Leahy, Dermot and Neary, J. Peter (2007) Multilateral Subsidy Games. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6479. Discussion Paper. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.

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Abstract

This paper examines the rationale for multilateral agreements to limit investment subsidies. The welfare ranking of symmetric multilateral subsidy games is shown to depend on whether or not investment levels are "friendly", raising rival profits in total, and/or strategic complements, raising rival profits at the margin. In both Cournot and Bertrand competition, when spillovers are low and competition is intense (because goods are close substitutes), national welfare- maximizing governments will over-subsidize investment, and banning subsidies would improve welfare. When spillovers are high, national governments under-subsidize from a global welfare perspective, but the subsidy game is welfare superior to non-intervention.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Additional Information:	For helpful comments we are grateful to Arijit Mukherjee and to participants in seminars at Prague and UCD, at the EEA Conference in Lausanne and at the GEP Conference on "New Directions in International Trade Theory" at the University of Nottingham, June 2007. Dermot Leahy acknowledges the support of the Science Foundation Ireland Research Frontiers Programme (Grant MAT 017).
Keywords:	industrial policy; investment subsidies; oligopoly; R&D spillovers; strategic trade policy; subsidy wars;
Academic Unit:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
Item ID:	2757
Depositing User:	Dermot Leahy
Date Deposited:	06 Oct 2011 15:25
Publisher:	Centre for Economic Policy Research
Funders:	Science Foundation Ireland
URI:	http://www.cepr.org
Use Licence:	This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

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