MURAL - Maynooth University Research Archive Library



    Rereading the Kripkean Intuition on Reference


    Flanagan, Brian (2014) Rereading the Kripkean Intuition on Reference. Metaphilosophy, 45 (1). pp. 87-95. ISSN 1467-9973

    [img]
    Preview
    Download (122kB) | Preview


    Share your research

    Twitter Facebook LinkedIn GooglePlus Email more...



    Add this article to your Mendeley library


    Abstract

    Saul Kripke's thought experiments on the reference of proper names target the theory that the properties which identify a term's referent are the subject of an implicit agreement. Recently, survey versions of the experiments have been thought to show that intuitions about reference are culturally contingent. Proposing a revisionary interpretation, this article argues, first, that Kripke's Cicero/Feynman experiment reveals that every name user knows enough to be capable of identifying the same individual as the name's most informed users. Second, the article shows that Kripke's presentation of the Gödel/Jonah experiment is ambiguous with respect to the properties attributed to the referent. Disambiguated, the experiment fails to reveal that name users may be mistaken in every unique property they attribute. Since the experiment's ambiguity is replicated in survey presentations, cross-cultural variation in survey response fails to show that intuitions about reference are culturally contingent.

    Item Type: Article
    Keywords: intuition; reference; descriptivism; experimental philosophy; proper names; Appealing;
    Academic Unit: Faculty of Social Sciences > Law
    Item ID: 8918
    Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12066
    Depositing User: Brian Flanagan
    Date Deposited: 18 Oct 2017 14:07
    Journal or Publication Title: Metaphilosophy
    Publisher: Wiley
    Refereed: Yes
    URI:

    Repository Staff Only(login required)

    View Item Item control page

    Downloads

    Downloads per month over past year