Pellicer, Miquel and Wegner, Eva (2013) Electoral Rules and Clientelistic Parties: A Regression Discontinuity Approach. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 8 (4). pp. 339-371. ISSN 1554-0626

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Abstract

This paper studies the causal effect of electoral systems on the performance of clientelistic vs. programmatic parties. We argue that, contrary to majoritarian systems, proportional systems disfavor clientelistic parties as voters can hardly be pivotal for electing their local patron. We test this insight using data from local elections in Morocco from 2003 and 2009. We use a regression discontinuity approach exploiting the fact that the law stipulates a population threshold below which the system is majoritarian and above which it is proportional. Results show a differential causal effect of proportional systems on programmatic and clientelistic parties: Clientelistic parties halve their seats and the programmatic party doubles them when crossing the threshold of proportionality. An important caveat is that the sample size around the threshold being relatively small, some coefficients are estimated relatively imprecisely. Fixed effects estimates exploiting a change in threshold from 2003 to 2009 yield similar results.

Item Type:	Article
Keywords:	Electoral Rules; Clientelistic Parties; Regression; Discontinuity Approach;
Academic Unit:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
Item ID:	12816
Identification Number:	https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00012080
Depositing User:	Miquel Pellicer
Date Deposited:	27 Apr 2020 13:01
Journal or Publication Title:	Quarterly Journal of Political Science
Publisher:	Now Publishers
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	Publisher
Use Licence:	This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

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