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    The Folk Concept of Law: Law Is Intrinsically Moral


    Flanagan, Brian and Hannikainen, Ivar R. (2020) The Folk Concept of Law: Law Is Intrinsically Moral. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 100 (1). pp. 165-179. ISSN 1471-6828

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    Abstract

    Most theorists agree that our social order includes a distinctive legal dimension. A fundamental question is that of whether reference to specific legal phenomena always involves a commitment to a particular moral view. Whereas many philosophers advance the ‘positivist’ claim that any correspondence between morality and the law is just a function of political circumstance, natural law theorists insist that law is intrinsically moral. Each school claims the crucial advantage of consistency with our folk concept. Drawing on the notion of dual character concepts, we develop a set of hypotheses about the intuitive relation between a rule’s moral and legal aspects. We then report a set of studies that conflict unexpectedly with the predictions by legal positivists. Intuitively, an evil rule is not a fully-fledged instance of law.

    Item Type: Article
    Additional Information: Cite as: Brian Flanagan & Ivar R. Hannikainen (2022) The Folk Concept of Law: Law Is Intrinsically Moral, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 100:1, 165-179, DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2020.1833953
    Keywords: experimental philosophy; jurisprudence; dual character concepts; legal positivism; natural law theory;
    Academic Unit: Faculty of Social Sciences > Law
    Item ID: 15654
    Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2020.1833953
    Depositing User: Cliodhna Murphy
    Date Deposited: 09 Mar 2022 15:44
    Journal or Publication Title: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
    Publisher: Australasian Association of Philosophy
    Refereed: Yes
    URI:

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