MURAL - Maynooth University Research Archive Library



    Beat 'em or Join 'em? Export Subsidies versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets


    O'Sullivan, Paul (1999) Beat 'em or Join 'em? Export Subsidies versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 101. pp. 577-596. ISSN 0347-0520

    [img]
    Preview
    Download (714kB) | Preview


    Share your research

    Twitter Facebook LinkedIn GooglePlus Email more...



    Add this article to your Mendeley library


    Abstract

    We compare adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other's R&D. When the government can commit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly effective and spillovers are near-complete. Without commitment, however, subsidisation may yield welfare levels much lower than cooperation and lower even than free trade, though qualifications to the dangers from no commitment are noted.

    Item Type: Article
    Keywords: R&D spillovers; R&D cooperative agreements; RJVs (research joint ventures); strategic trade policy; export subsidies;
    Academic Unit: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
    Item ID: 8626
    Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9442.00174
    Depositing User: Paul O'Sullivan
    Date Deposited: 16 Aug 2017 17:06
    Journal or Publication Title: Scandinavian Journal of Economics
    Publisher: Wiley
    Refereed: Yes
    URI:

    Repository Staff Only(login required)

    View Item Item control page

    Downloads

    Downloads per month over past year