Flanagan, Brian
(2018)
What do aggregation results really reveal about group
agency?
Philosophical Studies, 175.
pp. 261-276.
ISSN 0031-8116
Abstract
Discoveries about attitude aggregation have prompted the re-emergence
of non-reductionism, the theory that group agency is irreducible to individual
agency. This paper rejects the revival of non-reductionism and, in so doing, challenges
the preference for a unified account, according to which, agency, in all its
manifestations, is rational. First, I offer a clarifying reconstruction of the new
argument against reductionism (due to Christian List and Philip Pettit). Second, I
show that a hitherto silent premise, namely, that an identified group intention need
not be determined by member attitudes according to a rule, e.g., majority, is false.
Third, I show that, on rejecting this premise, the aggregation results lead instead to
the conclusion that, in contrast to individual agency, group agency is non-rational.
| Item Type: |
Article
|
| Keywords: |
Group agency; Collective intentionality; Judgement aggregation; Social ontology; Reductionism; Discursive dilemma; |
| Academic Unit: |
Faculty of Social Sciences > Law |
| Item ID: |
11650 |
| Identification Number: |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0866-9 |
| Depositing User: |
Brian Flanagan
|
| Date Deposited: |
07 Nov 2019 16:25 |
| Journal or Publication Title: |
Philosophical Studies |
| Publisher: |
Springer Verlag |
| Refereed: |
Yes |
| URI: |
|
| Use Licence: |
This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available
here |
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