Byrne, Julie and O'Connor, Thomas
(2017)
How do creditors respond to disclosure quality? Evidence from
corporate dividend payouts.
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 49.
pp. 154-172.
ISSN 1042-4431
Abstract
Using a sample of 17,544 firms from 28 countries we explore how creditors influence dividend
payouts in various disclosure regimes. Poorly-protected creditors do not restrict the
practice by firms in opaque regimes of using large dividend payouts to build reputation
capital, and place few restrictions on dividend payouts in transparent regimes. In intermediate
disclosure regimes creditors place large restrictions on dividend payouts. Dividend
payouts are always largest in transparent regimes. Our findings say that the disclosure
standards versions of the outcome and substitution agency models of dividends are not
mutually-exclusive, and are as effective under weak as they are under strong creditor
rights.
| Item Type: |
Article
|
| Keywords: |
Dividend payout;
Creditor rights;
Disclosure standards;
Agency outcome and substitution model of
dividends; Corporate Finance and Governance; Payout Policy; |
| Academic Unit: |
Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting |
| Item ID: |
11393 |
| Identification Number: |
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2017.04.002 |
| Depositing User: |
Thomas O'Connor
|
| Date Deposited: |
24 Oct 2019 16:09 |
| Journal or Publication Title: |
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money |
| Publisher: |
Elsevier |
| Refereed: |
Yes |
| URI: |
|
| Use Licence: |
This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available
here |
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