O'Connor, Thomas G. (2012) Investability, Corporate Governance and Firm Value. Economics Finance & Accounting Working Paper Series N223-12. Working Paper. National University of Ireland Maynooth. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

In this paper, I show that “investable premia” are greatest for transparent, well-governed firms. I find that single-class share investable firms and better-governed firms reap the largest valuation gains from becoming investable. Dual-class share firms do gain from becoming investable, but their gains are much lower than that of single-class share firms. These findings suggest that the failure on the part of firms to remedy agency conflicts prior to becoming investable only serves to greatly reduce, or even nullify their “investable premia”.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Keywords:	Investability; Corporate Governance; Tobin’s q; Working Paper N223-12;
Academic Unit:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
Item ID:	3801
Identification Number:	N223-12
Depositing User:	Ms Sandra Doherty
Date Deposited:	14 Aug 2012 15:42
Publisher:	National University of Ireland Maynooth
URI:
Use Licence:	This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

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