Flanagan, Brian (2013) Causal Legal Semantics: A Critical Assessment. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 10. pp. 3-24. ISSN 1740-4681

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Abstract

A provision's legal meaning is thought by many to be a function of its literal meaning. To explain the appearance that lawyers are arguing over a provision's legal meaning and not just over which outcome would be more prudent or morally preferable, some legal literalists claim that a provision's literal meaning may be causally, rather than conventionally, determined. I argue, first, that the proposed explanation is inconsistent with common intuitions about legal meaning; second, that explaining legal disagreement as a function of the causally determined meanings of moral terms requires, but lacks, a causal semantics which is clearly consistent with the scope of moral disagreement. Finally, I suggest that an element of the theory of language invoked by 'causal' legal literalists might be better deployed as part oían intentionalist account of legal practice.

Item Type:	Article
Keywords:	legal disagreement; causal theory of reference; legal intentionalism;
Academic Unit:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Law
Item ID:	11651
Identification Number:	https://doi.org/10.1163/174552412X628832
Depositing User:	Brian Flanagan
Date Deposited:	07 Nov 2019 16:30
Journal or Publication Title:	Journal of Moral Philosophy
Publisher:	Brill Academic Publishers
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	Publisher
Use Licence:	This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

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