Article
    Keywords: Dividend payout; Creditor rights; Disclosure standards; Agency outcome and substitution model of dividends; Corporate Finance and Governance; Payout Policy;
    Academic Unit: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
    Item ID: 11393
    Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2017.04.002
    Depositing User: Thomas O'Connor
    Date Deposited: 24 Oct 2019 16:09
    Journal or Publication Title: Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
    Publisher: Elsevier
    Refereed: Yes
    URI:

    Repository Staff Only(login required)

    View Item Item control page

    Downloads

    Downloads per month over past year