MURAL - Maynooth University Research Archive Library



    Risk-based Deposit Insurance: An Incentive Compatible Plan


    Pecchenino, Rowena A. (1992) Risk-based Deposit Insurance: An Incentive Compatible Plan. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 24 (4). pp. 499-510. ISSN 0022-2879

    [img]
    Preview
    Download (662kB) | Preview


    Share your research

    Twitter Facebook LinkedIn GooglePlus Email more...



    Add this article to your Mendeley library


    Abstract

    DEPOSIT INSURANCE PROVIDED by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) violates a basic principle of insurance: premiums are not adjusted for bank risk. Thus, banks have the incentive to take on more risk, increasing the insurer's liability but not the banks' costs (see Keeton 1984). This incentive is heightened further by the FDIC's timidity in closing failed banks. If uninsured depositors and other creditors were able and willing to evaluate bank risk and demand risk-adjusted returns on investments, the incentive for risk-taking would be weakened, since, in such a world, deposit insurance could be fairly priced (see Thomson 1987). When asymmetric information concerning both bank risktaking and insurer behavior characterizes the banking market [as Crane (1976); Avery, Belton, and Goldberg (1988); Keeton and Morris (1987); and Brewer and Lee (1986) all suggest to be the case], other remedies must be sought.'

    Item Type: Article
    Keywords: Risk-based; Deposit; Insurance; Incentive; Compatible Plan;
    Academic Unit: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
    Item ID: 8521
    Depositing User: Prof. Rowena Pecchenino
    Date Deposited: 26 Jul 2017 12:05
    Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
    Publisher: Wiley
    Refereed: Yes
    URI:

    Repository Staff Only(login required)

    View Item Item control page

    Downloads

    Downloads per month over past year