Deery, Paul
(2004)
Descartes and Foundationalism:
A Definitive Explanation for Knowledge
Possession?
Masters thesis, National University of Ireland Maynooth.
Abstract
This thesis attempts to investigate whether Descartes’s epistemoiogy as presented in the
Meditations should be interpreted in the traditional way, as an example of strong
classical foundationalism or whether this traditional account needs to be revised. I will
argue not only that the traditional account of Descartes’s epistemoiogy should be
revised, but that there is a particular interpretation that may provide compelling reasons
to adopt foundationalism.
Foundationalism is presented as a theory of epistemic justification. In other words,
foundationalism attempts to answer the question: how can we justify what we claim to
‘know’? On the foundationalist account, there are basic beliefs whose justification does
not depend on any other beliefs. Then there are beliefs whose justification does seem to
depend on other beliefs, these are the non-basic beliefs. Foundationalist theories
propose that the basic beliefs provide a solid foundation upon which the rest of our
knowledge can be built upon. The attraction of a foundationalist theory is that if it is
true, then it may provide a solution to the infinite regress problem. When we claim to
know something, the sceptic can ask: how do you know? When we provide an answer
to that question, once again the sceptic may ask, and how do you know that? This
process could continue indefinitely, in other words an infinite regress of justification is
set up. The foundationalist view is that at some point we must reach a base of
knowledge which is not in need of further justification.
Item Type: |
Thesis
(Masters)
|
Keywords: |
Descartes; Foundationalism; |
Academic Unit: |
Faculty of Arts,Celtic Studies and Philosophy > Philosophy |
Item ID: |
5196 |
Depositing User: |
IR eTheses
|
Date Deposited: |
17 Jul 2014 13:10 |
URI: |
|
Use Licence: |
This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available
here |
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