Share and Export
Share and Export
O'Sullivan, Paul (1999) Beat 'em or Join 'em? Export Subsidies versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 101. pp. 577-596. ISSN 0347-0520
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Abstract
We compare adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly
game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers,
each firm benefits from the other's R&D. When the government can commit to an export
subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly
effective and spillovers are near-complete. Without commitment, however, subsidisation may
yield welfare levels much lower than cooperation and lower even than free trade, though
qualifications to the dangers from no commitment are noted.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | R&D spillovers; R&D cooperative agreements; RJVs (research joint ventures); strategic trade policy; export subsidies; |
| Academic Unit: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting |
| Item ID: | 8626 |
| Identification Number: | 10.1111/1467-9442.00174 |
| Depositing User: | Paul O'Sullivan |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Aug 2017 17:06 |
| Journal or Publication Title: | Scandinavian Journal of Economics |
| Publisher: | Wiley |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Related URLs: | |
| Use Licence: | This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here |
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