Maguire, Phil and Moser, Philippe and Maguire, Rebecca (2015) A clarification on Turing’s test and its implications for machine intelligence. CEUR Workshop Proceedings, 1419. pp. 318-323. ISSN 1613-0073

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Abstract

Turing’s (1950) article on the Turing test is often interpreted as supporting the behaviouristic view that human intelligence can be represented in terms of input/output functions, and thus emulated by a machine. We show that the properties of functions are not decidable in practice by the behaviour they exhibit, a result, we argue, of which Turing was likely aware. Given that the concept of a function is strictly a Platonic ideal, the question of whether or not the mind is a program is a pointless one, because it has no demonstrable implications. Instead, the interesting question is what intelligence means in practice. We suggest that Turing was introducing the novel idea that intelligence can be reliably evidenced in practice by finite interactions. In other words, although intelligence is not decidable in practice, it is testable in practice. We explore the connections between Turing’s idea of testability and subsequent developments in computational complexity theory.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Cognitive Science, Torino, Italy, September 25-27, 2015.
Keywords:	Turing test; functionalism; mathematical objection; artificial intelligence; Chinese room argument; P versus NP;
Academic Unit:	Faculty of Science and Engineering > Computer Science Faculty of Science and Engineering > Psychology
Item ID:	10620
Identification Number:	urn:nbn:de:0074-1419-2
Depositing User:	Phil Maguire
Date Deposited:	13 Mar 2019 15:55
Journal or Publication Title:	CEUR Workshop Proceedings
Publisher:	CEUR
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	Organisation
Use Licence:	This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

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