Suttle, Oisin
(2016)
Debt, Default, and Two Liberal Theories of Justice.
German Law Journal, 17 (5).
pp. 799-834.
ISSN 2071-8322
Abstract
There is a fundamental disconnect between the public discourse about sovereign and
external debt in comparison to private domestic debt. The latter is predominantly viewed
through a Humean lens, which sees economic morality in terms of contingent social
institutions, justified by the valuable goods they realize; while sovereign and external debt
is viewed through a Lockean lens, which sees property, contract, and debt as possessing an
intrinsic moral quality, independent of social context or consequences. This Article
examines whether this Lockean perspective on sovereign and external debt is compatible
with the dominance of Humean approaches to the domestic economy. It considers and
rejects the most plausible argument for reconciling these views, which emphasizes the
different qualities of cooperation in the international and domestic economies. It further
argues that many standard objections to a Humean approach to sovereign debt suggest,
not the Lockean approach, but rather a Hobbesian international moral skepticism.
Concluding that the Lockean approach is unmotivated, this Article instead advances a
Humean account of sovereign debt and default. It shows how taking seriously the demand
for institutional justification and the idea of persons and peoples as free and equal
provides an account of the duties of states—whether creditors, debtors or third parties—in
sovereign debt crises. It further examines the implications of each approach for democratic
choice about sovereign default.
Item Type: |
Article
|
Keywords: |
Debt; Default; Two Liberal Theories; Justice; |
Academic Unit: |
Faculty of Social Sciences > Law |
Item ID: |
12319 |
Identification Number: |
https://doi.org/10.1017/S2071832200021477 |
Depositing User: |
Oisin Suttle
|
Date Deposited: |
30 Jan 2020 16:47 |
Journal or Publication Title: |
German Law Journal |
Publisher: |
Cambridge University Press |
Refereed: |
Yes |
URI: |
|
Use Licence: |
This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available
here |
Repository Staff Only(login required)
|
Item control page |
Downloads per month over past year
Origin of downloads