Roche, Bryan and Barnes-Holmes, Dermot (2003) Behavior Analysis and Social Constructionism: Some Points of Contact and Departure. Behavior Analyst, 26 (2). pp. 215-231. ISSN 2520-8969

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Abstract

Social constructionists occasionally single out behavior analysis as the field of psychology that most closely resembles the natural sciences in its commitment to empiricism, and accuses it of suffering from many of the limitations to science identified by the postmodernist movement (e.g., K. J. Gergen, 1985a; Soyland, 1994). Indeed, behavior analysis is a natural science in many respects. However, it also shares with social constructionism important epistemological features such as a rejection of mentalism, a functional-analytic approach to language, the use of interpretive methodologies, and a reflexive stance on analysis. The current paper outlines briefly the key tenets of the behavior-analytic and social constructionist perspectives before examining a number of commonalties between these approaches. The paper aims to show that far from being a nemesis to social constructionism, behavior analysis may in fact be its close ally.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	Cite as: Roche, B. & Barnes-Holmes, D. BEHAV ANALYST (2003) 26: 215. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03392077
Keywords:	contextualism; social constructionism; behavioral hermeneutics; behavior analysis; discursive psychology; postmodernism;
Academic Unit:	Faculty of Science and Engineering > Psychology
Item ID:	10663
Identification Number:	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03392077
Depositing User:	Dr. Bryan Roche
Date Deposited:	01 Apr 2019 14:15
Journal or Publication Title:	Behavior Analyst
Publisher:	Springer International Publishing
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	https://link.springer.com/
Use Licence:	This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

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