Husserl characterized his famous reduction of the natural standpoint to the transcendentalphenomenological standpoint in Part Two: ‘The Phenomenological Fundamental Consideration of Idea’ (1913) as a genuine return to ‘talk of Being’ (Seinsrede).1 Heidegger certainly did not disagree with this claim, or with this understanding of phenomenology.2 What, then, does Husserl say about Being in the Fundamental Consideration that has a bearing on Heidegger’s philosophical position in phenomenology? This is the issue that I propose to address in this paper. This particular issue is connected to the wider and deeply contentious matter of Heidegger’s philosophical relation to Husserl’s thought and to the development of that thought, and hence some reference to this matter will be necessary. For the purposes of this paper, however, I will focus on Heidegger’s controversial recovery of the ‘Being-question’ (die Seinsfrage) in light of his interpretation and evaluation of Husserl’s transcendental reduction.