O'Sullivan, Paul
(1999)
Beat 'em or Join 'em? Export Subsidies
versus International Research Joint
Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets.
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 101.
pp. 577-596.
ISSN 0347-0520
Abstract
We compare adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly
game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers,
each firm benefits from the other's R&D. When the government can commit to an export
subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly
effective and spillovers are near-complete. Without commitment, however, subsidisation may
yield welfare levels much lower than cooperation and lower even than free trade, though
qualifications to the dangers from no commitment are noted.
| Item Type: |
Article
|
| Keywords: |
R&D spillovers; R&D cooperative agreements; RJVs (research joint ventures);
strategic trade policy; export subsidies; |
| Academic Unit: |
Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting |
| Item ID: |
8626 |
| Identification Number: |
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9442.00174 |
| Depositing User: |
Paul O'Sullivan
|
| Date Deposited: |
16 Aug 2017 17:06 |
| Journal or Publication Title: |
Scandinavian Journal of Economics |
| Publisher: |
Wiley |
| Refereed: |
Yes |
| URI: |
|
| Use Licence: |
This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available
here |
Repository Staff Only(login required)
 |
Item control page |
Downloads per month over past year
Origin of downloads
Altmetric
Altmetric