Ding, Kemi and Dey, Subhrakanti and Quevedo, Daniel E. and Shi, Ling (2017) Stochastic Game in Remote Estimation Under DoS Attack. IEEE Control Systems Letters, 1 (1). pp. 146-151. ISSN 2475-1456

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Abstract

This letter studies remote state estimation under denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. A sensor transmits its local estimate of an underlying physical process to a remote estimator via a wireless communication channel. A DoS attacker is capable to interfere the channel and degrades the remote estimation accuracy. Considering the tactical jamming strategies played by the attacker, the sensor adjusts its transmission power. This interactive process between the sensor and the attacker is studied in the framework of a zero-sum stochastic game. To derive their optimal power schemes, we first discuss the existence of stationary Nash equilibrium for this game. We then present the monotone structure of the optimal strategies, which helps reduce the computational complexity of the stochastic game algorithm. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the obtained results.

Item Type:	Article
Keywords:	Stochastic game; DoS attack; cyberphysical systems security;
Academic Unit:	Faculty of Science and Engineering > Electronic Engineering Faculty of Science and Engineering > Research Institutes > Hamilton Institute
Item ID:	11515
Identification Number:	https://doi.org/10.1109/LCSYS.2017.2711044
Depositing User:	Subhrakanti Dey
Date Deposited:	25 Oct 2019 14:43
Journal or Publication Title:	IEEE Control Systems Letters
Publisher:	IEEE
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	https://ieeexplore.ieee.org
Use Licence:	This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

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