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    Shame Sanctions and Excessive CEO Pay

    Gopalan, Sandeep (2007) Shame Sanctions and Excessive CEO Pay. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (DJCL), 32 (3).

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    The debate over excessive CEO compensation has roiled scholars, corporations, and the government for a considerable time. This article argues that a singular focus on regulation is mistaken, and contends that an approach based on nonlegal sanctions is the answer. Agencies like the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) can resort to social sanctions with tools currently at their disposal at a relatively low cost to change the behavior of CEOs and corporate directors. Shame sanctions, as they are called, offer a nonlegal route to curbing exorbitant CEO compensation. Increased disclosure of executives' compensation agreements will trigger emotions like shame, guilt and embarrassment. This in turn has the potential to influence financial behavior and cause corporations to be more likely to heed the concerns of the public and shareholders vis-à-vis executive pay

    Item Type: Article
    Keywords: CEO pay; compensation; corporate governance; shame; greed; disclosure; SEC; NYSE; say on pay;
    Academic Unit: Faculty of Social Sciences > Law
    Item ID: 2435
    Depositing User: Prof. Sandeep Gopalan
    Date Deposited: 10 Feb 2011 16:26
    Journal or Publication Title: Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (DJCL)
    Refereed: Yes
      Use Licence: This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

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