Crummey, Conor
(2022)
One-system integrity and the legal domain of morality.
Legal Theory, 28 (4).
pp. 269-297.
ISSN 1352-3252
Abstract
According to contemporary nonpositivist theories, legal obligations are a subset of
our genuine moral obligations. Debates within nonpositivism then turn on how we
delimit the legal “domain” of morality. Recently, nonpositivist theories have come
under criticism on two grounds. First, that they are underinclusive, because they cannot explain why paradigmatically “legal” obligations are such. Second, that they are
overinclusive, because they count as “legal” certain moral obligations that are plainly
nonlegal. This paper undertakes both a ground-clearing exercise for and a defense of
nonpositivism. It argues, in particular, that Dworkin’s claims about the legal domain
of morality in his later work are often mischaracterized by critics, because these critics fail to read these claims in light of his earlier theory of “Law as Integrity.” A nonpositivist theory that unifies Dworkin’s earlier and later work, I argue, deals with the
criticisms leveled at nonpositivist theories better than other nonpositivist competitors.
| Item Type: |
Article
|
| Keywords: |
one-system; integrity; legal domain; morality; |
| Academic Unit: |
Faculty of Social Sciences > Law |
| Item ID: |
18039 |
| Identification Number: |
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325222000155 |
| Depositing User: |
Conor Crummey
|
| Date Deposited: |
16 Jan 2024 14:34 |
| Journal or Publication Title: |
Legal Theory |
| Publisher: |
Cambridge University Press |
| Refereed: |
Yes |
| URI: |
|
| Use Licence: |
This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available
here |
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