MURAL - Maynooth University Research Archive Library

    Coordination in Markets with Consumption Externalities: Advertising and Product Quality

    Pastine, Ivan and Pastine, Tuvana (2008) Coordination in Markets with Consumption Externalities: Advertising and Product Quality. Working Paper. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)

    Download (291kB) | Preview

    Share your research

    Twitter Facebook LinkedIn GooglePlus Email more...

    Add this article to your Mendeley library


    This paper studies advertising in markets with positive consumption externalities. In such markets, we show that firms may engage in advertising competition to coordinate consumer expectations on their own brand as long as they produce goods of similar quality. The firm with the lower quality product has a greater incentive to advertise. Hence in equilibrium, the lower quality product will often be more popular. We would like to thank James Albrecht and Curtis Taylor for their comments on a paper we presented at the North American Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society in Washington, D.C.. This paper is a direct result of the issues they raised. We would also like to acknowledge the assistance and advice of Neil Arnwine. All errors are of course our own.

    Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
    Keywords: Coordination; Markets; Consumption Externalities; Advertising; Product Quality; consumer expectations;
    Academic Unit: Faculty of Science and Engineering
    Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
    Item ID: 5041
    Depositing User: Tuvana Pastine
    Date Deposited: 23 Jun 2014 15:51
      Use Licence: This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

      Repository Staff Only(login required)

      View Item Item control page


      Downloads per month over past year

      Origin of downloads